Universität zu Köln

Oechssler, Joerg ORCID: 0000-0003-1418-0842, Roider, Andreas ORCID: 0000-0003-2151-912X and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015). Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work? J. Inst. Theor. Econ.-Z. Gesamte Staatswiss., 171 (4). S. 565 - 589. TUBINGEN: J C B MOHR. ISSN 1614-0559

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Abstract

Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling off reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling off. We also study the effect of subjects' degree of cognitive reflection on their behavior. (JEL: C78, C99, D8)

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Oechssler, Joerg UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-1418-0842 UNSPECIFIED Roider, Andreas UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-2151-912X UNSPECIFIED Schmitz, Patrick W. UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-385066
DOI:	10.1628/093245615X14307212950056
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Inst. Theor. Econ.-Z. Gesamte Staatswiss.
Volume:	171
Number:	4
Page Range:	S. 565 - 589
Date:	2015
Publisher:	J C B MOHR
Place of Publication:	TUBINGEN
ISSN:	1614-0559
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING; COGNITIVE REFLECTION; FAIRNESS; LEGISLATION; RECIPROCITY Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/38506