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To labor, love and peace….

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to develop a number of theoretical ideas about the emergence of the predominant party system in Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government from 2002 to 2015. A predominant party system emerges when a party wins at least three elections in a row by more than a 10 percent margin and forms the government alone. I argue that the expansion of clientelist networks under the AKP government has twofold ramifications, which in turn have reproduced the cycle of dominance. First, it strengthened voters' partisan identification. Second, it changed voters' ideology such that they became less resistant to or even supportive of neoliberal reforms. The conclusions are based on fieldwork in one of the poorest and most densely populated districts of Istanbul, Bağcılar.

1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION*[1]

How did Turkey's party system, long characterized by high fragmentation, volatility and polarization, turn into the predominant party system? Why has the urban poor, once the major constituency of social democrats, realigned with the neoliberal AKP? How does the everyday functioning of clientelism change in the urban setting? How does clientelism affect the partisan identification and ideological positioning of clients? This dissertation aims to address these questions based on ethnographic fieldwork in one of Istanbul's poorest and most densely populated districts, Bağcılar.

Coming to power in 2002, the AKP is now enjoying the longest period of one-party government in modern Turkey. To date, the party has won all legislative elections by a wide margin. While the vote share of the AKP was around 34 percent in 2002, it reached 49 percent in 2011 and the November 2015 snap elections. The AKP has performed similarly in the local elections as well and typically has dominated Central and Eastern Anatolia, the Black Sea and metropolitan areas, including Istanbul and Ankara.

The AKP's electoral success has drawn huge scholarly interest. The dominance has widely been discussed within the framework of the Islamization (for example, Eligür, 2010; Hale & Özbudun, 2009; Tuğal, 2009; Yeşilada & Rubin, 2011) and neoliberal transformation debates (for example, Bozkurt, 2013; Atasoy, 2009; Gümüşçü, 2010; Öniş & Şenses, 2009). This electoral dominance has not been widely addressed within the framework of the dominant party literature, however. There are a few superficial exceptions (cf. Ayan-Musil, 2015; Çarkoğlu, 2011; Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012), but they do not advance a theory of dominant party politics either. This study aims to fill this gap.

In this study, I first clarify the widely used, but weakly operationalized concept of "predominant party system." An overview of the literature suggests that authors have used a variety of labels to refer to the same phenomenon or the same set of cases

[1] *Some sections of this thesis are (for example, conceptual, theoretical, empirical and comparative sections) part of manuscripts currently under revision in scholarly journals.

without sufficient logical consistency. The labels include: predominant party system (Sartori, 2005); dominant party system (Dunleavy, 2010; Greene, 2007; Templeman, 2012); dominant-power politics (Carothers, 2002); single-party dominance (Pempel, 1990); one-party dominant state (Scheiner, 2006); hegemonic party autocracy (Magaloni, 2006); and dominant party regime (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Reuter & Remington, 2009).

This diversity of labels illustrates the notion of "conceptual stretching" (Sartori, 1970). To avoid that, I revisit the concept of predominant party system as presented in Sartori's seminal book, Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis (1976[2005]).

Because the confusion that plagues the concept of predominant party system largely stems from overlooking overlaps with associated concepts, I adopt a threefold strategy. First, I distinguish between the "dominant party*"* and the 'predominant party system'. Drawing on Sartori's framework, I argue that a dominant party system emerges "if a party wins at least three consecutive elections in a competitive political environment by more than a ten per cent margin and forms the government alone." I believe that this definition has distinct analytical utility, because it disqualifies, for instance, the Social Democratic Party (SAP) in Sweden and the Christian Democracy (DC) party in Italy, which were dominant parties, but were unable to transform the party system into a predominant party system, because they could not form a government alone.

In a second step, I seek to distinguish between predominant party system and the neighboring concept of "hegemonic party system." The distinction is between a party system that would (predominant party system) and one that would not (hegemonic party system) allow the existence of antagonist parties, as well as the alternation of power.

Finally, I connect the predominant party system to the political regime type. I contend that a predominant party system emerges only in a regime that permits a certain level of competition and allows government alternation. In most cases, predominant party systems allow "meaningful*,"* but "unfair*"* elections. While the

former deters a search for alternative channels of political struggle, such as boycotts and violent protests challenging the ruling party, the latter marks the existence of elements, including clientelism, that level the political field in favor of the ruling party (Greene, 2007).

After defining the concept of "predominant party system," the next task is to highlight the theories that account for its emergence and maintenance. I show that, although several theoretical frameworks (for example, institutional theory, social cleavage theory, and performance legitimacy theory) are relevant in explaining dominant party politics, resource theory has more explanatory power when it comes to understanding the AKP's grip on power.

Developed by Greene (2007) in his insightful book on the PRI in Mexico, resource theory posits that the predominant party system will sustain itself if the incumbent commands public resources (for example, secret line items and patronage jobs) and politicizes the bureaucracy. The cycle of dominance is likely to break down only if there is a severe economic downturn that shrinks public resources and curbs the room to maneuver of the public institutions.

I suggest a minor revision to resource theory, however. I contend that the privatization of public institutions does not necessarily undermine dominant party rule. On the contrary, privatization may foster dominance. The AKP case shows that the cronies who are nurtured through privatizations may well compensate for shrinking public resources during times of economic turmoil (such as the 2008 financial crisis).

The central concept of resource theory is clientelism. As Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007, p. 2) suggest, clientelism is a "transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services." Here, I should emphasize that direct payment is not common in Turkey.

Although clientelism is a historically-rooted phenomenon in Turkey and has played a major role in mobilizing the voters at the polls, it has not been studied sufficiently. As far as I can see, the existing scholarship has severe drawbacks. First, existing studies are mostly descriptive and repetitive; that is, they merely postulate how clientelism spread to urban areas in a historical context. Although recent additions

based on a quantitative approach (for example, Aytaç, 2014), list experiments (for example, Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2015), or formal modelling (for example, Kemahlıoğlu, 2005) have considerably enhanced our understanding of clientelism, they do not shed light on its mechanics and structure. Second, the interplay of clientelism, neoliberalism, and Islam has remained virtually untouched. Finally and more importantly, with a few notable exceptions (for example, Kemahlıoğlu, 2005), the literature lacks comparative findings that would situate the AKP experience in a cross-national perspective, highlighting its peculiarities and similarities with other cases.

In order to improve our understanding of clientelism, this study first focuses on the prevailing features of clientelism in Turkey. To start with, clientelism primarily targets the urban poor and the devout bourgeoisie. While the latter replaced the nationalist-secular bourgeoisie as patrons, the former have been added to village dwellers as clients. Second, clientelism is leader- rather than broker-mediated. This expresses the absence of strong brokers who command their own resources, thereby, enjoying autonomy from the party. I observe that clientelist exchange is guaranteed by the charismatic leader, whose image is constructed and propagated by the partisan media. Third, there is a division of labor among the patrons that take part in clientelist exchange. To illustrate, while the Ministry of Family and Social Policies explicitly targets the disabled and the elderly, the municipalities predominantly target the poor. Fourth, in stark contrast to other Islamic countries in which the Islamic-rooted parties could not adapt themselves to neoliberal programs (for example, Egypt and Tunisia), clientelism has been nurtured in line with the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. Fifth, clientelism is a problem-solving strategy for distinct classes (Auyero, 2001). To illustrate, while clientelism secures food for the poor, it is an instrument for doing business for construction companies. Sixth, Islam constitutes a non-material aspect of clientelism in Turkey; that is to say, Islam is the cement that assembles different classes under the clientelist machine. Similarly, it deters exit from the clientelist network. Finally, clientelism hinges on sectarian rather than ethnic exclusion. This implies that, while the clientelist network includes the overwhelming majority of Kurds, because they predominantly vote for the AKP – at least in the case of the urban

poor – it excludes Alevites because of their historical alliance with the social democrats.

Having highlighted the features of clientelism in Turkey, this study reveals the mechanism that connects clientelism to voters. In doing so, I question the widely recognized "clientelism automatically brings votes" argument, on at least two grounds. First, after receiving clientelist benefits, voters may easily vote for another party because voting is secret (Szwarcberg, 2015). Second and more importantly, if clientelism automatically brings votes, then the predominant party system would have emerged long before the advent of the AKP, given that clientelism is a strong feature of Turkish politics.

What then is the mechanism that keeps clients as loyal supporters of the incumbent AKP? I put forward the following hypothesis. Taking part in clientelist exchange boosts partisan identification and fosters the neoliberalization of Islamic ideology, which then reproduces the cycle of dominance.

To be more specific, clientelism strengthens partisan identification, which has historically been very weak in Turkey. I observe that strong partisan identification has three ramifications. First, it leads to the reading of political issues through the eyes of the party leadership. This explains why partisan polarization increasingly dominates religious and ethnic polarization. Second, it leads to the proliferation of "*hostile partisanship*." And third, it leads to the rise of partisan identification as a superior identity over traditionally dominant identities (for example, religious community identity).

In addition, clientelism prompts ideological change, namely neoliberalization of Islamic ideology. This apparently entails more complex processes and has drawn great scholarly interest (cf. Tuğal, 2009), although not in the context of clientelism. This transformation is crucial to understanding how Islam and neoliberalism, which have been widely imagined to be incompatible, are intermingled and harmonized. In the same vein, such a transformation is crucial to explaining why poor people have not only not resisted, but in fact have wholeheartedly embraced the neoliberal reforms that have undermined their material well-being. Third, this accounts for why Islamist

voters who tended to vote for more conservative parties or who long boycotted the elections aligned/re-aligned with the AKP.

1.1. Comparative cases

The established literature on clientelism has suffered extensively from "parochialism" (Sartori, 1991) arising from excessive reliance on single-case studies (Piattoni, 2001). In order to avoid that, this paper includes a comparative chapter. Relying on the secondary literature and the reports of both public and private institutions that compile regular data on similar cases in Mexico, Taiwan, India, and Japan, I investigate the role of clientelism in the emergence and maintenance of the predominant party system. I find that if brokers are strong and vote buying is prevalent, it is likely that partisan identification will not become stronger over time and ideological change (if prompted by the dominant party) will remain weak.

1.2. Method and fieldwork

To date, scholars have used a wide range of methods (for example, quantitative approaches, formal modelling, surveys, and ethnography) to understand and measure clientelism. Each method has its own drawbacks. For instance, because clientelism is informal, unwritten, and personal, using proxies (quantitatively) and surveys would potentially provide biased and unreliable information (Muno, 2010).

This study explicitly rests on an ethnographic approach. In comparison with alternative methods, ethnography is a good way to observe clientelist exchange in daily life and build a bottom-up theory from it. Within the ethnographic approach, my method is participant observation, which requires ethnographers to participate in relevant activities with the subjects and observe their behavior.

In this framework, I conducted field research in Istanbul's peripheral district of Bağcılar. The selection of Bağcılar was based on the following rationale. First, the AKP wins the highest number of votes in the districts of Istanbul, averaging more than

50 percent since 2002. Second, Bağcılar is the stronghold of Islamic groups, which makes it a good laboratory in which to observe their changing voting behavior.

The fieldwork was carried out between November 2017 and April 2018. Based on the "Interview Guide," presented in Appendix I, I conducted 60 interviews with partisans, municipality and party workers, and the *mukhtar* (see Appendix II for the detailed information about the interviewees). The interviews took place in different places, including the party and municipality buildings and cafés.

Conducting research in Bağcılar unavoidably had some difficulties. First and foremost, it involved security risks because of Bağcılar's high crime rate. Second, mounting partisan polarization and the state of emergency, which was in force during the fieldwork, made it difficult for my target group to express their views comfortably. Therefore, after conducting a number of individual interviews, I shifted to "group interviews." The logic was that if partisans saw others who vote for the same party, they would feel more secure and comfortable. The change in strategy worked well. In addition, in order not to discourage partisans, I did not record the interviews. Neither did I ask for detailed personal information that could identify the interviewees or make them feel uncomfortable.

I must also note that the fieldwork was special for me. This is because I grew up in Bağcılar. This facilitated my task in the following ways. First, being familiar with the field meant that I was familiar with the people whom I needed to talk to and observe. This acquaintance substantially reduced the time needed to find key informants and interviewees. Second and even more importantly, the fact that an "insider" was doing the research allowed me to capture long-term phenomena, such as the changing ideology of the voters.

1.3. Contributions and output

This study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, it contributes to the literature on political parties by using a new three-pillar strategy to tackle the pervasive conceptual confusion relating to a predominant party system.

Second, this study will be the first of its kind to analyze the emergence of the dominant party system in Turkey in a cross-national perspective. Third, this study differs from the existing works with its empirical foci. While recent studies have explored the interaction of clientelism with "ethnicity" (for example, Akdağ, 2014) or investigates instances of "patronage" (for example, Kemahlıoğlu, 2012), "public procurement law" (for example, Gürakar, 2016) or "Conditional Cash Transfer" (for example, Aytaç, 2014), this study seeks to examine the interplay between clientelism, Islam, and neoliberalism. Fourth, this study is unique in terms of its ethnographic approach. An overview of the literature suggests that there is hardly any ethnographic work on the functioning of clientelism in Turkey. Last but not least, the timing and space of the fieldwork must be highlighted. Above all, the fieldwork was carried out in the aftermath of the July 2016 failed coup attempt (November 2017 to April 2018), when the authoritarian character of the AKP government was very tangible. Regarding the space of the fieldwork, because most people living in Istanbul have never been in Bağcılar because of its peripheral location and notoriety, it was stimulating to do research there.

1.4. Plan

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides an introduction. Chapter 2 clarifies the concept of "predominant party system." Chapter 3 evaluates different theoretical perspectives to try to explain the emergence of the predominant party system and to justify the supremacy of resource theory over alternatives. Chapter 4 traces party system change in Turkey. Chapter 5 examines the AKP government with reference to its Islamic and neoliberal character, the amalgam of which makes clientelism work smoothly. It also briefly highlights the electoral performance of the AKP. Chapter 6 presents the empirical findings, drawing on fieldwork in Bağcılar. Chapter 7 extends the argument to the cases of Japan, India, Mexico, and Taiwan. Chapter 8 concludes.

2. CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK*

This chapter revisits the concept of predominant party system, drawing on Sartori's framework. Scholars have used a plethora of labels to refer to the same phenomenon or the same set of cases: "predominant party system" (Sartori, 2005); "dominant party system" (Dunleavy, 2010; Greene, 2007; Templeman, 2012); "dominant-power politics" (Carothers, 2002); "single-party dominance" (Pempel, 1990); "one-party dominant state" (Scheiner, 2006); "hegemonic party autocracy" (Magaloni, 2006); and "dominant party regime" (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Reuter & Remington, 2009). Even if it is true that party systems are closely linked to regime or polity types, the arbitrary use of the concept inevitably leads to conceptual stretching.

In order to achieve conceptual clarity in this framework, I adopt a threefold strategy. First, I distinguish between the dominant party and the predominant party system and unequivocally concentrate on the latter. The logic behind this strategy is straightforward: A dominant party by itself does not make the party system a predominant one (Sartori, 2005). Prominent examples include the Christian Democracy (DC)-led coalition governments in post-war Italy and the Social Democratic Party (SAP)-led coalition governments in Sweden. As a second step, I distinguish between predominant party systems, which belong to competitive politics, and hegemonic party systems, which do not. Finally, I briefly relate predominant party systems to regime types and conclude that they are observed only in hybrid and democratic regimes.

2.1. The party and the party systems

In order to account for any type of "party system," one should start from defining a "party."[2] An overview of the literature suggests that the political party

2 As Sartori (2005, p. 57) argues, it seems inadvisable to analyze the party systems "unless we establish what is not a party, and unless we are clearheaded about the essential what for of parties."

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literature is quite old: Ostrogorski (1902); Michels (1911); Schattschneider (1942); Key, (1949); Duverger (1954); La Palombara & Weiner (1966); Lipset & Rokkan (1967); Sartori ([2005]1976); Aldrich (1995); Ware (1996); and Katz & Crotty (2006).[3] As widely argued (cf. Schattschneider, 1942; Ware, 1996; Penning & Lane, 2005; Katz & Crotty, 2006), political parties are central to the political systems. Although there has been growing skepticism about the validity of this argument in recent years (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010; Diamond & Gunther, 2001, p. ix), it is evident that in all modern polities – except the few partyless (for example, dynasties in the Gulf region) and anti-party polities (for example, military regimes) – political parties are the major institutions driving the political process.

Parties perform numerous functions: they aggregate interests; identify goals (ideology and program); recruit elites; form and sustain the government; integrate (participation, socialization, mobilization), persuade, and deliberate (Von Beyme, 1985, p. 13; Bardi & Mair, 2008, p. 117; Key, 1964: 43; Sartori, 2005: 25; Diamond & Gunther, 2001, n.p. ; Macridis, 1967, p. 17; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 91). In order to carry out these broad tasks, parties have developed complex institutional/organizational structures, such as mass parties[4] after World War Two or catch-all parties[5] since the early 1970s.

The rule of thumb is that wherever they are institutionalized, political parties do not function on their own; rather, they influence and are influenced by the environment in which they operate. This is where parties are connected to party systems.

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[3] Despite the volume of scholarship, the disagreement on how to define, categorize, and conceptualize political parties has persisted (Maisel & Cooper, 1978, p. 10).

4 The mass party was based on workers' mass membership. The members equally finance the party through contributions. It has a well-disciplined and strong leadership (Duverger, 1954).

5 The rise of "catch-all parties" (Kirscheimer, 1966) or "professional electoral parties" (Panebianco, 1988) coincided with the decline of ideology, party membership and class politics and the increasing salience of the party leadership and the interest groups in shaping politics (Kirscheimer, 1990, p. 59; Pizzorno, 1990, p. 61).

In comparison with political parties, party systems are less studied because of their complexity (Bardi & Mair, 2008, p. 147; Kitschelt, 2007, p. 522). As Kitschelt (2007, p. 523) argues, party systems define the numbers of players, as well as the distribution of resources and capabilities among the parties. On the concept of the party system, Sartori (2005, p. 57) notes that:

> yet, and at a minimum, the concept of system is meaningless – for purposes of scientific inquiry – unless (i) the system displays properties that do not belong to a separate consideration of its component elements and (ii) the system results from, and consists of, the patterned interactions of its component parts, thereby implying that such interactions provide the boundaries, or at least the boundedness, of the system … parties make for a 'system', then, only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition.

Without understanding the party as a unit, then, party-system analysis will be incomplete and vice versa. Furthermore, the system cannot be reduced to its parts: a party must be a *"*part of a whole*"* rather than a "part against whole*"* (Sartori, 2005, p. 22). The part–whole framework has broader implications in understanding the functioning of the party system: if the parts overwhelm the whole, the result is factionalism; if the whole overwhelms the parts, the result is monopoly or unipartism (Sartori, 2005, p. 58).[6] The predominant party systems are typical examples of the latter instance.

Within this framework, this study focuses on the analysis of the party system rather than the party because clientelism leads to power asymmetry among political parties. In other words, while maximizing the votes of the incumbent, clientelism

6 In this sense, it is possible to argue that one-party polities have no party system because the ruling party represents the whole (Sartori, 2005).

diminishes the opposition and hinders them from being a credible alternative to the ruling party.

In order to account for diverging party systems, scholars have developed distinct typologies.[7] The most popular party typologies are those of Duverger (1954), Dahl (1966), Blondel (1968), Rokkan (1970), and Sartori (1976)[2005], which are summarized in Table 1.

Contrary to Mair (1997, p. 199), who suggested that "the classification and typologies of party systems is by now a long-established art," the recent changes in the political landscape – the rise of extreme right-wing and radical left-wing parties in Western Europe – make it essential to revisit the long-established party system typologies. However, since the publication of Sartori's book on parties and party systems in 1976 [2005], no serious effort has been made to enhance our understanding of party systems (Ware, 1996).[8] Therefore, the confusion about the classification of party systems has persisted (Kitschelt, 2007, p. 522).

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7 In analyzing the party systems, the first and most widely used approach is centered on the number of parties (Mair, 1998, p. 200). The numerical approach is relevant in showing the extent of political power fragmentation and concentration; the number of possible interaction streams and the tactics of party competition and opposition (Sartori, 2005, p. 106). The resulting types under the numerical criterion are one-party system, two-party system, and multi-party system. Another popular approach again centers its analysis on the numerical criterion, but this time to show the distribution of power among political parties. The resulting typologies are unipolar, bipolar, and multi-polar structures. The third approach highlights the type of polity, thereby classifying party systems into competitive and non-competitive ones (Maisel & Cooper, 1978, p. 12). Similarly, some approaches combine a variety of the approaches mentioned above. The resulting types include authoritarian versus democratic; issue-oriented versus clientele-oriented; national versus regional; religious versus secular; and democratic versus revolutionary party systems (Macridis, 1967, p. 20). The hybrid typologies have two main problems. First, some define the nature of the political regime (authoritarian versus democratic) rather than the party system. Second, some are far from being comprehensive, namely the issue-oriented versus clientele-oriented and the religious versus secular party systems.

8 The party system typologies are rarely developed today because they are parsimonious and "invariably obscure certain differences" (Wolinetz, 2004, p. 9). Likewise, existing typologies have an inherent problem: they reflect the country-specific bias of the researchers who developed them, such as Duverger of France, Rokkan of Norway, Sartori of Italy and Lijphart of Holland (Daalder, 1983, p. 8). The fact that the party system typologies are largely based on the European context also causes validity problems (Gunther & Diamond, 2003, p. 168).

Among the wide-ranging typologies, the most comprehensive is the one developed by Sartori (Mair, 1997; Wolinetz, 2004). According to Sartori (2005, p. 105), “almost every writer comes up with his own scheme” and thus “confusion and profusion of terms seems to be the rule.” This is because there is no counting rules. Therefore, Sartori introduces “irrelevance criteria,” which discounts parties that have neither “coalition” nor “blackmail potential.” To put it simply, a party has coalition potential if other parties consider it as a feasible coalition partner. On the other hand, a party has blackmail potential if it intimidates the ruling parties even if it is in opposition (Sartori, 2005, pp. 107–110).

In addition to the number of parties, Sartori takes into account the spatial distance between the parties in developing his typology. This refers to the attitudinal position of the parties toward each other and vis-à-vis the regime. Here, the key concept is “anti-systemic party.” Typically, anti-system parties, such as the Italian Communist Party or the Alternative for Germany, have the potential to weaken the legitimacy of the political regime through veto power. Moreover, these parties are capable of influencing the dynamics of the party system in a “centrifugal” fashion (Sartori, 2005, pp. 108–109).

Table 1: Types of party system

Author	Principal criteria for classification	Principal types of party system identified
Duverger	• Number of parties	• Two-party systems • Multiparty systems
Dahl	• Competitiveness of opposition	• Strictly competitive • Co-operative/competitive • Coalescent/competitive • Strictly coalescent
Blondel	• Numbers of parties • Relative size of parties	• Two-party systems • Two-and-a-half-party systems • Multiparty systems with one dominant party • Multiparty systems without a dominant party
Rokkan	• Number of parties • Likelihood of single-party majority • Distribution of minority party strengths	• The British/German "1 vs. 1+1" system • The Scandinavian "1 vs. 3-4" system • Even multiparty systems: "1 vs. 1 vs. 1+ 2-3"
Sartori	• Number of parties • Ideological distance	• Two-party systems • Moderate pluralism • Polarized pluralism • Predominant-party systems

Source: Mair (1997, p. 2).

Given the number of parties and their ideological distance, Sartori develops a nine-fold typology, some of which will be highlighted in more detail below. Despite its analytical strength, Sartori's typology has been contested on several grounds. These include the overcrowding of the systems of "moderate pluralism," the absence of a real "two-party system," and the exhaustion of systems of "polarized pluralism" (Mair, 1997, pp. 204–205). Von Beyme (1985, pp. 1–2) adds that Sartori overlooks social and structural considerations that actually shape the party system. Another critique posits that Sartori's emphasis is on the nuances of the party system rather than its properties (Bardi & Mair, 2008, p. 150).

Against this backdrop of criticisms, I adopt Sartori's typology because it is the most innovative and the most advanced: it encompasses the degree of consolidation of the party system, the mode of power alternation, the quality of opposition, and the general dynamics of the party system (centripetal versus centrifugal) within a time- and context-sensitive framework (Bogaards, 2004, p. 193). In a similar vein, Sartori's typology performs better than alternative typologies in that it highlights the interactions between parties and thereby denotes the functioning of the party system (Mair, 1997, p. 204).

2.2. The dominant party and the predominant party system

Dominant party politics have attracted great scholarly interest. Since the seminal work of Duverger (1954), numerous authors have contributed to the literature (for example, Arian & Barnes, 1974; Blondel, 1968; Bogaards, 2004; Bogaards & Boucek, 2010; Dunleavy, 2010; Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006; Pempel, 1990; Van de Walle & Butler, 1999; Scheiner, 2006; Templeman, 2012) in a variety of times and contexts.[9] No consensus has yet been reached about the definition and operationalization of the concept, however (Bogaards, 2004).

9 For instance, the studies of Coleman (1960) and Van de Walle & Butler (1999) examine dominant parties in a Sub-Saharan African setting, while those of Pempel (1990) and Ware (1996) focus on established democracies.

Analyzing the dominant parties in Scandinavia and the Third Republic in France, Duverger (1954, pp. 308–309), for instance, posits that:

> a party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch … a dominant party is that which public opinion believes to be dominant ... Even the enemies of the dominant party, even citizens who refuse to give it their vote, acknowledge its superior status and its influence; they deplore it but they admit it.

Duverger's definition is normative because he takes influence rather than strength as operationalizing dominance. Alan Ware (1996) adopts a similar approach, drawing attention to the opposition parties that are "without hope of being in government" in the dominant party system.

By contrast, the numerical approach takes two variables into account: length of time in office (longitudinal criteria) and size of vote/seat share. Regarding the former, virtually all scholars agree that dominance is established over time. As Table 2 shows, however, the settled threshold varies considerably: a single re-election (van de Walle & Butler, 1999); three elections (Sartori, 2005); 20 years, four consecutive elections or one generation (Blondel, 1968; Greene, 2007); or 30–50 years (Cox, 1997). The longitudinal approach suffers from one serious drawback: If one increases the threshold to 50 years, only Mexico remains on the list; if one reduces it to a single re-election, the set of cases become so large that the result would involve "conceptual stretching" (Greene, 2007, pp. 15–16).[10]

10 For Patrick Dunleavy (2010), the longitudinal approach is tautological, as it involves an attempt to measure dominance with the mechanism that sustains it.

Table 2: Definitions of dominant parties

Author(s)	Coleman	Van de Walle & Butler	Ware predominant	Sartori (pre)dominant	Ware dominant	Blondel	Pempel
Threshold of dominance	70% of the seats	60% of the seats	50% of the seats	50% of the seats	45–50% of the seats	40–50% of the votes Double the second party	Plurality of votes and seats
Opposition	Dispersed	–	Divided	–	Several smaller parties	Multiple opposition helpful	Inferior bargaining position
President	–	–	–	No divided government	–	–	–
Duration	Analysis limited to single election	Analysis limited to single election	Permanent	Three consecutive elections	Dominant party should win "usually"	Analysis over 20 years	Substantial period

Source: Adopted from Bogaards (2004, p. 176).

In addition, regarding the size of the vote and seat shares, while for Sartori (2005) and Ware (1996) dominant parties need an absolute majority in the parliament, Duverger (1954) and Pempel (1990a) opt for a plurality of votes and seat shares. Similarly, while Coleman (1960) and Van de Walle & Butler (1999) take a supermajority in the context of Africa, MacDonald (1971) sets the bar at 60 percent of the seats in the context of Latin America. More recently, Greene (2010, p. 4) contends that the dominant party in the parliamentary system[11] must hold the premiership in addition to at least a plurality of the seats. Such divergence hinges mainly on country/regional-specific bias. To illustrate, in the party systems that award the first party a comfortable majority, the threshold is higher (for example, Africa), while in political systems that experience tight electoral races, the threshold is lower (for example, Europe).

Relying on Sartori's framework, I here define a dominant party in terms of its role in forming the government, its strength vis-à-vis the second party, and its duration in power. A dominant party, then, is "one that wins at least three consecutive elections in a competitive political environment with a significant margin and plays a major role in government formation." This definition encompasses the SAP in Sweden and the DC in Italy, which were the main partners in coalition governments, as well as the AKP in Turkey and the INC in India, which formed the government alone.

As far as I can see, predominant party systems have the following properties. First of all, predominant party systems unquestionably belong in a context of party pluralism. This feature distinguishes them from single-party systems, which lack party pluralism.

Second, the opposition must consist of true antagonist parties. This marks the existence of independent parties, which are legal and legitimate, albeit not necessarily efficient actors challenging the incumbent (Sartori, 2005, p. 173; Magaloni, 2006, p.

11 According to Greene (2010, p. 4), to be a dominant party in a presidential system the incumbent must control the executive and an absolute majority of the seats.

1; Ware, 1996, p. 159). This distinguishes them from hegemonic party systems, which have satellite parties.

Third, alternation in power must be possible. Given that only one in six elections led to partisan alternation until recently (Przeworski, 2010, p. 46), this criterion is crucial to distinguish between the predominant party system, on one hand, and the single-party and hegemonic party systems, on the other.

Fourth, the dominant party must win at least three consecutive elections. Exceptions to this rule include cases in which the dominant party temporarily loses power but regains it in snap elections (for example, the November 2015 snap elections in Turkey).

Finally, the dominant party must form the government alone (Sartori, 2005, p. 175; Ware, 1996, p. 159). While this criterion requires the holding of an absolute majority in some settings, it requires only a simple majority in others. Recall that this criterion draws a line between the dominant party and the predominant party system. For instance, it disqualifies the Mapai Party in Israel that joined the government as the largest coalition partner and the SAP in Sweden, which formed minority governments (Sartori, 2005, p. 175).

Meeting these five criteria, the set of cases with predominant party systems includes, but is not limited to Mexico, Taiwan, India, Japan, and Turkey.

2.3. Predominant party systems versus hegemonic party systems

Predominant party systems are widely confused with "hegemonic party systems."[12] This stems mainly from the changing character of party systems – for example, from a hegemonic party system to a predominant party system or vice versa, as happened in Taiwan and Mexico.

12 The concept of the "hegemonic party" was coined by Wiatr (1970) in his analysis of the party system in Poland. Sartori borrowed the term and came up with the type of "hegemonic party system."

Broadly speaking, hegemonic party systems are different from predominant party systems in at least three respects. First of all, hegemonic party systems are essentially non-competitive. A hegemonic party "neither allows for a formal nor a de facto competition for power. Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties; for they are not permitted to compete" (Sartori, 2005: 204). In hegemonic party systems, elections are used to mask the reality of authoritarian domination under which opposition victory is virtually impossible (Diamond, 2002, p. 24). Hence, the hegemonic party will remain in power whether "it is liked or not" (Sartori, 2005, p. 30). Egypt under Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) was a notable example of a hegemonic party system. Typically, the NDP tolerated the opposition to the extent that it could retain control over them. Otherwise, it did not hesitate to crack down on the opposition, as in the case of Muslim Brotherhood candidates after the 2005 elections.

Second, building on the first aspect, a hegemonic party is much stronger than a dominant party: It would be able, for example, to unilaterally change the constitution (Magaloni, 2006, p. 35). This allows the hegemonic party to dominate the political regime in a desired direction.

Third, electoral malpractice is more frequent in hegemonic party systems than predominant party systems, which can be ascribed to the hegemonic party's unilateral control of organizing, monitoring, and adjudicating elections (Magaloni, 2006, p. 36). This makes government alternation through elections practically impossible.

2.4. Predominant party systems and political regimes

The third move, linking party systems to regime type, is more demanding than the first two steps, simply because there is no consensus on what democracy is or is not. Nevertheless, I emphasize, along with others (Boucek & Bogaards, 2010a, p. 5; Greene, 2007; Mair, 1997, p. 199; Wolinetz, 2006, p. 51), that this is an important step, because party systems directly influence the legitimacy, stability, and functioning of the regime through altering social locations, policy implementation, manipulation of social relativities, and control of institutional processes, such as voting system and

electoral boundaries (Dunleavy, 2010, p. 19). It also matters in distinguishing between a predominant party system and a hegemonic party system. For instance, predominant party systems can be observed only in democratic (for example, Japan and India) and hybrid regimes (for example, Turkey and Taiwan), which are competitive to varying degrees, while hegemonic party systems can be observed only in authoritarian regimes (for example, Egypt under Mubarak), which lack any competition.

As already noted, country-and region-specific bias frequently lead scholars to attribute predominant party systems to different regime types. For instance, according to some scholars (for example, Arian & Barnes, 1974; Sartori, 1976; Pempel, 1990a; Ware, 1996), who based their analysis on democracies, predominant party systems emerge in democracies, too. Such a perspective assigns an affirmative role to the dominant parties, such as bringing political stability (Arian & Barnes, 1974). As Pempel (1990a, pp. 1–2) points out:

> In these countries [with predominant party systems], despite free electoral competition, relatively open information systems, respect for civil liberties, and the right of free political association, a single party has managed to govern alone or as the primary and ongoing partner in coalitions, without interruption, for substantial periods of time.

Another strand of research attributes predominant party systems to "hybrid regimes,"13 which combine elections with authoritarian traits (Diamond, 2002). Unlike democracies, the dominant party system in hybrid regimes is assigned a negative role, because the dominant party regularly manipulates media, politicizes bureaucracy and judiciary, and exploits public resources to maintain its grip on power.

To be more specific, predominant party systems under hybrid regimes belong to competitive authoritarian regimes (CARs) (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Greene, 2007). According to Levitsky & Way (2010, p. 5):

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13 The literature suggests numerous labels in lieu of hybrid regimes, such as "semi authoritarianism" (Ottaway, 2013) or "grey zone" (Carothers, 2002).

> Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents.

In competitive authoritarian regimes, contestation occurs mainly in four arenas: the electoral arena, the legislature, the judiciary, and the media. Through this contestation, "opposition forces may periodically challenge, weaken, and occasionally even defeat autocratic incumbents" (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 54). As Greene (2007, p. 15) argues, competitive authoritarian regimes experience both "meaningful" and "unfair" elections: the former induces the opposition to form parties and contest elections, while the latter makes opposition victory almost impossible.[14] While meaningful elections[15] distinguish competitive authoritarian regimes from authoritarian regimes, unfair elections distinguish them from democratic regimes (Greene, 2007, pp. 12–14; Greene, 2010, pp. 810–811).

Predominant party systems under hybrid regimes need to be monitored closely lest they collapse into hegemonic party systems (Giliomee & Simkins, 2005), as many African states have done (van de Walle & Butler, 1999). In fact, dominant parties in

14 According to Greene (2007, p. 259), there are two problems with regard to Sartori's approach to political regimes. First, Sartori understates the significance of meaningfulness of elections in dominant-party authoritarian regimes. Second, he overstates the fairness of elections in dominant-party democratic regimes.

15 The notion of meaningful elections is closely linked to the "alternation rule." The basic premise of the alternation rule is that "parties lose elections." Accordingly, the regime is called authoritarian unless the incumbent peacefully transmits power to the opposition if it loses the elections. There is one serious drawback with this assumption, though. The alternation rule puts non-overlapping or even completely different regimes – that is, those that maintain their rule through democratic (for example, Japan) or autocratic (for example, China) means – in the same category (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010a, p. 9).

hybrid regimes[16] have the potential to distort democracy in three fundamental ways. First, they may narrow the scope of competition (Boucek & Bogaards, 2010b, p. 222). Second, because the possibility of power alternation is low, they may encourage corruption (Cox, 1997, p. 238). Third, the line between the state and the dominant party may blur as dominance is reproduced (Çarkoğlu, 2011; Cox, 1997; Scheiner, 2006).

As Sartori (2005) notes, the transition from a competitive (predominant) to an uncompetitive (hegemonic) party system – which does not correspond to progression along a continuum – is not possible unless the incumbents use force or fraud. Accordingly, the increased levels of repression and fraud observed in the past couple of years in Turkey should be taken as signals of the regime moving in a more authoritarian direction.

16 Turkey belongs among the hybrid regimes simply because of its long-established military tutelage, its undemocratic electoral law, and the constitution. Despite these drawbacks, Turkey fulfils the minimal procedural requirements of democracy if one overlooks malpractice during the recently held elections and referendums. These situate Turkey mid-way between democracy and authoritarianism.

3. CHAPTER THREE: THEORY

As a rule of thumb, concepts are not meaningful outside a theoretical framework. To that end, having established the conceptual framework, I now proceed to the theories on the emergence of predominant party systems.

An overview of the literature suggests that the factors leading to the rise of dominant parties are diverse: in South Africa's case, it was apartheid; in Mexico's case, civil war; in Taiwan's case, struggle against mainland China; in Israel's case, the establishment of a new state; and in Sweden's case, the establishment of the welfare state (Dunleavy, 2010, p. 13; Giliomee & Simkins, 2005, p. 3). However, as Greene (2007, p. 4) rightly notes, "it is unlikely that the mechanisms that produce dominant party rule also reproduce it over time."

Within this framework, this section briefly evaluates institutionalist theories, social cleavage theory, performance legitimacy theories, decision-theoretic models, and resource theory in explaining the reproduction of dominance. It also seeks to justify why resource theory and its central concept, clientelism, best explains the AKP case. Table 3 presents a summary of my findings.

Table 3: Theories of predominant party systems

CASES	**THEORIES**			
	Decision- theoretic Models	***Performance legitimacy theory***	***Social cleavage theory***	***Resource theory (clientelism)***
Mexico (PRI)	Applies (Greene, 2007)	Partially applies at least from 1940s to 1970s (Magaloni, 2006)	Cleavage based on development policy (Boucek & Bogaards, 2010; Greene, 2007)	Applies (Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006)
Japan (LDP)	NA*	Applies	NA	Applies (mostly in rural areas) (Scheiner, 2006)
India (CP)	Applies (Riker, 1976)	NA	Cleavages based on castes, religion, and ethnicity (Chibber, 1999; Chibber and Petrocik, 1989)	Applies, although it has become less salient in recent decades (Wilkinson, 2007)
Turkey (AKP)	Applies (for example, June 2015 elections)	Applied until 2007 financial crisis (Öniş, 2012; Kirişçi, 2009)	Center-periphery (Mardin, 1973) cleavage has transformed into a religious and, to a lesser extent, ethnic cleavage since the 1990s (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006)	Already-existing clientelistic networks have been expanded during the AKP's rule (Akdağ, 2014; Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2014; Erdem Aytaç, 2014; Kemahlıoğlu, 2012; Sayarı, 2014; Yıldırım, 2017)
Taiwan (KMT)	NA	Applies	Cleavage based on relations with China (Yu, 2005; Templeman, 2012)	Applies (Fell, 2005; Wang & Kurzman, 2007)

Note: * Not applicable.

Source: Author's elaboration and highlighted sources.

3.1. Institutional theories

Institutionalist theories contend that electoral systems structure party systems (Duverger, 1954; Farrell, 1997; Lipset, 1960; Sartori, 2001; Taagepera, 2007). For

example, it influences the number, size, and cohesion of parties; the government formula; the length of government (Sartori, 2001, p. 102; Taagepera, 2007, p. 1), and the parliamentary representation of women and minorities (Farrell, 1997, p. 142).

Electoral systems have commonly been viewed as durable institutions (Lijphart, 1994; Taagepera, 2007) because majorities or even qualified majorities are required in the legislative arena to make any changes to them. Usually, parties in power tend to alter electoral systems if they are unstable and fragmented (for example, Italy and Israel) or hyper-stable (for example, Singapore and Japan) (Norris, 2004, p. 81). The electoral engineering in Turkey illustrates both factors. While the latter applies to the 1960 military coup, which aimed to end the hegemonic party system, the former applies to the 1980 military coup, which aimed to eliminate high fragmentation.

The design of the electoral system is more important in predominant party systems than in other party systems because small changes in the electoral formula may realize substantial gains for the incumbent party (Sartori, 1990, p. 347). However, despite the significance of this issue, the relationship between predominant party system and electoral system has largely remained underexplored (Erdmann & Basedau, 2007, p. 10).[17]

Thus far, it has been shown that non-proportional systems – plurality voting, block voting, and single non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems – are more relevant than proportional systems in explaining dominance (Dunleavy, 2010, p. 13). To illustrate, the literature typically refers to the SNTV system in Japan, which helped to keep the JDP in power, although it never won more than half of the votes after 1963 (Cox, 1997; Ware, 1996; Reed, 2007).

Against this background, Table 4 demonstrates that a predominant party system may emerge under wide-ranging electoral systems, including majoritarian systems in India and Mexico, and the SNTV system in Japan and Taiwan. While Mexico and Japan switched to the mixed electoral system in the mid-1990s, Taiwan introduced the mixed electoral system in 2005. India, on the other hand, is still using

[17] For notable exceptions, See: Bogaards, 2008; Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni, 2001; Reed, 2007.

the first-past-the-post system (FPTP). The impact of electoral system changes on the party system varies. To illustrate, while the PRI and the KMT lost their majority in less than a decade after the change in the electoral system, the LDP lost its majority more than one and a half decades later.

Unlike these cases, Turkey has been using a proportional system with the D'Hondt formula since 1983. Bormann & Golder's dataset (2013) shows that although 37 countries use the D'Hondt formula, most of them do not have a predominant party system. This is mainly because the D'Hondt formula is designed to "minimize overrepresentation of the most overrepresented party" (Gallagher, 1991, p. 34). However, when the D'Hondt formula is combined with a high national threshold, it is conducive to the predominant party system. This is because of a drop in the number of tiny splinter parties in the party system (Farrel, 1997) and an increase in disproportionality (Anckar, 1997).

Table 4: Electoral system in selected countries with predominant party systems

	Electoral formula(s) in place during Dominance	Period in power
Mexico (PRI)	In the Chamber of Deputies a purely majoritarian system was implemented until the 1960s. Then, the majoritarian system was gradually abandoned. Since 1996, Mexico has used a mixed system: 300 seats are allocated according to plurality vote and the remaining 200 by proportional representation based on party lists.	1929–2000
Japan (LDP)	Japan used the SNTV system for its House of Representatives from 1947 to 1993. Since then, it has used a mixed-electoral system: 295 seats are allocated according to plurality vote and the remaining 180 seats by a proportional system based on party lists.	1955–2009 (except 1993–4)
Taiwan (KMT)	In the Legislative Yuan the SNTV system was used until 1992. A parallel system was introduced in 2005 and was first applied in the 2008 election: 73 seats are allocated on the basis of plurality vote, 34 by a party-list proportional system (Hare quota) and six by the SNTV system (for aboriginal voters).	1949–2000
India (INC)	Since independence, India has used the FPTP system for the House of the People.	1947–1977

Source: Author's elaboration.

The D'Hondt system applied in Turkey, with a 10 percent national threshold, best illustrates this. The electoral threshold, above all, substantially empowers the leading party while weakening the small ones. To illustrate, in the 2002 elections, the AKP captured two-thirds of the parliamentary seats even though it won only one-third of the votes. This extends to provincial level. For instance, the AKP won eight out of ten seats in Diyarbakır province with a vote share of a mere 15 percent. However, when the pro-Kurdish candidates ran under the party list of the HDP (People's Democratic Party) and passed the electoral threshold in the June 2015 elections, the AKP won only one seat with its 14 percent vote share, while the HDP won ten with its 79 percent vote share. The Diyarbakır case illustrates the trend in other Kurdish-majority provinces as well.

Second, the electoral threshold reduces the number of wasted votes (see Table 5), which coincides with the crystallization of votes around the major parties. This trend illustrates the "psychological effect" (Duverger, 1954) in voting behavior, although, to my knowledge, this argument has not been tested with individual data so far.

Furthermore, the electoral threshold encourages strategic voting. The underlying assumption is that voters cast their votes strategically to avoid the other camp being empowered by wasted votes. This is arguably the case with the HDP's passing of the threshold in the June 2015 elections. The most likely scenario was that if the HDP had failed to pass the threshold, then the AKP would have obtained a large enough majority to change the constitution unilaterally. In view of this, some CHP voters residing in metropolitan areas switched to the HDP (Öniş, 2016; Canyaş, Canyaş & Gümrükçü, 2016; Grigoriadis, 2016), although whether this was sufficient for the HDP to pass the threshold was doubtful.[18] In any case, the tendency towards strategic voting clearly manifests the extent of polarization in society (Esmer, 2019). This also corresponds to hostile partisanship and must be taken as alarming for the future of the political system.

[18] The KONDA (2015) survey, for instance, found that the HDP passed the threshold mainly because AKP voters switched rather than CHP voters.

Aware of the institutional barriers, the small parties in Turkey have followed two main strategies. One is aligning with other parties, be they large or small, before the elections. A typical example was the alliance between the Nationalist Work Party (MÇP, then MHP), the RP, and the Reformist Democracy Party (IDP) in the 1991 legislative elections.

The second strategy, particularly followed by pro-Kurdish parties/candidates, was to run as independents. For instance, in the 2007 elections, the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) ran with independent candidates instead of under a party list and won 21 seats. The same strategy awarded its successor, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), 36 seats in the 2011 elections.

Table 5: Wasted votes and turnout (%) (2002–2015/2)

	2002	2007	2011	2015/1	2015/2
Wasted	46.3	18.2	6.3	4.7	2.5
Turnout	76	82	81	81	84

Source: Supreme Election Council (YSK).

What is unique to the Turkish case is that, despite having a relatively disproportionate electoral system, turnout remains very high (Table 5). This might reflect two contradictory tendencies. The first is that voters might have interiorized the rules of the game. In this sense, high turnout is an indication of a legitimate political system. The second and the most likely scenario is that the electoral system delegitimizes the political system by fostering polarization, which motivates voters to go to the polls. In this sense, high turnout expresses the level of polarization in society.

In a nutshell, the evidence presented above reveals that a combination of electoral formula and national threshold played a significant role in transforming the party system into a predominant one for two main reasons. First, it brings about the overrepresentation of large parties and the underrepresentation of small ones. This

leads small parties to align with other parties or run with independent candidates to bypass the highest threshold in the world. Second, the electoral system concentrates votes among major parties and encourages strategic voting.

Despite its crucial role, outlined above, the electoral system alone does not fully account for the party system change in Turkey. That is to say, if the electoral system is a major reason behind the AKP's success, why did it not lead to the emergence of a predominant party system during the 1990s, given that the present electoral system has been in force since 1983? Thus, I contend that the electoral system should be supplemented by other elements, primarily clientelism and the mobilization of the religious cleavage, to fully account for the reproduction of dominance in Turkey.

3.1.1. Gerrymandering

In addition to changing the electoral formula or electoral laws, dominant parties frequently adopt the strategies of "malapportionment" and "gerrymandering" to skew the political field in their favor (Bogaards & Boucek, 2010).[19]

Malapportionment refers to "imbalances in the population densities of constituencies which favor some parties over others" (Farrell, 1997, p. 8). Although malapportionment is not frequent practice in Turkey, this does not mean that there is no disproportionality across electoral districts. For instance, in the November 2015 elections, in the most crowded electoral district in Turkey, Istanbul's first electoral district, 3,361,968 registered voters cast their votes for 31 deputies. This makes 108,450 voters per deputy. By contrast, in the least densely populated electoral district, Bayburt province, 52,698 voters voted for two deputies. This makes only 26,349 voters per deputy. Because Bayburt is the stronghold of the AKP, one might assume that malapportionment onesidedly benefits the AKP. However, this is not true. For instance, Tunceli (Dersim) province, the electoral district in which the AKP is weakest,

[19] Malapportionment and gerrymandering are widely discussed phenomena in the context of Malaysia (for example Hai, 2002; Ostwald, 2013), Japan (for example Christensen, 2004; Hata, 1990) and Mexico (for example Lujambio & Vives, 2008).

returns two deputies with only 62,615 votes, a number that does not significantly differ from Bayburt's.

In the case of gerrymandering, "constituency boundaries are redrawn with the intention of producing an inflated number of seats for a party, usually the governing party" (Farrell, 1997, p. 8). In comparison to malapportionment, gerrymandering is more evident in Turkey. That is to say, the ruling parties in Turkey have not refrained from punishing districts that did not vote for them. The most notable example was the DP governments during the 1950s, which divided Malatya province into two and downgraded the status of Kırşehir from a province to a district because they voted for the opposition.

Recently, the AKP government has also concentrated its efforts on rearranging district boundaries, an undertaking redolent of the practice of gerrymandering. By Municipal Law No. 6360 of 2012, 14 cities were promoted to metropolitan municipalities and 27 new districts were established. In the same vein, within the framework of this law, the AKP government redrew the boundaries of some districts that had experienced a tight race between the AKP and opposition parties. Accordingly, as Aygül (2016) reports, the incumbent party skewed the electoral field to its advantage.

To be more concrete, I briefly analyze election results from the Şişli and Sarıyer district in Istanbul to examine the effect of gerrymandering on electoral outcomes with this law. Before delving into the analysis, I must note that because Sarıyer and Şişli both belong to Istanbul's second electoral district, changing borders does not affect the number of seats gained in the legislative elections, although it does have the potential to substantially affect local election outcomes, as I demonstrate below.

Law No. 6360 relocated three neighborhoods (mahalle) in Şişli – Ayazağa and Maslak, known as Istanbul's financial centers, plus Huzur – to Sarıyer. This relocation sparked controversy among policymakers, but its consequences have not been empirically examined. Şişli is a known stronghold of the CHP, while Sarıyer has witnessed closer races (see Table 6). Huzur and Maslak tend to vote for the CHP, while

Ayazağa overwhelmingly votes for the AKP. More importantly, registered voters in Ayazağa far outnumber the voters in Huzur and Maslak (see Table 7). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that redistricting would benefit the AKP. However, whether it would be sufficient to affect electoral outcomes remains in doubt.

Table 6: Election results in Sarıyer district (number of votes)

Election year	AKP	CHP	Vote difference	Difference in relocated neighborhoods
2015/2	88,928	86,415	2,513	6,926
2015/1	69,155	75,836	-6,681	4,269
2014	82,328	107,268	-26,940	3,342
2011	71,293	73,888	-2,595	8,627
2009	46,546	54,909	-8,363	4,773

Source: Author's calculations.

Table 7: Election results in Ayazağa, Huzur, and Maslak neighborhoods (number of votes)

Name	2009		2011		2014		2015/1		2015/2	
	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP	AKP	CHP
Ayazağa	5,454	1,152	12,549	3,424	12,093	5,918	9,928	3,726	13,415	4,351
Maslak	233	137	452	389	372	1,108	369	1,122	568	1,539
Huzur	1,011	636	2,060	2,621	1,622	3,719	1,296	2,476	1,652	2,819

Source: Author's calculations.

Table 7 suggests that gerrymandering has not had a significant impact on electoral outcomes, with the exception of the November 2015 snap election. However,

the electoral trend in the Sarıyer district (Table 6) hints at the possibility that gerrymandering may have a decisive impact on future elections, particularly local ones.

3.2. Social cleavage theory

Drawing on the European context, *social cleavage theory* suggests that parties reflect major social cleavages in society (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Ware, 1996).[20] In the set of cases with dominant parties, this ranges from race in South Africa to relations with China in Taiwan, or economic development policy in Mexico (Boucek & Bogaards, 2010a, pp. 7–8; Greene, 2007, p. 308; Greene, 2008, p. 17).

In the case of Turkey, social cleavage theory has widely been depicted in terms of a "center–periphery cleavage" (Şerif Mardin, 1973).[21] In this designation, the center represents secular military, intelligentsia, bureaucracy, and the urban classes. The periphery, on the other hand, represents the conservative peasants, as well as small-scale provincial business owners.

The center–periphery framework has a changing character. As Çarkoğlu & Hinch (2006) contend, the center–periphery cleavage has started to be colored more by the religious and, to a lesser extent, the ethnic cleavage since the 1990s.

In this sense, once the party began to fear for its future in 2008, the AKP started to follow a polarization strategy, mainly along religious lines (Çınar, 2016).[22] This makes social cleavage theory relevant to the AKP case. However, it would be

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20 For Lipset & Rokkan (1967), there are four types of social cleavage: center–periphery, urban–rural, worker–employer, and bourgeoisie–landowner. While the center–periphery and the urban–rural cleavages emerged due to a national revolution, the worker–employer and the bourgeoisie–landowner cleavages emerged due to an industrial revolution.

21 Şerif Mardin imported the term "center–periphery cleavage" from Shils (1961). While for Shils, the center–periphery cleavage lost its salience with political and social integrity, for Lipset & Rokkan (1967) it is a feature of party systems. Recently, Wuthrich (2013) concisely debated this issue in the Turkish context.

22 For an excellent piece on the dynamics and current situation of mounting polarization, see (Esmer, 2019).

misleading to claim that the AKP still represents the periphery, given its alliance with the devout bourgeoisie and its mandate over the bureaucracy. This orientation seems to have pushed the AKP towards the center.

Despite its popularity, social cleavage theory has been contested on several grounds.[23] Above all, social cleavage theory does not apply to all cases with predominant party systems, particularly to India where the Congress Party achieved more or less the same support from different classes, ethnicities, and religions (Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989). Second, social cleavage theory may invert the direction of causality. Sartori (1968, p. 21) contends that, even if it is true that societal changes are registered through political parties, it is also true that parties might (de)politicize issues that are key to the functioning of the system. Third, social cleavages are not static and might strengthen or weaken over time, especially when parties cannot find any new cleavage to mobilize voters (Ware, 1996, p. 127). This was the case in Turkey in recent years. Last but not the least, parties not only reflect social cleavages, but also actively shape them (Leon, Desai & Tuğal, 2009). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the strengthening of partisan identification has severe implications for the content and structure of social cleavages in Turkish society.

3.3. Decision-theoretic model

The decision-theoretic model assumes that dominant parties conquer the center, and thus represent the median voter (Arian & Barnes, 1974; Cox, 1997; Greene, 2007; Riker, 1976). This enables the dominant parties to appeal to broad social groups (Greene, 2007, p. 45), divide the opposition (Riker, 1976), enhance their legitimacy (Arian & Barnes, 1974), and mitigate social conflicts (Greene, 2007, p. 45).

Among dominant parties, while the Congress Party in India is widely assumed to fit this model because of its pluralist voter base and the party leadership (Riker,

[23] Specifically in the Turkish case, the center–periphery cleavage does not explain the heterogeneous party base of the mainstream parties and the CHP's garnering of support from Southeast Anatolia through patronage (Sayarı, 2008, pp. 402-404).

1976; Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989), the LDP in Japan (Scheiner, 2006) and the KMT in Taiwan (Tzelgov & Wang, 2016) apparently do not conform to it.[24]

Regarding the case of Turkey, although the AKP arguably represents the median voter (Tuncer & Sağdiç, 2016), it is clearly a right-wing party because it incorporates neoliberalism, conservatism, and selective nationalism as parts of its political appeal. Illustrating this, a survey carried out by Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu found that the number of voters who define themselves as "right-wing" has boomed in recent years. To be more concrete, the proportion of self-identified right-wing voters increased from 22.7 percent in 1990 to 34.2 percent in 2009 (Radikal, 2010).

3.4. Performance legitimacy theory

Performance legitimacy theory posits that predominant party systems emerge because of dominant parties' remarkable economic performance. This theory takes voters to be rational actors who punish poor economic outcomes and reward good ones (Duch, 2007, p. 808).

While it can plausibly be argued that the KMT in Taiwan and the LDP in Japan took advantage of prolonged economic growth, others, including the PRI, were able to maintain their rule for two decades despite a deteriorating economic record (Greene, 2007, p. 19; Magaloni, 2006, p. 13).25 In my view, the Turkish case stands between these two examples. On one hand, the Turkish economy experienced high growth rates and booming exports from 2002 to 2008 (Kirişçi, 2009; Öniş, 2012), which led to an increase in the AKP's vote share. On the other hand, the AKP's vote share peaked at 49 percent in the November 2015 elections despite its deteriorating economic performance since 2008 (Cömert & Çolak, 2014; Acemoğlu & Uçer, 2015).

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[24] Based on the expert survey with the political scientists in 1993, Huber & Inglehart (1995) positioned the LDP, the PRI and the Congress on the right with the medium scores of 8.43 6.20 and 5.80, respectively in a scale that 1=left and 10=right.

25 Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu & Şenatalar (2005) found that AKP gathered huge support from those whose economic conditions deteriorated after the 2001 financial crisis. In another study, Başlevent & Kirmanoğlu (2015) argue that economic voting matters in Turkey and the AKP voters are satisfied with their economic conditions.

3.5. Resource theory

Resource theory aims to explore the political economy of single-party dominance. While the role of commanding public resources in the reproduction of dominance has been emphasized before (cf. Lipset, 1959; Weingrod, 1968; Pempel, 1990a; Scheiner, 2006), it was Greene (2007) who developed a comprehensive theory, dwelling on the PRI's dominance in Mexican politics. Greene (2007, 2010) posits that if the dominant party commands public resources and subordinates the public bureaucracy, it becomes more difficult to break the cycle of dominance. Unless resources shrink – often due to privatization of state-owned enterprises following an economic downturn – the dominance is expected to reproduce itself.

According to Greene (2007), dominant parties may benefit from public resources in several ways. In the first place, they may transfer money to clients from the budgets of state-owned enterprises or through secret line items. Such transfers are difficult to trace and usually closed to public scrutiny. Second, the dominant parties may take advantage of patronage resources, depending on the size of the public sector. Third, public resources can be used to exchange kickbacks and receive an illicit (if not illegal) campaign contribution from business circles. Last but not least, the dominant parties might use the administrative resources of the state, such as public vehicles and phones, as part of its electoral strategy to reach and mobilize voters (Greene, 2007, pp. 40–41). Having these advantages in hand, the dominant parties attract better candidates and communicate more easily with the electorate.

In comparison with alternative theories, resource theory has two advantages. First, it is inherently dynamic because it explains the ups and downs of the incumbent vote share in parallel with command over public resources. Second, it provides an insight into the weakness of opposition parties in challenging the incumbent.

Despite its merits, I suggest a minor revision with regard to resource theory. This is because resource theory does not account for dominant parties, which maintain power despite pursuing a privatization policy (even from the onset). The AKP case illustrates this well. For instance, while privatization revenues were merely 8.2 billion

US dollars between 1986 and 2003, they peaked at 58 billion US dollars from 2004 to 2015 (Bloomberg, 2016). Despite following this policy, the AKP's electoral performance took an upward trend from 2002 to 2015 November.

3.5.1. Clientelism

The central concept in resource theory is clientelism. Clientelism is a dynamic phenomenon located at the confluence of politics, society, and the market (Roniger, 2004, p. 368).[26] This makes it a rich concept that can be analyzed through the lenses of different disciplines. For instance, taking it as a type of "social relationship," anthropologists elaborate on the daily working mechanisms of clientelism, while political scientists, taking it as a "feature of government," investigate the effects of clientelism on voting behavior and democratization (Weingrod, 1968, p. 380).

Broadly defined, clientelism is "a transaction, the direct exchange of a citizen's vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services" (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 2).[27] Yet, I observed during my fieldwork that direct payment is not pervasive.

Clientelism is the scapegoat of modern politics. It is blamed for inhibiting horizontal solidarity (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984); corroding ideal citizenship (Trantidis, 2013; Roniger & Ayata, 1994); reinforcing oligarchic tendencies (Kaufmann, 1974); reversing accountability (Stokes, 2005); directly or indirectly

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26 Recently, political science studies on clientelism have exceeded anthropological ones. This political turn, while providing precision and calibration to the understanding of clientelism, has also caused problems. First, clientelism is increasingly taken as a political strategy that is restricted to election time. Second, clientelism is conceived as a vote-buying or turnout-buying strategy (Auyero & Benzecry, 2017, p. 181).

27 The literature offers a wide array of definitions of clientelism. For example, Stokes (2007, p. 605) defines clientelism as "the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?." According to Hopkin (2006a, p. 2), political clientelism "describes the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support." According to Roniger (2004, p. 353), "clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power and exchange, a nonuniversalistic quid pro quo between individuals or groups of unequal standing."

causing violence (Wantchekon, 2003; Wilkinson, 2007); hindering institutional development (Graziano, 1973); blurring public and private sphere distinctions (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002, p. 189); leading to economic inefficiency, systematic corruption, and populist backlash (Müller, 2006; Singer, 2009); and fostering inequality and reducing policy responsiveness (Ruth, 2011).

For long decades, the adherents of modernization theories[28] hypothesized that clientelism would disappear with economic and political modernization (Hicken, 2011, p. 297; Hopkin, 2006a, p. 2; Kopecký & Mair, 2006, p. 1; Piattoni, 2001, p. 1; Roniger, 2004, p. 356; Stokes, 2007, p. 607). However, this did not happen. Accordingly, it is now commonly accepted that clientelism operates effectively in both traditional and modern societies, and democratic and non-democratic regimes, as well as at local, regional, national, and supranational levels (Hopkin, 2006a, p. 2; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 4; Kopecký & Mair, 2006, p. 1; Mouzelis, 1985, p. 332), although its form and shape vary greatly (Lande, 1983, p. 440).[29]

The resilience of clientelism as a social and political force can be expressed through the multiple tasks it fulfills: clientelism links political representatives to the citizens (Hopkin, 2006a, p. 12); increases the bargaining positions of clients (Piattoni, 2001); provides social mobility and integrates divided societies (Müller, 2006, p. 192, Lemarchand & Legg, 1972, p. 171); enhances the policymaking capacity of the parties (Müller, 2006, p. 190); and overcomes the collective action problem (Warner, 1997, p. 534).

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28 Modernists had a number of expectations with regard to clientelism. Firstly, class politics relying on horizontal mobilization would replace vertical ones. Secondly, the dissemination of the mass party model would make it harder to sustain personalized representation through clientelism. Thirdly, professionalization would bring meritocracy. Fourthly, due to economic development, the domestic market would be more integrated into broader regional, national, or supranational units, which in turn would reduce the demand for a patron. Finally, the need for a mediator would decline as citizens become richer and more educated (Kopecky & Mair, 2006, pp. 4–5).

29 There is a rich scholarship on the analysis of clientelism in different settings: West and South Europe (c.f. Piattoni, 2001; Roniger, 2004); Far East (c.f. Callahan & McCargo, 1996); Latin America (c.f. Auyero, 2001; Gay, 1998; Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006); Africa (c.f. Van de Walle, 2003; Wantchekon, 2003) and the Middle East (c.f. Blaydes, 2011).

Conceptually, there are two major difficulties in studying clientelism. The first problem is what to include and exclude when defining clientelism. To illustrate, for Hicken (2011, p. 290), clientelism is dyadic, contingent, hierarchic, and iterated; for Kaufmann (1974, p. 285), it is unequal, reciprocal, particularistic, and private; for Lemarchand & Legg (1972, p. 152), it is asymmetric, extensive, and durable; while for Hopkin (2006b, p. 406), it is unequal, hierarchic, durable, obligatory, and duty-based.

The second problem is to distinguish clientelism from the neighboring concepts of "vote-buying" and "patronage." If this is not done carefully, it may lead to conceptual stretching (Piattoni, 2001). To avoid this, I briefly underline how my take on clientelism differs from vote-buying and patronage.

To start with, a vote-buying strategy can be pursued by both the incumbent and the opposition (Stokes, 2009, p. 15). Second, vote-buying is largely limited to election time (Schaffer, 2007; Stokes, 2009). Finally, vote-buying is limited to individual votes. Given all of this, my focus is not on vote-buying simply because I take clientelism to be a political and social phenomenon that is embedded and reproduced in everyday life (Auyero, 2001) rather than an instrument limited to certain situations.

Similarly, while clientelism entails the use of all kinds of public resources for electoral purposes (Hicken, 2011, p. 295; Hilgers, 2011, p. 575; Piattoni, 2001, p. 6), patronage merely denotes "the exchange of public employment for electoral support" (Stokes, 2009, p. 15). Because patronage jobs are limited in number, they are often earmarked for party activists rather than partisans (Stokes, 2009, p. 15). Despite the AKP government's extensive use of patronage, this study does not deal it because it would have required interviews with people in public institutions or with more educated people rather than with the uneducated poor in the street.

3.5.2. Clientelism in Turkish politics: The past

Although clientelism plays a major role in shaping Turkish voters' party preferences, it has not drawn much scholarly interest. Existing studies also have serious drawbacks, for example, for being too descriptive and repetitive. Although recent studies based on

a quantitative approach (for example, Marschall et al., 2014), list experiments (for example, Çarkoğlu & Aytaç, 2014) or formal modelling (for example, Kemahlıoğlu, 2005) have considerably advanced our understanding of clientelism, they take actors, structures, and relations as given and do not (intend to) highlight the dynamics and mechanisms of clientelism. Similarly, the interplay of clientelism, religion, and neoliberalism has remained virtually unexplored. More than that, the present literature lacks any comparative findings that would allow us to unearth the peculiarities of the Turkish case.

Clientelism is a historically-rooted phenomenon in Turkey. During the late Ottoman and early republican periods, first local notables, then small-town merchants (*eşraf*) and large landowners (*ağa*) brokered between the state and clients. The relationship between the brokers and the ruling elite was symbiotic: It enabled the center to control the periphery while it extended brokers' influence over the peasants (Ayata, 1994).

Although, with the transition to multi-party politics, the political parties gradually replaced the traditional actors as patrons (Sayari, 2011, p. 7), the hierarchical nature of clientelism remained virtually untouched. As rightly noted by Sayari (2011, p. 7), this kind of vertical mobilization contrasts markedly with class-based horizontal mobilization in western Europe and had substantial implications with regard to the voter–politician linkage in Turkey. On the supply side, the new political elite tried to solve socio-economic problems with pork-barrel projects, such as building new roads or providing electricity (Sayari, 2011, p. 8; Heper & Keyman, 1998, p. 259). On the demand side, it was expected that deputies be accessible and act as direct representatives of the voters (Ayata, 1994, p. 53).

From the 1960s onwards, clientelism spread rapidly to urban areas with urbanization and industrialization. The new urban squatters, who relied on political support for electrification and the distribution of land deeds, came to the forefront in this context (Kselman, 2012, p. 237). In this framework, Sherwood (1967, p. 57) illustrates how clientelist networks were serving as problem-solvers in big cities during the 1970s:

> A typical villager arriving in Ankara or Istanbul goes immediately to that district populated by people from his home village. The local Justice Party [AP] man helps him settle, aids him with his problems with the authorities, and functions as an employment agency, or a marriage bureau, as the case may be.

In the post-coup period, Turgut Özal, who became prime minister in 1983, put the blame on the "strong state" for the prevalence of clientelism. His assumption was that if his party (ANAP) could reduce the size of the state, clientelism would diminish. As a rule, if the diagnosis is wrong so is the prescription. That is to say, although the ANAP dramatically scaled down the public sector through large-scale privatizations (Öniş, 2004), clientelism only spread more widely. This was because the ANAP was itself a clientelist party, granting title deeds to squatter settlements, institutionalizing preferential electrification, frequently turning sub-provinces into provinces (White, 2002; Ayata, 1994), and creating new cronies. Accordingly, when the ANAP broke its promises it triggered a huge public reaction, which led to its defeat in the 1991 elections.

Why did the ANAP's clientelist machine fail to survive even though the party governed alone? Two major elements can be underlined. First, ANAP cronies were reluctant to share the burden of the clientelist state. Second, the ANAP lacked a strong party organization that could interact with voters in daily life and monitor their voting behavior.

The ANAP's main rival on the center-right, the DYP, was also deeply involved in clientelism. As the Civangate scandal and the Özer Çiller case illustrate, the party leadership built a massive clientelist network around the triangle of mafia, businessmen, and politicians.

In this context, the RP's anti-corruption discourse found a large audience. After coming to power in 1996, however, far from taking measures to eliminate it, the RP merely reshaped corruption, injecting an Islamic element,. When this was combined with the door-to-door electoral strategy of the highly committed party members, the RP created an efficient clientelist network. Even the breaking of the RP-DYP

government could not undermine this network, given the RP's control in the municipalities.

3.5.3. Clientelism under AKP governments

Although the AKP is the successor to the RP, its use of clientelism differs substantially. First, while the RP hinged its clientelism on a discourse of equality and social justice (economy), the AKP has built its clientelism on a discourse characterized by destroying the Kemalist order (politics). Second, while the RP's clientelism offered permanent solutions to clients' problems, such as housing, the AKP's strategy has been shaped by a professed concern to "save the day." Third, the parties differ in terms of their relations with business. Although the RP could not develop loyalty in the business sector due to pressure from the military and the social sector, the AKP has been able to nurture such loyalty, with friendly business sponsoring the clientelist machine during economic downturns. Finally, the AKP's clientelism is more efficient in deterring exit because multiple actors are involved in monitoring clients (see Chapter 6).

As Singer & Kitschelt (2011, p. 17) illustrate, clientelist parties must have the following features and the AKP evidently does.[30] First, clientelist parties rely on vague legislation. The most prominent item in this regard is the Public Procurement Law, which has been amended more than 100 times under AKP governments.[31] Second, clientelist parties are largely unresponsive to the demands of the middle class. This is because targeting the middle class is more costly than targeting the poor (Hicken, 2011, pp. 299–300).[32] Finally, clientelist parties are organized in a centralized and

30 An exception to this assumption is that the AKP's clientelism explicitly targets core rather than swing voters.

31 For insightful discussions on the amendments to the Public Procurement Law, see Ercan & Oğuz, 2006; Çeviker-Gürakar, 2016.

32 There were also some legitimate reasons for the AKP to distant itself from the middle class, which historically aligns with the Kemalist establishment (Kalaycıoğlu, 2001, p. 64).

hierarchical, albeit informal structure. The AKP illustrates this feature as well because the clientelist machine is guided by a very strong and centralized leadership.

In line with this, Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP) data[33] also demonstrate that the AKP far exceeds its rivals in appealing to voters with clientelist inducements (see Table 8). Its high scores reveal that the AKP is more clientelist than dominant parties in other settings (see Table 28).

Table 8: Clientelism and mainstream parties in Turkey

Party	b1 (gift and payment)	b2 (social policy benefits)	b3 (patronage jobs)	b4 (procurement contracts)	b5 (regulatory favors)	b11 (effectiveness of clientelist targeting)
HDP	2.0	3.3	3.7	3.4	3.4	2.9
MHP	1.5	2.9	3.7	3.2	3.3	2.6
AKP	4.0	3.8	3.9	3.9	4.0	3.7
CHP	2.1	3.0	3.5	3.2	2.9	2.4

Note: * Scores: 1 to 4 – 1= a negligible [clientelist] effort or none at all; 2= a minor effort; 3= a moderate effort; 4= a major effort.

Source: DALP.

Based on the narrative presented above, below I outline the properties of the AKP's clientelism.

[33] The DALP was a cross-national survey carried out by political scientists in the Political Science department at Duke University. The data were gathered in 2008 and 2009 from more than 1,400 experts in 88 countries. The experts assessed five targeted clientelistic partisan activities on a four-point scale to highlight the extent of clientelism and democratic accountability.

Clientelism targets mainly the devout bourgeoisie and the urban poor

Clientelism potentially targets all socio-economic groups by offering wide-ranging benefits (Landé, 1983, p. 440). Broadly speaking, the following benefits can motivate people from various social strata to join a clientelist network: For the poor, material aid or finding a job; for the middle class, finding or protection against the fear of losing a job; and for the upper class, exchanging kickbacks with the government.

Ayata (1990, p. 159) argues that a cross-class alliance is needed for the smooth operation of clientelism. In the case of the AKP, this is formed between the urban poor and the devout bourgeoisie. Starting with the former, the urban poor is targeted because they outnumber other groups (Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004; Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Szwarcberg, 2013), they are more risk-averse (Wantchekon, 2003; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno & Brusco, 2013), or because they are less costly (Hicken, 2011, pp. 299–300). Accordingly, it is not surprising that clientelist parties have regularly been observed in poor societies characterized by high inequality (Singer & Kitschelt, 2011, p. 17; Robinson & Verdier, 2013, p. 264). Turkey, with its high income disparities and poverty (see Chapter 4), thus offers favorable conditions for clientelism to expand.

The AKP government seeks to attract the votes of the poor with the money of the rich. In fact, the AKP's alliance with loyal business is not surprising if one considers that dominant parties typically have organic links to strong social groups, such as rich businessmen (for example, Japan), the church (as in Italy), or the unions (such as Sweden) (Dunleavy, 2010, p. 12). In this framework, AKP governments have frequently exchanged kickbacks with loyal businessmen, particularly in the construction sector (Marschall, Aydogan, & Bulut, 2015; Karatepe, 2016). In return for these favors, loyal businessmen donate money to a "pool," which is used to fund election campaigns and the non-partisan press. The purchasing of ATV-Sabah media by Çalık Group best illustrates this.[34] Second, loyal businessmen employ partisans in their businesses.

[34] The making of the partisan press under the AKP government is a dramatic example of patron-client relationship. In 2004, "Star TV*"* and "Star newspaper" owned by Genç Party

There is a division of labor among patrons in clientelist exchange

The party organization and its leader are not the only actors that ensure clientelist exchange. As will be discussed (see Chapter 6), there is a division of labor among patrons, including the party, the leader, the district governorship, the municipality, the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, mukhtars, charity organizations, religious communities, and loyal businessmen. To illustrate, while the Ministry of Social Policy targets primarily the disabled and elderly voters, the municipality targets the young poor. The division of labor has two main functions. First, it hinders the monopolization of clientelist resources. Second, it improves the efficiency of monitoring voters.

Clientelism is leader- rather than broker-mediated

A broker is a middleman who arranges exchanges of resources between clients and patrons who are geographically or personally distanced (Auyero & Benzecry, 2017). In addition, brokers target clients, monitor their actions, obtain knowledge, and enter into face to face interactions with them (Stokes et all., 2013; Auyero & Benzecry, 2017).

In the case of the AKP, as far as I observed, the party brokers organize meetings, make home visits, inform the party about developments in their area of responsibility, and take care of the people assigned to them, be it the elderly or the disabled. In this way, brokers keep the party organization alive and make things happen. Despite their crucial role, party brokers are not allowed to develop autonomous influence. Neither are they indispensable to the party leadership. The absence of strong brokers, in fact, maintains the unity of the party under a strong leader.

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leader Cem Uzan, was handed over to prime-minister controlled "Saving Deposit Insurance Fund" (TMSF). Three years later, the popular newspapers "Sabah*"* and "Takvim*"* and a popular TV channel 'ATV' were also taken over by the TMSF. These were then sold to the loyal businessmen through procurements. With the sale of Doğan group-owned "*Vatan"* and "Milliyet" to the pro-AKP Demirören family in 2011, the loyal businessmen's control over newspaper circulation rose by 30 percent in 7 years (Çarkoğlu, Baruh & Yıldırm, 2014, pp. 300-301).

Clientelism is a problem-solving strategy

Clientelism is a problem-solver for diverse groups (Auyero, 2001; 2012). In the case of the urban poor, clientelism serves to meet basic needs, which in theory are supposed to be met by the welfare state. In addition, clientelism promises upward social mobility and safeguards access to urban services and state jobs through its informal promotion and reward mechanisms (Auyero, 2012, p. 98).

Clientelism is shaped by neoliberalism

Unlike similar Islamic-rooted parties in the Middle East, the AKP's clientelism is shaped by neoliberalism. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, by implementing neoliberal policies, such as privatization and deregulation, the AKP has nurtured its Islamic bourgeoisie, which funds the clientelist network. Similarly, by perpetuating poverty, neoliberalism keeps clients dependent on the government to sustain their lives. In this sense, clientelism and neoliberalism are mutually reinforcing in Turkey.[35]

Islam constitutes a non-material aspect of clientelism

To build an efficient clientelist network, the flow of material benefits must be complemented by non-material instruments, such as Islamism (see Chapter 6). Islamism as an ideology fulfills two crucial roles for clientelist exchange. First, it serves as a cement that keeps normally antagonistic classes under the same party flag (Gülalp, 2001; Beinin, 2004). Second, it deters exit from the clientelist network through neighborhood pressure.

Clientelism hinges on sectarian rather than ethnic exclusion

[35] This stands in a stark contrast to Mexico, where the clientelist machine weakened after the PRI's neoliberal turn during the 1980s (see Chapter 6).

Clientelism is by nature exclusionary. In this sense, Alevites are excluded from the clientelist network because they have long been aligned with the social democrats. By contrast, because Kurds predominantly vote for the AKP – at least in Bağcılar – ethnic exclusion is not evident.

4. CHAPTER FOUR: PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN TURKEY

This chapter illustrates the trajectories of party system change in Turkey. To this end, it first introduces the framework for party system change and then illustrates such change on the example of Turkey.

4.1. Defining party system change

It seems obvious to state that party system change requires an already-existing party system (Mair, 2006, p. 66). The issue, then, is to determine how much change suffices to call it "party system change." Scholars have addressed this question by adopting one of two approaches. On one hand, the mathematical approach (for example, Rae, 1967[36]; Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) treats party system change as a matter of degree. In this framework, thresholds are set to reframe and locate party system change (Mair, 2006, pp. 63–64). On the other hand, as adopted in the present study, there is the traditional approach (for example, Duverger, 1954; Blondel, 1968; Sartori, 1976), which suggests that party system change is rare in practice because party systems are characterized by demanding features and precise boundaries (Mair, 2006, p. 63). The prominent example is Ireland, whose party system evolved into a predominant party system through the stages of polarized pluralism and moderate pluralism, respectively (Mair, 1979).

Although Turkey has the longest experience with parliamentary democracy in the Muslim world, the trajectories of the Turkish party system reveal that it has an "inchoate" (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995) "open" (Mair, 1997) or "unstructured party system" (Sartori, 2005) evidenced in high levels of fragmentation, volatility and polarization.[37] The reasons behind this are diverse: military interventions, inefficient

[36] Sartori (2005, pp. 273-274) shows that, Rae's fractionalization index overvalues large parties and undervalues small parties.

[37] According to Özbudun (2013, p. 2), these are "the three maladies of the Turkish party system".

governments, factionalism, party closures[38], party switches[39], and a lack of intra-party democracy. This feature poses a challenge to developing a consistent framework that would aid in thoroughly analyzing change in the Turkish party system.

Within this framework, this chapter above all seeks to up-to-date some decades-old pieces of research that examine the party system change in Turkey.[40] Second, unlike other studies that cover a time-limited period in their analysis and thereby lack reliable findings that highlight the general characteristics of the Turkish party system[41], this part encompasses the analysis of the party system change since the establishment of modern Turkey. Third, by consistently adopting Sartori's party system typology throughout the text, this chapter goes beyond taxonomies that do not provide meaningful insights within the context of party system theory.[42]

Against this background, using Sartori's typology, I examine the change in the Turkish party system based on two criteria: a) the number of relevant parties and b) the spatial distance between the parties (the level of polarization). For the former, we look at the electoral results and government compositions.

In this framework, while positioning the parties spatially, I primarily examine the party programs of the respective parties. My approach was content analysis that centered on finding key concepts that defined the ideology of the respective parties.

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[38] The regime has used the party closure card against any anti-systemic party, be it religious (for example, Welfare Party), ethnic (for example, People's Democracy Party) or class-based (for example, Turkey's Workers Party).

[39] Party switching is a common phenomenon in Turkey, particularly before 2002. For instance, from 1983 to 2002, 32 percent of deputies switched their parties. This exerted substantial influence on the party system by increasing fragmentation (Sayarı, 2008, p. 414).

[40] See, for instance, Ergun Özbudun, 1981; Sayarı, 1978.

[41] For instance, the studies of Öney & Selck (2017) focuses on the post-1980 period. Similarly, Ilter Turan's (1988) piece covers the changing party system in early 1980s.

[42] For instance, Ergun Özbudun (2013, p. 2) calls the Turkish party system during the 1990s "extreme multipartism," which lacks clarity of meaning. In the same vein, Üstün Ergüder & Richard I. Hofferbert (1988, p. 86) misleadingly calls the period from 1950 to 1973, "predominant party system". In doing so they apparently overlook the DP's authoritarian turn in the late 1950s; the coup d'etat in 1960; and the coalition governments in between 1961 and 1965.

To measure polarization, on the other hand, I make use of public surveys[43] and the secondary literature.

I suggest that investigating party programs has a clear advantage over other methods such as discourse analysis (for example, of the party leaders) in understanding the spatial distance between the parties. It is my view that Turkey has been governed by the mentality expressed in the famous motto of ex-Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel: "Yesterday was yesterday and today is today." This makes it inaccurate to base our analysis on the discourse of the party leaders. Therefore, I believe that party programs – although they are prone to change from time to time – will offer a more consistent approach to highlighting the ideological orientation of the parties.

On the other hand, I am well aware that our approach also has some constraints. First, the party programs largely consist of general and ambiguous expressions. Excluding a few examples, such as the "democratic left" slogan of the Republican People's Party (CHP) in the 1970s or the "idealism" of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), there is hardly any document that fully highlights the ideological orientation of the parties. Nevertheless, the use of some key terms such as "anti-nationalism" and "conservatism" helps to highlight the ideological positioning of the parties. Second, the party programs of both center-right and center-left parties include similar provisions that make it difficult to highlight the spatial distance between them. Third, in some cases, the party program and political practice do not overlap much. For instance, while the party program of the AKP is quite liberal, its policies in government have recently shown quite authoritarian tendencies.

Based on these background, I call the period from 1950 to 1960 a 'predominant party system with a leaning towards a hegemonic party system'; the period from 1961 to 1980, 'polarized pluralism driven by a left-right divide'; and the period from 1983

[43] There is a recent and growing literature on the dynamics of polarization in Turkey (e.g. Fabbe, 2011; Yılmaz, 2015; Çınar, 2011; Erdoğan & Semerci, 2018; Keyman 2014; Erişen & Erdoğan, 2019). Polarization is also discussed in different contexts such as media (Çarkoğlu, Baruh & Yıldırım, 2014); elites (Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2018); political Islam (Akçalı, 2011; Kaya & Sunar, 2015; Tepe, 2014); environmental movement (Özler & Obach, 2018); presidentialism (Aytaç, Çarkoğlu & Yıldırım, 2017) and class (Ferguson, 2014).

to 2002, ‘polarized pluralism driven by ethnic and religious cleavages’. Considering the recent authoritarian drift of the incumbent AKP, I call the period from 2002 onwards a “predominant party system with a leaning towards a hegemonic party system.” The summary of the findings can be found in Table 9.

With regard to the role of opposition parties in this change, I shall emphasize several points. First, the opposition is highly fragmented. Second, the opposition parties tend to be more antagonistic toward each other than the governing party, illustrating the existence of what Sartori calls “bilateral opposition.” Overall, I suggest that while fragmented opposition led to the emergence of a one-party government and/or military intervention because of the high polarization it induces (for example, the 1970s and 1990s), the existence of bilateral opposition prolongs one-party governments (for example, after June 2015 elections). I must emphasize that this hypothesis works for the post-1960 period since there was neither fragmentation nor bilateral opposition before that.

Table 9: Summary of the party system change in Turkey (1923-2015/2)

Period	Party system	Election year	Government type	Opposition type	Government(s) members	Anti-systemic party**	Fragmentation***
1923–1950	One-party authoritarian	-	One-party	-	CHP	-	-
1950–1960	Predominant party system with a leaning towards a hegemonic party system	1950	One-party	Unilateral	DP	-	Low
		1954	One-party	Unilateral	DP	-	Low
		1957	One-party*	Unilateral	DP	-	Low
1961–1980	Polarized pluralism driven by class conflict	1961	Coalition	-	CHP-CKMP-YTP-AP	-	High
		1965	One-party	Bilateral	AP	TIP	High
		1969	One party*	Bilateral	CHP-AP-MGP	TIP	High
		1973	Coalition	Bilateral	DP-MSP-AP-CGP-MHP-CHP	-	High
		1977	Coalition*	Bilateral	CHP-AP-MHP-MSP-CGP-DP	-	High
1983–2002	Polarized pluralism driven by ethnic and religious conflict	1983	One-party	-	ANAP	-	Low
		1987	One-party	Unilateral	ANAP	-	Low
		1991	Coalition	Bilateral	DYP -SHP	RP	High
		1995	Coalition	Bilateral	RP-ANAP-DYP-DSP-CHP-RP-DTP	-	High
		1999	Coalition	Bilateral	MHP-DSP-ANAP	-	High
2002–2015	Predominant party system	2002	One-party	Unilateral	AKP	-	Low
		2007	One-party	Unilateral	AKP	-	Low
		2011	One-party	Bilateral	AKP	BDP	Low
		2015/1	One-party	Bilateral	AKP	-	Low

		2015/2	One-party	Bilateral	AKP	HDP	Low

*Interrupted by military intervention/memorandum.

** Anti-systemic parties are those that have vote power or are capable of influencing the dynamics of the competition, be it in a centrifugal or a centripetal direction (Sartori, 2005).

*** Fragmentation is high if five or more parties actively shape the party system (Sartori, 2005).

4.2. 1923–1950: One-party authoritarianism

The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 by the CHP, which maintained its single-party rule until 1950. In terms of its organizational structure, the CHP was a typical cadre party, guided by a group of elites who organized the war of independence under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. As a general tendency, the CHP's rule was authoritarian in character, not totalitarian, because the CHP did not have a clear ideology[44] and was not interested in regulating the private sphere. In the same vein, in contrast to totalitarian regimes, political and social mobilization was circumscribed.[45]

Since the Young Turk era – although marginalized and frequently suppressed – the opposition was allowed to be represented in the parliament, be it the Liberal Union Party (Ahrar Party) in the First Constitutional Monarchy or the Second Group in the First Assembly of 1920–1923 (Özbudun, 2015, p. 36). During the single-party rule of the CHP, the ruling elites allowed the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) in 1924 and the Free Republican Party (SCF) in 1930. The regime's tolerance of these parties diminished, however, as they started to become credible alternatives to the regime (Turan, 2015, p. 47). While the TCF was banned after the assassination attempt on Mustafa Kemal in Izmir, the SCF dissolved itself upon Mustafa Kemal's request. The allegation was the same: they became the center of anti-secular activities. This rationale persisted in the following decades and laid the groundwork for the dissolution of the religious parties.

Why did the Kemalist elites allow party pluralism, even for a short period of time? The relevant literature suggests that the authoritarian regimes allow party pluralism for a variety of reasons, ranging from a desire to monitor the success of the regime (Blaydes, 2011) to alleviating possible tension between the ruler and the ruling

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[44] There is a great deal of literature that defines the CHP's ideology as corporatist. For instance, Parla & Davison (2004) labels the CHP's ideological orientation, solidaristic corporatism with a partial fascistic tendencies. Similarly, Zafer Toprak (1980) documents how the corporatism of the late Ottomans permeated into modern Turkey. However, not all authors share the view that the CHP was a corporatist party (e.g. Esen, 2014).

45 From a different perspective, the political regime was mobilizing as it was able to form a new republic. Therefore, in Linz's (2000) analysis, Turkey falls under the '*post-independence mobilizational regime*'.

elite (Magaloni, 2006, 2008). In the Turkish case, similarly to other authoritarian settings (Schedler, 2002, 2006), the inclusion of the opposition in parliament was clearly aimed at expanding the legitimacy of the regime. Once this failed, the check and balance mechanism was bypassed, which further intensified one-party control (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010, p. 123).

Absence of party pluralism does not amount to saying that there was no opposition. On the contrary, the opposition was organized within the ruling party. From the outset, intra-party contestation between the étatists and the liberals was intense. While the liberals overwhelmed the étatists during the 1920s, the balance of power shifted to the étatists after the 1929 economic crisis (Boratav, 2003; Zürcher, 2004). As Solinger (2001) argues, intra-party opposition has the potential to weaken one-party regimes. And this is exemplified in the collapse of CHP rule in the next decade.

4.3. 1950–60: From the predominant party system to the hegemonic party system

In 1945, reacting to the land reform program, four deputies resigned from the CHP and founded the Democrat Party (DP). The DP came into power in 1950 and repeated its success in the 1954 and 1957 elections, mainly drawing on the support of the periphery (Frey, 1975; Heper, 1985).[46] It remained in power until it was ousted by a military intervention in 1960.

During the 1950s, the major contestation took place between the DP and the CHP. Although niche parties such as the Nation Party (MP) were popular for some time, they could never translate that popularity into many seats in the parliament because of a first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system that empowers large parties and underrepresents small ones (Norris, 2004; Taagepera, 2007). In line with this, the

[46] The alliance of the periphery with the right wing parties gave rise to an equilibrium in which the right-wing votes typically double those of the left (Özbudun, 2013).

election results show that even the second party (CHP) was highly underrepresented. Accordingly, the DP sustained its super-majority in the parliament despite the substantial decline in its vote share in the 1957 elections.

Under any given standard, the spatial distance between the DP and the CHP does not suffice to put them in opposing camps – at least in the early 1950s. The difference between these two parties was non-ideological in character and mainly hinged on some policy issues (Sayarı, 1978: 43). When the DP attempted to strengthen its position in the political system and began to adopt populist authoritarian policies towards the end of the 1950s (Sayarı, 2002, p. 65), the gap between the discourse and the practice of the party became wider. Responding this, the CHP leadership started to address voters through a more reformist/progressive discourse and policy agenda.47

Despite exhibiting the characteristics of a predominant party system until the 1957 elections, the party system transformed into a 'hegemonic party system' in the next three years. First, the DP's attempt to confiscate the CHP's party property through the "Investigation Committee" (Tahkikat Komisyonu) (Hale, 2013, p. 106), its pressuring of the media, and its imposition of police control on the opposition illustrate the desire of the DP to eliminate competition (Harris, 1970, p. 445). The legal arrangements, on the other hand, included the downgrade of Kırşehir's status as province and the split of Malatya province after predominantly voting for the opposition. Second, the DP had enough of a majority to change the constitution during each term.

Eventually, the declining popularity of the DP as a result of economic setbacks (Tachau & Good, 1973, p. 552) and intra-party splits[48] accelerated its authoritarian turn. This drift brought about social mobilization within the opposition, especially in the form of student revolts (Sayarı, 2008, p. 406). When this was backed by secular

47 The document which best captured the reformist turn of the CHP was the "Declaration of Primary Goals" (İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi) in 1959. In the document, the CHP called for the separation of powers in addition to making necessary changes to ensure free and fair elections.

[48] For instance, the liberal wing of the DP founded the "Freedom Party" in 1956. The next year, Fuad Köprülü, one of four founders of the DP and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, resigned in 1957 (Karpat, 1961).

intellectuals and the bureaucracy, it laid the groundwork for the military intervention in 1960 (Landau, 2016, p. 205; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p. 154). After the coup, the army dissolved the DP.

The military intervention in 1960 turned Turkey into a "tutelage democracy". (Çalışkan, 2017; 2018). Since then, defining itself as a "guardian of the regime" (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p. 154), the military frequently intervened in daily politics and enjoyed autonomy in preparation of the defense budget and deciding on promotions (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p. 151). Despite these authoritarian traits, the basic principles of democracies such as free elections and the rule of law were respected (Akgün, 2001, p. 74). As will be discussed, the military tutelage maintained until the AKP's "competitive authoritarian turn".

4.4. 1961–1980: Polarized pluralism driven by left-right cleavage

After the coup d'état in May 1960 and in order to obscure the re-emergence of authoritarian one-party rule, the new electoral system (D'Hondt) was adopted. This move increased fragmentation in the parliament, especially on the right of the political spectrum, and thereby empowered anti-systemic parties at the expense of the center (Turan, 1988, p. 66).

I call the party system between 1961 and 1980 'polarized pluralism driven by left-right cleavage'. The left-right cleavage came to the forefront because of social transformation defined by rapid urbanization, industrialization and transition to a market economy (Özbudun, 2015). Accordingly, new parties with diverse ideologies came into existence to capture the newly rising sectors of society (Özbudun, 2015, p. 65; Özbudun, 2013, p. 2).

Polarized pluralism has several properties. First, fragmentation is high, implying that five or more parties simultaneously and actively shape the party system (Sartori, 2005, p. 112). Recalling the relevance criteria, the parties I count are the Republican People's Party (CHP), Justice Party (AP), National Salvation Party (MSP), Republican Villagers Nation Party [Nationalist Action Party]) (CKMP [MHP]), New Turkey Party (YTP), Nation Party (MP), Republican Trust Party [National Trust Party,

Trust Party] (CGP [MGP, GP]), and the Democratic Party (DP). At the same time, I discounted the Union Party of Turkey Party (TBP), because it never joined any coalition government and apparently had no blackmail potential.

Second, as a result of high fragmentation, the direction of the competition is centrifugal, showing the influence of the anti-systemic parties on the party system (Sartori, 2005, p. 119). Although during the 1970s, almost all parties adopted some sort of anti-systemic rhetoric[49] (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 123), I only identify the Turkey's Workers Party (TIP) as an anti-systemic party because its socialist leaning was regarded as a threat to the regime (Ünsal, 2002). Nevertheless, the TIP was capable of changing the dynamic of the competition in a centrifugal direction. Its effective opposition in the parliament, for instance, prompted the CHP to initially shift to the "left of the center*"* during the mid-1960s and then to "social democracy" in the next decade (Emre, 2014). It also prompted mainstream parties to abandon a "national reminder electoral system*"* and switch to the less proportional "D'Hondt system*"* (Aydın & Taşkın, 2016, pp. 173-174).

On the other hand, despite its ultra-nationalist program and discourse, I do not identify the MHP as anti-systemic, simply because it found a place in the coalition governments known as the "Nationalist Front Governments*"*. Nothing could illustrate polarized pluralism better than the name of these coalitions!

Third, in polarization pluralism, there is a bilateral opposition that makes the opposition parties closer to the governing parties than to each other (Sartori, 2005, pp. 118-119). This can best be derived from the party programs of the respective parties, which I summarize in Table 10. From the table, one may infer that the Republican Reliance Party/Reliance Party/Nationalist Reliance Party's (CGP/GP/MGP) emphasis on anti-religious extremism located them against the MNP/MSP tradition that prioritized religious values. In the same vein, the MHP's emphasis on anti-communism situated them in opposition to the TIP, which built its program on unionism and labor.

[49] According to İlter Turan (1988, p. 66), maximizing ideological distance to the rival parties was pragmatically adopted to make party switches more difficult.

Between 1960 and 1980, parties of diverse ideological backgrounds, including the nationalists, conservatives, socialists, and social democrats found a place in the parliament. This expanded spatial dimension of the party competition (Sayarı, 2014, p. 90). However, rather than fostering political consensus, party pluralism enhanced polarization in the parliament (Tachau & Heper, 1983).

Towards the end of the 1960s, political polarization extended to the social sphere, mainly through student protests and guerilla-style robberies and kidnappings (Tachau & Good, 1973, p. 553). The end result was the military memorandum in 1971 that curtailed the democratic rights granted by the 1961 constitution and narrowed down the political space with the sanction of party closure. During the 1970s, on the other hand, high levels of fragmentation[50] and resulting polarization, this time, turned into a widespread violent street clashes (Turan, 1988, p. 67), which made forming a stable government a formidable task.

Table 10: Parties and leanings (1961–1980)

Party	**Leanings**
CGP/GP/MGP	• Anti-communism • Anti-liberalism • Anti-religious extremism
CHP	• Democratic left (1976) (incorporates freedom, equality, solidarity, superiority of labor, and self-government) • Principles of Atatürk
	• Agrarianism

[50] Here, the role of the electoral system must be underlined. In the 1977 elections, despite winning 42 percent of the votes, the CHP could not obtain a big enough majority to form a government alone. If one considers that the ANAP was able to form a government on their own with merely 36 percent of the votes in 1987 or the AKP with 34 percent of the votes in 2002, the impact of the electoral system on the party system can be better understood.

AP	• Market economy
CKMP/MHP	• Agrarianism • Idealism • Nationalism • Anti-communism
TIP	• Unionism • Labor (socialism) • Social equality
MNP/MSP	• National View • Conservatism • Heavy industrialization • Anti-Westernism
YTP	• Individualism • Traditionalism (the legacy of the DP)

*Based on the party programs, available at

www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/e_yayin.liste_q?ptip=SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI

In this environment, which was deeply polarized along left-right lines, the only party that could maneuver both sides was Erbakan's MSP, the successor of the National Order Party (MNP). Reflecting the zeitgeist, the MSP prioritized economics over religion (Toprak, 2005, p. 171), despite its heavy emphasis on religion in its party program. This strategy put the MSP at an advantage during the 1970s, as it took part in the coalition governments of both camps and in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup (Atacan, 2005, p. 192; Yavuz, 2003, p. 69; Zürcher, 2004, p. 288).

Fourth, polarized pluralism empowered minor parties, the independents, and the defectors (Sayarı, 1978, p. 56). The Güneş Motel event illustrates this.51 As a result, reflecting the nature of polarized pluralism, governments were short-lived during this period (20 governments were formed in 20 years).

Overall, my analysis reveals that fragmented opposition initially led to the one-party governments of the AP in 1965 and 1969, which came to an end with the 1971 military memorandum. The combination of fragmentation and bilateral opposition during the 1970s led to political instability, which permeated into public life in the form of civil-war like situation. As Huntington (1968) observes, the inevitable result of this development was a military intervention in the praetorian regimes.

4.5. 1983–2002: Polarized pluralism driven by ethnic and religious cleavages

Polarized pluralism persisted in the aftermath of the coup as well, albeit changed in its form as the military severely crushed down the grassroots organizations of the left. In order to reduce fragmentation and thereby polarization, the D'Hondt system was implemented with a record-high national (10 percent) and a district level threshold.[52] Although these measures worked well during the 1980s, high levels of fragmentation returned to Turkish politics with the 1991 elections. (Çarkoğlu, 1998, p. 551). Accordingly, anti-systematic parties emerged as a credible alternative to the mainstream parties (Çarkoğlu, 1998, p. 544).

Recalling the relevance criteria, the parties we count include the Motherland Party (ANAP), True Path Party (DYP), Social Democratic People's Party (SHP), Democratic Left Party (DSP), Democratic Turkey Party (DTP), Welfare Party (RP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and the Republican People's Party (CHP). As shown in Table 11, In this term, fragmentation was high, especially after the 1991 elections

51 In the 1977 elections, despite casting record-high votes of 42 percent, the CHP failed to form the government alone because it lacked 13 seats. To compensate it, the CHP leadership transferred the splinters from the AP to the CHP after the meeting in Güneş Motel. In return for their favor, the splinters were awarded with ministership in the cabinet.

52 The district threshold included the division of big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara into smaller constituencies.

(Çarkoğlu, 1998) due to a lack of intraparty democracy, an authoritarian leadership and a closed-list party system which strengthened leaders' authority within their parties vis-à-vis opponents (Taagepera, 2007, p. 273).

Table 11: The trends of selected indicators (1983-1999)

	Turnout	Volatility	Fragmentation	Competition	Disproportionality
1983	88	-	2.85	85.4	6.79
1987	91	38.5	4.11	88.5	22.3
1991	81	16.6	4.67	97	11.34
1995	82	17.9	6.16	97.8	9.78
1999	83	20.2	6.78	95.8	9.47

Source: Tezcür, 2012, p. 119.

Notes: Volatility is based on the Pedersen formula. As the number gets closer to 0, parties' vote share remains the same across two elections. Fragmentation is calculated according to the Laakso-Taagepera effective number of parties' indicator. If one party has a huge majority, the number is slightly above 1. Competition measures the vote share differences between the winning party and the second-strongest party subtracted from 100. The nearer the resulting value to 100, the more competitive the party system. Disproportionality is based on the Gallagher index and is calculated by summing up of absolute differences between parties' seat and vote share.

Recall that high levels of fragmentation have a systemic implication – i.e., an increase in polarization (Sartori 2005). However, this time polarization was driven by ethnic and religious cleavages rather than by class (Kalaycıoğlu, 1999). Parties leanings derived from their program can be found in Table 12.

In relation to ethnic cleavage, while pro-Kurdish parties'53 programs emphasized anti-nationalism and racism, the MHP's party program was built on anti-terrorism (ethnic) and nationalism. The salience of ethnic polarization can best be shown through the remarkable increase in the vote share of the MHP – from eight percent in 1995 to 18 percent in 1999 – as a result of the PKK leader's imprisonment.

Table 12: Parties and leanings (1982–2002)

Party	**Leanings**
DYP	• Agrarianism • Nationalism • Conservatism
DSP	• Democratic left/social democracy • Secularism
SHP/CHP	• Kemalism • Social democracy
HEP/DEP/ÖZDEP/HADEP/DEHAP	• Anti-nationalism • Anti-racism • Pro-Kurdish • Pro-left
ANAP	• Mixture of four ideologies (center, center-left, center-right, Islamism) • Liberal market economy

53 The Kurdish candidates, who were elected under the SHP list in the 1991 elections were expelled from the party in 1994. This led them to form their own party, the Party of Democracy (DEP). The DEP and its successors were banned by the Constitutional Court on the ground that they divide the nation along ethnic lines.

	• Export-driven growth
MHP	• Anti-globalism • Nationalism • Anti-terrorism
RP/FP	• National View • Social justice (Just Order) • Developmentalism • Conservatism (Islamism)

*Based on the party programs, available at

http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/e_yayin.liste_q?ptip=SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI

The second element that drove polarization during the 1990s was religion (Esmer, 2002; Sayarı, 2002). The forerunner on the Islamic front was the Welfare Party (RP), the successor of the MSP. From the outset, while the RP constantly labelled itself as the "anti-order party", it referred to others as the "order party". This rhetoric hindered it from joining coalition governments after the 1991 elections. Therefore, I identify the RP between the 1991 and 1995 elections as an anti-systemic party. In contrast to this, although the RP increased its Islamic tone and injected its Islamic agenda into official documents such as "Just Order", it succeeded in forming an 11-month-long government with the DYP under the premiership of Erbakan, following its victory in the 1995 elections. Therefore, considering its coalition potential, I do not identify the RP as an anti-systemic party after the 1995 elections.

As I have highlighted, bilateral opposition prevails in polarized pluralism. Illustrating this point, the opposition to Islamists mainly came from the social democrats, who incorporated secularism into their party programs. What was

interesting during the 1990s was that fragmentation on the right permeated into left, which came to mean that there was no single party that represented the interest of the center (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p. 407). And paradoxically, fragmentation of the left among the CHP, DSP, and SHP laid the groundwork for the further rise of the Islamists (Öniş, 1997). The most notable example was the 1994 local elections, which resulted in a defeat of the social democrats in Istanbul and Ankara by a small margin.

Bilateral opposition was also evident on the right of the political spectrum. Despite having similar party programs and bases of support[54], the ANAP and the DYP failed to form a government together after the 1995 legislative elections because of their leaders' personal animosities. Accordingly, the DYP formed the government with the RP, which set the stage for the post-modern coup in 1997 and the AKP rule in 2002.

In addition, as a result of the polarized pluralism, the governments were short-lived during the 1990s (ten governments were formed between 1991 and 2002). This rendered parties largely unresponsive to the demands of the voters. The same applies to the opposition as well (Sartori, 2005, p. 122). Eventually, as a result of what Sartori (2005, p. 123) would call the "politics of outbidding", economic crises and political instability became chronic during the 1990s and early 2000s (Akgün, 2001, pp. 79-80).

4.6. 2002–2015: Predominant party system

After the 1999 elections, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Motherland Party (ANAP) formed a coalition government. Although the new government was successful in legalizing new democratic reforms, its management of the economy was a disaster. Consequently, the deepening of what Öniş

[54] Yılmaz Esmer (1995) shows that the ideological self-placement of the DYP and ANAP voters were similar to each other, just like the DSP and the CHP on the left.

(2003, p. 3) calls the "low-growth, high inequality syndrome" stimulated the most devastating economic crisis in February 2001.[55]

The resulting frustration with the mainstream parties led the public to widely believe that coalition governments are malignant. Therefore, coalition governments gradually lost their image of reflecting the plurality in the society and were increasingly equated with political malfunctioning rather than seen as institutions that reflected party pluralism. This political turn – the prevailing of stability over pluralism – constituted the "psychological dimension" of entering into the longest one-party government. With the support of the electoral system, the AKP captured two thirds of the parliamentary seats despite winning only 34 percent of the votes. After winning the third election in a row by at least a 10 percent margin in 2011, the AKP transformed the Turkish party system into a predominant party system (Aslan-Akman, 2012; Ayan-Musil, 2015; Baç & Keyman, 2012; Çarkoğlu, 2011; Gümüşçü, 2012).

As Mair (2006, p. 66) rightfully states, "change in the structure of competition [party system] is perhaps most easily observed when it involves a new party arriving in office; by definition, this will also involve the adoption of an innovative governing formula." The AKP as a six-month old party illustrates this occurrence.

Table 13: Selected indicators after 2002

	Turnout	**Volatility**	**Fragmentation**	**Competition**	**Disproportionality**
2002	76	41.7	5.43	85.1	27.04
2007	82	18.6	3.48	74.3	11.92
2011	81	11.6	2.97	76.2	7.47
2015/1*	81	11.4	3.65	84.1	4.9
2015/2*	84	9.8	2.99	75.8	6.7

[55] Because of the crisis, more than a million-people lost their jobs; 350.000 workplaces were closed down; and real wages declined by 20 percent. Expectedly, the most vulnerable group to the crisis was the poor (Öniş, 2003, p. 15; Yeldan, 2007, p. 3).

Source: Tezcür, 2012, p. 119.

Notes: Volatility is based on the Pedersen formula. As the number gets closer to 0, parties' vote share remains the same across two elections. Fragmentation is calculated according to the Laakso-Taagepera effective number of parties' indicator. If one party has a huge majority, the number is slightly above 1. Competition measures the vote share differences between the winning party and the second-strongest party subtracted from 100. The nearer the resulting value to 100, the more competitive the party system. Disproportionality is based on the Gallagher index and is calculated by summing up of absolute differences between parties' seat and vote share.

*****Personal communication with Güneş Murat Tezcür, 20 June 2017.

In the post-2002 period, electoral volatility and fragmentation declined sharply, and the party system became more stabilized (Tezcür, 2012). However, these changes did not tone down polarization (Çınar, 2016). On the contrary, party polarization increased. For instance, according to Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSeS) data, the party system polarization score of Turkey rose from 2.34 in 2002 to 6.21 in 2015 (Erdoğan & Semerci, 2018, p. 39). Similarly, a survey on public polarization conducted by Konda (2010) reveals the intensity of polarization along party lines.

In addition to public surveys, the extent of polarization can also be grasped from the electoral indicators, i.e. high turnout levels and the lowering of wasted votes, presented in Chapter 3 (Table 5). To remind again, while turnout reached a record-low 79 percent in the 2002 elections, it averaged 87 percent in the last three elections (2011, June and November 2015). The wasted votes followed the same trend and declined from a record-high 47 percent in 2002 to a record-low 3 percent in the November 2015 elections. I argue that the increase in turnout and the decline in wasted votes cannot be primarily explained through the policy appeals of the relevant parties. Rather, I suggest that voters are going to the polls in order to prevent the other party(ies) from winning the elections. This strategic voting resulting from polarization prompts further polarization and clearly undermines the quality of democracy.

Considering the relevance criteria, in this period, the parties I count consist of the CHP, MHP, and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party/Peace and Democracy Party/People's Democratic Party (DTP/BDP/HDP). At the same time, I qualify the BDP/HDP (for the 2011 and November 2015 elections) as an anti-systemic party given its lack of coalition potential and veto power. However, I must also underline that the HDP's anti-system party image eroded considerably between the June and November 2015 elections, when it was seen as a viable partner in the coalition talks with the CHP (Sözcü, 2015).

In accounting for the relations between the opposition parties, if one excludes the temporary cooperation between the MHP and the CHP during the 2010 referendum, the presidential elections in 2014, and the cooperation between the CHP and the HDP in the recent campaign against the introduction of presidentialism in Turkey, the opposition could not open a unique front against the AKP. Instead, as a typical feature of polarized pluralism, bilateral opposition prevailed between the nationalist and MHP and the pro-Kurdish parties that locate their political orientation in oppose to each other in their party programs as summarized in Table 14. However, unlike the 1990s, the contestation between these opposite poles took place in parliament, at least from 2007 onwards.

Table 14: Parties and leanings (2002–2015)

Party	**Leanings**
CHP	• Kemalism • Social Democracy
AKP**	• Pro-democracy • Pro-liberalism (economic)
MHP	• Idealism • Nationalism

	• Moralism • Agrarianism • Communitarianism
DEHAP/DTP/BDP/HDP	• Anti-nationalism • Anti-racism • Pro-Kurdish • Pro-labor

*Based on the party programs, available at

www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/e_yayin.liste_q?ptip=SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI

**What is notable for the AKP program is that it refrains from highlighting any concrete principle or ideology that defines its ideological orientation – at least until the AKP leadership formulated the term "conservative democracy" to refer its ideology.[56]

The AKP also weakened the opposition through appealing to the leaders of rival right-wing parties. Most notably, the AKP melted down the HAS Party and the Democrat Party – which performed well in the 2009 local elections – by persuading their leaders to defect in return for high-ranking positions within the AKP cadres.[57] This strategy of melting down political rivals by offering political favors – miniaturizing its clientelist nature – further entrenched the AKP's dominance in politics.

In addition, the opposition suffered from other weaknesses. First, the fragmented opposition lacked any cross-class support that might jeopardize the AKP's grip on power (Öniş, 2012, p. 147; Öniş, 2013, pp. 118-120). For instance, the MHP and the pro-Kurdish parties remained as niche parties that could not extend their voter

[56] For an insightful study on the concept of the conservative democracy, see Çağliyan-İçener (2009).

[57] These figures later became the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Culture, respectively.

base beyond their core constituencies. Second, the opposition suffered from lack of unity within the party. To illustrate, the CHP witnessed an intense intra-party rivalry between a defensive nationalist camp that prioritized the defense of the secular regime and the European style social democratic faction that prioritized democratic and economic reforms (Öniş, 2012, p. 147; Öniş, 2013, pp. 118-120). Third, the opposition parties could not generate a reliable party program as an alternative to the incumbent. More specifically, the opposition parties could not attract new voters with their party program emphasizing redistribution and anti-corruption (Öniş, 2012, p. 147).

Finally, I suggest along with other scholars (for example, Keyman & Gümüşçü, 2014; Özbudun, 2015; Çınar 2016; Lancaster 2016) that the predominant party system in Turkey has tended to transform into a hegemonic party system in recent years, particularly after the November 2015 elections. This is also reflected in Freedom House reports as well as in the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index.[58] There are two major indications of this transformation. The efforts of the AKP to not share power with the opposition after the June 2015 elections and the declaration of a 'state of emergency' (SoE), ensuing in the failed coup attempt in July 2016, evidently restrained political freedoms and competition (Erişen & Erdoğan, 2019, p. 5) through the securitization of dissent (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016). Second, electoral malpractices, including the use of fraud and intimidation, have become more evident. The recent violations with regard to the counting of votes in the presidential referendum in April 2017 and the voting conditions in the eastern and southeastern provinces draw attention to electoral malpractice. Similarly, repression of opposition became evident, as in the case of Gezi Park protests (Akkoyunlu & Öktem, 2016, p. 506).

Although these features bring the party system closer to a hegemonic party system, in order to fully qualify as a hegemonic party system, two more features must be observed. The first one is related to the majority of the AKP in the parliament.

58 According to Freedom House report, Turkey moved from the category of a "partly free" country with the freedom score of 3.5 in 2015 to the category of "not free" with the freedom score of 5.5 in 2018. In the assessment of the Economist, Turkey's democracy score dropped from 5.63 in 2013 to 4.88 in 2017, which indicates that Turkey is getting closer to authoritarian regimes.

Unlike the hegemonic party systems, the AKP could never retain enough of a majority (two-thirds of the seats) to change the constitution unilaterally. However, it would be logical to treat the recent alliance between the AKP and the MHP on the transition to presidentialism as the fulfilment of the first criterion. Second, unlike the hegemonic party system, it would be inappropriate to put all opposition parties in the basket of 'satellite parties'.

The transition to hegemonic party system marks that Turkey's regime[59] has been evolving from a "tutelary democracy"[60] to a "competitive authoritarian regime" (CAR) (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016; Özbudun, 2015; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2018). The drift towards competitive authoritarianism means that the essentials of democracies, e.g., the separation of powers, press freedom and the procedural requirement of conducting elections, have no longer been fulfilled and political competition is skewed in favor of the incumbent through repression, fraud and patronage (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016; Çalışkan, 2018). A notable example that shows the how political competition is narrowed down is the sending of the HDP leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, to prison along with other deputies, following the removal of immunities by the parliament.

[59] The AKP's authoritarian turn takes different labels such as "delegative democracy" (Taş, 2015); "neo-fascism" (Tuğal, 2016); "weak authoritarianism" (Akkoyunlu & Öktem, 2016) or "electoral authoritarianism" (Arbatlı, 2014).

[60] The AKP weakened the military through pursuing the EU agenda, decreasing the level of internal threats, and implementing legal reforms (Akça & Balta-Paker, 2013; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2016).

5. CHAPTER FIVE: AKP

This chapter is about the AKP. First, it traces its political roots; then, it highlights the two core characteristics of the AKP, neoliberalism and political Islam, whose amalgamation make clientelism an efficient political mobilization strategy. Finally, it briefly examines AKP government policies.

5.1. The rise and fall of Islamist politics in Turkey

Contrary to the claims of the AKP leadership that the AKP is following in the DP's tradition (Hürriyet, 2003), the AKP is an Islamic-rooted party that evolved from the "National Outlook Tradition."[61] Below, I present a short overview of this transformation.

The first party in the National Outlook Tradition was the National Order Party (MNP), which was established in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan. The founding of this Islamic-leaning party was a watershed: It helped to institutionalize Islamic actors, who had long been considered "outsiders" (Boztemur, 2001, p. 127). It also expressed the mobilization of small entrepreneurs in Anatolian provinces against the big secular capital owners in the metropolitan areas (Sarıbay, 1985; Gülalp, 2001).

Despite its emphasis on social justice rather than Islamism in appealing to voters (Guidere, 2012, p. 226), the MNP was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 1971 for its anti-secular activities. In practice, this judgment was nugatory because it did not impose any sanctions on the establishment of successor parties.

After the closure of the MNP, the National Salvation Party (MSP) was formed. In keeping with its symbol, the MSP was a "key" party during the 1970s, despite its vote share of around 10 percent. This was because, as mentioned in the previous chapter, in a highly fragmented and polarized parliament, small parties played a crucial role in forming governments. Consequently, the MSP became an indispensable part of

[61] The National Outlook Tradition emphasizes Turkey's economic and cultural development based on Islamic ethics.

coalition governments in the 1970s. Along with other parties, the MSP was closed down by the military regime following the coup d'état.

The third party in this tradition, the Welfare Party (RP), was founded in 1983. Similar to its predecessors, the RP represented mainly the interests of provincial businessmen and artisans in Anatolia (Tuğal, 2012, p. 32; Karadağ, 2010, p. 20). In terms of its organizational structure, the RP was unique (Mecham, 2004, PP. 342–343) as it incorporated well-organized party members whose enthusiasm was maintained by ascribing party duties to the "order of God" (Ayata, 1996, p. 52). When this enthusiasm was combined with a large-scale mobilization capacity, the RP rose to be the first mass party in Turkey (Özbudun, 2006, p. 552).[62]

As Table 15 illustrates, the RP's electoral performance improved rapidly during the 1990s. To illustrate, the RP received 16.8 percent of the votes in the 1991 legislative elections, rising to 21.3 percent in 1995. The RP showed the same promise in the 1994 local elections as well and captured 28 cities, including Istanbul and Ankara.

Table 15: Electoral performance of the National Outlook Tradition parties (1973–1999)

Election year	Party	Vote share	Seat share
1973	MSP	11.8	10.6
1977	MSP	8.6	5.3
1987	RP	7.2	–
1991	RP	16.8	13.7
1995	RP	21.3	28.7

[62] Parties in Turkey were first organized around cadre parties. In the course of time, their weak social base and need to finance party activities and election campaigns pushed these parties to transform themselves into cartel parties. In the course of all this no genuine mass party has been institutionalized in Turkey because of the weakness of organized labor and the anti-labor policies of the governing elites.

1999	FP	15.4	20.1

Source: Supreme Electoral Council.

Several elements might account for the rise of the RP. The first element was military support for the Islamists, who were seen as "on the same side" during the civil war–like situation in the 1970s, within the framework of a program known as the "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis*"* (TIS). The TIS aimed to "pacify social dissent" and "consolidate conservative forces" to maintain social unity (Buğra, 2002, p. 189). The second element was the demise of the social democrats due to the military crackdown. The social democrats were also plagued by factionalism, however. For example, they contested the 1994 local elections under the flags of three separate parties. This divided the vote and allowed the RP candidates in Istanbul and Ankara to win with slight margins. Third, as center parties proved inefficient and the social democrats perished, the RP attracted more voters with its economic program, which explicitly targeted the urban poor, artisans, and provincial businessmen (Özbudun, 2000; Toprak, 2005; Beinin, 2004; Gülalp, 2001). Finally, the Islamists' success in providing services must be noted. Recall that the RP's popularity began to grow with its successes in Konya, Sivas, Maraş, and Van municipalities.

As the leading party in the 1995 legislative elections, the RP formed an 11-month old coalition government with the True Path Party (DYP), under the prime premiership of Erbakan. This development pushed Erbakan into a difficult dilemma. If he sought to placate the secular establishment and tone down his anti-system position, he would have alienated his core supporters; on the other hand, if he did not do so, his party would have been confronted with the threat of disbandment (Eligür, 2010, p. 217). Nevertheless, Erbakan dared to take some steps against the secular establishment: he hosted religious leaders in the official residence, engaged more with the Islamic world, and frequently used anti-secular language, along with his deputies. In the shadow of a military memorandum on 28 February 1997 – which was frequently

called a "post-modern coup"[63] – the Constitutional Court dissolved the RP for its anti-secular activities.

Following that, supporters founded the Virtue Party (FP). The new party leadership aimed to soften the FP's radical image (Eligür, 2010, p. 236) by curtailing its infamous anti-democratic and anti-Western stance. Whether this was pragmatically motivated or not – apparently it was a tactic to solve the party's existential problem in politics – the radical break with the past led to a serious intra-party contestation between the "moderates," who suggested solving the party's problems with new leadership, and the "hardliners," who were true followers of Erbakan. The decline in the party's vote in the 1999 legislative elections exacerbated the rivalry. At the historic party congress in 2000, the moderates defeated the hardliners by a small margin. Following that, the moderates decided to form a new party under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

5.2. AKP

The AKP was established in August 2001. In order not to be confronted by the secular establishment, the AKP developed its party program on three pillars: market reforms, democratization, and EU accession (Leon, Desai & Tuğal, 2009, p. 209). Broadly speaking, while the market reforms aimed to alleviate the impact of the 2001 economic crisis, the democratization agenda aimed to end military tutelage. The EU agenda, on the other hand, was adopted pragmatically to help realize the first two goals.

As already mentioned, the AKP amalgamated neoliberalism and political Islam to make its clientelism work more smoothly. I briefly examine these features below.

63 The 28 February memorandum brought about the closure of religious schools and the dismissal of Islamic-affiliated personnel in the public bureaucracy.

5.2.1. AKP's flirtation with the global order: neoliberalism at the climax

Neoliberalism,[64] whose influence grew from the early 1970s, is inherently contradictory. On one hand, it prioritizes the role of individuals as consumerist actors responsible for their own well-being. On the other hand, it favors the family and the community as substitutes for the welfare state (Kaya, 2014).

Traditionally, Islamic-rooted parties/movements have had little to do with neoliberalism (Tuğal, 2009), among other things because it contradicts the Islamic notion of divine justice. In this sense, the AKP experience is path-breaking because it managed to present neoliberalism in "democratic" and "Islamic" dress (Tuğal, 2012, p. 40).

The dynamo of neoliberal transformation has been loyal conservative businessmen, who are known as the "devout bourgeoisie." Considering that the nurturing of the bourgeoisie by the political elite is an established historical trend in Turkey (Boratav, 2003, p. 40), the rise of the devout bourgeoisie under the guidance of the AKP governments is not particularly surprising. In this period, the devout bourgeoisie accumulated wealth through several channels.[65] First, it took advantage of privatization programs. As already mentioned, AKP governments have generated more revenue than all previous governments put together from privatization. For instance, the electricity provider BEDAŞ, which has 10 million customers, was sold to the loyal KOLIN-LIMAK-CENGIZ consortium in 2013. Second, the AKP has exploited public procurement to enrich its loyal businessman (Gürakar, 2016). For instance, the Cengiz group have been rewarded with large-scale projects, including the third airport in Istanbul, Ordu-Giresun airport, ETI Copper and Ilısu Dam (Birgün, 2016a). Thirdly, Islamic wealth expanded through joint businesses and Arab

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[64] According to Harvey (2005, p. 2), neoliberalism is "a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade."

65 The backing of the devout bourgeoisie also had a symbolic meaning. It was a gesture to reciprocate the devout bourgeois support for Erdoğan in the AKP's formative phase. Recall that 28 of the 31 deputies who had a MÜSIAD past sided with the moderates and joined the AKP after the closure of the FP (Gümüşçü, 2010, p. 846).

investments. The common Sunni identity served "as a cultural framework for capital accumulation" (Beinin, 2004, p. 4; Ayata, 1996, p. 51; Kaya, 2014, p. 5). Joint businesses include Finansbank and Kuwait-Turk in the banking sector; Turk-Telekom in the communications sector; and Bein Sport in the media sector.

The evolution of the devout bourgeoisie, far from ending corruption, has exacerbated already corrupt state–business relations (Karadağ, 2013, p. 149). Accordingly, the cronyism of the 1990s expanded.[66] The Denizfeneri case was a prominent scandal that illustrated the extent of corruption,[67] although most striking were police corruption operations in December 2013, which included the arrests of ministers' sons.[68]

The other constitutive element of the AKP's clientelism is the urban poor. However, although the urban poor has been the AKP's biggest source of support in all elections, it has done nothing to improve its prosperity. On the contrary, neoliberal policies have led to a dramatic increase in social inequality, indebtedness, violence, and crime.

Looking at the economy overall, according to the CHP (2018) report, during the period between 2002 and 2016, per capita public debt rose from 3,677 Turkish lira to 9,647 Turkish lira. Similarly, the total amount of private household debt to the banks increased from 6.6 billion TL to 419.6 billion TL. In the same period, the ratio of

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66 Cronyism and nepotism became more evident during the 1990s. The most notable examples include the cronies around prime minister Tansu Çiller's husband (Özer Çiller) and president Demirel's cousin (Yahya Murat Demirel).

67 The Denizfeneri scandal first erupted in Germany in 2007. The Frankfurt prosecutor's office claimed that merely 40 percent of donations collected by Denizfeneri Vaqf to help vulnerable people in Islamic countries were actually transferred, while the rest went to related companies in Turkey. According to the opposition in Turkey, some of the money was also transferred to the AKP, which led to a court case in Turkey. After trials, while the association's managers were found guilty in Germany and sentenced to prison, all suspects were released in Turkey, where the principal perpetrators are alleged to reside (Cumhuriyet, 2015).

68 On the morning of 17 December 2013, the police arrested prominent figures including the General Manager of Halkbank, the mayor of Fatih, and the loyal businessmen, such as Reza Zarrab and Ali Ağaoğlu and the sons of the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Economy, and the Minister of Environment and Urbanization. The accusations involved bribery, misconduct, and smuggling (BBC, 2014).

household debt to income (per family) rose from 4.7 percent to 57 percent. Similarly, the number of cases pending in the Debt Collection Office rose from 8.6 million to 26.1 million.

In the same vein, official figures demonstrate limited economic improvement during the neoliberal transformation. Before delving into numbers, I should note that the official statistics need to be approached cautiously, for two main reasons. First, in calculating GNP, TURKSTAT changed the base year to 2008, when the Turkish economy experienced significant upheaval. This puts the development of economic indicators since then in a better light (Eğilmez, 2016). Second, political pressure has been put on authorized institutions to manipulate the numbers, which has become more evident in recent years.[69]

In this light, Table 16, derived from TURKSTAT Income and Living Conditions Survey data, shows that for the period between 2006 and 2016, the poverty line increased threefold, while the poverty rate declined from 18.6 percent to 14.3 percent. In the same period, the number of poor declined by a mere 1.5 million in Turkey as a whole, and only 132,000 in Istanbul (Table 17).

[69] In October 2018, the vice president of TUIK, Enver Taştı, who was heading the team that announces inflation numbers, was dismissed. This development followed the announcement of record high inflation in September 2018 (6.3 percent) (Birgün, 2018).

Table 16: Number of poor, poverty rate and poverty gap by equivalized household disposable income, 2006–2016 (50% of median income) (Turkey)

Year	Poverty threshold (TL)	Number of poor ('000)	Poverty rate
2006	2,351	12,548	18.6
2007	3,041	11,163	16.3
2008	3,164	11,580	16.7
2009	3,522	12,097	17.1
2010	3,714	12,025	16.9
2011	4,069	11,670	16.1
2012	4,515	11,998	16.3
2013	5,007	11,137	15.0
2014	5,554	11,332	15.0
2015	6,246	11,219	14.7
2016	7,116	11,026	14.3

Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey.

Table 17: Number of poor, poverty rate and poverty gap by equivalized household disposable income, 2006–2016 (50 percent of median income) (Istanbul)

Year	Poverty line	Number of poor ('000)	Poverty rate
2006	3,479	1,622	13.3
2007	4,487	887	7.2
2008	4,574	1,224	9.9
2009	4,922	1,199	9.5
2010	5,161	1,454	11.5
2011	5,741	1,499	11.7
2012	6,016	1,247	9.6
2013	6,563	1,134	8.6
2014	7,304	1,491	10.5
2015	7,920	1,596	11.1
2016	9,059	1,490	10.2

Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey.

More importantly, income inequality was high. As Table 18 shows, the Gini coefficient dropped slightly, from 0.428 in 2006 to 0.404 in 2016. Table 19 demonstrates also that the share in disposable household income of the poorest 20 percent increased slightly, from 6.0 percent in 2003 to 6.3 percent in 2015. The share of the fifth quintile, the richest 20 percent, on the other hand, fell slightly, from 46.2 percent in 2004 to 45.3 percent in 2015. Furthermore, the ratio between the richest 20 percent and the poorest 20 percent dropped from 8.1 percent in 2007 to 7.6 percent in

2015. In Istanbul, this rose from 5.3 percent to 7.1 percent, marking increasing inequality under AKP governments (Table 20).

Table 18: Gini coefficient (2006–2016)

Year	Turkey
2006	0.428
2007	0.406
2008	0.405
2009	0.415
2010	0.402
2011	0.404
2012	0.402
2013	0.400
2014	0.391
2015	0.397
2016	0.404

Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey.

Table 19: Distribution of annual household disposable income by quintiles (2006–2016)

Year	1st quantile (poorest)	2nd quantile	3rd quantile	4th quantile	5th quantile (richest)
2003	6.0	10.4	14.5	20.9	48.3

2004	6.0	10.7	15.2	21.9	46.2
2005	6.1	11.1	15.8	22.6	44.4
2006	5.8	10.5	15.2	22.1	46.5
2007	6.4	10.9	15.4	21.8	45.5
2008	6.4	10.9	15.4	22.0	45.3
2009	6.2	10.7	15.3	21.9	46.0
2010	6.5	11,1	15,6	21,9	44,9
2011	6.5	11.0	15.5	21.9	45.2
2012	6.5	11.0	15.6	22.0	45.0
2013	6.6	10.9	15.4	21.8	45.2
2014	6.5	11.0	15.6	22.2	44.7
2015	6.3	10.9	15.5	22.0	45.3
2016	6.3	10.6	15.2	21.6	46.3

Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey.

Table 20: S80/S20 ratio by equivalised household disposable income (2006–2016)

	2006	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**
Turkey	9.6	8.1	8.1	8.5	7.9	8.0	8.0	7.7	7.4	7.6	7.7
Istanbul	6.7	5.3	6.0	5.9	6.4	6.2	6.4	6.6	6.1	7.1	7.4

Source: TURKSTAT, Income and Living Conditions Survey.

In this situation, instead of building a strong welfare state, the AKP leadership tried to restructure the social security system[70] to target the most vulnerable in society, namely the disabled and the elderly (Tuğal, 2012, p. 29; Öniş, 2009, p. 24). This is in line with the neoliberal agenda. The AKP also encouraged religious charity organizations to share social service provision with the government (Buğra & Candaş, 2011). These policies merely reproduced poverty rather than healing it. After all, if the material conditions of the poor had improved, there would be fewer clients relying on the support of AKP governments to meet their basic needs. This would have a negative impact on the AKP's vote share.

The neoliberal turn has also had legal repercussions. In this framework, the government prepared a new Health and Education Law that substantially curtailed the role of the state in fulfilling these functions. This allowed pro-AKP businesses to accumulate more wealth (Yıldırım & Yıldırım, 2011; İnal, 2012; İnal & Akkaymak, 2012; Etiler, 2015; Kurul, 2012; Özdemir & Özdemir, 2012). Moreover, the AKP backed "inflexible working," including part-time work, teleworking, and hiring, with amendments to the Labor Code. In the same vein, the AKP restructured worker–employer relations by transferring some employee rights to third parties. This policy also championed subcontracting, particularly in the construction sector. To illustrate, the number of subcontracted workers rose from 387,000 in 2002 to over 2 million in 2017 (Cumhuriyet, 2017a). When the policy of subcontracting was accompanied by unsafe working conditions to cut labor costs even further, it produced catastrophic results. Indeed, 20,000 workers have lost their lives since the AKP came to power in 2002 (Birgün, 2017). The most tragic event was the mine accident in Soma, which cost the lives of 301 workers.

The deteriorating economic indicators are also reflected in the social sphere. For instance, between 2002 and 2017, the divorce rate rose by 38 percent; prostitution by 790 percent; reported child abuse by 434 percent; homicide by 231 percent; arrests

70 Buğra & Keyder (2006, p. 211) call the pre-AKP social security system as '*inegalitarian corporatism*'. This term denotes the exclusion of the rural population and the urban informal sector from the social security system.

and convictions by 285 percent; the number of drug addicts by 678 percent; and reported violence against women by as much as 1,400 percent (CHP, 2018).

5.2.2. AKP and political Islam: Cyclical moderation

If one pillar of AKP's clientelism is neoliberalism, another is political Islam. As noted in the first part of this chapter, the rise of political Islam in Turkey began long before the AKP came to power and Islamist politics has undergone substantial changes since then.

As a concept, political Islam is equivocal.[71] Before the Arab Spring, the advocates of political Islam were considered the biggest opposition group in the Middle East, whose access to the state was blocked by authoritarian leaderships. Although political Islam is a reaction to political exclusion, it would be inaccurate to claim that political exclusion has led to social exclusion. On the contrary, authoritarian leaders turned a blind eye to Islamist activism in the streets, which led to the mobilization of followers around mosque networks and the building of a massive parallel state that shares the burden of welfare services with the regime (cf. Wiktorowicz, 2004; Rutherford, 2013). The legacy of such burden-sharing has played an important role in the landslide victories of Islamic-rooted parties since the Arab Spring.

Whether it was because of the internal secularization that followed political inclusion (Gürses, 2014; Tepe, 2005; Gümüşçü, 2010) or economic liberalization (Tuğal, 2009; Gümüşçü, 2010), the AKP, as a moderate Islamist party, did not prioritize its Islamic agenda, at least in its first term. This was also reflected in the discourse of the party leadership. From the outset, the leadership consistently labeled the party "conservative democrat," a term coined by the party leadership and broadly

71 On the emergence of political Islam as an ideology and a political system, see Roy (1994), Ayubi (2003), and Esposito (1997).

refers to the "socially conservative" and "economically liberal" policies of AKP governments.[72] In this connection, Erdoğan has stated that:

> A significant part of Turkish society desires to adopt a concept of modernity that does not reject tradition, a belief in universalism that accepts localism, an understanding of rationalism that does not disregard the spiritual meaning of life, and a choice for change that is not fundamentalist. The concept of conservative democracy is, in fact, an answer to this desire. (Yavuz, 2009, p. 92)

From this statement, one can infer that conservative democracy is introduced as a middle ground between the two antagonistic tendencies assumed to exist in Turkish society. This delineation clearly reflects a desire to establish the AKP in the political spectrum as moderate. Secondly, this statement shows that the party leadership was trying to avoid publically pledging anything "radical" that might call to mind the legacy of "Just Order" and thereby offend the secular establishment.

In contrast to its early years, the AKP leadership prioritized its Islamic agenda immediately after it started to consolidate its power (Kaya, 2014; Eligür, 2010). In its Islamization efforts, the AKP government has collaborated with Islamic movements. These movements offer their members a channel for upward mobility and solve the collective action problem (Beinin, 2004, p. 29). This strategy has allowed religious movements to expand their influence in the public arena and even to capture some key state institutions, such as the police, the judiciary, and the army, as was the case with the Gülenists.

In the same vein, AKP governments have invested heavily in religious education centers, particularly "Imam Hatip schools" (religious teaching schools). To illustrate this, while only 71,100 students enrolled in 450 Imam-Hatip high schools in 2002, the number had risen to 555,870 students enrolled in 1,149 schools in 2015 (Eğitim-Sen, 2016). The religious schools are instrumental in injecting Islamic values

72 Scholars have used numerous labels, including "conservative globalism" (Öniş, 2009) and "neoliberal populism" (Bozkurt, 2013) to define the AKP's political orientation.

in the young generation. The recent election slogan of the AKP, "not for the next election, but for the next generation," becomes more meaningful from this perspective. Similarly, the number of religious courses in the school curriculum has been increased. For instance, courses on the life of the Prophet Mohammad and on the Quran and the Fundamentals of Religion became obligatory in primary schools.

In the final analysis, the AKP's alignment of Islam and neoliberalism has produced contradictory results. As will be shown in Chapter 6, religiosity has not increased. Nor has the AKP been able to prevent the radicalization of its voter base. Moreover, given the AKP's recent crackdown on oppositional religious communities, relations between the AKP and religious actors have become more asymmetrical. That is to say, the AKP government started to narrow down, if not entirely eliminate, the room to maneuver of religious movements that do not recognize its political authority.

Having highlighted the AKP's neoliberal and Islamic character, in the next section we examine the AKP's electoral performance in each electoral term. Each section briefly analyzes civilian–military relations, neoliberalism, religion, and authoritarianism.

5.3. Elections

5.3.1. 2002–2007: The good old days

The legislative elections held in November 2002 were a landmark because they laid the ground for the longest ruling single-party government in Turkey (see Table 21). Winning 34 percent of the votes, the electoral system enabled the AKP to capture 363/550 seats, four seats too few to change the constitution unilaterally. Along with the AKP, the only party that surpassed the threshold was the CHP. The partners of the previous coalition government (ANAP, MHP, and DSP), on the other hand, suffered a historic defeat: their combined vote share declined from 52 percent to 20 percent. The AKP repeated its electoral success in the 2004 local elections as well and won 58 cities, including Istanbul and Ankara.

Table 21: Election results (2002–2015/2)

Election	AKP			CHP			MHP			HDP		
	Vote	***Seat***	***Difference***	***Vote***	***Seat***	***Difference***	***Vote***	***Seat***	***Difference***	***Vote***	***Seat***	***Difference***
2002	34.2	65	+30.8	19.3	32.3	+13	8.3	0	–	–	–	–
2007	46.5	62	+15.5	20.8	20.3	–0.5	14.2	12.9	–1.3	–	–	–
2011	49.8	59.4	+9.6	25.9	24.5	–1,4	13.0	9.6	–3.4	–	–	–
2015/1	40.8	46.9	+6.1	24.9	24.0	–0.9	16.2	14.5	–1.7	13.1	14.5	+1.4
2015/2	49.5	57.6	+8.1	25.3	24.3	–1.0	11.9	7.2	–4.7	10.7	10.7	0

Source: Supreme Election Council (YSK).

How did the AKP land such a big win in 2002? Several factors might account for it. The first was apparently Erdoğan's so-called success while he was mayor of Istanbul. The second one was Erdoğan's image as "victim," acquired after his imprisonment due to a religiously-tinged poem he read at a public meeting. The third

was the failure of the coalition governments during the 1990s, which boosted the protest vote (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu & Şenatalar, 2004, p. 308).[73]

Coming to power after the worst economic crisis in modern Turkey, the AKP's major aim was to secure macroeconomic stability and sustain economic growth (Tezcür, 2012, p. 122). In its first term, the AKP achieved this goal, to a certain extent. To illustrate, as shown in Table 22, between 2003 to 2006 GDP growth averaged 7.8 percent, while inflation dropped sharply from 25.2 percent to 9.5 percent. Similarly, while exports rose from 116 billion dollars to 173.2 billion dollars, imports rose from 157.8 billion dollars to 223.3 billion dollars.[74] Despite these achievements, the AKP's economic program failed to reduce unemployment and the deficit. In fact, as Yeldan (2007) points out, this term marked the beginning of the jobless growth pattern and record-high deficits, which laid the ground for the 2018 economic crisis.

Table 22: Development of selected economic indicators (2002–2006)

Year	GDP growth (%)	Unemployment (%)	Exports (billion $)	Imports (billion $)	Inflation (%)
2002	6.4	10.3	96.0	135.7	44.9
2003	5.6	10.5	116.0	157.8	25.2
2004	9.6	10.8	140.7	180.9	10.5
2005	9.0	10.6	157.4	198.5	10.1
2006	7.1	8.7	173.2	223.3	9.5

Source: World Bank.

73 The protest votes also account for the rise of the Islamist and the nationalist parties in the 1990s (Tachau, 2002).

74 Scholars used various labels such as "trading state" (Kirisci, 2009) or even "golden age" (Öniş, 2016) to describe the economic transformation in the AKP's first term.

On the political front, the priority was to overcome military and judicial tutelage through EU accession-related reforms. In this framework, the government legislated six harmonization packages and issued a new Civil Code, Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, and Law on Association. Thanks to these reforms, the accession negotiations started with the EU on October 2005. This development further softened the AKP's image in the international arena. Accordingly, Erdoğan frequently appeared on the covers of popular magazines as the man who successfully reconciled Islam and democracy.75

Despite the initial optimism based on the AKP's reformist agenda, it became clear towards the end of its first term that the weakening of military tutelage would not bring democratic consolidation (Gümüşçü, 2016, p. 6). On the contrary, the AKP leadership started to establish its own tutelage. The triggering event was the presidential elections in 2007. Starting as a procedural disagreement on the method of choosing the new president, the presidential elections rapidly turned into a debate on a secular versus a religious president and sparked massive demonstrations against the AKP government in large metropolises. The political turmoil further deepened with the publication of a memorandum on the website of Turkish Military Forces on 27 April 2007, which recalled its responsibility to take measures against anti-secular acts on the part of the government. The message was loud and clear to the AKP administration. The government had no choice but to call for early elections in 2007.

5.3.2. 2007–2011: Consolidation of power

In the 2007 elections, the AKP raised its vote share to 46 percent, although the number of seats declined to 341 as the MHP passed the electoral threshold. The AKP's increasing appeal can largely be read as a public reaction to the threat of military intervention. In contrast, the AKP's vote share fell sharply to 39 percent in the local elections held in March 2009 due to deteriorating economic performance.

75 For instance, the TIME cover on November 28, 2011 praised Erdoğan as a man who is "secular, democratic, Western-friendly."

During this "time of transition" (Öniş, 2016, p. 142), the AKP government further consolidated its power by weakening the guardians of the old regime, namely the military, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. The AKP brought this about in two ways. First, the government prepared a comprehensive reform program, which was approved in a public referendum in 2010. The referendum also changed the procedure regarding the selection of the president, which henceforth was to be by public vote. Second, the AKP started to use repression against the opposition. To this end, the AKP government and its Gülenist allies targeted secular-nationalists in the media, the judiciary, and the military with broad judicial operations, such as "*Ergenekon"*[76] and "*Balyoz*."[77] Simultaneously, the government cracked down on Kurdish politicians and activists with "*KCK"* operations.[78]

As the AKP's grip on power tightened, the secular establishment played its last card. In March 2008, the Chief Public Prosecutor, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, filed a case to ban the AKP. In the indictment, the AKP was accused of Islamizing society. Hearing the case, although 10 of 11 members of the Constitutional Court agreed that the AKP had become the center of anti-secular activities, the court did not rule to disband the AKP, but to punish it by cutting half of its state funding.

The AKP's second term was also shaky as regards the economy. Most dramatically, the so-called economic success story came to an abrupt end. The trigger event was the 2008 global economic crisis, which hit the Turkish economy along with

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[76] Ergenekon (allegedly the name of a clandestine organization) operations began on July 12, 2007 after the police found 27 hand grenades in the Istanbul district of Ümraniye. The ammunition was alleged to belong to the so-called "deep state" that aimed to overthrow the AKP government by force. Hundreds of politicians, journalists, and high-ranking military cadres, most of whom with a nationalist-secular background, were arrested. When the long-lasting trials ended, most defendants were sentenced to long years of imprisonment (BBC, 2013). The defendants were later released after a retrial, whereas the judges of the first trial were sent to the prison for being Gülenists in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt.

[77] The Balyoz case involved the so-called military coup plan to overthrown the AKP government. Hundreds of military personnel were imprisoned after the hearings. As in the case of the Ergenekon case, however, all were released after a retrial.

[78] The KCK operations targeted the political wing of the Kurdish movement. Over time, the operations extended to non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, writers, journalists, and lawyers. After seven years of trials, dozens of Kurdish politicians were imprisoned (Cumhuriyet, 2017b).

developing countries. Accordingly, the GDP growth rate averaged 2.3 percent (see Table 23) and the unemployment rate reached to a record-high 12.5 percent in 2009. Despite the shrinking economy, the AKP government did not renew the once-traditional stand-by agreements with the IMF. Although this decision drew huge public support because it was taken as a victory against international capital, it could not prevent a fall in the AKP's vote share in the 2009 local elections.

Table 23: Changes in selected economic indicators (2007–2010)

Year	GDP growth (%)	Unemployment (%)	Exports (billion $)	Imports (billion $)	Inflation (%)
2007	5.0	8.8	192.5	248.4	8.7
2008	0.8	9.7	190.4	264.7	10.4
2009	-4.7	12.5	165.1	244.2	6.2
2010	8.4	10.6	200.6	263.3	8.5

Source: World Bank.

5.3.3. 2011–2015: The "New Turkey"

Despite the political and economic difficulties, the AKP's vote share reached 49.9 percent in the 2011 elections. The CHP, under newly elected leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, gained a quarter of the votes, with the MHP polling half that. With its third consecutive election victory by a margin above 10 percent in 2011, the AKP transformed the Turkish party system into a predominant party system. The AKP repeated its success in the 2004 local elections and won 48 cities.

On the political front, anger against Erdoğan's neoliberal and Islamic policies again turned into widespread political mobilization in June 2013. In response to the government's plan to build a shopping mall in the middle of Gezi Park and cutting down the trees, millions of protestors took to the streets and occupied Taksim Square. The protests ceased only after Erdoğan gave up his plan.

In addition to rising extra-parliamentary opposition, the AKP had to contain rising right-wing challengers, namely the Democrat Party (DP) and the HAS Party. To ensure this, the AKP co-opted the leaders of these parties, Süleyman Soylu and Numan Kurtulmuş, by offering them high-ranking positions within the AKP.[79] The strategy of co-opting political rivals in return for political favors further entrenched the AKP's dominance on the right.

Moreover, similar to other dominant party examples (Pempel, 1990a), the AKP exhibited its desire for a long-term strategy in the document "Political Vision 2023."[80] The target was later revised to 2071. The "New Turkey" discourse came to the forefront in this context.

On the economic front, as Table 24 demonstrates, the AKP performed better than in its previous term with regard to GDP growth and unemployment. To be more precise, GDP growth averaged 7.3 percent and the unemployment rate averaged 8.8 percent. In contrast to this trend, while the volume of exports increased slightly from 226.7 billion dollars to 244.8 billion dollars, the volume of imports soared from 279.9 billion dollars to 340.6 billion dollars.

[79] They later became the minister of the interior and the minister of culture, respectively.

[80] The document described the policies that the AKP government plans to implement until 2023. For instance, the AKP called for an end to party bans; hearings in defendants' mother tongue; the transition to a presidential system and adopting a new constitution. Besides, by the year 2023, the AKP pledged to increase GDP per capita to 25,000 dollars; exports to 500 billion dollars; and the overall size of the economy to 2 trillion dollars (AKP, n.d.). As things stand today, these economic targets seem far from realistic.

Table 24: Changes in selected economic indicators (2011–2014)

Year	GDP growth (%)	Unemployment (%)	Exports (billion $)	Imports (billion $)	Inflation (%)
2011	11.1	8.8	226.7	279.9	6.4
2012	4.7	8.1	228.6	325.2	8.8
2013	8.4	8.7	247.1	323.4	7.4
2014	5.1	9.8	244.8	340.6	8.8

Source: World Bank.

5.3.4. From June to November 2015: The fall and the rise of the AKP

The June 2015 elections were a watershed as the AKP lost its parliamentary majority despite winning 40.8 percent of the votes. Sayarı (2015, p. 264) argues that three developments triggered this outcome: the poor economic performance, the HDP's passing of the threshold, and defections to the MHP.

Because the AKP lost its legislative majority, the opposition gained a unique opportunity to end the one-party dominance. However, the opposition missed this chance, not because of the AKP's central position, as the decision-theoretic model envisages, but because of the historical animosity between the ultra-nationalist MHP and the pro-Kurdish HDP. This instance shows how social cleavages may lead to a coordination failure in the opposition.

After the June 2015 elections, Turkey was dragged into an unprecedented cycle of violence. On one hand, clashes with the PKK intensified after the end of the "Democratic Opening Up Process."[81] On the other hand, the civil war in Syria spread

81 The Democratic Opening Up Process was initiated by the AKP government to end the long-lasting war between the PKK and the Turkish government, which has cost more than 40,000 lives. The ceasefire of 2013 ended after the killing of two policeman in Ceylanpınar in July 2015 (the killers are still unknown), for which the government held the PKK responsible.

to Turkey in the form of Islamic-motivated terrorist attacks.[82] The escalation of political violence on both fronts left 602 dead between June to and the snap elections in November 2015 (Evrensel, 2015).

In this context, via the partisan press, the AKP propagated the view that the rising political instability was due to its loss of a majority in parliament. This propaganda ultimately worked well and brought back the lost votes in the November 2015 elections. Accordingly, the AKP reclaimed its majority in the parliament.

Since then, political instability has deepened. The most tragic event was the failed military coup on July 15, 2016, which was alleged to have been staged by Gülenists. After quelling the coup, the government introduced a state of emergency, allegedly to protect the constitutional order and quell the perpetrators ("Gülenists"). Although the state of emergency was introduced as a temporary measure, it remained in force for two years. During this time, it has openly been turned into an instrument for suppressing all opposition to Erdoğan's rule. By means of a series of decree-laws, 27 percent of the judiciary (excluding military judges), 12 percent of the police force, 7 percent of military staff, and 700 academics have been dismissed. Of these academics, 404 had signed the "Peace Declaration" that criticized the government for human rights violations in the Kurdish-majority provinces. In addition, the government appointed public officials or trustees to 99 municipalities, 94 of which were held by the pro-Kurdish party. The crackdown extended to the media as well: 20 magazines and 30 publishing houses and distribution companies were disbanded, along with 34 radio and 33 television channels (Deutsche Welle, 2018; Cumhuriyet, 2018a).

To further consolidate his power after the coup attempt, Erdoğan put forward the presidential system. Aligning with the MHP, the AKP government put the relevant amendments to a public vote in April 2017. The controversial referendum, which was

82 ISIL carried out numerous terrorist attacks in 2015. For instance, two days before June elections, five people killed in bomb attack to the HDP's Diyarbakır meeting. In July, the suicide bomber targeted the meeting in support of Kobane resistance and left 33 dead. The most brutal attack targeted the "Peace and Democracy Meeting" in Ankara, which cost the lives of 109 people and wounded more than 500.

characterized by widespread irregularities,83 the new system was approved by a very slight margin. Then, in the presidential elections held in June 2018, Erdoğan became the first president of Turkey under the presidential system.

83 In the referendum, despite the explicit provisions in law, the Supreme Electoral Council ruled to validate the large quantity of unsealed votes: the opposition estimated that the number of unsealed votes was around two million. Given that 650,000 votes would have sufficed to change the result, the validation of the unsealed votes was decisive.

6. CHAPTER SIX: FIELDWORK

Political party scholarship emphasizes that clientelism reproduces dominance by tilting the political field in favor of the incumbent parties (cf. Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006; Scheiner, 2006). In my fieldwork in Istanbul's Bağcılar district, however, I found that the causal link between clientelism and dominance is far from automatic.

My view is that the link between clientelism and dominance can be properly understood only if the ideological and identity changes that partisans experience after becoming part of a clientelist network are highlighted. To put it more clearly, first, clientelism strengthens partisan identification. Second, clientelism makes partisans, especially the poor, less resistant or even supportive of the neoliberal reforms that in fact undermine their well-being.

In this framework, this chapter first highlights the method, scope, and significance of the fieldwork. Then, it introduces the field by identifying demand and supply as they pertain to the actors, as well as the structure and operation of clientelism in Bağcılar. Finally, it establishes the causal link between clientelism and dominance.

6.1. Method

Clientelism as an amorphous, latent, and elusive phenomenon is hard to observe, operate, and measure (Hicken, 2011; Wantchekon, 2003; Lande, 1983). Broadly speaking, while the observation problem is due to the informal and illegitimate character of clientelism, the operational problem is related to clientelism's various components. The measurement problem, on the other hand, emerges as a result of these two problems.

Scholars have adopted a wide array of methods to investigate clientelism.[84] Reflecting the zeitgeist, the most popular approach is quantitative. This primarily entails the use of proxies in measuring clientelism. To illustrate, Keefer (2007)

[84] Recently popularized methods include formal modeling (cf. Medina & Stokes, 2003; Robinson & Verdier, 2002), experiments (cf. Wantchekon, 2003), and expert surveys (cf. DALP data).

takes the level of corruption, while Desposato (2007) takes voters' demographic characteristics as proxy. Because clientelism is informal, unwritten, and personal, using proxies may lead to unreliable and invalid conclusions (Muno, 2010). Another popular method is to use surveys (for example, Brusco et al., 2004), which are costly and unreliable because clientelism is "morally objectionable" (Muno, 2010; Wantchekon, 2003).

In addition to these renowned methods, one of the most traditional, but seemingly less popular approaches is to investigate clientelism through ethnographic fieldwork. Ethnography, as a bottom-up approach, provides deep insights on the daily practice of clientelism (Muno, 2010; Auyero, 2001). Similarly, ethnography helps to distinguish between actual and expected behavior; it enhances rapport, makes it possible to observe non-verbal behavior, the context, and relationships, and also makes available recently encountered information on the subject (Scupin, 2015, pp. 128–142).[85]

Within this framework, I carried out my ethnographic fieldwork in the Bağcılar district of Istanbul. The fieldwork lasted from November 2017 to April 2018. In the field, my biggest advantage was that I was very familiar with the district because I had lived there for more than two decades. Practically, it allowed me to make contact with the residents more easily than other researchers and to find key informants and interviewees in a short period of time. Theoretically, it substantially contributed to advance my arguments because I was able to observe long-term changes (for example, ideological changes) in residents' voting behavior.

I complemented the ethnographic data with interviews. The interviews were conducted with partisans, brokers, party officials, mukhtars, and municipal employees residing in Bağcılar. More specifically, the interviews encompassed 45 partisans; nine municipality employees, one mukhtar and five party workers/officials. The interviews were held in various places, including the party and municipal buildings, parks, café,

[85] The shortcomings of using ethnography, on the other hand, include its limited comparability and generalizability (Muno, 2010), because of the parochialism (Sartori, 1991) embedded in the ethnographic studies.

and a high school. In the early stages of my interviews, I realized that the interviewees were not comfortable talking about the government because they feared losing their jobs or client benefits. The state of emergency that was in force at the time of the fieldwork added to this. This pushed me to switch from "individual" to "group" interviews. For practical purposes, the group interviews were less structured and were conducted in a more flexible manner.

6.2. Scope and significance

Because clientelism is a multi-dimensional phenomena, its scope has to be constrained in order to write meaningfully about it. I applied this rule using threefold strategy. First, I narrowed clientelism down to the exchange of votes for the distribution of material aid, jobs, and services. This excludes, for example, exchanging kickbacks with the government through public procurements. Second, I interviewed partisans rather than opponents to unearth the objective and the subjective conditions of political clientelism (Auyero, 2012, p. 99; 2000, p. 153). Third, I restricted the spatial dimension of this study to the urban area.

With regard to the significance of the fieldwork, several points might be underlined. First, by adopting a top-down approach, this study unearths the micro-logic of clientelism. Second, this paper is the first of its kind in featuring the operation of clientelism in Bağcılar. Third, this study is important because it is highly representative: Bağcılar's demographic structure largely coincides with that of other poor districts of Istanbul, such as Esenler, Sultangazi, & Sultanbeyli. Fourth, this study draws the boundaries of political clientelism: it accounts for partisans who take part in clientelist exchange but have not experienced any change with regard to their partisan identification and/or ideology. Last but not least, the timing of the fieldwork must be noted. This fieldwork was conducted in a polarized, authoritarian setting, that is, under the state of emergency.

6.3. Case selection: Bağcılar

Bağcılar is a relatively new district located on the outskirts of Istanbul (see, Figure 1). While it remained within Bakırköy district until 1992, it became a separate district with the union of Kirazlı, Güneşli, and Mahmutbey neighborhoods under Law No. 3806. Although Bağcılar has a surface area of only 22 km^2, it has 748,483 inhabitants, according to the 2017 census. This makes Bağcılar the third most populated district in Istanbul (Cumhuriyet, 2017c). Currently, Bağcılar has 22 neighborhoods (see Figure 2).[86]

86 The neighborhoods of Bağcılar are 100. Yıl, 15 Temmuz (Evren), Bağlar, Barbaros, Çınar, Demirkapı, Fatih, Fevzi Çakmak, Göztepe, Güneşli, Hürriyet, İnönü, Kazım Karabekir, Kemalpaşa, Kirazlı, Mahmutbey, Merkez, Sancaktepe, Yavuzselim, Yenigün, Yenimahalle, and Yıldıztepe.

Figure 1: Bağcılar district on map of Istanbul

Source: www.wowTurkey.com

Figure 2: The neighborhoods of Bağcılar



Bağcılar's population grew tremendously with the hyper-urbanization that took place from the early 1990s onwards. Accordingly, 37 percent of its inhabitants have moved to the district since 2000. In terms of geography, most residents are from the Black Sea, the East and the Southeastern regions. Bağcılar also hosts notable amount of Balkan migrants, particularly from Bulgaria, who were relocated following the collapse of the communist regimes in the Balkans.

Bağcılar is a notorious district in Istanbul. In social media, daily life in Bağcılar, as well as the neighboring districts of Esenler and Güngören, are often the subject of mockery. This primarily reflects the high crime rate, which is evident from even a short visit to the district. The first thing that is likely to draw a visitor's attention is the youngsters who stand on every street corner. For a regular resident or a researcher, it is a part of daily routine to fall foul of these people. In the same vein, Bağcılar hosts various violent political groups. Since my childhood, I have witnessed several police operations against Hezbollah,[87], PKK, and al-Qaeda. Among these groups, the Islamists have more influence on the street.[88]

Bağcılar has a significant place in Istanbul's economy. It hosts massive organized industrial zones, such as İSTOÇ, MASSİT, and OTO CENTER. Reflecting the residents' socio-economic structure, the most developed sectors are textiles and shoes. These businesses are usually located in the basements of apartments. In these sectors, most people are underpaid and work long hours without social insurance. As Syrians recently have begun to flow into the district, wages have fallen further and informality has boomed.

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[87] Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed Kurdish-Islamist terrorist group. In the early 1990s, the group had a violent clash with the PKK in Southeastern Anatolia, leaving hundreds dead. Hezbollah lost power after its leader, Hüseyin Velioğlu, was killed in a police operation in 2000. Since then, the group has concentrated its efforts in the legal domain and established the political party *HÜDA-PAR* in 2013.

88 As Tuğal (2009) observed in Sultanbeyli, the Islamic groups organized around tea houses and the bookstores during the 1990s. Although these places are still serving as a gathering place for the radical Islamic groups, as I observed in Bağcılar, their number sharply declined recently due to a neoliberal transformation of the Islamic ideology, which also amounts to de-politicization of the masses.

In recent years, Bağcılar has come to the forefront with rapid urban transformation. As will be shown, although urban development was initially justified on the basis of renewing buildings damaged in the 1999 earthquake, it soon took the form of "rentier transformation," to enrich loyal businessman. As a result, two conflicting trends emerged in the district. On one hand, there are some neighborhoods, such as Demirkapı, that are still characterized by unlicensed construction and unplanned urbanization. On the other hand, some neighborhoods, such as Bağlar and Hürriyet, are being transformed. In between these poles stands Evren. While some parts of Evren, closer to the highway, have been transformed substantially, with the construction of luxury hotels and residences, its outskirts have remained virtually untouched, thus exhibiting "urban duality" (Auyero, 2001; see also Photo 3).

Photo 3: Urban duality: A look at Bağcılar

6.3.1. Parties and elections in Bağcılar

Bağcılar's large population makes it a key district in elections. As Table 25 and Table 26 show, Bağcılar is an AKP stronghold. In every election, the AKP's vote share has revolved around 50 to 60 percent, well above the national average. Bağcılar is critical for the AKP; in the June and November 2015 elections, it won the highest number of votes there of any district in Istanbul.

Electoral politics in Bağcılar has the following characteristics. First, Bağcılar overwhelmingly hosts Islamist/conservative voters who migrated mainly from the Black Sea (Turks) and the East/Southeastern Anatolian regions (Kurds). Given the contradictory or even antagonistic voting tendencies of these regions, Bağcılar is an

interesting case and highlights the AKP's catch-all nature. Second, the Social Democrats are much weaker here than the national average. For the most part, the CHP gets votes from Alevites and Balkan migrants. Third, the pro-Kurdish party is stronger than the national average, such that the HDP ranked second in the June and November 2015 elections. In fact, the success of the HDP is not surprising given the density of the Kurdish population. Fourth, given the density of Kurds and the conservatives, the nationalist MHP underperforms here.

Table 25: Vote shares of the AKP in legislative elections

Year	Nationwide	Bağcılar
2002	34.2	48.9
2007	46.5	56.9
2011	49.8	60.4
2015/1	40.8	50.0
2015/2	49.5	59.5

Table 26: Vote shares of the AKP in the local elections

Year	Nationwide	Bağcılar
2004	41.6	43.9
2009	38.3	49.2
2014	42.8	57.2

6.4. From the 'social democrats' to the 'Islamists': Clientelism during the 1990s

Bağcılar was within the boundaries of social democrat–leaning Bakırköy district before it became a separate district in 1993. Since then, while Bakırköy remains the stronghold of the Social Democrats, Bağcılar has realigned with the conservative/Islamist parties.

In order to reveal how this transformation has interacted with clientelism, I interviewed a mukhtar[60]*[89] who has resided in Bağcılar for more than three decades. He noted that:

> Bağcılar was ruled by the Social Democrats when it was part of Bakırköy and, given the economic conditions of the residents, that was understandable. However, when the SHP [Social Democratic Populist Party] ruled the district, there were no roads, water or electricity. After Feyzullah Kıyıklık [the first mayor of Bağcılar from the Welfare Party, currently the AKP deputy] became mayor, the face of the district began to change. Because he was a lawyer and had good connections, the infrastructure of the district developed tremendously.

The statements of the mukhtar provide two vital observations with regard to voter–politician links in Turkey. First, what voters expect from politicians is to have good contacts with the people who command both material and non-material resources or who facilitate access to them.[90] Such expectations leads to the expansion of cronies around politicians. Second, "service" is extolled, even if it requires breaking the law.[91] This legitimizes and normalizes corruption. The pervasive view among AKP partisans that "they (AKP) are stealing but serving" also illustrates how service is extolled among AKP voters.[92] Therefore, as I will show, it was not surprising that party and

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[89] * The number of the interviewee is shown in parentheses. More detailed information about the interviewee is given in Appendix II.

90 This conforms to what Erdoğan Yıldırım (1995) portrayed as the "ideal deputy" in the eyes of a typical Turkish voter.

91 A devout follower of this tradition was Melih Gökçek, a former mayor of Ankara. He frequently propounded the building of new roads, even against hostile court decisions, under the banner "serving Ankara" (see, for instance, Evrensel, 2017).

[92] In this sense, what makes the AKP unique is that it managed to associate itself with "service." Within the framework of party literature, this illustrates how service as a "policy

municipal officials loudly proclaimed their "illegal," if not "illegitimate" acts with "pride."

What differentiates the RP's clientelism from that of the AKP is that it hinges on solving clients' basic and permanent problems. Take the case of unlicensed buildings. One partisan [2] observed that:

> When the Social Democrats were ruling the district, you were not allowed to build unlicensed apartments. If you did, the municipal workers demolished it. After the RP took office, unlicensed construction was allowed in return for fines. Everyone was happy with that. This increased the vote share of the RP in the following elections.

In light of this, it can be argued that the RP's main strategy was to enable newcomers to own a house. In turn, they were expected to vote for the RP from gratitude and reciprocity generated through clientelist exchange. Overall, when the RP's clientelist housing policy was combined with its success in providing basic local services, this brought a vast number of voters, who were closely connected to the party leadership. This group became the core voters of the National Outlook Tradition in the district.

Although the RP's clientelism can be understood as problem-solving as it largely solved residents' housing problems, it was also a double-edged sword. In other words, permission for unlicensed construction became a major hurdle to developing infrastructure and modernization in the following years. As a result, the streets remained disorganized and ugly and almost no green areas were left to allow residents to breath. More importantly, the risk of building collapses increased, for example in

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issue" is attributed to "party image." Sartori (2005, p. 293) notes that "parties communicate with mass electorates via party images and much of their electoral strategy is concerned with building up the appropriate image for the public from which they expect votes." Nevertheless, it must be noted that party images are not necessarily the same among diverse groups that support the same party (Sartori, 2005, pp. 293–294). For the catch-all AKP, this is even more evident. For instance, conservatism/Islamism was also widely emphasized as a defining character of the AKP during my interviews.

the event of an earthquake. The urban transformation in the district, which was propagated to renew building stocks damaged in the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake,[93] came to the fore in this context. However, as already mentioned, the AKP used urban transformation projects to enrich its own business supporters rather than to improve the infrastructure and look of the district.

6.5. The demand side: the poor

Among the various socio-economic groups, the poor in particular depend on clientelism to survive or solve their problems (see Chapter 4). Even in pursuing their most basic rights, the poor need the help or, to put it more bluntly, the "mercy" of the political authorities.

Looking at Bağcılar is a good way of examining the interplay between clientelism and poverty. Although I could not obtain official district-level data on poverty, despite my inquiries – possibly on purpose – poverty is a widely recognized phenomenon in Bağcılar. However, the views of patrons and clients diverge substantially with regard to its dynamics . Broadly speaking, while the party and the municipality emphasize the AKP government's successful efforts to reduce poverty, the clients underline how the government has failed to improve their well-being.

To start with, the municipal officials typically referred to high levels of informality as a source of poverty. One [49] illustrated this as follows:

> Poverty is considered high in Bağcılar because of high informal employment. In every family, there is at least one person who is informally employed. These people are underpaid in return for earning higher wages in cash. Accordingly, they are counted as poor in the official statistics.

[93] According to official figures, in the 1999 earthquake, whose epicenter was the neighboring city of Kocaeli, 17,840 people lost their lives (981 in Istanbul alone) and 43,953 people were injured. Bağcılar was one of the most heavily damaged districts in Istanbul (Hürriyet, 2000).

Although the officials consider high levels of informality to be the main source of apparent poverty, they are reluctant to take any measures to reduce it. For instance, according to the DISK report (2018), between September 2016 and September 2017 total employment rose by 1,233,000, whereas informal employment rose by 491,000. This provides an informality rate of around 40 percent. The informality rate is likely to be even higher (at least in the short run) in the wake of the arrival of more refugees from Muslim countries (for example, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq), who have gradually started to replace the present workforce in the district. This trend, if it persists, also has the potential to make Bağcılar the second Zeytinburnu district of Istanbul, in terms of demographic structure.

In addition, officials commonly believe that the number of poor has declined due to the AKP's remarkable economic performance. The examples given by municipal officials were interesting:

> Do you see how many cars we have in the street? Now, there is a traffic jam everywhere. There is not even a place to park our cars at night. How can these people afford to buy a car? Because their purchasing power has increased. [52]

> Unlike before, people can afford to go out for a drink or food. Now, there are many expensive cafes and restaurants in Bağcılar. And they are all crowded. [56]

Another municipal official [54] argued that:

> Although I do not have the official numbers, I can assure you that the number of the poor has been reduced substantially in recent years. We can derive this from our social assistance program. While we were providing assistance to around 15,000 people a few years ago, this number has now declined to 10,000.

Are these figures correct? Apparently not. According to the "Revised 2017–2019 Strategic Plan*"* (Bağcılar Belediyesi, n.d.), the number of residents provided with

social assistance is estimated to be around 21,000. Of those, 8,500 people benefit from income support; 4,000 from coal subsidies; 1,500 from sports aid; and 7,000 from bag and stationary aids. In total, the municipality plans to spend over 22 million TL on these items. This amount excludes 18.5 million TL that is planned to be spent on disabled people. With sport and social activities, the total number of people that the municipality plans to target stands at around 310,000, amounting to more than 40 percent of all residents in the district.

Unlike officials' claims related to the decline of poverty, clients' statements reveal how poverty is reproduced in the district:

> In comparison to previous years, housing prices have increased substantially in Bağcılar. Although my father could comfortably own a flat during the 1990s, I can't afford one. Therefore, my plan is to move the cheaper districts of Sultangazi or Esenyurt, after I marry this summer. [17]

> I work in a textile atelier and earn slightly above the minimum wage. I have two children. My wife is not working. Although I live in a very small flat, half of my salary goes to rent. With the remaining money, I do not know how I can make ends meet. Without assistance, I cannot survive. [19]

> I migrated to Istanbul in 2004. Although I receive aid from the municipality, life has become much more expensive for me. I even have difficulties sending my child to high school. I have to pay for transportation and food. I am seriously thinking about going back to my village. In my village, at least I will not pay rent. [39]

These testimonies demonstrate that the AKP has reproduced poverty rather than curing it. Broadly speaking, it does so in two ways. The first is dispossession, which has been increasing with the urban transformation projects that have caused

house prices in the district to skyrocket.[94] The second is to make people dependent on the state (or rather the government) to maintain their living standards and solve their problems.

I am well aware that the aforementioned examples do not represent the entire economic picture in the district. In fact, I closely observed that there are some people whose economic conditions have improved such that they have come to own a car or a flat under the AKP. However, before attributing that "success" to the government, we need to underline its dynamics. None put this better than the mukhtar [60]:

> Yes, the economic situation of some people improved. But how has this happened? For many years, there were only two postmen in our neighborhood. Now there are four. They mostly bring legal documents. This means that the government enabled people to own a car or a flat through borrowing.

It is ironic that, similar to the displaced masses who were forced to move to cheaper districts, better-off people have already moved or are thinking of moving from Bağcılar. One partisan [30] illustrated this view:

> We have been living in Bağcılar for 30 years. If things turn out that way, we will move to Başakşehir [the district that the conservative bourgeoisie prefers to reside in] in a few months. I do not want any of my children to live here. There are many drug addicts in the street and they are all dangerous. If we stay here, the future of my children will not be much different from them. Because Başakşehir is full of housing estates, at least nobody bothers you in the street.

Overall, the statements by partisans and official figures demonstrate that the AKP government has reproduced poverty. In this context, by establishing a clientelist relationship with the poor, it easily turned them into true partisans.

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[94] Dispossession has the potential to undermine AKP rule in the short run by fostering dealignment.

6.6. The supply side: Patrons

As the nature of clientelism changes, so do the patrons. Illustrating this, *ayans* (landed proprietors), *ağas* (landowners), and religious leaders, who guided clientelist exchange during the late Ottoman period and the early republic, gradually lost ground after the transition to multi-party politics in 1950.

In the case of the AKP, as far as I have observed, the supply side of clientelism includes, but is not limited to, the party, the district, and the metropolitan municipalities, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, the district governorship, the mukhtars, religious groups, merchants, industrialists, the construction industry, and the *vaqfs*.

To ensure the efficiency of the clientelist network, there is a complex division of labor among these actors. Accordingly, each actor targets distinct social groups with distinct benefits. For instance, in delivering clientelist benefits, municipalities prioritize poor people, while the Ministry of Family and Social Policies targets the disabled.

Despite its advanced structure, the division of labor among patrons is not problem-free. The major problem is double funding. That is to say, because clientelism is informal, a client may simultaneously receive clientelist benefits from several channels and it is very difficult to disentangle them. Although waste is not a serious problem as long as it does not put the overall functioning of the clientelist network in danger, the clientelist party seeks to minimize turnover. One municipal officer [47] admitted instances of double-funding:

> We have a list of people who are in need of help. We try to draw up the list while coordinating with relevant actors as much as possible. But double funding is unavoidable, even if we pay the utmost attention.

Ortakaya and Torun (2009) estimate that the rate of double funding was 29.3 percent in 2009 with regard to public assistance. To improve this, the government

introduced the "Social Assistance Information System" (SOYBIS) in 2009. This online service allows public institutions to query whether applicants have already applied for other aid at other institutions or already receive aid from any official body. Under normal conditions, this measure is expected to reduce double funding; however, as my interviews with the municipal officers reveal, the rate of double funding is still quite high. This shows that the online check using SOYBIS is used as a last resort in order not to disappoint clients. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the people who receive clientelist benefits by far exceed those who need it. This also explains why officials from the Ministry of Family and Social Assistance refrained from sharing poverty statistics with me.

6.6.1. Party

Among the actors mentioned above, political parties require special treatment because they increasingly orchestrate clientelism in the modern world. To perform this efficiently, parties need strong organizational power and charismatic leadership. The AKP apparently fulfills both conditions.

To learn more about the role of the political party in the clientelist machine, I visited the AKP office in Bağcılar. I should note that, although it was not election time, the building was extremely crowded, particularly with elderly people and women. When I entered the building, a group of party workers, including the head of the women's branch, had gift-bags in their hands and were going out. When I asked a party worker where they were heading, he said they were going to celebrate the birth a supporter's child.

During my interviews, the officials emphasized that the AKP has more than 120,000 members in Bağcılar. Reflecting this, the first thing I realized was the party officials' self-confidence. The words of one party official [55] illustrate this:

> There is no party if there is no strong organization. We are very strong in Bağcılar. The municipality cannot do its job if we do not work. We are the backbone of the party.

Although at first glance the number of members sounds quite high, amounting to half the AKP votes cast in Bağcılar in the 2015 November elections, it is not surprising given that the typical party membership in Turkey remains only on paper and does not impose any responsibilities on members, such as paying membership fees or regularly taking part in party activities. What is unique to the Turkish case is that passive membership does not lead to weak partisan identification. On the contrary, partisan identification strengthens over time, as will be shown, due to clientelism.

The party has multiple functions within the clientelist network. First, the party organization makes it possible to reach a larger audience. It does so by establishing daily and face-to-face contact with the voters. This essentially requires committed party workers to sacrifice their time and money for the party. One party official [59] illustrates this:

> We start our business on the morning of election day. There is no difference in our strategy before or after the election term. We do as much as we can. For instance, I work in the transport sector. I do my job from morning to 3 o'clock [pm]. Then, I come here and stay until night. There are always officials in this building. You can find our officials here from morning to 11 o'clock at night.

Despite its extent and activism, the AKP organization is far from reaching everyone residing in Bağcılar. There are a number of important practical limitations. One party official [58] admitted this:

> It is impossible for us to reach everyone. In terms of population, every neighborhood in Bağcılar is as large as a small-sized province in Anatolia. Even though we have a good capacity and committed members in almost every street, it is not possible to reach everyone and enter every building. The biggest problem is the housing estates. Besides, some opposition supporters do not allow us to reach people in certain places.

Second, the party organization directs clients to the relevant institutions or the authorities that may help them to solve their problems. For instance, party workers/officials might establish contact between the district governorship and an elderly person who is in need of medicine but cannot afford to buy them.

Third, the party mobilizes voters for rallies or at the polls with its strong organization. However, apart from election times, the party organization is not much visible in the street. To illustrate, one partisan [32] pointed out that:

> The party does not have regular contact with me in normal times. However, on the eve of the elections, the party frequently sends messages and calls by phone. The workers on the phone just kindly thank me if I say I can't join the event.

The lack of party activism during normal times apparently has two main reasons. The first is the embodiment of clientelism in the cult of personality. This keeps clients as loyal voters even if the party organization is not particularly active at grassroots level or even if it is not well liked. The second reason is to neutralize "excessive" politicization of the masses. The logic is that if politicization becomes an essential part of clients' daily routine and heightens their sense of expectation, it may rebound on the clientelist machine itself.

Last but not least, the AKP monitors clients before and after the elections. It does so through a sophisticated organization that has adequate and up-to-date information on clients because of its daily close contact with them. In this framework, one AKP official [55] detailed how monitoring works:

> We have groups of 30 people in every neighborhood targeting women, young people, elders, and regulars. We are very careful in choosing our neighborhood organization members. We always investigate them thoroughly before they become active in our party. They are very important for our party. For instance, if a person asks for assistance, we immediately call our neighborhood organization members. In hours, our organization provides detailed information about the person concerned. We make our decision based on this feedback.

As already demonstrated, the AKP organization is crucial for the functioning of the clientelist network because of its ability to guide, mobilize, and monitor clients and reach new ones. This feature distinguishes the AKP from previous incumbents (for example, the ANAP), which could not transform the party system into a predominant one because they failed to establish effective monitoring and relied solely on the charismatic leader to underwrite clientelist exchange.

6.6.2. Municipality

The municipality is another key actor in clientelist exchange. In addition to personnel, the municipality commands vast amounts of public resources. While the former enables it to reach a wider audience, the latter secures the voters' long-term commitment.

During my interviews in the municipality building, I noticed two elements that make the municipality–voter linkage evidently clientelist: the criteria for selecting the needy and the way in which benefits reach the needy.

To be more specific, there is no objective income threshold that defines the poor for municipality workers. One officer [48], for instance, remarked that:

> I think that people who earn less than the minimum wage [1,500 TL] are poor. [after thinking a bit more] In fact, if you add the rent, even 2,500 TL is not sufficient.

Because the poverty criteria are evidently arbitrary, they can easily be manipulated by the municipality to discriminate against non-partisans. In this setting, applicants for aid seem to be abandoned to the prerogative of the municipal officers. The absence of an objective poverty threshold can also be manipulated by clients. One municipality official [50] noted that:

> Our people are vigilant. A man applies for aid and passes the initial assessment. Then, we visit his home. He offers us Parliament cigarettes, which are very expensive. We witness many similar instances. I saw many people who have iPhones in their pocket but still apply for aid. However, these are easier to identify.

Well aware of the partisan bias, almost all applicants present themselves as partisans. Yet, it is not easy to deceive the officials. After processing the initial documents, the officials carry out interviews to identify whether the applicant is a partisan or not. In this setting, proof of party membership or the reference of a party-related person facilitate access to clientelist benefits. On the other hand, even if someone is identified as not a partisan, their application is not rejected automatically. Here, the decision is made on the basis of whether a non-partisan can be converted into a partisan. This strategy is crucial to extending the clientelist network beyond core voters.

In addition to the lack of an objective threshold for allocating aid, the way benefits are distributed to clients also conforms to typical clientelist exchange. As far as I observed, the municipality provides clientelist benefits as manifestly as possible. Because this "open-air show" is proof that the municipality backs its supporters, the authorities are keen to maintain it. This clearly contrasts with the flow of programmatic benefits, which are delivered quietly and in a more professional manner.

6.6.3. Leader

The party leader, Erdoğan, plays multiple roles in clientelist exchange. First, he is the guarantor of clientelist exchange. This is above all due to the intense media propaganda that praises him for this.[95] The widespread view among clients that "if Erdoğan goes, so do the benefits" is the product of such propaganda. Here, there is also a pragmatic concern that must be emphasized. The clientelist network is so crucial for the AKP that its destiny cannot be left in the hands of the fragmented party

[95] The KONDA (2017) survey demonstrates that AKP supporters strictly follow the partisan press: ATV (26 percent), A Haber (17 percent), and the state-owned TRT (19 percent).

leadership and/or brokers. If it was, then the fate of the AKP would not be much different from other dominant parties (for example, the KMT in Taiwan; see Chapter 7).

Despite my finding that loyalty to the AKP goes hand in hand with loyalty to Erdoğan, there is a notable difference between them, which has become more evident in recent years. Although the electorate is increasingly holding the party organization responsible for political errors and the declining electoral performance of the AKP, it has so far kept the leader aloof from critics.[96] Accordingly, a leader who previously was equated with the party has slowly acquired a new position beyond and above the party. This strengthens his appeal by allowing him to attract non-partisans as well. As a result of this tendency, Erdoğan could easily get votes from the nationalist MHP in the 2018 presidential elections.

In line with that, both partisans and the party leadership praised Erdoğan during my interviews. For instance, one partisan [23] noted that:

> I don't have party membership and have never joined any party activities except big meetings in Istanbul. I follow Erdoğan on the TV and he feels close to me. If I have to describe him with one word, it would be "sincere."

The party organization [59] shares this view:

> People believe in Erdoğan. We think that if the headman (*reis*) says something, he definitely knows it. If there is no Erdoğan, there is no party.

Erdoğan's role is even more crucial when it comes to local elections. One partisan [27] pointed out that:

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[96] In line with that KONDA (2017) survey found that while 46 percent of the AKP voters vote because of Erdoğan, merely of 22 percent vote because of the AKP's political appeal.

> I vote for Erdoğan. Although I do not like the work of the mayor in Bağcılar, I still vote for him because I feel that I would be betraying Erdoğan [if I didn't]. Erdoğan is sincere and has so far stood up to pressure successfully.

Although the embodiment of the clientelist network in the personality of Erdoğan creates a strong partisan attachment at grassroots level, it also poses a risk for the future. The ANAP case illustrates that the clientelist network cannot survive if it hinges on the charismatic leader. It is likely that the AKP will confront the same scenario in the post-Erdoğan period.

In addition to being a guarantor, Erdoğan keeps the clientelist network alive. As already emphasized, the lack of party activism during non-electoral periods is closely related to the strong party leader who communicates with partisans daily via the partisan press. In any case, this is an efficient strategy because it enables the party leader to reach a larger audience with far less resources than the party organization needs to carry out the same function.

Third, Erdoğan keeps normally antagonistic classes united under the same party flag. This is more crucial in the absence of a precise ideology and growing income inequality. Nevertheless, I contend that even Erdoğan's charisma may not suffice to unite these classes if the economic crisis that began in the summer of 2018 deepens further in 2019.

Last but not least, Erdoğan bypasses any judicial supervision that might put the maintenance of the clientelist exchange in jeopardy. As Scheiner (2006) in the context of Japan, and Wang & Kurzman (2007) in the context of Taiwan demonstrate, the institutional protection of clientelist actors is essential to building an efficient clientelist machine. Such protection explains, for instance, why both the party and the municipal officials did not hesitate to mention extralegal acts openly during my interviews.

6.6.4. Religious groups, *vaqfs* and loyal businessmen

The religious groups – which are organized around mosques, Quranic courses, and bookstores[97] – are historically dominant in Bağcılar. Although they insist that their main aim is to save souls, religious groups have in recent times sought also to pursue the interests of their members. Prominent examples include Gülenists and Menzilcis,[98] who are organized in the public bureaucracy to the extent that they constitute a "parallel state."

The tasks of the religious groups within the clientelist machine are twofold. First, they attract new clients and deter exit by establishing daily face-to-face contact with their members. Second, because the relationship between the religious leader (imam) and his followers is hierarchical in itself, religious groups facilitate the integration of members into the clientelist network.

Another crucial actor is the "vaqfs". These include "Türgev"[99] and "Ensar",[100] which seemingly operate as the civil-society wing of the AKP government.[101] Similar to religious groups, the vaqfs, especially the religious ones, target clients with a discourse of "brotherhood, solidarity, and goodness" (Zencirci, 2014) and establish personal and constant relationships through religious gatherings, excursions, and sport

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[97] According to the district office of the Mufti, Bağcılar has 69 mosques, 19 small mosques (*mescit*), 13 boarding and 36 non-boarding Quran courses.

[98] The opposition media widely report that members of Menzil tariqats have started to fill open positions in the Ministry of Health, after the dismissal of the Gülenists (Cumhuriyet, 2016a).

[99] Türgev was founded in 1996 under the guidance of Erdoğan when he was mayor of Istanbul. Currently, his son, Bilal Erdoğan, has an administrative position in it. The vaqf aims to build dorms for students, whose number exceeds 10,000. Türgev has frequently been accused by the opposition of having corrupt relations with AKP-administrated municipalities (Türgev; Cumhuriyet, 2016b).

[100] Ensar Vaqf was established in 1979. It is typically associated with the National Outlook Tradition. The vaqf has recently been targeted by the opposition because of child abuse scandals (Birgün, 2016b).

[101] A recent report shows how the AKP-administrated Istanbul metropolitan municipality supports loyal vaqfs through the transfer of public resources. To illustrate, up to 2018 , the municipality transferred 51 million TL to Türgev (amounting nearly 10 million dollars at current exchange rates) and 28 million TL to Ensar (Toker, 2019).

activities. The feeling of reciprocity emanating from such linkages makes it easier to buy the loyalty of *vaqf* members.

Loyal businessmen are also pivotal actors in the clientelist machine. It is widely reported that this group donates money to the pool in return for government kickbacks (Çeviker-Gürakar, 2016; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2018). This money is then distributed to the poor in the form of clientelist benefits. In addition, loyal businessmen contribute to public resources by paying taxes. Illustrating these, the mukhtar [60] noted that:

> There is a big textile company located nearby. Recently, the owners had to make a change in the plan of their factory. In return for this, the company donated thousands of food packages to the municipality. The municipality then distributes these packages to partisans.

Among loyal businessmen, construction companies such as *Ağaoğlu* and *Torunlar* merit special attention.[102] In return for undertaking large-scale urban transformation projects or intended changes in construction plans, loyal construction companies donate money to the pool or employ partisans in their businesses. They also monitor the voting behavior of their employees. During my interviews, workers widely complained that the construction companies compel them to take pictures of the ballot when they vote. Even worse , the workers claimed that construction companies threaten to dismiss them if they cannot prove that they voted for the AKP.

Finally, the potential of construction companies to sabotage the AKP's electoral performance must be emphasized. During my fieldwork, the partisans, especially the poor, widely complained about growing corruption between construction companies and local politicians and its destructive impact on the district.

[102] During the period of AKP rule, Ağaoğlu and Torunlar groups have come to prominence by undertaking large-scale construction projects alone or in collaboration with Emlak Konut (TOKİ's subsidiary). For instance, Ağaoğlu and Emlak Konut collaborated on the "Maslak 1453 Istanbul" project, located in the middle of the forest. Torunlar group, on the other hand, constructed huge towers where Galatasaray's stadium used to be (Ali Sami Yen). It has also constructed popular shopping malls, such as the Mall of Istanbul and Torium.

This tendency might be reflected in the 2019 local elections, with a sharp drop in the AKP's vote share.

6.7. The content of clientelist exchange

As already noted, clientelism involves the exchange of goods and services for political support. The goods and services vary, based on the setting. In the case of Turkey, coal seems to be the favorite clientelist good overall, followed by flour, tea, sugar, rice, and clothes (cf. Sayari, 2014). This observation, however, does not entirely apply to Bağcılar. For instance, because most houses use natural gas for heating, distributing coal would not be the best strategy. Nevertheless, I heard of extreme cases in which clients receive the coal and then sell it on. Similarly, cash payments are uncommon in Bağcılar.

What is evident in the field is that different actors target clients with distinct benefits. In this framework, at least in theory, it is reasonable to assume that the AKP itself is not one of these actors, because the party finance system restricts the spending of treasury money for the sole purpose of party activities (for example, paying rent on buildings, workers' salaries, and campaign spending). Confirming this assumption, one party official [57] declared that:

> Because parties have no budget to help the needy, we frequently collect money.

I must, however, admit that theory and practice do not overlap much here. During my interviews with partisans, many admitted that they received symbolic gifts such as Turkish delight and Turkish coffee from the party at regular meetings (see, for instance, photos 1 and 2). Although it is very difficult to identify financial resources used to fund them, it is likely that small favors of this kind put the AKP ahead of other parties because opposition parties lack the resources to follow suit.

In comparison with the party, the municipality offers more diverse clientelist benefits. This is because it legally commands a vast amount of public resources. Illustrating this, one social worker [51] emphasized that:

> There is no limit on the distribution of aid. We distribute everything, including beds, coal, and money. We furnish a house [showing a photo of the truck that carries aid]. We can even find partners for those who come here for that purpose.

Photo 1: Turkish delight with a party logo

Photo 2: Turkish coffee with a party logo

In addition to delivering material benefits, the clientelist actors also provide job and services to clients. I personally witnessed two instances in the AKP building. The first one was an old man with an AKP hat. Talking to the party official, he said:

> I have back pain so I cannot work. I do not have any money to buy my medicine. For God sake, help me.

Another was a woman in her early 20s who came in when I was talking to party officials. She said:

> Hello, I am looking for a job. I came here with a reference from Mr. Kaya. He said that if I give you my CV, you would help me get a job.

As we have seen, clientelist actors offer wide-ranging benefits to secure clients' votes. The aim is to maximize the party's appeal while minimizing the cost. The reproduction of poverty clearly serves this aim.

6.8. Exclusion

Clientelism in Turkey can be regarded as both exclusionary and inclusionary. It is exclusionary in the sense that the opponents of the AKP government do not benefit from it. It is inclusionary in the sense that the poor masses who were long excluded from the clientelist network have been incorporated into it. These two features exert substantial influence on the party system: while the former extends the level of polarization, the latter boosts partisanship.

During my interviews, as might have been expected, the municipal officials denied that they discriminate against non-partisans in selecting aid recipients. One municipal official [52], for instance, contended that:

> We do not ask people where they were born, which sect they belong to. Neither do we ask whether they vote for us. We only listen to their stories and try to solve their problems. Believe me, many people in this building are from other parties.

He explained:

> We do not discriminate among the people because we have a conscience.

The emphasis on a conscience is common among municipal officials. It clearly shows how the objective notion of "law" is substituted by the subjective notion of

"conscience" in dealing with citizens. This notion contrasts starkly with the programmatic settings. That is to say, in a welfare state, the distribution of benefits is not left to the conscience of social workers, but the rules that apply equally to all citizens, regardless of how they vote.

Although the municipal officials claim otherwise, it can easily be observed that, by the very nature of clientelism, the opponents are excluded from the clientelist network. More specifically, opponents are punished by not being helped, or by being informed too late or even not at all of possible assistance.[103] One former party worker [18] admitted this:

> In neighborhoods such as Bağlar and Hürriyet, the residents always complain about lack of services at our meetings. And the response is that these places are not a priority for the municipality because the opposition is more popular.

In the same vein, the *mukhtar* [60] noted that:

> The aid distributed by the public institutions and the party target partisans surreptitiously. Non-partisans are not even informed about what is being distributed.

In fact, discrimination against the opposition is hardly rare among AKP politicians. In addressing the public, many AKP mayors and candidates have pledged that they will not serve the places that did not vote for them or that services will be provided in accordance with the AKP's vote share.[104]

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[103] It must be emphasized that receiving information on clientelist benefits is vital in settings characterized by a high illiteracy rate.

[104] Examples of discriminatory language are abundant. For instance, during his local election campaign, former mayor of Ankara Melih Gökçek pledged that he would start providing benefits to the district that gave him the biggest support if he was elected (Cumhuriyet, 2014a). Similarly, former Istanbul mayor Mevlüt Uysal promised that his priority in building the metro line would be districts in which the AKP is most popular (Evrensel, 2018b).

Exclusion may also reflect sectarian and/or ethnic bias. In the case of the AKP, I observed that discrimination takes place against people who belong to the Alevite sect. This is because support for the AKP is lowest among this group.[105] Because the place of birth, for the most part, indicates sectarian identity in the Turkish context, it is not difficult to identify Alevite applicants in face-to-face meetings/interviews.

Unlike sectarian exclusion, ethnic exclusion is less visible because the overwhelming majority of Kurds in Bağcılar support the AKP. The close ties between the AKP and Kurdish voters can easily be discerned from the density of Kurdish-speaking people in the party, municipality, and district governorship buildings. This shows that the AKP invests in swing voters who may potentially shift to the pro-Kurdish HDP, as in the June 2015 elections. In Istanbul, given the weight of Kurdish voters and the close race with the CHP in the local elections, this strategy is even more important for the AKP's electoral success.

6.9. Deterring exit: monitoring and punishment

To reproduce dominance, clientelist parties must deter exit.[106] If they are unable to do so, clients may receive benefits with one hand and vote with another (Szwarchberg, 2015).

Parties deter exit through several instruments. The most common method is to build an efficient monitoring mechanism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).[107] In densely populated districts, this requires to sharing monitoring tasks among multiple actors. For instance, while religious groups monitor their committed followers, parties monitor through their neighborhood organizations.

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[105] According to the Konda (2017) report, Alevites constitute a mere 1 percent of the AKP's total voter base.

[106] Although monitoring and punishment are essential for clientelist parties to minimize turnover, two factors substantially reduce the need for them, at least in the context of Bağcılar. The first is the status of Bağcılar as a stronghold of Islamic/conservative parties. The second is weak inter-party competition on the right of the political spectrum.

[107] The successful institutionalization of monitoring leads to what Stokes (2005) calls "perverse accountability," which holds voters accountable to politicians rather than vice versa.

In addition to establishing efficient monitoring, clientelist parties deter exit by playing the punishment card. This entails the withdrawal of clientelist benefits from those who fail to give their support.[108] One partisan [33] working in the construction sector illustrated this:

> My boss said that I have to take a photo of my vote and send it to him. If I did not do it, he threatened to fire me.

Another partisan [5] said:

> The party workers said that if the AKP does not win, I will no longer get any aid. Therefore, I will vote for the AKP in the upcoming elections although I do not like its service anymore.

Reflecting this approach, in interviews with clients the municipal officials refrain from situating distributed benefits within the welfare state framework. If benefits are associated with the welfare state, this would imply that they are permanent, not temporary and conditional. This would give clients less incentive to show loyalty to the government.

6.10. Swing vs. core voters

Whether clientelist parties target "swing" or "core" voters is a subject of controversy among scholars.[109] The rule of thumb is that, while swing voters' support is conditional and rests on the delivery of clientelist benefits, core voters' support is not conditional and rests mainly on a party's policy appeal (Szwarchberg, 2013, p. 34). This

[108] This rests on the "discretional nature of particularistic transfers" and illustrates what Magaloni, Cayeros & Estevez (2007, pp. 184-185) call the "threat of exclusion."

[109] To illustrate, for Magaloni (2006), the incumbent targets swing voters, while for Dunning & Stokes (2010), there is a division of labor between the party brokers and the leader. The former target the core voters and the latter targets the swing voters.

delineation, however, does not mean that core voters do not benefit from clientelist resources. On the contrary, core voters are the primary organizers and biggest beneficiaries of the clientelist machine – at least in the context of Bağcılar.

In this framework, I define core voters as "those who take part in clientelist exchange as client or patron and/or who come from National Outlook tradition." Swing voters, on the other hand, are "those who do not come from the National Outlook tradition and/or who are not included in the clientelist exchange." Broadly speaking, conservative Kurds, nationalists, and liberals can be labeled swing voters.

Below, I briefly summarize the stories of core and swing voters, based on my interviews. Accordingly, in Table 27, I present a prototype of core and swing voters.

Table 27: Prototype of core and swing voters

		National Outlook Past?		**Client?**	
		YES	NO	YES	NO
Core	Ahmet/Mehmet	X		X	
	Murat		X		X
Swing	Serkan		X	X	
	Ramazan		X		X

Core voters

a) A client and has a National Outlook past: Ahmet and Mehmet are twin brothers. They studied together in the underground Quranic courses. They had to choose this path because their father was against enrolling them in the "secular" public schools. After finishing high school externally in 2013, Ahmet and Mehmet were appointed imams by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which transformed them into true

partisans. The twins' story is noteworthy as it shows how the AKP appeals to "anti-state" Islamic groups through the instrument of patronage. It also illustrates how clientelism works as an inclusionary force for those with a radical Islamic past.

b) Not a client but has a National Outlook past: Murat was born in Erzurum. He finds Erdoğan sincere and trustworthy because, for the first time, as he sees it, "one of us" became head of state. Murat is not a member of the AKP. His political activism does not go beyond attending mass meetings, reading the partisan press, and political discussions with friends in coffee houses. He is a typical example of what I call a "non-partisan partisan," whose attachment to the party is based largely on Erdoğan's charisma, built up by the partisan press. As far as I observed, this group – which has no direct link to clientelist actors but is strongly affiliated with the leader Erdoğan – is largely excluded from the clientelist network. This clearly shows the role of the party in accessing clientelist benefits.

Swing voters

a) A client, but does not have a National Outlook past: Serkan was born in Ordu and has a social democrat background. Serkan voted for the AKP until recently. He also worked in the youth organization, but then kept his distance after observing that the party had started to become corrupt. He pointed out that, after he left the party, it cut off all aid to him. Noting that the party workers were extremely careful in taking care of the poor and refraining from corruption in the 2000s, he observed that the party had switched from "populism" to "elitism," nurturing the Islamic bourgeoisie. Although he is not a partisan anymore, he still feels closer to the AKP than their opponents. Serkan's story is illustrative as it hints at the future of AKP rule. As Greene (2007) argues, this type of voter – who is close to becoming detached from the incumbent, but does not see the opposition parties as credible alternatives and so remains loyal to the incumbent at the ballot box – has the potential to weaken dominant party rule. Based on my observations, I expect that dealignment from the AKP will be

rapid in the short run, but I would also say that realignment will require more time because the opposition is still not popular among dealigned voters.

b) Not a client and does not have a National Outlook past: Ramazan was born in Çanakkale and has a nationalist background. His interest in religion started during his stay in Gülenist dormitories. Although he has voted for the AKP several times, he recently switched to the CHP. This move followed the 17–25 December (2013) operations that marked the end of the Gülen–Erdoğan alliance. Ramazan pointed out that he never joined in any party activity and has never received any benefits from clientelist actors.

6.11. Causal mechanisms

Although clientelism is an efficient strategy to target and mobilize voters, it does not automatically guarantee clients' votes at the ballot box. If this is the case, then the predominant party system should have emerged long before the AKP period because clientelism is a key feature of Turkish politics. This makes it essential to identify the mechanisms that link clientelism to dominance.

Based on my fieldwork, I argue that the AKP's use of clientelism leads to two developments, which in turn reproduce the cycle of dominance. The first is the strengthening of partisan identification. The second is the transformation of voters' ideology in such a way that it can be reconciled with a neoliberal order.

In the next section, I discuss these developments.

6.11.1. Strengthening partisan identification

Despite its significance, the impact of clientelism on partisan identification has remained virtually unexamined, at least in the context of Turkey. My fieldwork demonstrates that, due to the flow of clientelist benefits, AKP supporters have become strong party identifiers, which stands in contrast to the historically weak partisan

identification in Turkey.[110] This is best expressed in the sharply decline in volatility rates since 2002.

Partisan identification is essential to political behavior. While one stream of research takes it as a psychological trait or predisposition, another takes it as active behavior, evidenced in party membership or going to the polls (Converse & Pierce, 1985, p. 143). In the case of Turkey, partisan identification is a mixture of both trends. While the notion of the "non-partisan partisan" illustrates the former, the fact that most AKP voters are party members[111] illustrates the latter.

Partisan identification is a matter of degree. While strong identifiers "always vote for the same candidate or party regardless of what it says or does," weak identifiers are prone to defection (Sartori, 2005, p. 293).[112] The former is widely regarded as a stabilizing force for the political system, whereas the latter is taken to be alarming for the quality of democratic representation (Campbell et all., 1960; Dalton, 1996; Rose, 1998).

This assumption does not extend to Turkey. That is to say, strong partisan identification fosters polarization and thereby destabilizes the political system. This is because partisan identification gets stronger due to the flow of clientelist benefits. More specifically, I observed that the more clients benefit from clientelist resources, the stronger their identification with the party.[113] This shows that strong partisan identification works against democracy in the case of Turkey.

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[110] Weak partisan identification has been attributed to a variety of elements. According to Sayarı (2008), this is due to the disappearance of parties or changes in their names. In another paper, Ali Çarkoğlu (1998) draws attention to the role of military intervention in accounting for this. Özbudun (2001), on the other hand, contends that disappointment with the mainstream parties lies behind weak partisan identification.

[111] As of March 3, 2019, the AKP had 10,337,144 members, while the CHP had only 1,218,611 members.

[112] This does not mean that weak identifiers are always unstable voters. In fact, weak identifiers can be very stable if their vote is motivated by "negative voting," that is , parties they dislike (Sartori, 2005, p. 293).

[113] The only exception to this rule is the group that I call "non-partisan partisans," who are not part of the clientelist machine, but still have strong partisan identification.

The strengthening of partisan identification has three dimensions. The first amounts to getting people to view political, social, and economic developments through the prism of the party, or rather the party leader. This demonstrates that parties not only interpret ongoing cleavages (cf. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), but also have the capacity to change voters' perceptions and identities (cf. Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960), which is more likely in polarized settings (Druckman, Peterson & Slothuus, 2013).

The best example that shows how the AKP leadership shapes the views of its supporters is the "Kurdish Opening Process." Opinion surveys initially showed that AKP supporters were very supportive of the peace process. However, once the AKP switched its policy after the June 2015 elections, public support for the peace process dropped sharply.[114] The mooted presidential system is another illustrative case. The panel data show that, as Erdoğan and the AKP pushed for the presidential system, public opinion shifted towards embracing it.[115]

Second, strong partisanship involves an increasing dislike for opposition parties, illustrating "hostile partisanship." This has the potential to ruin or delegitimize the political system by exacerbating political and social polarization (Almond & Verba, 1963). Hostile partisanship overwhelmingly affects the CHP in urban settings.[116] During my fieldwork, I heard many examples of this:

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[114] Several surveys showed how the AKP leadership affected the political behavior of partisans in an intended direction. A Konsensus (2010) survey, for instance, found that from October 2009 to April 2010, support for the peace process rose from 32.8 percent to 48.1 percent, and then jumped to 65.7 percent in January 2014 (Cumhuriyet, 2014b). Similarly, a SAMER survey that was conducted in the Kurdish provinces found that support for the peace process skyrocketed to 84.7 percent in October 2014 (Bianet, 2014). In stark contrast to this trend, an Optimar survey in May 2016 shows that support dropped sharply to 27.3 percent once the AKP inverted its Kurdish policy (T24, 2016).

[115] A&G research, for instance, found that support for the presidential system rose from 37.4 percent to 45.7 percent between June and November 2016 (Milliyet, 2016). A similar trend was also observed by the Konda survey. It found that from February to March 2017, the support for the presidential system rose by 7 percent (T24, 2017). In the same vein, Optimar research found that between 2014 and 2017, the approval rate rose by 12 percentage points (Milliyet, 2017).

[116] This trend cannot be extended to the Kurdish-majority provinces. In these areas, hostile partisanship is directed against the HDP as the AKP's most powerful rival.

> I always vote for the biggest rival of the CHP. The CHP mentality banned the headscarf and religious groups. For long years, we had to read the Quran in silence and secretly. [26]

> The CHP leader only talks. No action. The CHP supporters are always against building new airports, bridges and roads. They do not want the development of Turkey. Therefore, I vote for the AK Party. [29]

> I can swear that if the CHP comes to power, aid will be cut off. I remember that the municipalities were providing scholarships to university students. Then, they stopped after the CHP complained to the Constitutional Court.[117] The CHP takes from the public rather than serving it. [13]

> While the CHP [SHP] was ruling Bağcılar, there was no clean water. The roads were full of mud. They do not know how to administer the municipalities. I never vote for them. [31]

> I work in Levent. Almost everyone supports the CHP in my workplace. I behave as if I am one of them. Otherwise, they would look down on me. In their conversations, they are constantly belittling AKP supporters as illiterate. The CHP cannot win elections with this mentality. [15]

> The CHP is cooperating with the PKK and FETÖ [Gülenist Terrorist Organization]. The HDP entered parliament with the support of the CHP. Therefore, I always vote for the strongest rival of the CHP. [35]

The proliferation of hostile partisanship has severe repercussions in the social field. Illustrating this, research on the dimensions of polarization in Turkey (Istanbul Bilgi University, 2018), conducted in 2017, found that 69.6 percent of respondents do

[117] The story can be found here: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/belediye-burslari-iptal-10410064

not want to be neighbors with voters for the party to which they are most hostile. Similarly, 78.7 percent of respondents declared that they would not allow their daughter to marry a supporter of the party to which they are most hostile.

Third, partisan identification has begun to prevail over competing identities. This is by no means the same as saying that identification based on religion, ethnicity, or regionalism has lost its salience. On the contrary, these identities are as strong as ever. The change has occurred rather in the hierarchical pyramid that defines these identities. The expansion of the clientelist network has moved partisan identification to the top.[118]

What best illustrates this trend is the ongoing war between the AKP leadership and the opposing religious groups. As already mentioned, the AKP government has co-opted a substantial portion of religious communities by allowing them to capitalize on private and public resources. The rest, which have not fallen in with the political authorities, have faced judicial and financial investigations. The case of Kuytul[119] best illustrates this.

The AKP's changing policy towards religious groups found a large audience among its supporters. To illustrate, during my interviews, almost all partisans underlined that their position changed negatively towards religious communities in the aftermath of the July 2016 failed coup. One partisan [45], for instance, stated that:

> I have been a member of a religious community for many years. The difference between the party and the religious community is that the religious communities only think about their interests and they nurture regimented people. They are closed to criticisms. The members take whatever the leader says as a command. In most cases, the imams

118 I should admit that this hierarchical structure cannot be applied to whole Turkey, particularly to the East and Southeast Anatolia, where traditional social ties still determine the voting behaviour. During my extended fieldwork (July 2018) in Kurdish provinces, significant portion of the AKP supporters and even party officials emphasized that they vote and work for the AKP because of their clan leader's order.

119 Alparslan Kuytul headed Furkan Vaqf. The vaqf has been known with its Islamic agenda and its opposition to Erdoğan rule. In January 2018, Kuytul and the prominent figures of the Vaqf were arrested for their activities against the constitutional order (Cumhuriyet, 2018c).

> regard party leaders as rivals and oppose them. After July 15 [2016], the public thoroughly understood this point. Now, no one wants to send their children to religious schools. And this is good for our society.

Let me briefly discuss this statement. First, I believe that, during the period before 2013, when the AKP had good relations with the religious communities, the same person would not have complained that the religious communities raise "regimented" people, let alone are trying to capture state institutions. This is because the party leadership, at that time, strongly pushed the view that religious groups operate only for God's sake. Second, in a political context in which the government's authoritarian leanings are crystallizing, accusations from the AKP party base that religious communities nurture regimented people, exclude their rivals, or mindlessly obey their leaders are ironic, to say the least!

The deteriorating image of the religious communities in the eyes of partisans has also been captured by public surveys. For instance, according to the "Religion and Religious Values" survey conducted by MAK research in 2017, half the respondents indicated that religious communities should be subjected to state control. More interestingly, only one-sixth of the participants declared an affiliation with religious communities or orders (Sputnik, 2017).

6.11.2. Change in ideology

It is admittedly more complex to show the causal link between clientelism and ideological change. This is simply because ideological change is both prior and posterior to clientelist exchange. It is prior because the decline of working class ideology prepared the ground for clientelist parties to expand (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Roniger, 2004). It is posterior, on the other hand, because clientelism is such a strong force that it is capable of shaping voters' ideology.

This study is aimed explicitly at understanding the latter phenomena, in other words, the impact of clientelism on voters' ideology. I argue that such an inquiry is necessary for at least three reasons. First, it helps us to understand how Islam and neoliberalism, which have long been considered incompatible, can coexist. Second, it

accounts for why the poor have not resisted neoliberal reforms even though they undermine their well-being. Third, it explains why Islamist-rooted voters, who are known to be sensitive to the notion of social justice, realigned with the AKP.

Before delving into the analysis, the term "ideology" needs to be defined.[120] Gerring (1997, p. 957) argues that:

> To some, ideology is dogmatic, while to others, it carries connotations of political sophistication; to some, it refers to dominant modes of thought, and to others, it refers primarily to those most alienated by the status quo (for example, revolutionary movements and parties). To some, it is based on the concrete interests of a social class, while to others, it is characterized by an absence of economic self-interest. One could continue, but the point is already apparent: not only is ideology farflung, it also encompasses a good many definitional traits which are directly at odds with one another.

In the context of Turkey, ideology refers both to the dominant mode of thought (for example, Kemalism) and resistance to it (for example, Islamism).[121] What notably happened during the AKP reign is that once resistant ideology (i.e. Islamism) became dominant over time, in parallel to the AKP's clientelist policies.

In this light, I below show how clientelism leads to the moderation of the Islamic ideology and the approval of the neoliberal reforms, which then reproduce the AKP's dominance.

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120 The term "ideology" is a product of the French Enlightenment. At that time, ideology was defined as a "science of ideas," that is, a technique to discover truth and dissolve illusions, rather than as a "type of thought." With Marx, the concept embraced its present meaning: the "quality of thought" that can be distorted (Mullins, 1972, pp. 499–500).

121 As far as I observed, ideology has a very negative connation for supporters, as well as the administration. They commonly believe that ideology constrains parties to narrow constituencies and hinders them from extending their voter base beyond that. Accordingly, being "non-ideological" is considered crucial for electoral success.

6.11.3. Islamism

As Dixit & Londregan (1996) contend, ideology is an effective way to build common identity with the voters. In this sense, the AKP's coloring of its clientelism with the Islamic tone has drawn huge public support, particularly from those who felt excluded before because of wearing headscarf, being a member of the religious community, or studying in the underground Quaranic courses.

In line with that almost every partisan that I interviewed blessed the AKP government for its policies towards religion. Some examples are shown below:

> *'I vote for the party that is most compatible with Islam. During the AKP rule, religious freedom has expanded. Therefore, I vote for it.' [4]*

> *'Before the AKP, women with headscarf were excluded from the universities and the public institutions. Now, we can go to universities and work in public institutions with our headscarf.' [10]*

> *'I am very happy to see that our president knows how to read Quran. He even reads better than many Imams.' [38]*

As far as I observed, the AKP's clientelism interacted with religion in two ways. First, clientelism led some radical Islamists, who were historically sensitive to the notion of social justice, to realign with the neoliberal AKP. This happened in two ways. To start with, clientelist exchange upgraded small-scale business owners into big capitalists by allowing them to capitalize on public procurements or undertake urban transformation projects. In the same vein, the AKP government connected with Islamic-rooted voters by establishing patronage links with the state, which they had long imagined to be "alien" or even an "enemy." These developments, in turn, transformed radical-Islamist rooted voters into true supporters of the AKP government. The story of Mehmet and Ahmet (see Chapter 6) best illustrates this transformation.

Second, clientelism has led some previously non-religious people to become moderate Islamists, at least at the level of discourse. Adopting an Islamic discourse is pragmatically motivated to win procurement contracts or access clientelist benefits. This instance particularly applies to traditionally center-right voters who aligned more recently with the AKP. Observing this trend, one partisan [21] pointed out that:

> Religious words are now in everyone's mouth. Someone addresses you with "Selamun Aleykum." Then, he talks about how to steal people's money. In recent times, people have begun to fast and go to the mosque in order to get something out of it. Unfortunately, we observe this behavior in many people.

What must be underlined is that moderation among Islamists and Islamization among secular people are occurring simultaneously. And the result is inevitably conflicting. One partisan [22] argued that:

> What has happened in the past decade is that the left has cast off nationalism and the state, whereas the right has cast off religion. Practicing religion has been rendered merely formal. It now consists of visiting religious places with girlfriends on Fridays and tweeting verses on Fridays. Although the number of women with a headscarf has increased, religious people have become more secular. Now, women wear a headscarf but also put on makeup. This is how Islam is being distorted.

As this statement illustrates, there has been a widespread reaction to changes in religious mindset from the party base, particularly from those who have a National Outlook Tradition past. I expect that, despite their extent, these complaints will remain whispers unless the AKP's management of the economy hits such voters in their pockets.

6.11.4. Neoliberalism

The second dimension of ideological change is the drift towards neoliberalism among clients. This entails two elements. First, it expresses support for the hegemony of the devout bourgeoisie. Second, it involves support for neoliberal reforms.

Relating to the former, during my interviews in the field, the sense that the AKP government had promoted its own business interests was very strong. This development is praised rather than opposed because partisans take it as a victory against secular business. More than that, it is taken as a "dream model" for climbing the social ladder. Illustrating this, one partisan [34] argued that:

> Before the AKP government, conservative business was completely excluded from the state. Kemalists were taking all procurement contracts. This does not happen anymore. Now, Kemalists accuse the AKP government of having corrupt relations with businessmen, as if they got rich another way.

Another partisan [24] noted that:

> Many people have got rich under the AKP government. In this period, becoming rich is easier than in other periods. God is bestowing at least something on working people.

Second, the ideological change is part of mobilizing the support of the poor for neoliberal "reforms," including subcontracting and privatization. Within the framework of clientelism, this means support for economic policies that expand the patron's resources, some of which are then supposed to be passed on to clients in the form of clientelist benefits. Illustrating this view, one partisan [11] noted that:

> I am against unionization. Unionized workers earn money by sleeping, so to speak. The solution is subcontracting. Subcontractors don't cost too much, and they work harder because there is no job guarantee. Bağcılar municipality implements this policy successfully.

Another partisan added that [12]:

> The previous governments put their men into state-owned enterprises. Therefore, one hundred people do the jobs of ten people in these businesses. And the workers earn very high wages. As a result, most state-owned enterprises make a loss. Privatization is the right policy.

Because clientelism hinges on inequality and hierarchy between the patron and the client, it is inevitable that this is reflected in the economic field. In this framework, the neoliberal drift has softened criticisms of wealth and inequality among AKP voters, which stands in stark contrast to the RP period (Öniş, 1997). This means that the RP's dream to realize a "just order" has been abandoned. Instead, the notion of justice is confined to political issues, such as lifting the ban on headscarves. The views of interviewees best illustrate this transformation:

> Under the RP, we were thinking more radically. We were against riches and waste. I don't think it's the same now. Turkey has changed a lot. Now, there is wealth in the country. Traders and builders quickly become rich. [20]

> The RP could not get the votes of the rich. Mostly, poor people residing in the squatter settlements voted for it. Of course, there were people voting for religious reasons, but mostly people were voting because of the economy. Unlike the RP, the AKP gets votes from every group. [25]

People's co-optation into the neoliberal order can be observed even more easily within party cadres. One party official [58], for instance, contended that:

> It is impossible for a person to stay poor in Bağcılar. You can get aid from numerous places. Our people are not poor, they are "luxury poor."

> They are not poor in the sense of eating and drinking, but in relation to social activities.

The term "luxury poor" entails more than might appear. This view apparently takes poverty in the narrower sense of access to food and drink and considers anything beyond that (for example, access to social life) as a luxury. This rationale normalizes poverty and is instrumental in hampering further economic demands by the poor. The remarks of another party official [59] were even more revealing:

> I believe poor people are lazy. Today, anyone willing to work can get a job easily. But because many institutions provide assistance, no one wants to work.

In a nutshell, these testimonies show that the lower classes have started to lose their ability to empathize with each other because they are part of a clientelist network. This is a manifestation of what I call "de-identification," which aims to destroy resistance to neoliberal reforms that undermine the well-being of the poor.

7. CHAPTER SEVEN: COMPARISON

This section seeks to investigate the role of clientelism in the emergence of predominant party systems. My main intention is to situate the Turkish case among the broader set of predominant party systems. In order to draw reliable comparisons, in this section the cases of Mexico, Taiwan, India, and Japan are presented.[122]

These cases were selected as follows. First, the cases differ in terms of democratic quality. That is to say, while in India and Japan predominant party systems are maintained under a democratic regime, in Mexico and Taiwan this occurs under a hybrid regime. Second, the cases differ in terms of the form clientelism assumes. To illustrate, while vote buying prevails in Mexico, patronage and pork-barrel politics prevail in Japan. Third, the cases differ in terms of the type of relationship with the voters. For instance, while the voter–party linkage is broker-centered in Mexico, it is candidate-centered in Japan.

Drawing on the secondary literature and DALP data (see Table 28), I argue that if the dominant party employs a vote-buying or pork-barrel strategy, then the partisan identification does not get stronger over time and ideological change (if imposed by the incumbent) remains weak. This is because these strategies are aimed at bringing short-term benefits rather at transforming society in the long run. My findings are summarized in Table 29.

First, I shall underline the limits of this section. First, to my knowledge, apart from data from the Election Center of National Chengchi University for Taiwan, Mexican panel data, and data from the National Election Studies carried out by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in India, longitudinal data on changes in partisan identification and ideology are missing. Therefore, I could not obtain reliable data on the changing ideology of Indian

[122] Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007, p. 3) argue that there is not much comparative studies on clientelism because clientelism as a concept is rooted in anthropological and sociological studies that have taken it as a particular instance of social affiliation in traditional societies rather than as a pertinent feature of modern polities.

voters. Second, the existing data are not satisfactory in a number of respects. For instance, the Mexican panel study data do not account for the level of partisan identification before the 1990s or reveal the changing nature of voter ideology in Mexico. These drawbacks show that a more valid comparison can be made only when more data on relevant cases are collected through surveys and fieldwork.

This chapter is organized as follows. For each case, I first discuss the elements that led to the emergence and maintenance of the predominant party system. Then, along with other factors, I discuss the role of clientelism in the reproduction of dominance. Lastly, I examine how clientelism impacts partisan identification and the ideology of clients.

Table 28: Clientelism in comparative perspective*

Country	Party	b1 (gift and payment)	b2 (social policy benefits)	b3 (patronage jobs)	b4 (procurement contracts)	b5 (regulatory favors)	b11 (effectiveness of clientelist targeting)
Mexico	**Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)**	**3.7**	**3.5**	**3.4**	**3.5**	**3.4**	**2.2**
Mexico	National Action Party (PAN)	2.7	2.7	2.7	3.1	3.3	1.7
Mexico	Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD)	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.0
Taiwan	**Kuomintang (KMT)**	**3.1**	**3.5**	**2.6**	**2.6**	**3.6**	**3.5**
Taiwan	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	2.7	3.2	2.5	2.5	3.4	3.1
India	**Indian National Congress (INC)**	**3.3**	**3.4**	**3.1**	**3.1**	**3.2**	**3.2**
India	Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)	3.1	3.3	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1
India	Communist Party of India (CPI)	2.2	3.0	2.8	2.1	2.2	3.0
Japan	**Liberal Democratic Party Japan (LDP)**	**2.3**	**3.3**	**2.4**	**3.5**	**3.1**	**3.2**
Japan	Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.6
Japan	Japanese Communist Party (JCP)	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.1	1.2	2.5
Japan	Japanese Social Democratic Party (JSP)	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.0	1.2	2.1

Note: * Scores: 1 to 4 – 1= a negligible [clientelist] effort or none at all; 2= a minor effort; 3= a moderate effort; 4= a major effort.

Source: DALP data.

Table 29: Features of clientelism in selected cases

Case	Type of relationship with voters	Form of clientelism	Exclusion	Partisan identification	Ideology change
Mexico	broker-centered	vote-buying "pork"	party-based	moderate (sometimes hostile)	decline of the clientelist machine led to ideological shift towards neoliberalism
Taiwan	both broker (local factional leaders) and candidate-centered (SNTV)	patronage vote buying	party-based and ethnic (Taiwanese)	moderate	weak proof: support for independence rose
India	broker-centered (i.e., upper castes and classes)	vote buying "pork"	party-based	strong (non-hostile)	decline of the clientelist machine has popularized local ideologies as an alternative to Gandhism
Japan	candidate-centered (SNTV)	patronage "pork"	party-based	weak	weak competition of all against all makes ideology secondary in addressing voters

Note: NA: not applicable.

Source: Author's elaboration and secondary sources.

7.1. Mexico

The PRI[123] is the longest-ruling dominant party in the world. It maintained its power from 1929 to 2000. Established as a cadre party to unite the victorious warlords following the Mexican civil war, the PRI rapidly transformed into a catch-all party by integrating peasants and workers into its "statist corporatism" (Magaloni, 2006, p. 4).

For long decades under PRI rule, Mexico had a hegemonic party system. To illustrate this, between 1939 and 1977 the only opposition party that was permitted to exist was the National Action Party (PAN), which advocated the expansion of religious freedom and a market economy. For long decades, the PAN remained loyal to the PRI (Klesner, 2001, p. 25), fulfilling the role of "satellite party" in the hegemonic party system.

During the 1970s, PRI rule was confronted with an economic crisis.[124] In response, PRI leader Salinas implemented austerity measures, including the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the reduction of foreign tariffs, a shift to an import-based strategy, and further integration with international capital through regional organizations such as NAFTA (Kaufman, 2005, p. 182; Dominguez & McCann, 1995, p. 36).

This "party change" had a substantial impact on political competition. First, the neoliberal drift led to the eruption of intra-party contestation, which then led to the birth of the left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in 1977 (Solinger, 2001, p. 37). The emergence of the new party undermined the

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[123] Although the PRI lost the presidential election in 2000, it maintained its leading status in both the Senate and the House of Deputies until 2018. The 2018 elections witnessed the landslide victory of Lopez Obrador of the social democratic National Regeneration Movement party (MORENO). With its worst electoral result since its establishment, the PRI captured a mere 14 seats in the 128-seat Senate and 42 seats in the 500-seat Chamber of Congress.

[124] The economic problems were due to the increasing public debt and the growing balance of payments deficit (Kaufman, 2005, p. 181). To show the extent of the economic crisis, GDP per capita declined by 9 percent between 1981 and 1989 and consumer price inflation soared over 60 percent. Similarly, the minimum wage was cut by half from 1980 to 1988 (Dominguez & McCann, 1995, p. 36).

legitimacy of the PRI as the sole voice of the peasants and the workers. Second, the privatization of state-owned enterprises within the framework of neoliberal transformation diminished the public resources that would otherwise have been used for clientelist exchange (Greene, 2007).

When defections and the decline of the clientelist machine combined with the personal charisma of Vincente Fox, the PAN's presidential candidate, the PRI was defeated in the 2000 presidential elections (Greene, 2007, pp. 300–301).

During its tenure, the PRI used a set of instruments to hold onto power. First, the PRI benefited from its historical legitimacy (Klesner, 2001). Second, it took advantage of its centrist political position, which typically led to a coordination failure among the opposition (Greene, 2007). Repression was a last resort and fraud was not rife as late as the 1980s. Besides that, charismatic leadership was not crucial because the political system was designed to hinder personal dictatorship (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007). Similarly, the contribution of the PRI's economic performance to its dominance was limited (Magaloni, 2006).

In addition to the aforementioned elements, clientelism as a pertinent feature of Mexican politics (Eisenstadt, 2003, p. 29) fostered the PRI's dominance. For instance, based on 2,400 interviews, the Mexico 2000 Panel Study found that the PRI was the most clientelist party in Mexico and its adherents were the biggest beneficiaries of clientelist inducements. In the same vein, according to DALP data (see Table 28), the PRI targeted voters intensively with gifts and payments, social benefits, patronage jobs, procurement contracts, and regulatory favors. To such an extent, in fact, that the PRI is probably the most clientelist party among the cases covered in this chapter.

The PRI pivoted its clientelism on a corporatist structure, which enabled it to exert tight political control over peasants and workers (Klesner, 2001, p. 6; Kaufman, 2005, p. 178). However, this approach weakened when the middle class and the urban informal sector started to expand from the 1970s. The response of the PRI leadership to this challenge was "portfolio diversification of electoral

investments," which entailed the re-transfer of public funds to less homogenous and more competitive districts (Magaloni & Cayeros, 2007, p. 202), as in the case of PRONASOL program.[125] Ultimately, even the new social benefits offered to voters did not halt the demise of the PRI.

How did clientelism affect partisan identification and voters' ideology in Mexico? To start with the former, because the dominant form of clientelism was vote-buying (see Table 28), it strengthened loyalty to brokers rather than to the party (Vidal, Ugues, Bowler & Hisket, 2010, pp. 79–80). Accordingly, once clientelist resources began to shrink during the 1990s, dealignment from the PRI proceeded rapidly.

With regard to the latter, the fact that the effectiveness of the clientelist network began to decline from the 1970s led to an ideological shift – at least at the level of party cadres – to save the clientelist machine. As already noted, this manifested itself in the abandonment of statist corporatism and the embrace of neoliberal reforms. However, rather than halting its demise, this ideological transformation further eroded the PRI's voter base.

7.2. Taiwan

Established on the Chinese mainland under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT[126] fled to Taiwan after it lost the civil war against the Maoists. The party then ruled Taiwan from 1949 to 2000, when the KMT's presidential candidate was defeated by its former secretary, James Soong, who ran as an independent.

In its early decades, the Taiwanese regime was authoritarian in character. This was mainly because of the minority rule by "*waishengen"* (Chinese

[125] The PRONASOL program was implemented to alleviate the negative effects of the neoliberal transformation and to improve national infrastructure. The program accounted for 8 percent of social spending (Stokes et al., 2013, p. 145).

[126] The KMT has exhibited a cyclical electoral performance since its defeat in 2000. While it lost its majority in the 2001 and 2004 elections, it reclaimed the legislature and the presidency in 2008. In the 2016 elections, the KMT again lost its majority and the presidency.

immigrants), based on martial law. In this setting, only small, tractable parties and independents were allowed to run against the KMT (in local elections only) (Solinger, 2001, pp. 32–33). The lack of party competition – at least until the late 1980s – puts Taiwan in the group of hegemonic party systems.

The authoritarian character of the regime was toned down in parallel with the lifting of the state of emergency in 1987 and the ensuing political liberalization. In this context, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) appealed to voters with its anti-corruption stance.[127] The acceleration of this trend led to the end of KMT rule in 2000.

A number of elements fostered the KMT's dominance. First, the social cleavage arising from relations with China must be emphasized (Templeman, 2012; Chu, 2005). Second, the KMT benefited from its remarkable economic performance, mixing tremendous economic growth – amounting to 9.75 per annum between 1961 and 1980 – with relatively low income inequality (Chu, 2005, p. 68). This trend also extended to the 1990s (Wang, 2012), illustrating the limits of performance legitimacy theory in explaining the KMT's dominance. Third, the KMT took advantage of the SNTV electoral system that gave it a significant advantage in elections (c.f. Carey & Shugart, 1995; Cox, 1996; Hicken, 2007).

Similarly, clientelism boosted the KMT's electoral performance (Bosco, 1994; Fell, 2005; Wang & Kurzman, 2007). According to DALP data (see Table 28), the KMT was the most effective party as regards targeting voters through gifts and payments, social benefits, and regulatory favors.

In building its clientelist empire, the KMT enjoyed substantial financial resources. In particular, it took advantage of money funneled from state-owned enterprises, (SoEs) as well as party-owned enterprises (PoEs) (Ho, Clarke, Chen & Weng, p. 164; Greene, 2007, p. 265; Matsumoto, 2002, p. 363). Party-owned

[127] For instance, one research study found that the proportion of respondents who labeled the KMT a "clean" party decreased from 37 percent to 25 percent between 1992 and 1996, while this assessment rose from 26 to 41 percent for the DPP (Fell, 2004).

enterprises are unique to Taiwan; in most other settings, political parties are not permitted to involved in business activities. Party-owned enterprises arguably made the KMT the richest party in the world (Matsumoto, 2002, p. 360).[128]

Clientelism frequently takes the form of vote-buying in Taiwan (see Table 28). For instance, one survey disclosed that the KMT bought as many as a quarter of the votes in the 1993 elections (Wang & Kurzman, 2007). Recall that vote-buying requires brokers who have daily contact with the voters. This role was performed by local leaders who had at their disposal experienced campaign managers, a significant budget, a network of trust, and judicial protection (Wang & Kurzman, 2007, p. 61). These brokers were so significant that a decline in their ability to mobilize as a result of broad social transformation eventually brought down the KMT regime (Chu, 2005, pp. 65–70).

With regard to partisan identification, because vote-buying was prevalent and brokers were strong, partisan identity remained weak among KMT supporters, at least during the 1990s. For instance, a panel study conducted by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University shows that (see Figure 3), for the period between 1992 and 2000, the proportion of voters who identified with the KMT dropped sharply, from 34.4 percent to 21.1 percent, while the share of those identifying with the DPP jumped from 3.3 percent to 26 percent.

With regard to ideological change, the decline of the clientelist machine had a substantial impact on the ideological dimension of party competition in Taiwan, namely the question of Taiwanese/Chinese self-identification. For instance, the panel study of the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University again shows that (see Figure 4) the proportion of those who define themselves as "Chinese" fell sharply, from 25.5 percent in 1992 to 12.5 percent in 2000, while "Taiwanese" self-identification jumped from 17.6 to 36.9 percent. This trend shows that, as anticipated, clientelism defined by vote-buying in Taiwan failed to transform clients' ideology.

128 The net assets of the KMT was estimated to be around 6.5 billion dollars which amounted to 2 percent of the GNP in 1998 (Matsumoto, 2002).

Figure 3: Changes in the party identification of Taiwanese people as tracked in surveys conducted by the Election Center, NCCU (1992~2018.06)



Source: https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167

Figure 4: Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese people as tracked in surveys by the Election Center, NCCU (1992~2018.06



Source: https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166

7.3. India

The predominant party system emerged under the rule of the Indian Congress Party[129] (INC or Congress Party). Historically, the Congress Party transformed itself from an independence movement to a "party of consensus" (Kothari, 1964, p. 1163) that "cuts across major ethnic, regional and class barriers" (Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989, p. 194). This enabled the Congress Party to stay in power from 1947 until its defeat by the BJP-led coalition in 1977.[130]

During its tenure in power, the Congress Party was confronted by a group of fragmented and weak opposition parties that were unable to extend their voter base beyond niche ethic, religious, or caste-based constituencies (Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989, p. 207). This evidently restricted political competition at the national level. However, the Congress administration compensated for the lack of inter-party rivalry with intra-party pluralism, arising from the party's catch-all character (Kothari, 1964, p. 1165).

Although the party itself was democratic,[131] Congress Party rule sometimes showed authoritarian leanings. Most notably, a set of political and social problems during the 1970s[132] led to the imposition of a state of emergency, which remained in force between 1975 and 1977 (Kochanek & Hardgrave, 2007, pp. 283–285). This laid the ground for the collapse of INC rule.

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[129] After its defeat in 1977, the Congress Party returned to power in 1980. Since then, the INC has been fluctuating between government and opposition. The overall trend, however, suggests that the Congress Party is not as strong as in the past. Illustrating this, in the 2014 elections, the Congress Party fell well behind the BJP for the first time since 1977 as a result of poor economic management and corruption.

[130] The BJP appealed to voters with its pro-Hindu and anti-Muslim rhetoric (Kitschelt, 2012, p. 108).

[131] Lijphart (1996), for instance, describes India as a "consociational democracy," citing four reasons. First, India has an inclusive grand coalition. Second, the diverging groups enjoy cultural autonomy. Third, the principle of proportionality is taken into account in political representation and public appointments. Fourth, a minority veto is possible.

[132] The problems included the Bangladesh war and the ensuing refugee crises, drought, and food and energy crises. These led to widespread political unrest throughout the country. The state of emergency was declared when political turmoil was combined with a judicial attack on Indira Gandhi (Kochanek & Hardgrave, 2007, pp. 283–285).

The Congress Party used a variety of instruments to maintain its power. First, the party's historical legitimacy must be emphasized (Kitschelt, 2012, p. 107). Second, the Congress Party benefited from its "centrist" position, which typically led to coordination failure among the opposition (Riker, 1976). Third, the Congress Party benefited from the deep-rooted social cleavages along caste, religion, and ethnicity lines, which constrained the opposition parties to niche constituencies (Chhibber & Petrocik, 1989; Kitschelt, 2012). Fourth, the party benefited from the FPTP electoral system, which consistently favored it in elections (Kochanek & Hardgrave, 2007, pp. 259–260). By contrast, the Congress Party's economic performance had a limited role in explaining its dominance.[133]

Along with these elements, clientelism played a major role in making the Congress Party dominant, to such an extent that Chandra (2004) calls India a "patronage democracy." Clientelism has two main functions in India. First, it has an electoral purpose. In this regard, as DALP data (see Table 28) suggest, the Congress Party and its main rival, the BJP, target voters with clientelist inducements. Second, clientelism allows the political elites to naturalize, institutionalize, and deepen hierarchies that rest on religion, ethnicity, and caste (Wilkinson, 2004).

As regards the impact of clientelism on partisan identification, India is a paradoxical case. Although the dominant form of clientelism in India is vote-buying[134] (Stokes et all., 2013, p. 51), this has not led to weak partisan identification. For instance, the 1967 post-election national survey conducted by Eldersveld (1970, 1973) found that 70 percent of voters in India had partisan identification and 51 percent had strong attachments.

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[133] GDP growth in India was slightly above 1 percent from the 1950s to the 1970s (Kitschelt, 2012, p. 133).

[134] Thanks to their social status and control over land, upper caste local intermediaries fulfilled this role (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 113; Krisna, 2007, p. 147), although their capability substantively declined with the Green revolution (Dasgupta, 2014).

With regard to the impact of clientelism on voters' ideology, it is evident that the decline of the Congress Party's clientelist machine in the wake of the Green revolution made Gandhism less popular among Indian voters. The recent rise of local ideologies (Rani, 2005) is another indication of this trend.

7.4. Japan

Japan can be described as a "democracy without competition" (Scheiner, 2006). Between 1955 and 2009, the LDP was so dominant that it was out of power for only 10 months and 20 days.[135] As Japanese politics turned into a "spectator democracy," with low electoral turnout rates (Hrebenar & Itoh, 2015, p. 5; Hrebenar, 2000, p. 18), the LDP's cycle of dominance became increasingly difficult to break by the opposition.

Historically, the LDP's support base includes peasants and small-business groups. The urban middle class is a relatively new addition to this list (Hrebenar, 2000, p. 25). By contrast, the opposition socialist and conservative parties have been constrained to narrow constituencies because they could not develop a reliable party program (Greene, 2007, pp. 279–280; Hrebenar & Itoh, 2015, pp. 10–11).[136] The opposition was long unable to present a common front against the LDP, at least until the 1993 elections (Christensen, 2000). Similar to Turkey, the bilateral opposition prolonged single-party rule, until the LDP's defeat by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009.

LDP dominance hinges on a number of elements. At the top stands the SNTV electoral system that overrepresents big parties and underrepresents small ones (cf. Cox 1997; Scheiner 2007). This enabled the LDP to form a government alone, even though it had not received more than half of the votes since 1963. Accordingly, the priority of the opposition was to replace the SNTV system with a mixed electoral

[135] The LDP returned to power in 2012 and still forms the government.

[136] The opposition also suffered from weak local foundations, candidate difficulties, and poor party organization and coherence (Scheiner, 2006, pp. 18–19).

system, after the LDP lost its majority in 1993. Despite this development, the LDP re-asserted its dominance in the next election, which clearly shows the limits of institutionalist theories in accounting for dominance. The LDP also owes much of its success to its amazing economic performance,[137] that lasted from the 1950s through the 1970s (Scheiner, 2006, p. 52).

In the same vein, clientelism boosted the LDP's electoral performance by weakening the opposition. DALP data (see Table 28) demonstrate that the LDP was much more clientelist than its rivals.

Clientelism is embedded in Japanese politics. It is, above all, rooted in intra-party contestation. In this sense, the LDP typically has five to seven factions, each of which seeks to capture the party leadership and seek an advantage (Hrebenar & Itoh, 2015, p. 11) by investing in fundraising organizations such as "*Könkei*"[138] (Bettcher, 2005, pp. 346–347). Similar to "koenkai" (local support groups), hereditary parliamentarism also illustrate the impact of clientelism in Japanese politics (Hrebenar & Itoh, 2015, p. 16).

Unlike the cases of Mexico, Taiwan, and India, where vote-buying prevails, the "pork-barrel" approach[139] is a dominant form of clientelism in Japan (McCubbins & Rosenbluth, 1995; Also see Table 28). The distribution of "pork" involves exchanging kickbacks with loyal businessmen through procurement contracts (Scheiner, 2006, p. 72; Greene, 2007, p. 282; Woodall, 1996), which frequently leads to large-scale political scandals. For instance, due to the Recruit scandal, the Takeshita government collapsed in 1989 (Scheiner, 2006, p. 33).

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[137] Illustrating this, for instance, taking GNP base period (100) to be 1951–1953, it rose to 248 for 1961–1963 and 664 for 1971–1973 (Johnson, 1982, p. 6).

138 "Koenkei" are candidates' organizations for raising funding for election campaigns. The annual expenditure of koenkai may exceed 1 million dollars (Christensen, 2010, p. 10). According to Er (1994), the persistence of koenkai in Japanese politics can be explained by three things: the absence of strong party organization; the traditional values of Japanese society; and small group loyalty as the basis of Japanese social interaction.

[139] Pork-barrel politics came to the forefront in the context of renewing national infrastructure devastated during World War 2 (Pempel, 2010).

Pork-barrel politics did not lead to strong partisan identification because it is not embedded in daily life. Accordingly, partisan identification in Japan remains among the weakest in the industrialized world (Scheiner, 2006, p. 68), as also indicated by the low turnout levels.

In Japanese politics, ideological debate is subsumed by clientelism (Scheiner, 2006, p. 66), although the impact of former on the latter is not easy to predict. This is because of the all-against-all competition in elections, which makes it inefficient for same-party candidates to use ideology to target and mobilize voters (Bettcher, 2005, p. 347). Therefore, candidates rely mainly on clientelist measures to appeal to voters (Cox & Thies, 1998, p. 269). However, as clientelist resources have fallen due to the country's economic stagnation since the 1990s (Park, 2008), ideology may be more important in targeting voters in upcoming elections.

8. CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I explore the role of clientelism in the emergence of the predominant party system in Turkey. First, I adopted a threefold strategy to tackle the conceptual confusion that has plagued the widely discussed, but weakly operationalized concept of the predominant party system. Drawing on Sartori's (2005) framework, I contend that a predominant party system emerges when a party wins at least three consecutive elections in a competitive political environment and is able to form a government alone.

Following that, I discussed relevant theories that may account for the emergence of the predominant party system in Turkey. I argue that resource theory – which posits that a predominant party system emerges if a party commands public resources and subordinates the public bureaucracy – is more relevant in explaining the AKP's dominance.

The central concept in resource theory is clientelism, which is an understudied phenomenon in the context of Turkey. Therefore, drawing on fieldwork in one of Istanbul's poorest and most densely populated districts, Bağcılar, I highlighted various features of the AKP's clientelism. First, clientelism primarily addresses the poor and the devout bourgeoisie. Second, there is a division of labor among patrons in clientelist exchange. Third, clientelism is leader-mediated, implying that brokers are weaker than in other settings (for example, Latin America). Fourth, clientelism works as a problem-solving strategy for diverse social groups, especially for the poor. Fifth, clientelism is shaped by neoliberalism. Sixth, clientelism draws on sectarian rather than ethnic exclusion. Seventh, Islam constitutes a non-material aspect of clientelism.

After that I highlighted the actors, the structure, and the operation of clientelism in the context of Bağcılar. Then, I revealed the causal mechanism that connects clientelism to voting. I contend that the causal link between clientelism and dominance is, in fact, far from being automatic. If it was, then the predominant party system would have emerged long before 2002 because clientelism is a pervasive feature of Turkish politics.

I argue that the AKP's use of clientelism has two ramifications, which in turn reproduce the cycle of dominance. To start with, clientelism leads to strong partisan identification. This contrasts with the traditionally weak partisan identification in Turkey. Strong partisan identification has three dimensions in the Turkish context: (i) it entails reading political developments through the eyes of the party or rather the party leader; (ii) it corresponds to hostile partisanship; and (iii) it marks a change in the pyramidal structure of competing identities, in which partisan identification rises to the top.

Second, clientelism has prompted ideological change, namely neoliberalization in an Islamic setting. This accounts for three developments: (i) it explains how Islam and neoliberalism have become intertwined; (ii) it expresses the support of the poor for neoliberal policies, although they undermine their well-being; and (iii) it shines a light on the realignment of radical Islamists and center-right voters with the AKP.

Finally, I sought to extend my arguments to the similar cases of Mexico, Taiwan, India, and Japan. Based on the available data and the secondary literature, I posit that if vote-buying and/or pork-barrel politics prevail as a dominant form of clientelism, partisan identification will not be stronger over time and ideological change, if imposed by the incumbent, is less likely to occur. This is because, first, vote-buying secures loyalty to brokers rather than to the party. Second, because pork-barrel politics is not reproduced in everyday life, it does little to transform clients into committed party members.

Based on the narrative presented above, this study opens up two areas of research for further investigation. The first is the gathering of data, be it quantitative or qualitative, on the impact of clientelism on partisan identification and ideological change in relevant cases. The second is ethnographic research on rural clientelism. This is essential if we are to understand transitivity between rural and urban spaces.

In light of this paper, it is possible to make some inferences regarding the future of AKP rule. It is better to start with what has not happened so far and what is less

likely to happen in the near future: defections and factionalism.[140] Thus far, defections have not posed a serious challenge to the AKP leadership as intra-party opposition has not been transformed into outside party opposition (with the exception of Abdüllatif Şener, former vice chairman in the AKP and current CHP deputy). This is because of organized attacks by both the government-controlled judiciary and the pro-AKP media. I think that even if a party is established by defectors in the near future, it will not rapidly turn into a credible alternative unless Erdoğan's charisma substantively erodes in the eyes of the electorate. Factionalism, on the other hand, has been contained by Erdoğan's tight control over the party.

By contrast, two issues have the potential to accelerate dealignment as they tend to trigger reactions from the party base. [141] The first is crony capitalism and corruption; the second is the status of Syrian refugees. The fact that hundreds of thousands of Syrians have joined the workforce adversely affects the AKP because unemployment has soared and wages are falling, especially in poor districts.

Dealignment may manifest itself at the next local elections in the form of a fall in turnout. If this occurs, it may even cost the AKP the local elections in big cities where its lead is narrow. To retard this trend, it is likely that the AKP's or rather Erdoğan's authoritarian policies will be more evident on the eve of the elections.

In any case, it would be misleading to expect that dealignment will rapidly turn into realignment. This may happen only if the opposition parties, particularly the AKP's right-wing competitors, develop a strategy to attract dealigned voters. Otherwise, because the vote share of the right-wing block (around 60 percent) is

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[140] The role of defections in dominant party politics has been well emphasized by Duverger. According to him (1954, p. 312), "the dominant party wears itself out in office, it loses its vigor, its arteries harden. It would thus be possible to show ... that every domination bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction."

[141] Such a reaction from the party base illustrates the notion of the "hidden transcript" (Scott, 1990), which can be taken as a form of resistance to patrons. This is ironic if it is recalled that the AKP came to a power by promising to end widespread corruption during the 1990s and deliberately used "AK" (clean) in its official name to distinguish itself from the mainstream parties.

typically double that of the left (around 30 percent) and transitivity is weak between these blocks, the Social Democrat alternative does not have much chance of ending AKP rule.

As a rule of thumb, when authoritarianism is combined with high levels of social and political polarization, destructive consequences are likely. The trajectories of the Turkish party system provide abundant examples that hint at what might occur in the near future.

One thing already attempted but without success was a military coup. The still inchoate institutional structure after the transition to the presidential system, the elimination of parliament's auditing powers and judicial independence, and, most notably, the severe ethnic, sectarian, and political polarization, which might potentially evolve into violent conflict, may again drive the army to take the initiative. Second, the curtailment of legislative power may strengthen extra-parliamentary opposition. This may increase the potential for a civil war–like situation, as in the 1970s.

Finally, the impact of the ongoing economic crises on the future of AKP rule needs to be discussed. As shown, the AKP's economic performance is strongly correlated with its electoral record. This means that, under deteriorating economic conditions, the local elections in March 2019 will witness a tight race between the AKP and the opposition parties. The dramatic decline in the vote shares of the "People's Alliance"[142] may potentially lead to snap elections, which may change the balance of power between the incumbent and the opposition.

The economic crisis, if it deepens, may have severe repercussions on the future of the clientelist machine as well. First, it would weaken the ties between private business and the party leadership, who is politically responsible. This development would reduce clientelist resources obtained in the form of bribes and tax. Second, as the problem-solving capacity of the social state diminishes due to shrinking public

[142] With the change in law before the June 2018 legislative elections, the parties are permitted to form an alliance in elections. This led to the formation of the "People's Alliance," which includes the AKP and the MHP, and the "Nation's Alliance," which includes the CHP, the İyi Party, and the Felicity Party.

resources, clientelism will be more vital in fulfilling this role. Third, neoliberalism will continue to shape clientelism if the government intensifies its neoliberal policies to try to overcome the crisis. Fourth, as public and private resources become more scarce, clientelism will reach fewer people and thus become more exclusive. In this case, the first group to be sacrificed will be the swing voters, who have a decisive influence in local elections, especially in metropolitan areas. Finally, as material resources shrink, the non-material component of clientelism, Islamic ideology, will slowly turn into a substitute for material benefits rather being complementary to it. Increasing investment in Imam Hatip schools and Quran courses is the clearest indication of this trend.

APPENDIX I: Interview guide

Introduction	▪ How long have you been living in Bağcılar?
AKP	▪ How many times have you voted for the AKP? ▪ Have you ever voted for another party? ▪ Which party and why?
Form of integration in clientelistic networks	▪ Are you aware of the material benefits distributed by the government and the pro-AKP actors? ▪ Have you received any benefits so far? ▪ If yes, what, when and how much? ▪ Is there any mediator that secures your access to goods? ▪ When deciding on which party to vote for, how important is the distribution of material benefits for you?

Partisan Identification	▪ What is your type of relationship to the AKP? (voter, member or partisan)
	  ▪ How has it changed in recent years?
	▪ How regularly do you take part in party activities?
	▪ How close do you feel to the AKP? (weak, moderate, strong)
	▪ Are you a sympathizer/member of any other religious or social group?
	▪ If the AKP's interest clashes with that of your mentioned group (religious group, regional-communal organization or civil society groups) which side would you take?
	  ▪ Why?

Ideology	▪ How do you define yourself politically? (e.g., left, right, conservative, nationalist) ▪ Have you observed any change in your political position during the AKP period? ▪ If yes, on which issues?

APPENDIX II: The list of interviews

Number	Gender	Date	Age	Homeland	Neighborhood	Islamic tradition?	Core or Swing?
Voters							
1	M	17.11.2017	24	Erzurum	Evren	Y	C
2	M	19.11.2017	62	Adıyaman	Evren	Y	C
3	M	21.11.2017	46	Hatay	Güneşli	N	C
4	M	23.11.2017	44	Gümüşhane	Evren	Y	C
5	F	28.11.2017	40	Kazakhistan	Bağlar	N	S
6	F	28.11.2017	23	Malatya	Hürriyet	N	S
7	F	1.12.2017	55	Siirt	Merkez	Y	C
8	F	1.12.2017	34	Kars	Hürriyet	N	S
9	F	5.12.2017	32	Bosna	Hürriyet	Y	C
10	F	5.12.2017	33	Ordu	Hürriyet	Y	C
11	M	9.12.2017	60	Trabzon	Merkez	N	C
12	M	9.12.2017	66	Adana	Merkez	Y	S
13	M	9.12.2017	42	Hatay	Fevzi Çakmak	Y	S
14	M	14.12.2017	20	Adıyaman	Evren	N	C
15	M	14.12.2017	24	Artvin	Bağcılar	Y	C
16	F	19.12.2017	37	Konya	Bağcılar	Y	C
17	F	19.12.2017	30	Ordu	Bağcılar	Y	S

18	F	19.12.2017	41	Ordu	Bağcılar	Y	C
19	M	3.01.2018	48	Diyarbakır	Demirkapı	Y	S
20	M	3.01.2018	53	Diyarbakır	Demirkapı	Y	C
21	M	3.01.2018	39	Siirt	Demirkapı	N	S
22	M	9.01.2018	32	Erzurum	Mahmutbey	Y	S
23	M	9.01.2018	26	Kastamonu	Mahmutbey	N	C
24	M	11.01.2018	59	İstanbul	Bağcılar	N	S
25	M	11.01.2018	70	İstanbul	Bağcılar	Y	C
26	M	11.01.2018	66	Samsun	Bağcılar	Y	C
27	M	16.01.2018	41	Ordu	Evren	N	C
28	F	16.01.2018	33	Çanakkale	Hürriyet	N	S
29	F	20.01.2018	39	Adıyaman	Evren	Y	C
30	F	20.01.2018	48	Diyarbakır	Güneşli	Y	S
31	F	20.01.2018	57	Sivas	Evren	Y	C
32	M	24.01.2018	33	İstanbul	Güneşli	N	S
33	M	24.01.2018	28	Tokat	Güneşli	N	S
34	M	27.01.2018	60	Ordu	Göztepe	Y	C
35	M	27.01.2018	65	Rize	Göztepe	Y	C
36	F	14.03.2018	38	Bingöl	Fevzi Çakmak	Y	S
37	F	14.03.2018	27	Bitlis	Fevzi Çakmak	Y	S
38	F	14.03.2018	38	Adıyaman	Göztepe	Y	C

39	M	20.03.2018	31	Adıyaman	Güneşli	Y	C
40	F	20.03.2018	22	İstanbul	Evren	N	S
41	F	20.03.2018	25	İstanbul	Evren	N	C
42	F	20.03.2018	34	Hatay	Evren	N	C
43	M	3.04.2018	52	Hatay	Mahmutbey	N	S
44	M	3.04.2018	32	Ordu	Mahmutbey	N	S
45	M	3.04.2018	34	Ordu	Mahmutbey	Y	C
Municipality							
46	F	17.11.2017	-	-	-	-	-
47	F	17.11.2017	-	-	-	-	-
48	M	17.11.2017	-	-	-	-	-
49	M	17.11.2017	-	-	-	-	-
50	M	17.11.2017	-	-	-	-	-
51	M	17.11.2017	-	-	-	-	-
52	M	17.11.2017	-	-	-	-	-
53	M	17.11.2017	-	-	-	-	-
54	M	17.11.2017	-	-	-	-	-
Party							
55	M	6.03.2018	-	-	-	-	-
56	M	6.03.2018	-	-	-	-	-
57	M	10.03.2018	-	-	-	-	-

58	M	10.03.2018	-	-	-	-	-
59	M	10.03.2018	-	-	-	-	-
Mukhtar							
60	M	20.11.2017[	-	-	-	-	-

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