Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013). Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered. Econ. Lett., 121 (3). S. 533 - 537. LAUSANNE: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA. ISSN 1873-7374

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Abstract

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment if and only if both tasks are successful. Yet, if the government has only a limited budget, it may be optimal to separate the tasks, so that there are two contractors each in charge of one task. In this case, high efforts in both tasks can be implemented with smaller bonus payments. (C) 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Schmitz, Patrick W.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-470476
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.015
Journal or Publication Title: Econ. Lett.
Volume: 121
Number: 3
Page Range: S. 533 - 537
Date: 2013
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
Place of Publication: LAUSANNE
ISSN: 1873-7374
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPSMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/47047

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