Universität zu Köln

Goergen, Marc, Limbach, Peter and Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik (2020). Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation. J. Corp. Financ., 65. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1872-6313

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Abstract

Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the firsttime disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining or separating the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous, comprise more words, and have a more positive tone for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering firm's characteristics. Our evidence enhances the understanding of firms' endogenous decision to opt for CEO duality and its value consequences.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Goergen, Marc UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Limbach, Peter UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-309271
DOI:	10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101770
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Corp. Financ.
Volume:	65
Date:	2020
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1872-6313
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language PRODUCT MARKET; POWERFUL CEOS; BOARDS; PERFORMANCE; DIRECTORS; IMPACT; OWNERSHIP Multiple languages Business, Finance Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/30927