The Politics of Religiously Motivated Welfare Provision

Inauguraldissertation
zur
Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der
Universität zu Köln
2010

vorgelegt
von

İpek Göçmen Yeginoğlu,

aus
Bursa (Türkei)
Referent: Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Wolfgang Streeck
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Ayşe Buğra
Tag der Promotion: 11 Februar 2011
For my grandma,
Hüsnüye Balkan
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements vii

1. Introduction .................................................................1  
   1.1. What is a Faith-Based Organization .........................2  
   1.2. Case Background: Understanding Turkey in relation to the existing variety in Europe ..............................7  
   1.3. The Structure of the Thesis .....................................8

2. Theorizing Religiously Motivated Social Provision ...............11  
   2.1. Two Competing Stories ..........................................12  
      2.1.1. The Return of Religious Charity? ..................12  
      2.1.2. A shift in the welfare mix? .........................21  
   2.2. The scope of the project and expected contributions ....25  
   2.3. Methodology .....................................................27  
   2.4. Conceptual Clarifications ....................................29

Part I

3. State, Religion and Social Policy at the Time of National Revolutions .......35  
   3.1. Taking Religion and State Relations Serious ................36  
   3.2. Patterns of Social Policy Field in Europe .................39  
      3.2.1. Britain .....................................................40  
      3.2.2. France ....................................................43  
      3.2.3. Germany ...............................................46  
      3.2.4. Sweden .................................................50  
   3.3. Conclusion .......................................................53

4. Contemporary Shifts in State, Religion and Society Relations in Europe ......54  
   4.1. The cases of medium degree of change: Britain and Sweden ...........56  
      4.1.1. The transformation of state-society relations in Britain ....56  
      4.1.2. The transformation of state-religion alliance in Sweden ....60
4.2. The cases of low degree of change: Germany and France…………………64
   4.2.1. The rearrangement of the state-religion relations in Germany…64
   4.2.2. The inclusion of the third sector to the social policy arena in
   France…………………………………………………………………67
4.3. Conclusion……………………………………………………………71

Part II

5. State-Society Relations and Social Provision in Turkey…………………..74
   5.1. Late Ottoman Period and National Revolution………………………75
   5.2. The Golden Ages of Welfare State Development……………………82
       5.2.1. The Establishment of the two-tier Welfare State in Turkey…..83
   5.3. Shifts in the Welfare Arena in the post-1980s……………………….88
       5.3.1. Transformations of the Turkish Welfare State………………..91
   5.4. Conclusion…………………………………………………………100

6. State-Religion Relations and Social Provision in Turkey…………………..103
   6.1. From the Empire to the Republic: Nation State Formation Period……104
   6.2. The Contested Area of Religion and Politics in Turkey…………………109
   6.3. The Rise of Islam as the Main Cleavage in Politics (post-1980s)……115
   6.4. Conclusion…………………………………………………………125

Part III

7. Religiously Motivated Welfare Associations in Turkey…………………129
   7.1. Exploring the Universe of Social Provision and RMAs………………130
   7.2. Sampling and Data Collection……………………………………….137
   7.3. Overview of the Sample of RMAs……………………………………141
   7.4. Conclusion……………………………………………………………150
8. Religion, Politics and Social Welfare Revisited ........................................152
  8.1. Major divide: New and Vintage RMAs .........................................153
      8.1.1. New RMAs ..........................................................155
      8.1.2. Vintage Associations ..............................................171
  8.2. Alevi Associations ............................................................180
  8.3. Umbrella Organizations ......................................................183
  8.4. Conclusion .................................................................185

9. Conclusions ....................................................................................187
  9.1. What have we learned from this study? .......................................190
  9.2. Overall Implications ...............................................................201

Appendix I .........................................................................................206
Appendix II .......................................................................................210
Appendix III .....................................................................................212
Appendix IV .....................................................................................213
References .......................................................................................218
Acknowledgements

I have been dreaming of writing these acknowledgements for so long since I thought it would be the final task, but now I know writing is an unending process and there is no final draft. I am sure the journey will continue, but let me thank to all people who helped me up until this point. This dissertation would not have come to fruition without the PhD Fellowship of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies so I would like to acknowledge their financial support. The smiling faces in the administration and library of the institute, who always have quick solutions for any problem, created the ideal working conditions. More importantly, I thank to my two supervisors Wolfgang Streeck and Ayşe Buğra for always being available for support through these three years and helping me not to lose direction. They both contributed to the structure and arguments in this work, by commenting on several versions. Wolfgang Streeck provided me with the position in the institute by saying that they need an eye on a country like Turkey. Although not one of his main interest areas, his enthusiasm on the case of Turkey always amazed me and recharged my batteries whenever I felt burned out. I would in no way go into the effort of comparing Turkey with four European countries without his encouragement.

A second institution I have to mention is the Social Policy Forum at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul not only for accepting me as a guest researcher during my field research period in Turkey, but also being a pioneer in social policy research in Turkey, and producing the most important publications which made my job easier. I owe Ayşe Buğra, who is the chair and one of the founders of this research and policy center, an enormous debt of gratitude for accepting to be the second supervisor of this dissertation. Her advices and comments have helped me a great deal to grasp the complications of social policy field in Turkey. She also took time for long meetings and phone calls to help me structure the thesis. I am very grateful for her kindness and willingness to share her thoughts with me. A last institution I would like to thank is IRLE, University of California Berkeley, for providing me a great working environment during my six months stay in the USA.
Philipp Manow has been part of the advisory committee and encouraged me to pursue my ideas on religion and welfare. The analysis also benefited from discussions with Cihan Tuğal, Aysegül Komsuoğlu and Britta Rehder as well as from their comments on the very early versions of this work. Roy Karadag has been an untiring reader. He critically read the multiple draft chapters and provided me with inspiring comments. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu supported me since I have been her student as an undergraduate of sociology at the Middle East Technical University. I can never forget how I was following her classes and dreaming of becoming like her one day. Our discussions at the very early stages of this work helped me to shape the overall structure.

The main field research was conducted in Turkey. I would like to thank all of the associations for opening their doors to me and to all my respondents for answering my questions. This dissertation would not have come to existence without their cooperation. Aykan Erdemir eased my job, by providing me with the names and the contact details of the Alevi organizations that can be interesting for me to talk to. I am also indebted to Nese, Şeref Yeginoğlu and Arzu, Tolga Zoral. Their unlimited support during my field research in Turkey made me once more realize that there is nothing more valuable than having a loving and caring extended family.

I am very grateful to Özge Cansu Özmen Pushkin, who spent many hours on the entire manuscript, for always having time for reading multiple drafts and helping me to deal with the complications of language. Zeynep Tüfekcioğlu, Azer Kılıç, Elena Bogdonova, Sabrina Zajak, Thorsten Kogge, and Anna Skarpelis read chapters, provided comments and more importantly shared my burdens during the writing process.

I owe a great debt to Özge Koca, who always had time to listen to my endless confusions and guide me through the most important decisions of my life. I owe special thanks to Bilge and Şahin Koca for helping me to realize many of my dreams since I was a kid; to Dilek and Nejat Sezer for their absolute trust in me and support over the past years; and to Nurdan and Hüseyin Besen for always being with me whenever I needed them. I thank my dear friends, Seda Güldoğan, Ahu Günay, Ödül Alev Oksay, and Duygu Balıkçılar, for their understanding of my absence from many important occasions in the last years.
Last but not least, I thank my mother and father Sevgi and Necati Göçmen for their unconditional love and support; and my brother, Emre Göçmen, for making my years of absence more bearable for my parents. I know that they hate the fact that I am away from home already for ten years, and they think that I spend much more time with my books than with them. So, I owe them a big apology for not being able to be with them during all these years, and thank them for their understanding. My biggest debt is to my dear husband, Bener Yeginoğlu for sharing my enthusiasm, joy and troubles and for being the most supportive and understanding man on earth. I dedicate this work to my grandmother, Hüsniye Balkan, as she was the first and most influential teacher of my life. I can never thank her enough for introducing me to the world of books and knowledge.
1. Introduction

The last decades have been stage to increasing presence of faith-based organizations (FBOs)/religiously motivated civil society associations (RMAs) in the social policy arena of various welfare states. The kick off was from America, in the 1980s when the Reagan administration announced religious organizations as being more effective than state agencies and secular voluntary associations in the provision of welfare. The rise of the concept of Charitable Choice as an important part of comprehensive welfare reform in 1996 was the second step, making the area of welfare accessible and inviting for the religious associations. This opening has been taken further by the Compassionate Conservatism initiative of the Bush government after 2001.

Similarly in the United Kingdom, the momentum increased in the 1980s and 1990s with Thatcher’s policies of ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’ and rising emphasis on the role of ‘active citizens’ (Billis and Harris 1992). So the rise of the discourse around the concept is mainly a development triggered by the political sphere in the American context, and diffused first to the British and later on to some of the European countries. Harris et.al. point to the growing cross-party interest in religious organizations in the United Kingdom, especially in the last two decades (Harris, Halfpenny et al. 2003: 93). They mark the Conservative Party’s launch of the social policy initiative called ‘Renewing One Nation’ as a groundbreaking event as presenting faith groups as innovators in solving persistent social problems and creating ‘compassionate communities’ (ibid: 95). As suggested by Philpot this idea of compassionate conservatism was borrowed from the Republican Party’s discourse in America (Philpot 2001: 75). As he argues, Hague took this idea further by arguing that the faith communities will even replace all the government programs which was confirmed by Tim Mongomerie- director of Conservative Christian Fellowship with the statement that “(…) all existing government programs would be maintained indefinitely until faith communities, charities and other voluntary groups were ready to take on the challenge of providing them. Change would only occur after extensive consultation and with, where appropriate, piloting” (Mongomerie 2001). New Labour

1 The concepts of religiously motivated associations and faith-based organizations will be used interchangeably in this thesis. The reasons on this decision will be discussed in the Chapter 2.
government and Tony Blair also shown great interest in the capacity of faith-based organizations in contributing to social welfare, providing social provision, and regenerating communities (Harris et. al. 2003:96; Philpot 2001:78).

The rise of interest on FBOs/RMAs is not limited to the cases of the US and UK, which can be categorized as liberal welfare states. Welfare states that are representing other parts of the welfare typology (Esping-Andersen 1990) such as Conservative corporatist, Scandinavian, and Southern have also have been focus of research for the changing share of religiously motivated associations in their welfare mixes. In addition to the European welfare states, the role of religion in the welfare arena became an area of interest for the Middle Eastern countries too. In the majority of these studies, rearrangements in the area of welfare, which is also named as retrenchments or the withdrawal of state from the area of welfare provision, are pointed out as the main reasons of the increasing presence of religion in the area of welfare. My aim in this thesis will be to show that neither the reasons, nor the outcomes of what is currently witnessed in the area of social provision in different welfare states are identical. The historical analyses of the five cases included in this project will demonstrate that both the processes behind the contemporary proliferation of religiously motivated associations, and the contemporary roles and functions of these associations in welfare arena vary depending on the historical specificities of the country under analysis.

1.1. What is a Faith-Based Organization?

The literature on faith-based organizations is a recent and limited one. A clear-cut definition of the term does not exist up to this point, and the academic discussion on the concept is also dispersed in the areas of social policy, social exclusion, development and civil society studies. In this part I will briefly go into the existing

---


discussions on the phenomenon of faith-based organizations; discuss their achievements and shortcomings.

One of the major concerns of any study that makes use of the term faith-based organization or religious organization is to provide the reader with a definition of the concept and its coverage area. This conceptual problem is not inherent to the literature on faith-based organizations. Nevertheless, the ambiguous nature of the concepts such as religion and faith makes the issue more burdensome in this area. The questions involved are numerous, and the answers are case specific. Every single case differs in what faith means for that specific context, what is included in the area of faith-based organizations, and according to which criteria it is defined. Congregations at the national and local level, churches, and other forms of worshipping communities, sectarian agencies, and mosques are only a few examples of the possible forms of organizations that are included under the title of faith-based organizations. Apart from them, there are also organizations that are religiously affiliated but not religious in the strictest sense of the term. The fact that religion and religiously related issues were neglected in most areas of social sciences in the period before the last decades is one of the reasons for the lack of conceptual language and methodological tools to undertake research in these areas. As a possible solution, most of the scholars working in the area came up with typologies either by focusing on the institutional characteristics of the organizations or the level of religiosity involved in them (see Monsma 1996; Smith and Sosin 2002; Jeavons 2004). As will be discussed in the empirical chapters, this thesis also dealt with this problem of conceptualization by developing a typology on the level of religiosity.

The literature that concentrate on the FBOs as agents of social work mainly studies on the questions related to the functions of them in social/public provision and the questions on the issues such as capability and effectiveness (see Cnaan 1999; Boddie and Cnaan 2006; Dinham 2009). This focus of the literature makes more sense once we remember that the welfare reforms both in the cases of the US and UK put emphasis on the FBOs as being more effective or successful providers than state

---

agencies and secular non-profit organizations (see Philpot 2001; Melville R.; McDonald 2006; Nagel 2006). In the case of the US, the emphasis on religious communities and organizations as possible actors of social service provision has increased since the Reagan era. This period after the 1980s marked the rise of nostalgia for the good old days of pre-modern welfare when the pious people helped one another and when the “evil” of impersonal services and bureaucracy was not invented yet. Supporters of the idea that FBOs should be major providers generally point to factors such as committed volunteers, spirits of care and hope, available resources, and better knowledge of needs of the locals as making faith-based services superior to the secular ones. Either as welfare providers or as participants in new forms of governance, one of the main questions around the issue of increasing presence of faith-based or religions organizations in the public realm is whether they contribute to solving social problems and increase well-being and/or contribute to the ideal of social cohesion. To answer these questions, the studies center on the scope of activity fields of FBOs, and study the outcomes of example projects undertaken by them. Yet, the number of studies and their coverage area is very limited to prove any of these claims.

The interest of the studies, especially in the US and the UK is most of the time on the organizations that are active on the local level. What Cnaan defines as “newer deal” is the reverse trend of the one in the 1960s, in which local responsibilities were on the decline and the central ones were prominent (Cnaan 1999: 4). As the report on FBOs as social providers suggests for the case of UK:

---


The renewal of interest in the potential contribution of faith-based organizations as providers of public services does not concern itself with those large national or regional institutions whose role in the welfare mix is taken for granted and whose religious origins are forgotten or overlooked. Instead, the contemporary policy current is directed towards small-scale activity which takes place at a local or community level and is undertaken by people from a much wider variety of faiths than the Christian and Jewish congregations which played a prominent role in the 19th and much of the 20th centuries (Rochester, Bissett et al. 2007: 43).

Therefore, there is a strong emphasis on the FBOs as local agents, who are able to find local solutions to the problems of locality. Nevertheless, less is known about how these organizations operate in specific local settings, and how the relations between providers and benefices are formed in these localities.

As will be discussed in the historical parts, involvement of religious or faith-based organizations in social welfare provision has always been the case both in the Christian and the Muslim world. Then the first question to ask is “why there is a contemporary rise of them in various welfare states?” Existing literature lacks a focus on the possible political reasons of the renewal of interest in the faith-based associations. I find Habermas’ conceptualization of the renewal of religious movements all over the world—including the heart of the Western one—as the ‘political revitalization of religion’ very helpful (Habermas 2006). Since neither the role of religion in the social provision area, nor the role of religious organizations in the welfare mixes is something new, this thesis claims that what we are currently witnessing is a political process that invites faith-based organizations to the public arena as possible solutions to the contemporary problems of societies.

The changing relation between states and religious organizations is also one of the frequently researched issues in the last decades. The amount of funding available for these organizations increased in most countries, and new forms of interaction such as partnerships in governance structures are on the rise8. It is in this new environment of

---

governance that questions of autonomy such as ‘can a voluntary agency/religious organization protect its independence while getting most of its funding from state agencies? How can faith-based organizations fulfill secular bureaucratic criteria associated with government funding?’ are on the rise. Partnerships between government and religious bodies are not always interpreted positively, as the following quote demonstrates: “The more a religious organization adapts modern, hierarchical, bureaucratic forms, the more difficult it is to maintain and protect its religious identity and uniqueness” (Vanderwoerd 2004: 242). As a solution, some of the organizations set up quotas for limiting the amount of money accepted from central institutions.

In addition to the area of social provision, the issue of faith and the organizations that are established around it are also of interest for the studies on social integration and cohesion. Especially in the multicultural countries of the developed capitalist world, faith started to be used as the main distinguishing characteristics of the migrant groups, in replacing the categories of race and ethnicity (Ahmed, Cantle et al. 2009). In contrast to the emphasis on race and ethnicities as the major determinant of identity in the 1990s, the current emphasis of political discourse is on belonging to different faith groups. This shift is also an indicator of how religion is used to achieve political aims such as pacifying the possible conflicts between different faith traditions. Woolcock’s distinction between bonding, bridging and linking types of social capital has been used as a guide to study the contributions of faith-based organizations to the establishment of well-connected communities (Woolcock 2001; Furbey, Dinham et al. 2006; Harris 2009). The distinction made is similar to Granovetter’s famous analysis of differences between weak and strong ties (Granovetter 1973). Proponents of the idea claim that supporting faith-based organizations also triggers establishment of cross faith connections, which helps development of ‘bridges’ in forms of increasing understanding and/or creating connections between different faith backgrounds.

A crucial aspect that did not receive attention in the literature is the historical mechanisms behind the proliferation of these associations in different countries. The

---

9 In the interviews I have conducted in Britain, this was one of the frequently referred issues. The struggle the Catholic Children’s Society and the central government had on the issue of adoption rights for gay couples is a good example of the possible questions of autonomy. Whether the voluntary organizations are becoming mere expansion of state institutions or will it be possible for them to protect their values, and identity is a question that should be a topic for future research.
international research project titled *Faith-based Organizations and Social Exclusion in the European Cities*, which is a European Commission funded project that is in progress, is undertaking an analysis of FBOs in five countries (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom). The project, in a comparative fashion, studies the different roles of FBOs in different countries by focusing on their welfare state types and the position of religion in their political structures. Nevertheless, the project—in its current status—fails to provide historical explanations for the rise of these associations in each of the cases. Instead, it follows the convergence model and argues that the FBOs are on the rise in order to fill the gap opened due to the retrenchments of the welfare states. Rejecting this general explanation, this thesis will undertake a historical institutionalist approach to understand the mechanisms of change that bring about the rise of FBOs in different welfare states.

1.2. Case Background: understanding Turkey in relation to the existing variety in Europe

Turkey is the main case under analysis. Turkey is a member of the NATO, Council of Europe, OECD, one of the G-20 major economies, an important ally of the United States in its Middle Eastern politics, and the first state with a majority of Muslim population that is a candidate for the European Union membership. The rise of Islam in the political, economic and social spheres of this country, whose main development aims in the last century can be summarized as secularization, westernization and modernization, is obviously a question of interest for all of these publics. The historical analysis of Turkey, which can be marked as a borderline case in comparison to the group of European cases under analysis, will demonstrate that differences between the social and political roles of the organizations in different countries are not due to being Christian or Muslim, but due to the historical configurations of power between state and religion and the maturity level of the welfare state under analysis.

Four European countries—Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden—are included in the analysis, in addition to the main case of Turkey. These country studies will be
used as shadow comparisons in order to arrive at an understanding of the historical mechanisms behind the current religious dynamics in the area of welfare. They have been chosen to represent available configurations of state-church relations in the area of welfare: Britain a liberal welfare state, with a state church and a quite secular institutionalization of welfare provision since the last decades; Germany, a conservative welfare state, having a historical system of cooperation between two main churches and the state in the provision of welfare; France, also a conservative welfare state, with a strict separation of state and church; and Sweden, a Scandinavian welfare state, with an established church that is abolished in 2003. The main aim for this project to include these country studies is not to come up with a general theory of religiously motivated social provision. On the contrary, the research by focusing on an in-depth study of a borderline case like Turkey, in comparison to the European cases such as Britain, Germany, France, and Sweden aims to point at the reflections of historical trajectories on contemporary changes.

1.3. The Structure of the Thesis

Chapter 2, following the introductory chapter, presents the connections of this dissertation to the existing literatures of welfare and religion, welfare mixes, third sector and sociology of religion; and introduces the analytical framework of the study. The chapter starts with a discussion on the “evolution” of social policy from being a form of religious charity to social citizenship right, and questions whether the rise of emphasis on the religiously motivated associations in the contemporary times can be interpreted as a move reversing this course of evolution. Following this, the focus is on the main discussions in the literatures on welfare mixes and third sector and the question of whether the phenomenon of the religiously motivated associations can be understood in relation to the shift welfare states are undergoing in the last decades. Finally the aim and scope of the study is outlined by touching upon on the issues of methodology and main concepts.

The historical and empirical research undertaken is organized in three main parts, following the introductory and the theoretical chapters. Part I concentrates on the European variety in the area of religion and welfare by studying the cases of Britain,
Germany, France and Sweden. Two chapters included in this part aim to go into a detailed exploration of the interactions between religion, state and society in the area of social provision and to supply the reader with a historical understanding of religiously motivated associations as social policy actors. Chapter 3, the first one of this part, looks into pre-modern forms of social policy in the period before the establishment of the modern welfare states. The time of national revolutions is studied as the period in which main conflicts between religion and the newly rising nation states took place on the issue of who will be the main provider in the social sphere. By following the steps of religion and welfare literature, this chapter presents different patterns of religion and state relations and their reflection on the area of welfare. Chapter 4 looks into the time period after the 1970s and study the contemporary changes in the area of state-society and state-religion relations. Following up on the historical analysis introduced in the previous chapter, this one aims to designate how shifts in the welfare configurations on the one hand, and the shifts in the way the states are arranging their relations with religious institutions and groups, on the other hand defines the current position of RMAs in various welfare states.

Part II undertakes a comprehensive study of the Turkish case, by focusing on the two mechanisms of change that are defined as explanatory for the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in the previous part. Chapter 5 engages in a historical study of the development of social welfare in Turkey in the light of the developments in the European welfare arena. This analysis of the expansion of the welfare system in Turkey concentrates on the main characteristics of state-society relations and asks whether the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in the social sphere of the country marks a change or not. Chapter 6 investigates the specific secularization path Turkey followed in the last century. It puts light on the main shifts in the balance between religious and secular forces in the social and political spheres in Turkey and demonstrates how the rise of religion as a main cleavage line in the political sphere set the stage for the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in the last decade.

The last section—Part III—takes up on how RMAs function at the micro level by analyzing the findings of the empirical research conducted on these associations in Turkey. The main aim of this part is to demonstrate how the dynamics of state-
religion relations at the macro level is reflected on the meso level. Chapter 7 starts with providing information on the universe of RMAs in Turkey and the empirical research undertaken. Following this introduction, a brief presentation of the activity areas, organizational characteristics, and practices of provision is carried out. Chapter 8 focuses on the differences in the political and religious identities of the RMAs included in the sample. It sheds light on how the identities of single RMAs are contingent on their different positions within the constituency of political Islam in Turkey and in the international Islamic movement.

Chapter 9 is the concluding part in which discussion of the major findings of the study, its contribution to the related literatures and suggestions for future research is included.
2. Theorizing Religiously Motivated Social Provision

This chapter starts with a brief discussion of the research questions guiding this dissertation, and places these questions in relation to the existing literatures around the issue of religiously motivated social provision. Following the review of the literature, and identifying the gaps in it, the scope and the aims of the thesis will be introduced, and the expected contributions will be presented. Against this background, a discussion of the methodology and the conceptual issues will be included in the last sub section.

The two main questions this dissertation deals with are “What are the historical mechanisms behind the contemporary rise of religiously motivated welfare associations? What are the main characteristics of these “new” social policy providers?” As it is the case most of the time, to answer these questions is only possible through delving into many more questions at the intersection of different social phenomena. The first question to start with is whether faith-based/religiously motivated provision is a new phenomenon or not. There is a popular discourse on the concept of faith-based organizations in the last decade, both in the academic and political spheres, especially in Britain and the United States. The discourse is relatively new, but if the phenomenon itself is new or not is probably the very first question that one should delve into. So, do we witness the rise of FBOs as a new actor in welfare provision or do we witness an increase in the visibility of the already existing ones? Some additional questions may be asked about the meaning of their increasing visibility or increase in number: Are these organizations suggest that there is a return to older forms of solidarity? Can we declare that this development is an outcome of increasing presence of religion in the public sphere OR an outcome of retrenchments in the welfare states? All of the questions listed above are of interest for this research project, and they will be returned to, since the possible political and social outcomes of provision by these associations can not be understood in isolation from them. The issue is broad and it encompasses more than a single clearly defined academic field. Hence, this chapter will go into a brief discussion of the related fields such as religious charity, welfare state, third sector, welfare mixes, and sociology of
religion and present how the research questions undertaken in this study are related to these existing literatures.

2.1. Two Competing Stories: Return of Religion or Shift in Welfare Mixes?

The concept of faith-based organizations is a new one, although what it refers to—if interpreted as religious charity—can be argued to be one of the oldest institutions of human history. After reading what current literature names as FBOs, and I name RMAs as a contemporary form of religious charities, which ruled the social policy arena in a period starting from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century. Following this interpretation, the first sub-part of the chapter will explore religious charities as the preliminary forms of social provision and pose the question whether the contemporary proliferation of these associations can be analyzed as a failure of the secularization and the modernization paradigms and as a proof of the return of religion to the public sphere. The second sub-part focuses on the literature on welfare mixes, welfare governance and third sector and asks the question whether the increasing importance of FBOs in the social policy arena can be interpreted as an outcome of retrenchments in the welfare arena or a shift in the welfare mixes—mainly characterized by increasing activity by civil society and private actors and decreasing state action as a result of welfare retrenchments.

2.1.1. The Return of Religious Charity?

The increasing importance and visibility of faith-based organizations in the provision of social welfare can be interpreted as a challenge to the main paradigms of modernization and secularization. Religious forms of provision were the forerunners of modern social policies by the state. The establishment of modern welfare states, which resulted in a decrease in the activity areas of religious institutions, is only a development of the twentieth century. Following this historical development line of social policy, one may suggest that the current “rise” “return” or “increasing
visibility”\textsuperscript{10} of faith-based organizations is a reverse step in the historical path, or a backward move in the line of evolution. This part of the chapter goes into a discussion about the plausibility of this argument. The first sub-section briefly presents the foundations of religious forms of provision in the Christian and Muslim contexts, and goes into a discussion of the secularization and the modernization paradigms and a critique of their reading of the development of the modern welfare state. Finally the third sub-part looks into the sociology of religion literature with a specific concentration on the debate about the return of religion in the public sphere.

\emph{Religious Charity in the Christian and Muslim Contexts and the Modernist Challenge}

Before being a welfare state provision or a citizenship right, care for the poor has been defined as a pious and moral duty in the religious texts of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. How poverty and inequality have been perceived varied through time and space, but any faith tradition that existed in human history searched for possible solutions to the problem of poverty. Being aware of the great variety of approaches to poverty by different confessions even in the same religion\textsuperscript{11} and taking the risk of simplifying, the aim of this part will be to point at the common roots of charity in the Christian and Muslim contexts.

Charity with its different forms of provision has been the main social welfare institution in the Christian world, before the emergence of welfare states as such. Geremek’s study \textit{Poverty: a History} is one of the influential works looking into how poverty has been framed and dealt with in different societies, in a time period from the Middle Ages onwards (Geremek 1994: 120). Geremek starts his work by informing the reader that in the medieval era charity was a universal duty, and it was the most important way of creating bonds in the society (ibid:15-52). As he describes, the Christian doctrine of poverty before the eleventh century had little to do with

\textsuperscript{10} Which one of the three is true depends on the country under analysis. For some of the European cases it is possible to talk about increasing visibility of FBOs that has always been there. In some others there is an increasing number and plurality.

social reality, it was purely a spiritual value: the criterion of poverty was not the lack of material wealth but the lack of power, privilege and social position. Twelfth and thirteenth centuries were marked as the time of expansion of charities in Western countries of the Christian world. According to Geremek, charity at the time was a way to strengthen relations between religious institutions and the faithful (ibid: 23). Moreover, the act of charity was also a kind of contract between the recipient and the pauper: in exchange for the material alms given to the poor, the poor promised spiritual support. As de Swaan argues the care of the poor has always been a Christian duty: “It is customary to describe this care in terms of individual, altruistic motivations, and an affair between two parties, the charitable and the beneficiary, the giver and the receiver of alms. In fact, from early on care of the poor was the object of collective action and served a collective goal” (De Swaan 1988: 21).

This rule of religious charity, as the main form of provision by the churches, has been the case before the nation state formation period in Europe. The rise of nation state as an outcome of liberalization ideals by the end of the nineteenth century challenged the presence of church in all political areas (see Gould 1999), welfare provision being the most important one. As Morgan exhibits, the building of nation states in this century resulted in the direct competition between the national governments and the church for the hearts and minds of people (Morgan 2002: 124). Since the main ways of getting hold of the hearts and minds of people were through education, health and assistance, the area of welfare state became an area of struggle between the liberal and the religious elite.

The prevailing picture in the area of social provision in the Islamic part of the world was similar. Helping the co-believers has always been one of the main rules of Islamic religious belief. In Islam, as argued by Dean and Khan, if it were possible to identify the moral principle underlying welfare provision in an ideal Islamic state, it would be embodied in the concept of Zakat, the religious duty imposed on Muslims to give a proportion of their disposable wealth for distribution to members of the Ummah who are in need12. Zakat is one of the five central pillars of the Muslim faith,  

12 Although I will make an introductory presentation of the existing literature here, whether zakat can be seen as an instrument of fighting poverty or redistribution is a highly contested issue. For a detailed study see Kuran, T. (2003). Islamic Redistribution through Zakat: Historical Record and Modern Realities. Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts. M. Bonner, M. Ener and A. Singer. Albany, State University of New York.
each of which represents an absolute religious obligation. Zakat is ‘enrobbed’ with religious sanctity and ensures the redistribution of wealth, not by coercion, but through the acceptance of moral principles. Though subsequently constituted as an annual religious tax on property, Zakat is for the benefit of the Ummah as a whole and is supposed ultimately to bring to the donor an increase of property in this world and religious merit in the next. The giving of Zakat can therefore be both altruistic and instrumental (Dean and Khan 1997: 196-197).

The most important social policy institution in the Islamic empires was vakif/Waqf, which has its foundations in the 10th century. Dallal defines Waqf as “the detention of the corpus from the ownership of any person, and the gift of its income either presently or in the future, to some charitable purpose” (Dallal 2004: 13). The origins of the institution of Waqf in Islam are similar, even identical, to those of ancient church property, with collective ownership and use by the religious community (Othman 1983). Waqf, the standards of which were provided by the Islamic law, was mainly an institution to perform many of the services that are the responsibility of the public sector in the modern state. As Makdisi puts forward, “waqf systems duplicate many of the roles played in the modern states by public, non trading corporations, religious and charitable foundations and trusts, religious offices and family settlements” (Makdisi 1981).

This brief overview of “pre-modern” forms of religious institutions taking care of the poor in Christianity and Islam makes the common roots of welfare provision in these two belief systems apparent. Whether these support mechanisms established on religious forms of belonging will survive into the modern period has been one of the main questions of the discipline of sociology in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century. Founding fathers of classical social theory characterized modernization as a process of structural-functional differentiation that will lead to linear progress. The Durkheimian understanding of modern social structures were built on the fragmentation, specialization and differentiation of the social order, which subsequently will result in dissolving of the mechanic solidarities that were created around traditional values such as family, religion, and kinship (Durkheim 1893 [1966]). Following this idea of modernization, establishment of the modern welfare
states were interpreted as the main solution to the newly rising needs of the populace in an era of increasing industrialization. Institutionalization of the state provided welfare was supposed to result in the decline of religiously motivated social policy, since both the need for it will disappear and also the forms of solidarity that feeds it will not be able to persist in the “modern era”. The theories of secularization in the period after the 1970s also supported these interpretations of welfare development that are declaring the decline of religious institutions and their impact on society and culture (see Chadwick 1975; Martin 1978; Berger 1982; Berger 1990; Bruce 2002). The possibility that religious ways of thinking and acting can survive in the public realm was not given credit by these scholars. The expectation was either complete demise of religious institutions or total retreat of religious activity to the private realm.

One can defend that the increasing emphasis on the faith-based organizations in different spheres of society in the 21st century is a mere indicator of failure for the secularization thesis. Nevertheless, this will not only be an ahistorical argument, it will also represent a crude oversimplification of secularization thesis to the single idea of religious decline. Gorski’s studies on secularization debate can be referred to for getting a grasp of the multiplicity of the debates on what secularization is (Gorski 2000; Gorski and Altinordu 2008). While historically situating different theories of secularization in an analytical map, Gorski makes it clear that different lines of secularization debate put forward different projections about the future of religion in society. One common thesis, which constitutes the core of the secularization paradigm, present in the studies of scholars such as Comte, Weber, Berger, Luckmann, Parsons, Wilson, Bruce, and Casanova is the differentiation thesis. Differentiation idea affirms that “religious and nonreligious institutions have become increasingly differentiated overtime” (Gorski 2000: 140). As will be analyzed in the empirical chapters, faith-based organizations can be seen as a threat to this main thesis of secularization owing to their hybrid motivations and organizational style that are cross-cutting the religious and the secular arenas.

The second issue that has to be kept in mind, while going into a discussion of whether the rise of FBOs can be interpreted as a failure of secularization paradigms is that secularization is not a single paradigm, nor is its claims generalizable for every
society. The multiplicity and variety of secularization histories has been mostly neglected by the scholars in the field. David Martin’s work *On Secularization* is one of the exceptions that is crucial both to gain an understanding of the ‘several stories’ on secularization and also the historical specificities behind different patterns of it (Martin 2005). In addition to the sociology of religion literature, there is also a growing interest in political science literature on the varieties of secularisms in different countries. Two exemplary historical comparative studies in this area are one by Kuru focusing on different forms of secularisms as an outcome of historical relations between state and religion (Kuru 2007; Kuru 2009); the other by Monsma and Soper that studies church and state relations in different democracies (Monsma and Soper 2009). Both of the studies, in a very successful manner, challenge the single theory of secularism that is valid in all countries at all times. How relations between religion/church and state formed various forms of secularisms in different countries is one of the main theses of both.

Following a similar line of argument, I will be pinpointing different forms of secularisms as one of the main criteria to define the current position and the roles of faith-based/religiously motivated organizations in different welfare mixes. When we remember that provision of welfare has always been an area of institutionalization for religion in the public sphere, it should not be surprising that the shifts in its position in the political and public arenas are also influencing the area of welfare to a great extent. The number of studies increasing in the area of welfare and religion is also an important proof of this argument (Bäckström and Davie 2009; Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). The European project titled *Welfare and Religion in a European Perspective (WREP)* can be marked to be exemplary with its center on relations between different churches, church state relationships and welfare states from sociology of religion perspective. Another study, with a very similar direction but from a political science outlook is *Religion, Class Coalitions and Welfare States* by Van Kersbergen, and Manow which will be discussed in more detail in the next section as one of the main lines of literature this research projects benefits from.

To conclude, we can argue that the expected linear development line—from religious charity to modern and secular state provided welfare—did not come into existence neither in the European countries nor in the US. Current patterns of social provision in
different countries all around the Western and the non-Western world makes it clear that the convergence model suggested by the modernization and secularization paradigms did not come into reality. It is a clear fact that the amount of state provided welfare increased in the beginning of twentieth century, and one of the main reasons for this was increasing need as a result of commodification of labor. Many scholars point to the time period between 1880 and 1914 as the birth of the welfare state by making references to major developments such as the introduction of social insurance, the extension of citizenship, the de-pauperization of welfare and the growth of social expenditure (Powell and Hewitt 2002: 12). Nevertheless, the expectation that this path of modernization and secularization will result in universalization of social citizenship rights that “encompass the whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the social heritage, and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950) did not come true as the current evidence suggests. Religious organizations, either church related or private have never disappeared from the provision arena. Their area of activity varied over time and space, nevertheless total secularization of the welfare arena had not been the case either in the European or in the American context.

Consequently, I see the studies putting emphasis on the historical differences between various forms of developments in state-church relations to have more explanatory power than a general understanding of modernization or secularization paradigms. For that reason the next chapter will take up on the possible patterns of social policy provision by focusing on the relations between state and religion. Yet, before going into this, the next sub-section will present a contemporary discussion on the religion and public sphere and how this discussion can be valid for the research on faith-based organizations.

The return of religion to the public sphere?

The contemporary discussions around secularization, post-secularism, the return of religion, the rise of public religions are also relevant for this research project. Even though it is not the main area of interest, I believe that questions such as ‘why is there a growing interest on the specific type of civil society organizations that are
religious/faith-based? Is this situation an outcome of increasing demand (from parts of population and governments), or increasing supply (from religious institutions or groups)? Can we really talk about a rise in religiosity or is it just an increase in the visibility of religion or publicity of religion?’ are important questions to bear in mind.

Casanova’s influential book of *Public Religions in the Modern World* distinguishes between three main claims of secularization thesis that are differentiation, privatization and religious decline (Casanova 1994). According to him, the end of the twentieth century is marked by ‘deprivatization’ of religion as an outcome of differentiation. The ongoing presence of religion in the public sphere, as an important part of civil society, is for Casanova the proof demonstrating that the decline and the privatization theses failed. “Public” for Casanova refers to three main areas of the polity that are the state, political society and civil society (Casanova 2003: 111). He asserts that these three realms are the most important actuality areas for religion in the contemporary times. The cases in the book demonstrate civil society as the fundamental locus for religious action after the 1980s. The increasing visibility of faith-based organizations in civil society can also be marked as another example of Casanova’s thesis of public religion. Although his approach is based on a differentiation between the public and private spheres, Casanova also puts emphasis on the necessity to reconsider “the issue of challenging boundaries between differentiated spheres (*public and private*) and the possible structural roles religion may have within those differentiated spheres as well as the role it may have in challenging the boundaries themselves” (Casanova 1994: 7). So he does not totally exclude the idea that the boundaries of these spheres are porous.

The main claims of Casanova on the issue of public religions can be useful in analyzing the increasing emphasis on FBOs in the social spheres of different societies. Nevertheless, whether this increase can be interpreted as an example of desecularization at the meso-level as an outcome of secularization at the macro level is a debatable question. An additional question that is triggered by an analysis of Casanova’s suggestions is whether it is the religious forces that “challenge the boundaries” of different spheres or whether it is the boundaries that have been anyways under transformation due to the changes at the socioeconomic structures of the countries. Giving tentative answers to these questions will be one of the main aims
while undertaking the analysis of the empirical material in the following parts of the study.

*Religion Returns to the Public Square* is another study identifying the relation between religion, civil society and public policy (Heclo and McClay 2003). While the volume mainly takes up on the case of the United States, the declarations about “going public” of religion are not even limited to the West, as Heclo puts forward in the introductory chapter: “Religion refused to stay in the private ghetto to which modernity had assigned it. From the Islamic revolution in Iran, to the Catholic Church in communist Eastern Europe, to the Religious Right in the United States, religion reengaged with political history” (Heclo 2003: 7). Heclo defines the relation between religion and public policy as an “inescapable coupling”, due to the “profound and unavoidable” connections between them (Heclo 2003: 17). The chapters by Coleman on *American Catholicism, Charities, and Welfare Reform* (Coleman 2003) and Carlson-Thies on *Charitable Choice Initiative* (Carlson-Thies 2003) present religiously-motivated/faith-based social provision as an outcome of the return of religion to the public sphere. The authors point at the old times when religion was an important part of welfare, before extension of government provision, and to the new/contemporary times in which religion is again involved in welfare. Yet, the question whether the increasing presence or visibility of religious organizations in the public sphere can be interpreted in the same way in different countries with different histories of secularization is not even mentioned in this edited volume.

This sub-section of the chapter focused on two main lines of literature to give a tentative answer to the question of whether the increasing presence of the FBOs in the social policy arena can be interpreted as a failure of modernization and secularization paradigms, and whether this can be seen in line with the popular conception of the return of religion to the public sphere. As the discussion demonstrated all of these literatures have partial explanatory powers to help us understand the rise of faith-based organizations in the social provision arena. Yet, none of them is comprehensive enough to equip us with the instruments to understand the mechanisms behind this change. It is true that there is a change in the public presence of religion in some of the countries in the last decades. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily explain the rise of religiously motivated associations in the welfare arena. In order to arrive at a
more complete understanding of the concrete processes, the transformation of social policy structures in the last decades should be analyzed. The next section will center on this other side of the medal.

2.1.2 A shift in the welfare mix?

Existing research on welfare mixes has increased mainly in relation to the so-called crises of the European welfare states in the period after the 1980s. In the period following the late 1970s, the increasing pressures on the nation states to survive in the open economy (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000) and to preserve existing levels and forms of social provision became strenuous. The period starting from the late 1970s marked a crises period for the European welfare states due to the increasing disorganization of the political economy. Disorganization, as described by Streeck, ‘denotes a decline in centralized control and authoritative coordination in favor of dispersed competition and spontaneous, market-like aggregation of competing preferences and individualized decisions’ (Streeck 2009: 96). This process of disorganization triggered revisions in the welfare mixes of many countries. The increases in the share of private/voluntary/civil society actors in welfare provision have been the common trend. In addition to the changing allocations of different providers in the welfare mixes, there have been shifts in the nature of relationships between them. Changing boundaries and blurring of lines between different providers became one of the commonly discussed characteristics of the new welfare mixes. This subsection of the chapter will mainly focus on two lines of literature; welfare mixes approach and third sector studies, as offering possible explanations for the transformations of the welfare arena, and the increasing number and/or visibility of faith-based/religiously-motivated organizations in this arena.

The main argument of the welfare mixes approach is that social policy has always been an arena shared by the public and private actors and institutions throughout history (Wuthnow 1991; Evers 1993; Abrahamson 1995; Evers and Olk 1996; Abrahamson 1999; Ascoli and Ranci 2002). The configurations of the welfare mix, which consists of family, state, market and voluntary sector, have always been in a making and remaking process as part of the dynamic changes in the political,
economic and social spheres of societies. The scholars of the welfare mixes approach agree upon the argument that welfare states are going through a period of transformation in which the voluntary sector is becoming a major provider in the period after 1980s. Although I agree with the main claims of the current literature in marking the shift in the welfare mixes, I have concerns about the accuracy of the assertion that there is a common state of transformation bringing about identical outcomes (see Bode 2006) throughout the Western Europe. I claim that the first thing in order to undertake an analysis of change in the welfare mixes is to comprehend the diversity of welfare mixes in comparative terms. There may be a common shift towards a governance approach, but I argue that historical specificities play the determining role for the diverse outcomes of the welfare shifts in each case.

In close connection with the studies on the issue of welfare mixes is the recent emphasis on the issue of governance in the area of social policy (Jessop 1999; Daly 2003; Bode 2006). The governance approach focuses more on the nature of the relationship between different providers. Although its main area of usage is not social policy, the concept of governance began to appear in discussions of it (Daly 2003). Governance in social policy field mainly refers to increasing of decentralized and diffused forms of policy making and provision as an outcome of coordination between private and public bodies. The functioning of the faith-based/religiously-motivated organizations can be seen as a good example for the new forms of governance. In the case of the United Kingdom the phrase “state as a steerer rather than rower” which used to define governance under New Labour is quite informative to understand the nature of relationship between various providers (Daly 2003: 120). In many countries, the number of partnerships between states and private and voluntary agencies are on the rise as an outcome of the increasing emphasis on the governance approach. Nonetheless, whether states will give up their roles to be rowers is still unknown for most of the European cases.

A highly related literature that should not be left out of the discussion is the one on the so-called third sector (Anheier and Seibel 1990; Seibel 1990; Gidron, Kramer et al. 1992; Evers and Laville 2003; Kendall 2009). Third sector is also an area of research that has gained increasing importance in Europe in the period after the 1990s, in close connection to the welfare mixes approach. Third sector research does not
exclusively focus on the area of social policy, yet in this project it will be mainly studied in relation to the ‘recalibration’ (Pierson 2001) of the welfare state in the last decades. Although the definition and clarity of the concept third sector is contested, its quality in bringing an improvement to the public-private duality is clear in distinguishing the market from the voluntary sector, and in pointing to the unclear boundaries between them. Third sector research mainly took a sociological and political perspective for the analysis of organizations that are situated in the intermediate area between market, state and private households (Evers 1990). The focus on the intermediary nature of third sector makes clear that “there is no clear line of demarcation between, on the one hand, the market place, the political arena, communities and state organizations, and on the other the third sector” (Evers and Laville 2003: 36). Faith-based organizations are good examples representing this intermediary nature of the third sector, as the empirical chapters will present. An additional powerful side of third sector studies is the attention they pay to historical specificities of state civil society relations in order to explain the backgrounds of current developments.

The change in the nature of the political and social movements in the last decades is also a core area for third sector studies. The movements of the 21st century are defined to be more diverse and plural than the class based interest groups that ruled the politics before 1980s. Current diversity of the social service organizations in terms of resources, goals, steering mechanisms and corporate identity are defined using the analytical concept of hybrid organizations (Evers and Laville 2003: 237-252). A further defining characteristic of these organizations is the forms of cooperation and partnerships within themselves and between them and the state. Some of the scholars interpreted new forms of cooperation such as networks and partnerships as creating ‘win-win’ situations for all participants such as markets, civil society, community based initiatives and state (Evers and Laville 2003: 37). Others point at the possible issues of dependency creation and instrumentality that can rise between governments and the civil society organizations (Lewis 1999; Dahrendorf 2001; Lewis 2004). I would claim that the nature of relationships between civil society organizations and state becomes even more interesting when the organizations under focus are the religious or faith-based ones. Whether faith-based organizations are sacrificing from their religious aims and motivations in order to work together with state agencies, or it
is the secular states who are giving up some of their criteria of social policy making and provision is an important distinction that needs to be taken into consideration by future research.

Existing literature does not pay specific attention to the issue of religion and how it can be significant for the formation of diverse third sectors in different countries. I see this as a weak point and claim that a complete understanding of the third sector is not possible without a focus on the relations between religious and secular authorities in a country. Robert Wuthnow is one of the exceptions to the trend of neglecting religion in the study of voluntary organizations (Wuthnow 1991). He sees the distinction between religious and secular forms of voluntary organizations crucial due to two historical reasons: first is the determining role of religious values and organizations in providing a ground for the rise of other kinds of voluntary organizations, and second is the determining role of state-religion conflicts in shaping the voluntary sector (ibid: 20). I agree with his claim that “much of the variation in the scope and functions of the voluntary sector in contemporary advanced industrial societies can be traced to the historical patterns that were established during the Enlightenment, and later, during the republican revolutions and social–democratic upheavals of the nineteenth century” (Wuthnow 1991: 21). According to him, to get a better understanding of the voluntary sector one should be attentive to the relevancy of the social and cultural changes for the religious dimension in a society, since the changing role of religion in return may give a hint about the transformations in the composition and orientation of the voluntary sector (ibid: 22). His approach is quite helpful for the study of current changes in the voluntary social provision arena in general and for the study of faith-based organizations in specific. Nevertheless, the case studies in his edited volume Between States and Markets unfortunately fail to put the necessary emphasis on the issue of state-church conflicts on the one hand, and the changing role of religion on the other, which are two important factors shaping the voluntary sector.

In conclusion, the existing literatures that are candidates in explaining the rise of FBOs in the social policy arena either fail to pay attention to the history of these formations in different welfare states or they miss the shifts in the area of religion and politics as possible influential factors. Moreover, there are no studies that reconcile these two possible explanations—the return of religion and the shift in the welfare
mixes—to arrive at a more complete understanding of the phenomenon of faith-based/religiously motivated associations. The next session will identify how this research deals with the weak points of the existing literatures and will present the main arguments of the thesis.

2.2. The scope of the project and expected contributions

As the discussion of the literature made clear, faith-based organizations is quite a recent area of study. The research conducted on the topic is quite limited, and most of it is concentrated on the cases of United States and United Kingdom. Moreover, the existing studies do not take into consideration the relevance of the topic in an interdisciplinary manner; their approach is limited to single fields such as social policy, urban development, sociology of religion and social cohesion. On the other hand, the interests of these single literatures do not intersect and therefore they do not communicate with each other. The overall aim of this thesis is to provide the reader with a historical and interdisciplinary understanding of religiously motivated associations in different welfare mixes. While doing this, the research will benefit from a wide variety of social science literatures and theories, and will also contribute to them. The expected contributions can be discussed under three main titles that represent the three main interests of this thesis.

The main question guiding the research undertaken for the first two main parts of this dissertation is: *What are the historical mechanisms behind the contemporary rise of religiously motivated associations in the area of social provision?* The first aim of this research is to provide an overall historical understanding of the rise of FBOs in different welfare states, and investigate the possible mechanisms behind “the return of religious charity” in the area of welfare. This is mainly achieved by defining social provision arena as a dynamic one that has always been under continuous change to reconcile the balance between different providers. This first section characterize social provision as a form of give and take relationship which has always been important for different actors in order to raise their political power, social prestige, or influence on various populations. Churches and state, being the main providers in the arena, have been through periods of conflict and/or cooperation in different geographies. The question then becomes how did a balance come to place between
these different providers? What arrangements does politics find to reconcile the sacred and the secular claims? The crucial era that has been under scrutiny to answer these questions is the time of national revolutions. The settlements between states and churches at the crucial periods of late nineteenth, early twentieth century have been analyzed as the main influential factor defining the role of religious actors and institutions in the newly establishing welfare states. This part mainly benefits from discussions on religion and welfare, and religion and politics.

Part I focuses on four different European countries in order to present how interactions between state and church influenced the shaping of social policy arena in each of them. Two main periods are studied for each of the countries under analysis: the first one is the period in which the formative historical solution between the state and church settled (late nineteenth, early twentieth century), and the second one is the current period where a “renaissance of charitable organizations” is the case. The presentation of these four cases provides us with a panorama of the existing patterns of relationships in the area of welfare, and equips us with an understanding of two explanatory mechanisms that have determined the contemporary presence of RMAs in a welfare state. Part II made use of the findings in Part I for an in-depth analysis of the Turkish case and demonstrated that in contrast to the general perception, Turkey is not a peculiar case. Two main contributions are expected from these two main parts of the dissertation. The first one is an interdisciplinary historical understanding of the phenomenon of FBOs. The discussions in this part are expected to contribute to the literatures on welfare mixes, religion and welfare and third sector. The second one is an-depth understanding of the development of state-society and state-religion relations in Turkey, which is the only country that does not have the institutionalized religious partner (church) in the area of provision.

The third contribution of this research to the existing literature will be through the empirical study of religiously motivated associations in Turkey. This part aims to point out the politics of religiously motivated welfare provision at the meso level, by making an in-depth study of the main aims, connections and functioning of the RMAs. The main question guiding this last section is “What are the main characteristics of these “new” social policy providers?” The presentation of the areas of activities, organizational characteristics, decision making mechanisms and
practices of provision will be the main focus of the chapters in this part. The differences in the identities of the associations and the discussion on the reasons behind these differences are expected to contribute mainly to the literature on faith-based organizations in Europe and on religion and welfare in the Middle East.

2.3. Methodology

As asserted by Pierson ‘Placing politics in time can greatly enrich both the explanations we offer for social outcomes of interest, and the very outcomes that we identify as worth explaining’ (Pierson 2004: 2). Consequently, trying to understand the current roles of religiously motivated associations in contemporary welfare systems would be a hopeless effort without getting an understanding of the history behind their existence. Therefore, the main research methodology that will be used in the first two parts is historical analysis to explain the causal mechanisms behind the contemporary increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy arena. Historical in this research means that the researcher situates the study within the relevant contexts, takes a sophisticated approach towards historiography, thinks seriously about issues of process, timing, and historical trajectories, and gains a deep understanding of the cases (Amenta 2003: 94).

As Mayntz maintains, a study with the aim of causal reconstruction of a specific macro phenomenon and the exploration of mechanisms begins with the identification of an *explanandum* (Mayntz 2003: 5). According to her, ‘Processes generally do not come as discernable, "given" units; they have no naturally given beginning and end. We artificially pick out a sequence, a part of the ongoing process, and try to explain how it has come to the particular point that is our *explanandum*’ (ibid.). The *explanandum* of this research is the increasing role of religiously motivated associations in social provision. To follow the processes that resulted in this explanandum, the research will focus on the history of social policy, starting from early nation state formation period to today. While doing this, the main lines of interest will be the history of state and religion relations, and the state and society interactions in the area of welfare provision. The analysis of the relations between religion, state and society is expected to result in an comprehensive understanding of
the mechanisms behind the changing role of RMAs in the welfare state structures. The procedure to be followed will be to give thick descriptions of state, society and religion interactions in each period and to analyze the possible reflections of them on the social policy arena. As Myntz argues, ‘mechanisms state how, by what intermediate steps, a certain outcome follows from a set of initial conditions’ (Mayntz 2003: 4). Following this idea, critical junctures of each period will be analyzed by focusing on the institutions and actors in the field of social policy in order to follow the chains of different mechanisms which jointly generated the outcome of increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy field.

Following the historical part, the third main part of presents the empirical analysis of the religiously motivated associations that have been founded in the last decades. In-depth interviews conducted with the administrators and volunteers of the RMAs, the local and central social policy administrators, and scholars working in the area are the main sources of data. The main field research has been carried out in Turkey in the period between January 2008 and June 2009. Access to the field was not easy. These organizations are most of the time reluctant to talk about their activities. Especially after the huge corruption scandal of the biggest RMA in mid 2007; it became even harder to reach these groups. A couple of months before I went to Turkey to conduct the main field research the largest RMA in Turkey had been taken to the court in Germany due to illegal transfer of donations collected from Turks living in Germany to certain businesses companies in Turkey. Obviously, this issue had huge repercussions on the Turkish branches of the organization as well as the other RMAs doing similar activities. The organizations were quite hesitant towards my interview request. One of the resources I used to get in touch with the RMAs was the internet: I searched the existing civil society organizations working in social assistance and solidarity areas in each of the three cities. After creating a list, I have gone through their web-pages to see whether they do explicit or implicit references to Islam, God, Prophet Muhammad, or other divine issues, so that I could make a preliminary decision on whether they can be considered as FBOs or not. In the third stage, I phoned these organizations and asked for appointments by stating that I am a PhD student doing research in the area. Sometimes I managed to get a positive answer after a couple of phone calls to the organization, talking to various people, explaining in detail, who I am, what I want to learn from them, what my aim is etc. Sometimes I
had to use some personal connections to reach some people. But there were also exceptional cases in which they kept postponing me for weeks, or politely refused the interview request.

The interviews consisted of semi-structured, open ended questions. Each interview was around an hour, in which the following data is collected: (1) History of the organization- founding date of the organization, professional and educational backgrounds of the founders, their main motivations while founding the organization. (2) Organizational details- number of employees and volunteers, scope of action, main activities, decision making, and resources. (3) Connections- relations to institutions, other civil society organizations, municipalities, political parties, media and business. The data gathered from the in-depth interviews have been analyzed by using coding and content analysis.

2.4. Conceptual Clarifications

I believe that the most comprehensible and valuable theories of social science are the ones that are crystal clear about the concepts they utilize. Nevertheless, any social scientist very well knows that being clear about the concepts we use is one of the most strenuous parts of research. Interdisciplinary research agendas are one of the most problematic ones in achieving this conceptual clarity since definitions, and understanding attached to most concepts differ from one discipline to the other. A further problematic research agenda is the intercultural and/or international comparative case studies, given that one to one matching of concepts through different cultures and nations is an extremely rare case: If one is doing cross-country comparisons, and trying to understand similar situations in different social and political environments, in-depth explanations of what is meant by the usage of one specific concept becomes even more important. Research done on faith-based organizations, charities, and/or religiously motivated social provision in the last decades involves the complications of both being interdisciplinary and comparative. I will try to inhabit future rise of misunderstandings in my study by starting with a discussion of concepts.
As already mentioned in the introduction and the title of this chapter, the concept I utilize for this research is religiously motivated organizations (RMAs). The concept of RMAs should be understood as a more general concept than FBOs, which is also suitable to use in the Muslim context in addition to the Christian. Faith-based organizations, as the concept is used in Europe and the United States, refers to a group of organizations that includes institutionalized religion (churches, religious congregations) in addition to charitable and philanthropic organizations that are grounded in the main faith traditions of the societies. Their references to religion, religious aims and practices are open. Most of the time, moreover, these are places of worship or connected to places of worship. Moreover, religious faith is the main component of self-definition in most of the cases. The situation in Turkey presents a contrast to these structures in the European and the American contexts. The absence of institutionalized religion—in the form of a church—is obviously the main difference between the Turkish case and the others. Mosque in the Muslim world cannot be accepted as a counterpart to the churches in the Christian tradition. Mosques are only places of worshipping; historically they have never had social functions that are comparable to the churches in the Christian world. They have never had either political or economic freedom from the state. Therefore they have never been institutionalized as partners of social provision, nor have they ever undertaken social assistance activities except from very minor attempts. Therefore, the organizations I refer to under the title of RMAs are not mosques; instead, they are private organizations that are free from any forms of institutionalized religion or place of worship. The main reasons for conceptualizing them as religiously motivated are the underlying driving forces for their provision of welfare and—most of the time veiled—connections they have to religious groups, sects or tarikats (Sufi orders and communities). In short these organizations I refer to are part of third sector/civil society/voluntary sector, they are non-state and non-profit, and they are working in the area of social welfare/social policy provision.

I prefer to use a very general definition of what association is, following the French sociologist Alain Caille. In looking at the relationship between gift and association, Caille defines association as a convention in which two or more people pool their material resources, their knowledge for undertaking activities for a purpose that is not principally that of sharing material profits (Caille 2000: 52). The RMAs I am referring
to as being the center of attention for this research are associations that are formed by pooling of some material and non-material resources by a group of individuals on a voluntary basis for the provision of social services or goods for the poor and needy. So the associations that are under focus are the ones that are active in the area of social provision, for increasing the material and sometimes also non-material (spiritual, metaphysical) well-being of their recipients.

What about being religiously motivated? What does this research refer to with the concepts of religion and religious? According to Durkheim: “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim 1917: 62). Durkheim’s definition makes references to a unified set of beliefs, and an institution (Church) that unites all who believe. Beckford, on the other hand, criticizes Durkheim for defining religion “too closely related with very rigid sense of the sacred, community and moral obligation” (Beckford 1994: 319). The relatively flexible definition of Beckford, which does not necessarily draw a strict line between the sacred and the profane, have been preferred as it is more suitable for defining the characteristics of religious organizations included in this research project.

George Simmel is also one of the names Beckford draws on, while formulating this designation of religion. Simmel’s contribution to the sociology of religion in early twentieth century is worth looking into as it represents quite an inclusive interpretation of what religious is (Simmel 1905). He defines religious relations dispersed in the daily life of people: “I do not believe that the religious feelings and impulses manifest themselves in religion only; rather, that they are to be found in many connections, a co-operating element in various situations, whose extreme development and differentiation is religion as an independent content of life” (Simmel 1905: 360). So what religious is, is not strictly and inevitably connected to what sacred is and is not perfectly distinguishable from what profane is. One of the characteristics of utilizing such a definition of religion and religious is its instability and not rigid form: What religious is, or what can be included in the area of religion is in a constant process of definition and redefinition.
Luckmann’s theory of levels of transcende nce can also be helpful to get a better understanding the relations between what “natural/profane/nonreligious” and “supernatural/sacred/religious” are:

“Religion” is commonly taken to refer to a particular part of human existence, the part that is concerned with the “supernatural”, with the “ultimate meanings” of life, with “transcendence.” However, no matter into how many different parts one divides human life, it constitutes a single trajectory between birth and death, a trajectory which normally has a certain elementary, pre-reflective, taken-for-granted unity of meaning, and identity. In human life the “supernatural” is bound up with the “natural”; “ultimate” meanings of life make sense only in the context of the significance of common everyday affairs; and the “transcendent” is only transcendent with respect to something “immanent.” (Luckmann 1990: 128).

In such an understanding of religion and transcendence, what is religious is not necessarily limited to the strict dichotomy of sacred and profane, or is not necessarily part of institutionalized religion in the form of a church or mosque.

Wuthnow’s emphasis on the social dimension of religion and its “functionality” becomes relevant at this point. As he argues,

“Religion has an organic quality, a communal and moral dimension that binds people to one another and creates close dependencies between them and their environments. […] Religions become embodied as moral communities—as networks of deeply felt obligation to one another and to collective rituals and beliefs, all of which provide a sense of belonging, even security to the participants” (Wuthnow 1988: 308).

Further consideration of these dependencies and the bounds created will be of crucial importance to understand the functioning of the RMAs in various networks of reciprocity.

In conclusion, following Luckmann, Simmel, Beckford, and Wuthnow when I talk about religiously motivated associations in this study, I will be referring to any association built on some forms of organic quality (Wuthnow 1988), undertaking
social provision activities as an outcome of various levels of transcendence as a motivation (Luckmann 1990), and by connecting their actions to some form of a deeper and ultimate reality (Beckford 1994: 339).

The next part of the will focus on a historical study of the European variety in state, religion and society relations in the area of welfare provision, and how this variety is shaping the contemporary developments in the area of religiously motivated welfare provision.
Part I
3. State, Religion and Social Policy at the Time of National Revolutions

In order to provide a dynamic historical understanding of social policy, I define it as an area of loyalty creation and contract revision between providers and beneficiaries—these two sides can be state and society, church and believers, voluntary organizations and various groups of needy. I argue that provision of welfare should be understood as a continuously negotiated relation between these two sides. Failure to provide may mean losing the loyalties created through distribution of benefits and a decline of power. Historically, the costs and benefits of welfare provision have been shared mainly between state and society. Various institutions of local or central state, and different subsections of society have been eager for the provision of social benefits. Family, civil society associations, religious institutions can be listed as some of the main ones that undertook this role in different time periods.

This chapter will focus on the interaction between religion and state—as the main institutions which have been responsible to provide for the poor and needy—at the turn of the twentieth century. Various forms of cooperation and conflict between these two institutions at the time of national revolutions will be analyzed as the main factor explaining the disproportionate presence of religion in the newly rising welfare states in different societies. Before going into further discussion, I need to clarify that whether to include religion in the area of state or society is a case and time specific decision, outcome of which influenced the configurations of social provision mixes in different countries. Nevertheless, for the sake of analysis I will define the area of religion, which includes both formal and informal religious institutions and organizations, as a separate area from the areas of state and society. Following this line of argument, the area of social provision will be defined as one of a continuous interaction between state, religion and society. In order to get a full grasp of the argument and to sketch a variety of possible forms of state-religion relations in the

13 What I refer to by the concept of power is cultural, social, but mainly political influence on the beneficiaries.
area of welfare, the cases of Britain, Germany, France and Sweden will be under analysis in the following section.

The main theoretical framework to undertake this analysis is borrowed from the welfare and religion literature. I will adapt the cleavage theory of the Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan (1970), and look into the nation state formation period in different welfare state structures. My main argument behind this inquiry is that the contemporary change in the area of religiously motivated social provision can only be understood in relation to the historical cleavage structures in a society. Therefore, I will go into an exploration of how this theory has been used as a base for an understanding of different welfare state structures by Van Kersbergen and Manow (2009) and expand this understanding to explain the differences and similarities between the current share and roles of religiously motivated civil society organizations in a variety of welfare states.

3.1. Taking Religion and State Relations Serious

Religion has always been a neglected area in the welfare state research. Apart from a couple of exceptions, not much emphasis was put on it neither as an explanatory variable for understanding the varieties of welfare states, nor for understanding the current changes in them. When I talk about taking religion seriously, as a factor for understanding the changes in different welfare configurations, I will mainly be referring to religious institutions and organizations as players in the social provision arena. Therefore, I will be referring to religion as a resource and a cleavage that organizes society, not as a set of beliefs and practices.14

In their study *Religion Class Coalitions and Welfare States*, Van Kersbergen and Manow point out four main problematic or missing parts of existing welfare state research. According to them, for a better understanding of welfare state types (1) exclusive focus on worker mobilization is not enough; (2) not only the capital-labor

---

14 I will leave out the contents of the belief systems as possible explanatory factors for the rise of various welfare arrangements. Nevertheless, I want to make sure that this does not necessarily mean that I argue the content of the belief systems do not matter. An exemplary work demonstrating how they matter is S. Kahl (2009). Yet, my focus especially in explaining the increasing emphasis on the religiously motivated organizations will be on religion as an organizing structure and a religious institutions and actors as political players.
but also church-state conflict; (3) historical facts such as liberalism and anti-
clericalism; (4) not only Catholic Church but also the Protestantism should be taken
into consideration as having important influence in the development of welfare (Van
Kersbergen and Manow 2009). Therefore, using the main conceptual framework of
Stein Rokkan (1970), and building on the theories of Flora and Heidenheimer (1981)
they emphasize the role of religious cleavages in shaping political class coalitions and
welfare states. Van Kersbergen and Manow (2009) point out the functionalist ways in
which the welfare state researchers (such as Flora 1983; Heidenheimer 1983; Berger
1990) made a causal connection between the decline of religion and the rise of
Protestantism and the development of the welfare state (Van Kersbergen and Manow
2009: 13-17). Nevertheless, they also argue that these theories, despite their
interpretation of religion as a structural variable, were important in making a first
attempt to emphasize religious cleavages in a society as a factor in defining the type
of welfare state. Their approach, therefore, provides an historical answer to the variety
of welfare states by focusing on mainly the developments of the late 19th, early
twentieth century at the time of national revolutions and by analyzing not only the
relations between states and churches but also political alliance formations around
main cleavages in a society. They explain welfare regimes “as formulas of political
compromise between different electoral and societal groups, […] Yet in order to
understand which kind of political class-compromises were struck in the different
European countries, we need to analyze systematically the presence or absence of
different societal cleavage lines”(Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009: 33). A similar
argument pointing at the influence of different religious confessions on the early state
formation and on the formation of various welfare state types in Europe comes from
Gorski in his work *Disciplinary Revolution* (Gorski 2003).

Social provision became an area of struggle for the first time in the nation state
formation period, owing to the claims of the newly rising state structures on
monopolizing welfare provision. Late nineteenth, early twentieth century is the period
in which formative historical solution between state and church has been formed. As
Kalyvas asserts, in the second half of the nineteenth century, “Catholic Europe
became the scene of unbridgeable conflict between those who are determined to limit
or abolish the ancient church’s rights and influence and those who saw damnation,
temporal as well as eternal, in a divorcement of church and state” (Kalyvas 1996:
Church-state conflict and how it has been resolved in different nation states has been one of the main lines of literature that this research project benefits from (Kalyvas 1996; Gould 1999; Gorski 2003).

The end of nineteenth, beginning of twentieth century is also crucial as a period of political class conflicts between different groups of elites in European countries. With the rise of liberalism ‘as a movement for political reform’ the absolutist regimes of Europe went into a period of change which will result in different political formations in each of them. Gould criticizes the approaches that explain regime change as a pure outcome of economic development. As he presents “transitions to liberal regimes among the countries of Europe were also relatively independent of economic development and were influenced by the choices of political movement leaders and other elites in the institutions of states and churches” (Gould 1999: 12). While explaining origins of liberal reform in different European cases, he focuses on the relations between state and church and the political actors as the main factors shaping the outcomes. Social policy, although not as the main focus of analysis, is very relevant in the study of different cases as the most crucial area of struggle between the state and church.

The emphasis on state-church conflict in the welfare state research mainly concentrates on the explanation of different types of welfare states. My research project by connecting these arguments to current developments in the area of religiously motivated social provision will show how these historical formations between state and church and between different elite groups representing these two institutions influence the current roles and functions of religiously motivated social assistance organizations in different countries. Gould suggests “Religion as an institution determined the fate of attempts at liberal reform” (Gould 1999: 115). Taking this argument one step further, this research project will show how religion and state relations in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century determined the faith of religiously motivated social provision in the end of twentieth and early twenty-first century.

I assert that national revolutions are crucial to study not only for an explanation of the welfare state types but also for a better understanding of the current transformations of the welfare states. Forms of nation state and religion cooperations or conflicts have
been the defining factor for the role of religious institutions in the area of provision. What kind of a role religious institutions were guaranteed has been different in the cases like Britain, where a strong struggle between the church has never occurred; Germany, where a balance between the dual church structure had to be settled; France, where strict laicism of the Republic excluded religion from all of the public arenas, and Sweden where the socialist movement and the single state church tried to find the right balance between who would be the provider. Therefore, the following sections of this chapter will go into a presentation of the state-religion relations at the time period of nation state formation in a variety of European cases and demonstrate how the cooperation or conflict lines defined the role of religion/religious institutions in different welfare states types.

3.2. Patterns of Social Policy Field in Europe

The four cases that will be analyzed as presenting a variety of state-religion and state-society\(^{15}\) interactions in the area of social policy are Britain, France, Germany and Sweden. The table below present the summary of the cases included:

Table 3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State-Church Interaction</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single state church</td>
<td>Strict separation</td>
<td>Dual state church</td>
<td>Single state church</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-society Interaction</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Corporatist-Statist</td>
<td>Conservative-Corporatist</td>
<td>Social democratic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The selection of the cases have been undertaken by following a similar typology to that of other scholars who are undertaking research in the politics and religion arena (Minkenberg 2003; Robbers 2008; Barbier 1995). In my model, France is the country with strict separation between religion and state. Although it is a conservative welfare state like Germany, the position of the church is not similar: Catholic Church’s significant power in terms of charity came into conflict with the Republican Egalitarianism in the twentieth century. Germany is the system of cooperation between religion and state. The principle of subsidiary and the presence of two

---

\(^{15}\) What is meant by state-society interactions is the type of the welfare state.
denominations in the country shaped its corporatist structure. Britain is the country with a state church, so there has never been a major conflict between the state and the Church, and religious charities have always been part of the welfare structure. Finally, the case of Sweden represented a less liberal form of the state-church cooperation where a social democratic welfare state did not leave much area to the religious institutions in the area of provision. One of these countries will be under focus in each of the subsections of this chapter with the main aim of analyzing the historical roots of different patterns of state-religion and state-society relationships in the social provision arena.

3.2.1. Britain

In different classifications of varieties in state church relationships, Britain has been categorized as being non-laicist by Barbier, as a state church system by Robbers and as having a close relationship between state power and church by Minkenberg (see Minkenberg 2003). Since 1707, the Monarch of England has also been the head of the Church of England and this resulted in the realization of close relations between the religious and the governmental substructures, and moreover sharing of some state functions with the Church. McLeod puts forward that the ecclesiastical structure of this country is a mixture of the continental European pattern and the North American pattern. Similar to most European countries, England had a dominant, privileged established church allied with the forces of political conservatism. However, similar to the United States, it is a multi-religious country in which large numbers of religious denominations were able to coexist due to its history of religious toleration (McLeod 1996). These characteristics of the British church and state relations have been a major factor in the early advancement of liberalism in this country in the nineteenth century.

When the history of church and state is focused in England, one can see that clergy and religious organizations of all kinds had an important role in the development of liberalism in the nineteenth century. As McLeod stresses England was overwhelmingly a Christian and Protestant nation and the kind of secular liberalism that was crucial in many continental European countries was never the case in
England (McLeod 1996: 2). A specific emphasis had been given to the role of the Liberal Party and its Anglican leader Gladstone in successfully using religious forces for supporting liberal ideas between 1867 and 1875 (De Ruggiero 1959; Bentley 1987; Breuilly 1992; Gould 1999). In this period, the legitimate authority of the government and the church were upheld, as Parry asserts (Parry 1986). There was no hostile relationship between the religious forces and the liberal ones as it had been the case in some continental countries like France. In contrast, religious forces have been part of the supporter groups for liberalization and in exchange for this support; liberals assured programs for their religiously motivated supporters (Bentley 1987: 15). The multi religious structure of the country was also a reason for the establishment of close connections between church and the liberal movement. The non-conformist Protestant churches and the unprivileged Catholic Church both in specific ways supported the Liberal Party with the hope of improving their position. The only opposition was to the privileged position of the Church of England which served the advancement of British liberal movement under Gladstone (Gould 1999: 31-32, 88, 109, 120-123).

It is possible to see the imprints of this relatively peaceful coexistence of the liberal order and religious groups throughout the history of welfare state development in Britain. The country kept its long tradition of charity alive up until today as a supporter of the state provision of welfare. The evolution of the social policy sphere in Britain was also one of a gradual secularization and formalization of the voluntary organizations (Kendall and Knapp 1993). The existing literature on pre-modern forms of social policy in Britain demonstrates that voluntary organizations based on the ideals of helping your co-believers have existed centuries before the establishment of state institutions that are responsible for the care of the poor and the sick. The overwhelming majority of the organizations working in the social assistance field starting from the early seventeenth century were religious charities. Kramer, in his book *Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State* exhibits that the starting point of the modern British law of charities was adopted in 1601. For the next three hundred years, apart from parish, poor relief and some types of public institutional care: “religious and philanthropic organizations were almost alone in the social services. They established numerous homes, hospitals, schools, training institutions, workshops, and clubs and organized visiting and other forms of what are called the
personal social services” (Kramer 1981: 37). The nineteenth century was marked by further expansion of charity in Britain (Fraser 1973; Thane 1978; Kramer 1981; Jones 2000). The main period that is pointed out for the rise of charities is the Victorian age between 1837 and 1901. As Fraser argues, there was apparently no subject that could not arouse the philanthropic urge of the Victorian public, which resulted in an impressive growth in the charities in the nineteenth century. According to him, in the course of Victorian periods the emphasis of religion shifted from man serving God to man serving his fellow-man. Especially in the latter part of the nineteenth century much religious activity came to be socially oriented, religion became imbued with an essentially social conscience (Fraser 1973: 117-118). Kramer, similarly points out the groundbreaking role of voluntary organizations in the development of welfare state in Britain by arguing that “The evolution of the British welfare state from its religious and philanthropic origins to the present statutory structure occurred within the context of a set of values and norms regarding citizen participation that has become a prototype for other Western democracies” (Kramer 1981: 54).

The early twentieth century in Britain is marked with the increasing role of state activities in the social arena. Yet, different than in many of the European cases this secularization process was free of major clashes between state and church. The state started to acknowledge responsibility for the poor and the sick and the first modern statutory social services introduced between 1905 and 1914. For Britain, that was the time when substantial social legislation was introduced by the Liberal Party under the leadership of Lloyd George (Kramer 1981: 38). The main reasons for the introduction of these basic social policies in the early years of twentieth century were to control labor and to increase efficiency. As argued by Clarke, Langan and Williams, the welfare benefits that were introduced in the first half of the century were concerned with appeasing and supervising the increasingly “militant” working class and sustain the stability of the country (Clarke, Langan et al. 2001: 32). Therefore it is possible to see secular state gradually stepping in the area of provision in the period following the nation state formation.

As presented, the lack of conflict between the state and the Church of England; and the liberal attitude of the state that did not exclude religious charities from the social provision arena resulted in the establishment of a balance between religious and
secular agencies in the early twentieth century. The role of churches and other forms of religious organizations have not been institutionalized as main partners of social provision as it has been the case in of Germany, yet they were also not excluded from the arena as it has been in the cases of France and Turkey. As will be discussed in the next chapter on contemporary changes, this established balance between religion and state would only go through some minor changes in the period after the 1980s.

### 3.2.2. France

France is a country that is characterized by laicism, which means a strict separation between the state and the church. The roots of this strict separation can be traced back to the nineteenth century France. As Morgan maintains, France in nineteenth century is often presented as consisting of two conflicting worlds: one resolutely monarchist, pro-clerical, and reactionary, and the other just as determinedly revolutionary, anticlerical, and republican (Morgan 2002: 35). This main cleavage in the social and political life of the country resulted in a power struggle between Catholics and the anti-clericalists on who will have more influence over the state, community and the family (ibid:38). The history of secularization (or laicism) in France presents a completely different picture than the gradual and harmonious secularization of the British case. Following a Rokkanian analysis, this can be explained as an outcome of the different cleavage lines in the two societies. The social and political sphere of France, different than Britain, was marked by the deep cleavage between the sacred and the secular authorities. The ruling period of the Third Republic is specifically important in terms of the rise of anti-clericalism. The aim to eliminate the power of clergy from the social and the political spheres was the grounding principle and the “real cement” for the republican party (Mayeur and Reberioux 1987: 84). As Ertman argues: “Republicans in France used anticlericalism to create a broad-based movement uniting peasants and local notables in regions traditionally hostile to the Church with urban democrats in support of the new regime” (Ertman 2009: 50). Peasants also supported the republicans against the Church in the late 19th century, and this was mainly due to the church’s position as being the owner of a relatively large percentage of the land (Gibson 1991: 113; Gould 1999: 59). Archambault also points out the opposition between Catholicism and Republicanism as the main
dividing line in French politics. The historical analysis demonstrates that this cleavage was also clearly reflected on the social provision arena as a fierce competition between the religious and secular social provision institutions. The practice of charity being a crucial integral part of Catholic ideology was in complete contrast to the Republican ideologies that aims industrializing and urbanizing and the state provision of welfare (Archambault 1993: 13).

The hostile relationships between the church and the state in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century resulted in the formation of a closed Catholic work in the French case. As Berger puts it the church built “a dense and wide-ranging network of associations (…) with sharply defined and well-protected boundaries” (Berger 1987: 128). According to him, “These associations were to be mass movements of ordinary people, replacing the study and prayer groups of small elites that the church had promoted in the nineteenth century. Catholic Action movements made explicit one of the principle tenets of integralist belief: that religion should not be simply a matter of private life, but a commitment to collective action” (Berger 1987: 130). So, the religious forces were able to organize in forms of associations however a confessional party did not rise in the case of France, between 1871 and 1940 although it did in the other European states like Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Austria (Kalyvas 1996; Gould 1999; Warner 2000; Palier and Manow 2009). There is a recurrent question in the literature: why could or did the French Catholics not organize a political party? I will not go into the details of the discussions about why it was not the case; however I would claim that the absence of political representation of the church and/or religious forces in the form of a political party that can fight for their rights resulted in a relatively abrupt secularization of the country\(^{16}\). Since the balance of forces shifted between the church and the liberal forces starting from the late nineteenth century positioning them in totally conflicting positions, a gradual secularization period as it was the case in Britain was not possible in France.

Pre-modern social policy in France, similar to the other Catholic countries, was mainly marked by the activities of Church and the religious charities. As it is the case in all European countries, ancient charities have been the forerunners of secular social policies. As Archambault puts forward, two pillars of social protection was

\(^{16}\) This abrupt secularization France is quite similar to the case of Turkey, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.
functioning in France in the Middle Ages: (1) charitable organizations of the parishes and the monastic orders that are active in the areas of hospitals, asylums and orphanages, and (2) charitable brotherhoods that are part of guild system (Archambault 2001: 207). Ullman describes this period of pre-modern social policy being characterized by the leading role of charity in addition to collaborative efforts of state and church (Ullman 1998: 49). In the late nineteenth early twentieth century France, social policy became one of the main battle fields of this conflict between the state and the church. As Smith puts forward “Catholicism, after all, stressed local, parish based charitable works—the very antithesis of secular, national state welfare” (Smith 2003: 24). The centralization and homogenization of the social structure of the society was the main aim of the governments that came to power after the French revolution, so the public education system was especially crucial in achieving this aim. As Morgan demonstrates, the conflicts in the Protestant countries resolved easier as the church became a partner of the state in the education policy. Catholic countries, in contrast went through fierce battles to decide on who controls education (Morgan 2002: 124). France is an example of the fiercest of these conflicts which ended with the victory of the state excluding church from the educational sector and closing up more than 2,500 Catholic schools in 1904 (Palier and Manow 2009: 154).

One specificity of the French welfare state is the introduction of the social assistance system before the introduction of social insurance. As Childers suggests, the development of social assistance system enable the construction of France as a nation: “Social solidarity was created through the expansion of social rights, as French citizens shifted their loyalties from local and traditional forms of assistance to nationally administrated welfare” (Childers 2006: 130). This should also be understood in relation to the specific position of state-church conflict in the France case. As Renards present: “For the policy of assistance publique set in motion in the 1880s was explicitly locates in the context of policies aimed at strengthening the Republic. Its principle aim was, in its early stages at least to play a part in the struggle against the Catholic church, which was deeply involved in the welfare institutions of the period, and to redefine relations between public and private in this sector, which was then being reshaped” (Renard 1994: 95). The main aim of the Republic was to fight against church’s existence in the social and political arena, while introducing reforms such as assistance for abandoned children in 1889, medical assistance in
1893, children in 1904, old-aged in 1905. Merrien stated that the main intention of the introduction of these social assistance and public relief measures were to replace the private charities and to pursue with the “laïcisation de l’action sociale” (Merrien 1990: 164-166). One further move that was taken by the government to establish authority over the various existing public assistance schemes was to introduce the Direction de l’Assistance Publique under the responsibility of Ministry of the Interior (Weiss 1983: 59). All these legislations that are introduced by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century have been important steps in the way towards the creation of a strictly secular welfare state. Palier and Manow name this process of secularization as “Consolidating the Nation through the ‘Laïcisation de la Protection Sociale; by giving the examples of how the entire debates of social policy—such as schooling, child and family policy and social assistance—were dominated by the state-church cleavage (Palier and Manow 2009: 150-151).

This specific pattern of secularization that the French state pursued resulted in the exclusion of the church and religious charities from most of the social provision arenas and the rise of a welfare state with a weak voluntary sector and lack of cooperation between religious and secular providers. Transformations in the composition of the society resulted in some shifts in the last decades. Yet, as will be presented in the next chapter, France still is the case with the strictest control on the possible increases of religiously motivated provision in its social policy arena.

3.2.3. Germany

In classifications of state-church relationships, Germany is generally placed half way between France and Britain. While the French case is marked with high degree of contradiction and separation and the British case with non-separation, Germany is classified as a system of common tasks by Robbers (Robbers 2005), and as semi-laicist by Barbier (Barbier 1995). According to Minkenberg, the idea of separation in Germany has been modified by some overlap of state and church responsibilities which resulted in upholding of some privileges of the main churches (Minkenberg 2003). More than the conflict between the state and the church, the conflict between
two denominations—Catholicism and Protestantism—marked the political and social history of Germany.

In relative terms, modern social policy in Germany has developed quite early in comparison to other European countries. Already in the eighteenth century provision of poor relief was accepted as public responsibility. A modern social security system was formed as early as the Wilhelmine period. As Sachsse states, the working class question was clearly distinguished from the question of poor by legislation and administrative institutions with the introduction of “workers insurance” in 1880 (Sachsse 1996: 149). In addition to the public services of welfare, there was a wide variety of civil associations and private charities in the field of social welfare in the nineteenth century Germany. Starting from 1870s social associations at the national level were formed to achieve scientific and professional goals for social policy (Sachsse 1996: 157). These reforms were steps towards the modernization and secularization of the traditional charity structure that was based on religious motivations. The main associations established in the period are “Verein für Socialpolitik” (Association for Social Policy) founded in 1873, “Deutscher Verein für Armenpflege und Wohltätigkeit” (German Association for Poor Relief and Charity) among many others (ibid.). The history of associations and public social provision in Germany, presents the relatively peaceful coexistence of the private and public, religious and secular forces in the area of social policy starting from the early ages to today.

Centralization and reorganization of the private welfare sector in Germany took place in the Weimar period. Central nationwide associations like the Protestant “Central Committee of the Inner Mission” the Catholic “Caritas Association” are established in this period in 1848 and 1897 respectively (Sachsse 1996: 166). In Sachsse’s words: “With the extension of the Weimar Welfare State the strict distinction of state and society as separate spheres stemming from the 19th century tradition in German social and constitutional theory collapsed. A new sector consisting of private agencies, public funds, para-governmental and para-fiscal organizations developed that was neither state nor non-state in the traditional sense” (Sachsse 1996: 169). “After World War I, the Weimer Constitution discontinued the traditional union of church and state. Therefore, the Christian welfare organizations sought both to institutionalize the
primary of private over public welfare in social welfare legislation, and to exclude political welfare organizations, and the interests they represented” (Bauer 1990: 104). Both the Protestant and the Catholic churches established solid networks of welfare services in the Weimer Republic (Heinze and Olk 1981). Caritas and Diakonie as the largest umbrella organizations of the German welfare arena have been the most important examples of this division. These associations were already founded in German Empire, and after that moved to the position of being umbrella associations in the early years of Weimer Republic (Sachsse 1996). As Zimmer interprets it, the acceptance of both of these associations as counterparts by the state bridged the religious division between Catholics and Protestants in the welfare policy field (Zimmer 1999: 41). Although conflicts existed in some time periods between these three actors of the social policy, a rapture of bonds never occurred as it was the case in France for example. Hence, the German political authorities have managed to keep up their cooperation both with the church and the voluntary organizations. In contrast to the case of France, German democracy has been identified with an attitude of anti-etatism (Seibel 1992: 59).

The main period of conflict between the liberals and the religious authorities took place in the united Germany under the rule of Bismarck. The Bismarckian period, with its policy of *Kulturkampf* in between 1871 and 1882, was stage to the fiercest struggle between the two sides. In Sperber’s words: “The ministry, with the enthusiastic support of the Liberal parliamentary majority, attempted to re-assert the predominant influence of the state over the church in a wide variety of arenas, ranging from the control of the educational system to the legal validity of marriage, to the education, appointment and discipline of the Catholic clergy” (Sperber 1980: 320). In this period, the state directly attacked the Catholic Church and moreover denounced the power of the Church in 1853 (Kalyvas 1996: 204). In Gould’s interpretation, this movement of the Bismarckian German state to deprive the Catholic Church from its privileges resulted in the consolidation of political Catholicism that lead to the formation of the Center Party in 1870 (Gould 1999). The influence of the party increased in the political arena in 1872 due to state’s attack against the Catholic Church, which according to Ross turned into “the major religio-political conflict in nineteenth century Germany” (Ross 1976: 15). State subsidies to the Catholic Church were cut in 1875 and all Catholic schools were taken under state control in 1972. This
period, by the end of nineteenth century, can be marked as the main clash between the secular and the religious forces over the division of responsibilities in social welfare. The Catholic Church lost its influence especially in the area of education; however religious forces in general uphold and even reinforce their influence in the areas of social welfare services with the principle of subsidiarity.

In order to achieve a balance of forces between religious and secular authorities, Catholic Church developed the principle of subsidiarity in the first half of the twentieth century. As clearly explained by Anheier, this principle of Catholic philosophy is a response to two main challenges the church has to face in the nineteenth century: “(1) greater individualism, which, outside the realm of the family and the local parish, coincided with an increased need for forms of social solidarity and nonfamily-based social services and welfare; and (2) the emergence of the secular nation-state, with its large scale bureaucracy, which challenged the position of the Catholic Church” (Anheier 1992: 33). By referring to the Papal Encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, McIlroy explains the major characteristics of subsidiarity by communicating Pius XI’s statement that “it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can achieve by their own initiative and give it to the community; decisions should be taken at the lowest level possible which is compatible with good government” (McIlroy 2003: 739). Therefore the principle of sharing power as downwards as possible has been an important ruling idea of German politics starting from nineteenth century. As Anheier suggests the principle was included in most of the legislation introduced between 1950 and 1975- like the Social Code, the Federal Social Assistance Act, and the Youth Welfare Act, which resulted in the creation of highly protected, state-financed system of assistance delivery by autonomous nonprofit organizations (Anheier 1992: 37).

Consequently, these characteristics of the history of cooperation between the state, the established churches and the voluntary sector in Germany enabled a balanced division of labor—between the sacred and secular authorities—in the social policy sphere. The study of the contemporary period in the next chapter will demonstrate how these established relations hinder change in the German welfare arena and determine the future of the social welfare provision in Germany.
3.2.4. Sweden

Sweden represents one end of the separation, openness and regulation scales of church-state relations in Europe, whereas France represents the other one (see Minkenberg 2003: 200). In the period after the Lutheran Reformation in the sixteenth century, the transition from Roman Catholic to Evangelical-Lutheran Christianity, the creation of the national church and the Swedish kingdom had been parallel developments. Evangelical Lutheran Church was the only state church in Sweden until 2000 and membership to it was obligatory by law until 1951. Belonging to the Church of Sweden and attending to its major activities had been considered as a necessary part of being a Swedish citizen. As suggested by Bäckström, the transition took off during the emergence of the industrial society; resulted in the development of the Church as “a state institution among others at a national level and a municipal organization in parallel with the secular authorities at a local level” (Bäckström, Beckman et al. 2004: 45). He labels this process as the development of the Folk Church as a part of the Folk Home (ibid.). This period of complete fusion between state and church, in which there was no form of religious liberty available, and the priests—as civil servants—were also undertaking non-religious tasks, has been defined as “the century of Lutheran orthodoxy” (Gustafsson 2003: 51). As stressed by scholars in the field, the inseparability of the state and the Church was clear from the establishment of priests and bishops as one of the four estates of the Swedish Parliament (Bäckström, Beckman et al. 2004: 32-34).

In addition to its public and political roles, the social provision roles of the Church—in areas such as health, education and social care—were also crucial in the period before mid nineteenth century when a slow process of change started. A turning point in this process of gradual change was a reform of local administration, which introduced separation between parishes and municipalities. The government reform undertaken in 1862 resulted in the secularization of the services in the areas such as poor relief, education and daily care. As claimed by Anderson, these secularization measures attracted some opposition from the Church and the religious circles in the later years (Anderson 2009: 221). Nevertheless, this opposition remained at a quite ineffective level since no political division was present between the Church and state, and the Church was highly dependant on the State for its economic survival. As a
response to the rise of public poor relief, there have been minor attempts to increase the Church’s influence and role in the public system, yet it was only in the twentieth century that these attempts became more determined (Anderson 2009: 222). Rapid industrialization, the emergence of a labor movement, and the Free Churches movement in the last quarter of the 19th century could be mentioned as explanatory factors for the increasing interest of the Church to be influential in the social policy arena.

The emergence of these two main lines of popular movements—Labor and Free Churches—was threatening the Church of Sweden’s monopoly in the area of religion and presence in the area of social services—especially education. Similar to the other European cases, liberalism has also been an influential political force in the nineteenth century Sweden. Liberals did not directly oppose the Church of Sweden nevertheless; the rise of liberal ideologies may anyways be marked as an influencing factor on the cultural and religious orthodoxy of the state and church in Sweden. The rise of social democrats in late nineteenth century constituted a further threat to the authority of the Church. In its early years after the establishment in 1889 the Social Democratic Party (SAP), has been both an anti-clerical and anti-religious force in politics. Nevertheless, they moderated their discourse in the early twentieth century with the fear to offend parts of the population with religious sensitivities. As argued by the scholars working in the area, the years in between the establishment of the Social Democratic Party and the 1920s and 1930s were marked by the gradual move of both the Party and the Church to a moderate position due to the rise of the political power of the Party on the one hand, and the increasing interest of the Church to be active in the area of social reforms on the other hand (Tingsten 1973; Anderson 2009: 229). An important move by the social democratic party to decrease the role of religion as a potential oppositional political force was the establishment of Social Democratic


19 Especially the worker groups with religious sensitivities and the Liberals with their relations to the Free churches. For a detailed study see Tingsten, H. (1973). The Swedish Social Democrats. Their Ideological Development. New Jersey, Bedminster Press.
Brotherhood, which made possible attracting believers. This move also was a step to mark the main cleavage in politics on the line of socialist-non-socialist (Anderson 2009: 230).

In comparison to the other cases under analysis, the case of Sweden can be labeled as the country in which little or even no political conflict took place over who would be the main provider of social policies. The transfer of most of the social services—such as education, health, care—from the Church to the state took place in the early stages of welfare state development. Yet the specific characteristics of the relationship between state and the Church resulted in the peaceful nature of these transfers. The Church of Sweden has never become a separate political or economic power. As explained by Bäckström, the Church of Sweden did not become a part of voluntary sector either; instead the State had a strict control and administrative power on the church in assigning it a range of services in the welfare arena (Bäckström, Beckman et al. 2004: 47).

As a result, in comparison to state-church conflict or cooperation having an important shaping power in the cases like France and Germany, in the case of Sweden the lack of a cleavage line on this axis resulted in the minor role of religion shaping the early social policy arena. As put forward by Morgan, “…the collaborative and relatively non-conflictual relationship between the established church and the state in Sweden, as in other Nordic countries precluded the formation of religious cleavages around religion” (Morgan 2002: 132). The Church, despite having a prominent presence in the area of provision in pre-twentieth century, could not play a significant role as an alternative to state action in the period after. As argued by Andersen, “the Church tried to influence the course of social policy in the formative period of the welfare state, but failed: Liberals, Social democrats and Agrarians competed to control the content of early social policy” (Andersen 2009: 231). In conclusion, these historical specificities of the Swedish state-church relations resulted in the establishment of a Scandinavian welfare state that did not incorporate churches or religious voluntary organizations as social policy providers. The reflections of this historical background on the contemporary social policy developments will be a discussion point in the next chapter.
3.3. Conclusion

The brief presentation of the case studies on the history of state-church relations in the nation state formation period, and establishment of the modern welfare states aimed to equip the reader with a broad picture of various historical arrangements existing in Europe. How different patterns of cooperation or conflict between state and church in the area of provision determined the future integration or exclusion of religious institutions in different welfare typologies have been the question dealt with in each of the cases.

As discussed for each of the cases above, the rise of the nation states, accompanied by the ideal of social provision as an area of state action resulted in key transformations in the provision arena. Different welfare mixes grown out of the interactions between religious and secular institutions as providers of social services. I argue that it is crucial to understand how these power struggles between different providers of social welfare shaped the early welfare state structures. Building on this understanding, the next chapter will aim at bridging the historical specificities of the countries presented in this chapter with the contemporary developments in the area of welfare (i.e. increasing presence of FBOs in the social policy arena).
4. Contemporary Shifts in State, Religion and Society Relations in Europe

The main arguments of the religion and welfare literature on how different formulations of the state-church relations played an important role in the establishment of welfare state typologies have already been discussed in the last chapter. What I find lacking in these existing literatures is the attempt to make a connection between the historical explanations and the contemporary developments. Manow and Kersbergen (2009) concentrate on different state-religion configurations, and different class coalitions, as two main influencing factors in the establishment of different welfare state types at the time of national revolutions. Nevertheless, they do not pay attention to how current changes in the political relevance of religion and the relations between religious and secular forces in the political field may effect transformation of welfare states. My main aim in this chapter will be to demonstrate the reflections of historical trajectories on the contemporary developments in various welfare state types.

As presented in the previous chapters, existing theories explain the rising interest on FBOs as social policy providers either as a response to the retrenchments in welfare states, or a return of religion to the public sphere. The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that neither the rise of religion nor the retrenchment of the welfare states arguments are enough for a comprehensive understanding of the historical processes behind the rise of religiously motivated associations in single cases. I do not contend that these factors may not have an explanatory power for some of the cases. Nonetheless, I suggest that a better understanding of the phenomenon needs a redefinition of the explanatory factors. This chapter points out a lack of attention to the relevance of interactions between religion and politics in the discussions of the rise of RMAs in the welfare arena. It is commonly overlooked that the rise of these associations in the social sphere is an outcome of the political choices. I suggest that it is not the return of religion but the changing relevance of religion in politics and changing relations between state and religion/religious groups that is the first factor explaining the increase in the religiously motivated provision. Instead of a general
‘one fits all’ kind of argument about the return of religion in the public sphere, I claim that the increasing visibility or number of these associations in different welfare structures can only be understood by looking at the religion and state relations in each specific case.

The second factor that is generally defined as retrenchments in the welfare arena or the shifts in the provision of welfare from state to civil society and private actors is also problematic as such. These literatures mark the increasing presence of voluntary organizations in the welfare mixes or the expanding of third sector in the area of welfare as the common changes in the European welfare states in the last years. I agree that in many countries it is possible to talk about an increasing presence of civil society actors in the area of social provision, yet whether these adjustments mark a reform in the way a state organizes relations with its citizens is the main question that is of interest in my understanding. I claim that answers to questions such as whether the state is giving up its role of being the main provider, and whether there is a refitting in the position of the state in comparison to the civil society associations can provide us with a much better understanding than any convergence argument.

Consequently, this chapter defines the changing position of religiously motivated associations’ contingent on the interaction between the shifts in these two axes of state-society and state-religion relations. Britain and Sweden will represent the cases of medium level of change, in comparison to the low level of change in the cases of Germany and France. The case studies of France, Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom will demonstrate that change in these countries is smaller in comparison to Turkey. The relative stability of the four European cases will be explained in relation to the inhibiting role of the well-established patterns either in state-society (Germany, Sweden) or in state-religion (Britain and France) relations.

---

20 Amount of change is defined in comparison to the case of Turkey, which is the country with the biggest amount of change. As the coming chapters will present, the Turkish case is a critical one due to the major changes in both of these axis in the last years.
4.1. The cases of medium degree of change: Britain and Sweden

Britain and Sweden are the cases in which both the numbers of and the interest on faith-based organizations are on the rise in the last two decades. There is a rising presence of these organizations in the public spheres of both of the countries. There is an increasing material and ideological support by the governments for their increasing presence as social actors. Nevertheless, the mechanisms that triggered the rise of these phenomena in these two countries are not necessarily the same. This section will demonstrate that while the shift in the state-religion relations is more dominant in determining the increasing interest in the FBOs as social actors in the case of Sweden, the shift in the state-society relations is the more dominant factor in Britain. The following in-depth analysis of areas of religion, politics and social policy in the two cases will prove the significance of historical patterns of state-society and state-religion relations in shaping the responses of different welfare structures to the contemporary challenges.

4.1.1. The transformation of state-society relations in Britain

The 1970s came with crisis in Britain, similar to most other European countries. While the consensus on the crucial role of social policy ended in this period, the rising belief was that Keynesian economics did not function anymore. Different approaches emphasizing the responsibilities of citizens and the importance of having plural actors in the welfare arena gained significance in this period. Margaret Thatcher came to power in 1979, replacing the Labour Government, which was a milestone representing that monetarism in politics and economics would dominate the following decade in the UK. Rising ideologies of the period designated increasing importance given to individual freedoms and a lesser role to state intervention in the economy. The withdrawal of the state from the social policy field transferred the responsibilities to other agencies such as private enterprises, NGOs and families as a part of ‘welfare pluralism approach’ (Wolfenden 1978; Gladstone 1979).

As Jones suggests, it is in this period of two consecutive conservative government administrations of 1979-83 and 1983-87 that it become fashionable again to talk of ‘the poor’ as a single class, and of ‘scroungers’ and ‘layabouts’ who would not work.
‘Greed and acquisitiveness were extolled as virtues, and the gap between rich and poor got wider’ (Jones 2000: 163). To think about the poor as a single class is also closely related to the social exclusion discourse that to a great extent replaced the inequality and the poverty discourses in Britain after the 1980s. This discourse veils the multiple class structure of the society. When social policy defines poor as a single class then the solutions that will be proposed to solve the problems will not aim at redistribution to fight inequality that is present at all levels in the society but it will only focus on helping the neediest parts of the population to make a living possible for them.

In the 1997 elections, the promise to tackle social exclusion was successfully used as a strategy by Tony Blair. After the victory of the Labour Party in the elections, the Social Exclusion Unit was set up by the Prime Ministry to “fight” against social exclusion. As Lister persuasively puts forward, “work not welfare represents the passport to social inclusion” (Lister 1998: 220). In this understanding of New Labour, the duties and personal responsibilities are emphasized more than the rights to welfare. In his book, Work Consumerism and the New Poor, Bauman explains how the new poor became more marginalized as the state withdrew support (Bauman 1998). While the discourse on the rights of the poor was declining, a discourse about responsibilities arose. Clarke, Langan and Williams summarize the objectives of Conservative policy making in the 1980s and 1990s as to ‘(1) reduce the disincentive and dependency-creating effects of benefits; (2) create a more efficient benefits system by “targeting” benefits at the most needy; and (3) encourage moves away from the state as the primary agency of social insurance’ (Clarke, Langan et al. 2001: 80). All of these points indicate a major shift in the state-society relations.

This third shift of encouraging moves away from state as the primary agency of social insurance mainly turned the focus to the voluntary sector, as the oldest actor of the social work field. Thatcher’s coming to power in 1979 and the policies she followed to limit the role of state feed into to the rise of the voluntary sector. Scholars interpret the name change of the National Council of Social Service to the National Council for Voluntary Organizations in 1980 as a hint signaling a major shift (Harris, Rochester et al. 2001: 2). The scholars agree on the idea that the role of voluntary organizations in social policy field has moved from periphery to the center in these decades. Voluntary
sector was not anymore seen as complimentary or supporting to the main provider of
the state anymore—as it was the case in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. Starting
from the late 1970s voluntary organizations moved to the position of main provider in
many areas of social policy (Billis and Harris 1992; Johnson 1992; Harris, Rochester
et al. 2001). When the aims of the neo-liberals to decrease their responsibility in the
social policy arena came together with the religious group’s aims of increasing the
number of their supporters came together, the holy combination between religion and
neo-liberal politics was on the stage. Harris et.al. point to the growing cross-party
interest in religious organizations in the UK, especially in the last two decades
(Harris, Halfpenny et al. 2003: 93). They mark the launch of the Conservative Party’s
introduction of a social policy initiative called ‘Renewing One Nation’ as a
groundbreaking event mentioning faith groups as innovators in solving persistent
social problems and creating ‘compassionate communities’ (ibid: 95). One can argue
that a new consensus arises in the social policy field starting from 1980s, which is
characterized by the emphasis put on the voluntary actors—especially religious
ones—as one of the main providers of the social welfare. Following the Conservative
Party, New Labour government and Tony Blair have also shown great interest in the
capacity of faith based organizations roles in contributing to social welfare, providing
social provision, and regenerating communities (Philpot 2001; Harris, Halfpenny et
al. 2003). In conclusion, the transformations the British welfare state has gone
through in the time period starting from the late 1970s can be interpreted as a main
shift in how the state defines its relations with its citizens. The state deciding to be the
steerer of the welfare arena paved the way for the increasing presence of FBOs in the
social sphere.

The shifts in the area of religion and politics have only been a supplementary factor
for the increasing presence of FBOs in social policy sphere in the case of Britain. The
interest of the governments in the material and non-material resources of the FBOs is
one of the main reasons for the increasing emphasis on these organizations. In a
period of financial problems for the welfare state, the governments realized the
already existing resources that FBOs and churches have and wanted to make use of
these resources to support their welfare and cohesion activities. These resources that
are referred to are both material —such as buildings, volunteers, donations—and not
material ones such as the historical experience of churches on the issue of charity,
religious values in terms of giving. Dinham and Lowndes put emphasis on the same reasons to explain the increasing presence of FBOs in the public realm: “Since the mid-1990s and from 1997 in particular, governments have identified the potential for building on the traditional service role of faith bodies (for instance in education, housing, fostering and adaptation) and extending this into new areas (including urban and rural regeneration, community safety, childcare and health promotion)” (Dinham and Lowndes 2009). The second commonly enumerated reason in explaining the increasing visibility of FBOs is the influence of political leaders with strong faith commitments21. One name that popped up nearly in all interviews is Tony Blair, with the references he made to the importance of faith in some public speeches. The respondents argued that religion in the political and social spheres is not a taboo anymore: The visibility of religion and reference to religious groups and beliefs started to be accepted as something normal.

This increasing interest of governments in FBOs has a political reason in addition to the material. This generally left out reason is the aim of prevention of religious extremism. This is especially in the agenda after the terrorist attacks in the US and UK. Some social policies that are introduced after this date are in favor of supporting different religious groups economically in order to give them a chance of presence and representation in the social and political spheres. The success of FBOs in serving “hard to reach groups” is also a shared explanation for the rise of these groups. It is a generally accepted idea that FBOs are more successful in fulfilling some specific needs, owing to their success in targeted, and customer-tailored policy provision. These areas are the ones where the proliferation of new organizations is the case. As an outcome of increasing number of programs that were introduced, and availability of funding options different faith communities who did not organize under FBOs before are encouraged to do so.

To put it in crude terms we can say that religion as a variable is back to the political arena. The increasing problems of the people of different faiths alert governments to take action in these areas. The existing welfare structures are not enough to meet the needs of all parts of the population. The changes in the state-society relations leave more people susceptible to different forms of provision. Putting more emphasis on the

21 Information gathered through the interviews conducted with scholars working in the area, and voluntary sector administrators.
faith communities does not only equip the governments with political support from these groups, it also provides them with support from the general public (since satisfaction of the needs of minorities is expected to bring cohesion and public peace). Although the dominant reason of change is defined as the shift in the position of the state in the welfare arena, the changing political relevance of religion should not be left out as a complimentary cause.

4.1.2. The transformation of state-religion alliance in Sweden

The case of Sweden is also defined as one of a medium level of change. The principal reason of increasing presence of faith-based organizations in the public sphere in Sweden is marked as the contemporary shift in the area of religion and state relations in this country. As already introduced in the third chapter, Sweden had its own style of state-church separation\textsuperscript{22} which could be seen as non-existent for many. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Sweden and the state was one and indivisible for a period over three centuries. Religious liberty was not extant in the country in the period before 1952, when it was allowed in the form of possibility of withdrawal from the membership to the state church. Finally, as of January 1, 2000 the Church of Sweden is in the same status with the institutions of other beliefs—such as Christianity, Islam or Hindu, Jewish etc.—existing in the country\textsuperscript{23}. As put forward by Bäckström, “During the period 1862-2000, the church has developed from being an official, unifying and integral part of society where it enjoyed a religious monopoly into a semi-official organization which competes with others in the sphere of beliefs and views of life, within what may be described as a deregulated, religious market economy” (Bäckström, Beckman et al. 2004: 51). I claim that this change in the state-religion relations is the dominant explanatory factor behind the rise of interest in FBOs in the social arena.

\textsuperscript{22} See Gustafsson’s (2003) explanation of the Swedish-style church-state separation stating with the first reforms in 1900-1952, continuing with the optimistic phase between 1956 and 1972, meeting with resistances between 1973 and 1979, going through an exploratory phase in the 1980s, arriving to a decision phase after 1992, before it arrived to a consensual outcome of disestablishment of the state church in 2000.

\textsuperscript{23} In the period after 1998 all of these communities have the right to register and get their portion from the church taxes collected by the state, as a portion of the income tax.
Religion has never been a political cleavage in Sweden, due to this cooperative and nonconflictual link with the state, but the relations of it with the state and citizens were not developed on liberal lines such as in the case of Britain. A more authoritarian and regulative framework dominated the relations between state and church. The universal and egalitarian characteristics of the welfare state, limiting the space available for the rise of religious charities as alternative social provision actors, was also a reason for the lack of conflict between the sacred and the secular institutions. Still, the shift happening in the last decades, due to the increasing diversity of the needs of the multicultural and the multi-faith society opens up a space available for the rise of faith-based organizations. Moreover, the necessity to fulfill the needs of this new populace makes it essential for the state to support the establishment of these FBOs, since religion is after a long time rising to the position of a politically relevant issue. Failing to fulfill the needs of these groups, would not only delay the integration of them, but can also result in creation of general unrest in the society and possible loss of political power for the governing parties. Therefore, I argue that the recent split between the state and church, and opening up of the public arena for various faith communities’ set the necessary ground for the rise of FBOs in Sweden.

Lundström and Wijkström define the period after the 1970s as one of the new social movements and a growing welfare mix in Sweden (Lundström and Wijkström 1995). The current picture presents a situation where the Swedish state is trying to keep the same distance from all the faith communities but also “keen to keep some control at arms length” (Fridolfsson, Elander et al. 2009: 184). Official registration of the FBOs, distribution of government grants, and assistance provided to collect their membership fees are listed as some of the ways of government interest in these organizations (ibid.). So what we see is the expanding of the state-religion relations to include believers other than the members of the Evangelical Lutheran church. The government introduced an agreement to recognize and reinforce the role of idea-based voluntary organizations in 2007.

The shifts in the area of state and society relations are smaller in comparison to change in the state and religion relations in Sweden. The redistributive and universal characteristics of the Swedish welfare state have always been a defining factor for the
state-society relations. The state and the non-profit sector have been in close cooperation, but different than the cases of Britain and Germany, the Swedish welfare state did not incorporate voluntary organizations into the welfare arena as social service providers. Instead, the role of voluntary organizations active in the area have mainly been as democratic agents (Klausen and Selle 1996). Complete coverage of state in the arena especially in the period following the Second World War, resulted in state’s taking over of the social service tasks from these associations and in some cases forced exclusion of them through legislation changes or the cuts in the subsidies (Lundström and Wijkström 1995; Lundström 1996: 133-134). One issue that needs to be mentioned at this point is the difference in the perception of charity in Sweden. Unlike the American or the European contexts, charity is perceived as something negative in Sweden “stemming from the image of the poor, helpless human beings heavily dependant on a wealthy and paternalistic, sometimes capricious upper class” (Lundström and Wijkström 1995: 7). The transition of the services from the charitable organizations to the state institutions generally marked the expansion of the coverage area and fair distribution as the main aims (Lundström 1996). In their analysis of the Swedish non-profit sector, Lundstrom and Wijkstrom argue that the sector is well developed in the areas of culture, leisure and advocacy, but not in the areas of health and social services—as it is the case in most of the other European countries (Lundström and Wijkström 1995: 1).

There are scholars claiming that the current problems the Swedish welfare state is facing brings forward reforms similar to the ones in the other European countries, such as deregulation, decentralization and privatization resulting in the increasing role of voluntary associations in the welfare arena (Lundström and Wijkström 1995; Lundström 1996; Bäckström, Beckman et al. 2004; Pestoff 2004; Fridolfsson, Elander et al. 2009). The increasing pressure on the financing of the universal welfare state in a period of economic liberalization resulted in a change that aims efficiency more than democracy (Fridolfsson, Elander et al. 2009: 180). Joining the European Union has been a further move that opened a door for the reforms in the relations between local, national and international level. In this international arena, where the states lost control over some of their functions, municipalities came into a position where they can easily get into partnerships with voluntary associations and search for support at the supranational arena. The explanatory research conducted on the Swedish FBOs
sector, shows that cooperation by the municipalities and faith based associations is a trend in the last decade, yet this is still a phenomenon limited to the larger cities. Voluntary service production do not exist in many Swedish municipalities (Fridolfsson, Elander et al. 2009: 181).

Whether the changes that are on the agenda as a response to the common challenges of internationalization and neo-liberalization will result in a convergence or would the Swedish welfare state manage to protect its characteristics to be the main provider is still an open question. Looking at the historical specificities in the state, religion and society relationships, I would claim that it will. Although there is an increasing interest on voluntary organizations in general, the main sources of funding are still the subsidies from local and central governments (Boli 1991; Lundström 1996). Therefore, the argument that the voluntary sectors are becoming producers of services do not hold, at least for now. The research undertaken on the FBOs in Sweden demonstrates that, it is still not possible to see FBOs as actors of social service delivery at the national level (Fridolfsson, Elander et al. 2009). There might be a rise in the share of the third sector in the Swedish welfare state mix, in parallel to the ones in the other European cases. Yet, I approach Pestoff’s argument on the changing role of third sector “from advocates and/or innovators into professionalized service providers” (Pestoff 2004: 77) with caution. Especially the non-socialist government period between 1976 and 1982 have been stage to some rising interest on the possible social provision roles for the voluntary sector, but the current picture demonstrates that the main historical roles of the third sector in Sweden as “schools of democracy” (undertaking action in advocacy and representation) is still dominant.

As the evidence suggests, both the dynamics in the area of state-society, state-religion relations had an influence on the increasing number and diversity of the FBOs in the Swedish context. Yet, in a relative perspective the gradual changes in the state-society relations would not have been enough to cause the rise of FBOs without the shift in the state-religion relations. Consequently, the novelty in this area of state-religion relations is marked as the dominant reason of increasing emphasis on the FBOs in the case of Sweden. Religiosity is marked to be absent from the political context in Sweden in the studies undertaken in the period before 1990s (see Boli 1991). Yet the
developments after this period demonstrate that religion is back to the political sphere and it is not a marginal issue in the area of welfare state politics anymore.

4.2. The cases of low degree of change: Germany and France

Germany and France are the cases in which the amount of change concerning the position of FBOs in the area of welfare is minor. A brief overview of religion, state and social policy relations in these two countries makes it clear that resistance to change is due to long lived institutional conflicts or cooperation’s that are settled early in the 20th century. Therefore, the fact that there is no proliferation of religiously motivated associations in these two cases does not mean that there is no restructuring in these two axes. Instead, it means that the well-institutionalized structures of state-society and state-religion relations in these two countries are more resistant to revisions. Similar to the cases of medium level of change, one of the explanatory factors is more dominant than the other for fostering change, in each of the cases. In the case of Germany, it is the reorganization of the relations of the diverse faith groups with the state. In the case of France, it is inclusion of the third sector as a possible actor in the area of provision.

4.2.1. The rearrangement of the state-religion relations in Germany

As the historical analysis proved, Germany is a country with one of the most solid foundational arrangements between state and its two main churches. This is true especially when the area of welfare provision is concerned. As discussed in the previous chapter this power settlement between state and the two churches, resulted in the rise of the corporatist structure of the German welfare state that included religious charities as main providers in the social policy arena. Welfare associations—Wohlfahrtsverbände—that are organized at the national scale have always been the main actors of social policy field in Germany. Consequently, the phenomenon of FBOs is not something new in the German social policy arena. The rise of new faith communities and a rearrangement of state-religion relations in order to include these
diverse groups in the existing structures are the main changes that are taking place in the case of Germany.

A tradition of cooperation has existed in the history of the German third sector starting from the early stages. As suggested by authors working in the area, Germany, being composed of the Protestant Kingdom of Prussia and the Catholic Empire of Austria, has remained politically as well as religiously divided for centuries (see Anheier and Siebel 1993). Hence, the centralization of the state authority in politics was not the case in Germany unlike France, starting from the eighteenth century. This pluralistic power setting and the absence of serious conflicts between different groups made the development of the third sector in cooperation with the state possible from the very beginning. It was already in the late 19th century that provision of social services were developed in a corporatist system in which municipal authorities and voluntary organizations were working together in many cities of Germany (Evers and Strünck 2002: 169). Thus, it would not be possible to compare the German third sector to its French or American counterparts without taking these historical attributes into consideration.

The specific characteristics of the German third sector are important to mention, to get a better understanding of its resistance to change. One of these characteristics is that most of the associations are politically motivated and part of a larger corporatist structure. Almost all of the nonprofit organizations are members of larger umbrella organizations. A second characteristic of the sector is its ideological and religiously divided structure. The religious and ideological division lines of the German political structure that has been previously mentioned are also present in the welfare associations’ area. The German welfare associations has been divided along these traditional lines of political and especially religious conflicts (Anheier 1990; Schmid 1996; Zimmer 1999). As Anheier suggests quite clearly “Organized religion, almost exclusively the Catholic and the Protestant Churches, maintain the largest and politically most protected presence in the third sector and are, historically, its most important part. To some extent, the third sector is both the terrain and result of the conflict between organized religion, political opposition, and the state over the division of labor and spheres of influence” (Anheier 1990: 329). Caritas and Diakonie has been the representative of this division in the German welfare arena. These
characteristics of the third sector, in which faith-based/religiously-motivated associations are a crucial part, mark the specificity of the German case in comparison to the others. The case of Germany has been defined as the case with the least amount of change in the sample, due to the well-established and relatively stable position of its welfare associations.

The main reason of revisions after the 1960s was the increasing heterogeneity in the third sector. 1960s and 1970s have been periods of expansion for the German third sector (see Anheier 1990; Bauer 1990; Zimmer 1999). Evers and Strunck argue that the cultural changes of the period after the 1960s resulted in the rise of new voluntary associations, separate from the existing traditional umbrella organizations. Consequently, the authors present contemporary third sector in Germany as consisting of two cultures of organizations: one traditional and one new generation\(^{24}\) (Evers and Strünck 2002: 171). One of the main reasons that triggered change in the area of welfare associations after the 1990s is the partial deinstitutionalization of the principle of subsidiarity. In the previous structure of the social policy provision local governments and the welfare associations were the main providers. After the 1990s this situation has altered as a result of the flourishing of self-help groups and their official recognition as service providers (Bönker and Wollmann 1996: 454). Starting from the 1990s, traditional welfare associations of the German corporatist structure lost their privileges in the area of social provision. Public funding is not restricted to the main umbrella organizations anymore. Thus, an environment of competition has been created between the new voluntary organizations like self-help groups and the older more traditional ones, which resulted in a restructuring of the social services field. Some scholars name these changes as the replacement of the old corporatist structures with more pluralist ones (Bönker and Wollmann 1996).

The single research conducted on FBOs in Germany puts forward that the rise of voluntary work in general and FBOs in specific is an outcome of the retrenchment of the welfare state and the increasing gap between the state provision and the increasing demand for social provision (Friedrichs and Klöckner 2009: 103). Although I do not totally discard the claim that the restructuring of the welfare arena is one of the

reasons contributing to this change, I prefer to put more emphasis on the transformations that took place as a result of the inevitable need to integrate diverse faith groups into the existing welfare structures. When I assert that the main reason of change concerning the FBOs in the case of Germany is the changing relevance of religion in politics, I do not point at a adjustment in the strong constitutional positions of the Catholic and the Protestant churches. Their established position is still in presence. Yet, as an outcome of increasing faith diversity in the society and its increasing visibility in the public sphere, the well-established connections between the state and the umbrella organizations representing the main population is undergoing a process of change. A reorganization of the corporatist structures of welfare was inevitable in order to meet the newly rising needs of the migrant populations with different faith backgrounds. Until a couple of years ago, any organization that had something to do with public welfare had to belong to the one of the six umbrella organizations in order to get their tax exemption, or to have access to any government money at all. The recent abolishment of this rule is an important example showing how the situation is getting more favorable for the rise of FBOs.

The major activity area of the newly rising FBOs is another reason why I do not find the welfare retrenchment argument sufficient. The research I have conducted on the Muslim organizations in Germany shows that social provision is not one of the main areas of activity for them. Instead, the Muslim FBOs are mainly active in areas such as interest representation, cultural activities and religious education. This finding also supports my claim that the reason behind their rise is not retrenchments in the welfare arena, but the reorganization of the relations between the German state and the existing faith groups in order to integrate them to the existing structures.

4.2.2. The inclusion of the third sector to the social policy arena in France

France is marked as a case of minor change due to the persistence of strict secularism in the political sphere. As discussed in detail in the last chapter, the strict separation between state and church in the beginning of the 20th century resulted in the secularization of the social welfare arena. Therefore, the Catholic Church, which has been a major player in the area of voluntary welfare in some other countries, did not
have an important standing in France. In the period after the revolution and the
separation of the state and the church in 1905, the Catholic Church’s welfare activities
were limited to its believers (Bahle 2003: 8). The Church’s charitable organizations
were closed down and properties were nationalized. As Archambault suggests the
secularization of the social policy area in France shifted the position of the Catholic
Church from being “the direct manager of the charitable institutions” to “offering
moral inspiration to the leaders of most health and welfare organizations”
(Archambault 2001: 219). The principle of subsidiarity that has been crucial for
organizing the social policy arena of the German case was not influential in the
French one. Although religious charities were the main providers in the previous ages,
a tradition of private action and subsidiarity did not develop in France (ibid: 206).
One of the main reasons for that was the early replacement of the Church by the
central government in hospitals, asylums and schools. As Archambault puts forward
“the consequence of French etatism was a reverse subsidiarity principle: the nonprofit
sector, whether religious or secular, dealt with public concerns that the state
neglected, outside the scope of state provision” (ibid). The secular characteristics of
the French welfare state did not go through any major transformations until today.
There have been changes in the perception of voluntary organizations, but the issue of
religion is still a taboo in French politics. Consequently, I define the settled strict
separation between religion and state as the main reason hindering the rise of
religiously motivated associations in France. Similar to the other European countries,
France is also going thorough an era of increasing migration and multiculturalism.
Yet, the established state-church separation and the principle of laicism still prevent
the rise of any kind of religiously related welfare organizations in France.

In contrast to the relative stability of the laicism principle, etatist characteristic of the
French social policy has been reformed in the last decades. The relative
underdevelopment of the nonprofit sector has been a recurrently mentioned topic in
French history. Rather than perceiving the third sector as a sphere of citizen activism
and an indicator of pluralism of democracy, French had a historical mistrust towards
voluntary associations. Archambault describes this rejection of any third party in
between the state and the citizen as an outcome of the Rousseauian concept of the
state: “No one is allowed to incite citizens to have an intermediary interest-between
their own and the state’s, to separate them from the Nation by spirit of cooperation”
This tradition has been continued to in the post World War II period. Centralization has been one of the aims of the newly establishing welfare state. As Ullman explains, “when the welfare state was consolidated in 1945, nonprofit organizations had a long history of managing such institutions as hospitals, orphanages, old age homes, and long term emergency shelters” (Ullman 1998: 52). In the new established system of state welfare these organizations were taken under the sponsorship of the state and started to function as part of the state. However, one important fact to bear in mind in the context of this research is that, while these associations were included in the state apparatus of welfare, some others like charities were totally excluded until the 1980s. As Ullman asserts, the secretary general of Secours Catholique—the largest Catholic charity in France—recently disclosed the hostility of the state towards his organization and other charities before the changes in the 1980s (ibid: 53).

Archambault in her study of the non-profit sector in France declares that since 1965 there is a rapid increase in the “associative” factor of the nonprofit sector (Archambault 1993: 3). On the one hand, one can argue that the rise of the voluntary sector in France in the 1970s and 1980s is parallel to other European countries, being an outcome of the crises of the welfare states. On the other hand, there are also other factors that are content specific to the case of France. Ullman in her comprehensive work on the new partnership between non-profit organizations and state in France claims that changing relationships are not an outcome of fiscal crises of the welfare state (Ullman 1998). In her explanation delegation of some roles of social assistance to the voluntary organizations is part of the efforts to democratize and expand the welfare structures in France. In her words:

In fact, French political elites with a strong stake in the power of the state, many of them Socialists, sought to recruit nonprofit organizations as partners of the state, not to roll back the state but to bolster and extend its power.(…) They sought to increase state capacity in order to achieve two goals: the strengthening of democratic institutions of governance and the reform and extension of welfare programs to reach more of the disadvantaged and to respond more effectively to the changing needs of society(Ullman 1998: 4).
I interpret this is a hint of the shift in the state-society relations defining the area of social policy. Ullman mentions how crucial the role of the epistemic community was, which consist of three different intellectual groups, in rearranging the relationships between state and the nonprofit sector. Interestingly, the common world view that grouped these three intellectual communities together was the ideology of the Catholic Left (ibid: 138). Berger in her work *Religious Transformation* explains that these Catholic activists as being socialized in the traditions of Catholic action. According to her thesis, this group of Catholic militants rise from the crumbling of the Catholic world as an outcome of the collapse of religious structures (Berger 1987: 114). In her words this group “draw parallels between the two churches, Catholic and communist” (Berger 1987: 117). Therefore the French intellectuals in the second half of the twentieth century emerged from these groups of people whose basis were in the Catholic militants of the early nineteenth century and as Berger puts forward “they took with them into politics a highly elaborated set of interpretations and aspirations that originate in a religious vision” (Berger 1987: 136). Thus, the emphasis they put on voluntary organizations can be seen as a reflection of the subsidiarity principle of the Catholic teaching.

Two important policy changes took place after the Socialist Party coming to power in the 1980s enabled the increasing partnerships between the state, cooperatives and foundations. The first one is the Decentralization Law of the Socialist government in 1982, which put an end to the France’s old tradition of centralization. As an outcome of decentralization a great number of tasks of social care has been shifted from central bodies to local departments and this had an important influence on the non-profit sector (Bahle 2003: 12). According to Bahle, this “renaissance of the nonprofit sector” resulted in a system of “local corporatism” in the area of social services in France in the since the mid-1980s (ibid). The second one is the minimum income of the poor act (RIM) in 1989 that also paved the way for the increasing importance of voluntary organizations in France, by making the state as the main provider of the funds, but the local government agencies and the voluntary organizations as the implementers. As Ullman also suggests, every major poverty initiative after the 1980s is implemented by the nonprofit organizations (Ullman 1998: 134).
In conclusion, similar to other cases in the sample, it is possible to see a rise of voluntary organizations in France although its historical reasons are quite different from the other cases. One has to note the fact that the voluntary organizations that are on the rise in the French case are not the religiously motivated ones due to the relative stability of state-religion relations in this country.

4.3. Conclusion

Table 4.1 summarizes the overall argument of this chapter concerning the dominant mechanisms and the degrees of change in the share of FBOs in the welfare arena. To emphasize once more, the shift in the relationship between state and society refers to transformations in the area of welfare. This criterion questions whether there are any adjustments in the position of the state in the area of welfare provision. The shift in the area of religion and state digs into the area of politics to see any adjustments in the relationships between State, Church, and the new faith communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of change</th>
<th>Shift in the state-society relationship</th>
<th>Shift in the state-religion relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This brief overview of the European cases demonstrates that the processes that triggered change in these countries can be explained in relation to the dominance of one of two mechanisms above. Nonetheless, the dominance of one mechanism, do not necessarily mean stability in the other mechanism. In the case of Britain, the rise of FBOs resulted from the states’ decision to open up more space for voluntary

---

25 The shifts in the state-society and the state-religion relations in Turkey, which is defined as the only case with high level of change, will be the focus of the next two chapters in Part II.
organizations and be the steerer of the social policy arena. At the same time, there are the increasing demands of a multiplicity of faith groups. In France, there is also an invitation by the state to the voluntary actors, but the historical division between state and church is still an inhibiting factor for the rise of FBOs. A process of opening of the established relationships between the two denominations and the state in the area of welfare is visible in Germany, in order to fulfill the needs of the different religious groups. Finally, in Sweden we observe the disentanglement of the state-church unity creating space for the rise of other faith communities.

... 

The next part will focus on state-society and state-religion relations in Turkey, in order to equip the reader with a comprehensive understanding of the predominant historical mechanisms behind the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in recent years.
5. State-Society Relations and Social Provision in Turkey

The shift in the state-society relations is the first factor\(^\text{26}\) that I focus on as being an explanatory one for the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in the social policy arena. How a state circumscribes the area of welfare provisions; how inclusive or exclusive the welfare state is; whether the state defines itself as the main provider for fulfilling the needs of its citizens, or if it prefers to be the steerer of social provision arena are the important questions that will guide this section in defining the nature of state-society relations in a society. When I refer to the relations between state and society in the case of Turkey, I will be mainly referring to how the area of social policy has been defined by the state actors; on a continuum of being an area of philanthropy for the well-off, and an area of state responsibility for fulfilling the citizenship rights of the people. Although not as easy to distinguish at the empirical level as it is at the theoretical one, the Polanyian concepts of redistribution and reciprocity will be kept in mind as the main distinguishing factors defining the nature of relations between state and society in the area of welfare provision (see Polanyi 1957: 45-59). Whether the social welfare arena is dominated by provisions that are based on institutional patterns of centricity or symmetry will be the main defining factor for this distinction.

This chapter will center on a discussion of state-society relations in the area of welfare provision in Turkey in the light of international developments. Although the aim is not a truly comparative one, the developments in the Turkish case will be studied in relation to the general trends in the European welfare arena. While tracing the changes, which took place in the Turkish welfare state in the last century, the main question will be whether the increasing provision by religiously motivated associations marked a shift in the state-society relations or whether it marks continuity with the previous periods. In order to give a substantiated answer to this question, the chapter will undertake an in-depth study of the state-society relations starting from the late nineteenth early twentieth century Ottoman Empire to contemporary times. The first sub-part focuses on the hybrid forms of provision in the late Ottoman, early

\(^{26}\)The second explanatory mechanism—shifts in the state-religion relations—will be the focus of discussion in Chapter 6.
Republican era. The second section concentrates on the establishment of the Turkish welfare state in the post-1940s, by paying specific attention to the informal channels of provision and the role of different societal and political actors in paving the road for access to these channels. Following that, the last part focuses on the transformations of the welfare arena in the post-1980s.

5.1. Late Ottoman Period and National Revolution

An analysis of the social policy sphere in the Ottoman Empire is not possible independent of the analysis of the religious sphere, since a division between the two was not present in the period before the early twentieth century. Religious institutions called vakifs/religious endowments dominated the social provision arena of the Empire for centuries. In line with the religious charities in the pre-modern times in Europe, one of the main functions of the religious elite and the Sufi orders in the Ottoman Empire was social service provision through charitable endowments/vakifs.

Vakif/waqf has been the main institution undertaking social provision activities in the Empire in the period until the late nineteenth century. The origins of the vakif institution lie in the Islamic traditions of taking care of the poor which existed long before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. As defined by Yediyildiz “waqf is a social, legal, and religious institution which played an important role in social, cultural, and economic life of the Islamic world, especially the Turkic world of the Seljuq and Ottoman period from middle of the eighth century until the end of the nineteenth”(Yediyildiz 1996: 50). There are even discussions about the roots of the vakif structure in times of the Prophet (see Gil 1998). Nevertheless, as any other institution, vakifs have gone through tremendous change in this time period of more than ten centuries. First and foremost, vakifs were born out of the religious obligations of taking care of the poor; and were institutionalized for the sake of God. The private properties that are endowed for public use made the financing of basic forms of welfare such as health, education, housing and food possible. Since the property dedicated cannot be taken back or used for other purposes, the vast number of vakifs on the Ottoman land made the provision of welfare services possible in a permanent fashion. With these characteristics, the institution of vakif was mainly the predecessor
of the public services in the modern state (Cizakca 1998; Cizakca 2000; Singer 2002; Abou-El-Haj 2005; Ozbek 2005; Ozbek 2007). One important characteristic of the vakif structure is that the establishment of a vakif has always been an act performed by an individual or a group of individuals. In that sense, the institution of vakif in the Ottoman Empire is similar to the contemporary civil society organizations working in the area of welfare provision. Nevertheless, the specific type of sultanic charity, which combines private and public forms of giving, has been one of the peculiarities of vakif structures (see Ozbek 2003), which distinguish them from charities and other forms of civil society organizations.

While analyzing vakifs in a comparative framework to today’s religiously motivated associations and to the religious charities in Europe, one has to be aware of both the similarities and the differences these institutions had to charities in the Christian world and to contemporary RMAs. First and foremost, social provision was not the only or the main function of vakifs in the Ottoman Empire. The functions vakif fulfilled in the Empire were manifold and dynamic. As argued by Singer “waqf is one kind of property holding, one form of capital investment, one form of patronage, one mode of beneficence.” According to her, the benefits of the institution also derive from these multiple and overlapping contexts (Singer 2002: 12). From the fourteenth to the nineteenth century the establishment of vakifs by the imperial family was the main ways of settling, developing and sustaining their sphere of influence on the subject populations and reinforcing legitimacy (ibid: 298). The interrelations between founding vakifs and political legitimation has been subject to research by many historians and social scientists (see Hodgson 1974; Singer 2002; Ergin, Neumann et al. 2007). Vakifs were instrumental to the conquest and colonization policies of the Ottomans by developing public and commercial institutions. When vakifs were created in the newly occupied lands, then the culture of the central state, as well as public services and security would have been transferred (McChesney 1981). Provision of services in the newly conquered lands created a sense of loyalty and eased the legitimization of the new political authority. When seen from this perspective, it is impossible to realize the close connection between social provision and politics, and especially how social provision becomes a crucial arena for creating influence especially at the time of political change or instability. These interactions
between politics and social provision will be repeated over time, as the following sections will demonstrate.

Endowment of private property as a *vakif* was not always an outcome of pious aims. A related benefit that the *vakifs* provided the founders with, was the social prestige: Since establishment of a *vakif* was seen as a religious and altruistic activity, these people gained a trustworthy and honest reputation in the society. Economic independence and the facilities provided by the *vakif* structures to the pious elite-ulema were important factors that increased the power of these elite in this era. As summarized aptly by Singer “beneficence is never an expression of pure altruism, but is always practiced with some sort of benefit in mind: Non material ways: qurba, prestige, legitimacy and patronage were their reward” (Singer 2002: 35). As this picture presents, *vakif* can be understood both as a religious and political institution which combined private and public ambitions and resources in the provision of welfare. As the following sub-sections will present, most of these characteristics of the Ottoman *vakifs* are tried to be reproduced in the contemporary state *vakifs*, which are established in the period after the 1980s.

*Vakifs* started to lose their significance in the Ottoman Empire starting from the nineteenth century onwards. After this century, both their numbers and function in the area of welfare decreased in the Empire due to centralization reforms undertaken in the political arena. The establishment of a *vakif* ministry (*Evkaf-i Humayun Nezareti*) in 1826 put an end to the autonomy of the *vakif* structures by taking away their control from the religious elite. The following step was taken in 1840, which brought an end to the financial autonomy of *vakifs*. Attaching *vakifs* to an imperial ministry that is empowered to regulate them resulted in the repudiation of the major principles of the system (Kuran 2001: 62). As Kuran argues, “It became a routine for the Waqf Ministry to subsidize one waqf’s operations through the receipts of another, even to use pooled waqf revenues to finance new expenditures lacking any particular waqf founder’s authorization. During the final century of the Ottoman Empire, the activities financed by the Waqf Ministry included imperial parades, the construction of new palaces, streetcar services and even the repayment of foreign debt” (ibid.).

---

27 This close connection between access to power through provision of social services, and transferability of capital from one form to the others (social, political and economic) will also be a point of discussion in the following sections on the contemporary period.
Functioning of *vakifs* in their traditional forms became nearly impossible under these conditions.

In parallel to the developments in Europe, this era in Turkey was also stage to power struggles between the old and the new elite. The transformations the Empire had been through resulted in the gradual washing away of power and influence of religion and religious elite especially in the political arena, which also result in an erosion of their roles in social provision. A political group that had crucial influence in the politics of the early twentieth century was Young Turks. This progressive group, who was the main force in the transition of the Empire from monarchy to constitutional monarchy and had crucial influence on the intellectual arena of the period, also triggered a shift in the area of social welfare. Parla defines the economic philosophy of the period as solidarist corporatism, as a middle way between liberalism and socialism (Parla 2006). Similarly, Mardin explains, the economic philosophy of the Young Turks as solidarism, which is characterized by the plurality of the reciprocal ties, as the middle ground between Marxism and bourgeois elements of ideology of the French revolution (Mardin 2006). Consequently, the period witnessed the first reforms in order to centralize, modernize and secularize the social institutions of the Empire.

The models for the newly established institutions were the European countries like France and Germany. The first step undertaken to achieve these aims was to destroy or totally restructure the institutions of the previous regime. Establishment of the Administration of Public Assistance (*Muessesdat-i Hayriye-i Sihhiye Idaresi*), which brought together all social assistance institutions established by Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) can be interpreted as a symbolic move towards this aim. Özbek claims that the main ideals of the political era was to cut all the possible connections to the past, and to abolish all the traditional forms of social assistance (Ozbek 2000). By the end of World War I, following the developments in the social policy spheres of the European countries, “social economics” started to be used as a concept and ideal by Young Turks (Toprak 1995). The establishment of a “national economy” was the slogan with which Young Turks were indicating their own variant of *Die Neue Orientierung* ideal

---

in Germany. (Mardin 2006: 21). Nevertheless, although the ideal was in the discourse, to put these ideals into full practice was not possible at the time.

The rise of the Republican Turkey

Secularization of the public and political spheres was the most important defining features of the newly rising Republic. As will be discussed in the coming chapter, the early twentieth century was marked by the abolishment of all forms of religious institutions, which also meant the end of all forms of legal social service delivery by the religious endowments, vakıfs and tarikats. An important move in the area of social provision was the abolishment of Seriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti in 1924, which resulted in further loss of power for vakif institutions, whose political and material influence had already vanished since the late nineteenth century.

Compared to the European cases analyzed in the previous part, the kind of welfare state that is on the rise in this time period in Turkey is a restricted one. Some fragmented welfare measures were introduced; however, a comprehensive development of a welfare state did not take place. Talas gives five main reasons while explaining the reasons behind the slow development of social policy in Turkey before the Second World War. These reasons are (1) the undemocratic character of the political regime, (2) the agriculture based economic structures and the underdevelopment of the industrial ones, (3) absence of a working class, (3) 1929 economic depression, (5) the negative attitudes towards leftist ideologies (Talas 1992: 79). What is also crucial to emphasize at this point is that, unlike European countries, the emergence of social policy in Turkey did not come to the stage as a response to the rise of capitalism. The social policy needs of this era are not related to industrialization or deruralization as it has been the case in other European countries. Poverty in the Turkish context in this period is an outcome of the wars and political processes in the last decades.²⁹ Therefore the rise of the first social welfare arrangements in this period can be understood in relation to the legitimacy need of the newly established Republic and its paternalistic approach towards civil servants.

Analyzing the issues of poverty and social policy in the first years of the Republic, Bugra similarly argues that fighting poverty for the statist elite of the Republic was not perceived as a responsibility of the state (Bugra 2008). The only forms of social security acts introduced in this era were to meet the needs of the formally employed and the civil servants, no measures have been taken in the area of social assistance.

The single party period (1923-1945), which is generally marked as an etatist period in the Turkish politics, was not exclusively marked by the expansion of state provision of welfare. Instead, the Party invested great effort in the establishment of voluntary organizations in order to support the parts of the populace who are in need. Especially following the economic crises of the 1929, the need for formal social assistance—in the cities—increased to a level which was not possible to ignore. Nevertheless, the main forms of provision introduced by the Party, as a solution to the needs of the poor and the needy, were philanthropic organizations that had been initiated and sometimes directly established by the Party members. 1930s and 1940s were stage to increasing number of philanthropic associations that focused their attention on different publics. A brief look on the titles and the focus groups of these associations shows that they have been mainly focusing on the religious minorities living in the big cities. (see Ozbek 2006: 151). In addition to these associations that mainly concentrates on fighting urban poverty, more specific problems such as child poverty was also tried to be solved by the benevolent actions of the citizens (Ozbek 2006: 145-146). As Özbek presents, in the 1940s, the Party was especially involved in supporting the students in the cities through the charitable organizations it has established as a part of the Party structure (ibid). Most of the times, these voluntary organizations were undertaking activities in the Party offices. Therefore, it was not easy to distinguish the activities of the political party and the activities of the voluntary organizations from one another. This historical evidence proves that in the early years of the Republic the social policy arena of the country was shaped by the absence of a formal social protection system, and the dominance of philanthropic foundations.

The state, instead of defining social provision as an area of responsibility, preferred to be a steerer and motivator of the voluntary associations that were undertaking social

---

30 A state organization—labeled Himaye-I Etital Cemiyeti—was established in 1917 in order to protect the children and was named as Cocuk Esirgeme Kurumu in 1934. Nevertheless the activity of the organization was not enough to be a remedy for the increasing child poverty in the rural area.
provision activities. The voluntary organizations of this era are partially controlled and supported by the state, which makes it harder to classify them as civil society or state organizations. As Bugra demonstrates in her research on the era: “the public campaigns organized by the members of Republican People’s Party to encourage rich to help the poor involved a fair dose of compulsion along with the appeals to sentiments of social solidarity” (Yalman 1973; Bugra 2007a: 50). Social services provided by these campaigns can be situated in the middle way between state and civil action: the money raised from the public by the activities of members of the party in power was used to help the poor. The fact that the members of the party included some compulsory measures to make citizens support the campaigns gave the actions a peculiar outlook. These hybrid forms of provision by public campaigns, which integrated some mix-patterns of public and private resources, were similar to the provision of welfare in the Ottoman Empire by vakifs. In line with their history, the new forms of philanthropy were also used for disseminating the political ideologies of the new elite. Establishment of Public Houses—halkevleri is a good example of how the politics of provision functioned. These were voluntary organizations that are mainly established for spreading the republican ideology to the populace but they also undertook services such as distribution of food and coal (Bugra 2008: 139). These institutions also played an important role in idealizing the Western social model for the masses and depict Islam as the “other”31. Establishment of numerous women’s organizations combining the aims of presenting the ideal secular republican women’s identity and outlook to the poor and needy parts of population was also part of the philanthropic activities by the new Republican elite32.

This period of late Ottoman and early Republican history presents continuity in state-society relations. Social policy arena was reshaped following the lines of dominant political ideologies such as nationalism and modernization, but the form of relationship between the state and the society did not go through a fundamental

change. The reforms undertaken by the new political elite did not establish a social policy arena that is based on social citizenship rights. Instead, they only reproduced the philanthropic institutions of the previous period along the lines of their ideologies.

5.2. The Golden Ages of Welfare State Development

The epoch between 1945 and the early 1970s has generally been marked as the golden age of welfare states. Rapid initial reforms to create a much more comprehensive and generous welfare state, based on the idea of social citizenship, were strengthened in this period. Publications such as English economist J.M. Keynes’s *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936) British economist and reformist W. Beveridge’s *Social Assistance and Allied Services* (1942) and *Full Employment in a Free Society* (1945) and British Sociologist T.H. Marshall’s *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950) were pioneers shaping the ideals of the newly rising welfare states in Europe.

What was achieved in the closed economies of the nation states during the golden age was more or less a consensus among different strata of societies. European states were committed to increase resources for the expansion of benefits and coverage within an extended system of welfare. Economic growth and full employment were the two main goals for the governments to keep this growing system of social welfare going. As Pierson suggests, this post-war consensus may be considered in two ways: either as a consensus between classes or as a consensus between political parties. At the class level, both labor and capital were to share in the common objectives of sustained economic growth. In its party form, consensus indicated broad agreement on the constitutional rules of the political game, a political style of compromise and bargaining (Pierson 1998: 124-125). Obviously, this dual consensus that was achieved between the two classes, which had always been rivals in political economy due to their competing interests, smoothed the transformations taking place in the welfare arena. Following a similar vein, Offe argues that the welfare state served as a peace formula in the advanced capitalist democracies of the West after the Second World War by limiting and mitigating class conflict, and balancing the asymmetrical power relation between labor and capital (Offe 2000: 67). His definition of the welfare state
of the post-war period is the political solution to societal contradictions. Throughout this period, social policies were one of the most important legitimizing factors of modern democratic states in relation to the redistribution role they played in societies. The next section will look into how these developments at the European level have been reflected on the case of Turkey.

5.2.1. The Establishment of the Two-tier Welfare State in Turkey

The post Second World War period was also a stage to expanding welfare state coverage in Turkey. The influences of the war were felt on the already weak economy of the new Republic which resulted in the increasing levels of poverty especially in the cities. The budget deficits of the early 1940s forced the government to print money which resulted in an increase in inflation, and further problems of survival for the populace. As an outcome of these developments, the government in power felt the urge to take some action in the area of welfare provision which consisted of establishment of social security institutions and initiating the founding of voluntary organizations.

The increasing political competition in the period after the mid-1940s can also be marked to have a speeding effect for the establishment of formal organizations in the welfare state arena. A discourse on the rights of citizens and the responsibilities of the state to fulfill the needs of citizens were on the rise for the first time as an outcome of the influences from the international arena. In addition to the developments in the international arena, the German and Austrian academics that migrated to Turkey due to the war in their countries are also considered to be of crucial influence for the rise of discussions around the issues of social policy, social security, and labor issues. Conferences organized around these issues in the period after 1948 had an important triggering effect for the further rise of awareness on these topics (Ozbek 2006: 159-173). As a consequence, the first regulations on labor and institutionalization of first social security institutions took place under the influence of Bismarckian type of welfare ideals in the 1940s.

One important difference that has to be kept in mind while making an analysis of the establishment of the welfare state in Turkey in comparison to the European cases is
that the industrialization and urbanization levels of Turkey were extremely low in comparison to the European ones. The share of industrial sector in the gross national product was 15.9% while the percentage of agriculture was 43.1 and service sector was 41.1 in the year 1945. Although the percentage of industrial sector rise from around 8-10% in the mid-1920s, to around 15-16% in the mid 1940s, the level of urbanization did not follow this trend. The rural population ratio, which was 24.4 percent in 1927 hardly reached to 24.9% in 1945. Therefore, the processes behind the expansion in the arena of welfare development in Turkey were substantially different than the prevailing picture in Europe. The establishment of the Turkish welfare state did not follow a parallel line to industrialization and/or capitalist development as it has been the case in the West. The Republic of Turkey was not a capitalist economy at the time, so it would be misleading to interpret the rise of social policy institutions as an outcome of the accumulation and legitimization needs of the capitalist state. Therefore, the rise of the welfare institutions in the period between 1945 and 1960s can mainly be explained as an outcome of the increasing needs of the populace, transition to the multi-party rule and the external influences of the European welfare arena. The increasing industrialization and the increasing influence of leftist movement on politics in the period between 1960s and 1980s can be marked as an additional factor for the development of social provision institutions and of the rise of a conception of social state.

The institutions which founded the basis of a social security system in this period are the Social Insurance Institution established in 1945 covering workers, Retirement Chest created in 1949 for civil servants, and Bağ-Kur founded in 1971 for the self-employed. These institutions that are totally independent from each other and serve different target groups resulted in the fragmentary structure of the social welfare system in Turkey. Moreover, the steps taken in the name of establishing a social assistance system in parallel to the social security system were not sufficient, which resulted in the underdevelopment of the social assistance arena, and the two-tier


34 For the reasons of this relatively slow pace of urbanization in the early republican years see (Bugra 2008:105-128).

35 See Table 2, in appendix I for rural urban population ratios in the period after the 1970.

structure of the welfare state in Turkey which covers the civil servants and the formally employed but leaves out informally employed and unemployed parts of population. The establishment of Social Assistance Institute in 1959 was a step to take care of these groups. Services to meet the needs of the urban poor, unemployed, kids, teenagers and supporting families can be listed as the main aims of the Social Assistance Institute in the 1960s. Nevertheless, the limited services of this Institute were neither enough to be a remedy for increasing levels of poverty, nor did it change the mentality that poverty should be fought with the cooperation of charitable action of the wealthy individuals and voluntary organizations. An interview conducted with the Minister of Health and Social Security in 1959 makes it clear that there were at least some state authorities who were aware of the differences between state provided social assistance and the charitable actions, yet this awareness did not become widely accepted to expand the coverage of the social assistance regulations to include all citizens as an outcome of their citizenship rights\(^ {37} \).

The fact that the coverage area of the welfare provisions excluded the rural and the informally employed parts of population gives an important hint about the form of state-society relations at this stage of the development of a welfare system in Turkey. Even in this period, when the Turkish state was defined as a social state by the 1961 Constitution\(^ {38} \) and a discourse around the issues of citizenship was on the rise, the needs of more than half of the population was left to the informal support mechanisms such as families, communities, benevolent citizens and clientelist relations. Instead of establishing institutionalized forms of support to cover all the citizens that are in need, Turkish political parties in power (especially the right wing ones that were influential in politics after mid-1940s) preferred to establish relations of patronage with the masses\(^ {39} \). Bugra draws attention to the establishment of a moral economy which

\(^ {37} \) The minister Lutfi Kirdar, in the interview he gave to daily Cumhuriyet on 23 September 1959, openly puts forward that social assistance is one of the oldest institutions of humanity. He makes references to the charitable endowments, soup kitchens, and religious duties. Yet, as he openly asserted these acts had an element of benevolence and clemency that limits their outcomes in the long run, they cannot be enough to fulfill the needs of the populace. Modern social assistance, in comparison is an outcome of social solidarity, which makes it more functional. (Daily Cumhuriyet, 23.10.1959).

\(^ {38} \) 1961 institution defines the Turkish Republic as a welfare state in which every citizen has a right to social security. As defined by law, it is state’s responsibility to establish the institutions to guarantee the social security and social assistance provision for its citizens.

function through informal and personalized forms of provision between the state, society and other social actors to compensate for the lack of formal social policy institutions (Bugra 2008: 157-158). Therefore, it is possible to talk about continuity in the state-society relations between the single party period (1923-1945) and the rules of the Democrat party (1950-1960) and Justice Party (1965-1971). Although steps have been taken in order to establish a social protection scheme for some parts of the population, the area of social assistance continued to be an area that is to a great extent left out by the state.

The characteristics of the Turkish welfare state that was mainly developed in this time period mostly resemble to the Southern European welfare regimes. Bugra and Keyder point to the following similarities between the Turkish and Southern European welfare regimes: (1) the fragmented and hierarchical nature of social policy, (2) a labor market structure where self-employment, unpaid family labor and informal-employment practices are very common, (3) lack of universal health care and (4) centrality of family in risk situations (Bugra and Keyder 2003; Bugra and Keyder 2006). I agree with their categorization of the Turkish welfare state in the Southern European type, yet I would argue that the fourth characteristic they suggested can be enlarged to include community level interactions. Connections at the community level, based on mechanical forms of solidarity, can be mentioned as the main supplementary form of provision that have been active for the parts of population that are left out of the protection schemes of the established welfare state. In the period before the 1980s, these connections played a crucial importance for the survival of people in the rural areas, and the new migrants in the urban areas.

Religiosity has also been one of the important criteria in getting access to social help through community bounds. The heterodox and multiple forms of peripheral Islam in forms of religious communities (cemaat) and Sufi orders (tarikats) were undertaking solidarity activities and social help. Although these forms of provision were not included in the formal social policy structures of the welfare state, and therefore not easily noticeable in the public sphere, the empirical research undertaken in this study made it clear that they played an important role especially in the rural areas and in

40 Such as Social Disability and Old Age Pensions in 1976, which guaranteed support for the target group who are over 65 years old and/or disabled and do not have a family to take care of them.
small Anatolian cities. Institutionalization of these forms of giving started gradually following the rise of small business activities in the Anatolian towns and the establishment of the conservative and/or religious network structures around these businesses after the 1970s. Nevertheless, these forms of giving did not turn into formal civil society organizations in the period before the 1990s due to multiple prohibitive factors such as socio-economic situation of the country and economic and political maturation level of the networks themselves, which will be discussed in the following sub-section.

The changing political atmosphere of the country after the 1970s had some influences on the area of social policy too. The ideals of social justice, welfare and equality showed up as important party propagandas of the pro-Islamic National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi/MSP). Especially in the 1970s an egalitarian discourse and emphasis on state intervention was in fashion (Bugra 2002b: 124). In addition to the political discourse, there were also developments at the local level that were in line with the anti-capitalist rhetoric of the party. As put forward by Jenkins, “by the time it left power in 1978, the MSP was as much a social movement as a political party” (Jenkins 2008: 137). The party invested in the formation of social networks in the Anatolian towns and also among the Turkish Diaspora in Europe. It founded many cultural and social associations attracting women, youth and businessmen. Owing to the socio-economic changes of the last decades new small merchant groups were also on the rise in the periphery whose activities are in line with the populist social justice ideals of the party. Mardin points out the correlations between economic growth in the provincial centers, with the increase of merchants and artisans-esnaf associations and support for religious activities (Mardin 1977: 292). Following on these lines, I claim these interconnections to be a crucial factor for the rise of religiously motivated civil society and new forms of welfare provision by these groups in the following decades.

This period in the Turkish political economy can be characterized as a period of foundation building. In addition to the reforms in the political and legal arenas, rise of civil activities marked the period between the 1960s and 1980s. The liberal political sphere that was guaranteed to a great extent by the 1961 constitution resulted in the rising number of interest groups and civil associations. Nevertheless, the activities of

---

41 Information gathered from interviews conducted with the RMAs.
these groups were mostly organized around the main cleavage line of left-right politics, which resulted in increasing unrest in the public sphere and the interruption of democracy in 1980\textsuperscript{42}. These organizations, although can be marked as the early formations of civil activity in Turkey, had exclusively ideological orientations. Elementary forms of conservative social networks were also founded in this period, yet neither their economic and organizational power nor the political maturation of the Republic was enough to tolerate formation and working of religiously motivated civil society organizations. The military coup of 1980 was the clear proof of the political instability and limited freedoms in the country.

A shift occurred both in the main political cleavages in the society and representation of them in the social sphere after the coup in 1980. Religiously motivated forms of social provision only come to the public stage after this period. The maturation of the necessary conditions such as further liberalization of religion and exploitation of it in the political sphere as an ideology to fight communism in the 1980s, rising economic might of the small business in Anatolia throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and the strengthening of the new conservative elite networks will be points of discussion in the next part, which focuses on the rise of religiously motivated civil society in social policy arena.

### 5.3. Shifts in the Welfare Arena in the post-1980s

Beginning in the late 1970s, changing economic and political settings of the world order started to threaten the functions of the states. Erosion of national borders, opening of national economies to global competition, and the position of nation states to share their sovereignty with transnational powers are important factors that can be listed among many others to explain the changing situation. The crucial points that are spotted for the breakdown of closed systems of national economies are the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1970/73. Therefore, starting from the 1970s, there was a shift from closed to open economies. As Genschel points out in his article *Globalization and the Welfare State*, since the

1970s international trade has more than doubled in OECD countries. International bank lending has grown more than eightfold, and the volume of foreign direct and portfolio investment has quadrupled during the past decade alone (Genschel 2004: 616). The erosion of the control of nation states over their economic borders is of crucial importance in this context. As Scharpf and Schmidt argue in their two-volume analysis of *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy*, this is almost always the case for the member states of the European Union (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000: 2). The autonomy of the European welfare states to design their social policies has declined in this period starting from the 1970s. This period starting from the late 1970s can also be explained by the increasing disorganization of the order. Disorganization, as described by Streeck, “denotes a decline in centralized control and authoritative coordination in favor of dispersed competition and spontaneous, market-like aggregation of competing preferences and individualized decisions” (Streeck 2009: 96). The effects of this increasing disorganization, as the main characteristic of the neo-liberal era, have been also felt in social areas without any delay. As Mishra states, “the process of downgrading the social began with the ascendancy of neo-liberalism at the nation-state level in the late 1970s” (Mishra 1999: 115).

As a consequence, the consensus about welfare states came to an end in this period, and the welfare states started to get attacks from all sides of the political spectrum. As Offe puts forward, the right wing started to criticize the welfare state as it was imposing a burden on taxation and regulation upon capital that amounted to a disincentive to investment. A further claim by the right wing was that entitlements and collective power positions that welfare states granted to workers and unions resulted in a disincentive to work. On the other hand, there were attacks from the socialist left. The socialist left argued that the welfare state was ineffective and inefficient since the redistribution of the welfare was not vertical but horizontal within a class of wage earners, and this resulted in “horizontal equality” which should not have been the aim of a welfare state. A further critique from the left pointed out that welfare states were repressive arguing that the provisions to the poor were made conditional upon conformity to rules and regulations. A third critique from the socialist left was related to the politico-ideological control function of the welfare structures. They claimed that the false ideological understanding of social and political reality created by the welfare states prevented the formation of a political
understanding of society as something that must be changed (Offe 2000: 67-76). Therefore, all these discussions about the malfunctioning of the welfare states paved the way for changes in the social policies of the European welfare states.

The reasons that led to the restructuring of the welfare regimes after the 1970s are manifold. Van Kersbergen mentions seven areas of change after his literature review of a great variety of sources: (1) The change in demographic structures: Falling birth rates and an aging population in Europe; (2) Change in the traditional family structures: The shift from double income double career households to single parent households; (3) The loosening of economic growth and the post-industrialization of labor markets; (4) The changing roles of men and women that challenge the gender assumptions of welfare structures; (5) The weakening position of the organized labor which was an economic and a social basis for the welfare states; (6) New risks and needs that arose for which welfare states cannot be an answer for; (7) The accelerating globalization and specifically, European political and economic integration that revolutionized the relatively fixed relations between nation states and the deteriorating autonomy of nation states in the sphere of social policy making (Van Kersbergen 2000: 21-22). I claim that changing position of religion in the political sphere should be added as an eighth one in close connection with the sixth and seventh areas of change defined by van Kersbergen. As a collective outcome of all the factors listed above, starting from the late 1970s and increasing in the 1980s and 1990s, many European countries made revisions to their welfare policies in order to reduce the direct redistributive role of states.

Alternative definitions of ideal state-society relationships gained dominance especially in the period after the 1980s. These new ideals of the welfare state put more emphasis on “reciprocity”; on the duties/responsibilities of the citizens, families and civil actors in return of the services provided by the state. I define this as a shift away from the ideal of redistributive welfare by the state to a welfare state characterized by the multiplicity of the providers and the reciprocal relationships these providers build with their supporters\(^{43}\). Mechanisms working on the basis of symmetry on the lines of primary forms of belonging gained importance in this period. The emphasis on the faith-based organizations as partners of social provision similarly increased both in

\(^{43}\) In-depth analysis of these reciprocal relationships in the case of Turkey will be undertaken in the empirical chapters in Part III.
some countries of the Middle East and Europe, in this time period. As Bugra draws attention, in the contemporary social-policy discourse, where both the role of the family and traditional norms of charity are frequently evoked, it is impossible to miss the commonality between Islamic and Christian value universes currently salient in the formation of the conservative liberal position against public assistance. What references to Islam signify seems to be little different from what a conservative outlook introduces in the realm of social assistance in any religious context. The notions of communal solidarity are as attractive in an Islamic context as they are in a Christian one, especially as supporting elements of contemporary neo-liberalism (Bugra 2007a: 47). I agree that the original mechanisms triggering change in the welfare structures of different states are more or less identical, nevertheless in-depth analysis of the Turkish case in the following section will make sure that history still matters in defining the outcomes that gradually evolve from the processes triggered by these original mechanisms.

5.3.1. Transformations of the Turkish Welfare State

As increasingly becoming part of the global economy, the transformations Turkish political economy went through starting from the critical juncture of the 1980s were in many ways in accordance with the changes in the international arena. This sub-part of the chapter will undertake an in-depth analysis of these developments such as transformation to a market economy, increasing levels of urbanization, and the decreasing levels of family support mechanisms in order to shed light on the reasons behind the proliferation of religiously motivated welfare associations in the last decades. The analysis will prove that the Turkish social policy sphere in the period after the 1980s is characterized by the increase of demand for social provision (not a decrease of supply) and the expansion of social assistance arena (not contradiction or retrenchment of it).

Transition from an import-substitution to a liberal, export-driven market economy marked the socio-economic trends of the period after the 1980s in Turkey. Economic liberalization policies—flexibilization of the exchange rate, subsidies for export oriented companies, privatization of the State Economic Enterprises, financial and
import liberalization and promotion of foreign investment (Aricanli and Rodrik 1990)—of the Özal period had crucial transforming power for the Turkish socio-economics. These implementations in the economy caused booming of the GNP and the export rates but also resulted in declining living standards due to a decrease in the formal employment chances with increasing deregulation, and privatization of the state-owned enterprises. By the end of Özal’s time in office, the unemployment rates were higher and the average wages of unionized workers were lower than the figures of 1980 (see Yeldan 1994). In addition to the liberalization policies, rural to urban migration has also been one of the crucial reasons for the rise of unemployment and poverty due to reasons such as the cuts in agricultural subsidies. The highest rate of migration from rural parts of the country to the cities happened between 1980 and 1985 with an urbanization rate of 7.7 % and the urban population had been equalized to rural population in mid 1980s. The rise of unemployment and the decreasing chances of getting formal employment resulted in an increase in the number of people who are in need of formal or informal forms of support.

As briefly mentioned in the previous part, the important functions, family and communities fulfill in providing a safety net for their members has been pointed as one of the main defining factors for the Southern European Welfare state types (Ferrera 1996). These characteristics, being also one of the main defining features of the Turkish welfare state, started to lose their functionality in the period after the mid-1980s. The demographic trend towards nuclear families from extended families has been a crucial reason for the decline of the support mechanisms. Increasing rates of migration from rural to urban areas and the changing reasons of migration have been additional ones. In the period before the 1980s, migration from the rural to urban areas was marked by the pull factors such as better employment, higher income, and better education facilities available in the cities. Nevertheless, after the 1980s much of the migration occurred due to push factors such as economic rupture with the countryside, or the threat of violence due to war situation in the case of the Kurds

44 See Appendix II, Table 2. Urban-Rural Population in Turkey.

Once the determinant reason of migration changed from pull to push factors, informal support mechanisms—such as in-cash and in-kind transfers—that helped the survival of rural migrant in the urban area until the 1980s have gone through a process of decline. The empirical research conducted by the RMAs also supports the argument that migration to the cities has been one of the main reasons for increasing demand for welfare provision. As the interview partners claimed, migration to the cities resulted in the decomposition of the traditional and religious solidarity bonds that have existed in the countryside. As they suggested, older forms of support mechanisms such as cemaats and tarikats lost their functionality in the urban arena. The loss of material and moral support from the traditional community structures resulted in the search for alternative forms of support mechanisms in the cities.

The decline of these informal forms of support are defined as an “erosion of the informal pillars of developmentalist welfare” (Bugra and Keyder 2006) or the “decline of the moral economy” (Bugra 2008). This change also points to a turn in the state and society relationships in which the informal channels such as possibilities of informal housing or access to state rents have come under pressure due to the economic, social, political developments and resulted in the rise of phenomenon called new forms of poverty (Bugra 2003; Bugra and Keyder 2003). Therefore, the newly migrants in the city, being both disconnected from their previous forms of support mechanisms and having lost the chances of benefiting from previously available informal forms of state support, were in search of state or voluntary initiatives that will be a remedy for their needs.

The existing social security structures that only provide for the formally employed and their dependants could not be a solution for the increasing levels of urban population that is either unemployed or employed in the informal sector. The employed percent of the potential labor force, which is only 44%, is an important indicator to show the scale of the problem (World 2005b: ii). The data of State Institute of Statistics presents the ratio of population that is covered by one of the social security institutions as % 46.5 in 1980 and 54.6 in 1985

46 See Appendix II, Table 1. The Population Covered by Social Insurance Programs.
from time to time, the governments did not take any action in this area probably due to the belief that these companies will not be able to survive the financial burdens of meeting the necessary requirements to be included in the formal sector. Introduction of social assistance schemes to support the increasing number of the unemployed and the informally employed people without the necessary means to provide a basic survival for their families has become inevitable in this period.

According to the World Bank Report in 2005, 27% of the population lives under the complete poverty line, which is calculated as an estimate of total of food and non-food expenditures (i.e. clothes and shoes, hygiene spending) (World 2005a). The rise of religiously motivated associations can only be understood by taking these context specific factors seriously. In this neo-liberal atmosphere of increasing need and decreasing of older forms of solidarity, belonging to some forms of communal networks become crucial for the survival of the poor. In the case of Turkey the main defining characteristics of these communal networks were different levels of religiosity involved in them. As Bugra puts forward, “in the cultural atmosphere of the 1990s, Islam had become a strategic resource in the attempts of an ever-increasing number of Turkish city-dwellers trying to cope with the fragmenting and alienating forces of urban life” (Bugra 2002b: 126). The details of this process will be discussed in the following chapters. Yet, the next part will focus on the transformations in the welfare system of Turkey in the period from 1980s to today.

*Social assistance arena in the making*

The transformations in the socio-economic structures of the country that were accompanied by the increasing demand in the area of social welfare resulted in the introduction of new forms of provision and also in reforms in the existing social policy structures. One change that took place in this period was the increasing emphasis on the social assistance mechanisms in order to support the parts of population that are not employed and living in extreme forms of poverty. As discussed in the previous sections, assistance for the poor was never regarded as an area of public policy intervention by the Turkish state: both in the Ottoman and the Early Republican periods, social assistance left to be an area to be handled by the
benevolent citizens\textsuperscript{47}. The welfare state that had been established after the Second World War in Turkey only focused on the workers with formal contracts, civil servants and self-employed; leaving out unemployed, and informally employed. It would not be inaccurate to claim that not a single investment was made in the social assistance area after the establishment of Darülaceze by the end of the nineteenth century, and an institution for the protection of children (SHÇEK) in the early twentieth century. The legislation that introduced a Social Disability and Old Age Pensions Regime in 1976 is argued to be the only modern legislation in the area of social assistance, which guarantees protection for the citizens who are not covered by any other social security services and who do not have close relatives to take care of them (Bugra and Keyder 2006)\textsuperscript{48}.

In the period after the mid-1980s, the state felt the urge to undertake some more encompassing actions in the area of social assistance. Introduction of the 1986 legislation on the incitement of a social assistance and solidarity was a first and crucial step for the state to take over responsibility for provision of social assistance. Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to interpret this step as a divergence from the tradition of seeing social assistance as an area of philanthropy. Bugra interprets this legislation as an early response of the liberal market economy “to regard poverty as a problem that could be best dealt with through the country’s traditional ethos of charity involving a society-specific form of state-society cooperation without proper delineation of private and public funds used to assist the needy” (Bugra 2007a: 46).

The talk held by a parliamentarian in 1986 for the justification of the introduction of the legislation demonstrated the expected support from the citizens:

\textit{Vakifs} have been the long lasting and fundamental institutions of the Turkish Islamic civilization that existed in Anatolia for more than thousand years. They have been ahead of their time in meeting the social, economic and cultural needs of the society.


\textsuperscript{48} This is also an example of the approach which considers the family responsible for taking care of the needy. Only people who do not have relatives to take care of them are eligible for the assistance.
In Ottoman history, *vakifs* have been active in many areas like infrastructure, education, care of the needy and housing. These services not only fulfilled economic needs but also had a social function. Unfortunately, *vakifs* declined in the last years.

With the introduction of Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund the yearned for functions of *vakifs* will reemerge. Serving the parts of population that are under the middle income level and who are not benefiting from social security will once more be possible with the support of our benevolent and wealthy citizens in addition to the state provision.” (quoted by Bugra 2008: 206, my translation)

It is possible to see the historical references of the new law to the *vakif* structures, and the nostalgia created around these institutions. Nevertheless, these discussions around the ideal of revitalizing the traditional *vakif* structures did not take into consideration that *vakifs* have never been institutions established with pure aims of social provision. Even in their golden ages, they have always been used as instruments of political power building, or for protecting the rights of individuals against state (see Cizakca 2000; Kuran 2001; Singer 2002; Singer 2005; Singer 2008). Therefore, the aim of bringing such a politically laden notion back to the center of social assistance arena is a decision that needs to be discussed from a social citizenship perspective. Although resistance from some of the political parties was the case, and discussions on the possible problems and weaknesses of the legislation took place in the parliament, the law became effective in 1986. The legislation founded the Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund under the Prime Ministry as an umbrella organization that assumes “all the social responsibilities on behalf of the state with regards to the needy and the destitute that are deprived of any social security provisions” (SYDGM 2009).

One change that the establishment of this Fund brought to the social policy structure of Turkey was the increasing emphasis on the localities. Currently, there are over nine hundred *vakifs* all over the country that are connected to the central directorate in Ankara but governed by the local board of trustees that are composed of local governors and two philanthropists from the locality. In the period after the 1990s and especially after the financial crises of 2000 and 2001 both the budget and the activity field of the Fund increased remarkably. One of the most influential projects of the *Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund* in recent years has been the *Social Risk Mitigation Project*, which has been put into use with a loan granted by the World
Bank in 2001. The development objective of the Project was “to mitigate the impact of economic crisis on poor households (social risk mitigation) and to improve their capacity with similar risks in the future (social risk management)” (World Bank 2001: 2). The main components of the project were conditional cash transfers to the poor, assistance programs supporting education and health areas, and development projects such as micro-credits. In 2004, the Fund gained an institutional structure of a general directorate called Prime Ministry General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity, which mainly financed by an off-budgetary funding that is a combination of a share of income tax revenues and a share of traffic fines. Since 2006, when the loan agreement with the World Bank expired, the Social Assistance and Solidarity Vakıfs continued undertaking the same services that were started as a part of the loan agreement. When the characteristics of them such as their local structures, areas of activity and decision-making processes are analyzed it is possible to see the parallels of these state institutions with the religiously motivated civil society organizations. There is no evidence proving that the state vakıfs were the models that RMAs followed, nevertheless the similarities signify this possibility.

Social provision by the municipalities

Social welfare provision by the municipal governments is also a recent development of the last decade at the local level. The role local governments play in social policy field has been continuously increasing in the period after the mid-1990s. Statistical data is not available on the scale of the social assistance work undertaken by the municipalities, but their presence in the area of social provision—with social projects such as employment creation and their direct social aid programs such as distribution of food, coal, clothing the like—is impossible to miss.

Increasing levels of social provision by the municipalities bring with it questions related to politicization of provision. This has been a widely discussed issue in the media, especially during the election times.49 Due to the independent structure of the municipalities in accepting donations from private individuals, it is not easy to control

49 There was a visible increase in the number of news on distribution of food, coal, and even household appliances by the municipalities in the period before the local elections in 2009, and general elections in 2007.
the sources and the expanses of their budget, which obviously raises concerns about possible cases of corruption. In the interviews I have conducted with the municipalities, two main lines of argument were dominant in explaining the reasons and benefits of social assistance provision by the municipalities. On the one end of the continuum, there were the statements of the municipalities that are governed by the party in power. They claimed that the main reason for increasing presence of municipalities in the social policy arena is the increasing levels of poverty and the benevolent nature of Turkish people.

On the other side, there were the municipalities that are governed by the opposition government, which interprets the developments of the last decades as a pure outcome of clientelist relations and politicization of social policy. For the opposing group social policy should be an outcome of social rights of the citizens, and hence it is “dangerous” to leave this field completely to the local governments or civil actors. An interview I have conducted with a vice major in one of the municipalities in Istanbul, who is in office for the last fifteen years, was interesting in presenting the change that happened at the municipal level in the last decade. As she told me, in the last fifteen years, she has witnessed a great increase in the number of the families asking for assistance. According to her words, fifteen years ago the number of poor families that were applying for social aid —in this specific municipality— was around three hundred; this number increased to ten thousands now. As she describes, this cannot merely be an outcome of increasing poverty levels. She suggested that the right wing parties, which are in power in the last decades, have never defined social policies in relation to social rights. Instead —according to her— they preferred to keep the citizens in a dependency relationship, so that a reciprocal relationship between social provision and voting can be continued. Although I mostly agree with the interpretations of the vice municipal, I believe that one thing that is lacking in her explanation is that social assistance arena has always been an area of philanthropist relations independent of the party in power. Therefore, I claim that the novel part of the development is not the relations between the providers (either the central state institutions or any other private ones) and beneficiaries, which have always been marked by clientelistic notes, but the increasing activities of the local governments and their dubious relations to both the donators (businessmen) and the recipients in the area of social policy.
Transformations of the social security arena

The changes in the area of welfare provision were not limited to the social assistance sphere but also influenced the social security institutions of the Republic. The influences of the IMF and the World Bank on the Turkish economy increased after the crises of 1994. High deficits of the social security system were seen as the major problem in failing to achieve the requirement of the stand-by agreement of a fiscal surplus of %6.5 of the GDP. Especially the economic crises of the 2000 and 2001 proved that it is inevitable to undertake some reforms in the social policy arena. In addition to the crises, the accession talks with the European Union also triggered a chain of changes —such as the preparation of the Joint Inclusion Memorandum— in the social welfare arena in the period after 2004.

The fundamental change that took place in this period was the introduction of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security Institution as an umbrella establishment assembling the three existing social security institutions, which were Retirement Chest for civil servants, Social Insurance Institution for workers and a pension fund, and Bağ-Kur for the self-employed. This implementation resulted in main shifts in the health and pension areas of social security. Although some discussions around the issues of loss of autonomy for the funds of the previous institutions, and privatization of health care personal took place in the public sphere, the reforms were important for creating equality for the citizens who were previously supported by different social security institutions according to different norms and benefits. The establishment of the Social Security Institution and the reforms in the health care had positive effects in curing the inequalities of the two-tiered welfare system by taking some basic steps —such as free distribution of elementary school textbooks— to institutionalize universality of services (Bugra 2008: 234-236). Therefore, it would be mistaken to mark the period after the 1980s in Turkish welfare state as an era of social policy retrenchment. Although the reforms undertaken were fundamentally aiming to cope with the budget deficits, they also had positive outcomes as discussed above.

5.4. Conclusion

Proliferation of religiously motivated associations in the area of social provision came about in this environment of increasing needs but also expanding social assistance by both the central and municipal governments. In the light of this historical analysis of the state-society relations in the area of social policy in Turkey, the question that interests me is whether what we currently witness in the area of social assistance is a just a continuation of the dominant logic defining this area. As already mentioned before, the area of social assistance has always been dominated by the idea that state should not be the main and the only provider. Poverty has always been seen as a problem that should be fought with the communal efforts of the public—such as family, community, benevolent citizens—and the state. Therefore, philanthropic organizations have always been an important part of this area of welfare provision.

Hence, I do not claim an extensive shift in the state-society relations in Turkey. I believe that continuity rather than change marks the characteristics of the new period in state-society relations. The first reason supporting my claim is the increasing state action in the area of social assistance in the last years. Steps such as establishment of state vakıfs, introduction of the green card scheme, temporary support to the needy families can be counted as some of the important ones that prove that state decided to take on responsibility in areas that it did not before. The proliferation of religiously motivated associations accompanying this shift looks quite puzzling at first sight. It would have been easier to explain the rise of these associations in parallel to retrenchments in the area of welfare, as it is the case in some of the European countries. Nevertheless, the historical specificities of the Turkish welfare state—its fragmented structure, leaving nearly half of its population without any forms of social security and its lack of an established social assistance structures—resulted in an unexpected shift in the area of welfare structures.

In the period after the 1990s, when the transformation of Turkey to the global market economy had been accelerated, the negative consequences of the economic

developments could not be carried by the existing formal social welfare schemes and the informal support mechanisms such as families anymore. In a period when the European welfare states were searching for ways to share their responsibilities with other actors and institutions such as civil society associations and private agencies, Turkish state had to expand its responsibilities to cover the ever-growing share of population that needs support mechanisms. The state, for the first time, defined the social assistance area as a possible responsibility sphere for itself, and took some steps in widening the area of coverage of the welfare state by institutionalizing local vakıfs to meet some extreme forms of need. Yet a closer look to the functioning of these organizations will show that the change is not really about the state-society relations, since these vakıfs are only partially supported by the public funds.

Even though the developments in the Turkish welfare system seem to be in line with the claims of the welfare governance approach, which is characterized by the increasing share of private and voluntary contributions in the welfare mixes and the new partnerships between different providers and the state, I would deny that this can be an explanatory factor for the Turkish case. First of all, these areas have never been covered by state action. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the associations are taking over what the state has been doing before. Secondly, in contrast to the European cases outsourcing of provision or public financing of welfare activities undertaken by civil society associations is not common in Turkey. Provision in the area of social assistance is quite a recent phenomenon as discussed above, the state is recently taking action in the area and there is still a huge gap even to fulfill the survival needs of the public. To conclude, it is not possible to talk about a shift in the welfare mix that is characterized by a decrease in the role of state in the provision and an increase in the roles of civil society and private actors.

To conclude, what we are witnessing today is much more than a transformation of the already existing ways of taking care of the people. The area of social assistance is going through a process of establishment and growing. It is possible to talk about a pluralization of the existing actors in social provision. Therefore, what requires explanation in the case of Turkey is not the transformation of social assistance from a social citizenship right to a form of civil society provision, but the characteristics of the newly rising social assistance sphere. This is exactly the reason why the next
chapter will go into a discussion of the rise of political Islam as an explanatory factor for the new developments in the area of social assistance in Turkey and especially for the rise of RMAs. Why the associations that are on the rise are the religiously motivated ones will be the question to guide the discussion.
6. State-Religion Relations and Social Provision in Turkey

The previous chapters defined two main processes to be explanatory for the increasing presence of religiously motivated associations in the area of welfare provision. The second one, the shifts in the relations between state and religion; the dynamics of cooperation and conflict between the main institutions of secular and sacred authorities in the area of social provision is the main focus of this chapter. An in-depth historical analysis of the interaction between state and religion in defining the contemporary position of religiously motivated associations in the case of Turkey will be undertaken in comparison with the European variety that has been introduced in the third and fourth chapters. The analysis of the European variety already introduced the idea that the range of state church relationships in different welfare states had a decisive effect in determining the future presence of religiously motivated associations in the area of social provision. The cases of Britain, France, Germany and Sweden demonstrated how different secularization histories influenced the establishment of different welfare mixes by the end of nineteenth, early twentieth centuries. Following on the main arguments developed in Part I and II, this chapter focuses on the dynamics of religion and state relations in Turkey in the time period starting from late Ottoman period to today with a special emphasis on the area of social provision. The analysis aims to provide an understanding of how the social policy patterns established in the early nation state formation period had repercussions for the further development of competition and/or cooperation between sacred and secular providers of social policy.

In order to provide a historical answer for the rise of RMAs in Turkey, this chapter is founded on the theoretical basis of the religion and welfare literature that is introduced in Part I. A systematic analysis of the existing cleavage lines\(^\text{52}\) in the Turkish politics will be undertaken to understand the characteristics of welfare state in Turkey. State-religion relations will be analyzed as the peripheral cleavage line in the period before the 1970s and as the main one in post-1980s shaping the development

of the welfare mix. How various political conflicts on this main societal cleavage line of sacred-secular shaped the development of the Turkish welfare structures will be the focus of attention. The historical analysis will confirm that the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in the last two decades can only be understood by looking into changing relevance of religion in the public and political spheres.

The first section will concentrate on the first steps of secularization in the nation state formation period, after giving a brief introduction to the religion and state relations in the late Ottoman Empire. Following that, the second sub-section (1945-1980) will focus on the transformation of strict secular codes of the early Republican period in the period after the mid 1940s, the gradual rise of Islam in the political and social arenas of Turkey and multiple interruptions of this process by the judicial and military forces. This part aims to go into an in-depth analysis of the processes behind mobilization of Islam in the Turkish politics in order to trace the roots of religiously motivated associations in the period before 1980s. I claim that this era between late 1960s and 1980s is important for the rise\(^{53}\) of Islam as a main social, cultural, and political resource setting the background for the establishment of a main political cleavage line in politics. The third part will focus on the post-1980s, in which religious parties came to a position to exploit the political potential of religion and managed to politicize the cleavage line of sacred/secular as the main one in politics. The main interest while undertaking this analysis will be on the possible reflections of state and religion interactions on the social policy sphere in general, and on the destiny of religiously motivated associations in the welfare arena in particular.

\section*{6.1. From the Empire to the Republic: Nation State Formation Period}

Situating Turkey in the middle of European cases, representing different forms of state church conflicts and collaborations in the area of welfare may look like an unconventional decision at first sight. Nevertheless, this part will demonstrate that when the nation state formation period is focused on, what has been going on the in the social policy sphere of Turkey, especially in terms of religion and state relations

\(^{53}\text{Instead of a “resurgence” of Islam in Turkey —as it is commonly referred to in the literature—this chapter will focus on the “rise” of it as a resource in the socio-economic and the political spheres, since I interpret this to be a novel process more than a revival or a return.}
can easily be positioned in the European variety and can be explained through the same mechanisms of change. The institutions representing the religious and state authorities may be different in the case of Turkey, and even lack of church may be marked as a big enough difference to make this comparison pointless for some. Yet, this section will demonstrate that the period that marked the end of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Turkish Republic has been scene to conflicts around the issue of social provision, which can be easily fit into the European context.

Religion neither in the Ottoman Empire nor in the Turkish Republic has ever been represented as a coherent body of power separate from the state. It has either been integrated into the state power—as in the case of Ottoman Empire—or excluded from it, as it has been the case after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Islam constituted a central ingredient of the state power in the Ottoman Empire, through institutions such as Caliphate and Sheikh-al-Islam (Seyhulislam), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Seriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti). Following the incorporation of Caliphate from the Mamluks in the 16th century, the Ottoman Sultan/emperor was entitled to the positions of appointee of God and the leader of the Islamic world. Merging the political with the divine power in a single position, the religious and state authorities became one and indivisible in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, as the historical studies on religion and politics in the Ottoman Empire suggests, the political authority although theoretically shared by the religious one, was superior to it. This twofold nature of the Ottoman state power, including both secular and religious elements, went through a process of change starting from the nineteenth century. Centralization and Westernization being the main aims, religious institutions were under siege and the power of the religious elite (ulema) was in decline in this period.

Contrary to the double power structure of church and state in the Catholic Orders, Islam, even in its heyday of influence in the Empire, has never been an independent political force. Its authority and influence has always been scattered over a multiplicity of formal and informal structures. Moreover, the representation of religion was not limited to the political arena only. In addition to the ‘Orthodox Islam’

that was represented by the religious elite/intellectuals (*ulema*), who are civil servants of the state; Islam was also represented by a multiplicity of actors such as Sufi orders-*tarikats* and saints- *seyhs* at the local level. Mardin describes this as the ‘heterogeneous and multidimensional’ character of Islam in the Empire (Mardin 1977). This position of religion as being both part of political power and the ruling elite and also being represented by a multiplicity of peripheral organizational forms undertaking social activities was the main picture in the Empire.

The first years of the Republican history were marked by the efforts to demolish the presence of religion in the political and social arenas. The duality of the secular and the Islamic institutions —schools, courts, laws— that ruled the country through the nineteenth century was brought to an end with the Kemalist reforms of the early twentieth century (Inalcik 1964: 446-447). The abolishment of the Caliphate, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (1924) were the main steps undertaken to put an end to this duality in the political sphere. The introduction of the Law of Unification of Instruction, which closed down all *medreses*/religious schools and united all educational institutions under the Ministry of Education, and the abolition of religious education in schools in 1927 created a national education system that was designed along the lines of the French model.

Secularization in Turkey did not only mean the exclusion of Islam from the political sphere, but also established total control of religion by the state. The establishment of *Diyanet*—the Directorate of Religious Affairs—under the Prime Ministry in 1924 was the main step to achieve this control. The administration of religious worshipping institutions, the regulation of religious belief and rituals, and the guidance of society on religious issues were the main tasks of the new institution. The establishment of *Diyanet* and roles of this institution have always been a contested area in the Turkish political history. The Republican elite had an interest in using Islam to create social cohesion in society. Islamist intellectuals like Kara argued that this institution was not founded to regulate the religious affairs of the public but religious affairs of the state (Kara 2004). For him and other Islamists the establishment of *Diyanet* resulted in the utilization and exploitation of religion to meet the needs of the state and its total

---

exclusion from the areas of religious education and vakifs (ibid.). The disestablishment of Islam from being the state religion in 1928, the inclusion of laicism in the fundamental principles of the Republican People’s Party in 1931, and in the constitution in 1937 were the final moves that completed the formal transition to a secular order. Kuru defines the period between 1923 to 1937 by the dominance of assertive secularism which means the exclusion of religion from the public sphere and confinement of it to the private domain (Kuru 2009: 11). I claim that this strict elimination of religion from the social and public areas and its total regulation by the state resulted in the total exclusion of religious forms of provision from the newly establishing area of welfare.

Reforms in the sphere of religion were one of the priorities of the new regime, in order to cut the existing ties with the Ottoman Empire. As argued by Yalman, “[…] the intention of the Turkish Reforms is clearly to deal a mortal blow to an entire culture and to set up a new culture, with new men. […] And since Islam was at the heart of the ancient regime, it is Islam that receives the heaviest blow”(Yalman 1973: 154). It is important to mention at this point that the two versions of Islams existing in the Empire —the orthodox and the folk Islam— were influenced differently by the secularization policies of the Republic. While the Orthodox Islam of the elites totally disappeared by the abolishment of the Caliphate and the Ulema, the heterodox Islam of the masses survived despite the legal bans on its institutions, religious brotherhoods and orders. As suggested by scholars in the area, “not allowed to move and expand outwards, peripheral Islam turned deeply inwards” (Sunar and Toprak 1983: 428). The main move to wipe out the influence of popular Islam was the introduction of Law of 677 in 1925, which closed down all turbes, tekkes and zaviyes, which were the main religious organization venues for Sufi tarikats. This significant step illustrates that the secularization policies of the early republic did not only cover the political but also the social arena. These brotherhoods had served crucial religious and social functions throughout the history of the Empire: “On a psychological level they offered a mystical, emotional dimension which was lacking in the high religion of the ulema and at the same time they served as networks offering cohesion, protection and social mobility”(Zurcher 1997: 200). An excerpt from a speech by Mustafa Kemal below represents the attitude of the new elite to the traditional organizations of popular Islam:
To seek help from the dead is a disgrace to a civilized community… What can be the objects of the existing brotherhoods (tarikat) other than to secure the well-being, in worldly and moral like, of those who follow them? I flatly refuse to believe that today, in the luminous presence of science, knowledge, and civilization in all its aspects, there exist, in the civilized community of Turkey, men so primitive as to see their material and moral well-being from the guidance of one or another seyh. Gentlemen, you and the whole nation must know, and know well, that the Republic of Turkey cannot be the land of seyhs, dervishes, disciples, and lay brothers. The straightest, truest Way (tarikat) is the way of civilization. To be a man, it is enough to do what civilization requires. The heads of the brotherhoods will understand this truth that I have uttered in all its clarity, and will of their own accord at once close their convents, and accept the fact that their disciples have at last come of age (translated and quoted by Lewis 1961).

The quote makes clear that one of the main aims of secularization reforms were to free the individual from the community bounds established on traditional/religious forms of belonging. Mardin defines the common ground of the secularism reforms by Atatürk as the creation of the individual citizen who is free from the controls and the pressures of the gemeinschaft (Mardin 1981). The main aim of the reform movements at the time was to replace the traditional forms of authorities with the universal and objective truths of science. Nevertheless, the years to follow proved that what was not realized at the point in time was that universal truths of science did not provide these people with norms, moral values or any other form of belonging. The ideals of the new culture—that are marked by dominant notes of Western values and practices—could not be translated to all parts of society, but only created an identity for the newly rising urban elites. Therefore, the space emptied by these traditional brotherhoods and tarikats, which were the only resources of networking and support for some parts of the public, were now open to be filled. The attempt to dissolve these religious and traditional forms of communities, and the failure to replace them with other forms of belonging such as social citizenship was probably one of the main oversights of the early Republican era.

Similar to the power struggle between dominant churches and newly rising nation states in Europe, this era of nation state formation in Turkey was also stage to a power struggle between the old religious and the newly rising secular elites. Yet, the authoritarian political atmosphere of the country was not suitable for any possible
reflection of the religious cleavage to the political sphere. The single party period did not allow the rise of any form of institutionalized opposition against its power. The founding of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) in 1924 was the main attempt of the various groups opposing the rule of Mustafa Kemal. Nonetheless, the party was accused of having an Islamic identity and being a threat to the ideological foundations of the new Republic and closed down in as short period as six months. The political atmosphere of the new Republic became even more authoritarian after this first try out, which prevented the rise of any kind of opposition party for the next twenty years. Therefore, groups with more conservative and religious motivations were totally excluded from the new order with no chance of representation neither in political parties nor in the social arena.

This authoritarian climate, which dominated the Turkish politics in the first two decades after the establishment of the Republic, resulted in the marginalization of religion. This exclusion of religion from the political and public spheres has also inhibited further presence of it in the social policy sphere, and any possible coexistence or cooperation between sacred and secular providers in the area of social welfare. Nonetheless, this did not necessarily hinder the possibilities for the rise of religiously motivated associations in the future since a comprehensive welfare system to fulfill the basic needs of citizens cannot be established. The coming chapters will demonstrate how the politicization of religion, and the increasing needs in the area of welfare—being the two main explanatory factors—will result in the proliferation of religiously motivated associations by the end of twentieth century.

6.2. The Contested Area of Religion and Politics in Turkey

Religion has always remained as a contested area in Turkish politics. The relatively strict and authoritarian secularization path preferred by the early Republican state elite, pushed Islam in the periphery of cultural, social and political life of the modern Turkish state. I claim that this approach of the Turkish state towards Islam has been the impediment to the rise of religion as a main cleavage in politics. Since the formal

representation of religion in the political party form was not possible, it remained as a contested phenomenon with the potential to be politically exploited. This section concentrates on the dynamics of state-religion relations in Turkey in the period from the mid-1940s to the 1980s, which was stage to partial consolidation of democracy and multiple interruptions of it by the military. The changing position of Islam in the political and public spheres will be the main focus of attention by following a historical sequence of crucial events such as establishment and liquidation of political parties and military coups.

1945-1960: the first and careful steps

The transition to a multi-party system in the mid-1940s and the establishment of right wing parties resulted in a growing opposition to the strictly etatist and secular political programs of Republican People’s Party57 (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). The competition between the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) and CHP resulted in the use of religion as political propaganda by both parties. In the 1947 congress of the CHP, the idea of liberalizing the role of secularization in the social area was an important part of discussions (Toprak 1981: 77). The inclusion of courses on religion in the school curricula, opening of religious education institutions like Imam Hatips and departments of Theology, the reopening of tombs, and increasing number of mosques were some changes that were completed in the last five years of the CHP rule. Following these reforms in the pre-election period and the additional ones after the election in 1950, the rule of Democrat Party (1950-1960) witnessed the revival of religion in the social sphere. This revival is also characterized as a “redefinition of laicism” (Sunar and Toprak 1983: 429-430).

Democrat Party shared many sensitivities of the CHP regarding the issue of secularism in the political sphere. Yet, they had a more liberal interpretation of public religion. Therefore, after the 1950s visibility of religion in the public realm increased, which was legitimized by the argument of fulfilling the needs of the populace.58. This period of the DP rule was stage to the re-legitimization of some religious

---

57 The Republican People’s Party represented both the party and state up until this date.
58 After their three-decade rule, CHP has been accused of creating an ethical, moral and cultural void in the society as an outcome of its strictly secular reform programs they had implemented.
brotherhoods in return of the political support they provided for the party in the 1954 and 1957 elections (Zurcher 1997: 245). These being the main characteristics, the Democrat Party years were marked by the attempts to open a niche for the integration of the groups other than the secular Republican elite of the new Republic in the political sphere too. As argued by Ayata, the expansion of the clientelist networks to include the peasants and newly rising merchants were one of the characteristics of the DP rule (Ayata 1996: 44). Religion was one of the crucial organizational resources used for the mobilization of these groups in the political sphere.

The military coup in May 1960 was the first break in the Turkish democracy experience. The Democrat Party was closed down for violating the secular principles of the Turkish Republic and Kemal Ataturk, as an outcome of its interactions with the Islamic groups and its acts in popularizing Islam. This was a proof, showing that there was no “normalization” of the relationship between the state and religion. The ruling state elite did not approve of the rise of religion in the social and political spheres of the country. As aptly argued by many scholars, in the period before the 1970s it was not yet possible for the Islamists to present their ideals in the political arena, therefore they had to integrate their ideals with other political movements like conservatism or nationalism (see Duran 2004). Although the Democrat Party put great effort in presenting a secular picture in politics and in keeping a balance between the secular tradition of the state and the rising Islamist ideals, it could not prevent the closure of the Party in 1961.

1965-1980: further move

The political environment in the period after the military coup was neither prohibiting nor limiting the increasing representation of Islamic forces in the political arena. Moreover, the liberal approach of the new constitution towards the political and organizational rights opened the way for sneaking of Islamic actors into the political arena in the decades to come. In the elections following the military coup in 1960, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) that was established as a continuation of the Democrat Party came to power. Expressing its commitment to the secularist principles of the Republic, the AP had been a channel of presentation of Islamic demands in the
political arena. As argued by Ayata, Justice Party was different than the Democrat Party since they “established direct and lasting relationships with various Islamic groups, communities and leaders” which “involved a process of exchanging votes and political support for access to public resources and protection against threats from the state and the secular forces” (Ayata 1996: 44). In comparison, as he claims, the relations of the Democrat Party with the Islamic groups were limited to “mobilize provincial local notables who had influence over local religious leaders” (ibid.). The relations of the Justice Party could therefore be interpreted as opening a new phase in the area of interaction between religion and politics. A further step —the establishment of pro-Islamist political parties— was only possible after the 1970s as an outcome of these smaller steps that made the integration of the religious groups into the right wing political parties possible. Support from the religious brotherhoods, like Naksibendis and Nurcus 59 was also crucial for the establishment of the Islamic parties.

The rise of political Islam in various Muslim countries was an additional factor that paved the way for the establishment of the first Islamist political party in the early 1970s. The influence of the Islamic movements in countries like Egypt, Iran, Pakistan resulted in the rise of a new interpretation of Islam, which emphasized that practicing Islam should not be limited to the private sphere. 60 After 1960s Islamic texts of groups like Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria and Jamaati Islami in Pakistan were widely read among Turkish Islamists. This triggered the aspiration of the Turkish Islamists for being active participants in the political sphere. The political movements in these Islamic countries set an example for the possible ways of integrating Islam into the public and political arenas. The founding of the first Islamic political parties of Turkey followed these exogenous changes in the Islamic world and the endogenous changes—such as increasing migration to the cities, weakening of the rural and traditional bounds and socio-economic changes—in the last decades.


The establishment of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP) in 1971 and the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP) in 1972, following the closure of MNP by the military intervention in the same year, marks the beginning of a process in which Islamic politics will separate from right wing politics and form their own representation channels (Cakir 2004). The rise of these political parties should be studied in close connection with the parallel rise of small and medium size businesses in Anatolia. It is important to mention that the most important figure of political Islam—Necmettin Erbakan—prior to establishing a political party, has been the spokesman of conservative small businesses in Anatolian towns. Therefore, the main political support basis of him were these small and medium scale firms of newly rising Anatolian capital/green capital, which would be on the rise in the following decades and would form an alternative to the big bourgeoisie of the big cities and specifically Istanbul.

The emphasis on moral values and heavy industrialization were the two main defining characteristics of politics by the MSP. The first one has been an important criterion for belonging to the networks established at the crossroads of economy and politics and the second one defined the most efficient way to increase economic might. As Bugra shows in her study on the comparison of TUSIAD and MUSIAD, reciprocity networks were especially important for the newly rising Muslim businessman, since they lacked the state support that was available for the private enterprises that were established earlier (Bugra 1998). The following historical and the empirical chapters will go into an in-depth analysis of the functioning of these networks.

In the period between 1974 and 1978, the MSP took part in three different coalition governments, during which it laid the foundations of the Islamic networks established at the intersection of business, politics and bureaucracy (see Özbudun 2000). Education was one of the main area of activities for the MSP; more than two hundred vocational religious education schools (Imam Hatip Okullari) were opened in the coalition years of the party (Pak, S.-Y. (2004). “Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The case of Turkey.” Comparative Education 40(3).

61 Before this date, the presence of Islamism in the political sphere was only possible with an integration of it with nationalism, and conservatism as the two other main ideologies of Turkish political right. For a study see Bora, T. (1998). Turk Saginin Uc Hali: Milliyetcilik, Muhafazakarlik, Islamcilik. Istanbul, Birikim Yayinlari.

62 For a detailed study of these schools see Pak, S.-Y. (2004). "Cultural Politics and Vocational Religious Education: The case of Turkey." Comparative Education 40(3).
in the political arena and the last coalition government, which the party was also a part of, came to an end in 1977. Shortly in the aftermath, the third military coup of the Turkish democracy had taken place, and the Turkish Military forces overtook the government on September 1980.

In conclusion, this period from the mid-1940s to the 1980s is marked by the increasing presence of religion in the social and political arenas of the Turkish Republic and reformation of the strict secularization of the early Republican period, which meant total exclusion of any forms of religion from the public and the political sphere. In the first interlude from the mid-1940s to mid-1970s the conditions in the political field were not ready to allow the establishment of a pro-Islamic party. Connections that have been built between the ruling right wing parties and the religious groups can be interpreted as a preparation stage for the politicization of religion. Nonetheless, even these veiled interactions resulted in the multiple interruptions of the regime by the military forces and closures of the political parties.

The first pro-Islamic parties were founded in the period after the 1970s, even though the political environment was not stable enough to make their long-term survival possible. Nevertheless, this early presence of the pro-Islamic parties in coalition governments facilitated an increase in the number of people with Islamist sensitivities in the bureaucracy in various positions of the state, and in business in various fields of economics. Access to various spheres of socio-economic and political life resulted in the formation of networks cross-cutting these areas. Clientelist networks established by the political parties at the intersection of economic, political and social arenas set the stage for future success of these groups. Part III, which will focus on the empirical findings of the study, will demonstrate the functionality of these networks in establishing the necessary economic and social basis for the rise of religiously motivated welfare associations in the period after the 1990s.

This snapshot of the political arena in Turkey demonstrates that religion has not been a main cleavage line in the Turkish politics before the 1980s. The main cleavage lines of Turkish politics in the pre-1980s period can be defined on the axes of left-right and center-periphery, to use the terms of Lipset and Rokkan (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Religion has always remained as a politically contested arena, and the first parties
were established in the early 1970s. Yet the parties were neither long lasting nor
influential enough to be able to shift the main dividing line in politics. It was only
after the 1980s that religion shifted from the periphery to the center of political
interest. The underlying reasons causing this shift will be the focus of attention in the
following section.

6.3. The Rise of Islam as the Main Cleavage in Politics (post-1980s)

The shaping of the social policy sphere in society is highly related to the political
struggles the society is going through. The major lines of conflict eventually reflected
in the area of social policy, since this has always been one of the main areas of back
building in politics. Especially in countries where state services do not cover
fundamental areas of welfare provision, there is a greater room for the politicization
of services. Subsequently, foundational stages of welfare state development have been
the period in which the newly established structures were open to any influence from
the political field. In this subsection of the chapter, I will argue that the proliferation
of the religiously motivated associations in Turkey can only be understood in relation
to the developments in the political sphere of the country in the last decades. Hence,
the rise of RMAs will be explained as an outcome of re-shaping of the welfare state
structures through the main cleavage lines in the society.

In Turkey, the proliferation of the religiously motivated welfare associations
coincides with the rise of Islam as a main cleavage in politics. As already discussed in
the previous part, due to the specific secularization history of the country, religion has
remained a phenomenon with the potential to be exploited by political actors.
Nevertheless, the circumstances for the rise of it as a main cleavage were not
maturated in the period before the 1990s. This chapter claims that the rise of Islam as
the main cleavage is the second explanatory factor for the rise of RMAs in the social
policy sphere. The networks established in the process of the rise of Islam in the
economic, political and the social spheres, and the exploitation of social provision
arena by the political parties set both the examples and the necessary foundational

---

63 The first one is the increasing demand in the area of social assistance, which was the main point of
discussion in the previous chapter on the development of welfare state in Turkey.
basis for the rise of RMAs. The initial steps of this development were the increasing presence of religion in the public sphere in the post-1980s, the rise of the Welfare Party to power in the mid-1990s and the rule of the Justice and Development Party in the period after 2002.

After the military coup

The period after the military coup in 1980 marked a new start for state and religion relations in Turkey. In order to cope with the polarization of the country on the left-right axis, the Turkish Islam synthesis has been put forward as the main ideology of the state. The steps taken in the years after the coup were crucial in reintegrating Islam into the social, political and cultural life of the society. The leaders of the military coup, by fusing Islamic and nationalist goals, aimed to create “a more homogenous and less political Islamic community” (Yavuz 1997: 67). For them, Islam as a pacifying and submissive ideology was preferable to the threat of communism. The Özal era (1983-1989) was marked by the integration of this new ideology into state discourse. The public visibility of religion through the representation of political figures—including him—in the media during Friday prayers or expressing their religious beliefs became common. Additionally, this period was also stage to the opening of new mosques, and Imam Hatip schools and the first discussions about whether university students should be allowed to wear the headscarf-turban or not. Özal’s pro-Islamic attitudes were most of the time explained in relation to his connections to one of the most influential tarikats (Naksibendis) in Turkey.

The increasing visibility of Islam was not limited to the public sphere; steps have also been taken in the economic field to introduce Islamic principles into business and finance sectors. The introduction of Islamic banking was a crucial step by Özal government, which resulted in bringing savings of the pious Muslims into the


financial system and made the business relations with the Arab states easier. DITIB—the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs—was founded in 1984, to integrate the Turkish Diaspora living in Germany into the new Turkish-Islamic ideology. This was a move that would facilitate the return of remittances to Turkey in the following years. As argued by Yavuz, the moves after the coup in 1980 aimed at the inclusion of Muslims into the economic system and as this integration also facilitated the process in which they “shape the educational, political and economic spheres with their own norms” (Yavuz 1997: 70).

An important aspect of the rise of political Islam in Turkey was the return of Erbakan to the political arena and increasing political support for the Welfare Party in the mid-1990s. This was an early proof of the ideological change the state and the society had gone through in the period between 1950s and 1990s. Islamic identity claims became more politicized in this period of the rise of Islamic parties. Önis describes this process as the ‘the resurgence of Islam’ (1997, 2001). For him, not only has religion been politicized by political parties identified with the Islamic identity and discourse, it has also been articulated by economic actors, civil society organizations and cultural identity claims.66 Clear proof of the rise of Islam in the economic arena in the 1990s was the rising power of the “Islamist” or “Green” capital or “Anatolian Tigers” and the establishment of MUSIAD, which is the business association of the newly rising medium and small scale Anatolian businessman with conservative/religious backgrounds67. Yavuz defines the expansion of the economy to include these small scale provincial businessman as an important reason for the success of the Welfare Party and adds that although the main ideology of the emerging bourgeoisie was socially Islamic, it was economically liberal (Yavuz 1997: 72). This combination of the Islamic and the liberal ideologies proved to be the main underlying factor for success not only in areas of politics and economy. It also introduced a new approach to the social provision arena, as will be discussed in the following section.

---

66 As already briefly mentioned in the previous footnotes, I am hesitant to use the term ‘resurgence of religion’ in order to explain the developments in the Turkish political arena in the period after the 1980s. The term resurgence refers to a rebirth or return. Yet, what we currently witness in the case of Turkey is not a recurrence. Religion has never had such a presence in the social, economic or political spheres of this country before. Therefore I will prefer the term rise, instead of resurgence.

The accomplishment of the Welfare Party in the 1995 elections should not be understood only as an outcome of rise of Islam in the political and economic arenas. The social networks that have been established by the party and the social provision activities that were carried out through these networks were crucial factors for its success. As Heper argues, before the 1995 elections, the Welfare Party essentially functioned not only as a political party, but also as a welfare agency for the needy. As widely discussed in the literature, intra-community solidarity of the Anatolian capital provides its members with mutual support and cooperation: “Religious groups or communities, while building mosques, Qur’an courses, schools and student dormitories with the money collected from members or friends, who give to charity out of religious duty, also prepare a customer and capital base for the schools, business and enterprises of their members” (Demir, Acar et al. 2004: 171). In line with this tradition of mutual support and cooperation, Erbakan’s Welfare Party took networking activities, which were kicked off in the MSP days, to a highly developed stage. The party obtained appointments for people at the hospitals and other public service agencies, and distributed coal, clothing, soup and food to the needy through the municipalities it controlled (Heper 1997: 36). They invested significant effort in mobilizing support from the grassroots, and establishing contact on a personal level with each and every possible voter. The role of female party workers was crucial in establishing these networks; they made regular visits to households they are responsible for in a neighborhood and provided material (food, fuel etc.) and moral support to the needy. In addition to grassroots mobilization, the party also invested significant effort in establishing networks between business, media and civil associations. In the 1995 elections, the Welfare Party was supported by “a complex network of Islamist economic ventures which included companies, chambers of commerce and industry, trade unions, women and youth groups, some 50 publishers, 45 radio stations, 19 television channels and hundreds of video and cassette producers” (ibid.). I claim that these networking activities of Welfare Party paved the way for the establishment and the success of the religiously motivated associations, which would be on the rise in the years to come.

68 1990s were also stage to increasing number of conservative and Islamic media companies-television channels, radio stations, and newspapers.
The party’s main political program titled “just order” brought claims of social justice and equality into the center of party politics. In a way, just order was an attempt to bring Islamic ethics into the capitalist economy and create a community around these ideals. As defined by the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, just order “consists of a secure social and economic environment, the protection of state property, an end to nepotism and corruption, cooperation between state and society to cope with poverty, and an end to undue Western influence over Turkey” (2003). For some authors this program had been interpreted as a third way between capitalism and socialism (see Ozbudun 2006). The ideals of the party program—just order—had some similarities to the ideals of a welfare state in its emphasis on achieving equality and social justice. Nevertheless, the road chosen in order to achieve the just order was not taking redistributive state action or widening the scope of welfare policies but establishing communities and networks founded on the Islamic ideas of morality and trust. This choice can partly be explained by the clientelist relations that has always been part of Turkish politics and partly by the opposition of pro-capitalist Islamists to the idea of redistribution through state provision. The party was trying to reconcile the needs of its support base to the desires of the businessmen, who were part of the Islamic networks. Bugra explains the efforts of the party in formulating the Just Order, as an attempt to make sure that both the supporters and the potential supporters of the Party believe that the party both “contribute to the upward mobility of the newly emerging Muslim businessmen and without creating doubts about the party’s position vis-à-vis socioeconomic equality” (Bugra 2002b: 127).

The social provision ideas created around the concept of just order by the Welfare Party reflected both continuity and change in comparison to earlier approaches. In line with the state-society tradition of the previous periods, the main instruments of creating the just order were private benevolence and voluntary initiatives that were


70 For various reactions to just order by different groups of Islamists see Tugal, C. (2002). "Islamism in Turkey: beyond instrument and meaning." Economy and Society 31(1): 85-111.
organized around communal forms of belonging and solidarity. The main distinction from the early Republican years was the dominant ideologies behind social action; Islamic ideals replaced the secular and modernist ideals of the early twentieth century. Moreover, they seemed to function better than the previous ones as the main motivations for philanthropic action. The main reason for their relative success was the intra-community trust and solidarity bounds established on the ideals of Islam. As asserted by Bugra, “Only in the cultural setting of Islam could justice acquire a meaning, a meaning derived from reciprocal obligations of trust, loyalty and solidarity that bind the community of believers” (Bugra 2002b: 129). The functionality of these reciprocal bounds for the rise and the successful functioning of the religiously motivated associations will be a point of discussion in the empirical chapters.

A short process of stagnation

The period known as the February 28 process forced Welfare Party to resign and the party was banned in 1998 for violating the principle of secularism. In addition to the party, Islamic foundations and thousands of Qur’an courses were abolished for being a threat to the secular state. The report of the military on June 1997 listed 19 newspapers, 110 magazines, 51 radio stations and 21 television channels engaged in Islamist propaganda; and claimed that there are 2,500 associations, 500 foundations, more than 1,000 companies, 1,200 student dormitories and over 800 private schools that are established and administrated by Islamists.\footnote{Data taken from the briefing of the Turkish General Staff to the media on June 11\textsuperscript{th} 1997.} The numbers are informative in providing an idea about the rise of the religious groups in the social and economic spheres of the society. As an outcome of this increasing pressure on them, many religious establishments went underground and political Islam went through a major transformation in the years to follow.

The last years of the Welfare Party already marked a shift from religious right of the political spectrum to the center right (Yilmaz 2005). Moreover, the Virtue Party, which was established as a follow up of the Welfare Party, engaged in a political discourse that included the ideals of democracy, the rule of law, and the EU accession. Nevertheless, even this shift was not enough to prevent the closure of the
Virtue Party by the Constitutional Court in 2001. This final closure resulted in a split in the Islamist movement between the conservative Islamists who founded the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) and the liberals—or conservative democrats as they define themselves—who established the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP). The development and the success story of the AKP and how they differ from the traditional Islamists are issues that have been widely discussed in the literature in the last years. The next section, without going into an in-depth analysis of these issues, will focus on some crucial changes that have been taking place in the political and social arenas of the country since AKP’s coming to power.

Cohabitation of Islam and Neo-liberalism

The first steps of cohabitation of Islam and neo-liberalism took place in the 1990s, yet the real fusion happened during the rule of Justice and Development Party (AKP). The main claim of the party during the 2002 election campaigns was that they represent a break from the political Islam tradition of the previous Islamic political parties. They did not identify themselves as Islamist but as conservative democrats. The differences of the AKP from the previous pro-Islamic parties can be interpreted as an outcome of the learning process political Islam has gone through in the electoral democracy of Turkey in the last half century. This historical process seems to have transformed this branch of the Islamists to a more liberal, modernist, and Western-oriented group. The electoral success story of the AKP, in addition to many structural reasons, should also be understood in relation with their ability to speak to a large section of voters including former center-right, moderate Islamists, moderate nationalists, and even a section of former center left, and forming a “notion of politics that is based on compromise and reconciliation in place of a politics based on conflict” (Ozbudun 2006: 549). This shift in the approach towards groups of different political and social backgrounds has been a crucial reason for achievement in the early years of AKP government.

Circumstantial factors such as the political and economic instability of the country in the period before the 2002 elections and the economic crises of 2001 and 2002, which increased poverty and insecurity in the society, were some of the main reasons for the
AKP’s victory as a newly established party. Nevertheless, these issues were also first tests the party had to pass successfully in order to gain further support of the populace. Avoiding taking action in the social security and assistance areas would have been suicidal for the future success of the government. Reforms in the social policy environment of the country kicked off under these conditions, which were marked by the cohabitation of Islam and neo-liberal policies. Scholars point to a strong conservative-liberal tendency in the current social policy environment in Turkey, whereby Islamic notions of charity successfully complement attempts at downsizing the state through strict controls over social spending (Bugra and Keyder 2006: 226). According to them, Islamic elements in the ideological orientation of the AKP have been very useful in motivating and mobilizing civil initiatives, such as NGOs who appeal to norms and institutions of Islamic solidarity through which they generate private donations, towards providing social assistance (ibid. 224). Whether there is a direct influence of the party in power on the increasing number of RMAs in the social policy arena is debatable. Nevertheless, the increasing presence of them in the social policy realm, by making use of the already existing networks established in the last decades, is an observable fact.

Compared to the main emphasis of the previous Islamists on the area of politics, the AKP claimed that they put more emphasis on the social and civil society spheres. As they argued, their interpretation of secularism highlights the separation of politics and religion and protection of religious rights in the private and public realms. Nevertheless, the highly contested issues of the period such as the transformation of the public sphere along the Islamic lines, compulsory religious courses in the schools, existence of a state institution such as Presidency of Religious Affairs and Qur’an courses supported by this institution, the increasing number of wives of politicians with the headscarf, are all indicators proving that it is not easy to make this distinction between politics, and social and civil society spheres. The failure of the AKP government to find a solution for the headscarf issue and for the problems of the Alevi population are clear indicators demonstrating that it is not really possible to draw a strict line between what is called “protecting the religious rights” and “separation of religion and politics”. As already put forward, the specific trajectory of secularization in Turkey left religion as a contested phenomenon at the center of the political field and the AKP government has been in a unique position to exploit this
potential. Therefore, the protection of religious rights in the civil and private sphere cannot be discussed without paying attention to their implications in the political arena. The functioning of RMAs, which will be the focus of attention in the coming chapters, is also a clear prove of the blurred boundaries between these areas.

Tugal’s emphasis on both society and state transforming attempt of Islamism in Turkey is crucial to understand at this point (Tugal 2009). As he claims, the transformation Turkey has been undergoing in the last decades, especially under the AKP government, is a “passive revolution” which consists of a partial Islamization that is parallel to a deeper neo-liberalization and capitalization. The reason why it has been easier for the Islamists to achieve this transformation in the socio-economics of the country for Tugal is their success in transforming everyday life of the people simultaneous to their success in governing and provision (Tugal 2006; Tugal 2009; Tugal 2009). Therefore, the rise of Islamic civil society should be analyzed as only one part of the ongoing process of change Turkey has been going through.

Transformation of Sufi Islam

The transformation of Sufi Islam is the last crucial mechanism of change one has to get a grasp of for a better understanding of how religion became a cleavage line in Turkish politics and how this has been reflected in the area of social provision. As already mentioned in the historical chapter on the Ottoman Empire, Sufi Islam has been one of the major forms of how religion has existed in the society. Sufi Islam can be defined as a total of the Islamic brotherhoods and tarikats, which have been more peripheral ways of practicing Islam following the goals of Sufi tradition. In the time frame in which strict secularization of the country excluded religion from the political and public spheres, Sufi orders have been the main niches for the survival of religion.

As generally mentioned in the interviews I have conducted with the Islamists, the socio-economic changes in the country also influenced the traditions and institutions of Sufi Islam. Increasing urbanization, individualization and globalization changed how Islamists interpret the world and also religion. As demonstrated in the quotation below, these transformations facilitated the spreading of the Islamic codes of conduct to the public and political spheres. As one of my respondents put quite openly,
Muslims’ perception of the economics and politics changed in the period after the 1990s:

There was activity before the 1990s, but it was in traditional forms of brotherhoods-cemaat or tarikats. Muslims went through a transformation since the 1980s and 1990s. They started perceiving the world in a different way. The traditional structures in which we did not question the authority and obedience to the seyh (sufi master) do not exist anymore. The need to institutionalize increased after the 1980s. We—as Muslims—need to organize in bigger circles. Before, the image of a good Muslim was one who goes from home to mosque, and from mosque to home, who does not take part in any kind of trade or economic activities. That was the mentality for a long time. Now, have a look around you, the number of holdings, foundations, organizations owned by pious Muslims increased remarkably. I believe that Muslims opened their eyes. Before, the idea was to leave the economic and political arenas to other people. But now it is not like that. It would not be even possible for you to come here and talk to us before 1980s. People would have thought that it is not allowed for a man and woman to sit in the same room and talk. But now it is possible if we have an open door.

Here, an old aged respondent, who has been part of the same Sufi order for a period of over twenty years, explains the transformations he has witnessed in the last decade. As an insider, he points out how both the mentalities of Islamists towards capitalism, and politics changed in the last decades, and values such as individualization and democracy are on the rise in the religious communities. By also mentioning that it would be impossible for me to interview them before the 1980s, he made sure that the amount of change and “modernization” they have been through was clear to me. Nevertheless he also included the condition that the door should be open, which can be interpreted as an emphasis on the particularity of their own values and morals in comparison to the Western ones. I believe this quote is highly representative of the transformations of the Sufi Islam and the current stage of many Islamic groups in constructing and deconstructing both the tradition and modernity in their way of creating a mode of conduct. Moreover, the quote also points to the changes in the political sphere of the country, which made the involvement of these groups in the social, political and economic fields of action much more welcoming.
6.4. Conclusion

This chapter undertook an analysis of the path Islam followed in the Turkish politics from marginalization in the early Republican years to becoming a mainstream cleavage line in the post-1980s. The main aim was to show how the increasing relevance of religion in politics and the formal representation of it through the rise of pro-Islamic political parties triggered change in the social policy sphere, which resulted in the proliferation of religiously motivated associations in welfare provision.

The historical analysis demonstrated that the specific secularization history of the Turkish state resulted in the formation of a welfare state that excluded religious forms of provision. I claim that the lack of a coherent authority representing religion, and the strict reforms established not only to separate religion and state but also to achieve complete regulation of religion by the state resulted in the removal of religion from the formal social policy arena. Yet, although religion vanished both from the political and the welfare arena for a period of time, this did not necessarily mean total disappearance of religious groups. They went underground, they become invisible but their activities have always continued. This also served to feed the multiplicity in the area of religion. Peripheral forms of religion survived in different communities without a central authority resulted in the heterogeneity in the religious field. The only central authority, which produced Turkish State’s interpretation of Islam, has been Diyanet, yet social provision has never been one of its area of activities.

As Manow and Kersbergen claim, the criteria for a cleavage line to be determinant for welfare state type is its politicization or partization (Manow and Van Kersbergen 2009), yet neither of this was the case in Turkey in the period before the 1970s. Apart from some minor attempts, religion has remained as a contested phenomenon, neither totally separate nor totally free from the influences of the state. This picture changed in the last decades with the rise of pro-Islamic political parties. The post 1980s period has been stage to the utilization of social provision as one of the most important and successful ways of political back building by the newly rising pro-Islamic parties. Following the developments in the political sphere, social policy began to be characterized with a dominant note of Islam. Religiously motivated welfare

---

72 The reflections of this heterogeneity and multiplicity in the area of religion on RMAs will be the main focus of Chapter 8.
associations, due to their sensitivity towards poor and needy and their attachment to Islam, became the main representatives of the Islamic and conservative parties in the public realm. Therefore, the increasing power of the parties has been going hand in hand with the proliferation of the religiously motivated welfare associations in the social policy arena.

In comparison to the minor levels of change in the European countries, change in the social policy sphere of Turkey is defined as a major one, due to the proliferation of the RMAs in the last decades. As this chapter demonstrated the determining factor of this change has been the shift in the area of state-religion relations. The two chapters in Part II have proven that in comparison to Turkey the struggles between religion and state in the social provision arena have been settled much earlier in the European countries under analysis. The settlements were an outcome of different trajectories in each of the cases: In Germany we have seen the solution of the state-church conflict by systematic integration of the two churches in the welfare system. In France, the settlement meant the complete exclusion of religious institutions from the provision arena. In Sweden, church remained as a part of state power until the peaceful division in 2000. Finally, Britain has always been the example of a state church tolerating diversity. As the study of these European cases manifest, the presence of church/churches as institutional representatives of religion has been a crucial determining factor in the establishment of a balance between state and religion. In the case of Turkey, however, both the lack of an institution similar to church, and the impossibility of establishing a political party that will represent religious motivations in the period before the 1970s and the hardship of keeping it in the system in the period after, postponed this settlement of the relations between state and religion.

The fact that a balance in state-religion relations has already been established in Europe by the end of nineteenth, early twentieth century does not mean that there have been no transformations in this area in the last decades. As argued in Part II, the increasing ethnic and religious diversity is one of the main reasons of change in the well-institutionalized religion-state relations in Europe. The established structures which either gave monopolistic power to the single state churches (as in the cases of Sweden and Britain) or that prioritize the main faith groups (as it is in the case of Germany) are getting under serious revision in the last decades. Re-structuring of the
welfare systems in order to give more material and discursive support to the new faith groups seems to be a necessity for the peaceful integration of these populations into the existing systems.

In conclusion, when the cases of Turkey and the other European countries are compared it is possible to see that the restructuring is happening at a much more central arena of state-religion relations in Turkey, whereas at a more peripheral arena in the European cases.

... 

The next main part focuses on a study of these organizations at the micro-level. The findings of the empirical research will be presented in order to demonstrate the inner structures, functioning and the motivations of these organizations to get a better understanding of the possible changes they bring to the area of welfare provision.
Part III
The rise of religion as a main cleavage in the political sphere, and the increasing demand in the area of social provision have been defined as the main reasons for the proliferation of religiously motivated welfare provision in Turkey. This third part, building upon the findings of the previous ones, takes the analysis to a meso level and focuses on a comprehensive study of twenty-six RMAs in Turkey, as the main focus of empirical research. Questions such as: “How big is the population of RMAs? What kind of activities do they undertake? Are they a homogenous group?” If not, what kind of differences defines the demarcations in the population?” have been the main ones guiding this research. These chapters (seven and eight) will provide answers to these questions through the detailed presentation of the outcomes of the field research undertaken. The results that will be discussed in this empirical part of the study are the outcomes of two rounds of interviews undertaken in Turkey in the time period in between January 2008 and May 2009. Ethnographies from the field will be included in addition to the systemic analysis of the in-depth interviews conducted with the associations, to provide the reader with a more comprehensive picture of the arena.

The last decades in Turkey have been stage to an increase in the interest on the actions and the motivations of RMAs, as “new” welfare providers. The fact that the biggest associations have been started as television programs increased their visibility in the public arena. Media coverage of the associations slowly increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Especially the names of the biggest three—Deniz Feneri, IHH and Kimse Yok mu73—started to be frequently mentioned in the media. Yet, whether the population is limited to a couple of big associations that are active at the national and international scales, or it is possible to talk about an increasing presence of RMAs at the local level was an open question at the time when I decided to undertake research in this arena. In order to offer a preliminary answer to this question and inform the reader about the details of the field research undertaken, this chapter will start with an exploration of the social policy universe in Turkey, which will be followed by discussion of sampling, and access to the field. On overview of the main areas of

73 Further analysis of these three associations is included in Chapter 8.
activity and organizational characteristics of the associations will be under focus in the last section.

7.1. Exploring the Universe of Social Provision and RMAs

Post-1990s saw the increasing presence of civil society associations with religious connections in the public sphere. Yet, none of these associations are registered as religiously motivated or faith based in Turkey, as it is the case in most of the European countries and the United States. For that reason, it is not easy to define the universe of them. None of the questions such as “How many RMAs are active in the welfare sphere of Turkey? Are they concentrated in some cities? Are they more a rural or an urban phenomenon? How big are their budgets and how big is their share in the total welfare expenditure of the country?” are easy to answer. Therefore, the lack of factual information has been the main problem for me as I was trying to get a grasp of the universe and to decide on a proper sampling method.

An exploratory field trip was the first step I took in order to overcome these problems and to find preliminary answers to some of my questions. During this first field trip I have conducted interviews with scholars (conducting research on poverty, social policy, and welfare state), state officers (in state institutions of social policy planning and implementation), and mayors and vice mayors in municipalities of the biggest cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Bursa. This first round of interviews I have conducted in early 2008 helped me to do a mapping of the social policy arena in Turkey and to position the RMAs in this preliminary map. The interviews also made clear that there is an increasing awareness on the growing presence of civil society associations in the social policy sphere.

Social scientists I have interviewed without any exception, called attention to a new trend in the area of welfare provision in the post-1990s, and especially in the last decade. As they define, this new trend has been mainly marked by the increasing presence of a multiplicity of actors other than the central state institutions in the social welfare arena. Civil society associations, political parties, and municipalities are the actors and institutions that are mentioned the most in the new social provision sphere. A second trend that is frequently mentioned in addition to the multiplicity of the
actors is the dominance of a discourse on benevolence and charity in the area of provision. This is not a totally new phenomenon, yet it has become a much more dominant one due to the increasing presence of non-state actors in the social provision field. The conservative and religious background of the ruling political party has also been marked as one of the main reasons for the increasing emphasis on charity. The scholars I have interviewed were quite critical about the rise of RMAs in the social policy sphere. Some interpreted this as an outcome of lack of social citizenship rights and the creation of a culture of dependency. Some others drew similarities between the activities of these RMAs and Islamic Welfare Activism in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Palestine and Lebanon.

The second group of interviews was undertaken in local and central welfare administration institutions. I have visited State Planning Organization, which is not a social policy institution as such but is responsible for planning the economical and the social priorities in policy making by using instruments like Development Plans. Prime Ministry General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity, which is the main institution responsible for social assistance that is the administrative body of around nine hundred local vakıfs that are active in the provinces and the districts. Republic of Turkey Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is the main and the only state institution of religion that represents Islam. The aim in all of these visits was to get an idea about whether or not these main state institutions are aware of the increasing numbers of RMAs in the social policy arena, and if yes how they perceive this development. The state officers I have talked to were positive about the increasing presence of civil society associations in the welfare arena, yet they also always made sure to mention that this is not an area that can totally be left to voluntary action. It was interesting to see that all of the interview partners, while referring to the increasing presence of civil society organizations in welfare provision, avoided any reference to religion, religiosity or Islam. Yet, whenever I asked for examples, the names dropped were the ones I have included under the title of RMAs. Moreover, even my slightest touch upon any issue related to religious motivations in social provision, was taken with great caution. In most cases when I expressed I am interested in the contemporary developments in how religion and social policy interact, I got odd looks and instant comments stating that Turkey is a secular state. In order to make my point clear, I had to start my questions with an introductory phrase
on the historical roots of religion and welfare relations. I referred to the examples in Europe—such as historical presence of the Churches in the area and the contemporary interactions between state institutions and faith-based organizations in many countries. Following my positive presentation and “normalization” of religious motivations in the area of provision some of my interview partners in the state institutions openly put forward that religiosity is the main incentive guiding the actions of these civil society associations.

In the interviews I have conducted with the Republic of Turkey Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), I was looking for any possible influence from above which may be supportive of the activities of the newly rising RMAs. Diyanet is the only institution that may be comparable to the State Churches in Europe, due to its function as the main religious body of the state. The interviews I have conducted with the administrators in the social affairs department, made clear that the institution do not have connections to the private RMAs. The administrators emphasized that Islam is a religion that puts major emphasis on assistance to the poor and social solidarity. Nevertheless, the institution of Religious Affairs does not have any direct responsibility in this area and do not have any influence on any form of welfare provision. The only indirect action they take is to include topics related to poverty and social solidarity in the Friday sermons of the imams, in order to raise public awareness.

I was also interested to learn about any social provision role that is played by the mosques therefore I also visited the Vice Müfti of Bursa and talked to some imams there. When I asked them about social assistance and aid provided by the mosques they said that although people who are searching for help sometimes approach them, they generally cannot respond to these calls, due to lack of financial resources. They said that the community of a mosque might (at some very exceptional and rare occurrences) organize some kind of help, in case someone from the community has an emergency situation. Nevertheless, this would never take the form of an organized and continuous welfare support. The müftis and imams I have interviewed emphasized that unlike churches in Christianity; mosques do not have any charity roles in Islam. As a last step, I have visited Turkish Religious Foundation which is a semi-civil, semi-governmental institution. This institution was both mentioned by
imams and the Diyanet administrators as the only one having some form of social provision function. Nevertheless, the director general of the foundation specified many times during the interview, that the Foundation is not a social aid association. As far as he explained, the actions they undertake in the filed are minor, such as distributing some scholarships to students, helping some poor families temporarily, and distributing some aid in religious festivals.

The last group of informants I have contacted was municipal governors. Local administrators at the municipal level are the main agency most of the RMAs interact while planning their actions at the local level. Therefore, before starting my interviews with the RMAs I wanted to get a general overview of what municipal administrators think about the current situation in the social provision arena. In order to get an idea about both sides of the political spectrum, I have visited both municipalities governed by the ruling part (Justice and Development Party/ AKP) and the ones that are governed by the main opposition party (The Republican People’s Party/ CHP). My main questions in my visits were about how they see the increasing presence of civil society associations in social provision arena, and whether they have partnership projects with any associations. There was a clear divide between the responses of the municipal administrators representing the two parties. Although I did not provide the respondents with names of any civil society associations, the municipal administrators of the CHP automatically started talking about the largest RMAs such as Deniz Feneri Social Solidarity Association. They claimed that Islamic parties such as AKP always used social provision as a tool to get votes. They claimed that there are direct connections between most of these associations and ruling party. In their words, they (as social democrats) never saw social policy as a form of charity. For them social policy is an outcome of social rights of the citizens, and consequently it is dangerous to leave this field completely to the local governments or civil actors. In both of the interviews I had with the municipalities in which Republican People’s Party is in power, there were mainly two points the interviewees put emphasis on. The first was the danger of usage of social aid in serving clientalism, and the second was the increasing role religion plays in the arena as a result of the Islamic references of the AKP government. When I asked in what

---

74 A comprehensive study of the history and connections of this RMA will be undertaken in the next chapter.
way religion plays a role in the area, the answer was clear: since AKP is an Islamic Party, and the municipalities in which its in power are distributing aid without any clear criteria, the people who are veiled or going to mosque have a better access to the aid distributed by them.

The municipal administrators where the AKP is in power pointed out the increasing levels of poverty and the benevolent nature of Turkish people as the main reasons for increasing role of civil society associations in social policy. Different than the municipals in the other group, they were careful not to mention any names. It was only after I asked for the names of the largest associations in the social provision arena that the municipals provided me with names such as Deniz Feneri and Kimse Yok mu. When I asked them how they see the roles of these associations in the area, answers I got were very positive and supportive of the rise. They made references to the achievements of these associations in the last years and the support of their government to the associations with legal changes in tax and association laws. As one of the vice-majors told me, the area of social provision cannot be left to the action of the central state. The support from civil society associations is crucial, and their role as the municipal administrators is to encourage partnerships between local level welfare administration and the associations.

Following this brief exploration of the state institutions, I decided to contact the RMAs whose names have been frequently mentioned by the state actors and academics as the most active associations in the social policy sphere. These were Deniz Feneri Dernegi (Light House Association), IHH (The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief), Kimse Yok mu Association, and Cansuyu Social Aid Association. These four RMAs are well known in the public sphere through their television programs, and/or their affiliation with pro-Islamic parties or religious brotherhoods. The foundation dates of these most influential associations (1998, 1992, 2003, and 2005) prove that civil society associations undertaking religiously motivated provision is a recent phenomenon in Turkey. During these exploratory interviews my aim was to get a grasp of the human and financial resources of these associations, the activities they undertake and their perception towards poverty and their specific role in fighting poverty. Religious affiliations of the associations were noticeable during these exploratory interviews
undertaken. In my interviews in three out of four associations the members of administrative boards were open to put forward that religious beliefs are important motive for their actions. During the interviews the administrators referred to religious responsibilities such as _zekat_, to Prophet Muhammad’s sayings about solidarity and helping coreligionists. Another clue that indicated the religious characteristics of the associations was the fact that the work scope of these associations is not limited to Turkey. All of them are active in other Muslim countries and in countries where Muslim minorities live, and the peak times of their activities both in Turkey and in the other countries are the two religious festivals (_Ramazan_ and _Kurban_). The administrators also made references to the activities of their branches in other cities, and/or the local associations they are working together with. In either of the cases this was a signifier of many more associations at the local level. In this first contact with the associations, the scale of activities and the human and financial resources they have access to surprised me. Information I gathered in these four interviews clarified that what is visible to the general public is only the tip of the iceberg. Although the visibility of the RMAs in the public sphere is limited to three or four organizations, the first interviews I have conducted with these associations in three cities made it clear that it is possible to talk about a mushrooming of them in the last five to ten years.

Nearly all of the interviewees (welfare state administrators in the central state institutions, municipal governors, and administrators of the RMAs) mentioned legal changes as a crucial reason for the increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy sphere. Therefore, before going into a discussion of sampling and data analysis, I would like to briefly mention the shifts in the legal structure in the last decades. Associational laws have undergone series of transformations of liberalization and restriction following the ups and downs of democracy in Turkey. The 1961 Law of associations was a relatively libertarian one, granting the citizens with the basic rights to form associations without many restrictions. However, the introduction of the new law following the 1980 coup d’etat repudiated an important proportion of citizen freedom in forming associations. The introduced law was prohibitive and restrictive both for the formation and the functioning of the non-governmental associations. The articles of the law were open to interpretation, which opened up a space for practical problems and case-to-case subjective decisions. To give an example, the law stated
that associations that function against the protection of social morale, public peace or national security were prohibited. The inclusion of such a highly contestable criteria into the law made the functioning of the associations extremely difficult. Although minor changes been undertaken in the following years, the issue of civil associations continued to remain in the public security arena and the associations were to report their actions to the police and the main state institution responsible for controlling their activities was the police.

European Union accession process, which gained acceleration after the 1990s, had stimulating effect for the rise of civil society. National Programs designed to meet the Copenhagen criteria included legal revisions on the issues of individual rights and freedoms, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of association, and enlargement of the space of civil society in Turkey.\textsuperscript{75} It is in such an environment that the rise of religiously motivated civil society organizations was possible. The major changes in the field came with the introduction of new law of associations in 2004. A subdivision titled the Department of Associations has been established under the Ministry of Interior, to supervise the establishment and working of civil society organizations in 2003 with its 81 local offices. This recent change in the law has been referred to as a very positive development by all of my interviewees. The respondents mentioned that the Turkish state finally stopped seeing civil associations as potential terrorist organizations, and this change in the mentality and perception towards the associations made their functioning easier. Some of the main revisions in the law are listed below:

- Associations are no longer required to obtain prior authorization for foreign funding, partnerships or activities.
- Associations are no longer required to inform local government officials of the day/time/location of general assembly meetings and no longer required to invite a government official to conduct or to supervise general assembly meetings.
- Officials conducting audits must provide 24-hour advance notice and just cause in the case of random audits.
- NGOs are permitted to open representative offices for federations and confederations internationally.

• Security forces are no longer allowed on the premises of an association without a court order.
• Internal audit standards (i.e. within associations) have been increased to ensure accountability of members and management.
• Associations will be able to form temporary platforms/initiatives to pursue common objectives.
• Government agencies and departments will be able to fund up to 50% of joint projects with associations.
• Associations will be allowed to buy and sell necessary immovable assets without prior authorization. (Bikmen 2005)

One more change in the legal order that deserves attention in this context is the introduction of food bank system in income tax legislation in 2004. With the adaptation in the tax legislation, it is now possible for companies to donate their products to civil society organizations and deduct the amount of donations from their income taxes. The minor revision of the law in 2005 extended the coverage of the food banking to clothing, home cleaning materials, and fuel, which in turn increased the amount of donations RMAs get from different business.

The exploratory research conducted with experts from academia, the central and local state institutions of welfare provisioning, and the main religious institutions provided insight on this poorly researched area. The information collected has proven that a similar phenomenon to FBOs in Europe is present in the case of Turkey too. Moreover, it demonstrated that unlike in Europe the associations in Turkey do not have any connections to institutionalized religion. Finally, it disclosed that the associations in Turkey are not registered under a specific category such as FBOs or RMAs. Sampling and data collection strategies have been decided under the light of this information.

7.2. Sampling and Data Collection

The main aim of the empirical research undertaken in Turkey was to get a better understanding of the phenomenon of RMAs. Due to lack of previous literature on these associations, I aimed to present the variety that is present in the field. The purpose of the sample was not being statistically representative, since the universe of
the organizations is not known. Instead, the main intention was to talk to as many associations as possible in order to understand their position in the overall social provision arena; their relations to public welfare providers; their religious, political and ideological motivations behind social provision; and their connections to different power structures such as political parties or Islamic movements. Having these aims, the characteristics of the cases were more important than the quantity of the sample.

Sampling is done at two levels to meet the aims of this study. The first level was deciding on the cities, and the second one was deciding on the associations. My focus on three cities was due the difficulty of access to these types of associations. I preferred to undertake research in big cities (population over one million) in order to have access to a bigger universe of RMAs, out of which I can sample from. In addition to being big, I preferred cities in which I have some personal connections that can be used to get access to the associations. The first city I have been to was Bursa, an industrialized metropolitan center in the Marmara Region. The city is the fourth largest city in Turkey with a population around two million\(^\text{76}\). The second city I have been to was Istanbul which is the biggest city in Turkey with a population of nearly thirteen million\(^\text{77}\). The third city was Konya, which is generally labeled as the most religious and conservative city in Turkey, with a population around one million\(^\text{78}\).

The second level of sampling has been undertaken in order to decide on which RMAs to contact. The first step I took at this level was to ask the city councils for the list of civil society associations active in social solidarity and social provision areas. Yet, the lists presented to me included thousands of organizations from every kind of activity area. Therefore, the first problem was to find out which of these associations can be included under the title of RMAs. The main resource I used for making this decision was the internet and the information I gathered from other associations. After creating a list, I have gone through their web pages to see whether they do explicit or implicit references to Islam, God, Prophet Muhammad, or other divine issues. These first steps made it possible to make a preliminary decision on whether an association can be considered as a RMA or not. The second concern after creating these lists was how to

\(^{76}\) 1,854,634 in the address based population survey conducted in 2009.
\(^{77}\) 12,782,960 in the address based population survey conducted in 2009.
\(^{78}\) 1,003,373 in the address based population survey conducted in 2009.
approach them, and how to arrange interviews with them. Civil society associations having any affinity with religion or any form of religiosity have always been reluctant to talk about their activities, moreover, after the huge corruption scandal of an RMA in 2007\textsuperscript{79}; it became even harder to reach these groups. The organizations were quite doubtful towards my interview requests when I first contacted them. I phoned them and asked for appointments by stating that I am a PhD student conducting research in the area. I had to talk to the administrators on the phone and introduce myself to them and tell them about my research project. In most of the cases I could not get an appointment during my first call, I was either asked to talk to someone else in the association or the respondent asked me to call again in a day. Often, I managed to set an appointment after the second phone call. There were also exceptional cases in which they kept postponing me for weeks, or politely refused the interview request. In some cases I benefited from personal connections such as family members and friends, to reach the associations. Once I got access to a couple of RMAs in a city, I continued with snowball sampling. By the end of each interview I have conducted with an RMA, I asked them about the other associations working in similar areas. I did not specify that I am looking for religiously motivated ones; nevertheless the names provided anyways belong to RMAs. This was a further proof of the increasing dominance of RMAs in the social provision arena.

The independent criteria used for the designation of the title “religiously motivated” can be summarized under three main categories: religious neutrality of the dominant discourse in the organization; religious neutrality of the workplace; and religious neutrality of the people active in the organization. The first category—religious neutrality of the shared discourse in the association—includes criteria such as whether the name of the RMA include terms with religious connotations; whether the administrators and volunteers interviewed referred to religious issues while talking about the aims, motivations and activities of the organization; and whether they mentioned God, Prophet and/or religious duties. The name of the association usually gives an idea about whether it is religiously motivated or not. Direct references to otherworldly aims, and religious duties—such as infak, hayir, sadaka, zekat, sevap—have also been important criteria. Absence of these references is not necessarily interpreted as a proof that an association is not religiously motivated since people

\textsuperscript{79} Further discussion of this corruption scandal is discussed in the next chapter.
active in these organizations most of the time deliberately avoided presenting their religious motivations. In these cases, the second and the third categories, which are mostly dependant on observation, were more useful to categorize the association under study.

The second category of variables used is related to religious neutrality in the workplace. In this category the focus was on whether there is a clear separation between the worldly and otherworldly issues in the organization. Participant observation was the main method in deciding on the religiosity level of the organization by looking into whether regular prayers were practiced in the office or not, whether one has to take their shoes off while entering the office or not\(^{80}\), and whether there are religious symbols hang on the walls, or prayer books present in the office. There have been cases in which my interview partners asked for my excuse and were practicing their daily prayers in the office while I was waiting for them to start the interview. I was asked to take my shoes off while entering the office of some of the associations. Religious books, and symbols were visible in the offices of the majority of the associations interviewed. I assert that these three criteria are clearly representing the lack of a separation between the activities that are undertaken by the RMAs (such as provision of social services) and pursuit of religious practices.

The third category of variables that has been paid attention was about visible religiosity of the administrators and volunteers in the organization. Whether the interview partner and the other members of the association that are met in the office wear religious symbols such as a headscarf, çarşaf, beard; whether the interviewer followed the Islamic rules of conduct between a man and woman—such as avoiding eye or body contact—were the criteria used for this category.

The main data collection method was semi-structured, open-ended interviews. The interviews were conducted either with high-level administrators, or experienced volunteers. The length of the interviews was one to two hours, in which three main groups of questions were addressed to each respondent\(^{81}\). The first group of questions was related to the history of the RMA. Founding date of the association, professional

\(^{80}\) Taking off the shoes is a practice for the Muslims for entering a praying place, since cleanliness of the room that is used for player is a must.

\(^{81}\) The interview guide can be found in Appendix III.
and educational backgrounds of the founders, their main motivations while founding the organization were the main questions asked in this part. The second part focused on the organizational details of the associations. The number of employees and volunteers, the number of branches, main sources of funding, main bodies of decision making, scope of action was the topics of this part. The final part concentrated on the connections of the associations to the other state institutions, civil society organizations, municipalities, political parties and media. Apart from some exceptional cases in which the respondents did not want me to use a recording machine, the interviews have been recorded.

In addition to in-depth interview, which was the main data collection method, observations in the field was the supplementary method used. Field notes taken during the interviews facilitated a much more comprehensive understanding of the associations. Information such as the interior design of the offices, the outfit of administrators and volunteers in the associations, the dominant code of conduct between men and women were paid special attention during the interviews. Therefore, the main data set consisted of the transcription of the interviews and observation notes from the field. All the information has been collected in Turkish and I have translated the direct quotations used in the text.

7.3. Overview of the Sample of RMAs

The RMAs that have been under inquiry share a common area of activities, which can be defined under the labels of social assistance and welfare provision. Increasing the well-being of recipients is the main aim of all of the associations included in the sample of the study. The first group of activity that is universal in the sample is the provision of basic supplies such as food, clothing and fuel. These provisions aim to meet existential needs of the recipients who are situated under the poverty or extreme poverty line. In the majority of the associations, provision in these areas are undertaken on a regular basis (either once a month or once in every three months)

82 A complete overview of the organizational characteristics of the twenty-one RMAs (excluding the Alevi and umbrella associations) can be found in appendix IV.
83 The differences within the sample of RMAs will be the main discussion point in Chapter 8.
since they constitute the main survival mechanism for the recipient groups such as unemployed, single mothers, sick, disabled and old.

The second most commonly referred area of activity is education; RMAs pay special attention to the issues of formal, cultural, moral and religious education of their target populations. In nearly half of the associations I have interviewed, special emphasis is put on the issue of “not only feeding the stomach but also feeding the intellect of the recipients”. In some cases this means organizing seminars and meetings to educate people in certain issues, like the importance of family and its functions, Turkish and Islamic culture. In others, it means providing scholarships for the successful kids of poor families, and/or provision of free accommodation for students in the dormitories of the associations. The main aims in providing education are increasing the awareness of recipients about worldly and otherworldly matters, and assist their development as responsible citizens and Muslims. These investments are expected to increase the beneficiaries’ chances of survival in the existing order in the long run. An additional effort that can be included under the title of education is the long-term development projects (such as agriculture or animal husbandry) that have been introduced in some special communities. The main motivation behind these projects is to “teach fishing instead of giving fish”84.

The third area consists of temporary relief provision in cases of emergency or extreme need. These are activities such as paying the electricity and water bills of the families, covering travel or health expenses of the applicants, providing support for the couples who want to get married. In addition to these activities in Turkey, all of the national RMAs and also some of the local ones conduct international projects in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Niger, and Peru. The main motivations are defined as helping those most in need; building ties with the people of these countries and helping our co-believers. The main areas of activities in the international arena are distributing food in Ramadan, and meat in festival of sacrifice- Kurb an, opening water wells and doing medical surgeries. International aid to the African and Middle Eastern countries constitutes an important part of activities for

84 This motto—of making individuals responsible for their future—has always been part of both state and civil society discourse in Turkey, in the discussions of social provision.
some of the organizations, and their share in the budgets of many RMAs seems to have increased in the last years. In this research the activities undertaken in the other countries will only briefly be touched upon, since the main focus is on the national activities of RMAs. Further research on the issue of international relief by the RMAs seems necessary but cannot be achieved within the realm of this project.

The last area of activities, which is less common than the ones in the first three groups, are the orphan projects and sister family projects. In one third of the sample, there are special projects for continuous support of needy families and orphan children. The programs include coupling of two families (one well-off and one needy) or one family and an orphan. The main aim of the projects is not only to meet the needs of the family and/or the orphan but also to establish connections that are more than material. Sister family and orphan projects are implemented both in Turkey in some other countries in Africa, and the Middle East.

Organizational style and scale

The associations included in the sample represented a great variety in terms of organizational scale, as can be seen from the table below. Both the associations that are active at the local level with a couple of employees and volunteers and the ones active in more than hundred countries are included in the sample. The common characteristics of welfare provision and religious motivations were the two criteria that resulted in the inclusion of these associations under the same title.

Table 7.4.1. Organizational scale of RMAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Activity scale</th>
<th>Number of branches in Turkey</th>
<th>Number of employees and volunteers</th>
<th>Number of recipients in Turkey (families)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biggest RMA</td>
<td>100 million USD</td>
<td>112 countries</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>100 e. 10.000 v.</td>
<td>30.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallest RMA</td>
<td>2.000 USD</td>
<td>A single city</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 e. 7 v.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The final sample consisted of twenty-six associations: seven of them active at the national level with representative offices or branches in a minimum of ten cities, whereas the other nineteen are active at the city or town level.

Although most of the associations were cautious about providing numbers to me, the stated budgets varied between 2,000 USD and 100,000,000 USD, average being around 9,000,000 USD. The average budget of the local associations that are only active in a single town or city is 1,500,000 USD. While interpreting the scale of the organizations it has to be kept in mind that most of these organizations are active only at the local level. The total budget of the thirteen associations, which disclosed their budget to me, equals to an average of 66,000,000 USD (excluding international aid). These numbers compared to the budget of the largest state institution for social assistance (SYDGM)\textsuperscript{85} in Turkey prove that the share of the RMAs in the total social assistance arena is not small at all.

The analysis made clear that decentralized organization and the emphasis on localities are the two important characteristics of the organizational structures of the RMAs. The organizational structures of the national RMAs are not centralized; the local bodies are responsible for management, and fund raising. The idea behind, as explained in similar wording by most of the interviewees, is having strong connections with the roots of the community. Since private donations are the only source of finances for the RMAs, their connections with the community are essential. As they claim, the central office can never have a better knowledge of neither the poor nor the rich in a city or neighborhood. Therefore, the only aim of the central offices is to provide the local ones with the necessary know-how. After the orientation period, the new association is left to function with its own resources that are mainly raised from the locality. In most of the cases, the main ties that exist between the center and the local offices are the shared values and motivations.

\textsuperscript{85} The total expenses of the SYDGM in year 2009 equals to an average of 395,000,000 USD (see http://www.sydgm.gov.tr/upload/mce/birimler/strateji/2009_faaliyet.pdf)
**Human Resources**

The administrator and volunteer compositions of the associations are also quite diverse. All of my informants were men in between 40 and 65 years of age. Nearly half of them can be labeled as middle-class professionals, whereas the other half are retired merchants, politicians or people of religion. Out of all occupations represented in different associations, medium size merchants and businessman are by far the greatest majority.

The main skeleton of the associations (founders and the administrative body) consists of people that are connected to each other through informal connections such as being part of the same *tarikat* (Sufi order), *cemaat* (religious community), or local community. The foundations of the associations are generally based on these “mechanical forms of solidarity” no matter whether they have hundreds of employees and thousands of volunteers or just a couple of them. Even if the organizations are huge, employing hundreds of people and having thousands of volunteers, personal connections and informal ties that existed prior to the establishment of the RMA still constitute their basis. As it has been communicated in many interviews, without having a stable basis of strong ties in these informal networks, the associations do not have a great chance to expand.\(^{86}\)

These ties on the community level result from shared social and political interests of the members of the community, or in other words from shared motivations about life and afterlife. It is not easy to see whether individuals in these networks prioritize one form of interest (such as economic, political or social) over another while deciding to take part in volunteering work. Yet, it is possible to observe that interconnectedness of different forms of interests is the main resource that keeps the associations running. There may be a couple of different reasons for a volunteer to take part in social provision work. One reason can be their faith in religion, or their belief in the benefits of charity. A second reason can be their interest to establish or keep social relations, which may bring many benefits in the long run. A third interest can be more political, such as contributing to the Islamization of society or the political system. Nevertheless, it is important that none of these lines of interests takes a shape to

---

\(^{86}\) An in-depth discussion on the functioning of different RMAs will be focused in the next chapter.
disturb community bounds, since mutual relationships built around these relationships are the main resources that bind people together in these associations.

All of the RMAs, apart from one or two exceptions, work on the principle of volunteering. The number of volunteers varies from tens to thousands, depending on the size of the association. The main tasks of fund raising, public relations, and interaction with the needy are the kinds of tasks volunteers carry out. Volunteers are seen as the backbones of the organizations. There are a couple of paid employees in each RMA, but the majority is volunteers. My findings show that volunteers that are active in the field are mostly women, whereas the administrators of the organizations are mostly men. The administrators I have interviewed think that women are more successful in interacting with the recipients and fulfilling their needs, whereas men are more successful in fund raising, organizing budget issues and formal arrangements. So it would not be inaccurate to argue that there is a gender division of labor present in most of the RMAs.

_Funding_

Donations are the main and only resources of these associations. Local RMAs are generally dependent on personal and neighborhood connections, whereas the national scale organizations use all kinds of media (such as television shows, advertisements in the radios and newspapers) to increase donations.

One of the common ways of fund raising for the local RMAs is to visit merchants and businessman and inform them about the aims and functions of the RMA. These forms of primary ties are vital especially in the early stages of establishment by facilitating enlargement of financial resources. The fact that the founders of most of these organizations are or had been businessmen themselves makes the establishment of these ties easier. These visits are the most successful way of getting access to sustainable resources at the local level. Following the same logic, the priority in the distribution of services and assistance is also given to the localities, so that the successful functioning of the associations at the local level can be made public. In some RMAs, special emphasis is put on bringing together the donators and the receiver of benefits. This is believed to maximize satisfaction for both sides. When
the provider witness the vulnerability of the receivers, their self-evaluation of their contribution increases, which in turn result in further attachment to the RMA and continuation of regular donation.

Most of the largest associations that are active at the national level started as television programs in channels owned by big business groups that have close connections to some political parties and cemaats. The television programs share a similar format: they visit some poor families, expose the conditions under which these people try to make a living and ask the audience for donations. In addition to the audience, philanthropist people from the locality and the local governorship and municipalities are also asked to assist the family. At the end of the programs audience always sees a happy family picture, content with the assistance they got and thanking the contributors and God. It is impossible to miss the constant effort to give religious messages to the public in these programs. The way the spokespersons dress up, the way men and women approach each other, the discourse in use all seem to be exemplary from an Islamic point of view. The language used includes ample references to Quran, to the Prophet and God. Both the reasons and the solutions to poverty are explained in relation to the will and power of God. The RMAs are presented as the delegates that transfer God’s allowance to the poor. Poverty and hunger are defined as ways of examination for the human beings—aclikla imtihan—in the Islamic belief. The main message transferred is if human beings manage to survive in these times as well behaved Muslims—without rebelling (isyan) and without committing any religiously prohibited action such as stealing, or prostitution—God will reward them. This is a commonly shared discourse in the television shows. On the other hand, the viewers are warned that wealthy Muslims are examined through their possessions: rich people ought to share their belongings with the poor and the needy. Only by sharing their wealth with the people around them, can they live the life of a content Muslim. Therefore, the main motivation of the associations is to make this transfer possible between the giving and the receiving hands, to help both parties to be successful in the religious examinations they are going through. When this is done publicly in the television programs, it plays an

---

87 Further discussion of connections between religious communities, television shows and RMAs will be a point of discussion in the next chapter.
important educational role for the audience, by reminding them about their religious
duties and results in increasing donations.

Currently out of twenty-six RMAs interviewed, nine of them have weekly television
shows and radio programs to support the activities of their association, and more than
half of them have advertisements in the TV channels, radios and newspapers. Media
connections, by increasing the visibility of the associations, increase support for the
activities they are undertaking. The television and radio shows do not only make it
possible for the associations to publicize their activities, but also include
advertisements of the business holdings’ and companies’ that support them
financially.

Means testing, decision-making and practices of provision

Definitions of the associations on who is eligible for social provision vary. Some
organizations have a strict policy of helping only the people who are under the
extreme poverty line. Some others are more flexible about their target audience.
However, one issue that came up in all interviews is the necessity that people should
be first and foremost responsible to earn their own livings. None of the RMAs have an
interest in supporting people who are able to work; beggars are not perceived
positively.

The application process the needy should go through to be eligible for assistance is
more or less the same in all RMAs. At first, the prospective recipient should compose
a file of documents showing that s/he qualifies to apply for assistance. An official
document of poverty from the lowest municipal governor of the neighborhood is a
must to apply for help in any of these organizations. In addition, one should document
demographic information like age, income, disabilities, home ownership, and
employment status. When this first file of information is provided to the organization,
volunteers or employees go through it and make the first selection. If one qualifies for
the second round, then one or two employees or volunteers from the association make
a visit to the neighborhood of the applicant to complete what they call the “social
investigation form”. In order to fill this form, the volunteers talk to the grocery store,
butcher, municipal representatives and neighbors in the district and check if the
information provided by the applicant is correct. Only after making the final visit to the applicants’ residence and meeting the family and seeing the household does the responsible person from the RMA fill out the social investigation form. The decision to provide is generally made by the employees at the administrative levels of the association after an examination of the form.

This procedure, although claimed to be objective by most of the RMAs, have some problems inherent to it. First of all, the decision-making practices lack professionalism. As already mentioned in the previous parts, the employee and the volunteer structures of the associations are composed of merchants, retired tradesman and housewives, so neither the people who undertake the social assessment, nor the ones making the final decision have any social work expertise. As it has been communicated in most of the interviews, personal judgments and experience are the main sources of decision-making. The second problem is the lack of objective criteria and transparency. Every association has different levels of flexibility while conducting their application processes. The rules and regulations of application processes are more closely followed in the larger organizations working at the national level, whereas the role of personal judgments is ruling in the local ones. Some respondents put it openly that there is always the likelihood that a decision is biased:

We do not discriminate against any belief, religion or political affinity. We do not decide on whom to help by looking at their eye color. It is possible that when I enter a house I do not like how people behave, how they sit and stand but this will at most have an influence of ten percent on my decision. Although we are trying to base our system on objective criteria, you know we are also human beings, we may also make mistakes.

Although the respondent is stating that they do not discriminate, the absence of any kind of expertise system opens room for subjective decisions.

Once a decision is made to help a family, the provision is regular in most of the cases. Either it is once a month or once in three months. How the delivery of supply is organized also varies from one organization to the other. In some exceptional cases the associations follow clear-cut principles of religious or traditional motives of giving in the Turkish culture. For example “the giving hand and the receiving hand
should not know about each other” or the service should be delivered “as if the giving party owes the recipient”. As one of my respondents claimed, “Sometimes these visits are much more important then the package delivered. These people value the fact that someone rings their bell and cares about how they are more than the material help that is delivered.” In general, volunteers of the association are the ones to deliver the packages to the households. This delivery is more than a material exchange, volunteers most of the time frame this as a “visit” to the recipient family. The members of the RMA ask if everything is fine in the recipient families’ life, if they have any problems or if they need anything. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that these visits may also be used as important mechanisms of control. The quote below gives some idea:

Regular visits are made to the households of the recipients to update information about their situation, to see whether there is any change in the household, to see whether they still need help or not and to see whether the given supplies are used properly.

Matters such as lack of criteria about what is proper or not, and lack of expertise in the area of provision hints at the subjectivity of the processes undertaken. The means testing process is generally open to stigmatization of the poor and increasing social control on their daily lives. How far these controls can go, and what their effects on the recipients may be, are crucial questions that need to be analyzed by further research.

7.4. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to give an insight of the field research conducted by presenting the sampling and the data collection techniques and giving a first overview of the findings. As discussed in the first part, the scarcity of the existing literature and the lack of formal information on these associations have been the decisive factors in the preference of the sampling and the data collection methods.

The preliminary findings gathered from the interviews with social science scholars, administrators in the state institutions of social provision and central and local level religious authorities, made clear that there is an increasing presence of RMAs in the
social welfare arena in Turkey. The interviews in the state institutions clarified that authorities are aware of the rise and the activities about the associations and are not critical about them as long as they are in line with the legal structure. The interviews with the religious representatives such as imams, muftis and administrators in Diyanet were informative in demonstrating that mosques or any other state institution of religion is not included under the title or RMAs.

The activity areas of the RMAs indicate a clear difference of the Turkish case from the European ones. As the analysis demonstrated the target populations of the RMAs in Turkey are citizens under poverty or extreme poverty line, who are not covered by any forms of state provision such as social security or social assistance. Unlike in Turkey, faith-based organizations in the European cases fill specific niches in the area of social provision. They are mainly active in areas where community tailored provision is preferred rather than general provision in order to help solve the problems of the multicultural societies such as social cohesion and integration. The outsourcing of social provision activities by the states to faith-based organizations is another common practice in some of the European cases. Nevertheless, even under these conditions, beneficiaries are provided with alternative sources of provision, which protect them from being fully dependent on provision by FBOs. In the case of Turkey, the lack of adequate state support frames the nature of the relationships between the recipients and the associations. The organizational analysis of the RMAs demonstrates the amount of diversity in the sample. The budgets, activity scales, employee and volunteer compositions of the RMAs diverge to a great extend. An in-depth analysis of the variance in the sample and the reasons behind this variance will be the main focus of next chapter.
8. Religion, Politics and Social Welfare Revisited

The fact that Turkey is a country with 99% Muslim population creates the myth of homogeneity in the religious arena. The increasing number of studies on the rise of political Islam in the last decade supports the misinterpretation of a single Islamic movement. Yet, the findings of the empirical research made clear that RMAs in Turkey do not compose a coherent group; they differ in many respects such as their relations to central and local state institutions, political and ideological standpoints, the level of religiosity involved in them, and their main motivations of action being the most important ones.

This chapter will focus on the classification of the associations at multiple levels, detailed explanations of the history of some of the largest ones and in-depth discussion of observations from the field. First of all, I will introduce the main divide in the sample, which is the one between “new” and “vintage”88 RMAs. This first level of classification will focus on the foundation dates and the histories of the associations interviewed. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that this classification, which is introduced with the aim of a better understanding of the field, will not present homogenous groups either. As the next sections will demonstrate within group differences characterizes both of the groups and the multiple subgroups that will be presented. A closer look at different sub-groups of associations and a more detailed analysis of single RMAs will provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the divides in the universe of RMAs and the historical as well as the political reasons behind these divides. An analysis of the existing differences in the ideological and political stand points of the associations will shed light on the interconnectedness and the blurred boundaries between religion, politics and social welfare provision.

88 The term vintage association was inspired by the discussions we had with Prof. Ayse Bugra.
8.1. Major divide: New and Vintage RMAs

The analysis of the associations interviewed made clear that the main dividing line in the sample is between what I labeled as the new and the vintage associations. This distinction is based on the foundation stories of the associations, which includes characteristics such as date of foundation, main aims of founders and main activity areas at the time of establishment. It is not very easy to set strict dividing lines in any of these areas. Yet, it is still possible to see the common trends that divide the two groups, as can be seen in the table below. I explain this variety in the table in relation to the transformation of state-religion relations in Turkey. The associations, which are defined as the new RMAs, are established in the last decade, in which religion became the main cleavage in the political sphere of the country. Vintage associations, on the other hand, are the ones that have been established at the earlier stages of the rise of Islam. Therefore, they have been transformed and reshaped through ups and downs of state-religion relations. The main defining characteristics of the two groups can be seen in the table below:

Table 8.1. New and Vintage RMAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New RMAs</th>
<th>Vintage RMAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity scale</strong></td>
<td>National and international</td>
<td>Mainly local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity areas</strong></td>
<td>Limited to social provision</td>
<td>Broader than social provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foundation dates</strong></td>
<td>Late 1990s, early 2000s</td>
<td>Earlier than 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secularization</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professionalization</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formulation of motivations</strong></td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>Islamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative backgrounds</strong></td>
<td>University graduates, young professionals</td>
<td>People with formal or informal religious education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding sources</strong></td>
<td>International campaigns, TV programs, advertisements</td>
<td>Personal and local community connections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New RMAs are the associations that are established in the late 1990s and early 2000s, whereas the vintage ones have a longer history. The foundation dates of the associations, which corresponded to different eras of state-religion relations, defined
their main motivations and the characteristics. It is possible to say that both groups have been important organizing forces for the rise of political Islam. Yet, they had different strategies to achieve this aim. Social provision was not a crucial part of Islamist movement in the period before the 1990s; the possible political benefits of social welfare provision have been discovered only in the mid-1990s. Therefore, the vintage associations and foundations that have been established with different motivations such as Qur’an courses, teaching Islamic ways of living or supporting the international Islamic movement began to put more emphasis on provision activities in the period after the mid 1990s and early 2000s. Most of the vintage associations have been involved in activities for Islamization of the society and the political system. Some of them have been through times of political pressure; they have been prohibited or closed down for periods. Yet, similar to the history of pro-Islamic political parties, following every closure, they re-opened with new names.

How the RMAs in these two groups perceive state and, their position in the social provision arena vis-a-vie the state are to important defining characteristics. The new RMAs see state institutions as possible partners, and define their role in the social provision arena as supporting the state. Unlike the new RMAs, the vintage ones see state institutions as control mechanisms, and define their actions in the provision arena either totally free of state action (outcome of religious aims) or as fixing the failures of state (such as failing to institutionalize zekat). I interpret these two clearly defined positions of the new and vintage RMAs as a reflection of the shifts in the state-religion relations. Whether the associations were established in a time period in which the political environment was welcoming or not has been an important defining factor in shaping state-RMA relations. Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasize that the picture presented here is a quite dynamic one. Since the relations between state and religion is still not a settled one in the case of Turkey, it is possible to see the reflections of any change at the macro level on the identities and characteristics of the associations. Therefore, dynamism is the main characteristic both defining the state-religion relations at the macro level, and the relations between state institutions and RMAs at the meso level.
8.1.1. New RMAs

After a long bus trip to the outer skirts of Istanbul, I arrive to the headquarters of one of the largest religiously motivated welfare associations in Turkey. I have read a lot and heard a lot about this association before; I have attended to a conference they organized on poverty, watched their television programs, and seen their advertisements. Yet, this will be my first interview with them. After getting off the bus and walking in the middle of nowhere for some five minutes, there it is, the big signboard of the association. The closer I get, the bigger it looks and I realize that I am not walking towards a single office or building, but towards a big complex consisting of a bunch of storage and administrative buildings in a garden (about 3000 to 3500 m²) that is separated from the street with walls and fences on them. When I arrive at the gate of the headquarters, I realize that the entrance is possible only going through private security. The guard in the small security cabin asks me why I am there and if I have an appointment and then asks for my ID. So I give him my ID and he gives me a visitor’s card. My first impression is “wow, this is much bigger and professional than I have imagined”. After checking my ID, the guard takes me through the gate and accompanies me to the building where I will have the interview with the PR manager of the association. Here a young lady, who has increased my feeling of “wow” with her appearance, welcomes me. She is unveiled, with dyed blonde hair and heavy make-up. Frankly, she is not the type of woman I would expect to be welcomed by in a religiously motivated association. Trying to hide my surprise, I ask for the PR manager and finally I am in his office.

The office is big and furnished with stylish, new furniture. There are no visible religious symbols or books in the room. The interview partner, who looks like a westernized professional dressed in a suit and tie, with a clean-shaved face, welcomes me with a handshake and takes me to smaller room where we can sit together around a table. I start asking general questions about the aims, motivations, foundation story of the association, and yet he does not look like he is into talking. He answers nearly all of my questions by saying he can give me documents about it, or that I can read about it in the web-page. Not an easy start, but I am trying to find a way out to make him talk about the motivations of the employees and the missions of the association. I am asking about the backgrounds of the people at the administrative positions, he
says it is a mixture but many of them are highly educated, as he is. The language he uses is totally free of any religious references. Even a slight touch to any religious motivation or belief is not present in his talk. He insistently puts emphasis on the humanitarian motivations as the main missions of the association. The interview is relatively shorter compared to the other interviews I have conducted in RMAs. Therefore, I thank him and say I am sure he is very busy and ask him whether I can have a walk in the association and talk to some other employees and volunteers. He unwillingly agrees and accompanies me to the floor below, to an office where the small library of the organization is present and where four employees of the association have their desks. After meeting with the woman at the entrance and the interview with the PR manager, this is a step behind the façade. The two men in the office greets me with a slight head shake, but do not shake my hand, whereas the two young women with headscarves stand up and welcome me with warm handshakes. I only have the chance to have a short talk with them, which is also not possible to record since I am not there to interview them. However, this brief talk and a quick look into the library of the association is much more enlightening than the interview with the PR manager. The volunteers and employees are interested in talking to me; they are quite open about their religious beliefs and tell me how important it is in our religion to help other people who are in need. They openly put forward that religious motivations play a crucial role for the volunteering activities of the association. The library contains many religious books related to poverty, inequality, and helping others. After a total of one and a half hours, I leave the association after thanking the volunteers and employees. The lady with the short cut dress is not there when I am leaving.

This introduction, composed from my field notes and observations of the visit in the headquarters of one of the largest RMAs in Turkey, gives an idea about how a typical new RMA looks like. Most of the new RMAs are active at the national and international levels, with big budgets and large area of influence. The number of associations included in this section is thirteen (half of the whole sample); four of them are the biggest ones with nearly total coverage in Turkey and activities in more than ten countries around the globe. The other nine are associations that are local representatives or branches of these four big RMAs or independent ones that share similar missions.
The associations included in this group can be labeled as the “kids” born after the last turn of political Islam in the last decade. This last turn, as already discussed in the historical chapters, brought a more modernist, liberal and western oriented group of Islamists (or conservative democrats, as they define themselves) to the power. The rise of the new RMAs corresponds to such a time period. Therefore, the traits of the associations included in this group, such as relatively high levels of professionalization and secularization should be seen as the outcomes of the learning process Islamic groups have been going through in the post-1970s period. As the introductory observation notes makes clear, work and religious practices seem quite separate in these RMAs. There are not many religious symbols present in the offices, the administrators and employees do not practice daily prayers in the office, but instead go to a mosque.

The majority of the administrators of the new RMAs are university graduates. They explain the establishment of their associations in relation to humanitarian and moral motivations. The way they frame their missions is relatively secular than the vintage RMAs. They are careful to use a religiously neutral discourse:

We value human beings. Humanitarianism is the main motivation behind our actions. We do not only provide for people, but we also undertake research on the issue of poverty. We invest in the scientific and academic field. We provide people with the necessary skills to work and earn their life.

We are founded with humanitarian aims. What motivated us was the generosity of Anatolian people. Turkish people are known to be the most generous people on earth.

The founders/administrators define their ideal as the wish to become a partial remedy for the increasing number of people living in poverty, or as one respondent put it, “to be beneficial to the society”. In their responses to the questions related to motivations and aims of the organizations, they mainly touched upon issues of personal and social responsibility to fight the inequalities and poverty existing in the society.

If I do not care about this poverty around me, I will lose my humanity. To be indifferent to people who need help would have been a weakness of personality. So that is why we started this association. Our idea at first was not to form an association, we just wanted to help some people around us, but then when both demand and supply
increased, we thought maybe it is a good idea to institutionalize what we are doing. Therefore we established this association.

Religious beliefs came to the picture when the administrators started to talk about the personal motivations of the volunteers. The interviewees did not avoid making clear statements about religiosity involved in the provision practices and the motivations behind these practices, especially at a personal level.

People apply as volunteers by saying that they want to acquire God’s merit. This world is temporary; there will be an assessment in the other one.

Religious motivations have a very important influence. People do not come here to increase their economic gains, social status or political power. Some can try it, but they would not stay for a long time. People know that this world is a place of examination; they know that there will be an assessment of all what we have done in the otherworld. They know that they have humanistic and religious responsibilities. If one lives in prosperity and do not help the needy around them, this is a big question mark that they have to pay for at some point. Our Prophet had said: you earn God’s merit when you pet the Orphan’s head. Nothing apart from religion can make someone to go to the other end of the world to help others.

As can be seen from the quotes above although the associations in this group prefer to define the main motivations of their associations as humanitarian, when specially asked about the volunteer and employee motivations, they do not hide from mentioning religiosity as a crucial drive. This moderate level of religiosity present in their discourse is also visible in their publications, web pages, and the television and radio programs they produce.

The associations included in this group have quite positive interactions with central and local state institutions of social provision and also government. Their answers to my questions like how they see their role in the provision arena and whether they are open to working with state institutions were quite positive. As I already mentioned in the introduction these associations see public welfare offices as possible partners. Partnerships between a civil society association and a state institution in local, national or international projects are still rare, but there are some examples\textsuperscript{89}. In

\textsuperscript{89} Such as a project of Cansuyu association with Ministry of Education on distributing free wheelchairs to disabled children.
addition to partnerships, the most common interaction between welfare administrators at the local level and RMAs is information exchange. The public welfare agencies and RMAs do their own means testing but they share their lists of beneficiaries at the end of the day, in order to prevent double provision.

The founders of the RMAs in this group conveyed that the state cannot be a remedy for all needs in the society. In their perception, civil society associations should also play a role in social provision. Therefore, they decided to fulfill what they interpret as their responsibilities. As the passages below exemplifies:

We see what we do as a part of our social responsibility. I believe that is how things should work. I am very happy that the number of civil society organizations working in this area has been increasing. Of course the state has to provide social provision, but civil society organizations also have very important roles.

State has to be more active in the area of social policy. We see our role as guiding and stimulating for the state. We do not dream of overtaking the role of the state in the area of welfare. We just want to be a role model for the state activities. Civil society has to function as a role model in this area.

There are some things that you cannot expect the state to achieve; they are not a part of state’s responsibility. State has responsibility in the areas of education, health and infrastructure; however, it cannot be expected to create solidarity. Creating solidarity bounds can only be a function of the civil society organizations like us. In a way what we do is complimentary to state activities.

This positive approach of believing in a necessary cooperation between state and civil society in the area of provision is common in the associations in this group.

A last characteristics of the associations included in this group can be marked as their positive interactions with the ruling government. An important indicator of this is the status of Association for Public Interest that has been awarded to some of the largest RMAs in this group. The title, which can only be decided by the Council of Ministers in Turkey, guarantees important rights such as tax exceptions for associations that are active at the national level. Two of the new RMAs—Deniz Feneri and Kimse Yok mu—achieved this status of Association for Public Interest in 2004 and 2006 subsequently. The fact that these entitlements were only possible in the Justice and
Development Party’s time in office can be seen as an indicator of the positive relations between these associations and the government. A second indicator of the positive relations between new RMAs and the Justice and Development Party government is the discursive support that is given to some associations in the media.\(^9\)

As already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, although the associations that are included under the title of new RMAs have many characteristics in common, it should still be kept in mind that the group in itself is not homogenous. The positions of the associations within the constituency of political Islam determine the differences that will be presented at the second level of classification. The next section focuses on three of the biggest associations in the field, which have yearly budgets over million dollars. These grand RMAs that have presence in all parts of Turkey, and in many other countries, have a more or less common activity area. Nevertheless, their outlook to politics and connections to different power structures (such as different religious communities and political parties in Turkey, international Islamic movement) are crucial in defining their motivations in the social provision arena. These three associations will be analyzed as the ideal types of three different Islamic identities present in the field: the first one identified with the rise of a moderate political Islam in Turkey (Deniz Feneri); the second one as a more liberally politicized version that carries important nationalistic tones (Kimse Yok Mu); and finally the third one which represents a more radical version of Islam that defines its identity in relation to the International Islamic movement (IHH).

Deniz Feneri Dernegi/ Light House Association

The history of the association dates back to a television program Sehir ve Ramazan (City and Ramadan) started in the religious month of Ramadan in the year 1996. The television channel that produced and broadcasted the program was a municipal channel in Istanbul at the time when Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the Mayor and the Welfare Party was the governing party at the municipal level. Later on this television channel has been being privatized and sold to a business group of Islamic capital and

\(^9\) For Prime Minister Erdogan’s positive comments on Kimse Yok mu for their activities during the religious festivals see the related article in Zaman daily on 22.12.2007). Talks T. Erdogan held after the Gaza Flotilla incident in May 2010 was an example of support for IHH.
changed its name. The foundation story of the television channel-Kanal 791 is as interesting as the foundation of the RMA and gives an idea about the loose boundaries between politics, business and civil society. The idea to establish a television channel broadcasting according to Islamic standards, which will also support the political movement (Milli Gorus), was an idea that appeared in early 1990s92. Many newspaper articles (appeared in the years from 2005 to 2008) claimed that this TV channel was founded with the money collected from migrant workers in Germany: After the decision to establish a TV channel was taken by Necmettin Erbakan and other members of Milli Gorus, they started searching for founders/shareholders that will support their initiative and most of the needed money had been collected from the visits they made to Germany. Supporters of the Milli Gorus movement gathered in the mosques and the idea to found a television channel that would broadcast programs that were in line with the principles of Islam and would support the Welfare Party were explained to them. So, it should be kept in mind that the Deniz Feneri Association was an initiative of this first Islamic television channel in Turkey.

Soon after the program started, it is transformed to a weekly program—called Deniz Feneri—of social aid collection and distribution93. As their administrators claim, due to the increasing interest and the rise of demand and supply Deniz Feneri Welfare and Solidarity Association have been established in 1998. In the years to follow, the association grew to be the largest RMA in Turkey. The current organizational structure of the association consists of three branches—in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and three representative offices—in Thrace, Black Sea Region and Eastern Anatolia. It has around 400 professional employees and more than 50,000 volunteers. In addition to total coverage of Turkey, the association has also been undertaking activities in countries such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Daghestan,

---

91 See related article in the daily Radikal, 14.10.2005
92 Rusen Cakir, a journalist who conducted in-depth research on political Islam and Welfare Party, also claims that it is interesting that the Welfare Party did not make much investment to media in the period before the 1990s see Cakir, R. (1994). Ne Seriat Ne Demokrasi Refah Partisini Anlamak. Istanbul, Metis Yayincilik.

93 The trend television program to association is a quite common story in the establishment of the RMAs. The first television programs started in the mid 1990s set an example for further expansion of media-RMA relationships. Once the success of the television shows were realized in collecting large sums of money, civil society associations with the same names were established and they have kept up expanding since then.
Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Kosovo, Lesotho, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Moldavia, Mozambique, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, Sudan, Slovenia, Tatarstan, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

The headquarters of the association is in Istanbul. As the administrators of the association put forward, this was not a professional effort in the beginning; neither the founders nor the volunteers were experienced in what they did. They rented a small storage area for the goods collected and started their activities from this base. The big earthquake that hit the Marmara Region in 1999 was a time of growth for the association; not only their budget, but also their publicity increased owing to the social aid activities they undertook in the earthquake region. The institutionalization and professionalization continued in the years to come, and the association received the ISO 9001 Quality Certificate in 2002. The association has been entitled to the Turkish National Assembly Award of Eminent Services and titled as a Leader in Social Responsibility in 2005.

In the interviews I have conducted with the association, I have been informed that the association regularly supports 30,000 families every month and in their records they have information about 470,000 families in Turkey, meaning nearly 2 million individuals. In addition to the headquarters in Istanbul (3300 m² administrative and logistics centre), the association has a major branch in Ankara (5000 m² area, logistic center, a guest house and a modern soup kitchen), and four representative offices\(^4\) that are each responsible from ten to fifteen cities in their region. The coverage area of the association and the numbers are informative about the amount of funding it has access to.

Donations are the main and only cash income for the association. In addition to cash, they also accept in-kind donations such as food, clothing, furniture, medicine, education and cleaning materials. Advertisements broadcasted in television, radio and newspapers are the most important tools for increasing donations. As it is communicated by the PR manager, the association is very careful about maintaining a transparent system. They introduced a barcode system, which makes each and every

\(^4\) Aegean Representative Office: 1200 m² administrative and logistics centre. Thrace Region Representative Office: 2500 m² logistics centre. Eastern Anatolia Representative Office: 3312 m² logistics centre. Black Sea Representative Office: 2500 m² logistics centre.
donated good traceable. Moreover, a software program called Help Organization Programme is developed by the association in order to gather information about incoming donations, donors, volunteers and recipients. This is a central program that is available online and can be updated at the national level by any of the branches or representative offices. Deniz Feneri Association was the first one introducing these technologies to the social provisioning work that are later on taken as an example by other large RMAs.

I only had the chance to visit the headquarters of the association in Istanbul and interview the PR responsible and a couple of volunteers. My plan was to revisit the association in a couple of months again, but it was not possible due to a corruption scandal happened in the coming months. The disappearance of forty-one million euro, collected by a Turkish philanthropic association (Deniz Feneri e.V) in Germany, made the headlines of the news in all newspapers and television channels in fall 2008. The question, whether this association is a branch of the Turkish Deniz Feneri or not, was the central discussion in the media. The German association, although not officially a branch of the Turkish one, has also been established with the encouragement of Kanal 7. The suspects in Germany were accused of using the donations collected from the Turkish-German population with different aims than charity or philanthropy. An amount around twenty million was illegally transferred to some business corporations in Turkey. Nevertheless, the interesting situation is not limited to the use of donations in an illegal way. The names making the illegal transactions and the corporations that the money had been sent to were the real interesting parts of the story for the public in Turkey. The head of radio and television supreme council, who is known for his close connections to the Justice and Development Party, was one of the founders of the business corporation to which the money was sent.

All three suspects of the trial were convicted of corruption and sentenced to prison by the German court in September 2008. In the months following the trial and the conviction of corruption, the issue continued to occupy major coverage in the Turkish media. The opposition party and some other media groups claimed that money, sent to Turkey by the organization in Germany, was mostly used by the political party in power (AKP). Following that, Turkish Ministry of Justice inquired the German court to send the lawsuit file to Turkey in September 2008. The legal investigation is still
ongoing. Yet, all these discussions on the relations between this business corporation, the party in political power and the solidarity association has been an extreme example of the blurred boundaries between politics, business and philanthropy in Turkey. Although the association lost some ground, it is still an important player in social provision arena.

**Kimse Yok Mu Association**

*Kimse Yok Mu* is one the three largest social solidarity associations in Turkey which is active at the national and international levels. The association defines itself as a Turkish non-governmental association that aims to fight poverty and eliminate social inequalities and encourage humanitarian aid. They have the mission to play a leadership role in aid activities all over the world. They want to be the first association to reach people—from all races, religions, nations—in times of natural or man made disasters. Currently, *Kimse Yok Mu* have branches in twenty-eight cities in Turkey, and around seventy-five percent of its budget is spent in the country. Social provision at the national level was the first area of action, yet it also started to undertake activities in other countries with the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004. Humanitarian aid campaigns for Palestine-Lebanon, Peru, Bangladesh, Sudan-Darfur, Georgia-Ossetia, Myanmar, China, Gaza and Haiti have been organized in the years to follow.

The foundation story of the association has important similarities to *Deniz Feneri*. *Kimse Yok Mu* also started as a follow-up of a television program in a TV channel—*Samanyolu*—with an Islamic identity. Both the association and the television channel are known for their close connection with the *Gülen Community*. The television program started in the period after the big earthquake in Turkey in August 1999. *Samanyolu TV*, with the help of the donations from its viewers, started a program

---

95 An Islamic social movement headed by Fethullah Gülen; a revised and “modernized” version of Nur movement which derives from Said Nursi’s teachings. For more information see Esposito, J. L. and M. H. Yavuz (2003). *Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement*. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press.

96 My interview partner indicates that *Samanyolu TV* is particular in terms of its organizational style. It has many shareholders, who own small shares of the company. As he claims no one is allowed to own bigger shares since this is against the mission of the channel to be representative of a population.
that calls for help for the survivors of the earthquake. The name of the association, which can be translated as “Is there anybody there?” was inspired from the way rescue teams were calling while searching for any alive person in the wreckages of the buildings. By 2002 a system of organizing help was established under the name of the television program, whereas the launching of the NGO as a humanitarian aid association happened only in 2004.

The organizational structure of Kimse Yok Mu is less centralized than Deniz Feneri. Branches of the association are organized at the city level and they are responsible for raising their own funds. They share the vision and mission of the center and act in compliance with the main principles. Once a decision is taken by the association to establish a branch in a city, one or two possible candidates are appointed by the center. Since the association is organized around an already existing community of followers, appointing people for taking over responsibility is not a problem. Following the decision on the head of administration and the transfer of know how from the center, the branch is expected to function with its human and material resources at the local level. In cases of international projects, the branches are expected to collect funds and transfer them to the center.

The growth rate of the association in the last years is impressive. Currently the association has branches in 30 cities and only the Istanbul headquarters have access to 62,000 families with 100,000 volunteers and 110 employers. My interview partner, an administrator and volunteer in the headquarters of the association in Istanbul, stated that they could not limit or control the rapid growth of the association in the last years. As an example, he mentions how the association received 12 million USD donations in the two weeks after the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005. The association at the time was quite small—they had a two room office in Istanbul. Obviously the question I have in mind after this statement of my interview partner is how an organization that is one year old can have access to such a large scale of resources. In the quote below the respondent explains how their connections to a religious leader (Fethullah Gulen) resulted in their extreme popularity in a short time:

Respondent: When our association was only two rooms, an earthquake happened in a country. Then the leader of one of the largest cemaats (religious communities) in
Turkey, who is highly respected, made a statement that it is important to help the people in this country. In the next month, we received 12 million USD.

Me: So do you mean that this association has been established by this cemaat whose head is this leader?

Respondent: We can say this association is established with his advice. Whenever he briefly mentions that helping our brothers is important, millions are floating into the organization. So we cannot control it, we are expanding everyday even if we do not want to. Samanyolu television is also an establishment founded by his proposal; Zaman daily was also founded with his suggestion. Cihan News Agency is also set up with his initiative. But, we do not belong to a single group, we are open to everyone and we help everyone. We do not have connections to any political party.

This quote is an example demonstrating the benefits of the interconnectedness of the RMAs to the religious communities and the networks established around them. It is possible to see how social and cultural capital that is shared in these communities can easily be transferred to economic resources.

The international activities of the association in different countries are also closely connected to the already existing ties of the community. The colleges Türk kolejleri that are founded by the supporters of the Gülen community in the last decade in different countries have been the helping hand in spreading the activities of the association at the international arena. The respondent explains that the foundation story of the colleges is quite similar to foundation story of Kimse Yok Mu. In his words, after the disestablishment of the Soviet Republic, Fethullah Gülen advised people around him to found schools in Middle Asia. In the following years, he expanded his advice to cover whole world. This is how Türk Kolejleri were established, just like Kimse Yok Mu, just like Samanyolu Tv, Zaman daily and Cihan news agency. As my respondent put it, “currently there are more than a thousand of these colleges all over the world; they also work like civil society associations, although they are not”. As he explains the colleges have been the main guides when the association decides to take action in a country. This picture proves that Kimse Yokmu is just one branch of the large scale of activities undertaken by this religious cemaat, which defines its identity as a protective force against radical Islam.
Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH)

The history and foundation story of IHH is quite different from the associations analyzed previously. IHH was established in 1992 with the main aim of helping the war victims in Bosnia Herzegovina. Supporting the civilians in the war in Chechnya in 1995 was their second main activity, where their name started to be heard in the public. As the two incidents resulting in the establishment of the association makes clear, IHH defines its mission broader than social provision. As they state in their web page, they aim to “spread justice and good, and to fight the evil on Earth” by protecting values in a changing world. Currently IHH is actively working over one hundred ten countries in the world, have around hundred thousand volunteers; and their yearly budget is around hundred million dollar.\(^{97}\)

The Islamic characteristic of the foundation is much visible in comparison to the other RMAs under study. IHH have been subject to the attention of the Turkish media for the first time in 1998. The association was accused of transferring thirty six million Turkish liras, collected for helping Muslims in Bosnia, to the Welfare Party.\(^{98}\) Although the claim was not proved, the disappearance of this large amount of money collected for humanitarian aid was in the media as a scandal for a long time; and close relations of the association to the Islamist political party was put under light. More recently, IHH—as one of the main organizers of humanitarian help to Gaza strip, with Free Gaza Movement—came to the center of attention with the Gaza Flotilla raid on May 31, 2010. The incident made the connections of the foundation with the international Islamist movement more visible. The interview I conducted with a member of the administrative board in 2007 gave hints about the broader aims of the association in supporting Muslim populations in different parts of the world. The two quotes below—the first by an administrator in the headquarters of the association, the second by an administrator in a local office—give an idea about the motivations of the foundation:

A new world order is on the rise in the last decades. We first realized this with the war in Bosnia. This new world order is creating people who are in need of support. We decided that we have to be with these people, we have to support them; not only

\(^{97}\) Numbers are taken from the interviews conducted with the administrator in the Istanbul headquarters.

\(^{98}\) See related article in the daily Radikal, 01.06.2010
materially, we also need to make their voice heard, we have to teach them about their rights. We have never been an organization who only provides food and clothing to needy in order to meet their daily needs. We wanted to learn the reasons behind people’s problems; we wanted to have a political standpoint. Mending the wreckages others create has never been our only aim. We wanted to fix the sources of the problems. We decided that we have to be present in every part of the world where Muslims live; we have to be informed about them, take care of them. This is what we do in the last decade.

Not every association services the stomach; servicing the intellect and hearts are equally important. These three can be fed by helal (objects or actions that are acceptable by Islam) or by haram (objects and actions that are forbidden by Islam). We are not only interested in the stomach; we also pay attention to nourish the mind and the heart.

As clear from the quotes, IHH is mainly active in countries with Muslim populations. The association did not start as a television program, but uses every kind of media to advertise its activities. They have weekly television shows that are broadcasted by different national and local television channels. At time of establishment, IHH became publicly known as an extension of Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) and its leader Necmettin Erbakan. In the following years the association moved to a more radical Islamist standpoint and lost its connections to the political party. The administrators of Cansuyu\textsuperscript{99} association, which is also a RMA that is established by the Felicity Party, were open in telling the connections of these two associations and their political party.

Cansuyu Administrative: You probably know that we have been established in connection with the Felicity Party. IHH was also established by the advice of Necmettin Erbakan, but our close connection with them ended at a point. Now we have Cansuyu as our welfare association. We also have a television channel. We have a program in TV5 channel about social help and solidarity. That is how the idea of founding a solidarity association came up.

\textsuperscript{99} Cansuyu is an RMA that is included in the sample. It was founded in 2005 in Ankara and has offices in six major cities in Turkey. The administrative staff of Cansuyu consists of old bureaucrats, mayors and activists--many of them from the Saadet Partisi (Virtue Party). A detailed discussion on the association is not included due to its smaller scale in comparison to Deniz Feneri and Kimse Yok Mu.
Me: How do these connections function? Does someone from the political party appoint different people in different cities to establish RMAs?

Cansuyu Administrative: Not the party, but the higher authorities in the religious communities -cemaats- decide who will be the founders of the association in a city. Once a person is appointed by the center, and then the assigned person establishes the association in that city with the assistance of others, who are also part of this cemaat structure. Political party is also part of this whole. You know, we are not the only example for this. All of the big solidarity and help associations have been established within these cemaats, and most of them also have political party connections.

Me: Do you think these connections are necessary? What are the benefits of having these alliances?

Cansuyu Administrative: Imagine that some people in a city decide to form an association to help the poor. How many people can they reach? When you start as part of an already existing structure or political party, then it is much easier to expand. Having political connections means having a connection to the whole world. [...] Another important benefit of these connections is about finding volunteers and working with them. Finding committed volunteers is not easy. Not everyone can work as a volunteer. One needs a mission. People who are part of these structures (cemaats) work for the sake of God and for realizing their mission. This makes things easier.

Me: What about the connections with the political party? How do they function?

Cansuyu Administrative: When some needy people come to the political party to ask for help, we tell them we have an association distributing social assistance and send them to the association. The state cannot achieve everything; we should also fulfill our responsibilities.

This excerpt is exemplary in explaining the underlying structures behind the largest RMAs in Turkey. The respondent puts forward that there is a double sided relationship between the political party, which is mainly an establishment representing a religious community, and the civil society association, which is founded to fulfill the needs of the people who come to ask for help from the political party. The administrator of the RMA also claims that it is not possible for a civil society association to reach a large scale without having connections to some religious
community and political parties. Apparently, being part of a big network makes it possible for the associations to have access to more resources.

The organizational structure of IHH is different than Deniz Feneri and Kimse Yok Mu: they do not establish branches. As the respondent claimed they are supporting local people in different cities to establish associations like IHH. These new associations learn from the experiences of IHH, undertake projects such as orphan projects and sister family projects, but they are established under different names. I have visited two of these local associations in different cities. They told me that they are sister associations with IHH. They raise their own funds and transfer around 50% to 70% of their income to IHH for the international projects.

Orphan Care Programs is an area of action that is kicked in by IHH and followed by many other RMAs. Although Turkish state provides accommodation and the necessary financial support for the orphans, IHH administrators and volunteers emphasize this program as a main area of action. They claim that state support is not sufficient to fulfill all needs of a kid. The following quote is an example that shows how immaterial forms of support in addition to material are perceived as a must by IHH:

It is important to follow a kid in every respect. The orphans are taken care of in the orphanages by the state, but these kids feel lonely. We have a project to take care of these kids by our volunteers. The volunteers visit the orphans in the orphanage and they invite them to their houses, they make sure that they are being educated about their cultural and moral values. It is important that these kids feel themselves as part of a structure. It is important that they know that they have a brother supporting them. These kids should not feel lonely; they should know that there is a social structure or institution that is behind them. Our Prophet (s.a.v) said it: If anyone strokes an orphan's head...he will have blessings for every single hair he touches.

The administrator of the RMA does not seem to agree that belonging to a formal structure—a state orphanage—and getting formal education is enough for these kids. He also does not think that the moral and the cultural education given in the orphanage are sufficient. Therefore, the association volunteers to provide a kid with
some informal support mechanisms and a form of belonging that is based on traditional, moral, cultural and religious identifications\textsuperscript{100}.

8.1.2. Vintage Associations

I hardly manage to arrange a meeting after a couple of phone calls and a couple of days waiting period. Finally a young voice in the phone tells me that x hoca (master) agreed to talk to me. The office of the RMA is inside a big block of offices and shops. While going up the stairs, I realize that there are three other social help associations in the same block, all with names with open religious connotations. Once I am in front of the door, I knock the door and a young man opens it. Careful about not to look at me in the eyes, he asks me take off my shoes. Even if he would not, I would have done so, since I see at least four or five pairs of shoes in front of the door, and I see he is bare foot. I cannot say I feel comfortable entering the office. The single step into the office makes clear that I am in an Islamic association. The entrance of the association reminds me of entering a mosque, with the carpets covering the floor, the specific odor in the air and group of shoes in front of the door. The young guy directly takes me to the office where he and my interview partner shares. The office is a very small one, consisting of two or three rooms and in the size of not more than sixty square meters. My interview partner does not stand up or shake my hand when I enter the office. Moreover, he is avoiding eye contact with me. He starts by asking why I am there and what I exactly want to know; and while asking these questions he does not look at me but the wall just across him. After listening to my explanation about my interests, he stands up and says its prayer time so first they need to pray and only after that we can start the interview. They (with the younger man) exit the room and probably go to the bathroom for ablution, the ritual cleaning of the body before the prayer. To my surprise, they return with bare feet and just lay their prayer rugs in front of me, re-put on their socks and practice their prayer in the same room where I am sitting.

\textsuperscript{100} What usually do not even come into question in the study of these forms of belonging—in communities of faith or religion—are the possible restrictions it may bring to the freedoms of individuals. Especially regarding children, it is not hard to imagine that the restrictions on freedom can be even more severe.
While waiting for their prayer to end, I have a glance at the room. The room is full of religious symbols. Prayers are hanging on the wall. There are religious books on the desks and in the bookshelves. Both the administrator and the younger man in the room have a similar style of beard and are dressed in baggy trousers. When they finish their prayer, both of them put away their prayer rugs, go back to their desks and we start our interview. I can feel that my interview partner is quite tense and do not really enjoy my presence in the office. At some point when the young guy goes to the next room, he asks him to leave the door open, which is a signifier showing that he does not want to be alone with an unknown woman in the same room behind closed doors. In the first fifteen or twenty minutes of the talk, his answers are quite brief and he does not look at me even for a moment. He talks and stairs at the wall against him. I am trying to look as supportive and agreeing as possible in order to relax him a little bit. I am telling him how it is normal for faith based organizations to be involved in social action in Europe and the United States, and giving some examples about the current increase of their roles in the welfare arena. The air in the room starts to change after my respondent realizes that I am not critical about his remarks and really value what he says. I am using every opportunity to show that I am interested in hearing more. The interview flows after this point. Now he does not seem uncomfortable in looking at me, he does not stare at the wall anymore. There is a constant insistence on me to drink more tea, which is in itself enough to show that he enjoys the talk and he wants to tell more. In between the words of explaining about their missions, aims and motivations, he is also talking about his beliefs about being a good Muslim. Probably to comfort me, he says whether people really believe or not cannot always be seen from their outfits. A woman may prefer not to wear the headscarf in some period of her life, but if she is a real believer in her heart and follows the other rules of religion then she may still be a real Muslim. Towards the end of the interview, he gives me a Quran as a present and I politely accept it. It is a translation to Turkish by one of the imams in their association. After getting used to my presence and believing in my good will, his approach towards me changes completely. Just before I am about to leave the room, he does not forget to mention how much Islamists have changed in the last years. He says “it would not be possible for you to come here and interview us if it was ten years ago, since we would think that it is not acceptable for a man and a woman to sit and talk in the same room if they are not relatives, but you see now it is not a problem if the door is open.
This is more or less the same picture I witnessed in the associations I have labeled as vintage RMAs. Vintage RMAs have a relatively longer history and they are revised versions of previously existing institutions; their foundation dates are in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Nearly all of the RMAs included under this category are foundations (vakıfs), which are also civil associations but have some legal differences to associations. One important difference that may be important to know is that associations work on a membership basis, whereas foundations/vakıfs are founded on charitable endowments—meaning their main source of funding comes from sustainable resources. As the historical chapters demonstrated vakıfs have a history that dates back to centuries before. Below are some examples demonstrating how the administrators of vintage RMAs interpret transformation of the vakıfs institutions throughout the Turkish history:

Turkey has gone through a major transformation after the Turkish War of Independence, and some structures like vakıfs had disappeared during this transformation. Now there is a return to these old structures. For example there are some businessmen I know, they ask me saying ‘I have 10.000.000 zekat this year, but I do not have time to distribute this’ can you do it for me? They are searching a place that they can trust, so they choose one of the associations working in social provision area.

Before 1980s everything was prohibited in this country. People even did not learn about their religion. People were afraid of Islam. We all lived through times of oppression. The vakıfs were afraid of having any assets, thinking that the state can confiscate their property at any moment.

As the quotes hint at, the vintage RMAs were mainly established in order to keep alive the practices and teachings of Islam. In the period before the 1980s, most of these associations have been organizing places for cemaats (religious communities) and tarikats (Sufi orders), some of which have been the main actors behind the rise of political Islam. Their initial activities were Qur’an courses, religious education and community gatherings such as sohbets\textsuperscript{101}. Nevertheless, they included social assistance to their variety of activities in the last years. The military intervention on February 28\textsuperscript{th} of 1997 has been an important turning point for most of these

\textsuperscript{101} Sohbets are “informal meetings where people gather and listened to religiously learned person, pray communally and eat snacks” (Tugal 2009: 61). These meetings have also been important recruiting grounds for some Islamist groups.
associations that were undertaking action with the main aims of Islamization of the society and the political system. The more radical ones having aims such as changing the political system have been closed down. What I define as the vintage RMAs are the associations that redefined their identities and areas of action in the period following the February 28th process. Some of the prohibited ones are re-opened with different aims; the others that were not closed down just became more aware of the possibility of closure and took action to avoid it. The share of social provision in the action repertoires of the associations increased after this point.

A further reason that triggered the inclusion of social provision to the action repertoire of the associations was the increasing emphasis of the pro-Islamic political parties on social justice. As already discussed in the historical chapters, the Welfare Party has been a pioneer in discovering the most efficient ways of how social provision at the grass-roots level can be used for political back building. This was an important shift in the rise of political Islam. Realizing the impossibility of changing the political system in the short-run and digesting the failures of the past, a group of Islamists redefined their main aim as the Islamization of the daily life. Social provision was a great instrument for achieving this aim. Many associations took the way Welfare Party was organizing social provision as an example for their activities. In a period when the political representation chances of the Islamic groups increased, traditional communities and vakif structures redefined their areas of action. Instead of focusing on the education of their limited number of members in their quite closed communities, behind their closed doors, many of them opened up their services to larger populations of possible supporters. The associations, which undertook activities such as publication of religious books and journals, and offering Quran courses, included social provision into their area of activities. Currently, most of the associations included in this group fulfill multiple roles such as education in cultural and religious matters and social provision.

Our aim in establishing this association was not social help. Our aim was to educate the young people in the neighborhood as responsible Muslims of good character. Young people do not know about their identities: You see some young people on the streets; you cannot decide whether to categorize them as Muslim, or Christian. They do not

---

have an identity. They do not know their history, culture, or values. We are the descendants of a great civilization. We have a great history. (…)

The lack of quality education is the main reason for all problems in the society. The families do not educate their kids, religion is not taught, the official education system is a wreck anyways (…) so, we thought we should raise young people who know about their history, who have higher morality, who know their religion. We want these kinds of people to climb up to the upper levels of society. That was our only aim.

We first started with educational activities; the main aim of the association was to educate people in areas of morality, and religion. Even before the legal establishment of the association, we were active as a cemaat-religious community. In three years time we also started doing activities in the area of infak to help the needy.

There have been cases in which the respondents defined social provision activities as an instrument to educate people.

If the heads of these people are not filled in addition to their stomachs’, then these people will be a burden on our nation, society and Muslims. Consequently, we believe that educating people is more important then feeding them. (…) When you help people, these people feel that they owe you something in return. We have to make use of this feeling and educate them. Some groups in Turkey are very successful in doing this. You cannot educate a person that you do not finance materially, but if you give 100TL to someone every month then this person will feel obliged to learn from you. Or if you support this person today, you can expect that s/he will be a representative, a supporter of your association in the future. There are cemaats who make use of these relations very wisely: they give one to you today and collects back ten from you in five years (bugun bir veriyor, bes yil sonra senden on aliyor).

The increasing social provision activity is also explained in relation to increasing demand: increasing inequalities and social exclusion in the cities. I interpret this as a revision of some vakıfs that were mainly active in cultural and educational areas in order to catch up with the necessities of the contemporary times. I do not claim that charitable activities were not a focus area for the vakıfs, nevertheless it started to be the main area of activity in the period following 2000.

There is a reality we are facing: everyday, the number of people living below the extreme poverty line is increasing. We have to help these people as an outcome of our
faith. (…) We are founded with the motivation to help these people. We do this only for God’s sake. (…) We’re Muslims. There is a command of God to the Muslim societies. God says in your income, there is a portion that belongs to the poor. If Muslim people follow this command, I believe there will be nothing called poverty. Our duty as an association is to remind people about God’s command.

As the quote demonstrates, one of the reasons for these associations to step into the social provision arena was the increasing poverty in the society.

The vintage RMAs are mostly active at the local level, their resources are much smaller in comparison to the new RMAs. Another important defining characteristic of the vintage RMAs is their low level of secularization. To elaborate, the associations in this group do not make a necessary separation between practicing religion on the one hand, and being active in the area of social provision on the other: Practicing daily prayers in the office, taking shoes off while entering the workplace, hanging religious symbols on the walls are common practices. In comparison to the new RMAs that have been discussed in the previous section, these ones are representing a more traditional line of Islamists. This should not necessarily mean that they are more fundamentalist when it comes to interpretation of religion, yet they openly put forward that that religious principles is at the center of their actions:

We only work for God’s sake, that is why we have founded this association. I learned something from my exhaustive readings of Koran that one does not gain God’s sake with praying or fasting. These are the acts of worship one does for himself. The only real worshipping for God is to help human beings who are in need. That is why we have established this association.

References to Qur’an and hadis have been crucial in explaining the motivations for volunteering. Hadis—the revelations by Muhammad about what he approved or the things he said and the things he did— is one of the two main sources of information in Islam. Especially while talking about the motivations of volunteers, there were numerous citations to Hadis.

The Prophet said: the first ones to enter Heaven will be the generous people. When our people hear about this Hadis, they are motivated to do anything.
The most fortunate people are the ones who are help the others, said our Prophet. To fulfill this call is the main motivation for many people.

The Prophet said: You are responsible as much as you have power. That means one should be helpful to other people, as long as they have material or physical capabilities.”

The Holy Prophet has said: The man is not from me who sleeps contentedly while his neighbors sleep hungry.

Muhammad gave a promise to us. He said we would live through four different epochs after his time. The first was Umayyad Caliphate. The second was Abbasid Caliphate. The third is a period of chaos, which is the current period. Finally, the fourth is the one in which the prophet is expected to return. So people are getting ready to the fourth one by working for God.

These quotations demonstrate that the sayings of the Prophet or hearings about these sayings are important motivating factors for the volunteers in these organizations. According to the interview partners, to provide for the poor and the needy is a religious duty and the rewards of these services will be presented in the eternal life. In comparison to the humanitarian aims of the new RMAs, which are defined closely related to making this world a better place to leave, the vintage RMAs are more interested in the benefits of their activities in the afterlife103.

The founders and the staff of the voluntary organizations in this group are mainly merchants, theologians, and retired civil servants. In some cases theologians are seen as the main source of information for the decisions of who is eligible for help. One of my respondents told me that they have both lawyers and theologians in their organization, and while the first one is an advisory body for the issues about juridical law, the second one is the authority to decide who is entitled to receive help under Islamic principles104. The associations in this group believe that the Islamic duty of *zekat* (distribution of alms tax), meaning giving four percent of your income to the needy, should be practiced independent of the existence of a welfare state. In their belief, in an Islamic state, it should be state’s responsibility to collect and distribute

---

103 This does not necessary mean that new RMAs do not have motivations related to afterlife, but they did not openly talk about them.

104 It would never have been possible to hear such kind of a statement in one of the newly established, professionalized RMAs included in the first group.
zekat, as alms tax. They claim that since this rule is not practiced by the Turkish state, civil society organizations should assist citizens to fulfill their religious duties. The following quote is an example from the interviews:

We started this association as five small scale tradesmen. You know, there is an institution called zekat in Islam. Our aim was to create a pool—from the zekats of five of us—from which we can distribute to the poor. In the meantime, however, our friends and acquaintances heard about our organization and they offered to give their zekats to us. Therefore, we officially established the association in 2001.

While the new RMAs had a quite positive perception of the state, the vintage ones are more critical. An important characteristic of this group is their critical comments about the state and how it excluded religion from every realm of society. They continuously mention responsibilities the state has failed to meet in area such as education (i.e. introduction of eight years compulsory schooling and the lack of enough emphasis on religious education) and social provision (i.e. failure to institutionalize zekat). In contrast to the complete incorporation of the new RMAs to the political system, vintage RMAs—although gone through crucial transformation in the last years—still include some traces of Islamist opposition against the existing system. In relation to their dissatisfaction with the current system, the administrators and the volunteers in this group are nostalgic about the Prophet Mohammed’s time and/or the Ottoman Empire period. Creation of myths around stories such as the generosity of people in the Ottoman Period and in the times of the Prophet is a way to indicate that philanthropy has always been part of the Turkish and the Muslim traditions. As I listened to numerous times in different interviews, at the time of Prophet, there were no poor people in the society, so Muslims sent their zekats to other countries and sometimes even to Christian ones. A second commonly told story is about the sadaka stones at the time of Ottoman Empire. During this period, the wealthy would leave money to these sadaka stones and the poor would go and get only as much as they need, so that the other people who are also in need can benefit from the money left.

In addition to being critical, the associations in this group interpret their function as totally independent of the welfare functions of the state. In comparison to the new RMAs, vintage RMAs do not prefer to have much interaction with the state. The
respondents were quite negative while talking about possible relations with state agencies.

We do not see the kind of work we do as state responsibility. This is our duty. There are things that are promised to us by God and Prophet. There are rules we have to obey, like sadaka and zekat. That is how we started. Then, in time, we realized that we are doing the kind of work that the state has to do.

Social help/assistance is something about morality. Moral responsibilities do not have legal principles. Then, nothing can reinforce these activities better than religious sentiments. Religious sentiments are hereditary. Religious rules tell us what is right and what is wrong. What we are supposed to do and what we are not supposed to do. Wherever you go, this does not change. Think about a city whether in Europe or in Turkey. What is in the center? Church or the Mosque. Then, if something is in the center, you cannot behave as if it is not there. That is exactly what has been done in Turkey for years. In the west the states accept religion and religious organizations as legitimate actors. In Turkey, you are only acceptable if you do everything behind a secular display. If you do social assistance with religious motivations you are named as fundamentalist and/or reactionary. The state expects from me not to have any religious motivations. This is impossible not to have any religious motivation and still take part in these kind activities. One needs a spiritual source to get his inspiration from.

In their perception, the only kind of interaction state agencies have with the RMAs is controlling them. General attitude of this group can be summarized by the statement of one of the respondents: “we are glad if they just stand away and do not interfere with what we do”. Some RMAs that are reorganizations of previously banned associations by the state are especially negative towards the idea of working together with the state institutions. As the excerpt below demonstrates, the associations do not see a common ground on which partnerships or projects may develop between voluntary organizations and the state: “Civil servants who work in state offices of social provision do not perceive civil society organizations in a positive way. They try to classify us as belonging to this or that fundamentalist or reactionary group.” The wording used about belonging to this or that group refers to the Islamic groups or tarikats. Although the fragmented structure of social provision is seen as one of the crucial problems of the field by all actors and institutions, the RMAs in this group
argue that “the organization of social provision through a central body that is shared by the state and voluntary actors is not possible”. This ruling mentality that draws main lines of separation between the state and the voluntary services does not seem to disappear in a short period.

The picture is somehow different when the relations with local municipalities and local welfare administrators are taken into consideration. Especially in cases where the governors of the city, mayors of different municipalities and also the civil servants in the social assistance offices are supporters of the same political parties, the relations between these institutions are quite positive. As one of my respondents openly declared “currently, the local municipality lets us use the conference rooms in the municipality for free, but if the municipality would not have been represented by party x—which is an Islamic one—then they would not let us use it”. One other reason I have discovered for positive relations between RMAs and local authorities was personal connections.

8.2. Alevi Associations

A study of religiously motivated associations without going into a brief discussion on Alevi groups would have been missing. Alevis is the second major religious group after Sunnis in Turkey. Their share is estimated to be 10-15 percent of the Turkish population. Assimilative policies of the Ottoman Republic and the Turkish state resulted in a long-term absence, invisibility, or silence of this group in the public sphere. Nevertheless, a revival/re-politicization/rewaking of Alevilik has been the case in the period starting in the 1980s and speeding up in the 1990s. Increasing

105 I talk about Alevi groups since it would be misleading to talk about a single group of Alevis. It is possible to talk about different groups of Alevis with regard to their interpretation of Alevilik, political orientation or distance to Sunni Islam. See Bilici, F. (1998). The Function of alevi-Bektashi Theology in Modern Turkey. Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social Perspectives. S. E. Olsson, E. Özdalga and C. Raudvere. Istanbul, Swedish Research Institute.


number of Alevi civil society associations have been the main organizing institutions in this revival. I have contacted some of the major ones in the area in order to see the share social provision activities have in this movement.

I have visited three of the most influential Alevi associations in Turkey—Karacaahmet Sultan Dergahi, Sah Kulu Sultan Dergahi and Cem Vakfi. The first two are traditional Alevi dervish lodges that are established in the 13th and 14th centuries. They have been through times of political pressure and closures and re-opened in the period after the 1970s and 1980s. Cem Vakfi, established in 1996, is a large umbrella association, which has its own media (radio and television channels and newspaper). The interviews I conducted in these three important institutions made clear that welfare provision is not one of the main areas of activity in any of them. They all have some support structures for their people, but this only occupies a minor share in the overall activity area.

The relations of this religious community with the state defined the specific characteristics of the associations they have developed. Alevism has never been included in the state interpretation of religion. Turkish State, due to its Sunni dominant view of Islam, failed to meet the needs of Alevi population in areas such as education and religious practices. Religious services are included under the title of public services in Turkey, and their costs are covered by the state institution of religious affairs (Diyanet). Nevertheless, Diyanet represents only Sunni version of Islam, and defines mosques as the only worshipping places. Alevism has never been taught in schools as a part of curriculum, or in the theology faculties. Their places of worship (cemevleri) are still not considered by the state as a place of worshipping. In relation to these shortcomings, my respondents voiced that they are undertaking voluntary public service provision. What they meant with this is that although they pay taxes as every other citizen, their kids cannot learn about their belief system in the schools and they have to cover all the costs of their worshipping places. Therefore, Alevis had to organize their own resources in order to practice and teach their beliefs. Dergahs/Cemevleri meets these multiple needs of the community such as education, worshipping, and also provision of food, scholarships to students and in kind transfers to needy members. As one of my respondents put forward very clearly:
You cannot find a single Alevi organization that only focuses on welfare provision or social assistance. These institutions are founded in order to keep Alevi belief and tradition alive. We, of course, take care of our people; food and clothing aid is part of our activities. Yet, to concentrate on social welfare only would be a luxury for Alevi organizations. We can only do this if we solve the main problems of our community. Alevis are trying to express themselves in the public sphere in the last twenty years. We are fighting for legitimacy and equal citizenship rights.

As another respondent put forward, at the time when their foundation was established in 1996, it was still not even possible to voice the word Alevi. The political environment started to change in the mid-1990s, as claimed by the organizations; yet, they still have a long way to go to achieve their ideals of equal citizenship rights. Until then mere focus on social provision seems like a luxury for them.

Alevi organizations, I have interviewed, were also quite critical about the idea of social provision by associations that have religious and/or political aims. One important issue that came up in the interviews I have conducted with Alevi organizations was their idea of separating politics from social provision work. All three associations I have contacted criticized the connections between political parties, religious communities, government and RMAs. They do not reject the idea of social solidarity and help, yet they emphasized that this should be mainly the role of the state to provide for its citizens.

If provision is targeting the poor and needy, if there is no other aim involved in it, if the needy situation of the individuals is not utilized for steering their political or religious ideas, we agree with that kind of provision. We have seen examples of these misuses; some of them are on court108 currently. Unfortunately the weakness of the welfare state in Turkey opens up free space for these kinds of associations.

A last issue that came up in the interviews was exclusion of the Alevi citizens from provision by the Sunni RMAs. Nearly all of the new and vintage RMAs I have interviewed put emphasis on their indifference to people from different religions, sects or nations. Nevertheless, administrators of the Alevi associations claimed that RMAs do not even enter the neighborhoods where the majority of inhabitants are Alevis.

108 The respondent is referring to Deniz Feneri Social Solidarity Association here.
In conclusion, general mission of the Alevi associations can be defined as recognition of their belief, traditions, and fight the assimilative strategies of the Sunni Islamists. To be recognized as equal citizens and to benefit from the services of the state are the demands they put priority on. They undertake social provision activities to support their people, but these are neither on a large scale nor have any political motives behind. Nevertheless, when the historical development of the Sunni RMAs and their transformations is taken into consideration, it could be expected that once the Alevi organizations solve these more existential problems of their community, they may be more active in the social provision sphere.

8.3. Umbrella Organizations

Umbrella organizations are a relatively new phenomenon in Turkey. Yet, some of the RMAs I have interviewed are members of two umbrella organizations: TGTV (Turkiye Gonullu Tesekkuller Vakfi) and IDSB (The Union of NGOs of the Islamic World/Islam Dunyasi Sivil Toplum Kuruluslari Birligi). I will briefly discuss the main motivations and activities of these two umbrella associations in order to shed light on the network structures around RMAs and the divides in the population them.

TGTV is the largest national umbrella organization of the civil society associations with “Islamic sensitivities” as its president puts it. The idea to establish such an umbrella organization dates back to the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nevertheless, the legal establishment was only possible in 1994. The development of TGTV follows a parallel path to the development of Milli Gorus political movement\(^{109}\). Therefore, the main aim of the umbrella organization is to create coordination between different areas of Islamic civil society—such as education, law, worker, businessman, social provision associations—sharing the same religious values and sensitivities. An additional aim that is mentioned in the interviews is to create a coordinated pressure group in politics to protect the rights of their people with the motto of “the rights given by God cannot be taken away by anyone else”. Coordination between

\(^{109}\) The political movement where all pro-Islamic parties such as National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Felicity Party and Justice and Development Party rooted from.
associations and the use of media are the two important means to raise a collective voice in the public sphere, as the principle administrators of TGTV claims.

In such a body of associations many things that are not achievable for single civil society associations become possible and even easy. For the RMAs social capital (connections to the network) can easily be turned into economic capital (donations from the business firms). For the business associations, economic capital can easily be turned into social capital (getting a belonging in the social networks), which in the long run is expected to produce more economic capital. As the president puts forward, coordination between associations is crucial for the functioning of the whole: “if there is an economic need we can collect a huge amount of money in a very short time, if there is a need in the juristic order, there are the law associations to solve it.” Functioning of these connections across different associations that are immersed in areas such as business, law, education, culture and social provision sheds light on how the networks established cross cutting these areas makes the transfer of one form of capital to the other forms possible. However, it would be a misinterpretation to think that TGTV includes all the RMAs that are under study. It is possible to see the reflections of the ideological and political differences at this level too. *IHH* and *Deniz Feneri*, which are both rooted from *Milli Gorus* movement, are members of TGTV. Nevertheless, *Kimse Yok Mu* is not a member of the umbrella association, due to Gülen Movement’s position against political Islam110.

TGTV aims to be a role model for the formation of local umbrella organizations and also assist them. They have initiated the formation of Anatolian Civil Society Platforms organized at the city level. These platforms are umbrella associations that organize action and information exchange between civil society associations in a city and also facilitate communication within the national level which is represented by TGTV. As the head of association puts forward, organizations such as these are crucial in this century, since the more traditional orders in which the *seyh* (Sufi master) was taking care of the *murid* (follower) cannot function in the urbanized and the industrialized socio-economic structures of Turkey. Therefore, interaction between the local, national and international levels is seen as a must in order to meet

---

110 *Kimse Yok Mu* Association was also critical of the Gaza Flotilla movement that was headed by *IHH*. The representatives of the association claimed that although they have been sending humanitarian help to Gaza since 2006, they never had a problem.
the needs of their communities today. In addition to the local civil society platforms, TGTV also initiated the establishment of IDSB (The Union of NGOs of the Islamic World). The establishment of IDSB is explained as a crucial necessity in the period after 9/11 in the interviews I have conducted with the founders. As they claim, they aim to be a representation power in this geography of Islamic countries.

8.4. Conclusion

The variety in the sample of RMAs and the reasons behind it has been the two main interests of this chapter. A closer analysis of the associations and the classification of them at multiple levels have been undertaken in order to get a clearer picture of religiously motivated welfare provision in Turkey. The typology presented demonstrated the heterogeneity in the field. As the discussion of the criteria and the grouping of the associations according to these criteria proved, it is not possible to talk about a homogenous group of religiously motivated associations. The identities of associations, their areas of provision, and relations with the Turkish state and contemporary government all vary from one case to the other. This variety in the sample is explained not only in relation to the different positions of associations within the constituency of political Islam (both at the national and the international level), but also dynamic transformations of these positions in time.

The differences between new and vintage RMAs, the special position of the Alevi associations in the sample and activates of the umbrella associations are all crucial indicators showing how religion, politics and social provision are interrelated. The new RMAs, which are established with the aim of provision at the national and international levels, are defined as an end product of the latest transformations of political Islam. As the in-depth study of the largest ones proved, although they are lumped under the same category, their Islamic identities, relations to different religious groups and to international Islamic movement differ to a great extend. On the other hand, the study of vintage RMAs exemplified the amount of ongoing change and dynamism in the area. Their history of the vintage RMAs demonstrate how the associations evolved in parallel to the contextual factors such as transformations in the
socio-economic arena, changing state-religion relations at the national level and shifts in the strategies of the international Islamic movement.
9. Conclusions

Social welfare provision has always played an important stabilizing function for societies both by creating legitimacy for existing systems and by establishing bonds of solidarity. In the pre-modern times provision had been a crucial might at the hands of the churches and religious authorities. In the modern times, however, this power have been taken away—either partially or totally—from the religious authorities and given to modern welfare states. The period following the rise of the nation state in the late 19th early 20th century has been stage to struggles between religious and secular authorities about who the main provider will be. The conflict was about losing or gaining an instrument of loyalty creation, political base building and access to power. Some states limited the role of provision to the secular establishments of modern welfare states, whereas the others chose to keep the social provision area as a shared one between churches and the state. Whatever option was preferred at the time, contemporary period is stage to a reworking of these balances in many countries, and faith-based organizations/religiously motivated civil society associations are prominent figures of this ongoing process of change.

There are two puzzling facts about this prominence of faith-based organizations/religiously-motivated associations in the social policy sphere. The first one is the fact that the rise of these associations corresponded with the end of century-old secularization in the area of social policy. The second is that this rise, although at different levels and in different configurations, occurs across various types of welfare states. Starting from these two puzzles, a historical in-depth analysis of the phenomena of what is named as faith-based organizations in the literature, and what I call religiously motivated associations has been the main focus of this study. The phenomenon is new, and the available literature on it is not comprehensive. Therefore, the first objective has been to achieve a more complete understanding of the phenomenon of FBOs / RMAs. The research available on faith-based organizations limits its questions to a narrow focus either in terms of literature, in terms of timing, or in terms of geography. My aim was to overcome these limitations of the existing research by undertaking an inter-disciplinary, historical, and cross-cultural analysis of these organizations.
Existing literature on faith-based organizations is generally limited to the concerns of single areas such as voluntary action, urban studies, or social cohesion. The capabilities and effectiveness of FBOs as newly rising forms of voluntary organizations that are functional in the areas such as social work, cohesion and integration are the main interests (see Cnaan 1999; Boddie and Cnaan 2006; Dinham 2009). Commonly addressed questions by these studies are about the practical use of these organizations for increasing well-being of citizens, solving social problems or contributing to social integration/cohesion. Broader analytical questions such as reasons for their rise or the possible implications of their increasing number, which would require taking an interdisciplinary approach, are missing in the literature. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of faith-based organizations, the introductory section on theorizing religiously motivated welfare provision has been devoted to achieve an inter-disciplinary comprehension of the phenomenon by making use of different strands of literature such as religion and welfare, sociology of religion and third sector.

The first step taken in order to achieve a better understanding of the phenomena has been the introduction of the term religiously motivated welfare associations, replacing faith-based organizations. This term is introduced in order to overcome the haze around the concept of FBOs and to expand its coverage in order to include the case of Turkey. A relatively broad and flexible definition of the terms religion and religiosity are utilized that rejects a clear-cut separation between what is sacred and what is secular. Simmel’s definition of religious relations as being diffused in the daily life of people (Simmel 1905), and Wuthnow’s emphasis on religion as having communal and organic dimensions creating dependencies and obligations (Wuthnow 1988: 308) have been used as the main characteristics defining religion and religiosity in the context of RMAs. Therefore, the bodies that are included under the title of RMAs were not limited to institutionalized forms of religion such as churches, mosques and congregations.

The main research question, “What are the historical processes behind the contemporary proliferation of religiously motivated associations?” necessitated to go into a discovery on the possible roots of these organizations in the Middle Ages. An inquiry into the Christian and Muslim traditions of taking care of the poor
demonstrated that religious philanthropy is one of the oldest institutions that have been shared by the societies of different geographies, cultures, and religions over centuries. Despite the differences in tone, religious texts of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, all defined care for the poor as a pious and moral duty. Religious charities in the Christian context, *vakifs* and endowments in the Muslim context have been the main institutions of social provision before the rise of modern welfare state. These institutions have a much longer history than the history of modern welfare states. *Therefore, what is currently ‘marketed’ as faith-based organizations is not something totally novel.*

The rise of the nation state and the modern welfare state was accompanied by an expectation of the demise of these long-lived institutions of religious origin. The ruling paradigms of modernization and secularization predicted a decline both in the need and the sources of religious forms of belonging. Differentiation of religious institutions and decline of religion were the main claims of the secularization theorists in the mid-twentieth century. As the historical analysis demonstrated, partial realization of this expectation has been the case in all of the countries under analysis. Nevertheless, a total demise of religious forms of provision has never occurred in any of them. The last decades, in contrast, witnessed both increasing visibility of already existing institutions and the proliferation of new types of them. I do not interpret what we are currently witnessing in the area of religiously motivated provision as a mere return of religious forms of charity to the social policy sphere. Instead, I define this increasing presence and number of the RMAs in the social policy field as a revitalization of religion*111* in order to deal with the contemporary problems of European societies. *The secular democracies of the 21st century seem to volunteer reintegrating religious forms of provision to their welfare mixes, in order to fight the contemporary problems such as increasing poverty and social exclusion. But how does this change come about? What are the mechanisms that triggered this increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy arena? These were the questions at the center of the research undertaken.*

9.1. What have we learned from this study?

The existing literatures on faith-based organizations do not problematize the increasing presence of FBOs as social policy actors. More than the reasons of their rise, their functions and organizational characteristics are the focus of the existing studies. This study focuses on two possible alternative answers existing literatures may give to the main research question. The chapter on theorizing religiously motivated welfare provision was stage to a discussion of these alternative explanations. The first one, the claim on the rise or return of religion to the public sphere, has been based on the modernization and secularization paradigms that are prominent in the sociology of religion literature. The second one, the claim on the retrenchments in the welfare states, or transformations in the welfare mixes, concentrates on a mere analysis of the changes in the area of social policy as the main explanatory factor for the rise of FBOs. I argue that neither of these explanations offered by the sociology of religion literature and welfare state research is sufficient for an overall understanding of the increasing presence of FBOs in the social policy arena.

The most important shortcoming of the available literatures is their failure in paying attention to historical specificities. As already discussed in the introduction, the phenomenon of FBOs is not limited to the liberal welfare states. Conservative corporatist, Scandinavian and Southern European ones are also stage to similar changes in the last decades. The majority of the studies on religiously motivated welfare provision in these countries provide theories of convergence—either about the retrenchments in the area of welfare, or the rise of religion in the public sphere. Yet, what they fail to achieve is to shed light on the historical mechanisms bringing about this change in various welfare states. One of the main aims of this work has been to come up with explanatory factors that can be used in order to understand change by taking historical factors seriously.

Existing literature defines “the problems” and “the solutions” independent of the case under study. These generalized explanations that do not take into consideration historical specificities do not equip us with the necessary tools to understand change in single cases. As discussed in the second chapter, neither the theory of secularization can be reduced to the argument of the demise of religion; nor can the
changes in different welfare state structures be limited to the theory of retrenchment. In order to overcome these weaknesses of the literature, I have taken a historical and context sensitive approach to explain change in both of these areas. *Various trajectories of state-religion and state-society relations are defined as the two main arenas that are of interest for a better and more comprehensive understanding of the increasing presence of RMAs in social policy.*

*Secularization trajectories defining welfare state transformations*

The use of secularization theories to understand welfare state typologies, or changes in the welfare states is not common in the literature. By pointing out how shifts in the state-religion relations reflect on the social provision area, I aimed at filling in this gap between secularization and welfare state theories. Building on theories of state formation in the studies of scholars such Gould (1999), Kalyvas (1996), Gorski (2003), Ertman (1997) various histories of secularization have been identified as the main factor in determining the position of religious institutions in the newly established welfare states by the end of the late nineteenth, early twentieth centuries. Since the provision of social policy has always been an important area of institutionalization for religion in the public sphere, its relations with state institutions was identified to be crucial to study in order to follow the shifts in religiously motivated welfare provision. Stein Rokkan, Arnold Heidenheimer and Peter Flora have been the pioneers in integrating religion into welfare state research. Following this line of scholars and how their theories are used by Van Kersbergen and Manow in explaining welfare typologies, historical conflicts between religious institutions and newly rising nation states are focused on as an important factor defining the type of welfare state established in this period. This has been a step taken in order to use state-religion relations to understand the contemporary changes in the social policy structures of the European welfare states. In order to achieve this aim, religion has been defined as a cleavage line and a resource that organizes society.

The existing literature on transformations of welfare states and welfare mixes also suffer from a similar shortcoming of generalized explanations. Whether the European welfare states are converging to the liberal type has been a commonly discussed
question in the welfare state research in the last decades. A common state of transformation towards a governance approach that puts more emphasis on the private and voluntary providers is a widespread argument. I agree that there are general mechanisms influencing the configurations of welfare mixes such as globalization, supra-nationalization and socio-demographic changes. Nevertheless, I claim that how these general mechanisms of change take shape in different countries and what kind of outcomes they trigger cannot be understood without looking into the historical factors. The historical analysis undertaken for the five cases demonstrated how various histories of state-society relations has been a determining factor for shaping the contemporary transformations in the welfare arena.

Country studies

How these two mechanisms—(1) shifts in the area of religion and politics and (2) shifts in the social policy sphere—interact and bring about change in the area of religiously motivated welfare provision has been the focus of the study in the third and fourth chapters. Country studies included were chosen to represent a variety on both in terms of state-society and state-religion relationships. The variety on the state-society axis is defined along the welfare typology: a liberal, a corporatist, a Scandinavian and a southern European country is included in the sample. On the state-church axis the same countries are placed on a scale between cooperation/non-separation (liberal) and competition/separati on (authoritarian). The variety presented in this comparative part made it clear that different secularization histories resulted in either marginalization or integration of religious forms of provision in the newly rising modern welfare structures. The main finding—bringing together historical and contemporary analysis—is that countries with settled/well-institutionalized structures either in the area of state-religion or state-society are more resistant to change.

The historical analysis of the case of Britain demonstrated that the main reason for the rise of RMAs in this country is the contemporary transformations in the welfare state arena (in other words, the shift in the state-society relations). The neo-liberal reforms of the period after the 1980s resulted in a move of voluntary associations from the periphery to the center of the social provision arena. As the state redefined
its new task as steering of the welfare provisions, RMAs became one of the central providers. In comparison with this great shift in the state-society relations, the amount of change in the state-religion relatively smaller. The Church of Britain is still the main national church, and a liberal atmosphere is present in the relations between different religions, congregations and the state. The main ongoing change, similar to the other European countries is the increasing number of migrants and multiculturalism in the society. This, obviously, results in the rise of a multi-faith society, with which the state has to reconsider its interactions. Material and discursive support to minority groups and to the RMAs established by them—in order to generate social cohesion and integration—are the steps taken in this area. In conclusion, the case of Britain is marked as one with much change due to the shift in state-society relations. The peaceful settlement of state-religion relations in the nation state formation period and the relatively tolerant approach of the state towards different faiths prevented any abrupt change in this area.

Unlike Britain, the dominant change in **Sweden** has been in the domain of relations between state and religion. Sweden is one of the exceptional cases in which research on religion and welfare state has been growing in the last years. This can already be interpreted as an indicator of the transformations in the arena. Its peculiar relations between state and religion, which can be characterized as non-separation and high regulation, mark the case of Sweden. The Scandinavian welfare state of Sweden marked the state as the main and only provider for its citizens; church or any other religious institutions was not guaranteed a presence in the area of social provision. This history of a settled and well-defined area of state-society relations makes it clear that the main change triggering the rise of RMAs is not a shift on this parameter. This does not necessarily mean that there is no change in the welfare state, yet the change in this area is smaller in comparison to the change in the state-religion relations. The disestablishment of the state-church in 2003, and the increasing plurality in the society necessitated the liberalization of the relations of the state with different faith communities. The state felt the urge to establish relations with different faith communities and to support their actions in the public sphere as possible actors to resolve the rising problems of the contemporary society.
The case of Germany is one of little change in comparison with the cases of Sweden and Britain. Germany is a country where the solution of the conflict between state and religion was resolved by the systemic integration of the churches to the welfare system. This contracting out of the state functions to non-state actors such as church resulted in the establishment of a well-institutionalized solution between state, religion and society. The principle of subsidiarity, which has always been an important defining feature of German political arena, safeguarded the presence of lower-level organizational structures in the area of provision. This resulted in the establishment of a well-developed third sector and the cooperative structure between third sector organizations and the state. Therefore, what defines the minor increase in the number of RMAs in the social sphere is not a shift in state-society relations, but one in the area of state-religion relations. The increasing diversity of the population in the last decades, made it harder for the state to stick to the established social welfare system, which privileged the two churches and the main umbrella organizations as its partners. Hence, the last years have been stage to an expansion of the state interest towards civil society organizations of various faiths, in order to make the integration of them into the system possible. This shift in the corporatist relations between state and the existing faith communities is seen as the main reason of change in the case of Germany.

Finally, the case of France is also one of little change. There is not much evidence proving a rise of religiously motivated associations in the area of welfare. The nation state formation period in France witnessed the most fierce conflicts between the state and the church. The strict separation between state and church that have been established as an outcome of this conflict and the steps taken with the aim of secularization in the early twentieth century resulted in the exclusion of the Catholic Church from main areas of welfare such as education and social services. When the area of state-society relations is taken into consideration, France can again be marked as a peculiar case. The relations between voluntary organizations and the state went through an abrupt change after the Revolution. The rise of the solidarity ideal around the concept of nation resulted in the rejection of any intermediary organizations between the state and the citizens. This ‘etatism’ of the French republic did not allow the rise of a viable third sector in the area of social policy. It was only after the late 1970s and 1980s that the strict etatism of the country went through major
transformations. Especially the rule of Socialist party was stage to the establishment of some partnerships between the state and foundations, which also brought about the increasing presence of voluntary organizations in the social welfare arena. Nevertheless, in contrast to the principle of etatism, the laicism principle ruling the state-religion relations in France did not go through any reformation; it is still well established and resistant to change. I define this relative stability in the area of state-religion relations as the main reason inhibiting the rise of RMAs in the case of France.

*Understanding the “foreign”*—The case of Turkey

Turkey has been chosen as the main case of analysis due to its special position on the margins of European integration, as a country with ninety-nine percent Muslim population with a tradition of laicism, undergoing serious reformation in the last decades. The findings of the historical analysis on the state-society and state-religion relations in Turkey, in a period starting from the late nineteenth century to today, have demonstrated that the proliferation of RMAs in the case of this country can also be understood by focusing on the same mechanisms of change that have been active in the European cases. In comparison to the other cases, Turkey is the one with the highest degree of change, with the rapid rise in the number of RMAs in the last decade. *I explain this high level of change in the case of Turkey with regard to the partial resolution of the unresolved conflicts in the area of religion and state in the last decades, and the expansion of the social provision arena.*

State-society relations in the case of Turkey were not shaped under the conditions of rising industrialization and capitalism. Different from the developed capitalist economies of the West, the initial welfare arrangements grew out of the benevolence of the state and the political parties in power. Therefore, state-society relations have been shaped along the lines of clientelist relations that rendered the area of social policy open for politicization. Especially in times of political crises or change, the social policy arena has been used as an area of loyalty creation. The first example of this was in the late Ottoman period when the Young Turks were reforming the social policy arena that was heavily marked by the notes of the religious elite of the previous period. A similar development occurred in the early Republican period when all of the
religious institutions of the previous period were either prohibited or closed down and were replaced by the voluntary organizations promoting the modernization and secularization ideals of the new Republic. This proves that philanthropy has always been a crucial ingredient of the social provision arena. Its forms and the political ideologies defining the motivations behind it changed in time, but its presence in the arena was more or less constant.

The scale of the gap that is left uncovered by state institutions has been identified as the main reason for the presence of philanthropic organizations in the social policy arena. A social assistance system, accompanying the social security arrangements was not developed in Turkey before the 1990s; the share of populace that was out of the protection schemes of the state has always been much larger than its counterpart in the European countries. A welfare state, which is defined along the lines of social citizenship, has never been established in Turkey. This ideal emerged in the social policy discourse at times, but no real action had been taken to undertake the necessary reforms. It is only in the last decades that the state felt the urge to take some steps in the social policy arena, in order to fight the increasing problems of the contemporary period.

The areas of social assistance and social security have been undergoing comprehensive reforms in the last years. The liberalization of the economy and politics in the period after the 1980s resulted in increasing levels of unemployment and poverty, which in turn increased the demand for social provision. New forms of provision by municipalities, local social solidarity vakıfs and voluntary organizations represent the developments of the last two decades. Aims such as poverty reduction or fighting social exclusion have been included in the state social policy discourse for the first time. Moreover, some steps have been taken to achieve these aims, which are partially triggered by European influence. In short, the current proliferation of religiously motivated associations takes place in this environment along with the expansion of social assistance by central and municipal governments. The contemporary rise of RMAs is scrutinized under the light of these state-society developments. As the analysis demonstrated, in contrast to the dominant views, what explains this rise is not the retrenchment of the welfare provisions, but instead the increasing demand for provision in the last decades.
The shift in the state-religion relations is marked as the dominant one in determining the direction of contemporary change in the social policy structures in Turkey. The history of state-religion relations in Turkey presents a picture that is more authoritarian and secular compared to the European cases. The reforms initiated in the early years of the Republic adapted a French variant of laicism resulting in the total exclusion of religion from public and political spheres, as well as complete control of the religious institutions by the state. Religious institutions and authorities were not even guaranteed a separate area where they could pursue their activities. One of the main reasons that made it possible for the state to achieve this complete control was the lack of an institutionalized form of religion similar to the church in Christianity. Due to this lack, religion has never been presented as a coherent power; its authority has been dispersed in a multiplicity of informal structures in the social sphere. The analysis of the European cases demonstrated that the resolution of the conflicts between the states and the churches in the early twentieth century resulted in the creation of well-defined areas of existence for religious institutions in the social provision areas of these countries. The political climate of the early Republican period in Turkey resulted in the marginalization of religion not only from the political, but also from the public arena.

One of the main aims of secularization reforms was to change the forms of belonging prevailing in the society. The reformers of the early twentieth century hoped that the secularization and modernization reforms would annihilate the needs for religious and traditional forms of belonging. The abolishment of tekkes, zaviyes, and vakifs was the outcome of such a mentality. Nevertheless, none of the institutions established to replace them has been sufficient. Nor did these heretical forms of Islam totally disappear in the years to come. Religiously motivated provision has not had a formal presence in the modern welfare state established, but this did not totally inhibit the survival of some functions of these religious institutions in the social sphere. The social networks established and utilized by pro-Islamic parties in the period after the mid-1970s can partially be explained in relation with these institutions. But only partially, since the contemporary networks established, having religiosity as one of their main resources, have a much wider area of connectivity that is dispersed to the political and economic spheres. The variety of existing interests and easier
convertibility of them from one type to another (economic, social, political) mark the difference of the contemporary networks to the traditional ones.

The specific secularization path taken by Turkey had inhibited the presence of religion as a main cleavage in the political arena for a while. It was only after the 1980s that an important shift occurred between state and religion, which also had important repercussions in the area of welfare. I assert that without this increasing relevance of religion in the political field, the proliferation of RMAs would not have taken place. The crowding of the social assistance arena with philanthropic associations is similar to the single party period. Nevertheless, the growing discourse on issues of benevolence, charity and philanthropy is much more prominent this time, due to factors such as fertility of the dominant political atmosphere, and the scale and the visibility of the problem. Whether this abundance of RMAs in the social provision arena is here to stay or not is still an open question. Yet the historical analysis made clear that absence of a well-defined balance between state and religion, and relatively immature characteristics of the welfare state resulted in the larger space available for the rise of RMAs in the case of Turkey.

The influences at the organizational level

The empirical research, which was centered on the motivations and functioning of the RMAs, aimed to attain a comprehensive understanding of RMAs as social policy providers. The first task was to decide on which organizations could be listed under this title of “religiously motivated”. Due to the sensitivity of the issue of religiosity, and rejection of the label by the organizations, criteria defining what characterizes a RMA had to be determined. Following the preliminary research conducted in the field, the presence of religion in the discourse of the association, in the workplace and in the outlook of the people who are active in the association were the three factors decided upon as substantive criteria to label an organization as a religiously motivated one.

The exploratory research undertaken has proven that there is an increasing presence of these associations in the social policy sphere of the country in the last decade. However, it also gave the first hints of differences of the Turkish case from the
European countries. First of all, the issue is more politically laden in the case of Turkey, and the respondents were suspicious about the interview request. Secondly, there is no available data on the present population of the RMAs, which are active in the provision arena. Lastly, institutionalized religion is not part of the population of RMAs.

In-depth interviews conducted with the administrators of the associations have proven that the organizational scale of the associations vary to a great extent. RMAs that are active at the local, national and international levels are all included in the sample in order to represent the present variety. The provided information about the budgets of the associations has proven that their share in the social policy arena is much larger than expected. In spite of the range in the organizational scale, the associations shared common area of activities such as regular support for the poor families by provision of basic supplies, temporary relief provision in times of emergency, and informal education of the recipients on moral and religious issues. The activity area of the international associations covers Muslim countries and the countries in which Muslim populations live.

Decentralized organizational structures of the associations and their emphasis on the locality as the main source of human and financial capital were important indicators of their ties at the community level. A closer look into decision-making mechanisms and the practices of provision shed light on the lack of objective eligibility criteria; lack of expertise in the area of provision; informal nature of the relationships between the providers and beneficiaries; and tighter surveillance mechanisms to control the use of provided help. Volunteers are active in all steps of provision such as deciding on who is eligible, making the social investigation to decide on provision, distributing the benefits and deciding on the termination of assistance. Although there are some codes of conduct defining how all of these steps should be taken, in most of the associations, personal judgments and lack of transparency seem to be the rule. The informal relations between the volunteers and the beneficiaries that involve a dose of surveillance and control—such as visits to the households and to the neighborhood of the beneficiaries—raises questions of possible breach of individual freedom.

An in-depth analysis of sample of RMAs, their histories, religious and political identities, missions and motivations demonstrated that the transformations of the
associations followed the transformations of the relations at the macro level (between religion and state). The main division in the sample of RMAs is marked between the new and the vintage ones, whose foundation dates correspond to different stages of state-religion relations in Turkey. Secularization and professionalization levels of the associations, backgrounds of their founders and administrators, their activity scales and areas, their relations to local and central welfare administration all vary depending on which stage of the rise of political Islam these associations have been established.

The new RMAs are identified as the end products of the transformations in the political sphere of the country in the last decades; whereas the older ones, which have recently included social provision in their area of activities, are labeled as vintage RMAs. The rise of majority of the associations in both of the groups corresponds to the changing political atmosphere of the country in the period after the coup in 1980. This period saw the proliferation of the Islamic groups in the public sphere. Increasing number of civil society associations provided the Islamists with a possibility to undertake activities in a legal context. Education—in the broadest sense of the term—including Qur’an courses, sohbets, seminars on Islam, has been the main activity areas of vintage associations. Social provision became one of the crucial mobilizing activities of the Islamic movement only in the period after the early 1990s. The military intervention of 1997 has been a turning point for many associations that have been the main organizing spaces for political Islam at the local level. They have been either closed down or put under strict control, which resulted in social provision becoming a more attractive option as a new area of activity. Another contextual reason that made undertaking social provision activities more appealing for these groups was the increasing poverty in the society as an outcome of the economic crises. Therefore, the available space in the social provision arena has also been crucial for the newly rising Islamic groups for political back building.

The variety in the area of religiously motivated provision is not limited to the division between new and vintage RMAs. The analysis of a selection of associations demonstrated various groups with different political and religious ideologies populating the social provision arena. The in-depth analysis of single RMAs made clear that the identities of the associations are highly related to their different
positions within the constituency of political Islam in Turkey and in the international Islamic movement. There is evidence demonstrating that some of the associations work as an extension of some political parties. Some others, aiming to keep their distance from party politics and defining their position against radical Islam, have combined forces in areas such as education, publication, broadcasting and social provision. Whether these associations are undertaking action in order to support the populations that are already sharing their worldviews, or whether any form of indoctrination is inherent to provision activities is not easy to determine. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the boundaries between social provision, politics and religion are totally blurred.

9.2. Overall Implications

The increasing presence of RMAs in the public sphere is interpreted as an important step for contemporary democracies in learning how to accommodate religious groups of different types in the existing political systems in civil society, third sector and sociology of religion literatures. This argument might hold true especially when the voluntary associations are democratic agents taking up advocacy roles and playing the role of watchdog in the political systems they are part of. Nevertheless, I claim that the fact that this accommodation mainly takes place in the social provision arena of many states is not free from problems concerning social citizenship and democracy. In this final section of the study, I will focus on the possible overall implications of the increasing presence of these associations in the welfare arena.

I started this study by pointing at the solidarity-creating and social-stabilizing functions of social welfare provision. How these functions have been utilized by different providers such as religious institutions, state and civil society associations, and how they evolved in time were the focus of the historical chapters. The kind of arrangements politics found to reconcile the balance between different providers in different periods is studied in the comparative part on the cases of Britain, Germany, France and Sweden. The analysis demonstrated that “pre-modern” forms of provision, which was mainly a relationship between believer and church or between different strata of society, created solidarity built on moral and religious bounds. The
establishment of the modern welfare states, with institutionalization of social citizenship rights, however, carried this solidarity bounds to the level of nation state. Welfare policies have started to be defined as one of the most important legitimizing aspects of the European democracies in the period following the mid 20th century. In the light of this historical overview, I see three interrelated issues that need to be highlighted as implications of the increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy arena. I will discuss them starting from the micro level and moving to the macro one.

The **first** issue is the possible influences of the increasing presence of RMAs in the welfare arena on social precarization. As Marshall defines, the extension of social provision was important as far as it reduces the risk and insecurity, and it results in an equalization of more and less fortunate at all levels (Marshall 1964: 102). Compared to the early 20th century, the world we live in today—with increasing levels of flexibilization in the employment contracts and increasing risks of social exclusion for the poor—makes the risk-reducing function of social provision even more essential. The contemporary world of social welfare, however, is characterized by the increasing presence of voluntary associations as providers. Charity in all its forms is on the rise in the last decades. Religiously motivated ones are one of the most common forms of it, although not the only one. Whether these associations decrease insecurity and risk in the lives of their beneficiaries is a key question one has to take into consideration at this point. The characteristics of provision such as lack of objective eligibility criteria, informal nature of the relationship between the provider and beneficiary, co-existence of religious and moral education aims accompanied by provision, and tighter surveillance mechanisms to control the use of provided help indicate that the provision by RMAs do not necessarily result in the equalization of more and less fortunate or reducing insecurity. In Baumann’s words provisions by the associations can be defined as “communal insurance against individual misfortune” or “charity on the part of ‘those who feel like it’ targeted at ‘those who need it’” (Baumann 2001: 59). In an environment where the alternative mechanisms of support have been declining, these provisions by the RMAs create relations of dependency between the beneficiaries and the providers. The ways means testing is undertaken and provision is delivered by the RMAs is open to stigmatization of the poor and increasing social control.
The second issue that is highly related with the first one is about the transformation of the solidarity bounds in societies. Modern welfare states have been the crucial institutions that generate social solidarity within the borders of the nation state. In the light of my findings both on the case of Turkey and the other European welfare states, I see that increasing presence of RMAs in the social policy arena will result in a redefinition of the solidarity bounds at various levels. As both the historical and the empirical chapters demonstrated, community is a concept that gains importance in relation with provision by civil society associations that are established with religious motivations. RMAs are establishments with religious and political ideologies. The form of safety nets they are providing is generally based on communal forms of identification. Even in a case like Turkey, where the great majority of the population is Muslim, there are obvious divides between different communities. As the empirical analysis of associations in Turkey made clear, we are faced with a situation in which different parts of the population are under the influence of different religious groups.

The situation is somewhat different in the developed capitalist economies of the West, with well-established welfare systems. The European democracies under analysis put special emphasis on these associations as important instruments in the integration of migrant populations and strengthening of social cohesion. Nevertheless, thinking about the loyalty creation role of welfare provision, it is very well possible that the support given to different faith groups to provide for their communities will in the long run result in the intensification of particularistic loyalties, which will impede cohesion. As aptly put forward by Baumann, “Insecurity (among the migrant as much as among the native population) tends to transform multiculturality into ‘multicommunitarianism’” (Baumann 2001: 141). Then, the answer to the question ‘will these communal solidarities be able to fit into the national solidarity?’ will be highly determinative for the future of European societies.

The final issue, which is triggered by the first two, is about the possible influences of this transformation in the welfare arena on state-citizen relations and on the functioning of a democracy. Social citizenship rights defined by T.H. Marshall put emphasis on a level of support that makes it possible for every citizen to pursue a life of a “civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1964: 72). As clear from the definition, this level of support brings with it a level of
basic equality that is granted through the rights of citizenship. The question that arises at this point is whether the increasing presence of voluntary associations, whose identities are defined on the basis of ideological, religious and political forms of belonging, will disturb this level of equality that is necessary for the functioning of democracy. Crouch’s definition of post-democracy is also related to this concept of citizenship. As he claims democracy requires certain rough equalities in a real capacity to affect political outcomes by all citizens (Crouch 2004: 16). How the concept of social citizenship will be redefined in this environment of increasing presence of RMAs in the welfare arena and what kind of implications this redefinition will have on contemporary democracies are crucial questions that needs to be addressed.

The analysis of the case of Turkey demonstrated that these associations do not only complement the public provisions of the state, but also substitute their absence in many areas. In such an environment, the lack of alternative provision mechanisms results in the establishment of dependency relations between the providers and the recipients. As already briefly mentioned before, the fact that the RMAs prove for the fundamental needs of the poor and needy gives them access both to control the lives of these individuals according to their standards of morals and ethics, and to influence their choices in the political field. The simple fact that the amount of help rises abruptly at times of elections is a clear proof of politicization of social provision. Therefore, the increasing presence of these associations in the countries without mature welfare states should be paid more attention. It should not be missed out that abandoning the needy to the pity of the voluntary associations for survival needs opens a major door for the exploitation of social policy provision as a political instrument.

Somewhat different than the case of Turkey, RMAs play a supplementary role in the European welfare states. What we see in many of these countries is the outsourcing of some main areas of provision to RMAs. There is a discourse on the rise, which claims that these associations are better providers than state institutions. I interpret what we witness currently in the European cases as the increasing appetite of the states to revitalize the material, social and political resources of religion and religious groups in an era of increasing needs in the area of welfare. The fact that these associations
mainly support the migrant groups, who are more prone to social exclusion, is an indication of the transformations in the European welfare states. Answers to the questions whether these provisions by RMAs will create the necessary equalities for the functioning of a democracy and for the equal attendance of their beneficiaries in the life prevailing in the society they live in will be highly determinative for the future of the European democracies.

In the light of my findings, I believe that these three areas should be the focus for future research. Raising these three issues, I do not claim that the increasing presence of RMAs in the social provision arena will necessarily bring about identical outcomes in the democratic systems of all the countries under analysis. As we have learned from the historical findings of this study—demonstrating that social provision has always been an area of struggle between different providers and any settlement that is at place is a dynamic one—historical specificities of the single cases will determine how each country will deal with the threads in its social provision arena.
### APPENDIX I

#### Table 1. Population Covered by Social Insurance Programs (1950-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>841,362</td>
<td>1,230,858</td>
<td>1,413,345</td>
<td>2,455,484</td>
<td>3,160,354</td>
<td>4,413,911</td>
<td>4,736,647</td>
<td>6,260,500</td>
<td>8,110,395</td>
<td>9,019,396</td>
<td>10,010,996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Footnotes:
2. Exports.
3. The law 447 concerning Big Kah 1972 and its amendments by 1983 have in effect since 1972 and the members covered by the law 145 have been benefitting from health insurance since 1990, and the members covered by the law 126 have been benefitting from health insurances since 1990.
4. The law 447 and its amendments by 1983 has 32,000 insured and the members covered by the law 145 have been benefitting from health insurances since 1990.
5. The law 447 and its amendments by 1983 has 32,000 insured and the members covered by the law 145 have been benefitting from health insurances since 1990.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>40,318</td>
<td>13,722</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>26,596</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>1970-1975 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44,737</td>
<td>16,065</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>28,672</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>1975-1980 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50,664</td>
<td>23,138</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>27,526</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>1980-1985 7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>67,420</td>
<td>38,461</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>28,959</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>2000 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>68,497</td>
<td>39,790</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>28,708</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>2001 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>69,318</td>
<td>40,823</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>28,495</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>2002 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>70,393</td>
<td>41,924</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>28,469</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>2003 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>71,312</td>
<td>43,636</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>27,946</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>2004 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>72,065</td>
<td>44,747</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>27,318</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>2005 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>72,974</td>
<td>45,754</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>27,220</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>2006 2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TÜİK, CPT.

Kaynak: TÜİK, CPT.
(1) Years between 1970-2006 are census data results. Years between 2000-2006 are mid-year estimations.
(2) Kent 20,000 ve daha fazla nüfusu olan yerleşimleridir.
(2) Urban refers to areas with population of 20,000 or more.
Table 3. Developments in Domestic Market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>200%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>110%</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>210%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120%</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>220%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130%</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>230%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>240%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The data represents annual growth rates and percentage changes from the previous year.
### APENNDIX II

#### List of Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date and Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Technical University</td>
<td>Professor of Sociology</td>
<td>09.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harran University</td>
<td>Professor of Sociology</td>
<td>10.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministry General Directorate of Social</td>
<td>Resource Management Assistant</td>
<td>11.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance and Solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministry General</td>
<td>Head of Directorate of Project Monitoring and</td>
<td>11.01.2008 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity</td>
<td>Evaluation Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministry State Planning Organization</td>
<td>Head of Social Sectors Coordination Unit</td>
<td>14.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Ministry State Planning Organization</td>
<td>Head of Strategic Planning Unit</td>
<td>14.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Technical University</td>
<td>Professor of Sociology</td>
<td>15.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Technical University</td>
<td>Doctor of Sociology</td>
<td>15.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Sociology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara Cankaya Municipality</td>
<td>Member of City Council</td>
<td>15.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacettepe University Department of Social Work</td>
<td>Professor of Social Work</td>
<td>16.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacettepe University Department of Social Work</td>
<td>Professor of Social Work</td>
<td>16.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Technical University</td>
<td>Doctor of Economics</td>
<td>16.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Economics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cansuyu Social Aid Association</td>
<td>Founder and Head of Administration</td>
<td>17.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Religious Foundation</td>
<td>Head of Social Unit</td>
<td>17.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Turkey Presidency of Religious Affairs</td>
<td>Head of Social and Cultural Services</td>
<td>18.01.08 Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and</td>
<td>Founder and Administrator</td>
<td>21.01.08 Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Relief (IHH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul Kadikoy Municipality</td>
<td>Vice Mayor</td>
<td>22.01.08 Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province of Bursa</td>
<td>Vice Mufti</td>
<td>23.01.08 Bursa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa Nilufer Municipality</td>
<td>Vice Mayor</td>
<td>24.01.08 Bursa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa Nilufer Municipality</td>
<td>Head of Social Work</td>
<td>25.01.08 Bursa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimse Yokmu Social Aid Association</td>
<td>Founder and Administrator</td>
<td>28.01.08 Bursa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yildirim Municipality</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>29.01.08 Bursa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emirsultan Mosque</td>
<td>Imam</td>
<td>30.01.08 Bursa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deniz Feneri Derneği</td>
<td>Head of Public Relations</td>
<td>31.01.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deniz Feneri Derneği</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>31.01.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somuncu Baba Vakfi</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>14.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fakir ve Muhtacılara Yardım Derneği</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>15.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İHH Bursa</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>16.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İnsanlığa Hizmet Vakfı</td>
<td>Founder and Administrator</td>
<td>22.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yardimeli Derneği</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>23.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mevlana Celebi Vakfı</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>24.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonul Kusagi Derneği</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>27.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SODEV</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>28.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGTV</td>
<td>Head of Administration</td>
<td>29.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karacaahmet SD</td>
<td>Head of Administration</td>
<td>30.04.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cansuyu Bursa</td>
<td>Head of Administration</td>
<td>01.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kimse Yokmu</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>05.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahkulu SD</td>
<td>Head of Administration</td>
<td>06.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hudayi Vakfı</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>07.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRFAN-DER</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>11.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dosteli Derneği</td>
<td>Head of Administration</td>
<td>11.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyuk Selcuklu Vakfı</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>11.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYDER</td>
<td>Founder and Administrator</td>
<td>12.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinar Eğitim Vakfı</td>
<td>Head of Administration</td>
<td>12.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayir Kapisi</td>
<td>Founder and Administrator</td>
<td>12.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya Union of NGOs</td>
<td>Head of Administration</td>
<td>13.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravza Eğitim Vakfı</td>
<td>Head of Administration</td>
<td>13.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Union of NGOs of the Islamic World</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>14.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa Provincial Directorate of Associations</td>
<td>Head of Provincial Directorate</td>
<td>21.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayra Hizmet Vakfı</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>22.05.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İlim Yayma Cemiyeti</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>25.05.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the interviews in Turkey, around five to ten expect interviews were undertaken for each country study (Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden).
**APPENDIX III**

**Interview Guide**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>History of the RMA</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Can you tell me about the history of this association?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In which year you have been established?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Who were the founders?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are their educational and professional backgrounds?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Aims and motivations</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• What were the main motivations while founding the association?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can you tell me about the mission and vision of your association?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the main motivations behind volunteering work?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Organizational information</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• How many people are employed in the association?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How many volunteers work for the association?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How big is your yearly budget?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you have branches in other cities?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are your main areas of action?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the professional and educational backgrounds of the employees?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the professional and educational backgrounds of the volunteers?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are your main sources of funding?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can you tell me about your criteria in choosing whom to help?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How many families or individuals do you support?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Are your provisions regular or one time?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Connections</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Do you have connections to any media company?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you have connections to any political party?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you undertake political activities?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Do you have any contact to local or central welfare administration offices?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have you ever worked in partnership with state institutions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How do you see the role of civil society in the social welfare arena?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How would you define your relationship with the state?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Of Branches</td>
<td>Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>15 semi-autonomous offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6 branches (each responsible for circa 10 cities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>15 semi-autonomous offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The respondent provides this number but also adds that it is not really realistic because the larger portion of their income is in kind, therefore they are not included in the cash budget.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Donations</th>
<th>Administrative Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7,000,000 TL</td>
<td>20 e. 800 people visiting the soup kitchen. 360 students</td>
<td>1,000 families</td>
<td>Monthly food aid. Soup kitchen. Scholarships.</td>
<td>Donations through personal connections of the founders. Small donations from the visitors of the tomb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,000,000 TL</td>
<td>10 e. 4-5 v.</td>
<td>100 families</td>
<td>Monthly food aid. Scholarships. One time support mechanisms such as paying bills or rent.</td>
<td>The rents of the previously donated real estates (houses, offices, fields). Donations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>280,000 TL</td>
<td>5 e. 20 v.</td>
<td>300 families 70 students</td>
<td>Businessman, local tradesmen, lawyers, theologian</td>
<td>In kind help. Seminar and conference organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>580,000 TL</td>
<td>2 e. 5 v.</td>
<td>300 families 40 students 1500 individuals (soup kitchen)</td>
<td>Merchants, medical doctors.</td>
<td>Educational and cultural activities. Soup kitchen. Provision of food and clothing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 e.</td>
<td>100 families Some students</td>
<td>In kind provision. Quran courses, scholarships, international projects.</td>
<td>Donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250,000-300,000 TL</td>
<td>1 e</td>
<td>200 families</td>
<td>Ex municipal administrators retired local politicians, traders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 e</td>
<td>3500 families (soup kitchen)</td>
<td>Local tradesmen and retired theologians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50 v.</td>
<td>1500-1700 individuals (soup kitchen)</td>
<td>Local tradesmen and retired theologians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>200,000 TL</td>
<td>60 v.</td>
<td>20 families</td>
<td>A group or merchant friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,000,000 TL</td>
<td>20 c.</td>
<td>1500 families</td>
<td>In kind provision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


**Newspapers**

Cumhuriyet
Radikal
Zaman
İpek Gökmen Yeginoğlu

Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Paulstrasse 3
D-50676 Köln, Germany
Tel: 0049 174 3869584
ig@mpifg.de

Personal Details

Gender: Female
Place of Birth: Bursa, Turkey
Date of Birth: 11.02.1983

Education

10/2007- present Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne-Germany

  Doctoral Fellow
  Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Streeck, Cologne
  Prof. Dr. Ayse Bugra, Istanbul

08/2009- 12/2009 University of California Berkeley, Berkeley-USA
  Visiting Scholar, Department of Sociology

09/2005- 07/2007 Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen-Germany
  M.A in Integrated Social Sciences--Sociology, Economics, Politics
  Thesis title: Diffusion of Social Policy Discourse in the European Union-The Cases of the United Kingdom and Ireland Committee: Jan Delhey, Hartmut Wessler

09/2001-06/2005 Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara-Turkey
  B.S in Department of Sociology (Valedictorian)
  Minor Program in Department of Business Administration
Teaching and Research Experience

02/2007 - 06/2007  Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen-Germany  
Teaching assistant to Prof. Jan Delhey for the course “Social Inequality”  
Tasks included support in the research projects of the professor and in the preparation of the teaching materials.

09/2006 - 06/2007  Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen-Germany  
Teaching assistant to Prof. Christian Welzel for the course “Civic Networks and Social Capital”  
Tasks included grading of research papers.

06/2004 - 07/2004  Middle East Technical University, Ankara-Turkey  
Research Assistant in a project on labor market in Turkey  
Tasks included assistance to the design process of research and the organization of the research schedule; conducting interviews with individuals by using life history analysis technique.

01/2003 - 02/2003  UNICEF and Middle East Technical University, Ankara-Turkey  
Research Assistant in a project on Mother and Child Health  
Tasks included conducting surveys and analysis of the survey data in SPSS.

Professional Presentations

12/2010  The Politics of Religiously Motivated Welfare Provision: the Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective  
Paper Presentation- The Forum on Religion, London School of Economics

06/2010  The Politics of Religiously Motivated Welfare Provision  
Paper presentation- Economic Sociology, Political Economy Summer School, Sciences Po Paris

02/2010  State, Religion and Social Policy in Turkey  
Invited talk- Religious Studies Colloquium at Ruhr University Bochum
Diverse roles of faith based organizations in the Muslim and Christian contexts– A comparison of Britain and Turkey
Paper Presentation- ARNOVA 38th Annual Conference ‘Philanthropy in Communities Finding Opportunities in Crises’- Cleveland USA

A Critical analysis of Diffusion of Social Exclusion Discourse
Paper Presentation- HWK Conference ‘Inclusion and Exclusion in Contemporary Europe’, Delmenhorst- Germany

Towards a common European Social Policy Discourse?
Paper Presentation- 2nd ECPR Graduate Conference - Barcelona, Spain

Conference Appearances

07/2010 9th International Conference of the International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR), Istanbul
11/2009 38th Annual Conference of the Association for Research on the Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA), Cleveland
08/2008 2nd Annual Graduate Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Barcelona
09/2006 4th Annual Conference of the European Network for Social Policy Analysis (ESPaNet), Bremen

Participation in Summer Schools

06/2010 MPIfG Summer School on “Economic Sociology, Political Economy”, Sciences Po, Paris
07/2008 Central European University Summer School on “Religion and Politics”, Budapest
03/2008 Bremen Graduate School of Social Sciences Summer School on “Quantitative and Qualitative Methodology”, Bremen
Research Interests

Comparative Social Policy  State-Religion Relations
Historical Sociology  Civil Society
Political Economy  Welfare State

Skills

Languages:  Turkish: native  English: fluent  German: intermediate

PC knowledge:  Microsoft Office (Word, Excel, PowerPoint); Internet; SPSS

Fellowships and Awards:

10/2007-12/2010  Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Germany
Dissertation Fellowship

08/2005- 06/2007  German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)
Scholarship for the M.A. Program at Jacobs University Bremen

07/2005  Heinrich Boll Foundation
Awarded to attend to Joint Conference on Globalization,
organized by Free University Berlin and Middle East Technical
University

07/2004- 08/2004  Middle East Technical University
Awarded to attend the "Program on American college English"
at Pitzer College, California, USA

Referees:

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Streeck
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
E-mail: ws@mpifg.de

Prof. Dr. Ayse Bugra
Bogazici University Social Policy Forum
E-mail: bugray@boun.edu.tr