Disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines.

An analysis of policy effect(iveness)
Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Frauke Kraas
Prof. Dr. Josef Nipper

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for Harald and Gesche
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1. Introduction

1.1 Context and key questions

This study is about disparities of poverty and wealth. Disparities have always existed between regions and people. It has been a conventional task for (national) governments to alleviate them. Alongside recent globalisation processes, people and space are pushed together towards increased interaction. As a result, differences and distances between people and regions seem to blur. Somewhat paradoxically, an all-embracing insecurity evolves at the same time; which in turn causes space and societies to further differentiate. In other words, differences and distances between people and regions, here disparities also increase (again).

Similarly, poverty and wealth turn into concepts that are more intricate. They are mobile positions as global liberalisation opens up opportunities to people and regions to advance their quality of life. However, the risk to ‘fall down the ladder’ is equally high as to ‘move up the ladder’. In fact, multi-facetted vulnerabilities and insecurities grow as much as opportunities for improvement arise. Consequently, regions and people must engage in a continuous struggle against poverty, and thereby are compelled to consider its numerous dimensions and risks.

In this context, the identification of disparities of poverty and wealth, on the one hand, and the agenda setting and implementation of governmental policy responses, on the other hand, become ever more complex and challenging. Scholars analytically (re)focus on the classic task of the (national) government to promote stability, security, and equality by reaching out to the peripheral regions, marginalised people, and most problematic issues of disparities of poverty and wealth. Yet nowadays, national government’s steering and outreach capabilities, firstly, are impeded by liberalised market forces, and secondly, face increasing competition by local government and governance initiatives between state, market, and societal stakeholders. This new setting, however, also bears chances for improved, complemented, and more effective governing by enabling state-society interactions and partnership. In fact, policymakers’ comparative power and capacities rather than formal political accountabilities determine the effect(iveness) of policy on disparities of poverty and wealth.

This study investigates how governmental policy intervention encounters and (re)produces disparities of poverty and wealth in the Republic of the Philippines. The Philippines are a particularly interesting case because, firstly, they are geographically and ethno-linguistically extraordinarily scattered and diverse, and therefore specifically prone to disparate development. Secondly, the country is assumed to be disproportionately exposed to global developments due to its historical links to the Malay, Melanesian, Arab, Chinese, Spanish (colonial power 1565-1898) and US American (colonial power 1898-1946) orbits. Thirdly, governmental policy-making in the Philippines has been decentralised since 1991, potentially
giving way to strengthened regional balance and improved policy outreach to the marginalised and peripheral.

More precisely, I analyse the multiple expressions of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines at inter- and intra-provincial scales, and then focus on the effect(iveness) of governmental policy targeting them. I aim at elaborating a theoretical framework and empirical answers to two research questions

I. **What features, patterns, and dynamics do disparities of poverty and wealth have in the Philippines?**

II. **How are these disparities of poverty and wealth (re)produced through governmental policy?**

I examine these ‘faces’ of disparities focussing on three aspects. Firstly, the emphasis is foremost on spatial disparities that point at the unequal incidence of poverty indicators among provinces, regions, municipalities, and/or the rural-urban scale (Stiens 1997: 11-12; 22-24; Sommers & Mehretu 1998: 140-141). Secondly, this study focuses on disparities of poverty and wealth and it follows that “if there are major differences in the quality of life between different people or groups [or spaces] within a single society, one can speak of disparities” (ESCAP 2001: 5; note by A.C.). This implies, thirdly, that spatial disparities of poverty and wealth always cohort people-related imbalances in spatial aggregates of provinces and regions. In other words, “…spatial disparities are spatially structured social imbalances” (Grundmann 2002: 1; compare Urry 1995: 71). Fourthly, disparities of poverty and wealth do not only stretch across ‘spatial matrixes’. They may also stem from social structures such as class, gender, ethnicity, religion, etc., and are then termed social inequality (Johnston et al 2000: 389). Social inequalities are only considered in this study when interacting and/or related to spatial disparities.
1.2 Objectives, structure, and organisation of the study

Key question I of this study deals with disparities mainly as spatial, territorial structures and undertakes a form of ‘earth-writing’ – and thus points to traditional geography in its Greek meaning. Hence, the first objective of this study is

To identify the geographical manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines.

Disparities (as well as poverty) usually carry a negative connotation, are multi-perspective, highly contentious, yet popular issues in academia, politics, and the public alike, which are difficult to grasp analytically (compare for example the dissimilar approaches by Sen 1992; Solimano 2000; Smith 1999; Diez 2003; Sibley 1995; Bathelt & Taylor 2002; Birdsall 1998).

The first reason for why disparities (of poverty) have “such a prevailing presence in the literature is because it [they] can be conceived of in so many overlapping ways, from the culture and politics of social exclusion through to the economics of lagging region” (Rigg 2003: 89; note by A.C.). Secondly, socio-spatial transformations alongside globalisation have extended the topic’s multi-dimensions and multi-scales. Thirdly, debates on disparities and on poverty both trail the discourse on even more controversial development processes (ESCAP 2001; Thiel 2001). Fourthly, the Philippines’ status as developing country and related limitations in data resources further complicate the acquisition of an encompassing understanding of its disparities of poverty and wealth.

Such complexity necessitates this study to examine the meanings and problems spatial disparities of poverty (in the Philippines) encompass and to arrange them into an analytical and operative framework. Thereby I connect and mark off the concepts of disparities and poverty with neighbouring and overlapping concepts denoted by terms of ‘differentiation’, ‘distance-proximity’, ‘boundary’, ‘fragmentation’, ‘centre-periphery-relation’, ‘marginal(ity)-elite’, ‘exclusion-inclusion’, ‘(in)equality’, and ‘development’. I organise and combine analytical approaches of various academic disciplines including Development Geography, Political Geography, Social Geography, Regional Studies, Development Studies, Sociology, Ethnography, Social Anthropology, and Politics. Such interdisciplinary analysis corresponds with the general turn in Human Geography towards working in the spaces between theories and sciences (see Aufhauser & Wohlschlägl 1997).

In the Philippines societal and political transformation is characterised by a focus on persons and rhetoric rather than ideologies and programmes (see McCoy 2002; Mulder 1999; Coronel et al 2004). This setting suggests withdrawing from an emphasis on the ideological standpoints that run through the majority of discourses on disparities. Therefore, this study uses publications from various ideological corners in order to elaborate a comprehensive analytical framework meeting the Philippine environment.
In contrast to the ‘earth-writing’ structures highlighted by key question I, key question II more strongly considers human agency – or traditional ethnographies in terms of the Greek 'people-writing' – which contemporary streams of Human Geography have incorporated since the cultural turn of the discipline in the 1990s (Cloke et al 2004: 189-200).

I specifically presume that “policy can make a difference” (CASE 2002) upon the state of disparities of poverty and wealth. In other words, when disparities of poverty and wealth prevail or deteriorate despite operating policy schemes this may indicate a policy failure or mislead. At the same time any assessment of specific policy approaches requires the knowledge of how poverty is concentrated geographically, socially, and sectorally (i.e. key question I; Smith 1999: 5). Figure 1.1 schematically relates these two major themes in focus.

Figure 1.1: Simplified scheme of the study’s analytical foundation

Accordingly, the second objective of the study relating to key question II asks

**To explain and understand the effect(iveness) of (governmental) policy intervention upon disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines.**

In other words, I analyse the power geographies of government’s policy-making for their impact on disparate developments. Thereby I neither intend to give an encompassing overview on the effect(iveness) of selected policy approaches nor to discuss tested policy models that may possibly be appropriate for the Philippine setting. Instead, I aim at illuminating typical features, and particularly those impediments and constraints that prevent policy and policy-making upon disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines from being effective. Implicitly prospects for transformative governmental policy are analysed, that means policies, which build on closer state-society interactions and stakeholder partnership – rather than old-established governmental political hierarchy – to bridge Filipinos’ differences and diversity, and steer them towards a more balanced development.

Vitally, this study considers (policy of) disparities of poverty from a situation-, context-, and place-sensitive perspective. The analysis *inter alia* refers to typical Filipino socio-culture that has evolved throughout history. It ought to be noted that most of the traits that are internationally cited as ‘typical’ Filipino refer to the lowland Christian-educated, Tagalog-speaking Malay-Filipino majority in the country (and even they are far from being a
homogenous group, compare chapter 5.1). Because this study is dependent on the literature, it similarly discusses the majority’s socio-culture, however points out to minority cultures where possible and relevant (see chapter 9.1; below). Generally, I do not envisage to illustrate Philippine sociology, but rather assume socio-culture to constitute a framework in which disparity production and policy-making are embedded, and which characteristically enable, constrain, prevail, or alter state-society interactions in policy-making (see Schweizer 1999: 17-20). In addition, this approach guarantees the relevance of my research to Filipinos themselves (see Strubelt 1997: 5).

This study then provides insights into broader developmental problems and prospects in the Philippines through a policy lens. This task becomes even more crucial given the country’s enduring developing status – and turns more interesting when considering that in the early post-colonial period (after 1946) the Philippines used to be among the socio-economically most developed countries in Southeast Asia (see Hutchcroft 1998). Besides, by the means of this approach the study meets the call for a profound turn and re-orientation in Human Geography towards policy-led research on disparities and poverty (see Martin 2001; Dorling & Shaw 2002).

A key to the identification (and alleviation) of disparities is the chosen unit and scale of analysis, as illustrated in table 1.1 (compare Bigman & Deichmann 2000: 52-60; Tunstall & Lupton 2003: 17-25). This study concentrates on the provincial scale to analyse spatial disparities as well as respective policy. The national, regional, municipal, and local (barangay and purok) scales are organised around the provincial focus and occasionally used as supplements when contextually reasonable. The choice of the provincial scale is most appropriate, because, firstly, it is the level on which the highest aggregated data are available for all 79 Philippine provinces. Secondly, the decentralisation process since 1991 has made provinces the largest local government units and, therefore, the meso-level that specifically interacts and channels national and local policy. Thirdly, given the diversity of Philippine regions and people, a comprehensive in-depth analysis of the entire Republic would exceed the scope of this study. Therefore, I conduct a case study on the island province of Bohol set in its decentralised policy framework to answer key question II.

The analysis of key question I takes an integrative approach, considers manifold manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth, and seeks to identify crucial factors of their production in the Philippines. As for key question II not all of these factors can be examined. Therefore, three specific and selected policy fields are chosen as ‘subclasses’. The choice is based on findings from key question I. These subclasses, like the entire case study, provide an ideal channel for a focussed, precise, and well-contextualised investigation on explanatory factors for a multi-facetted phenomenon such as the production of disparities (compare Yin 2003; George & Bennet 2005). Clearly, the findings on Bohol are not
necessarily representative for the entire Philippines. Comparative assessments are supported and facilitated by field research findings in Cebu province and Metropolitan Manila, expert interviews, and an intensive literature review. It is attempted to provide tentative insights into certain socio-political dynamics, which may, to some extent, exist and operate similarly in other regions of the country (compare approach by George 1998; chapter 4.1).

Emphasis is put on the present day situation reviewed against processes of change mainly since the mid 1980s – the date of both, the political birth of Philippine democracy and the strong upheaval of globalisation. If necessary for a comprehensive understanding I also draw back on earlier developments in Philippine history. Table 1.1 summarises and provides an overview of the organisational structure of this study.

**Table 1.1: Organisation of research study**

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2. Disparities of poverty and wealth: Theoretical faces

2.1 From disparities to differentiation: Introducing analytical multi-dimensions

‘Disparities’ are an academic subject with multiple analytical perspectives. This chapter aims at presenting and arranging these perspectives into an operational framework. Firstly, from the ‘earth-writing’ perspective I perceive disparities as the momentary ‘snapshots’ of structural imbalances that can be depicted geographically. Disparities describe dispersely distributional patterns, which may appear in isolated or associated forms with different and changing intensities. They produce patterns and trends, and can be projected on the earth surface (compare cartographic visualisation in chapters 5, 6, 7). Therefore,

“It is possible to think of uneven development simply in terms of […] income levels, in unemployment, in cultural resources – between different regions or communities. […] And such measures of the geographical inequalities within and between countries are certainly important (Massey & Jess 1995: 224).

Simultaneously and secondly, disparities are dynamics, which in fact combine description and analysis, structure and agency. I comprehend spatial (social) disparities as the central elements of the process of spatial (social) differentiation. Differentiation is, generally speaking, defined as becoming (mutually) distant, complex, and separate into independent entities (Nassehi 1997: 619). Spatial (social) differentiation, specifically, means the progressive division of space (society) into separate entities, which may occur and interact at global, national, regional, provincial, local, rural-urban, or else scales. Spatial (social) disparities, like space (society), are inherently dynamic and alterable. They remain in the process of ‘becoming’, being constantly re-produced, corresponding to social, contextual, and spatial contexts (Paasi 1996: 3, 7-15). Disparities are a product of ‘people-writing’, here human agency and interactions. I prioritise the explanation and understanding of disparities of poverty (in the Philippines) through policy agency – see chapters 1 and 3 for reasoning. Thus, disparities always evolve out of historical differentiation; they are ‘path-dependent’ (see Miggelbrink 2002: 62-65). This implies, thirdly, that disparities themselves often provide the sources for further differentiation and fragmentation (see chapters 3.1, 8).

Fourthly, disparities are no ‘objective’ notion. The relative cognition of imbalances between spaces and/or people is a prerequisite for the awareness (and image) of – in the case at hand – a ‘poorer’ or ‘wealthier’ status (Romanowski 1998: 74; ESCAP 2001: 4-5; Schmidt 1998: 58). Such comparisons are enabled above all through the ‘global’ media and migrants who distribute information about and imaginations of strange orbits. Through such representative ‘windows’ into the world, Filipinos realise their own more deprived or more privileged living situation, and the developmental gap between them and others. The same processes work at international as well as sub-national scales (compare Appadurai 1996: 3; 1998: 21). Literally,
disparities present manifestations of socio-spatial consciousness (Paasi 1995: 43). Such socio-spatial consciousness changes with the channel of social construction—as subsequent chapters elaborate—for example, differ between (a) illustrations of quantified data projected into figures and maps, (b) ‘subjectives’ created by local people, (c) public opinions as conveyed through civil society or political processes, and (d) various academic perspectives (compare Strubelt 1997: 7). However, socio-spatial consciousness is naturally shaped in socio-cultural and political-economic contexts, and, therefore, takes on heterogeneous and contentious forms. As such, for example, map illustrations of disparities always communicate the viewpoints, motives, and targets of those who have profiled them (see chapter 4; Deichmann 1998: 103).

In summary, disparities are simultaneously (a) material ‘earth-structural imbalances’, (b) the product of people’s (policy) agency, (c) the source of fragmentation, and (d) politically and socio-culturally covered, interpreted and imagined constructs (compare Bohle 2004: 22; Massey 2003: 32-36; Gebhardt, Reuber, Wolkersdorfer 2003: 21; Läpple 1991: 41-43).

Hence, this study analyses and relates the manifestations of disparities in territorial as well as in social space. I emphasise the analytical perspectives (a) and (b), as shown in figure 2.1, and consider and incorporate (c) and (d) where relevant.

**Figure 2.1: Analytical multi-perspectives on disparities**

![Image of a diagram showing analytical multi-perspectives on disparities.](image_url)
2.2 Relational distribution of proximity and distance

2.2.1 Spatial disparity and social inequality

As mentioned in chapter 1.1, spatial disparities (of poverty and wealth) refer to the unequal geographic incidence of (poverty) indicators among provinces, regions, municipalities, the rural-urban or else scale. As noted, disparities also exist in form of ‘inequalities’ since any “distribution is also, of course, structural, for individuals are born into pre-existing positions in a social and economic hierarchy and the structures they will enter will significantly shape their future lives” (Phillips 1999: 17). Generally, in this study social inequalities are only considered when interacting to spatial disparities. They do not necessarily correspond, however often do so. For example, Ricketts (2002: 11) finds evidence that populations, which are underserved by public health services, are usually located at a greater physical distance from the (often urban) headquarters of service delivery. Intrinsically, there is “… a certain reciprocity between ‘the social’ and ‘the spatial’ – while we in a spatial discipline accepted that the spatial was always socially constructed so too, we argued, it had to be recognized that the social was necessarily also spatially constructed” (Massey, Allen, Sarre 1999: 6; compare Mehretu, Pigozzi, Sommers 2000: 96-98).

Disparities of poverty and wealth create a parameter from the region\(^1\) or people/social group with the lowest indicator of poverty/wealth to the region or people/social group with the highest indicator. The remaining regions or people/groups are positioned in-between the two extremes (compare Romanowski 1998: 67). Clearly, the greater the distance between the two ‘ends’ of the parameter is, the more heterogeneous the regions/people with regard to poverty and wealth are, hence the deeper is the level of disparity and vice versa (Bathelt & Glückler 2002: 48-50). The depth of distance is, as mentioned above, also relative to social cognition and construction. Hence, disparities refer essentially to the relative relationship of distance and proximity between the poor(er) and wealth(ier) spaces and people/social groups under investigation (compare Steinbach 2004: 27-29).

Obviously, the issue of inequality is more likely to pose moral questions about ‘right’, ‘wrong’ and ‘what is just’. The moral, philosophical, and ideological values and motives of those who advance them are rather difficult to disentangle. In other words: “The idea of equality is perhaps the defining feature of modern political thought […] Nevertheless, few political principles are as contentious as equality, or polarizes opinion so effectively” (Heywood 2004: 284). For reasons of the Philippine context as noted in chapter 1 this study is situated at the intersection points of ideologies, and discusses only selected moral motives within the framework of spatial disparities and of relevance for the Philippine case.

\(^1\) In the theoretical chapters I use the term ‘region’ more broadly as a synonym for any sub-national spatial unit between the local and the national. Only in the empirical chapters I, as noted in chapter 1, specify to examine spatial disparities between Philippine political and administrative provinces, regions, and municipalities.
2.2.2 Consequences: Boundaries in space and society

As the relative distances between regions and people grow, fragmentation into ‘wealthier centres of power’ and ‘weak, poorer peripheries’, and into ‘socially marginalised’ and ‘social elite’ groups may occur. In other words, the distances in space and society may evolve into more clear-cut – material and/or conceived – boundaries in space and society. These boundaries may correspond with (but can also cross) already existing natural-environmental, social, cultural, political, economic, or else boundaries (Paasi 1995: 49-52; see chapters 5, 6, and 7).

For example, peripheral regions are said to suffer from ‘the poverty of remoteness’ (Rigg 2003: 122-125). The boundary of peripheries is identified by poverty due to isolation from the main centres of economic activity and political decision-making, and due to remote and/or disadvantageous natural-environmental location including lack of infrastructure, water scarcity, steep slopes, or rough terrain (compare Parnwell and Rigg 1996; Sommers & Mehretu 1998). Mountainous areas are often characterised as peripheries for they face related problems such as difficult accessibility, extensive (agricultural) economies, out-migration, scarce resources, and rough natural conditions (compare the Philippine case in chapters 6, 7).

Similarly, “generic marginality is a condition of a community […] that has been adversely affected by uneven development” (Sommers & Mehretu 1998: 136). Specifically, marginal people lack integration and participation in the dominating (social, economic, political) structures and processes, generating a feeling – and a boundary – of non-belonging to the political, economic, and socio-cultural centres of decision-making (Schmidt 1998: 49,59; Tesitel, Kusova, Bartos 1999: 40; Leimgruber 1998: 27). Logically, the vulnerability to marginalisation is larger for those people that are already at the bottom end of the disparity range, in the case at hand, the very poor (Romanowski 1998; Böhnke 2001).

At the upper ends of the social disparity range, some groups may dispose of disproportionately more resources, and eventually become outstanding social elites. This study deals with elites only as a consequence and mean of the production of social disparities; I do not discuss extensive elite theory in detail. Important however, social elites often represent the political and socially powerful and governing elite, which resides in – and in fact contributes essentially to the status of – the centres of power (compare Sauer 2000: 63-64). This implies that any analysis of disparity production should consider the impact of elites. In this context Das (2000) and the World Bank (2003) highlight issues of elites’ inherent societal

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2 Other scholars relate the concepts differently or not at all (see Böhnke 2001; Sommers & Mehretu 1998; Smith 1999; Tunstall & Lupton 2003).
3 Note that the authors apply the term marginality to social groups as well as to space. In order to keep a consistent theoretical framework I use it only in its social reference.
4 See Bellamy (2004) for further reference.
responsibility to engage in the alleviation of disparities of poverty and wealth – which, however, often remains unmet.

In case a region or a social group are entirely incapable of or denied access, membership and/or participation to political, economic, and socio-cultural systems, they are called ‘excluded’\(^5\). ‘Exclusion’ draws a sharper boundary between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ than peripherality or marginality. However, I reject an extremely polarising understanding of exclusion. Those ‘excluded’ usually still belong (at least formally) to the society in one way or another because disparities – in their nature of being parameters of distances – are not just gaps but literally represent ‘gaps in connections’. In other words, ‘distance demands communication and interaction. Its very possibility depends on communication or interaction. It depends on joining things up within – and thereby making – a single space’ (Law 2003: 6). Therefore I ascribe exclusion as a possible consequence of disparities in form of progressive accumulation of boundaries instead of a final ‘out-stage’. The above quote’s emphasis on ‘interaction to make a single space’ again highlights the role of human action upon relations of distance and proximity, centre and periphery, marginalised and elites, and socio-spatial exclusion (see Massey & Jess 1995: 225).

2.2.3 Re-organisation of space, scale, and society through globalisation

Globalisation is claimed to be one major force behind contemporary socio-spatial development (Reuber & Wolkersdorfer 2001: 1). I introduce it briefly here and elaborate individual issues in subsequent chapters. Globalisation is generally defined as the worldwide increasing networking that takes place simultaneously at various levels and dimensions. Most importantly it jeopardises the traditional understanding (a) of space as the ‘container’ of territoriality and social actions, (b) of scale, and (c) implicitly of social (including policy) actions in space and scale. Thereby, globalisation sheds new light on the subject of disparities.

Forwarded by progressing information and communication technology (ICT) since the 1980s, globalisation implies the detachment of socio-economic contexts from their traditional localised settings and reinforces interactions between economies, cultures, and societies. ‘The global’ influences formerly purely national, regional, and local issues, which, in turn, are redefined according to global contexts. Comparisons, interactions, and competition between scales increase (see chapter 3.3; Clausen 2001; Beck 2000; Robertson 1998).

Thus, globalisation means compression of space, time, scales, and people – the so-called process of deterritorialisation. The very distant becomes proximate and the very proximate

\(^5\) The present study does not intend to give an overview on the extensive topic of exclusion but to introduce the concept as related to disparities. The major schools elaborating the concept of exclusion are (a) sociological poverty and inequality research, (b) system theory, and (c) policy-related analyses. Not even within these schools definitions are clearly set; see Göbel & Schmidt (1998), Stichweh (1997), Böhne (2001), Kronauer (1998); Askonas & Stewart (2000); CASE (2002).
becomes distant. As a result, differences and distances between people and regions seem to blur and homogeneity seems to spread. Somewhat paradoxically, at the same time spatial and social differentiation, fragmentation and exclusion take place more rapidly, condensed, and alterably. An all-embracing insecurity evolves which in turn causes space and societies to further differentiate. In other words, differences and distances between people and regions, here disparities, increase (again) (see Appadurai 1996; Giegel 1998; see chapter 3.3 for impacts of globalisation on policy-making settings).

More precisely, globalisation tends to operate spatially selective in favour of large agglomerations (like Metropolitan Manila in the Philippines) and, thereby, reshapes and reinforces centre-periphery relations. Cities become the major locations of competition between the global, the national, and the local as they represent the junctions and political controlling centres of globalisation streams and offer the required infrastructure and global connections (Sassen 2002: 15-17). In contrast, rural regions are often neglected by globalisation, and their peripheral status and exclusion are deteriorated or introduced (Scholz 2004: 216-253).

In analysis one always has to consider that ‘the’ globalisation process is commonly applied to almost every contested contemporary issue and is sometimes (arguably) merged with other, overlapping debates. It however also ought to be noted that globalisation is only one, yet surely an important historical period to shape disparate developments (compare Clausen 2001). Disparities represent the condensed layering of past, present and future configurations of multi-facetted and multi-contextual spatial and social relations.

Globalisation also has an explicit consequence for research, including this study: The forces of globalisation operate similarly (if with different outcomes depending on different pre-conditions) in industrialised and developing countries like the Philippines. Therefore, academic approaches to its impact on (disparate) development overcome the gap, which has long existed between those theories focussing industrialised and those exclusively referring to less advanced countries. In other words, academic concepts on relations between globalisation and disparities turn ‘global’.
2.3 Indicators for disparities of poverty and wealth

2.3.1 The disparity – poverty nexus

Poverty and disparities are not identical concepts. Public and academic circles sometimes tend to reduce disparities to the ‘poor’ and/or the ‘rich’ regions and/or people (compare Weller & Hersh 2002). However, disparities point to differences in the quality of life between different regions (people) and, as mentioned, create a parameter between those regions (people) that are worst and best off. Poor (or wealthy) regions or people, in contrast, literally represent distinct positions on, but never the whole parameter of disparity.

Similar to disparities, the concepts of poverty and wealth have become more complex alongside globalisation. They are now more mobile positions in flux, and the chances for regions and people to ‘move up’ the ‘quality ladder of life’ are equally high as the risk to ‘fall down’. Regions and people must engage in a continuous struggle against poverty and are compelled to constantly consider its numerous dimensions, risks, and their interrelations (compare discourse on vulnerability and poverty; Alwang, Sigel, Jorgensen 2002). Such situation also complicates the analytical identification of (disparities of) poverty in this study.

Accurate, relevant, and reliable indicators for poverty faces of disparities (in the Philippines) are essential information for appropriately responsive and targeted policy-making; the methodology of data generation considerably affects resulting quality of data (and possibly policy) (Tunstall & Lupton 2003: 25-26, 32; EU-Directorate General for Research 1998: 9-11; NEDA 2001: 240). There are more practically used indicators to identify the poor than there are to explore the gaps between the poor and the wealthy. Often, disparities are detected by comparing poverty indicators between different regions or population groups (compare Green 1994).

As a direct indicator of poverty, absolute poverty is defined as non-fulfilment of basic bodily needs or subsistence in terms of nutrition (inadequate minimum daily calorie intake and the per capita income to spend on it), clothing, or housing. Analyses from an absolute poverty perspective focus on poverty incidence. In contrast the concept of “relative poverty means that people lack the resources to live a life that their society considers adequate” (ESCAP 2001: 4). For it incorporates a comparative aspect, the concept of relative poverty stands closer to the analysis of disparities. Relative poverty lines are typically set at a certain cut-off point of income/consumption/nutrition intake, derived from comparing lower and upper segments of society. Consequently, lines of relative poverty (and thus the disparate patterns they form) reflect local conditions and living standards of the people/region under investigation. They differ from region to region, community to community, and from time to time – and pose a difficult definition task to their technical developers (Mia 2001: 5-7;
Gwatkin 2000: 6-8; Bigg & Satterthwaite 2005: 23-24). Investigations on relative poverty are more likely to stress the depth of poverty besides its incidence.

**Developmental problems and prospects**

The debates on disparities and poverty both follow the more general discourse on the theory and practice of development – which, in turn, “is one of the most complex words” (Johnston et al. 2000: 166; see Thiel 2001) and discussed controversially. Disparities are the markers of development which do not benefit all areas and people equally, whereas poverty is claimed to result from underdevelopment that is the inadequate capability of societies to provide their population with the basic requirements of goods and services. However, ‘equal development’ is difficult to define in a meaningful way because geographical location, morphology, natural and environmental conditions, city system, and to some extent, ethno-linguistics always lay a base for social and spatial imbalances. They can be altered by human agency only in the long run (Finke 1997: 30-31; ESCAP 2001: 8-11; Bigman & Fofack 2000: 1-3; Schmidt 1998: 47).

Generally, ‘the poor’ are assumed to pose greater developmental problems than ‘the wealthy’. This study intends to provide theoretical and empirical insights into (obstacles to effective policy for) developmental problems and prospects in the Philippines. Accordingly, I highlight the issue of poverty over wealth – with the mentioned exception of wealthy elites’ responsibility for engagement in the alleviation of disparities and poverty.

**2.3.2 Identification paths of the poor**

Indirect indicators define the poor and thus disparities between the poor and wealthy through (a) the fundamental differentiation as elaborated in chapter 2.3.1 and, primarily, through (b) various dimensions of human agency. One major discourse among scholars (and policymakers) exists on whether to approach disparities of poverty and wealth one-dimensionally as a mainly economic phenomenon and process, or by integrating economic, social, cultural, connective, political and else perspectives (Maier & Tödtling 2002: 19-24; Thiel 2001: 30-32; Schmidt 1998: 53-59). Conventional approaches since the 1960s have preferred a one-dimensional economic perspective. Integrative indicators have strongly entered the poverty discourse since the late 1980s. They may involve so-called ‘objective’, quantitatively measurable variables – a popular example being the Human Development Index (HDI) composed of life expectancy at birth, educational attainment, and adjusted measure of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita – as well as self-assessed, ‘subjective’ indicators by the people concerned. For example, poverty may be defined qualitatively by indicators of vulnerability, powerlessness, stability, regularity of employment, dependency, food deficit,

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6 I do not argue geo-deterministically here but simply presume that certain topographical and environmental features pre-condition certain economic and social characteristics of the region and its inhabitants’ livelihood.
housing situation, or household relations (Rigg 2003; Civit, de Manchon, de Villanueva 1999).

For the study at hand I assume that “poverty has been the major problem confronting the Philippines for decades. Thus, various administrations have declared the fight against poverty as the centrepiece of their development agenda” (DILG et al 2002: 1) – however so far have not found effective and sustainable policy responses, because, generally, “poverty has a thousand faces and generates a thousand policy responses, all of them least than perfect” (Cunha 1999: 38). Therefore, I call for an integrative and explorative approach in order to grasp and understand the multi-dimensional manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines – and later identify the obstacles to effective policy interventions for the most crucial factors (see chapter 8; Umehara & Bautista 2004: 5).

Through the lens of current globalisation economic aspects of disparities of poverty are not to be neglected. They can be, among others, assumed to offer an interesting insight into the interactions between liberalised market forces and political control (see chapters 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). In addition, the combined deductive-inductive research in the Philippines (chapters 6 and 7 mainly) suggests the present study to understand disparities of poverty and wealth (in the Philippine setting) to be inherently economic, yet not exclusively: Every economic process has a social notion and roots in a political and cultural context. This is in fact especially true in times of globalisation when the economic, social, and political spheres increasingly blend and interact. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the relevant indicators and analytical themes, which are chosen by the deductive-inductive research design as elaborated in chapter 4.

Table 2.1: Indicators for the identification of disparities of poverty and wealth

| Direct measurement: Absolute and relative poverty |
|-------------------------------------------------
| Indirect measurement: Integrative approach       |
| Economic                                        |
| Income vs labour                                |
| Competitive sectors                             |
| Social                                          |
| Education & Health                              |
| Population & Migration                          |
| Connective                                      |
| Infrastructure                                  |
| Technology                                      |
| Policy-making*                                  |
| Globalisation                                   |
| Spatial relations                               |
| Rural-urban interactions                        |
| City system                                     |
| Ethno-linguistics & Socio-culture               |
| Morphology & Resources & Environment            |

*dealt with in chapter 3  
Clausen 2005
Income, labour, and economic sectors in times of globalisation

Income and labour are ‘the’ classic factors of production and typically applied to discern disparate developments of poverty and wealth, and to target alleviation policy. For instance, the income-based Gini-coefficient is a popular statistical indicator on disparities (for income-focussed analysis see Kakwani, Prakash, Son 2000; Weller & Hersh 2002; Person & Tabellini 1994; Sala-i-Martin 2002; Li & Zou 1998; Chakrabarty 2002; for labour focus see Elmhirts & Saptari 2004; Smith 1999; Böhnke 2001; Bhalla & Lapeyre 1997).

Both, income and labour have been highlighted by economic globalisation, which comprises increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) and world trade, the global integration of capital markets, and an expanding international division of labour. Economic globalisation pushes neo-liberal capital-based development, which is, on the one hand, claimed to work as a catalyst for poorer people and regions to catch up with and balance development. Specifically, production sites are relocated to cheaper, less developed sites, export-oriented markets are enlarged, employment is created, and technologies transferred (Bürklin 2000: 31-35, 38; Gundlach & Nunnenkamp 1996: 36-38; also Dollar & Kraay 2002; Nunnenkamp 1998). On the other hand, constraint-free neo-liberal market principles reduce political intervention and thus social protection, and turn labour markets, income relations, and economic sectors ever more competitive and volatile. Employment becomes uncertain and temporal; the responsibilities for socio-economic security, socio-spatial development, and balance are shifted to the individual (Dore 2003; Ashley, Boyd, Goodwin 2000).

Parallel, economic sectors transform through globalisation. Specifically, the future of agriculture – the traditional economic base of most developing countries like the Philippines – is uncertain because globalisation tends to operate sectorally selective to the advantage of services and industries, and to the detriment of agriculture (Clausen 2002; forthcoming B). In turn, particularly tourism as the ‘largest global industry’ receives more attention. Globalisation enables many developing countries including the Philippines to emerge as popular newcomer destinations. Consequent economic impacts of tourism can include (a) wages earned from formal employment, (b) earnings from (informally) selling goods, services, and casual labour (c) profits arising from locally-owned (often small and medium-sized) businesses (SMEs), and (d) collective income through land rental pay or dividends from a private sector partnership etc. (Ashley, Boyd, Goodwin 2000). Moreover, it is hoped that “although tourism is closely linked to the travel and hospitality trade, it is more than merely a major economic activity. It is a powerful environmental, social, cultural, and institutional force” (Poh Poh 2003: 409), which can potentially become a development catalyst specifically for the peripheral and marginalised (Scheyvens 2002).
**Human resource development and education**

Human resource development has long been a prime theme in (disparate) development. Especially education is valued to generate positive impacts on economic production, levels of fertility, health status, and attitudes towards political participation (UN 2003; Case 2001). Education provides income and employment opportunities for the peripheral and marginalised. Basically, education is a means to knowledge which, in turn, entails innovation, qualification, and the efficient distribution of information – as such the starting point of any socio-economic development.

**Health-related human resources**

Health is another ‘traditional’ human resource, which, like education is affected by human agency, however also depends on individual bodily conditions. Usually, disparities of health are either looked at in terms of health status (mortality, diseases etc.), health outcome, or service delivery. Generally, research has shown that “*increasing inequalities in health [...] are associated with widening social and material disparities between the wealthiest and the poorest areas* (Hayes 1999: 290). Hence, the greater the depth of disparities of poverty is, the greater the health inequalities, and vice versa (compare Gwatkin 2000: 6-10; Gatrell 1997: 142-151).

**Population and urbanisation**

High population growth exacerbates already existing socio-economic problems. Although population growth is an ‘old hat’ of the international discourse, it remains relevant in many developing countries like the Philippines (Jones 2005: 8). Often fertility is highest among the poorest people and in the peripheries – leading to large-scale out-migration of the economically active population towards ‘globalising’ centres. Large-scale urbanisation processes are the result, as well as growing gaps between ‘megacities’ with more than 5 million inhabitants like Metropolitan Manila on the one hand and peripheries with elderly and youngsters on the other hand. In many cases, the megacities struggle with an accumulation of so far unknown dimensions of quantitative extension and high concentration of population, infrastructure, economic power, financial capital, and decisions, whereas those in the peripheries face – if out-migration and urbanisation pertain – cumulative exclusionary processes (see Coy & Kraas 2003; Rigg 2003; Clausen forthcoming A).

**A note on culture and ethno-linguistics**

The ‘cultural turn’ in the Social Sciences has put new emphasis on the cultural and ethno-linguistic manifestations of inequality of poverty and wealth since the 1990s (Gebhardt, Reuber, Wolkersdorfer 2003; Bohle 2004). For example, Mehretu, Pigozzi and Sommers (2000: 92) argue that in developing countries ethno-cultural factors to marginality (and
peripherality) operate through (a) the polarisation of colonial and indigenous populations, and (b) internal tribal cleavages based on claims for self-determination. I also generally acknowledge, “where ethnic identities coincide with economic/social ones, social instability of one sort of another is likely – ethnicity does become a mobilising agent, and as this happens the ethnic divisions are enhances” (Stewart 2002: 33). However, some debates on ethno-cultural inflictions of conflicts miss out that the actual conflict base is often socio-economic in nature (Ehlers 1997).

In contrast to this conflict-focused view, Capella-Miternique & Font-Garolera (1999: 89-90 92-97) show that cultural links can help to correct spatial and social imbalances: A culturally-linked population shares a common identity, similar interests, and thus bears greater development potentials (compare chapter 3.1). Cultural-ethno-linguistic links are also involved when migrants send back remittances to their families and places of origin (Clausen 2001), and when communities do not turn uniformly ‘global’ through globalisation but instead widen their reference points and become ‘glocal’ without losing their local uniqueness (Robertson 1998).

Above and beyond certain, culture and ethno-linguistics always essentially affect the cognitive dimensions of disparities: Disparities essentially “refer to the extent to which culturally valued material and social rewards are allocated disproportionately” (Peoples & Bailey 1994: 301). Such perspective highlights once again the necessity to embed this study’s investigation in the context of Filipino’s socio-culture.

**Access, infrastructure, connectivity, and ‘the distance to care’**

One indicator which can positively affect all others is ‘access’ such as access to public goods, infrastructure and services like education, health, roads, electricity, and water facilities, access to labour, capital, credit, and technology markets or else (compare Bhalla & Lapeye 1997: 424-428). The ICT- ‘revolution’ has been claimed to particularly improve access(ibility) by potentially offering worldwide inexhaustibly available, easily and quickly accessible information and knowledge pools (compare Weel 1999). However, as technology enables development, it simultaneously bears risks for disparate development. Nath (2000) puts it strongly: “The info-technological revolution […] is restructuring the global social economic equations – shifting from income divide to knowledge divide”. This knowledge divide is related firstly, to people’s educational status, and secondly, to exclusionary processes of ‘gaps in connectivity’ or, as they are commonly called, digital divides.

In many developing countries like the Philippines, the access from and to the very remote and naturally disadvantaged regions still remains a question of adequate infrastructure and transport by roads and bridges, electricity, and else. Bigman & Fofack (2000: 3) point to “the critical role that distance – to and from the sources of raw materials, main transport routes,
seaports, and large population centers – plays in determining the division of production between industrial and primary-producing regions” (see also Scholz 2004; ESCAP 2001).

No matter which perspective is taken, issues of access always also relate to questions of legal and socio-cultural entitlements. In other words, access opens up material, imagined, and socially constructed modes for ‘re-connecting’ the peripheral and marginalised with the centres; it is a key for determining exclusionary processes (Böhnke 2001: 1). Logically, such ‘access(ibility)’ can be enhanced for the marginalised and peripheral also by increasing the ‘outreach’ from those in elite and central positions. For example, Ali & Pernia (2003) note that the effects of road construction on poverty alleviation are improved if complemented by governmental ‘outreach’ in terms of social service provision. Hence, access is also a matter of the “distance to care” (Ricketts 2002: 10), here specifically the distance between governmental services and the peripheral and marginalised. The subsequent chapter centres on this distance to care and related socio-political indicators.

To conclude, figure 2.2 schematically summarises how this study approaches and operationalises the identification of the manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines.

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7 These notions are connected with the development discourse on ‘ownership’ and Sen’s capability approach which are not to be elaborated in detail in this study. For further reference see Thiel (2001); D + C (2005); Sen (1992); Stewart & Deneulin (2002).
3. Policy intervention and disparity production

3.1 Disparities, politics, policy: Interrelations

3.1.1 Why do disparities matter politically?
Disparities and exclusionary processes between regions and people harm social and national cohesion. Social cohesion defines “the strength of social relations, shared values and communities of interpretation, feelings of a common identity and a sense of belonging to the same community, trust among societal members as well as the extent of inequality and disparities” (Berger-Schmitt 2000: 3). From a political perspective, such cohesion is fundamental to the ‘imagined communities of nationality’ (compare Anderson 2003). Disparities challenge such feelings of inclusion in a national community or a state. In developing countries formerly colonised countries like the Philippines, it has since independence typically been the task of the state government(s) to engage and achieve such building of a cohesive and inclusive nation and create homogeneity out of heterogeneity (see Horvatich 2003). Not only bears the successful accomplishment of this task important development impetus (see chapter 2.3.2), it is also seen as a crucial element to guaranteeing global competitiveness of a country and its people.

Growing disapproval with their marginal, peripheral and/or excluded situations may lead people to search for responsible actors to blame. The state government – as the classic agent of the vulnerable – is usually the first to be addressed. If the government does not manage (or care) to alter the situation, the people may support opposition movements for ‘redistributive and recognitive justice’ (Fraser 1998) and, possibly, inflict armed conflicts and/or civil wars (compare conflicts in Northern Ireland, Indonesia or Mexico; see Kraas 2004: 46-49). Alternatively, if the politically dominant belong to an ethnic or social group that is at the same time economically deprived, political instability may arise when government encroaches upon economically privileged (group) as it happened in the Rwanda and Uganda cases (Stewart 2002: 33-37). As a matter of fact the unequal distribution of socio-economic and political resources and of opportunities and rights represents the root causes for armed conflicts in developing countries (see chapters 5.2, 6.3, and 8; Lund & Mehler 1999: 47).

It is partially for those reasons that disparities usually carry a negative connotation, are a widely discussed matter of political discourse, and are usually targeted by policy aiming at their reduction or redistribution. Governments and administration in disparity-torn countries fear for their legitimacy and autonomy. Then, policy towards the deprived people and regions becomes vital not only in terms of reducing disparities of poverty and alleviating conflict, but also for the survival of the political actors, usually the government itself (Scott 1998: 13; Rigg 2003: 87).
3.1.2 Conceptualising disparities as a product of policy-making

This chapter elaborates an analytical framework for disparities as products of policy; single aspects are specified in subsequent chapters. In brief, policy is able to transform distances in space and society (Bebbington 2004: 725-726, 732). Finding the adequate policy on disparities has become increasingly difficult in the face of their growing complexity. None the less, the political is the only sphere of human agency that operates to find collectively binding decisions for other spheres. Thus, policy-making is ascribed an outstanding regulation and steering potential (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1988). Prevailing or deteriorating disparities of poverty may, in turn, indicate a policy failure or mislead. Hutchcroft asserts for the context of this study: “A major source of obstacles to sustained development in the Philippines lies in the political sphere” (1998: 3). Going one step further, this study particularly examines the reasons for policy failure and misleads, here typical impediments and constraints for effective policy-making on disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines (see chapter 1 and 8).

Policy process

Policy is here broadly defined as

- A label for a field of activity (e.g. a broad statement about a social or economic policy);
- An expression of general purpose or desired state of affairs (e.g. to combat poverty and inequality, to guarantee primary education);
- Specific proposals (e.g. to halve the poverty incidence by 2015 by 50%);
- Resolutions of government (officially announced decisions);
- Formal authorisation (e.g. acts of parliament or statutory instruments); and
- A programme or project (e.g. defined, specific spheres of policy activity such as poverty reduction strategy or land reform programme) (compare Turner & Hulme 1997: 57-60).

Policies and policy-making are dynamic and involve a decision-making process ranging from problem identification, agenda setting, implementation, to evaluation – see figure 3.1. It is important that “policy is less a set of rational choices than a complex, unpredictable and above all political process” (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001: 8). Policy action is purposive and subjective, including cognitive viewpoints of their makers. The process of knowledge generation, communication during, and the means of decision-making and execution reflect to some extent what policy-makers want to know, their motives and objectives, use of information, and degrees of commitment and reflection – which then concomitantly affects the outcome of policy (on disparities of poverty) (Koob 1999: 151-153; Gauld 2000: 231-232).
Classic policy-making: National state government and administration

Policy-makers determine outreach, process and, thus, effect(iveness) of policy on disparities of poverty. The classic principal actor involved in policy-making for a more balanced development is the national state government. Its responsibility for the distribution of resources, the rule of law, and the provision of social protection and services is often normatively justified by failures in ‘equality’ of the market economy and social justice arguments (chapter 3.2.1; Conway & Norton 2002; World Bank 2003; Solimano 2000). The state stands for the common good, the inclusive political association that acts upon the needs of its citizen within its defined territorial borders. One could say that it is the classic arena while the national government is the traditional mode through which authority of the state is brought into operation: To govern means to rule or control with authority.

The administrative machinery of the state, here the officials who carry out governmental business, is referred to as bureaucracy. Its functioning is essential for effective governmental service delivery, as these are the people effectively implementing policy and thus, determining its ultimate impact (World Bank 2003: 17; Bird & Rodriguez 1999; compare chapter 3.2.3).

Classic governmental policy-making operates in form of top-down, (national) state-centred decision-making channelled via authoritative exchanges through the bureaucracy to the people. Citizens are regarded as the recipients of governmental service, as ‘policy users’ (Cornwell & Gaventa 2001; Kjaer 2004). Chapter 3.3 contrasts this model with decentralised local government and multi-stakeholder alternatives.
Policy effect(iveness): Boundary inscription and outreach

One central assumption of this study is that the performance of policy on disparities of poverty and wealth depends on their – and their makers’ – uneven presence across space, society, time, and context. The subsequent quote on non-governmental organisations equally accounts for governmental policy-making:

"The flows of knowledge, resources, ideas, values and power that sustain and are channelled by NGOs ‘touch ground’ unevenly. To understand the nature of this unevenness and how it is generated is critical to understanding NGO as a phenomenon, but also – perhaps more important – to understanding their place in the reproduction and change of patterns of uneven development" (Bebbington 2004: 732; see also Sommers & Mehretu 1998: 135).

Central to this thought is that policy-makers and the content of their policy literally “inscribe the territory over which they operate” – and thereby shape disparities. “The inscription is twofold, relating not just to describing the boundaries of the space over which they claim competence, but also to describing the economic, social, political and cultural nature of that space” (Edwards et al 2001: 293; see Allen 2003). In other words, policy inscriptions define the geographic and social ‘boundaries’ of disparity parameters, as well as their multi-facetted poverty/wealth- dimensions. It has been observed, for instance, that “many of those [policy stakeholders] involved in development themselves come to be part of the problem of inequality, rather than contributors to its solutions” (Kelly & Armstrong 1996: 246; note by A.C.). Another example, an elementary ‘boundary’ is set already by the political system differentiating itself into political/administrative units: These subsequently provide specific conditions (in the sense of a ‘domain’) for stakeholders’ socio-spatial agency and consciousness (Gren & Zierhofer 2003: 627). Sectoral policy-making – purposely or unintentionally – may inscribe different boundaries when they target a certain peripheral region or marginalised group. For example, in many countries the geographic boundaries of health service areas do not correspond with political/administrative units (Rogers 2000: 79).

Hence, the outreach of policy to the peripheral, marginalised and most problematic poverty issues determines where and how spatial and social boundaries are inscribed, which regions, people, and issues are included in policy-making, and thus where and how chances exist to reduce disparities of poverty, in short the effect(iveness) of policy. Literally, outreach means to include spaces, people, and issues in socio-political interaction and communication processes (see Nassehi 1997: 620). Policy outreach can re-connect lagging regions and people to the social, economic and political centres and enable them to advance their quality of life (Bebbington 2004). More precisely, spatial policy outreach to the peripheries is a means of territorial development administration (Smith 2000) and about the “spatial sphere of influence of a project” (Bigman & Fofack 2000: xiv), while social outreach to the marginalised means that the “maximum program benefit should be directed to the population
group with the highest poverty” (Balisacan 1997: 18; compare Das 2000). Accordingly, specific programmes should tackle the very relevant issues to disparities of poverty.

It follows, firstly, the more effective policy outreach is the less relational distances and boundaries exist between regions and people. And secondly, the more congruent the outreach of different policies, either the less disparities exist or the deeper/exclusionary is the single one boundary constructed by all policies together. Policy (outreach) effectiveness is expressed by (a) its completeness (i.e. what proportion of the targeted peripheral and/or marginalised are reached), and by (b) its efficiency (i.e. what proportion of the totally reached are marginalised and/or peripheral) (Tunstall & Lupton 2003: 1-2; Thys 2000: 7). Essential for pursuing policy with high levels of completeness and efficiency is (c) the policy cycle. This implies policy-makers’ initial objectives, contingent administrative execution, and learning from experiences, all set in order to be ‘subjective’ towards reaching the envisaged objectives: “Policy discourses, and the categorization, problem definitions and administrative procedures which develop within and from these discourses, promote and justify particular concerns, strategies and solutions at the expense of others” (Gauld 2000: 231).

In addition, policy can only effectively reach out when it (d) considers the outreach capabilities of their makers. Policy-makers possess an individual capacity and capability to ‘touch down’ and inscribe (balanced) development. As “policy is about decisions“, having the capacities for these “decisions are about power” (Turner & Hulme 1997: 58). This study does not intend to give an extensive overview on power theories but assumes, broadly speaking, that policy-makers’ power depends on their financial, knowledge, networking, and representative resources (see chapter 3.2.3). These capacities and capabilities enable them to remove or constitute disparities of poverty: “Power in its various guises takes effect through distinctive relations of proximity and reach” (Allen 2003: 2; compare also Gauld 2000).

Policy should (e) ideally take into account the context and actors of disparate development and of political decision-making in the setting at focus. As Bebbington’s above citation indicates, non-governmental policy-makers enter the policy arena. They – as well as liberalised markets – pose challenges or potential partnerships to governmental policy (outreach). This study examines whether and how such changing state-society power relations in policy-making, here multi-stakeholder policy environments affect disparities of poverty in the Philippines (see Massey, Allen, Sarre 1999: 169-170). The focus is on meso-level policy settings and interactions in the Philippines as well as on micro-level concrete policy programmes and projects on the case of Bohol. However, these issues are understood to be embedded in the macro-level backgrounds of the character of the (Philippine) state and its societal peculiarities (compare Das 2000; Moore & Putzel 1999; Hauck 2004).

8 For further reference see Haugaard (2002); Allen (2003); Stewart (2001), Heywood (2004).
Intensified state-society interactions can facilitate (f) the acceptance of policy, if the people, media, academia, and others are addressed and, ideally, actively ‘empowered’ to participate in decision-making. In other words, “the development of the political capabilities of the poor should be an important objective of anti-poverty policy” (Moore & Putzel 1999: 7), because broad-based societal acceptance of and inclusion in policy-making are essential factors for success (compare chapter 3.3; Rauch 2003: 39). Notions of ‘formal equality’, that is declaration of equal political status to cultural, ethnic or else minority groups through state government institutions enhance the minorities’ acceptance of policy, and thus strengthen policy outreach (compare chapter 5.2). Such a ‘justice of recognition’ (Fraser 1998) guarantees the right of all population groups to be included in policy-making (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001: 6). If not integrated, the neglected regions, people, and issues become further disconnected, non-accessible and distant to the (actions by the) (state) centre of decision-making. Allen (2003: 1) describes these situations: “Then there are those unsettling moments when you find yourself on the receiving end of a blunt decision or insensitive instruction taken by some far-off government agency”. Such experiences may fuel further fragmentation and opposition movements, as the case study of Bohol in chapter 8 demonstrates.

The elaborated analytical framework for disparities as products of policy is schematically overviewed in figure 3.2. As noted, this study uses this framework to essentially discern typical impediments to effective policy-making on disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines. Individual aspects of the framework are elaborated in more detail subsequently.

**Figure 3.2: Analytical framework on the (re)production of disparities through policy-making**

9 Note that statement (a)-(f) in text and figure differ.
3.2 Policy outreach to disparities: On policy effect(iveness)

3.2.1 Distinguishing motives, ‘talking equality’

‘Grand’ organisational motives to engage in uneven development implicitly point to issues of responsiveness and responsibility, and comment on intrinsic political economic relations between state government and market forces. In brief, motives may shift from (a) the interventionist ‘equality of outcome’ to (b) the (neo)liberal market-oriented ‘equality of opportunity’, and (c) a middle path of what I term the ‘equality of outreach’.

‘Equality of outcome’ implies that disparities never disappear as the market allocates resources unequally. Government must control the market to distribute its benefit across regions and people. Yet, even if they obtain an (unlikely) equal socio-economic status, experience shows that there might be little to re-distribute when economic growth comes to a halt.

The (neoliberal) notion of ‘equality of opportunity’ has arisen with globalisation. The state withdraws from the economy but attempts to open up equal opportunities to people and regions particularly through social policy\(^\text{10}\) (Philipps 1999; Bhatta & Lapeyre 1997). With regard to reducing disparities of poverty, “what matters are life chances, not equality here and now […] and its consequent view of social indicators as measuring the means available to people to construct good lives” (Esping-Andersen 2000: 16). Relevant policies focus on balancing opportunities for the poor and non-poor to earn a decent living through, for example, investing in their human resources or access to markets. People are perceived as policy ‘choosers’ from or ‘competitors’ for services (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001). Yet, while the rules in this ‘equality of opportunity’-game may be equal for the poor and non-poor, the starting-points from which they enter the game and the circumstances in which they operate are never equal. Competition between people and regions for benefits and the gaps between the ‘winner’ and the ‘losers’ are likely to grow. And it becomes an issue of “at what point poverty and disparities become morally unacceptable and what balance to strike between freedom and equality” (ESCAP 2001: 12; compare also chapter 3.2.2).

One lesson learned from the above discourse is that “development is about providing conditions which facilitate people’s ability to lead flourishing lives” (Stewart & Deneulin 2002: 62). Yet, in the face of the complexities and fluidities of globalising lives, these conditions are not satisfied by free market competition alone but require political mediation of state, societal and market preferences. Classically, government is asked to find (policy) answers and ways of “how [Filipino] citizens can deal with difference and still live in an organised civil society” (Mohan 2002: 68; note by A.C.). In this context I introduce the

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\(^\text{10}\) Note that ‘social’ in this study refers to (a) social outreach to the marginalised people, as well as (b) social policy in terms of policy targeting social dimensions of disparities of poverty and wealth, e.g. human resources.
‘equality of outreach’-approach. So far, the concept of outreach has been particularly popular with scholars working on social policy and micro credits. Being an essentially geographic concept, however, it can be appropriately and suitably transferred and applied in the wider context of this study’s focus on (spatial, social, and sectoral) disparities of poverty and wealth. Further, it is understood to comprise both, social and economic policy aspects. Consequently, the ‘equality of outreach’-approach prioritises remedial policy action by those who govern, particularly issues of service delivery, socio-economic protection and the relationships between service provider and clients (compare Conway & Norton 2002; Smith 2000; World Bank 2003; Das 2000; Bird & Rodriguez 1999).

3.2.2 ‘Pros and cons’ of targeting policy

In the context of this study, policy outreach inherently implies geographic targeting of spaces, social targeting of the marginalised and sectoral targeting of the most problematic issues. In other words, targeting means the identification and tackling of certain areas, people, and sectors specifically affected by and/or the various dimensions of disparities of poverty and wealth. One of the major benefits of targeting policy in a developing context is cost-effectiveness. Moreover, specifically “area-based targeting can be an effective way of reaching poor individuals, offering high levels of ‘completeness’ and ‘efficiency’” (Tunstall & Lupton 2003: 4; compare chapter 3.1.2).

Yet, there are certain obstacles to effective policy targeting. Firstly, as chapter 2 exemplifies, the adequate identification of area clusters or pockets of the poor and peripheral and of factors crucial to disparity production is complex and complicated. Similarly, when spaces and places, social groups, and sectoral matters have been defined to be targeted, their definition must be of some continuity over time – a complicated task especially in times of globalisation (Stewart 2002: 6). And logically, policy outreach to the most problematic developmental issues equally depends on the applied definition of (disparities of) poverty, specifically (a) whether absolute or relative poverty, and (b) ends or means of poverty are tackled, (c) which quantitative and qualitative indicators are chosen to label the poor and the wealthy, (d) which factors are assumed to be most influential, and (e) moral and ideological underpinnings. Moreover, when applied, targeting measures have to (f) be sustainable and contingent in both, their operation and outcome.

Secondly, (policy on) the peripheral areas should be linked with those on the marginalised population in a most complete and efficient way. Yet, “inevitably, however, there are also some not-so-poor people in poor regions and a lot of poor people in ‘rich’ regions” (Bird & Rodriguez 1999: 305; see also Bigman & Fofack 2000; Tunstall & Lupton 2003).

Notwithstanding these objections, spatial, social, and sectoral policy outreach can be linked towards mutual beneficial outcomes. For example, Thys (2000: 7, 11) observes with regard to
micro-finance poverty reduction schemes that “a more conscious product-led approach to deepening outreach yielded a greater social output by increasing the share of very poor borrowers being served while achieving similar results in terms of breadth of outreach and financial sustainability than a more incidental approach”. Moreover, dynamic externalities may result from geographic and/or social targeting for broader organisational and sectoral environments. For instance, investments in infrastructure in a remote region are likely to reinforce private investments, allocate labour and technology, upgrade education and knowledge levels, and contribute to the region’s socio-economic development base (Balisacan & Fuwa 2004).

The chances for comprehensively beneficial policy outcomes are enhanced when policymakers and people bundle their resources and tackle together the problems at hand (see chapter 3.3). In this context, Rauch (2003) points to the significance of scale, indicating that the local, regional, national, and global arenas should pursue differently targeted, yet systematically related policy tasks. One could equally argue, however, that a targeted policy approach may cause an increase in competition for the directed intervention and conflict among the area representatives, people, and their organisational advocates.

**How to best tackle disparities of poverty sectorally? An excursus on two ongoing debates**

This study cannot give an extensive review on numerous existing sectoral policy approaches and is not understood as a policy-content specialists’ investigation. The debate around the most crucial factors of disparate development is contextually situated in the discourse between market force and government control. The following sections introduce two related ongoing international debates.

There is, firstly, ongoing discussion on whether to alleviate disparities of poverty and wealth more effectively by targeting economic growth or redistribution (Dagdeviren, Hoeven, Weeks 2002; Balisacan 1997; World Bank 2003). The former theme emphasises absolute and the latter relative poverty and disparity aspects. Since economic liberalisation in the 1980s, policy-makers have believed that “growth itself would be the vehicle for poverty reduction, achieved through ‘trickle-down’ mechanisms not always clearly specified”. Obviously, free markets and individuality rest uneasily with notions other than the equality of opportunity.

However, driven by experiences of boom-and-bust, socio-spatial exclusion, and political conflicts in the 1990s the international community and many governments have moved to recognise that “to reduce poverty, growth is not enough, nor is redistribution enough. What is required is a growth policy that incorporates equity as a forethought, rather than an afterthought” (Dagdeviren, Hoeven, Weels 2002: 383, 405). The statement signifies a shift
towards the ‘equality of outreach’-approach. Chapters 8.1 and 8.2.1 discuss the Philippine and Boholano courses between growth and redistribution.

A second theme questions whether to target growth and redistribution by economic or social policy. The international community currently seems to favour social sector approaches embedded into a (neo)liberal economy and equality of opportunity frame (see chapter 3.2.1). For example, the World Development Report 2004 understands ‘making services work for poor people’ to include “those services that have the most direct link with human development – education, health, water, sanitation, and electricity” (World Bank 2003: 1). Such social sector approaches are transferred into national and regional ‘poverty reduction strategy papers’ which “attempt to build inclusive public social policy around a basic neo-liberal framework, and to position it as a new way forward which transcends ideological divides, while including diverse interests, from the poor to global capital” (Craig & Porter 2001: 3).

In contrast to social sector approaches, there are voices that call for a stronger focus on economic issues as part of development, for example, for so-called ‘pro-poor’ strategies. These voices demand a role for economic policies in sustainable socio-economic development and instruments, which bundle business, anti-poverty and, -disparity interests (compare Ashley, Boyd, Goodwin 2000; Rodolfo 2003; Thirlwall 2002). This debate essentially faces the dilemma that dealing with economic sectors from a pro-poor perspective always needs to consider that “the private sector deals with their clients: customers and shareholders. Development professionals deal with theirs: poor people and donors. Traditionally the two worlds have been separate” (Ashley & Roe 2003: 4). In other words, if government is to steer, for example, tourism policy, it then deals with a sector, which is largely driven by the private sector and is likely to dispose of somewhat few policy instruments only. This obstacle can be assumed aggravated in the environments of developing countries such as the Philippines, where administrative instruments are often weak (compare chapter 3.3.1).

Apparent from these accounts, the significance of ‘access and outreach’ in policy-making processes cannot be underestimated. Policy access and outreach can, however, only be successful and effective in sustainable poverty (and disparity) reduction if, as Bigg & Satterthwaite (2005: 1-25) point out, policy ‘touches down’ to local contexts, integrates local pro-poor policy-makers, and encourages locally affected people to participate in all policy stages.
3.2.3 Outreach capacity and capability: A question of power

The previous chapters have elaborated on externally provided preferences from which governmental policy-makers can choose. At the same time, every government (policy stakeholder) possesses specific internal capacities and capabilities to accomplish its tasks. As noted in chapter 3.1.2, its power resources affect how effectively government addresses the peripheral, marginalised, and problematic poverty issues. Specifically financial, knowledge, networking, and representative resources and their interaction constitute this power.

**Financial assets** essentially relate to the level of governmental spending (potentials) which should ideally cover at least the administrative costs of establishing a multi-scalar data information basis on disparities and poverty as well as setting up adequate policy responses, and their monitoring and evaluation. Bird & Rodriguez (1999) point to the importance of local salary bills of public employees as an incentive for high-quality policy administration, because the administrative staff is in charge of delivering the services within any disparity-and poverty alleviation strategy. Another factor to consider in developing contexts like in the Philippines includes (a) that governments (and non-governmental actors alike) often heavily rely upon donors for budgetary support – a situation that shifts power balances in policy-making (Bigg & Satterthwaite 2005: viii-ix). Moreover, (b) financial sectors and funding resources are likely to involve corruption incidences with adverse consequences: “*There is now a broad consensus on the deleterious impact of corruption on economic growth, equitable wealth distribution, and the legitimacy and efficiency of governing institutions*” (Le Billon 2001: 1; see also Das 2000: 645).

**Human or educational capital** is, as mentioned, a crucial and competitive factor to policy-makers, business, and people alike in the contemporary ‘knowledge society’. Policy outreach can be enhanced through the combination of ‘global’, internationally applied knowledge and local expertise. Ideally then, policy-makers go ‘glocal’ (compare chapter 2.3.2). Thereby, as a positive side effect, they also strengthen local participation in and acceptance of policy (Neubert & Macamo 2002: 12-17). Again, the skill level of the local bureaucracy is important to guarantee precise identification of disparities of poverty and adequacy, relevance, and appropriateness of responsive policy. Further of relevance, foreign consultants and/or NGOs are often asked to fill in lacks in governmental human capital with respect to specific projects.

**Social capital** points to the ability to gain access to resources by virtue of social linkages (following Bourdieu) and to guarantee the observance of norms (following Coleman). Social capital forms the fundament of any social network, here formal or informal assortments of individuals or institutions who maintain recurrent contact with one another and channel and interpret information and resources on, in the present case, disparity and poverty alleviation (compare Portes & Mooney 2000; Fernandez-Kelly 1995).
With respect to ‘inscriptions of disparities’ it is important to consider that “networks [...] make space not only through the properties of presence, but also through those of absence” (Ash 2002: 390). Social networks are based on the inclusion-exclusion principle and thus, can potentially deepen the boundaries of disparity parameters (compare chapters 2.2; 3.2.3). At the same time, networks can enable different (policy) stakeholders to bundle their resources towards achieving greater impact (Clausen 2001; 2002). The findings of Portes and Mooney (2000: 27) in migrant communities are assumed to account similarly for stakeholders’ policy-making circles: “When other material and institutional resources are present, social capital can bring about sustained community development”. The quote also points at the interactions between the various power resources.

**Symbolic capital and authority** point to informal power relations, representation, and reputation that are based on society- and cultural context-specific norms and values. Such informal power systems are usually not visible at first sight but they co-exist with official business or politics-related power positions. They often represent a crucial factor for the success or failure of the administrative coordination of policy, and specifically, for its acceptance and participation among the local people (compare Kraas 2003: 65-73). Moreover, when symbolic capital determines the formation of social networks, so-called ‘cronyism’, the risk of corruption, and of less effective policy-making rise (Kraas 2000: 113-114). Turning the perspective, if government is not aware of specific symbolic authorities in their target areas, respective governing and policy-making (at a distance) may become ineffective and problematic as well (Bigg & Satterthwaite 2005: 6; compare chapter 9).

To conclude, (a) financial and partly knowledge resources can equip government with ‘power over’, here domination over, the conditions framing disparate development as well as over some other policy-makers and the local people. At the same time, however, (b) government equally embodies the capacity to enable policy as participatory ‘concerts in action’, by using its networking, symbolic, as well as some knowledge resources to ‘empower’ other policy-makers and the local people to participate and support policy interventions together (Stewart 2001; compare also Rauch’s account in chapter 3.2.2). Besides the powers to dominate and to empower, government (c) should also possess the power to minimise internal abuses through corruption or cronyism. This is explicitly what is implied by the term governmental ‘accountability’\footnote{For further reference on accountability see, for example, Gloppen, Rakner, Tostensen 2003.}.

“Power, and the need to control it, define the basic bargain between those who govern and those who are governed [...] When accountability fails – when the state breaks its bargain with citizens – many things can go wrong. Public fund may be misappropriated or stolen, public officials may routinely demand bribes, public contracts and public post may be unfairly awarded, public services may be poorly delivered (or not delivered at all)” (Schuster 2000: 1, emphasis by A.C.).
Put differently, government’s power capacities affect the (uneven) presence of policy performance on disparities of poverty across space, society, time, and context, here affect the (re)production of disparities through their external as well as their internal use and abuse.

3.3 Transformative politics: Contextualising alternative policy arenas, actors, and agency

3.3.1 Politics of scale: Regionalism or ‘bringing the state back in’?

A by-product of globalisation is the scalar re-configuration of national government’s policy (service) delivery. As mentioned, deterritorialisation and the liberal turn cause the competition between the sub-national and national to grow. Particularly regions (administrative or non-administrative units) experience resurgence to self-determine their own path of development. Regionalism defines "both the emerging importance of regions as territorial units in global competition and the increase in co-ordinated actions within regions to improve competitive position compared to other areas" (Agnew 2000: 103). Regions are claimed to become the basis of economic and social life, the focal point of knowledge creation, the key arena for promoting a plural society based on participatory politics and identity, as well as a functional space for socio-economic policy intervention (Jones 2001: 1186; MacLeod 2001: 805).

Because of regionalism, the previously dominating national arena of policy-making, here the state, is claimed to be ‘be hallowed out’ and unable to uphold its traditional tasks for the distribution of resources and the provision of social protection. This weakness of the classic policy arena is feared to deteriorate exclusionary processes and socio-political tensions.

However, exactly these fears of losing state control have also resulted in claims for a re-emphasis of re-strengthened ‘big government’, especially since the 11 September 2001-attacks on the U.S.A, and therefore for a reinforced role of the state in steering (balanced) development (see Lake 2002). In fact, many scholars and think-tanks, including Huf (1998), Moore & Putzel (1999), Rigg (2003), Stewart (2001), and the World Bank (2003), reassert that disparities of poverty, especially the exclusion of people and spaces, should be dealt with from the ‘top’ or ‘centre’ of power, which is, in their view, equivalent, with the state arena, national government and administration authority.

Others argue that the above ‘New regionalism’-approach fails to explain the linkages between the regionalisation of competition, business, and the changing role of the state realistically (see Peck 2003: 222-223). In short, even under a neo-liberal regime

“the free market requires the state or cognate institutions if it is to work. Free markets, in short, do not just happen […] the development of free markets depends crucially upon the extension as well as the intensification of specific forms of state power” (Harvey 2000: 178).
Harvey relates here to the ‘equality of outreach’-approach of chapter 3.2.1 and explicates that state politics are driven away from performing some of their conventional functions, however have to maintain a certain regulation of markets. This is specifically important in developing countries like the Philippines where state government is often needed to jump-start economic growth sectors (Rodolfo 2003). While doing so, national government has to share tasks with the sub-national, international arenas and actors. Then, the major role of (national) government in times of globalisation implies to rearrange the scalar and sectoral organisation of policy-making to reduce disparities of poverty effectively (Edwards et al 2001; Stewart 2001).

3.3.2 Re-arranging governmental policy-making I: Decentralisation

The leading governmental political institutions at sub-national scale are local government units, which comprise in the Philippine case provincial, municipal, and barangay (neighbourhood-organisation) governments (see chapters 5.2 and 8). In the course of re-arranging governmental power and tasks, local governments are strengthened and partly gain more autonomy in policy-making from national governments through decentralisation reforms. Although there are many different definitions to it, decentralisation generally “involves a transfer of authority to perform some services to the public from an individual or an agency in central government to some other individual or agency which is ‘closer’ to the public to be served” (Turner & Hulme 1997: 152). Authorities are decentralised either within (a) formal political structures (devolution), (b) public administrative structures (deconcentration), or (c) from state to private sectors (privatisation). Especially by devolution and deconcentration national governments aim at negotiating the internal organisation of state politics in order to ‘keep the state in’. However, when decentralisation is not successfully implemented, for example if a simultaneous transfer of responsibilities and resources does not accompany the transfer of authority, or if decentralisation disproportionately involves privatisation, it may also adversely contribute to ‘hallowing out’ the state (Turner & Hulme 1997; Cornwall & Gaventa 2001).

The key argument justifying decentralisation directly relates to greater policy outreach: “Decentralized government is closer and therefore more accessible to the people it is meant to govern” (Lake 2002: 817; compare Mahal, Srivastava, Sanan 2000). Through their more direct contact with the ‘field’, local governments can improve policy effectiveness, reduce costs, mobilise more resources, strengthen links between policy-makers’ and empower peoples’ participation and acceptance – all means to a successful alleviation of disparities. Sceptical assessments, however, claim “there is no reason to expect that decentralisation will be pro-poor” (Moore & Putzel 1999: 1). Instead, local governments’ lack of power, particularly of institutional, funding and knowledge resources, and persistent discrepancies between citizens’ preferences and political can impede pro-poor and anti-disparity impacts of
decentralisation. Moreover, Rüland (1998: 181-183) observes for Southeast Asia the tendency among central governments to apply ‘pseudo’ decentralisation measures to enhance the effectiveness of their central decision-making. In these cases what is officially called decentralisation is de-facto deconcentration (compare also Kraas 2000: 133).

Notwithstanding this controversy, above and beyond decentralisation “does not occur in general but rather in a particular context – in a country with its own history and traditions and its own specific institutional, political and economic context (Bird & Rodriguez 1999: 300). Then, decentralisation has a distinguished appearance in the Philippines, which is to be examined in chapters 5.8 and 9.

3.3.3 Re-setting governmental policy-making II: State and society in interaction

As mentioned, globalisation helps to establish non-governmental policy-makers. The ‘rising stars’ in the political arena comprise market and civil society stakeholders such as (a) (transnational) businesses, (b) specific societal lobbyists and interest groups, (c) intergovernmental organisations, (d) non-governmental organisations (NGOs)\(^{12}\), and people’s organisations (POs) as community-created economic entities with a legal personality (Valaskakis 1999: 155-156). Therefore, all spheres of life are politicised and all sections of society are requested to become political partners and contribute towards a more balanced development (see Beck 2000: 1; Giddens 2000: 85-121). This diversified setting of policy-making is called ‘governance’ and it

“…refers to something broader than government. The new use of governance does not point at state actors and institutions as the only relevant institutions and actors in the authoritative allocation of values […]. They all, to some extent, focus on the role of networks in the pursuit of common goals; these networks could be intergovernmental or inter-organizational […] or they could be networks of trust and reciprocity crossing the state-society divide” (Kjaer 2004: 3-4).

Political steering and policy-making through governance operates differently from the governmental and market alternatives. Table 3.1 overviews and contrasts the three approaches. In theory, governance emphasises ideas of (local) participation, state-society and public-private partnership, and multi-stakeholder network formations across scales and institutions. It especially focuses on community accountability, here sees the people as policy ‘shapers’. Thus, it opens up opportunities for political steering by multi-stakeholders across scales including the marginalised and peripheral themselves.

\(^{12}\) NGOs are organisations, which operate external to the government but in the public sphere; they usually advocate the interests of specific social groups.
Table 3.1: Three alternatives in policy-making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy-maker</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basis of relationship</strong></td>
<td>Prestige, power and employment</td>
<td>Contract and property rights</td>
<td>(Local) participation, resource exchange, co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Degree of dependence</strong></td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium of exchange</strong></td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means of conflict resolution/ coordination</strong></td>
<td>Rules and commands</td>
<td>Haggling and the courts</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td>Subordination</td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Role of targeted people</strong></td>
<td>Policy user</td>
<td>Policy chooser/competitor</td>
<td>Policy shaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational structure</strong></td>
<td>Hierarchies</td>
<td>Markets</td>
<td>Multi-stakeholder networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Kjaer 2004; Cornwall & Gaventa 2001

**Conflict or cooperation? Implications for policy effect(iveness)**

The diversification of policy-making surely “alters geometries of power, empowering some actors while disempowering others” (Edwards et al 2001: 290-291), and thus challenges government’s classic role as the ‘number one’- policy-provider as well as its ‘classic’ policy outreach (effect(iveness)). Voices of the development discourse typically emphasis the new role and power of the local people and peoples’ organisations in shaping decentralised, governanced policy environments. Calls for neo-liberal free markets and less state control explicitly promote the participation of stakeholders from the private sector in policy (see Mani 2001: 87- 90).

In whatever composition, state and societal policy-makers can conflict, which may impede or at least not benefit policy outreach. In case they operate parallel to each other without cooperating, they may cause policy redundancies and/or multi-coverage of areas, issues, and social groups. Depending on the comparative status of an organisation and its capacities to deliver effective policy, specific policy-makers could be gradually replaced altogether. This can imply that multi-stakeholder governance replaces ‘classic’ government models (Bigg & Satterthwaite 2005: x).

In contrast, intensified cooperation and partnerships between state and societal and market actors can complement and improve policy outreach and effect(iveness) and lead to a merging of governmental, market and governanced policy-making characteristics:

“Partnerships, it is claimed, can offer a blending of resources from the public, private, and voluntary sectors which adds up to more than the sum of parts, can provide a forum in which local communities can make their voices heard, and, as agencies for delivery, can help foster a shared sense of objectives and direction at a local level” (Edwards et al 2001: 289).
Partnership can be used to extend the outer reaches of governmental policy-making to become more responsive and effective in the alleviation of poverty and disparities. Particularly when the relation is institutionalised, it can empower people’s political involvement, strengthen policy acceptance, decrease administrative costs, and diversify resources and organisational capacities. Smith (2000) thereby stresses the essential function of government to initiate, negotiate, and de-facto lead the course of such partnerships – also across spatial scales (compare Balgos & Batario 1999; Harvey’s argument in chapter 3.3.1).

Popular models in institutionalised state-society partnerships usually focus on local governments. They include (a) contracting where the identification and formulation of policy remain governmental tasks while their implementation is issued to private and civil actors or to specific specialised governmental agencies or foreign consultants. (b) Community planning means that government holds encompassing competences but must consider community needs by conducting community surveys, launching a community plan, and strategically planning thereafter. (c) Community leadership implies that local government persuades private and civil stakeholders to achieve prescribed objectives and creates all kinds of partnerships with them, including direct provision, grants-in-aid, advocacy, consultation, coordination etc.. (d) Self-help refers to local government building up voluntary, self-help organisations through training, tax relief, administrative support or low interests loans (adjusted after Smith 2000; Mani 2001; World Bank 2003; Edwards et al 2001; Cornwall & Gaventa 2001).

I infer from the above discussion that nowadays the multiple actors and arenas of policy intervention not necessarily operate as mutually exclusive or competing geographies “but rather as densely superimposed, interdependent forms of territorial organization” (MacLeod 2001: 815). It follows that any analysis of policy interventions on disparities of poverty and wealth must consider existing multi-reference systems and thereby aim at “a balanced assessment of the respective scales and potentials of the externally – and internally-oriented sectors” (Lovering 2001: 351; see also Hill 2000; Agnew 2000).

Finally, following the line of the theoretical argument, key research questions I and II can be broken down to empirically answer six sub-questions for the Philippine case, as identified in table 3.2. Table 3.2 equally presents a summary and complementation of the organisational structure and the empirical tasks set for this study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key research questions</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Analytical focus</th>
<th>Sub-questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. What features, patterns and dynamics do disparities of poverty and wealth have in the Philippines?</td>
<td>Structure ‘earth-writing’</td>
<td>Identify disparities of poverty and wealth</td>
<td>Structures of distance and proximity, Spatial, social and poverty-sectoral disparities</td>
<td>What spatial (and social) patterns and trends of disparities of poverty and wealth are inscribed into and between Philippine provinces? What are the main developmental problems and prospects in the Philippines? Do they alter their presence at different scales?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. How are these disparities of poverty and wealth (re)produced through governmental policy?</td>
<td>Agency ‘people-writing’</td>
<td>Explain &amp; Understand the effect (iveness) of policy intervention upon them</td>
<td>Policy outreach (to regions &amp; provinces, population groups, problematic poverty issues), Focus on impediments and constraints of effective policy-making, Case study of Bohol</td>
<td>What, whom, and where do governmental policy intervention tackle disparities of poverty and wealth in Bohol? Which constraints impede effective governmental policy? What role do partnerships with and participation of societal stakeholders in a decentralised setting play in enhancing policy effect(iveness)? How do socio-cultural Philippine peculiarities affect the processes at hand?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Research design and paths of operationalisation

4.1 Methodological setting: Combining quantitative and qualitative research

The study is planned, organised and put into practice as an independent investigation including three months of empirical research in the Philippines (April 2003; January to March 2004). It is embedded in the project ‘Socio-economic regional disparities and globalisation in Southeast Asia’ at the University of Cologne, Germany. Little theory-led publications exist on the study’s central themes for the Philippines. Therefore, I deductively developed some theoretical concepts as ‘starting points’ and inductively refined them as the research proceeded. My research approach is for most parts explorative, combining theoretical and empirical findings to constitute the reality of the subject matter as seen in this study.

For a coherent and consistent investigation the research methods must be able to (a) identify the ‘thousand faces of poverty across space’ (key question I), and (b) to assess the mechanism and effect(iveness) of policy interventions upon them (key question II). This setting suggests to complementarily utilising quantitative and qualitative research approaches in a way they can best unfold their respective analytical strengths (compare Brannen 2004). Overall, the idealised polarisations between quantitative and qualitative research are negotiated and integrated. Thereby, a more comprehensive and realistic view on the topic is developed and the reliability, validity, and preciseness of findings are increased (compare Sale et al 2002; Mayring 2001; Kelle & Erzberger 2000).

Key question I

Table 4.1 presents the mix of methods and highlights the principal analytical tools for each key question. I utilise mainly quantitative and cartographic tools to identify disparities of poverty and wealth, in particular statistics visualised in provincial and regional maps for the entire Philippines, and intra-provincially for the case study of Bohol province. I focus on cartographic analysis because of its descriptive, explorative, and analytical strengths:

“Maps are used to show locations, distances, directions and the size of areas. Maps also display geographic relationships, differences, clusters and patterns. Maps are used for navigation, exploration, illustration and communication in the public and private sectors [...] Maps summarize large amounts of information concisely. It would be hard to match a map’s ability to represent not only huge quantities of numbers but also information about the spatial relationship between observations” (Deichmann 1998: 2, 103).

Depending on the data quality I use the information in the maps not as hard-facts but – and here quantitative and qualitative methods intertwine – as qualitative indicators on disparities. Such analysis is comparative for thematic maps. Comparisons between (a) areas on the same
map, (b) maps, (c) different variables for the same area, and (d) maps on various periods are enabled. In order to improve my interpretative work – and this is another aspect where quantitative and qualitative paradigms interweave – I have asked selected experts and publications for their qualitative interpretations of the quantitative illuminations of the maps.

Table 4.1: Research methods to analyse key questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Cartographic</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key question I</td>
<td>79 provinces ⇒ 16 regions / entire Philippines ⇒ Bohol province / Municipalities</td>
<td>Secondary statistics to identify ‘faces’ of disparities</td>
<td>Exploratory map series to identify ‘faces’ of disparities</td>
<td>Expert interviews to support interpretation of quantitative and cartographic findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key question II</td>
<td>Case study: Provincial government Bohol ⇒ Puroks / Barangay &amp; Municipal governments ⇒ National government</td>
<td>Map series to illuminate policy outreach</td>
<td>Expert interviews</td>
<td>Ethnographic field observations and participation Policy profiles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key question II

As noted in chapter 1, governmental policy effect(iveness) on disparities of poverty is in-depth investigated for the island province of Bohol in its decentralised setting. A case study approach is most adequate here because firstly, I research for explanations for a contemporary multi-facet phenomenon in a real-life context, and secondly, because these explanation are guided by the question of ‘whether’ and ‘how’ governmental policy has an impact on disparities rather than by ‘how much’ it matters (see Yin 2003: 1, 13; George & Bennett 2005: 25).

As noted in chapter 1, in order to allow for a better focussed and in-depth investigation key question II concentrates on three specific and selected policy fields as ‘subclasses’ which are chosen after research findings of key question I. The respective choice of Bohol is reasoned firstly, because of its ‘typical’ patterns and trends in disparities of poverty (see chapters 6 and 7 for details) and, secondly, because of its innovative anti-poverty policies (see chapter 8). Thirdly, Bohol neighbours the second largest metropolitan area in the country, Cebu-Mandaue, and offers good research opportunities on spill over effects from centre to hinterlands. Put in theoretical terms, Bohol represents an ideal case study because it shows both, unique and typical features in the Philippine context of the set research question.

Policy is affected by the perspective, cognition, and background of their makers and recipients. Accordingly, research methods are required to recognise and explain multiple interpretations and constructions of ‘truth’ (compare Cloke et al 2004: 150; 169-200). Therefore, I primarily carried out qualitative in-depth expert interviews, ethnographic field
observations and participations, and collected policy documents. Policy outreach is visualised by thematic maps – once again intertwining quantitative and qualitative methods – because “in policy-oriented analysis, maps can play an important role by presenting complex relationships in a way that is easy to interpret, and by identifying the spatially relevant policy alternatives” (Bigman & Fofack 2000: 27).

Although the findings for Bohol are limited in scope, they address important problems associated with the research question in a Philippine context. It follows that “its generalizations are more narrow and contingent than those of the general ‘covering laws’ variety than some hold up as the ideal, but they are also more precise and may involve relations with higher probabilities” (George & Bennett 2005: 78). With the support of research in Cebu and Metro Manila, an intense review of academic literature and policy documents it is attempted to distinguish certain obstacles to effective policy intervention on disparities of poverty and wealth, which may, to some extent, exist and operate similarly in other regions of the country (see approach by George 1998).

4.2 Statistic and cartographic exploration of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines

4.2.1 Data compilation: Taking administrative hurdles

I select the indicators illustrating the manifestations of disparities of poverty to meet goals of research feasibility and data relevance as accounted in theoretical and Philippines-related publications, and qualitative research. Limited data availability restricts the selection. Sometimes qualitative data fill in the gaps. I retrieved some data online and the majority during field visits. Data inconsistencies and multiplicity of sources13 suggest focusing on data published by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) and National Statistical Office (NSO) in order to guarantee a comparable and coherent identification of disparities.

Changes in political and administrative classifications of regions and provinces

Figure 4.1 displays the political/administrative divisions of the Philippines from 1998 to 2001, which is the basis to most of the data I use. Then, the Republic of the Philippines consisted of 79 provinces, grouped into 16 regions14. To allow comparisons over time the data is adjusted to the changing political/administrative classifications since the 1970s. Table 4.2 displays these changes and the various political-administrative classification periods. Although notes in the respective figures indicate when an alternative classification to the 1998-2001 one is applied, comparisons over time and maps remain complex.

14 In 2001, another 110 so-called “chartered cities” existed. These, however, are usually not depicted separately from provincial data. Therefore I neglect chartered cities; see http://www.statoids.com.
Records on intra-provincial Bohol

Comprehensive, spatially aggregated statistics on intra-provincial Bohol are only limitedly available (see chapter 7; expert interview 15). I am significantly restricted not only in finding variables on Bohol that are comparable to the provincial/regional scale, but also in enabling their comparisons across space and time. Several maps are compelled to vector-based information or plain, sometimes non-spatial statistics. Figure 4.2 shows the contemporary political/administrative division of the province: It consists of 47 municipalities, the City of Tagbilaran (the provincial capital), and 1118 barangays (villages). The province is subdivided into three congressional districts. The administrative/political boundaries have not altered during the period of relevance. While regions are administrative subdivisions under the national government, provinces, municipalities, and barangays compose separate political local government units (LGUs). Puroks (or sitios) are semi-formal neighbourhood organisations that are not incorporated in formal politics and administration (chapters 8, 9).

Table 4.2: Changes in administrative classifications of Philippine regions and provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Admin. Period</th>
<th>Date ratified</th>
<th>Change of region</th>
<th>Change of province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1992</td>
<td>07/11/1975</td>
<td>Creation of National Capital Region (NCR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23/10/1989</td>
<td>Organic Act to create Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR), plebiscite =&gt; final creation in 1997, functionally reduced to administrative region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>01/08/1989</td>
<td>Organic Act to create Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), plebiscite =&gt; inauguration in 1990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>16/03/1992</td>
<td>New: Sarangani splits from South Cotabato</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22/05/1992</td>
<td>New: Guimaras splits from Iloilo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>New: Bilaran splits from Leyte</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23/02/1995</td>
<td>Sultan Kuradat moves from Central Mindanao to Southern Mindanao</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Sultan Kuradat moves from Southern Mindanao to Central Mindanao, reverse change of 1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>07/03/1998</td>
<td>New: Compostella Valley splits from Davao del N.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>23/02/2001</td>
<td>New: Zamboanga-Sibugay province splits from Zamboanga del Sur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19/09/2001</td>
<td>Western Mindanao is Zamboanga Peninsula</td>
<td>Basilan moves to ARMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Cotabato and Sarangani move to SOCCSKSARGEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central Mindanao is SOCCSKSARGEN</td>
<td>South Cotabato and Sarangani move to SOCCSKSARGEN, Lanao del Norte moves to Northern Mindanao</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>17/05/2002</td>
<td>Southern Tagalog splits into MIMAROPA and CALABRAZON</td>
<td>MIMAROPA: Marinduque, Mindoro Occidental and Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, CALABRAZON: Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Quezon, Rizal; Aurora is transferred to Central Luzon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.nscb.gov.ph/factsheets; various years
Figure 4.1: Political and administrative classification of the Philippines 1998-2001
Figure 4.2: Administrative and political classification of Bohol province

A. Province of Bohol: Municipalities and barangays 2004

B. Barangay of Pamilacan: Puroks and households

C. Schematical overview of political levels
4.2.2 Data processing and evaluation: A question of data quality

Table 4.3 overviews the quantitative and cartographic research chronology at provincial (and regional) scales. It shows that data processing and evaluation are closely interwoven, and presents encountered problems and undertaken countermeasures. A Geographical Information System (GIS) was established to administer the statistical database and map series. To assure (a) a realistic identification of disparities, and (b) comparativeness in and between maps, I illustrate most indicators as choropleths and classify them by quartiles (compare Brewer & Pickle 2002; Theodosakis 1990; Evans 1977). Distorting outliers are selected prior to quartile classification and displayed separately (see Bigman & Fofack 2000). I often illustrate absolute values as well in order to (c) discern additional information of the individual variables. I apply the same paths of procession to Bohol data, however, simplified and shortened: I am not able to establish neither a statistical database nor a GIS, but use choropleths of quartiles and outliers where possible.

To increase the validity and reliability of my findings on patterns and trends of disparities in the Philippines, I subdivide all indicators into three quality classes according to the following factors:

- Obvious mistakes or deviations?
- Incomplete, inconsistent data, missing values, exceptions?
- Notes on data generation and definition available?
- Is variable constantly updated?
- Additional qualitative assessment, if relevant.

Table 4.4 summarises the factors of the subsequent classification procedure: The data quality of variables suggests whether their interpretation (1) refers to quantitative ‘hard facts’, (2) uses the quantitative ‘hard’ facts yet considers conceptual restraints (e.g. respondents to income surveys may not inform about their real income), or (3) relates to qualitative patterns and trends. A white colouring of the map legend points at data quality 1, yellow and orange indicate data quality 2 and 3 respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data quality</th>
<th>Degree of data reliability*</th>
<th>Interpretation of quantitative data…</th>
<th>Legend colour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>reliable</td>
<td>as ‘hard-facts’</td>
<td>white</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>reliable yet doubts whether generation of data in fact recognises all relevant aspects/can obtain realistic results</td>
<td>as facts under consideration of general conceptual constraints</td>
<td>yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>semi-reliable quality</td>
<td>only as qualitative trends and patterns</td>
<td>orange</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* taking into account the natural limitations of quantitative data analysis
In the face of recurrent imperfect data accuracy, I withdraw from analysing causal relationships, statistical correlations, or econometric analyses. Instead, I evaluate the individual characteristics of each variable, scale, region, province, and municipality, and subsequently compare, contrast, and relate them within and between maps. With regard to Bohol, I determine its ‘place’ in Philippine (disparate) developments by combined inter- and intra-provincial maps and statistics (chapter 7). A ‘hard’-fact, quantitative comparison between the inter- and intra-provincial scalar manifestations of disparities of poverty is made impossible by limits in data availability and quality. However, the information provides an adequate basis for a qualitative comparative portray of developmental problems and prospects and for subsequent policy analysis (key question II).

Hence, I literally lay numerous maps documenting different indicators on poverty and wealth over each other in order to discern concentrated pockets or clusters of poverty or of wealth (compare Hentschel et al 2000). Such additive and comparative approach is claimed to have the advantage of specifically revealing difference and diversity, here disparities (May 1997: 201-202). The spatial patterns caught in the maps represent simultaneously the situational ‘snapshots’, means, and consequences of disparities of poverty and wealth (compare theory in chapter 2).

On the whole, the explorative map series enables me to (a) inductively identify qualities and quantities of disparities in the Philippines, (b) partially detect explanatory factors to prior findings, and (c) to a minor extent, discern arguments to falsify or verify some deductive theses (compare Deichmann 1998). In order to improve my interpretation I use experts’ opinions, field visit observations, and published accounts. As the final product, I develop qualitative themes of (spatial) disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines to be illustrated in chapters 6.3 and 7.3.
### Table 4.3: Chronology of quantitative and cartographic research process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedures</th>
<th>Problems encountered with …</th>
<th>Countermeasures and solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Establish a statistical data base and a GIS as cartographic foundation | **Confusion over boundaries**: No uniform classification of boundaries; agencies apply different classifications (e.g. NEDA ↔ NSO, NSCB\(^{15}\)) Some cities are confusingly classified to belong to different provinces (e.g. Marawi City and Cotabato City) Sources use different boundaries even for data referring to same year  
=> comparisons over time and across variables become problematic | **Focus** on data published by NSCB and NSO, as based on same boundaries (NSCB Fact sheets and Philippine Standard Geographic Code (PSGC)\(^{16}\))  
Marawi City belongs to Lanao del Sur; Cotabato City to Maguindanao province  
1998 -2001 boundaries defined as ‘standard’ classification  
**Comparisons** across time made possible by map series |
| Digitalisation and classification of national, regional, provincial administrative boundaries over time (table 4.2) | **Data availability**: Various statistical agencies exist; responsibility between institutions not set; different institutions – even agencies within one institution – publish dissimilar data on the same subject; some desired variables (e.g. on political processes) are not surveyed  
**Spatial aggregation**: Variables are rarely provided as spatial aggregates; provincial level most detailed level available; limited rural/urban coverage (often missing values for specific provinces in Mindanao and the NCR) | **Focus** on data published by NSCB and NSO  
**Personal visits** at NSCB headquarter in Manila to request for specific data |
| Data compilation                                 | **Data availability**: Various statistical agencies exist; responsibility between institutions not set; different institutions – even agencies within one institution – publish dissimilar data on the same subject; some desired variables (e.g. on political processes) are not surveyed  
**Spatial aggregation**: Variables are rarely provided as spatial aggregates; provincial level most detailed level available; limited rural/urban coverage (often missing values for specific provinces in Mindanao and the NCR) | **Focus** on data published by NSCB and NSO  
**Personal visits** at NSCB headquarter in Manila to request for specific data |
| Data processing I                                | **Format of variables**: Varies between absolute/ relative, % change, related to population (total, per capita, age-group-specific), families or household (total, age-specific), labour force, area, specific indices, ratios  
**Data quality**: Wrong, controversial data, reference groups (e.g. age) not adjusted to international standard, exceptions, redundancies, incompleteness, lack of technical notes(updates), inadequate differentiations “missing and “0-value” | **Standardisation**: All variables are included in data bank with (a) their absolute and (b) any kind of relative value  
**Cross calculations and re-inquiries**: Always check data credibility, try to identify mistake, use technical notes on specific surveys (by NSCB and NSO) to sort out some confusion, otherwise exclude entire variable |

---

\(^{15}\) NEDA = National Economic Development Authority; NSO = National Statistical Office; NSCB = National Statistical Coordination Bureau  
### Evaluation I: Exploratory data analysis on individual variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exploration of features of individual variables</th>
<th>Distortion by outliers: Extreme outliers distort distributional characteristics of variables and thus their visualisation in maps</th>
<th>Identify outliers: Use descriptive statistics, histograms, stem-and-leaf plots to (to be visualised separately in maps)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Data procession II: Visualisation for comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establish a map series</th>
<th>Type of map: Which meets the targets of analysis, data availability, and visualisation best?</th>
<th>Choropleth maps: Standard to display relative values as they enable comparisons between and within maps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technique of classification: Exploratory data analysis shows that distributions of variables are multiform, no single classification method suits optimally ⇒ target of comparison requires to choose an uniform technique of classification (even if not meeting all individual variable characteristics equally)</td>
<td>If necessary for individual characteristics absolute values are displayed in an extra map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quartile classifications (plus outliers): Meet overall aim of comparison between and within maps best, and equally acknowledges the individual features of variables through selection of outliers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Evaluation II: Comparison and contrast spaces, scales and variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison, interrelation and contrast of regions, provinces, scales, and variables</th>
<th>Subjectivity in perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contextual distortion: Statistics do not register all important aspects of variable; e.g. informal sector, seasonal work, childrens' work are not registered under 'labour' (compare table 4.4; data quality class 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimisation through above processing, evaluation, co-reading, qualitative interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research is always subjective to some extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quality classes: Individual variables are classified into three 'quality classes' which suggest the preciseness of their analytical use (see table 4.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No econometric analysis: Causal relationships and correspondences are not examined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Evaluation III: Typical themes of (spatial) disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines

- Inductively discern qualities and quantities
- Explain prior findings
- Assess deductive theses, if possible

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Clausen 2005
4.3 Qualitative research on policy-making in the Philippines

4.3.1 Investigating policy effect(iveness): An overview

While thematic maps provide information on the state of disparities, I apply four research tools to explain and understand the effect(iveness) and typical mechanism of respective policy-making in the Philippines: (a) expert interviews; (b) compilation of policy profiles; (c) ethnographic observation and participation during field visits and; (d) qualitative maps on policy outreach of individual policy-makers.

More precisely, (a) I carried out expert interviews assuming that experts have an assured knowledge on the topic, yet critically bearing in mind their subjectivity (Köhler 1992). I specifically interrogated the motives, contents and means, accomplishments, problematic dimensions and features of policy-making, and asked for subjective assessment of and explanation for its success or failure. Interviews with foreign experts who work for the governmental agencies in focus specifically help to attain substantial information that are less influenced and restricted by Philippine socio-cultural peculiarities (and thus, highlight those; compare chapter 9). (b) I inquired policy-makers of written information on their policy programmes, monitoring and evaluation. During interviews I also asked the interviewees to portray his/her organisation’s policy activities in more detail. (c) Field visits to policy sites helped me to foster research findings on policy features, catalysts, and constraints, specifically on the integration levels of the local people and other policy partners/competitors as well as on policy makers’ outreach capabilities. In addition, I intensified qualitative observations of the state of disparities, of inter-and intra-organisational behaviour, interaction, and communication among policy-makers and between them and the local people. (d) Above and beyond, I am provided with sufficient information to qualitatively map certain aspects of spatial and sectoral policy outreach and understand their explanatory background in chapters 8 and 9.

4.3.2 Expert interviews and the significance of informality in the Philippines

In total I conducted eleven formal and guided expert interviews of which seven were recorded (see appendix A1). Nine interviews deal mainly, yet not exclusively, with the Bohol context while two interviews that were held in Manila focus on the entire Philippines. In the Philippines a great part of ‘formal’ life takes place informally or as one interview partner expressed it: “Coffee table talks are more fruitful than official meetings” (expert interview 9) (see chapter 9). Therefore, Filipino experts’ information policy is significantly influenced by the place of interviewing. I followed the suggestions of Elwood & Martin (2000) and asked the experts to choose the location of our conversation, and put more emphasis on my
observations on the location and the implications it may have had on course and content of the interview.

Broadly speaking, the informants were most open at their private homes or in closed-door offices, and more closed up when their colleagues, or worse, their superiors were present. This relates to the issues of social hierarchies (analysed in chapter 9; see also photo 4.1). Officials distribute information only when they feel assured to be expressly entitled to. In this context it was difficult to conduct and record efficient formal interviews. I had to meet the majority of experts several times to give them time to get to know, trust and assess my 'hierarchical' position towards them before they would talk to me sincerely and frankly. In addition, the most interesting topics were discussed only after working hours in an informal atmosphere when the recorder was turned off. Five of the formal interview partners rejected to be recorded at all. One interviewed expert explains: “I think they are afraid of be quoted. I mean they are afraid to be quoted making these comments or not and it will be something that will be used against them in the future” (expert interview 1). I took memos of these interviews instead. None the less, I had to consider that conversation partner “don’t want to appear too critical of the government or the local leaders and so. So they cannot express their own opinions openly” (expert interview 1). Such environmental conditions suggested focusing on informal conversations. I conducted and memorised another nine informal interviews (compare appendix A2), which often provided the more useful information. In analysis, I integrate the information derived during both, formal and informal conversation to increase the validity of my interview data and to obtain a much richer and intimate understanding of the significant issues.

**Interview style**

Prior to conducting the interviews I transferred some of the theoretical concepts into an initial interview manual containing the major aspects of investigation\(^{17}\) (see table 4.5). The employed interview style resembles what Lamnek (1995) and Mayring (1996) define a 'problem-centred interview' supplemented by certain elements of a 'focussed interview'. More precisely, the guiding elements of the interview style are

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\(^{17}\) The interviews were tested with selected officials of Montebello Hotel in Cebu City.
Explorative research, here openness and flexibility towards the subject matter, the research design, the situation of investigation, the employed methods, and the course of research;

Informal communication between the researcher and the interview partners (if possible);

A holistic approach, meaning the integration of the daily context and history of the interview partners in the investigation.

Another principle of problem-oriented interviews suggests to remain passive and to let the interview partners make their own points. However, in the described Philippine setting I would not have received much useful information, if I had pursued this principle. Instead, I explicitly asked for information, repeated my questions using different phrases, and thus more strongly guided the course of the interviews. I varied the interview contents and style depending on the hierarchical position, thematic focus, and background of my conversation partner, and according to the findings compiled during the deductive-inductive research process.

Table 4.5: Central themes in guided interviews (adopted individually)

| What ? | - What are main problems in Bohol / respective project area of interviewee?  
- (Spatial) disparities of poverty and wealth: Issues and conception  
- General portray of policies |
| Who ? | - Policy-makers involved  
- Partnerships in policy-making? Characterisation of interaction  
- Participatory approaches? Outline |
| How ? | - How do respective decision-making and policy-making processes work?  
- Policy process stages  
- Resulting practices of cooperation and conflict, participation |
| Outreach ? | - Area targets? Why? Experiences?  
- Sectoral outreach? Explanations and experiences  
- Social outreach? Explanations and experiences |
| Effects ? | - Impact analysis of (policy) actions; Subjective and hard-fact assessment  
- Impediments (e.g. political, social, economic, cultural or else) |
| Why ? | - Enabling and constraining factors /explanations offered by  
  - Actors' interests, motivations, targets, and constructions?  
  - Cooperation and conflict between actors?  
  - Participation of local people?  
  - Solution finding process?  
  - Any recommendations for better? If adequate, ask for potentials of globalisation  
  - Future expectations? |
**Institutional and professional background**

The interview partners were selected by their institutional and professional backgrounds (table 4.6) in order to catch a great variety of perceptions. With the exception of the private sector (whose representatives were reluctant to be interviewed), I met representatives from the major institutions involved in policy-making on disparities of poverty and wealth.

- As noted, I concentrated on Provincial Government Agencies (four formal and three informal interviews at various agencies of the Provincial Government of Bohol).
- In order to complement these insights into policy-making at local governments, I interviewed consultants from International Aid Organisations who are employed with local governments in Bohol (two formal and one informal interviews with two consultants from the German Development Service (DED) and one informal interview with a consultant from the British Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO)).
- For purposes of comparisons and analysis of state-society interactions I interviewed representatives of the ‘governance’-counterpart to governmental policy, here of Non-Governmental Organisations (three formal and three informal interviews).
- For additional information partly beyond the Bohol context, I talked to representatives of Academic Institutions (two formal interviews at de la Salle University Manila, one informal at Holy Name University, Tagbilaran, Bohol, and one informal with a foreign researcher based in Manila).

Table 4.6 and appendices A1 and A2 overview the interview partners by their institutional background, date, duration, status, and place of interview.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Socio-cultural background</th>
<th>Professional operation level</th>
<th>Interaction with topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>“Westernised” Filipino/Non-Boholano</td>
<td>International, national</td>
<td>Research (policy-oriented)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Filipino/Non-Boholano</td>
<td>International, national, regional</td>
<td>Research (policy-oriented)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>Provincial and local Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration; Technical support &amp; service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>Provincial and local Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration; Technical support &amp; service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>Provincial and local Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>National, regional, Bohol</td>
<td>Marketing &amp; sales; Consultancy &amp; promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 &amp; 17</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>“Westernised” (lived overseas), Non-Boholano but spent half his life there</td>
<td>Provincial and local Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration; Advocacy; Technical support &amp; service delivery; Consultancy &amp; promotion; Research (policy-oriented)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>Regional; Local Bohol</td>
<td>Advocacy; Technical support &amp; service delivery; Consultancy &amp; promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 &amp; 16</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Filipino/Non-Boholano</td>
<td>National; Local Bohol</td>
<td>Advocacy; Technical support &amp; service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>“Westernised”</td>
<td>Local Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration; Consultancy &amp; promotion; Technical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 &amp; 19</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>“Westernised”</td>
<td>Provincial and local Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration; Consultancy &amp; promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>National; Regional; Provincial and local Bohol</td>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>Provincial Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration; Technical support &amp; service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>Provincial Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>Provincial Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18a</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>Boholano</td>
<td>Provincial and local Bohol</td>
<td>Technical support &amp; service delivery; Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18b</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>“Westernised”</td>
<td>Provincial and local Bohol</td>
<td>Planning &amp; administration; Technical support &amp; service delivery; Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>“Westernised”</td>
<td>National, and local Manila</td>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.3 Field visits: Ethnographic participation and observation

I visited thirteen field sites in Bohol, Cebu, and Manila to acquire more intimate insights into (a) the disparate developmental situation in Bohol and the Philippines with regard to poverty, agriculture and tourism, (b) the sites of policy implementation, (c) the de-facto policy activities of the government, especially their (d) interaction with and the responses of local people and policy partners and competitors, and (e) various ‘political and societal truths’ of policy intervention. I was able to access and participate particular, local Boholano (Cebuano and Manila) worlds as well as to observe local practices of political consultations (see photos 4.2 and 4.3). As such my ethnographic findings are not “realities extracted from the field but are ‘intersubjective truths’ negotiated out of the warmth and friction of an unfolding, iterative process” (Cloke et al 2004:170; see Schweizer 1999). These ‘truths’ are indicators for the ‘socio-spatial consciousnesses’ that were discussed theoretically earlier.

Obstacles and countermeasures encountered during field visits

Table 4.7 lists the field visit sites. The fact that I am a foreigner, whether I participated or observed, and whether I was by myself or accompanied by experts of other organisations, significantly affect the insights I gained and sometimes even evolved into obstacles. If possible, I undertook countermeasures, which are enclosed in italics following every listed obstacle (see also figure 4.7).

Culture gap: Being German I was not personally familiar with Philippine socio-culture. Interpreting the observations was sometimes difficult. I read and discussed the findings with experts from the PPDO, Local Development Foundation Bohol, a Filipina Professor from Manila, and foreign researcher who have lived or still live in the Philippines.

Language barrier: Particularly the inhabitants of rural, non-touristy areas in Bohol and Cebu spoke limited English and were shy towards foreigners. I was tied to other organisations to translate by which presumably some information was lost and contextual modifications made. I repeated my questions many times and used different phrasings. I intensified my observations, took memos, and asked friends and experts for their interpretation. I tried to
relax the atmosphere and relieve people’s shyness by joking, chatting and laughing. Speaking a few sentences Cebuano eased the atmosphere, too.

**Dependency on assisting organisations:** I was to some extent dependent on assisting organisations to participate in local meetings and access non-published, confidential information sources. These field visits were usually scheduled more tightly and thus my observations were restricted in terms of duration and intensity. Generally, the insights I gained during the field visits varied considerably depending on the assisting organisation’s policy approach. For example, during my stay on Pamilacan island (see figure 4.7; field visit 11) I spent two days talking to many local people of different backgrounds and status, and to consultants of several development aid agencies who engage on the island. In contrast, the visits to the municipalities of Inabanga, Clarin, Tubignon and Loon together with the PPDO (field visit 5, photo 4.3) involved almost exclusively formal meetings between municipal and provincial governments. Here, I was limited to talk to the higher ranked officials whom I had been introduced to. Often their superiors stood close by and our conversation was therefore constrained. A third example, I attended two different purok meetings in the barangay of Laya, Baclayon (field visit 3). My participation and observation was less restricted at the first meeting than at the second meeting where the barangay captain was present (compare chapter 8.4.4). On other occasions, such as in Guindulman municipality of Bohol (field visit 4) and Malapascua island in Cebu (field visit 7), I did not present myself as a researcher but as a tourist and was astonished to be treated completely differently and to gain once again new impressions.

As a tackling measure I reinforced efforts to collect information on the background of the settings. I purposely visited, if possible, some sites various times, either accompanied by various organisations, by private persons or being by myself. Direct observation of the behaviour and communication among the local people as well as towards the staff of the organisations provided additional information.
Table 4.7: Overview over field visits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date in 2004</th>
<th>Accompanied by</th>
<th>My role was</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign or local</td>
<td>Expert or local person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cebu City</td>
<td>31 Jan - 5 Feb; 17 Feb</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mactan Island</td>
<td>4 Feb; 22-23 Feb</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 puroks in barangay Laya, Baclayon</td>
<td>7 Feb</td>
<td>Local + foreign</td>
<td>Government + NGO + Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Barangay Basdio, Guindulman</td>
<td>8 -10 Feb</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Inabanga Clarin Tubignon Loon</td>
<td>11 Feb</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Government + NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bogo</td>
<td>14 Feb</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Malapascua Island</td>
<td>14 - 16 Feb</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Metro Manila Island</td>
<td>18 -21 Feb; 15-25 April 2003</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City</td>
<td>25 - 29 Feb</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Panglao Island</td>
<td>2 March</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Consultant/ Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Pamilacan Island</td>
<td>3 - 4 March</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Consultant/ Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Sierra Bullones</td>
<td>7 March</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Carmen Loboc</td>
<td>7 March</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.4 Qualitative processing and evaluation

I pursue a contextual, subject-oriented qualitative processing and evaluation approach. Chapter 8 portrays seven specific policy initiatives in Bohol, which are all selected to belong to the three sub-class policy fields. These initiatives are analysed for their effect(iveness) in the context of their decentralised setting. Basically, chapter 8 and partially chapter 9 represent the essence of findings as derived from the following procedures.

Firstly, I produce qualitative maps on their policy outreach from the compiled multi-source information (see chapter 4.3.1). The maps compare policy makers’ ‘inscriptions’ of spatial, social, and sectoral disparities in the three relevant policy fields. In addition, when added as literal ‘layers’ to the ‘pockets of poverty’ in Bohol detected earlier, the policy maps illuminate whether and how the selected policy reach out to the peripheral, marginalised and most significant problems.

Secondly, for explaining and understanding these results, I refer mostly to interview information and field visit observations. Each interview is transcribed or memorised, and afterwards thematically structured into a categorical system. The categories are derived from the initial interview guide and inductively extended in accordance with the interview contents. The memos on the field visits are similarly processed so that they are valuable for analysis. Then, I analyse the statements, perceptions, and observations as articulated for each category for hints and explanation models on obstacles to effective policy-making. If the data allows, I also compare these accounts between policy fields. Thereby constant consideration of the contingent situation and context at hand, the locations, and the background of each interview partner and policy in focus are important.

Thirdly, I deduce a general assessment of outreach accomplishments of the particular policies in their policy fields and a list of constraints thereon, as well as diverse patterns of how specific governmental – and ‘governanced’ – policies conceive, explain, tackle, and (re)produce disparities of poverty and wealth. I specifically distinguish those obstacles and problems in policy-making, which are typically related to Boholano or Filipino socio-culture (compare chapter 9.1). The outcomes are sets of typical policy-making behaviour and processes in Bohol, which, with the help of an intense literature review, expert interviews and ethnographic observation, can partially be authenticated for more general features of policy effect(iveness) upon disparities of poverty in the Philippine setting.
5. Basic differentiations of Philippine nature, people, and politics

This chapter literally portrays those factors, which represent an inherent base for disparate development in the Philippines and which can be modified through human agency only in the long run (compare chapter 2.3). In other words, this chapter deals with the basic natural conditions and basic societal and political differentiations in the Philippines (a) with regard to morphological and climate hazards and natural resources, (b) population distribution and the city system, (c) ethno-linguistics, and (d) political decentralisation.

5.1 Foundation for spatial divides? Diversity of Philippine nature and people

On morphology, natural hazards, and resources

The Philippines have an extremely scattered morphological shape, which facilitates certain disparate developments. The country is a geographically fragmented archipelago of 7107 islands, which are commonly subdivided into three greater regions as illustrated in figure 5.1: Luzon in the North, the Visayas in the Centre, and Mindanao in the South. The interior of most islands usually consists of mountains rising steeply behind a narrow coastal strip. They are the product of a complex intertwining of converging and diverging tectonic plates between which the Philippine plate is ‘sandwiched’. Greater plains only exist in the biggest islands of Luzon (e.g. in Cagayan Valley) and Mindanao. The Philippines inhibit about 200 volcanoes. 22 are considered active, of which 12 alone are located in Luzon (plus 56 inactive ones). Weak earthquakes are daily phenomena, 44 very strong earthquakes exceeding 6.5 in magnitude took place within the last 400 years. Again, Luzon is the hardest hit region. Besides seismological turbulences, the Philippines are worldwide among the countries most prone to climatic hazards. They have a generally tropical monsoon climate (summerly Southwestern and winterly Northeastern monsoon). Already monsoons may cause flooding, storm waves, erosion and landslides, however, these are exacerbated by an average of 6 typhoons per year. Especially Luzon and the entire East-facing regions are most frequently hit by typhoons. Mindanao is the least frequently affected region (Fuchs 2002: 16-19).

These natural and morphological environments condition certain features of the economy. For example, the country, especially the Mindanao region, is rich in natural resources including mineral, forest, and fishing grounds. The tropical climate and volcanic soils benefit the growth of diverse agricultural products. Lowlands are generally more fertile sites for agriculture than uplands (Riethmueller & Schoenwaelder 1992). Further impacts of natural conditions on agricultural production, trade, infrastructure, and accessibility, as well as on population distribution and ethno-linguistics are to be illustrated in subsequent chapters.
Figure 5.1: Morphology of the Philippines
The city system and population distribution: Coastal and Manila biases

Figure 5.2 (and 4.1) visualise the Philippine city system and population distribution as of 2003 and 2000. There are 115 cities in the Philippines in 2003, most of them located at the coast. This is due to (a) the trade advantages of coastal locations, and (b) the better accessibility of coastal regions compared to the mountainous interiors of the islands. Most cities are historically established sea trade centres and serve as strategic entry points into the mainland.

The capital and megacity Metropolitan Manila or National Capital Region (NCR) clearly dominates the city system with 9,033,183 inhabitants, followed by Davao City (1,147,116 inhabitants) in Davao del Sur, and Cebu City, or rather, Metro Cebu-Mandaue (978,549 inhabitants) in Cebu province. The dominance of the NCR emerges as a result of colonial economic preferences. The Spanish colonial power from 1565 until 1898, the American colonial power from 1898 until 1946, as well as subsequent Filipino governments organised their state power, policy and resource allocation in a centralised and urban- (i.e. Manila-) focussed manner (Krische 2000: 39-44). As an indicator of widespread urbanisation processes induced by the capital, the concentration of cities is exceptionally high also in the neighbouring provinces of Central Luzon and (the Eastern CALABRAZON parts of) Southern Tagalog. On the contrary, the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), Cagayan Valley, Eastern Visayas, and the ARMM, selected provinces of Northern and Central Mindanao and Caraga as well as Western provinces of Southern Tagalog display a stronger rural character.

Historically, the Filipino population is rural-based (compare chapters 5.2 and 8). However, with economic power accumulating next to political power in the urban areas, Philippine settlement patterns have also turned increasingly urban (compare chapters 6.1 and 6.2.1 for details on spatial economy and migration processes). In mid-2002 already 60% of the 78,744,000 Filipinos reside in urban areas. Moreover, the urban population currently grows faster at annually 3.2% than the total population at 1.9% (ESCAP 2002).

However, it ought to be noted that classifications into urban and rural areas in the Philippines have to be analysed with caution. Firstly, their differentiation is based on a complex and multi-indicator definition (see www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/articles/con_urbanrural.htm). Secondly, classifications change constantly (compare www.nscb.gov.ph/factsheets/) and are not always easy to follow up. None the less, as will be shown in chapter 6, the overwhelming dominance of the NCR and its adjacent provinces in the city system and population distribution present simultaneously a foundation, a means, and an outcome of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines.
Figure 5.2: Absolute rural and urban population by Philippine provinces in 2000
Ethno-linguistic diversity

Filipinos are a socio-culturally extremely diverse people. Figures on the number of ethnic-linguistic groups differ according to which authority is read and the applied ethnological definition. Accounts vary from 51 major ethno-linguistic groups (Monsod & Monsod 2003) over to at least 77 (Peralta 2003) to 169 groups (Hirtz 2003). The majority of scholars agree, however, to organise the altogether 81,408,000 Filipinos (as of mid 2004) into four broad groupings in accordance with their place of origin and sequence of immigration to the archipelago that now constitutes the Philippines.

The first settlers of austroloid and meleanic origin arrived ca. 20,000 years ago and are today subsumed under the term ‘Negritos’. Afterwards people of old-Malay descent moved to the archipelago, to which, for example, the Ifugao in Luzon still belong. Today these two groups together comprise various indigenous communities who make up in-between 2% and 10% of the total population, depending on the author cited. They live mostly in the mountainous interiors of the (greater) islands, especially Luzon.

In subsequence followed younger-descent Malays who represent the majority of Filipinos today inhibiting mainly the lowlands and the coastal strips. Due to Spanish missionary work most of them converted to Christian religion (today ca. 93% of Filipino are Christians: 85% Roman Catholics, 7% Protestants, 1% indigenous Iglesia ni Cristo) making the Philippines the only Christian-dominated country in Southeast Asia.

Mindanao was islamised from Indonesia since the 15th century and reigned as Islamic sultanates. After many years of battles the Spanish gradually conquered the sultanates in the mid and late 19th century. The Spanish, after them the Americans and Malay Filipino government(s) since the 1950s have purposely drawn Christian settlers from Luzon and the Visayas there. As a result, nowadays the Muslim groups are minorities in Mindanao (and make up about 5% of the total Filipino population and less than 21% of the Mindanao population) and concentrate in the Sulu archipelago and Southwest Mindanao (Hayase 2004: 34-37; 54-55; Schneider 2000: 15-16; compare chapters 5.2, 6.3, and 9).

Furthermore, early trade with the Chinese, Indians, and Arabs introduced respective diverse people and again different economic and socio-cultural influences to the archipelago. In Southeast Asian comparison the Chinese population in the Philippines is small at ca. 850,000, i.e. 1.2% of all Filipinos in the late 1990s. They usually live in bigger cities like Cebu, Davao, Zamboanga, and 50% of them alone in Metro Manila (Ang See 1997: 40-41). In spite of their small numbers the Chinese play an important role in the Philippine economy (compare chapter 6.3).

With respect to languages, the official languages are Pilipino – which essentially grounds on the Manila-based Tagalog and is the language of education – and English as the business
language introduced by the US colonial power. De-facto many more languages exist: Figures again vary from 105 (Taoshiaki 2002) to 988 (Schneider 2003). The geographic fragmentation of the country facilitates the parallel existence of languages. Dialects and/or languages often alter from one island to another, from lowland to upland, from one community to another. Spanish vocabulary has accessed mainly bureaucratic process language and naming, however some elderly in the Visayas and Mindanao still speak a Creole of Spanish and local tongues (field visits 1 and 9; Taoshiaki 2002: 11).

On the one hand, due to their various historical interactions with other cultural spheres and their ethno-linguistic diversity Filipinos are assumed to be disproportionately exposed to global developments (compared to many of their Southeast Asian neighbours like Thailand) and consequently to more easily and successfully act in the globalising world of today. On the other hand, however, their exceptional ethno-linguistic diversity and morphological fragmentation simultaneously makes the Philippine(s) (state) face the challenging task of creating and maintaining societal and national unity and cohesion (see chapters 3, 9 and 10).

5.2 Laying the basis for policy intervention: Decentralisation

In 1991 the Congress of the Philippines under the presidency of Aquino Corazon (1986-1992) approved Republic Act No. 7160 which is known as the Local Government Code (LGC). The LGC enacted the decentralisation of service delivery functions and regulatory powers from national to three geopolitical local government units (LGUs): provinces, municipalities, and barangays. LGUs are illustrated schematically in figure 4.2 part C for the case of Bohol.

With this decentralisation endeavour Philippine government and administration is being historically transformed once again. Until 1991 the archipelago’s history of spatial organisation of control and power has entailed the following periods:

- When the Spanish conquered the archipelago they encountered little socio-political village communities known as ‘barangays’. Only the Muslim areas in the South were organised in kingdom-like realms. During their rule the Spanish tried yet were not able to establish centralised control over the archipelago (compare below). They actively used ‘cofradias’, local religious fraternities, in order to increase their influence sphere (and spread Catholism effectively by these means).

- Local and regional landowners (see chapter 6.1.3 for details) rose alongside agricultural commercialisation in the 18th century. They mostly engaged individually in economic exchange relations with foreigners, which, in turn, further reinforced centrifugal powers.

- The Americans used these locally established power structures as an extended form of their own power outreach and “superimposed a weak central state over a polity of quite autonomous local centres of power” (Hutchcroft 1998: 25). They were more successful in conquering Mindanao (by exploiting internal rivalries among the various Moro leaders) and created a Moro province, which they governed separately from the rest of the country (David 2002: 73).
In early post-war Philippines the independent national government(s) worked to enhance centralised control. Many of the wealthy and influential landowner families became politicians based in Metro Manila.

When Ferdinand Marcos became elected President in 1965 he established his own oligarchy, made up by members of his clan and trusted cronies. Concomitantly, he further pushed allocation of decision-making and power to his followers and to Metro Manila (Hamilton-Paterson 1998).

In 1972 Marcos declared martial law, centred his power base on the military, and officially recognised the need to decentralise. De-facto, however he only deconcentrated the workload to local government offices while accumulating more power centrally, which made him all-powerful and able to commit severe human right violations and political corruption (compare Bolongaita 1996; Osteria 1996).

After ‘people power’ or ‘EDSA I’ ousted the authoritative regime of Marcos in 1986, a new Constitution was ratified in 1987 under Aquino Corazon, which opened legislative doors for the decentralisation processes to come. It was also decided that in the Philippine Presidential form of government, the President exercises supervisory authority directly over the provinces, while the provincial governments exercise supervision over municipalities (Valdellon 1999).

Since its enactment in 1991, the implementation of the Local Government Code has been politically shaped through the presidencies of Aquino Corazon (1986-1992), Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), and Gloria Mascapacal Arroyo (2001-ongoing). Precisely, the Code aims at guaranteeing that “the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals” (Republic Act No 7160 Sec. 2). In order to meet these targets it

- Devolves and deconcentrates authority, assets and personnel to provide service delivery functions from various national government agencies to local government units,
- Gives regulatory, governmental and corporate powers to local government units that traditionally belonged to national government,
- Increases the financial resources available to local governments through (a) autonomous taxing powers, (b) automatic release of internal revenue allotments (increase from 11% to 40%), and (c) local share of revenue from national wealth derived by locally-based government-owned and/or -operated corporations. For the first time local governments can receive domestic and foreign grants directly.
- Encourages the active participation of and partnership with the private sector and civil society organisations like NGOs and people’s organisations (POs) in special bodies like the local school board, local health board, local peace and order council and development councils at provincial, municipal, and barangay level.

The local development councils – called Sangguniang – exercise the delegated legislative power and provide guidance on development paths. Table 5.1 overviews the organisational structure and tasks of the LGUs, specifically the Sangguniang. It highlights that decentralisation in the Philippines aims at strengthening participatory policy-making and local
governance. By not merely bringing government closer to the people, but by equally involving local people in thinking out, planning and implementing policy themselves the LGC is often claimed to foster another step of the Philippine road towards democracy (Valdellon 1999; see below comments on autonomous regions). It ought to be noted that not all governmental sectors have been decentralised. Chapter 8 picks up the sectoral tasks decentralised to the case provincial government of Bohol with special relevance to this study.

Table 5.1: Structure and tasks of local government units and Sangguniang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Executive</th>
<th>Provincial Government</th>
<th>Municipal Government</th>
<th>Barangay Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Barangay Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Sangguniang</td>
<td>Mayors of composed cities and municipalities</td>
<td>All punong barangays (city/municipalities)</td>
<td>Members of the SB Representatives of NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairman of the committee on appropriation of the SP concerned</td>
<td>Chairman of the committee on appropriation of the SP or SB concerned</td>
<td>Representative of congressman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td>Congressman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representatives of NGO (not less than ¼ of the members of the fully organised council)</td>
<td>Representatives of the NGOs (not less than ¼ of the members)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks of Sangguniang</td>
<td>Formulate long term, medium term and annual socioeconomic development plans and policies</td>
<td>Enacts ordinances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formulate the medium-term and annual public investment programmes</td>
<td>Approves resolutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriates funds of the general welfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adjusted after PPDO 2002

Regional autonomy

Besides its objective of local autonomy the Local Government Code re-confirms the special administrative position of two autonomous regions. The formal organic creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) and (b) the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) dates back to 1989 (figure 4.1). The LGC accounts for the autonomous regions only as long as these come up with own local government codes (Republic Act No 7160 Sec. 526). As table 4.2 clarifies, despite both regions being named ‘autonomous’ only the ARMM functionally operates autonomously and has as the sole region in the country its own regional government. The CAR operates despite its name as an administrative region under the direct supervision of national government. This is partly due to the negative outcome of a plebiscite in 1990 to decide on the autonomous status and to continual legal challenges. Although the ARMM remains an integral part of the Philippines, and the President exercises supervision
over the regional governor, regional autonomy and governance guarantees wide-ranging powers and functions, including certain governmental powers and separate executive, legislative, and judicial powers to impose and collect certain taxes (compare ADB 2002a).

In many ways the formal creation of both autonomous regions is seen as a step by the (national) government towards formal ‘justice of recognition’ to the indigenous communities in the upland North of Luzon and the indigenous Muslim communities in Mindanao, as well as a response to ongoing (armed) conflicts with them. Broadly speaking, conflicts between government and various indigenous minorities in the uplands of Northern Luzon started in the 1970s, when large-scale governmental ‘development projects’ meant to construct and exploit dams, mines, and agro-industrial sites in lands inhibited by the minorities (Hegmanns 1990). Conflicts were partially settled by the Constitution of 1987 and the Indigenous People’s Right Act of 1997 recognising the rights of indigenous cultural communities (see chapter 9.3.4).

Conflicts between government and Muslim minorities in Mindanao date back to colonial times, but arose increasingly after independence when government-induced migration of Christian Filipinos put growing pressure on original landownership, plus Christian Filipinos took control over the large parts of the administration and the rich natural resources in the region. In the 1970s the situation escalated into armed conflict over uneven socio-economic resource distribution, political separatism, and recognition of cultural-religious identities as “many Muslim resisted the national identity of Filipino because they understood that Muslims had no place in a nation-state that consistently disregarded and denigrated Islam” (Horvatich 2003: 23; see chapters 9.1, 9.3.4, 10 for follow-up). It ought to be noted that in spite of their common experience of marginalisation there are various Muslim identity groups – reflecting ethno-linguistic diversity – with each of them pursuing their own socio-economic and political goals until today (Schneider 2000; Buendia 2002). Internationally the conflict(s) of Mindanao are registered as civil war with the major opponents being the national (local) government(s) and military on the one hand and the ‘Moro Islamic Liberation Front’ (MILF) and the more militant ‘Abu Sayaff’ on the other. A peace agreement has been signed with the ‘Moro National Liberation Front’ (MNLF) in 1996, which can partially be seen as a response to the granted autonomy for the ARMM. Despite positive peace talks between MNLF and MILF fighting continues and has actually gained intensity since 11 September 2001 (http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/; see follow-up chapter 9.3.3).

The objectives of the Local Government Code for local autonomy and cooperation between administrative and political scales, and between societal and state actors become even more crucial in the light of these conflicts over uneven resource and power distribution. Thus, it is to be examined in this study whether the quote is justifiable to claim that “the recent Philippine decentralization appears as a good opportunity to fight poverty” and disparate development (Bird & Rodriguez 1999: 304).
6. Spatial divides of poverty and wealth in the Philippines: Empirical explorations

This chapter (together with subsequent chapter 7) presents findings to key question I: It identifies and relates different faces of spatial disparities of poverty and wealth in and between Philippine regions and provinces. Thereby some reference is made to some of their social inequality manifestations. The structure of the chapter follows the list of indicators of disparities of poverty introduced in chapter 2.3.2. Aspects of access and infrastructure are integrated with the social and economic issues they overlap with (no sub-national data is available on technological connectivity).

One implicit aim of this chapter is to identify – with support of a map series, statistics, and scholars’ assessments – those factors, which are particularly important to the production of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines (these will centre the analysis of policy intervention later on). It ought to be noted that this chapter already represents the outcome of the many steps of combined deductive-inductive research; it does not demonstrate individual inductive identification stages. Therefore, those issues detected to be of explicit significance (for example indicators on economic sectors) are discussed in more detail than others.

As outlined, problems related to data quality and availability constrain the research process. Notwithstanding my counteractions (see chapter 4) these data restrictions to some extent

(a) Impede the quantitative findings and suggest to emphasise on their qualitative contents and to use, if appropriate, other scholars’ assessments complementarily, and
(b) Make comparisons across sub-national spaces, over time, and across variables more difficult.

Ultimately, this data environment can be assumed to significantly reflect both, on the developmental paths of as well as on policy-making vis-à-vis poverty and disparity alleviation in the Philippines (compare theory chapter 3; Balisacan 1997: 2; follow up in chapter 8).

6.1 Economic disparities of poverty and wealth

6.1.1 National government’s income-based perspective

The official ‘faces’ of disparities of poverty in the Philippines are income-based estimates published every three years by the National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). Statistically, the data are of comparably low quality because, firstly, their coefficients of variations are often above 10% (NSCB 2003a). Secondly, prior to 2003 the NSCB recorded poverty incidence at regional scales only. It follows that provincial poverty data before 2003 are re-estimates from regional data (NSCB 2003b). Thirdly, NSCB publications on poverty do not cite the population data sources they use (see NSCB 2000; 2002b; 2003a; 2003b).
Figure 6.1: Poverty incidence: Magnitude of urban and rural poor by province, and the poor as a percentage to provincial population in 2000

* estimates from National Income and Expenditure Survey, data are based on administrative classification of 1997. (Comoros Valley is included in Davao province)
Perspective Ia: Absolute and relative poverty across provinces

In 2000, poverty incidence is registered by a per capita income less than the annual poverty threshold of 11,605 Pesos (calculated to meet food and non-food requirements\(^{18}\)). Accordingly, the NSCB (2003a) estimated 34% of Filipinos to be poor. Figure 6.1 illustrates the spatiality of poverty incidence by (a) the magnitude of rural and urban provincial poor, and (b) their proportion to the total population. Numerically, the poor cluster in and around Metro Manila, Bicol, the Central Visayas, and Western provinces of Mindanao. Obviously, absolute numbers of the poor are strongly related with population numbers in the respective regions. Negros Occidental is the province with the highest number of 1,312,727 poor, followed by Masbate. Cebu province and Metro Manila rank third and seventh with 1,081,449 and 848,962 poor people respectively\(^ {19}\).

Poverty is more a rural than an urban phenomenon. Only in and around Metro Manila and Cebu urban exceeds rural poverty – a result of high urbanisation (compare figure 5.2). Reversing the absolute numbers, the quartile with the lowest percentage of the poor to the total population (7.5-32.7%) allocates in and around Metro Manila and Central Luzon. The very far North of Luzon, and – strikingly – the small islands of Guimaras and Basilan, as well as the provinces of Cebu, Misamis Oriental, and Davao del Sur also belong to this first quartile, but resemble ‘wealthier islands’ surrounded by provinces with a clearly higher proportional poverty incidence. According to his field observations expert interview\(^ {20}\) regards the information on Guimaras and Basilan to be unrealistic: He would categorise both provinces among the poorest in the country. Provincial ‘pockets’ of the highest percentage of the poor (51.9-70.9%) concentrate in Mindanao, Eastern and Western Visayas, Bicol, and the CAR, and are headed by Masbate, Sulu, Romblon, and Ifugao provinces.

Figure 6.2 shows the poor as a proportion of the regional population since 1991. As a trend, the poor’s percentage in most regions has decreased between 1991 and 1997 and has increased since – a possible indicator for the impact of the economic recession commonly called the ‘Asian crisis’ in 1997/1998. The crisis set off in Thailand, spread over Asia and is, broadly speaking, seen as a result of volatile globalisation-led growth that relies upon global capital and labour division. However, the Philippines were less hard hit than their neighbours. Yet, the crisis coincided with a severe El-Nino-related drought in the Philippines, which exacerbated the recession (Bautista 2000).

\(^{18}\) The measurement involves construction of (a) food and (b) poverty thresholds: (a) includes income needed to obtain a food basket for urban and rural areas of each region, satisfying a minimum nutrition of 2000 kilocalories per person per day; (b) defines food threshold plus non-food expenditure of household within a 10 percentile band around the food threshold in the income distribution (including costs for clothing, housing, medical care, education, transportation and communication, non-durable furniture, personal care).

\(^{19}\) Note that absolute numbers of the poor evidently reflect general population distribution patterns.
Exceptions in figure 6.2 are the (a) ARMM and Bicol, which have developed the opposite direction, (b) CAR and Cagayan Valley, which have reduced their proportion of the poor continuously since 1994, and (c) Northern Mindanao where the percentage of the poor has almost stagnated.

The figure suggests grouping those regions with similar poverty levels over time. The ‘wealthiest’ group is headed by Metro Manila and includes Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, and Central Visayas. The other extreme with poverty percentages around 60% consists of the ARMM, Bicol, and Central Mindanao. In fact, all Mindanao regions register high-poverty levels, the Visayan medium-levels, the Luzon regions located proximate to Metro Manila low, and the Luzon regions located at a distance to Metro Manila high and medium poverty levels.

Figure 6.2: The poor as a percentage to regional population 1991-2000

*Caraga is not included in data source

Source: NSCB 2002b
Perspective II: Distribution of income poverty or income inequality

The NSCB (2000) stresses that its poverty measurement enables comparison across provinces, while still acknowledging local differences as it is based on locally distinct food baskets (see footnote 18). In contrast, Balisacan (1997) claims this methodology to induce spatial distortions: As consumption turns to higher quality with higher income, food thresholds are higher for the wealthier than the poorer. Thus, food poverty lines are not comparable across regions since they imply different living standards. Balisacan infers that illustrations of the distributional aspects of poverty are biased.

As noted, a popular indicator that explicitly illuminates the distributional aspects of disparities of poverty is the income-based Gini-coefficient, as displayed in figure 6.3 for Philippine families by provinces in 1997 and 2000. In 2000, the most obvious ‘pockets’ of low-income inequality are located in the provinces around Metro Manila (not the Metropolitan itself!) and the very North of Luzon, whereas especially the Visayan provinces register comparably high-income inequality. Mindanao shows a mixed picture, ranging from provinces in the ARMM with the lowest inequality in the country to highly unequal Zamboanga, South Cotabato, and Bukidnon. Compared to 1997, broadly speaking, income distributions have deteriorated in the Visayas and have become more equal in Luzon and Mindanao – with the exception from Bicol and CAR provinces. This is an interesting observation given that, according to figure 6.2, poverty incidence in most provinces started to rise again in 1997 and one could expect inequality to increase parallely.

In a qualitative comparison of figures 6.1 and 6.3 the Philippine provinces can be grouped according to their specific income poverty and inequality relation. There are

(a) Provinces with high poverty incidence and low inequality (e.g. the ARMM provinces, Agusan del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, Marinduque);
(b) Provinces with high poverty and high inequality (e.g. the CAR and Bicol provinces, Bohol, Capiz);
(c) Provinces with low poverty and low inequality (e.g. provinces surrounding Metro Manila, Central Luzon, the very North of Luzon);
(d) Provinces with low poverty yet higher inequality (e.g. Metro Manila, Cebu, Capiz, Iloilo, Misamis Oriental, Davao del Sur), and
(e) Residual provinces with non-conform and varied patterns.

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20 The ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality to the area below the line of perfect equality: 0 indicates perfect equality and 1 perfect inequality.
Figure 6.3: Gini coefficient of Philippine provinces in 1997 and 2000
6.1.2 On labour: Alternative viewpoint

Unemployment and underemployment

Unemployment and underemployment\(^{21}\) are not included in official poverty statistics, yet the national government views them as central to Philippine developmental problems (NEDA 2001: 31-35). The Philippine labour force participation in 2001 is at 67.5 % the highest in ten years (NSCB 2002b). The ILO (2003) calculates the rate even higher at 69.8%, yet also illustrates that Philippine labour force participation remains low in Southeast Asian comparison. Figure 6.4 shows the annual national employment and underemployment rates between 1991 and 2001, and employment rates by region in 2001. Employment rates vary between 89.9 and 92.6%; that means that unemployment rates officially swing around 10%.

Figure 6.4: Annual employment and underemployment rates of the household population 15 years and over 1991-2001, and employment rate by region in 2001

In this context, one expert interviewee advises to consider that “in the first half of 2005 Arroyo and other government officials announced that the ‘officially’ given figures on unemployment are not correct. They said approximately 13%. But if you ask me and other friends of mine in the Philippines agree it could be around 30%. Again a problem of statistics or of faked statistics” (expert interview 20). Unemployment numbers are also likely to be

\(^{21}\) Underemployment includes all employed persons who desire additional (hours of) work (NSCB 2002b).
many times higher than the official counts, because data are inconsistent as several sources publish different figures on the same indicator\textsuperscript{22}. Furthermore, informal labour makes an important contribution, yet is not registered and figures remain vague. For example, Schneider (1999) registers between 16\% and 34\% of employment in Baguio and Zamboanga City as informal\textsuperscript{23}. In the absence of formal social protection schemes, there is little incentive to register as unemployed. The government only offers internet-based assistance to employment search and creation (Brooks 2002). These services concentrate in Metropolitan Manila and its surroundings. Notwithstanding these data constraints, all employment data used for this study indicate similar tendencies and therefore the figures are utilised as qualitative indicators.

Employment rates show a slightly ‘bumpy’ increase in the early 1990s and a sharp downfall after 1996, which, despite some fluctuations, have not picked up considerably until 2001. Obviously, these trends correspond (in reverse direction) to those of poverty incidence. Underemployment follows an opposite trend and thus matches with those of unemployment, yet is with rates ranging from 23.7\% (1998) to 16.6\% (2001) considerably higher than unemployment. The labour underutilisation rate peaked with up to 33.3\% in 1998, the crisis-year.

\textbf{Boom- and bust experiences and the income - labour nexus}

The experiences of Filipinos in the labour market, with income-poverty and with inequality all reflect the boom and bust cycle in overall economic growth. The course of the Philippine Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1984 and 2002, as illustrated in figure 6.5 has been very unstable: The country suffered from three socio-economic crises in 1983/84, 1990-92 and 1997/98: Once it managed to recover from one recession, another already commenced.

The recession 1983/84 is claimed to have resulted from a foreign debt crisis and stoppage of foreign loans interrelated with unsuccessful governmental interventions due to ‘cronyism’ under Marcos (compare chapter 5.2), and the rise of mass protest against Marcos following the assassination of his ‘rival’ Aquino in 1983. The bust years 1990-92 were mainly an inflation crisis with inflation reaching 20\% (Lim 1998). As mentioned, the ‘Asian crisis’ together with the El Nino-instigated drought set of another severe recession period in 1997/98.

Strikingly, in 2000 the GDP grows at 4.2\%, yet employment falls and vice versa in 2001. Three explanations are likely: (a) Values on GDP before and since 2000 are not directly comparable because of a change in methodological derivation. Comparable figures of GDP would probably have been lower for 2000, given that economic recovery was dampened by

\textsuperscript{22} Compare data published by ADB, ESCAP, NEDA and NSCB (see bibliography).

\textsuperscript{23} ‘Informal’ includes the self-employed without official licence and enterprises with less than 5 employees.
political turmoil through (b) ‘people power II’ forcing Estrada out of and Arroyo taking over presidency, and (c) a blackmail series in Mindanao (compare chapter 8.4.2). Since 2001, rising employment and GDP and less underemployment have indicated a hopeful ‘new beginning’ under Arroyo (compare chapters 9 and 10).

Figure 6.5: GDP growth and GDP by sector (at constant 1985 prices)

Spatial disparities in the labour market

Figure 6.6 visualises absolute (sectoral) employment by province in 2001. Besides logically reflecting population distribution, the differentials in employment exemplify levels of economic attractiveness. In absolute numbers, employment is allocated in the NCR and surroundings, to a lesser extent in Cebu and Negros Occidental, and in and around Davao del Sur. In comparison, figure 6.4 implies that the unemployment rate in 2001 is also highest in the NCR, followed by Southern Tagalog, Central Luzon, and Central Visayas. In contrast, the ARMM registers a contrasting pattern with very little absolute employment yet the lowest unemployment rate. Its economy is based above all on subsistence agriculture and fisheries, both sectors with many family workers and little (registered) dismissals.

Relating the findings to the city and population distribution in figure 5.2, obviously, (a) the largely urbanised regions record high absolute employment, high unemployment, and high absolute yet low population-relative poverty. On the contrary, (b) those regions with less absolute employment, relative low unemployment, yet high relative poverty incidences comprise the CAR, Cagayan Valley, Eastern Visayas and the ARMM, selected provinces of Northern and Central Mindanao and Caraga as well as Western MIMAROPA provinces of Southern Tagalog – all of which display a stronger rural character according to figure 5.2.
Figure 6.6: Employment by sector and province in 2001
6.1.3 Sectoral developments: Agriculture vs. services and industry?

Figure 6.7 visualises the absolute gross domestic product (GDP) by economic sector and GDP growth rates by regions from 1999 to 2001 and in the crisis year 1998. As to be expected, in absolute terms, the NCR outnumbers all other regions in terms of income production, followed by its neighbouring regions of Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon, the Central and Western Visayas and Southern Mindanao. Noteworthy, the Western Visayas produce almost as much as their Central neighbour, yet with much smaller population numbers (see figure 5.2). With the exception of Northern Mindanao, residual Mindanao regions are far behind the development of Southern Mindanao. The ARMM and Caraga are at the least end of the GDP parameter in the country. Western and Central Mindanao, Eastern Visayas, Bicol, the CAR and Cagayan Valley follow.

In sectoral terms, the figure confirms already noted spatial patterns: The agricultural sector has disappeared from the NCR. Services produce more than 50% of the GDP there and in the Central Visayas. Industry dominates over 50% of the economy in CAR, while in turn agriculture takes the lead in Cagayan Valley, Western Mindanao, and the ARMM. Subsequent chapters discuss sectoral developments in detail. In comparison with employment by sector in figure 6.6 one can infer, broadly speaking, that most regions with a majority of labour force in agriculture are least successful in terms of GDP production and growth (exceptions of Cagayan Valley and Central Visayas). In contrast, those regions with high employment in services and industry yield higher economic products and growth (exception of CAR).

None the less, with regard to GDP growth 1999-2001, Cagayan Valley and Southern Mindanao head the countrywide trend, based on agriculture/fishery (-industry) and trade – and despite the sharp decrease in GDP in 1997/98 (small map, figure 6.7). The more industry and service-led NCR, Central Luzon, the CAR, Western and Central Visayas also yield high growth rates, and suffered comparatively less during 1997/98. This finding suggests that hazards may have had more adverse effects on the Philippine regional economy than the Asian crisis in 1997/98 (Shaw 1999; see chapters 5.2, 6.3). Southern Tagalog is one step behind because of its divide into, broadly speaking rural-agricultural MIMAROPA and urbanising, service-industry-led CALABRAZON (see table 4.2; small map in figure 4.1).

Thus, the spatial distribution of GDP adds another ‘layer of disparities’ to the already elaborated rough patterns and underlines the basic differentiation into

(a) Largely urbanised regions with larger overall economic production, higher absolute employment, high absolute yet low population-relative income poverty. Note that these regions also have high rates of labour turn-over and income inequality, as opposed to

(b) Rural regions with less absolute employment, relative low unemployment, lower overall economic production, relatively high-income poverty incidences, yet lower income inequality. This broad differentiation is specified in subsequent sections.
Figure 6.7: Gross domestic product by economic sector and region, and its overall growth rates 1999-2001 and during the ‘Asian crisis’ year 1998
Agriculture and fishery: Traditional backbone of the Philippine economy

The Philippines are traditionally an agricultural and fishery economy. Table 6.1 shows that Palay rice, corn, sugarcane, coconut, and banana are the top 5 crops in terms of value of production in 2001. Besides minor changes, these plantation crops have been the top 5 for 50 years. Colonial powers introduced plantations to the Philippines, which have dominated the agro-industrial (export) landscapes in Mindanao, the Visayas, and Cagayan Valley until today. Plantation-led areas typically co-exist with areas characterised through small-scale, mainly subsistence agriculture (see chapter 7). Relating tables 6.1 and 6.2 it becomes obvious that only coconuts and bananas are used for large-scale exports, whereas rice even has to be imported in huge amounts. Put differently, the Philippines are not able to provide their inhabitants with their prime crop food.

Table 6.1: Top 5 agricultural crops by value of production 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Value of production in million Pesos</th>
<th>Per cent of total production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Palay</td>
<td>105,323,1</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Corn</td>
<td>30,724,8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sugarcane</td>
<td>25,211,3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Coconut</td>
<td>24,434,4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Banana</td>
<td>22,672,3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NSCB 2002b

Table 6.2: Top 5 of agricultural exports and imports 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Export commodity</th>
<th>Value in US$</th>
<th>Import commodity</th>
<th>Value in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Oil of coconuts</td>
<td>352,625,000</td>
<td>1. Wheat</td>
<td>486,728,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bananas</td>
<td>308,887,000</td>
<td>2. Cake of Soya Beans</td>
<td>231,911,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dried coconuts</td>
<td>94,798,000</td>
<td>3. Milled Paddy Rice</td>
<td>211,663,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Canned Pineapple</td>
<td>81,979,000</td>
<td>4. Dry Skim Cow Milk</td>
<td>145,712,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Prepared Fruit</td>
<td>64,901,000</td>
<td>5. Cigarettes</td>
<td>107,838,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO 2003

In the fishery sector, the production quantity of catches has increased constantly since the early 1970s as figure 6.8 illustrates. Besides fisher folks’ ‘traditional’ coastal fishing for subsistence, there are an estimated one million small-scale fishermen (mostly relying on reef fishery), who contribute almost one billion US dollar to the

Figure 6.8: Quantity of fish production 1992-2001

Source: IBON 2002

24 1 Philippine Peso is worth 0.0200140 US Dollar or 1 US Dollar 49.9650 Pesos as of 05/10/2006.
economy (White, Vogt, Arin 2000). Besides, commercial large-scale fishing with processing facilities on board, and aquaculture of prawns, milkfish, shells, or seafood in mangrove brackwaters are growing sectors in the Philippines. Aquacultures have been practiced in the Philippines since the 17th century and have become a very significant export product and a means to large-scale income generation (Uthoff 2000). However, at the local level, overfishing and resource depletion, pollution, and deforestation of mangrove areas – the breeding and nursery sites of many fish, shells, and birds, and control to soil erosion and salination – make fisher folks’ attempts to secure a livelihood ever more difficult (compare Bohol case in chapters 7.2.3 and 8.4.3; Kelly 1996; ADB 1999).

**Productivity of the primary sector and labour dilemmas**

Since the early 1980s the primary sector has in fact been a shrinking sector in terms of employment and income production the Philippines and continues to dominate the economy only in the mentioned regions of Cagayan Valley, Western Mindanao and ARMM (compare figures 6.6, 6.7). In 1985 agriculture and fisheries still accounted for 26.7% of the national economy, industry for 33% and services for 40.4%. By 2003 the share of the primary sector drops to 19.9%, the secondary sector stagnates at 33.5%, while the tertiary sector produces at 46.7% almost half of the economy (see figure 6.5). Only Cagayan Valley and Southern Mindanao experience a period of successful growth due to their primary sectors, which are mainly plantation-led (coconut, palm oil, fruits, timber), plus in case of Southern Mindanao in services (figure 6.7).

Notwithstanding its reduced productivity, in 2001 37.7% of all employed Filipinos are still officially engaged in the primary sector (NSCB 2001). These figures do neither include unpaid family workers, people pursuing several jobs at a time nor the informal sector. Therefore, figures can be assumed higher: Estimates reach 64% (Shaw 1999: 44). As figure 6.6 displays, agriculture and fishery remains the dominant sector of employment in most of Mindanao, Eastern Visayas, Northern Luzon as well as MIMAROPA- Southern Tagalog. These agricultural/fishery-led regions are – when compared with the spatial patterns of poverty incidence and the city and population distribution – at the same time those with over-proportionally high percentage of poor inhabitants and those with a stronger rural character (see figures 6.1, 5.2).

It ought to be noted that agricultural and fishery development in the Philippines is additionally impeded through the

(a) The lack of space in the relatively narrow strips of fertile coastal lowlands where increasing urbanisation takes away agricultural lands;

(b) The natural disasters that frequently hit the country;

(c) The morphological fragmentation; and
(d) Dependence on irrigation infrastructure.

For example, the sharp decrease in GDP in Southern and Northern Mindanao and Cagayan Valley in 1997/98, depicted in figure 6.7, are, as briefly hinted at before, above all caused by the natural phenomenon of El Nino and the following drought. The ‘Asian crisis’ is only partially to blame because the Philippine agricultural sector is only limitedly integrated in global(ised) markets. Somewhat paradoxically, “Thus, in a perverse way, the backwardness of Philippine agriculture has proved a strength during the crisis” (Shaw 1999: 48; compare also Clausen forthcoming B).

The morphological fragmentation of the Philippines results in high transport, logistic, and infrastructure costs which eventually make “it cheaper to bring corn from Bangkok to Manila than to bring corn from Cotabato to Manila” (Intal & Osman Ranit 2001: 1). Moreover – and this accounts for all economic sectors – the small markets of the single islands make economies of scale more difficult, cause lower price outcomes for farmers, and the domestic markets to be unable to compensate unexpected, high demand levels which are then released through imports. These inefficiencies of the distribution system lead to additional pressure for economic protection, which in turn, keep up labour costs. It is argued that the Philippines fall behind in international competition for foreign investment and labour division in all economic sectors because of their high labour costs compared to countries like Indonesia, Vietnam or China (expert interviews 1, 20).

Irrigation infrastructure is an essential aspect to enhance agricultural productivity because “it is land quality, not farm size per se that tends to positively influence the income of the poor” (Baliscan & Pernia 2002: 5). However, Baliscan & Pernia forget here that the establishment and maintenance of irrigation facilities already require a certain financial asset which most of the very poor do not possess. Figure 6.9 highlights that the irrigated areas in Luzon exceed those in the Visayas and Mindanao in absolute terms. Central Luzon, Illocos and Cagayan Valley are top in the country, whereas the ARMM and Central Visayas come last. This is particularly interesting because Cebu and Negros provinces belong to the traditional large-scale agricultural plantation areas (compare Torres-Mejia 2000). Also worth noting is that irrigated areas in Bicol exceeds those in Mindanao. In terms of irrigation potential, huge capacities exist in Mindanao, and to a lesser extent, in Western Visayas and Cagayan Valley.

The map hides yet another problematic aspect persistent in Philippine irrigation development. Irrigated farmland is above all located in the fertile, intensively cultivated lowlands but receives water from upland springs – a relationship that turns to become problematic with increasing intensity of upland agriculture as chapters 7.2.3 for the case of Bohol. Kikuchi, Maruyama, Hayami (2003) even foresee the gradual collapse of existing irrigation facilities in the Philippines due to water mismanagement, rehabilitation and maintenance problems, and a consequential food crisis in near future.
Figure 6.9: Status of irrigation development in 2001
Landownership fundamentals

Figure 6.10 underlines some of the mentioned aspects and points at a problem that is fundamental in understanding disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines: Social inequalities created through unequal landownership overlap with material and spatial disparities.

The figure visualises the percentage of farm area by total area and province in 2002 (part A) and its changes since 1991 (part B). Part A shows that relatively high percentages of land are, broadly speaking, in agricultural use in Bicol, Negros, Northern and Southern Mindanao. Interestingly, other agricultural productivity hubs such as Cagayan Valley register relatively little proportions of farmland. These findings can only be understood when related to the overall alienable and disposable, i.e. private land area, which in turn partially reflects morphological conditions, as illustrated in part C of the figure. With regard to Cagayan Valley, the map indicates low percentages of alienable lands, which may in turn result in the low farmland proportions (which are, however, as noted, highly productive, possibly by means of irrigation).

For further explanation, the figure indicates farmland by their operators’ place of residence and not by the actual location of the farms. This is also the reason why, at first sight strikingly, Metro Manila records the highest percentage of farm area in the whole country and its figures exceed even a 100%. In other words, many farm owners live in Metro Manila and operate their farms as ‘absentee owners’ at a distance. These finding are linked to the fact that most agricultural lands in the Philippines are owned by wealthy landowners, while practically looked after by tenants and landless workers. The landowners contribute to the wealth of the capital (for example through taxes), whereas the tenants and landless Filipinos make up specific poverty groups and contribute to the poverty accumulation in the agricultural regions (compare Bohol case in chapters 7 and 8; Torres-Mejia 2000). Similar situations may apply to the provinces surrounding the Metropolis, however, these provinces may also be affected by the mentioned displacement of agricultural lands through urbanisation and industrialisation. The phenomenon of sharply decreasing percentages of farm area in these provinces stresses this argument (figure 6.10 part B).

In the context of disparate development, relations between Philippine landowner elites and marginalised workers are most worthy of note. However, it ought to be mentioned, that a fairly distinct middle class has emerged in the Philippines alongside industrialisation and particularly globalisation processes. The middle class geographically concentrates in urban areas, mostly Metro Manila, and is estimated by expert interview 9 to comprise about 30% of Philippine society (see also chapters 9.2.2 and 9.3.2, Kimura 2003).
Figure 6.10: Farm area by province: Several Viewpoints
**Industrial development through globalisation**

Since the early 1980s the Philippine economy has aimed at the expansion of industries and services through export-orientated trade and inflow of foreign investment, in short through globalisation: Already in 1990 exports totalled 18.5% of the GDP and increased to 23.5% in 1995 and 51% in 2000 (Orbeta 2002). FDI inflows rose from US$ 530 million in 1980 to US$1.408 million in 1996. In addition, net private capital inflows increased from US$639 million to US$4.600 million (Angeles 2000). Sector-wise, as figure 6.5 and 6.7 show, the industrial sector grows less and is smaller than its service counterpart. In 2001, 16.3% of all employed Filipinos work in industry.

Spatially, industrial employment and GDP production are located disproportionately in Metro Manila, close-by Central Luzon provinces, CALABRAZON- provinces of Southern Tagalog, the Central Visayas, especially Cebu province. Interestingly, in CAR industry takes over more than 50% of the economy but generates little employment. Similarly, the regional shares of exports and FDI are biased: In 1988, Southern Tagalog makes up for 3.7% of exports and 28.8% of FDI in the national total, compared to Metro Manila at 57.1% and 42.7% respectively. By the year 2000, Southern Tagalog develops as the dominant exporter with 52.3% and receiver of FDI with 63.4%, followed by the NCR with 23.6% and 18.1% respectively. Obviously, investments, firstly, allocate almost exclusively to Metro Manila and Southern Tagalog, and secondly, have shifted proportionally from the Metropolis southwards into CALABRAZON provinces of Southern Tagalog in the 1990s (Pernia & Quising 2002).

The establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the Philippines explicitly aims at using global industrial enterprises as levers for a more balanced development, particularly for agro-industries in the poorer regions (compare Palpacuer & Parisotto 2003). However, the eventual SEZ distribution again replicates existing spatial and economic divides as figure 6.11 illustrates. With 71 Special Economic Zones Southern Tagalog (mostly in the CALABRAZON) clearly outnumbers all other regions, followed by the NCR with 24, Central Luzon with 15, and Central Visayas with 13 SEZs. Again, the Mindanao, Eastern and Western Visayas, and Northern Luzon Regions are worse off with 41 SEZs between them (PEZA 2003). The three SEZs in Banquet may account for the strong mining-industry in the CAR. However, as mentioned, industrial employment is small in the CAR (see chapter 6.3).

In fact, Philippine export processing zones (the most common kind of SEZ) generated only 0.3% of national employment, compared to 12.0% in China, 4.4% in Sri Lanka and 2.1% in Malaysia in 1995 – once again calling for less global integration of the Philippine economy than their neighbours (Jayanthakumaran 2003). Moreover, the SEZs tend to be badly integrated into local subcontractor systems and import between 40% and 75% of their production costs. Hence, neither local ancillary industries nor local (agro-) industries benefit substantially and durably from spill over effect (Hanisch 2000). In addition, a focus on
(industrial) growth through foreign investments reinforces the volatility of markets (compare small map in figure 6.7). Market volatility is also a reason for the discerned high unemployment in the NCR, Central Luzon, and Southern Tagalog (figure 6.4).

Figure 6.11: Special Economic Zones in the Philippines in 2003
**Development potentials in the service sector**

Services are the fastest growing and largest sector in the Philippines in terms of overall GDP and employment generation (see figures 6.5, 6.6, 6.7). In 2001, 46% of all employed Filipinos work in services. In addition, many small-scale businesses work in the service sector informally and seasonally as an income diversification instrument. This implies that they are not officially registered and pay taxes, yet are equally without access to bank credits and government support.

Figure 6.12 presents the officially registered small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the service sector for every 1000 Filipinos by province in 2000. It illuminates that. As to be expected, the quartile of highest allocation (plus outliers) of SMEs (between 71 and 166) is located in Metro Manila and the adjacent provinces. The North and South of Mindanao, especially Misamis Oriental and Davao del Sur are also included in this quartile. In contrast, the SME presence in ARMM is very low. In the North there is a clear ‘boundary’ between Central Luzon and the provinces of the CAR, which belong to the last quartile at between 3 and 41 of service SMEs by 1000 Filipinos. Towards the Eastern parts of the country another ‘pocket’ of provinces with low service SMEs consists of Eastern Visayas, South of Bicol, and Bohol province. Generally, with the exception of Cebu and Negros Oriental, the Visayas register comparatively few SMEs. This is a striking finding, as the Visayas – to be illustrated subsequently – represent in fact one of the main tourism hubs in the country, where one would consequently assume many SMEs to develop. Offering a possible explanation from a more conceptual angle (Bigg & Satterthwaite 2005: 10) point out that in many developing countries like the Philippines even officially registered micro, small and medium-sized enterprises ironically more often face discrimination in receiving funding, marketing or contract incentives by governments and international investors than large and already capital-stocked enterprises.
Tourism: A rural development catalyst?

Potentially the Philippines offer what many tourists seek for: White sand beaches, coral reefs, isolated ‘dream’ pacific islands, tropical flora and fauna, and exotic lifestyles. Moreover, Filipinos possess the assets of speaking English, they have – as to be shown in chapter 6.2 – a comparatively high educational attainment level, and are generally assumed to be open-minded towards foreigners (compare White & Rosales 2002).

In more central areas like Cebu expansion of tourism services can help to compensate population employment pressures. However, as figure 6.13 shows, many of the tourist attractions are located in rural and/or remote areas. Hence, tourism could ideally serve as the development catalyst for these areas and somewhat naturally compensate for the economic neglect of the rural and peripheral by the industries. In other words, tourism is the only economic sector, which has the potential to turn presumably comparative economic disadvantages of remote locations of the archipelago into advantages (see Pearce 2001 for an overview on this thesis).

For example, the approximately 3000 inhabitants of the small and isolated island of Boracay, located off Aklan province (see figure 6.13), used to live on subsistence fishery and agriculture. Since 1978 the island has been proclaimed as a ‘tourist zone’ for individual small-scale tourism, and first higher-standard accommodation were established in 1985. Tourism has developed rapidly and made Boracay one of the prime destinations for (foreign) visitors in the country. A complete transformation of Boracay’s economy is the result. Vorlaufer (1996: 153) estimates that in the mid-1990s between 11,000 and 14,000 people – including Boracayanos, Filipinos from other islands, as well as foreigners – live on tourism earnings on the island. Agriculture and fishery have almost disappeared, former farmers and fishermen now base their livelihoods on (formal and informal) tourist boat trips, market trade, construction work, tricycle services, souvenir sales or else. Skilled jobs with good pay in
high-end hostels attract migrants to the island. All in all, Boracay now fulfils economic ‘centre’ functions in the region (Shah, Gupta, Boyd 2000; see chapter 8.4.2 for follow-up).

Figures on the economic impact of tourism are rare and vary (see illustration of data situation below). Overall, however, in comparison with its Southeast Asian neighbours the Philippines’s volume of arrivals is still one of the lowest. Figure 6.14 shows that total visitors’ arrivals into the Philippines have constantly increased until 1997, then decreased slowly – probably due to the Asian crisis – and since 1999 rapidly, probably due to diverse political turmoil (compare also Rodolfo 2003: 13).

Yet, it is widely acknowledged that tourism in the Philippines is still in early stages of its product cycle and can – should – become a major contributor to the generation of foreign exchange earnings, FDI, here to economic growth through global market orientation (NEDA 2001: 71-78; compare chapter 8.1). Thereby high-end mass resort tourism goes hand in hand with smaller-scaled tourism in order to enable both, centres and peripheries to benefit from the sector in a sustainable way. To summarise an opinion asserted by many scholars: “We are optimistic that […] tourism development in coastal areas of the country will thrive in the coming years and contribute more to both environmental sustainability and the generation of rural wealth” (White & Rosales 2002: 260).

**Excursus: Talking data quality**

Hidden by figure 6.14 are the commonly encountered problems with data quality of tourism statistics in the Philippines, as demonstrated in figures 6.15 and 6.16 on spatially aggregated data. Figure 6.15 represents foreign travellers, overseas Filipinos, and domestic tourists visiting Philippine regions in 2001. The displayed patterns seem clear and reliable: By far the most (largely domestic) tourists arrive in Southern Tagalog, followed by the CAR and Central Visayas, which also registers the highest proportion of foreign visitors (no data are available for the NCR). The numbers of visiting overseas Filipinos seem marginal.

Figure 6.16 illuminates the provincial database from which the regional data is derived and gives evidence that the regional patterns are not reliable. Vast data inconsistencies and incompleteness are apparent across scales. Probably, data deficiencies would be even greater at municipal scale. In other words, the spatial scale of data illustration utilised in the maps – which is, however, often the only available one – may hide deficits in data generation at higher scales. This discovery should be considered for all perspectives on disparities of
poverty and wealth in the Philippines given in this study. Especially domestic tourism data should be treated with caution, because domestic tourists are neither officially counted nor differentiated from migrants visiting their place of origin. International tourists have to fill in registration cards when first entering the Philippines by plane, yet not when they arrive by ferry. According to figure 6.16 particularly Cebu stands out as a destination of international tourists. The Visayas represent a major destination for international beach, diving, and sex tourists, as to be explored for Bohol in chapter 8. Notwithstanding, the high numbers for Cebu may also ground in its function as a gateway for tourists into the Visayas, through its international airport and seaport (the 2nd largest after Metro Manila) and not necessarily hint at the numbers of tourists staying in the city.

Figure 6.15: Absolute numbers of tourists by region in 2000
Figure 6.16: Absolute numbers by tourists by province in 2000 – Data quality
Road infrastructure: An important aspect to all economic sectors

In the fragmented archipelago of the Philippine infrastructural accessibility represents one key factor to the development of peripheral regions. A central aspect is road infrastructure, which can, particularly when coupled with other sectoral investments exert great impacts on the welfare of the poor in the Philippines by establishing linkages through transport networks and channels of market distribution from peripheries to centres and vice versa (Ali & Pernia 2003; Pearce 2001).

Road density by province is displayed in figure 6.17. Basically, the map adds another ‘layer’ to the already-known pattern: Road networks are best in and around Metro Manila, Illocos, Central and Western Visayas, and Misamis Oriental. The outstanding position of Illocos may result from infrastructure investments by Marcos into his home region (compare chapter 9). The dense road network in Central and Western Visayas may be rooted in its relevance and investments in tourism. Interestingly, Bohol exceeds its neighbour Cebu (compare chapter 7.2.4 for intra-provincial situation). The roads in Misamis Oriental may be side effects of (foreign-owned) agro-industry. Noticeably, the province tops Davao del Sur.

Morphology may obviously influence provincial road density. Generally speaking, regions with greater lowlands are served better with roads than those with a more mountainous character. Central and Western Visayas represent two exceptions. The road network may also reflect population distribution and city system, however, does not do so in Illocos, Bicol, Western and Southern Mindanao, and Bohol province (compare chapter 5.1).
6.2 Social disparities of poverty and wealth: Filipinos’ human resources

6.2.1 Population dilemmas

Rapid population growth and the sharp contrast between regions with high and low population density put pressure on the Philippine present and future development paths (compare Gultiano & Ulrich 2001). The Philippine population has almost multiplied by four since the first census after independence in 1948 and reaches 81,408,000 people in mid 2004. The national population growth rate peaked at 3.08% in 1970 and has been reduced to a – still high – 2.36% in 2000. The continued population growth causes the unfavourable national age dependency ratio of 69.8 in 2000. This means that in 2000 59% of the Philippine population are between 15 and 45 years old. These 59% care for themselves and another 37% young and 4% elderly. About a third of the population is below fifteen. Thus, the population entering the labour force will continue to grow quickly for at least fifteen years (NSO 2001/2002).

Figure 6.18 shows provincial population densities in 2000. As expected, the economic centres register the highest densities, led by Metro Manila with 15,684 inhabitants per km². Some of the poorest provinces in Bicol, Western Visayas, and Sulu have high densities, too. In contrast, inhabitants in Caraga, Eastern Visayas, MIMAROPA, Cagayan Valley, and CAR live more scattered.

Relating these findings to the overall population growth from 1995-2000 (figure 6.19), projected total fertility 1995-2005 (figure 6.20), and income-poverty and inequality profiles, the following provincial processes and groupings can be inferred:

(a) The wealthier and relatively urbanised provinces in Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog-CALABRAZON, Central and Western Visayas, Davao del Sur, and Misamis Oriental
show high population densities and high overall population growth despite low fertility levels: I assume that they represent destinations of large-scale migration flows.

(b) Metro Manila itself seems already to be too ‘crowded’ to absorb large amounts of migrants.

c) The poor and highly unequal provinces in Bicol, Eastern Visayas, Caraga, and Western Mindanao demonstrate high fertility despite low/medium total population increase. If mortality is not exceptionally high, this pattern hints at large-scale out-migration. Emigrants escape the employment and poverty problems and at the same time support their families and places of origin through remittances.

d) The poor provinces of the ARMM and Kalinga and Apayo in CAR register high fertility and overall high population growth, yet their inhabitants do not seem to leave their homes. Similar processes are indicated in the case of Palawan. This pattern reflects that migration requires a certain amount of existing financial and network resources. It is not an option for the (very) poor.

(e) Residual areas like Cagayan Valley or Ilocos show varying patterns (as areas beyond the regional or provincial level may as well). This findings for the Ilocos case strikes, because the region is known as a ‘traditional’ origin of migrants.

As a result, provinces (c) have high dependency ratios; that means lower percentages of 15 to 64 years-olds in their population despite their high total fertility rates. In contrast, the destination provinces (a) and (b) have lower dependency ratios as they have absorbed the 15 to 64 year-olds. It follows, that the places of outbound migration loose their most productive

There are no official statistics on inland migration streams in the Philippines.
population and their human capital basis. They experience a ‘brain drain’ although these ‘brains’ are essential factors required to foster substantial change in their political economy landscape.

Filipinos also migrate abroad. In fact, they have become the largest ‘migrant nation’ in the world (Philippine Daily Inquirer 09/03/2003). In 2001 the stock estimate of overseas Filipino workers (i.e. the employed only) totals at 7,402,89426 – around 9% of the total population and 20.2% of the labour force. In addition, between 1981 and 2001 657,097 unemployed Filipinos have emigrated permanently (CFO 2002). Migrants’ remittances are essential incentives for development ‘at home’. Officially, migrants send back 6,031,271,000 US$ of remittances in 2001 which are not only significant for individual families and communities but for the Philippine economy as such (compare chapter 9.3.3).

Figure 6.20: Projected total fertility rate by region 1995-2005

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26 Data on international out-migration are published by the National Statistical Office (NSO), the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), and the Commission of Filipinos Overseas (CFO), each applying unique definitions. Therefore figures differ; see www.census.gov.ph; www.cfo.gov.ph; www.poea.gov.ph.
6.2.2 Education, health, and human development

High educational attainment and knowledge pools of Filipinos – an inheritance of American education system – is often claimed to be the most outstanding comparative advantage Filipinos have in the ‘global’ economy (see Hutchcroft 1998). Figure 6.21 visualises the subnational educational attainment of Filipinos aged five or older in four grades of qualification: Those with (a) no education, (b) elementary, (c) secondary, or (d) tertiary qualifications (no cumulative counting). A clear South-North differential strikes with regard to people with no and primary education, which reverses into a North-South divide with respect to secondary and tertiary qualifications. The inhabitants of Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog and Ilocos are the best educated, whereas the ARMM registers the highest percentage of non-educated inhabitants in the country. In Luzon, only provinces in the CAR and Cagayan Valley register larger proportions of the not or little educated. Mindanao provinces, with the exceptions of Misamis Oriental and Davao del Norte, record comparably low educational qualification levels. This is particularly interesting with respect to the outstanding economic centre function of Davao del Sur (compare chapter 6.1). Similarly, however, Cebu province reveals only moderate qualification levels. In terms of percentage of people with tertiary education Cebu is even overtaken by illoio and Aklan provinces, although only four universities are located in illoio and none in Aklan as compared to eight in Cebu (STEDNET 2002) – possibly once again an indicator for incorrect statistics?

Provincial averages of Filipinos’ life expectancy, displayed in figure 6.22 part A, confirm familiar spatial development patterns from a health perspective. Unexpectedly, Camarines Sur in Bicol belongs to the quartile of highest life expectancy. Given its high poverty, inequality and population density, I cannot think of any explanation but data inconsistency (although the data source is generally reliable).

Figure 6.22 part B displays that the Philippines lack doctors, especially most of Mindanao and Bicol and some parts of Eastern Visayas are severely underserved. Central and Western Visayas situate in middle ranks. However, the map does not comment on nurses or barangay health workers, its data source is only limitedly reliable, and illustrations do not match with prior findings: There are relatively few doctors in the provinces adjacent to Metro Manila in contrast to higher numbers in CAR or Palawan. Possible explanations may be that Filipinos living close to the Metropolis tend to go there to see doctors, and that the survey counts alternative health experts and ‘medicine men’ of the indigenous people in CAR and Palawan. This argument is supported by the fact that the highest relative numbers of doctors countrywide is registered for the small island of Siquijor, which is known for inhibiting many alternative healers (field research 01-03/2004). Yet, why are alternative health experts, ‘medicine men’ counted, not nurses and barangay health workers?
Figure 6.21: Educational attainment of household population over five in 2000
Water scarcity

Figure 6.23 displays the proportion of Filipinos without access to safe drinking water in 2000. Water scarcity is not only relevant to health but to agricultural productivity as well as to tourism infrastructure. Particularly the small islands struggle with the provision of safe water, often simply because of natural scarcity of drinking water. Besides, infrastructure rehabilitation and maintenance, and policy play an important role (continued in chapter 8).

Water provision in parts of Central Luzon, some Southern Tagalog, Ilocos, and the CAR provinces is most advanced. Some of these regions benefit from their natural water capacities, some from better distribution systems. Supposedly, in Metro Manila more people live in squatter settlements with no access to safe water than in its surroundings, accounting for the worse water situation in Metro Manila. The ARMM shows the worst water provision in the country. Other regions provide varied patterns that do not principally conform to those of other indicators. The water situation in Central and Western Visayas is, maybe because of their climate and predominately karst geology, worse than in their Eastern neighbours. The people of Centre, Western Mindanao, Quezon, and Palawan are equally bad off, although one can expect water availability less precarious in mountainous regions.
Integrative measurement: On human development

The Human Development Index (HDI) in figure 6.24 demonstrates poverty from a multi-indicator viewpoint at provincial scale for the years 1994, 1997 and 2000 (compare chapter 2.3.2). Non-surprisingly, the HDI of 2000 – again – indicates the familiar North-South discrepancy. Accordingly, the NCR has the highest development level, followed by almost all Luzon provinces. Only the CAR provinces show lower HDIs – a striking finding given the recent industrial growth and reduction of income poverty there (albeit high poverty incidences). For explanation, growth processes take place in an insular manner, often concentrating on the mining sites. Moreover, many of the indigenous minorities of the Philippines inhibit the uplands of the CAR provinces. These minorities have, as mentioned, been in conflict with state government over property rights since the 1970s and usually belong to the poorer segments of the CAR’s population (chapter 5.2). These issues may explicate the high levels of income inequality prevailing in the region (figure 6.3).

In the Visayas Illoio is the only province to be included in the quartile of second highest HDI while – interestingly – Cebu is not. A differential from West to East is apparent with Masbate and Western Samar recording the lowest indices. In contrast, in Mindanao the differential stretches from East to West, however, no province is included in the second highest quartile at all. Sulu province has the lowest index in the country.

Since 1994 human development has improved in almost all provinces. Especially Luzon (except from CAR) has turned into a ‘pocket’ of high human development which somewhat contrasts Southern Tagalog as a pocket of economic development. The Western provinces in the Visayas and the Eastern in Mindanao caught up, too. Ifugao, Masbate, Western Samar, Agusan del Sur, and the ARMM provinces have kept their low indices since 1994. Interestingly, neither Cebu nor Davao del Sur have increased their HDI considerably despite their economic pole functions. The NCR has been classified highest development throughout.
Figure 6.24: Human Development Index by Philippine provinces 1994, 1997, 2000
6.3 Spatial development ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’ qualitatively assessed

This concluding section of chapter 6 breaks down the previous cartographic and statistical findings to summarise typical perspectives on disparities of poverty and wealth, and discerns central qualitative themes to uneven development in the Philippines. These themes may partially appear stereotypic. Stereotypes, however, can help to discern and frame otherwise hardly recognisable processes in a pointed way, especially in the face of complex subject matters and data constraints (compare Clausen 2002). Part of this is to point at development constrains, prospects and explanatory factors behind them (sometimes raising explanations and issues not mentioned before).

Figure 6.25 qualitatively categorises and contrasts ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’ at provincial, regional and/or urban/rural scales from

(a) An income-wealth,
(b) An overall economic strength, and
(c) A human development & migration perspective.

This chapter sets up a ‘disparity-profile’ as related to these themes for those provinces, regions, and rural/urban areas with sufficient data information. Note also that, as determined by their thematic relevance, scales are purposely combined and vary within figure 6.25.

Rural-urban income divides

Broadly speaking, all three perspectives on disparities of poverty and wealth in the map illuminate a clear North-South divide, with Metro Manila and the adjacent provinces being the dominating centre regions, here the growth and development hubs of the country. Already in 1969 Senator Ninoy Aquino, the later assassinated opponent of Marcos subsumed the most visible feature of disparate development in the Philippines: “Manila is an imperium in imperio, a republic within a republic, and that Manila is as alien to the Philippines as Hong Kong” (quoted in Hamilton-Paterson 1998: xxiii). The quote can be assumed equally valid today. It highlights the immense material and imagined boundaries existing between the capital city and the residual country, and given its date of origin, underlines the historical construction of Metro Manila’s primacy position (chapter 5.1).

The leading theme behind spatial differentials in income wealth/poverty, illustrated in section A of figure 6.25, is the urban-rural divide: Income centres are the major cities and their surroundings, here the (a) NCR, Southern Tagalog-CALABRAZON and Central Luzon, (b) Cebu City and Cebu province, (c) Davao City and Davao del Sur, and (d) Cagayan de Oro and Misamis Oriental. In contrast, ‘peripheries’ of income wealth tend to show a more rural character. This category comprises, among others, the Eastern Visayas, the ARMM, Western
Mindanao, Caraga, Bicol, Southern Tagalog-MIMAROPA, CAR, and Cagayan Valley. The latter two regions have recently experienced considerable growth which is however, unequally distributed (see below for details).

From a morphological point of view, this urban-rural divide often overlaps with coastal-interior and lowland-upland divides in provinces (islands), fostered by historical settlement patterns, historical economic and political preferences, and social inequalities (see chapter 5.1 below; Hirtz 2003). These divides seem to result in gaps of access(ibility) and infrastructure services favouring the urban and coastal over rural areas which, in turn, deteriorate yet again the economic performance of the latter areas and the well-being of their inhabitants (Balisacan & Fuwa 2004).

The extreme morphological fragmentation of the archipelago has helped to reinforce the function and position of Metro Manila (and its surroundings) as the primate centre of income in the country. At the same time, however, the distance and isolation of many regions from the Metropolitan gives them some sort of ‘protection’ from Manila’s dominance and allows them – if necessary production factors are available – to evolve into secondary centres. Cebu and Davao City are examples for such emergent secondary centres (Vorlaufer 1996: 134).

It ought to be noted that neither all of Metro Manila nor Cebu or Davao City can be ascribed as belonging to the income ‘centre’ category. Actually – and somewhat paradoxically – income inequality is recorded highest in such centre regions and provinces. In other words, peripheries also exist within centres, particularly at higher scales, and vice versa. Urban income-poverty is an immanent feature in all bigger cities in the Philippines. In contrast, the remote island of Boracay in ‘peripheral’ Aklan is a major high-class tourist centre of wealth (compare field visits 1, 8, 9; expert interview 7; Spreitzhofer & Heintel 2002).

The rural-urban theme of income-related disparities is attributed and further fuelled by two prominent expressions of social inequality in Philippine society. Firstly, most Chinese Filipinos reside and work in urban areas (see chapter 5.1.) Despite their comparatively small numbers, Chinese Filipinos are a distinct economic power in the country, often claimed the most powerful and wealthy entrepreneurs (expert interview 20; Juan 1996). Due to their urban residence patterns, they implicitly contribute to urban-rural income gaps. Moreover, the living standard and economic position of many Chinese Filipinos is higher than that of the average Malay Filipino. This socioeconomic inequality along ethnic lines has caused some racial tensions targeting Chinese (Ang See 1997: 1-23; 161-189).

Secondly, the concentration of (absentee) landowners in and around the Metropolis fuels Manila’s dominant income position in the country while reducing the income growth options for the rural peripheries and their inhabitants. Moreover, landowner elites are stated to actually hinder development initiatives in some of the rural areas like Mindoro island for self-
Figure 6.25: Qualitative classification of Philippine ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’.

A. Income - Wealth
(stereo-) typical theme: urban <=> rural

B. Overall Economic Strength
(stereo-) typical theme: industry/service <=> agriculture

C. Human Development & Migration
(stereo-) typical theme: social indicators matter! & brain drain <=> brain gain

Qualitative ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ - categorisation as suggested by research findings

- Region/Province considered as centre
- Region/Province considered as periphery
- not assessable

Development Trends

- improving
- stagnating
- deteriorating

Data based on 1998 classification but differentiate Southern Tagalog into CALABARZON + MIMAROPA regions already

Draft and Layout: A. Clausen
Cartography: R. Bares
interest purposes (expert interview 20; compare chapter 9.2.3). Balisacan & Fuwa (2004: 21) go as far as to suggest that spatial income disparities account for a sizeable but not overwhelming portion of the national-level income divide, while prevailing inequalities, for example between the above-mentioned social groups are the leading themes of unbalanced development in the Philippines. This study acknowledges the importance of such connections between social inequalities and spatial disparities in the Philippine setting. The previous empirical investigation demonstrates, however, that disparities of income or else poverty indicator always have manifold dimensions and factors to them, including topography, infrastructure and access(ibility), historical courses of the political economy, human resources, and else besides social inequality.

**Overall economic strength: A matter of sectoral dichotomy between service-industry and agriculture**

According to figure 6.25 part B, centres of overall economic strength allocate above all in the urban(ising) areas with services and industry ‘hot spots’. Note that while the rural-urban divide continues to play a role, it is mostly an agriculture/fishery – industry/service dichotomy which acts as the leading theme behind spatial disparities in terms of overall economic strength. The service and industry-led centres portray low relative poverty, large GDP production and absolute employment. In contrast, high relative income poverty, low absolute employment, and little GDP production prevail in many rural, remote, and agriculture/fishery-led regions. Industry and service ‘hot spots’ are better integrated into global markets than their agricultural periphery counterparts. The lack apparent for the latter is to some extent based on insufficient (road) accessibility of peripheral regions, and productivity problems, partially related to inefficient or non-existing irrigation systems.

As to be expected, the economic centres comprise Metropolitan Manila, Cebu City, Davao City, and partly, Cagayan de Oro. The provinces of Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog-CALABRAZON benefit from their proximity to the large market and good infrastructure of Metro Manila, plus its historically grown global contacts (Makabenta 2002). The administrative division of Southern Tagalog into CALABRAZON and MIMAROPA reflects – and may be partly a response to – their dividing paths of development: While the CALABRAZON provinces develop into new cores of globalised industry and services, the MIMAROPA provinces are increasingly cut off from these political economy processes.

Central Luzon has benefited from the presence of the US American forces especially in 23 locations, especially around Clark and Subic Bay (ca. 80-120 km north of Metro Manila) between 1898 and 1992. The naval and air bases of the US army have triggered foreign and local investments, services and employment there, plus paid land rents which made up to 5% of the Philippine state’s financial budget. Since 1992 the region has been able to take
advantage of the pullout of the Americans. The former army bases have been converted into two export processing zones. By 1999, the two zones already provide more than 50,000 jobs (exceeding employment provided by the US army). At the same time economic growth and stability fluctuates (reflecting general boom and bust trends in the country), in particular when enterprises relocate their production to lower-cost countries like China (Zimmer 2004).

Similarly, economic development in Cebu City and province (and other parts of Central Visayas) benefit from good infrastructure facilities in terms of good road connections, the international airport, and five ports in and around Cebu-Mandaue (Makabenta 2002). Its economic strength is disproportionately attributed to the expansion of tourism-oriented services, as well as to industrial growth in several recently established Special Economic Zones especially on Mactan island. In the 1990s the ‘Ce-boom’ was declared to transform the city into a new Hong Kong of Asia. This target has not been reached so far, foremost because of export deficits, lack of technological inputs, and water scarcity (Torling 1997).

The Western Visayas stand out as an overall economic centre, with similar GDP to Central Visayas despite their comparatively lower population numbers. Interestingly, the Western Visayas do not have their ‘own’ urban agglomeration centre; Cebu City functions as their gateway. Economically, the strength of the region lies mainly in tourism and trade services, exemplified by Boracay island. However, the Visayas are also characterised by high levels of inequality and co-existence of peripheries and centres at higher scales, facts that remain hidden beneath the regional and/or provincial qualitative classification of figure 6.25.

The major economic competitive advantage of Davao del Sur is the status of Davao City as ‘the’ Mindanao door to international markets and its success in agro-industrial trade services. Misamis Oriental is its only competitor. The natural resource richness of the entire Mindanao region once led to calls for “Mindanao to emerge as RP’s next boom region” (Enginco 1995: 18). However, the persistent conflict between Moro movements and the government have hindered investors and government policy to reach out to many parts of the region (chapter 5.2). For example, foreign investors tend to withdraw from and local entrepreneurs may be forced to close down their business in conflict-ridden areas. These are, however, above all Western Mindanao, Zamboanga, the ARMM, and Sarangani and Cotabato in Southern Mindanao, here already the poorer areas. In 1999 large parts of Mindanao had not been supported with agricultural services by the government for over two decades (Shaw 1999; see chapter 9.3.4). Only in 2001 Mindanao has been made a new national focus of policy intervention only (see NEDA 2001; chapter 8.1). Moreover, mostly due to security reasons, but also to irritated political relations27 and public-private partnerships, the East Asian

27 Among other aspects, Philippine government has accused Malaysia and Indonesia to secretly support the Moro movements in Mindanao.
Growth Triangle ‘BIMP-EAGA’ has not progressed far. It was launched in 1994 by Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines islands of Mindanao and Palawan and aims at regional promotion of agro-industry, natural resource-based manufacturing, tourism, and SME encouragement (Turner 1995; ADB 2002b). On the whole, in a vicious cycle the conflict situation deteriorates the living situation of many people (Muslims and non-Muslims) in Mindanao, which, in turn, fuel opposition against the government and thus, the conflict(s).

Overall, residual Mindanao (besides Misamis Oriental and Davao del Sur) belongs to the ‘economically weak peripheries’. This category also comprises, roughly classified, Bicol, Eastern Visayas, major parts of Northern Luzon and the MIMAROPA-provinces of Southern Tagalog (see also Kelly 1999; Pernia & Quising 2002). Manasan & Mercado (1999) claim a mix of developmental handicaps to adversely affect these peripheries, stressing failure of agricultural programmes (compare chapter 8), lack of infrastructure, and natural hazards.

Strikingly, however, large areas of Luzon, which are most prone to natural hazards in the country, belong to the economic centre regions. Another example, peripheral Cagayan Valley has shown considerable resilience against natural hazards by its quick recovery after the recession 1997/98. Similarly, despite their vulnerability towards hazards, the Southern provinces of CAR show generally progressive development tendencies. On the whole, these findings suggest that natural hazards may severely constrain economic development, however, they do not seem to be the decisive factor in determining development trends and centre or periphery status of Philippine regions and provinces. Instead, more comprehensive, multi-scalar perspectives on specific development settings may result in a more realistic identification of (economic) peripheries and centres. This argument is underlined by the fact that the ‘success story’ of the CAR is largely attributed to industrial expansion in SEZs, to mining, and (related) big infrastructure investments on the one hand. On the other hand, great disparities and inequalities at higher scales are hidden by this story, with upland areas inhibited by indigenous minorities being disproportionately often at the lower end of the disparity parameter (Hirtz 2003).

By and large, it is clear that development of Philippine provinces and regions depends to a considerable extent on the comparative advantages of their (urban) centres for industrial and service establishments, or otherwise connectivity and proximity to such centres. In turn, the elaborated accounts confirm Balisacan’s statement that “the poverty problem in the Philippines remains largely an agricultural phenomenon” (1997: 24); and Rigg’s general observation on Southeast Asia surely accounts for the Philippine case:

“Every country has its lagging regions [...] as well as its lagging people. This inequality is sometimes expressed in terms of a rural-urban core-periphery dichotomy – by which it is also meant an agriculture-industry dichotomy – sometimes in terms of a regional balance, and often both” (Rigg 2003: 155-156).
Impact of economic globalisation

The impact of economic globalisation upon Philippine (disparate) development is controversially discussed. On the one hand, globalisation works to exacerbate the spatial, sectoral, and social divides. This is partially related to the fact that most island regions have their distinct and historically grown international economic relations, which continue to build the basis of their contemporary global networks (compare chapter 5.3).

Besides, and possibly more important, globalisation generates global enclaves of industry and services especially in and around Metro Manila, Cebu City, and Davao City. These, in turn, create employment and income. Their spill over effects into directly adjacent hinterlands has been comparatively successful, however, effects beyond that into more peripheral hinterlands are marginal and not sufficient. Simultaneously, the economic boom and bust cycle of the Philippine economy partially also reveals further risks of volatility through disproportionate emphasis on global markets. The urban and service/industry centres, which seemingly benefit from globalisation, yet face its volatility from within disproportionately, too: They have the highest rates of unemployment, underemployment, and job turnover. For example, during the ‘Asian’ crisis 1997/98, 58.13% of all establishment closures from 1998 to 2000 took place in Metro Manila alone (STEDNET 2002).

On the other hand, and none the less, economic globalisation acts as a catalyst for development through FDI in Special Economic Zones, service trade instigated by tourists, remittances send back by labour migrants, and an increase of exports. In addition, these growing sectors generate, even if not sufficient, at least some employment for the local population (compare Kelly 2001). Lanzona (2001) deduces in his case study on Bicol that globalisation has actually been beneficial to workers in centres and peripheries alike because, with the liberalising reforms, wages have risen in absolute terms for all Filipinos. Similarly, Balisacan is convinced that “contrary to popular perceptions, recent episodes of [mainly globalisation-induced] growth have not been anti-poor; the bulk of the poverty reduction in recent years has come from the beneficial effects of growth on the poor”. Yet, the data revealed in this chapter shows that poverty has in fact increased significantly again since the crisis 1997, and that it is important to take into account (and Balisacan agrees here) that “the importance of growth in poverty alleviation varies greatly, however, across administrative regions and sectors of the economy” (1997: 28-29; note by A.C.). Put differently, globalisation tends to create enclaves of industrial and service development whereas the primary sector where the majority of Filipinos still engages is little incorporated in global markets and with it – logically – many parts of the agricultural-led peripheral regions and its inhabitants. This observation leads to the overall conception that the Philippines are a country that is – despite trying hard and with some (urban) exceptions – (still) situated at the periphery of the global market. Furthermore, the existing global enclaves have proven to be volatile. For
example, in opposition to Lanzona’s above-noted positive assessment of rising wages through global integration, this rise in wages is also claimed responsible for increasing tendency of multinational corporations to relocate their production sites from the Philippines to countries with lower labour costs such as Vietnam or China.

**Human development and migration: Reflections of the same coin?**

Human development, as demonstrated in section C of figure 6.25, sheds light on human resource disparity aspects of centre-periphery relations. The map confirms a level of correspondence between human development centres and peripheries with their economic counterparts. The strong North-South divide and the dominance of Metro Manila and its surroundings show up again. Patterns vary with Illoio and Misamis Oriental overtaking the economic centres of Cebu and Davao del Sur. The better positions of the former provinces in educational attainment and life expectancy may account for this difference, and highlight that social indicators matter in development in the Philippines. Further, the case of Illoio suggests that the role of urban areas is possibly not as significant for educational and life expectancy factors in human development as it is for economic development. The example of Misamis Oriental underlines this claim to some extent: The province is smaller than Davao City in terms of size and economy, yet tops it in overall human development regards.

Section C of figure 6.25 also includes information on processes which simultaneously display consequence and means of centre and periphery relations in the Philippines: Migration streams reflect the strife of Filipinos from the peripheries to seek employment, higher income and allegedly better quality of life in the centres. These flows grow with population pressures on peripheries and involve mainly the young and productive (see Gultiano & Ulrich 2001). A loss of capital stock, here a brain drain occurs as the inevitable consequence in many peripheries. With it a vicious cycle commences: Development is further hold back when the most productive segments of the population leave, which then triggers the next generation to follow their footsteps and migrate as well. In the communities left behind, hopes and development initiatives typically focus – and partially rely – on remittances send back by the migrants (compare chapters 8.4.1 and 9.3.3).

It should be noted that inhabitants of those peripheries that are already situated at the very end of the disparity of poverty parameter, usually do not possess the resources to get involved in this migration system. This phenomenon is observable for entire provinces including the ARMM provinces, Kalinga and Apayo of CAR, and Palawan. Partially, this spatiality of immobility may ground on the fact that the ethno-linguistic minorities who live there, prefer

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28 This section refers mainly to population, education, and HDI data. The health issues discussed in chapter 6.2 are, apart from life expectancy, neglected because of the illustrated data inconsistencies.
not to move but to stay with their kind. However, it is at the same time yet another indicator for the generally little integration of provinces with indigenous population in overall transformation processes and interactions with other Philippine provinces. Development seems to stagnate there. Turning back to the elaborated income divides this stagnation may also explain why income relations in the named provinces are – despite being at a very poor level – actually among the most balanced in the country.

To conclude ...

The Philippines have some ‘ingredients’ promising developmental success, especially rich natural resources, a globally-oriented, well educated, and abundant workforce which speaks the main business language of the world (compare Hutchcroft 1998; White & Rosales 2003). None the less, a disparate and inconsistent course dominates the country’s development path. The subsequent typical themes have been identified to be particularly decisive for manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines. Importantly, these themes are constantly interrelated in the formation of ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’, and thus, in shaping development problems and/or prospects together:

- A North-South divide favouring Metropolitan Manila and its surroundings;
- A gap between urban and rural, lowland/upland, and coastal/interior areas. Centres are typically urban/lowland/coastal and peripheries are typically rural/upland/interior;
- Increasing disparities within centres and – less common – central enclaves within peripheries. Globalisation pushes the rise of these enclaves. Those peripheries at the very end of the disparity parameter show little differentiation but stagnation.
- A dichotomy between stagnating agriculture and fisheries on the one hand, and growing industry and service sectors on the other hand. This trend is reinforced by globalisation;
- The significance of human resource development, infrastructure, and access(ibility) to positively affect many other factors of (disparate) development.
- A population-employment dilemma in peripheries, resulting in large-scale out-migration and brain drain to centres.
- A ‘certain reciprocity between social and spatial divides (compare chapter 2.2.1) with regard to the concentration of Chinese Filipinos and landowners in urban areas, especially Metro Manila, and the concentration of Muslim and indigenous minorities in Mindanao, especially the ARMM and the CAR.

To conclude, these themes cumulatively build up a regional disparity parameter, with Metro Manila, CALABRAZON, and most of Central Luzon at the upper and the ARMM and Caraga, followed by other parts of Western Mindanao, the North of Luzon, Eastern Visayas, and MIMAROPA at the lower end. This disparity parameter has been gradually and
cumulatively reinforced and fostered throughout the historical course of political economy and conflict (see chapter 8.1). There is a certain correspondence between those areas of disproportionately deprivation and exclusion with those where ethno-linguistic minorities live and where political conflicts exist. As expressed by expert interview 2: “What are the ones that are in the lower bracket? Mostly, I think, ARMM areas. The Muslim region. And some of the areas in, in the north. Indigenous people. So there is also their distance to the centre”.

Referring back to the theoretical considerations, in my opinion, many Philippine regions and provinces show excluding characteristics of some sort. The only region, which could be ascribed to face more or less all-embracing exclusion would be the ARMM as indicated by its overall stagnation (there are not enough information available on Caraga to assess its exclusionary status).

With regard to economic sectors, agriculture and fisheries appear to represent ‘the’ constrain sector with its prevalence in peripheries, its insufficient productivity, and being trapped in historically grown unbalanced ownership relations. Prerequisites for large-scale industrial developments (driven by globalisation) are only given in the already wealthier and progressive urbanised areas, and thus result in either replicating existing disparity patterns or creating isolated enclaves. The only sector, which combines global market and income growth orientation with a spatial focus on ‘unspoilt paradise’ peripheries and smaller-scale development, is the tourism sector. Moreover tourism services offer potential (self-) employment to the generally well educated, English-speaking, and abundantly available Filipino labour force and therefore ways out of the population-employment-migration dilemma. For these reasons, tourism is increasingly heralded and promoted as ‘the’ potential vehicle for achieving economic growth combined with redistribution countrywide (compare chapter 8.1).

Against this background, the subsequent chapter examines and contrasts the typical themes of intra-provincial disparities in Bohol, elaborating the ‘faces’ of intra-provincial as compared to inter-provincial and inter-regional disparities in the Philippines.
7. Intra-provincial disparity patterns: The case of Bohol island

7.1 Conceptual and methodological background

This chapter portrays disparities of poverty in Bohol by (a) comparing the island to other provinces referring to the maps in chapters 5 and 6, and by (b) illuminating scalar relations between inter- and intra-provincial disparity patterns through maps at municipal level. Particularly part (b) proved difficult: I was restricted by poor data availability and quality. Philippine Executive Order 135 explicitly outlines the establishment of intra-provincial statistical systems to precisely define the needs of the poor in each province (NEDA 2001: 240). In Bohol, such endeavours have not progressed far. The quality of spatially aggregated data is determined by the interest of municipalities to participate in surveys (expert interview 15). Although the Provincial Planning and Development Office (PPDO) started an initiative to assemble statistics from municipal and barangay LGUs, major parts are incomplete and faulty (PPDO 2004a). I used them to cartographically display population data only and was otherwise compelled to vector-based information, non-spatial data, the self-assessment survey Bohol Poll 2001 and 2002 (HNU 2002), and qualitative interpretation supported by assorted field visit observations. The differences existing between the entire Philippines and Bohol are qualitatively summarised and contrasted in chapter 7.3

This chapter relies more heavily on qualitative research such as interviews and field observations. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 organise the interview partners and field visits by their thematic interaction with the topic in order to allow a reflective and in-situ interpretation of statements and observations.

In correspondence to prior findings on national development constraints and catalysts in chapter 6, three thematic ‘cornerstones’ and ‘subclasses’ to disparities of poverty and wealth are chosen to be examined in detail in this chapter and the subsequent policy analysis (compare chapters 1.2 and 4.1). These ‘cornerstones’ include, as figures 7.1 and 7.2 display

- Disparities and poverty,
- Disparities and agriculture, fishery, and resource management,
- Disparities and tourism and alternative livelihoods.
Figure 7.2: Overview of field visits carried out in the Philippines in 2003 and 2004
7.2 Comparative exploration of disparities of poverty in Bohol

7.2.1 Basic characterisation

Bohol is with 411,726 hectares the 10th largest island of the Philippines. Figure 7.3 displays Bohol’s topography, which is shaped by lowlands along the coast, around Tagbilaran and Panglao in the Southwest, and North/Northeast, and mountainous or hilly areas in the interior and the Southeast. The morphology of Bohol resembles that of most Philippine islands (see figure 5.1).

Bohol’s 1,137,268 inhabitants (as of 2000) also range at medium Philippine levels. According to figure 5.2, the rural population exceeds the urban by large in 2000. This finding is confirmed by intra-provincial patterns of the absolute municipal population in 1995 displayed in figure 7.4. Tagbilaran City has the strongest urban character. Only the island of Panglao and Bien Unido in the far North register almost equal numbers of urban and rural population; in all other municipalities rural exceeds urban. The Western municipalities facing Cebu
province (and City) show a relatively urban whereas the interior more a rural character. Numerically, most Boholanos live at the Western coast, in Eastern interior, and in South-Eastern coastal municipalities. Tagbilaran City and the municipalities of Ubay, Talibon, Inabanga and Carmen have populations of more than 40,000.

The majority of Boholanos are of Malay-Filipino inheritance. A small minority of Chinese lives in Tagbilaran City, and a small indigenous group in the uplands of the interior. Some Muslim Filipinos, mainly refugees from Mindanao, live in and around Tagbilaran City. Figures are available for neither group, and they are only rarely mentioned during conversations and in official documents.

### 7.2.2 Official poverty accounts

With an income-related poverty of 53.6 % (of the total population), Bohol belongs to the highest provincial quartile of poverty incidence country wide in 2000 (see figure 6.1). Incidences have risen since 1994 (figure 6.2), however, remain much lower than at peak times of 60.5% in 1985 (PPDO 2002). Income inequality, expressed by the Gini-coefficient, has also risen between 1997 and 2000 and in national comparison the province is again listed in the highest quartile (figure 6.3; NSCB 2003a). The province’s poverty incidence regularly exceeds the Central Visayan regional average (figure 7.5).

![Figure 7.5: Poverty incidence in Bohol and the Central Visayas 1991-2000](source: Provincial Government of Bohol 2003b)

![Figure 7.6: Boholanos’ self-assessed poverty 1997-2002](source: HNU 2002)

Figure 7.6 demonstrates the results of a survey by the Bohol Poll asking Boholanos to assess their poverty status (with no definition of poverty being given). Accordingly, Boholanos consider their poverty incidence to be higher around 60%. Similar to the official trends, self-rated poverty have risen between 1997 and 1999, slightly decreased until in 1999/2000, and from 2000 increased again considerably to 66% in 2002 (the indicators according to which such poverty has been self-rated were not available by HNU 2002).
In contrast to official national poverty measurement, the latest and most widely used official intra-provincial Bohol poverty data focus on education and health indicators. This Bohol Poverty Index was compiled, processed, and published by the PPDO in 2001. Surprisingly it completely ignores economic dimensions of development; it is derived from the following indicators: (a) Percentage of families with unsanitary toilets; (b) Percentage of families with access to doubtful water resources; (c) Percentage of children 0-83 months old who are malnourished; (d) School drop-outs of children 6-21 years old. Figure 7.7 portrays the corresponding distribution of poverty incidence across municipalities, supported by a ranking of the twenty poorest municipalities in Table 7.1.

Hence, recent intra-provincial poverty data for Bohol are not quantitatively – but only qualitatively – comparable to their inter-provincial counterparts. This is an important aspect to consider for cross-scalar policy-making and for analysis in this study. Note that the data also excludes Tagbilaran City, here only provides information on 47 municipalities.

### Table 7.1: Ranking of 20 poorest municipalities*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pres. Garcia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ubay</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bien Unido</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Inabanga</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Alicia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Buenavista</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pilar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Danao</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Talibon</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dagohoy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Clarin</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Getafe</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Anda</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Loon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sierra Bullones</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Catigbian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Batuan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Duero</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Candijay</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Sagbayan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Loboc</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* double rankings possible

Source: Provincial Gov. Bohol 2003
Figure 7.7 shows a ‘strip’ of high poverty at the North/Northeastern coast and in the interior, with gradually decreasing indices towards the South and West of Bohol. More precisely in morphological terms, poverty clusters comprise small islands, coastal lowland in the North and mixed upland and lowland interior communities. Wealth, in contrast, clusters particularly in and around Panglao (and around Tagbilaran, although there is no poverty index for the city itself), Tubigon, Jagna, and Guindulman – all coastal municipalities with a stronger urban character according to figure 7.4, yet with varying lowland and upland features. It ought to be noted that figure 7.7 may hide significant disparities at intra-municipal scales. A good example is the ‘wealthy’ and economically progressing municipality of Tubigon, where wealth de facto accumulates on the mainland (and causes the high index) while the outer islands are considered to be very poor (field visit 5; interview 17).

On the whole, qualitatively speaking, patterns of disparities of wealth in Bohol resemble the national findings regarding the allocation of wealth in coastal and urban(ised) areas. The strongly urbanised yet very poor Bien Unido represents an exception.

Unlike the national pattern, poverty is not disproportionately indicated for the uplands in Bohol, but on the contrary, in the great lowlands in the North and Northeast. Furthermore, the upland municipalities with the highest altitude, Jagna and Garcia Hernandez, belong to the wealthiest quartile of municipalities. This, however, is – similar to the illustrated Tubigon case – probably due to the wealthy coastal and urbanised areas compensating upland poverty within these municipalities. Generally, the coastal/lowland and interior/upland wealth differential prevalent at national level tends to corresponds in Bohol’s Interior, South and Southwest (field visits 4, 5, 12, 13).

Self-assessed poverty incidences of Boholanos (table 7.2) equally mark the Northern municipalities and generally rural areas as the poorest, with decreasing incidences towards the South. Interestingly, Tagbilaran City does not stand out as exceptionally wealthy.

The spatial pattern of official poverty incidence data broadly resembles self-assessed poverty incidences, and vice versa. I continue to relate further intra-provincial, indirect indicators of disparities of poverty to the official poverty accounts (similar to the approach at national scale).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7.2: Self-rated poverty (in %) in 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest District 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Divine World College Research Centre 2001
7.2.3 Economic sectors, productivity, and employment

Labour force participation in Bohol is posted at 68% in 2001 and ranks slightly above the Philippine average. Employment estimates reach a regional high of 94.6% in 2001 and therefore, unemployment a low. In an interesting contrast, Boholanos’ self-assessed unemployment in 2002 reaches a much higher 19% (HNU 2002). Either unemployment has increased an unlikely 14% in one year, or official or peoples’ perspectives are vastly mistaken. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show that agriculture and fisheries comprise 54% of the employed labour force, yet contribute only about 1/8 of the total regional GDP (no provincial GDP data exists).

Bohol is scarcely industrialised – the exception are a few small-scale fruit processing and livestock estates along the West coast, in Panglao, Tagbilaran City, and Ubay – yet these plants comprise 17% of the employed Boholanos (see table 7.3 later on). There are no Special Economic Zones in Bohol (yet; compare chapter 8). Services comprise 29% of the employed and contribute most to the GDP. On the whole, besides services especially in tourism, Bohol is limitedly integrated in global and national markets.

Agriculture and fisheries

Figure 7.8 underlines the almost exclusively agricultural character of Bohol by presenting an official (broad) land-use classification. Intensive and irrigated agriculture, especially rice, corn, and coconuts operate particularly in the irrigated and wealthier lowlands and coastal areas, whereas upland agriculture is characterised by shifting cultivations of root, timber, and medicinal crops (see Ulrich 2000). Note that Bohol is less prone to natural hazards than most other Philippine provinces. Note also that the built-up areas included in figure 7.8 do not correspond with the illustrated patterns on population distribution. Population data is extracted from the Census and are assumed more reliable than the land use map (see below for further reasons).
Figure 7.8 and 7.9 display that coconut and rice are the two dominating crops, followed by corn and rootcrops. Coconuts are exported, however, generally Bohol’s agricultural products are only marginally involved in inter-provincial trade. For instance, none of its ports is included in national statistics on exports and imports while all other provinces of the Central Visayas are (NSCB 2002b). There is comparatively little production of high-value crops like palm oil or mango. Larger scaled livestock farms operate mainly around Ubay. This study concentrates on crop agriculture and fishery. It only marginally deals with livestock.

As noted, lowland farmers are dependent on reliable water supplies from the uplands. Water resources have always been scarce in Bohol due to its geology as an island of karstland where water resources are limited to limestone aquifers. Until the 1970s, though, Bohol has been known for agricultural self-sufficiency. Since then it has recorded a decline in rice yields and their gradual replacement with corn and coconut cultivation. For explanation, population pressures have induced a rapid intensification of agriculture in the uplands accompanied by large-scale deforestation, which, in turn, has reduced water supply for the fields in the lowlands. One response from the lowland farmers to keep up harvests and profits has been to increase irrigated rice production because it allows two or three harvests a year and doubles the rain-fed production (expert interview 3). Logically, water resources are more depleted through such practice, and cause traditional irrigation systems to malfunction nowadays. Paddy rice lowland farmers in Bohol face serious problems (Ulrich & Reeder 1996: 291-292; Ulrich 2000: 476-486; 492).

Fishery is the second major source of livelihood especially for the coastal population including both, poorer and wealthier proportions of the Boholanos. Marine fish catches have, in fact, multiplied by more than four between 1998 and 2002 – largely due to commercial fishery (figure 7.10). Commercial fishermen enter the waters of Bohol often unregistered, therefore their catch can be assumed many times higher. However, such increase poses risks of environmental damage through over-fishing under which the poorer fishermen suffer most (see photos 7.3 and 7.4; expert interviews 7, 10, 3). Moreover, over-fishing implies serious and long-term environmental degradation to coral reefs, the most important fishing grounds for small-scale fishermen. As White, Vogt, Arin (2000: 599) note, the contribution of...
reef fishery to small-island fishery like that of Bohol can make up to 70% of the total harvest. Aquaculture or inland municipal fishery makes up (an increasingly) major proportion of fishery in Bohol – similar to the national scale. Fishponds are mainly located along the Western coast and in the poor East – can aquaculture develop into a potential development catalyst there (compare chapter 6.1.3)?

Spatially, in contrast to national patterns, one cannot infer that (only) the poorest areas in Bohol are mainly characterised by the primary sector. Agricultural and fisheries are spread across the entire island. Reasons that are more intricate explain persistent poverty. Firstly, it is significant to note that farmland in Bohol is organised mostly in small-scale patches with an average size of 0.6 hectares (compare photos 7.1 and 7.2). Because of such small-patched organisation, only 50% of the agricultural land area in Bohol is considered productive beyond subsistence. Therefore, figure 7.8 hides significant diversity in land-use beyond the figure’s broad classifications. This is also the reason why each class in the map contains several crops or types of land usage.

Secondly, the subsistence character of much of Bohol’s agriculture causes that farmers “mostly, they will not sell their products, they will just need them for their consumption”. This again interrelates with their trade as “mostly they go to the local markets” because they cannot afford transport costs to the larger markets for example in Tagbilaran (expert interview 3; Provincial Government Bohol 2003b: 63). Consequently, the intra- as well as inter-provincial trade, productivity, and earnings gained from the primary sector remain marginal. Thirdly, the small farm size impedes the introduction of technology into the sector (compare chapter 8.4.3). Overall, this small-patched land and subsistence character makes Bohol a typical case of the small Philippine islands where Spanish colonial powers have not established big plantations and with them significant larger-patched land use patterns. Its neighbour Cebu represents the alternative typical case as a major plantation province (field visit 6).

Besides the small patches, and similarly to national patterns, above all unequal land ownership and control systems are often claimed responsible for the prevailing poverty in agriculture in Bohol. Until the departure of the Spanish colonisers, the uplands used to be frontiers of communal pasturing. Families that were more affluent possessed the fertile lowlands of which large parts were cultivated by tenant farmers. In the 20th century many of the wealthy landowners moved to larger farms in Mindanao and sold the lowland rice lands to wealthy absentee owners who did not live nearby. Under American colonial rule these relationships were transferred into bureaucratic acts, control over the fertile lowlands through the wealthy absentee elite legitimised, and access to lands for tenants and agricultural workers more difficult (Ulrich 2003: 160-161; see chapters 6.1.3, 8.3.2 and 8.4.3).
Photo 7.1: Small-patched agriculture in Carmen

Photo 7.2: Rice terrace in the uplands of Sierra Bullones

Photo 7.3: Fisherman on his way to work

Photo 7.4: Fisherman’s home on Pamilacan

Photo 7.5: Tourist resorts along Alona beach on Panglao island

Photo 7.6: Chocolate Hills in Carmen municipality

Kindly provided by expert interviewees 11/18

Clausen 2004
Tourism

Similar to national data, I treat intra-provincial tourism figures on Bohol with caution. Visitors entering the province by ferry are not officially registered. Expert interviewee 20 confirms that this applies also for arrivals by plane. Moreover, resorts do not count the number of visitors but only the number of booked rooms – which may differ considerably due to the usually large size of Filipino families staying in one room together (field visits 9, 10).

In national comparison in 2000, Bohol ranks low with respect to (direct) tourist arrivals, and considerably lags behind its neighbour (and gateway) Cebu. Its share of foreign visitors (about one third) is comparatively high (see figure 6.16). Figure 7.11 illustrates these trends more precisely. Accordingly, tourist arrivals in Bohol have experienced a boom and bust course since 1998. Recently, a growth tendency is detected, which is probably related to positive political atmosphere under President Arroyo as indicated in chapter 6.1.2.

Assuming that the ratio of micro-, small, and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the service sector demonstrates commercial activities of the less wealthy and, therefore, possibly carries positive side-effects of broader tourism development (compare chapter 6.1.3), the findings displayed for Bohol in figure 6.12 are disappointing: The province belongs to the quartile with the lowest SME presence country-wide.

Yet, the sectoral employment trends since 1980, presented in table 7.3, notwithstanding illustrate a certain growth of the service sector (with a slight decrease since 1995) as opposed to decreases in the primary and tertiary sectors.

The Bohol Tourism Office compiled a directory of tourist-relevant facilities in Bohol including hotels, pensions, resorts, travel agents and tour operators, dive shops, land transport services and restaurants (BOT 2003). Although tourist attractions are spread across most of the island, including for example the Chocolate Hills in Carmen (a national geologic monument of 1,268 haycock hills, see photo 7.6), their proportional locations exemplify an obvious spatial bias of tourism development. Of in total 98 listed facilities 62 are located in Tagbilaran City, 19 at Alona beach on Panglao island (see photo 7.5), 16 in alternative locations in Panglao and only one elsewhere. Likewise, the PPDO admits that tourist facilities in 2002 are almost exclusively

![Figure 7.11: Tourist arrivals in Bohol](image)

Table 7.3: Employment by sector (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* numbers are rounded
Source: PPDO 2002; NSCB 2001
located in Tagbilaran City and Panglao (PPDO 2002: 15). It follows that areas, which are already relatively wealthy, economically benefit the most from tourism, while the peripheral and marginalised are further cut off. Existing divides seem to be replicated.

7.2.4 Social development, infrastructure, and connectivity issues

In terms of population density, Bohol ranks medium among Philippine provinces in 2000 (see figure 6.18). Intra-provincially, Tagbilaran City lists, as expected, the highest population density in 1995 (figure 7.12). The municipalities around the city, those facing Cebu, Panglao, Jagna and some municipalities in the far East as well as Bien Unido in the North also record higher densities, compared to relatively scattered population distribution in residual Northern, Eastern, Southern and interior Bohol. Table 7.4 indicates that these population strongholds have continued to grow until 2000. Interestingly, Dagohoy has been the fastest growing municipality although comparatively few inhabitants and population density was registered in 1995 (figure 7.4).

Overall, population growth in Bohol is at an annual average of 2.9 %, and thus higher than the national rate (compare also figure 6.19). Bohol’s population has numerically multiplied fivefold since 1903. Given this rapid population growth the mentioned low official rate of unemployment strikes me and suggests that the higher self-rated counterpart provided by the Bohol Poll is more realistic (confirmed by expert interviews 5 and 20). Boholanos engage in out-migration specifically to Mindanao and Metro Manila (Ulrich & Edgecombe 1999).
Education and health

Figure 6.21 illustrates that (a) about 5% of Boholanos aged five or older have no education, (b) over 50% have accomplished primary education, (c) approximately 25% secondary, and (d) about 20% tertiary levels. In comparison to other provinces, Bohol ranks in (a) medium, (b) highest, (c) medium to low, and (d) high quartiles respectively. Strikingly, the province registers more tertiary attainments than Cebu although official sources locate eight universities in Cebu and only one in Bohol (compare chapter 6.22; STEDNET 2002). The educational data situation becomes even more confusing when considering the vector-based educational infrastructure of Bohol displayed in figure 7.13 (as compiled by the PPDO 2004), where seven universities are recorded for Bohol. During my field visits and interviews I heard of only two universities, both located in Tagbilaran City. I also learnt that only the (secondary) educational facilities in Tagbilaran and Ubay offer education and qualification, which enable their students to gain access to higher-level careers. Overall, again major limitation to research due to low data quality become apparent. In this context, I am unable to provide a reliable assessment of educational facilities in Bohol, let alone their spatial distribution.

According to figure 6.22 Boholanos are included in the quartile of Filipinos with the highest life expectancy and register – in comparison with other provinces – a great lack of doctors. In addition, figure 7.13 shows that most hospitals are located along the coast, reaching up to Inabanga in the West and Anda in the East, whereas the North and interior municipalities are scarcely served. Private hospitals allocate particularly to areas between Tagbilaran and Guindulman or Tagbilaran and Tubignon. People from outer islands and often those from the uplands usually have to travel to ‘mainland’ Bohol for education and health services. Thus, they have to spend their scarce financial resources for transport to obtain (public) social services (field visits 4, 5, 11).
Figure 7.13: Educational and health infrastructure in Bohol as of 2001
**Water scarcity**

Figure 7.14 adds another aspect of health infrastructure: It visualises the percentage of households with access to doubtful water resources. The respective inter-provincial map in figure 6.23 registers 30.8% of Boholanos with no access to safe water in 2000, sorting it into the second highest quartile of provinces. Figure 7.14 now illuminates that particularly in the poor North, in some municipalities up to 70% of households, lack safe water access, with gradually decreasing percentages towards the (wealthier) South. Noteworthy, lowland areas are generally more adversely affected than uplands (with the exception of Carmen), because various rivers well in the mountains and usually flow towards the South of the island (PPDO 2002; compare accounts on agricultural water supply). The municipality of Cortes, adjacent to Tagbilaran, records rather poor access to safe water due to economically profitable yet environmentally controversial aquaculture and nipa production in its main river (nipa is a part of mangroves used for roofing) (field visit 5).

Altogether, these findings strike even more when considering that according to the PPDO (2002), even in the well-developed Panglao the majority of the tourism resorts face continuous scarcity of drinking water. Such statement suggests that the situation for those municipalities, which feature bad access to safe water according to figure 7.14 may indeed, be even more serious. Similarly, a majority of Boholanos whom I talked to during field visits 3, 4, 5, and 12 actually stated water supply problems among their prime concerns. Against this background the in average high life expectancy of Boholanos is an interesting feature.
Access, infrastructure and connectivity

The above accounts already indicate that infrastructure and particularly transport routes via road and sea play a significant role to economic, trade and tourism markets as well as to access to social service.

In national comparison, according to figure 6.17, Bohol is recorded in the highest provincial quartile in terms of road density (even exceeding Cebu). Accordingly, one might assume that road access to the rural and peripheral is unproblematic. However, figure 7.15 illustrates that, generally, Tagbilaran City is the ‘centre’ of the road system and province-wide by far best equipped in terms of connecting infrastructure. Almost all visitors enter the island through either the Tagbilaran airport or the Tagbilaran seaport, a fact, which naturally supports the allocation of tourist infrastructure there. Obviously, this is an immense competitive advantage for attracting economic and business activities, social facilities, political decision-makers, and Boholans (migrants), as well as tourists and international aid organisations to settle in Tagbilaran and its surroundings (compare chapter 8.3.1).

Moreover, during my field trips I learned that solely those roads classified as ‘national’ roads in figure 7.15 are concrete or asphalt roads yet even these have large potholes, are often in bad condition, and allow slow travel by car. This observation, firstly, brings attention back to matters of access, connectivity, and ‘the distance to care’ to markets, facilities, tourist attractions beyond Tagbilaran and national roads. It secondly suggests that the infrastructure conditions pertaining in those municipalities in Bohol and provinces of the Philippines that are officially acknowledged as less well equipped may in fact be entirely inadequate. Thirdly, such findings once again indicate the low data quality and limited reliability of many Philippine information systems.

Correspondingly, while the provincial government (2003b) claims that the province has sufficient electricity supply, I learned that many inhabitants of more remote areas like the Anda peninsula and Inabanga either have no electricity at all or self-generated, unsteady power sources (field visits 4 and 5). Figure 7.15 shows that electricity is limitedly provided for the mountainous areas of the island as well.

Figure 7.15 also indicates that especially Eastern parts of the island are literally cut off from (ferry) connections with neighbouring islands and/or the rest of the country. Generally however, port facilities and ferry connections are more evenly distributed across the province than the road network, and operate, for example, in the peripheral North. The Southern coastline between Jagna and Tagbilaran are not served with more ferry lines and ports, because these two connections are well established and attract travel and trade from neighbouring municipalities.
All in all, the infrastructure situation in Bohol can be stated to be either adequate for a spatially balanced tourism-services and industrial development nor allows for easy access-outreach relations in terms of trade and markets, as well as of services between the peripheral areas, their inhabitants and the government (compare chapter 8).

Figure 7.15: Connectivity infrastructure in Bohol as of 2001
### 7.3 Analytical inferences across inter- and intra-provincial scales

This chapter literally presents a follow-up to chapter 6.3. It summarises, compares, and analyses the themes of disparities of poverty and wealth elaborated for Bohol with those at inter-provincial and -regional scale. Analysis of Bohol is more constrained by data availability and reliability, and is focussed on disparate development related to poverty, agriculture, and tourism issues. Therefore, not all themes are comparable between the investigations of Bohol and of the Philippines. It also ought to be considered that comparisons of poverty patterns are restricted entirely to qualitative assessment, due to the dissimilar derivation process of national/inter-provincial and intra-Bohol poverty data. Table 7.5 provides a schematic overview of the comparative findings to be explained in detail in the following.

#### Table 7.5: Qualitative assessment of manifestations of intra-Philippine and intra-Bohol disparities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manifestations of disparities</th>
<th>Inter-regional &amp; provincial Philippines</th>
<th>Relation*</th>
<th>Intra-Bohol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct and official poverty indicators</td>
<td>Based on income data</td>
<td>⇔</td>
<td>Based on health and education data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect indicators</td>
<td>Agriculture/fishery – service &amp; industry dichotomy</td>
<td>≈ / ⇔</td>
<td>Subsistence agricultural/fishery is dominant, some dichotomy to tourism, no industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human resources matter</td>
<td>⇔</td>
<td>Economy matters more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population-employment dilemma</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>not reliably assessable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brain drain from peripheries to brain gain in centres</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>not reliably assessable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure and access seem to play important role, but not comprehensively assessable</td>
<td>≈ / ?</td>
<td>Infrastructure and access are decisive factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial disparities between</td>
<td>North-South</td>
<td>⇔</td>
<td>South-North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metro Manila - residual Philippines</td>
<td>≈</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City/ Panglao island) - residual Bohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban - rural</td>
<td>≈</td>
<td>Urban - rural (with exceptions!)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coast - interior</td>
<td>≈ / ⇔</td>
<td>Partly matching (in South and West), partly not (in the North/ Northeast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lowland - upland</td>
<td>≈ / ⇔</td>
<td>Partly matching (in South and West), partly not (in the North/Northeast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Faces’ of social disparities not identified comprehensively – to be continued</td>
<td>Unequal landownership</td>
<td>≈</td>
<td>Unequal landownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese concentration in urban centres</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>not assessable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous minorities in CAR and Muslim minorities in Mindanao peripheries</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>not assessable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*contrasting: ⇔; resembling: ≈; not assessable: ?

Clausen 2006
In terms of spatial patterns, the North-South divide and focus on Metro Manila in the Philippines faces a South-North divide and focus on Tagbilaran City and partially, Panglao island in Bohol. Alike the national level in Bohol the centres of development are the urbanised areas, especially Tagbilaran City and its surroundings. Implicitly, centre-periphery relations in Bohol have, similar to the whole Philippines, a distinct urban-rural face.

The municipal urban centres (usually the seats of municipal government), especially those at the Southern coast show characteristics of secondary centres, whereas “the more disadvantaged households and groups are in the rural townships, in the rural areas” (expert interview 7). Basically, the more rural and further North and Northeast located municipalities record higher poverty incidence and an overall peripheral status. At the low end of the municipal parameter of disparities of poverty and wealth are Pres. Garcia and Bien Unido.29

Spatial disparities within municipalities/communities may, alike at national scale, vary considerably. Morphological differentiation play a role, however not a straight one as at national scale (or they may simply be more precisely assessable in Bohol). Broadly speaking, the coastal/lowland and interior/upland wealth differential prevalent at national level more or less corresponds in Bohol’s South and Southwest. However, large lowlands reaching far into the interior of the island mark the very poor North and Northeast of Bohol. A different example, the relatively wealthy municipalities of Jagna and Garcia Hernandez are comparatively mountainous and have only a narrow lowland coastal strip – where, however, in the case of Jagna a vibrant harbour town is the motor of development (which could possibly hide intra-municipal disparities between coast and mountainous inland).

Spatial disparities of poverty and wealth in Bohol show some, yet again less plain interrelations with sectoral disparities than the inter-provincial patterns. This is mostly due to the almost exclusive agriculture and fishery character of the provincial economy with very little industry operating in Bohol. Note – and this may be an aspect applying to many other ‘agricultural peripheries’ of the Philippines – that agriculture and fisheries are mainly subsistence-oriented activities in Bohol. This is particularly due to small patches of land (compare below), little economies of scale, productivity, and trade.

Tourism services allocate almost exclusively in and around the wealthier centres of Tagbilaran City and Panglao island. This is notwithstanding the fact that tourist attractions are spread around the island. This implies, that the potential of tourism as a lever for more balanced development does not seem to be taken advantage of (compare follow-up in chapter 6.1.3).

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29 Note that while Ubay is among the officially poorest municipalities, it is also the location of several recent economic investment incentives (cattle farming) and therefore not considered at the very end of the disparity parameter (compare chapter 8).
The research in Bohol illuminates a high significance of issues of access, infrastructure, and connectivity for socio-economic development in both, (rural) peripheries and (urban) centres. One expert interviewee summarises the problems peripheral rural communities face:

“... the service delivery is not reaching them adequately, because of the squatted nature it is quite hard to form an organisation, it takes a longer time. Whereas in the urban they can call and ask for assistance. In the rural areas it takes a longer time to get the poor people together” (expert interview 7).

It ought to be noted that the issue of unequal landownership – prevalent in Bohol and the entire Philippines alike – plays an additional and significant role in this context. Unequal landownership deteriorates the marginalised situation of poorer tenants and landless workers as such, that they often lack the (legal, material, time and educational) assets to actively connect and benefit to the centres of assistance (i.e. mobility and establishing linkages requires resources already!). In other words, governmental outreach to the landowners (even if they are absentee owners) is automatically better facilitated than to those who are actually in more urgent need.

Findings on human development in Bohol allow interesting and somewhat summarising inferences for general development patterns. Therefore, they are elaborated in this final part of chapter 7. Precisely, in inter-provincial comparison of the Human Development Index in 2000 (figure 6.24) Bohol is included in the medium quartile, and has actually ‘jumped’ up a class since 1997 (where it had stagnated from 1994). This means that in 2000 Bohol is for the first time included in the same HDI quartile as its ‘wealthy’ neighbour Cebu. This may be related to Bohol’s life expectancy and educational attainment being above Philippine average (figures 6.21 and 6.22).

At the same time, considering the composition of the HDI, and given Boholanos’ outstanding education and life expectancy, the HDI still must have been pushed down by a lack of GDP by capita, here by a lack of economic productivity. These findings firmly suggest that economic aspects impede overall development in Bohol more than social (health and education) aspects. Such inference is underlined by Boholanos’ response to the Bohol Poll question for the most important problem they face in 2002, as represented in table 7.6. Accordingly, for more than 50% of the respondents the major problem in Bohol is the economy. Interestingly, the agricultural sector and its problems are apparently not counted as to belong to overall economic problems. This may again point at the dominant subsistence nature of the primary sector, and that the arena for economic progress is seen to be based in industry and services (compare perception of

| Table 7.6: Most important problem in the respondents’ place (in %) |
|-----------------|----------|
| Economy         | 57.2     |
| Agriculture     | 11.0     |
| Public services | 10.0     |
| Public safety   | 6.1      |
| Environmental   | 1.8      |
| Others          | 6.0      |
| Don’t know      | 8.0      |

Source: HNU 2002
government in chapter 8.1). Moreover noteworthy in the context of this study is obviously the third ranking of problems in public services.

Hence, it follows firstly, that the recent social-indicator-based poverty identification process by the provincial government ignores the de-facto existing economic developmental setting and therefore may adversely identify and target disparities of poverty and wealth.

Secondly, in Philippine comparison Bohol can be clearly classified as a developmental periphery which however recently shows endeavours, prospects and potential to maybe turn into a centre in the long run, especially through its commitment to opening up and benefiting from global markets through tourism services (compare figure 6.25).

Thirdly, when dealing with sectoral issues of poverty-alleviation, agriculture, and tourism, there is also a need to consider related issues of disparate development. This is particularly crucial in times of growth, or as the provincial government of Bohol points out:

“The more development took place, the greater the level of exclusion of the poor leading to a situation where pockets of poverty coexist with levels of relative affluence that often end up hiding the poor from the eyes of LGUs, policy makers and development institutions” (Provincial Government of Bohol 2003b: 2).

The quote declares that material disparities of poverty and wealth may interrelate with disparities of policy outreach in Bohol. Chapters 8 and 9 continue to empirically investigate the content and truth of this assertion.
8. Investigating the effect(iveness) of policy-making on disparities of poverty in Bohol

This chapter provides empirical answers to key question II. It analyses governmental policies for their outreach and effect(iveness) on the peripheral, marginalised, and most problematic poverty issues in Bohol. The decentralised setting requires integrating the case research on Bohol in a national government policy framework. Examples from other regions of the Philippines may also be used for complementary or comparative analytical purposes.

This chapter aims at discovering typical constraints of policy-making upon disparities of poverty and wealth in the peculiar Bohol-Philippine setting, assuming that the performance of policy on disparities of poverty and wealth depends on their – and their makers’ – uneven presence across space, society, time, and context (see chapter 3.1.2). Sectoral anti-poverty, tourism, and agricultural (partly including fishery) policy fields present the entry points for a policy analysis that is based on policy documents, qualitative interviews, field visits, outreach mapping and academic literature (see chapters 4.3.1 and 4.3.4).

8.1 National policy framework

Disparities or poverty, redistribution or growth?

Essentially, poverty – not regional – policy is politically considered “the most formidable development challenge for the Philippines in the 21st century” (NEDA 2001: 1; compare chapter 2.3.2). Such precedence of poverty over disparities is apparent by official statistics highlighting absolute over relative poverty incidences (compare chapter 6.1.2).

None the less, policy priorities in President Arroyo’s Medium-term Philippine Development Plan 2001-2004 recognise that “the fight against poverty will not be complete unless existing regional disparities are narrowed down” (NEDA 2001: 7). Compared to her predecessors, the Arroyo government is claimed to give greater attention to regional development (Mercado 2002). The targets of the plan are

- The decongestion of Metro Manila into Southern Tagalog- CALABRAZON and Central Luzon - Subic Clark;
- Urban centres as growth catalysts for rural hinterlands; and
- General poverty in Mindanao.

It shows that in the light of the findings of chapters 5, and 6 only few of the identified developmental peripheries are specifically targeted: Visayan provinces are not mentioned, and rural development is assessed as a function of growth in proximate urban centres. Instead, the development ‘hubs’ of Metro Manila and adjacent Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon continue to be addressed. Except targeting poverty in Mindanao, national policy outreach
plans for a more spatially balanced development remain somewhat unspecified and seem neither complete nor efficient.

Interestingly, national policy guidelines (more) explicitly recognise the socially dividing implications of poverty. Since the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act 1997 (under Ramos) governmental policy has concentrated on balancing the social volatilities induced by globalising free market forces. Likewise, the central targets of Arroyo’s presidency as listed in her 2001 state-of-the-nation-address follow such “socially oriented market economy approach” (Ana 1998) and include

- Free enterprise development appropriate to 21st century globalisation with a social conscience;
- Agro-industrial modernisation, founded on social equity;
- Social bias towards the disadvantaged people; and
- Rise of the moral standards of governments and society.

More emphasis has also been put on participatory governance approaches and administrative effectiveness as a means to combat (disparities of) poverty:

“Good and effective governance is vital to winning the battle against poverty [...] New partnerships between the government on the one hand, and business, civil society and people’s organisations on the other, will be forged and strengthened as the bureaucracy is right-sized to permit a reengineered government to do more with less in the delivery of public goods and services. This requires a performance-based and results-oriented government” (NEDA 2001: 253).

Notwithstanding the apparent acknowledgement of social and sectoral disparities and of state-society partnership, the majority of scholars judge that ultimately free-market, capital-based growth strategies dominate national government’s policy-making. For example, the government is claimed to head for turning the Philippines into ‘a newly industrialised country’. This would imply that their main policy priority is still on targeting growth over redistribution – an assessment underlined by the existing material disparities as shown in chapter 6 (Thompson & Villacorta 1996; Clausen forthcoming B). In other words, from this perspective the development discourse and relationship between market initiative and state government regulation in the Philippines remains dominated by global economy-centred, income-growth, ‘classic’ government-focussed anti-poverty concepts (Rigg 2003). This involves that national policy-making follows the theoretical argument of pursuing and achieving a more balanced development by the means of globalisation (see chapter 2.2.3; below). In what ways such approach involves a reorganisation of traditional, top-down policy-making procedures towards more participatory state-society interactions in a decentralised policy environment is to be examined by empirical research in this chapter.
Policy trends in economic sectors

Sectoral policy guidelines, particularly in the primary and tourism sectors, underline the above-noted growth paradigms and provide explanations for sectoral manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines.

During Marcos’ authoritative regime the Philippine economy was highly protected and operated on principles of import substitution. Especially agriculture received technical and financial support while industries and services, including tourism, were strongly controlled and regulated (Manasan & Mercado 1999). However, since the 1980s the Philippine economy has profoundly been re-shaped towards greater global competitiveness and integration through globalisation, liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation in the industry and service sectors (Orbeta 1996; Austria 2001). Particularly export industries but increasingly also tourism are heralded as major catalysts for growth in the Philippines, and the transformation of the economy into a globally-integrated market shall guarantee this growth (compare chapter 6.1.3). Accordingly, in the 1990s the inflow of foreign investments was liberalised. Moreover, the Philippines entered multilateral and regional trade associations, namely the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to enable the growing industries and services to realise economies of scale, to penetrate larger markets, and to attract foreign networks and investments (Aldaba 2000; Lim 1998). Eventually, the Medium Term Development Plan 2001-2004 explicitly aims at “putting the Philippines on the International Tourism Map” (NEDA 2001: 71) based on the expectation that “tourism is the fastest lane to getting the economy back on the track” (Roxas-Mendoza 2001: 28). At the end of the 20th century the Philippines are more global market-oriented than ever before (compare chapter 6.1.2 and 6.1.3; Balisacan & Pernia 2002).

This ‘global turn’ of the economy, however, takes place to the detriment of agriculture and fishery, which have been largely neglected since. Only President Estrada addressed food security and the modernisation of the primary sector in his ‘ERAP for the Poor’-movement (compare chapter 9.2.3). The Agriculture and Fisheries Modernisation Act (AFMA) of 1998 promises to mitigate problems of the rural poor in the agricultural sector. Yet it envisaged so by reinforcing, once again, global export-market orientation and agro-industrial growth (see also chapter 8.4.3). Chapter 6 and 7 have already illustrated some controversial consequences of economic transformation. The subsequent chapters elaborate whether and how such national framework interacts with decentral policy-making and disparities at intra-provincial scale in Bohol.
8.2 Boholano conceptions of disparities of poverty and wealth

8.2.1 Decentralised policy priorities and motives

How does the provincial government of Bohol recognise, identify, and approach disparities of poverty and wealth in a decentralised setting? Generally, the government practically executes and administers policy through respective offices, after the Sangguniang has set the guidelines (usually on the basis of recommendations and facts provided by the specialised offices; compare chapter 5.2). Note that in the Philippine presidential system of government, the President exercises supervisory authority over the provinces, while the provincial governments exercise supervision over municipalities (Valdellon 1999).

There are no policies and/or agencies, which deal exclusively with disparate development in Bohol. However, some sectoral and anti-poverty policies take an area- or group-based approach. Officially, as at national level, anti-poverty endeavours – and not disparities – set the main theme guiding most policy initiatives in Bohol. Asked to put up independent development plans by the Local Government Code, the respective Bohol Medium-term Development Plan 2004-2009 subsumes spatial as well as sectoral and social development under the prime objective of poverty reduction:

“The development challenge facing Bohol over the years has to do primarily with addressing poverty and its limited physical and economic resources to at least guarantee minimum desirable levels of social welfare and overall quality of life of Boholanos” (Provincial Government Bohol 2003b: 23).

The quote illuminates that the provincial government holds in particular a lack of economic resources and growth responsible for (disparities of) poverty, which result in inadequate social services and overall deprivation. This economically-oriented conception on (disparities of) poverty strikingly contrasts with the social identification process of poverty statistics (see chapter 6.1; 7.3). The above quote also indicates that the government highlights ‘life chances’ or what comes close to the ‘equality of opportunity’-approach. It follows that – similar to its national counterpart – the provincial government of Bohol emphasises poverty (reduction) over disparity (alleviation). Yet, at the same time the provincial government considers the spatial, social, and sectoral manifestations of poverty and acknowledges the significance of targeting policy in order to reach the poor: “To respond to the needs of the poor, it is first important to reach them wherever they are” (Provincial Government Bohol 2003a: 26).

Respective spatial, social, and sectoral development priority targets are specified:

**Spatial area targets**

- Coast and islands in the North;
- Uplands in the interior, and
- Watersheds in Loboc, Wahig-Inabanga, and Abatan.
Social group targets

- Farm and non-farm labourer;
- Tenant and part-time farmers;
- Marginal and part-time fishermen, and
- Miscellaneous: Unemployed, scavengers, single mothers or disabled.

Sectoral targets

- Agro-industrial development, and
- (Eco-) Tourism (see Provincial Government Bohol 2003a, 2003b).

These targets – unlike their national counterparts – adequately meet the uneven development situation in Bohol as identified in chapter 7. Particularly sectoral targets are further specified: The Bohol Medium Term Plan 2004-2009 identifies developmental constraints – here similar to national plans – to lie especially in the primary sector, such as

“low productivity in agriculture and fisheries continues to dampen economic growth. Majority of the farmers and fisherfolk have not been reached with basic services and extension programs to improve productivity and gain more access to an expanding market” (Provincial Government Bohol 2003b: xiv-xv).

The above-listed poverty groups are all engaged in fisheries and/or agriculture, and face the sectors’ quoted productivity and access problems: Farm and non-farm labourers depend on seasonal employment for subsistence, earn little, and are at greater risk to social instability and economic downturn. Tenants and/or part-time farmers are not able to produce economies of scale due to the small sizes of farms, poor irrigation, low value crops, poor soil, and inadequate technical equipments. Fishers confront fish depletion due to environmentally degraded marine habitats, intrusion of commercial fishing, and over-fishing. In this context, the government is “aware that asset reform is crucial to reducing inequalities and stimulating growth” and state that “expanding the assets base, as well as the productivity, of these various target groups remains a priority within the sub-sector”(Provincial Government of Bohol 2003b: xv).

In contrast, (eco-) tourism is understood as a development catalyst sector and is meant to

“…stimulate economic growth and provide direct cash benefits to local communities. These benefits can in turn be channeled to improve nutrition, food security, housing, and ultimately raise the standard of living in rural areas” (Provincial Government Bohol 2003b: 88).

In other words, the provincial government – alike the national government – approaches tourism as a means to overall economic progress on the one hand – the ultimate target is to replace Boracay as a tourist destination (expert interview 11). On the other hand, (eco-) tourism is officially recognised to provide alternative livelihood options to Boholanos, potentially also for the rural and peripheral. In this context the plans acknowledge the
capability of (eco-) tourism-related micro, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to provide employment and income, and therefore relieve some pressure and obstacles faced in agriculture and fishery. This policy focus on tourism development (and not industrial) seems reasonable in the face of the predominantly agricultural and peripheral character of Bohol (see chapter 7).

Overall, while the general priorities of the provincial government resemble their national counterpart by highlighting poverty over disparity reduction, they approach it differently by a combined growth-redistribution approach. This includes more explicit and detailed identification of spatial target areas, social target groups, and sectoral targets than at national level – giving some credit to Lake’s theoretical argument for decentralised local government’s policy outreach potentially being more effective (discussed in chapter 3.3.2).

Table 8.1 outlines the responsibilities that have been decentralised to policy-making at LGUs in the fields of poverty alleviation, agriculture/fishery, and tourism policy since 1991. It ought to be noted, however, that most of the tasks pursued by the provincial government ideally should be supported by and carried out in partnership with municipal and barangay LGUs as well, as they obviously affect their jurisdictions and population. All policies are expected to be in line with the idea that “the response to the poverty situation needs to be target-specific, adequate and timely. The interventions have to be mutually reinforcing and complementary, as well as affordable over time, by Government and other stakeholders. The key task is to match specific needs with project services” (Provincial Government Bohol 2003a: 17).

Table 8.1: Decentralised sectoral tasks of provincial governments (selection)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture &amp; Fisheries</th>
<th>Extension of &amp; research on services and facilities:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prevention/ control of plant/animal diseases =&gt; Productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Livestock farms &amp; markets, breeding stations, artificial insemination centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Assistance for cooperatives etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Transfer of appropriate technology &amp; knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cooperative implementation of land reform with national government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>- Tourism development (programmes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Tourism promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare &amp; Development</td>
<td>- Poverty alleviation projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Programs on rebel returnees and evacuees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Disaster relief operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Population development services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works &amp; Infrastructure</td>
<td>- Local roads and bridges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inter-municipal water works, drainage, sewerage, irrigation systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This study does not explicitly focus on the aspects displayed in grey colour, may however comment on them in discussion.

Source: adapted after Republic Act 7160; Balgos 2001; Osteria 1996
8.2.2 Profile of policy analysis

This study investigates seven policy initiatives and their respective policy-makers and executers and – given that no explicit anti-disparity policy is under operation in Bohol – subdivides them into (a) sectoral ‘indirect’ policy, in the fields of tourism and agriculture/fishery, and (b) ‘directly targeted’ anti-poverty policy. Table 8.2 provides an overview of the chosen policies and their makers.

Similar to national government the provincial government of Bohol aims at enhancing participatory governance and state-society partnership processes (see Provincial Government of Bohol 2003b). Accordingly, some governmental policy is executed in partnerships by NGOs, peoples’ organisations, and/or international aid organisations. This institutional setting allows for some comparison between ‘classic’ governmental and more recent ‘partnership or governed’ policy-making. The table does not allow insights into questions of if and how local populations are targeted to participate in policy-making when not organised into peoples’ organisations (the more common scenario). These issues are dealt with in the respective sections of this chapter.

Emphasis is on policy-making at provincial government level, with each policy case highlighting specific sectoral engagements. The two area-based, non-sectoral cases 6 and 7 at municipal and barangay level exemplify policy-making characteristics in typical Boholano peripheries – a small island and an upland community – in a comprehensive way.

Mostly, the subsequent sections present information on the state of policy (and their makers) as of early 2004, the main period of my research in the Philippines. Yet, it remains difficult to relate – and compare – the seven policies with each other for the following reasons: Firstly, the reference periods of the single policy description vary, for I was often dependent on the (date of the) information provided by policy-makers and interview partners. Secondly, in early 2004 the policies were situated at different stages of the policy cycle and, logically, applied varying log-frames. Such setting suggests to highlight qualitative explorations of patterns and trends over detailed fact-focused comparison, and to organise the respective policy investigation into two stages, which are adopted with reference to the policy cycle:

1. Policy plans and initial activities (chapter 8.3);
2. Advanced policy implementation and accomplishments (chapter 8.4);

Note that the boundary between the two stages may sometimes blur depending on the information available (compare subsequent chapter). Crucially, the two analytical steps are always contextualised in the decentralised policy setting of the Philippines, here broader development priorities of the national and provincial governments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Policy-maker &amp; executor</th>
<th>Institutional background</th>
<th>Partnership model* (if assessable)</th>
<th>Main office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provincial government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Investment</td>
<td>General direction &amp; annual projects</td>
<td>Bohol Investment Promotion Bureau (BIPC)</td>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tagbilaran City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tourism</td>
<td>General direction &amp; annual projects</td>
<td>Bohol Tourism Office (BTO) &amp; foreign consultant (German Development Service DED)</td>
<td>Provincial government &amp; International Aid</td>
<td>Community leadership</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Agriculture</td>
<td>General direction &amp; annual projects</td>
<td>Provincial Agriculturalist (PA)</td>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td>‘Classic’ government</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>‘Abante Bohol’ poverty reduction project</td>
<td>Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office (BPRMO)</td>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td>‘Classic’ government</td>
<td>Tagbilaran City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘Strengthening local government for effective service delivery for poverty reduction’ (‘SLGP’)</td>
<td>Provincial Planning and Development Office (PPDO) &amp; Bohol Local Development Foundation (BLDF)</td>
<td>Provincial government &amp; NGO</td>
<td>Community planning &amp; self-help</td>
<td>Tagbilaran &amp; Baclayon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Municipal &amp; barangay government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Policy on the island of Pamilacan, Baclayon</td>
<td>Municipal government of Baclayon &amp; foreign consultant of the DED</td>
<td>Municipal government &amp; International Aid &amp; People’s Organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Baclayon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Policy on uplands of Sierra Bullones</td>
<td>Soil and Water Conservation Foundation (‘SWCF’)</td>
<td>NGO &amp; People’s Organisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Bullones</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* following theoretical accounts in chapter 3.3.3

Aspects in grey colour are not explicitly focussed but only mentioned briefly during analysis.
A note on encountered monitoring and evaluation practices

Certain encountered practices of policy administration complicate this study’s assessment of governmental policy effect(iveness) on disparities of poverty. Firstly, the only examined policy-maker to provide thoroughly elaborated annual monitoring and evaluation reports is the non-governmental organisation SWCF (policy 7). Secondly, the majority of ‘quantitative’ evaluation information available is based on annual periods and usually available for one year only instead of a series of years.

Thirdly, neither the Bohol Tourism Office (BTO, policy 2) nor the Provincial Agriculturalist (policy 3) compile any comprehensive information on whether and how planned projects have been implemented. The BTO reasons this lack partly by their recent foundation in 2002 – it had been part of the Bohol Investment Promotion Centre (BIPC) before (expert interview 19). The planning officer of the Provincial Agriculturalist admits with respect to implementation reports that “the management requests them to do. But that is our …kanang …weakness. Because we are not able to implement it” (expert interview 3). Another example, when expert interviewee 2 is asked for information on a presentation he had given on decentralisation and participatory governance he first agrees and then withdraws: “What I can do is to give you a summary but I don’t have it right now […] Maybe because, ah […] when I was invited to this meeting, I just thought I just talk about my institute and not on a very specific project”. A related phenomenon, fourthly, interviewees refer to other ‘more responsible’ or ‘better informed’ officers. For example, expert interviewee 3 illustrates ”under the rice [programme] we have many projects. So I cannot oversee it thoroughly because we …ah… coordinator. I suggest you can talk to [him] so that he can explain to you” (compare also notes on informality and hierarchy in the Philippines in chapters 4.3.2 and 9).

Fifthly, the BIPC, Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office (BPRMO, policy 4), Philippine Planning and Development Office (PPDO) & Bohol Local Development Foundation (BLDF, policy 5) combine plans and accomplishments into short reports, sometimes allowing pointed insights, often not30. In the case of the BPRMO project field workers are claimed to write “an activity report plus their observations on the progress of our project, on the mistakes, what do you call that, the problems encountered, and then what were the recommendations of the people” (expert interview 4). Yet, I was not able to look at the reports but confined to information handed out to me and to qualitative appraisals.

Overall, the listed practices clearly restrict research findings to varying extents and are to be considered in subsequent analysis. As a result, not all analytical issues of figure 3.2 can be considered for every policy case.

30 For example, ‘Sectoral Provincial Framework Maps’ for Bohol cannot be used for this study because they do not differentiate between ‘plans’ and ‘existing and implemented facilities’. 
8.3 Policy plans and initial activities: Setting up policy outreach

8.3.1 (Eco-) Tourism endeavours

Bohol is divided into three economic investment promotion planning zones: The coastal municipalities facing Cebu are planned as an agro-industry/light industry zone and suitable locations for Special Economic Zones. The interior and Northeast represent a zone of agriculture, and the Southern coast from Tagbilaran/ Panglao to Anda – with one ‘excursion’ to the ‘Chocolate Hills’ – are to establish an eco-tourism base (see figure 8.4; BIPC 2001).

According to the Local Government Code Bohol’s provincial government can develop and promote the island’s tourism policy largely independently from national policy (table 8.1). None the less, when Bohol was declared a national (eco-)tourism target of the Philippines in 1998/99, this national impetus also reinforced provincial tourism endeavours. Since then the provincial government (policy 2) has launched eco-tourism31 programmes and attempts to integrate them in multi-sectoral approaches, for example, by linking them to coastal resource management or agro-tourism (expert interview 10). The Bohol Tourism Office (BTO) is meant to function as a prime policy community leader that seeks to advocate, consult, and coordinate cooperation with private and civil stakeholders (see chapter 3.3.3). Such multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder approach ought to facilitate (eco-) tourism to operate as a means to sustainable economic growth also in the rural and peripheral, and to enhance the acceptance of policy and its embeddedness into local areas and with the local people.

The official ‘six pillars of Bohol tourism’ comprise the (a) Chocolate Hills in Carmen (photo 7.6), (b) the Tarsier, one of the smallest living primates and oldest land species in continuous existence in the Philippines which inhibits the Corella area, (c) dive sites off the coast of Panglao, Balicasag, and Cabilao in Loon, (d) beaches of Panglao and Anda (photo 7.5), (e) cultural heritage buildings made out of coralline stones, above all allocated in the South and East coastline, and (f) Bohol’s history and culture (Provincial Government of Bohol 2003b).

Figure 8.1 part B displays these six pillars and some other attractions in a popular marketing prospectus distributed by the Tourism Office. The brochure conveys the impression that tourism attractions and facilities are spread across the entire province. However, the image blurs scales and distances, as a comparison between Part A and B of figure 8.1 illuminates. For example, the Chocolate Hills are in reality much smaller in proportion and situated further Southeast than illustrated in the brochure. None the less, figure 8.1 shows that some of the attractions are in fact situated in municipalities previously defined as poor, which implies that tourism development can potentially make a difference there.

31 It ought to be noted that ‘eco-tourism’ initiatives in the Philippines may not necessarily be understood to comply with the original concept and mainly concern with the environment and its conservation (compare Ashley & Roe 2003: 5). Instead, the term of eco-tourism is often used as an umbrella term for community-based, small-scaled, multi-sectoral, and pro-poor tourism approach.
Figure 8.1: Bohol satellite image and tourism prospect
The case of Pamilacan island (of Baclayon municipality, see figure 4.2) demonstrates such smaller tourism endeavours in ‘peripheries’ (policy 6): The inhabitants of the island barangay used to live almost exclusively on catching whale sharks and whales. Since 1997 they have been legally forbidden to pursue this occupation (after interventions by the World Wildlife Fund) (expert interviews 10, 7). Ever since, LGUs together with a Pamilacano peoples’ organisation, the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whalewatching Organisation, which was founded during the policy process, NGOs, and international consultants have planned, promoted, and partly introduced whale-watching and diving tourism to the now protected coral reefs surrounding Pamilacan in order to foster new livelihood options for Pamilacanos.

In addition, some (eco-) tourist accommodation on the island has opened up income alternatives. Similarly, small-scale eco-tourism projects have been launched particularly in the Eastern municipalities of Mabini, Candijay, and Guindulman, as well as in the Western municipality of Buenavista and promoted through, for example, coastal resource management showcases (see photo 8.1; expert interviews 10, 11; field visits 4, 11).

Pamilacan island as well as Mabini, Candijay, Guindulman, and Buenavista are included in so-called circuit routes for tourists identified by the Bohol Tourism Sketch Plan (CY 1998-2020) as an attempt to spread tourist routes across the island. Six circuit packages for visitors are identified. They all start from Tagbilaran City, yet cover all of Bohol and hence stretch beyond the official investment planning zones for tourism:

- Circuit 1: Tagbilaran, Dauis & Panglao, Balicasag & Pamilacan Islands;
- Circuit 2: Tagbilaran, Corella, Baclayon, Albuquerque, Loay, Loboc, Bilar, Carmen;
- Circuit 3: Tagbilaran, Clarin, Inabanga, Buenavista, Getafe, Talibon, Sagbayan;
- Circuit 4: Tagbilaran, Cortes, Maribojoc, Loon, Calape, Tubigon, Antequera, Balilihan;
- Circuit 5: Tagbilaran, Dimiao, Valencia, Garcia- Hernandez, Jagna, Duero, Anda;
- Sub-circuit 5: Anda Peninsula: Guindulman, Anda, Candijay, Mabini;

Notwithstanding these decentral endeavours, the satellite image of Bohol in comparison with the marketing prospectus (figure 8.1) clarifies that tourism marketing and plans by the BTO so far omit the peripheral Northern islands and coastlands despite their vast natural coral
reefs. The coral reefs in the North exceed those in Panglao and Anda by far and are located in greater proximity to the potential visitor ‘gate’ of Cebu. The policy neglect of these areas is even more striking considering the great poverty incidence in most of the Northern municipalities, and considering that these areas are named explicitly as spatial policy target areas (see chapter 8.2.1). Tourism could potentially present an alternative livelihood option there, similar to the Pamilacan case. Interview partner 17 explains that particularly the extreme water scarcity on the Northern islands and coastlines obstructs such tourism activities there. Yet, this argument is weakened by the fact that water is scarce in Pamilacan and even in Panglao, too. Interviewee 10 states further that the development of the North generally receives little attention, partly due to its limited accessibility from Tagbilaran City (figure 7.15), and more decisively, because most policy-makers – Filipinos equally as foreigners – prefer to be based in the city and situate their projects within comfortable reach, like on Pamilacan (compare also chapter 8.4.2).

8.3.2 Targeting policy plans for the primary sector

Turning to the primary sector, official policy frameworks in Bohol emphasise agricultural growth in combination with commercial production in industry and services on the one hand, and more balanced access to markets and assets on the other. Decentrally the provincial LGU particularly deals with the extension of (research on) services and facilities for increasing productivity, support for cooperative organisations, and technology and knowledge transfer (table 8.1). Selected areas for investment are high-value crop production, setting up of post-harvest facilities, feed mill and fruit/meat processing and inland fishing, aquacultures and processing. Needs in fishery shall be met, among others, by the delineation of municipal waters, provision of alternative livelihood and employment options, and enforcement of local fishing ordinances (BIPC 2001).

Figure 8.2 overviews the project plans of the Provincial Agriculturist (policy 3) for 2004. Basically, the office pursues classic sectoral governmental service delivery and traditionally works on its own. Number-wise and in terms of finances the projects’ emphasis is on the enhancement of (a) crop and (b) fishery productivity, as well as seed delivery, bio-intensive gardening, and technical equipments (expert interviews 3, 13). Besides, activity fields of (c) research and (d) training and capacity building, for example, by forming an inland-fishermen’s cooperation, take over smaller proportions. Overall, the activity plans of the Provincial Agriculturist clearly meet the set decentralised responsibilities.

Crop productivity enhancement projects are mostly directed at interior and Northeastern municipalities and thus, target many of the poorest agricultural areas. The locations with the highest concentration of projects plans are Tagbilaran City and Ubay. Panglao – already targeted by several tourism projects – is included again. Fishery enhancement projects are
more selectively planned for the Eastern municipalities of Mabini, Candijay, Guindulman (also tackled by eco-tourism policy), and for Clarin. Again, Panglao island is included while in contrast, some of the very poor and agriculture- and fishery-dependent municipalities and the outer islands in the North (from Inabanga to Bien Unido) are not.

This concentration of policy activities in already existing economic centres appears to conform to the national guidelines of focussing policy activities in urban areas (compare chapter 8.1). In fact, already since Marcos’ times Philippine governments have explicitly promoted such development of urban economic centres into major growth poles for the respective hinterlands. Equally, the dominance of Metro Manila has been fostered through policies, which funnel public investments mostly into the metropolis (Manasan & Mercado 1999; Spreitzhofer & Heintel 2002).

As a form of spill-over effect from centre to periphery, local governments in Bohol increasingly pursue to utilise their natural resources to profit from the needs of the ‘big neighbour’ Cebu. For example, Cebu City and Mactan island do not have sufficient water resources required for further commercial expansion. While there are many areas in Bohol facing water scarcity as well, the island’s three main watersheds in Loboc, Wahig-Inabanga, and Abatan provide sufficient water to their surroundings. Especially the Inabanga-Wahig river watershed falls into an area suitable as a source of alternative water supply for Cebu and could be exploited to the socio-economic benefit of both provinces and their inhabitants. Important to note, the benefits potentially could be distributed along the watershed from the town of Inabanga at the coast towards the more peripheral and poorer interior. The accomplishments of these policy plans are discussed in chapter 9.3.3 only.

Cooperating closely with the national Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Promotion Center, Department of Agrarian Reform, Agricultural Training Institute, National Irrigation Authority, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Cooperatives Development Authority, Land Bank, Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, and the World Bank, the Provincial Agriculturalist of Bohol instigates so-called ‘Agrarian Reform Communities’ (ARCs). ARCs are embedded in the nation-wide ‘Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme’ (CARP) which was launched in 1987. CARP, including ARCs, are a policy response to the fundamental landownership problems persistent in the country (see chapters 6.1.3 and 7.2.3). They are nationally and provincially considered crucial in reducing inequalities and stimulating growth by transferring assets and land ownership to small farmers, former tenants and farm workers:

“Inequitable access to land has, therefore, contributed to the government’s goal of reducing poverty and the promotion of social equity. Asset reform, especially land reform, is key to the attainment of these twin goals” (NEDA 2001: 168; compare chapter 8.2.1).
As part of the ARC programme, community development and support services are provided to agrarian reform beneficiaries in clusters of barangays where land distribution is ongoing. The project aims at raising people’s incomes and standards of living by improving their productive assets, rural infrastructure, financial services, and enterprise development (World Bank 2004).

Figure 8.2: Policy outreach plans 2004 by the Provincial Agriculturist of Bohol
### 8.3.3 Two anti-poverty policies in comparison

Around 39 different policies and/or projects operated in Bohol in 2003, which were involved in some way or another with poverty reduction and carried out by government or participatory governance initiatives. The Bohol Program Framework on Poverty Reduction seeks to provide a common policy ground for and integrates the guidelines, sectoral, area-based, target-group-oriented activities, and capacities of these 39 projects in order to expand their outreach and maximise their impact on high-poverty areas, groups, and issues. The framework was launched in 2002 and is the first Philippine integrative programme on poverty alleviation in a decentralised provincial framework. Its objective is to reduce poverty incidence in Bohol from 48.1% of total families\(^{32}\) to 30% until 2012. The framework is coordinated by the PPDO- Project Monitoring and Development Unit.

This study cannot provide a comprehensive account on the effect(iveness) of the entire framework. Instead, I in-depth investigate two smaller policies operating beneath the framework: Firstly, the ‘Strengthening local government for effective service delivery for poverty reduction’ (SLGP) carried out jointly by the PPDO and the NGO ‘Bohol Local Development Foundation’ (BLDF; policy 5), and secondly, the ‘Abante Bohol poverty reduction project’ pursued by the governmental ‘Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office’ (BPRMO; policy 4). Table 8.3 portrays and contrasts their official features as presented in early 2004.

**Table 8.3: Official portrayal of the two selected anti-poverty policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Strengthening local government for effective service delivery for poverty reduction ‘SLGP’</th>
<th>‘Abante Bohol’ poverty reduction project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Maker/executor</strong></td>
<td>Provincial Planning and Development Office (PPDO) &amp; Bohol Local Development Foundation (BLDF)</td>
<td>Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office (BPRMO; collaborates sometimes with Provincial Agriculturalist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time-frame</strong></td>
<td>Official: 2004 – 2007; however: during my visit in early 2004 activities had been ongoing on for ~ one year already</td>
<td>2002 – 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
<td>Improve access to services for the poor in the 17 poorest municipalities (according to PPDO survey, see figure 7.7) and reduce basic deprivations at purok level</td>
<td>Address rural poverty primarily in areas with insurgency-related problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity focus</strong></td>
<td>Local participation, capacity building, institutional change, technical assistance</td>
<td>Ideological change and conflict prevention through interventions that promote community organisations, entrepreneurship, sustainable livelihood, environmental management, food security, socio-cultural values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funded by</strong></td>
<td>AusAid – Philippines-Australia Community assistance Project (PACAP)+ Counterpart LGUs</td>
<td>20% development fund of provincial government + National Peace Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sources: PPDO 2004b; Provincial Government of Bohol 2003a; BPRMO 2003; expert interviews 4,7,17

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\(^{32}\) In chapter 7 I have cited poverty incidences measured by total population; therefore figures differ.
Both initiatives aim to tackle poverty alleviation with an area-based approach, yet they act out of dissimilar motives and apply dissimilar means and operation paths. The ‘SLGP’ is stronger embedded in the BPFPR framework than the ‘Abante Bohol’ project, because it is situated as a pilot project of the overall framework with the same policy-executer (PPDO and BLDF), while ‘Abante Bohol’ has been initiated before the launch of BPFPR. None the less it is the BPRMO with ‘Abante Bohol’ which makes Bohol “the only province which has a specific office to handle poverty” (expert interview 4) in the Philippines and which receives national funding and prominence. Therefore, ‘Abante Bohol’ is the better-known project of the two among the public, media, and politicians.

**Outreach setting: On neighbourhood puroks, communist- influenced barangays, and local participation**

The area approaches of the two projects are unique in the Philippines and illuminate their respective interests on (disparities of) poverty as well as examples of innovatively targeted policy approaches possible in a decentralised setting (compare chapter 3.3). Precisely, the ‘SLGP’ seeks to cover deprived puroks in 128 barangays of the 17 municipalities recorded as the poorest by the cited PPDO poverty survey (PPDO 2004b: 1-2; figure 7.7). The choice for puroks as the target level of the policy’s activities is based on the perception that puroks are voluntary neighbourhood organisations (compare chapter 4.2, figure 4.2). Their solidarity purpose is hoped to reinforce local people’s empowerment and participation in policy-making, to offer an alternative to and help avoid the potentially corrupt political organisation levels of LGUs:

“So that’s the motivation: Makes it easier for them to really mobilise communities if the purok system is in place. At the same time, of course, the neighbourhood concept […] so they have their own system. It’s only a formal way to get things done and to get service from the government”

– in contrast to barangays that “were corrupted by the party system. I mean they were given money by the parties […] so that they can buy votes. I mean that is one of the reasons the barangay council is there: easier […] to go and corrupt them and get some party politics, extensions of party politics at the barangay level” (expert interview 7).

Thus, the ‘SLGP’ addresses puroks as a new arena of participatory policy-making that is closer to the people and therefore more promising in terms of policy outreach and effect(iveness) on (disparities of) poverty. Implicitly, the ‘SLGP’ – in contrast to the other policies examined – emphasises explicitly institutional change over sectoral intervention (see table 8.3):

“Whereas, when you have an multi-sectoral orientation, area-based orientation for your organisation or a target-group approach than you have a better chance of sustainability for the groups […] Service delivery becomes not the ends but is a means
to them to have community organisation, to have their own decision-making council, to sit together as members of a neighbourhood association” (expert interview 7).

It ought to be noted that this positive attitude towards introducing puroks as policy-making level is not shared by all experts. Expert interview 10, for example, objects that the organisation of puroks is often enforced by barangay captains or councils in order to enhance their own power outreach. From this perspective, puroks represent non-voluntary, non-solidarity organisations, which are no more suitable for participatory policy-making than any formal LGU level like the barangays.

For the second policy in focus, ‘Abante Bohol’, “all the projects are concentrated in conflict areas, which means influenced by the communists and usually in the hinterlands where the ultra-poor are” (expert interview 4). The total target area comprises 335 barangays in 40 municipalities which are claimed to be affected by the communist guerrilla organisation of the National People’s Army (NPA) (see subsequent chapter for detailed portray of NPA; BPRMO 2003). Thus, ‘Abante Bohol’s engagement in poverty alleviation is foremost caused by political conflict:

“NPA influence first and foremost […] Otherwise there will also be existing another environment which later on will be very violent, you know, this contentment and everything because of what they say. So we go in and do something about it. That’s it […] Because if government does not visit these very poor areas the poor will find an alternative in the NPA, in the communist rule” (expert interview 4).

In fact, it is for this combination of poverty alleviation and political and ideological efforts why the national government supports ‘Abante Bohol’ and the BPRMO. All activities of ‘Abante Bohol’ that promote community organisations, entrepreneurship, sustainable livelihood, environmental management, food security, and socio-cultural values ultimately address ideological change and conflict prevention (table 8.3).

As a means to its overall objective, ‘Abante Bohol’ aspires to improve the empowerment of local people in policy-making. Thereby the BPRMO addresses the barangay level because

“we do not implement any intervention unless this intervention is identified by the recipients as such. They decide on the tools, on the means, so we just coordinate with them, and maybe raise the funds, but they have to have a counterfeit, to have a sense of ownership in all these projects. Cause without that, like so many handouts being done for so many years – nothing happened” (expert interview 4).

‘Abante Bohol’ sends trained field workers into NPA-influenced communities, who then live with the locals and try to support them with the above-mentioned services, to ‘empower’ them, as well as to ideologically-politically ‘battle for their hearts and minds’. Hence, similar to ‘SLGP’, ‘Abante Bohol’ recognises the significance of local acceptance and participation for effective policy-making, however seeks to utilise them as a means to the broader ideological and political interests.
On institutional partnerships

The ‘SLGP’ is institutionally implemented by a formal partnership of the Provincial Planning and Development Office (PPDO) and the NGO Bohol Local Development Foundation. This partnership setting is based on the observation that, while it has indeed the mandate to govern and to reach out to the poor, so far the provincial “government is only effective 5 km around town” – referring to Tagbilaran City (expert interview 7). The partnership is hoped to enhance ‘SLGP’s outreach beyond Tagbilaran, for firstly, NGOs have been observed to reach some areas that are not covered by government, and secondly, NGOs sometimes possess better finances, human capital stocks, and logistics (expert interviews 5, 17; see Gauld 2000 for similar praxis within forest policy in the Philippines). At the same time, in the view of the ‘SLGP’, provincial government needs to hold significant policy competences

“because they still control most of the power […] they can obstruct you, they can hinder, provide all sorts of constrains, create problems for you if they don’t see the connection with their administration. […] Precisely, when you work with community groups so they, they are very sharp on that these groups may might work against their political interest” (expert interview 7).

It follows that, while ‘SLGP’s plans ultimately target puroks, the project’s activities are operated through a multi-stakeholder partnership base: “All our interventions here in the province […] work on a very detailed strategy of hitting all the levels” (expert interview 7). In other words, and relating back to theory, the ‘SLGP’ is organised to pursue a middle path between a self-help and a community planning partnership (see chapter 3.3.3, table 8.2).

In contrast to the ‘SLGP’ the BPRMO and ‘Abante Bohol’ more strongly follows the traditional conception of policy-making that

“Government is to initiate and coordinate and that is about it […] and these areas, ah, have never been visited by any government except the present (expert interview 4).

Hence, the BPRMO spokesman agrees with the above quote on the limited outreach of governmental policy and attempt to change this situation, however not through formal partnerships with non-governmental organisations but by its own ‘classic’ endeavours. Thereby the office sometimes cooperates with the Provincial Agriculturist by contracting out some activities in the field to them (compare chapter 8.4.3). Interestingly, when other governmental agencies like to get involved in NPA-influenced areas, the BPRMO states to try to organise their work cooperatively. In opposition to this statement, however, the office is accused of not facilitating the entrance of NGOs and community organisations into the areas. According to expert interviewee 5 such non-integrative behaviour causes significant impediments to effective implementation of coherent development and peace efforts in the NPA-affected municipalities which does not help to effectively reduce the “feeling of neglect” that many Boholanos, who live in marginalised locations in and outside NPA influenced areas, have towards the government.
8.3.4 Excursus: Influence sphere of the National People’s Army

The National People’s Army (NPA) is the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) which calls itself representative of poor peasants and justifies their armed resistance against the Philippine government(s) with political agendas for more equitable socio-economic reforms, land entitlements, and more political autonomy. In other words, the NPA understands itself – similar to the Moro and indigenous movements – as an opposition movement fighting for ‘redistributive and recognitive justice’ in the Philippines (compare chapter 3.1). The organisation’s foundation dates back to the anti-Japanese guerrilla, so-called ‘Huk’-movements, in the 1940s. It reached its zenith of power during the period of political turnovers in 1986 (when they controlled an estimated 20% of communities in the country; see Hanisch 1995). Ever since the NPA has officially lost some of its influence sphere, however is still active in the entire Philippines and the conflict is internationally registered as an anti-regime war (AKUF 2006 at http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/IPw/Akuf/). The NPA is particularly active in the rural, in uplands, and in agricultural ‘peripheries’, hence those areas which are often characterised by unequal landownership and higher (disparities of) poverty. As one interview partner describes the NPA presence indirectly:

“If I have to figure out if a province or an island is secure or not I just look at how many cities and how many banks they have […] well, you know, in the rural areas there are many mountains [...] well, mountains offer many places to hide and do things without anyone noticing” (expert interview 9).

Thus, the national strongholds of (armed) conflicts between NPA and government are North Luzon, Bicol, and the peripheral parts of the Eastern, Western, and Central Visayas. The NPA has been active in Bohol since 1981 (Ulrich 2003). During field research there, the presence of the NPA has been a re-occurring subject, as the following examples highlight.

- On the route of field visit 5 an insurgency between national forces and NPA took place and military forces blocked the roads and searched all passing cars and passengers.
- In early February 2004 the NPA attacked the Provincial Governor of Bohol, Erico Aumentado, on the roads of Tagbilaran City after which “there was a press briefing given by the NPA head and he said it was meant only to warn the governor that they can strike everywhere even in the heart of provincial government” (expert interview 7).
- The influence of the NPA on LGU politics and policy-making is described to be rather vast: “They were telling us […] that they [the NPA] have the power, they can even summon the mayors, they summon the mayors last Saturday” (expert interview 7).
- In some municipalities and barangays the NPA is said to establish so-called ‘shadow governments’ where they take away taxes from the official local governments, block access roads, and hold meetings and trainings. One of those places in Bohol is Sagbayan (field visits 1, 4, 5, 12, 13).
- Expert interviewee 7 reports of a siesta in an upland municipality in Bohol where NPA representatives are invited to an official meeting in the mayor’s house. In other words, the conception of the NPA among many Boholanos, even government officials “is not like
your idea of a terrorist like with a gun and with some... No, they are part of the community” (expert interview 7). Similarly, Boholanos whom I talked to throughout field visits, mostly perceive the NPA as an ideological alternative rather than a military or security threat (while in contrast the Abu Sayaff in Mindanao is perceived as a threat; field visits 1, 12; expert interviews 8, 17).

➢ Logically, therefore, this public ‘commodification’ of the NPA reinforces its threatening potential to government’s official influence sphere, legitimacy, and autonomy (compare chapter 3.1). Expert interviewee 4 observes Boholanos to mistrust government in NPA-affected areas: “In these places, these places, the residents are very worried about the presence of government […] they are so suspicious […] because of the communists […] they tell them the government is useless”. Such realisations gives obvious evidence for the strong support by the national government for ‘Abante Bohol’.

➢ Since 1999 the provincial government together with the national government in Manila have searched for solutions of the conflict and launched as part of a peace and development approach the policy of ‘Abante Bohol’ and the BPRMO in 2001 (expert interview 5).

➢ In this setting some provincial government officials are convinced that so far the NPA “politically ... cannot harm the ... our [government] coordinators, all those who deliver immunisation and all that stuff. They [the NPA] cannot harm them because politically you loose also support from the people there” (expert interview 4). In contrast, other officials believe that the local people are happy to receive governmental service delivery, however, continue to believe and support the NPA (expert interviews 5, 7).

Figure 8.3 visualises confidential military information on the spatial outreach of the NPA in Bohol as of 2003/2004. Accordingly, their influence sphere is vast and covers approximately one third of the island. Expert interview 5 explicates the map:

➢ In 39 barangays shadow governments are established, which implies that over 50% of the population as well as the barangay councils there support the NPA. These shadow governments are in particular set up in strategic locations (e.g. Bilar) close to national military camps, access and transport points/ routes and/or the decision-making centres.

➢ 203 barangays are ‘infiltrated’, which indicates that NPA meetings are held there, NPA representatives visit the area and try to establish contacts and ‘recruit’ fellows. NPA-infiltrated areas are scattered around the islands in order to demonstrate the government ‘they are there’.

➢ 91 barangays are ‘threatened’, which means that about 25% of the inhabitants sympathises with the NPA. Given the difficulty of gathering this information, some classifications may overlap.

Spatially, the NPA acts particularly in the Northern and Western uplands, stretching towards the island’s interior, as well as in the far East of Bohol. There are four so-called ‘fronts’ of intensive, armed conflicts between national military and NPA rebels in Bilar, Carmen, Batuan
and Sagbayan. The national military has counter-camps in Carmen (307 brigades of the Philippine army\textsuperscript{33}), Tubigon and Candijai.

The previous accounts clarify that the NPA is a strong competitor for the LGUs and their own spheres of influence; here an opponent in the “battle for the hearts and minds of the people” (expert interview 4), which has to be taken seriously in policy-making, processes in Bohol and beyond.

\textbf{Figure 8.3: Areas influenced by the National People’s Army (NPA) in 2003/2004}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure8_3}
\caption{Areas influenced by the National People’s Army (NPA) in 2003/2004}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{33} Note that the military is a somewhat independent actor in politics in the Philippines. As common in many Southeast Asian countries the Philippine army usually operates in the name of the state but maintains the power to go against the government if it finds it necessary (compare coup d’état in 1986, recent rumours of a military coup against Arroyo, or coup d’état in Thailand on 19/9/2006). See Hegmanns 1990 and Siemers 1993 for further reference.
8.4 Advanced policy implementation and accomplishment: Identifying impediments

8.4.1 Investment activities

Figure 8.4 demonstrates the investment accomplishments by the BIPC, the provincial government agency for attracting and assisting public and private (joint) investments in Bohol in 2003. The map recalls that in 2003 the majority of investments went into tourism and trade. Initiatives nearly exclusively address Tabilaran City and Panglao island, that means already the most progressive areas. Some experts see these preferences rooted – to a certain extent – in the National Tourism Master Plan, which declared Panglao a national priority tourism area in 1990 and has promoted an SEZ of 2000 hectares there (expert interviews 8, 19, 20). As expert interviewee 6 explains, especially slow or problematic land delineation processes are responsible for slowing down the development of this SEZ as well as others along the coastline (see figure 8.4; compare chapter 8.4.3).

Only two investments target the primary sector in spatial peripheries: A palm-oil refinery and a health resort are set up in Carmen and Dagohoy respectively. The palm-oil refinery is a facility for processing high-value crops in Bohol and strengthens the agro-industrial economy. Yet, the map hides that in 2003 the refinery was only partly established, as well as a 20-hectare provider-nursery in Ubay. Still waiting for implementation are oil palm plantations of an additional 40,000 hectares in Talibon, Trinidad, San Miguel, Getafe, Buenavista, Danao, Dagohoy, Ubay, Sagbayan, Inabanga, and Alicia. These are needed to serve the refinery and are meant to involve the participation of marginalised farmers.

Interestingly, the retirement village (investment 9 in figure 8.4) is an initiative of Boholano return migrants who invest in the local economy (compare chapters 2.3.2, 6.2.2). Such investments by overseas or returning migrants are highly welcomed and promoted by national and local governments alike (expert interview 6; compare chapter 9.3.3).

Generally, the difficulties in Bohol of spreading investment activities beyond the established economic centres into peripheral areas, to the marginalised people, and into the neediest sectors appear to reflect countrywide tendencies. The case of the so-called ‘Regional Agro-Industrial Centers’ (RAICs), a special kind of Special Economic Zones promoted by national government, exemplifies this observation. The actual objective of RAICs is to strengthen rural-urban interactions and balance centre-periphery relations by reinforcing links between agriculture and industry. Initially there were plans for RAICs in all sixteen Philippine regions, yet in 1999 only seven operated. These are located in CAR, Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, Central Visayas, Northern and Southern Mindanao. The remaining nine failed to be established foremost due to budget constraints, land acquisition problems, inaccessibility, marketing failures, and political disputes. Similar to most SEZs, the operating RAICs register
some growth in export-oriented agro-industry, however, they operate as globalised enclaves in already established economic centre regions (Hill 2000).

**Figure 8.4: Official planning zones and investment accomplishments in 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Investment project</th>
<th>Employment generated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Agro-)Industry:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Palm Oil Refinery</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Furniture Factory</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Beach Resort</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mini Golf</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Divers Resort</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Health Resort &amp; Spa</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Divers Club</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pension House</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others:</td>
<td>Retirement Village</td>
<td>no data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>City Mall</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.4.2 Tourism policy

My field experiences as a tourist – used here in lieu of lacking official/academic information – suggest that out of the decentral tourism circuits identified by the provincial government (chapter 8.3.1) only circuits 1 and 2 are, in fact, ‘in operation’. I cannot speak for circuit 6 and the Northern ‘stops’ of circuit 3. However, for the residual circuits 3, 4, and 5 account that (a) I have neither encountered one travel agency or hotel/resort actually offering tours around these circuits, nor (b) are they actively promoted and/or supported by the Bohol Tourism Office (interview 11,19), nor (c) have I met many tourists who had visited these circuits, nor in my knowledge (d) exist sufficient tourist facilities in these places, and/or (d) facilities to reach them (see figures 7.13, 7.14, 7.15).

These – subjective and non-representative, however indicative – observations are underlined firstly, by local people and LGU representatives I met during field visits, who request a more decentral implementation of tourist policy covering “not only Panglao” - “we want to benefit as well” (purok assembly II; field visit 3). Similarly, data in chapter 7.2.3 has revealed the concentration of tourism services in the already established centres of Bohol.
Once again, the national situation is similar here: Until 1992 promotions have focused disproportionately on hotel establishments in Metro Manila causing, firstly, an exacerbation of already existing divergences in the spatial economy of the country and, secondly, a non-profitable over-supply of accommodation in the Metropolis.

Secondly, I turn to the example of the Anda Peninsula, which is included in the circuits as a visitors’ destination and targeted by small-scale eco-tourism projects, mostly due to the marine sanctuary in the barangay of Basdio. De-facto there are only a handful isolated resorts in Anda, most of which are run by foreigners. These resorts are accessible only by privately organised transport over earth roads (taxi drivers even refuse to go there from Tagbilaran). Due to these accessibility problems, some of the resorts actually face serious economic problems (field visit 4).

A third example, the tourist infrastructure of Pamilacan island offers less than ten single-roomed, unfurnished nipa huts without fresh water or electricity, illustrated in photo 8.2. Therefore most tourists visit Pamilacan on one-day boat trips, do not stay over night but return to Panglao or Tagbilaran for accommodation and other services. As a result, only four families (which are those running the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whalewatching Organisation) out of the 1500 people living on Pamilacan benefit from and can make tourism their (part-time) business. Other than that, tourism does not make a large contribution to the islanders’ alternative livelihood and anti-poverty endeavours, but, on the contrary – fourthly – induces new divides and conflicts between those active in tourism and the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whalewatching Organisation on the one hand and the traditional fishermen on the other (field visit 11; expert interviews 10, 11). These conflicts are essentially based on changing socio-economic power relations between the old (fishermen) and recently developing (tourism-earners) elites on the island. Put differently, the new economically successful elite of tourism earners challenges the political influence sphere and status of the old fishermen. Financial capital succeeds old-established symbolic and social capital (see chapter 10). Alongside, connections between social inequality and material disparities become apparent.

A different socio-cultural component to possibly develop, deteriorate, and harden tourism-induced conflicts is provided by the case of Malapascua island located off Cebu (field visit 7).
On Malapascua the diverse socio-cultural backgrounds of the ‘competitors in tourism development’ is the leading cause for conflict as the island’s space and population is deeply divided between in-migrating investors from Manila and the indigenous islanders over issues on land, marketing, operation of tourism business, and employment of local people. Vorlaufer (1996: 153-154) detects comparable disputes between indigenous population and immigrants on Boracay island. And Shah, Gupta, Boyd (2000) detect that alongside economic transformation on Boracay the livelihood of the poorest, who are usually indigenous, has actually become more vulnerable and insecure: They typically take over low-skilled occupations. Yet, wages for these low skilled jobs decrease because of an over-supply of workers while prices rise. In addition the smallest businesses are threatened by immense and more capital-intensive competition. However, in contrast to Boracay, Boholanos may, due to their outstanding educational attainment (chapter 7.3), be able to take over a larger proportion of skilled jobs made available through tourism development. Thus, the potential of local economic benefits through tourism expansion may be higher in Bohol than experienced in Boracay.

Another example of tourism-induced conflicts is presented when a majority of the local population in Basdio on Anda peninsula reacts to the foreign-administered resorts – and their tourists – with hostility. They are particularly frustrated about being cut off from the benefits the resorts produce, as their foreign owners tend to provide all services to the tourists independently (actually import many goods) and even prohibit local people to enter the resort grounds (field visit 4). Here tourism development has until now not led to the intended establishment of locally owned, (eco-) tourism-related, micro, small, and medium enterprises (and similar situations are observed all over the island). Another possible reason for the locals’ hostility towards the foreign investors may be the influence of the NPA, as the Anda peninsula has been observed to develop into a major entry-point for and recruitment stronghold of NPA activists from other islands (expert interview 5).

The NPA also plays an active role in a conflict that takes place around the Chocolate Hills National Monument (see Ulrich, Day, Lynagh 2001). The establishment of the protective Monument status in 1997 is designated to conserve the Hills landscape for its scenic beauty and tourism potential. It however imposes the abrogation of private ownership and subsumes the land to the state without consulting local residents or considering historical practices of land settlement and land use. Therefore, the authorisation of the Monument status has caused civil uprising led by the NPA and the establishment of a new ‘front’ against government known as the Chocolate Hills Command.

As a contrasting example, the NGO SWCF (policy 7) introduces eco-tourist tours in the poor (and NPA influenced) uplands of Sierra Bullones in a slow community-led process, explicitly in order to avoid hostile reactions as found in Anda, Pamilacan, or the Chocolate Hills, and in
order to make tourism a socially accepted and economically beneficial contribution for the local people. Although specific tours have been developed and organised since 2003, these are purposely not marketed by agencies and/or operators in the province (yet). Only ‘insiders’ can book these tours. That way the local people are given the time and the chance to get used to, make use of and decide upon the course of these alternative income opportunities themselves. However, in early 2004 this approach did not shown the desired success (yet?); local people still face visitors with great scepticism (field visit 12, expert interview 8).

Hence – and this is an important aspect to consider – the various case studies elucidate that even if tourism initiatives tackle poorer and more peripheral areas, they neither automatically incorporate their local inhabitants nor necessarily work to their benefit, nor are inevitably welcomed. From the perspective of the BTO and its foreign consultant (policy-maker 2), this is partially related back to (a) malfunctioning community leadership. Instead of convincing and inducing cooperative practices and policy-making between public, private, and civil stakeholders the BTO and provincial government in general engage in very little communication and cooperation. Moreover, while it is reasonable and adequately fundable to integrate most initiatives with coastal resource management and/or agro-tourism components, such approach complicates sharing responsibilities and tasks (expert interviews 11, 19).

Furthermore, the examples have shown that (b) economic and political interests often work against each other in tourism policy. With tourism being an economically profitable growth sector, which aims at attracting (foreign) private investor, resulting initiatives often serve the interests of the investor only and not those of the local Filipinos and/or the government.

Besides, (c) expert interviewee 11 describes that the Bohol Office for Tourism de-facto pursues all ‘recommendations’ by national agencies and does not decide and act independently despite their new decentralised powers (see also expert interview 8).

And (d), short-comings in transport infrastructure, tourist service infrastructure (for example, due to water scarcity) and access(ibility) hinder more effective, decentral and inclusive outreach of tourism policy. In this context one expert interviewee explains that governmental policy outreach is not only a matter of material infrastructure equipment but significantly also a matter of the social (cultural) access(ibility) of the people. In the case of Pamilacan the ‘included’ tourism earners are at the same time those who are more open and communicative towards non-islanders and non-traditional income-earning initiatives (expert interview 10, field visit 11). Similarly, political and ideological access(ibility) may play a role for governmental policy outreach, public participation and acceptance in NPA-influenced barangays and municipalities.

Interestingly, Bohol’s provincial government is partially aware of these constraints. It identifies the most urgent unmet needs to a successful implementation of tourism as a anti-
poverty, growth-driving policy sector as persistent little involvement of local entrepreneurs in projects, generally low levels of and inconsistent investment, inadequate tourist services, non-optimised promotional activity, and constraints in infrastructure facilities (PPDO 2002: 36-37). However, the policy-makers in charge so far do not seem to be able to effectively apply countermeasures, largely because concurrent re-formulation of policy and missing monitoring activities typically work towards “creating many small, poorly planned tourism development areas with little or no central planning” (White & Rosales 2003: 239). As a result, tourism development mostly replicates economic interests and existing poverty and wealth divides between, literally speaking, ‘first class’ tourism development spots in and around Tagbilaran/ Panglao/ Chocolate Hills, ‘second class’ mixed functions along the Southern coast and in the Chocolate Hills area, and ‘third class’ mainly agricultural, non-touristy residual Bohol.

Additionally it is important to consider the national political and security situation and the respective image that the Philippines, including Bohol, carry in overseas media and public. Such image affects tourist flows into Bohol (and the entire Philippines) and therefore the demands, resources, potentials, and course of (policy) developments in the sector beyond the influence sphere of the provincial government. In other words:

“Also ich glaube das kommt sehr auf die ganze Situation auf den Philippinen an. Auf Terrorismus und solche Dinge. Ich mein, wenn mal wieder zwei Bomben in Mindanao in die Luft gehen, dann kommt auch keiner mehr nach Pamilacan. Auch wenn Pamilacan nichts mit Mindanao zu tun hat. Oder wenn in Manila was passiert, dann kommt keiner”.34 (expert interview 10, see also expert interview 9).

The expert refers to the political conflicts between Moro movements and government in Mindanao as well as to kidnapping incidences of tourists by the former. As to be expected, these (armed) conflicts represent not only a ‘threat of a bad image’ to the directly affected regions but equally to (tourism) development of far-away Bohol and in fact, the entire country. Speaking for the whole country “either we have no image – since nobody hears about us – or, since all countries hear about us is only the bad image, we get a bad image about crime and kidnapping, and everything like that” (Roxas-Mendoza 2001: 29). Such negative socio-cultural constructions of the Philippines as a tourist destination peaked when the guerrilla group ‘Abu Sayaff’ in 2000 kidnapped 21 tourists from Sabah in Malaysia to the Sulu archipelago in 2000. In order to raise awareness of their fight for separatism of Muslim Mindanao, the Abu Sayaff allowed international media to broadcast the kidnapping story life – leading to international warnings about visiting the Philippines and reductions in tourist numbers as reported in chapters 6 and 7.

34 Literal translation into English: “Well, I think, this depends on the general situation in the Philippines. On terrorism and such things. I mean, if there are two bombs being detonated in Mindanao, no one comes to Pamilacan anymore. Even if Pamilacan has nothing to do with Mindanao. Or if something happens in Manila, no one will come” (expert interview 10).
8.4.3 Policy implementation in the primary sector

Policy plans for the primary sectors focus crop enhancement actions by the Provincial Agriculturalist. When implemented these are said to be adjusted to local conditions and demands for the following reasons. The planning officer of the Provincial Agriculturalist stresses with respect to their crop enhancement activities that “although we are giving them for free there should be an equity so that they feel they are part of it” and “if farmers have request we will consider also. The better if the LGU supports. There will be a counterpart”. Moreover, she explains that mostly the poorer LGUs and people turn to them, because “those who have the economic resources and the technicians they are doing it in their own way” (expert interview 3).

However, other interviewees as well as some field visits indicate differently. For example, the Provincial Agriculturalist distributes – in cooperation with the national Department of Agricultural Reform (DAR) – free fishing nets, fast-fattening pigs, and tree seedlings in Pamilacan. Apparently, however, the fishing nets’ sizes are inadequate for local fishing grounds plus tear quickly. The pigs need large amounts of food in order to grow at a quicker pace. In poor areas and especially islands like Pamilacan food is not abundantly available even for the people and transport is expensive, so these pigs are under-nurtured and more vulnerable to diseases than the local pigs (field visit 11; expert interview 10). As with the tree seedlings, they are surely useful, for Pamilacan is almost completely bare and exposed to heavy soil erosion. However, due to the extreme water scarcity on the island only certain kinds of scrubs and trees can grow there, which are not the ones being delivered. Furthermore, Pamilacanos are not trained in dealing with the new devices. Interview partner 4 reports similar incidences for upland communities (not precisely referring to the Provincial Agriculturalist though) and generally claims for more social training and preparation of local people instead of pure, non-reflective service delivery: “So what happens: example, comes in a group, hey, gives them pigs, give them pigs, just give for fattening. Here, and the next days they have slaughtered the pigs. Because there is no social preparation” (compare also expert interview 15).

With regard to fishery, dynamite\textsuperscript{35}, cyanide\textsuperscript{36} and Muroami\textsuperscript{37} fishing methods are a daily practice even in marine sanctuaries like in Basdio-Guindulman. It is a desperate attempt by fishermen to make a living despite already severely over-fished resources. The process eventually destroys both, the basis of fishing and alternative eco-tourism livelihood (field visit

\textsuperscript{35} Blast method throwing dynamite off the boat. Underwater explosion causes all kind of fish to die (old and young fish population) combined with massive destruction of corals around the blast site.

\textsuperscript{36} Fishing by poisoning: Cyanide is taken under water in with glass vessels. After smashing the glass vessels cyanide intoxicates the fish for an easy catch under water. The cyanide is lethal for corals as well. In addition intoxicated fish will be part of the food chain and will poison human beings.

\textsuperscript{37} Formerly a Japanese method of fishing using a special net. The net is also deadly for young fish population due to the very small mesh size. It is destructive for corals due to mechanical destruction.
4; expert interview 7). Over-fishing is also caused by commercial fishermen who prove difficult to be addressed through Bohol’s provincial government as “the commercial fishermen, they don’t come from Bohol” (expert interview 3). Basically, they are uncontrollable when they enter municipal waters because, at least in early 2004, the plans to delineate municipal waters and enforce local fishing ordinances were not implemented.

Furthermore, inland aquaculture production, which is increasingly being promoted as a development strategy, legitimises – nationwide and in Bohol – massive human-induced changes of the brackwater eco-system including large-scale mangrove deforestation. As a result fish and shell breeding grounds, control for land erosion and siltation are taken away from local fisher folks. In other words their struggle to make a living becomes ever more difficult. Hence, local environmental and economic costs are high, while at the same time employment and food supply for the locals frequently stagnates, especially when technology is being introduced. Field research in Bohol and Cebu confirms that Boholanos and Cebuanos do usually not eat prawns because they are too expensive (field visits 7, 9). Moreover, local ownership of aquaculture fishponds is not supported because Republic Act 7881 exempts fishponds from CARP land reform.

Kelly infers that aquaculture as a development strategy in the Philippines generally “represents the continuation of a discourse of development that neglects the informal, small-scale and non-quantifiable aspects of everyday economic activity” (Kelly 1996: 55). In other words, market (growth) is prioritised over Filipinos’ (Bohlanos’) well-being. It follows, firstly, that the policy approaches in the primary sector need to take into better consideration the various local handicaps and conditions contributing to the problems in agriculture and fishery, and secondly, that there is a need for keeping up plans and pursuing their implementation, ideally including training of the local population to enhance acceptance and participation of new devices, regulations, and goods. In this context, thirdly, a special need is also apparent for policy on sustainable resource management training in Bohol (expert interview 9).

With regard to sustainable yet profitable agriculture, according to the Provincial Agriculturalist of Bohol, it is able to comply with its growth priorities. About 120,000 mango trees, that means high-value crops, bore fruit in 2003/2004 with another 80,000 trees yielding in 3 to 4 years\(^{38}\). However, plans for a fruit-processing plant in Tagbilaran to foster high-value crop production and processing in Bohol demonstrate the difficulties related with establishing a shift from subsistence agriculture to more beneficial technology-led agro-industry in Bohol. After extensive discussions between private and public stakeholders and at a progressed stage of planning, a market study conducted by the Holy Name University found out that Bohol’s subsistence-based agricultural market is not capable of providing sufficient supply and

\(^{38}\) Mango trees grow very slowly and provide fruit only at a progressed age.
demand for the plant (expert interview 12). It becomes apparent that that the small-patched agriculture prevalent in Bohol impedes the government’s course towards large-scale agro-industrial development or simply, that the latter does not consider the former appropriately. Simultaneously its subsistence character, small market, and morphological fragmentation complicate a technological modernisation of agriculture in Bohol.

An interesting aspect in this context: The provincial policy course goes hand in hand with national guidelines, especially those of the Agricultural and Fisheries Modernisation Act (AFMA). Yet, the person responsible for administering governmental agricultural policy planning in Bohol is not familiar with the Act at all. Contrary to tourism policy, it seems that agricultural policy frameworks are not necessarily passed on from national to local levels, or that staff at the LGU is not sufficiently trained to translate them into provincial policy.

If technology-led restructuring of the economy is to be successful, policy-makers need to pay attention to the fact that this implies, firstly, that few new employment opportunities are generated – a significant aspect regarding high levels unemployment across the Philippines, especially in agricultural peripheries with high fertility rates like Bohol. Secondly, the creation, implementation and dissemination of technology require large amounts of (private) capital, a well-trained stock of experts, i.e. high educational attainments, which is provided for in Bohol, and a reliable electricity system, which is not given in Bohol (compare Lee 2001; ILO 2004). Furthermore, market competition principles tend to drive private investments to places that already offer technological and educational resources, which are usually – again – the existing economic centres. In other words, to Bohol and general Philippines applies what has been discovered in other developing countries: “Without innovative public policy, these technologies could become a source of exclusion, not a tool of progress” (UNDP 2001: 1).

Against this background, the governmental plans for agro-industrial expansion in Bohol, including the establishment of SEZs in the poor and less accessible municipalities of Inabanga, Clarin, and Talibon seem unrealistic endeavours to pursue. Only selected sites, like Tubigon and possibly Jagna in the South, both of which already maintain some economic linkages and a ferry connection with (the market in) Cebu City and Northern Mindanao respectively, may be able to actively and successfully engage in agro-industrial development (field visit 5; compare chapter 7). Maybe these conditions are also behind the fact that none of the SEZ plans have been implemented so far. Expert interviewee 10 points out for Pamilacan what applies to all of Bohol: “Wenn man hier etwas herstellt, man kann halt gar nicht so viel verkaufen”39. Therefore, in her opinion, priority one of agricultural policy – just as Kelly postulates for inland fishery and aquaculture – should be on locally needed products and

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39 Literal translation into English: “If you produce something here, you won’t be able so sell this much”.

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small-scale resource management (plus training) instead of high-value crops and large-scale production.

Some of these demands were explicitly taken into account by the Fisheries Sector Programme, which was run by national and local governments together with contracted NGOs and the Asian Development Bank from 1989 to 1999. The programme emphasised integrative coastal resource management and generation activities to meet the needs of the poor fisher folk. Mangrove areas were reforested and altogether 52 fish sanctuaries and 3000 artificial reefs established. None the less, the coastal resource management initiative was not successful in opening up new livelihood options to the fisher folk. Summarising the impediments: The programme’s components were planned too complex and unrealistically; too many stakeholders took over responsibilities; communication and transparency of interaction was not adequate and tasks not clearly distributed; the involved LGUs lacked funding; administrative and technical resources were too weak to enforce laws on illegal fishing, municipal fishery ordinances, and the delineation of municipal waters. Partner-NGOs did not successfully find access into local fisher folk communities and when they left, most projects were abandoned (see ADB 1999: 1-4; IV 13-17). This example shows firstly, that many of the previously noted constraints may interrelate with each other, secondly, that not necessarily sector-inherent problems but rather administrative and cooperative aspects pose the major impediments, and thirdly, that comprehensive, participatory, and integrative policy approaches may be needed as a response.

Land reform: Success of failure?

One major impediment to effective implementation of more sustainable resource management practices is the landlessness of most Boholano farmers and fishermen, which causes them not to pay much interest in long-term resource management but rather to care for immediate outputs. This includes not looking after the free seeds given to them by the government as well as not caring about dynamite and cyanide fishing methods (compare Cramb et al 2000 for similar experiences in Palawan, Illoilo, and Cebu). As expert interview 10 explains the fishermen of Pamilacan historically used to run their fishing businesses independently and autarkly. There was neither need to collaborate with others nor for alternative livelihood activities. This perspective is continuously reflected in the difficulties policy stakeholder face when attempting to organise those occupied in agriculture and fishery into advocacy or support networks, or to train them about alternative income opportunities (expert interview 3). Obviously, inclusive and participatory policy-making is generally hardly feasible in this environment (compare Ross, White, Menguito 2000 for similar experiences and inference in community-based activities in marine protected areas out off Cebu; chapter 9.3.1)
Figure 8.5 shows the Agricultural Reform Communities (ARCs), which were launched in Bohol between 1996 and 2001/2002. In terms of spatial outreach, the map illuminates that the land reform policy indeed successfully addressed those areas of Bohol, which are considered to be the poorest and agricultural peripheries. Former owners of the land usually give up their land voluntarily or receive compensation by the government. According to the provincial government (2003b) the ARCs have been provided with farm-to-market roads, bridges, irrigation systems and post harvest facilities, water and power supply, education and health services since. The total cost of all the projects implemented by the end of 2003 (including ongoing projects) in the ARCs totals 309,254,236 Philippine Pesos.

However, the success rate in transferring landownership, that means the most significant aspect of the ARCs, is not documented. Interviewee 3 claims that CARP is almost completed in Bohol. Counter-arguments stress that, for example, land in places like Pamilacan is still owned by two or three landowners who are moreover no Pamilacanos but absentee owners (expert interview 10). Another counterargument asserts that paradoxically, the CARP reform makes it actually more difficult for tenants to acquire land. Precisely, under CARP a tenant can now lay claim on a piece of land after having cultivated it for three years. Consequently, absentee owners increasingly withdraw from employing tenants. The land available to poorer farmers is effectively reduced (Ulrich 2003: 170). Hence, the ‘social boundaries’ between landowner elite and the landless have hardened through CARP – in contradiction to its objectives. These social boundaries may also have some impact on what expert interviewee 7 reports to be a common phenomenon in Bohol: Many of the tenants who receive some land through the reforms actually sell it back to their former landowner – according to the expert for reasons to earn some money and/or due to long-established reciprocal obligations. In other country-wide reported cases, landowners’ resistance lead to a
situation where beneficiaries cannot occupy the land. It may be for these difficult social boundaries and informal power relations that public lands make up two thirds of the totally redistributed land in the Philippines in 2001 (Borras 2003: 1052; chapter 9.2.2 for follow up).

Figure 8.6 provides a comparative account on outcomes of the CARP reforms at national scale. The map illuminates that, in national comparison, less land has been redistributed in the Central Visayas including Bohol than in most other regions. The ARMM shows the least outcome of CARP so far, while Cagayan de Oro, Southern Tagalog and Central Mindanao the most. Referring back to findings of chapter 6 this means that some agricultural peripheries – which are generally assumed to be in greater need for land reform – are reached out to while others are not. Partly, the small coverage in the ARMM may be related to their regional autonomy status. It partly, however, also reflects the ARMM’s already more or less excluded position in the country (see chapter 6.3). When looking at what proportion of overall plans (from 1987 to 2008) have been implemented by 2001 (part C in figure) similar spatial distribution patterns are evident. Interestingly, with regard to CARP outcome in Bohol achievement rates have so far only been very low ranging from 41 to 53% – underlining the critique voiced by some experts in the previous section.

To conclude this chapter, the sectors, areas and people engaged in the primary sector are defined by the provincial government to be tackled mainly with growth- and productivity oriented measures, which are to pay attention to questions of more balanced assets and access to markets. In terms of concrete policy, the Provincial Agriculturalist is successful in reaching out to the poor agricultural areas, with the exceptions of some municipalities in the far North. In addition, the targets of productivity enhancement are met by applying the majority of resources on these issues. Then overall, the provincial activity plans correspond with their decentralised responsibilities.

None the less, the sectoral approach aiming at the large-scale commercialisation of the primary sector, partly through the establishment of SEZ, processing plants, high-value crops and aquaculture, proves difficult and unrealistic in the face of the subsistence character prevalent in the sector. Especially no or little consideration of local conditions, participation and knowledge, and the demand for training accompanying service delivery constrain an effective policy implementation. Too little internal capabilities to execute legislations like sea delineations also play a role. Land reform implementation in the province is assessed sceptically, too. Generally, the prevailing lack of landownership and historically grown symbolic values and unequal power relationships cause a certain restriction of many Boholanos towards active engagement in long-term resource management activities, cooperative actions, and land reform. Ultimately, such social environment and conception of policy-induced transformation make the already existing complications in participatory and sustainable policy-making even more difficult.
Figure 8.6: Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme: National accomplishments
8.4.4 Anti-poverty policies

This chapter profiles steps for implementation and accomplishments of the two anti-poverty policies ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’ under investigation. What has already been hinted at in chapter 8.3.3 now becomes obvious: Although they ought to become partners under the Bohol Poverty Reduction Framework the ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’ have profoundly different understandings and approaches, yet sometimes encounter similar difficulties. None the less, they perceive each other more or less as competitors, at least in early 2004.

Figure 8.7 illustrates ‘Abante Bohol’s activities and their spatial and partly sectoral outreach. In a comparison with figure 8.3, broadly speaking, it shows that the project meets its objective to tackle those areas under NPA influence. As a result, the BPRMO sees the NPA’s influence sphere waning, in contrast to the BLDF, which claims that it either stagnates or possibly, as inequality grows in the province, is even on the rise. Whether waning or not, the impressions compiled during field research, as noted in chapter 8.3.4, indicate that the NPA still profoundly affects social-economic developments, social constructions, security situation and policy-making on the island. However, it should be considered that most of the NPA representatives who are active in Bohol are – and this is atypically in the Philippines – not Boholanos but enter the island from Samar/Leyte or Negros – strongholds of the national movement. This implies, that despite their vast sphere of influence their activities in Bohol may be of less intensity and vehemence than in other regions of the Philippines (expert interview 5).

The ‘SLGP’ declares to tackle puroks in the 17 poorest municipalities as defined by the poverty index of the PPDO survey, which is illustrated in figure 7.7 (see PPDO 2004b: 1-2; note that the survey does not cover barangay information). ‘SLGP’s projects plans to target the five poorest municipalities of district 1 and 2 and seven of district 3 (because this district consists of more municipalities). Figure 8.8 and table 8.4 visualise those barangays and municipalities, which are de-facto reached out to by ‘SLGP’ and clarify that their majority do not correspond with the poorest areas classified by the PPDO poverty index. For example, not a single project site is located in the poor North and the three poorest municipalities, here Pres. Garcia, Ubay, Bien Unido (see table 7.1) are ignored. Out of those municipalities listed in the highest poverty quartile in fact only Pilar, Alicia, and Inabanga are included in the ‘SLGP’. At the same time, the relatively wealthy San Isidro and Calape are incorporated. All in all, most of ‘SLGP’s factual outreach areas represent comparatively medium poor or medium wealthy municipalities. On a positive note, the ‘SLGP’ successfully targets some of the marginalised and peripheral small islands off the West coast – the first LGU project to do so. None the less, the project mostly fails to achieve its spatial outreach goals.
Difficult accessibility and infrastructure may (again) explain difficulties in policy interventions in the far North. Already in the interior and Northwest “the access roads to these barangays [are] terrible, terrible when it rains, and terrible when the sand is wet” (expert interview 4). However, it is more likely that the continuing neglect of these municipalities by governmental as well as by NGO policy interest and activities cause a vicious cycle of accumulating exclusion (see chapter 8.3.1). The relative and material distance of these areas and their inhabitants from the decision-making centres are aggravated, which in turn, makes it increasingly challenging to intervene there because respective awareness, partners, funding, and possibly local acceptance are difficult to find. This situation becomes even more problematic and is a likely path into even deeper poverty for those excluded
municipalities that show exceptionally high population growth rates and density like Bien Unido.

Sectoral outreach: An issue of participation, acceptance, and partnership

The declared activity foci of ‘Abante Bohol’ aims at interventions that promote community-organisations, entrepreneurship, sustainable livelihood, environmental management, food security, and socio-cultural values (see again table 8.3). Figure 8.7 gives an overview of the sectoral accomplishments after the first two years of project implementation. Accordingly, more than two thirds of available money is utilised for purposes of livestock, crop dispersal and productivity enhancement (dispersal of chicken, corn and rice seeds, tree seedlings, hybrid rice commercialisation etc). The remaining third of financial assets goes into – listed by priority – technical and infrastructure assistance (water resources, electrification, capacity building (organisation of cooperatives), and livelihood and social services. Overall, therefore, the declared objectives are accomplished, yet thereby sectoral activity foci – similar to the Provincial Agriculturalist – strongly pursue pure service delivery without management training and community organisation. This may partly be due to national influence on the
project and its relevance for national peace and order interests. National government’s long-term planning emphasises the crucial role of prosperous and productive agricultural communities for “sustaining peace in the countryside. An equity led growth that is felt at the grassroots level would renew the trust and confidence of the rural population to the government and undermine the issue of armed conflict, which are based on agrarian issues” (NEDA 2001: 168) – and governmental agricultural policy in Bohol is, as illustrated, foremost about service delivery.

Like agricultural policy, some of the projects under ‘Abante Bohol’ are not adjusted to local conditions or needs: “It is funny, the chicken we gave to them to raise, they are so huge that when they bring them to the market, nobody buys. Yeah. Seven kilos” (expert interview 4). Never the less, in the expert’s perception, ‘Abante Bohol’ not only successfully targets NPA influence areas but also wins the ‘battle for the hearts and minds of the people’. Precisely with regard to the people living in NPA affected areas he claims “in the last two years they are beginning to open up, they are beginning to smile at our people, whereas before they were just watching. So that is already a behavioural indicator of acceptance” (expert interview 4).

Representatives of the SLDP doubt this success of ‘Abante Bohol’ and criticise: “That project that really works for those delivering chickens and all that stuff etc. They, they are not, I think, so effective in the ideological field like because they lack the training, they lack the conviction. Whereas the other side has done the conviction to […] like how do we really build up a volunteers” (expert interview 7; see also expert interviews 5). This criticism relates back to an argument already raised with regard to the Provincial Agriculturalist: The people are happy to accept the goods and materials handed out to them, however, either cannot use them properly due to a lack of training back-ups and/or do not change their sympathy with the NPA thereafter.

Figure 8.7 also shows a discrepancy between planned and implemented activities. Given that ‘Abante Bohol’ was meant to run from 2002 until 2005, early 2004 only about 30% of projects are actually been initiated in the majority of target areas. This delay may partly root in preparation time needed to set up projects, yet partly also derives from general project management difficulties and problematic cooperation with local LGUs. Expert interviewee 4 reports that sometimes ‘Abante Bohol’ faces opposition not only by NPA representatives but also by municipal and barangay governments. The BPRMO responds with drastic measures as the following quote demonstrates

“If the barangay […], they don’t like us to get there […] We ask the people. So the barangay captain cannot do anything anymore. The people want it. But there are barangay captains who are really, you know, the landlord side, nothing much happens without them. So we bring along the military and tell this barangay captain your task is democracy” (expert interview 4).
The ‘SLGP’ similarly reports to sometimes encounter unwelcoming reactions by municipal and barangay LGUs. None the less, the ‘SLGP’s representatives strongly oppose armed reactions to existing conflicts. They call for peaceful approaches instead which aim to help distribute participatory governance and trust in government:

“What I am only saying is that government should have a more effective way to deal with it rather than arms, or rather than bribery, like giving chickens and all that. But this will not solve the problems but listening to their complaints to why they are there on that side. But you can not threaten them, use like fear in the area and all that, using military means. What I am saying is that through the power of the community also they can device some ways so that everyone can live harmoniously” (expert interview 7).

Sector-wise the ‘SLGP’ practically focuses – according to its objectives – on institutional change and establishing partnerships in the fields of identification of poverty, training of Boholanos in decision-making procedures, various self-help initiatives, and financial matters (micro-credit system). As of early 2004 the identification of poverty and training in decision-making were almost completed – actually prematurely to the official start of project as funded through LGU resources. However, in order to pursue their activities both policy initiatives are dependent on the cooperation of municipal and barangay LGUs – despite their official supervisory role over these LGUs (see chapter 5.2, Valdellon 1999). As shown, this implies firstly, that the PPDO-BLDF and the BPRMO have to visit the LGUs and ‘sell’ their projects.

Secondly, despite participatory approaches and targeting local people, local LGU representatives tend to retain an exceptionally powerful position in the course of the policy process, which thirdly, opens up windows for biased decision-making and even corruption. For example, the first purok assembly I visited during field visit 3 took place without the barangay captain (only the purok President was present), in the second purok assembly (in a different purok within the same barangay) the barangay captain was present. Communication was completely different in the two cases. During purok assembly I all attendants contributed to the discussion and seemingly openly uttered their opinions. In contrast, during purok assembly II the barangay captain took over more than ¾ of the talking and besides, only two or three other attendants who held some higher functions in the community spoke as well. Moreover, the barangay captain openly suggested that her barangay should receive exceptionally many ‘SLGP’ project resources because of her good personal relationships with the President of the BLDF and the Mayor of Baclayon. She reacted surprised when told that the target areas are provided with resources depending on their poverty status. This incidence implicitly hints at the extraordinary input and significance of informal social networks in policy-making in the Philippines – which sometimes are more decisive than factual reasoning and arguments. These illustration also show, that although the idea of targeting puroks for policy-making sounds promising and innovative, even at this ‘informal’ level the features of what is called ‘traditional Philippine politics’ based on reciprocal social ties may impede policy effect(iveness). Chapter 9 continues to clarify these issues in more detail.
To summarise, the decentralised anti-poverty endeavours by the provincial government of Bohol demonstrate innovative initiatives in the context of the entire Philippines. Both policies under investigation, ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’, innovatively incorporate areas where high poverty is prevalent and no other governmental policy-maker has operated before. Thereby ‘Abante Bohol’ meets its objective to tackle those areas under NPA influence, while the ‘SLGP’ mostly fails to achieve its set spatial targets. Reasons for its limited spatial outreach are yet again partially infrastructure and accessibility problems, partially a lack of political will, interest, and sometimes competition by other stakeholders.

Corresponding to its seemingly complete spatial outreach ‘Abante Bohol’ is complete in implementing its sectoral targets of service delivery. Similarly, ‘SLGP’ often seems to successfully accomplish its envisaged initial steps towards institutional change at purok level and capacity building where it operates.40 None the less, both projects encounter unwelcoming reactions by some barangay and municipal governments, which they respond to by military force (‘Abante Bohol’) and negotiations (‘SLGP’) respectively. The exceptionally powerful position of these local LGUs in the course of the policy process undermines the officially supervisory position of the provincial government over municipalities. It opens up windows for biased decision-making and even corruption and gives evidence for the difficulties of policy-making across local government scales and in community planning models. In addition, training and local adaptation of services are being neglected especially by ‘Abante Bohol’ and therefore some of its policy interventions prove little effective – similar to those of the Provincial Agriculturalist. Therefore, ‘Abante Bohol’s ultimate aim of winning the ideological battle for the hearts and minds of the local people and resolving the conflict between government and NPA remains controversially assessed.

40 Note that final assessments cannot be made as the project was ongoing when visited.
8.5 Obstacles to policy outreach and effect(iveness) in summary

The following factors are identified to constrain policy outreach and effect(iveness) on disparities of poverty and wealth in the decentralised setting of provincial Bohol. For classification reasons, some obstacles may be illustrated in broader, more generalised terms. The listed factors may also overlap and interrelate.

Spatial policy bias

Policies tend to most effectively support those areas, which are already wealthier and progressive, and not necessarily those most needy or those identified as poverty areas in overall plans. To most policies applies what expert interviewee 10 observes for Pamilacan: The fishermen in the North of the island feel ‘left alone’ by (tourism) development support which concentrates to the South where development is progressed already:

“Es kriegen immer nur die anderen Unterstützung [...] die Leute auf dieser Seite der Insel, also die, wo die Touristen sind, und PET, also da wo die Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whalewatching Organisation ist” (similarly experienced during field visits 3, 12, 13).

This finding applies across scales from within Pamilacan to between municipalities where the far North and Northeast as well as many outer islands are largely neglected. Interior uplands and some watersheds are only occasionally targeted, while the already wealthier Tagbilaran City and Panglao island are almost always reached out to by policy.

Partially restricted access(ibility) and topographical fragmentation drive the provincial government to neglect these areas. However, political ignorance and lack of interest, NPA presence and conflicts, profit seeking, and non-conformability between political and economic interests also play significant roles. Interestingly, there is a certain spatial policy orientation in Western parts of Bohol towards benefiting from the ‘big neighbour’ Cebu, yet impacts remain marginal so far.

Hence, spatial disparities are reflected in policy disparities and vice versa. As a result, the marginalised and peripheral seem to be trapped in a vicious cycle of accumulating exclusion. The only municipalities that appear to be in a state of complete exclusion are Bien Unido and Pres. Garcia and possibly many of the outer islands in the far North.

41 Literal translation in English: “It’s only the others who get supported […] the people on that side of the island, where the tourists are and PET, that is, where the Pamilacan Island Dolphin and Whalewatching Organisation is”.
Disparities and political conflict

There is another dimension to add to the certain reciprocity ‘between ‘the social’ and ‘the spatial’ in the Philippines (chapters 2.2, 6.3), namely, the overlap of NPA presence with those areas identified as agricultural and poor peripheries with highly unequal landownership relations in Bohol. In other words, developmental peripheries and their marginalised population are apparently linked to conflicts between government and NPA’s alternative ‘fields of power’ inscribing into space, society, and politics of Bohol. Similar trends have been illuminated for the entire Philippines with regard to the Moro and indigenous movements already (see chapter 6.3). These phenomena are, in fact, typical examples of the opposition movements for ‘redistributive and recognitive justice’ elaborated on from a theoretical standpoint in chapter 3.1.1. They can be understood as a response to prevailing (social and spatial) disparities of poverty and wealth, and possibly as a pointer to failing governmental outreach.

Sectoral policy bias

Agro-industrial and (eco)tourism policy are clearly – and adequately – emphasised as the major sectors linked to (disparities of) poverty in Bohol. However, governmental policy in Bohol (as in other provinces of the Philippines, compare Gauld 2000) often conceives policy effectiveness as to enhance productivity. As such, growth- and global market oriented approaches are emphasised, here productivity and technical aspects in the primary sector and foreign-led investments in tourism development. These are – following neoliberal paradigms – then meant to achieve socially and economically balancing outcomes (see chapter 3.2.1). In reality, such social and economic effects are often not accomplished, simply because those engaged in tourism development foremost pursue purposes of economic profits. The initial provincial policy priority of connecting (pro-poor) growth with redistribution is not put into practice.

Deficiencies in policy administration

Pure sectoral outreach plans are not sufficient to guarantee policy effectiveness. Governmental policy in Bohol often fails to meet its own objectives of being “adequate, timely, mutually reinforcing, complementary, affordable over time, matching specific needs with project services” (compare quote in chapter 8.2.1). Precisely the following problems can be defined from the empirical findings:

- Provincial tourism, agriculture, investment, and anti-poverty policy alike show discrepancies and inaccuracies between plan and implementation. Typically, policy outreach plans are more efficient and complete than their eventual accomplishments.
- Frequently, policy is not effectively implemented because local contexts, knowledge, and interests are neglected. This deficit applies even to some of those policies, which
explicitly aim at local participation. The plans for large-scale agro-industrial development, which ignore de-facto limited market demand and supply in Bohol most vividly display this problem. Besides, many of the government’s delivered services are not used by local people because they are inadequately trained to do so.

- Different stakeholders in Bohol do not always cooperate ideally to pursue differently targeted, yet systematically related policy tasks (see chapter 3.3). Firstly, government’s cooperation with NGOs and POs has not progressed equally in all policy fields although the decentralisation process requires their incorporation already from the Sangguniang onwards (table 5.1). Secondly, unsuccessful negotiations and ‘partnership’ between government(s), NGOs, international organisations, and POs across scales frequently result in conflict and competition. Opposition by stakeholders to projects can imply that corruptive practices are necessary to ‘free’ the path for policy implementation.

- The magnitude of initiatives in all examined sectors at provincial, municipal, and barangay LGUs in Bohol indicate that the idea of decentralised policy-making is accepted. Yet, especially provincial tourism policy (still) appears to rely heavily on guidelines from Metro Manila. Provincial agricultural policy is observed to – somewhat strikingly – uncritically follow national endeavours on the one hand, however, on the other be little aware of some major national policies like the AFMA. The opposition that both poverty programmes, ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’, face from municipal LGUs also shows that the formal supervision role of the provincial government over municipalities under the Local Government Code is not always accepted in practice.

To conclude, the insights given in this chapter illuminate that in Bohol “successful economic development has been constrained to a large extent by the weakness of political development” (Hutchcroft 1998: 4). It remains to analyse in chapter 9 whether and how this political weakness it is actually embedded in typical Boholano and Filipino socio-cultural characteristics.
9. Political and cultural contexts of policy-making and disparity production

9.1 Socio-cultural environment and academic analysis: Critical reflections

This chapter takes the (in chapter 8 identified) constraints in governmental policy-making on disparities of poverty and wealth one step further by analysing them in the light of typical features of Boholano and/or Filipino political and cultural environments. Thereby I differentiate between the contexts of (a) government’s internal policy administration in chapter 9.2, and (b) of its external conflict and cooperation relations with other stakeholders in chapter 9.3.

The analysis in this chapter reflects more than previous ones those constrains in policy-making it aims at identifying and explaining, because firstly, Filipino political and cultural environments of policy-making relate closely to socio-cultural, often informal practices, expectations, and constructions. However secondly, manifold socio-cultures and ethno-linguistics exist concomitantly under the ‘umbrella’ of the Filipino nation, incited by the fragmented morphology of the archipelago and the separate historical development of its various regions (chapter 5). This diversity makes it difficult for Philippine government(s) to strengthen national cohesion and establish the ‘imagined communities of Philippine nationality’ (compare chapter 3.1.1). Broadly speaking, governmental measures for nation-building have centred on providing education in Tagalog and English (and not the local) languages, and on ethnocentristic cultural politics focussing on lowland Filipino-Malay Christian ‘mainstream’ values (see quote by Horvatich 2003 in chapter 5.2; David 2002; Taoshiaki 2002; Buendia 2002). Accordingly, thirdly, (inter)national citations of ‘typical Filipino’ features and practices often reflect the same rather crude tendencies. Few accounts are available stressing cultural diversity and difference in contrast to an abundance of publications on ‘the’ Filipino culture and its relevance to societal processes available in Philippine bookshops (field visits 1, 8, 9; see e.g. Jocano 1997, 1999; Perttierra 2002; King 2002; Ramos Shahani 2003).

Fourthly then, Boholano socio-culture can be assumed to differ in some and correspond in other aspects from these ‘typical’ depictions (Boholanos are mainly of Filipino-Malay decent, see chapters 1.2 and 7). Yet, there are no publications available to explicitly clarify these differences. Hence, fifthly, this and the previous chapter are caught in a situation where on the one hand, empirical findings on constraints for policy-making on disparities are available for Bohol and only partially for the entire Philippines. On the other hand, the analysis for their socio-cultural embeddedness must use a mixture of so-called ‘typical’ Filipino features and a partially dissimilar ‘Boholano’ culture where the differences must be left more or less
undefined. Then, sixthly, I cannot rule out that some of the subsequent accounts may reflect state governmental constructions of Philippine uniformity. Using interview information, field experiences, and the available academic literature I, however, attempt to consistently indicate whether sources of information relate specifically to Bohol or the Philippines as a whole.

### 9.2 Constraints in policy administration

#### 9.2.1 Gaps in the policy process

As inferred from empirical findings in chapter 8.5, almost all policies under investigation show discrepancies and inaccuracies between policy plans and implementation. Yet, thorough and multi-scalar plans exist for all sorts of policy fields, problems, and potentials in Bohol (compare chapter 8.3). Moreover, national and provincial governments’ policy frameworks show some similarity in outline, objectives, and measures (see chapters 8.1 and 8.2). Therefore, it is too simple to argue, that “this is a developing country context where you don’t have this grand plan” (expert interview 2, see also expert interview 11). However, many of these plans prove to be unworkable, goals are not achieved, projects stopped and not implemented etc. (compare chapter 8.4). Frequently elaborated reasons behind their failure include firstly that policies are designed in a way that is disconnected from local customs, problems and people. Secondly, they show deficits in long-term planning and engagement. Expert interviewee 1 describes for the Philippine Medium Term Development Plan:

> “The Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan […] they were able to present the problem adequately in terms of statistics, but the strategies were a wild list. I mean, you have about twenty strategies. I mean, how do you prioritise which are durable? How do you address the specific problems? […] I mean it’s not a realistic plan” (expert interview 1).

The expert refers to the fact that policy plans are often disconnected from reality, here the factual local policy context. This is in so far surprising as it is often assumed that Filipinos/Boholanos ‘know what is best for them’ (expert interview 10). This assumption is based on comparatively high educational attainments among Filipinos and Boholanos (compare chapters 6.2 and 7.2.4). Kelly & Armstrong (1996: 255) report from their research in the Visayas that they find policy typically organised along (internationally suggested) theoretical lines – that means it is intellectually eloquent – but that it then fails to practically adapt to the situation in the field. The Bohol case displays similar incidences as seen especially in the cases of agricultural policy and the anti-poverty policy of ‘Abante Bohol’.

These adverse outcomes are often based on a situation where policy formulation and/or implementation are conducted in the absence of local participation. As a matter of fact, the extraordinary diversity and fragmentation of the Philippines explicitly calls for and makes the integration of ‘endogenous’ local knowledge even more necessary. Governmental policy-
makers, bureaucratic staff, and not even NGOs because they are mainly urban-and middle-class based (see chapter 6.1.3) may not always possess such endogenous knowledge, especially when foreign consultants are involved in the policy process, as it is the case with provincial tourism policy in Bohol. In other words, “in many cases, this lack of adaptability to the situation in the barrios can be traced to the Project’s institutional context. Its experience demonstrates the drawbacks in attempting to fuse the cultures of academia [bureaucracy] and village life” (Gauld 2000: 255, note by A.C.). Indeed, the rather successful approach of the ‘SLGP’ towards institutional change may partially be explained by the combined endogenous-international knowledge resource embodied in the president of the Bohol Local Development Foundation and consultant to Provincial Planning and Development Office (expert interviewee 7; see table 4.6).

All of these observations highlight the need for better monitoring and evaluation tools, and improved policy consistency. However, as illustrated for Bohol, monitoring and/or evaluation activities are close to non-existing (chapter 8.2.2). Instead, the tendency is to continuously replace old plans with new ones leading to policy inconsistency (expert interview 11). Interviewee 1 states:

“And then after five years she’ll come again with another set of plans, you see, presenting problems. But the wild list would still be there and nobody has really evaluated the extent to which, you know, these strategies have lead to the reduction of poverty or improvement of the situation of the population” (expert interview 1).

Policy plans and programmes are typically superseded as political posts and personnel in Metro Manila and Tagbilaran change. This is independent of whether the old ones have been fully implemented or not. A prominent example is the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Agenda introduced during Ramos’ presidency, which – despite successful outcomes and positive critiques – was almost completely modified when President Estrada took over.

Interestingly, during election periods, certain sectoral policies are preferred over others because they promise a quicker, better visible impact. These are then used to point out alleged policy consistency and effect(iveness) of the actions achieved by political leaders. Particularly infrastructure policies are used for these purposes, as photo 9.1 exemplifies (see also Coronel et al 2004: 196-215; chapter 9.2.3 for follow-up).
Hence, for most of the policy cases presented from Bohol in chapter 8, the classic policy cycle as presented in figure 3.1 typically lacks monitoring and evaluation activities; it may be interrupted and abbreviated; and it focuses too much on planning. Additionally, inadequate consideration and incorporation of locally-embedded knowledge often render policies disconnected from local contexts. In this setting, policy intervention struggles to induce sustainable, long-term, coherent, and contingent changes on disparities of poverty and wealth (expert interview 19).

9.2.2 On patronage and personalised politics

Policy administration in the Philippines is intertwined with principles of socio-political hierarchy, responsibility, and accountability, here issues of leadership and personalised politics that structure all sections of everyday life, including political and business matters.

‘Utang na loob’ and patronage systems

The principle of ‘utang na loob’ forms the basis for most social interactions among Filipinos. Interview partner 4 describes ‘utang na loob’ as politics that is related to “business is you know, [Visayan] and then traditional politics, they always play that, ah I give you a tennis court, ah, and I give you this back”. More precisely ‘utang na loob’ refers to reciprocal obligations of a Filipino to ‘pay back’ any person who has given or done anything for him/her, here to a ‘debt of gratitude’. ‘Utang na loob’ means that any person is entangled in a dense net of mutually binding ties, here that symbolic capital is the fundament to social networks. As hinted at in chapter 8, these informal ties often prove indispensable for achieving goals in policy-making and they are very important in times of crisis (Teves 2000; see chapters 9.2.3 and 10). They are also the reason behind the difficulties outsiders experience when attempting to acquire information from locals (see chapter 4.3.2). ‘Utang na loob’ still exists all over the Philippines, however, is stronger in rural than urban areas (expert interview 2, compare rural origin of Philippine communities in chapters 5 and 9.3.1).

Patronage refers to relationships created through ‘utang na loob’ between a patron and his/her clients across hierarchical scales. It originated from the traditional landownership relations which continue to be persistently unequal (see chapters 6.1.3, 7.2.3, 8.4.3). Since pre-colonial times a system has developed where the tenants and agricultural workers can enlarge their share of the harvest by investing their labour in the cultivation of land. The wealthy landowner (their patron) in turn distributes the surplus harvest among the tenants (clients) in order to attain status and expand his/her influence sphere. Usually he also takes care of health and education matters for his tenants and is the person they would ask for advice and decisions. In the long run these patronage relations appoint more (material) benefits to the landowner than to the tenants. However, the latter are usually guaranteed a secure livelihood as the landowners would not dare to ‘loose their faces’ by neglecting their tasks in the
reciprocal relationship. In fact, the tenants and workers usually do not perceive themselves to be in an inferior or disadvantaged position. This may change in cases when the land they cultivate is being – as described for contemporary Philippines in chapters 6.1.3 and 7.2.3 – taken over by absentee owners or unknown landlords who then do not feel the same reciprocal relationship (Ulrich 2003: 167-168). None the less, the incidences of Boholano farmers selling the land, which is given to them through CARP land reform, back to its former owner and patron (chapter 8.4.3) shows that the ‘traditional’ obligatory relations and patronage systems still remain in place until today.

Personalised politics

In a society centred on (hierarchical) social networks, personal characters tend to dominate policy contents and necessities. In fact, most visited projects in Bohol rely intrinsically on the leadership capacities of a single person. “Ich glaube es muss immer mindestens eine Person [...] sein, die wirklich dahinter steht, die es wirklich will und weiter durchdrückt, dass es auch wirklich passiert. Eine Person mit Einfluss“. This implies, in turn, “wenn die eine Person aufhört, ist ganz oft das Projekt zu Ende” (expert interview 10) – an observation which may provide yet another explanation for the common gap between policy plan and implementation.

The need for leadership may also be responsible for a common practice observed inside the visited governmental offices in Bohol. Here many staff members sit and wait to go home once they have finished their explicit tasks defined by a superior. They clearly have difficulties to work independently (own observations at several provincial government agencies, confirmed by expert interviews 11, 19). Similarly, expert interviewee 10 illustrates that her task as a foreign consultant to the municipal government of Baclayon comprises above all the organisation of papers, plans and ideas, setting up priorities or distributing responsibilities to other staff, because “es nimmt keiner in die Hand [...] absprechen tun sie sich schon [...] die hatten dann ein oder zwei Besprechungen aber haben hält gemeint, sie haben sich dann da hingesetzt und drumherumgeredet und dann wars wieder vorbei. Und no output weißt Du, no outcome. Und dann haben sie sich wieder mal getroffen und alle geredet. Und beim nächsten Mal ist keiner mehr gekommen”.

This certain inability to work, decide, and speak out independently is also exposed when interview partners frequently hand over and refer to allegedly better informed and directly accountable colleagues (see chapter 8.2.2).

42 Literally in English: “I believe there must always be one person who takes it on, who really supports and pushes it. Only then it actually works. One person with great influence”. This implies, in turn, “if this one person quits the job, often the entire project is cancelled as well”.

43 Literally in English: “Nobody takes over the job...They discuss the issues, have one or two consultations. However, they told me, there they sit together and talk around without focussing until the meeting is over. And no output, you know, no outcome. And some time later they meet again and everybody talks again. The next meeting nobody turned up any more” (expert interview 10).
The subsequent follow-up story of the two anti-poverty policies of ‘Abante Bohol’ and the ‘Strengthening local government for effective service delivery for poverty reduction’ (‘SLGP’) demonstratively exemplifies the crucial role a single person can have in determining the course and content of policy. When investigated in early 2004 the two policies pursued partially different policy approaches and goals, in fact they appeared to more or less compete with each other (compare chapter 8.3.4). Between early 2004 and 2006 the situation changed substantially as leading personnel shifted. The precise steps in time sequence were:

- The international donor AUSAid – PACAP rejects to financially support the ‘SLGP’ project.
- The ‘SLGP’ project stops to exist as a distinct project.
- The post of the head of the Bohol Poverty Reduction Management Office (BPRMO) (expert interviewee 4) and with it leadership for ‘Abante Bohol’ becomes vacant.
- The president of the Bohol Local Development Foundation and consultant to Provincial Planning and Development Office (expert interviewee 7) who has been accountable for carrying out the ‘SLGP’ takes over the post of head of BPRMO and is in charge of ‘Abante Bohol’.
- Some elements of ‘SLGP’ are integrated into ‘Abante Bohol’, such as community organisation efforts at purok levels. At the same time some service delivery tasks are shifted to cooperation with other sectoral agencies (The Bohol Chronicle 17/11/2004).
- The BLDF applies for foreign funding for a project on community organisation and institutional change at purok level that resembles the old ‘SLGP’ (http://www.poorfirstpovertycafe.org.ph/; 20/1/2006).
- There are no further updates on ‘Abante Bohol’ available on the Internet, therefore I cannot assess whether and how the project is still operating. However, expert interviewee 7 again changes posts in 2005 and now works for an international NGO.

While the new integration of both projects may potentially result in more bundled and possibly effective policy intervention on poverty, the occurrences give yet another example of policy inconsistency alongside changes of personnel (chapter 9.2.1). These events clearly underline an inference often made with reference to ‘Filipino-style’ policy-making that “in the Philippines politics is a matter of personalities and rhetoric, not of a platform an ideology”, concepts, and programmes (Mulder 1999: 7; see also Hutchcroft 1998: 13-15). In other words, political parties “no longer look at their candidates’ fitness for office or inclination to public service. Their sole concern is ‘winnability’” (David 2002: 148). This implies, in turn, that politicians are legitimised to change political parties and policy-makers like expert interviewee 7 can swap programmes. Concerning the current and former Boholano governor a similar picture arises: “This [current] governor used to be a Congress man. So. But the one, the opposition, was a former governor. Very young who’s trying to come back as a opposition. And ugly enough, maybe you have observed that they used to belong to the same party” (expert interview 7, note by A.C.). Siemers (1993: 120) notes that such behaviour can
sometimes also be a result of pressure on the politician who, as ‘patron’, is obliged to secure access to resources for his followers.

These interpretations imply “the idea that the ones who are elected are the only ones who can practice decision-making. And they earn it through elections. They have the constituency” (expert interview 2). For this reason the barangay captains, mayors, and the governor in Bohol as well as the senators and congressmen in Metro Manila plus their families are literally ‘untouchable’ (expert interview 18). For example, the German Development Service together with the municipal government of Baclayon has established a bakery operated by a women’s cooperative on Pamilacan, which is well accepted among the locals. However, the wife of the barangay captain took the money used as basic capital for running the bakery and spent it in Metro Manila. The bakery remained closed until the money was replaced from other sources. The members of the cooperative did not object (field visit 11, expert interview 10).

Although there is neither great consistency of policy nor of individual leaders in specific programmes, the political elite in the Philippines has proven particularly resilient to changes. This resilience is based on the fact that “politics in the Philippines is very dominated by some families and so on” (expert interview 7). Every Filipino has various godfathers beyond the genetic family. Through this godfather system social networks of the family are extended into what is often referred to as clans. The most influential clans make up the socio-political and simultaneously the economic elite of the country. “Elite Filipino families often perform a broad range of economic, social, and political functions” (McCoy 2002: 9). Historically, the old-established landlord families have possessed the most symbolic capital since the post-colonial, independent political system was founded in 1946. Thus, they were most eligible and legitimised to take over power. Ever since this legitimacy has replicated itself. Only Marcos established his own cronies and added another elite besides the ‘old’ elites (chapter 5.2). However, after his downfall, Cory Aquino, a landowner herself, took over power and re-connected to the pre-Marcos elite. Ever since these two oligarchic groups have constituted the political and economic elite of the country (Hamilton-Paterson 1998; Hegmanns 1990).

To give examples of resilient elite families in politics, the mayor of Inabanga municipality in Bohol is the wife of the previous mayor who had governed for three terms before his wife took over. At national scale Imelda Marcos, the wife of the former President whose authoritarian and corruptive presidency was, as noted, ended by ‘people power’ in 1986, continues to be a highly recognised personality among many Filipinos until today. In 1995 she was even elected a member of the national congress as a representative of the first district of Leyte (David 2002). Another example, Fidel Ramos, elected President 1992-1998, had previously been chief of the Philippine Constabulary, one of the most disreputable units of the military under Marcos. Similarly, Joseph Estrada, elected President 1998-2001 was mayor
during the Marcos years and said to never have given up his loyalty and admiration for the former leader (Carroll 1999).

As a major consequence, uneven patronage, leadership, and power relations control – hinder – many transformations in Bohol and the Philippines, not only in socio-economic but also in policy-making terms. Open discussions and opinion sharing are rare in such a policy environment, especially when superior leaders are present (compare example of purok assembly in chapter 8.4.4). Obviously this lack of transparency may also cause some of the locally-disconnected and non-participatory policy approaches detected earlier in chapter 9.2.1 (expert interview 11). Chapter 9.3.2 looks into the outcomes of such circumstances for state-society partnerships.

Moreover, political position becomes a means to economic power and vice versa. Until today, Philippine politics is steered by what expert interviewee 18 subsumes under: Socio-political power and money depend on and affect each other – however, stem from ‘utang na loob’ relations (compare Ulrich & Edgecombe 1999). In other words, “in a society with a long history of state and elite predation as well as mass powerlessness, the use of public office has been identified with gaining and maintaining economic, political, and social power” (Batalla 2001: 43, compare notes on corruption in subsequent chapter 9.2.3). Accordingly, the national congress resembles “an elite body that defends the interests of the wealthy and the powerful while occasionally being open to demands from below – [which] remains essentially unchanged” (Coronel et al 2004: viii). Against this background the limited progress and stark criticism of CARP policy are not surprising given that the President under which the land reform was enacted and many politicians and policy-makers today are landowners themselves. Borras (2003: 1062) puts it strongly: “Anti-reform political manipulation by landlords and their allies to exclude lands, rather than technical-administrative reasons claimed by the government, better explain the excluded” areas under CARP. In addition, matters of policy consistency are not overly important for an elite whose legitimacy unaffectedly prevails and remains unchallenged for cultural reasons. Generally, the unequal concentration of growth and income in the Philippines and in Bohol may not present as much of a problem for the elites – unless the disparities induce conflicts like the ones with Moro movements or the NPA, which then attack their legitimacy.

Recently, globalisation has brought impetus for new elite formations and a challenge to old ones. Through return migrants, remittance-receiving families, tourists, or entrepreneurs earning from uplifting economic sectors like tourism, globalisation creates new socio-economic elites in centre and peripheries alike. The result is often a conflictual encounter of old and new elites as portrayed for the example of Pamilacan in chapter 8.4.2 (compare also Ulrich & Edgecombe 1999). Certainly many (peripheral) areas in the Philippines can be assumed to experience what Edwards et al describe theoretically: “In traditional rural power
structures this [power] was performed through the informal backstage networks of social and political elites. However in many rural areas influence has shifted to new groups and proto-elites, who are without access to the same cross-scale networks” (Edwards et al 2001: 292; note by A.C.). Yet, as the previous accounts underline, it is still explicitly these ‘traditional’ cross-scale, informal networks that decide on the persistence and acceptance of any groups’ and proto-elites’ influence sphere among their fellow Filipinos.

To conclude, the Philippine socio-cultural environment of political economy processes opens wide windows for a deep divide in society between those who decide and possess and those who do not, between the politically and socio-economically marginalised and the elite. Long-established forms of socio-political organisation and power relations, prevalent in Philippine society and political economy, are based on endogenously generated, socially defined, and locally understood inequalities. These seriously impede effective policy interventions on spatial disparities and social inequalities. In fact, they often actively operate to (re)produce those Philippine landscapes of disparities of poverty and wealth they formally seek to change. Hence, the political and socio-economic elites of the Philippines often fail to meet their responsibilities to engage in more balanced development, as suggested in chapter 2.2.2.

9.2.3 Practice of corruption

An almost logic result of the prior analysis are open windows for personal enrichment and corruption. Expert interviewee 9 strongly criticises that many governmental policy interventions do not reach the poor and peripheral because of corruption preventing the resources to ‘touch down’ where they are needed and instead end up in the pockets of some policy-makers and -executers. There is both, extensive corruption in the administrative bureaucracy as well as in high-level political decision-making circles, and it stretches across almost all sectors including agriculture, infrastructure, education, disaster management etc. at national and local government levels (Coronel 2000). As it is based on patronage relations, corruption is historically institutionalised in the Philippines, which makes it more complicated to combat (Batalla 2001). Correspondingly, Hutchcroft (1998) depicts the Philippine political economy as ‘booty capitalism’ indicating that the political leaders who are in fact the economic elite use the state mainly for further self-enrichment and not for political purposes.

Figure 9.1 shows the distribution of the 20% development fund for the provincial government of Bohol in 2004 from which most decentralised policy fields are sponsored, including the examined policy fields of chapter 8. Strikingly, the expenditures on infrastructure development exceed all other sectors by large and make up 67%. Although infrastructure

44 Each LGU is required to spend 20% of the finances received from national governments on development projects. The plans of spending must be submitted to yet not approved by the Department of Interior and Local Government (compare chapter on decentralisation 9.3.4).
surely needs to be improved in the province, such disproportionate public expenditure pattern seems inadequate. One interview partner explains that personal enrichment practices are responsible:

“Mayors like for instance, confidentially I am saying: Why is it that they are more interested in infrastructure than in any other thing? Because they get 10% of the contracts! Whereas if you, if you say training and you say building people’s organisations and purok, there is no 10% […] So they all ask for market roads even if they don’t care whether the farmers really need this road. And then this highway and the dams and all this, because they get 10% from the contracts” (expert interview 7; see also Coronel et al 2004: 205-207).

Given the large investment in infrastructure, its prevalent bad state in the province (chapters 7.2.4 and 8) poses further questions for policy (in)effect(iveness). At national level, the congressmen and senators are given specific resources to spend on their home provinces, the so-called ‘pork barrel’ money. However, while they hold office in the capital in Manila, they get their votes from the provinces” (expert interview 7). Consequently, the money is often used for ‘visible’ projects as the noted ones into infrastructure to guarantee loyalty and support, or to buy votes (see photo 9.1). Moreover, “politicians implement policies often in favour of their own home province or region” expert interview 20). Probably this is the reason behind the well-equipped state of roads in Illocos province, the home of Ferdinand Marcos (see chapter 6.1.3).

The mentioned family clan tradition in Philippine politics results in another form of corruption, here cronyism in the form of the employment of family members, even if they are not as well qualified for the job as others. “Many politicians try to transform their electoral offices into lasting family assets” (McCoy 2002: 24; compare Hanisch 1995 for similar practices at LGU level). Again, social connections, based on genetic relations and symbolic representation, appear to determine the setting and therefore possibly the course towards ineffective policy-making. Financial capital plays a significant role as well, none the least as a major objective for undertaking corruption. The notorious bad pay for government officials fuels corruption and little effective work in administration (expert interview 11; Hanisch 1995). Such conditions date back to colonial times when bureaucrats were already badly paid
and spend most of their working time to ‘tax farm’ the local people for their own living (Batalla 2001: 43-46; compare accounts on decentralisation chapter 9.3.4).

Hence, policy-making at all levels in the Philippines tends to be centred on personal enrichment opportunities. Thereby however, corruptive practices are a historically embedded societal phenomenon. It applies to the Philippines what is expressed in theory:

“Corruption is not systematically ‘naked self-interest’ but can respond, for example, to codes of reciprocity within (neo) patrimonial political systems based on legitimate patronage” (Le Billon 2001: 1).

Never the less, as a result the abuse of government’s autonomy and power as a ‘self-service (money) station’ obviously leads to the loss of people’s trust in them: The government does not seem to have the power to control itself which is essential for retaining accountability to the people (compare theory in chapter 3.2.3). Consequently, material and imagined distances and boundaries between government and citizen, and inherently between elite and the residual population increase – and effective policy outreach made more complicated. In addition, corruptive practices cause investors to be sceptical about the reliability and effectiveness of economic policies and to withdraw from investment and/or joint endeavours with government.

Yet, this situation does not automatically stir Filipinos’ protest (compare example of bakery in Pamilacan above). Instead, “the ability of powerful local elites to capture the government machinery for their own ends” often goes hand in hand with “patronage, threats, and ties of clan and obligation to reduce citizen outcry against the elites’ use of public office for private gains” (George 1998: 224). Only at a certain stage of ‘saturation’, Filipinos start to actively dispute and object. The events of ‘EDSA I’ in 1986 when ‘people power’ ousted the authoritative rule of Marcos, as well as ‘EDSA or people power II’ which ended the corrupt presidency of Estrada in 2001 are the most popular examples. Possibly current accusations and protests against Arroyo in the streets of Metro Manila give further evidence of their ‘saturation’. Important to consider, the major protests are all directed at leadership changes at national government level, while their roots at local levels and in the inherited socio-political system remain untackled and unchanged.

Interestingly, ‘people power’ in the various cases comprise of different segments of the population, which intrinsically point at the outreach capabilities of Presidents and their acceptance in Filipino society. The events in 1986 probably represent the most integrative and inclusive ‘concert of protest action’ in Philippine history. Induced by people from all social classes and origins, at a later stage notably the usually apolitical Catholic Church and the military stepped in and supported the upheaval (see chapter 9.3.2). In contrast, the ‘people power II’ that ousted Estrada involved mainly urban middle-class and elitist Filipinos. As a former movie star Estrada is well known and popular with the rural poor. He has been the
only non-elitist President elected without the support of the oligarchy – a symbol to some that ‘traditional political culture’ is weakened and the poor empowered (compare Thompson 2002). However, while the poor and periheral voted Estrada into office in 1998, they could not prevent that Estrada was ousted by the urban-based middle-class- and elitist movements of people power II in 2001. The current President herself origins from the urban elite and is not very well approved of in the peripheries. Most of all the deprived segments of Filipino society are the major force behind current protests against Arroyo. Yet, in spite of several political crises, accusations of corruption, and one attempted coup in 2003, Arroyo narrowly defeated another film star popular with the rural poor, Fernando Poe, in the presidential elections of May 2004. In February 2006 a second alleged coup d’etat plot against Arroyo was uncovered and suppressed with force. Ever since rumours of a new coup d’etat and discourses on the weakness and/or strength of the Philippine state government and democracy prevail (see chapter 10).

9.3 External relations: Stakeholders’ interactions

9.3.1 Filipino paradoxes in participatory policy

Local policy participation is embedded in a paradox historical background in the Philippines. On the one hand, Malay-Filipino society is based on local organisations of small ‘barangay’-village communities (chapter 5.2), and family/clan ties are exceptionally strong. Local, participatory support systems have thus a long tradition. In fact, they have helped to face “the inability of the state to provide social services to the majority of the population“ (Bankhoff 2004: 19). The example of elapsed fishermen communities in the Visayas shows that such associations of local solidarity operated even across larger distances. The fishermen’s prime livelihood strategy was to establish several settlements on various islands and to seasonally circulate between them. Through this social networking across space they were able to ideally exploit sea resources and diversify subsistence risks (Seki 2000).

After independence, public recognition of these informal solidarity institutions at grassroot level waned over the years. None the less, they show that local cooperation and participation in shaping immediate surroundings and deciding on livelihood options, or in more modern terms in local participatory policy making, can be viewed as historically grown practice, claimed to “have proven extraordinarily resilient and adaptive” until today (Bankoff 2004: 19). Therefore, the idea of targeting barangay and specifically puroks as the major participating units of provincial anti-poverty policy, as done in the case of the ‘SLGP’ in Bohol, seems reasonable and promising.

In this context, however, the question poses why the Provincial Agriculturalist of Bohol has – as reported in chapter 8.4.3 – so many problems in attracting fisher folks and agricultural workers to community organisations, and why almost all policies in other fields are reported
to face more or less difficulties with empowering local people to participate actively in policy-making. These findings are probably based on the other side of the ‘Filipino participation story’, which is essentially related to the socio-political hierarchies and political culture in Philippine society.

Expert interviewee 2 asserts that in the Philippines local organisation and “participation is real challenge. So, so that is some kind of a planning process where they are able to identify what they want, instead of the tradition of procedure of accepting just what higher level bodies would give them”. In other words, whenever hierarchies and patronage relations are involved, particularly when projects are initiated or accompanied by representatives of ‘higher’ scales and/or ‘outsiders’, any kind of genuine participation, as understood in theory, is obstructed. For example, Cramb et al (2000) report from conservation farming projects in Palawan, Illoilo, and Cebu that project staff’s authority combined with support from the barangay leaders exerted strong pressure on the local people to adopt the suggested technologies and land-use practices. With regard to my own authority and hierarchy, I was given the advice during my research “don’t ask village people about politics, they are afraid to answer. Find answers in discrete way” (expert interview 9; compare chapter 4.3.2). Local people often avoid uttering their real opinions and preferably evade any kind of confrontation. Instead, their statements may just as well be echoes of dominant discourses, hierarchical expectations, and symbolic capital structures.

During field visits 3 and 5 Boholanos’ (Filipinos’) reluctance to actively participate in policy-making was experienced in yet a different manner. The local people who were asked to participate were mainly interested in ultimate results and how these would benefit them. They inquired very little about the contents of the projects, the tasks to be done, and their potential contribution to it. It seemed that they were reluctant or did not understand that they were to take over responsibility and activities themselves. In other words, while many local developmental problems exist, little local interest tries to challenge and solve them (expert interviews 10, 7). Likewise, Kelly & Armstrong (1996: 255-256) report with regard to their investigation of a ‘governanced’ Food System Development Project (FSDP) in the Visayas that the local people there, who were asked to become active policy-makers, continuously expressed discontent about the scarce material rewards of their participation. They expected that the project would provide them with capital grants, infrastructure, or other tangible aid. These and the local people attending the purok meetings in Bohol (field visit 3) clearly misunderstood the very idea of policy participation as promulgated by the government and NGOs. The latter maintain that projects should not offer pure service handouts, but rather foster a self-sustaining form of development that is based on ‘empowered’ endogenous resources and institutions (see chapters 3.3, 8.2, 8.3).
These expectations of automatic material returns and reluctant attitudes towards self-empowered participation may result from patronage relations where people rely on the decision, actions, and rewards of their patron. Participation becomes a way of connecting to a ‘patron’ (the project leader) in the hope that he/she gives out beneficiaries depending on personal relationships (Teves 2000: 54-58). Furthermore, communities have experienced a long history of governmental involvement in terms of ‘classic’ non-participatory service delivery. Therefore, the people may need time to get used to the new setting of being ‘policy shapers’ (see theory in chapter 3.3.3). Finally, local people may be unable to comprehend why government and NGO staff do not provide them with the material equipment they need when they obviously hold enough money (salary) and material infrastructure (computers, vehicles etc.) for themselves.

A starting point internationally conceptualised for tackling these participation dilemmas may be People’s Organisations (POs). Emerging from the localities themselves, the POs’ representatives potentially function as an ideal channel for compiling local interests, while simultaneously appropriately advocating these local interests to ‘outside’ stakeholders. However, as the case of Pamilacan in chapter 8.4.2 illustrates, a new PO can also induce a shift of power relations and elite positions to the extent that conflicts develop in lieu of cooperation and empowerment (similarly observed during field visit 12). Moreover, as Ulrich & Edgecombe (1999: 190-197) point out, access to many community organisations in Bohol request membership fees. In other words, the most deprived segments of the local population, here those at the very end of the disparity parameter, are again unlikely to become involved in policy-making, and their voices are neither heard nor advocated to ‘outside’ stakeholders. Put strongly, POs can even become yet another vehicle for further social differentiation and polarisation.

To conclude, participatory policy approaches into peripheries, such as by the ‘SLGP’ or ‘Abante Bohol’, may establish links with traditional village networks, however, they have to consider that the local people are more likely to behave according to traditional societal rules (which are frequently reinforced by government and NGO representatives themselves) than according to more modern theoretical understanding of participation. Local participation in its theoretical understanding is probably not feasible in the Philippines (yet). Thus, participatory cooperation policy models like community planning or community leadership have to consider these factors if they are to reach out effectively (compare next chapter on partnerships; chapters 3.3.3 and 8.4.4).

Besides the term of ‘traditional Philippine political culture’ may in fact refer to two power systems, neighbourhood and family ties on the one hand and patronage-based hierarchical networks on the other. It is far more commonly – including in this study – used in the latter sense, though. Finally, as participation is always dependent on local acceptance, a lack of
participation by local people may, of course, also indicate a non-inclusive or inadequate outreach of policies and policy-makers (compare chapter 9.2.1). By all means, therefore, any participatory policy initiative requires fundamental and constant discussion, explanation, and the determination to reach a common understanding of methods and goals by all affected and involved stakeholders.

9.3.2 Governmental relationships with NGOs: On the understanding of partnership and governance

Figure 9.1 illustrates that initiatives by LGU-NGO partners are provided with large sums of the 20% development fund in Bohol. Nationwide, figures show that numbers of NGOs and their incorporation in policy-making have rapidly increased since the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991. These NGOs are often believed to be capable of overcoming traditional politics and inducing a new political culture of participatory governance in line with modern theoretical concepts in the Philippines, for NGOs “tend to be more collaborative, less cynical, more willing to take risks, and less office-bound” (George 1998: 247; compare also Gauld 2000 and theory in chapter 3.3). Yet, prior empirical accounts in chapters 8 and 9.3.1 indicate that partnership and governance between state-society stakeholders in policy-making is problematic in Bohol (the Philippines?).

As discussed in chapters 9.2.2 and 9.3.1, interactions within families and clans are the fundamental form of social networking in Malay-Filipino society. Keeping this tradition in mind, many Filipinos understand the principles of partnership differently from the internationally circulating academic and political literature. One interview partner explicates:

“The biggest problem I see in the Philippines is the different understanding or comprehension of ‘partnership’. The interpretation of the word partnership is different to ours. Partnership is based on confidence among the partners. And Filipinos do not easily built up confidence to unknown individuals or institutions” (expert interview 20).

This scepticism towards potential partners is partially founded on the idea, that once formal cooperation is set up, it involves mutual obligations according to ‘utang na loob’ (Ulrich & Edgecombe 1999). Furthermore, many policy stakeholders in the Philippines nowadays seem to prefer what may be termed pragmatic, loose, shifting short-term alliances over engaging in such seriously binding reciprocity (compare Eaton 2001; Siemers 1993; Teves 2000). Such short-term alliances are frequently determined by personal advantages, however, they (still) can, as theoretically argued in chapter 3.2.2, enhance policy outcomes by bundling resources. Short-term alliances may fuel existing problems with policy consistency and possibly with self-enriching practices.

During interviews, government and NGO policy stakeholders blamed each other for discarding closer and more effective cooperation (expert interviews 3, 7, 8, 16, 19). Notably, such claims partially stem from within collaborative LGU-NGO ‘governanced’ projects, like
the described tourism programme and the ‘SLGP’ in Bohol. Reference is made essentially to their allegedly incompatible approaches and understandings of disparities of poverty and respective policy responses. The following non-representative, yet indicative examples highlight, however, that despite rhetorical differences, de-facto modes of operation of actors from government and NGOs are not that different:

- “Government tend to be sectoral and NGO tend to be target group [oriented] (expert interview 7; note by A.C.). The examples of ‘Abante Bohol’ and ‘SLGP’ demonstrate that this environment may be changing. Yet, it is true that “so far, government and NGOs are not trained together in order to allow for a building for a common understanding” (expert interview 2).

- The planning officer of the Provincial Agriculturalist in Bohol expresses “we are not like the NGO who can stay in the municipality most of the time […] we are only distributing the technical assistance during visiting […] there is no conflict but difference is, they can stay and see” (expert interview 3). Yet, the examples of the field officers of the BPRMO show that also government ‘can stay and see’ – indeed, these difference could also be an argument for government to contract out certain localised activities to NGOs (compare case of ‘SLGP’; chapter 3.3.3).

- Somewhat in contradiction to the theoretical arguments of George (1998) and Gauld (2000) in the first section of this chapter, critics also accuse NGOs to be little active in local project implementation but to focus advocacy tasks and media presence. As most NGOs are set up by the middle class, which is mostly urban and comprises only about 30% of Filipino society (chapter 6.1.3), the question arises whether these NGOs are actually able to grasp the real needs of the poor and rural/peripheral, and to advocate them adequately (expert interview 9; compare presidential changes in chapter 9.2.3). However, the examples of the Soil and Water Conservation Foundation (SWCF) and the Bohol Local Development Foundation give proof that some NGOs succeed to tackle the problems of the poor in the rural. The SWCF has located its headquarters in its target area, but thereby remains an exception in Bohol.

- Government agencies are claimed to be more restricted by social hierarchies and bureaucracy (i.e. corruption) than NGOs (expert interview 19). At the same time, both groups of policy-makers have to deal with the same opposition and potential corruption met in municipal and barangay governments and bureaucracies throughout the policy implementation process (compare cases of ‘Abante Bohol’ and ‘SLGP’ in chapter 8.4.4).

- NGOs are declared to see themselves in competition for funds with the government, and to only cooperate with the latter in order to survive rather than to improve projects (expert interviews 3, 17). Despite being non-representative, the institutional outline of the ‘SLGP’ (chapter 8.3.3) indicates differently.

It can be inferred from these remarks that ‘classic’ government and new governanced policy often do not work as dissimilarly and incompatibly in the Philippines as suspected by many interview partners and theoretical concepts (chapter 3.3). Do they achieve different outcomes on disparities of poverty, then? It is an interesting finding that local communities view both types of projects with equal scepticism and reluctance (see chapter 9.3.1). According to them, experiences with any ‘outsider’ instigating local policy have proven ineffective, for neither LGUs, NGOs, nor joint initiatives keep their promises (field visit 3), only request the locals
for their money and resources (field visit 5), prohibit traditional livelihoods (field visit 11; expert interview 10), and enforce projects, which only benefit them or investors but not the locals (field visits 4, 12). Clearly, local rejection of policy and their makers from ‘outside’ is based – once again – on adverse and little effective experiences with participatory and locally embedded policy approaches. A factor that should not be ignored, however, is that despite their generally negative experiences, local people nowadays have more (institutional) options to address when they want to voice their views.

One major reason for why ‘classic’ government and collaborative policy do not differ more strongly is that the principles, which theoretically distinguish government from governance, including collaboration, participation, networking, and empowerment are literally so-called ‘buzz’-words in Bohol (the Philippines?). This means that while the principles of governance have entered and shifted the rhetoric and some organisational structures of policy-making, they have not substantially altered their contents and practices. Often the premise of receiving international funding is a sufficient incentive for formally adopting the principles of governance in policy plans and outlines. Never the less the investigated partnership/governance initiatives in Bohol remain despite their formal organisation into networks, like the government itself, embedded in traditional modes of hierarchical regulation. Local people perceive themselves and their ideas to be positioned hierarchically lower than the officials and ‘outsiders’ (see chapter 8.4; Gauld 2000: 231-234; Kelly & Armstrong 1996: 248).

It is for these reasons that many of the participatory ‘bottom-up’ policy approaches in Bohol do not really reach their target groups. And even if they are planned to, as in the case of the ‘SLGP’, they still not necessarily accomplish mutual, equal-status participation by the local people. Similarly, training enhancement in the case of ‘Abante Bohol’ would not necessarily reinforce peoples’ independence and empowerment better than its current strategy of simple governmental service delivery with a local focus. More effective outcomes can be achieved by ensuring the support of local leaders and patrons for the projects. In Bohol, both ‘Abante Bohol’ and ‘SLGP’ equally often face the opposition by explicitly them (see chapter 8.4.4).

To conclude, main obstacles to policy effect(iveness) on disparities of poverty in Bohol (and potentially in other parts of the Philippines) may not necessarily ground on the institutional differences between those policies run solely by government and those operated by collaborative, governanced initiatives. Rather, the individual setting, outline, and processes of single policies as well as the socio-cultural and political understandings and practices of partnership and participation of all parties involved determine their eventually implemented outreach and impact. Thus, arguments of NGOs overcoming ‘traditional Philippine-style policy-making’ cannot be confirmed from field experiences. It can be confirmed, however, that elements of traditional and new political culture often coexist within and between single
policies and their makers. Moreover, the peripheral and marginalised have more (institutional) options today to address when they want to voice their views. Unquestionably though, Philippine policy discourse, makers, and interventions need to more critically consider “the importance of other more informal and indigenous forms of civil society that may be especially important to marginalized groups” (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001: 13).

Excursus: Church and politics

The Catholic Church belongs to the most powerful societal players in the Philippines and is able to affect (political and policy) developments (expert interview 5). Although so far not stressed in this study’s accounts on Bohol, for complementary reasons the special Filipino relationship of Church and politics shall be briefly illustrated here, especially so because numerous Church-related NGOs are active in the country, among others Couples for Christ-Gawad Kalinga where expert interviewee 9/16 (see appendices A1, A2) works.

Photo 9.2: Policy and the role of the Church in Loboc, Bohol

A popular example for the extent of the political influence of the church is its engagement in the overthrow of Marcos in 1986 and its involvement in setting up a democratic order thereafter (chapter 9.2.3; Carroll 1999: 31-48). At local scale, photo 9.2 pictures what can happen if the interests of the Catholic Church are not considered and consulted. The buildings on the picture are owned by the church and intersect a bridge’s intended path that was meant to cross Loboc river in Bohol. Because the government ignored this, the construction of a bridge was never finalised and put in use.

Another policy area where church interests have been very visible is population programmes (compare population development in chapter 6.2.1). Since the 1980s Philippine governments have given only modest political support to population policy due to the Church’s systematic resistance against any kind of population management. Under Marcos the Philippines were among the first to launch an official family planning programme in 1970; subsequent governments did not follow up the programme. The Presidents Aquino, Estrada and contemporarily, Arroyo alternatively focus(sed) on ‘responsible parenthood and informed choice’ and reject(ed) artificial birth control (Sison 2003; expert interview 1). Ramos made efforts towards a reproductive health scheme, but was stopped by the legislature. Ironically, today the neighbouring countries which once took the Philippines as model for population
policy have by large overtaken the country in terms of successful population management (Orbeta & Pernia 1999). As a result, more and more Filipinos, especially those in the peripheries with high-fertility rates, are caught in the population-employment-migration dilemma depicted in chapter 6, which consequently aggravates disparities of poverty and wealth.

9.3.3 Government’s interaction with internationals: Aid, dependency, abuse, or chance?

The Local Government Code enables local governments to apply independently to (foreign) grants for the first time in Philippine history. As illustrated for Bohol “donor assistance has been very helpful for a number of LGUs. Ah, like in the case of Bohol or in the case of Nueva Viscaya. Even Bulacan. Because these are areas of ah… these are the areas for, ah, for these donor-assisted projects” and “it’s really very important to assess the contribution of these donor-assisted projects” (expert interview 2). The majority of these donors are foreign aid or international organisations. As demonstrated, besides foreign funding for policy the provincial government of Bohol also seeks to attract foreign investors into tourism, as well as foreign consultants to LGUs (like expert interviewees 10 and 18). Thus, governmental interaction with internationals is situated at the intersection of private as well as public affairs, market and state interests, here economic growth and needs for social and spatial balance.

Bohol’s tourism projects are embedded in such multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder setting (see chapters 8.2.1 and 8.3.1). On the one hand, projects are thus never short of funding (expert interview 11). On the other hand, if policy becomes dependent on (foreign) funds – as it was the case with ‘SLGP’ – it faces the risk of interruption or complete turnover if these are not granted (see chapter 9.2.2). Moreover, funding organisations have great influence upon the contents and course of policy: The ‘SLGP’ outline was re-written several times in order to meet the expectations and criteria of the potential donor, AUSAid-PACAP. At the same time, foreign financial aid and human capital input can be a crucial means to making policy work effectively, as it is the case with the tourism initiatives in Pamilacan. The example of foreign tourist resorts in Anda peninsula demonstrate that even small-scale, private (and officially promoted) investments may, however, induce local conflicts if not planned and implemented to consider local opinions and spill over effects. Sometimes foreigners simply take advantage of the limited LGU outreach, as this ongoing conflict of 2004 demonstrates: Foreign-owned diving schools from Panglao take their tourists to the coral reefs of Pamilacan, yet refuse to pay the requested fees to enter Pamilacanos’ waters (who would naturally like to profit from tourism in their waters as well). The investors continue to ignore postulations by various LGUs to comply with the regulations, and it seems that the official arm is not long enough to stop them (or, alternatively, that the responsible offices actually do not want to stop them because they fear leaving foreign investors more than complaints by Pamilacanos?).
Fisher & Ulrich (2000) detect similar abusive practices with the transnational cooperation ‘Alliance’ that engages in public-private partnership with the provincial government of Bohol to develop the Inabanga-Wahid-watershed into a water supply for Cebu City (compare chapter 8.3.2). Contrary to official agreements Alliance does not consult or integrate local stakeholders in the project, and information dissemination is restricted to the town of Inabanga. The more peripheral communities remain uninformed although they are directly affected in their agricultural activities by the changes in the watershed. Consequently, “it is difficult to see how Alliance could claim to have been interested in Bohol’s development by embarking on the BCWSP [Bohol Cebu Water Supply Project], when the Boholanos themselves seem to have largely been excluded from the process itself” (Fisher & Ulrich 2000: 456; explanatory note by A.C.). The authors infer that the corporation is interested only in maximising its own profit and, contrary to initial plans, the project will eventually benefit Cebu City and ‘Alliance’ but not Bohol and its citizens.

A completely different yet significant perspective on the Philippine government’s relationship with internationals concerns the population-employment-migration dilemma. Precisely, the migration and ‘brain drain’ from peripheries into urban centres is accompanied by a ‘brain haemorrhage’ out of the country (Newsweek 04/10/2004). Since 1974 national governments have sought to demonstrate the population-employment-dilemma as a benefit in the sense that a large pool of redundant workers is available ‘to be educated for export’ to global labour markets. While cheap and low-educated labour force is the major factor used to motivate foreign investors to settle in the Philippines, professional skill development is promulgated as a profitable means to reinforce migration to meet labour shortages in neighbouring Asian countries, the USA and Europe. Higher wages abroad, possible remittances and migrant investments make this a favourite policy field for national and provincial governments to stimulate development in the Philippines (compare return migrants’ investments in Bohol in chapter 8.4.1). The strategy goes as far as to educate leaving Filipinos as ‘ambassadors’ of Philippine tourism to make them promote their homeland overseas (see figure 9.2).
However, studies indicate that the Philippine periphery and with it existing spatial, sectoral, and social disparities do not benefit much from the ‘education for export’ strategy of their government (compare chapter 6). Most of the development impetus through migrants remains (too) small-scaled, and is implemented with little contingency and coherence (Weekley 2003). Spatially, the largest number of international labour migrants comes from the urbanised, globalised core regions around Metro Manila, because most of the training apparatus and 99% of labour recruiters are locate there (Makabenta 2002; Tyner 1999). Peripheries like Bohol are involved in the labour circuits when their inhabitants – as Illocanos are known for – take advantage of long-established migration networks or through step migration, i.e. when they move to centres in the Philippines and from there abroad at a later stage (see chapters 6.2 and 7.2.4).

The most popular example of how international relations can shape policy and/on (disparate) development at a larger scale in the Philippines is surely the exceptional influence of their former colonial power, the USA. Not only benefited Central Luzon, as noted in chapter 6.3, from the long presence of US troops, but it also enabled substantial US support for the ‘American boy’, namely Marcos, and his authoritative regime to survive as long as they did (Hamilton-Paterson 1998). Another example, the international events around 9/11/2001, discourses of ‘clash of civilisations’, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism have (re)invigorated tensions in the conflict region Mindanao. As a result, 660 US troops re-entered the Philippines in 2002 and combined efforts with the Philippine government and military forces against ‘terrorist cells’ of the Abu Sayaff, which are said to be connected with Al Quaida. Most Moro groups plus the majority of Filipino citizens and many politicians condemned the US involvement, and accused Arroyo for trying thus to ensure US support for her flagging rule (Islam 2003; see chapter 9.2.3). Alongside these events, ethno-cultural components of the historical conflict have been highlighted more strongly than its redistributive elements (see Siemers 2001). Stronger governmental force upon Muslim movements has, however, increased governmental disregard of Islamic cultural and political identities through a lens of ‘fundamentalism’, which paradoxically, in turn cause the intensification and possibly fundamentalisation of even these identities (compare chapter 5.2). As a matter of fact, the strong impact of the USA on Philippine courses of politics and political economy has led some scholars to entirely doubt the effect(iveness) of Philippine government’s nation building activities as a whole (see Mulder 1999; chapters 3.1.1 and 10).

To conclude, most examples of government relations with internationals demonstrate an asymmetric relationship, which favours the interests of internationals and investors, and profit-generating market growth over redistribution interests of Philippine people and peripheries. Often, but especially illuminated by the interactions with the USA, this asymmetric relationship entails a profoundly conflictual outcome to further disintegrate Filipino people and their government.
9.3.4 Decentralisation: Inter-scalar competition?

Decentralisation through the Local Government Code is meant to enable better governmental policy outreach to local communities by ways of devolution, deconcentration, and enhanced participatory governance in Philippine centres and peripheries. However, its practical outcomes in Bohol are, as illustrated, diverse. Rüland’s noted observation of ‘pseudo’ decentralisation tendencies do not seem to apply to the Philippines, however, linkages between the various levels of government are sometimes too strong and dependent in some instances, while too weak and little communicated in others (compare chapter 3.3.2).

Provincial governors (as well as mayors and barangay captains) have been given the administrative authority over provincial (municipal/barangay) finances (Valdellon 1999). Nevertheless according to expert interviewee 2 “the problem is the fiscal, fiscal side [...] if you have limited resources, there is a limit to what you can do”. This particularly relates to LGUs’ dependence on money transfer from national government, here the “internal revenue allotment, which the provinces get from the government, the share, is not so much”. This internal revenue allotment (IRA) is allocated to LGUs according to population (weighted 50%), area (weighted 25%) and equal share (weighted 25%). Poverty incidence, socio-economic development level, and or agglomeration levels are not taken into account. The outcome of such procedure is that “there is not much apparent relation between per capita transfers and levels of regional poverty in the Philippines” (Bird & Rodriguez 1999: 308). In other words, those LGUs that are the most needy do not always receive the most. In Bohol, for example the Provincial Agriculturalist declares not to be able to fully implement some national acts and regulations “because we don’t have the money” (expert interview 3).

Next to the IRA, however, the LGUs “ need to have other sources of income. So what are the sources of income: business permits, real estate taxes. But ah, also the better governments are those who are able to get more revenues” (expert interview 2; see chapter 5.2). Yet, local taxes often prove rather small because the large informal sector, and in economies driven by agricultural subsistence like those of Bohol, only small numbers of businesses are set up.

A related obstacle lies in “problems with respect to resource transfer, because, ah, with decentralisation you transfer the hospitals and everything but you don’t have the doctors because they would rather stay in national offices because the salary is higher. And the local governments cannot pay the same salaries” (expert interview 2; see also Bird & Rodriguez 1999: 305). In other words, there is a greater need to decentralise assets and personnel to provide service delivery functions from various national government agencies to local government units. Better human resources in local administrations could potentially enhance the information sharing between administrative and political levels – a procedure that admittedly often fails in the decentralised tourism sector in Bohol, according to expert interviewee 11 (compare Agriculture and Fisheries Modernisation Act in chapter 8).

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As to be expected on the basis of previous accounts, decentralised policy-making lacks implementation of its objectives of participatory governance (chapters 8.1 and 8.2). So far the perception “is that only 25% of the local government units in the country are actually doing it properly. By properly meaning there is actual participation by civil society organisation in the local special bodies including local development council, local health board” (expert interview 2). The expert explains what happens in the residual 75% of cases: “Well, it’s not just the convening of the... having a meeting but, ah, not being able to participate productively. It’s like just getting their attendance and maybe having a civil society representatives who do not represent civil society but, in fact, are relatives of the local officials”. Ultimately, then, “the outcome is an enforcement of corruption on LGU level” (expert interview 20). Decentralised politics in the Philippines still follows ‘traditional Philippine political cultures’. It deals less with substantive debates over multi-scalar and cooperative development strategies and all the more with short-term socio-political calculations of personalised enrichment (see Eaton 2001). Indeed, there are observations that decentralisation may continue to fuel the unequal power relations and resource distribution by re-empowering the ‘traditional’ local elites it is supposed to combat (George 1998: 225).

Findings in this and the previous chapter confirm that the endeavour of decentralisation to increase the number of multi-scalar stakeholders actively involved in policy-making, has surely been successful, however, with a different outcome on policy outreach and effect(iveness) than envisaged. Resource deficits in devolution and deconcentration, socio-cultural constraints in participative policy and governance, features of patronage and corruptive leadership, and problems of inconsistent and locally disconnected policy in some way or another interrelate with and affect each other. Together they build up a whole set of constraining factors which typically impede effective policy-making on disparities of poverty and wealth in Bohol and other parts of the Philippines. These factors lead to the situation where many stakeholders engage in policies that concentrate on the very same places and areas (usually those which promise the most economic profit, see chapter 9.3.3), while others, usually the most needy developmental peripheries are cumulatively neglected. These constraints cause firstly, the spatial (sectoral and social) biases of policy-making discussed in chapter 8.5. Secondly, they also lead to an institutional ‘chaos’ at those policy sites that are reached out to by the various programmes and projects (expert interview 5).

For example, altogether eight different ‘outsider’ policy-makers are involved in ‘inscribing’ the geographies of the Chocolate Hills. As noted in chapter 8.4.2, the Hills has been made a protected conservation National Monument area, which is administered through the national Department of Environment and Natural Resources together with the provincial Bohol Environmental Management Office. The national Department of Public Highways is responsible for maintaining the buildings and roads within the area. General planning procedures are the responsibility of the PPDO and are influenced by the aspirations of the
national Department of Tourism and the Bohol Tourism Office. The BTO also promotes and implements the plans. Further, the province owns a restaurant in the Hills, which is however leased and managed by the municipality of Carmen. The profits of the restaurant go to 70% and 30% to the municipality and province respectively. The local population is rarely been consulted in the policy processes (field visit 13). In this setting, adequate policy targeting and sensible cooperation are made almost impossible, and the ignorance of local interests has led – as reported in chapter 8.4.2 – to the uprising of NPA activists in the area.

A similar situation exists on Pamilacan island, where in addition to the governmental initiatives investigated in this study, also various NGOs, international organisations, and university initiatives operate. Considering the multitude of initiatives active there, their outcomes are marginal and partially – like arising conflicts – unintended (compare chapter 8.4.2). Although most of the policy actors know about each other, with the exception of the foreign consultant to the municipality of Baclayon, they do not seek cooperation but prefer to work on their own. Indeed, they partially compete with each other for acceptance among local people who, in turn, try to make most profit by playing off the various projects against each other (field visit 11, expert interviews 10, 11).

Comparable observations are made with regard to decentralised policy-making in the two autonomous regions ARMM and CAR: In line with official regulations (chapter 5.2), the ARMM regional government has enacted an independent local government code for municipalities and barangays within the region in 1993. However, the code and associated laws neither are well understood by LGU officials or citizens, nor are they fully implemented. Most LGUs in the ARMM still use the national Local Government Code of 1991. Resembling findings in Bohol, implementation is constrained mostly by insufficient financial resources, weak institutions and administrative processes, and limited human resource capacity (ADB 2002a). In the CAR the LGC of 1991 plus particularly the Indigenous People’s Right of 1997 apply to manage the power relations of disparities of poverty and wealth, especially with regard to the indigenous minorities. Notwithstanding these legislations, legal and executive rights over resources, assets, and access to these continuously remain issues of controversy and of overlapping legal and policy spheres by national, local governments, and NGOs. Little space and options are left to the actually affected minorities to make their interest heard and considered in the debates and their outcomes (Hirtz 2003).

Hence, in Bohol and other provinces and regions in the country, stakeholders in – and despite – a decentralised governance environment continue to ‘operate as mutually exclusive or competing geographies’ and not, as theoretically stated, as ‘densely superimposed, interdependent forms of territorial organisation’ (see chapter 3.3.3). Thereby, neither the local population nor local policy outcomes necessarily benefit from the presence of multiple policy-makers but may be rendered unimportant in the course of competition among them.
10. Whither Philippines? Concluding remarks on regional balance, societal unity, and governmental power

This chapter closes the chain of arguments introduced in chapter 1 and gives answers to the key questions that guided the course of the study. Thus, it identifies the features, patterns, and dynamics of disparities of poverty and wealth in the Philippines, and provides explanations to and understanding of how these are being (re)produced through constraints to and in governmental policy. The elaborated findings are set into the context of regional (im)balance, societal (dis)unity, and governmental power – crucial issues determining the development path of the Philippines and its people in the 21st century.

For reasons inherent in the Philippine context (specified subsequently), this study develops an analytical and operative framework that is situated at the intersection points of the many theories, concepts, and ideological standpoints, which run through discourses on disparities. Therefore, disparities of poverty and wealth are in this study simultaneously recognised as material imbalances in space and society, the product of policy agency, a source of fragmentation, and politically and socio-culturally covered, interpreted and imagined constructs. Furthermore, their inter-provincial geographical manifestations in the Philippines are found to develop and operate alongside several typical themes, which may vary between inter-provincial and intra-provincial scales, shown for the case of the island province of Bohol. Spatial disparities, to some extent, overlap and interrelate with social disparities and inequalities. Together they reflect spatially-, socially-, and sectorally-biased policy outreach and effect(iveness) by national and decentralised provincial governments and vice versa. This study argues that these disparities in policy are shaped by their – and their makers’ – uneven presence across space, society, time, and context. This presence is increasingly a matter of transforming politics of scale between national, global, regional, provincial, and local actors, agency, and arenas in times of globalisation.

Developmental divide between North and South, driven by Metro Manila

The probably most visible feature of disparities inscribed into the Philippines is the demographic and socio-economic pre-eminence of its mega-city capital Metropolitan Manila. The city’s role as ‘the’ centre of the country has continually been fostered by the course of the political economy since Spanish and American colonisation. Because of Manila’s continuous sprawl and gateway function, the adjacent Southern Tagalog-CALABRAZON to the South and Central Luzon to the North have turned into similarly powerful core regions of the Philippine political economy. Together these three regions cause – crudely speaking – a North-South developmental divide that works to the detriment of (most of) the Visayas and Mindanao. Precisely, Metro Manila, the CALABRAZON, and most of Central Luzon are situated at the upper end of the national developmental disparity parameter. The Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and Caraga, followed by other parts of Western Mindanao, Eastern Visayas, Southern Tagalog-MIMAROPA, and parts of the North of Luzon, especially parts of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR), represent its lower end.

The extreme morphological differentiation of the archipelago works in favour of Metro Manila’s dominance. At the same time it creates a natural and imagined distance between the capital and the residual regions. These boundaries make socio-economic linkages and policy outreach by the national government to the far-away provinces and people more difficult. Simultaneously, they enable secondary centres such as Cebu and Davao City to prosper independently.

**Developmental gaps between urban and rural, lowland and upland, and coastal and interior areas**

In fact, most islands and provinces have a single urban centre, which has typically functioned as a gateway to rural hinterlands since pre-colonial times. This centre is usually located in lowland coastal areas due to easier accessibility and (sea) trade advantages. It fulfils prime centre functions within the province or island that resemble the dominant status of Metro Manila for the country. The provincial capital Tagbilaran City and the neighbouring peninsula of Panglao take over this role in Bohol.

Broadly classifying patterns of disparities, developmental ‘peripheries’ are typically defined as mostly rural and are located in the uplands and/or interiors of islands or provinces. Yet, lowlands do not automatically advance into ‘centres of wealth’ as illuminated by cases of poor and mainly lowland regions like Central Mindanao and Caraga or the far North and Northeast of Bohol. Similarly, the tourism boom of Boracay island as well as recent progressive trends in parts of the mountainous CAR show that ‘centres for development’ are also found in areas exceptional to the above general classification. In particular issues of access(ibility), the state of infrastructure, economic and business preferences, and political interests and the (un)succesful outreach of policy-making play significant roles in determining the status of developmental ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’.

**Policy emphasis on poverty over disparities and growth over redistribution...**

To combat disparate development as such is neither a priority in national nor in provincial policies in Bohol. Instead, policies of pro-poor economic growth (nationally) and of combined growth-redistribution (in Bohol) set the focus on poverty alleviation. In Bohol this includes an explicit identification of spatial policy target areas, social target groups, and sectoral targets in overall plans and frameworks. In line with theoretical concepts, the set objective is to render territorial, social, and sectoral development administration more effective and inclusive for the benefits of the peripheral, marginalised, and most important poverty issues.
Accordingly, in Bohol the two anti-poverty policies of ‘Abante Bohol’ and ‘SLGP’ address areas where severe poverty is prevalent and no other governmental policy-maker has operated before. None the less, these and other policies in the fields of tourism and agriculture tend to most effectively reach out to and promote those areas, which are already wealthier and more progressive. These are not necessarily the most needy or those previously identified as target areas but usually the development ‘centres’ as identified above. Most of the provincial government agencies in Tagbilaran connect only marginally with more remote municipalities and the outer islands – with the exception of nearby Pamilacan island. The very poor North and Northeast of Bohol, particularly the municipalities of Bien Unido and President Garcia, are not reached out to at all by any of the policies under examination. If any municipalities were to be called ‘excluded’, it would be them.

Generally, developmental spill over from urban centres like Metro Manila or Tagbilaran City into directly adjacent hinterlands, such as Southern Tagalog and Central Luzon or the Panglao peninsula, has been comparatively successful, however, effects beyond that are marginal. However, comparable to Cebu and Davao City at national scale, in Bohol secondary centres have evolved in vibrant harbour municipalities in the South and to the West: Jagna maintains economic relations with Northern Mindanao, and Tubignon with Cebu City. Astonishingly, the overall impact of Cebu City as a development catalyst for Bohol province is probably less distinct than expected.

**... Consequent sectoral divide: Industry and services vs. the primary sector**

Growth-oriented policy inevitably generates negotiations between state control and private markets over the degree of liberalisation and the ‘classic’ task of state government to provide redistributive measures to guarantee security, stability, and equality for its citizens. In the Philippines this discourse has resulted in sectorally-biased policy outcomes, induced by a turn towards the expansion of industries and services and towards global markets since the early 1980s. These policy biases reflect upon and work to deteriorate the spatial patterns of disparate development: Economic ‘centres’ are typically characterised by growing industry and service sectors, but ‘peripheries’ by stagnating agriculture and fisheries. Bohol belongs to this category of primary sector ‘peripheries’.
Volatility and vulnerabilities within industrial 'centres’

Global export-oriented, industrial development tends to be located in isolated (urban) enclaves, mainly in and around Metro Manila, Cebu City, and Davao City. These enclaves trigger off large-scale migration inflows from the economic ‘peripheries’, which are increasingly deprived of their most productive population group. According to theoretical arguments, with this ‘brain drain’ the ‘peripheries’ lose an important developmental catalyst. However, moving to an (urban) economic centre does not automatically mean for the migrant that he/she will ‘move up the ladder’ of development. On the contrary, multi-faceted vulnerabilities and insecurities await them, including high socio-economic volatility during recession periods, higher rates of job turn-over, underemployment, urban poverty, and the absence of social security networks or family bonds to protect them.

Productivity dilemmas and inappropriate policy design in the primary sector

Notwithstanding this policy focus on industries (and services, see below), the majority of Filipinos is occupied in the primary sector. Yet, agriculture and fisheries have largely been neglected by policy in the past twenty-five years. Single national and provincial attempts to strengthen the sector, and with them many rural and peripheral areas, emphasise – again in line with paradigms of globalisation – large-scale agro-industry and export. In Bohol these approaches have proven little effective, because they ignore the fact that local agriculture and fishery is by and large based on subsistence production. In other words, productivity is low and trade as well as the market for processed goods limited. Nationwide, the striking inability of the primary sector to provide the Filipino people sufficiently with their major crop food, namely rice, highlights the detached and inappropriate outline of policy. Moreover, in Bohol many of the services delivered by the Provincial Agriculturalist are not utilised efficiently by local people because they are inadequately trained to do so. In addition, inadequate internal capabilities to execute municipal sea delineations, local fishing ordinances, and land reform also hinder government to profoundly improve the livelihoods of Boholano agricultural workers and fishermen (see below).

Tourism: Untapped potential for development in peripheries

Tourism is the only sector that holds the potential to combine global markets and growth with a possible spatial focus on peripheral ‘unspoilt tropical paradises’. Here tourist destinations and facilities as well as related developments may provide alternative livelihoods to the (poorer segments of) local population, especially if initiatives are kept connected to local conditions and small-scaled. Bohol, as a typical agricultural periphery, is currently transforming as its inhabitants and government seek to climb the mobile ladder of development in particular by establishing the island as an emergent (inter)national tourism...
destination. The initiatives have managed to open up alternative livelihood perspectives to fishery, for example, on Pamilacan island. Furthermore, Bohol’s exceptionally well-educated human resource base provides Boholanos with the potential to take over and gain from many of the skilled jobs created through tourism. This is not self-evident as in other tourist destinations, like Boracay island, locals and local benefits have been impeded by incoming migrants. However, even though tourism policy in Bohol is planned to cover the entire island, its outcomes by and large replicate long-established spatial divides of poverty and wealth between Tagbilaran/ Panglao and its surroundings versus the residual municipalities.

Most of all, these dynamics again highlight that preference is given to growth and market and tourism is being under-utilised as a pro-poor sector. In Bohol, initiatives in the tourism sector as an economically profitable growth sector often serve the interests of the investors rather than the purpose of redistribution to the benefit of the local Filipinos. Consequently, firstly, investors allocate disproportionately in areas with easier accessibility, better infrastructure (airport and main harbour in Tagbilaran), and advantageous economies of scale. Secondly, large-scale initiatives – and official promotion of them – exceed small-scale, locally-embedded tourist establishments. Hence, local participation, socio-economic spill over effects, and local profits remain limited. As a consequence and thirdly, new conflicts and boundaries of poverty and wealth arise between those benefiting from tourism and those who do not.

**The free market requires the state if it is to work towards the poor, peripheral, and marginalised**

Theoretical neoliberal voices envisage the withdrawal of governmental regulation from the market, and an exclusive focus of governmental policy on social issues like (access to) human resources. However, Bohol’s experiences with (disparate) development are mainly related to socio-economic issues where agriculture and fishery are the most problematic sectors and tourism offers a possible way out. Therefore, Bohol’s provincial government policy frameworks adequately prioritise economic over social policy to strengthen pro-poor growth and more equitable development. In Bohol – and assumingly in other Philippine agricultural ‘peripheries’ – ‘the free market requires the state if it is to work’ to the advantages of all Filipinos, all regions, and all sectors (compare chapter 3.3.1). The findings of this study illuminate that the negotiations between state and market are, however, not optimised yet and need to further consider the marginalised and peripheral in policy plans and particularly in their implementation. Deficits in policy implementation are partially due to widespread administrative lacks of policy consistency and contingency. Bohol’s poverty statistics, for example, are based entirely on socially-derived indicators that stand in stark contrast to the economic focus of policy frameworks.
Reciprocities between spatial disparities and social inequalities...

Adding yet another layer of disparity manifestation, social inequalities overlap and interact with spatial disparities and with policy shaping them. Firstly, the extraordinary wealth of Chinese Filipinos and their tendency to reside and do business in the major cities contributes to the rural-urban developmental divide. Secondly, land property rights are highly unequally distributed in the Philippines. Historically, social class divides were created between landowners on the one hand and tenants and landless on the other. These continue to characterise socio-economic power relations particularly in primary sector ‘peripheries’ and present a major hindrance to reforming the agricultural sector, and thus to development in support of the deprived. In addition, many owners of rural land actually live in the urban ‘centres’ and further exacerbate the rural-urban divide. Thirdly, there is some reciprocal interaction between social and spatial disparities concerning the ARMM, (partially) Western and Central Mindanao, and the CAR, all of which are home to a large numbers of Muslim (Moro) and/or indigenous minorities. Even though these areas are rich in natural resources, the majority of inhabitants belong to the poorest of the Philippines, as profits are mainly being transferred to (foreign) investors and Metro Manila. As a matter of fact, especially the ARMM has long been in a state of developmental stagnation rather than transformation (as it is the case in Bohol). If any region were to be described as ‘excluded’ in the Philippine context, it would be the ARMM.

Filipinos of Malay descent are the largest ethnic group in the Philippines and are (stereo)typically defined by a ‘national’ culture of ‘lowland Christian mainstream values’. Looking more closely, Filipinos are a socio-religiously and ethno-linguistically exceptionally diverse people. This diversity is driven by the morphological fragmentation and largely independent, historical development of the single communities, islands, rural and urban areas, and regions. While such circumstances obviously complicate the identification of disparities of poverty and wealth in this study, they equally imply that policy-making ought to be particularly aware of this diversity and target it adequately. Instead, state governments have ‘imagined’ the Philippine nation on the foundation of the crude constructions of ‘the’ Filipino nation as a Tagalog and English-speaking community of Malay-Filipinos with a Christian value system.

… Resulting in armed conflicts in developmental ‘peripheries’

This disregard for minority cultures and the deprived together with developmental disparities have triggered off various persistent conflicts over socio-economic equality, land entitlements, cultural recognition, and political autonomy, and (in some cases) separatism between marginalised populations and government(s). Literally those areas identified as developmental ‘peripheries’ are strongholds of armed conflicts over what is theoretically termed ‘redistributive and recognitive justice’ (see chapter 3.1.1). Philippine government(s)
and military have fought with various Moro movements in Mindanao and with the communist National People’s Army (NPA) in North Luzon, Bicol, and the Visayas, including Bohol, since colonial times. These ongoing conflicts provide further explanation for developmental stagnation in some of the affected areas. Moreover, they indicate that policy has long failed to reach out to the peripheral, marginalised, and most important poverty issues. As matter of fact, the conflict regions in Mindanao have been neglected of agricultural reforms (and often of private investments) for more than twenty years, and made a new national focus of policy intervention only in 2001. In Bohol, the ‘Abante Bohol’ anti-poverty policy aims at winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the local people and resolving the conflict between government and NPA. Its performance remains controversially assessed, especially because it typically engages – similar to agricultural policy – in service delivery that is detached from the local contexts.

**Elitist power to control and abuse: On ‘traditional political culture’**

Indisputably, the previous findings indicate that sound political and policy foundations are essential to setting Bohol and the Philippines on a more balanced development path. According to theoretical arguments, government must therefore combine its own competence and capacity to steer conditions, which frame disparate development with mechanisms, which empower other nongovernmental policy-makers and local people in order to act in ‘participatory partnership concerts’ and in order to control internal abuses of power through corruption and cronyism. However, the noted failures of their effective policy outreach indicate that Philippine government(s) possess only limited power to control and steer structural factors of disparate development. Furthermore, as subsequently argued, politicians’ and policy-makers’ long-established elitist positions in society create an environment of ‘traditional political culture’, which prevents empowered collaborative actions and institutionalises power-abusive practices.

“The Philippines provides a clear-cut example of what kinds of obstacles to capitalist development can result when the power of an oligarchic [elite] is never tamed, and there is no concerted effort to promote the development of the public sector” (Hutchcroft 1998: 5; note by A.C.). For explanation, the old landowner families have traditionally fulfilled roles of patrons for tenants and landless workers. The former have historically taken care and ensured a livelihood for the latter while in turn being granted ‘utang na loob’ or ‘debt-in gratitude’, that means loyalty and full legitimacy to rule. On the basis of these reciprocal patronage relations, the landowners naturally became the most legitimate political leaders in the country after independence (that is also why many of them live in Metro Manila). Only under Marcos another elitist group emerged which consist of his cronies. Ever since, the elites of the Philippines have been drawn from these two ‘oligarchic’ groups, which share economic and political power among them.
This setting implies certain inferences for what is often subsumed to be ‘traditional Philippine political culture’. Firstly, politics and policy-making in the Philippines is a matter of personalities and rhetoric rather than concepts and ideas (the reason why this study works at the intersection points of theories). Secondly, policy is frequently disconnected from local contexts and inconsistent. Thirdly, elite families are given plenty of opportunities and engage in by-now institutionalised practices of corruption. They abuse their positions in government to enlarge their personal wealth. Fourthly, governments are safe to pay little attention to redistributive policies and be little concerned about how these reproduce disparities of poverty, until disparate development escalates to cause separatist movements which put governments and elites at risk (like, for example, in Mindanao). Accordingly, political rhetoric and statistical data mainly deal with absolute poverty rather than relative poverty. Fifthly, governmental failures and corruption do not automatically translate into protests by the Filipino people but is by and large accepted as being an element of socio-culturally embedded patronage reciprocity. Therefore, farmers who have been granted land under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme in order to reduce the imbalanced asset and power distribution in the ‘peripheries’, strikingly often sell the land back to its former owner and patron.

‘New political culture’ through globalisation and decentralisation?

Recently, globalisation has opened new options for social mobility and created new socio-economic elites composed of return migrants, remittance-receiving families, or entrepreneurs and workers earning from uplifting economic sectors like tourism. Many Chinese Filipinos belong to the new elites. While formations of these new elites occasionally work to reduce adverse impacts of ‘traditional political culture’, they have been found to lead to struggles between old and new elites, which potentially work towards further fragmentation and disparities within the communities.

Most of all and in line with theoretical expectations on changing politics of scale, political decentralisation in the Philippines has carried hopes to improve governmental policy outreach to the peripheral, marginalised and most problematic poverty issues since 1991. In reality, significant financial and human resource deficits at the local government units (LGUs) of provinces, municipalities and barangays (village) impede the outcomes of deconcentration and devolution. By means of enhancing local participation, state-society partnerships and governance approaches including peoples’ and non-governmental organisations (POs and NGOs) at LGU level, decentralisation, moreover, has been expected to help remove the socio-culturally embedded constraints to effective policy intervention on disparities in the Philippines. Subsequently, the number of NGOs rapidly increased, and mechanisms of governance were introduced at all policy-making stages. Participatory policy approaches can
also potentially reach out to ‘barangay’ communities, which are said to be the historical foundation and origin of Malay-Filipino society.

In theory, participatory policy approaches mean to aim at self-sustaining ‘bottom-up’ forms of development, which empower endogenous resources and institutions, and thereby policy effect(iveness) at local levels. In the Philippines, however, such understanding of participatory policy is impeded by the extraordinary position of local leaders and elites and their hierarchical influence. Accordingly, for example, the lack of landownership restricts the interests of many Boholanos for active engagement in participatory policy process and cooperative actions. Instead, participation in policy-making becomes a mean for connecting with a ‘patron’ (for example, the project leader) in the hope and expectation for material benefits. In other words, local participation, the way it is understood as a theoretical concept, is probably not feasible in the Philippines (yet).

Internationally, POs are often seen as an ideal channel for compiling local interests, while simultaneously for advocating these local interests to ‘outside’ stakeholders appropriately. However, experience in Bohol shows – similarly to experiences with new economic elites – that a new PO can also induce shifts of power relations and elite positions to the extent that conflicts develop in lieu of cooperation and empowerment. In addition, the most deprived segments of the local population are unlikely to become involved in any PO for these usually request membership fees. Thus, POs in Bohol – utterly in contrast to theoretical ideas – become yet another vehicle to fuel social differentiation and polarisation.

Similarly, state-society partnerships and governance, the way they are understood theoretically, are unable to overcome ‘traditional Philippine-style policy-making’ (yet). Government and governance policy stakeholders equally seem to prefer pragmatic, loose, shifting and short-term alliances in order not to be bound to long-term ‘utang na loob’ reciprocity. These alliances are determined by personal advantages and fuel existing problems with policy consistency and possibly with corruptive self-enrichment. Moreover, terms like governance, collaboration, participation and empowerment are frequently only used as ‘buzz words’ by policy makers and are abandoned in favour of traditional government mechanisms in the course of the official policy process. Hence, the principles of governance have entered and shifted the rhetoric and some organisational structures of policy-making, yet neither substantially altered their contents, hierarchical-style practices, nor ‘traditional Philippine political culture’. ‘Traditional’ government and ‘new-style governance’ do not work in as dissimilar and incompatible manners in the Philippines as suspected by many theoretical concepts.
Governmental power deficits

It remains up to a policy’s individual institutional setting, outline, process, and above all its capabilities as well as the power of its policy maker to determine policy effect(iveness). Generally, in an environment of Philippine ‘traditional political culture’ in particular symbolic power in combination with social capital decide on how well individual policy-makers and policies address set objectives in the long run. If networks and hierarchical positions are well in place, financial capital is likely to follow. In an environment of globalisation and growth-orientation, financial power gains significance as a way to social mobility and expanded influence. Local governments and their policies, however, tend to rely on finances and assets that are disproportionately transferred to them from national government or foreign aid organisations. In addition, in this transfer of resources from national to local governments patterns of disparities of poverty play a marginal or no role. Thus, the most needy LGUs seldomly receive the most resources (and, even if, these may not be available for policy implementation because of corruptive practices). On top of that, policy contents are sometimes altered in a way that does not fit local policy contexts because requirements by foreign funding institutions have to be met. A enhanced human capital base is needed that combines local-endogenous and practical with (inter)national, conceptual and theoretical knowledge in order to avoid these obstacles as well as common administrative problems with locally detached and therefore not accepted policy.

Spaces of governmental absence and their impact on identity formation

Resource and power deficits in improving decentralised outreach, socio-cultural constraints in participative policy and governance, features of patronage and corruptive leadership, problems of inconsistent and locally disconnected policy, and the preference for growth over redistribution all interrelate with and affect each other. Together they create a whole set of constraining factors which typically impede effective policy-making on disparities of poverty and wealth in Bohol and other parts of the Philippines. These constraints result in the spatial, sectoral, and social biases of policy-making as discussed. The outcome is a large gap between those areas, people, and issues where government and governance is proximate, accessible, and, in fact, over-represented, and areas that are neglected by and detached from policies and operate mainly within their own local contexts. Thus, governmental and governanced policies ‘make space not only through the properties of presence, but also through those of absence’ (compare chapter 3.2.3) and thereby often (re)produce disparities of poverty.

Although formal constructions of ‘the’ Filipino nation attempt to disguise the ‘spaces of absence’, these instigate Filipinos’ cultural and political identities to focus on their immediate surroundings: “Einer von Cebu wird immer erst sagen, er sei Cebuano, bevor er sagt, er ist
Filipino1” (expert interview 10). Especially on smaller islands like Bohol there is a pronounced island mentality and only little interest by people or policy-makers for any issues beyond. In Bohol, a similarly distinct ranking of identities shows in policy-makers on the tiny island of Pamilacan – although the island is already comparatively well addressed by decentralised policy: “Eine Inselmentalität ist schon sehr ausgeprägt. Und der mayor, der Bürgermeister von Baclayon und der barangay captain von Pamilacan verstehen sich wohl ziemlich gut, respektieren sich wohl auch, aber der kann eigentlich so sein eigenes Ding machen [...] Er [der barangay captain] ist auf jeden Fall Insulaner und denkt so und hat mit der LGU [in Balclayon] eigentlich weniger am Hut2“ (expert interview 10, notes by A.C.). Similar restrictive perspectives also cause, for example, some municipal and barangay governments to oppose the provincial policies of ‘SLGP’ and ‘Abante Bohol’.

Hence, the fragmented spatiality of cultural and political mentalities offers yet another explanation for why policy outreach to and partnership across LGUs may not function as conceptually intended. What is more, local and regional (imagined and practical) cohesion replace exceptionally weak ‘social relations, shared values and communities of interpretation, feelings of a common identity, a sense of belonging to the same Philippine community’, here national cohesion (compare chapter 3.1.1).

Opposition movements like the NPA and the various Moro and indigenous movements try to relate explicitly to such local and regional identities and the lack of national cohesion in those areas where government is ‘absent’. They present themselves as being the genuine advocates of the peripheral and marginalised. One advantage they have over government(s) and NGOs is that their representatives often originate from the local communities where they operate (not in Bohol). Therefore, local people are more likely not conceive themselves to be positioned hierarchically lower. Local participation, acceptance, and the movements’ power to control and empower local population may be higher. Moro movements have, contrary to what is envisaged, actually been stimulated by the shift of governmental policy to dealing with them as an expression of religious-cultural rather than socio-economic disparities since 11/9/2001.

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1 Literally in English: “A person from Cebu would always say that he or she is Cebuano before saying he or she is Filipino”.

2 Literally in English: “I believe the mentality focus is very much on the island. And the mayor of Baclayon and the barangay captain of Pamilacan get on well, and respect each other, however effectively do their own thing independently. [...] He [the barangay captain] defines himself as an islander from Pamilacan, and thinks like that and does not really care much about other issues of the LGU [in Baclayon]”.
Whither Philippines: Towards a strong or weak rule and does it matter?

Paradoxically, what governmental constructions of uniformity have not achieved within the Philippines, they accomplish overseas: The outside world perceives these ‘many Philippines’ as a whole. As an adverse consequence, then conflicts in Mindanao deter tourists from visiting the Visayas or Luzon and international investors from relocating their businesses in the Philippines. The image of the country is impaired and development impeded. Moreover, paradoxically, governmental outreach to the peripheral and marginalised and the construction of the imagined communities of Philippine nationality are claimed to have been more effective during the authoritative regime of Marcos than under the democratic and decentralised system that was set up in 1986:

“The Marcoses [...] had to some extent penetrated village life. No matter how physically distant the President has been, some token of his personal voltage had seeped through the very last barrio, or village, in the country. In many regions this was probably the first time such a thing had ever happened, so remote and aloof could the capital feel from elsewhere in the archipelago. [...] When Marcos went, the sense of a patron or a godfather went too. As Mrs. Aquino took over, that already tenuous central government presence withdrew. Her photograph replaced those of the Marcoses in the village school and the barangay (village) hall, but that was all. The whole community felt as though it had moved further away from the centre of things, back to the old self-sufficient marginality of pre-Marcos days” (Hamilton-Paterson 1998: xxiii).

It seems that the Philippines is caught in a situation where, on the one hand, authoritarian rule successfully reached out to the ‘peripheries’ and marginalised, however, it neither reinforced their development nor weakened traditional self-enriching practices by the political and economic elites. Resistance against the regime grew and further pushed disintegrating and fragmenting tendencies. The influence of the state government was destabilised and the Marcos regime finally dismantled.

On the other hand, ever since 1986, the new (formally) democratic and decentralised system of government has been weak and reliant on neoliberal, free-market development paradigms. This approach has achieved growth, yet growth in the very same spaces and places that were already more central and progressive and thus has exacerbated disparate development. Again, (stronger) differentiations of politics and policy-making, economic and business patterns and trends, and of society and mentality have been the consequences. Notions of regional balance, societal unity, and with these governmental powers have been put at stake. In addition, the status of the NPA and Moro movements inscribing competing geographies into space, society, and politics of Bohol and the Philippines has changed. Under the Marcos regime, politics and large parts of the public had conceived them in the light of militant opposition guerrillas. Nowadays the public and an increasing number of political stakeholders accept, welcome, and partially incorporate them (with the exception of the Abu Sayaff) in daily life routines and policy-making (in Bohol). NPA and Moro movements hold well-established alternative ‘fields
of power’ and ‘shadow governments’ in many Philippine ‘peripheries’. These significantly challenge the legitimacy of formal national and local governments.

Thus, contemporary politics of scale in the Philippines are – in line with theoretical debates – caught in an ongoing struggle between national and various regional and local arenas, actors, and agency. Contrary to theoretical beliefs, it, however, appears that even if liberal tendencies of globalisation, decentralisation and participatory governance expand in the Philippines, they eventually pose a risk to regional balance, societal unity, and a threat to the legitimacy of government and the nation-state. National government’s increasingly flagging outreach and rule are evident in the widespread opposition to both, the previous and current governments under Estrada and Arroyo.

To conclude, in Philippine reality the various – theoretically often separately handled – manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth exist in a parallel and overlapping way as material imbalances in space and society, the product of policy agency, the source of fragmentation, and politically and socio-culturally covered, interpreted and imagined constructs. They are that closely interconnected that they mutually instigate the (re)production of Philippine landscapes of disparities of poverty and wealth all over again. The glue that connects them is firstly, persistent policy preferences for (globalised) growth over (re)distribution and too little outreach to local contexts of the peripheries, marginalised, and most problematic poverty issues. Secondly, historically established, endogenous institutions of hierarchical political culture and elite dominance characterise policy-making by government, NGOs and POs alike. They impede any form of sustainable, locally-embedded development as well as the outreach capabilities of decentralised policy-making. While globalisation surely adds to the problematic development path of the Philippines, the question of Filipinos’ future is ultimately to be decided by whether and how these inherent institutions of political culture can and will change. The significance and weight of endogenous political culture should therefore receive greater attention in theories on policy outreach and effectiveness and on (disparate) development in general.
11. Bibliography


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Republic Act No 7160 Sec. 2: Local Government Code.
Topographic map of the Philippines 1:250000, 1976.
### 12. Appendix

#### A1: Guided expert interviews by institutional background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of interview</th>
<th>Taped or memo</th>
<th>Date &amp; Duration</th>
<th>Place – as chosen by interviewee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academic Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>taped</td>
<td>20/02/04 50 min.</td>
<td>in her closed office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>taped</td>
<td>20/02/04 80 min.</td>
<td>empty library of Yuchengo Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provincial Government Organisations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>taped</td>
<td>12/02/04 80 min.</td>
<td>in her superior’s open-plan office, Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>taped</td>
<td>01/03/04 70 min.</td>
<td>in open-plan BPRMO office, Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>memo</td>
<td>26/02/04 ~ 30 min.</td>
<td>in open-plan PPDO office in Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>memo</td>
<td>01/03/04 ~ 30min.</td>
<td>in her closed office in Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-governmental Organisations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>taped</td>
<td>10/02/04 50 min. 28/02/04 130 min.</td>
<td>at his home, Baclayon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>memo</td>
<td>07/03/04 ~ 60 min.</td>
<td>in closed SWCF office in Sierra Bullones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>memo</td>
<td>05/02/04 ~ 60 min.</td>
<td>in café in Cebu City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Aid Organisations</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>taped</td>
<td>04/03/04 155 min.</td>
<td>on Pamilacan beach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>memo</td>
<td>27/02/04 ~150 min</td>
<td>in café in Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Test interview with randomly selected staff member, Montebello Hotel, Cebu City (04/02/04)
### A2: Informal expert interviews by institutional background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of interview</th>
<th>Date &amp; Duration</th>
<th>Place – as chosen by interviewee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academic Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>27/02/04 ~ 20 min</td>
<td>in her closed office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provincial Government Organisations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>06/02/04 ~ 30 min</td>
<td>in her open-plan office, Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>26/02/04 ~ 20 min</td>
<td>in closed PPDO office in Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>27/02/04 ~ 40 min</td>
<td>in open-plan PPDO office &amp; in café in Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-governmental Organisations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>06/02/04 ~ 20 min</td>
<td>in open-plan office of NGO in Tagbilaran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>06/02/04 ~ 40 min</td>
<td>in open-plan PPDO office in Tagbilaran; during field visit 5; in BLDF office/private home of president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>07/02/04 ~ 20 min</td>
<td>in BLDF office/private home of president</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>International Aid Organisations</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>24/02/04 ~ 30 min</td>
<td>in BTO open-plan office, Tagbilaran</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Researcher</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>various occasions</td>
<td>via email and on the phone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Memos were taken on all interviews.
A3: Abstract of Ph.D. thesis

In contemporary times of globalisation the manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth and the design and implementation of policy responses become ever more complex and challenging. It is the conventional task of the (national) government to promote socio-economic security and equality by reaching out to the peripheral regions, marginalised people, and most problematic issues of disparities of poverty and wealth. This Ph.D. thesis argues that governmental policy outreach and effect(iveness) are increasingly determined by whether and how policy-making considers and integrates liberalised market forces, societal stakeholders, and national and decentralised local governments. In the Philippines disparities of poverty and wealth particularly disadvantage rural, agricultural peripheries that show a high concentration of Muslim and indigenous minorities, and at local scales, of tenants and landless workers. Governmental policy-making (re)produces these disparities through spatial and sectoral biases on market growth and global integration for the most profitable yet volatile urban coastal centres of industries and services. Moreover, endogenous institutions of ‘traditional Philippine political culture’ render policy-making ineffective as a means for a sustainable, locally-embedded, and -empowered form of development. The political elite is more interested in (corruptive) self-enrichment practices than long-term objectives of redistribution. Socio-cultural patronage relations towards them constrain participation of and partnership with local populations and non-governmental organisations in policy-making. In lieu of cooperating, stakeholders operate mutually exclusive or compete with each other, causing an institutional overload and chaos in the most profitable policy sites, while others are entirely neglected. Altogether, the interactions between spatial, sectoral disparities, social inequalities, and policy-making biases have triggered of persistent armed conflicts over ‘redistributive and recognitive justice’ in the developmental peripheries. The conflicts work to exacerbate the developmental gap between centres and peripheries, weaken Filipinos’ national cohesion in favour of regional and local identities, and threaten the legitimacy of government. Hence, this thesis depicts how imbalanced negotiations between state and globalised market on the one hand and a persistent endogenous political culture in policy-making on the other can work to continually (re)produce manifestations of disparities of poverty and wealth to eventually undermine government and nation-state.
A4: Zusammenfassung der Dissertation
Disparitäten zwischen Arm und Reich. Eine Analyse über Policy Effektivität auf den Philippinen


Abschließend kann festgehalten werden, daß die vielfältigen – in Theorien oftmals separat gehandhabten – Ausformungen von Disparitäten in der philippinischen Realität nebeneinander existieren als strukturelle Ungleichgewichte, als Ergebnisse von ineffektiven Policy-Handlungen, als Quellen von Fragmentierung sowie als soziokulturell und politisch geformte Konstruktionen und sich wechselseitig beeinflussen, ja oftmals gegenseitig
**Erklärung**


*Anne Clausen*

Meerbusch, den 1.11.2006

Teilpublikationen:


* eingereicht über Frau Prof. Dr. Kraas; Annahme der Beiträge mündlich bestätigt.
Lebenslauf

Persönliche Daten
Name Anne Clausen
geboren am 07.04.1978 in Kassel
Familienstand ledig
Staatsangehörigkeit deutsch

Ausbildung
bis 1995 Städtisches Meerbusch Gymnasium
1995 – 1996 New Zealand Bursary and University Entrance, Kamo High School, Whangarei, Neuseeland
In Deutschland anerkannt als Allgemeine Hochschulreife
Abschluss mit Note 1,9
Abschluss mit Note 1,0 (mit Auszeichnung)
seit 10/2001 Doktorandin der Kulturgeographie an der Universität zu Köln

Berufserfahrung
07/1999 – 09/1999 Studienbegleitende Berufspraktika bei den Vereinten Nationen – Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), Bangkok, Thailand
09/2001 – 02/2005 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Geographischen Institut der Universität zu Köln im Projekt 'Globalisation and regional disparities of socio-economic structures in Southeast Asia' bei Prof. Dr. F. Kraas
seit 02/2006 Lecturer for Human Geography and Development Studies, School of Earth Sciences and Geography, Kingston University London, Großbritannien