Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016). Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Eur. Econ. Rev., 87. S. 92 - 108. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV. ISSN 1873-572X

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Abstract

The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs. (C) 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Mueller, DanielUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Schmitz, Patrick W.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-268268
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.04.013
Journal or Publication Title: Eur. Econ. Rev.
Volume: 87
Page Range: S. 92 - 108
Date: 2016
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Place of Publication: AMSTERDAM
ISSN: 1873-572X
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
ASSET OWNERSHIP; DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCES; REFERENCE POINTS; HOLD-UP; GOVERNANCE; RENEGOTIATION; INTEGRATION; INFORMATION; ALLOCATION; CONTRACTSMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/26826

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