Universität zu Köln

Kipper, Jens ORCID: 0000-0002-8138-0855 (2016). SUBSTANCE AND THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. Ergo, 3. S. 1 - 27. ANN ARBOR: MICHIGAN PUBLISHING. ISSN 2330-4014

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

In this paper, I identify and discuss the following feature of our judgments about hypothetical scenarios concerning the identity of persons: with respect to the vast majority of scenarios, both members of a pair of logically complementary propositions about personal identity are conceivable. I consider a number of explanations of this feature that draw on the metaphysics and the epistemology of personal identity, none of which prove to be satisfactory. I then argue that in order to give an adequate explanation, one needs to recognize an important characteristic of our concept of personal identity: it is such that if there are mental substances (or the like), they constitute personal identity. At the same time, there can still be persons if there are no such substances. Since this finding casts doubts on the way that thought experiments about personal identity are usually set up, I end by outlining its potential consequences for the debate over the identity of persons.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Kipper, Jens UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0002-8138-0855 UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-292611
DOI:	10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.001
Journal or Publication Title:	Ergo
Volume:	3
Page Range:	S. 1 - 27
Date:	2016
Publisher:	MICHIGAN PUBLISHING
Place of Publication:	ANN ARBOR
ISSN:	2330-4014
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language Philosophy Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/29261