Boone, Jan ORCID: 0000-0002-0958-2444 and Schottmuüler, Christoph ORCID: 0000-0001-6059-1090 (2019). Do Health insures contract the best providers? Provider, Networks, Quality and Costs. Int. Econ. Rev., 60 (3). S. 1209 - 1248. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1468-2354

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Abstract

We provide a modeling framework to analyze selective contracting in the health-care sector. Two health-care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal provider quality through their choice of provider network. Selective contracting focuses on low-cost providers. Contracting both providers signals high quality. Market power reduces the scope for signaling, thereby leading to lower quality and inefficiency.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Boone, JanUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-0958-2444UNSPECIFIED
Schottmuüler, ChristophUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0001-6059-1090UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-145472
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12383
Journal or Publication Title: Int. Econ. Rev.
Volume: 60
Number: 3
Page Range: S. 1209 - 1248
Date: 2019
Publisher: WILEY
Place of Publication: HOBOKEN
ISSN: 1468-2354
Language: English
Faculty: Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions: Center of Excellence C-SEB
Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Microeconomics
Subjects: Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
MANAGED CARE; INSURANCE; COMPETITION; EQUILIBRIUM; INCENTIVES; MARKETS; DEMAND; PLANSMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/14547

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