Universität zu Köln

Franchino, Fabio ORCID: 0000-0001-8774-6494 and Wratil, Christopher ORCID: 0000-0002-7339-9628 (2019). Representing the compromise: How institutions serve government support coalitions in European Union policy making. Eur. J. Polit. Res., 58 (4). S. 1129 - 1152. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1475-6765

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Abstract

This article presents an original model of policy making by multiparty coalitions at the international level. Specifically, it analyses how domestic institutions serve parties in enforcing policy compromises onto national ministers negotiating legislation in the European Union (EU). In contrast to existing research on coalition politics, the model accounts for the benefits of not only legislative but also executive institutions and incorporates opposition parties as pivotal actors under minority governments. Ministers propose policy positions at the EU level that represent domestic coalition compromises when cabinet participation, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight of EU affairs make it cheap for coalition partners to challenge the minister's position and when ideological divisiveness increases the incentive to do so. Statistical analyses of 1,694 policy positions taken by ministers from 22 member states in the Council of the EU provide strong empirical evidence for the model. The results support the claim of executive dominance in EU policy making but also highlight that, where institutions are strong, ministers represent domestic coalition compromises rather than their own positions.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Franchino, Fabio UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-8774-6494 UNSPECIFIED Wratil, Christopher UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-7339-9628 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-129895
DOI:	10.1111/1475-6765.12327
Journal or Publication Title:	Eur. J. Polit. Res.
Volume:	58
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 1129 - 1152
Date:	2019
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1475-6765
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL; KEEPING TABS; EU POLICY; PARTNERS; COUNCIL; RESPONSIVENESS; ALLOCATION; MECHANISMS; POSITIONS; ELECTIONS Multiple languages Political Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/12989