Universität zu Köln

Eder, Anna-Maria A. . No commitment to the truth. Synthese. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this article is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Eder, Anna-Maria A. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-344963
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-019-02528-8
Journal or Publication Title:	Synthese
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-0964
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language BELIEF Multiple languages History & Philosophy Of Science; Philosophy Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/34496