Universität zu Köln

Guertler, Marc and Guertler, Oliver (2019). Promotion signaling, discrimination, and positive discrimination policies. Rand J. Econ., 50 (4). S. 1004 - 1028. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1756-2171

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Abstract

This article studies discrimination in a model in which promotions are used as signals of worker ability. The model can account for statistical and taste-based discrimination. In the short run, a positive discrimination policy is beneficial for workers in the middle of the ability distribution, because these workers are promoted if and only if the policy is in place. Instead, workers of either high or low ability suffer from the policy. In the long run, the policy benefits all targeted workers. The model can explain empirical findings about the effects of a gender quota on the boards of Norwegian companies.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Guertler, Marc UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Guertler, Oliver UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-126736
DOI:	10.1111/1756-2171.12303
Journal or Publication Title:	Rand J. Econ.
Volume:	50
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 1004 - 1028
Date:	2019
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1756-2171
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION; DYNAMIC-MODEL; EQUILIBRIUM; TOURNAMENTS; TURNOVER Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/12673