Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012). Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information. Econ. Lett., 117 (3). S. 642 - 646. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

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Abstract

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Schmitz, Patrick W.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-477438
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.016
Journal or Publication Title: Econ. Lett.
Volume: 117
Number: 3
Page Range: S. 642 - 646
Date: 2012
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication: LAUSANNE
ISSN: 1873-7374
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
INVESTMENT; GOVERNMENT; RIGHTSMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/47743

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