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Jonathan H. M. Kempen

"Sharing is over!" A Case Study on Sharing Norms in the Namibian Resettlement Projects of Skoonheid and Drimiopsis

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

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Preface

Jonathan Kempen behandelt in seiner MA Arbeit ein klassisches Thema der Sozialethnologie: wie sind Normen des Teilens, Moralität und Alltagshandeln miteinander verknüpft. In der Ethnologie ist „Teilen“ ein prominentes Thema insbesondere in der Ethnographie egalitärer, vor allem wildbeuterischer Gesellschaften. Ethnographien arbeiten sich dabei meist an zwei Positionen ab: während die einen das Teilen als einen Akt reziproken Austauschs verstehen, als Gabe auf die stets eine Gegengabe folgt, betonen die anderen, dass Teilen vor allem als moralischer Akt verstanden wird und in einem ökonomischen Sinne keine Gegengaben verlangt. Kempen gelingt es sehr gut diese unterschiedlichen Positionen herauszuarbeiten und für seine eigene Arbeit in angemessene Fragestellungen zu überführen. Er stellt dabei heraus, dass „sharing“ sich in der Ethnographie meist auf das Teilen von Nahrungsmitteln bezieht, während reziproker Tausch deutlich eher mit dem Austausch von Nicht-Lebensmitteln verbunden ist.

Seine dreimonatige Feldarbeit führte Kempen auf zwei namibischen Resettlement Farmen in der Omaheke Region durch. Beide Resettlement Farmen werden hauptsächlich von San bewohnt, aber auch Mitglieder anderer ethnischer Gruppen siedeln dort. Auf vorbildliche Art und Weise generiert Kempen Daten aus teilnehmender Beobachtung, offenen Interviews, einer Netzwerkanalyse (egozentrierte Netzwerke), einfachen Verfahren der kognitiven Ethnologie und Extended Case Studies. Kurz stellt er auch seine Versuche mit experimentellen Situationen dar. Es gelingt Kempen sehr gut, aus den empirischen Daten neue Erkenntnisse abzuleiten. Dabei ist seine Ausgangshypothese in dem Ausruf „Sharing is over!“ – Teilen spielt in der heutigen Gemeinschaft der Resettlement Schemes keine Rolle mehr – klar formuliert. Kempen untersucht in seiner Arbeit, auf welchen Ebenen Teilen in einer post-jägerischen Gesellschaft weiterhin von Bedeutung ist; denn schon erste Interviews zeigten ihm, dass über Teilen auch weiterhin sehr viel gesprochen und diskutiert wird – und Teilen zumindest als Norm- und Wertidee weiterhin sehr präsent ist.

Abstract

One very popular field of investigation in hunter-gatherer research is normative sharing as a means to sustain egalitarian structures within hunting and gathering societies. It has been hypothesized that such sharing practices may inhibit economic development in these societies as they are based on immediate-return strategies. In a world that is increasingly based on delayed-return subsistence and long-term planning the sharing norms that are widely associated with the San groups of Southern Africa may be an obstacle to their economic performance. However, it remains to be evaluated to what extent such norms are still a part of their daily life and whether their sedentarization together with other groups has caused a change in their sharing behavior. Looking at two Namibian resettlements with a considerably large number of San, this case study evaluates the role of sharing among former hunter-gathers in relation to neighboring 'Non-San' groups. It finds that there is no substantial difference in the performance and likeliness of sharing between San and 'Non-San' in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis, but it continues to play a strong discursive role in both fractions. This dissonance between the absence of normative sharing practices and the continuity of sharing as a discursive tool reveals the actual dilemma.

- Dedicated to my mother -

Acknowledgements

This thesis was conducted in the context of a research forum at the University of Cologne named “Advancing common-pool resource management in heterogeneous groups”, which aims at establishing fields of joint research between social anthropologists and behavioral economists. Its participants and contributors provided me with academic, logistical and financial support in the course of my studies. Professor Dr. Michael Bollig and Dr. Arne Weiß were the forum’s main supervisors of my field research.

Ute Dieckmann from the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) in Windhoek provided me with academic input and knowledge on the San of Namibia and she established contact to the Desert Research Foundation of Namibia (DRFN). Erik Dirkx from DRFN introduced me to the resettlement projects in Omaheke Region and provided my field research with official support as hosting organization and by introducing it to the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (MLR), known as the Ministry of Land Reform since 2015. Marvin Sisamu from the MLR gave me permission to conduct my research in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis while Gabs Siyaya and Lenin Uaendere, as the ministry’s local representatives, provided me with all the information that they had available.

Special thanks go to Siyaya who opened his doors to me, provided me with food and accommodation and became a close friend during my stay in Skoonheid. I admire his knowledge about the people of Skoonheid and his devotion to their everyday needs, which essentially enhanced the quality and quantity of the gathered data and made my stay even more enjoyable.

The people of Skoonheid welcomed me in their community and made me feel comfortable among them. Together with the people of Drimiopsis they gladly gave me information about their lives and the community. My main translators Maria Tjoei (Skoonheid) and Amanda Araes (Drimiopsis) provided me with more than just their language skills as they also introduced me to their world and the people that play an important role in their lives. Further translation and research assistance was provided by Nikki Gamgawases, Jan Tjoei, Frederik Gariseb, Jacob Karstens (all Skoonheid), David Araeb and Chrisjan Naub (both Drimiopsis). I thank the development committee members of Skoonheid and Drimiopsis and also Chief Frederik Langman for their hospitality.

I thank all those who offered their proofreading skills. I thank my Afrikaans teachers Barbara Scharfbillig and Peppe Polera. Furthermore, I want to thank Muremi John and Christi Mutota from DRFN’s office in Gobabis for their constant support. Sebastian Schneiders gave me valuable lessons in statistics. Further financial support was provided through the

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Finally, and most importantly, I thank my family and close friends for their constant support and loyalty.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

DRFN	Desert Research Foundation of Namibia
GRN	Government of the Republic of Namibia
LAC	Legal Assistance Centre
LISUP	Livelihood Support Program
MLR	Ministry of Lands and Resettlement; Ministry of Land Reform (since 2015)
NAD	Namibian Dollars
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSA	Namibia Statistics Agency
SADF	South African Defense Forces
SWAPO	South-West Africa People's Organisation
SWATF	South-West African Territorial Force
TLA	Tswana Legislative Authority

1. Introduction – An Explanation of the Title

To use a quote which claims that "Sharing is over!" in the title of a study on Namibian Resettlement – consequently dealing with the Omaheke San[1] – may seem risky in an academic environment where the importance of sharing norms to the egalitarianism of hunter-gatherer[2] societies has been stressed on several occasions. When preparing my field research in March of 2014 I stayed in Windhoek to consult with local NGOs and listened to the things that the capital's inhabitants had to say about the San. Among the most memorable statements that a self-declared San-expert had to convey at a local tavern was the sentence: "Sharing is over my friend!" This rather succinct way of summarizing the status of sharing among the San seemed too simplistic to be taken seriously at that time, but it cropped up again during my field research in Skoonheid half a year later. Among the first people that I interviewed was James B. (65 years old) who started laughing when I asked him about sharing in the community and he explained:

> *Sharing is over Mister[3]! The sharing is like that… now when they eat, when they have food at home they eat together. But when they got also in the trouble they give maybe[4] the other one the cow to help the other one like this and that. Now tell me now, the government bring now cows and give every household cattle cattle cattle… now maybe if I'm a San now and I have four sons or five and every son has an own house… and I'm sitting here in my house as the father and the government give me two cattle and every one of my sons two here, two here, two here, two, two… is twelve then and I, the father, take them and look after them… now who's got the most support now? Where is the difference now? And there is other poor people there and they have nothing… is this sharing now or what? Only the big ones profit, this the truth! Is not sharing!*

James B. offers the characterization of a sharing system that has been transformed from a social insurance mechanism in food distribution into a tool of wealth accumulation. This perspective is based on his own dynamic identity, for which he claims San, Herero, and German ancestry and the usage of Khoekhoegowab[5] and English at home. His relation-

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[1] "In general, San individuals identify themselves according to their ethnic group, i.e. Ju|'hoansi, !Xun, Hai||om, Naro, Khwe or !Xoon, rather than as 'San', which is, like 'Bushmen', an external term." (Dieckmann *et al*. 2014: xiii)

[2] "'Hunter-gatherer' is a contested term. At the 'Man the Hunter' conference, it became abundantly clear that gathering supplied proportionately more food in most hunter-gathering societies than did hunting. New appellations, such as gatherer-hunter and forager, emerged." (Solway 2006:75) In this thesis, the terms 'hunter-gatherer' and 'forager' are used interchangeably

[3] Translated from Afrikaans: "Meneer"

[4] Translated from Afrikaans: "miskien"

[5] Commonly referred to as "*Damara-taal*" – "Damara-language"

ship to 'being San' and its stereotypes mirrors the situation of the San in all of Southern Africa. There are numerous studies on the developments that different San groups have gone through in the recent decades and most of them stress their difficulties in developing an identity which fits for all the different San groups. There are mixed or hybrid identities based on language and genetic heritage. Some groups are caught in an essentialist discourse on 'authentic indigeneity' and the struggle for land rights (Sylvain 2002, Widlok 2010) while others try to leave behind the negative stereotypes that history has marked them with and that society continues to impose upon them (Dieckmann *et al.* 2014).

Being simultaneously a member and an outside observer of the society that he describes, it is obvious that James B. has an ambivalent opinion about sharing. On the one hand, he explains that sharing is actively practiced. On the other, he declares its official end. So why then would that short and provoking sentence "Sharing is over!" be a suitable opener for this thesis if it is so ambiguous and seemingly non-telling in this case? Actually, it fits for that same reason: sharing in this context is no longer as clearly defined as it used to be and has been subject to new definitions and identity systems. One could supplement the phrase "as we knew it" to make the quote even more applicable. For cases like the resettled Omaheke San, role and function of sharing need to be reassessed as it is no longer part of an immediate-return subsistence system. This implies that the ways it has been analyzed and defined as leveling-mechanism in the context of Woodburn's "Egalitarian Societies" (1982) or as a response to environmental factors (Layton 2005), are not appropriate anymore and that "sharing" in this sense might actually be "over". It has been adjusted to daily circumstances and now serves as an identity marker for those who do no longer fit the description of the 'authentic bushman'. As Renée Sylvain notes:

> *[T]he Omaheke farm San, despite their conditions of dependency, still exercise considerable autonomy in the creation of their cultural identity – they have a hand in the invention of their own traditions. If we want to find the 'authentic' San, we must look to the world the San made for themselves (2006: 196).*

However, if sharing is to be redefined in the way it is practiced and the way it serves San society today, it must also be assessed to what extent it can still be seen as a social norm. Is a certain sharing behavior demanded by society and are people who do not adhere to that demand being sanctioned? Also it needs to be asked to what extent there are differences within society as a whole. The Resettlement Farms in Namibia's Omaheke Region are not only inhabited by people with San identity. These 'Non-San'[6] groups (mostly Da-

[6] 'Non-San' will be used as an analytical category in this thesis and is just like 'San' or 'Bushmen' an external label. Surely, the people included in this category would never label themselves as

mara) live under the same “conditions of dependency” that Sylvain describes above. The two groups have adopted livelihood strategies from each other and therefore the Non-San definition of sharing needs to be taken into account as well. If the concept of sharing as a social norm, in the way it was known to social and cultural anthropologists as a unique San trademark, is actually “over”, its current role and function among the surrounding groups is of importance as well.

The remainder of this opening chapter offers a short (and surely not complete) introduction to some anthropological perspectives on sharing in hunter gatherer societies, a short introduction of post-independence resettlement history in the Omaheke Region and a presentation of the research question. The second chapter will present more background information on the research setting and introduce the applied methods. The results of these methods will then be presented in the third chapter according to the relevant topics and contrast groups. Finally, the description of two non-representative field experiments in the fourth and final chapter will provide the imagery to summarize the research findings and to conclude this thesis.

1.1 The Role of Sharing in Hunter-Gatherer Societies

> *Successful human foragers often share their take with those who acquire less. This propensity to share has puzzled anthropologists, who have long noted the prevalence of sharing among human groups and its rarity in other animal species. Social anthropologists have proposed a variety of functionalist explanations about why humans share, such as the exchange ethic (Mauss 1967) or generalized reciprocity (Levi-Strauss 1969). (Bird & Bird 1997).*

The anthropological and ethnographic discourse on the meaning and function of sharing in hunter-gatherer studies is as old as hunter-gatherer studies itself. Leaving different tendencies of interpretation of the anthropological disciplines throughout the colonial ages aside, the starting point for a distinct analysis of hunting and gathering societies is usually stated to be the 1966 conference labeled ‘Man the hunter’ in Chicago. For the 1960s, the Rousseauian dichotomy of natural purity versus cultural pollution, which interprets hunting and gathering societies as more natural and therefore more human than others (Barnard 1983: 194), formed the starting point of interpretation. It was then developed into a reversion of the assumption that these societies are permanently starving and having little lei-

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such and that is why it is spelled in single quotes at this point. Hereinafter it will be spelled without single quotes, though, to make the caption appear less erratic.

sure time. Marshall and Lee observed that adult !Kung[7] in Namibia and Botswana spend only two to three hours on subsistence activities per day and further noted that sharing functions as a redistribution of wealth (ibid: 197). This enables members of hunting and gathering societies to follow what Sahlins has defined as the 'Zen road to affluence', a lifestyle of few needs, low accumulation of goods and satisfaction through low amounts of labor time. It is juxtaposed to 'the Galbraithian way,' which is based on the assumption that man's needs are great but the means are limited (Sahlins 2006: 80).

After further interpretations of hunter-gatherer mode of living in the 1970s, which were usually based on Marxist perspectives (Barnard 1983, Lee 1992), James Woodburn finally introduced his theory on "Egalitarian Societies" in 1982, which up to today forms the basis for discussions on the role of sharing in hunter-gatherer societies. Based on his own field research among the Hadza (Tanzania) and the documentation of !Kung life by Marshall and Lee, Woodburn added some refinements to Sahlins' concept of "The Original Affluent Society" and introduced the categories of 'immediate-return' and 'delayed-return' as means to classify hunting and gathering societies:

> *Briefly put, in economies of immediate-return systems 'people usually obtain an immediate yield for their labor, use this yield with minimal delay and place minimal emphasis on property relations' in contrast to delayed-return systems, 'in which people place more emphasis on property rights, rights which are usually but not always linked with delayed return on labor' (Woodburn in Solway 2006: 69).*

Further, he stated that delayed-return may be more variable and may in the end lead to agricultural subsistence systems, but they can never be the basis for egalitarian social systems (Woodburn 1982: 434), as delayed-return relies on task specialization, intergenerational authority and certain kinship ties (Woodburn 2005: 21). An egalitarian immediate-return society must apply certain leveling mechanisms to eliminate distinctions of wealth, power and status while usually gender-based distinctions remain due to division of labor. According to Widlok (2005: 14) the strongest leveling mechanisms are not based on institutional rules, but are part of everyday behavior and discourse. Woodburn's original paper (1982) contained six leveling-mechanisms, but in subsequent discussion (2005) he only mentioned three of them, which are listed below:

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[7] San languages make use of click sounds of which three will be referred to in this thesis due to language and group names. In common orthography they appear as follows:
- ! describes an alveopalatal click as in "!Kung"
- /' describes a dental click with a glottal stop as in "Ju/'hoansi"
- // describes a lateral click as in "Hai//om" (Lee 1979: xxv)

In some orthographies / matches | and // matches ||.

- Mobility and flexibility: Fundamental nomadism of immediate-return hunter-gatherers with small, frequently moving camps in an area that usually provides a year's subsistence includes full access rights for any individual. Monopolies on resources in an area do not exist and it is easy for an individual to separate from conflicts without essential economic punishment. The ability of individuals to attach or detach themselves at will from grouping and relationship inhibits the development of group authorities.
- Access to food and other resources: The association of land to a certain group or person is only a means of identification while no exclusive rights over land and the resources within exist. Knowledge is the only prerequisite to acquire food. The free use of resources limits dependence and domestic authority.
- Sharing: Differences in yields of food production should not be used to build wealth and dependencies to ensure an egalitarian social structure. Woodburn interprets the so-called "waves of sharing" (1982: 441) as a form of taxation.

To Woodburn, ideology (i.e. egalitarianism) is the causative principle for immediate-return systems and the so-called leveling mechanisms such as sharing. He rejects the stance that environmental and evolutionary factors caused them, which has, however, been subject to dispute. For example, Hayden (1994) notes that the character of a resource determines the protection mechanisms being developed by the community. Layton (2005) explains that freedom of movement and unrestricted access to resources is usually a response to the unpredictability of resources such as wild game or rainfall. Also, the defending of a resource is often not economic enough and mutual access often functions as some kind of insurance mechanism. In this case, part of the problem may be that early anthropologists have claimed their own irreplaceability in hunter-gatherer studies and therefore show a certain distrust towards other disciplines: "Only part of the behavior of hunter-gatherers can be accounted for by even the most fine-grained ecological analysis." (Lee in Wiessner 1982: 61).

Further academic disputes on sharing usually include the aspect of reciprocity. In the 1970s, Sahlins and Levi-Strauss amongst others analyzed sharing as generalized reciprocity, which is a favored perspective up to today:

> *Why do people share what they value—even though they cannot count on a return? When ethnographic accounts of sharing enter wider social science discussions, a twofold strategy for solving this apparent paradox emerges. Both strands of this strategy attempt to escape the paradox by incorporating the phenomenon of sharing into the dominant theory of value derived from monetized markets and reciprocal exchanges. Sharing is either redefined as a covert form of market behavior or as ultimately governed by extended forms of reciprocity. (Widlok 2013: 11).*

Most arguments in the debate on reciprocity are closely linked to the phenomenon of meat sharing due to the fact that this is one of the most frequently described sharing processes among immediate-return hunter-gatherers. The so-called hunting-sharing complex is a uniquely human invention (Ichikawa 2005: 156), in which the following observations have been made and frequently discussed. First, hunting success differs and the good hunter never gets back as much as he gives. Second, the entitlement to a share of meat does not depend on the receiver's previous donations. Third, most often sharing is not in the interest of the donor but imposed by the community. This is also called 'demand sharing' and will be relevant in the discussion of sanctions upon norm infringement. The fourth observation is that often the meat belongs to the owner of the arrow, trap, or net and not to the hunter himself. While the owner takes the responsibility of sharing, the hunter's effort may be rewarded through prestige and support in bad times. Often it is more important that an owner exists than who the actual owner is (Ichikawa 2005: 162).

To summarize all debates and arguments on sharing reciprocity would fill a large book as it is also linked to the "Great Kalahari Debate" (Welsch & Endicott 2006: 107) between traditionalists (Solway *et al*. 1990) and revisionists (Wilmsen 1989) and furthermore involves contributions of other scientific disciplines such as economics (Chakraborty 2006). Generally, one can say that food sharing may originally have been based on ecological factors and may still be restrained by them. However, it has developed into a social norm that developed into part and parcel of an egalitarian ideology and may be seen as a reciprocal activity depending on the time frame of observation. Further references to current debates and contributions will be made in the main parts of this thesis.

1.2 Post-Independence Resettlement in Namibia's Omaheke Region

According to the census from 2011 the San are the fifth largest language group in Omaheke Region after the Herero (41.5%), Nama/Damara (28.1%), Afrikaans (10.0%) and Oshiwambo-speaking people (6.7%) (NSA 2011: 42). Furthermore,

> *There are three main San groups: the Ju|'hoansi, living primarily in the northern and central areas; the Naro in the east; and the !Xoon in the south […]. There are also a small number of 'N|oha families living in the southern part of the so-called 'Corridor area' in southern Omaheke. (Dieckmann et al. 2014: 42).*

The colonial history of contact between the San of Southern Africa and European ethnographers is a very long one, which cannot easily be summarized at this point for reasons of space and relevance; different San groups went through very different political and economic developments. Well-written summaries on pre-colonial and colonial 'Bushmen' history have been contributed by Gordon (2000), Gordon & Douglas (2000) and another de-

scription of historical and current issues is provided by Hohmann (2003: 1-35). At this point only the Omaheke San and their post-independence resettlement will be of interest, although very recent history cannot be told without reference to South African Apartheid policies nonetheless:

> *Two very different historical trajectories of colonial rule and identity formation were followed in the case of the Namibia San. For those San living in what is now the Otjozondjupa Region, colonial rule, and later apartheid, took the form of geographical, economic and political segregation and containment on reserves and an ethnic homeland (Bushmanland), where they were able to maintain a foraging lifestyle until fairly recently. But other groups–such as the Omaheke San–experienced colonial rule and apartheid as a process of complete land dispossession and eventual incorporation into the lowest stratum of a racialized and ethnically hierarchical class system. These two historical trajectories were reflected by the colonial distinction between the 'wild' hunting and gathering Bushmen, and the 'tame' farm labouring Bushmen. (Sylvain 2003: 112).*

The fact that the San in Omaheke Region, which has been characterized by Gordon & Douglas as "a vast, flat, seemingly monotonous, stoneless expanse" (2000b: 7), have been labeled 'tame' and 'unauthentic' has made them invisible or at least uninteresting to most research groups and the wide public (Sylvain 2006). The famous Harvard Kalahari Research Group and their Kalahari Peoples Fund mostly focused on the !Kung in the former homeland and in Botswana and thereby supported them in their strive for indigenous land rights (Biesele 2006). Meanwhile, however, the majority of the San population, especially in Omaheke Region, was struggling to gain proper humanitarian and academic attention due to their 'tameness' in the years around Namibian independence. The San in Omaheke Region are mostly Ju/'hoansi[8], who constitute the second largest San group in Namibia with a population of 7,000 behind the Hai//om with a population of 11,000 (Biesele & Hitchcock 2011: 5f).

According to Suzman, the Omaheke used to, and continues to be "divided into commercial and communal farming blocks. The commercial farming block was comprised of hundreds of white owned farms […]. To the north of these farms lay the communal farming areas, former 'native reserves' for the Herero and Mbanderu" (2000: 12). The San, lacking any tenure rights in this area, were forced to make a living in one of the two blocks and "came to constitute an often-scorned underclass of cheap labour" (Suzman 2002: 22). After independence, the San's overall situation in Omaheke Region and in the whole of Namibia did not improve as many farmers began to lay off excess staff due to fear of policy changes. The fact that the Omaheke had a relatively large San population and that its

[8] According to Biesele & Hitchcock (2011) the term "Ju/'hoansi" is used for the language and the people, while "Ju/'hoan" is only used as an adjective.

economy is mainly based on cattle farming left large numbers of San families stranded after losing their workplaces:

> *As a result, the San were foremost on the list of the intended beneficiaries of the resettlement lands purchased under the Agricultural Land Reform Act (1995). This Act empowered the government to purchase commercial farmland to resettle the most marginalized of Namibia's landless rural poor. (ibid: 23).*
>
> *The most recent data suggests that a total of 192 farms amounting to 872 230 ha of freehold land previously owned by white commercial farmers has been transferred to previously disadvantaged Namibians in Omaheke since Independence. […] In all, approximately one quarter of all the freehold land in Omaheke has been transferred to previously disadvantaged Namibians since Independence. (Werner & Odendaal 2010: 55).*

Apart from other more commercial approaches in the land reform and resettlement process, the majority of resettled San in Namibia got a new place to live in so-called group resettlement projects or group holdings. These were supposed to cater to "a formal or non-formal group composed of people who cannot form a co-operative but are interested in engaging in agricultural or other production as a group" (ibid: 23). In other words, landless people were given a piece of land on a farm, bought by the government, where they were to engage in agriculture together with other resettled families. "By 2010, at least 55 group resettlement projects had been set up under the auspices of the MLR, and at least 23 of these have considerable numbers of San beneficiaries" (Dieckmann *et al*. 2014: 448). Out of these 23 projects, six are located in Omaheke Region (i.e. Blouberg, Vergenoeg, Tsjaka/Ben-Hur, Drimiopsis, Skoonheid, Donkerbos-Sonneblom). These six farms differ in the way that GRN and MLR acquired them and also in the different developments that they have gone through since then. The latter three were part of DRFN's Livelihood Support Programs (LISUP I + II) from 2007 until March 2015 in cooperation with the MLR and other NGOs and institutions: "LISUP is an integrated rural development programme aimed at improving living conditions and food security in the resettlement projects by building capacity and developing skills" (Dieckmann *et al*. 2014: 53). Although group resettlement projects were supposed to be self-sufficient after receiving governmental support (i.e. houses, equipment, water, seeds, etc.) for the first five years, it turned out very soon that they would not succeed (Werner & Odendaal 2010: 24). Apart from economic disappointments, overpopulation, and crime, one central problem in the group resettlements in Omaheke Region is inter-cultural communication and cooperation:

> *In group resettlement farms, many San live together with Damara farmers, and sometimes also Herero or Tswana farmers. Most of the time, collaboration between San people and people of these other ethnic groups is hard to find; instead leaders of different factions in the community will try to control access to valuable*

project resources, equipment and income-generating projects. (Dieckmann et al. 2014: 88).

Issues of cooperation within the community are closely related to the issue of sharing and the social norms that it corresponds with. As the title of this thesis and the previous descriptions may reveal, the field research relevant for this case study was conducted on two of the above mentioned farms, Drimiopsis and Skoonheid. Drimiopsis, located 45 km north of Omaheke Region's capital Gobabis, comprises 2,262 ha of land and was taken over by the GRN from the Tswana Legislative Authority (TLA) in 1991 and officially established as a group resettlement project in 1993 (Dirkx & Alweendo 2012: 8; Dieckmann *et al*. 2014: 449). Sixty brick houses were constructed, but soon Drimiopsis became overpopulated and many people were once again resettled, most of them to Skoonheid.



Map 1.2.1 Research area

Skoonheid, located 120 km north of Gobabis, was bought and established as a resettlement project in 1993. Sixty brick houses enabled the influx of people, mostly Ju/'hoansi and Damaras (Dieckmann *et al*. 2014: 44). It comprises 7104 ha of which currently merely 2100 ha are available to the resettled people (DRFN 2009: 13) as the rest has been "occupied by Herero speakers and their livestock, leaving only the central area for the intended settlers." (Suzman 2000: 14). One of the dominant families in Skoonheid are the Langmans of which Frederik Langman was elected as Traditional Authority of the Omaheke Ju/'hoansi in 1996, but it took until 2009 for him to be formally recognized by the GRN (Dieckmann *et al*. 2014: 72).

Both places have received governmental and non-governmental support since their establishment. Education, food security, shelter, water and sanitation have been constant is-

sues to the MLR, DRFN and other NGOs. Further details on demographic development of the research sites, livelihood and subsistence issues will be given in chapters two and three below.

1.3 Research Question

> *Hunter-gatherer societies with immediate-return systems are unique in the degree to which almost all of the social contexts within these societies maximize equality although, of course, members of most of these societies today have much experience of inequality – usually profound inequality – in their dealings with members of other ethnic groups because, as people identified as hunter-gatherers, they are so politically weak and so subject to discrimination. (Woodburn 2005: 22).*

It has been stated by many different scholars (e.g. Biesele & Hitchcock 2011: 62-64) that the San of Southern Africa are facing a leadership dilemma. On the one hand, they need leadership with representative authority to stand up for their rights in land claims, cultural rights and politics. On the other, they are said to be originally egalitarian, not allowing for the establishment of individual leaders and property rights. If they were to allow leadership based on individuals to arise, this would be against their customs and thereby – as some may argue – annul their customary rights to land. Regarding this dilemma, Widlok (2010) has observed that those former hunter-gatherers in Namibia, who had stronger leadership structures and followed some delayed-return subsistence strategies, were more successful in obtaining their rights.

Just like James B. from Skoonheid has observed in the introductory section of this chapter, sharing has advantages and disadvantages. Biesele & Hitchcock have observed that "the sharing ethic of the Ju/'oansi […] made it difficult for an individual to build up his herd", because sharing demands "from relatives forced animals to be slaughtered and eaten prematurely" (2011: 90). It has been argued that the San would not only politically, but also economically be more successful if they were to abandon their egalitarian property values. The accumulation of capital or simply the storage of seeds becomes extremely difficult if strong sharing norms exist within the surrounding society (Woodburn 1982: 447). According to Woodburn, egalitarian values are in contradiction with delayed-return activities (1982: 434) although he later speculated that

> *a predatory and entrepreneurial form of immediate-return system in which the egalitarian ideology and system of social sanctions enforcing sharing are less elaborated and less effective […] could constitute a possible bridgehead for some entrepreneurial families to move into delayed return, particularly in, for African hunter-gatherers, those rare cases in which individuals have succeeded in gaining access to education and to stable, paid employment. (2005: 29).*

Now, one might say that the Omaheke San have already moved beyond predatory immediate return as they have been practicing agriculture and delayed-return strategies, as laborers or as entrepreneurs, for some generations. Therefore, for them sharing norms should not be of relevance anymore in comparison to those who only recently gave up hunting and gathering. The answer from an emic perspective is straightforward:

> *There are those people from the old times, which used to live in the fields/bush, and who tried to help themselves. We, who are now here, we are now a bit too weak/poor. And we try to help each other and what we get is for all of us. It is not only for us, but for all of us. Those who are too weak/poor also get something. (Arnold A., 40 yrs, from Skoonheid)*[9].

Obviously, sharing remains part of everyday discourse among the San. The first research question therefore is: Is sharing in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis simply a discursive tool for identity construction or is it actually a social norm? Furthermore it needs to be asked: Do those who identify themselves as San in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis show stronger or weaker sharing norms than their Non-San neighbors? If this is the case, can sharing norms be one possible explanation for their weak economic performance? In this regard, further factors such as age, wealth, and place of living have been examined to account for differences beyond the identity/language line.

[9] Translated from Afrikaans: “Daar is mense wat nog in die ou tyd... wat in die velde was... hulle kan net self probeer om te help... en ons wat nou hier is, ons is nou eindelik net bietjie swak. En ons probeer nog om ons mekaar te help... wat ons kry, dis vir ons almal. Dis nie net vir ons, is vir ons almal. Hulle ook kan kry wat swak is.”

2. The Research Setting and the Applied Methods

The field data was gathered between September 17th and December 9th 2014. During that time I was accommodated at Skoonheid's central farm house, which serves as a point of gathering and administration, while also offering accommodation to MLR's representatives and guests. James Suzman spent eighteen months (1994-96) in Omaheke Region and also lived on Skoonheid's neighboring farm 'Rosenhof'. During that time he befriended people whom I was to meet twenty years later and he experienced aspects of Ju/'hoan society which had not changed much upon my arrival. Knowing about his previous research, I decided to postpone the lecture of his case study until the end of my research in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis as I did not want my perception to be influenced by his descriptions. Another place of accommodation was available to me in Gobabis, which was helpful when conducting day-long research in Drimiopsis due to shorter driving distance and better availability of petrol.

The most recent baseline survey was conducted in 2011. At that point Skoonheid consisted of "266 inhabitants, who permanently stay in Skoonheid, […] counted amongst 58 surveyed households" and Drimiopsis was home to "829 persons divided over 128 households" (Dirkx & Alweendo 2012: 8-9). These numbers are very likely to be higher for Skoonheid and Drimiopsis at the moment according to the sources that I was able to access during field work (see 2.2).

Before my arrival in Skoonheid, I spent twelve days in Windhoek working on my language skills in Afrikaans and consulting with representatives of DRFN and LAC about research procedures. It must be noted, however, that in spite of previous learning efforts in Germany and Windhoek, my Afrikaans was far from perfect upon arrival. It took several weeks and some help from kind translators until I could fully participate in conversations. However, Afrikaans and English are mostly used as lingua franca in the resettlements and are rarely spoken at home or used in conversations between individuals who share another language. According to the survey by Dirkx & Alweendo, 66 percent of Skoonheid's population speak a San language, Ju/'hoansi being the most dominant one. Khoekhoegowab is spoken by 24 percent in Skoonheid. In Drimiopsis, these two language groups are almost equally represented in number while making up 91 percent of the local population. As the research question made it necessary to assign 'San' and 'Non-San' labels to informants and their households, the language spoken at home by the research informants had to serve as the major indicator for that purpose. A distinction based on racial or other ethnic characteristics would have been inappropriate. However, when people were not able to speak Ju/hoansi or another San language they could still claim San identity. In this case I relied on information by other farm inhabitants whether this person or household was to

be regarded as San, Damara or any other. Further languages spoken in the area are Setswana, Otjiherero, Oshiwambo and Kavango. Due to my lack of skills with regard to Namibian languages other than Afrikaans and English, certain aspects of interaction and argument in daily life could not be grasped and/or fully understood. However, I claim that I was able to observe and document essential parts of resettlement life through translation, observation and written-down information.

The following paragraphs summarize the methods that were applied in the field while their results will be presented and discussed in chapter three. I assigned so-called 'informant codes' to my informants, which were used in the digital data gathering process in order to ensure their anonymity when presenting the digital data to co-workers and representatives of institutions. The list of corresponding names was kept separate and secret. The codes were assigned according to the research stage at which the informants first participated (example in chart 2.5.1).

2.1 Participant Observation

Many different definitions of this method have been offered in the past decades and it remains a sometimes confusing factor to students of popular ethnographic methods. Maybe this is due to the fact that every researcher finds his or her own way of practicing it and ends up with valuable data in most cases. I decided to stick to the following definition and adjust it according to my needs and possibilities:

> *Participant observation involves immersing yourself in a culture and learning to remove yourself every day from that immersion so you can intellectualize what you've seen and heard, put it into perspective, and write about it convincingly. When it's done right, participant observation turns fieldworkers into instruments of data collection and data analysis. (Bernard 2006: 344).*

The most important prerequisite for successful participant observation was in this case surely fulfilled by the possibility to stay in Skoonheid and partake in its inhabitants' daily life. Committee meetings, pension payout, political rallies, football tournaments, workshops and elections were the official events that I was able to attend and observe. However, everyday events such as garden and construction work, disputes, injuries, administration requests or simply the acquisition and preparation of food were even more important to my topic. As the rare availability of cheap transport is one of the major issues to Skoonheid's people, I was usually among the first to be approached when people needed a ride being one of the few people with a working car. While driving I was able to get acquainted with key figures of the community and to learn from them. Although Skoonheid was my main place of stay, I made sure to be in Drimiopsis for the important events and also took time to hang out during the day while gathering data through other methods. I

carried pen and paper, camera and a Phillips Voice Tracer (DVT2000) with me at all times to be able to record interesting observations immediately.

2.2 Wealth Ranking

At the beginning of my stay in Skoonheid I conducted a wealth ranking process as proposed by Grandin (1994: 21-35) using a list of 74 households provided by the representative of MLR for Skoonheid and the help of six informants, who had been approached via convenience sampling. The aim of this task was a better understanding for the situation of individual households, and the results were also used as a tool for balanced sampling at later research stages.



Graph 2.2.1 Wealth ranking results of Skoonheid with DRFN labels (n=74)

Five separate interviews were conducted; one interview was conducted with two informants at the same time. They were given the following task: to sort cards with the names of Skoonheid's household heads according to their own knowledge and perception of the given persons' wealth. The informants were free to sort the households in as many groups as they found appropriate. They were asked to explain their choices and to name wealth indicators. Apart from some common factors such as government jobs, the owning of a plot house, car or cattle, most informants stressed that they sorted the households according to intuition, explaining that there would be no large differences between their degrees of poverty anyways. In two interviews the informants found a categorization into four groups appropriate, while two other informants sorted the households into six groups. One informant created eight groups. The individual groupings of the households were then recorded, converted into comparable scores and finally sorted according to natural breaks.

The wealth ranking results are already presented at this point and not in chapter three as they are essential for the description of the sampling strategy in the following methods. The result was a list of households, in which four natural breaks were to be observed in the scores, providing a spectrum of five different groups (see graph 2.2.1).

Interestingly this corresponded with the wealth ranking that had been conducted by DRFN three years before (DRFN 2011: 21). Their ranking followed a similar task with six community members of Skoonheid, who were asked in a group discussion to sort a list of 58 households into five groups which were entitled: 'Suffering' (for the poorest households), 'A bit better', 'Better', 'Moving forward', and 'Stable/grounded' (for the best situated households). The essential differences between DRFN's ranking and the one conducted for this paper were the separation of informants and the possibility to freely adjust the number of groups according to the informant's perspective. The group titles of this previous ranking task by DRFN were adopted for better illustration. However, for systematic sampling at later research stages the two top groups were combined due to the very small number of households that they contained.

The task was repeated in Drimiopsis using a list that is originally used for water revenue collection provided by DRFN. No official list of village households by the MLR was available. As the number of households in Drimiopsis is too large to conduct an effective and informative wealth ranking for all of them (128 households according to Dirkx and Alweendo (2011: 8); 218 households according to the water revenue list), it was only conducted in the neighborhoods of Kanyemba and Klein-Kanyemba with an overall 83 households (hereinafter: 'the Kanyembas' whenever the sample population is referred to). For the following research tasks, informants were selected from this list of households with only one exception. In the Kanyembas, the sorting tasks with the five informants resulted in four major groups (see graph 2.2.2). Therefore two DRFN labels had to be combined to form one: 'A bit better' and 'Better' became '(A bit) better'. However, to avoid further complications the groups will from hereon be numbered from one to four with wealth group one (WG1) representing the poorest 'suffering' group and wealth group four (WG4) being the wealthiest.



Graph 2.2.2 Wealth ranking results of the Kanyembas with adjusted DRFN labels (n=83)

2.3 Open/Semi-structured interviews

Individual viewpoints and stories are an essential part of ethnography. For gaining a first insight, getting more detailed explanations and generating concise and valuable quotes – like the one given in the thesis title – open interviewing is an appropriate tool. In this case, open interviewing or a semi-structured interview entails a recorded conversation without fixed questions and no set time frame (Bernard 2006). A list of topics served as an orientation to make sure that the informants were able to produce statements on the most salient research issues. The recording devices included the voice tracer (as previously described), my mobile phone, and a simple notepad.

The interviews were conducted in Ju/'hoansi, Khoekhoegowab, Afrikaans and English. I was able to understand and conduct most interviews in the latter two languages, but it was inevitable to rely on the skills of my translators whatsoever. English and Afrikaans statements are here presented in their original wording and grammar. Afrikaans statements and phrases have been translated by myself into English while the original is presented in footnotes. Whenever a statement shows grammatical errors this is due to the fact that all statements in English and Afrikaans and the translations from Ju/'hoansi and Khoekhoegowab have been presented in the way they were uttered by the informants and translators during the interview.

In Skoonheid, seven interviews were conducted with twelve informants including one group interview with six informants. In Drimiopsis eight informants were interviewed separately. They were interviewed in their homes or at the central points of administration and gathering (i.e. Skoonheid's farm house and the office building in Drimiopsis). The first interviews were conducted according to the results of the previous wealth ranking and the language spoken in the household. At other times, people demanded to be interviewed or were asked to repeat more elaborately what they had uttered at earlier informal occasions for recording purposes.

Overall, Skoonheid interviews lasted much longer and were much more informative than the ones conducted in Drimiopsis, where some people did not even manage to say 'yes' or 'no' for the whole visit. While the conversations themselves offered a chance to gain insight into people's lives and their stories, the transcriptions and quotes will be an illustrative tool for the rest of this thesis. The ethnographer's privilege and burden in dealing with interview data is the selection of valuable quotes and to keep less significant data for archival purposes only.

All informants were ensured anonymity and therefore all names have been changed into more general ones that are less revealing. This is also the case for the previously used statements. However, in some instances reference has to be made to an informant's offi-

cial role (e.g. chief or chairperson) or to their background, which may lead to an identification based on knowledge about the local hierarchies and biographies.

2.4 Free-listing

Most anthropological literature on sharing focuses on food distribution and the relations of property associated with food production. To find out what goods are associated to the cultural domain of sharing by the inhabitants of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas a free-listing task (De Munck 2009: 47-66) was conducted with twelve informants in each location. The 24 informants were asked to list some common goods that are being shared in the community. Additionally three sub-categories were offered for the case that informants were not able to produce more than five items: food stuffs (e.g. maize), other consumption goods (e.g. tobacco) and valuable assets (e.g. money or tools). The results were then used in the creation of a questionnaire for the following network analysis.

2.5 Ego-centered Network Analysis

To conduct a complete network analysis on sharing behavior for the whole sample population in the given time frame was not possible. However, it was important to gather at least some ego-centered data to get an impression on the character of local sharing networks. The questionnaire was designed as a name generator (Lang & Schnegg 2002: 19) in which informants were asked to name persons whom they had shared certain goods with in a certain amount of time. In the questionnaire's phrasing (21 questions) certain parameters had to be included:

- The character of the shared goods: the questionnaire included the most popular goods from the previous free-listing task and additionally questions on the sharing of cooked food within and outside the household. Furthermore, it was based on theoretical considerations by Bird-David (2005), who has differentiated between sharing as a distribution of goods (e.g. food) and sharing as a common usage of an indivisible good (e.g. garden tools or livestock).
- The role of short-term reciprocity: the questionnaire distinguished between the giving and the receiving of the shared goods. Furthermore, it referred to sharing occurrences "within the last two days" for regularly shared goods (e.g. maize, phone credit) or "recently" for goods of seasonal character (e.g. tools, garden harvest).
- The role of in-group versus out-group sharing: the informants were asked about their relationship to the persons that they named. As a distinction based on language or ethnicity was not appropriate in this case, the dichotomy of family versus neighbor was introduced. Both San and Damara have complex kinship systems,

but in this case only a differentiation based on English family terms was conducted.

The following factors played a role in the sampling process:

- Two places of living (Skoonheid and the Kanyembas)
- Two time frames (two days before and after pension pay-out day)
- Four contrast groups (San versus Non-San; Pension versus No pension)
- Four wealth groups (The top two groups in Skoonheid combined)

These sampling factors add up to 32 questionnaire participants as presented in the chart below (2.5.1). In three cases, however, no household with the needed characteristics was available, so that the most similar available household from a neighboring wealth group was selected. The questionnaire was available in English and Afrikaans and the programs that were applied during the analysis were Stata/IC 12.0, MS Excel 2003 and Excel 2013.

	Skoonheid				The Kanyembas			
	Before pension payout		After pension payout		Before pension payout		After pension payout	
Wealth group	San	Non-San	Pension	No Pension	San	Non-San	Pension	No Pension
WG1	2C	5C	5F	3H	D8	E1	D3	C7
WG2	5A	5D	5H	5G	C6, E3	A1	B1, E2	B4
WG3	4G	**N/A**	2B	5I	**N/A**	D1	**N/A**	E4
WG4	5E	4A, 5B	3G	4C	E5	D9	E7	E6

Chart 2.5.1 Distribution of households in the network sample

2.6 Statement-Agreement Survey

As a result of previous observations, a questionnaire was developed, which offered 37 statements to overall 80 informants (40 per resettlement farm) and asked them to indicate to what extent they agree with them. For this purpose a Likert scale was applied with five different options to choose from, which did not present noteworthy difficulties to the translators and the informants:

- 1: Fully disagree / *Stem glad nie saam nie* = 0% agreement
- 2: Disagree / *Stem nie saam nie* = 25% agreement
- 3: Undecided / *Nutraal* = 50% agreement
- 4: Agree / *Stem saam* = 75% agreement
- 5: Fully agree / *Stem heeltemal saam* = 100% agreement

The statement items were grouped into three sections:

Personal property vs. common good: most researchers in hunter-gatherer studies see a strong link between a different definition of property and more extensive sharing practices,

which can be linked with differing definitions of theft. In this context items involving the taking without permission of goods with different physical closeness (e.g. stocked food vs. garden vegetables) and different value (e.g. milk vs. meat) were presented to the informants. The list of goods was partly based on the free-listing results and the earlier conducted network analysis. This was combined with the family versus neighbor dichotomy which had previously been applied in the analysis of the network questionnaires and proved suitable. This formed the following statement frame for the first ten items: "If F/N[10] takes my X without permission, that person is a thief."

Sharing obligation and reciprocity: this section was also based on the family versus neighbor dichotomy. The first eight items (11-18) asked the informants to indicate to what extent they felt obliged to share a certain good when being asked by a family member or neighbor ("When F/N asks me for X, I feel obliged to share with him/her."). The other eight items (19-26) then asked to what extent the informants expected to get something in return for helping that person ("If I share X with F/N, I expect that person to help me in the future."). The phrasing of these items proved to be a problem during the interview process. Some informants interpreted "expect" as normative while others saw it more from an empirical perspective. This aspect will be discussed more elaborately in chapter three.

Economic self-perception: items 27-30 asked the informants about direct economic behavior (long-term planning and work effort) with an indirect relation to sharing while items 31-37 offered different explanations for personal economic failure ("I struggle in life, because…"). This last part of the questionnaire was less informative about sharing itself, but more a snapshot of general perceptions of the world and will not be discussed in this thesis.

[10] F = a family member; N = a neighbor.

3. Results and Discussion

At this point a working definition of the term 'norm' or 'social norm' is inevitable. Although it may not be explicitly applied in all subsequent sections it forms the basis of analysis in all of them. Gerd Spittler's work on "Norm und Sanktion" from 1967 may be somewhat outdated due to other more recent publications on the topic of social norms, but it constitutes a good introduction to a timeless issue in the definition process whatsoever: the term 'norm' has been subject to many different definitions with varying foci depending on the context it is used in. Spittler describes three different viewpoints of definition (1967: 9-15):

"*Norm als Verhaltensgleichförmigkeit*"[11]: In this case norms are seen as shared frames of reference within a certain cultural group. They depend on observed regularities in the opinion of the majority. They may also be defined as 'customs' as long as deviant opinions are not frowned upon by other group members. As soon as controlling mechanisms such as sanctions are applied the majority opinion is defined as 'norm'.

"*Norm als Verhaltensforderung*"[12]: A norm-sender demands that the norm-receiver behave in a certain way. In this case, the regularity or uniformity of behavior as defined above is only a result of the demand. It is important that sender and receiver are known for the norm to be of a certain value. As soon as sender and receiver are known the validity of the demand may be reassessed.

"*Norm als Verhaltensberwertung*"[13]: Before a demand can be made, members of a group must evaluate a certain behavior and find it to be acceptable or appropriate. Norms are associated with a corresponding value. It is important to note that a certain way of behavior may be regarded as valuable, but may not be consistent with the two previous definition viewpoints (e.g. civil disobedience against an oppressive state).

In his study, Spittler decides to assign the term 'norm' to the second definition. Uniformity of behavior he defines as 'custom' and the evaluation of behavior as "*Bewertungsstandard*"[14] as long as it is shared by large group. This definition viewpoint has also been applied in the analysis for this thesis for three reasons. First, the sharing of food and money is not unique to hunter-gatherers and can be observed with certain regularity in every culture (e.g. donations at Christmas time). Therefore, it would be difficult to justify research on sharing norms among the San if they were defined as observed regularities, observable in any other society. Second, although Wiessner claims that Ju/'hoansi sharing is not

[11] Norm as uniformity of behavior
[12] Norm as demanding of behavior
[13] Norm as evaluation of behavior
[14] Standard of evaluation

based on demand (2005: 123) I choose to agree with Widlok, who claims that "in a certain sense there is no sharing without a demand" (2013: 21). Therefore norm-sender and norm-receiver are inevitable components of sharing norms. Thirdly, as pointed out in the introductory chapter, sharing and especially demand sharing may occur without the norm-sender's awareness of it as a leveling-mechanism of an egalitarian ideology. Furthermore, sharing obligation may constitute impairment to long-term planning in agriculture. This leads to the conclusion that an evaluation process may not necessarily take place.

According to Spittler, the main prerequisite for a demand to be defined as a norm are sanctioning mechanisms (1967: 19). It is, however, important to keep the difference in mind between a simple disadvantage of not complying with a custom and the proactive sanction by community members upon norm infringement: "*Sanktionen sind Reaktionen auf Abweichungen von Verhaltensregelmäßigkeiten, durch die demonstriert wird, daß das abweichende Verhalten nicht hingenommen wird*." (ibid: 23). This definition leads back to the argument on reciprocity in hunter-gatherer societies. If the motivation to share was simply based on reciprocity, sharing would have to be defined as a custom. In a custom, the share-giver weighs the concrete economic advantages and disadvantages of adhering to the custom of sharing and therefore will be unlikely to share with a person that is unable to reciprocate sooner or later. This is especially the case if every sharing demand is judged separately according to its usefulness. For the case of sharing norms, however, the reciprocity factor is weakened as the share-giver has to fear sanctions by the share-demanders in a case of non-compliance with these norms. These can also be intensified if the norm is breached repeatedly: "*Der Unterschied zwischen Norm und Brauch besteht also darin, daß im ersten Fall eine Verletzung nicht hingenommen wird, sondern, daß man mit weiteren, wahrscheinlich schärferen Mitteln versucht, die Norm durchzusetzen, während das beim Brauch nicht der Fall ist*" (ibid.).

Now the question may arise: Why it is so important to explicitly distinguish between sharing norms and sharing customs? On the one hand, it is linked to the academic discussion on hunter-gatherer reciprocity as explained above. On the other, normative behavior plays an important role in contexts of social cooperation such as the presented field setting. This becomes very clear in the norm definition that Lesorogol has offered:

> *Norms are shared beliefs about appropriate behavior held in a particular group or community. […] In other words, repeated patterns of behavior create expectations about future behavior and ensure a degree of predictability in social relations. […] When norms are unclear or when there is widespread violation of normative behavior, others' actions become less predictable and cooperation more difficult to establish or maintain. […] Norms are enforced by sanctions of violations as well as rewards for behavior consistent with norms. In this way they play an important part in regulating individual behavior. (2007: 921).*

In this chapter, different aspects of sharing are discussed. First, it is important to define what people in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas associate with the act of sharing and how this is related to their identity. Secondly, to what extent the image of sharing corresponds with actual behavior needs to be assessed. This is followed by three sections that discuss mechanisms, which are part of the sharing process (demand, avoidance, sanction). The final two sections of this chapter discuss the economic consequences that sharing norms may have and the role that inter-ethnic communication plays in this context. All these issues were not only examined under the sometimes problematic San versus Non-San dichotomy. Differences according to age, place of living, and wealth were also taken into account with regard to the gathered qualitative and quantitative data.

3.1 The Emic Discourse: What is Sharing and Where Does It Come From?

From an academic perspective the starting point for the analysis of the sharing discourse among the San is often based on the reports of John and Lorna Marshall, who:

> *"reported that a kill of 15-18 large mammals per year was usual for a single Ju/'hoan band. Averaging 25 people per band […]. When an animal was killed, its owner had the right to distribute the meat. Without fail, meat was shared with virtually all members of the local group, along rather definite lines of sharing. Even those who might never have primary access to meat with which to reciprocate at a later date […] were given their shares. Certainly, the distribution of meat was a point of high tension in Ju/'hoan and all San societies: if anyone were to be left out, a great deal of bad feeling would result." (Biesele & Hitchcock 2011: 51).*

At this point, however, solely the emic discourse will be presented. Apart from academic considerations, which will remain of importance in the following sections, this part is concerned with the cultural domain that the people of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas have constructed around sharing: "cultural domain analysis – the study of the content and structure of shared beliefs about areas of culture" (Bernard *et al*. 2009: 189). At this point sharing is solely analyzed as a discursive construct: "Cultural domains are part of emic culture, so the study of those domains is necessarily about what people think they do – or what they think others do or might do – not what they do" (ibid.). To find out how sharing is constructed in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas data from three field methods is relevant. Interview statements are presented and then enriched by the results of free-listing and the statement-agreement survey.

Whenever Wilma J., an elderly Damara lady, talks about the times before Drimiopsis her face starts to light up. In the "good old days" she lived together with her mother and grandfather on a farm close to Gobabis working as a housemaid. She describes how her family never suffered from hunger and how they did not have to worry about the next day. How-

ever, the farm owner passed away and his children sold the farm to an investor from Botswana, who had no need for Wilma and her family. That is how she ended up in Drimiopsis. When asked in what year she had to leave the farm she looks down and scratches her head. She does not remember if it was 1998 or 2008 and explains that she never went to school and that she is too old to remember years. Today, she owns one of those many small allotments in Drimiopsis with a house made from corrugated iron. Some of her children and other relatives live in the same neighborhood while others stay at a neighboring farm or in Gobabis. Her husband passed away some years ago and so did two of her seven children. When she talks about her grandchildren she is proud of the fact that she is not able to count them all. She earns a living by preparing snacks (*padkos*) for school children and doing house work for her neighbors.

When people in Drimiopsis or Skoonheid are asked to tell a bit about their life before the resettlement farm, they start with the phrase: "We came from the farm". Wilma's life story is but one of many similar ones and most of them are reduced by the story tellers themselves to one central message: We used to have a good life before we came here. This is the case for many aspects of life on the resettlement farms and although Wilma insists that she is a pure Damara and that her family never had anything to do with hunting and gathering, her romanticizing view of the past also resembles those who claim San heritage:

> *There is more people here now, more people. They come from different areas. […] Life has been changed, because once they came here they wants to be like somebody who is now the chief, the chairpersons like that… and we the ones that came first they become low. It's making life harder with them. (Magda T., 18 yrs, from Skoonheid).*
>
> *We are having ways to help each other, but at the same time we all are not having that much power. And those days we were having knowledges that built up the boers [lit. "farmers", label for white Afrikaans-speaking settlers] and the boers they get rich and we just get poor and poor and poor. Nowadays there are no ways how to survive or do something. So everything we do must be under the law. We must not break the law, so it will be consequences to suffer. [...] The society have almost changed, but some did not change. Like in pos drie ["post three", a settlement 35 km to the west] the society have not change. Like those guys are still using alcohol and the self-mixtures. (Karl L., 52 yrs, from Skoonheid; through translator from Ju/'hoansi).*
>
> *Therefore, whenever I have something and somebody asks me [to share], I become stingy. Then I eat alone with my children and of course I give to my mother. So now when you do not have anything, for example sugar, and you ask somebody, all of them do not have sugar. But they do have it in the house and simply tell you they do not have. It does not work like in the old times. The current years*

have changed, lots of change. The people do not give to each other; they eat at home.[15] *(Anja G., 24 yrs, Skoonheid).*

Although the given quotes concern different topics such as political authority, cultural knowledge, and solidarity, they all contain a certain degree of nostalgia. When it comes to sharing, however, some claim that it is not only a matter of years past, but also a current practice:

We are here in Drimiopsis and the people from the farms come to us to ask for maize meal. Then we give it to the farm people. And the people in Gobabis are also suffering; our families are there and we give them, too. When we get the maize meal from the government, they demand: 'Give us, give us!' We are just giving! We give them food and a good place to sleep. They sleep here and move on. Also country people. We are helping one another. (Carla N., 45 yrs, from Drimiopsis).[16]

We, who are getting a pension, we buy our food and some small things that we need. That is all… for one family. Like here in my house, me and my wife get a pension and there is only us and the kids. […] The two of us, we help them [people who suffer from hunger]. If somebody asks for food, we help him. That is something that works. I think if somebody asks for some money or food, you can help. (Francis P., 65 yrs, from Skoonheid).[17]

Interestingly, Carla has a mixed background and speaks both Khoekhoegowab and Ju/'hoansi at home, while Francis is definitely a Damara. This shows that the discourse on sharing and solidarity is not restricted to San identity, but is also part of everyday thinking among Non-San. Very different information was gathered in the interviewing process and no clear-cut tendency could be identified along identity lines. Below, the first statement belongs to a Damara lady while the other three have been provided by Ju/'hoansi speakers:

I have family, but they do not worry about me. Only my daughter helps me, but only for the pension. When I ask for food, nobody can help, because they have no

[15] Translated from Afrikaans: "Daarom, as ek iets het en hulle vra dan suinig ek vir hulle. Dan eet ek dit alleen met my kinders of ek ou my ma, is klaar. As jy miskien nou nie iets het nie, soos byvorbeeld as jy nie suiker het nie: jy vra by iemand, en almal hulle het nou nie suiker nie. Maar hulle het dit in die huis maar hulle sê vir jou sy het nie. Dit werk nie soos die ou tyd nie. So nou se jare is verander; daar is groot verander. Die mense ou nie mekaar nie; hulle eet net by hulle se huis."

[16] Translated from Afrikaans: "Ons is nou in Drimiopsis. Die plaas se mense kom vra hierso by ons mielie-meel. Dan ou ons vir die plaas se mense. En die mense in Gobabis is baie swak. Daar is ons se families. Ons ou hulle hierso. As ons die mielie-meel van die government kry dan vra hulle: 'Ou ons, ou ons!' Ons gee net! Ons gee kos, ons gee slaapplekke mos. Hulle slap by ons en gaan verby. Ook buitemense! Ons help mekaar."

[17] Translated from Afrikaans: "Ons wat pension-mense is ons koop ons se kos en nog goedertjies wat ons nodig is, dis al... vir een family. Soos my huis is hier so, ek is pensionaar en my vrou is ook pensionaar en dit is net ons twee en ons die kinders. [...] Ons twee se kant, ons help hom! As sy honger kom vra, ons help hom. Dis iets wat werk. Ek dink as mens iets kom vra geld of kos, jy kan help."

food. I ask, but nobody give me. […] The neighbors have nothing, my daughter has nothing, I have nothing. How can we help the others when there is nothing? […] The time I come to Drimiopsis, the people share, but now it is different. The people are mean and cannot see. […] All things is now money, the people that make the garden are just selling. No trade, all cash. […] Language does not matter, everybody is alone. (Maria A., 70 yrs, from Drimiopsis, through translator from Khoekhoegowab)

Relatives and neighbors help each other. They help me as well, for example when I want to visit someone, they always help me with the donkey-cart to go and visit. But it is only the families on their own; they do not work well together. The food from the garden we only share within the family. (Anton G., 60 yrs, Drimiopsis)[18]

People here do not help me. Only at the farms I get help. They give me milk, meat, porridge and money. But not in Drimiopsis. I give, but others will not give. Neighbors and family are coming and I help, but they do not. This is part of the life. […] When the Bushmen stay in a group they give for the others, but when you stay far you cannot get and give. (Martha S., 30 yrs, from Drimiopsis; through translator from Ju/'hoansi)

Usually you cook only for your wife and the children that stay in the house. Whenever somebody comes to visit he should not wait for food. You should give to him. Then you may get less as you gave to the visiting people. But with the food you have to ask him. If you say: 'I have some food', you must give him. With tea and coffee you ask and people say: 'Yes, I will have some coffee.' Then you get it for him. […] When you see hungry people then you say to them: 'Do you have food?', 'No, I do not.', 'I have some maize meal at home.' Then you should send him some maize meal. That is the little bit that you can do for him. My wife and I have things like maize meal and sugar and tea and we give them to the people. If somebody has nothing, that person has nothing. If somebody has something, he helps. (Faustus L., 66 yrs, from Skoonheid)[19]

Out of the many points that can be discussed regarding the given statements, two have to be noted explicitly. First, it becomes apparent that sharing is part of a discourse which encompasses perceptions of both the past and the present. Secondly, this discourse constructs sharing always in an economic context, dominated by the issue of poverty, and independently from its characterization in past or present terms. Sharing is mostly mentioned in a context of having in the past and not-having at present as shown by the exam-

[18] Translated from Afrikaans: "Die familie en die buurmense hulle help mekaar. Hulle help vir my ook as ek miskien will gaan kuier en ek het altyd donkeykar gevra dan kom hulle vir my gaan kuier. […] Maar dis net familie, familie, familie; hulle werk nie baie saam nie. […] Ons deel die tuin kos net met die familie."

[19] Translated from Afrikaans: "As jy kook jy kook net vir jou vrou en jou kinders wat daar in die huisie is. As iemand kom kuier hy sal nie wag vir kos nie. Jy sal vir hom ou. Jy mag minder kry wat daai kuier mense gekry. Maar by die kos ook moet jy hom vra. As jy sê 'Ek het enige kos', dan gee jy vir hom. By tee en koffie jy vra, mense sê 'Ja ek drink een koffie', dan haal jy vir hom. [...] Waar jy sien die mense met die honger, dan sê jy vir hulle 'Het jy kos?', 'Nee ek het nie kos nie.', 'Ek het daar by my bitjie mielie-meel', dan kan jy vir hom bitjie miele-meel stuur. Dis bitjie wat jy kan vir hom maak. By goeder soos mielie-meel en suiker en tee daar het ek met my vrou, en ons ou mense. As iemand nie het nie, dan het daai nie. As iemand het, dan help hy."

ple of Wilma J. above. People in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis are not surrounded by an environment of abundant resources but by resource scarcity and poverty and therefore Woodburn's idea of sharing as a leveling-mechanism within an egalitarian ideology is inappropriate. When sharing becomes a means to ensure the survival of one's own and befriended families it is unlikely that anything but the will to survive is the guiding principle.



Graph 3.1.1 Free-listing results; number of participants = 24; food items in capitals

The analysis of qualitative interviews does not suffice on its own to find out what elements constitute the cultural domain of sharing in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas. Of importance is also a definition of the shared objects. Ethnographic literature mostly focuses on the sharing of food, especially that of meat. In Skoonheid and Drimiopsis this is only partly the case (see graph 3.1.1). In total, the 24 informants mentioned 24 different items; half of them were food related. On average each informant listed 7.08 items (170 items in total) out of which 3.63 items on average (87 food items in total) were food-related (see graph 3.1.2). While non-food items may surely also be of relevance, the term 'sharing' is still, to a somewhat greater extent, associated with food. This is supported by the observation that in eleven cases maize products, sugar and tea were listed together indicating an association chain. This has not been observed for any non-food items, although one might

expect to find a connection between money and airtime/phone for instance. Meat only plays a very small role in this context compared to other food items such as maize products and sugar. I was assured by several informants that meat is among the least shared food stuffs in both Skoonheid and Drimiopsis.



Graph 3.1.2 Free-listing, absolute result in categories

As mentioned in 2.5, Bird-David has pointed out two different meanings of 'to share' in the English language: "The first stresses a division of things between individuals, the second the joining of individuals in common action, experience, or usage." (2005: 203). The listed food items are surely being divided among the members of the community although one might argue that this is more likely to indicate social connectedness rather than division. Phones, tools and transport cannot be divided and therefore force the sharers to cooperate. Both ways of sharing seem to be practiced in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas.

The statement-agreement survey proved to be a suitable tool to gather quantitative data on the cultural domain of sharing, especially with regard to the second section on sharing obligation (items 11-18) and reciprocity expectations (items 19-26). Structure and wording of the questionnaire have been introduced in section 2.6.



Graph 3.1.3 Sharing obligation (items 11-18): sorted according to 'San versus Non-San'

The results present a relatively high agreement with the offered statements throughout the survey, none of the average values being below 60 percent agreement for all questionnaire items. Graph 3.1.3 shows a clear tendency that informants with San identity feel more obliged to share certain goods than others. This is especially the case for goods that are to be shared beyond family lines (on average 9 percent difference between San and Non-San). It must be noted, however, that these differences are never larger than 11 percent and that the sample size would have to be larger to make this result representative. Graph 3.1.4 shows that such differences also depend on the wealth of the household, although the result is more complex at first sight.



Graph 3.1.4 Sharing obligation (items 11-18): sorted according to 'Wealth Groups'

First, just like in graph 3.1.3 there is an overall tendency that the feeling of obligation to share is higher whenever it is a family member that demands a share. There are only two exceptions to that observation, for money and work in wealth group 4 (WG4), where the informants indicated that they feel more obliged to share with a neighbor than with a family member. Both money and work cannot be consumed as food immediately, but are means to acquire some. It is worth the thought, but not more than that, to take into account that goods of immediate use, such as food items or tobacco are of higher sharing value than those that require at least one other step to be turned into hunger relief. This could be an indicator for immediate-return values, but requires further research, as an argument on the present data would be too vague.

Second, the largest differences in agreement are found with regard to sharing money with a neighbor (30% difference between WG1 and WG4) and helping him with garden work

(19% difference between WG2 and WG4). It can be observed that different goods cause different sharing obligations, which is very likely to depend on the household's economic situation rather than their ethnic identity. People from poor households will feel less obliged to share the little that they have than those who are comparatively richer.

In questionnaire items 19-26 the informants were asked to indicate to what degree they expect a person to return a favor ("If I share X with F/N, I expect that person to help me in the future."). However, as already mentioned in 2.6, I noticed too late that this phrasing was problematic because the word 'expect' made two different interpretations possible: a normative one (Expectation: the demand to reciprocate based on an assured system of shared values) and an empirical one (Expectancy: the likelihood to reciprocate based on the personal feeling about previous behavior of a person). Yet these two different interpretations may be integrated in a system of argument with the data on the informants' feeling of obligation to share (items 11-18). Starting with the knowledge that the overall feeling of obligation to share generated high agreement values, three explanations appear plausible:

1. Altruistic motives based on a certain ethic (e.g. Woodburn's egalitarianism)
2. Normative expectations for a return (demanding reciprocity)
3. Empirical expectancy of a return (calculated likeliness of reciprocity)

In the first case one can hypothesize that the informant will indicate a higher value for questionnaire items 11-18 than for items 19-26 as reciprocal factors should not play a role if sharing behavior is based on ethic principles. The latter two explanations are based on Sahlins' assumption that generally an unspecified return is expected by the share giver (Bird-David 2005: 202). If an individual's feeling of obligation to share depends on normative expectations of reciprocity, it is unlikely that the economically thinking individual will indicate a lower value for items 19-26 than for 11-18. This is also the case, if an individual's feeling of obligation to share depends on empirical expectancy of a return, although in this case the causal chain is reversed. In the case of normative expectation the willingness to share precedes the expectation to receive something in return, while in the other case empirical expectancy entails the willingness to share.

While the San of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas indicated a higher feeling of obligation to share than their Non-San neighbors for all goods and share demanders (3.1.3), reciprocity expectations/expectancy are not as obvious (3.1.5). What remains stable is the strong differentiation between family members and non-related neighbors. Here we find that return expectations are generally lower for neighbors than for family members, which would not be the case if sharing was solely constructed around reciprocal principles. For more easily accessible share items such as tobacco and work the San seem to be more generous and seem to have higher return expectations as well. Sharing of food within the family

seems to raise no different points of view when it comes to San or Non-San identity and remains the category with the highest agreement rate.



Graph 3.1.5 Return expectancy/ reciprocity likelihood: sorted according to 'San versus Non-San'



Graph 3.1.6 Return expectancy / reciprocity likelihood: sorted according to 'wealth group'

With regard to the four wealth groups (3.1.6) it can be observed that a sharing demand for money from a neighbor caused the lowest feeling of obligation, but now the expectation/expectancy to receive something in return is lowest when tobacco has been shared with a neighbor. Also, WG4 had the strongest agreement rate for the sharing obligation, but remains much less dominant when it comes to returns for sharing. Regarding differ-

ences between the groups themselves no significant differences or tendencies can be observed except for the fact that WG1 and WG2 indicate the highest agreement rate whenever the family is concerned.

Responding to the three hypotheses which were developed above in order to solve the questionnaire wording dilemma, graph 3.1.7 combines the previous four graphs. The average agreement values on items 11-18 have been subtracted from the values of questionnaire items 19-26 for the four wealth groups and the two identity groups. It shows that in the majority of cases return expectations were lower than the feeling of obligation to share, which indicates that people construct their willingness to share in most cases around ethic motives such as solidarity and family cohesion. A significantly higher expectation/expectancy of receiving help in return for sharing was only indicated by WG1 when food had been shared with the family and by WG2, WG3, and the Non-San group in matters of sharing money. Surely this can be explained by the high significance that food has for the very poor people and the overall concreteness of value that money inhibits. WG4 is the only group that indicates lower return expectancy in all categories and seems to be the most altruistic with overall 120 percentage points of negative difference, followed by the San (73) and WG3 (68). This is remarkable in as far as WG3 and WG4 contain 10 San and 16 Non-San households, showing that both wealth and identity are values that need to be taken into account separately in the assessment of sharing, reciprocity and the underlying motives.



Graph 3.1.7 Values of items 19-26 were subtracted from the values in the corresponding category in items 11-18; values for wealth and identity groups

As a preliminary conclusion the following points can be made:

- The food sharing discourse is closely connected to the discourse on the past and the current poverty issues.
- Although other (less dividable) goods may also be shared, sharing is mostly associated with food.
- Both groups construct sharing as a non-reciprocal activity based on ethic values.
- Differences in the sharing discourse can both be explained with regard to identity and economic factors.

3.2 Data on Actual Behavior: What is the Role of Reciprocity and Moral Economy?

> *They [other San] do not share and only eat with their family. The little that people give to me I only give to my child and I sleep with hunger. There is nobody who shares with you in this place. But when you have something you give when they ask. It is hard in this place.*[20] *(Anja G., 24 yrs, Skoonheid)*

After describing how the inhabitants of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas use the idea of sharing as a discursive tool, the important question arises to what extent sharing can be seen as an actually practiced norm in this context. However, three theoretical assumptions need to be clarified a bit more explicitly in order to answer this question.

First, Spittler (1967: 18) notes that surveys, which ask the respondents how one ought to behave in a certain situation, may not tell to what extent the described norms are actually being practiced by them. This is especially the case if the individual's evaluation of the norm differs from society's demand. Thus, not every verbal demand for normative behavior can be regarded as an actual social norm, especially if it is merely applied as a discursive construct. In this case the survey data from the statement-agreement questionnaire needs to be enriched by empirical observations and quantitative data from the ego-centered network analysis asking for information on actual behavior.

Secondly, it is important to differentiate between food-sharing networks and gift-giving networks. Although these two systems may be inevitably linked when it comes to issues of food security they will be analyzed separately at this point. This is partly done to add further perspectives on the reciprocity argument and also to confine the categories of food

[20] Translated from Afrikaans: "Hulle deel nie, hulle eet net met die huisgesin. Die bietjie wat iemand vir my ou, gee ek maar net vir my kind en ek slaap maar net so met die honger. Daar is niemand wat vir 'n mens ou hierso. Maar as jy het dan ou jy as hulle vra. Dis baie moeilik hierso."

and non-food items in the free-listing task. Wiessner's observations of the !Kung[21] *hxaro* system are usually embedded in the discussion of environmental influences on the cultural systems and the sharing ethos of hunter-gatherers, which has been briefly described in the introductory chapter of this thesis. As *hxaro* she describes a gift-giving system, which establishes and maintains social bonds between individuals within and outside a camp of foragers:

> *Through a system of mutual reciprocity called hxaro, the !Kung San organize themselves in such a way that each family creates ties which distribute its risk over the population and thereby assure that losses will be covered in bad years. […] The hxaro relationship involves a balanced, delayed exchange of gifts, whose continuous flow gives both partners information about the underlying status of the relationship – one of a bond of friendship accompanied by mutual reciprocity and access to resources. In addition, each partnership links a person to a broad network of hxaro paths. (Wiessner 1982: 66).*

The definition of *hxaro* as a reciprocal system and the observation that "[g]ifts for hxaro can be any non-food items" (ibid: 70) are the first indicators that sharing and gift-giving are to be analyzed separately. Results from Skoonheid and the Kanyembas showed that food items are associated slightly more often with the act of sharing and that reciprocal expectations – may they be based on normative or empirical notions – are generally weaker than the feeling of obligation to share. Furthermore, Wiessner has observed that an exchange of goods upon demand does only very seldom occur and that a "gift is private property for as long as a person wishes to keep it" (ibid.). This contrasts the leveling-mechanisms that Woodburn has described, indicating that food-sharing and *hxaro* may have different origins. In a subsequent discussion Wiessner also supports the separate analysis of *hxaro* networks and food sharing due to differing social densities:

> *Comparison of the hxaro network with webs of food sharing would almost certainly yield different densities. Hxaro builds sparse networks to allow people to redistribute themselves over the resources of the region; ties of food sharing create community among people living in one place–both residents and visitors–and are dense within a given location. (Wiessner 1998: 515).*

In this case the two systems constitute similar means to different ends. While food sharing may function as leveling-mechanism and as catalyst for group identity, *hxaro* and potentially other gift-giving systems serve as a response mechanism to ecological uncertainties. Furthermore, food sharing must be labeled 'immediate-return', while *hxaro* can be regard-

[21] !Kung and Ju/'hoansi both belong to the Kx'a language family and the Northern Khoisan dialect cluster (Dieckmann *et al.* 2014: 23). Their names are often used interchangeably by authors like Wiessner (2005).

ed as a 'delayed-return' strategy as it is unusual to reciprocate immediately after the reception of a gift (ibid.). To separate food-sharing observations from gift-giving observations may be one approach that can reconcile the two opposing perspectives in the reciprocity discussion.

> *There is sharing without the motive to give—and, conversely, the motive to give exists without it being sharing, most prominently in gift-giving. This makes a simplistic explanation of why people share even less convincing when conceived of as reciprocal exchange and it makes sharing an even greater challenge to an emerging anthropological theory of value. (Widlok 2013: 12).*

Surely there are significant differences due to varying historical trajectories between Wiessner's descriptions of the !Kung *hxaro* and the kinship-based exchange systems of the Omaheke San (Sylvain 2003: 116). However, as shown in the previous section, hunter-gatherer identity remains a strong discursive force in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis and is inevitably linked to the culture of other San groups.

The third theoretical approach that needs to be taken into account for the analysis of actual sharing practices is related to *hxaro*, but needs some more explicit elaboration to reach its final argument. Wiessner's characterization of *hxaro* as a "product of a structured set of social relations" (1982: 61) links it with the discussion of moral economy (Bollig 1998: 138). Moral economy has been redefined several times by different scholars in the past decades and the academic debate has confronted its students with a puzzling number of definitions which are apparently all outdated. Short summaries on this topic have been provided by Peterson (2002) and Berzborn (2004: 9-11). Basically, the term 'moral economy' or 'economy of affection' (Lemarchand 1989) refers to the assumption that economic decisions within kinship groups are based on moral obligations of subsistence provision rather than on rational choice: "*Dabei wird eine Dichotomie erzeugt, die das Eigeninteresse des rationalen Akteurs in der marktorientierten Wirtschaft den moralischen Verpflichtungen als entscheidendem Steuerungselement der Subsistenzökonomie gegenüberstellt.*" (Berzborn 2004: 9). Bollig among others has, however, observed that kinship systems do not necessarily constitute an economic disadvantage. A moral economy based on far-reaching kinship-networks may very well be a "product of self-interest and rational interaction" (1998: 154) as long as moral obligations are based on reciprocal principles. This is also the case for *hxaro*, in which people often chose their gift-exchange partners according to the resources available in their area and the exchange partner's character. A *hxaro* relationship may also be ended if it turns out to be not reciprocal for one of the partners. In other words: „We can conclude that the crucial effect of morality is long term reciprocity and that the long term effect is achieved because it is not reciprocity which is the motive but morality." (Bloch in Berzborn 2004: 10). The question now arises:

why would 'moral economy' be of any interest to this thesis, now that the reciprocity factor has been eliminated by separating gift-giving from food-sharing? The answer is quite clear: food-sharing in Skoonheid and the Kanyembas may not only be of relevance among common relatives with strong moral obligations, but also beyond the family line. The analysis of the statement-agreement questionnaire has shown that people construct sharing as a non-reciprocal activity. Therefore it needs to be assessed whether sharing within the family and outside the family shows different degrees of a moral economy mindset. In this case, the factor of relatedness plays the most important role when comparing network data and looking for reciprocal relationships.

Putting the points made above in a nutshell the following questions need to be asked for the subsequent discussion: Does the data from the ego-centered network analysis mirror the emic perspective on sharing? Is food-sharing less reciprocal than non-food sharing and at which point is a relationship reciprocal? Is there a difference between sharing with a family member and a neighbor with regard to a moral economy that is based on reciprocal networks?

Before discussing these questions, the most noteworthy results from the network analysis are presented. In the analysis of the quantitative network data (details on questionnaire setup and sampling in 2.5) a summary was produced by calculating the average amount of sharing instances that the informants mentioned in the survey. Out of the goods mentioned in the questionnaire, four analytical categories were developed:

- cooked food: questionnaire items 2-3
- unprocessed food: questionnaire items 4-9 (maize, sugar, tea, coffee, vegetables)
- separable non-food: questionnaire items 10-13, 16-17 and 20-21 (airtime, tobacco, money, other)
- inseparable non-food: questionnaire items 14-15, 18-21 (tools, transport, other)

These categories were combined with four other elements denoting the kind of sharing action:

- giving to a family member (g_f)
- giving to a neighbor (g_n)
- receiving from a family member (r_f)
- receiving from a neighbor (r_n)

Having thus created 16 variables it was possible to calculate a total average for the corresponding answers of the 32 informants (see graph 3.2.1) and also to sort them according to identity, wealth, place of living, and the receiving of governmental monthly pensions.



Graph 3.2.1 Total results of network analysis; average calculated by dividing total number of sharing instances through number of informants (n=32); yellow: g_f (10.9375), red: g_n (3.0625), blue: r_f (4.28125), green: r_n (2.40625)

A two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test on Stata/IC12.0 was conducted, which indicated the probability (p) that the shown result is coincidental. Unfortunately, only a few statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) differences between the contrast groups were found. Graphs 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 are indicating the complete results sorted according to identity group. Only three variables have, however, produced significant results (i.e. cooked_g_f, unprocessed_g_f, and inseparable_g_n) and were marked by an asterisk. While both San and Non-San indicated high willingness to share food with their family members (graph 3.1.3), graph 3.2.2 indicates that San tend to share significantly more food with their family members than Non-San. However, this merely means that San households are larger than those of Non-San[22], which can have multiple reasons, but surely a willingness to share is mandatory in such large households. It needs to be noted that two Non-San mentioned

[22] Question two of the network questionnaire asked people to indicate how many people were eating at their fireplace on a regular basis, which is indirectly referring to the household size. San households in this sample hold 8.1 people while Non-San consist of 4.9 people on average. Skoonheid households have 5.6 people and households in the Kanyembas 7.4 people on average, which roughly corresponds with the findings of Dirkx & Alweendo who counted 4.6 people in Skoonheid and 6.5 in Drimiopsis households in 2011 (2012: 8-9).

people outside of the family as recipients of cooked food (cooked_g_n) while this was not the case for the San.



	g_f		g_n		r_f		r_n	
San	8,0625	3,125	0	0,875	1,25	1,5625	0,5	0,5
non-San	4,9375	1,5	0,1875	2,1875	0,4375	1,3125	0,1875	1,0625

Graph 3.2.2 average number of food sharing instances, sorted by identity. Tested for significance with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, marked with asterisk if p < 0.05 and therefore significant



	g_f		g_n		r_f		r_n	
San	1,9375	0,5	0,8125	0,0625	1,8125	0,375	0,75	0,4375
non-San	1,625	0,1875	0,9375	1,0625	1,4375	0,375	0,5625	0,8125

Graph 3.2.3 average number of food sharing instances, sorted by identity. Tested for relevance with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, marked with asterisk if p < 0.05 and therefore significant. Please note the change of scale on the left.

In the case of unprocessed food the San group stated significantly more sharing incidences than the Non-San group, too, which can again be explained by larger household sizes, but surely it is also an indicator for solidarity. On the other side the Non-San group indi-

cated a higher number of sharing incidences of unprocessed food with people outside of the family. However, there is a 15 percent (p = 0.15) chance that this result is coincidental. Only one further variable yielded a result with a significant difference between the two identity-based groups. That is the case for inseparable_g_n where the Non-San on average mentioned one sharing incidence for tools, transport or another inseparable good, while almost none was mentioned by the San.

Since several results showed no significant differences, only the ones with p being below 0.05 in the mentioned significance test are illustrated beyond this point. Graph 3.2.4 shows that only four out of the 16 variables produced significant differences between the informants' wealth groups. Interestingly the household size seems to yield no significant differences between the wealth groups (WG1=5.4; WG2= 7.3; WG3=8.3; WG4=5.2[23]). The results for unprocessed_g_f roughly mirror the results for willingness to share food with the family in graph 3.1.4. This indicates a certain correspondence between sharing discourse and actual behavior with regard to the individual's wealth. Furthermore, the data on wealth groups indicates that very poor households (WG1) seem to be badly connected as recipients of help from others. It is not surprising that they were not able to state giving instances of inseparable goods as tools and transport are almost by definition not available to members of WG1.



	unprocessed g_f*	unprocessed r_n*	inseparable g_n*	inseparable r_n*
WG1	1,571429	0,4285714	0	0,1428571
WG2	4,5	0,5	0,1	0,9
WG3	2	1,3333	2	0,5
WG4	0,6667	1	0,5556	0,7778

Graph 3.2.4 Significant results (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p < 0.05) for wealth groups

Surprisingly, the highest amount of statistically significant results was found through the comparison of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas. As shown in graph 3.2.5, eight variables produced significant differences between the two places. People in Skoonheid seem to

[23] Wilcoxon Rank-sum test for the two groups with the largest difference: p (WG3, WG4) = 0.1532

have more elaborated relationships with their neighbors, while people in the Kanyembas seem to share mostly within the family. This can partly be explained by the different household sizes as mentioned above. Another explanation would be the better infrastructural connectedness of Drimiopsis, which is closer to Gobabis and lies next to a tar road. Skoonheid lies rather isolated with only few larger settlements around. In Drimiopsis it is possible to borrow tools at the administration office while Skoonheid people have to help one another with tools. This makes inseparable goods such as transport and tools more likely to be exchanged beyond family lines in Skoonheid. In the Kanyembas there seems to be a more intense exchange of unprocessed food between family members than in Skoonheid, both on the giving and the receiving side. More people in the village and a better connectedness with other settlements usually mean more family members around who give and receive a share. Regarding separable goods it was observed that half of the people (6 out of 12) in the Kanyembas mentioned tobacco as an often shared good (graph 3.1.1), but only three of them (3 out of 16) mentioned tobacco sharing instances in the network analysis.



	unpro-cessed*	insepa-rable*	sepa-rable*	insepa-rable*	unpro-cessed*	sepa-rable*	cooked*	sepa-rable*
	g_f		g_n		r_f		r_n	
Skoonheid	1,0625	0,125	1,5625	0,9375	0,1875	0,9375	0,6875	1
Kanyembas	3,5625	0,5625	0,1875	0,1875	2,6875	2,3125	0	0,3125

Graph 3.2.5 Significant results (Wilcoxon rank-sum, $p < 0.05$) sorted by place of living

Age may play a role when it comes to sharing behavior. This can be examined by comparing those who receive a pension and government support with those who do not, both before and after pension payout day. However, no significant differences were observed in the data. Even after comparing money exchanges separately and only for pension receivers after pension payout day, no significant difference was found between San and Non-San. Although pension payout day was a productive date for participant observation (section 3.4), it did not yield significant results when comparing network data before and

after. Surely, researchers with the resources and time to conduct a complete network analysis with a representative sample size would be able to give a more sophisticated and detailed account of the consequences of pension payouts in former hunter-gatherer communities.

Returning to the guiding questions from this section's beginning: Does the factual network data mirror the emic discourse on sharing, especially with regard to the informants' identity (San vs. Non-San)? Is non-food sharing more reciprocal? Does reciprocity differ with regard to stronger or weaker moral attachment, inside and outside the family?

Of course, all informants mentioned someone that they had sharing relationships with, but the networks reveal a large variety. On average each respondent mentioned 20.69 sharing instances with great differences in network size: ranging between 4 and 57 mentioned sharing instances. Although the informants indicated that their feeling of obligation to share was somewhat smaller when a neighbor was concerned (see section 3.1) relatedness seems to be a much stronger factor with regard to actual behavior. People are not as altruistic as they claim to be as sharing is mostly practiced within the family, especially by the San. The numbers reveal that most San seem to focus on their own family, while most Non-San also extend their sharing networks to befriended neighbors (graph 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). This is partly due to the differing family sizes, although there are large families among the Non-San as well, but they integrate non-related people in their sharing network whatsoever. It remains unclear what the result had been if Herero, Damara, Wambo and Afrikaaner identity were assessed separately in the region.

Graph 3.2.1 indicates that 10.94 of the average 20.69 referred to g_f instances, meaning that in more than half of the cases (53 percent) people gave something to one of their family members. The household size is a crucial factor in the assessment of sharing practices. Another 21 percent referred to r_f instances while g_n and r_n together make up merely 26 percent. This may also have practical reasons: for one, people within the family are more easily remembered when informants have to recall their sharing partners. Second, informants tend to tell more about the help that they give to others than about the moments when they needed the help of another person: "Those people never remember when I help them, but they annoy me about the few times I need their help" (Gustav S., 46 yrs, from Skoonheid). This could be an indicator for a social anti-arrogance protection mechanism (Lee 1969), referred to in the conclusion.

The network data on actual sharing practice confirms certain points from the sharing discourse, especially the connectedness to food and the relatively high amount of sharing connections by its entire members. With regard to the cultural domain it has shown that food items (cooked and unprocessed) remain the most frequently shared, especially with regard to the number of sharing partners. Non-food items such as tobacco and phone

credit are surely also part of the sharing network, but food, due to its obvious importance to survival, remains most frequently shared across all identity and wealth groups.

Interestingly, the comparison of wealth groups produced more significant differences than the comparison of identities. This might make sense as the ability to share or the necessity to demand a share obviously depends on wealth, especially for WG1 which stated relatively few sharing instances, but indicated a relatively high willingness to share with others (except for money). Furthermore, the place of living plays a very important role, because the most significant differences in the number of sharing instances were found comparing Skoonheid and the Kanyembas while the analysis of the statement-agreement questionnaire had yielded no spectacular differences with regard to the two places.

As to the degree of reciprocity of non-food items and exchanges outside of the family the following has to be noted. Reciprocity is a complicated issue as it is connected to time. Most of the questionnaire items referred to sharing instances in the last two days and therefore it is very well possible that reciprocal relationships were not detected. However, four individual examples (graphic 3.2.6) may show the different kinds of sharing relationship and the degrees of reciprocity that exist.



Graphic 3.2.6 Individual networks of four informants: C7 (Ju/'hoansi speaking, female, WG1, 30 yrs, Drimiopsis), A1 (Khoekhoegowab speaking, female, WG2, 33yrs, Drimiopsis), 5F (Ju/'hoansi speaking, female, WG1, 63 yrs, Skoonheid), 2B (Khoekhoegowab speaking, male, WG3, 48 yrs, Skoonheid); blue circles indicate alteri that do not live in one of the resettlements; orange circles indicate alteri that have been illustrated twice due to the graphic's design; thicker arrows indicate more exchanges of goods than thinner ones (Designed with MS Powerpoint 2003).

C7 represents a (stereo)typical San household, where many relatives are sharing food, tobacco and phone credit with each other. The previously mentioned waves of sharing that Woodburn (1982) and Bird-David (1990) among others applied in their theories can here be observed. Those who are provided with cooked food in the household are beneficiaries of C7's (sometimes) reciprocal relationship with other family members. However, not one neighbor has been mentioned as giver or receiver. This sharing network seems to be predominantly based on moral principles and food sharing activities.

A1 has a small household and therefore gets the chance to practice successful network building also outside of the family. She maintains the family connection to those who stay in a different place (alteri A1n and A1o stay in Windhoek) and has a few neighbors who help her out. Five alteri are givers, four of them being reciprocal and belonging to the family.

5F personifies the exact opposite to the previous two examples. Only six alteri are part of this lady's network. She has very few family members in Skoonheid and those are mostly receivers. Those few relationships that may be regarded as reciprocal are not relatives of her. It seems that the missing connectedness to her family cannot be compensated through new links with the surrounding neighbors. A working moral economy does not exist in this example.

2B has a successful network and may even be a better example for waves of sharing than C7. There are eight alteri as givers and eight alteri as receivers, three of them being candidates for a reciprocal relationship. Furthermore, he has both food and non-food areas covered with giving and reciprocating alteri, which was not the case for the two Ju/'hoansi speaking ladies (C7 and 5F) who seemed to miss out on the inseparable non-food section. This may be an explanation why he was sorted into WG3 while the others are in WG1 and WG2.

As graphs 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 and the network examples have shown, San tend to focus on sharing food and some separable non-food items with family members, which seldom reciprocate. Non-San and those San with few relatives, on the other hand, also take care of their relatives, but extend their sharing relationships to non-related people and also create reciprocal relationships regardless of the shared goods. This leads to three hypothetical considerations:

- San food sharing exists as a discursive construct, but starts to fall apart as an active practice as soon as family bonds break away. Sharing of food with family members is mostly non-reciprocal.
- Non-San groups are also active sharers, but they tend to be influenced by strategic motives. They share also with neighbors and manage to have some reciprocal relationships for different kinds of goods.
- Factors such as family size, place of living and economic situation play an even more important role in a person's sharing behavior than identity based on language. This is not to say that these factors do not influence one another.

3.3 Rights and Obligations: Demand Sharing, Personal Property and Tolerated Theft

The argument of this thesis is based on the assumption that there is no sharing without demand, building on Spittler's definition of norms as *Verhaltensforderung* (1967) and on Widlok's observation that demand sharing is the product of social demand mechanisms and quasi the prototype of sharing (2013: 21). In addition,

> *Woodburn (1998) argues forcefully that sharing is not a voluntary act, but that members of the community are expected to share, or, perhaps more adequate: they are expected to give if somebody asks them to share. Sharing is, for Woodburn, very similar to an income tax in modern societies. The individual has no choice: if he wants to live in the traditional society, he has to share. Within this context Wiessner (1982) describes how members of the !Kung face the difficult decision between accumulating more material goods which they highly desire on the one hand or remaining in the traditional society which requires them to give up much of the items they are able to purchase when taking on a wage-job. (Kagi 2001: 38).*

Therefore, in statement-agreement questionnaire, items 11-18 were formulated with demand being the prerequisite for a sharing action. Surely it would be interesting to rephrase these questionnaire items without a direct demand and present them to the people of Skoonheid and Drimiopsis once more. Nonetheless these questionnaire items will not be discussed anymore as this has been done thoroughly in section 3.1.

However, there is room for some field observations. One time I returned to Skoonheid after two nights in Gobabis. My host Siyaya told me that only few hours after my departure for Gobabis, Uncle Samuel, an elderly well-known San gentleman had come to the door. He was demanding that Siyaya give him all the food I had left. His argument was that he was hungry, that the *klein-baas*[24] obviously did not need his food at the moment and that he would surely come back with more food. Thanks to Siyaya I did not go to bed hungry that night.

On a different occasion, Patrick, one of the small boys that regularly visited us saw me drinking tea in the morning. He came straight to me, looked me into the eye and said something in Ju/'hoansi and Afrikaans meaning: "What are you waiting for? I also want some tea!" However, when he took a sip from my cup he was totally disgusted by it be-

[24] From Afrikaans: "small boss"; the title *baas* is a remnant of Apartheid times, which was used by non-whites to address white men. *Klein-baas* was and continues to be used for the son of a white farmer, for instance. I felt very uncomfortable with this title as it was obviously due to my color of skin. Unfortunately, there was little chance to get rid of it and as time went by I got used to it. I managed to make some people use it ironically as I used to give the title *baas* to my host Siyaya, who definitely has no Afrikaaner heritage in his family.

cause it was lacking sugar. He was also among the kids who regularly stood in front of our door at lunch time. Patrick and his friend Rambo were always around as soon as Siyaya and I were starting a fire. The kids knew around what time we ate lunch and that we had an electric cooking plate inside the house. Therefore, a fire automatically implied the preparation of meat and the longer they stayed around to watch the meat being prepared, the more confident they were of receiving one or two pieces. Other children were specialists in running to the house entrance as soon as they heard my car approaching. They knew that I always had oranges with me returning from Gobabis and that I was happy to share them. Interestingly, these children made no effort to share the things they had just received. Whenever there were more kids than oranges, I had to cut them up first as a fight would have been unavoidable otherwise. At other occasions the hands of all present people, even of those who were unknown to me, were extended in demand as soon as I revealed the cough sweets from my pockets that I always carry with me. Physical presence as a tool of demanding, as practiced by Patrick, his friends and others, has been described by Widlok in the following way:

> *We need to recognize that one's mere bodily presence, underlined by addressing the other person in particular ways, is always a demand for being acknowledged as a partner, a personal being with legitimate needs. An appropriate definition of demand sharing is therefore much broader than the use of explicit demands such as "Give me . . ." leading to the appropriation of what one may think one is entitled to. The explicitness of the demand may differ and it may be entirely implicit (Widlok 2013: 21).*

The disappearance of my prescription sunglasses shortly after letting Patrick stay in the house for a short while during a thunderstorm disturbed the friendly relationship to him and his friends. I was told by two Damara ladies on separate occasions that it was my own fault. They explained that by letting him eat with us he had become something like a family member. If Patrick was raised the same way they had been, everything in the house belonged to him as it belonged to all family members. It was absolutely legitimate to take the sunglasses and hide them so that I could not take them back. The same happened when an art workshop was held for Skoonheid's women at the admin building. As soon as Siyaya and I had left the house teabags, matches, firewood, dishes, and cutlery vanished.

Although Patrick and I reconciled after a while, these events prompted me to include a section on theft and personal property in the statement-agreement questionnaire to find out how acceptable it was to members of society (see section 2.6 for further details). This was also done because several people who were responsible for the gardens and for the herding of animals told me that theft was a big problem in Skoonheid's society, but that it

was seldom punished although it significantly disturbed development. Especially in the gardens, theft caused a lot of resignation and disinterest.

Regarding the significance of this topic to economic theory and its anthropological contributions in the context of "The tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968) and the following responses (e.g. Ostrom 1990), only this much can be noted at this point: sharing systems and the definition of property rights are tightly connected, if not complements, to the existence and failure of common-pool resources (Kagi 2001: 72) such as water, gardens and grazing land.

With regard to the discourse on sharing alone, the term 'tolerated theft' needs to be explained to illustrate how blurred the lines of definition can be when discussing (former) hunting and gathering societies. The concept of "tolerated theft" was developed by Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) and Blurton Jones (1984). It was applied in the field by Bird & Bird (1997) under the assumption that successful foragers will let some of their food be taken away "not voluntarily, but simply because defending them is too costly" (Kagi 2001: 38):

> *If the benefits for consuming more of the resource are sharply diminishing, the fitness payoffs of consuming an additional portion of food will be worth less to the acquirer than to an unsuccessful hunter. If unsuccessful hunters attempt to claim the prey, acquirers will be expected to refuse such demands until the cost of defending additional calories against the demands of those who have none is greater than the benefit the acquirer would receive by eating or trading those extra calories. (Bird & Bird 1997: 51).*

Tolerated theft bypasses the social norms behind demand sharing. It builds on the assumption that the official owner has no right to own the desired good as soon as he or she has no real use for it anymore. This roughly corresponds with Uncle Samuel's demands for my food. The question of the extent to which the concepts of demand sharing and tolerated theft condition or complement each other is difficult to answer. It is also questionable whether tolerated theft must be regarded as a social norm or rather as customary behavior. This is particularly because the role allocation of norm sender and norm receiver is ambiguous.

In other words, it is to be expected that people with more food will be more willing to accept theft than those who have less. Also, people with a dominant sharing ethos should be expected to tolerate theft to a larger degree than others. The description of the two Damara ladies, who explained that it was normal to take without asking, also leads to the conclusion that theft is more or less tolerated among family members.

Different from what I expected there was once again a relatively high agreement among the people of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas with the statements that I offered to them. The comparison of San versus Non-San yielded only two (statistically) significant results

(graph 3.3.1), but a tendency towards a stricter definition of theft among the San is visible. A comparison of the four wealth groups also produced no statistically significant differences. However, it can be noted that questionnaire respondents in WG4 were more willing to tolerate theft than others.

Graph 3.3.1 Disapproval of theft of X by F/N. Sorted by identity group. Tested for significance with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, marked with asterisk if p < 0.05 and therefore significant.



Graph 3.3.2 Disapproval of theft of X by F/N. Sorted by wealth group. Tested for significance with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, no significant results found.

Interestingly, the highest amount of significant results was produced in the comparison of Skoonheid and the Kanyembas as places of living. In all cases of suggested theft the people of Drimiopsis were stricter than the people of Skoonheid. The differentiation between related and non-related thieves was only confirmed in Skoonheid. At this point the self-critical ethnographer has to question the influence that the local translators might have had on the results also with regard on the previous results. It was not possible to supervise all survey interviews, but there was no point in time where I had the feeling that my translators and research assistants differed with regard to diligence and competence. Whether different translators would have produced different results is subject to speculation



Graph 3.3.3 Disapproval of theft of X by F/N. Sorted by place of living. Tested for significance with Wilcoxon rank-sum test, marked with asterisk if p < 0.05 and therefore significant.

One thing, however, seems clear: the low toleration of theft in quantitative terms stands in contradiction to the field observations as qualitative data. My argument at this point is that, once again, discourse and actual practice deviate from another as they already did in the previous two sections. Therefore, sharing as a social norm is put into question, because sanctions for norm infringement seem to be not efficient enough to actually cause a change of behavior.

3.4 A Conflict of Systems: Sharing Avoidance

In Skoonheid and Drimiopsis 'the first of the month' is not defined by the Gregorian Calendar; when people talk about the first of the month they mean pension payout day. On that day a well-guarded money transporter drives through the villages of the region to hand out pensions, disability grants, and child support for those who lost one or both parents. It is the community event that everybody waits for and already in the morning the first pensioners are excitedly sitting at the central places although the radio tells them that the car is still far away. During election time the parties use this day for rallies as they are aware that many potential voters are around and food sellers that remain unseen for the rest of the month suddenly show up to make a profit as long as the money is still around. Shop owners use this day to collect what is owed; pensioners are allowed to take credit up to 600 NAD, equal the pension amount. In Skoonheid the car owners are ready to take people to Epukiro R.C. to immediately spend the money on food and alcohol. One would expect the 15-minute pension payout spectacle to be a substantial part of a network analysis as it marks the inflow of capital and thereby triggers sharing actions. However, during the time of my field research this day proved less important to the investigation of sharing networks than to the strategies that people employ to avoid sharing.

In his well-known contribution "Demand Sharing: Reciprocity and the Pressure for Generosity among Foragers" from 1993, Nicolas Peterson describes the different strategies that Australian hunter-gatherers employ to deal with the sharing demands that society makes. One of these strategies entails that "demands can be refused. This can usually be done only by hiding, secretive behavior, and lying […]: such hiding is widespread and is a fully self-conscious strategy" (864). Another strategy that literature offers to avoid the immediate loss of capital through demand sharing is described by Wiessner, who explains that capital can be stored in the form of *hxaro* debt (1982: 67). In the case of Skoonheid and Drimiopsis similar strategies have been developed by their inhabitants.

One popular strategy, as mentioned by Peterson, is hiding. Although everybody knows how much the pensioners receive, some of them hide the money in their pockets and go home as quickly as possible. While the majority of people in Skoonheid receive their money at the payout car, many people in Drimiopsis travel to Gobabis in order to receive the money at the post office and immediately store it in their bank account. Some Damara gentlemen even offered me money to drive them to Gobabis for that reason. Interestingly, most people are able to give change on payout day although the pension is paid in 200 NAD bills and despite the fact that they were not able to buy anything in the morning. Sometimes even the gesture of hiding is enough to keep potential scroungers away.

Whenever I gave food to Patrick he quickly moved behind a wall or a tree to express his unwillingness to share although he remained visible.

Picture 3.4.1 Settling debts on pension pay-out day

A different form of hiding is the avoidance of cash capital. Money at home is sharable money and therefore has to be transferred into goods or credit. I observed John K. and Ismael H. arguing right next to the payout car. Asking them about the reason for their argument, they explained: John had just received outstanding disability grants and wanted to pay what he owed to Ismael. Ismael, however, felt uncomfortable bringing home more money than his wife expected. John insisted. Ismael took the money, but was not able to give change to John. He gladly refused and told Ismael to keep it some time. Credit in this context seems to be more valuable than cash, because cash can be shared.

The next strategy is pretense. Apart from creative pensioners who claim immediately at the payout car that they must have dropped the money somewhere and that they are unable to find it, this strategy is mostly applied in the days after. On pension payout day all spectators claim the same thing: “The money will be gone within a week or even tomorrow.” (Anna A., 33yrs, Drimiopsis) and this attitude is strategy and symptom of other strategies at the same time. Surely people are quick to spend the money on food and other necessities, but often the fact that money is quickly spent by the majority is reason enough for the individual to claim impecuniosity. Within a few days after payout most pensioners will insist that they have nothing to share, because “the money is ALWAYS gone after a few days”[25] (Alfons A., 58 yrs, Skoonheid). The claim to have nothing to share is also applied by non-pensioners on a regular basis to avoid sharing: “Maybe whenever I have a lot, I have to share, but with little [food in the house]… no no I cannot [share]”[26] (Carla N., 45 yrs, Drimiopsis). However, graph 3.4.2 indicates that the willingness and success to save money is relatively high, especially among the Non-San and WG3 and WG4.

[25] Translated from Afrikaans: “die geld is ALTYD weg na ‘n paar dae”
[26] Translated from Afrikaans: “As miskien baie is, dan moet ek deel, maar as bitjie… ah ah ek kan nie.”



Graph 3.4.2 Statement-agreement questionnaire items 27-28: Willingness to save recently received money versus the success in doing so.

The avoidance of communication was also among the strategies that I observed. On telling Patrick to go and get his friends as we had cooked too much rice, he simply claimed that he was hungry enough to finish the pot by himself. At a different occasion Jan K. (28 yrs, Drimiopsis) complained that no-one had informed him the other day that the neighboring farmer was handing out free meat. He explained that having no family meant no sharing and therefore no information whatsoever on what was going on in the location. This stands in direct contradiction with the observations of Lee & Hurlich: “Just as the !Kung and other hunter-gatherers place a high value on sharing and reciprocity of food, so do they emphasize sharing and reciprocity of information.” (1982: 334).

What do these observations imply for the discussion of sharing norms? First, an interpretation of sharing norms as *Verhaltensgleichförmigkeit* would lead to the conclusion that sharing avoidance is the norm and not sharing itself. Second, sharing norms as *Verhaltensforderung* implicates that the role of norm-sender (share-demander) and norm-receiver (share-avoider) significantly influences the value of the norm. The fact that there is almost no household in Skoonheid without a pension receiver on payout day annuls the right to demand a share beyond the household structures and the obligation to positively respond. Third, *Verhaltensbewertung* is the only way that sharing could be seen as a norm in this context as people do complain about stingy community members. However, they are unwilling to go beyond the discursive level, because of their own stinginess. Fourth, sharing avoidance is obviously tolerated, which again puts the function and effectiveness of sanctions into question.

3.5 Searching for Norms: Are There Sanctioning Mechanisms?

> *For example[27], like those people, the old people, that was living in the bush... if something like that [somebody being unwiling to share] happened, they used to talk and understand each other. They will maybe take a grandmother or someone to talk to him or her, to change... peacefully. And nowadays, if somebody do something like asking someone and the other one say 'No', so the other day he will not understand... start making like coming out of violence. Ja, it will start in a fight. (Karl L., 52 yrs, from Skoonheid; through translator from Ju/'hoansi).*

The previous sections have put into question whether sharing can be regarded as a social norm on the resettlement farms. This question is connected to the existence of sanctions, which according to Spittler are a prerequisite for the effectiveness of norms:

> *Sanktionen sind nicht einfach Nachteile. Auch Abweichungen von Bräuchen haben nachteilige Konsequenzen. Von Sanktionen sprechen wir nur dann, wenn durch Reaktion gezeigt wird, daß das abweichende Verhalten nicht hingenommen wird. […] Eine Reaktion nennen wir nur dann Sanktion, wenn sie der Normbrecher zu spüren bekommt. Mißbilligungsäußerungen, die nur gegenüber Dritten geäußert werden, oder innere Mißbilligung sind keine Sanktionen." (Spittler 1967: 27).*

Quantitative methods to test the existence of sanctions in ethnography demand a lot of creativity and the application of interdisciplinary approaches. To develop vignette surveys or large-scale economic games next to the obligatory qualitative methods was not possible in the short amount of time that I was able to invest in the field. Therefore, the following observations and considerations must suffice at this point.

In the weeks after my sunglasses vanished I refused to hand out oranges to Patrick and his friends, not only because I was upset with them, but also because I wanted to test them for sanctions. As expected, they uttered their disappointment, but no real sanctions like pranks or rude behavior followed. Often people asked for money, petrol or airtime and the longer I stayed, the more I tended to refuse with reference to my own lack of the like. If any of the people that I turned down executed sanctions that went beyond a frown or a short statement of regret, I did not notice them.

This is not to say that the people in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis do not know how to sanction an outsider like me for supposedly inappropriate behavior. It is almost impossible to stay in Skoonheid and get acquainted with its people without upsetting those who do not like each other. On several occasions I was caught between the lines of inter-personal and inter-family conflicts, which resulted in the refusal of interviews, strategic tardiness and misinformation. These sanctions, however, were never directly connected with declined sharing demands.

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[27] Translated from Afrikaans: "Soos vorbeeld"

Apart from Karl's very dramatic description above, my observations were confirmed by most interview partners. Aleksia J. (40 yrs, Drimiopsis) explained that there was no need for anger when a sharing demand was turned down even if there is plenty of food in the house. I asked Clara N. what people do when they are told that there is no food in the house for sharing. She responded: "What can you do? Just go to the next house! We cannot talk badly about each other."[28] Anja G., however, described the following scene: "When you go and ask for something, he will tell you there is nothing. As soon as you leave, gossip starts behind your back. Then they say: 'That woman never gives to me, why should I give to her?'"[29]. In this case the demand itself is sanctioned and it seems that the only way of sanctioning sharing refusal is the reversed refusal of the like. This is, however, conditioned by the availability of deniable capital, which is not the case for a majority of people in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis.

The means to sanction are a critical element in this discussion. In most economic games, testing the willingness to sanction the behavior of others, the participants need to invest a certain amount of their capital to execute punishment (Lesorogol 2007: 920). In some game setups not every participant is able to punish, but is assigned with this ability by the game supervisor. Similar conditions exist in the resettlements and the question arises: Who is officially responsible for sanctions?

Looking at sanctions beyond the sharing discourse, it can be noted that new coercive powers have been established and reformed in Namibia by different political regimes in the recent century. These powers also influenced the former hunter-gatherers and their egalitarian structures. One of the leveling mechanisms that Woodburn discussed in "Egalitarian Societies" but ceased to mention in later contributions is the "access to means of coercion" (1982: 436). He explains that the availability of lethal weapons in hunter-gatherer societies and the widespread ability and willingness to kill another human in secret or with the toleration of society creates a powerful leveling mechanism against individual ambitions for wealth, power and prestige.

Today this leveling mechanism is opposed by the law and the power of the state who executes it. Those who might have been raised on egalitarian principles are now committing a crime should they take the law into their own hands. Incidences of violence and even murder may have occurred during my stay in Skoonheid, but they were usually the product of alcoholic rage and less of cunning ambushes. In the case of a serious dispute the

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[28] Translated from Afrikaans: "Wat kan 'n mens doen? Hy moet ander huis toe gaan! Ons mag nie sleg mekaar praat nie."

[29] Translated from Afrikaans: "As jy iets gaan vra by hom, hy ou jou klaar. As jy net gaan dan begin skinder agter jou. Dan sê hulle 'die vrou ou mos nie vir my, hoekom ou ek vir haar?"

inhabitants of Skoonheid usually call upon the committee members, the chief, or sometimes the police in Epukiro R.C. to solve the problem. The authority of Chief Langman, however, is contested as soon as Non-San are involved and even some local San do not accept him as a leader.

Taking this discussion back to the issue of sharing I hypothesize the following. According to Woodburn, egalitarian hunter-gatherers were able to control all significant aspects of social life through norms that were enforced by sanctions if necessary. The ability to sanction with regard to criminal misbehavior was then seized by state-based coercive powers and thereby caused instability in the social sanctioning system as a whole. This is not to say that the San have lost their willingness and ability to sanction normative misbehavior, but their normative system and the interconnected sanctions have been redefined by the surrounding societies. Sharing is not enforced by sanctions and it also is not an effective leveling mechanism in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis. Therefore, based on field observations and theoretical considerations, I argue that normative sharing as part of an egalitarian hunter-gatherer ideology is actually over.

3.6 Economic Consequences: The Same Destiny as the Ik?

"Sharing is over!" may lead to associations with Colin Turnbull's book "The Mountain People" (1972). Turnbull spent two years in Northern Uganda living among the Ik, who had been resettled to the mountains outside of Kidepo National Park where they originally lived around Mount Morungole as hunter-gatherers. In the account of his field research he describes a group of people that has turned from a stereotypical hunter-gatherer society full of harmony and solidarity into loveless and selfish individuals, which have even abandoned affections of kinship.

> *But in the crisis of survival facing the Ik, the family was one of the first institutions to go, and the Ik as a society have survived. They still insist on living in villages even though the villages have nothing that could be called a truly social structure, for they encompass no social life, and despite the fact that members of a village mistrust and fear each other more than any others, in direct proportion to their proximity and completely without regard to family and kinship. The mistrust begins even within the compound, between a man and his wife, and between each of them and their children. (133f).*

In Ik society children are abandoned by their parents at the age of three and they are forced to join bands of other children and teenagers in their search for food. In these bands they experience betrayal, suppression and learn other social-Darwinist qualities that they need in order to survive. Old people are not supported by their children and are left to die of hunger and thirst. The use of violence and deception to steal even the smallest bit of food from a relative or neighbor has been explained by Turnbull like this:

> *It seems that they have come to a recognition of what they accept as man's basic selfishness, of his natural determination to survive as an individual before all else. This they consider to be man's basic right, and at least they have the decency to allow others to pursue that right to the best of their ability without recrimination and blame. (182).*

As cause of this negative transformation he designates the forced expulsion from an environment of natural and spiritual richness and the resettlement into a region tormented by drought and inter-ethnic violence. The changes in subsistence based on the establishment of agriculture, cattle raiding and trading with surrounding groups may also have provoked the change in society.

Many of Turnbull's descriptions and theoretical assumptions about the origin and structure of Ik society have been falsified or have at least been subject to legitimate discussions based on methodological criticism (Barth 1974, Wilson *et al*. 1975) and more accurate empirical findings (Heine 1985). However, he illustrates in a dramatic but plausible way the conception that environment, economy, spirituality and social cohesion are so tightly connected that the disturbance of just a single one of them may cause a whole system to collapse.

In this case, Turnbull's account of the Ik and a comparison with characteristics of the Omaheke San functions as a bridgehead for the analysis of the connection between sharing and economic performance. The approach that both groups used to be hunter-gatherers which were eventually resettled is too simplistic, however. This would not do justice to the political complexities and the different historical trajectories that have entangled these groups. However, their subsequent subsistence change towards agriculture is of importance as it also brought the confrontation with delayed return.

Their resettled status has forced them to develop a new system of inter-ethnic cooperation. Interestingly, both Ik and some San groups have similar creation myths in which their role as marginalized group in such an inter-ethnic system is expressed:

> *During the creation God gave the Dodos and Turkana cattle, so they always have food. But he also gave them the spear, so they kill. God gave the Ik the nakut, or digging stick, and told them not to kill. But he also gave them nyeg, hunger. That is why, my saintly old informants never failed to tell me, it was the duty of everyone else to give the Ik cows, goats, sugar, tobacco, and lots of money. (Turnbull 1972: 186).*

> *The Hai||om woman found an iron [bar] and a hoe. But then the white woman snatched [tsabu] the iron from her and stole [|ã] it. And the Owambo woman grabbed the hoe. Hence the Hai||om woman was left with a wooden stick only, which she sharpened to use for digging out bush food […] that is why the Owambo now have gardens and millets [sãu-e]. And that is why the white people have the store and machines while the Hai||om gather bush food. (Widlok 1999: 47).*

These myths do not only express the interconnectedness of subsistence mode and marginalization. They mirror an identity system of learned helplessness and acceptance of an inferior status. Actually, many people in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis talk positively about their role during Apartheid as farm laborers, trackers and housemaids. When asked, most of them would choose a life as laborers for the *baas* rather than returning to foraging in the bush.

Turnbull's Ik uphold a gift-exchange network that resembles the *hxaro* of the !Kung and they uphold a sharing ethos solely based on discursive practices and less on actual exchanges of support. Both groups have a wide repertoire of sharing avoidance tactics.

> *While they still retain the quaint old-fashioned notion that man should share with his fellows, they place the individual good above all else and almost demand that each get away with as much as he can without his fellows knowing. […] What was not seen by the others did not belong to them. I began to see why the Ik did not go in and out of each other's compounds, and why these seemed even more tightly shut off from each other than the village as a whole was from the outside. In building these fortresses they were defending themselves not from some outside enemy, but from each other. (Turnbull 1972: 101).*

However, there are also significant differences between the Ik and the people of Skoonheid and Drimiopsis, the first being the persistence of affectionate social structures. The Ik have reduced the family to its economic advantages and disadvantages. For the people in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis it remains an institution of moral obligation and affectionate connectedness. This is the case for all people on the resettlement farms and not only for those who claim hunter-gatherer heritage. Although the final argument of the previous section was that sharing can no longer be seen as a social norm in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis, their inhabitants are yet far from the Ik's destiny. This is also due to differences in their history. The Ik were resettled, forced to practice agriculture and in that context their society's norms began to fall apart. For the Omaheke San there is no such clear-cut order of events. They were incorporated into new cultural and economic systems several times in the past centuries and when they finally were resettled to Skoonheid and Drimiopsis their identity as San was once again redefined by external and internal forces (see sections 1.2 and 3.7).

The most important difference in this context concerns the economic correlations and the argument structure that is derived from them. In the case of the Ik the collapse of their economy caused a collapse of society. With regard to the Omaheke San, the causal chain and argument structure is reversed: the resettlement process got stuck in economic disappointment and the question arises whether this was due to socio-normative structures of sharing. In the research setup it was argued that stronger sharing norms among the San than amongst other groups of the area could be an explanation for their weak eco-

nomic performance. Now that it was found that sharing cannot be regarded as a social norm anymore, different potential explanations must be reconsidered.

The San deserve that their role as passive victims of surrounding societies is questioned to a certain extent. The missing differences between the sharing practices of the San and their neighbors do not necessarily imply that they have fallen victim to external pressures. It could very well be that the surrounding groups adapted certain norms from the San and therefore there is little difference between them. However, looking at historical developments, the field evidence on avoidance strategies, missing sanctioning mechanisms and the schism between discourse and practice this scenario remains unlikely.

What does the persistence or the abandonment of sharing norms imply for economic performance? Biesele & Hitchcock have observed among resettled Ju/'hoansi in Nyae Nyae area that "When people refused to share the few resources that they were able to obtain, reciprocity systems were disrupted and social tensions increased" (2011: 10). In this case the abandonment of sharing constitutes an economic disadvantage while the original argument of this paper was based on the assumption that sharing in a delayed-return system of wage labor and agriculture inhibits economic progress:

> *[M]any !Kung are really torn between the desire to accumulate goods and the desire to remain within a secure system of mutual help. It is not uncommon to see a person work hard for a while, accumulate goods, come under more and more pressure to give them away in hxaro, and finally give in and redistribute them […] partially because the ideology of generosity and equality is such a strong force in !Kung life. A person who has been stingy for too long feels miserable. (Wiessner 1982: 82).*

Two items (29-30) on the statement-agreement questionnaire aimed to find out how sharing demands by society influence the effort that people invest in their own economic success. Item 29 asked them whether they were willing to increase their work effort in order to meet an increase of demands by other people. Item 30 asked them to indicate whether an increase of sharing demands caused loss of motivation (moral resignation) in them. The first item resulted in a relatively high agreement rate among all relevant contrast groups, except for WG3. The degree of resignation was generally lower than the willingness to increase effort. However, by subtracting the values of item 30 from those of item 29, two groups indicate significantly higher values than the others. This means that the Non-San and WG4 have an economically more convenient attitude with regard to the equilibrium of motivation and resignation.



Graph 3.6.1 Effort increase versus resignation upon increase of sharing demands.

It seems that the disadvantage of the San lies in the fact that they hold on to a discourse which creates sharing as one ideal part of their culture. However, this does not correspond to their needs and actual motivation. As graph 3.6.1 shows, it is not the San who are highly motivated to increase their work effort, but the Non-San and those who have already been successful in the accumulation of relative wealth (i.e. WG4). The San are caught between a sharing discourse and non-sharing practice. There is no fully working reciprocal system, no working egalitarian leveling-mechanism, but a discourse that still constructs an ideal of San culture. This study does not aim – and never has – solely to blame the San's sharing discourse for their poor economic performance, but this discursive construct which obviously lacks the conviction to turn it into practice is surely not an advantage.

3.7 Apartheid's Legacy: Ethnic Divides Block Sharing and Progress

John K. was among the first people that I became acquainted with in Skoonheid and he was also among the first to be resettled to Skoonheid in 1993. Talking about that time, he mentions that he did not yet have a beard when he arrived, obviously referring to it as a proof of increased maturity today. He explains that Skoonheid gave him the opportunity to create something out of nothing. At first sight this statement might seem confusing as his family is amongst those who struggle the most in Skoonheid in terms of money and local politics. However, when one gets to know the story of his life before Skoonheid, it quickly

becomes clear why he is so passionate about the few positive developments of the past decades.

His parents were farm laborers who had to regularly change their place of employment in Omaheke Region. Moving with them he started farm work at an early age. Then, in 1981 he was recruited as a tracker and later also as a sharpshooter by the South-West African Territorial Force (SWATF), who had started recruiting San in 1974 (Hurlich & Lee 1982: 335) by the command of the South African Defense Forces (SADF): "A significant reason for military recruitment was the belief that Bushmen were 'natural' trackers and thus would be effective counterinsurgency operatives" (Gordon 2000b: 2). He was involved in the guerilla war between the South African colonial forces and the nationalist forces of the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) until 1987. "I hunted Wambos."[30] is all he says when he is asked about his former job description. Eventually, three bullets of a SWAPO soldier hit his shoulder and stomach. He survived and was brought to South Africa for three months of medical rehabilitation. He lost a kidney and currently suffers from back aches, which enables him to receive a monthly pension from the government since late 2014. After his time in the army he survived with small jobs in Gobabis area until he finally moved to Drimiopsis and was resettled to Skoonheid in 1993.

Unlike many others he is able to talk about his war experiences and shares them with his children and friends. When asked how he feels today about the things he had to do in the war he looks at the ground and says: "Now I do not know if it was good. All what I did was a job. That is what you have to understand. That is how it came and now it is over. […] Well, let bygones be bygones."[31] At the presidential elections in 2014 he supported SWAPO as he is thankful for the support that he received from the government. Furthermore, he insists that the racial divides of Apartheid's legacy have to be abandoned to focus on the struggle against unjust hierarchies in Skoonheid: "We cannot stay with Damaras and San on different sides. We have to live and work together. Not separate!"[32]

In fact, John is among the few San in Skoonheid, who openly criticize the chief's family for supposedly abusing their power and his dismissive perspective on the racial divides that characterize the village unfortunately remains an exception. There is almost no issue in Skoonheid that is not based on racial politics, sharing as well:

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[30] Translated from Afrikaans: "Ek was hunting die Bamboes." (i.e. SWAPO soldiers)

[31] Translated from Afrikaans: "Ek weet nou nie: was dit goed? All wat ek gedoen het… dit is 'n werk. Dit moet jy net verstaan. Dit het so gekom en dit is verby. […] Ja, wat verby is verby." Note: The last sentence was also spoken in Afrikaans as a gesture of reconciliation by Nelson Mandela at his inauguration as president of South Africa in 1994.

[32] Translated from Afrikaans: " Ons kan nie Damaras daar en San anderkant bly nie. Ons moet saam bly en saam werk. Nie apart nie!"

> We don't know how Jesus made us. But if another tribe ask something here at this San tribe, they are just giving easily out, but if a San guy go and ask something at another guy, another tribe he will say you are stupid, you don't know how to use it. But it's the same thing that they are asking and they are just given. So that's how slowly how we are not getting along. (Karl L., 52 yrs, from Skoonheid; through translator from Ju/'hoansi).

> The people they are not united. They is in groups. There is a divide. Let me tell you straight: The most of the people are San, but they divided them in themselves. Who are the real Damaras? […] There is none. The other people what they call Damaras, their mother is a real San and only the father is Damara. What shall you call them? […] The San here are divided like the peoples of Israel. They speak one language, but they are tribes, they are divided. […] The difference between the Wambos and the San is in the blood. The San are not cattle people. They is afraid of the west, the cars and so. […] When the outside people are going to the Chief here, he will tell you 'The Damara people want to push us down. They want this place alone here.' But where is the Damara people here, tell me? (James B., 65 yrs, from Skoonheid).

At the end of section 3.6 I mentioned that a fractured sharing ethos cannot be blamed for the economic failure of the resettlement farms alone. This is mostly due to the fact that in many minds the divides of Apartheid time persist and interfere with cooperation-based development. The fate of the San of Omaheke Region has significantly been influenced by Apartheid policy. For centuries it created a mindset of inferiority and after independence the San have remained among the most marginalized groups of Namibia. However, due to the efforts of governmental and non-governmental organizations there are Ju/'hoansi in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis today who are aware of their rights and who are not afraid to accuse suppression. However, the development of a San leadership structure has not only caused problems with reference to the discussion of authentic indigeneity, but also burdens the relationship to their neighbors. Unfortunately, the awareness of suppression is often aimed at the wrong people. Many Non-San citizens of Skoonheid and Drimiopsis suffer from poverty as well and feel patronized by the empowerment discourse and left alone by the government. For instance drought relief is only distributed to San in both resettlements and the Ju/'hoansi leaders accuse everyone who disagrees with them of being aggressors and of having a suppressive attitude.

Those groups, which have been lumped together under the label of 'Non-San' in this thesis for analytical purposes, surely deserve differentiation. Many Nama in the resettlements are not granted a representative identity as they speak the 'Damara-language' (Khoekhoegowab) and therefore receive the label 'Damara'. There are Herero, Kavango and Caprivians who are all labeled 'Wambo' due to their skin color. Those who have par-

ents of different cultural and linguistic origin are often referred to as *basters*[33], which can be both burden and advantage, depending on the person's ability to change identity strategically.

In a nutshell, racial divides and mistrust remain dominant in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis and make interethnic cooperation a difficult challenge to all who try to promote social and economic progress. A common normative system, possibly independent from hunter-gatherer ideologies of sharing, would surely be helpful. For that purpose, the rhetoric of Bird-David's metaphor of inter-connected vessels may be applied, which originally aims to explain hunter-gatherer sharing habits among the Nayaka in South India:

> *[I]magine a series of vessels, independent each of the other, into each of which liquid is poured such that each receives an equal share. Only to the extent that they are similar will the vessels be filled to the same level. In the second case, imagine connected vessels: according to the so-called 'law of connected vessels', should liquid be poured into any one of them, it will flow from one to another until it fills them all to the same level. The vessels themselves need not be the same […]. Without an intentional intervening design, the leveling is attained because they are connected. (Bird-David 2005: 212).*

Going beyond the metaphor's reference to sharing habits it is necessary for the inhabitants of the group resettlement farms to overcome the divides that Apartheid policy created. They need to create their own (normative) inter-connectedness in work effort and return in order to improve their economic situation.

[33] From Afrikaans: "bastard"

4. Two Experiments and a Conclusion

I was approached by the captain of Skoonheid's football team around mid-October. A tournament was to be held next Saturday, but the team had not been able to raise enough money to participate (500 NAD per team), due to delayed salary payments. I was asked to sponsor 400 NAD, but instead chose to conduct a small experiment with the team members to test their sharing avoidance and their willingness to contribute to a common good. I regarded an economic game as a good way to get an insight into this topic although it was of little representative value due to the rather biased sample of informants.

The experiment was conducted on Friday afternoon before the football tournament and lasted for a bit more than one hour. I asked the captain to choose 15 players with good team spirit, who came to Skoonheid's administration building. They were asked to see me in the office one after another. No other persons were present in the office. Each player was given the chance to roll a die and receive the tenfold amount in NAD, so that the minimum amount would be 10 NAD and the maximum amount would be 60 NAD. Afterwards they were asked to decide how much they would like to keep for themselves and how much they would like to give to the team. They were informed that the personal amount would only be paid out one week later while the team's amount would be paid out right after the end of the experiment. The amount that was to be given to the team was written down on a piece of paper and given to the player. The amount that they wanted to keep for themselves was noted on a separate piece of paper that remained with me. I ensured each of them that the other team players would not be able to find out what the individual had rolled or contributed.

As a second step, the amounts were added up in front of all the players and they were asked to discuss the result for ten minutes. After a while, the players were then informed about the total sum that had been set aside and that they would have the chance to contribute to the team for a second time. Those players who wanted to do so came to the office and let me know how much of the money that they had set aside was to be contributed to the team. The full amount was then announced and handed over to the team manager.

In the first round eleven players gave the larger amount of money to the team with eight of them contributing the whole amount that they had received from the die-roll. Three players decided to split the amount in half and one decided to keep the greater amount to himself. Altogether 445 NAD out of possible 540 NAD was contributed by the players to the whole team in the first round. In the second round five players out of the seven who had kept some money aside decided to make another contribution. In the end there was another 55

NAD on the table, so that 500 NAD was given to the team and 40 NAD was left to three individual players.

Before the experiment I expected to find high sharing avoidance in this group, because they had been unable or unwilling to raise enough money for the tournament out of their own funds. Afterwards, my expectations were proven wrong as the majority of players contributed a reasonably large amount to the team rather than keeping most of the money to themselves. Several explanations were tested, ranging from different degrees of willingness to contribute, free-rider psychology and long-term versus short-term orientation. Identity and language seemed to offer no adequate explanation. The few significant differences according to language yielded that the Otjiherero-speakers were the least selfish while the San were the least willing to share.

A few hours later I found a potential explanation for the players' generous behavior. When I asked the coach who would be playing at the tournament, he explained that there was a first team (Team A) and a second team (Team B) and that only the players from the first team would be playing in the tournament as there was only money for one team. I inquired who from the experiment participants played for which team; it turned out that ten (out of 15) were playing for the second team. I assume that the likelihood of playing in the tournament due to the internal structures of the team influenced the experiment's result. In both teams a very small amount was kept by the players for themselves: 7.1% of the available money was held back by Team A and 7.5% was held back by Team B. A significant difference can only be observed comparing first round and second round contributions. It seems that Team B was more willing to contribute in the first round than Team A. Possibly the experiment participants of Team B were hoping to raise enough money for a second team to participate for Skoonheid in the tournament. However, when they realized in the group discussion that the contributed money would only be enough for one team to participate, Team A was willing and able to contribute more, while Team B realized that they could just as well keep the money.

The fact that only one team would be playing caused an intense argument between players and team management. Team A was mostly dominated by Damara, Herero and Wambos while Team B consisted mainly of San. Coach and captain were accused of undermining the San people in the team. This was due to the fact that it had been mostly Team B players who had gained the money in the experiment. After a daylong argument, 300 NAD were raised by the team and I agreed to contribute another 200 NAD, so that both teams were now able to participate in the tournament. This shows that unwillingness to contribute must have been at least partly a reason for the lack of team funds. Team B lost the first game 0:7 while team A made it to the final where they lost 4:1.

The second experiment that I dared to conduct ended even more chaotically and added more turmoil to my reputation as a bush greenhorn in Skoonheid. Inspired by Richard B. Lee's essay "Eating Christmas in the Kalahari" (1969), I decided to give a farewell party to say thank you to the people of Skoonheid for hosting me in the previous months. In his famous essay Lee described how he made a generous gift to the !Kung by buying a well-nourished ox for their Christmas celebrations. However, he experienced that the !Kung ridiculed him and denigrated the meat that he had bought. Further he found out that they did so to everyone who managed to bring valuable food and other goods into the community. It turned out that the !Kung used ridicule and demotion as a protection mechanism against arrogance and pride as Lee's friend Tamazo told him:

> *'Yes, when a young man kills much meat he comes to think of himself as a chief or a big man, and he thinks of the rest of us as his servants or inferiors. We can't accept this. We refuse one who boasts, for someday his pride will make him kill somebody. So we always speak of his meat as worthless. This way we cool his heart and make him gentle.' (Lee 1969: 4).*

Surely the fact that the date chosen for the party, December 6th, marked St. Nicolas Day, which is celebrated as a pre-Christmas event in Germany and other countries, motivated me even more to choose a fat cow for slaughtering and start my own "Eating Christmas in the Omaheke" experiment. My expectations were rather vague as anything similar to Lee's experience seemed unlikely to happen based on my previous observations.

I approached the chairman of Skoonheid's community committee and asked him to find somebody who was willing to sell a cow for slaughtering. Very soon a willing seller was found, the cow was examined and a price was negotiated. However, on that same day I received a couple of puzzling messages from other villagers while buying maize meal for the celebration in Gobabis. They were telling me not to buy the cow, because a group of San gentlemen, including the committee chairman and the seller of the cow, had already made up a plan how to keep Damaras and other Non-San people away from the meat. When I returned to Skoonheid, several San and Damaras told me to cancel the event, because they feared that fighting would start as soon as the cow was led to the slaughtering place. The chairman and others insisted that they had never made such plans and some Damaras produced even more absurd facts about the plan to reserve the meat solely for the San. I knew that arguing would not stop until the deal was canceled. After consulting with trusted people in Skoonheid and the involved NGOs I decided to cancel the

purchase of the cow and to buy 'neutral' *boerewors*[34] from an external farmer. I thought of it as the handiest option when it came to sharing with large groups of people and I hoped that nobody would be able to make special claims on this external purchase. The seller of the cow understood my problem and was happy himself for not being at the center of attention anymore. However, his brother and the chairman seemed to interpret my cancellation of the cow purchase as an offence against all San people of Skoonheid. They told me to cancel the whole event when I approached them for help with the preparations.

Initially, Lee's perspective that the San tried to downplay the meat donation to inhibit my own ambitions could have been applied to this demand. Also the following description by Woodburn might have explained the situation by referring to the lost amount of money that would have enriched the community through the cow purchase:

> *The evidence suggests that people find it exceptionally difficult, even intolerable, to give up or to limit their entitlement to share and equally difficult to accept the wealth or the authority or the superior status of any of their kin, their friends or other members in their own community. (Woodburn 2005: 24).*

By referring to Chief Langman's authority, however, I was told by the chairman to bring the meat to DuPlessis where all the Damaras stayed as I was no friend of the San anymore in his eyes. This demand not only negated his entitlement to a share, but also acknowledged the superior status of one of his kin.

Intense arguments between community members followed and even threats were exchanged in the two days to come: "Here is the problem of the San: when somebody comes to help and say 'Thank you' you tell him to fuck off [vulg.]. That is why the San are doing so badly. You are stupid!"[35] and "The Damaras and Wambos have always suppressed us… that is something that even the Lord does not forgive"[36] were among the less intense sentences that I was able to record[37]. It needs to be mentioned explicitly that this conflict took place only between a few individuals while the rest of the community could not have cared less. In the end I cancelled the official event, but my host Siyaya, his family, friends from the village and I happened to have a 'little' *braai*[38] at the farm house anyway. 70 kilograms of *boerewors* had to be consumed somehow and most passersby

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[34] From Afrikaans: "farmer's sausage"; a popular South African grill sausage made of beef, lamb and sometimes pork or ostrich. In colloquial conversation it is also referred to as 'boerie'.
[35] Translated from Afrikaans: "Dis die problem van die San mense: as iemand kom en wil help en wil 'Dankie' sê, julle maak net 'fuck off'. Daarom is die San mense so swak. Julle is dom!"
[36] Translated from Afrikaans: "Die Damaras en die Wambos het ons altyd onderdruk… dis iets wat selfs die Heere nooit vergewe."
[37] I have refrained from mentioning names or even pseudonyms at this point due to the explosive content.
[38] From Afrikaans: "barbecue / grill"

sat down and got a piece of '*boerie'*, most of them being children. Finally I was able to celebrate St. Nicolas Day in the Omaheke, although it turned out a lot different from what I originally had in mind.

One might suspect that the cow disaster influenced my choice of the thesis title and this is true to a certain extent. It took this final week of my stay to make sense out of the gathered data, because observations and quantitative data differed to such a great extent. I found eventually that sharing has become a matter of identity and racialized politics as both San and Damara in Skoonheid have little solidarity left for one another.

The two experiments show that there is more to sharing than any simplistic or essentialist interpretation can grasp. It is not a simple matter that can be explained by altruism, reciprocity or ideology. It is influenced by circumstances of politics, identities and discursive exchange in an increasingly complicated world: "sharing among humans is best understood as the result of complex forms of interactions" (Widlok 2013: 16).

Returning to the research questions, the discussion of this thesis has shown that sharing in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis may be one of the many tools that individuals and groups use to shape their cultural identity. However, the network analysis revealed a schism between the discursive construction of sharing and actual sharing practice as soon as people outside of the family are concerned. The lack of efficient sanctioning mechanisms showed that sharing may be regarded as a custom and part of an oral tradition but definitely not as a social norm. Therefore I argue that James B. was right when he claimed that "sharing is over".

It was found that there is no significant difference between the San and their neighbors with regard to the application of sharing in common discourse. Other factors are much more dominant than identity (San or Non-San) in the study of sharing norms in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis. Individual wealth, character of the exchanged goods, place of living, and strategic and reciprocal social networks inside and outside of the family play a much more important role in the description of sharing and its economic consequences.

Leaving abstract considerations on sharing behind, it is not easy to find an appropriate final statement for this thesis, which gives concrete perspectives and advice with regard to the economic process in Skoonheid and Drimiopsis. This is due to the complexity of the answers given above. The helpfulness of my field research to the local decision makers will have to be judged by them. Regarding the future of Namibian group resettlements, however, I insist that it will depend to a large extent on the ability of individuals to include inter-cultural cooperation mechanisms into their identity systems. Ending on a quote, it becomes clear that rather outdated ethnographic observations remain up-to-date as long as they are reinterpreted in the context of inter-cultural resettlement conflicts:

Like individuals in any society, foragers have to struggle with their own internal contradictions…. The demands of the collective existence are not achieved effortlessly, but rather they require a continuing struggle to deal with one's own selfish, arrogant and antisocial impulses. (Lee 1982 in Patterson 2006: 60).

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