Schmitz, Patrick W. ORCID: 0000-0003-3461-5102 (2021). On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries. Econ. Lett., 202. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Consider a buyer and a seller who have agreed to trade an intermediate good. It is ex-post efficient to adapt the good to the prevailing state of the world. The seller has private information about the costs of adapting the good. In the case of non-integration, the buyer has no possibility to verify claims that the seller makes about her costs. In the case of vertical integration, the buyer can verify evidence about the costs that the seller might be able to provide. Even though we assume no further differences between the ownership structures, it turns out that the parties may prefer non-integration. (c) 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by- nc- nd/4.0/).
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-573583 | ||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109823 | ||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Econ. Lett. | ||||||||
Volume: | 202 | ||||||||
Date: | 2021 | ||||||||
Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | ||||||||
Place of Publication: | LAUSANNE | ||||||||
ISSN: | 1873-7374 | ||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||
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URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/57358 |
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