Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015). Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions. J. Public Econ., 132. S. 23 - 32. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 0047-2727

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Abstract

The government and a non-governmental organization (NGO) can invest in the provision of a public good. Who should be the owner of the public project? In an incomplete contracting model in which ex post negotiations are without frictions, the party that values the public good most should be the owner, regardless of technological aspects. However, under the plausible assumption that there are bargaining frictions, the optimal ownership structure depends on technological aspects and on the parties' valuations. We-show that the differences between incomplete contracting models with public goods and private goods are thus smaller than has previously been thought. (C) 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Schmitz, Patrick W.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-385175
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.009
Journal or Publication Title: J. Public Econ.
Volume: 132
Page Range: S. 23 - 32
Date: 2015
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication: LAUSANNE
ISSN: 0047-2727
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; TASK INTERDEPENDENCE; PARTNERSHIPS; ECONOMICS; COSTSMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/38517

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