Universität zu Köln

Garcia-Segarra, Jaume ORCID: 0000-0002-3112-9275 and Gines-Vilar, Miguel (2019). Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems. J. Econ. Interact. Coord., 14 (1). S. 215 - 225. HEIDELBERG: SPRINGER HEIDELBERG. ISSN 1860-7128

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Abstract

Some bargaining solutions may remain unchanged under any extension of a bargaining set which does not affect the utopia point, despite the fact that there is room to improve the utility of at least one agent. We call this phenomenon the stagnation effect. A bargaining solution satisfies stagnation proofness if it does not suffer from the stagnation effect. We show that stagnation proofness is compatible with the restricted version of strong monotonicity (Thomson and Myerson in Int J Game Theory 9(1):37-49, 1980), weak Pareto optimality, and scale invariance. The four axioms together characterize the family of the bargaining solutions generated by strictly-increasing paths ending at the utopia point (SIPUP-solutions).

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Garcia-Segarra, Jaume UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-3112-9275 UNSPECIFIED Gines-Vilar, Miguel UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-155964
DOI:	10.1007/s11403-017-0212-5
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Interact. Coord.
Volume:	14
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 215 - 225
Date:	2019
Publisher:	SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
Place of Publication:	HEIDELBERG
ISSN:	1860-7128
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/15596