Universität zu Köln

Irlenbusch, Bernd, Rilke, Rainer Michael ORCID: 0000-0001-8901-860X and Walkowitz, Gari (2019). Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency. Exp. Econ., 22 (2). S. 552 - 577. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-6938

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Abstract

We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods game setting. In a first experiment, we test whether exogenously determined feedback about a good example (i.e., the maximum contribution in a period) in contrast to a bad example (i.e., the minimum contribution in a period) induces higher contributions. We find that when the type of feedback is not transparent to the group members, good examples boost cooperation while bad examples hamper it. There is no difference when the type of feedback is transparent. In a second experiment, feedback is endogenously chosen by a group leader. The results show that a large majority of the group leaders count on the positive effect of providing a good example. This is true regardless whether they choose the feedback type to be transparent or non-transparent. Half of the group leaders make the type of feedback transparent. With endogenously chosen feedback about good examples no difference in contributions can be observed among transparent and non-transparent feedback selection. In both experiments feedback shapes subjects' beliefs. With exogenously chosen feedback, transparent feedback tends to reduce beliefs when good examples are provided as feedback and tends to increase beliefs in when bad examples are provided as feedback compared to the respective non-transparent cases. Our results shed new light on the design of feedback provision in public goods settings.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Irlenbusch, Bernd UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Rilke, Rainer Michael UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0001-8901-860X UNSPECIFIED Walkowitz, Gari UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-147213
DOI:	10.1007/s10683-018-9575-2
Journal or Publication Title:	Exp. Econ.
Volume:	22
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 552 - 577
Date:	2019
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-6938
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language CONDITIONAL COOPERATION; PUNISHMENT; BEHAVIOR; COMMUNICATION; DYNAMICS Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/14721