Universität zu Köln

Doerrenberg, Philipp, Duncan, Denvil, Fuest, Clemens and Peichl, Andreas (2014). Nice Guys Finish Last: Do Honest Taxpayers Face Higher Tax Rates? Kyklos, 67 (1). S. 29 - 54. HOBOKEN: WILEY. ISSN 1467-6435

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between tax morale' and tax policy. Using a unique cross-country data set based on the World Values Survey and the World Tax Indicators, we find that income groups with high tax morale face higher average and marginal tax rates. We propose three possible mechanisms which could help to explain our results: i) an inverse elasticity argument where governments seek to minimize distortions, ii) a political economy argument where governments take voting behavior into account, and iii) an administrative costs argument where taxing high morale groups is more cost efficient.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Doerrenberg, Philipp UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Duncan, Denvil UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Fuest, Clemens UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Peichl, Andreas UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-447981
DOI:	10.1111/kykl.12042
Journal or Publication Title:	Kyklos
Volume:	67
Number:	1
Page Range:	S. 29 - 54
Date:	2014
Publisher:	WILEY
Place of Publication:	HOBOKEN
ISSN:	1467-6435
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language WELFARE-STATE; MORALE; EVASION; VARIABLES; REFORM; IMPACT; TRUST Multiple languages Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/44798