Universität zu Köln

Alos-Ferrer, Carlos ORCID: 0000-0002-1668-9784 and Kern, Johannes (2015). Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games. J. Math. Econ., 61. S. 34 - 58. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0304-4068

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Abstract

Extensive form games modeling continuous-time decisions are plagued with problems of nonexistence and nonuniqueness of outcomes. As a second-best, the literature has imposed extraneous restrictions on the strategy sets, raising questions on the nature and interpretation of the resulting formal object, and on which restrictions are appropriate. We provide a first-best framework, formalizing continuous-time repeated games as extensive form games incorporating natural conditions from the onset. Every strategy profile induces a unique outcome, without any restrictions on the strategy sets. Further, the unrestricted strategy sets are equivalent to a specific class of strategies in a more naively specified continuous-time game. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Alos-Ferrer, Carlos UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-1668-9784 UNSPECIFIED Kern, Johannes UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-385070
DOI:	10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.07.006
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Math. Econ.
Volume:	61
Page Range:	S. 34 - 58
Date:	2015
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication:	LAUSANNE
ISSN:	0304-4068
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language DIFFERENTIAL-GAMES; MODEL Multiple languages Economics; Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/38507