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Alos-Ferrer, Carlos and Netzer, Nick (2015). Robust stochastic stability. Econ. Theory, 58 (1). S. 31 - 58. NEW YORK: SPRINGER. ISSN 1432-0479

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Abstract

A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Alos-Ferrer, Carlos UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Netzer, Nick UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-417989
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-014-0809-z
Journal or Publication Title:	Econ. Theory
Volume:	58
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 31 - 58
Date:	2015
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	NEW YORK
ISSN:	1432-0479
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA; EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY; BOUNDED MEMORY; GAMES; SELECTION; MODEL; DYNAMICS; MUTATION; CHOICE Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/41798