Cassar, Lea (2019). Job Mission as a Substitute for Monetary Incentives: Benefits and Limits. Manage. Sci., 65 (2). S. 896 - 913. CATONSVILLE: INFORMS. ISSN 1526-5501

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Many jobs are connected to a prosocial mission-namely, to a social purpose beyond profit maximization. I use three laboratory experiments to investigate if employers can use the mission to economize on monetary incentives. In my first experiment, I exogenously vary whether the agents' effort generates a donation to a charity of their choice (matched mission), generates a donation to a charity chosen by another subject (random mission), or generates no donation (no mission). I find that the mission, whether matched or random, increases effort compared to the no-mission condition. Consistent with the theory, nonmotivated principals exploit the agents' motivation by offering lower piece rates, whereas very motivated principals pay higher piece rates to boost the donation. I find no difference in the effort and piece rate between the matched- and random-mission conditions. In my second experiment, I use a selected pool of motivated subjects but still observe no difference between these two treatments. In my third experiment, I explore whether the effect of mission-matching may arise through gift exchange: principals decide between choosing the mission or delegating the choice to the agent. I do not find evidence that agents who are delegated the mission choice reciprocate with higher effort. These findings suggest that while a prosocial mission allows for economizing on monetary incentives, there are no further gains from increasing the quality of the mission-matching.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Cassar, LeaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-157664
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2903
Journal or Publication Title: Manage. Sci.
Volume: 65
Number: 2
Page Range: S. 896 - 913
Date: 2019
Publisher: INFORMS
Place of Publication: CATONSVILLE
ISSN: 1526-5501
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
IMPURE ALTRUISM; WARM GLOW; MOTIVATION; DONATIONS; CURRENCYMultiple languages
Management; Operations Research & Management ScienceMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/15766

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

Altmetric

Export

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item