Gillen, Philippe, Rasch, Alexander, Wambach, Achim and Werner, Peter (2016). Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation. Theory Decis., 81 (4). S. 511 - 535. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-7187

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Abstract

In this article we experimentally investigate reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions in which bidders compete to sell their single unit to a buyer who wants to purchase several objects. Our study yields three insights: (i) bids are substantially higher than Nash equilibrium bids predicted by standard economic theory; (ii) these higher-than-predicted prices gradually decline in later periods; and (iii) bid pooling (or simultaneous bidding) is frequently observed-the majority of bidders submit their bids immediately after the first bidder has sold his unit. A model that distinguishes between myopic and sophisticated bidding strategies helps to organize these patterns both on the aggregate and on the individual level.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Gillen, PhilippeUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Rasch, AlexanderUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Wambach, AchimUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Werner, PeterUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-258000
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-016-9546-z
Journal or Publication Title: Theory Decis.
Volume: 81
Number: 4
Page Range: S. 511 - 535
Date: 2016
Publisher: SPRINGER
Place of Publication: DORDRECHT
ISSN: 1573-7187
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
1ST-PRICE AUCTIONS; PRICE-COMPETITION; WINNERS CURSE; COLLUSION; BEHAVIOR; MODEL; OLIGOPOLY; BELIEFS; GAMESMultiple languages
Economics; Social Sciences, Mathematical MethodsMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/25800

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