Universität zu Köln

Goeree, Jacob K., Holt, Charles A. and Smith, Angela M. (2017). An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma. Games Econ. Behav., 102. S. 303 - 316. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

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Abstract

In a volunteer's dilemma, only one volunteer is needed to obtain a benefit for all. Volunteering is costly, and the symmetric Nash equilibrium involves randomization. These predictions have the intuitive property that volunteer rates decline with larger groups, but surprisingly, the probability of obtaining no volunteers is increasing with group size, even as the number of players goes to infinity. These predictions are evaluated in a laboratory experiment with a range of group sizes. Observed volunteer rates are lower with larger groups, as predicted, but the incidence of no-volunteer outcomes declines with group size, in contrast to theory. This reduction in no-volunteer outcomes for large groups can be explained by a one-parameter generalization of the Nash equilibrium that adds quantal response noise due to unobserved random effects. Significant individual heterogeneity in observed volunteer rates motivates the estimation of a heterogeneous equilibrium model with a distribution of propensities for volunteering. (c) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Goeree, Jacob K. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Holt, Charles A. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Smith, Angela M. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-237154
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.002
Journal or Publication Title:	Games Econ. Behav.
Volume:	102
Page Range:	S. 303 - 316
Date:	2017
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1090-2473
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language BEHAVIOR; EQUILIBRIUM Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/23715