Mass, Helene, Fugger, Nicolas, Gretschko, Vitali and Wambach, Achim (2020). Imitation Perfection-A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurements. Am. Econ. J.-Microecon., 12 (3). S. 189 - 246. NASHVILLE: AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC. ISSN 1945-7685

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Abstract

Procurement regulation. aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that such regulation imposes virtually no restrictions on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule-imitation perfection-that restricts discrimination significantly. It ensures that in every equilibrium, bidders with the same valuation distribution and the same valuation earn the same expected utility. If all bidders are homogeneous, revenue and social surplus optimal auctions consistent with imitation perfection exist. For heterogeneous bidders, however, it is incompatible with revenue and social surplus optimization. Thus, a trade-off between non-discrimination and optimality exists.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Mass, HeleneUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Fugger, NicolasUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Gretschko, VitaliUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Wambach, AchimUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-324963
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160250
Journal or Publication Title: Am. Econ. J.-Microecon.
Volume: 12
Number: 3
Page Range: S. 189 - 246
Date: 2020
Publisher: AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
Place of Publication: NASHVILLE
ISSN: 1945-7685
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
MECHANISM DESIGN; CORRUPTION; AUCTIONS; COMPETITIONMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/32496

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