

**Einstellungen zu Minderheiten in Deutschland:  
Zur Rolle von ideologischen Einstellungen und Werten bei der  
Erklärung von Vorurteilen**

Inauguraldissertation  
zur  
Erlangung des Doktorgrades  
der  
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät  
der  
Universität zu Köln

2020

vorgelegt  
von

Marcus Eisentraut, M.A.

aus

Siegen

Referent: Prof. Dr. Eldad Davidov  
Korreferent: Prof. em. Dr. Peter Schmidt  
Drittgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Anastasia Gorodzeisky

Tag der Promotion: 03.11.2020

# Danksagung

An dieser Stelle möchte ich den Personen danken, die mich auf dem Weg zur Fertigstellung dieser Arbeit begleitet und unterstützt haben:

Zunächst möchte ich meinen Betreuern Eldad Davidov, Hermann Dülmer und Peter Schmidt danken. Sie hatten immer ein offenes Ohr für mich und vor allem haben sie mir etwas vermittelt, was wahrscheinlich nur Wenige auf diese Weise vermitteln können: Spaß in und an der Wissenschaft.

Zweitens möchte ich mich bei den Personen bedanken, die mit an der Erstellung der hier enthaltenen Beiträge beteiligt waren: Alexander Jedinger und Aribert Heyder. Letzterem gilt mein ganz besonderer Dank, da ich ohne ihn wohl nie in die Welt der empirischen Sozialforschung eingetaucht wäre und sein Engagement sozusagen den Grundstein für diese Dissertation gelegt hat.

Drittens möchte ich mich bei allen bedanken, die mir in sonstiger Weise bei dieser Arbeit unter die Arme gegriffen haben, weil sie Korrektur gelesen, Ratschläge gegeben oder mich einfach nur bei guter Laune gehalten oder meine schlechte Laune ausgehalten haben. Dazu gehören: Christian Czymara, Thomas Ebel, Simon Eckert, Karoline Harzenetter, Nora Huth, Stefan Jünger, Julia Klinger, Reiner Mauer, Maike Metz-Peeters, Pascal Siegers, Keith Smith, Anne Stroppe und Jessica Trixa.

Ein großer Dank gilt auch meinen Freunden und meiner Familie, die immer für mich da waren und mir das nötige Selbstbewusstsein geschenkt haben, welches für die Erstellung eines solchen Werks nötig ist.

Mein letzter und ganz spezieller Dank geht an meine Frau Caro, die mit mir alle Höhen und Tiefen durchlebt hat, die eine Dissertation mit sich bringt und die dabei immer die Ruhe und Zuversicht ausgestrahlt hat, die mir manchmal im Schreibprozess abhandenkamen.

# Inhaltsverzeichnis

1	Einleitung.....	1
1.1	Forschungsfrage .....	1
1.2	Vorurteile gegenüber Minderheiten .....	3
1.3	Ideologische Einstellungen und Werte.....	5
1.4	Zusätzliche Faktoren: Bedrohungswahrnehmung und Anomia .....	6
1.5	Der Zusammenhang von Vorurteilen, ideologischen Einstellungen und Werten .	7
2	Islamophobia or criticism of Islam? An empirical study about explanations using representative surveys from Germany.....	11
2.1	Introduction .....	11
2.2	Origins of Islamophobia.....	12
2.2.1	Islamophobia and prejudice.....	14
2.2.2	Islamophobia versus criticism of Islam .....	15
2.2.3	Predictors for Islamophobia.....	16
2.2.4	Authoritarianism.....	16
2.2.5	Social dominance orientation .....	18
2.2.6	Anomia .....	19
2.2.7	Relationships between the latent constructs .....	20
2.3	Empirical analyses.....	22
2.3.1	Islamophobia, secular and equality-referred criticism of Islam (2005).....	23
2.3.2	Empirical Replications (2007 and 2011) .....	28
2.3.3	The Stability of the relationships.....	31
2.4	Conclusion.....	34
3	Antisemitismus und Autoritarismus - Eine traditionell stabile Beziehung? Eine empirische Studie unter Berücksichtigung von Messinvarianz anhand der ALLBUS–Daten 1996/2006/2012/2016.....	36
3.1	Einleitung .....	37

3.2	Autoritarismus, klassischer und sekundärer Antisemitismus sowie Israelkritik und Israelbezogener Antisemitismus .....	38
3.2.1	Klassischer Antisemitismus.....	40
3.2.2	Sekundärer Antisemitismus.....	40
3.2.3	Israelbezogener Antisemitismus.....	40
3.2.4	Israelkritische Einstellung .....	41
3.3	Empirische Methode .....	41
3.4	Empirische Ergebnisse .....	42
3.5	Fazit.....	49
4	Explaining attitudes toward minority groups with human values in Germany - What is the direction of causality? .....	51
4.1	Introduction .....	51
4.2	Basic human values and attitudes toward minorities .....	53
4.2.1	Previous research on the direction of causality .....	56
4.3	Hypotheses .....	58
4.4	Method .....	58
4.4.1	Data and model structure.....	58
4.4.2	Sample .....	59
4.4.3	Measurement .....	60
4.4.4	Control variables.....	61
4.4.5	Validity and invariance.....	61
4.5	Results .....	63
4.5.1	Descriptive results .....	63
4.5.2	Robustness.....	64
4.5.3	Main results .....	66
4.6	Conclusions .....	70
4.6.1	Limitations.....	73
4.7	Appendix .....	74

5	Exploring the Differential Effects of Perceived Threat on Attitudes toward Ethnic Minority Groups in Germany.....	76
5.1	Introduction .....	77
5.2	Perceived Threat and Ethnic Prejudice .....	77
5.3	The Present Study.....	80
5.4	Method .....	81
5.4.1	Participants .....	82
5.4.2	Measures.....	82
5.5	Results .....	83
5.6	Discussion .....	88
5.7	Appendix .....	91
6	Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse .....	96
7	Literaturverzeichnis .....	100
8	Tabellenverzeichnis .....	123
9	Abbildungsverzeichnis.....	124

# 1 Einleitung

## 1.1 Forschungsfrage

*„Niemand darf wegen seines Geschlechtes, seiner Abstammung, seiner Rasse, seiner Sprache, seiner Heimat und Herkunft, seines Glaubens, seiner religiösen oder politischen Anschauungen benachteiligt oder bevorzugt werden. [...]“ (Artikel 3, Absatz 3, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland)*

Aus gutem Grund legt das deutsche Grundgesetz fest, dass Menschen unabhängig ihrer Herkunft oder religiöser Anschauungen gleich behandelt werden sollen, entstand es doch vor dem Hintergrund der Erfahrungen mit dem Dritten Reich. Während des Regimes der Nationalsozialisten wurden gezielt Vorurteile gegenüber Menschen mit bestimmten ethnischen oder religiösen Zugehörigkeiten instrumentalisiert und für die Legitimierung von Gräueltaten genutzt. Heute, mehr als 70 Jahre nach Inkrafttreten des Grundgesetzes, leben wir in einer Gesellschaft, die sich bei der Frage des Zusammenlebens verschiedener Nationalitäten und Religionen wieder zu polarisieren scheint (Zick et al., 2019). In einer Zeit, in der in Europa mehrere rechtspopulistische Parteien in die Regierungen gewählt wurden und mit der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) auch hierzulande eine autoritär-nationalradikale Partei (Heitmeyer, 2019) in allen Parlamenten der Länder und des Bundes vertreten ist, ist die Frage nach dem friedlichen Zusammenleben der Mehrheitsgesellschaft und diversen Minderheiten wieder aktueller denn je.

Das politische und gesellschaftliche Klima scheint sich bezüglich des Umgangs mit Minderheiten in Deutschland vor allem in den letzten Jahren zunehmend aufgeheizt zu haben. Exemplarisch kann man hierfür das Zitat des Bundesinnenministers Horst Seehofer anführen, der Migration in einem Interview 2018 als „die Mutter aller Probleme“ (Deutsche Welle, 2018) bezeichnete und damit den in Deutschland lebenden Minderheiten indirekt eine Mitschuld am angespannten gesellschaftlichen Klima attestierte. Die Aussage von Seehofer geschah im Nachgang gewalttätiger Ausschreitungen in Chemnitz einige Wochen zuvor, bei denen sich mehrere tausend Rechtsextreme versammelten und gegen Ausländer\*innen demonstrierten, wobei es zu gewalttätigen Übergriffen gegen Presse und Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund kam (Tagesschau, 2018).

Über bestimmte ethnische und religiöse Minderheiten wurde in den letzten Jahren in Deutschland mehr und hitziger diskutiert als über andere. Als eine der am meisten diskutierten religiösen Minderheiten in Deutschland kann man sicherlich die hier lebenden Muslim\*innen zählen. Schon 2010 war die Debatte über in Deutschland lebende Muslim\*innen auf einem negativen Höhepunkt, als Thilo Sarrazin sein Buch „Deutschland schafft sich ab – Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen“ veröffentlichte, welches sich millionenfach verkaufte (Handelsblatt, 2014). Ein weiteres prominentes Beispiel für die aufgeheizte Debatte rund um Muslim\*innen in Deutschland ist die Organisation „PEGIDA“ (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes), welche schon seit ihrer Gründung 2014 die Unvereinbarkeit von Mehrheitsgesellschaft und muslimischer Minderheit propagieren und zu ihren Hochzeiten bis zu 25.000 Menschen für Demonstrationen mobilisieren konnten (Schwemmer, 2018; Heyder und Eisentraut, 2016). Auch im Zuge der sogenannten „Flüchtlingskrise“ war das gesellschaftliche Klima bezogen auf die größte religiöse Minderheit in Deutschland angespannt (Czymara und Schmidt-Catran, 2017; Kansak et al., 2016). Da die meisten Geflüchteten aus islamisch geprägten Staaten Afrikas oder dem Nahen Osten stammen (Connor, 2016), drehen sich Diskussionen oft um religiösen Fundamentalismus, der den in Deutschland lebenden Muslim\*innen häufig pauschal unterstellt wird (Helbling und Traunmüller, 2018; Czymara, 2019).

Neben den Geflüchteten und Muslim\*innen, die eher die Diskussionen der letzten Jahre geprägt haben, gibt es auch Minderheiten, die aktuell zwar nicht so häufig im Fokus der öffentlichen Debatte stehen, aber schon seit jeher mit Vorurteilen und Diskriminierung konfrontiert sind. Zwei Beispiele hierfür sind im deutschen Kontext einerseits Sinti und Roma, andererseits jüdische Menschen (Zick et al., 2016). Die Frage ist, wie man negative Einstellungen gegenüber diesen verschiedenen Minderheiten erklären kann und ob diese Erklärungsmodelle unabhängig von zeitlichem Kontext, Stichprobe und untersuchter Minderheit stabil bleiben. Die Hypothese, welche im Mittelpunkt dieser Dissertation steht, ist, dass es mit ideologischen Einstellungen und Werten psychologische Komponenten gibt, die eine stabile und dauerhafte Erklärung für Vorurteile gegenüber verschiedenen Minderheiten unabhängig vom zeitlichen Kontext liefern.

Die vier Beiträge der hier vorliegenden kumulativen Dissertation sollen daher einige der wichtigsten psychologischen Faktoren aufzeigen, die die Forschung für die Entstehung von Vorurteilen in den letzten Jahrzehnten identifiziert hat. Dabei stehen drei Aspekte besonders im Mittelpunkt: erstens soll überprüft werden, inwieweit sich etablierte psychologische Erklärungsansätze (wie z.B. Autoritarismus) bei der Erklärung von Vorurteilen ge-



genüber bestimmten Minderheiten in Deutschland eignen und ob eine empirische Differenzierung zwischen Vorurteilen und davon abzugrenzenden kritischen Einstellungen<sup>1</sup> erfolgen kann. Zweitens soll gezeigt werden, wie stabil diese Erklärungsmodelle über verschiedene Stichproben und Zeitpunkte hinweg sind und wie gut sie sich langfristig zur Erklärung der Abwertung von Minderheiten eignen. Und drittens soll beleuchtet werden, welche kausalen Mechanismen es bei der Erklärung von Vorurteilen gibt und ob die Erklärungsmodelle für unterschiedliche Minderheiten in gleicher Weise angewendet werden können.

Im Folgenden ist zunächst eine kurze Zusammenfassung der relevanten erklärenden und zu erklärenden Konstrukte aufgeführt, die in den vier Beiträgen der Dissertation untersucht werden. Anschließend wird ein Überblick darüber gegeben, welche unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkte die einzelnen Beiträge der Dissertation bei der Erklärung von Vorurteilen setzen. Abschließend und nach den vier einzelnen Beiträgen der Dissertation werden in einem Gesamtfazit die Ergebnisse der Beiträge zusammengefasst, um die aufgeworfene Frage nach der Verbindung von ideologischen Einstellungen, Werten und Vorurteilen beantworten zu können.

## **1.2 Vorurteile gegenüber Minderheiten**

Was verstehen wir unter einem Vorurteil? Im Standardwerk des psychologischen Vorurteilforschers Gordon W. Allport *The Nature of Prejudice* wird ein Vorurteil als „ein zustimmendes oder ablehnendes Gefühl gegenüber einer Person oder Sache, das der tatsächlichen Erfahrung vorausgeht“ (Allport, 1954) definiert, womit klargestellt wird, dass ein Vorurteil nicht auf der unmittelbaren Erfahrung mit der entsprechenden Person oder Sache fußt, sondern auf andere Weise entsteht. Es handelt sich nach Allport um ein „schlechtes Denken ohne ausreichende Begründung“ und darüber hinaus um „Gefühle der Verachtung, Missbilligung, der Angst, der Ablehnung“, die auf fehlerhaften und starren Verallgemeinerungen gründen (Allport, 1954).

---

<sup>1</sup> Eine „kritische Einstellung“ meint hier eine ablehnende Haltung gegenüber einzelnen Aspekten im Zusammenhang mit religiösen oder ethnischen Minderheiten, z.B. die Sicht auf Trennung von Religion und Staat in Teilen der muslimischen Bevölkerung. Eine solche Haltung unterscheidet sich zum Vorurteil u. A. dadurch, dass es nicht zu einer generalisierten Abwertung einer ganzen Gruppe führen muss. Stattdessen wird faktenbasiert ein Werturteil gefällt, welches in der Regel nicht auf Pauschalisierung oder doppelten Standards beruht (Eisentraut, 2016; Leibold und Kühnel, 2008).

In dieser weitgefaste Definition nach Allport fallen allerdings auch verhaltensbezogene Ausdrucksformen wie physische Gewalt oder Vermeidung von Kontakt unter den Begriff des Vorurteils. Im Unterschied zu Allport differenzieren andere Autoren (z.B. Ehrlich, 1973; Dovidio und Gaertner, 1986) zwischen der verhaltensbezogenen Komponente eines Vorurteils im Sinne einer Einstellung und einem tatsächlichen Verhalten (z.B. in Form von Diskriminierung). Auch in der hier vorliegenden Dissertation soll der Begriff des Vorurteils nicht im Sinne eines Verhaltens, sondern im Sinne einer (negativen) Einstellung verstanden werden. Dies liegt einerseits darin begründet, dass eine vorhandene Einstellung nicht zwangsläufig zu einem gelebten Verhalten führen muss (Ajzen und Fishbein, 1980) und daher konzeptuell davon getrennt werden sollte. Andererseits wird in den folgenden empirischen Studien kein Verhalten gemessen, sondern eine ablehnende Einstellung gegenüber Minderheiten. Mit Einstellung ist dabei eine psychologische Tendenz gemeint, die sich in der positiven oder negativen Bewertung einer bestimmten Entität, also beispielsweise einer Gruppe von Personen, ausdrückt (Eagly und Chaiken, 1993).

In der vorliegenden Arbeit handelt es sich bei den Entitäten, die bewertet werden, um unterschiedliche Minderheiten in Deutschland. Die Einstellungen gegenüber verschiedenen Minderheiten existieren dabei jedoch nicht isoliert voneinander, sondern teilen psychologisch gesehen bestimmte Gemeinsamkeiten (Meuleman et al., 2019). Schon in den grundlegenden Werken von Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson und Sanford (1950) sowie Allport (1954) gibt es die Beobachtung, dass negative Einstellungen beziehungsweise Vorurteile zu verschiedenen Gruppen in einem starken (empirischen) Zusammenhang stehen. So formuliert Allport (1954), dass Menschen, die eine bestimmte Minderheit abwerten, eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit haben, auch andere Minderheiten negativ zu sehen. Dieses Konzept einer generellen Abwertung von Fremdgruppen wird in der Theorie der Gruppenbezogenen Menschenfeindlichkeit (GMF; Zick et al., 2008; Heitmeyer, 2002) aufgegriffen. Die GMF-Theorie besagt, dass Vorurteile gegenüber verschiedenen Gruppen auf eine ihnen gemeinsame Ideologie der Ungleichwertigkeit zurückzuführen sind und es daher eine Art „generalisiertes Vorurteil“ gibt, welches alle negativen Einstellungen gegenüber Minderheiten miteinander verbindet. Empirisch konnte die Idee eines generalisierten Vorurteils bereits durch diverse Studien bestätigt werden (Zick et al., 2008; Asbrock et al., 2009).

### 1.3 Ideologische Einstellungen und Werte

Insbesondere zwei individuelle Faktoren wurden für die Erklärung von generalisierten Vorurteilen immer wieder herangezogen: Autoritarismus und soziale Dominanzorientierung. Ebenso erlangte auch die Wertetheorie nach Schwartz (1992) in den letzten Jahrzehnten an Wichtigkeit, wenn es um die Erklärung von Einstellungen gegenüber Minderheiten ging.

Das Konzept des Autoritarismus geht auf die Theorie der autoritären Persönlichkeit (TAP) zurück (Adorno et al., 1950), die man als „Klassiker“ der Sozialforschung bezeichnen könnte, da sie immer noch zu den am meisten verwendeten Theorien bei der Erklärung von Einstellungen gegenüber Minderheiten zählt. In der Theorie der autoritären Persönlichkeit wird Autoritarismus als eine tiefliegende Einstellungsideologie in der Persönlichkeit beschrieben, welche mit einer Feindseligkeit und Aggression gegenüber ethnischen Minoritäten und anderen unkonventionellen Gruppen verbunden ist und die hauptsächlich durch frühe Kindheitserfahrungen geprägt wird (Adorno et al., 1950). Bob Altemeyer (1981) entwickelte den Begriff des Autoritarismus weiter und beschreibt diesen im Gegensatz zu den Autoren der TAP nicht als Persönlichkeitsmerkmal, sondern als sozial erlernte und modifizierbare Einstellung. In seiner Konzeption besteht Autoritarismus hauptsächlich aus drei Facetten: autoritärer Aggression, autoritärer Unterwürfigkeit und Konventionalismus. Die autoritäre Aggression involviert den Willen, diejenigen zu bestrafen, welche in ihrem Verhalten von den Richtlinien der etablierten Autoritäten oder Konventionen abweichen. Die autoritäre Unterwürfigkeit beinhaltet Respekt, Vertrauen und Gehorsam gegenüber etablierten Autoritäten. Konventionalismus umfasst die Ehrerbietung für traditionelle Werte wie Patriotismus, klassische Geschlechterrollen und Religion (Altemeyer, 1981). Die Subdimension der autoritären Aggression ist Teil des ersten Beitrags (Heyder und Eisentraut, 2016), die autoritäre Unterwürfigkeit wird im zweiten Beitrag untersucht (Heyder und Eisentraut, im Erscheinen) und alle drei Facetten sind Gegenstand der Messung von Autoritarismus im vierten Beitrag (Jedinger und Eisentraut, 2020) dieser Dissertation.

Ähnlich wie der Autoritarismus hat sich das Konzept der sozialen Dominanzorientierung (SDO, Pratto et al., 1994) als eines der wichtigsten Konstrukte zum Verständnis von Intergruppenbeziehungen und der Psychologie sozialer Vorurteile etabliert. Die Theorie der sozialen Dominanzorientierung basiert auf der „[...] grundlegenden Annahme, dass alle menschlichen Gesellschaften als Systeme gruppenbasierter sozialer Hierarchien struk-

turiert sind“ (Heyder, 2005: 55). Die SDO ist definiert als eine individuelle Präferenz für die hierarchische Ordnung von gesellschaftlichen Gruppen und hat sich als starker Prädiktor für generalisierte Vorurteile und diskriminierendes Verhalten gegenüber verschiedensten Fremdgruppen erwiesen (Asbrock et al., 2010; Ho et al., 2012; Sidanius und Pratto, 1999). Altemeyer (1998) sieht SDO und Autoritarismus als zwei Seiten einer Medaille, wobei Autoritarismus die Unterordnung unter starke Autoritäten und SDO die Herrschaft über subdominante - also untergeordnete - gesellschaftliche Gruppen repräsentiert. Duckitt (2001) geht hingegen davon aus, dass den beiden Faktoren unterschiedliche psychologische Prozesse und damit unterschiedliche „Weltansichten“ zu Grunde liegen. Während sich autoritäre Einstellungen eher durch eine Sozialisation entwickeln, die durch Strafe, Restriktivität und soziale Konformität gegenüber Autoritäten geprägt sei, resultiere die SDO aus einer Sozialisation, die durch Kälte und Lieblosigkeit bestimmt werden würde und die damit zu einem ideologischen Dogmatismus und einer darwinistischen Weltanschauung führe (Duckitt, 2001). SDO wird hinsichtlich ihrer Bedeutung für Vorurteile in den Beiträgen 1 und 4 dieser Dissertation analysiert (Kapitel 2 und 5).

Die Wertetheorie von Shalom Schwartz definiert menschliche Grundwerte (Basic Human Values) als „[...] transsituative Ziele von unterschiedlicher Wichtigkeit, die als Leitprinzipien im Leben einer Person [...] dienen“ (Schwartz, 1994: 21). Jedes Individuum verfügt demnach über eine eigene Hierarchisierung beziehungsweise Priorisierung der einzelnen Werte, welche über Zeit und Situation hinaus als relativ stabil angenommen wird (Rokeach, 1973). Die Struktur und Definition der Basic Human Values wurde mittlerweile in zahlreichen empirischen Studien (z.B. Schwartz et al., 2012, 2017; Davidov et al., 2008b; Steinmetz et al., 2012) validiert und ihre Bedeutung für Einstellungen gegenüber Minderheiten konnte ebenso durch einige Analysen gezeigt werden (z.B. Davidov et al., 2014; Davidov et al., 2012, Beierlein et al., 2016). Eine genauere Betrachtung der Basic Human Values und ihrer Bedeutung für Einstellungen gegenüber Minderheiten findet sich im dritten Beitrag dieser Dissertation (Kapitel 4).

#### **1.4 Zusätzliche Faktoren: Bedrohungswahrnehmung und Anomia**

Neben ideologischen Einstellungen und Werten werden in den Beiträgen dieser Dissertation noch andere individuelle Faktoren betrachtet, die eine Rolle bei der Erklärung von Vor-

urteilen spielen. Einer dieser Faktoren sind subjektive Bedrohungswahrnehmungen. Diese Bedrohungsgefühle können sich auf ökonomische, symbolische oder auch andere Aspekte wie z.B. die Angst vor Kriminalität (McLaren und Johnson, 2007; Abrams et al., 2017; de Rooij et al., 2018; Ward, 2018) beziehen, die im Zusammenhang mit Vorurteilen gegenüber Minderheiten und der Sorge vor Einwanderung stehen können. Auch konnte gezeigt werden, dass solche Bedrohungswahrnehmungen durch ideologische Einstellungen beeinflusst werden und damit als Mediator für die Entstehung von Vorurteilen dienen (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt und Sibley, 2007; Cohrs und Asbrock, 2009). Die Rolle von Bedrohungswahrnehmungen wird im vierten Beitrag (Kapitel 5) näher beleuchtet.

Neben der Bedrohungswahrnehmung wird Anomia in einem der Beiträge als Facette für die Erklärung von Vorurteilen herangezogen (Beitrag 1, Kapitel 2). Anomia ist als psychischer Zustand definiert, welcher durch den gesellschaftlichen Wandel und die damit verbundene Veränderung von geltenden Norm- und Wertemustern herbeigeführt wird. Dadurch kommt es bei Individuen zu einem Zustand der Orientierungslosigkeit und Handlungsunsicherheit (Hüpping, 2006: 86). Um den Zustand der Anomia empirisch zu erfassen, werden in der Regel Frage-Items verwendet, die das Gefühl ausdrücken, dass es an festen Grundsätzen mangelt und traditionelle Werte an Bedeutung verloren haben, die dem Individuum Sinn und der Gesellschaft Ordnung gaben (Hüpping, 2006; Heyder und Gaßner, 2012).

Anomia und subjektive Bedrohungswahrnehmungen grenzen sich von ideologischen Einstellungen und Werten in dem Sinne ab, dass sie im Vergleich mehr von situativen Einflüssen abhängig und im Vergleich weniger stabil sind (Voelkle et al., 2012; Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt und Sibley, 2007).

## **1.5 Der Zusammenhang von Vorurteilen, ideologischen Einstellungen und Werten**

Um Vorurteile gegenüber Minderheiten zu erklären, gibt es zahlreiche Ansätze: so konnte schon häufig der Einfluss soziodemografischer Variablen wie Bildung, lokaler Ausländer\*innenanteil (Klinger et al., 2017) oder Einkommen gezeigt werden (z.B. Heyder, 2005; Zick und Klein, 2014; Zick et al., 2016). Außerdem spielen natürlich Faktoren wie die Häufigkeit von Kontakt (Asbrock et al., 2012) oder aktuelle mediale Diskurse (Czymara

und Dochow, 2018; Meeusen und Jacobs, 2016) eine wichtige Rolle bei der Herausbildung negativer Einstellungen. In der vorliegenden Dissertation soll es jedoch nicht um solche Faktoren gehen, die entweder stark situativ geprägt sind (wie aktuelle Diskurse) oder die zu einem Großteil externen Einflüssen unterliegen (wie soziodemografische Faktoren). Stattdessen liegt der Fokus in den hier aufgeführten Beiträgen auf individuellen psychologischen Faktoren, die zwar nicht unveränderlich, aber relativ stabil über die Zeit gesehen sind und die schon in frühem Lebensalter geprägt werden. Dies gilt sowohl für Autoritarismus (Altemeyer, 1988) und soziale Dominanzorientierung (Sidanius und Pratto, 1999) als auch für die Basic Human Values (Schwartz, 2012).

Tabelle 1 zeigt eine Übersicht der in dieser Dissertation enthaltenen Arbeiten. Die ersten beiden Beiträge widmen sich der Frage, wie stabil Autoritarismus (Beiträge 1 und 2) und SDO (Beitrag 1) als erklärende Faktoren über mehrere Stichproben und über mehrere Jahre hinweg sind. Der erste Beitrag (Heyder und Eisentraut, 2016) beschäftigt sich dabei mit der Frage, wie wichtig die Faktoren Autoritarismus und SDO für die Erklärung von Islamophobie sind. Hierfür werden Querschnittsdaten der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Jahren 2005, 2007 und 2011 (GMF-Survey: Heitmeyer et al., 2013) genutzt, um Islamophobie sowie Autoritarismus und SDO im Längsschnitt zu messen. Anhand der Analyse zeigt sich, dass Islamophobie in den drei Querschnitten stabile empirische Zusammenhänge mit Autoritarismus, SDO und Anomia aufweist, während kritische Einstellungen zu Geschlechterrollen und Säkularisierung im Islam keine oder nur sehr geringe Zusammenhänge mit diesen Konstrukten aufweisen.

Im zweiten Beitrag (Heyder und Eisentraut, im Erscheinen) wird ein genauerer Blick auf den Zusammenhang zwischen Autoritarismus und Antisemitismus über 2 Jahrzehnte geworfen. Hierfür werden Querschnittsdaten aus den Jahren 1996, 2006, 2012 und 2016 (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften: GESIS, 2016 und 2017) genutzt, die verschiedene Subtypen des Antisemitismus (klassischer, sekundärer und israelbezogener Antisemitismus) enthalten. Die Modelle zeigen, dass Antisemitismus und Autoritarismus eine stabile empirische Beziehung über alle Querschnitte aufweisen und dass kritische Einstellungen zur Politik Israels in keinem Zusammenhang mit Autoritarismus stehen. Die Beiträge 1 und 2 verbindet, dass in beiden die langfristige Validität der Messung von Vorurteilen über verschiedene Stichproben getestet wird.

Auch im dritten Beitrag (Eisentraut, 2019) geht es um die Stabilität und Invarianz von erklärenden Faktoren, nur dass hier nicht Autoritarismus und SDO, sondern Basic Human Values auf ihre Rolle bezüglich der Einstellung zu Minderheiten untersucht werden. Zu-

sätzlich wird in dieser Studie getestet, ob die gegenseitige Wirkung von Basic Human Values und Einstellungen zu Minderheiten über verschiedene Zeitpunkte unterschiedlich stark ist. Dieser Test der „kausalen Wirkungsrichtung“ wird dadurch möglich, dass es sich bei den in Beitrag 3 verwendeten Daten (im Gegensatz zu den Querschnittsdaten aus den ersten beiden Beiträgen) um eine Panel-Befragung (GESIS-Panel: GESIS, 2017) handelt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass es zwischen Einstellungen und Basic Human Values keine eindeutige kausale Wirkungsrichtung gibt, sondern sich beide über die Zeit gegenseitig beeinflussen. Außerdem kann gezeigt werden, dass sowohl die verwendeten Werte als auch die analysierten Einstellungen über den zeitlichen Verlauf invariant und damit empirisch vergleichbar bleiben.

In Beitrag 4 (Jedinger und Eisentraut, 2020) wird erneut die Rolle von SDO und Autoritarismus für Vorurteile gegenüber verschiedenen Minderheiten getestet, allerdings liegt der Schwerpunkt hier auf der Einbeziehung von subjektiven Bedrohungswahrnehmungen als Mediator für den Effekt von ideologischen Einstellungen auf Vorurteile. Die Analysen auf Basis der Daten des GESIS-Panels (GESIS, 2017) zeigen, dass kulturelle und ökonomische Bedrohungswahrnehmungen Vorurteile gegenüber Ausländer\*innen und Muslim\*innen erklären, während kriminelle Bedrohungswahrnehmung bei den Gruppen Sinti/Roma und Geflüchteten eine dritte relevante Dimension darstellt. Außerdem wird gezeigt, dass Autoritarismus, im Gegensatz zu SDO, unterschiedlich starke Effekte auf die verschiedenen Bedrohungsdimensionen hat.

**Tabelle 1: Übersicht der Beiträge**

<b>Beitrag</b>	<b>I (Kapitel 2)</b>	<b>II (Kapitel 3)</b>	<b>III (Kapitel 4)</b>	<b>IV (Kapitel 5)</b>
Titel	Islamophobia or criticism of Islam? An empirical study about explanations using representative surveys from Germany	Antisemitismus und Autoritarismus – Eine traditionell stabile Beziehung? Eine empirische Studie unter Berücksichtigung von Messinvarianz anhand der ALLBUS–Daten 1996/2006/2012/2016	Explaining attitudes toward minority groups with human values in Germany - What is the direction of causality?	Exploring the Differential Effects of Perceived Threat on Attitudes toward Ethnic Minority Groups in Germany
Untersuchungsgegenstand	Relative Stärke verschiedener Einflussfaktoren auf Islamophobie und islamkritische Einstellungen	Stabilität der Messung und des Zusammenhangs von Antisemitismus und Autoritarismus	Der Zusammenhang von Werten und Einstellungen zu Minderheiten im zeitlichen Verlauf	Der Mediatoreffekt von Bedrohungswahrnehmungen auf Einstellungen zu Minderheiten
Abhängige Variable(n)	Islamophobie; islamkritische Einstellungen	Klassischer, sekundärer und israelbezogener Antisemitismus; israelkritische Einstellungen	Einstellungen zu Geflüchteten, Muslim*innen, Sinti/Roma und Ausländer*innen	Einstellungen zu Geflüchteten, Muslim*innen, Sinti/Roma und Ausländer*innen
Erklärende Variablen	Autoritarismus, SDO, Anomia	Autoritarismus	Werte (Conservation, Universalism)	Autoritarismus, SDO, Bedrohungswahrnehmung
Daten	GMF-Querschnittsbefragungen: 2005, 2007, 2011	ALLBUS-Querschnittsbefragungen: 1996, 2006, 2012, 2016	GESIS Panel-Wellen: 09/2015, 05/2016, 09/2016, 11/2016	GESIS Panel-Wellen: 05/2016, 11/2016
Ergebnisse	SDO, RWA und Anomia sind über alle Stichproben und Jahre hinweg stabile erklärende Faktoren für Islamophobie.  Islamophobie und islamkritische Einstellungen lassen sich empirisch klar voneinander abgrenzen.	Autoritarismus und Antisemitismus haben über zwei Jahrzehnte hinweg eine stabile empirische Beziehung.  Autoritarismus hat unterschiedlich starke Effekte auf verschiedene Formen des Antisemitismus und hat keinen signifikanten Effekt auf israelkritische Einstellungen.	Werte sind im Verlauf der Zeit etwas stabiler als Einstellungen zu Minderheiten.  Werte und Einstellungen zu Minderheiten verstärken sich im Laufe der Zeit gegenseitig. Es besteht eine reziproke Kausalität zwischen Werten und den Einstellungen zu Minderheiten.	Kulturelle und ökonomische Bedrohung erklären Vorurteile gegenüber Ausländer*innen und Muslim*innen, während kriminelle Bedrohung bei Sinti/Roma und Geflüchteten eine dritte relevante Dimension darstellt.  Autoritarismus hat, im Gegensatz zu SDO, unterschiedlich starke Effekte auf die verschiedenen Bedrohungsdimensionen.
<b>Status</b>	<b>Veröffentlicht:</b> <b>Islamophobia Studies Journal (2016), Vol.3 (No.2), Pp. 178-198.</b>	<b>Im Erscheinen:</b> <b>Methodenzentrum Sozialwissenschaften Göttingen (Hrsg.)(2020): Grundlagen - Methoden - Anwendungen in den Sozialwissenschaften. Festschrift für Steffen M. Kühnel. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.</b>	<b>Veröffentlicht:</b> <b>Social Science Research (2019), Vol. 84. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.06.015</b>	<b>Veröffentlicht:</b> <b>Frontiers in Psychology (2020), Vol.10 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02895</b>
<i>Eigener Beitrag</i>	<i>Textliche Darstellung und Durchführung der empirischen Analysen., Mitentwicklung der Idee, Revision aller Teile des Papers</i>	<i>Textliche Darstellung und Durchführung der empirischen Analysen, Revision aller Teile des Papers</i>	<i>Alleinautorenschaft</i>	<i>Textliche Darstellung und Durchführung der empirischen Analysen, Mitentwicklung der Idee, Revision aller Teile des Papers</i>



## 2 Islamophobia or criticism of Islam? An empirical study about explanations using representative surveys from Germany

With Aribert Heyder (University of Marburg, Germany)

Published in the Islamophobia Studies Journal (2016), Vol. 3 (No.2), Pp. 178-198.

**Abstract:** The phenomenon of Islamophobia has been a widely discussed topic in scientific research, politics, and media over the last decade. Especially in the immigration country Germany, with Muslims constituting the largest foreign community of faith, the discourse concerning the integration of the Islamic culture has been on the political and public agenda. Especially at this time, discussions have reached a very intense level with respect to the current acting protest movement “PEGIDA” (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the occident) in Dresden. One of the most heavily discussed issues at present is the question if this movement is anti-Islamic or if it just criticizes the Islamic culture or religion without dealing with social prejudices. Based on three representative surveys from Germany (2005, 2007, and 2011), this study examines several causes of Islamophobia. Specifically, different forms of criticism of Islam are investigated including the effects of education and age using structural equation modeling.<sup>2</sup>

### 2.1 Introduction

There is a large potential for prejudice against Muslims and their religion. This was demonstrated not only in scientific studies. In Germany one could observe this by the recurrent protest marches of the so-called „PEGIDA“ (Patriotic Europeans against the Islam-

---

<sup>2</sup> The empirical analyses are based on the representative data sets of the GFE project (“Group Focused Enmity”) of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, University of Bielefeld, Germany. The survey was supported by a consortium of foundations headed by the Volkswagen Stiftung. We thank Prof. Dr. Peter Schmidt and Prof. Dr. Ulrich Wagner for their critical and very helpful comments.

ization of the occident) movement. This group has found high resonance in parts of the population and since its start in October 2014, it has attracted up to 25,000 followers who have articulated their fear of Islam and a foreign infiltration of the country. Meanwhile, there are already offshoots like the so-called „Pegida UK“ in Great Britain. Faced with these developments, the subject of Islamophobia is of high relevance to the present situation.

This study wants to expose the phenomenon of Islamophobia on different levels. Therefore, we will first address what Islamophobia means in the societal, theoretical, and empirical areas and point out the difference to Islam-critical attitudes. Subsequently, we will briefly elucidate three of the most important explanatory factors for social prejudice: authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and anomia.

The empirical study is based on three German representative surveys from 2005, 2007, and 2011 stemming from the German long-term project entitled “Group Focused Enmity” (GFE, for an overview see Zick et al., 2008). The analyses using the data of 2005 deals with the differences between Islamophobia, secular and equality-referred criticism of Islam. Using the surveys from 2007 and 2011, we try to replicate parts of these results. All three analyses include authoritarianism, anomia, and social dominance as predictors for Islamophobia. In addition, we control for effects of age and education.<sup>3</sup> The final section deals with the question of whether the relationships between the predictors and Islamophobia are stable over the three time points.

## 2.2 Origins of Islamophobia

Without going into the far-reaching discussion about the definition of Islamophobia or related constructs like anti-Islamism, hostility against Islam, or anti-Muslim hostility (see further articles in this and former volumes, see also Islamophobia Studies Yearbook and

---

<sup>3</sup> Level of education and age are important predictors in the context of social prejudice. These variables are theoretically quite complex, because they represent different aspects which are not directly measured. For example, cognitive abilities or value orientations with respect to education (for more details, see Heyder, 2003) or different age effects like life cycle, period, or cohort effects (see Glenn, 2005). Unfortunately, we cannot go into these details and will use the two variables as “control variables” which is not satisfying from a scientific standpoint. Nonetheless, it is a pragmatic decision on the background of this article which tries to give an empirical overview and principal insights to empirical studies on Islamophobia in the social sciences. We also have tested whether gender, a similar complex variable, has an effect on Islamophobia but found none or only very weak effects.

several articles in *Patterns of Prejudice*), we will briefly address the provenience of the term Islamophobia as well as the origin of the phenomenon itself. From the perspective of philosophy of science there is no right or wrong definition. It's rather a question of a useful nominal definition for scientific purposes.

The term "*Islamophobia*" – related to the English term „xenophobia“ – initially became popular in the sciences and the broader political public by a report of the British Think Tanks Runnymede Trust (1997, for an intensive discussion on the conceptualization of Islamophobia, see Sayyid, 2014). Substantively it concerns prejudice against and fear of the Muslim populations in Western societies. Of course, this year is not the hour of birth of the phenomenon, but it was the first time that a larger publication dealt with the subject and labeled it Islamophobia (Allen, 2010). Ever since, the term Islamophobia also stands for a debate on a continuum between two extreme standpoints. On the one hand, every kind of criticism of Islam or Muslims is generally condemned as hostility against Muslims and the Islamic religion. On the other hand, the decline of the occident is conjured because of the growing Muslim populations in Western societies, and this danger must be combated, also with the use of force. Both positions are based on a variety of reasons and justifications, which can be political or personal (Allen, 2010, 3f.).

The *origins of the Western fear of Islam* go far back in history and is somehow that what currently is discussed in the context of the phenomenon of Islamophobia. It is a modern continuation of the feelings initialized by the shock of Christians due to the Islamic expansion in the 7<sup>th</sup> century. This first dissemination of a new, concurring world religion is the fundament of the nowadays widespread fear called “forward march of Islam.” A portrayal that was revived, for example, in the 16<sup>th</sup> century when the ottoman Turks massively invaded Europe. This very long tradition of distrust and fear of Muslims in Europe experienced a new dramatic peak after the events of 9/11, a terrorist act that had much more far-reaching and severe consequences for the USA than for Europe. Thus, at the beginning of the new millennium, intense debates about the future role of Muslims in Western societies again became common place, and this also in Germany.

One reason for the polarization of the role of Islam in the German population is that Muslims compose the largest immigration group in this country, which results in issues of conflict such as integration, culture, and religion. The difficult relationship between German policy and the public with respect to the subject of Islam and integration is obvious in various public debates in the media, especially after spectacular Islamist attacks or also during the “hot” periods right before elections. Besides clear anti-Muslim statements, the

discussions deal with the question of where the cut-off takes place between Islamophobia and the criticism of Islam. People can have prejudicial attitudes toward Muslims and their religion but this is different than a critical attitude toward Muslims and Islam.

### 2.2.1 Islamophobia and prejudice

If Islamophobia is not simply the same as a sharp form of a critical attitude, the question comes up about what social prejudice is. Gordon W. Allport, one of the fathers in the field of prejudice research, defines it as: "...an aversive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group" (1954: 7). Without diving into the vast literature on attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, and so on (see e.g. Allport, 1954; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Brown, 1995; Dovidio et al., 1996, Schütz and Six, 1996; Duckitt et al., 2002), we will very briefly describe the term in the sense we use it here.

Almost all of the experts in this field share at least the conceptual view that prejudice is an attitude. With reference to the „three-components-model“ (Rosenberg and Hovland, 1960), attitudes consist of an affective, cognitive, and conative component. Following this general concept, we view *cognitive negative stereotypes, affective antipathy, or dislike and readiness or intention for discriminatory behavior as components of prejudicial attitudes*. This can also be found in the definition given by Brown (1995): „(...) the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of their membership of that group.“ (ebd.: 8). Nonetheless, we do not share the view that real behavior is part of a prejudicial attitude and therefore place importance on the difference between attitude and behavior. Like Allport already mentioned in this sense: „Although most barking [...] does not lead to biting, yet there is never a bite without previous barking“ (1954: 57).

### 2.2.2 Islamophobia versus criticism of Islam

What is the difference now between Islamophobia and criticism of Islam? As clarified above, the first is clearly called social prejudice. Generally speaking, the latter can be called a cognitive belief about critical aspects with respect to rules, norms, and practices within parts (some groups, some states, etc.) of the collective community of Islamic peoples (“Ummah”) but without using negative group-based stereotypes attributing these negative aspects to all the members of the whole community. Recently, using representative survey data, Leibold and Kühnel (2008) conducted the first empirical study in Germany that differentiated between Islamophobia and the criticism of Islam.

There is an obvious parallel with respect to the difference between social prejudice and the fact-based criticism of Israel in the field of research on anti-Semitism (for a discussion about similarities between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, see Klug, 2014). In a nutshell, Heyder and colleagues have already conducted a study in 2005 based on the concept of “communication latency” of anti-Semitism by Bergmann and Erb (1986). In the course of their study they postulated theory-driven differentiated criteria with respect to the criticism of Israel that had nothing to do with anti-Semitism, and they tested the assumptions with empirical representative data for Germany (Heyder and Iser, 2005; Heyder et al. 2005). Transformed to the purposes of the present study, criticism of Islam has to be regarded as part of an anti-Islamic attitude if it includes at least one of the following elements:

1. *Social prejudice*, the use of anti-Islamic negative stereotypes, affective antipathy, or dislike and readiness or intention for discriminatory behavior: Negative attributes are ascribed to Muslim people in general on account of their membership to the Islamic community. Example: Because the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” is aggressive and violent, all Muslims are aggressive and violent.

2. The application of *double standards in judging the policies of Islamic states*. Particular political measures or practices are criticized in Islamic states but not in other countries.<sup>4</sup> Example: The practice of death penalty, for example in Saudi Arabia and the USA (just to mention two states beside dozens of others).

3. The *generalization of anti-Islamic prejudices to all the Islamic states*, making these states into a “collective Islam”<sup>5</sup>: Characteristics that serve to justify prejudices against

---

<sup>4</sup> Derived from the context of anti-Semitism, explicated by Uri Avnery, *Anti-Semitism: A Practical Manual*, <http://www.alternet.org/story/17628>. 2004, and also Nathan Sharansky, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 30.04.2004.

<sup>5</sup> Derived from the context of anti-Semitism, explicated by Brian Klug (2003).

Muslims are generalized to Islamic states and are instrumentalized to convict and isolate Islamic countries. Example: Islamic countries are violent.

4. The opposite case is also feasible following the same logic, namely, when the *criticism of some Islamic states is projected onto all Muslims* and they are held responsible for some states' actions. Here, criticism of some Islamic countries' policies is instrumentalized to justify prejudices against all Muslims. Example: The practice of death penalty in an Islamic state serves for negative stereotypes about Muslim people.

### 2.2.3 Predictors for Islamophobia

There are several theoretical explanations that have been applied for the prediction of prejudice against specific groups including the “*theory of anomie*” (Durkheim 1970 [orig. 1897], Merton 1938), the “*authoritarian personality*” (Fromm, 1941, Adorno et al., 1950), “*relative deprivation theory*” (Stouffer et al., 1949), “*contact hypotheses*” (Allport, 1954), “*social identity theory*” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), “*social dominance theory*” (Sidanius et al., 1991), or “*integrated threat theory*” (Stephan and Stephan, 2000), just to mention a few of the more well-known approaches. To date, thousands of books and articles presenting a multitude of empirical research and theoretical discussions to cover and modify these theories have been presented. Some of these theoretical approaches were also integrated in the GFE project.

For purposes of the possibility for comparisons, our study includes the following theoretical approaches, respectively, the following concepts: authoritarianism, anomia, and social dominance orientation. Beside these, we will include the well-known “demographic” factors of level of education and age of respondents.

### 2.2.4 Authoritarianism

“The authoritarian personality” (TAP, Adorno et al. 1950) can be called the „milestone of empirical social research“ (Fahrenberg and Steiner 2004). It is still one of the mostly applied theories for the explanation of social prejudice. The origin of this theory goes back to the studies in the 1930s by Erich Fromm (1941). Adorno et al. (1950) assume that a partic-

ular type of parental upbringing produces a particular type of personality. According to TAP, the childhood surroundings represent the strongest influence in the development of the authoritarian personality. This psychological influence is shaped primarily by *socialization in the parental home and a parental style of upbringing characterized by a strong emphasis on conformity to conventional moral ideas and "good behavior"*, that is associated with the use of strong punishments for disciplining children (Adorno et al., 1950), although other socialization processes in the wider family, school, and peer groups also play a role in the development of authoritarianism. The authoritarian personality is also characterized by a strongly submissive attitude toward authority, a simplifying and rigid cognitive style, and a strong tendency to hold right-wing and racist ideas. This is linked to a further feature of the authoritarian personality: a pronounced willingness to entertain prejudices toward all that is "foreign" or "different" and everyone who "thinks differently".

The research conducted by the authors of TAP was largely guided by the assumption "that the political, economic, and social convictions of an individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a 'mentality' or 'spirit', and that this pattern is an expression of deeplying trends in his personality" (Adorno et al., 1950: 1). In their thorough analysis of TAP, Stone and Smith (1993) conclude that the essence of the authoritarian personality is that such individuals submit to the authorities they respect and oppress out-groups no matter the composition. In other words, the out-groups suffering discrimination may be Muslims, Jews, foreigners, homosexuals, disabled people, or other stereotyped groups.

Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1998) has reformulated Adorno et al.'s (1950) theory and refuses the assumption of a "deeplying trend in personality".<sup>6</sup> Rather, he talks about a socially learned and modifiable attitude, called right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Furthermore, he has reduced the original nine dimensions to just three: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. The second of these dimensions was assessed in the GFE surveys. Authoritarian aggression consists of a refusing attitude against all parts of a society which are perceived as unpleasant such as "outsiders," "troublemakers," or "criminals." This leads to a devaluation of and hostility against "outgroups" as, in

---

<sup>6</sup> Alternative approaches in contrast to the assumptions of Adorno et al. were also formulated by Lipset (1959) in his „theory of working class authoritarianism“ and by Detlef Oesterreich which is known as the "authoritarian reaction" (see Oesterreich, 2005, 1996).

this case, the Muslims living in Germany (e.g. Leibold and Kühnel, 2008; Leibold et al., 2012).

### **2.2.5 Social dominance orientation**

Even though it represents the outcome of twenty-five years of research, the Social Dominance Theory (SDT) of Sidanius and Pratto (Sidanius et al., 1991, Sidanius and Pratto, 1999, Sidanius et al., 2004, Pratto et al., 2006, Ho et al., 2012) is very new in comparison to the classical theory of the authoritarian personality. Sidanius and Pratto regard their interdisciplinary theory as a synthesis of different approaches that have developed in the field of intergroup attitude research.

SDT starts from the fundamental assumption that all human societies are structured as systems of group-based social hierarchies. In a nutshell, this means that the hierarchical social structure comprises one or more dominant and hegemonic groups at the top of society with one or more subordinate groups located in the bottom social strata. The dominant groups are characterized by overproportional possession of positive values, of “all those material and symbolic things for which people strive” (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999: 31). SDT goes on to assume that dominant groups have the greatest interest in stabilizing the system and the associated differences in status.

Three processes play a stabilizing role. *Aggregated individual discrimination* describes everyday discrimination against particular socially constructed groups in society, such as foreigners, disabled people, homosexuals, etc. Collectively, these individual acts of everyday discrimination lead to a stabilization of group-based inequality. *Aggregated institutional discrimination* relates to a society’s institutions with all their rules, procedures, and unequal treatment of different groups. These institutions may be private, such as shops, businesses, and banks, or public and state institutions such as schools, courts, and job centers, etc. Finally, *behavioral asymmetry* reinforces the system of group-based hierarchies through the ways minorities and subordinate groups can be repressed, manipulated, and controlled by the dominant groups. Here, “asymmetry” means the differences in the behavior repertoires between individuals belonging to the respective groups with their different degrees of access to resources of social power. This unequal distribution of options reinforces and amplifies the group-based hierarchical relationships within the social system.



These stabilizing processes occur within three stratification systems, the so-called tri-morphic structure of group-based social hierarchy (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999: 33). In the age system, the adults generally have greater power and influence and consequently dominate children and younger adults. In the gender system, the men, who have more political and social power, dominate the women. In the third system, the arbitrary set system, processes are governed by group memberships and differences, which are socially constructed through particular characteristics.

Lastly, the system of group-based hierarchies, social inequality, and acts of discrimination is justified morally and intellectually by means of legitimizing myths (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999: 45) that are composed of attitudes, social values, convictions, stereotypes, and ideologies. Negative attitudes toward minorities living in a society in the sense of social prejudices also fall under this broad definition of myths. The relationship to social dominance orientation can be found in its' definition: "*SDO is defined as the degree to which individuals desire and support group-based hierarchy and the domination of 'inferior' groups by 'superior' groups.*" (48)

### **2.2.6 Anomia**

Anomie is a societal condition of absence of clear societal norms and values and of disorientation. This can be an *overall societal status of anomie*, which primarily can be found in transitional countries or also the anomic situation of an individual who is uprooted from his or her habitual social environment (Wasmuth and Waldmann, 2005: 24). Early on, Durkheim postulated anomic suicide, which results from the discrepancy between the needs of an individual and the possibilities to realize these needs (1970 [Orig. 1897]: 114). While Durkheim and, in reference to him, Merton (1938) relate the term anomie to the macro level, Srole (1956) labeled the *individual condition as anomia*. Here, the anomia-scale is an indicator for the subjective condition of anomia. However, this scale does not really measure the lack of norms of anomie but the subjective assessment of one's own chances in the future or the individual meaninglessness (Friedrichs, 2004: 485).

Anomia was used as a predictor for social prejudice in numerous classical studies (e.g. Srole, 1956, Roberts and Rokeach, 1956, McDill, 1961). In recent years, this predictor has also been utilized in several publications in Germany (e.g. Kühnel and Schmidt, 2002,

Hüpping, 2006, Legge and Heitmeyer, 2012). Hüpping, for example, explains the causal effect of anomia on Islamophobia as follows. On the background of an increasing desire for the past and related fixed patterns of cultural values and norms, the entry of Islam into the Western culture is viewed as responsible for the decline of formerly existing rules and other aids for orientation (Hüpping, 2006: 94). Taking into account that attitudes toward Muslims should also be influenced by situative societal circumstances, the stability between the relationship of anomia and Islamophobia is of special interest in the empirical analyses.

To measure the condition of anomie, items are frequently used which express the feeling of difficulty to distinguish between right and wrong in the context of complex societies suffering from the lack of fixed tenets and traditional values and norms. The latter gives meaning and orientation to the individual and order for society. Thus, the attitudes are not immanent in the personality as such but are a consequence of experiencing deep feelings of insecurity, of anomic conditions (Hüpping, 2006: 87f.). In this sense, anomia is clearly different from other predictors of Islamophobia, because it is much more affected by situative influences compared to authoritarianism or social dominance orientation.

### **2.2.7 Relationships between the latent constructs**

In the following summary, we will show how the three predictive latent constructs are theoretically interrelated which has consequences for the empirical analyses. This clarification is sometimes missing in empirical research, and this represents an obstruction of theory testing and theoretical derivatives.<sup>7</sup>

With reference to the question of the (causal) *relationship between social dominance orientation* (SDO, Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) *and right-wing authoritarianism* (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981), different approaches can be found in the literature (e.g. Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 2006, Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001). Following Duckitt (2001) and Küpper and Zick (2005), we assume that both constructs equally explain prejudices of social minorities. They represent complementary perspectives and are in a close relation with the devaluation of out-groups. Empirically, their relationship is correlative rather than

---

<sup>7</sup> Especially when using multiple regression models which cannot take into account the relationships between the independent variables.

causal. SDO and RWA are both regarded here as generalized or ideological attitudes (see Duckitt et al., 2002; Six et al., 2001).

However, the *relationship between anomia and RWA* is much more difficult to clarify. The literature and the empirical results are not undisputed. Basically, there are two opposing theoretical models.<sup>8</sup> Srole (1956) and Scheepers et al. (1992) postulate that anomia is influencing RWA. They describe anomia as a psychological condition which is characterized by a desperate search for clear rules and stable circumstances. The world is perceived as unsteady and too complex - a condition which causes a generalized aggression consisting of a combination of anger and fear. Hence, anomic individuals tend to develop authoritarian attitudes which are associated with a strong desire for secureness and for fixed structures. Schlüter et al. summarize: “Individuals who feel normless and meaningless adopt authoritarian attitudes in order to regain orientation in an environment perceived as increasingly complex and irritating. Thus, according to this perspective authoritarianism serves as a coping-mechanism for individuals who are anomic.” (2007: 317).

An alternative view, proposed by McCloskey and Schaar (1965), suggests that authoritarianism causes anomia. According to McCloskey and Schaar, certain personality characteristics as reflected by authoritarianism lead to anomia, because the narrow-mindedness of authoritarian people confines their opportunities for social interactions with others (Voelkle et al., 2012).

Schlüter and colleagues (2007) have tested latent autoregressive cross-lagged models using data from a three-wave panel study including authoritarianism and anomia. One of their main results was: “Thus, we conclude that in this study McCloskey and Schaar’s suggestion (1965) that it is authoritarianism which causes anomia gains most support, albeit the data revealed some evidence for a reverse effect of anomia.” (2007: 317). Later, Voelkle et al. performed a similar analysis using a five-wave panel design. Their results support the former analyses: “Thus, our results support the hypothesis of McCloskey and Schaar (1965) that it is more likely that authoritarianism causes anomia than vice versa.” (2012: 187). According to these findings, we also postulate that authoritarianism causes anomia. This, even when not tested with panel data, is also valid for social dominance orientation taking into account that both latent constructs share conceptually common aspects.

---

<sup>8</sup> Beside these models, also a correlative relationship or a so-called interaction effect could be the case. The latter constellation can be proved using the data on hand. The causal influence of RWA on Islamophobia is higher when the respondents have high values on the anomia-scale compared with respondents with low scores. Nonetheless, the causality cannot be answered using survey data, whereas panel-data is much better suited to clarify this question.

*RWA*, *SDO*, and also *anomia* should have a causal influence on *Islamophobia*, which has been empirically demonstrated in several German studies (e.g. Leibold et. al., 2012, Hüpping, 2006). Instead, we postulate that these predictors should have almost none or no effects on critical attitudes toward Islam. Criticism of Islam cannot be equated with *Islamophobia*, as explicated above.

On the basis of the theoretical background delineated above, we derive the following main hypotheses which will be empirically tested:

- **H1:** *Islamophobia* is empirically distinct from different forms of criticism of Islam.
- **H2:** The higher the level of authoritarian attitude of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency for *Islamophobia*.
- **H3:** The higher the level of social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her  
• tendency for *Islamophobia*.
- **H4:** The higher the level of *anomia* of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency for *Islamophobia*.
- **H5:** The higher the level of social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her  
• *anomia*.
- **H6:** The higher the level of authoritarian attitude of a person, the stronger is his or her *anomia*.
- **H7:** The predictors for *Islamophobia* should have almost none or no effects on critical attitudes toward Islam.

### **2.3 Empirical analyses**

In the following section we present the empirical analyses to test the above derived hypotheses. It is divided in three subsections. The analyses using the 2005 data deals with the differences between *Islamophobia* and *secular and equality-referred criticism of Islam*. Using the 2007 and 2011 data, we try to replicate parts of these results. All of the three analyses include authoritarianism, *anomia*, and social dominance as predictors for *Islamophobia*. In addition, we control for age and education effects. The last subsection deals

with the question of whether the relationships between the predictors and Islamophobia are stable over the three time points.

All the descriptive results are produced using the statistical package SPSS. The causal relationship analyses are done by using structural equation models (SEM, Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989). The software, meanwhile also distributed by SPSS, is called AMOS (Arbuckle, 2009).

### **2.3.1 Islamophobia, secular and equality-referred criticism of Islam (2005)**

In the scientific literature, one can find several different empirical operationalizations for measuring Islamophobia. Here, we will just present the measurement of Islamophobia with reference to the surveys used here. Different concepts and measurements can be found, for example, in Imhoff and Recker (2012) or Lee et al. (2009).

In the course of the German long-term project “group focused enmity” (GFE, for an overview see Zick et al., 2008), ten representative surveys were conducted between 2002 and 2011. Beside several latent constructs which are part of the so called “syndrome of group focused enmity” like racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, heterophobia, and prejudices against jobless, homeless, or handicapped people, the research team developed different items for measuring Islamophobia. During the project time period of 10 years, only one short scale consisting of two items was continuously recorded for Islamophobia. In addition, other item formulations were used in some of the GFE surveys from time to time. The two items, which should measure *the core of an Islamophobic attitude* are: “One should prohibit the immigration of Muslims to Germany” and “Because of the many Muslims here, I sometimes feel like a stranger in the own country” (see Leibold and Kühnel, 2003).<sup>9</sup> The first statement reflects the undesirability of Muslim immigrants in Germany and represents the conative component of an attitude. It measures not a concrete behavioral intention but a political claim for the strict prohibition of immigration of Muslims. The second puts stress on the strangeness of Muslims in relation to the autochthon German population. It represents the feelings of fear and threat as the affective component of a prejudicial attitude (for a criticism of these items, see Pfahl-Traughber, 2011).

---

<sup>9</sup> Short scales like this are the result of intensive pre-tests with smaller samples of about 200 or 300 respondents. Usually, in the GFE project, several items were tested via confirmatory factor analyses. After that, the “best” items were selected with respect to the central quality criteria of validity and reliability.

All item formulations of the attitudes are reported in table 2.1. As an overview, we show the means for the three different levels of education.


**Table 2.1:** *Item formulations and descriptive statistics of the latent constructs (2005)*

<b>Education</b>	low	medium	high
<b>Islamophobia</b>	<b>n=375</b>	<b>n=588</b>	<b>n=775</b>
Because of the many Muslims here, I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country.	m = 2,44* s = 1,06	m = 2,25* s = 0,98	m=1,82* s = 0,88
<b>(total: m = 2,27; s = 1,05)</b>			
One should prohibit the immigration of Muslims to Germany.	m = 2,23 s = 0,89	m = 2,14 s = 0,92	m = 1,72* s = 0,76
<b>(total: m = 2,10; s = 0,90)</b>			
<b>Anomia</b>			
Nowadays, everything has become so much in disarray that one does not know where one actually stands.	m = 3,08* s = 0,88	m = 2,92* s = 0,87	m = 2,57* s = 0,86
<b>(total: m = 2,92; s = 0,90)</b>			
Matters have become so difficult these days that one does not know what is going on.	m = 3,13* s = 0,86	m = 2,88* s = 0,85	m = 2,51* s = 0,84
<b>(total: m = 2,93; s = 0,89)</b>			
In the past everything was better, because one knew what one had to do.	m = 3,07* s = 0,92	m = 2,83* s = 0,96	m = 2,42* s = 0,90
<b>(total: m = 2,88; s = 0,96)</b>			
<b>Social dominance orientation (SDO)</b>			
Some groups in the population are worth less than others.	m = 2,01* s = 1,00	m = 1,76* s = 0,97	m = 1,43* s = 0,78
<b>(total: m = 1,80; s = 0,96)</b>			



**Figure 2.1:** Path diagram of the causal relationships (2005)

(standardized regression coefficients + explained variances:  $R^2$ )<sup>10</sup>



\* Explained by age, see table 2.2.

The SEM analysis including the two different forms of criticism of Islam underlines the difference between them and the social prejudice of Islamophobia. The latter is significantly influenced by all the independent variables (total effects must be taken into account, see table 2.2).<sup>11</sup> But this is not valid for the two facets of criticism of Islam. In contrast to Islamophobia, these forms of criticism can only be poorly explained by the predictors of anomia, SDO, and RWA. The explained variance ( $R^2$ ) is .02 for the secular and .08 for the gender critique - which is very low compared to the value of .52 for Islamophobia. This demonstrates that criticism of Islam is not only theoretically but also empirically different from Islamophobia. This finding is especially true for the secular critique, because only one significant effect exists, namely the causal effect from the respondent's age (not included in the figure). Despite the fact that the influence is quite low (.16), it clearly shows

<sup>10</sup> Standardized regression coefficients vary from -1 to +1 and represent linear relationships. 0 indicates no causal influence at all (excluded from the model). The higher the values are, the stronger are the causal influences. SDO and RWA are correlated via their residuals with .24. Islamophobia, Secular Criticism and Gender Criticism are also intercorrelated via their residuals with values between .16 and .61. The control variables education and age are not included in the figure. For their direct effects and overall influences, see table 2.2. The fit measures of this final model are: chi-square/df: 3.1; gfi: .98; agfi: .97; cfi: .98; rmsea: .03; p-close: 1.0. These values are very satisfactory (see e.g. Arbuckle, 2009).

<sup>11</sup> The factor loadings for all the latent constructs and their indicators (validity coefficients) vary from .50 to .87 and are therefore sufficient to high.



that the older the respondents are, the more they tend to have a critical attitude toward Islam, based on secular principles. Several age effects can be responsible for this result, e.g. cohort effects or life cycle effects. This would be a question of further analyses.

The gender equality-referred criticism of Islam is influenced by RWA in a remarkable way (.29), and this leads to the question why a classical predictor for social prejudice is influencing this kind of criticism. One can only speculate on this finding. One reason could lie in the fact that authoritarian people place great importance on conventions (the third dimension of RWA: conventionalism, see Altemeyer, 1988, 1998) and strict norms, especially within the family and the kind of upbringing the children are subject to. Forbidding children to participate in sport activities in school is not in line with these fixed norms within the family. However, this cannot explain the effect on the second item on gender equality. Further analyses should be done with this respect.

The empirical analysis of the 2005 data demonstrated that the majority of the postulated hypotheses are confirmed. H1: Islamophobia is empirically distinct from different forms of criticism of Islam. The model shows that the two facets of Islam critique can be clearly separated from Islamophobia, even if there are quite weak correlations between Islamophobia and the critical attitudes (not included in the figure). H2, H3, and H4: The higher the level of the authoritarian attitude, social dominance orientation, and anomia of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency for Islamophobia. These hypotheses are also confirmed, which is indicated by the significant direct effects from SDO, anomia, and RWA on Islamophobia ( $R^2 = .14, .32, \text{ and } .43$ , respectively). The same can be said for H5 and H6. The higher the level of social dominance orientation and authoritarian attitude of a person, the stronger is his or her anomia. SDO and RWA both have significant effects on anomia ( $R^2 = .14 \text{ and } .44$ , respectively).

Lastly, H7. The predictors for Islamophobia should have no or almost no effects on critical attitudes toward Islam. This hypothesis is only partly confirmed. One exception can be detected. There is a medium effect from RWA to the equality-referred criticism of Islam, as mentioned above. Beside this deviant result, all predictors for Islamophobia have no causal effect on the secular criticism of Islam and the gender equality-referred criticism. This also underlines the distinctness of Islamophobia as social prejudice and the criticism of Islam as an attitude which is mostly independent from typical social prejudice predictors.

To give a final impression about the overall causal influences, taking into account direct and indirect effects, we present the so-called standardized total effects. As an example

(without presenting the underlying statistical details to demonstrate how these effects emerge, see figure 2.1): SDO has two direct effects—one on anomia and one on Islamophobia. Hence, there is an additional so-called indirect effect from SDO via anomia on Islamophobia. Taking the indirect and direct effects into account, the total effect of SDO on Islamophobia is .19 (see table 2.2). One can see that the *strongest predictor for Islamophobia is RWA, followed by anomia, education, SDO, and age of respondent.*

**Table 2.2:** Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2005)

Variables	Age	Education	SDO	RWA	Anomia
Education	-.16	-	-	-	-
SDO	.04	-.25	-	-	-
RWA	.15	-.40	-	-	-
Anomia	.09	-.32	.14	.44	-
Gender Crit.	.04	-.11	-	.29	-
Secular Crit.	.16	-	-	-	-
Islamophobia	.10	-.31	.19	.57	.32

### 2.3.2 Empirical Replications (2007 and 2011)


As mentioned above, utilizing the data from 2007 and 2011, we will reproduce and try to confirm the results from the 2005 analysis. Compared to the previous model, the one for 2007 has a few changes due to additional items that were not used in every GFE survey. The most obvious difference between the model of 2005 and the later ones is that the items measuring the two different facets of Islam critique are no longer included, as they were only part of the 2005 survey. The next difference is that SDO was measured via three indicators in 2007 and 2011 instead of one, which not only gives the latent construct more variance but also changes its substantive content.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> The two additional items are: “Some groups in the population are more useful than others” and “The groups at the bottom of society should stay at the bottom.”

**Figure 2.2:** Path diagram of the causal relationships (2007)

(standardized regression coefficients + explained variances:  $R^2$ )<sup>13</sup>



The consequences of these mandatory changes resulting from the available data can clearly be detected in the model. SDO, now measured with three items, has become a much stronger predictor for Islamophobia, and its (total) effect on Islamophobia is almost as equally high as RWA (see figure 2.2 and table 2.3). With this respect, H2, H3, and H4 were confirmed again. Moreover, the effects of education and age are almost the same as in the 2005model.

Nonetheless, there is one major difference between 2005 and 2007 with respect to H5 (The higher the level of social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her anomia): Analyses using the 2007 and 2011 data did not support this hypothesis. RWA still has a direct effect on anomia (H6) but the causal effect of SDO on anomia is no longer significant. This result demonstrates the impact of a change in the number of indicators on

---

<sup>13</sup> SDO and RWA are correlated via their residuals with .39. The control variables education and age are not included in the figure. See for their direct effects and overall influences, table 2.3. The fit measures of this final model are: chi-square/df: 3.2; gfi: .99; agfi: .98; cfi: .98; rmsea: .04; p-close: .99. These values are very satisfying (see e.g. Arbuckle, 2009). The factor loadings for all the latent constructs and their indicators (validity coefficients) vary from .58 to .89 and are therefore sufficient to high.

analytical outcomes.<sup>14</sup> However, the results strongly confirm the core hypotheses of the predictors for Islamophobia and therewith the quality of the theories.

**Table 2.3:** *Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2007)*

Variables	Age	Education	SDO	RWA	Anomia
<b>Education</b>	-.12	-	-	-	-
<b>SDO</b>	.04	-.29	-	-	-
<b>RWA</b>	.17	-.40	-	-	-
<b>Anomia</b>	.09	-.38	-	.36	-
<b>Islamophobia</b>	.09	-.32	.38	.39	.23

In looking at the model for 2011, compared to 2007, the same hypotheses are confirmed. This is true for H2, H3, and H4: The higher the level of the authoritarian attitude, social dominance orientation, and anomia of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency for Islamophobia. RWA again acts as the strongest predictor for Islamophobia. The explained variance for Islamophobia (54 %) is the highest of all models (see figure 2.3).

However, RWA still has a strong, significant direct effect on anomia (H6). Overall, the majority of the hypotheses could be confirmed using the 2011 data. The effect from SDO on anomia, which only appears in the 2005 model, should be the subject of further empirical analysis. This is also true for the partial differences in the effects of education and age on RWA, SDO, and anomia. The overall effects of those two predictors on Islamophobia is almost the same for all three models (see tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4).

As in the 2007 model, SDO was measured by three items, whereas anomia was only measured by two.<sup>15</sup> Again, H5 (the higher the level of social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her anomia) could not be confirmed.


---

<sup>14</sup> In addition, anomia has “lost” one indicator due to its missing distinctness to other constructs: “In the past everything was better, because one knew what one had to do.” There were significant factor loadings to other latent constructs. Due to this result, one indicator was excluded from the model.

<sup>15</sup> Again, one indicator of anomia was excluded from the model for the same reasons which were detected in 2007.

**Figure 2.3:** Path diagram of the causal relationships (2011)

(standardized regression coefficients + explained variances:  $R^2$ )<sup>16</sup>



**Table 2.4:** Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2011)

Variables	Age	Education	RWA	SDO	Anomia
Education	-.19	-	-	-	-
RWA	.08	-.40	-	-	-
SDO	.07	-.35	-	-	-
Anomia	.07	-.37	.50	-	-
Islamophobia	.06	-.34	.43	.34	.28


### 2.3.3 The Stability of the relationships

The analyses up to now have only examined the hypotheses for the three time points separately. By implementing structural equation modeling, we can test for significant differences between groups. In other words, one can answer the question of whether the detected

<sup>16</sup> SDO and RWA are correlated via their residuals with .48. The control variables education and age are not included in the figure. See, for their direct effects and overall influences, table 2.4. The fit measures of this final model are: chi-square/df: 2.2; gfi: .98; agfi: .97; cfi: .98; rmsea: .04; p-close: .96. These values indicate a very satisfactory model fit. The factor loadings for all the latent constructs and their indicators (validity coefficients) vary from .60 to .91 and are therefore sufficient to high.

differences of the causal relationships in the three models are at random or if the relationships differ over time. The goal of a so-called multiple group comparison is to find differences in the effects between the latent constructs when comparing several groups. These groups can be e.g. different grades of education, age groups, or countries. In our case, the three different samples of the 2005, 2007, and 2011 surveys are being compared to determine if the stability of Islamophobia can be measured and predicted over time.

**Figure 2.4:** Path diagram of the causal relationships (all samples)  
 (standardized regression coefficients + explained variances: R<sup>2</sup> of 2005/2007/2011)<sup>17</sup>



The explained variances (R<sup>2</sup>) of Islamophobia are fairly high, with values ranging from .43 to .51. This demonstrates the extraordinary importance of the latent constructs and the theories behind them. Anomia, SDO, and especially RWA are strong predictors for Islamophobic attitudes.

The somewhat weak effects of SDO on Islamophobia can be explained by the fact that SDO is only measured by one indicator in the comparison model using all three data sets. The respondent’s age has very small but significant effects on the education level (negative) and on RWA (positive).

<sup>17</sup> The fit measures of this final model are: chi-square/df: 2.6; gfi: .99; agfi: .98; cfi: .99; rmsea: .02; p-close: 1.0. These values indicate a very satisfactory model fit (see e.g. Arbuckle, 2009).

**Table 2.5:** *The different relationships between groups (unstandardized regression coefficients)<sup>18</sup>*

	2005	2007	2011
<b>Education → Anomia</b>	-.09	-.23	-.18
<b>Education → SDO</b>	-.30	-.17	-.21
<b>RWA → Anomia</b>	.48	.41	.56
<b>SDO → Anomia</b>	.11	n.s.	n.s.

The latter result can be explained by the change in the parenting style in Germany since the 1970s that is still quite common today. This is known as “anti-autoritäre Erziehung” i.e. anti-authoritarian upbringing. Child rearing today and in the last few decades has been much less characterized by a strong emphasis on conformity to conventional moral ideas, to authoritarian submission, and a punitive style of upbringing than it was forty or fifty years ago. The negative causal effect between age and education is due to the educational expansion that has been taking place in Germany since the 1960s, which led to more people having higher levels of education. This process is also still ongoing.

The comparison of the relationships between the different data sets from 2005, 2007, and 2011 demonstrates - most importantly - that Islamophobia can be predicted over various samples and years in a very stable manner. Table 2.5 contains only those parameters which are not invariant over time. In other words: All the causal relationships are not different across the three samples, with the exception of the values in table 2.5. This is really an astonishing result and strongly supports the theories of the authoritarian personality, anomie, and social dominance theory (see figure 2.4 and table 2.6).

Keeping in mind that the integration of Muslims in Germany is a very multifaceted topic with a constantly changing media and political context, the stability of the causal effects on Islamophobia is a very interesting empirical finding. In contrast to Islamophobia, the prediction of anomia happens to be fairly unstable over the different years. Both the causal effect of education and the causal effect of RWA on anomia are not invariant between the groups (see table 2.5). Also, as mentioned above, there is only one significant effect of

---

<sup>18</sup> Tests for significant parameter estimates differences must be done with the unstandardized coefficients (for the mathematical rationale, see Bollen, 1989).

SDO on anomia (2005). This shows that anomia is a latent construct that is strongly influenced by situational aspects and the condition of society and, therefore, cannot be explained as being stable as e.g. RWA, which, in contrast to anomia, is more deep-seated in one's personality. It is also noticeable that the only stable effect of education is the one on authoritarianism. This underlines the importance of the educational and social backgrounds and the environment for the development of an authoritarian attitude.

**Table 2.6:** *Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2005/2007/2011)*

Variables	Age	Education	SDO	RWA	Anomia
<b>Education</b>	-.15/-.15/ .15	-	-	-	-
<b>SDO</b>	.04/.03/.03	-.25/-.18/-.20	-	-	-
<b>RWA</b>	.16/.15/.15	-.40/-.40/-.38	-	-	-
<b>Anomia</b>	.09/.09/.10	-.31/-.38/-.36	.13/-/-	.43/.36/.49	-
<b>Islamophobia</b>	.10/.09/.10	-.31/-.30/-.29	.21/.13/.13	.57/.53/.56	.28/.27/.27

## 2.4 Conclusion

Islamophobia was not only a big topic in scientific research the last few years, but was also a buzzword in many public and political debates. The phenomenon of the “enemy image Muslim” is not new in Western societies – in fact, it has its beginnings in the Christian view of Muslims in the Middle Ages. However, especially in Germany, the subject matter could not be more current and explosive than it is today, as can be seen in the prevailing debates about Islamist terrorists on the one side and the growing Islamophobic movements in Europe like PEGIDA on the other. Especially under these circumstances, it is imperative that scientific research uncovers the reasons behind Islamophobia, which is a relatively widespread social prejudice in the German population. As long as Islamophobia persists, this will hinder the successful and peaceful integration of the Muslim community in Germany.

There were three main goals of this study: (1) to demonstrate the empirical distinctness between Islamophobia and a rational critique of Islam, (2) to examine some of the most



important empirical predictors of Islamophobia, and (3) to reproduce the findings and to test the empirical stability of the predictors across different samples. For this purpose, representative data of the German population from the years 2005, 2007, and 2011 were analyzed.

The first important distinction to point out is that criticism of Islam is not the same as Islamophobia. The empirical results clearly confirm one of our derived hypotheses. Islamophobia is empirically distinct from different forms of criticism of Islam. The latter has to be regarded as part of an anti-Islamic attitude only if it includes at least one of the following elements: (1) *Social prejudice*, (2) the application of *double standards in judging the policies of Islamic states*, (3) the *generalization of anti-Islamic prejudices to all the Islamic states*, making these states into a “collective Islam,” and (4) when *criticism of some Islamic states is projected onto all Muslims* and they are held responsible for some states’ actions. Second, empirically Islamophobia can be explained quite well by the three latent constructs of authoritarianism (RWA), anomia, and social dominance orientation (SDO). The explained variance of Islamophobia was very high (with values between .43 and .54) in all three analyses. The most important predictor is RWA, followed by anomia and SDO.

Third, the replications of the theory-driven empirical analyses and the test of the stability of the causal relationships strongly support the central hypotheses. The higher the level of an authoritarian attitude, anomia, and social dominance orientation of a person, the stronger is his or her tendency for Islamophobia. This is one of the most important findings in this study. The mentioned relationships were stable over time and therefore strongly support the theories of the authoritarian personality, anomie, and social dominance theory.

The classical predictor for prejudices, authoritarianism, is not only the most stable latent construct that can be measured across different samples but also the one that has by far the largest effect on Islamophobia. From the scientific perspective this is good news because these results support the theoretical background and the concept of an authoritarian attitude as a predictor for social prejudice. From a social or ethic perspective, however, this is a result which implies that Islamophobia will remain a stable phenomenon in Germany for years to come. This is because authoritarianism is still a widespread deep-seated personality attitude in the German population which is shaped by the educational background, the parental style of upbringing, and the political culture as a whole. The conclusion that is reached is that Islamophobia, with authoritarianism as its strongest predictor, will only change if the value orientations in the society also change in a constant way.

### **3 Antisemitismus und Autoritarismus - Eine traditionell stabile Beziehung? Eine empirische Studie unter Berücksichtigung von Messinvarianz anhand der ALLBUS-Daten 1996/2006/2012/2016**

Mit Aribert Heyder (Universität Marburg)

Im Erscheinen:

Methodenzentrum Sozialwissenschaften Göttingen (Hrsg.)(2020): Grundlagen - Methoden  
- Anwendungen in den Sozialwissenschaften. Festschrift für Steffen M. Kühnel.

Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

**Abstract:** Zahlreiche Studien haben mehrheitlich in Querschnitt-Analysen die starke empirische Beziehung von Autoritarismus und Antisemitismus bestätigt. Die ALLBUS-Daten 1996, 2006, 2012 sowie 2016 bieten nun die seltene Gelegenheit, die Stabilität dieses empirischen Zusammenhangs über einen Zeitraum von 20 Jahren und somit vier Erhebungszeitpunkten im Längsschnitt strengen statistischen Tests zu unterziehen. Die Items zur Erhebung der beiden, beziehungsweise drei latenten Konstrukte (klassischer und sekundärer Antisemitismus) wurden in diesen Jahren repliziert, was auch eine Überprüfung der Messinvarianz erlaubt.

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht unter Anwendung von Strukturgleichungsmodellen (multiple Gruppenvergleiche) zum einen die Stabilität des Zusammenhangs (Strukturkoeffizienten) sowie die Invarianz der jeweiligen Messmodelle der latenten Konstrukte (konfigurale, metrische sowie skalare Invarianz). Zusätzlich widmet sich der Beitrag einer kleinen Untersuchung zur Unterscheidung von klassischem, sekundärem sowie des sogenannten Israelbezogenen Antisemitismus und einer nicht antisemitischen Israelkritik. Die beiden zuletzt genannten Konstrukte wurden zwar nicht anhand multipler Indikatoren operationalisiert, der ALLBUS 2016 enthält aber zumindest jeweils ein Item zur Messung dieser

beiden Konstrukte, was bedingt auch einen Vergleich mit der erstmaligen empirischen Umsetzung dieser Einstellungsvarianten anhand des GMF–Survey 2004 zulässt.

**Schlüsselwörter:** Antisemitismus, Autoritarismus, Israelbezogener Antisemitismus, Israelkritik, Messinvarianz, Längsschnittstudie, Strukturgleichungsmodelle

### 3.1 Einleitung

Die zunächst auf Anhieb leicht verständliche sowie einleuchtende Tatsache, dass die Ergebnisse von Messungen nur dann vergleichbar sind, wenn die verschiedenen Messungen die gleichen Sachverhalte messen, scheint banal. Dennoch ist diesem Sachverhalt lange Zeit keine besondere Beachtung geschenkt worden und er ist bis heute nicht in alle Bereiche der empirischen sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung durchgedrungen. Eine Sensibilisierung für diese Problematik, welche speziell bei Längsschnittstudien aber auch bei international vergleichenden Untersuchungen vorliegt, hat allerdings schon früh stattgefunden (z. B. Jagodzinski und Kühnel 1987; Jagodzinski et al. 1987, 1990) und hält bis heute an, wie die zahlreichen publizierten Studien der letzten Jahre zeigen (z. B. Schlüter et al. 2008; Mewes et al. 2010; Wagner et al. 2012; Davidov et al. 2014). Auch Steffen Kühnel hat sich schon sehr früh dieser Problematik angenommen und unterscheidet zwei alternative Strategien bei Gruppenvergleichen. „Zum einen kann die Gruppenzugehörigkeit als eine unabhängige Variable in das Modell eingeführt werden. Zum anderen können die Modellparameter jeweils in gruppenspezifischen Modellen geschätzt werden“ (Kühnel 1996, S. 130). Er führt weiter aus: „In Gruppenvergleichen werden Stichproben auf Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede untersucht. Ausgangspunkt ist die Frage, ob sich die Parameter eines statistischen Modells zwischen den zu vergleichenden Gruppen signifikant unterscheiden“ (S. 131).

Auch wir werden uns multiplen Gruppenvergleichen widmen. Hierbei sind wiederum zwei mögliche Varianten zu unterscheiden. Will man Unterschiede zwischen verschiedenen Gruppen innerhalb eines Querschnitts untersuchen, so konstituiert das Gruppenmerkmal (z. B. Ost-/Westdeutschland) die Anzahl der zu vergleichenden Gruppen. Wir wenden uns der zweiten Variante zu und werden die Stabilität der „traditionellen Beziehung“ zwischen Autoritarismus und zwei Formen einer antisemitischen Einstellung, dem klassischen

sowie dem sekundären Antisemitismus im Längsschnitt empirisch überprüfen und unschwerpunktmäßig der Messinvarianz auf der Grundlage der vier ALLBUS-Erhebungen 1996, 2006, 2012 sowie 2016 widmen.<sup>19</sup> Somit handelt es sich um eine Trendstudie und nicht um eine Panel-Studie, für welche zunächst das gleiche, grundsätzliche Problem der Messinvarianz existiert, jedoch weitere hinzukommen (siehe Jöreskog 1979; Jagodzinski et al. 1990; McArdle 2009). Zusätzlich werden wir eine kurze empirische Analyse zur Unterscheidung von antisemitischen Einstellungen und einer nicht antisemitischen, israelkritischen Einstellung im Vergleich zu einer GMF-Erhebung aus dem Jahr 2004 (Heyder et al. 2005) vorstellen.

Im Folgenden werden wir den theoretischen sowie methodisch-statistischen Hintergrund beleuchten und anschließend die empirischen Ergebnisse präsentieren. Aufgrund des begrenzten Umfangs muss dies in gebotener, pointierter Kürze erfolgen. Differenziertere Hintergrundinformationen finden sich in den zitierten Quellen.

### **3.2 Autoritarismus, klassischer und sekundärer Antisemitismus sowie Israelkritik und Israelbezogener Antisemitismus**

Die Studien zur „Authoritarian Personality“ (Adorno et al. 1950) als „Meilenstein der empirischen Sozialforschung“ (Fahrenberg und Steiner 2004, S. 127) sind bis heute Gegenstand unzähliger Artikel in internationalen Journals, „special issues“, Dissertations- und Habilitationsschriften sowie größeren Sammelbänden im Bereich der Vorurteilsforschung (z. B. Stone et al. 1993; Lederer und Schmidt 1995; Rippl et al. 2000; ein aktueller Überblick findet sich in Seipel et al. 2015). Besonders die Veröffentlichungen von Altemeyer sind hierbei hervorzuheben, der Anfang der Achtziger und dann im Verlauf der neunziger Jahre die ursprüngliche Skala zur Messung der Autoritären Persönlichkeit weiterentwickelt hat (Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996). In vielen Studien wurde diese neue Skala in seinen Arbeiten empirisch überprüft (kritisch hierzu z. B. Stenner 2005) und hat sich bis heute als Grundlage für die Erhebung einer autoritären Einstellung etabliert (Duckitt und Sibley 2010). In seiner als Right-Wing-Authoritarianism (RWA) bezeichneten Überarbeitung reduzierte Altemeyer Autoritarismus auf drei der neun von Adorno et al. (1950) etablierten

---

<sup>19</sup> Eine ähnlich angelegte Studie mit GMF-Daten (Projekt „Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit“) der Jahre 2005/2007/2011 zur Erklärung von Islamphobie findet sich in Heyder/Eisentraut (2016).

Subdimensionen: Autoritäre Aggression (durch Autoritäten sanktionierte generelle Aggression gegenüber anderen), autoritäre Unterwürfigkeit (Unterwürfigkeit unter etablierte Autoritäten und generelle Akzeptanz ihrer Aussagen und Handlungen) und Konventionalismus (starkes Befolgen etablierter gesellschaftlicher Konventionen) (Beierlein et al. 2014, S. 5f.). Die ALLBUS-Daten 1996/2006/2012/2016 enthalten lediglich zwei Items zur Messung der autoritären Unterwürfigkeit.

Die vorliegende Fachliteratur zum „ältesten Vorurteil der Menschheit“ ist dementsprechend umfangreich. Im deutschen Kontext sind hier vor allem die Verdienste von Benz, Bergmann sowie Erb und KollegInnen in den letzten Jahrzehnten zu nennen, was sich in zahlreichen empirischen Untersuchungen niedergeschlagen hat (Benz 2005; Bergmann und Erb 1991; Bergmann 2010, um nur eine kleine Auswahl zu treffen). Dort wurde bereits zwischen klassischem und sekundären Antisemitismus unterschieden. Aufbauend auf diesen Arbeiten und weiteren Publikationen anderer AutorInnen haben Heyder et al. (2005) eine ausdifferenzierte Messtheorie weiterer antisemitischer Einstellungsfacetten und einer nicht antisemitisch motivierten Israelkritik entwickelt und empirisch überprüft. In dieser Breite wurde solch eine Konzeption erstmals im GMF-Survey 2004 (siehe auch Schmidt et al. 2011) in einer repräsentativen Befragung empirisch umgesetzt (eine weitere groß angelegte Studie findet sich bei Kempf 2015).

Insgesamt wurden im GMF-Survey 2004 fünf antisemitische Einstellungsvarianten sowie eine israelkritische Einstellung theoretisch hergeleitet und anschließend erhoben (Heyder et al. 2005). Die genannte ALLBUS-Datenreihe enthält den klassischen und den sekundären Antisemitismus sowie im Jahre 2016 jeweils ein Item zur Messung der Israelkritik und des israelbezogenen Antisemitismus, was zwar sehr begrenzt ist, aber dennoch einen Vergleich der zentralen empirischen Ergebnisse auf der Grundlage der beiden Datensätze erlaubt. Hierbei wird es in erster Linie darum gehen, die Stärke der Korrelationen zwischen den latenten Konstrukten komparativ zu betrachten. Aus diesem Grund sollen hier auch nur die eben genannten vier Konstrukte im Sinne von Nominaldefinitionen vorgestellt werden.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Die nachfolgenden Begriffsbestimmungen stammen größtenteils aus Heyder et al. (2005, S. 145ff). Auf die Kennzeichnung von Zitaten wird hier verzichtet.

### **3.2.1 Klassischer Antisemitismus**

Als klassischer Antisemitismus wird die offene Abwertung von Juden auf der Basis negativer und tradierter Stereotype bezeichnet (vgl. Bergmann und Erb 1991). In der nun über zweitausendjährigen Geschichte des Antisemitismus haben sich je nach Funktion verschiedene Bilder der Judenfeindschaft zu Mythen verwoben, die dazu dienen, Juden sozial und politisch zu diskriminieren, zu vertreiben oder gar zu vernichten. Als Beispiele seien an dieser Stelle die Bilder vom Christusmörder (klerikale Begründung), dem geldgierigen Wucherjuden und der jüdischen Weltverschwörung (weltliche Begründung) genannt.

### **3.2.2 Sekundärer Antisemitismus**

Bei sekundärem Antisemitismus geht es um eine für Deutschland spezifische Form des Antisemitismus. Er ist durch Relativierung, Verharmlosung und teilweise Leugnung (*Auschwitzlüge*) der nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen an den europäischen Juden sowie der Forderung nach einem Schlussstrich unter dieses Kapitel der deutschen Geschichte gekennzeichnet (vgl. Bergmann und Erb 1991). Diese Verharmlosung der deutschen Verbrechen geht meist mit einer Täter–Opfer–Umkehr einher. Schuld und Schuldabwehr stehen in seinem Zentrum: Sekundärer Antisemitismus reflektiert die unverarbeitete und unangenehme Schuldfrage (vgl. Stegemann 1995), die dem Bedürfnis nach einer ungebrochenen, positiven deutschen Identität eine prinzipielle Schranke setzt (vgl. Haury 2001).

### **3.2.3 Israelbezogener Antisemitismus**

Hierbei handelt es sich um die Übertragung der Kritik an der Politik Israels auf alle Juden. Jüdische Bürger – gleich welcher Nationalität – werden kollektiv für die Politik Israels verantwortlich gemacht. Die jeweils ansässige, lokale jüdische Bevölkerung außerhalb Israels wird zu einem Repräsentanten der israelischen Politik und auf Grund dessen zur Zielscheibe von öffentlichen Angriffen und Diskriminierungen. Dieser Antisemitismus bezieht sich auf die Politik Israels, die als Rechtfertigung für die Ablehnung von Juden dient.

### 3.2.4 Israelkritische Einstellung

Unter einer israelkritischen Einstellung ist in Abgrenzung zu den bereits genannten Begriffen, eine kritische Einstellung gegenüber der Palästinenserpolitik des Staates Israel gemeint, die nicht als antisemitisch bezeichnet werden kann. Sowohl jüdische Institutionen in Deutschland, jüdische Intellektuelle als auch israelische Repräsentanten haben in der Vergangenheit immer wieder darauf hingewiesen, dass Kritik an der israelischen Politik bei weitem nicht gleich jeden zum Antisemiten macht (vgl. Grosser 2009; Klug 2003; Bergmann und Wetzel 2003; Butler 2004).

## 3.3 Empirische Methode

Grundsätzlich müssen zunächst die Messmodelle der latenten Konstrukte unter Anwendung von (simultanen) konfirmatorischen Faktorenanalysen auf Validität und Reliabilität geprüft werden (Brown 2010), bevor man sich der Messinvarianz über die Erhebungszeitpunkte widmen kann (Meredith 1993). Diese sind dann im vorliegenden Fall anhand multipler Gruppenvergleiche überprüfbar (grundsätzlich hierzu, Jöreskog 1971).

Prinzipiell lassen sich vier verschiedene Varianten von Messäquivalenz unterscheiden (Fontaine 2005; van de Vijver und Leung 1997). Einen kompakten Überblick bieten hier Milfont und Fischer (2010, S. 112). „Functional equivalence (does the construct exist in all groups studied), structural equivalence (are indicators related to the construct in a non-trivial way), metric equivalence (are loading weights identical across groups) and full score or scalar equivalence (are intercepts, that is the origin of measurement scales, identical across groups).“ Die Autoren weisen allerdings darauf hin, dass die funktionale Äquivalenz nicht und die strukturelle Äquivalenz nur bedingt mit statistischen Methoden überprüfbar sind.

Insgesamt lassen sich sieben verschiedene Varianten der Invarianzprüfung differenzieren (Milfont und Fischer 2010, vgl. Vandenberg und Lance 2000; Steenkamp und Baumgartner 1998; Meredith 1993):

**1. Konfigurale Invarianz:** Die faktorielle Struktur sollte zunächst in allen Gruppen gleich sein. Dies stellt die Grundvoraussetzung für alle weiteren Varianten dar und wird in der Regel anhand der Anpassungsmaße des multiplen Gruppenvergleichs beurteilt.

**2. Metrische Invarianz:** Diese ist gegeben, wenn die Faktorladungen zwischen den Indikatoren und den jeweiligen latenten Konstrukten in allen Gruppen gleich sind. Da dies in der praktischen Forschung nicht sehr häufig vorkommt (je nach Anzahl der latenten Konstrukte und Gruppen), schlagen Vandenberg und Lance (2000) vor, dass wenigstens partielle metrische Invarianz erforderlich ist. Das heißt, dass die Mehrheit der Faktorladungen gleich sein sollte.

**3. Skalare Invarianz:** Diese ist dann gegeben, wenn zusätzlich zur metrischen Invarianz auch die Intercepts (Konstanten in der Regression) der Indikatoren über die Gruppen hinweg gleich sind. Diese Form der Invarianz ist Voraussetzung für die Vergleichbarkeit der Mittelwerte der latenten Konstrukte (Marsh et al. 2009, 2010; Meredith 1993). Auch hier sollte wenigstens partielle skalare Invarianz vorliegen (Vandenberg und Lance 2000). Bei multiplen Gruppenvergleichen müssen zumindest konfigurale sowie (partielle) metrische Invarianz gewährleistet sein (Vandenberg und Lance 2000; vgl. Milfont und Fischer 2010; Davidov et al. 2014). Lägen diese Invarianzvarianten nicht vor, wäre ein Vergleich zwischen den Gruppen unmöglich, da jeweils völlig unterschiedliche Konstrukte gemessen würden. Die übrigen möglichen 4 Modellprüfungen sind optional und nur in theoretisch begründeten, speziellen Fällen anzuwenden. Dennoch sollen sie der Vollständigkeit halber genannt werden: 4. Fehlervarianz Invarianz, 5. Faktorvarianz Invarianz, 6. Faktorenkovarianz Invarianz sowie 7. Faktormittelwert Invarianz (Milfont und Fischer 2010; Vandenberg und Lance 2000).

### 3.4 Empirische Ergebnisse

Auf der Grundlage der bisherigen Ausführungen werden nun die empirischen Ergebnisse präsentiert und interpretiert. Um die Modellüberprüfungen der konfiguralen, metrischen sowie skalaren Invarianz durchzuführen, haben wir dabei die Software Mplus 8 verwendet (Muthén und Muthén 1998–2017). Bei den analysierten Daten handelt es sich um die „Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS)“ von 1996 (n = 3512), 2006 (n = 3366), 2012 (n = 3476) und 2016 (n = 3464)<sup>21</sup>. Tabelle 3.1 enthält alle Items, die für die Analysen verwendet wurden. Bis auf die Items zu Israelbezogenem

---

<sup>21</sup> Datenquellen: kumulierte ALLBUS-Daten von 1980–2014 (doi:10.4232/1.12646) und ALLBUS 2016 (doi:10.4232/1.12796).



Antisemitismus und zur israelkritischen Einstellung, die lediglich im ALLBUS 2016 enthalten sind, wurden die Items in allen vier Jahrgängen in identischer Form erhoben.

Die Items wurden anhand von 7er-Skalen mit den Antwortkategorien von „1: *Stimme überhaupt nicht zu*“ bis „7: *Stimme voll und ganz zu*“ erhoben. Zur Messung des sekundären Antisemitismus hätte in allen vier Datensätzen außerdem das Item „*Mich beschämt, dass Deutsche so viele Verbrechen an den Juden begangen haben*“ zur Verfügung gestanden. Es wurde jedoch aus der Analyse ausgeschlossen, da es nur unzureichend mit den anderen Antisemitismus-Items korreliert und somit zu einer maßgeblichen Verschlechterung des Messmodells führen würde. Ein Grund dafür könnte die umgekehrte Polung des Items sein, da hier im Gegensatz zu den anderen Items eine starke Ablehnung, und nicht etwa eine Zustimmung, auf eine antisemitische Einstellung hindeutet. Eine inhaltliche Erklärung der unzureichenden Validität des Items geben Bergmann und Erb (2000), die das Item ebenfalls aus der Analyse ausschließen und postulieren, dass es weniger eine Einstellung zu Juden als vielmehr ein Gefühl historischer Verantwortung messe. Eine weitere mögliche Erklärung, welche aber ebenfalls spekulativ bleiben muss, ist einstellungstheoretischer Art. Das genannte Item ist nämlich das einzige, welches die emotionale Komponente einer Einstellung abbildet und nicht wie die anderen kognitiver oder verhaltensbezogener Natur ist.

Durch das Wegfallen des zweiten Items zur Messung des sekundären Antisemitismus verbleiben mit Autoritarismus und klassischem Antisemitismus zwei latente Konstrukte, deren Messinvarianz sich über die vier Zeitpunkte mit unterschiedlichen Stichproben testen lässt. Tabelle 3.2 zeigt die Anpassungsmaße für die unterschiedlichen Modelle, wobei das konfigurale Modell die besten Fit-Maße vorweist, also das Modell ohne die Vorgabe gleicher Parameter zwischen den Gruppen.

Nach den von Chen (2007) definierten Kriterien bei der Testung von Invarianz dürfen diese Maße sich allerdings in einem bestimmten Umfang verändern, was in dem vorliegenden Fall bedeutet, dass das Modell der partiellen skalaren Invarianz als akzeptabel eingestuft werden kann.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Bei Stichprobengrößen von  $n > 300$  gilt für das Testen der Invarianz: Eine Veränderung von CFI  $> .01$ , RMSEA  $> .015$  und SRMR  $> .030$  bedeutet, dass die Gruppen nicht invariant sind (vgl. Chen, 2007).

**Table 3.1: Itemformulierungen**

<b>Autoritarismus</b>	<b>Wir sollten dankbar sein für führende Köpfe, die uns genau sagen können, was wir tun sollen und wie. (v377)</b>
	Im Allgemeinen ist es einem Kind im späteren Leben nützlich, wenn es gezwungen wird, sich den Vorstellungen seiner Eltern anzupassen. (v378)
<b>Klassischer Antisemitismus</b>	Juden haben auf der Welt zu viel Einfluss. (v307)
	Durch ihr Verhalten sind die Juden an ihren Verfolgungen nicht ganz unschuldig. (v310)
<b>Sekundärer Antisemitismus</b>	Viele Juden versuchen, aus der Vergangenheit des Dritten Reiches heute ihren Vorteil zu ziehen und die Deutschen dafür zahlen zu lassen. (v309)
<b>Israelbezogener Antisemitismus (nur 2016)</b>	Bei der Politik, die Israel macht, kann ich gut verstehen, dass man etwas gegen Juden hat. (mj05)
<b>Israelkritische Einstellung (nur 2016)</b>	Es ist ungerecht, dass Israel den Palästinensern Land wegnimmt. (mj06)

Nach den von Chen (2007) definierten Kriterien bei der Testung von Invarianz dürfen diese Maße sich allerdings in einem bestimmten Umfang verändern, was in dem vorliegenden Fall bedeutet, dass das Modell der partiellen skalaren Invarianz als akzeptabel eingestuft werden kann.<sup>23</sup> Dieses Level der Invarianz erlaubt Vergleiche von Strukturkoeffizienten und latenten Mittelwerten zwischen den Gruppen. Um die partielle skalare Invarianz zu erreichen, wurde das Intercept des Items v377 „*Wir sollten dankbar sein für führende Köpfe, die uns genau sagen können, was wir tun sollen und wie*“ im Modell von 1996 frei geschätzt, was eine deutliche Verbesserung zum voll skalar invarianten Modell ergibt. Eine Erklärung für diese deutliche Modellverbesserung durch das Freigeben lediglich eines ein-

<sup>23</sup> Bei Stichprobengrößen von  $n > 300$  gilt für das Testen der Invarianz: Eine Veränderung von CFI  $>.01$ , RMSEA  $>.015$  und SRMR  $>.030$  bedeutet, dass die Gruppen nicht invariant sind (vgl. Chen, 2007).

zigen Parameters liefert die Verteilung dieses Items in der Befragung von 1996. Denn im Jahr 1996 lehnten diese Aussage noch 37,7 Prozent der Befragten voll und ganz ab, während die komplette Ablehnung in allen darauffolgenden Jahren immer unter 30 Prozent lag. Diese gravierende Veränderung in der Beantwortung des Items führt dazu, dass für die Stichprobe von 1996 keine skalare Invarianz vorliegt.

Der (bei partiell skalarer Invarianz zulässige) Vergleich der latenten Mittelwerte ergibt kein eindeutiges Bild in Bezug auf den Trend von autoritären und antisemitischen Einstellungen in der deutschen Bevölkerung. Wie in Tabelle 3.3 zu erkennen, steigen Autoritarismus und klassischer Antisemitismus im Jahr 2006 zwar auf ihren höchsten Wert, sinken aber 2012 und 2016 kontinuierlich wieder ab. Nur beim sekundären Antisemitismus lässt sich ein klarer Abwärtstrend erkennen, wenn man die Werte der vier Jahre vergleicht.

**Table 3.2:** *Invarianztest*

	Skalare Invarianz	Partiell skalare Invarianz <sup>24</sup>	Metrische Invarianz	Konfigurale Invarianz
$\chi^2$	269.427	187.675	111.465	48.661
df	30	29	24	12
RMSEA	0.048	0.040	0.032	0.030
CFI	0.970	0.980	0.989	0.995
SRMR	0.038	0.034	0.031	0.012

Stichprobengröße nach Jahren:

1996: N=3512/2006: N=3366/2012: N=3476/2016: N=3464/insgesamt: N=13818

**Table 3.3:** *Mittelwerte der latenten Konstrukte (im Vergleich zu Referenzgruppe 1996)*


	2006	2012	2016
<b>Autoritarismus</b>	0.267*	-0.059	-0.229*
<b>Klassischer Antisemitismus</b>	0.099*	-0.121*	-0.191*
<b>Sekundärer Antisemitismus</b>	0.062	-0.150 *	-0.424*

\* signifikante Veränderung des Mittelwerts im Vergleich zu 1996

<sup>24</sup> Intercept v377 in 1996 frei geschätzt.

Nachdem nun gezeigt werden konnte, dass die Messung von Autoritarismus und klassischem Antisemitismus partiell skalar invariant ist und sich somit Vergleiche über die Effektstärken und Mittelwerte zwischen den Stichproben der vier verschiedenen Jahre anstellen lassen, soll nun die Stabilität der kausalen Beziehungen zwischen Autoritarismus und den verschiedenen Formen des Antisemitismus im Fokus stehen, wie sie in Abbildung 3.1 dargestellt sind. Hierbei ist zu beachten, dass zwei verschiedene Modelle gerechnet wurden: Erstens das „Stabilitätsmodell“, in welchem die vier Stichproben von 1996, 2006, 2012 und 2016 miteinander verglichen wurden, und zweitens das Modell, in welchem nur die Stichprobe von 2016 berücksichtigt wurde und neben klassischem und sekundärem Antisemitismus auch der Israelbezogene Antisemitismus sowie die israelkritische Einstellung einbezogen wurden.

**Figure 3.1:** *Strukturgleichungsmodell*



**Table 3.4:** *Anpassungsmaße der Strukturgleichungsmodelle*

	$\chi^2/df$	RMSEA	CFI	TLI	SRMR
<b>Stabilitätsmodell</b>	5.10	0.034	0.985	0.979	0.021
<b>Modell 2016</b>	6.44	0.040	0.986	0.963	0.018

Tabelle 3.4 zeigt die Anpassungsmaße der beiden Strukturgleichungsmodelle, welche die Kriterien für ein gutes Messmodell erfüllen. Einzig das Verhältnis „ $\chi^2/df$ “ fällt eher mäßig aus. Um die Stabilität der kausalen Beziehung von Autoritarismus auf klassischen und se-

kundären Antisemitismus über die vier Stichproben zu überprüfen, wurden Chi-Quadrat-Tests durchgeführt. Es zeigte sich, dass der Effekt von Autoritarismus auf beide Formen des Antisemitismus in allen vier Jahrgängen jeweils gleich ist. Tabelle 3.5 zeigt diese über die Jahre konstanten Effekte in standardisierter Form (unstandardisiert sind die Effekte identisch). Man kann außerdem erkennen, dass Autoritarismus einen größeren Einfluss auf den klassischen als auf den sekundären Antisemitismus hat.

**Table 3.5:** *Standardisierte Effekte im Stabilitätsmodell*

	1996	2006	2012	2016
<b>Autoritarismus</b>	0.352	0.320	0.357	0.357
<b>→ Klassischer Antisemitismus</b>	(0.124)	(0.103)	(0.127)	(0.127)
<b>Autoritarismus</b>	0.152	0.148	0.158	0.140
<b>→ Sekundärer Antisemitismus</b>	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.020)

**(erklärte Varianz in Klammern)**

Auch das Modell für 2016, in dem die vier unterschiedlichen abhängigen Konstrukte untersucht wurden, zeigt, dass der klassische Antisemitismus deutlich stärker vom Autoritarismus beeinflusst wird als die anderen Konstrukte. Wie in Tabelle 3.6 dargestellt, sind die Effekte bezüglich des sekundären und Israelbezogenen Antisemitismus auf einem gleich hohen Niveau, während es in Bezug zur nicht antisemitischen Israelkritik gar keinen Effekt gibt. Dieses Ergebnis stützt auch die theoriegeleiteten empirischen Resultate von Heyder et al. (2005) sowie Schmidt et al. (2011), nach denen eine kritische Haltung gegenüber der israelischen Palästinenserpolitik nicht gleichzusetzen ist mit antisemitische Einstellungen. Der klassische Prädiktor für soziale Vorurteile Autoritarismus steht in keiner empirischen Beziehung zur nicht antisemitischen Israelkritik. Allerdings muss dies unter der genannten Einschränkung eingeschätzt werden, da sowohl der Israelbezogene Antisemitismus als auch die Israelkritik mit nur einem Item erfasst wurden. Diese Beschränkung gilt auch für den abschließenden Vergleich der hier ermittelten Korrelationen zwischen den Konstrukten und denjenigen aus den beiden genannten Studien. Die Korrelationen lauten wie folgt (erster Wert Allbus 2016/zweiter Wert GMF–Survey 2004): Klassischer Antisemitismus –

sekundärer Antisemitismus (0.71/0.50); klass. Antis. – israelbezogener Antisemitismus (0.65/0.70); klass. Antis. – Israelkritik (0.24/n.sig.); sek. Antis. – israelbez. Antis. (0.36/0.40); sek. Antis. – Israelkritik (0.18/n.sig.); israelbez. Antis. – Israelkritik (0.38/0.21).

**Table 3.6:** *Standardisierte Effekte im Modell für 2016*

	<b>2016</b>
<b>Autoritarismus</b>	0.403
<b>→ Klassischer Antisemitismus</b>	(0.163)
<b>Autoritarismus</b>	0.186
<b>→ Sekundärer Antisemitismus</b>	(0.035)
<b>Autoritarismus</b>	0.175
<b>→ Israelbezogener Antisemitismus</b>	(0.031)
<b>Autoritarismus</b>	Kein sign.
<b>→ Israelkritik</b>	Effekt
<b>(erklärte Varianz in Klammern)</b>	

Bedenkt man die erwähnte Einschränkung sowie den zeitlichen Abstand der beiden Erhebungen von 12 Jahren, so sind die Ergebnisse insgesamt erstaunlich ähnlich. Auffällig sind jedoch die Abweichungen bezüglich der Israelkritik, welche in der vorliegenden Studie mit allen anderen antisemitischen Facetten positiv korreliert bei Werten zwischen 0.18 und 0.38. Inhaltlich könnte dies bedeuten, dass im Verlauf der 12 Jahre eine zunehmende Vermengung antisemitischer Einstellungen mit nicht antisemitisch motivierten Beurteilungen der israelischen Palästinenserpolitik in der deutschen Bevölkerung stattgefunden hat. Ein nicht wünschenswertes Ergebnis, welches jedoch durch weitere Studien näher untersucht werden müsste.

### 3.5 Fazit

Wie auch schon vorherige Studien zeigen konnten, handelt es sich bei Autoritarismus um ein Konstrukt, welches als verlässlicher Prädiktor für verschiedene Formen gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit fungiert. In der vorliegenden Studie konnte nun außerdem gezeigt werden, dass sich Autoritarismus – zumindest die im ALLBUS verwendete Kurzskala mit zwei Items zu autoritärer Unterwürfigkeit – stabil über 20 Jahre und verschiedene Stichproben messen lässt. Auch der klassische Antisemitismus zeigt sich äußerst stabil in seiner Messgüte, was sich in der vollen skalaren Invarianz des Konstrukts ausdrückt. Aufgrund von Einschränkungen der verwendeten Daten können leider keine Aussagen über die Invarianz der anderen Antisemitismus-Formen, beziehungsweise der Israelkritik getätigt werden, da diese Einstellungen jeweils nur mit einem einzelnen Item gemessen wurden.

Was man allerdings klar festhalten kann, ist, dass Autoritarismus die antisemitischen Einstellungsvarianten unterschiedlich stark bedingt. Der klassische Antisemitismus, der von allen Formen des Antisemitismus am meisten durch eine direkte negative Stereotypisierung der Juden gekennzeichnet ist, wird hierbei am stärksten durch eine autoritäre Einstellung erklärt, wobei die Stärke des Effekts in den vier untersuchten Stichproben eine konstante Höhe aufweist (standardisiert zwischen 0.3 und 0.4). Auch der sekundäre Antisemitismus wird stabil durch den Autoritarismus vorhergesagt, mit Effekten von ca. 0.15 allerdings deutlich schwächer. Die Erklärungskraft des Autoritarismus würde wahrscheinlich noch bedeutend höher ausfallen, wenn neben der autoritären Unterwürfigkeit auch die Subdimension der autoritären Aggression in der ALLBUS-Skala erfasst wäre.

Neben diesem Modell, welches erfolgreich die Stabilität der Messung und die Vorhersage antisemitischer Einstellungen durch Autoritarismus mit den Daten von 1996–2016 aufzeigen konnte, wurde noch ein separates Modell berechnet, welches nur auf der Stichprobe von 2016 basiert. Hier konnte gezeigt werden, dass der Israelbezogene Antisemitismus, ähnlich wie der sekundäre Antisemitismus, nur relativ schwach von autoritären Einstellungen erklärt wird, während es gar keinen Effekt von Autoritarismus auf die israelkritische Einstellung gibt. Dieses Ergebnis spricht ebenfalls für die Verwendung von Autoritarismus zur Erklärung menschenfeindlicher Einstellungen, da eine autoritäre Persönlichkeitsstruktur verlässlich eben solche vorhersagen kann, sich dagegen aber nicht auf nicht-vorurteilsgeprägte Einstellungen auswirkt. Auch die Betrachtung der Korrelationen

zwischen der israelkritischen Einstellung und den Antisemitismusvarianten zeigen ähnliche Ergebnisse wie die GMF-Studie von Heyder et al. (2005), wo die empirische Abgrenzung von israelkritischen und antisemitischen Einstellungen demonstriert werden konnte.

Im Vergleich zu vielen ähnlich angelegten Studien wurde hier zusätzlich die Stabilität der Regressionseffekte und die Vergleichbarkeit der Messungen der verwendeten Konstrukte überprüft, indem auf Basis vier verschiedener Stichproben eine Invarianzprüfung erfolgte. Dabei konnte gezeigt werden, dass sich weder die Messung der Konstrukte noch ihre Effekte aufeinander in vier verschiedenen Jahren und Stichproben signifikant unterscheiden, obwohl sich das Niveau der Ausprägung von antisemitischen und autoritären Einstellungen in der Grundgesamtheit der deutschen Bevölkerung in der Zeit von 1996–2016 durchaus verändert hat (wie der Mittelwertvergleich der latenten Konstrukte veranschaulicht). Die Invarianz des Zusammenhangs zwischen Autoritarismus und Antisemitismus spricht sehr für die Güte der Theorie der Autoritären Persönlichkeit. Somit kann die Ausgangsfrage klar mit ja beantwortet werden: Es handelt sich um eine „traditionell stabile Beziehung“.

Aber auch die Verlässlichkeit von Messinstrumenten in der quantitativen Sozialforschung konnte im vorliegenden Fall noch einmal unterstrichen werden. Es bedarf allerdings noch weiterer Analysen, um nicht nur die Güte von Einstellungsmessungen bei Umfragen anhand größerer Itembatterien noch tiefer gehend zu untersuchen. Zusätzlich sollten dabei die unterschiedlichen Dimensionen des Autoritarismus sowie verschiedener antisemitischer Einstellungsfacetten und die Einbeziehung emotionaler, kognitiver sowie behavioraler Komponenten von Einstellungen berücksichtigt werden.



# 4 Explaining attitudes toward minority groups with human values in Germany - What is the direction of causality?

Published in:

Social Science Research (2019), Vol. 84. DOI:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.06.015

**Abstract:** This paper examines the reciprocal relations between values and attitudes toward minorities over a period of fourteen months in 2015 and 2016. A representative sample of the adult population in Germany completed four waves of a panel study in which attitudes and values were each measured two times. Reciprocal relations over time between Schwartz's (1992) higher-order value of conservation and the value of universalism as well as attitudes toward four different minorities (Muslims, refugees, foreigners, Sinti/Roma) were examined using a modified cross-lagged longitudinal design. The results showed that values and attitudes had reciprocal longitudinal effects on one another, meaning that values predicted changes in attitudes and attitudes predicted changes in values. The findings also revealed that (1) values were more stable over time than attitudes, and (2) the longitudinal effect of values on attitudes was not significantly stronger than the longitudinal effect of attitudes on values.

**Keywords:** universalism values, conservation values, attitudes toward minority groups, panel design, structural equation modeling

## 4.1 Introduction

Attitudes and values are central to public discourse. In recent years, the development of attitudes toward minority groups such as Muslims or refugees has been extensively discussed in both political debates and the media. In Germany, as in other European countries, these discussions are often connected to disputes about security and tradition versus toler-

ance and inclusion, which can be expressed in the form of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992). Understanding the interrelation of these values and attitudes toward minorities is not only of interest in psychological research but may also be helpful in fostering social cohesion because values are important predictors of people's attitudes toward minorities (Davidov et al., 2008a; Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; Davidov et al., 2014) and may influence the direction and speed of social change (Schwartz, 2007).

It is clear that values play an important role in understanding and addressing negative attitudes toward minority groups. Therefore, it seems reasonable to address these values, especially in a time of great societal polarization regarding the topics of immigration and integration (Zick et al., 2016). What if attitudes toward ethnic minorities are also relatively stable over the course of time and are not significantly changeable? What if attitudes themselves have a similar effect on values as values do on attitudes? This possible direction of causality is rarely investigated because values are usually seen as “[...] deeply rooted, abstract motivations that guide, justify and explain attitudes [...]” (Schwartz, 2007: 169). Although it has been shown that values can be influenced by behavior (Vecchione et al., 2016) or traits (Vecchione et al., 2019), the possible effect of attitudes on values has rarely been a topic of empirical research in previous studies. Thus far, there is only limited empirical evidence suggesting that causality flows from values to attitudes and that the effect of values on attitudes is generally stronger than the opposite (Homer and Kahle, 1988; Schwartz et al., 2010). However, most studies have included only one assessment time and, consequently, have been unable to test the predicted paths of influence across time.

To expand on this issue, I examined the reciprocal relations between attitudes and values using four waves of data and controlling for the stability of the variables over time. Although the use of nonexperimental data limits firm conclusions about causality, the use of a longitudinal design allows qualified inferences to be made regarding the direction of influence among the examined constructs (Little et al., 2009).


By using representative panel data from Germany, where indicator variables for several attitudes and values were collected at subsequent points in time between 2015 and 2016, this paper seeks to answer the following questions:

- 1) Are values more stable than attitudes over time?
- 2) Do attitudes and values have a significant effect on each other over time?
- 3) Is there a unidirectional direction of causality, or do values and attitudes have a reciprocal relation over time?

## 4.2 Basic human values and attitudes toward minorities

Basic human values are defined as “[...] desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity” (Schwartz, 1994: 21). Their importance is ordered in individual hierarchies that are usually viewed as (more or less) stable across time and situations (Rokeach, 1973). Therefore, individuals’ values serve as guidelines to judge people, events, and actions. The structure and definition of basic human values (Schwartz, 1992) have been empirically validated by many studies (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2012, 2017; Davidov et al., 2008b; Steinmetz et al., 2012). In this quasi-circumplex structure (Figure 4.1), adjacent values share common motivational cores and are thus more compatible with each other, whereas conflicting values and incompatible motivational goals are located on opposing sides of the circle.

**Figure 4.1:** *Theoretical model of relations among ten motivational types of values (Schwartz, 2012)*



Each of the ten values belongs to one of the four higher-order dimensions, which have two different lines of conflict. First, some values express the need for new experiences and ideas (openness to change), in contrast to values that involve avoidance of change, self-restriction and order (conservation). Second, some values emphasize the well-being of other people (self-transcendence), whereas others reflect the prioritization of one’s own interests (self-enhancement) (Schwartz, 2012).

In contrast to values, attitudes are seen as less stable and refer to positive and negative evaluations and beliefs regarding a specific object (Davidov et al., 2008a). Generally, values are considered more abstract than most attitudes (Schwartz, 1992). More precisely, attitudes can be defined as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993: 1). However, similar to values, they can have immense stability over time and can be categorized into more or less important attitudes (Krosnick, 1988).

In the present study, the attitudes of interest are the positive or negative evaluations of different minorities in Germany. The theory of group-focused enmity (Zick et al., 2008) suggests that attitudes toward different minorities are empirically connected through a common underlying motivational core. This concept goes back to Gordon Allport’s assumption of the generality of prejudice, meaning that “[...] people who reject one outgroup will tend to reject other outgroups” (Allport, 1954: 66). Another classic, *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950), also reported high correlations among various prejudices. Seventy years after these original assumptions, an abundance of studies (e.g., Asbrock et al., 2009; Zick et al., 2008; Zick et al., 2009) have shown that there is in fact a strong interrelation of attitudes toward different outgroups.

In the present study, attitudes toward four different outgroups in Germany are studied: Muslims, Sinti and Roma, refugees and foreigners.

With a proportion of approximately 5.4-5.7 percent of the total population, Muslims are the second largest community of faith and therefore constitute the largest foreign cultural-religious group in Germany (Stichs, 2016). Muslims are faced with many prejudiced attitudes, such as the depiction as the ultimate cultural “Other” who will never truly adopt the liberal and democratic values of Western society (Kumar, 2012; Meuleman et al., 2018). Negative attitudes toward Muslims go far back in history and are related to current discussions in the context of Islamophobia (Heyder and Eisentraut, 2016). This group is one of the most relevant when we discuss outgroup attitudes in Germany.

In addition to Muslims, another minority has been extensively discussed, especially in recent years. In 2015 and 2016, approximately one million people seeking refuge came to Germany, most of whom were fleeing the wars in Syria or Afghanistan. This led to reactions in the population: assaults on refugee accommodations, violence against refugees and right-wing propaganda about “foreign infiltration” were on the everyday media agenda (Küpper et al., 2016). On the other hand, there was a remarkably voluntary commitment of civil society to help the newcomers begin a new life in Germany (Karakayali and Kleist,

2015). Since these years, population and politics have been polarized regarding the topic of refugees, which makes them an important group to consider when examining outgroup attitudes in Germany.

Unlike refugees, who are mostly associated with newcomers, foreigners are viewed primarily as people that are long established in German society. The term “foreigner” in Germany is associated mostly with people of Turkish origin but also with Southern Europeans (such as descendants of Italian labor migrants) and immigrants of Eastern European origin (Asbrock et al., 2014). Additionally, only approximately 2 percent of the population thinks of refugees when confronted with the term “foreigner” (Wasmer et al., 2018). This makes foreigners an interesting comparison group when examining attitudes toward refugees.

In contrast to Muslims, foreigners or even refugees, the share of Sinti and Roma in the aggregate German population is relatively small, and they are seen as less of a threat to the dominant culture. Like unemployed or homeless people, they are perceived more as a socially subordinated outgroup with low status that competes for social services (Zick and Klein, 2014). A large part of the German population associates the Sinti and Roma with criminality and abuse of the welfare state (Zick et al., 2016). This group is a meaningful addition when we examine outgroup attitudes in Germany because, like Muslims, they are faced with long-established prejudices, but unlike Muslims, there is much less discussion about attitudes toward the Sinti and Roma, both in the public and in science.

Previous research has shown that attitudes toward the two largest outgroups, foreigners and Muslims, are heavily influenced by values (Pedersen and Hartley, 2012; Beierlein et al., 2016). In addition, I want to examine the relationship between values and smaller minority groups: one relationship that was extensively discussed in recent years (with regard to refugees) and one that is not as present in the public discourse (Sinti/Roma). This will help to obtain a better understanding of the generalizability of the interrelation of outgroup attitudes and basic human values.

For each of the four groups, two particular values are expected to have an effect on attitudes toward these groups, namely, conservation and universalism. Several studies have shown how important these two values are for explaining anti-immigrant attitudes and prejudice, whereas other values have shown only weak or ambiguous effects in past research (Davidov et al., 2014; Davidov et al., 2012, Beierlein et al., 2016).

A prioritization of universalism increases readiness for outgroup contact (Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995) and support for immigrants (Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; Davidov et

al., 2008a; Davidov et al., 2014; Schwartz, 2010) and Muslims (Pedersen and Hartley, 2012) as well as for homosexuality (Kuntz et al., 2015) and gender justice (Feather and McKee, 2012) while fostering greater support for social equality and tolerance toward different lifestyles (Schwartz et al., 2010; Piurko et al., 2011).

Conversely, conservation values seem to promote negative attitudes toward immigration (Davidov and Meuleman, 2012; Davidov et al., 2008a; Davidov et al., 2014), homosexuality (Kuntz et al., 2015), gender equality and poor people (Chambers et al., 2012). The higher-order value dimension of conservation consists of three values: security, tradition and conformity. These values aim to preserve the status quo and to maintain social and cultural standards in a society (Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995). Because foreigners, Sinti and Roma, refugees and Muslims all bring their own traditions and norms, individuals from the dominant ingroup who strongly prioritize conservation may feel challenged or threatened by these groups. This threat of conservation values may lead to more negative attitudes toward these minorities (Beierlein et al., 2016, Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995; Cohrs and Asbrock, 2008).

#### **4.2.1 Previous research on the direction of causality**

With regard to the direction of causality, previous research has mostly shown that values are “[...] more stable and less vulnerable to the impact of current events [...]” (Schwartz et al., 2010: 448) than attitudes. Therefore, they should be less amenable to change (Konty and Dunham, 2010). Additionally, values are described as “transsituational goals” and “guiding principles” (Schwartz, 1994: 21) as well as central aspects of people’s self-identity and personality (Rokeach, 1973). Consequently, most empirical results support the assumption that causality flows to a greater extent from (the more basic) values to (the more specific) attitudes than vice versa (Homer and Kahle, 1988; Schwartz et al., 2010).

This causal direction is explained as follows: the realization of certain values can either be blocked or promoted by the presence of certain outgroups. If this is the case, the subjective relevance of these values for the formation of attitudes toward these minority groups will become evident (Beierlein et al., 2016). A considerable number of studies have shown the important predictive role of basic human values in explaining attitudes toward minority

groups (e.g., Beierlein et al., 2016; Schwartz, 2010) and anti-immigration attitudes (e.g., Davidov et al., 2014; Davidov et al., 2012).

Similar to the examples above, previous research has mainly followed Rokeach's (1973) assumption that values are largely stable. Only recently have researchers begun to explore when and how values change.

In this regard, Bardi and Goodwin (2011) integrated the existing evidence from studies with adults and proposed a model of value change. They noted that adaptation has been a prominent facilitator of value change in the literature. They argue that a new life situation requires new behavior (for example, the laws or social norms of a new country) and is likely to elicit many frustrations and unexpected outcomes for habitual behavior or attitudes that may challenge the existing value system, possibly leading to its change (Bardi et al., 2014). An example of value change due to new life circumstances is the situation after the 9/11 attacks. Verkasalo and colleagues (2006) exemplified this change with matched groups of Finnish school children and university students. For these groups, the importance of security values increased, whereas the importance of stimulation values decreased in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Another important facilitator of value change that is strongly connected to the principle of adaptation and that was noted by Bardi and Goodwin (2011) is consistency maintenance. This concept builds on ideas from cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; for a general overview, see also Cooper, 2012) that note the importance of the consistency of one's self-concept as a driving factor for attitudes and behavior. This means that awareness of the inconsistency between values and attitudes may make a value salient and cause a person to think deeply about whether that value is more important to the person than previously thought. Repeatedly expressing an attitude that is inconsistent with a person's values may lead to value change because values are used to justify attitudes.

Because important attitudes are unlikely to change, inconsistency between an important attitude and a value is likely to be resolved by bringing the latter into line with the former (Krosnick, 1988). If both the attitude and the value are equally important, the inconsistency may be resolved by denial, bolstering, or other such mechanisms (e.g., Abelson, 1959). Another possibility for resolving such inconsistencies is that values and attitudes reciprocally converge over the course of time. Previous research has shown such a reciprocal relation over time for values and behavior (Vecchione et al., 2016). Especially in early childhood, when an individual's value system is starting to be increasingly integrated into the emerging sense of self, values are continuously readjusted to be in line with one's own

observed behavior (Fischer, 2017). These “feedback effects” have been found not only for behavior but also between values and beliefs (i.e., values predict increases in compatible beliefs, and beliefs predict subsequent increases in compatible values) (Goodwin et al., 2012). In the case of traits, there is not even a reciprocal connection; traits affect values over time (Vecchione et al., 2019).

These findings support the idea that one of the sources of value change is the consistent and repeated pattern of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that individuals experience across situations (Bernard et al., 2003). Hence, considering the evidence about the reciprocal relations of values and related constructs such as beliefs, traits or behavior and bearing in mind the facilitators of value change, I expect to find a reciprocal connection between attitudes and values.

### **4.3 Hypotheses**

The hypotheses that derive from the theoretical considerations above can be divided into three parts. The first is the hypothesis about stability. Given the theoretical considerations and the empirical evidence, I expect that *values are more stable over time than attitudes toward minority groups (H1)*.

The second pair of hypotheses involves the effect of values on attitudes. I expect that universalism has a positive effect on attitudes toward all four minority groups (H2), whereas conservation (H3) has a negative effect on these attitudes.

The third pair of hypotheses involves the direction of causality. I expect that *attitudes toward minorities have an effect on values over time (H4)*. However, considering the results of previous studies on value-related constructs, I expect that *values have a stronger effect on attitudes than attitudes have on values (H5)*.

## **4.4 Method**


### **4.4.1 Data and model structure**

In the current study, I used data from the GESIS Panel (GESIS, 2017). This panel collects data from a representative sample of the adult population in Germany. It includes measures



of human values as well as measures of attitudes toward Muslims, refugees, Sinti and Roma, and immigrants. To test the causal effects of values on attitudes and vice versa, four waves of the GESIS Panel were used. These four waves consist of two waves in which attitudes toward different minorities were measured and two waves that included measures of basic human values. This procedure means that the two different theoretical constructs were not measured simultaneously but in an alternating sequence with differing time gaps between the measurements (see Figure 4.2).

**Figure 4.2:** *Items and time points of measurement*



*Note.* (Values T1: 09/2015; Attitudes T2: 05/2016; Values T3: 09/2016; Attitudes T4: 11/2016)

The time gaps between the different measurement points are T1 (measurement of values) to T2 (measurement of attitudes): 8 months; T2 (attitudes) to T3 (values): 4 months; and T3 (values) to T4 (attitudes): 2 months. This design leads to an alternative version of an autoregressive cross-lagged panel model (because normally, the constructs of interest would be measured at the same time).

**4.4.2 Sample**

Since 2013, the waves of the GESIS Panel have been conducted at 2-month intervals drawing from the German-speaking population between the ages of 18 and 70 years (at the time

of recruitment) who permanently reside in Germany. The panel started in 2013 with a stratified multistage probability sample of 7,599 respondents, and the four waves used in the analysis include more than 3,000 respondents each (T1-09/2015: N=3,615; T2-05/2016: N=3,408; T3-09/2016: N=3,287; T4-11/2016: N=3,273).

#### 4.4.3 Measurement

The human values scale used in the GESIS Panel is derived from the 57-item *PVQ-R* (Revised Portrait Value Questionnaire), which was developed to measure 19 theoretically and empirically distinguishable values (Schwartz et al., 2012). However, due to limited resources of time and money, surveys require short, valid, and reliable instruments. Therefore, instead of using all 57 items to assess all 19 values, the panel used only 17 items that served as good indicators of the four higher-order value dimensions: self-enhancement, self-transcendence, openness to change and conservation. The items were validated in past studies (Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004) and followed the approach presented by Schwartz and colleagues (2001).

Each of the items in the item pool included a short verbal portrait of a person. The portraits described a person's desires, wishes, and aspirations linked to a specific value within the value circle (Schwartz, 2012). Respondents were asked to rate on a six-point scale how similar the person described in each portrait was to them.

The value of Universalism was measured by two items: U1: "It is important for him/her to be tolerant toward other people and social groups" and U2: "It is important for him/her that all people, even strangers, are treated fairly" (1 = Is not at all similar to me; 6 = Is very similar to me).

The higher-order dimension of Conservation was measured by three items: C1: "It is important for him/her to preserve traditional values and convictions", C2: "It is important for him/her to live in a strong state that can defend its citizens" and C3: "It is important for him/her to obey the law" (1 = Is not at all similar to me; 6 = Is very similar to me).

To measure attitudes toward the four different minorities, respondents were randomly divided into four different groups, and each group answered a set of items related to one of the four minorities. Each group contained between 846 and 862 participants at T2 when attitudes were measured for the first time and 804 to 828 participants at T4, which was the

second measurement of attitudes. Each respondent evaluated the same minority group across each of the two time points. The wording of the two items measuring attitudes was the same for each group of participants; the only difference was the referenced minority.

The first item in each group was M1/F1/R1/SR1: “How would you assess [Muslims / foreigners / refugees / Sinti and Roma] in Germany overall?” The second item was M2/F2/R2/SR2: “How would you describe your feelings toward [Muslims / foreigners / refugees / Sinti and Roma] in Germany in general?” (1 = very negative; 5 = very positive).

#### **4.4.4 Control variables**

Previous studies have shown that people with higher education, lower age, higher income and a left self-placement on the political orientation scale have more positive attitudes toward minorities (Zick et al., 2016). For the German population, it has been shown that universalism is influenced by female gender, age, education and income (all positive), whereas conservation is influenced by female gender (negative) and age (positive) (Meuleman et al., 2012). To check the robustness of the effects, the models were also estimated with and without sociodemographic control variables. The control variables were gender, which was scored 1 for male and 2 for female, age, which was measured in years, education, which was measured by the highest level of education achieved (1 = lower secondary school up to 3 = general qualification for university entrance), political orientation, which was measured by self-placement on a 0 (left) to 10 (right) scale, religiosity, which was measured by responses to the question “*How important is religion in your life?*” on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important), and household income, which was measured by categories from 1 (700€ or less) to 14 (6000€ and more).

#### **4.4.5 Validity and invariance**

Because every participant was only asked about one of the four minorities, four different models were estimated. All the models had the same structure and tested the same structural effects, with the exception of the latent factor “attitudes toward (refugees / Muslims / foreigners / Sinti and Roma)”, which was switched for each model. The four groups that

were asked about a different minority group were randomly assigned and not systematically different in any way. All variables in all four models showed sufficient discriminant validity and had standardized factor loadings of at least .40 (Table 4.1).

**Table 4.1:** *Standardized factor loadings for all models*

Dimension	Item	Standardized factor loading in model:				Time point
		Muslims	Foreigners	Refugees	Sinti/Roma	
Universalism	T1-U1	.759 (.037)	.814 (.051)	.778 (.035)	.642 (.044)	T1
	T1-U2	.621 (.033)	.444 (.038)	.534 (.031)	.541 (.041)	
	T3-U1	.775 (.036)	.895 (.056)	.745 (.033)	.732 (.044)	T3
	T3-U2	.616 (.032)	.534 (.039)	.552 (.033)	.598 (.040)	
Conservation	T1-C1	.527 (.033)	.482 (.037)	.619 (.036)	.488 (.032)	T1
	T1-C2	.584 (.035)	.589 (.042)	.568 (.035)	.646 (.035)	
	T1-C3	.513 (.034)	.562 (.046)	.448 (.037)	.590 (.035)	
	T3-C1	.577 (.033)	.490 (.038)	.624 (.037)	.504 (.032)	T3
	T3-C2	.656 (.035)	.585 (.046)	.601 (.037)	.723 (.034)	
	T3-C3	.563 (.033)	.550 (.040)	.471 (.035)	.592 (.034)	
Attitudes toward Muslims / foreigners / refugees / Sinti and Roma	T2-M1	.876 (.017)	.852 (.020)	.834 (.018)	.829 (.022)	T2
	T2-M2	.942 (.018)	.920 (.020)	.927 (.017)	.948 (.023)	
	T4-M1	.850 (.018)	.819 (.021)	.818 (.018)	.853 (.022)	T4
	T4-M2	.942 (.018)	.873 (.022)	.911 (.019)	.956 (.022)	

*Note.* N = 860 (Muslim-model)/ 845 (foreigner-model)/ 849 (refugee-model) / 845 (Sinti/Roma-model);  $p < 0.001$  (two-tailed test) for all factor loadings. Standard errors in parentheses.

The issue of comparability of the latent constructs over time was addressed by testing longitudinal measurement invariance. Invariance testing in longitudinal data involves ensuring that an indicator of a construct maintains its relationship with the other indicators of the same construct over time (Little, 2013). For all four models, partial scalar invariance was reached, which is a higher invariance level than the minimum requirement for a comparison of structural effects, called metric invariance (Vandenberg and Lance, 2000). Scalar invariance means that not only do the factor loadings of the constructs remain stable over time (metric invariance) but the intercepts of the indicators also remain the same. This level of invariance was given in all four models, with the exception of one indicator (Item C2: *“It is important for him/her to live in a strong state that can defend its citizens”*), which showed only metric and not scalar invariance. However, this level of invariance also allows for testing the structural effects by using chi-square difference tests. Those are necessary to check whether the quasi-cross-lagged effects of universalism and conservation on attitudes toward minorities were significantly different from the effects of attitudes on these values.

Overall, the data supported the hypothesized models as well as the partial scalar invariance, as indicated by the model fit statistics: model 1 (Muslims): CFI = .972, RMSEA = .048,  $\chi^2 = 200.403$ ,  $df = 68$ ; model 2 (foreigners): CFI = .964, RMSEA = .051,  $\chi^2 = 217.277$ ,  $df = 68$ ; model 3 (refugees): CFI = .969, RMSEA = .048,  $\chi^2 = 203.091$ ,  $df = 68$ ; model 4 (Sinti and Roma): CFI = .975, RMSEA = .042,  $\chi^2 = 167.328$ ,  $df = 68$ .

## **4.5 Results**

### **4.5.1 Descriptive results**

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 report the means and standard deviations for basic human values and attitudes toward the different minorities. The means of the universalism items are higher than those of the items measuring conservation. Not only is universalism the value with the highest importance on average, but it is also the value with the least variation across response categories. The means and frequency distributions of the attitudes toward minorities show that, on average, none of the minorities are perceived as predominantly positive or negative. With means ranging between 2.79 (T2-SR1: “How would you assess Sinti and Roma in Germany overall?”) and 3.19 (T2-F1: “How would you describe your feelings

toward foreigners in Germany in general?”), attitudes toward all minorities seem to be balanced. However, slight differences can be seen because Sinti and Roma are continuously the most negatively rated group, and the most unspecified outgroup, foreigners, is rated more positively than the other groups.

**Table 4.2:** *Wording of the items of the GESIS Panel Human Values Scale*

Value	Item name	Question wording	Mean (SD)
		We will now describe different persons. Please read every description and think about how similar the person is to you. Please state how similar the person is to you.	
Universalism	T1-U1	It is important for him/her to be tolerant toward other people and social groups.	4.66 (1.086)
	T3-U1		4.58 (1.063)
	T1-U2	It is important for him/her that all people, even strangers, are treated fairly.	4.77 (1.040)
	T3-U2		4.77 (1.002)
Conservation	T1-C1	It is important for him/her to preserve traditional values and convictions.	4.11 (1.210)
	T3-C1		4.09 (1.211)
	T1-C2	It is important for him/her to live in a strong state that can defend its citizens.	4.13 (1.272)
	T3-C2		4.34 (1.224)
	T1-C3	It is important for him/her to obey the law.	4.21 (1.175)
	T3-C3		4.26 (1.167)

*Note.* 1 = Is not at all similar to me, 2 = Is not similar to me, 3 = Is just slightly similar to me, 4 = Is fairly similar to me, 5 = Is similar to me, 6 = Is very similar to me T1 = 09/2015, T3 = 09/2016

#### 4.5.2 Robustness

The effects of the control models, including the sociodemographic variables, were in line with previous findings that showed the influence of these variables on human values and attitudes (see, e.g., Meuleman et al., 2012). Attitudes toward the four groups were mostly influenced by age and religiosity (both positive), universalism was influenced by female gender, education (both positive) and left self-placement on the political orientation scale, and conservation was influenced by age, religiosity (both positive), and right placement on the political orientation scale (All effects of sociodemographic control variables on attitudes and values are given in appendix Tables 4.7-4.10).

**Table 4.3:** *Wording of the items measuring attitudes toward minorities*

Attitudes toward:	Item	Question Wording	Mean (SD)	Frequencies (%)				
				1 = very negative	2 = rather negative	3 = neutral	4 = rather positive	5 = very positive
<b>Muslims</b>	T2-M1	How would you assess Muslims in Germany overall?	2.98 (.742)	1.9	20.3	58.6	16.5	2.7
	T4-M1		2.94 (.737)	2.4	21.0	58.5	16.1	2.0
	T2-M2	How would you describe your feelings toward Muslims in Germany in general?	3.00 (.782)	2.3	20.3	56.2	17.8	3.4
	T4-M2		2.97 (.739)	2.9	18.1	61.0	15.7	2.3
<b>Foreigners</b>	T2-F1	How would you assess foreigners in Germany overall?	3.15 (.761)	1.7	15.0	52.0	28.9	2.4
	T4-F1		3.17 (.672)	1.3	10.0	60.8	26.3	1.7
	T2-F2	How would you describe your feelings toward foreigners in Germany in general?	3.19 (.769)	1.5	13.8	52.4	28.8	3.5
	T4-F2		3.16 (.685)	1.4	9.6	63.4	22.7	2.9
<b>Refugees</b>	T2-R1	How would you assess refugees in Germany overall?	3.11 (.777)	2.1	16.7	52.2	26.6	2.5
	T4-R1		3.04 (.701)	1.2	17.2	59.8	19.9	1.8
	T2-R2	How would you describe your feelings toward refugees in Germany in general?	3.18 (.810)	1.8	15.6	49.9	28.2	4.4
	T4-R2		3.07 (.743)	1.2	18.0	56.2	21.9	2.7
<b>Sinti &amp; Roma</b>	T2-SR1	How would you assess Sinti and Roma in Germany overall?	2.79 (.617)	2.4	23.1	68.4	5.0	1.1
	T4-SR1		2.82 (.722)	5.8	18.6	64.6	10.1	.9
	T2-SR2	How would you describe your feelings toward Sinti and Roma in Germany in general?	2.86 (.635)	2.0	20.8	68.2	7.5	1.5
	T4-SR2		2.84 (.757)	5.7	19.1	62.4	11.0	1.7

Note. T2 = 05/2016, T4 = 11/2016

Including or excluding the sociodemographic variables had no impact on the substantive results of the models, which supports the robustness of the empirical relationship between values and attitudes (For improved readability, the results of the models including the sociodemographic variables are not reported in the text. For the full results including all control variables, see appendix Table 4.11).

### 4.5.3 Main results

**Hypothesis 1:** Values are more stable than attitudes over time.

When we examine the stability of values compared to attitudes (Table 4.4, visualized in Figure 4.3), we can see in all four models that the autoregressive effects of the values of universalism and conservation (ranging between .710 and .905) are almost always stronger than the autoregressive effects of attitudes toward minorities (.519 to .705). There is only one exception: in the model of attitudes toward Muslims, the autoregressive effect of attitudes is not significantly different from the autoregressive effect of universalism when applying chi-square difference testing ( $\Delta\chi^2 = 0.669$ ,  $df(1)$ ,  $p > .10$ ). Despite this one deviant effect, there is good empirical evidence for the theoretical assumption of values being stable over time and situations. Furthermore, when we take into account the time gap of one year between the measurements of values (T1 to T3) versus the gap of only six months between the measurements of attitudes (T2 to T4), this supports the hypothesis that values are more stable than attitudes overall. This argument is even stronger when considering the possible effects of panel conditioning (Sturgis et al., 2009). Panel conditioning means that attitude or value items become more reliable and more stable with each measurement because they may be influenced by the interviews conducted in previous waves. This influence should be stronger in the measurement of attitudes because they are measured in a much shorter time period than values.


**Hypothesis 2:** Universalism has a positive effect on attitudes toward minority groups.

Regarding the effects of values on attitudes, universalism always has a strong positive effect on attitudes toward all minorities (see Table 4.5). This finding is true both for the initial effect from T1 to T2 (ranging between .421 and .608) and for the cross-lagged effect that explained a *change* in attitudes (T3 to T4: between .168 and .295) (see Table 4.6). The



effect is larger at T1 to T2 because it does not control for the stability of attitudes as in T3 to T4. In other words, an individual who highly prioritizes universalism is more likely to have a positive attitude toward different minorities. Additionally, if an individual changes his/her attitude toward a minority in a positive way, universalism can explain this change to a certain degree. This effect is especially true for refugees (as seen in Figure 4.3, the model in the lower left corner). In this group, universalism had the greatest effect on attitudes (T1→T2: .608 / T3→T4: .295). The major goal of people with universalist values is that all people are treated equally and that there is social justice. Therefore, it makes sense that attitudes toward refugees would be strongly influenced by such motivations because this minority is most associated with unfair and unequal living conditions from which they are fleeing.

**Figure 4.3:** Standardized initial, autoregressive and cross-lagged effects of all four models



**Table 4.4:** Standardized autoregressive effects from T1 to T3 and T2 to T4

Model	Effects	Standardized effect	Chi-square difference, df(1)	p
Muslims	UNI (T1) →UNI (T3)	.731*** (.037)	0.669	n.s.
	ATT (T2) →ATT (T4)	.705*** (.030)		
	CON (T1) →CON (T3)	.790*** (.031)	10.543	<.01
	ATT (T2) →ATT (T4)	.705*** (.030)		
Foreigners	UNI (T1) →UNI (T3)	.905*** (.037)	63.712	<.01
	ATT (T2) →ATT (T4)	.614*** (.039)		
	CON (T1) →CON (T3)	.795*** (.033)	19.427	<.01
	ATT (T2) →ATT (T4)	.614*** (.039)		
Refugees	UNI (T1) →UNI (T3)	.740*** (.040)	15.964	<.01
	ATT (T2) →ATT (T4)	.546*** (.050)		
	CON (T1) →CON (T3)	.823*** (.033)	31.836	<.01
	ATT (T2) →ATT (T4)	.546*** (.050)		
Sinti / Roma	UNI (T1) →UNI (T3)	.710*** (.044)	3.989	<.05
	ATT (T2) →ATT (T4)	.519*** (.039)		
	CON (T1) →CON (T3)	.811*** (.030)	10.375	<.01
	ATT (T2) →ATT (T4)	.519*** (.039)		

Note. \*\*\*P<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Hypothesis 3:** Conservation has a negative effect on attitudes toward minority groups.

Like universalism, conservation has a strong effect on all attitudes toward minorities but in the opposite direction. As expected, this higher-order value, which includes tradition, conformity and security, increases negative attitudes toward outgroups. For all four groups, conservation has negative effects from T1 to T2 (-.177 to -.370) (see Table 4.5) and from T3 to T4 (-.063 to -.146) (see Table 4.6), although the effect sizes are slightly smaller than those for universalism. The strongest effect is found for attitudes toward refugees (-.370). It seems that in the German context, refugees are strongly perceived as a threat to existing cultural norms and traditions. In contrast, conservation has the weakest effect on attitudes toward foreigners (-.177), which underlines the very different perception of this group.

Compared to refugees, foreigners are not perceived as newcomers but rather as people who have been established in German society for a long time (Wasmer et al., 2018).

**Table 4.5:** *Initial effects of values on attitudes (T1 to T2)*

Model	Effects	Standardized effect
Muslims	UNI (T1) → ATT (T2)	0.490*** (.041)
	CON (T1) → ATT (T2)	-0.309*** (.048)
Foreigners	UNI (T1) → ATT (T2)	0.463*** (.043)
	CON (T1) → ATT (T2)	-0.177*** (.048)
Refugees	UNI (T1) → ATT (T2)	0.608*** (.044)
	CON (T1) → ATT (T2)	-0.370*** (.048)
Sinti /	UNI (T1) → ATT (T2)	0.421*** (.052)
Roma	CON (T1) → ATT (T2)	-0.228*** (.052)

Note. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

**Hypothesis 4:** Values and attitudes both have effects on each other over time.

Overall, we can see that for conservation and universalism, there is not only an effect of values on attitudes but also vice versa. All cross-lagged effects between T2 and T3 (attitudes on values) as well as T3 to T4 (values on attitudes) are significant (Table 4.6). Therefore, values and attitudes build a self-reinforcing loop of reciprocal causation over time.

**Hypothesis 5:** The effect of values on attitudes is stronger than vice versa.

It was assumed that the effects of values on attitudes over time (T3 to T4) would be larger than the opposite condition (T2 to T3). Despite the fact that the standardized effects of values on attitudes (e.g. Muslim model:  $\beta = .190$ ,  $p < .001$  /  $\beta = -.063$ ,  $p < .05$ ) were slightly larger than the opposite ( $\beta = .117$ ,  $p < .001$  /  $\beta = -.054$ ,  $p < .05$ ), the strict statistical tests implied that this small difference was not significant (e.g. Muslim model:  $\Delta\chi^2 = 0.011$ ,  $df(1)$ ,  $p > .10$ ;  $\Delta\chi^2 = 0.468$ ,  $df(1)$ ,  $p > .10$ ) (see Table 4.6). Therefore, it seems that there is no unambiguous direction of causality. Instead, the empirical results suggest that values and attitudes have a similar influence on each other over time.

**Table 4.6:** *Cross-lagged effects from T2 to T3 and from T3 to T4*

Model	Effects	Standardized effect	Chi-square difference, df(1)	p
Muslims	ATT (T2) →UNI (T3)	.117*** (.025)	0.011	n.s.
	UNI (T3) →ATT (T4)	.190*** (.036)		
	ATT (T2) →CON (T3)	-.054* (.025)	0.468	n.s.
	CON (T3) →ATT (T4)	-.063* (.029)		
Foreigners	ATT (T2) →UNI (T3)	.063** (.020)	2.187	n.s.
	UNI (T3) →ATT (T4)	.168*** (.042)		
	ATT (T2) →CON (T3)	-.089** (.032)	0.175	n.s.
	CON (T3) →ATT (T4)	-.083** (.030)		
Refugees	ATT (T2) →UNI (T3)	.166*** (.035)	0.137	n.s.
	UNI (T3) →ATT (T4)	.295*** (.050)		
	ATT (T2) →CON (T3)	-.066** (.025)	0.112	n.s.
	CON (T3) →ATT (T4)	-.106** (.038)		
Sinti / Roma	ATT (T2) →UNI (T3)	.150*** (.029)	0.089	n.s.
	UNI (T3) →ATT (T4)	.274*** (.043)		
	ATT (T2) →CON (T3)	-.118*** (.027)	0.370	n.s.
	CON (T3) →ATT (T4)	-.146*** (.033)		

Note. \*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ . Standard errors in parentheses.

## 4.6 Conclusions

Values are described as “[...] desirable transsituational goals [...] that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person [...]” (Schwartz, 1994: 21) and are usually viewed as stable across time and situations (Rokeach, 1973). However, past research has shown that values can change during life transitions (Bardi et al., 2014) and through the process of consistency maintenance (Bardi and Goodwin, 2011). Empirical studies also suggest that values can be influenced by traits (Vecchione et al., 2019), beliefs (Goodwin et al., 2012) and behavior (Vecchione et al., 2016; Fischer, 2017). Despite this evidence, the interrela-

tion of attitudes and values over time has rarely been studied directly in previous research (Bardi et al., 2014).

The present study investigated the associations between values and different outgroup attitudes over time. In this regard, the study had three main goals. First, it examined the stability of basic human values and attitudes toward minorities. Second, it examined the interrelation of values and attitudes toward different outgroups in Germany over time. Third, it investigated whether the direction of causality between attitudes and values over time is unidirectional or bidirectional.

This was accomplished by using German panel data in which participants were divided into different groups and asked about four different minorities. Both values and attitudes were included in two waves but were not measured at the same time, meaning that four different panel waves were used. With this design, it was possible to take a closer look at the stability of values and attitudes over time and to compare their effects on each other at different measurement points. To accomplish this goal, four different quasi-cross-lagged models were estimated that examined the effects of the values of conservation and universalism on attitudes toward refugees, Muslims, foreigners and Sinti and Roma.

In line with previous findings (Bardi et al., 2014; Vecchione et al., 2016), the current study showed that values are, as expected, more stable over time than attitudes toward minorities. In the examined time frame of fourteen months between 2015 and 2016, values seemed to be more stable over time and situations. This finding is further supported when we take into account the longer time gap of one year between the measurements of values (T1 to T3) versus the gap of only six months between the measurements of attitudes (T2 to T4).

The values of universalism and conservation also have strong effects on outgroup attitudes. For attitudes toward refugees, the initial effects of values were particularly strong. This may be because this group is more relevant for the realization of the values of universalism and conservation than the other groups.

Universalism generally represents the motivational goal of social justice and equality of all human beings. Therefore, attitudes toward refugees are strongly influenced by such motivations because this minority is probably most associated with unfair and unequal living conditions from which they are fleeing. The remarkable voluntary commitment of civil society to help refugees (Karakayali and Kleist, 2015) can most likely be seen as an expression of strong universalist values.

On the other hand, conservation represents the need to protect the culture and traditions of the autochthonous population. As the assaults on refugee accommodations, violence against refugees and right-wing propaganda about “foreign infiltration” (Küpper et al., 2016) have shown, many German citizens seem to be afraid to lose their culture when too many newcomers enter the country.

Not only are attitudes toward minorities strongly influenced by conservation and universalism, but attitudes also have a “feedback” effect on values. Values are generally defined in such a way that they have great causal significance. Values structure people’s cognitive architecture and guide behavior and thoughts, but it seems that this process does not work exclusively in one direction. Some authors have shown a connection between values and behavior (e.g., Fischer, 2017; Cieciuch, 2017; Vecchione et al., 2016) in which the latter can cause changes in values. The same appears to be true for attitudes and values. Causality between values and attitudes is bidirectional; therefore, they build a self-reinforcing loop of reciprocal causation over time. This reciprocal relationship occurs for all groups, which shows that the results are generalizable and not connected to a specific type of outgroup attitude. These findings support the idea that values change due to consistent and repeated pattern of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that individuals experience across situations (Bernard et al., 2003). In return, those values then influence thoughts, feelings and behavior again. This interdependency should be considered in future research about the influence of values on attitudes.

Given the continuing increase in immigration around the world and the accompanying widespread right-wing populism throughout Europe, it is critical to understand the genesis of negative attitudes toward minority groups. This study may provide some advice in this regard. Given their stability, values can be good predictors of outgroup attitudes, even in times of great societal change. Education about values such as universalism should therefore start in early ages of childhood and should continue throughout adolescence, which will have a long-term effect on individuals’ value hierarchies. The present findings also show the importance of *both* values *and* outgroup attitudes to achieve long-term effects. Moreover, the reciprocal interrelation of values and attitudes is applicable to different outgroup attitudes. Because attitudes and values influence each other over time, it is probably not sufficient to promote only universalist values or only positive outgroup attitudes. Political measures should focus on fostering both if they aim to create a long-lasting outgroup-friendly atmosphere within the population.

### 4.6.1 Limitations

This study has some limitations. First, the conclusions regarding the longitudinal relationship between values and attitudes are limited because they are based on a single study. The results observed in the present study cannot be generalized to earlier periods of the life course. It is important for future studies to track this relation over different developmental periods. For example, different results might be observed at earlier ages, such as in middle childhood, when conceptions of desirability are formed and progressively differentiate into a structure that is similar to that found in adults (Uzefovsky et al., 2016).

Second, the model used in the present study could not disentangle the within-person process from stable between-person differences. With more and simultaneous points of measurement, a random intercept cross-lagged panel model could be used that separates within-person changes from between-person differences (Hamaker et al., 2015).

Third, the strength of the relation between values and traits may depend upon the selected time interval between measurements (Luhmann et al., 2014). If we want to more deeply examine the reciprocal relationship between attitudes and values, further research could profit from even more panel waves that go beyond four points of measurement. Additionally, with a different data structure, such as a simultaneous measurement of values and attitudes in the same waves, other types of analysis would be possible (Voelkle et al, 2012), and the interpretation of the cross-lagged effects would be more accurate.

Additionally, it would be desirable to test the generalizability of the findings across different populations and cultural contexts. We know that value priorities may vary with various life conditions and across social and cultural contexts (Schwartz, 2012). The next step could be to compare these results, which are specific to the German population, with other European countries to see whether the values that were used here work the same way with regard to attitudes toward different minorities.

It is hoped that future research will take a deeper look at the relationship between out-group attitudes and values because an understanding of this mechanism is essential for permanent and stable social cohesion in modern multicultural societies.

## 4.7 Appendix

**Table 4.7:** *Effects of sociodemographic control variables on attitudes toward refugees*

	Attitudes tw. refugees T2	Universalism T1	Conservation T1
Gender	-.055	.098*	.046
Income	.056	.002	-.023
Age	.139**	.061	.251***
Left-right- orientation	.088	-.346***	.253***
Religion	.127**	.099*	.154**
Education	.069	.125**	-.090

Note. \*\*\* $P < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$

**Table 4.8:** *Effects of sociodemographic control variables on attitudes toward Muslims*

	Attitudes tw. Muslims T2	Universalism T1	Conservation T1
Gender	-.007	.202***	.135**
Income	.057	.074	.119*
Age	-.036	.052	.175***
Left/right orientation	-.037	-.242***	.292***
Religion	.143***	.074	.129**
Education	-.065	.104*	-.223***

Note. \*\*\* $P < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$

**Table 4.9:** *Effects of sociodemographic control variables on attitudes toward foreigners*

	Attitudes tw. foreigners T2	Universalism T1	Conservation T1
Gender	-.048	.122**	.074
Income	.093	.083	.107*
Age	.137**	.051	.210***
Left/right orientation	-.034	-.301***	.289***
Religion	.120***	.122**	.183**
Education	.044	.152**	-.145**

Note. \*\*\* $P < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$



**Table 4.10:** *Effects of sociodemographic control variables on attitudes toward Sinti/Roma*

	Attitudes Sinti & Roma T2	tw. T1	Universalism T1	Conservation T1
Gender	.018		.148**	.002
Income	.035		-.056	.039
Age	.100*		.036	.145**
Left/right orientation	-.038		-.332***	.154**
Religion	.116**		.120**	.174***
Education	-.067		.164**	-.165***

Note. \*\*\*P<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05

**Table 4.11:** *Standardized autoregressive and quasi-cross-lagged effects of all four models with control variables*

		Universalism T3	Conservation T3	T2: Attitudes toward:			
				Refugees	Muslims	Foreigners	Sinti & Roma
Refugees	Universalism T1	.766***		.642***			
	Conservation T1		.854***	-.450***			
	Attitudes tw. refugees T2	.142***	-.045*	1			
	Attitudes tw. refugees T4	.254***	-.073*	.585***			
Muslims	Universalism T1	.755***			.420***		
	Conservation T1		.785***		-.284***		
	Attitudes tw. Muslims T2	.103***	-.050*		1		
	Attitudes tw. Muslims T4	.186***	-.068*		.705***		
Foreigners	Universalism T1	.904***				.455***	
	Conservation T1		.812***			-.228***	
	Attitudes tw. foreigners T2	.068***	-.065*			1	
	Attitudes tw. foreigners T4	.168***	-.070*			.624***	
Sinti & Roma	Universalism T1	.735***					.414***
	Conservation T1		.832***				-.282***
	Attitudes tw. Sinti & Roma T2	.149***	-.107***				1
	Attitudes tw. Sinti & Roma T4	.269***	-.145***				.523***

\*\*\*P<.001, \*\*p<.01, \*p<.05

gray background: cross-lagged effects

underlined: autoregressive effects

# 5 Exploring the Differential Effects of Perceived Threat on Attitudes toward Ethnic Minority Groups in Germany

With Alexander Jedinger

(GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne, Germany)

Published in *Frontiers in Psychology* (2020), Vol. 10 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02895

**Keywords:** ethnic prejudice, differentiated threat, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation

**Abstract:** Adopting a differentiated threat approach, we investigated the relationship between cultural, economic, and criminal threat on attitudes toward four different ethnic minorities in Germany (Muslims, foreigners, refugees, and Sinti and Roma). We hypothesized that the effect of different types of intergroup threats on ethnic prejudice varies with the perceived characteristics of minority groups. Using a representative sample of German adults, we found that cultural and economic threat primarily predicted attitudes toward Muslims and foreigners, while criminal threat played a minor role in attitude formation among the majority population. For refugees and Sinti and Roma, all three types of intergroup threats were found to be equally important for the prediction of attitudes toward these minority groups. These results are only partially in line with the culture-specific threat profiles of these minority groups in the German context. Therefore, we discuss the tenability of the differentiated threat approach to explain the genesis of ethnic prejudice in different cultural contexts.

## 5.1 Introduction

Right-wing populist parties and candidates often evoke threat scenarios to fuel anti-immigrant sentiments and spark opposition to policies that favor minorities (Jetten et al., 2017; Schmuck and Matthes, 2017). Depending on the national and historical context, minorities are framed as an economic, existential or cultural threat to the host society to mobilize support for anti-minority positions. For instance, during the 2017 federal election campaign in Germany, the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) warned against Muslim migrants as a danger to democracy, safety and shared cultural values (Biskamp, 2018). These types of populist appeals are often based on the (implicit) assumption that people have different sensitivities to qualitatively different types of threats. While the impact of perceived threats on ethnic prejudices is well documented (Riek et al., 2006), there is a lack of research on the differential effect of threatening cues on specific out-group attitudes.

In the present study, we examine the relative impact of cultural, economic and security threat perceptions on hostility toward different minority groups in Germany (Muslims, foreigners, refugees, and Sinti and Roma). Based on a differentiated threat approach (Meuleman et al., 2017; Meuleman et al., 2019), we explore whether the primacy of different kinds of threats in explaining prejudice is outgroup-specific because minority groups can differ in the extent to which they subjectively threaten the cultural, economic and security-related interests of the majority group.

## 5.2 Perceived Threat and Ethnic Prejudice

In recent years, intergroup threat theory (ITT; Stephan et al., 2016) has emerged as an important framework to understand the role of threatening cues in the genesis of ethnic prejudice. The ITT distinguishes between two basic sources of threat perceptions: realistic and symbolic interests. Realistic threats refer to threats to physical safety, material resources or social status caused by outgroups, while symbolic threats pertain to threats to the moral beliefs and values of in-groups. Past research has shown that perceived realistic and symbolic threats are among the most important predictors of prejudice against ethnic minorities (Riek et al., 2006). Intergroup threat is associated with greater resentment to-

ward newly arriving immigrants (e.g., Stephan et al., 1998;Stephan et al., 1999;Croucher, 2013) as well as resident minority groups (e.g., Stephan et al., 2002;González et al., 2008). Although Stephan et al. (2016) recognize that different types of minority groups may elicit distinct threat perceptions, differential threat effects on out-group hostility have rarely been systematically tested (for exceptions, see Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005;Cottrell et al., 2010;Hellwig and Sinno, 2017;de Rooij et al., 2018). Instead, past research has often focused on whether symbolic or realistic types of threats are generally more important in explaining ethnic resentments independent of the specific characteristics of out-groups (e.g., Sniderman et al., 2004;McLaren and Johnson, 2007;González et al., 2008).

Based on earlier approaches like the dual-process motivational model (Duckitt, 2001) and the stereotype content model (Cuddy et al., 2008) that traced the origins of prejudice to specific intergroup relations, the differentiated threat model (DTM; Meuleman et al., 2017;Meuleman et al., 2019) holds that minority groups can be categorized based on the perceived nature of the threat they pose. By combining the realistic and symbolic dimensions, Meuleman et al. (2019) derived a three-fold group typology. *Deviant groups* are perceived as challenging the established social order and values of a society but do not represent an economic threat (e.g., LGBT). *Competing groups* are believed to strive for the redistribution of scarce resources such as jobs, affordable housing and transfer payments but do not violate accepted cultural norms (e.g., poor people). Finally, *dissident groups* are seen as a relevant threat to in-groups' materials resources and are simultaneously suspected to undermine shared moral values and beliefs (e.g., immigrants). According to the DTM, specific segments of the in-group may be disproportionately influenced by different types of threat perceptions, which in turn depend on the context in which concerns about distinct outgroups are framed. For example, majority group members who hold socio-economic positions similar to those of low-skilled immigrants are more likely to experience realistic threat and to oppose redistributive policies because they compete for the same welfare state resources (van der Waal et al., 2010).

Using representative survey data from Belgium, Meuleman et al.(2019) showed that socio-economic status variables, group relative deprivation and traditional gender role attitudes have distinct effects on prejudice toward sexual and ethnic minority groups that are partly in accordance with a theoretical analysis of the threat profile of each group in the Belgian context. Anti-immigrant sentiments, for example, are more strongly predicted by social class, while anti-Semitism is more strongly related to religious involvement. The overall pattern of results, however, is not entirely in line with the predictions generated

from the DTM, which might be because threat perceptions were not directly measured (see also Meuleman et al., 2017).<sup>25</sup>

In our view, another limitation is that research within the ITT and DTM frameworks has either subsumed threats to the well-being and safety of in-group members under realistic threats or ignored the distinct effect of security concerns in the formation of prejudice. Previous research, however, has demonstrated that concerns about crime and/or terrorism are a qualitatively distinct type of threat that explains ethnic resentments above and beyond cultural and economic considerations (McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Abrams et al., 2017; de Rooij et al., 2018; Ward, 2018). Therefore, we believe that the inclusion of security threats allows a more differentiated picture of threat profiles and thus provides better insight into the emergence of ethnic prejudices.

An advantage of the DTM is that the model offers the possibility to combine the personality-oriented approach with a context-specific approach to explain prejudices. A central tenet of the dual-process motivational model (Duckitt, 2001) is that negative attitudes toward outgroups are rooted in two generalized ideological orientations: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994). Authoritarianism refers to an ideological belief system which is characterized by obedience to authorities, conformity to legitimate norms within a society, and aggressiveness to individuals who deviate from these rules. Social dominance describes the belief that the relationships between social groups should be hierarchically organized and that the in-group should be superior to and dominate out-groups. While authoritarianism is primarily concerned with the interrelatedness of social groups, social domination deals with the distribution of power and resources between social groups. Duckitt and Sibley (2007) suggest that RWA primarily predicts prejudice towards outgroups that are perceived to challenge the prevailing normative order or deviant groups in the terminology of the DTM. In contrast, SDO explains prejudice toward groups that try to undermine the dominance and power relations between groups in society or competing groups from the perspective of the DTM. Thus, both RWA and SDO influence prejudice through different threat perceptions, which adds further distal explanatory factors to the DTM.

---

<sup>25</sup> This is surprising because the survey data they use (2008 European Values Study, Belgian drop-off questionnaire) include threat-related items, at least for immigrants and Muslims (see Meuleman et al., 2019: p. 230).

### 5.3 The Present Study

In this study, we extend the work of Meuleman et al. (2019) by directly measuring the effect of subjective threat on four specific minority groups (Muslims, foreigners, refugees, and Sinti and Roma) and additionally consider the role of fear of crime as a qualitatively distinct type of intergroup threat. Furthermore, we examine RWA and SDO as dispositional antecedents of threat perceptions.

To derive testable hypotheses from the DTM, it is first necessary to analyze the cultural, economic and security contexts in which ethnic prejudices arise. In the German context, Islamophobic threat narratives focus on the infiltration of German culture by aggressive political Islam as well as fear of terrorist activities (Biskamp, 2018). Foreigners are closely associated with third-generation Turkish labor migrants (Asbrock et al., 2014), who are perceived as competitors in the labor market as well as a threat to cultural values. Terrorism, crime and the spread of Islam in Germany are associated with the term “refugee” (Infratest dimap, 2017). Finally, safety and economic concerns play a prominent role in negative attitudes toward Sinti and Roma, who are often devaluated as “social parasites”, “beggars” and “criminals” in the public discourse (Center for Research on Anti-Semitism and Institute for Prejudice and Conflict Research, 2014;End, 2017).

In summary, we hypothesize that prejudice toward Muslims is more strongly related to cultural threat than to economic competition or crime-related perceptions (Hypothesis 1).<sup>26</sup> We expect that anti-foreigner prejudice is more strongly associated with economic and cultural threat, while fear of crime should play a minor role (Hypothesis 2). Attitudes toward refugees should be equally strongly determined by cultural and criminal threats but less determined by economic threats (Hypothesis 3). Finally, resentments toward Sinti and Roma should be more strongly related to economic and criminal threat than to cultural anxiety (Hypothesis 4).

To embed the DTM in a wider nomological network, we also explore whether perceptions of cultural, economic and criminal threats are affected differently by RWA and SDO. Recent research suggests that RWA and SDO increase the susceptibility to threatening cues, which in turn mediates the effect of ideological attitudes on prejudice (Duckitt, 2006;Duckitt and Sibley, 2007;Cohrs and Asbrock, 2009). That is, RWA is stronger corre-

---

<sup>26</sup> One could argue that terrorist activities are part of perceived criminal threat. Despite certain congruence, however, we assume that terrorism is probably another independent type of threat for which we unfortunately have no measures in the available data.

lated with attitudes toward groups that are perceived as socially deviant but not low in status, whereas SDO is more associated with prejudice toward groups perceived as socially subordinate (Duckitt, 2006; Asbrock et al., 2010). Previous findings also suggest that the effect of RWA and SDO on prejudice is, to a large extent, mediated by different threat perceptions that can be linked to different outgroups (Asbrock et al., 2012).

Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that individuals high in RWA will be more sensitive to threats toward cultural and safety interests (Hypothesis 5). By contrast, individuals high in SDO are more inclined to perceive threats to in-groups' material resources (Hypothesis 6). Finally, we expect that the effects of RWA and SDO on prejudice are fully mediated by cultural, economic and criminal threats (Hypotheses 7 and 8).

## 5.4 Method

In the present study, we use data from two waves of the GESIS Online Panel (GESIS, 2017). The GESIS Online Panel is an academically driven bi-monthly survey that collects information about political and social issues among a representative sample of German-speaking adults aged 18 to 70 years. The initial sample was drawn from municipal population registers using a geographically stratified probability method. Prospective panel members were offered an incentive in exchange for participation in subsequent panel waves, which included computer-assisted web interviews or mailed paper questionnaires to those without Internet access or those who preferred not to participate online (for methodological details, see Bosnjak et al., 2018). The May 2016 wave ( $N = 3356$ ) included measures of RWA and SDO, while the November 2017 wave ( $N = 2858$ ) included measures of threat perceptions and attitudes toward multiple minority groups (Muslims, refugees, Sinti and Roma and foreigners). Thus, the data offer the opportunity to test our hypotheses with a diverse sample of participants and to simultaneously take advantage of the panel structure by using variables from different waves that reflect the assumed causal ordering of variables in our theoretical model.

### 5.4.1 Participants

Only participants who completed both waves of the panel surveys were included in the analysis. We removed participants with a migration background or membership in the Islamic community, which left a total of 2301 participants.<sup>27</sup> The mean age of the subsample was 51.5 years ( $SD = 13.4$ ), and 50.6 percent were male.<sup>28</sup> The majority of respondents (45.4 percent) held a university or technical college entrance qualification, 36.1 percent held an intermediary secondary qualification, and 18.5 percent held the lowest secondary qualification in the German education system (including no school-leaving certificate). The modal response for monthly household income was from €2300 to €3200 Euros (21.0 percent).

### 5.4.2 Measures

The wordings of all items and descriptive statistics are provided in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 of the appendix.

**Ideological Attitudes.** Participants completed a three-item right-wing authoritarianism measure adapted from the German KSA-3 scale (Beierlein et al., 2014a) that addresses the major facets of authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission and conventionalism. Social dominance orientation was measured using four items that were specifically designed for the GESIS Online Panel (Beierlein et al., 2014b). The four items tap into two aspects of SDO, namely SDO-Dominance, which means the preference for some groups to dominate others, and SDO-Egalitarianism, which is a preference for non-egalitarian inter-group relations (Ho et al., 2012). All items were rated on four-point response scales (1 = *disagree strongly*; 4 = *agree strongly*).

---

<sup>27</sup> Following Schenk et al. (2006), we categorize participants as migrants insofar as both parents were not born in Germany or the participant and at least one of the parents were not born in Germany. For reasons of data protection, the standard version of the GESIS Online Panel measured religious affiliation with four response categories: (1) 'No religious community', (2) 'Roman Catholic Church', (3) 'Protestant Free or Evangelic Church' and (4) 'Other religious community'. Therefore we included only participants with membership in Christian churches or no religious community and excluded the remaining participants from the analysis.

<sup>28</sup> The high mean age is due to the panel design of the study. The recruitment for the GESIS panel took place in 2013 and the items we used (including SDO and RWA) were included in 2016. Therefore, respondents are about 3 years older than they were at the start of the panel (see appendix Table 5.4 for a demographic comparison to the German Microcensus)



**Perceived Intergroup Threat.** Perceived cultural, economic, and criminal threat were each measured by one item from a larger battery about the perceived consequences of immigration. The introduction to this battery prompted participants to think about minorities in Germany. We selected three items referring to increasing crime rates by immigrants, threats to the German culture posed by immigrants and the extent to which immigrants are good for the German economy (1 = *agree strongly*; 5 = *disagree strongly*).<sup>29</sup>

**Attitudes toward Minorities.** Minority-related attitudes were measured by two items for each of the four minority groups. Those items were identical except for the referenced minority: (a) “How would you assess [Muslims/foreigners/refugees/Sinti and Roma] in Germany overall?” and (b) “How would you describe your feelings toward [Muslims/foreigners/refugees/Sinti and Roma] in Germany in general?”. Responses to both items were provided on a scale with values ranging from 1 (= *very negative*) to 5 (= *very positive*).

## 5.5 Results

The descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the variables included in this study are displayed in Table 5.1. The indicators of economic, cultural and criminal threats were strongly correlated, which suggests that they represent an underlying latent construct. However, despite their conceptual overlap, we contend that the items reflect different facets of intergroup threat that have distinct effects on group-specific prejudices.

To test our hypotheses, we employed a structural equation model (see Figure 5.1) with RWA (3 items), SDO (4 items) and attitudes toward the four minority groups (2 items each) as latent variables using Mplus Version 8.0 (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2017). For our analysis, we implemented the full information maximum likelihood estimator (FIML) to account for the non-normal character of some items and missing data (Schafer and Graham, 2002).<sup>30</sup> The final model fits the data very well [ $\chi^2(88) = 226.937$ , root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.026, comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.994] and

---

<sup>29</sup> This is based on the assumption that in the German context these four groups are indeed perceived by the majority as immigrants. We reran the analysis using group-specific threat items from another wave of the GESIS panel and obtained similar results to that reported below with the exception that there were no group-specific equivalents to criminal threat in that wave (see Table 5.11 in the appendix).

<sup>30</sup> Alternatively, the weighted least square mean and variance adjusted (WLSMV) estimator can be used in Mplus to account for non-normal ordinal data (Flora and Curran, 2004). Analyses with WLSMV revealed no substantial differences.

is also superior to alternative modeling approaches in terms of model fit (see Table 5.13 in the appendix).

**Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Study Variables**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. RWA									
2. SDO	0.36								
3. Economic Threat	0.32	0.27							
4. Cultural Threat	0.44	0.33	0.58						
5. Criminal Threat	0.43	0.31	0.55	0.75					
6. Attitude: Muslims	0.32	0.28	0.51	0.59	0.55				
7. Attitude: Foreigners	0.29	0.19	0.44	0.46	0.42	0.53			
8. Attitude: Refugees	0.34	0.28	0.55	0.61	0.60	0.64	0.62		
9. Attitude: Sinti & Roma	0.31	0.28	0.37	0.44	0.45	0.51	0.44	0.59	
M	2.75	1.91	2.81	2.74	3.20	3.20	2.86	3.14	3.46
SD	0.71	0.56	0.85	1.17	1.13	0.70	0.63	0.73	0.76


*Note.*  $N = \text{min. } 2,129$ . RWA = Right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = Social dominance orientation. Means and standard deviations for variables 1-2 and 6-9 are mean-scaled scores but were estimated as latent constructs in the main analysis. All correlations  $p < .001$ .

The standardized factor loadings of all items and reliability coefficients are presented in Table 5.10. in the appendix. All factor loadings of the items were equal to or greater than .50. The reliability coefficients were also sufficient with Cronbach's Alpha values above .70.<sup>31</sup> The standardized path coefficients for all direct effects are presented in Table 5.2.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> For information on thresholds of model fit, factor loadings and reliability, see Hair et al. (2014).

<sup>32</sup> We allowed residual covariances between (a) the group-based hierarchy and anti-egalitarianism facet of social dominance orientation (Ho et al., 2012), (b) cultural, criminal and economic threat, (c) attitudes toward Muslims, foreigners, refugees and Sinti/Roma, (d) the attitudinal items that had the same wording: "How

**Figure 5.1: Final Structural Equation Model**



*Note.* Residual covariances between the threat and prejudice variables were allowed but removed for ease of presentation (see Footnote 8).

Direct effects of RWA and SDO that are not depicted:

SDO → Att.tw. Muslims: .11\* (.04)

RWA → Att.tw. foreigners: .14\*\* (.04)

SDO → Att.tw. Sinti/Roma: .18\*\*\* (.05)

The results showed that all types of perceived threat had a significant positive effect on prejudice toward Muslims. More importantly, a chi-square difference test revealed that cultural threat exerted a significantly stronger effect on anti-Muslim prejudice than criminal threat ( $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 7.69, p = .006$ ). In contrast, the effect of cultural threat was not significantly different from the effect of economic competition ( $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 0.55, p = .460$ ), which provides only partial support for Hypothesis 1 that cultural factors dominate anti-Muslims attitudes.<sup>33</sup> As hypothesized, cultural and economic threats had a significantly stronger effect on attitudes toward foreigners than criminal threat (cultural vs. criminal,  $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 5.20, p = .023$ ; economic vs. criminal,  $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 26.13, p < .001$ ). We found that attitudes

---

would you assess [Muslims/foreigners/refugees/Sinti and Roma] in Germany overall?" and "How would you describe your feelings towards [Muslims/foreigners/refugees/Sinti and Roma] in Germany in general?"

<sup>33</sup> The complete results for the chi-square differences tests are provided in Table 5.8 in the appendix.

toward refugees are shaped by all three types of intergroup threats, and the effects are relatively similar in size. Although the effect of economic and cultural threats are significantly different from each other ( $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 3.94, p = .047$ ), this difference is not substantial in terms of effect size. Therefore, we conclude that this result partly supports Hypothesis 3. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, the effects of perceived cultural, economic and criminal threats on prejudice toward Sinti and Roma are not significantly different from each other ( $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 2.84, p = .092$ ).

**Table 5.2:** Direct Effects of RWA, SDO and Threat Perceptions on Minority Attitudes

	Attitudes toward							
	Muslims		Foreigners		Refugees		Sinti & Roma	
	Est. (SE)	95% CI	Est. (SE)	95% CI	Est. (SE)	95% CI	Est. (SE)	95% CI
RWA	-.01 (.04)	-.07;.05	.14** (.04)	.07;.21	.01 (.04)	-.05;.07	.06 (.04)	-.02;.12
SDO	.11* (.04)	.03;.18	-.04 (.05)	-.13;.04	.07 (.04)	.01;.14	.18*** (.05)	.11;.27
Economic Threat	.21*** (.03)	.17;.25	.26*** (.03)	.22;.31	.25*** (.02)	.22;.29	.11*** (.03)	.07;.16
Cultural Threat	.33*** (.03)	.28;.38	.22*** (.04)	.16;.28	.26*** (.03)	.21;.31	.12** (.03)	.06;.17
Criminal Threat	.18*** (.03)	.13;.23	.09* (.03)	.03;.14	.26*** (.03)	.22;.31	.21*** (.03)	.15;.26

*Note.* Entries are standardized path coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. RWA = Right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = Social dominance orientation. CI = Confidence interval. Explained variance: Muslims ( $R^2 = .47$ ), foreigners ( $R^2 = .32$ ), refugees ( $R^2 = .51$ ), Sinti and Roma ( $R^2 = .29$ ). \* $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Regarding the differential impact of RWA and SDO on intergroup threat, we found that RWA exerted significantly stronger effects on cultural ( $\beta = .39, SE = .04, p < .001$ ) and criminal threat ( $\beta = .41, SE = .04, p < .001$ ) than on perceived economic competition ( $\beta = .23, SE = .05, p < .001$ ), as hypothesized. The results of the difference test corroborate this finding ( $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 49.80, p < .001$ ).

**Table 5.3: Indirect Effects of RWA and SDO on Minority Attitudes**

	Attitudes toward							
	Muslims		Foreigners		Refugees		Sinti & Roma	
	Est. (SE)	95% BCI	Est. (SE)	95% BCI	Est. (SE)	95% BCI	Est. (SE)	95% BCI
<b>RWA</b>								
Indirect effects via								
Economic Threat	.05*** (.01)	.03;.07	.06*** (.01)	.04;.08	.06*** (.01)	.04;.08	.03** (.01)	.01;.04
Cultural Threat	.13*** (.02)	.10;.16	.09*** (.02)	.06;.12	.10*** (.02)	.08;.13	.05** (.02)	.02;.07
Criminal Threat	.07*** (.02)	.05;.10	.04* (.01)	.01;.06	.11*** (.02)	.08;.14	.08*** (.02)	.06;.11
Total indirect effect	.25*** (.03)	.20;.30	.18*** (.03)	.14;.22	.26*** (.03)	.21;.31	.15*** (.02)	.12;.19
Direct effect	-.01 (.04)	-.07;.05	.14** (.04)	.07;.21	.01 (.04)	-.05;.07	.06 (.04)	-.02;.12
Total effect	.24*** (.05)	.16;.32	.32*** (.05)	.24;.40	.28*** (.05)	.20;.35	.21*** (.05)	.13;.28
<b>SDO</b>								
Indirect effects via								
Economic Threat	.05*** (.01)	.03;.07	.07*** (.02)	.04;.09	.06*** (.02)	.04;.09	.03** (.01)	.02;.04
Cultural Threat	.08*** (.02)	.05;.11	.05*** (.01)	.03;.08	.06*** (.01)	.04;.09	.03** (.01)	.01;.05
Criminal Threat	.03** (.01)	.02;.05	.02* (.01)	.01;.03	.05*** (.01)	.03;.07	.04** (.01)	.02;.06
Total indirect effect	.16*** (.03)	.11;.21	.13*** (.03)	.09;.18	.17*** (.03)	.12;.23	.09*** (.02)	.06;.13
Direct effect	.11* (.04)	.03;.18	-.04 (.05)	-.13;.04	.07 (.04)	.01;.14	.18*** (.05)	.11;.27
Total effect	.27*** (.06)	.17;.36	.09 (.06)	-.01;.18	.24*** (.05)	.15;.33	.28*** (.05)	.19;.37

*Note.* Entries are standardized path coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. RWA = Right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = Social dominance orientation. BCI = Bootstrapped confidence interval.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

The hypothesis that SDO should be more strongly related to perceived economic threat is not supported by the results. SDO is significantly associated with economic threat ( $\beta = .24$ ,  $SE = .05$ ,  $p < .001$ ), cultural threat ( $\beta = .23$ ,  $SE = .05$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and criminal threat ( $\beta = .19$ ,  $SE = .05$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The effects are quite similar in magnitude and not significantly different from each other ( $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 3.18$ ,  $p = .075$ ).<sup>34</sup>

Finally, we tested the indirect effects of RWA and SDO on minority attitudes using bias-corrected confidence intervals (BCI) with 5,000 bootstrap samples (Hayes, 2013). The results of the mediation analysis partly confirmed our hypotheses about the mediation of the effects of RWA and SDO (see Table 5.3). The direct effects of RWA on attitudes toward Muslims, refugees and Sinti and Roma were not significant, whereas the total indirect effects via threat perceptions were significant because the 95% BCI did not contain zero. However, the direct effect of RWA on anti-foreigner sentiments was still statistically significant ( $\beta = .14$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $p < .001$ ), indicating partial mediation by subjectively perceived threat (95% BCI [.07, .21]). The effects of SDO on attitudes toward foreigners and refugees were fully mediated by perceived threat insofar as the 95% BCI of the indirect effects did not contain zero. There were still significant direct effects of SDO on prejudice toward Muslims ( $\beta = .11$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $p = .008$ ) and Sinti and Roma ( $\beta = .18$ ,  $SE = .05$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The total indirect effects were both significant which indicated that the effects of SDO were partially mediated by intergroup threat (Muslims, 95% BCI [.11, .21], Sinti and Roma, 95% BCI [.06, .13]).

## 5.6 Discussion

Adopting a differentiated threat approach, we examined whether the effect of perceived cultural, economic and criminal threats on prejudice varies across different minorities in Germany. We go beyond previous studies by measuring the perceived threat directly and considering fear of crime as an important additional threat dimension. Our results show that negative attitudes toward Muslims and foreigners are primarily shaped by perceived cultural and economic threat, while criminal threat plays a minor role among these minority groups. In contrast, prejudices against refugees and Sinti and Roma are equally linked to

---

<sup>34</sup> Total explained variance: economic threat ( $R^2 = .18$ ), cultural threat ( $R^2 = .32$ ), criminal threat ( $R^2 = .29$ ).

all three types of threat perceptions. Our results are thus only partially in line with the culture-specific threat profiles that we have derived from previous research.

We also examined stable ideological antecedents of threat perceptions. In line with previous research (e.g., Cohrs and Asbrock, 2009), RWA has a much stronger effect on the perception of cultural and criminal threats compared to the formation of economic threat perceptions. However, a differential genesis of the three types of threats could be found for the effects of RWA but not for SDO. Finally, consistent with prior findings in the literature, the effects of stable ideological orientations are at least partly mediated by threat perceptions (Cohrs and Ibler, 2009).

What conclusions can be drawn from these findings for the differentiated threat model? On the one hand, there is some evidence for the group-specific emergence of prejudices. On the other hand, it also becomes clear that across all investigated groups, all three types of threats have significant and substantial effects on the attitudes of the majority population, even if their relative impact varies. However, it is problematic to draw clear conclusions about the validity of the DTM from these findings because the model provides no a priori hypotheses about the relative importance of group-specific threat perceptions. These perceptions must be theoretically specified for the respective historical and cultural context or derived from empirical research. In this respect, our analysis of the group-specific threat profiles might not be correct in the present case. This is problematic to the extent that the DTM can hardly be falsified because no systematic assumptions about the antecedent conditions can be inferred from the model. However, from a deductive-nomological perspective of science, this significantly reduces the informational value of the DTM because it cannot be applied without further auxiliary assumptions (Hempel, 1965). If the hypotheses derived from the DTM are refuted, this may mean that the core model, the auxiliary assumptions, or both are not correct. At its core is the vague statement that the relative importance of different types of threats for the emergence of group-specific prejudices can vary depending on the social context. Because established explanatory approaches such as the ITT do not explicitly exclude this assumption, researchers can fall back on these theories.

Despite our theoretical criticism, the DTM can have a valuable explorative function because it more stringently links the genesis of negative attitudes toward outgroups with the economic and social contexts in which prejudices arise. For example, our analysis revealed interesting differences in the development of prejudice against four different minorities in Germany. According to our results, interventions to reduce prejudice toward Muslims and

foreigners should primarily focus on reducing the economic and cultural threat perceptions that are linked to these groups. In addition to economic and cultural threat perceptions, prejudice toward Sinti and Roma as well as attitudes toward refugees are connected to beliefs about criminal threat. Therefore, it would be advisable to incorporate this dimension when designing interventions to reduce prejudice. Another reason to focus on differential threat perceptions when designing such interventions is their role as mediators of generalized ideological attitudes. Whereas RWA and SDO can be seen as motivational goals that are rooted within the personalities of individuals (Duckitt, 2001), threat perceptions should be more susceptible to change and therefore, assumedly better suited to be addressed by anti-prejudice programs.

Of course, our study has some limitations that should be taken into account in its interpretation. One limitation of our study is that we had only a single item per threat dimension, which reduces the reliability of the measures. We also measured perceived threat in general terms, and the question wording was not specific to certain outgroups (see appendix, Table 5.11). Furthermore, the specified dimensions used may not be the only types of threats that play a role in the formation of prejudice. For Muslims and refugees, the dangers of terrorist activities may also be an important aspect of citizens' concerns (Heyder and Eisentraut, 2016). However, even if we had better measures at our disposal, our theoretical concerns remain. Finally, the target groups were chosen because they currently dominate public discourse in Germany, but we concede that all groups may elicit similar reactions as they belong to a common category of "strangers" or migrants (e.g., Spruyt and van der Noll, 2017). However, if we had chosen other target groups, such as LGBT people, the distinction between different effects of threat perceptions may have been even much more pronounced. This means that the present study represents a particularly rigorous test of the DTM and is likely to underestimate differential threat effects.

Future research should focus on further investigating the role that specific threat perceptions play in the genesis of prejudice toward different outgroups. A more sophisticated measurement of different threat types would be desirable, so that the different types of threats can be empirically distinguishable. Additionally, researchers should validate the differentiated threat model in various national contexts that have different prominent outgroups. On a final note, we think it would be interesting to test the DTM over a long-term time period to potentially test the direction of causality between differentiated threat and prejudice toward different groups with longitudinal data in which threat and prejudice are measured simultaneously in various waves.



## 5.7 Appendix

**Table 5.4:** *Demographic Composition of the Sample Compared to the German Microcensus*

	<i>GESIS Panel (2016)<sup>35</sup></i>	<i>German Microcensus (2014)</i>
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	1164 (50.6%)	237981 (48.5%)
Female	1137 (49.4%)	246070 (51.5%)
<b>Age</b>		
< 19	19 (1%)	76822 (16%)
19-29	260 (11%)	62368 (13%)
30-39	277 (12%)	54864 (11%)
40-49	571 (25%)	68962 (14%)
50-59	588 (26%)	75835 (16%)
60+	570 (25%)	143877 (30%)
<b>Education</b>		
Low	445 (19%)	163767 (41%)
Medium	806 (36%)	117387 (29%)
High	1039 (45%)	119698 (30%)
<b>Income</b>		
< 900	83 (4.1%)	26962 (5.9%)
≥ 900 < 1300	101 (5.0%)	40648 (8.9%)
≥ 1300 < 1700	168 (8.3%)	50817 (11.1%)
≥ 1700 < 2300	296 (14.7%)	75710 (16.6%)
≥ 2300 < 3200	425 (21.0%)	97698 (21.4%)
≥ 3200 < 4000	358 (17.7%)	61717 (13.5%)
≥ 4000 < 5000	273 (13.5%)	47644 (10.4%)
≥ 5000 < 6000	158 (7.8%)	25085 (5.5%)
≥ 6000	159 (7.9%)	30396 (6.7%)

<sup>35</sup> The recruitment for the panel took place in 2013 and the items we used (including SDO and RWA) were included in 2016. Therefore, respondents are about 3 years older than they were at the start of the panel.

**Table 5.5: Ethnic Prejudice**

Attitudes toward:	Item name	Question Wording	Mean (SD)	Distribution (%)				
				1 = very negative	2 = rather negative	3 = neutral	4 = rather positive	5 = very positive
		<i>Now we are interested in your appraisal of different groups living in Germany.</i>						
Muslims	eebd214a	How would you assess Muslims in Germany overall?	2.78 (.750)	4.4	27.4	54.6	12.7	0.8
	eebd218a	How would you describe your feelings towards Muslims in Germany in general?	2.82 (.741)	3.7	26.0	56.3	12.9	1.1
Foreigners	eebd215a	How would you assess foreigners in Germany overall?	3.14 (.690)	1.2	12.7	58.7	25.8	1.5
	eebd219a	How would you describe your feelings towards foreigners in Germany in general?	3.15 (.672)	1.2	10.8	62.2	23.8	2.0
Refugees	eebd216a	How would you assess refugees in Germany overall?	2.81 (.769)	4.8	25.4	54.6	14.2	1.0
	eebd220a	How would you describe your feelings towards refugees in Germany in general?	2.90 (.774)	3.9	22.0	55.3	17.3	1.5
Sinti and Roma	eebd217a	How would you assess Sinti and Roma (e.g. so-called gypsies) in Germany overall?	2.50 (.794)	11.5	33.8	48.1	6.2	0.5
	eebd221a	How would you describe your feelings towards Sinti and Roma in Germany in general?	2.57 (.797)	10.4	30.6	51.2	7.1	0.7

Note. All Items were reverse-coded for analysis.

**Table 5.6: Perceived Threat**

Threat	Item name	Item wording	Mean (SD)
Economic	eebu109a	Immigrants are generally good for the German economy.	2.81 (.848)
Cultural	eebu110a*	German culture is threatened by immigrants.	3.26 (1.167)
Criminal	eebu111a*	Immigrants increase the crime rate in Germany.	2.80 (1.134)

Note. \* Items were reverse-coded for analysis. Response scale: 1 = Agree strongly, 2 = Agree somewhat, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Disagree somewhat, 5 = Disagree strongly.

**Table 5.7: Right-wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation**

	Item name	Question wording	Mean (SD)
		<i>Please indicate on the scale, ranging from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”, to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.</i>	
Right-wing thoritarianism	Au- dbbd218a	We should take strong action against misfits and slackers in society.	2.74 (.905)
	dbbd219a	Well-established behavior should not be questioned.	2.57 (.861)
	dbbd220a	We need strong leaders in order to live a safe life in society.	2.93 (.882)
Social Dominance Orientation	dbbd221a	It is good if some population groups have more opportunities in life than others.	1.85 (.705)
	dbbd222a	It is useful for society if some groups in the population are superior to others.	1.93 (.771)
	dbbd223a*	All population groups should be treated equally.	3.28 (.736)
	dbbd224a*	All population groups should have the same amount of influence in society.	2.89 (.837)

Note. Items with an asterisk (\*) were reverse-coded for analysis. Response scale: 1 = *fully disagree*, 2 = *rather disagree*, 3 = *I rather agree*, 4 = *I totally agree*.

**Table 5.8: Chi-square Difference Tests of the Effects of Intergroup Threat on Minority Attitudes**

<i>Comparison Model</i> ( <i>Degrees of Freedom: 88</i> )		226.937			
Eco, Culture, Crime	→ Muslims	235.514	8.577	2	<0.05
Eco, Culture	→ Muslims	227.484	0.547	1	n.s.
Eco, Crime	→ Muslims	232.025	5.088	1	<0.05
Crime, Culture	→ Muslims	234.633	7.696	1	<0.01
Eco, Culture, Crime	→ Foreigners	253.287	26.350	2	<0.01
Eco, Culture	→ Foreigners	233.660	6.723	1	<0.01
Eco, Crime	→ Foreigners	253.064	26.127	1	<0.01
Crime, Culture	→ Foreigners	232.133	5.196	1	<0.05
Eco, Culture, Crime	→ Refugees	231.963	5.026	2	n.s.
Eco, Culture	→ Refugees	230.881	3.944	1	<0.05
Eco, Crime	→ Refugees	230.115	3.178	1	n.s.
Crime, Culture	→ Refugees	226.989	0.052	1	n.s.
Eco, Culture, Crime	→ Sinti & Roma	229.778	2.841	2	n.s.
Eco, Culture	→ Sinti & Roma	227.476	0.539	1	n.s.
Eco, Crime	→ Sinti & Roma	228.087	1.150	1	n.s.
Crime, Culture	→ Sinti & Roma	229.722	2.785	1	n.s.

Note. Eco = Economic threat; Culture = Cultural threat; Crime = Criminal threat.

**Table 5.9:** *Chi-square Difference Tests of the Effects of RWA and SDO on Threat Perceptions*

<i>Comparison Model</i>		226.937			
<i>(Degrees of Freedom: 88)</i>					
RWA	→ Eco, Culture, Crime	276.733	49.796	2	<0.01
RWA	→ Eco, Culture	268.085	41.148	1	<0.01
RWA	→ Eco, Crime	270.590	43.653	1	<0.01
RWA	→ Culture, Crime	226.948	0.011	1	n.s.
SDO	→ Eco, Culture, Crime	230.114	3.177	2	n.s.
SDO	→ Eco, Culture	229.219	2.282	1	n.s.
SDO	→ Eco, Crime	226.998	0.061	1	n.s.
SDO	→ Culture, Crime	229.141	2.204	1	n.s.

*Note.* RWA = Right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; Eco = Economic threat; Culture = Cultural threat; Crime = Criminal threat.

**Table 5.10:** *Factor loadings and Reliability*

<i>Construct</i>	<i>Item name</i>	<i>Factor loading (stand.)</i>	<i>Cronbach's Alpha</i>
Right-wing Authoritarianism	dbbd218a	.682	.71
	dbbd219a	.620	
	dbbd220a	.718	
Social Dominance Orientation	dbbd221a	.502	.71
	dbbd222a	.500	
	dbbd223a	.541	
	dbbd224a	.519	
Attitudes toward Muslims	eebd214a	.886	.88
	eebd218a	.879	
Attitudes toward foreigners	eebd215a	.882	.84
	eebd219a	.817	
Attitudes toward refugees	eebd216a	.908	.88
	eebd220a	.865	
Attitudes toward Sinti and Roma	eebd217a	.925	.92
	eebd221a	.912	

**Table 5.11: Group-Specific Effects**

	Attitudes toward							
	Model 1: Muslims		Model 2: Foreigners		Model 3: Refugees		Model 4: Sinti & Roma	
	Est. (SE)	95% CI	Est. (SE)	95% CI	Est. (SE)	95% CI	Est. (SE)	95% CI
SDO	.09 (.09)	-.05;.24	.03 (.09)	-.12;.18	.06 (.16)	-.16;.29	.23** (.08)	.10;.36
RWA	-.03 (.07)	-.15;.08	.06 (.07)	-.06;.18	.05 (.12)	-.13;.20	.19* (.06)	.01;.21
Cultural Threat	.43*** (.05)	.34;.52	.22** (.07)	.10;.32	.32*** (.06)	.22;.42	.17* (.08)	.04;.30
Economic Threat	.26*** (.06)	.17;.35	.33*** (.06)	.23;.42	.35*** (.06)	.26;.44	.26** (.08)	.14;.38

Note. Entries are standardized path coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. RWA = Right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = Social dominance orientation. CI = Confidence interval. Explained variance: Muslims ( $R^2 = .48$ ), foreigners ( $R^2 = .31$ ), refugees ( $R^2 = .47$ ), Sinti and Roma ( $R^2 = .40$ ). \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Table 5.12: Standardized Effects of Sociodemographic Variables on Prejudice**

	Attitude toward			
	Muslims	Foreigners	Refugees	Sinti/Roma
Gender	-.04*	.03	.01	-.01
Income	.05*	.00	.04*	.07**
Education	.06**	-.12***	-.03	-.02
Age	.05*	-.10***	-.07***	-.05*

Note. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Table 5.13: Comparison of Alternative Model Fits**

	Final model	Model 1: SES included	Model 2: Gen. Threat Factor	Model 3: Mediator switched
$\chi^2$	226.937	701.704	327.400	na
df	88	144	100	na
RMSEA	.026	.044	.031	na
CFI	.994	.972	.990	na

## 6 Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse

Im ersten Kapitel dieser Dissertation wurden mehrere Fragen hinsichtlich der Bedeutung, Stabilität, Vergleichbarkeit und Kausalität von ideologischen Einstellungen und Werten (Basic Human Values) bezogen auf die Erklärung von Vorurteilen formuliert. Im Folgenden sollen die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse aus den Beiträgen dazu noch einmal zusammengefasst werden.

*Der Unterschied zwischen kritischen Einstellungen und Vorurteilen* wurde in den ersten beiden Beiträgen kritisch überprüft. Dabei wurde deutlich, dass sowohl Islamophobie als auch Antisemitismus empirisch klar von islamkritischen, beziehungsweise israelkritischen Einstellungen getrennt werden können. Außerdem wurden kritische Einstellungen im Gegensatz zu Islamophobie und Antisemitismus nicht, beziehungsweise nur minimal (im Falle von geschlechterbezogener Islamkritik) von Autoritarismus vorhergesagt. Damit zeigt sich einerseits die Validität der verwendeten Messinstrumente, und andererseits, wie wichtig eine klare Trennung von Vorurteilen (wie Antisemitismus und Islamophobie) und kritischen Einstellungen ist. Denn gerade in öffentlichen Diskursen wie jene zur Integration von Muslim\*innen in Deutschland oder auch zur kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der Politik Israels werden häufig immer noch Vorurteile unter dem Deckmantel kritischer Meinungen vorgetragen und andersherum kritische Meinungen vorschnell als Vorurteile abgetan (Heyder und Eisentraut, 2016; Heyder und Eisentraut, im Erscheinen).

*Die Stabilität des Zusammenhangs und der Messungen von ideologischen Einstellungen, Werten und Vorurteilen* wurde in den ersten drei Beiträgen der Dissertation thematisiert. Im ersten Beitrag (Kapitel 2, bzw. Heyder und Eisentraut, 2016) konnte gezeigt werden, dass Islamophobie über mehrere Jahre und Stichproben einen starken Zusammenhang mit Autoritarismus und SDO aufwies. So wurden Querschnitte aus den Jahren 2005, 2007 und 2011 analysiert und miteinander verglichen. Vor allem der Zusammenhang von Autoritarismus und Islamophobie erwies sich dabei als durchgehend hoch und stabil - für SDO waren die Zusammenhänge etwas weniger stabil. Auch im zweiten Beitrag (Kapitel 3, bzw. Heyder und Eisentraut, im Erscheinen) zeigte sich der Zusammenhang zwischen Autoritarismus und Vorurteilen - in diesem Fall Antisemitismus - als stabil über mehrere Querschnitte. Hier wurden vier Befragungen der deutschen Bevölkerung aus den Jahren 1996, 2006, 2012 und 2016 miteinander verglichen und jedes Mal zeigte sich ein starker

Effekt von Autoritarismus auf Antisemitismus, der empirische gesehen unverändert blieb, obwohl sich das Ausmaß an Antisemitismus in der Bevölkerung im Untersuchungszeitraum teilweise erheblich änderte. Damit kann Autoritarismus auch über Jahrzehnte hinweg als verlässlicher Prädiktor für Einstellungen gegenüber verschiedenen Minderheiten gelten, der auch 70 Jahre nach seinem theoretischen Ursprung nichts an seiner erklärenden Relevanz eingebüßt hat.

Um die Zusammenhänge von Autoritarismus und Vorurteilen vergleichen zu können, muss die Grundbedingung erfüllt sein, dass die Messungen über die verschiedenen Befragungen überhaupt vergleichbar sind (Davidov et al., 2008). Hierfür wurden in den Beiträgen 1 und 2 empirische Tests der Messinvarianz sowohl von ideologischen Einstellungen als auch von Vorurteilen durchgeführt. Auch in diesem Zusammenhang zeigte sich die empirische Stabilität von Autoritarismus: alle Messungen waren über alle Zeiträume hinweg invariant. Das bedeutet, dass Autoritarismus über zwei Jahrzehnte und in unterschiedlichen Stichproben empirisch vergleichbar untersucht werden konnte. Ebenso galt dies für den Antisemitismus und partiell auch für Islamophobie. Im Vergleich zu den Beiträgen 1 und 2 konnte in Beitrag 3 der Vergleich der Messungen mit Paneldaten unternommen werden. In Beitrag 3 (Eisentraut, 2019) wurde der Zusammenhang von Basic Human Values und Einstellungen gegenüber verschiedenen Minderheiten untersucht. Es zeigte sich, dass sowohl die analysierten Werte (Universalism, Conservation) als auch die Einstellungen zu Minderheiten über die Zeit gesehen invariant, also stabil in der Messung waren. Diese empirisch überprüfbare Vergleichbarkeit von ideologischen Einstellungen über mehrere Querschnitte (Beiträge 1 und 2) sowie von Werten im Längsschnitt (Beitrag 3) macht ideologische Einstellungen und Werte für die Erklärung von Vorurteilen so wertvoll.

*Die Effekte von Werten und ideologischen Einstellungen auf verschiedene Vorurteile sollten auch hinsichtlich Kausalität und Mediatoreffekten getestet werden.* In Beitrag 3 wurden daher die Werte Universalism und Conservation zusammen mit Einstellungen gegenüber vier verschiedenen Minderheiten (Muslim\*innen, Geflüchtete, Ausländer\*innen, Sinti/Roma) auf ihren gegenseitigen Effekt im zeitlichen Verlauf getestet. Dabei zeigte sich, dass Werte und Einstellungen zu Minderheiten sich gegenseitig beeinflussen, wobei die Stabilität der Basic Human Values im Vergleich zu den Einstellungen etwas höher war. Insgesamt waren die Basic Human Values in dieser Studie aber volatiler als ursprünglich angenommen, da man bei Werten eigentlich theoretisch davon ausgeht, dass diese über Zeit und Situationen hinweg stabil bleiben. Eine Veränderung der Einstellungen zu Min-

derheiten scheint aber durchaus zu einem Hinterfragen der eigenen Haltung und damit zu einer Veränderung von Werten führen zu können, wie die Ergebnisse in Beitrag 3 zeigen.

Beitrag 4 (Jedinger und Eisentraut, 2020) wiederum untersuchte dieselben vier Minderheiten wie Beitrag 3, aber hinsichtlich des differenzierten Effekts unterschiedlicher Bedrohungswahrnehmungen. Dabei wurde analysiert, wie Autoritarismus und SDO über ökonomische, kulturelle und kriminelle Bedrohungswahrnehmungen auf Vorurteile wirken. Ein Ergebnis der Studie war, dass die unterschiedlichen Bedrohungswahrnehmungen sich nur relativ wenig darin unterschieden, wie gut sie die Einstellungen zu den verschiedenen Minderheiten erklären konnten. Im Gegensatz dazu hatte Autoritarismus wie erwartet einen deutlich stärkeren Effekt auf symbolische und kriminelle Bedrohungswahrnehmung als auf ökonomische Bedrohungswahrnehmung. Außerdem wurde sowohl der Effekt von SDO als auch der von Autoritarismus fast vollständig durch die Bedrohungswahrnehmungen mediiert. Insgesamt zeigt sich also, dass ideologische Einstellungen wie Autoritarismus und SDO direkt und indirekt eine starke Wirkung auf unterschiedliche Vorurteile haben.

Zusammenfassend wurde in allen vier Beiträgen die Wichtigkeit ideologischer Einstellungen und Basic Human Values für die Erklärung von Vorurteilen gegenüber unterschiedlichen Minderheiten in Deutschland herausgearbeitet. Vor allem Autoritarismus bewies sich in den Beiträgen 1, 2 und 4 (und ähnlich die dem Autoritarismus inhaltlich ähnliche Wertedimension „Conservation“ in Beitrag 3) als verlässlicher und robuster Prädiktor von Vorurteilen. Da Autoritarismus sich in der Messung sowie bei den direkten und indirekten Effekten auf Vorurteile als stabil erwies, sollte dieser „Klassiker“ der ideologischen Einstellungen auch in zukünftigen Untersuchungen zu Vorurteilen nicht außer Acht gelassen werden. Vielmehr sollte es vermehrt Panel-Studien geben, in denen ideologische Einstellungen und Werte erfasst werden, damit auch intra-individuelle Veränderungen in diesen Konstrukten gemessen werden können. Denn sowohl ideologische Einstellungen als auch Werte gelten als psychologische Faktoren, die sich über den Verlauf des Lebens nur relativ wenig verändern. Da sie einen so großen Einfluss auf die Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von Vorurteilen haben, wäre es sinnvoll zu untersuchen, ob diese theoretisch angenommene Stabilität über große Zeiträume empirisch wirklich gegeben ist. Die Ergebnisse von Beitrag 3 stellen diese Annahme zumindest hinsichtlich der Basic Human Values in Frage.

Längsschnittstudien könnten in Zukunft dabei helfen, die Interaktion von Vorurteilen, ideologischen Einstellungen, Werten und anderen individuellen psychologischen Merkma-



len zu verstehen. Es ist nicht nur wichtig zu sehen, welche Konstrukte zur Entstehung von Vorurteilen beitragen, sondern auch, wie Vorurteile selbst andere Werte und Einstellungen verändern und prägen können. Zudem müsste es vermehrt darum gehen, die Zuverlässigkeit von theoretischen Erklärungsmodellen auf ihre langfristige Anwendbarkeit hin zu überprüfen. Nur mit dem Verständnis über Stabilität, Vergleichbarkeit und Kausalität wird man in der Lage sein, nachhaltig positive Einstellungen zu Minderheiten herzustellen und aufrechtzuerhalten.

## 7 Literaturverzeichnis

Abelson, Robert P. (1959): Modes of resolution of belief dilemmas. In: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (3), S. 343–352.

Abrams, Dominic; Van De Vyver, Julie; Houston, Diane M.; Vasiljevic, Milica (2017): Does terror defeat contact? Intergroup contact and prejudice toward Muslims before and after the London bombings. In: *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 23 (3), S. 260–268. DOI: 10.1037/pac0000167.

Adorno, Theodor W.; Frenkel-Brunswik, Else; Levinson, Daniel J.; Sanford, R. Nevitt (1950): *The Authoritarian Personality*. 1. Aufl. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Ajzen, Icek; Fishbein, Martin (1980): *Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior*. Pbk. ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.

Allen, Christopher (2010): *Islamophobia*. Farnham: Ashgate.

Allport, Gordon W. (1954): *The nature of prejudice*. 1. Aufl. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.

Altemeyer, Bob (1981): *Right-wing authoritarianism*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.

Altemeyer, Bob (1988): *Enemies of freedom. Understanding right-wing authoritarianism*. 1st ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers (Jossey-Bass public administration series).

Altemeyer, Bob (1998): The Other “Authoritarian Personality”. In: *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 30, S. 47–92. DOI: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60382-2.

Arbuckle, James (2009): *Amos 18 user's guide*. Chicago, Ill.: SPSS Inc.

Asbrock, Frank; Christ, Oliver; Duckitt, John; Sibley, Chris G. (2012): Differential effects of intergroup contact for authoritarians and social dominators: A dual process model perspective. In: *Personality & social psychology bulletin* 38 (4), S. 477–490. DOI: 10.1177/0146167211429747.

Asbrock, Frank; Lemmer, Gunnar; Becker, Julia C.; Koller, Jeffrey; Wagner, Ulrich (2014): “Who Are These Foreigners Anyway?” The Content of the Term Foreigner and Its Impact on Prejudice. In: *SAGE Open* 4 (2), 215824401453281. DOI: 10.1177/2158244014532819.

Asbrock, Frank; Sibley, Chris G.; Duckitt, John (2009): Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation and the dimensions of generalized prejudice: A longitudinal test. In: *Eur. J. Pers.* 24 (4), 324-340. DOI: 10.1002/per.746.

Avnery, Uri (2004): *Anti-Semitism: A practical Manual*. Online verfügbar unter <http://www.alternet.org/story/17628>.

Bansak, Kirk; Hainmueller, Jens; Hangartner, Dominik (2016): How economic, humanitarian, and religious concerns shape European attitudes toward asylum seekers. In: *Science* (New York, N.Y.) 354 (6309), S. 217–222. DOI: 10.1126/science.aag2147.

Bardi, Anat; Buchanan, Kathryn E.; Goodwin, Robin; Slabu, Letitia; Robinson, Mark (2014): Value stability and change during self-chosen life transitions: self-selection versus socialization effects. In: *Journal of personality and social psychology* 106 (1), S. 131–147. DOI: 10.1037/a0034818.

Bardi, Anat; Goodwin, Robin (2011): The Dual Route to Value Change: Individual Processes and Cultural Moderators. In: *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 42 (2), S. 271–287. DOI: 10.1177/0022022110396916.

Beierlein, Constanze; Asbrock, Frank; Kauff, Mathias; Schmidt, Peter (2014a): Die Kurzsкала Autoritarismus (KSA-3): Ein ökonomisches Messinstrument zur Erfassung dreier Subdimensionen autoritärer Einstellungen. (GESIS-Working Papers 2014/35). Mannheim: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften (GESIS-Working Papers, Bd. 2014/35).

Beierlein, Constanze; Asbrock, Frank; Kauff, Mathias; Schmidt, Peter (2014b): Die Kurzsкала Autoritarismus (KSA-3): Eine Kurzsкала zur Erfassung der Sozialen Dominanzorientierung. (GESIS-Working Papers). Mannheim: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften (GESIS-Working Papers, Bd. 2014/35).

Beierlein, Constanze; Kuntz, Anabel; Davidov, Eldad (2016): Universalism, conservatism and attitudes toward minority groups. In: *Social science research* 58, S. 68–79. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2016.02.002.

Benz, Wolfgang (2005): *Was ist Antisemitismus?* 2. Aufl. München: C.H. Beck. Online verfügbar unter <http://www.socialnet.de/rezensionen/isbn.php?isbn=978-3-406-52212-3>.

Bergmann, Werner (2010): *Geschichte des Antisemitismus*. 4. Aufl. 5., durchgesehene Auflage, Originalausgabe. München: Verlag C.H. Beck (C.H.Beck Wissen, 2187).

Bergmann, Werner; Erb Rainer (1986): Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und Öffentliche Meinung. Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 38 (2), S. 223–246.

Bergmann, Werner; Erb, Rainer (1991): Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1946-1989. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Bergmann, Werner; Erb, Rainer (2000): Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1996. In: Blickpunkt Gesellschaft 5. Deutsche und Ausländer: Freunde, Fremde oder Feinde? Empirische Befunde und theoretische Erklärungen, (Hrsg.) A. Richard, P. Schmidt, und M. Wasmer. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, S. 401–438.

Bergmann, Werner; Wetzels, Juliane (2003): Manifestations of Anti-Semitism in the European Union. Wien. Online verfügbar unter <https://www.jugendpolitikeneuropa.de/downloads/4-20-1949/eustudieantisem.pdf>, zuletzt aktualisiert am 2003, zuletzt geprüft am 12.09.2017.

Bernard, Mark M.; Maio, Gregory R.; Olson, James M. (2003): Effects of Introspection About Reasons for Values: Extending Research on Values-as-Truisms. In: Social Cognition 21 (1), S. 1–25. DOI: 10.1521/soco.21.1.1.21193.

Biskamp, Floris (2018): Populism, religion, and distorted communication. In: Z Religion Ges Polit 2 (2), S. 247–276. DOI: 10.1007/s41682-018-0022-1.

Bollen, Kenneth A. (1989): Structural equations with latent variables. New York: Wiley (Wiley series in probability and mathematical statistics. Applied probability and statistics). Online verfügbar unter <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=839033>.

Bosnjak, Michael; Dannwolf, Tanja; Enderle, Tobias; Schaurer, Ines; Struminskaya, Bella; Tanner, Angela; Weyandt, Kai W. (2018): Establishing an Open Probability-Based Mixed-Mode Panel of the General Population in Germany: The GESIS panel. In: Social Science Computer Review 36 (1), S. 103–115. DOI: 10.1177/0894439317697949.

Brown, Rupert (2010): *Prejudice. Its Social Psychology*. 2. Aufl. Chichester, West Sussex, Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub. Online verfügbar unter <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10411624>.

Butler, Judith (2004): *Der Antisemitismus-Vorwurf. Juden, Israel und die Risiken öffentlicher Kritik*. In: *Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte*, (Hrsg.) D. Rabinovici, U. Speck, und N. Sznajder. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, S. 60–92.

Center for Research on Anti-Semitism and Institute for Prejudice and Conflict Research (2014): *Between indifference and rejection: Public attitudes towards Sinti and Roma*. Berlin: Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency. Online verfügbar unter [https://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/publikationen/factsheet\\_engl\\_Bevoelkerungseinstellungen\\_gegenueber\\_Sinti\\_und\\_Roma.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=1](https://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/publikationen/factsheet_engl_Bevoelkerungseinstellungen_gegenueber_Sinti_und_Roma.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1).

Chambers, John R.; Schlenker, Barry R.; Collisson, Brian (2013): *Ideology and prejudice: the role of value conflicts*. In: *Psychological science* 24 (2), S. 140–149. DOI: 10.1177/0956797612447820.

Chen, Fang Fang (2007): *Sensitivity of Goodness of Fit Indexes to Lack of Measurement Invariance*. In: *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 14 (3), S. 464–504. DOI: 10.1080/10705510701301834.

Cieciuch, Jan (2017): *Exploring the Complicated Relationship between Values and Behavior*. In: Roccas, S., Sagiv, L. (Hrsg.), *Values and Behavior. Taking a Cross Cultural Perspective*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, S. 237–247.

Cohrs, J. Christopher; Asbrock, Frank (2009): *Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and prejudice against threatening and competitive ethnic groups*. In: *Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.* 39 (2), S. 270–289. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.545.

Cohrs, J. Christopher; Ibler, Sina (2009): *Authoritarianism, Threat, and Prejudice: An Analysis of Mediation and Moderation*. In: *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 31 (1), S. 81–94. DOI: 10.1080/01973530802659638.

Connor, Phillip (2016): *Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015*. Online verfügbar unter <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to->, zuletzt geprüft am 26.04.2017.

Cooper, Joel (2012): Cognitive Dissonance Theory. In: Van Lange, P.A., Kruglanski, A.W., Higgins, E.T. (Hrsg.), *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume 1*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, S. 377–397.

Cottrell, Catherine A.; Neuberg, Steven L. (2005): Different emotional reactions to different groups: a sociofunctional threat-based approach to "prejudice". In: *Journal of personality and social psychology* 88 (5), S. 770–789. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.88.5.770.

Cottrell, Catherine A.; Richards, David A.R.; Nichols, Austin Lee (2010): Predicting policy attitudes from general prejudice versus specific intergroup emotions. In: *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 46 (2), S. 247–254. DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.10.008.

Croucher, Stephen M. (2013): Integrated Threat Theory and Acceptance of Immigrant Assimilation: An Analysis of Muslim Immigration in Western Europe. In: *Communication Monographs* 80 (1), S. 46–62. DOI: 10.1080/03637751.2012.739704.

Cuddy, Amy J.C.; Fiske, Susan T.; Glick, Peter (2008): Warmth and Competence as Universal Dimensions of Social Perception: The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS Map. In: *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Bd. 40: Academic Press, S. 61–149.

Czymara, Christian S. (2019): Propagated Preferences? Political Elite Discourses and Europeans' Openness toward Muslim Immigrants. In: *International Migration Review*. DOI: 10.1177/0197918319890270.

Czymara, Christian S.; Dochow, Stephan (2018): Mass Media and Concerns about Immigration in Germany in the 21st Century: Individual-Level Evidence over 15 Years. In: *European Sociological Review* 34 (4), S. 381–401. DOI: 10.1093/esr/jcy019.

Czymara, Christian S.; Schmidt-Catran, Alexander W. (2017): Refugees Unwelcome? Changes in the Public Acceptance of Immigrants and Refugees in Germany in the Course of Europe's 'Immigration Crisis'. In: *European Sociological Review* 33 (6), S. 735–751. DOI: 10.1093/esr/jcx071.

Davidov, Eldad; Meuleman, Bart; Billiet, Jaak; Schmidt, Peter (2008a): Values and Support for Immigration: A Cross-Country Comparison. In: *European Sociological Review* 24 (5), S. 583–599. DOI: 10.1093/esr/jcn020.

Davidov, Eldad; Schmidt, Peter; Schwartz, Shalom H. (2008b): Bringing Values Back In: The Adequacy of the European Social Survey to Measure Values in 20 Countries. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 72 (3), S. 420–445. DOI: 10.1093/poq/nfn035.

Davidov, Eldad; Meuleman, Bart (2012): Explaining Attitudes Towards Immigration Policies in European Countries: The Role of Human Values. In: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (5), S. 757–775. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2012.667985.

Davidov, Eldad; Meuleman, Bart; Cieciuch, Jan; Schmidt, Peter; Billiet, Jaak (2014a): Measurement Equivalence in Cross-National Research. In: *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 40 (1), S. 55–75. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-soc-071913-043137.

Davidov, Eldad; Meuleman, Bart; Schmidt, Peter; Billiet, Jaak (2012): Social Location and Value Priorities. A European-Wide Comparison of the Relation between Social-Structural Variables and Human Values. In: Keil, S.I., Gabriel, O.W. (Hrsg.), *Society and Democracy in Europe*. New York: Routledge, S. 45–67.

Davidov, Eldad; Meulemann, Bart; Schwartz, Shalom H.; Schmidt, Peter (2014b): Individual values, cultural embeddedness, and anti-immigration sentiments: Explaining differences in the effect of values on attitudes toward immigration across Europe. In: *Köln Z Soziol* 66 (S1), S. 263–285. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-014-0274-5.

Deutsche Welle (2018): Migration 'mother of all political problems,' says German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer. Online verfügbar unter <https://www.dw.com/en/migration-mother-of-all-political-problems-says-german-interior-minister-horst-seehofer/a-45378092>, zuletzt geprüft am 06.09.2018.

Dovidio, John F.; Gaertner, Samuel (1986): Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism: Historical Trends and Contemporary Approaches. In: *Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism*, (Hrsg.) J. Dovidio, und S. Gaertner. San Diego, New York, Berkeley: Academic Press, S. 1–34.

Dovidio, John F.; Brigham, John C.; Johnson, Blair T.; Gaertner, Samuel (1996): Stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination: Another Look. In: *Stereotypes & Stereotyping*. New York: The Guilford Press, S. 276–319.

Duckitt, John (2001): A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. In: *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* Volume 33, Bd. 33: Elsevier (*Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*), S. 41–113.

- Duckitt, John (2006): Differential effects of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on outgroup attitudes and their mediation by threat from and competitiveness to outgroups. In: *Personality & social psychology bulletin* 32 (5), S. 684–696. DOI: 10.1177/0146167205284282.
- Duckitt, John; Sibley, Chris G. (2007): Right wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and the dimensions of generalized prejudice. In: *Eur. J. Pers.* 21 (2), S. 113–130. DOI: 10.1002/per.614.
- Duckitt, John; Sibley, Chris G. (2010): Personality, ideology, prejudice, and politics: a dual-process motivational model. In: *Journal of personality* 78 (6), S. 1861–1893. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00672.x.
- Duckitt, John; Wagner, Claire; Du Plessis, Ilouize; Birum, Ingrid (2002): The psychological bases of ideology and prejudice: Testing a dual process model. In: *Journal of personality and social psychology* 83 (1), S. 75–93. DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.83.1.75.
- Durkheim, Emile (1970): Der anomische Selbstmord. In: *Die Entfremdung des Menschen in einer heilen Gesellschaft. Materialien zur Adaption und Denunziation eines Begriffs*, (Hrsg.) Arthur Fischer. München: Juventa, S. 114–122.
- Eagly, Alice Hendrickson; Chaiken, Shelly (1993): *The psychology of attitudes*. [Nachdr.]. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
- Ehrlich, Howard J. (1973): *The Social Psychology of Prejudice. A systematic theoretical review and propositional inventory of the American social psychological study of prejudice*. New York: Wiley (A Wiley-Interscience publication).
- Eisentraut, Marcus (2019): Explaining attitudes toward minority groups with human values in Germany - What is the direction of causality? In: *Social science research* 84, S. 102324. DOI: 10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.06.015.
- End, Markus (2017): Subtle images of antigypsyism: An analysis of the visual perception of “Roma”. In: *Identities* 24 (6), S. 668–683. DOI: 10.1080/1070289X.2017.1380265.
- Fahrenberg, Jochen; Steiner, John M. (2004): Adorno und die autoritäre Persönlichkeit. In: *Köln Z Soziol* 56 (1), S. 127–152. DOI: 10.1007/s11577-004-0006-3.
- Feather, Norman T.; McKee, Ian R. (2012): Values, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Ambivalent Attitudes Toward Women. In: *J Appl Soc Psychol* 42 (10), S. 2479–2504. DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00950.x.



- Festinger, Leon (2001): A theory of cognitive dissonance. Reissued by Stanford Univ. Press in 1962, renewed 1985 by author, [Nachdr.]. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press.
- Fischer, Arthur; Ellwein, Thomas (1970): Die Entfremdung des Menschen in einer heilen Gesellschaft. Materialien zur Adaptation und Denunziation eines Begriffs. München: Juventa.
- Flora, David B.; Curran, Patrick J. (2004): An empirical evaluation of alternative methods of estimation for confirmatory factor analysis with ordinal data. In: Psychological methods 9 (4), S. 466–491. DOI: 10.1037/1082-989X.9.4.466.
- Fontaine, Johnny R.J. (2005): Equivalence. In: Encyclopedia of Social Measurement, (Hrsg.) K. Kempf Leonhard. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, S. 803–813.
- Friedrichs, Jürgen (2004): Normenpluralität und abweichendes Verhalten – Eine theoretische und empirische Analyse. In: Was treibt die Gesellschaft auseinander? (Hrsg.), W. Heitmeyer, O. Backes, und R. Dollase. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, S. 473–505.
- Fromm, Erich H. (1941): Escape from Freedom. 1st Owl book ed. New York: Farrar & Rinehart (An Owl book).
- GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. 2016. Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften ALLBUS - Kumulation 1980–2014. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA4582 Datenfile Version 1.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.12646.
- GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. 2017. Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften ALLBUS 2016. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5250 Datenfile Version 2.1.0, doi:10.4232/1.12796.
- GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. 2017. GESIS Panel - Standard Edition. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5665 Datenfile Version 19.0.0, doi: 10.4232/1.12743.
- Glenn, Norval (2005): Cohort Analysis. 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States of America: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Goodwin, Robin; Polek, Ela; Bardi, Anat (2012): The Temporal Reciprocity of Values and Beliefs: A Longitudinal Study within a Major Life Transition. In: Eur. J. Pers. 26 (3), S. 360–370. DOI: 10.1002/per.844.
- Grosser, Alfred (2009): Von Auschwitz nach Jerusalem. Über Deutschland und Israel. 2. Aufl. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.

Hair, Joseph F.; Babin, Barry J.; Anderson, Rolph E.; Black, William C. (2014): *Multivariate data analysis*. Seventh edition, Pearson new international edition. Harlow, Essex: Pearson (Pearson custom library). Online verfügbar unter <http://lib.myilibrary.com/detail.asp?id=527034>.

Hamaker, Ellen L.; Kuiper, Rebecca M.; Grasman, Raoul P. P. P. (2015): A critique of the cross-lagged panel model. In: *Psychological methods* 20 (1), S. 102–116. DOI: 10.1037/a0038889.

Handelsblatt (2014): *Wie Sarrazin Millionär wurde*. Online verfügbar unter <http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/it-medien/lukratives-buch-wie-sarrazin-millionaer-wurde/6647994.html>, zuletzt geprüft am 20.03.2020.

Haury, Thomas (2001): Der Antizionismus der Neuen Linken in der BRD. Sekundärer Antisemitismus nach Auschwitz. In: *Antisemitismus – die deutsche Normalität. Geschichte und Wirkungsweisen des Vernichtungswahns*, (Hrsg.) Arbeitskreis Kritik des deutschen Antisemitismus, S. 217–229.

Hayes, Andrew F. (2013): *Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis. A regression-based approach*. New York, NY: Guilford Press (Methodology in the social sciences). Online verfügbar unter <http://lib.myilibrary.com/detail.asp?id=480011>.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (2019): *Autoritär, national, radikal*. Hg. v. Sueddeutsche. Online verfügbar unter <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/afdpopulismus-extremismus-1.4407594>, zuletzt geprüft am 06.12.2019.

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm; Zick, Andreas; Kühnel, Steffen; Schmidt, Peter; Wagner, Ulrich; Mansel, Jürgen (2013): *Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit (GMF-Survey 2005)*. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5570 Datenfile Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11811

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm; Zick, Andreas; Kühnel, Steffen; Schmidt, Peter; Wagner, Ulrich; Mansel, Jürgen; Reinecke, Jost (2013): *Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit (GMF-Survey 2007)*. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5572 Datenfile Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11814

Heitmeyer, Wilhelm; Zick, Andreas; Kühnel, Steffen; Schmidt, Peter; Wagner, Ulrich; Mansel, Jürgen; Reinecke, Jost (2013): *Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit (GMF-*

Survey 2011). GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5576 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11807

Hellwig, Timothy; Sinno, Abdulkader (2017): Different groups, different threats: public attitudes towards immigrants. In: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 43 (3), S. 339–358. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2016.1202749.

Hempel, Carl Gustav (1965): *Aspects of scientific explanation*. New York, NY: Free Press (A Free Press paperback).

Heyder, Aribert (2003): *Bessere Bildung, bessere Menschen. Genaueres Hinsehen hilft weiter*. In: *Deutsche Zustände, Folge II*, (Hrsg.) Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, S. 78–99.

Heyder, Aribert (2005): Soziale Dominanz und Autoritarismus. Zur Erklärung von „Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit“ im Kontext eines Bildungskonzepts. In: *Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie* 13 (1-2), S. 53–82.

Heyder, Aribert; Iser, Julia (2015): *Criticism of Israel or Patterns of Anti-Semitism? A Representative Study in Germany*.

Heyder, Aribert; Gaßner, Anna (2012): Anomia, Deprivation und Wertorientierung zur Vorhersage rechtsextremistischer Einstellungen - Eine empirische Studie mit Repräsentativdaten aus Deutschland. In: *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* 41 (3), S. 277–298. DOI: 10.15203/ozp.18.vol41iss3.

Heyder, Aribert; Eisentraut, Marcus (2016): *Islamophobia and Criticism of Islam: An Empirical Study of Explanations Using Representative Surveys from Germany*. In: *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 3 (2), S. 178–198. Online verfügbar unter [https://www.crg.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ISJ6\\_Dec2016-Final-1.pdf](https://www.crg.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ISJ6_Dec2016-Final-1.pdf).

Heyder, Aribert; Eisentraut, Marcus (2020): *Antisemitismus und Autoritarismus – Eine traditionell stabile Beziehung? Eine empirische Studie unter Berücksichtigung von Messinvarianz anhand der ALLBUS-Daten 1996/2006/2012/2016*. Forthcoming. In: *Grundlagen - Methoden - Anwendungen in den Sozialwissenschaften : Festschrift für Steffen M. Kühnel*.

Heyder, Aribert; Iser, Julia; Schmidt, Peter (2005): *Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus*. In: *Deutsche Zustände, Folge III*, ed Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Frankfurt/Main.: Suhrkamp Verlag, S. 144–165.

Ho, Arnold K.; Sidanius, Jim; Pratto, Felicia; Levin, Shana; Thomsen, Lotte; Kteily, Nour; Sheehy-Skeffington, Jennifer (2012): Social dominance orientation: revisiting the structure and function of a variable predicting social and political attitudes. In: *Personality & social psychology bulletin* 38 (5), S. 583–606. DOI: 10.1177/0146167211432765.

Homer, Pamela M.; Kahle, Lynn R. (1988): A structural equation test of the value-attitude-behavior hierarchy. In: *Journal of personality and social psychology* 54 (4), S. 638–646. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.54.4.638.

Hüpping, Sandra (2006): Anomia. Unsicher in der Orientierung, sicher in der Abwertung. In: *Deutsche Zustände. Folge 4*, (Hrsg.) Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, S. 86–100.

Imhoff, Roland; Recker, Julia (2012): Differentiating Islamophobia: Introducing a New Scale to Measure Islamoprejudice and Secular Islam Critique. In: *Political Psychology* 33 (6), S. 811–824. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00911.x.

Infratest Dimap (2017): *ARD Deutschlandtrend Januar 2017*. Infratest. Berlin, Germany.

Jagodzinski, Kühnel (1987): Estimation of Reliability and Stability in Single-Indicator Multiple-Wave Models. In: *Sociological Methods & Research* 15 (3), S. 219–258. DOI: 10.1177/0049124187015003003.

Jagodzinski, Kühnel, Schmidt (1987): Is there a “Socratic Effect” in Nonexperimental Panel Studies? In: *Sociological Methods & Research* 15 (3), S. 259–302. DOI: 10.1177/0049124187015003004.

Jagodzinski, Kühnel, Schmidt (1990): Searching for parsimony: are true-score models or factor models more appropriate? In: *Qual Quant* 24 (4), S. 447–470. DOI: 10.1007/BF00152015.

Jedinger, Alexander; Eisentraut, Marcus (2019): Exploring the Differential Effects of Perceived Threat on Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minority Groups in Germany. In: *Frontiers in psychology* 10, S. 2895. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02895.

Jetten, Jolanda; Ryan, Rachel; Mols, Frank (2017): Stepping in the Shoes of Leaders of Populist Right-Wing Parties. In: *Social Psychology* 48 (1), S. 40–46. DOI: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000289.

Jöreskog, Karl G. (1971): Simultaneous factor analysis in several populations. In: *Psychometrika* 36 (4), S. 409–426. DOI: 10.1007/BF02291366.

Jöreskog, Karl G. (1979): Statistical Estimation of Structural Models in Longitudinal Development Investigations. In: Longitudinal Research in the Study of Behavior and Development, (Hrsg.) J.R. Nesselroade, und P.B. Baltes. New York: Academic Press, S. 303–352.

Jöreskog, Karl G.; Sörbom, Dag (1989): LISREL 7. A guide to the program and applications. 2. ed. Chicago, Ill.: SPSS Inc.

Karakayali, Serhat; Kleist, J. Olaf (2015): EFA-Studie: Strukturen und Motive der ehrenamtlichen Flüchtlingsarbeit in Deutschland, 1. Forschungsbericht: Ergebnisse einer explorativen Umfrage vom November/Dezember 2014. Berlin.

Kempf, Wilhelm (2015): Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee. Eine Spurensuche. Berlin: verlag irena regener (Friedens- und Demokratiepсихologie, Band 12).

Klinger, Julia; Müller Stefan; Schaeffer, Merlin (2017): Der Halo-Effekt in einheimisch-homogenen Nachbarschaften: Steigert die ethnische Diversität angrenzender Nachbarschaften die Xenophobie? In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 46(6), S. 402–419. DOI: 10.1515/zfsoz-2017-1022.

Klug, Brian (2003): The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism. In: Patterns of Prejudice 37 (2), S. 117–138. DOI: 10.1080/0031322032000087973.

Klug, Brian (2014): The limits of analogy: comparing Islamophobia and antisemitism. In: Patterns of Prejudice 48 (5), S. 442–459. DOI: 10.1080/0031322X.2014.964498.

Konty, Mark A.; Dunham, Charlotte Chorn (1997): Differences in value and attitude change over the life course. In: Sociological Spectrum 17 (2), S. 177–197. DOI: 10.1080/02732173.1997.9982159.

Krosnick, Jon A. (1988): Attitude importance and attitude change. In: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 24 (3), S. 240–255. DOI: 10.1016/0022-1031(88)90038-8.

Kühnel, Steffen (1996): Gruppenvergleiche in linearen und logistischen Regressionsmodellen. Mannheim.

Kühnel, Steffen; Schmidt, Peter (2002): Orientierungslosigkeit – Ungünstige Effekte für schwache Gruppen. In: Deutsche Zustände, Folge 1, (Hrsg.) Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, S. 83–95.

Kumar, Deepa (2012): *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire. The Cultural Logic of Empire*. Chicago: Haymarket Books. Online verfügbar unter <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10602915>.

Kuntz, Anabel; Davidov, Eldad; Schwartz, Shalom H.; Schmidt, Peter (2015): Human values, legal regulation, and approval of homosexuality in Europe: A cross-country comparison. In: *Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.* 45 (1), S. 120–134. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.2068.

Küpper, Beate; Rees, Jonas; Zick, Andreas (2016): Geflüchtete in der Zerreißprobe. Meinungen über Flüchtlinge in der Mehrheitsbevölkerung. In: Zick, A., Küpper, B., Krause, D. (Hrsg.), *Gespaltene Mitte - feindselige Zustände. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2016*. Issued by R. Melzer for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Bonn: Dietz, S. 83–110.

Küpper, Beate; Zick, Andreas (2005): Status, Dominanz und legitimierende Mythen. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme der Theorie der Sozialen Dominanz. In: *Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie* 13 (1-2), S. 31–51.

L. Milfont, Taciano; Fischer, Ronald (2010): Testing measurement invariance across groups: applications in cross-cultural research. In: *Int. j. psychol. res.* 3 (1), S. 111–130. DOI: 10.21500/20112084.857.

Lederer, Gerda; Schmidt, Peter (1995): *Autoritarismus und Gesellschaft*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Lee, Sherman A.; Gibbons, Jeffrey A.; Thompson, John M.; Timani, Hussam S. (2009): The Islamophobia Scale: Instrument Development and Initial Validation. In: *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 19 (2), S. 92–105. DOI: 10.1080/10508610802711137.

Legge, Sandra; Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (2012): Anomia and Discrimination. In: *Methods, Theories and Empirical Applications in the Social Sciences*, Festschrift for Peter Schmidt, (Hrsg.) Salzborn, Samuel, Davidov, Eldad, and Jost Reinecke. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, S. 117–125.

Leibold, Jürgen; Kühnel, Steffen (2003): Islamophobia. Sensible Aufmerksamkeit für spannungsreiche Anzeichen. In: *Deutsche Zustände. Folge 2*, (Hrsg.) Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, S. 100–119.

Leibold, Jürgen; Kühnel, Steffen (2008): Islamophobie oder Kritik am Islam? In: *Deutsche Zustände. Folge 6*, (Hrsg.) Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, S. 95–115.

Leibold, Jürgen; Thörner, Stefan; Gosen, Stefanie; Schmidt, Peter (2012): Mehr oder weniger erwünscht? Entwicklung und Akzeptanz von Vorurteilen gegenüber Juden und Muslimen. In: Deutsche Zustände. Folge 10, (Hrsg.) Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, S. 177–198.

Lerner, Richard M.; Steinberg, Laurence (Hg.) (2009): Handbook of Adolescent Psychology. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Lipset, Seymour Martin (1994): Political man. The social bases of politics. Expand. ed., 5. impr. Baltimore: Hopkins.

Little, Todd D. (2013): Longitudinal structural equation modeling. New York, NY: Guilford Press (Methodology in the social sciences). Online verfügbar unter <http://gbv.ebib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1137447>.

Little, Todd D.; Card, Noel A.; Preacher, Kristopher J.; McConnell, Elizabeth (2009): Modeling Longitudinal Data from Research on Adolescence. In: Richard M. Lerner und Laurence Steinberg (Hg.): Handbook of Adolescent Psychology. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Luhmann, Maike; Orth, Ulrich; Specht, Jule; Kandler, Christian; Lucas, Richard E. (2014): Studying Changes in Life Circumstances and Personality: It's About Time. In: Eur. J. Pers. 28 (3), S. 256–266. DOI: 10.1002/per.1951.

Lynn, Peter (Hg.) (2009): Methodology of Longitudinal Surveys. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Macrae, Colin Neil; Stangor, Charles; Hewstone, Miles (Hg.) (1996): Stereotypes and stereotyping. New York: Guilford Press. Online verfügbar unter <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/bios/guilford051/95037283.html>.

Marsh, Herbert W.; Lüdtke, Oliver; Muthén, Bengt; Asparouhov, Tihomir; Morin, Alexandre J. S.; Trautwein, Ulrich; Nagengast, Benjamin (2010): A new look at the big five factor structure through exploratory structural equation modeling. In: Psychological assessment 22 (3), S. 471–491. DOI: 10.1037/a0019227.

Marsh, Herbert W.; Muthén, Bengt; Asparouhov, Tihomir; Lüdtke, Oliver; Robitzsch, Alexander; Morin, Alexandre J. S.; Trautwein, Ulrich (2009): Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling, Integrating CFA and EFA: Application to Students' Evaluations of Univer-

sity Teaching. In: *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 16 (3), S. 439–476. DOI: 10.1080/10705510903008220.

McArdle, John J. (2009): Latent variable modeling of differences and changes with longitudinal data. In: *Annual review of psychology* 60, S. 577–605. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163612.

McClosky, Herbert; Schaar, John H. (1965): Psychological Dimensions of Anomy. In: *American Sociological Review* 30 (1), S. 14. DOI: 10.2307/2091771.

McDill, Edward L. (1961): Anomie, Authoritarianism, Prejudice, and Socioeconomic Status: An Attempt at Clarification. In: *Social Forces* 39 (3), S. 239–245. DOI: 10.2307/2573215.

McLaren, Lauren; Johnson, Mark (2007): Resources, Group Conflict and Symbols: Explaining Anti-Immigration Hostility in Britain. In: *Political Studies* 55 (4), S. 709–732. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00680.x.

Meeusen, Cecil; Jacobs, Laura (2017): Television News Content of Minority Groups as an Intergroup Context Indicator of Differences Between Target-Specific Prejudices. In: *Mass Communication and Society* 20 (2), S. 213–240. DOI: 10.1080/15205436.2016.1233438.

Meredith, William (1993): Measurement invariance, factor analysis and factorial invariance. In: *Psychometrika* 58 (4), S. 525–543. DOI: 10.1007/BF02294825.

Merton, Robert K. (1938): Social Structure and Anomie. In: *American Sociological Review* 3 (5), S. 672. DOI: 10.2307/2084686.

Meuleman, Bart; Abts, Koen; Meeusen, Cecil (2017): Walloons as General or Specific Others? A Comparison of anti-Walloon and anti-immigrant Attitudes in Flanders. In: *Psychologica Belgica* 57 (3), S. 75–97. DOI: 10.5334/pb.336.

Meuleman, Bart; Abts, Koen; Sloopmaeckers, Koen; Meeusen, Cecil (2019): Differentiated Threat and the Genesis of Prejudice: Group-Specific Antecedents of Homonegativity, Islamophobia, Anti-Semitism, and Anti-Immigrant Attitudes. In: *Social Problems* 66 (2), S. 222–244. DOI: 10.1093/socpro/spy002.

Meuleman, Bart; Davidov, Eldad; Schmidt, Peter; Billiet, Jaak (2012): Social location and value priorities. A European-wide Comparison of the Relation between Socio-demographic Variables and Human Values. In: Keil, S., Gabriel, O. (Hrsg.), *Society and Democracy in Europe*. London: Routledge, S. 45–68.



- Mewes, Ricarda; Christ, Oliver; Rief, Winfried; Brähler, Elmar; Martin, Alexandra; Glaesmer, Heide (2010): Sind Vergleiche im Depressions- und Somatisierungsausmaß zwischen Migranten und Deutschen möglich? In: *Diagnostica* 56 (4), S. 230–239. DOI: 10.1026/0012-1924/a000026.
- Mikulincer, Mario; Shaver, Phillip R. (Hg.) (2010): *Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels of our nature*. Washington: American Psychological Association.
- Muthén, Linda K.; Muthén, Bengt O. (2005): *Mplus. Statistical analysis with latent variables ; user's guide ; [Version 3]*. 3. ed., 4. print. Los Angeles Calif.: Muthén & Muthén.
- Oesterreich, Detlef (1996): *Flucht in die Sicherheit. Zur Theorie des Autoritarismus und der autoritären Reaktion*. Opladen: Leske und Budrich (Fragen der Gesellschaft).
- Oesterreich, Detlef (2005): Flight into Security: A New Approach and Measure of the Authoritarian Personality. In: *Political Psychology* 26 (2), S. 275–298. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00418.x.
- Pedersen, Anne; Hartley, Lisa Kathryn (2012): Prejudice Against Muslim Australians: The Role of Values, Gender and Consensus. In: *J. Community Appl. Soc. Psychol.* 22 (3), S. 239–255. DOI: 10.1002/casp.1110.
- Piurko, Yuval; Schwartz, Shalom H.; Davidov, Eldad (2011): Basic Personal Values and the Meaning of Left-Right Political Orientations in 20 Countries. In: *Political Psychology* 32 (4), S. 537–561. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00828.x.
- Pratto, Felicia; Sidanius, Jim; Levin, Shana (2006): Social dominance theory and the dynamics of intergroup relations: Taking stock and looking forward. In: *European Review of Social Psychology* 17 (1), S. 271–320. DOI: 10.1080/10463280601055772.
- Riek, Blake M.; Mania, Eric W.; Gaertner, Samuel L. (2006): Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: a meta-analytic review. In: *Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc* 10 (4), S. 336–353. DOI: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1004\_4.
- Rippl, Susanne; Seipel, Christian; Kindervater, Angela (2000): *Autoritarismus*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Roberts, Alan H.; Rokeach, Milton (1956): Anomie, Authoritarianism, and Prejudice: A Replication. In: *American Journal of Sociology* 61 (4), S. 355–358. DOI: 10.1086/221767.

- Rokeach, Milton (1973): *The nature of human values*. New York NY: Free Press.
- Rooij, Eline A. de; Goodwin, Matthew J.; Pickup, Mark (2018): A Research Note: The Differential Impact of Threats on Ethnic Prejudice Toward Three Minority Groups in Britain. In: *PSRM* 6 (4), S. 837–845. DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2017.24.
- Rosenberg, Milton J.; Hovland, Carl I. (1960): Cognitive, affective and behavioral components of attitudes. In: *Attitude Organization and Change*, (Hrsg.) Rosenberg, Milton J, Hovland, Carl I., McGuire, William J., Abelson, Robert P. and Jack W. Brehm. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, S. 1–14.
- Sagiv, Lilach; Schwartz, Shalom H. (1995): Value priorities and readiness for out-group social contact. In: *Journal of personality and social psychology* 69 (3), S. 437–448. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.69.3.437.
- Sayyid, Salman. (2014): A Measure of Islamophobia. In: *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 2 (1), S. 10. DOI: 10.13169/islastudj.2.1.0010.
- Schafer, Joseph L.; Graham, John W. (2002): Missing data: Our view of the state of the art. In: *Psychological methods* 7 (2), S. 147–177. DOI: 10.1037/1082-989X.7.2.147.
- Scheepers, Peer; Felling, Albert; Peters, Jan (1992): Anomie, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism: update of a classic theme and an empirical test. In: *Politics and the Individual* 2 (1), S. 43–60.
- Schenk, Liane; Bau, Anne-Madeleine; Borde, Theda; Butler, Judith; Lampert, Thomas; Neuhauser, Hannelore; Razum, Oliver (2006): Mindestindikatorensatz zur Erfassung des Migrationsstatus. Empfehlungen für die epidemiologische Praxis. In: *Bundesgesundheitsblatt, Gesundheitsforschung, Gesundheitsschutz* 49 (9), S. 853–860. DOI: 10.1007/s00103-006-0018-4.
- Schlüter, Elmar; Davidov, Eldad; Schmidt, Peter (2007): Applying autoregressive cross-lagged and latent growth models to a three-wave panel study. In: *Longitudinal models in the behavioral and related sciences*, (Hrsg.) van Montfort, Kees, Oud, Johann, and Albert Satorra. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers, S. 315–336.
- Schlüter, Elmar; Schmidt, Peter; Wagner, Ulrich (2008): Disentangling the Causal Relations of Perceived Group Threat and Outgroup Derogation: Cross-national Evidence from German and Russian Panel Surveys. In: *European Sociological Review* 24 (5), S. 567–581. DOI: 10.1093/esr/jcn029.

Schmidt, Peter; Iser, Julia; Heyder, Aribert (2011): Ist die Kritik an Israel antisemitisch? Die politische Orientierung macht den Unterschied. In: (Un)Gleichzeitigkeiten. Die demokratische Frage im 21. Jahrhundert, (Hrsg.) A. Langenohl, und J. Schraton. Marburg: Metropolis, S. 189–224.

Schmuck, Desirée; Matthes, Jörg (2017): Effects of Economic and Symbolic Threat Appeals in Right-Wing Populist Advertising on Anti-Immigrant Attitudes: The Impact of Textual and Visual Appeals. In: *Political Communication* 34 (4), S. 607–626. DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2017.1316807.

Schütz, Heidi; Six, Bernd (1996): How strong is the relationship between prejudice and discrimination? A meta-analytic answer. In: *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 20 (3-4), S. 441–462. DOI: 10.1016/0147-1767(96)00028-4.

Schwartz, Shalom H. (1992): Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries. In: *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* Volume 25, Bd. 25: Elsevier (*Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*), S. 1–65.

Schwartz, Shalom H. (1994): Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values? In: *Journal of Social Issues* 50 (4), S. 19–45. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01196.x.

Schwartz, Shalom H. (2007): Value Orientations. Measurement, Antecedents and Consequences across Nations. In: Jowell, R., Roberts, C., Fitzgerald, R., Eva, G., (Hrsg.), *Measuring attitudes cross-nationally. Lessons from the European Social Survey*. Los Angeles, London: SAGE, S. 169–203.

Schwartz, Shalom H. (2010): Basic values: How they motivate and inhibit prosocial behavior. In: Mario Mikulincer und Phillip R. Shaver (Hg.): *Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels of our nature*. Washington: American Psychological Association, S. 221–241.

Schwartz, Shalom H. (2012): An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values. In: *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture* 2 (1). DOI: 10.9707/2307-0919.1116.

Schwartz, Shalom H.; Boehnke, Klaus (2004): Evaluating the structure of human values with confirmatory factor analysis. In: *Journal of Research in Personality* 38 (3), S. 230–255. DOI: 10.1016/S0092-6566(03)00069-2.

Schwartz, Shalom H.; Caprara, Gian Vittorio; Vecchione, Michele (2010): Basic Personal Values, Core Political Values, and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis. In: *Political Psychology* 31 (3), S. 421–452. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00764.x.

Schwartz, Shalom H.; Cieciuch, Jan; Vecchione, Michele; Davidov, Eldad; Fischer, Ronald; Beierlein, Constanze et al. (2012): Refining the theory of basic individual values. In: *Journal of personality and social psychology* 103 (4), S. 663–688. DOI: 10.1037/a0029393.

Schwartz, Shalom H.; Cieciuch, Jan; Vecchione, Michele; Torres, Claudio; Dirilen-Gumus, Ozlem; Butenko, Tania (2017): Value tradeoffs propel and inhibit behavior: Validating the 19 refined values in four countries. In: *Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.* 47 (3), S. 241–258. DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.2228.

Schwartz, Shalom H.; Melech, Gila; Lehmann, Arielle; Burgess, Steven; Harris, Mari; Owens, Vicki (2001): Extending the Cross-Cultural Validity of the Theory of Basic Human Values with a Different Method of Measurement. In: *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 32 (5), S. 519–542. DOI: 10.1177/0022022101032005001.

Schwemmer, Carsten (2018): *Social Media Strategies of Right-Wing Movements - The Radicalization of Pegida.*

Seipel, Christian; Rippl, Susanne; Kindervater, Angela (2015): Autoritarismus. In: *Politische Psychologie. Handbuch für Studium und Wissenschaft*, (Hrsg.) S. Zmerli, und O. Feldman. Baden-Baden: Nomos, S. 144–162.

Sidanius, Jim; Pratto, Felicia (2001): *Social dominance. An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression.* 1. paperback ed. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Sidanius, Jim; Pratto, Felicia; Martin, Michael; Stallworth, Lisa M. (1991): Consensual Racism and Career Track: Some Implications of Social Dominance Theory. In: *Political Psychology* 12 (4), S. 691. DOI: 10.2307/3791552.

Sidanius, Jim; Pratto, Felicia; van Laar, Colette; Levin, Shana (2004): Social Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method. In: *Political Psychology* 25 (6), S. 845–880. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00401.x.

Six, Bernd; Wolfradt, Uwe; Zick, Andreas (2001): Autoritarismus und Soziale Dominanzorientierung als generalisierte Einstellungen. In: *Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie* 9 (2-3), S. 23–40.

- Sniderman, Paul; Hagendoorn, Louk; Prior, Markus (2004): Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities. In: *Am Polit Sci Rev* 98 (1), S. 35–49. DOI: 10.1017/S000305540400098X.
- Spruyt, Bram; van der Noll, Jolanda (2017): The “Islamized Stranger”: On “Chronic” Versus “Contextual” Saliency in the Measurement of Anti-Muslim Prejudice. In: *Political Psychology* 38 (6), S. 977–989. DOI: 10.1111/pops.12383.
- Srole, Leo (1956): Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study. In: *American Sociological Review* 21 (6), S. 709. DOI: 10.2307/2088422.
- Steenkamp, Jan-Benedict E. M.; Baumgartner, Hans (1998): Assessing Measurement Invariance in Cross-National Consumer Research. In: *J CONSUM RES* 25 (1), S. 78–107. DOI: 10.1086/209528.
- Stegemann, Ekkehard W. (1995): Die christlichen Wurzeln des Judenhasses. In: *Antisemitismus: Geschichte – Interessenstruktur – Aktualität*, (Hrsg.) G. Hentges, G. Kempfert, und R. Kühnel. Heilbronn: Distel, S. 9–24.
- Steinmetz, Holger; Isidor, Rodrigo; Baeuerle, Naissa (2012): Testing the Circular Structure of Human Values: A Meta-Analytical Structural Equation Modelling Approach. *Survey Research Methods*, Vol 6, No 1 (2012): Special Issue on the Theory of Human Values / *Survey Research Methods*, Vol 6, No 1 (2012): Special Issue on the Theory of Human Values. DOI: 10.18148/srm/2012.v6i1.5096.
- Stenner, Karen (2005): *The authoritarian dynamic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Cambridge studies in public opinion and political psychology).
- Stephan, Walter G.; Boniecki, Kurt A.; Ybarra, Oscar; Bettencourt, Ann; Ervin, Kelly S.; Jackson, Linda A. et al. (2002): The Role of Threats in the Racial Attitudes of Blacks and Whites. In: *Personality & social psychology bulletin* 28 (9), S. 1242–1254. DOI: 10.1177/01461672022812009.
- Stephan, Walter G.; Ybarra, Oscar; Bachman, Guy (1999): Prejudice Toward Immigrants. In: *J Appl Soc Psychol* 29 (11), S. 2221–2237. DOI: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.1999.tb00107.x.
- Stephan, Walter G.; Ybarra, Oscar; Martinez, Carmen Martinez; Schwarzwald, Joseph; Turkaspa, Michal (1998): Prejudice toward Immigrants to Spain and Israel. In: *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 29 (4), S. 559–576. DOI: 10.1177/0022022198294004.

Stephan, Walter G.; Ybarra, Oscar; Rios, Kimberly (2016): Intergroup threat theory. In: Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination, (Hrsg.) T.D. Nelson. 2. ed. New York: Psychology Press.

Stephan, Walter G.; Stephan, Cookie W. (2000): An integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice. In: Reducing prejudice and discrimination: Social psychological perspectives, (Hrsg.) Stuart Osofsky. Mahwah: Erlbaum, S. 23–46.

Stichs, A. (2016): Wie viele Muslime leben in Deutschland? Eine Hochrechnung über die Anzahl der Muslime in Deutschland zum Stand 31. Dezember 2015. Hg. v. Deutsche Islam Konferenz (BMBF Working Paper, 71). Online verfügbar unter [https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/WorkingPapers/wp71\\_zahl-muslime-deutschland.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile](https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/WorkingPapers/wp71_zahl-muslime-deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile).

Stone, William F.; Lederer, Gerda; Christie, Richard (1993): Strength and Weakness. The Authoritarian Personality Today. New York, NY: Springer New York.

Stone, William F.; Smith, Lawrence D. (1993): Authoritarianism: Left and right. In: Strength and weakness: The authoritarian personality today, (Hrsg.) Stone, William F., Lederer, Gerda, and Richard Christie. New York: Springer-Verlag, S. 144–158.

Stouffer, Samuel A.; Suchman, Edward A.; DeVinney, Leland C.; Star, Shirley A.; Williams, Robin M. (1949): Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier. Vol. 1, Adjustment During Army Life. Princeton. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sturgis, Patrick; Allum, Nick; Brunton-Smith, Ian (2009): Attitudes Over Time: The Psychology of Panel Conditioning. In: Peter Lynn (Hg.): Methodology of Longitudinal Surveys. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, S. 113–126.

Tagesschau (2018): Ein Tötungsdelikt und die politischen Folgen. Online verfügbar unter [https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/inland/chronologie-chemnitz-103~\\_origin6e5426c3-fbe7-4c1d-b911-c602021a8711.html](https://www.tagesschau.de/faktenfinder/inland/chronologie-chemnitz-103~_origin6e5426c3-fbe7-4c1d-b911-c602021a8711.html).

Tajfel, Henri; Turner, John C. (1979): An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In: The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, (Hrsg.) William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel. Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole, S. 33–47.

- Uzefovsky, Florina; Döring, Anna K.; Knafo-Noam, Ariel (2016): Values in Middle Childhood: Social and Genetic Contributions. In: *Soc. Dev.* 25 (3), S. 482–502. DOI: 10.1111/sode.12155.
- van der Waal, Jeroen; Achterberg, Peter; Houtman, Dick; Koster, Willem de; Manevska, Katerina (2010): ‘Some are more equal than others’: economic egalitarianism and welfare chauvinism in the Netherlands. In: *Journal of European Social Policy* 20 (4), S. 350–363. DOI: 10.1177/0958928710374376.
- van Vijver, Fons J. R. de; Leung, Kwok (1998): *Methods and data analysis for cross-cultural research.* [Nachdr.]. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE (Cross-cultural psychology series, 1).
- Vandenberg, Robert J.; Lance, Charles E. (2000): A Review and Synthesis of the Measurement Invariance Literature: Suggestions, Practices, and Recommendations for Organizational Research. In: *Organizational Research Methods* 3 (1), S. 4–70. DOI: 10.1177/109442810031002.
- Vecchione, Michele; Alessandri, Guido; Roccas, Sonia; Caprara, Gian Vittorio (2019): A look into the relationship between personality traits and basic values: A longitudinal investigation. In: *Journal of personality* 87 (2), S. 413–427. DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12399.
- Vecchione, Michele; Döring, Anna K.; Alessandri, Guido; Marsicano, Gilda; Bardi, Anat (2016): Reciprocal Relations across Time between Basic Values and Value-expressive Behaviors: A Longitudinal Study among Children. In: *Soc. Dev.* 25 (3), S. 528–547. DOI: 10.1111/sode.12152.
- Velasco González, Karina; Verkuyten, Maykel; Weesie, Jeroen; Poppe, Edwin (2008): Prejudice towards Muslims in The Netherlands: testing integrated threat theory. In: *The British journal of social psychology* 47 (Pt 4), S. 667–685. DOI: 10.1348/014466608X284443.
- Verkasalo, Markku; Goodwin, Robin; Bezmenova, Irina (2006): Values Following a Major Terrorist Incident: Finnish Adolescent and Student Values Before and After September 11, 2001. In: *J Appl Soc Psychol* 36 (1), S. 144–160. DOI: 10.1111/j.0021-9029.2006.00007.x.
- Voelkle, Manuel C.; Oud, Johan H. L.; Davidov, Eldad; Schmidt, Peter (2012): An SEM approach to continuous time modeling of panel data: relating authoritarianism and anomia. In: *Psychological methods* 17 (2), S. 176–192. DOI: 10.1037/a0027543.

Wagner, Ulrich; Becker, Julia C.; Christ, Oliver; Pettigrew, Thomas F.; Schmidt, Peter (2012): A Longitudinal Test of the Relation between German Nationalism, Patriotism, and Outgroup Derogation. In: *European Sociological Review* 28 (3), S. 319–332. DOI: 10.1093/esr/jcq066.

Ward, Dalston (2019): Public Attitudes toward Young Immigrant Men. In: *Am Polit Sci Rev* 113 (1), S. 264–269. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055418000710.

Wasmer, Martina; Kwasniok, Silke; Kialunda, Annette (2018): Welche Gruppen werden mit der Formulierung "in Deutschland lebende Ausländer" assoziiert? Entwicklung eines Kategorienschemas zu einer offenen Frage im ALLBUS 2016. Unter Mitarbeit von GESIS-Leibniz-Institut Für Sozialwissenschaften.

Wasmuth, Ulrike C.; Waldmann, Peter (2005): Anomie. In: *Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft*, (Hrsg.) Nohlen, Dieter, and Rainer-Olaf Schultze, Bd. 24. 24. Aufl. München: Becksche reihe.

Zick, Andreas; Klein, Anna; Groß, Eva; Hövermann, Andreas; Küpper, Beate (2014): *Fragile Mitte - feindselige Zustände. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2014*. Hg. v. Ralf Melzer. Bonn: Dietz.

Zick, Andreas; Küpper, Beate; Krause, Daniela; Berghan, Wilhelm (2016): *Gespaltene Mitte - feindselige Zustände. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2016*. Hg. v. Ralf Melzer. Bonn: Dietz.

Zick, Andreas; Schröter, Franziska; Küpper, Beate (2019): *Verlorene Mitte - feindselige Zustände. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2018/19*. Hg. für die Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung v. Franziska Schröter.

Zick, Andreas; Wolf, Carina; Küpper, Beate; Davidov, Eldad; Schmidt, Peter; Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (2008): The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The Interrelation of Prejudices Tested with Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data. In: *J Social Issues* 64 (2), S. 363–383. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00566.x.

Zick, Andreas; Küpper, Beate; Wolf, Hinna (2009): *European Conditions. Findings of a study on Group focused Enmity in Europe*. Presentation of the Study on November, 13th 2009 in Berlin. Online verfügbar unter [http://aas18.wegewerk.org/w/files/pdfs/gfepressrelease\\_english.pdf](http://aas18.wegewerk.org/w/files/pdfs/gfepressrelease_english.pdf).



## 8 Tabellenverzeichnis

<b>Table 1:</b> <i>Übersicht der Beiträge</i> .....	10
<b>Table 2.1:</b> <i>Item formulations and descriptive statistics of the latent constructs (2005)</i> ....	24
<b>Table 2.2:</b> <i>Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2005)</i> .....	28
<b>Table 2.3:</b> <i>Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2007)</i> .....	30
<b>Table 2.4:</b> <i>Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2011)</i> .....	31
<b>Table 2.5:</b> <i>The different relationships between groups (unstandardized regression coefficients)</i> .....	33
<b>Table 2.6:</b> <i>Standardized total effects on the latent constructs (2005/2007/2011)</i> .....	34
<b>Table 3.1:</b> <i>Itemformulierungen</i> .....	44
<b>Table 3.2:</b> <i>Invarianztest</i> .....	45
<b>Table 3.3:</b> <i>Mittelwerte der latenten Konstrukte (im Vergleich zu Referenzgruppe 1996)</i> .	45
<b>Table 3.4:</b> <i>Anpassungsmaße der Strukturgleichungsmodelle</i> .....	46
<b>Table 3.5:</b> <i>Standardisierte Effekte im Stabilitätsmodell</i> .....	47
<b>Table 3.6:</b> <i>Standardisierte Effekte im Modell für 2016</i> .....	48
<b>Table 4.1:</b> <i>Standardized factor loadings for all models</i> .....	62
<b>Table 4.2:</b> <i>Wording of the items of the GESIS Panel Human Values Scale</i> .....	64
<b>Table 4.3:</b> <i>Wording of the items measuring attitudes toward minorities</i> .....	65
<b>Table 4.4:</b> <i>Standardized autoregressive effects from T1 to T3 and T2 to T4</i> .....	68
<b>Table 4.5:</b> <i>Initial effects of values on attitudes (T1 to T2)</i> .....	69
<b>Table 4.6:</b> <i>Cross-lagged effects from T2 to T3 and from T3 to T4</i> .....	70
<b>Table 4.7:</b> <i>Effects of sociodemographic control variables on attitudes toward refugees</i> ..	74
<b>Table 4.8:</b> <i>Effects of sociodemographic control variables on attitudes toward Muslims</i> ..	74
<b>Table 4.9:</b> <i>Effects of sociodemographic control variables on attitudes toward foreigners</i>	74
<b>Table 4.10:</b> <i>Effects of sociodemographic control variables on attitudes toward Sinti/Roma</i> .....	75
<b>Table 4.11:</b> <i>Standardized autoregressive and quasi-cross-lagged effects of all four models with control variables</i> .....	75
<b>Table 5.1:</b> <i>Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Study Variables</i> .....	84
<b>Table 5.2:</b> <i>Direct Effects of RWA, SDO and Threat Perceptions on Minority Attitudes</i> ....	86
<b>Table 5.3:</b> <i>Indirect Effects of RWA and SDO on Minority Attitudes</i> .....	87

<b>Table 5.4:</b> <i>Demographic Composition of the Sample Compared to the German Microcensus</i> .....	91
<b>Table 5.5:</b> <i>Ethnic Prejudice</i> .....	92
<b>Table 5.6:</b> <i>Perceived Threat</i> .....	92
<b>Table 5.7:</b> <i>Right-wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation</i> .....	93
<b>Table 5.8:</b> <i>Chi-square Difference Tests of the Effects of Intergroup Threat on Minority Attitudes</i> .....	93
<b>Table 5.9:</b> <i>Chi-square Difference Tests of the Effects of RWA and SDO on Threat Perceptions</i> .....	94
<b>Table 5.10:</b> <i>Factor loadings and Reliability</i> .....	94
<b>Table 5.11:</b> <i>Group-Specific Effects</i> .....	95
<b>Table 5.12:</b> <i>Standardized Effects of Sociodemographic Variables on Prejudice</i> .....	95
<b>Table 5.13:</b> <i>Comparison of Alternative Model Fits</i> .....	95

## 9 Abbildungsverzeichnis

<b>Figure 2.1:</b> <i>Path diagram of the causal relationships (2005)</i> .....	26
<b>Figure 2.2:</b> <i>Path diagram of the causal relationships (2007)</i> .....	29
<b>Figure 2.3:</b> <i>Path diagram of the causal relationships (2011)</i> .....	31
<b>Figure 2.4:</b> <i>Path diagram of the causal relationships (all samples)</i> .....	32
<b>Figure 3.1:</b> <i>Strukturgleichungsmodell</i> .....	46
<b>Figure 4.1:</b> <i>Theoretical model of relations among ten motivational types of values (Schwartz, 2012)</i> .....	53
<b>Figure 4.2:</b> <i>Items and time points of measurement</i> .....	59
<b>Figure 4.3:</b> <i>Standardized initial, autoregressive and cross-lagged effects of all four models</i> .....	67
<b>Figure 5.1:</b> <i>Final Structural Equation Model</i> .....	85