Mimra, Wanda and Wambach, Achim (2016). A note on uniqueness in game-theoretic foundations of the reactive equilibrium. Econ. Lett., 141. S. 39 - 44. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses the problem of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979) allocation as an equilibrium allocation, however multiplicity of equilibrium emerges. In this note we imbed the reactive equilibrium's logic in a dynamic market context with active consumers. We show that the Riley/Rothschild-Stiglitz contracts constitute the unique equilibrium allocation in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||||
Creators: |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-279700 | ||||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.016 | ||||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Econ. Lett. | ||||||||||||
Volume: | 141 | ||||||||||||
Page Range: | S. 39 - 44 | ||||||||||||
Date: | 2016 | ||||||||||||
Publisher: | ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA | ||||||||||||
Place of Publication: | LAUSANNE | ||||||||||||
ISSN: | 1873-7374 | ||||||||||||
Language: | English | ||||||||||||
Faculty: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Divisions: | Unspecified | ||||||||||||
Subjects: | no entry | ||||||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
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Refereed: | Yes | ||||||||||||
URI: | http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/27970 |
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