Mueller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015). Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted. Econ. Lett., 129. S. 116 - 121. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

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Abstract

When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now suppose therestriction on penalties for first-time offenders is relaxed; i.e., larger fines for a first offense become enforceable. Should overdeterrence of repeat offenders now be reduced? We show that this is the case only if the original restriction was not very strong. Otherwise, overdeterrence of repeat offenders should actually be further amplified. (C) 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Mueller, DanielUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Schmitz, Patrick W.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-408128
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.010
Journal or Publication Title: Econ. Lett.
Volume: 129
Page Range: S. 116 - 121
Date: 2015
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication: LAUSANNE
ISSN: 1873-7374
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
DESIGNMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/40812

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