Universität zu Köln

Rockenbach, Bettina ORCID: 0000-0003-2624-1964 and Wolff, Irenaeus (2016). Designing Institutions for Social Dilemmas. Ger. Econ. Rev., 17 (3). S. 316 - 337. HOBOKEN: WILEY-BLACKWELL. ISSN 1468-0475

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Abstract

Considerable experimental evidence has been collected on rules enhancing contributions in public goods dilemmas. These studies either confront subjects with prespecified rules or have subjects choose between different rule environments. In this paper, we completely endogenize the institution design process by asking subjects to design and repeatedly improve rule sets for a public goods problem in order to investigate which rules social planners facing a social dilemma invent' and how these rules develop over time. We make several noteworthy observations, in particular the strong and successful use of framing, the concealment of individual contribution information and the decreasing use of punishment.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Rockenbach, Bettina UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-2624-1964 UNSPECIFIED Wolff, Irenaeus UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-268331
DOI:	10.1111/geer.12103
Journal or Publication Title:	Ger. Econ. Rev.
Volume:	17
Number:	3
Page Range:	S. 316 - 337
Date:	2016
Publisher:	WILEY-BLACKWELL
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1468-0475
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship for Experimental and Behavioral Economics Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Reinhard Selten Institute
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PUBLIC-GOODS EXPERIMENTS; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION EXPERIMENTS; COLLECTIVE ACTION; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; COSTLY PUNISHMENT; GAMES; COOPERATION; PROVISION Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/26833