Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012). Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information. Econ. Lett., 117 (3). S. 642 - 646. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-477438 | ||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.016 | ||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Econ. Lett. | ||||||||
Volume: | 117 | ||||||||
Number: | 3 | ||||||||
Page Range: | S. 642 - 646 | ||||||||
Date: | 2012 | ||||||||
Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | ||||||||
Place of Publication: | LAUSANNE | ||||||||
ISSN: | 1873-7374 | ||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
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URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/47743 |
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