Betzer, Andre, Lee, Hye Seung (Grace), Limbach, Peter and Salas, Jesus M. (2020). Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers. J. Financ. Quant. Anal., 55 (2). S. 581 - 620. NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. ISSN 1756-6916

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Abstract

This study finds a positive, economically meaningful impact of generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) on shareholder value using 164 sudden deaths and 345 non-sudden exogenous turnovers. The higher a departing CEO's general ability index (GAI), independently and relative to her successor, the lower is the abnormal stock return to turnover announcements. Returns reflect post-turnover changes in operating performance. Further, CEOs' and successors' GAIs are significantly positively related, but only for non-sudden turnovers. Consistently, for sudden deaths, we find positive stock returns to appointments of generalist successors. The results provide a market-based explanation for the generalist pay premium.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Betzer, AndreUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Lee, Hye Seung (Grace)UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Limbach, PeterUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Salas, Jesus M.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-343719
DOI: 10.1017/S0022109018001400
Journal or Publication Title: J. Financ. Quant. Anal.
Volume: 55
Number: 2
Page Range: S. 581 - 620
Date: 2020
Publisher: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
Place of Publication: NEW YORK
ISSN: 1756-6916
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
CEO PAY; WORK EXPERIENCE; FIRM; MARKET; DEATHS; SPECIALISTS; GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; IMPACTMultiple languages
Business, Finance; EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/34371

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