Bierbrauer, Felix ORCID: 0000-0003-3879-9607 and Netzer, Nick (2016). Mechanism design and intentions. J. Econ. Theory, 163. S. 557 - 604. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1095-7235

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Abstract

We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that differ with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satisfies an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all efficient social choice functions are implementable. We show how these results extend to a two-dimensional mechanism design setting where the agents have private information about their material payoff types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic account of the welfare implications of intentionality. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Bierbrauer, FelixUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0003-3879-9607UNSPECIFIED
Netzer, NickUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-277051
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.013
Journal or Publication Title: J. Econ. Theory
Volume: 163
Page Range: S. 557 - 604
Date: 2016
Publisher: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication: SAN DIEGO
ISSN: 1095-7235
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
SOCIAL PREFERENCES; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; RECIPROCITY; FAIRNESS; INCENTIVES; AUCTIONS; PARTNERSHIP; FOUNDATIONS; COMPETITION; EQUITYMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/27705

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