Kajackaite, Agne and Sliwka, Dirk ORCID: 0000-0002-8026-0165 (2020). Prosocial managers, employee motivation, and the creation of shareholder value. J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 172. S. 217 - 236. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER. ISSN 1879-1751

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Abstract

We argue that when contracts are incomplete it is not necessarily in the interest even of money maximizing shareholders to pick a manager who intends to maximize shareholder value. We first show in a formal model, as well as using observational data from over 900 firms and in a series of lab experiments that choosing a manager who has a preference to spend resources for social causes can increase employee motivation. In turn, losses in shareholder value due to investments in social causes may be offset by gains in employees' performance. The selection of a manager with social interests serves as a commitment device that raises employee motivation. Published by Elsevier B.V.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Kajackaite, AgneUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Sliwka, DirkUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-8026-0165UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-338775
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.02.021
Journal or Publication Title: J. Econ. Behav. Organ.
Volume: 172
Page Range: S. 217 - 236
Date: 2020
Publisher: ELSEVIER
Place of Publication: AMSTERDAM
ISSN: 1879-1751
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; INCENTIVES; COMPETITION; WORK; ENGAGEMENT; PROVISION; RESOURCES; ECONOMICS; MISSIONS; AGENTSMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/33877

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