Universität zu Köln

Alos-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon (2014). Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures. Games Econ. Behav., 87. S. 397 - 412. SAN DIEGO: ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE. ISSN 1090-2473

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Abstract

We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. In the presence of information spillovers, we provide a condition on the network structure that guarantees the emergence of efficient conventions. In contrast, if this condition is violated we will observe inefficient conventions, even in the presence of information spillovers. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Alos-Ferrer, Carlos UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Weidenholzer, Simon UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-429620
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.013
Journal or Publication Title:	Games Econ. Behav.
Volume:	87
Page Range:	S. 397 - 412
Date:	2014
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
Place of Publication:	SAN DIEGO
ISSN:	1090-2473
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language LOCAL INTERACTION; EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION; WEAKEST-LINK; GAMES; PLAY Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/42962