Universität zu Köln

Ockenfels, Axel ORCID: 0000-0003-1456-0191 and Schier, Uta K. (2020). Games as frames. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 172. S. 97 - 107. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

We show that economic games per se can provide contextual cues and thereby impact behavior. In two laboratory experiments, we examine whether deliberating on trust games versus stag-hunt games without feedback changes cooperation behavior in a subsequent game. First, we find that subjects who play trust games without feedback hold more pessimistic beliefs about other players' cooperation in a subsequent game than subjects who played stag-hunt games without feedback. We also observe that deliberation on trust games versus stag-hunt games accordingly affects behavior in a subsequent, unrelated game. While stag-hunt games align interests between players, trust games pose a conflict of interest between players. Such (mis-)alignments induced by the game potentially explain our findings, because they may offer cues that affect beliefs and behavior in subsequent games. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Ockenfels, Axel UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-1456-0191 UNSPECIFIED Schier, Uta K. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-338764
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2020.01.003
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume:	172
Page Range:	S. 97 - 107
Date:	2020
Publisher:	ELSEVIER
Place of Publication:	AMSTERDAM
ISSN:	1879-1751
Language:	English
Faculty:	Faculty of Management, Economy and Social Sciences
Divisions:	Center for Data and Simulation Science Center of Excellence C-SEB Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences > Economics > Microeconomics, Institutions and markets > Professorship 1 for Economics
Subjects:	Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language TRUST; DISTRUST; COOPERATION; BEHAVIOR; RISK Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
Refereed:	Yes
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/33876