Dutcher, E. Glenn, Balafoutas, Loukas ORCID: 0000-0002-3477-5096, Lindner, Florian, Ryvkin, Dmitry ORCID: 0000-0001-9314-5441 and Sutter, Matthias ORCID: 0000-0002-6143-8706 (2015). Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives. Games Econ. Behav., 94. S. 39 - 57. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top and at the bottom induces the highest effort, especially in larger groups. Avoiding being last produces the lowest variance of effort and is more effective at motivating employees compared to competing for the top. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Dutcher, E. GlennUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Balafoutas, LoukasUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-3477-5096UNSPECIFIED
Lindner, FlorianUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Ryvkin, DmitryUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0001-9314-5441UNSPECIFIED
Sutter, MatthiasUNSPECIFIEDorcid.org/0000-0002-6143-8706UNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-388698
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.008
Journal or Publication Title: Games Econ. Behav.
Volume: 94
Page Range: S. 39 - 57
Date: 2015
Publisher: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication: SAN DIEGO
ISSN: 1090-2473
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
TOURNAMENTS; CONTESTS; COMPENSATION; BEHAVIOR; PRIZES; ENTRYMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/38869

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

Altmetric

Export

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item