Universität zu Köln

Fochmann, Martin, Jahnke, Bjoern and Wagener, Andreas (2019). Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment. Scott. J. Polit. Econ., 66 (3). S. 434 - 459. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1467-9485

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Abstract

Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that 'the system' had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Fochmann, Martin UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Jahnke, Bjoern UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Wagener, Andreas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-137078
DOI:	10.1111/sjpe.12197
Journal or Publication Title:	Scott. J. Polit. Econ.
Volume:	66
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 434 - 459
Date:	2019
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1467-9485
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language SOCIAL TRUST; COOPERATION; CORRUPTION Multiple languages Economics; Political Science Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/13707