Linguistic and conceptual structures
in
the Beaver (Athapascan) mental lexicon

A study of body part terms
and emotion expressions

vorgelegt von

Carolina Pasamonik

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1. INTRODUCTION

Cognitive linguistics focuses on the interrelation between language and thought processes: cognitive structures of language play an important role in the approaches subsumed under this discipline of linguistics. It aims at understanding how conceptualization is reflected in linguistic expressions and how both influence each other (Langacker 1987, Lakoff 1987, Croft & Cruse 2004, Cruse 2006, Evans & Green 2006).

Figurative language offers a complex area for investigation and many cognitive theories concentrate on these semantic phenomena to describe the underlying cognitive mechanisms and their relations. The fields of emotions, personality traits and similar abstract concepts of our psychological world constitute an important topic (Kövecses 2000, Evans & Green 2006). In these universal concepts, embodiment and cultural models as relevant underlying cognitive mechanisms are combined in a particular way and reflect their interrelations in linguistic realizations.

Body part terms and their inclusion in figurative expressions of emotion in the Beaver (Athapascan) language are the topic of the present work. It is a contribution to the description of the Beaver language. It also contributes to the discussion about conceptual networks of polysemous lexical items, especially about concepts of body part terms. The Theory of Conceptual Metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2007, 2010) is applied with modifications and in combination with other frameworks (Evans 2006, Glucksberg et al. 1997). Research on these topics is often conducted on well-known languages, so the Beaver data will provide additional material for further theoretical examination. It is the first investigation of semantic and conceptual networks and structures in the Beaver mental lexicon.

The data presented are taken from the Beaver corpus[1] compiled as part of the DoBeS documentation project funded by the VW foundation. The whole documentation collection is archived and accessible at the MPI in Nijmegen (Netherlands).

1.1. AIMS OF THE THESIS

This thesis contemplates linguistic and conceptual structures of semantically complex networks of body part terms in the Beaver mental lexicon. In accordance with the cognitive linguistics approach, it will concentrate on non-literal and figurative usages of the lexical items, and on access to the relations between literal and intended figurative meanings. Especially, the underlying concepts and conceptual aspects highlighted in the different senses in semantically and conceptually complex meanings will be investigated.

The aims and goals of the investigations of concepts in relation to lexical items are defined as following:

> "[...] conceptual approach to word meaning takes seriously the goal of explaining speakers' behavior, and so it attempts to define the knowledge (mental representation) that underlies the significance of words and sentences" (Murphy 2005: 269).

But how can concepts as mental phenomena be accessed, by linguists as well as by speakers? How can they be described without any direct point of contact? Cognitive linguistics provides some accounts of how to investigate and how to deal with concepts. Although no ubiquitous methodology has been established so far, there is common consent concerning empirically based

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[1] I am grateful to all speakers who shared their knowledge of the Beaver language with us. For further information on this project and full acknowledgements see www.mpi.nl/dobes/projects/beaver. See also Jung et al. 2004-present.

evidence: linguistic data is needed to support theoretical assumptions and findings – not only from well-known Indo-European languages, but from as many language families as available.

As a contribution, Beaver figurative expressions of emotion containing specific body part terms are investigated here: constructions like *sadzéé' xaats'at* "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)" and *sįįdyíí' natlǫ* "I worry (lit. my minds are lots)" constitute linguistic and conceptual forms focused on. The domains of body parts as well as of emotions and personality traits as related mental phenomena are chosen as main topics for several reasons. First, body parts constitute a basic semantic domain. The individual body part (and organ) terms described here show complex, experientially and socio-culturally influenced networks including several otherwise unrelated semantic frames. Second, the abstract domain of emotions and personality traits is a highly relevant topic in cognitive linguistics. Standardized accounts and methodology for description and analysis are further elaborated (Dirven & Pörings 2003, Kövecses 1986, 1988, 2000; Kövecses & Csábi 2009). Finally, both domains – body parts and emotions[2] – are directly linked via linguistic inclusion of body part terms in expressions of emotion. The underlying conceptualization patterns and the polysemous networks of the linguistic material reveal complex interrelations and correspondences of conceptual parts found in both domains.

The aims of the examination are twofold: first, the underlying conceptualizations of the body part terms (for example, *-dzéé* "heart" and *-tsíí* "head") are investigated. This is done in order to describe the relations between the basic meanings and the non-literal and figurative senses. Second, the meanings and conceptual build-up of the complex emotion constructions are examined with respect to the conceptual aspects of the attributed characteristics

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[2] In the remainder of this thesis, the term "emotion" will be used for short to also comprise and mean personality traits and related psychological states and characteristics.

focused on. Forms with intransitive stative verbs like *sadzéé' nakǫįl* "I am sad, I worry (lit. my heart is heavy)" or with motion verbs like *madzéé' dah'atl'is* "be excited / scared (lit. his/her heart is dancing)" constitute the type of data analyzed here. The interaction between embodied experiences and cultural models plays a relevant role. As causing structures for the conceptualizations of the body parts and of the intended emotions and personality traits, both phenomena – embodiment and culture – constitute the reason and substructure for conceptual and finally linguistic patterns. Furthermore, cultural models are linked to language and thought via bidirectional relations: they determine conceptualizations and lexicalizations, but are also influenced by linguistic patterns and existing concepts (Wierzbicka 1997).

Conceptualizations of figurative forms are not directly accessible, so that inferences have to be made on the basis of linguistic structure. Here, it becomes apparent that the relationships between linguistic and conceptual structure is not a one-to-one relationship. Rather, one linguistic construction pattern can result from different underlying cognitive configurations. Therefore, the usage of linguistic evidence is accompanied by giving consideration to several alternative theoretical models of conceptualization and to the notions of lexicalization, conventionalization and economy of language.

Furthermore, metalinguistic statements are included as additional validation when available. Native speakers are able to realize conceptual and linguistic patterns to some extent which at least partially determine their way of talking about the world. On the other hand, they are not immediately and automatically aware of every figurative form conventionalized in their language. The expressions of emotion containing body part terms reveal that conventionalized linguistic patterns for meaning creation, but also established socio-cultural aspects, obscure and complicate access to figurativity (Holland & Quinn 1987). Conceptual patterns and mechanisms like polysemy, metonymy and metaphor are not directly or consciously available either, especially in natural

language use and communication. Relationships between literal and intended meanings, as well as between concepts and their linguistic manifestations partially allow for realization and discussion. Being informed and aware of idiosyncratic figurative phrases in one's own native language, speakers use their intuitions and knowledge about their language and parts of the underlying models to understand and explain how such linguistic realizations of emotion concepts work. These metalinguistic statements constitute important indications of linguistic and conceptual forms. Therefore, they are included in the analysis of the parts of the Beaver corpus dealing with the meanings and usages of the body part terms.

1.2. METHODOLOGY & STRUCTURE

A set of selected body part terms constitutes the main data in this work. These lexical forms are presented in their semantic and conceptual networks, reflecting their meaning components as well as their different senses and usages. The conceptual aspects which are used as points of departure for the derived meanings are discussed in detail, since they reveal the diverse ways which lead to the establishment of non-literal and figurative senses and allow for an analysis of their conceptual structures.

In most of the networks investigated here, the domain of emotions is included, i.e. specific conceptual aspects of the body part terms are incorporated in concepts of, for example, ANGER, FEAR or STUBBORNNESS via the usage of the lexemes. The conceptualizations of these figurative constructions form the second topic. For cognitive theories, these expressions constitute special challenges due to their complex forms which do not directly express the intended target but implicitly refer to a relationship between some specific state or activity of a body part (or SEAT OF EMOTION) and the emotion or personality trait to be actually expressed.

Besides the conceptual make-up of the body part terms, the realization of the verbal meanings in relation to the body part terms as subjects is discussed. The figurative meanings of the emotion expressions on the one hand reflect embodiment and cultural models as determining factors in the conceptualization processes. On the other hand, they reveal the complexities of the relationships between (similar) linguistic forms and (diverse) underlying structures.

To describe and investigate the different senses and usages of polysemous lexemes, Langacker's Network Model (1987, 1990) is applied. This allows for the identification of the relationships holding between the various meanings, and the underlying conceptual structures and frames included in such complex meaning networks.

Consequently, it is embedded in the holistic approaches (Jackendoff 1983, 2007, Lakoff 1987) as opposed to two-level models preferred by Bierwisch (1982, 1983) and others (e.g. Lang 1990, 1991). This means that no distinction will be made between world or encyclopedic knowledge on the one hand and linguistic or semantic knowledge on the other. Furthermore, language and cognition are realized as closely associated and corresponding. Thus, language does not constitute an autonomous system in cognition, but rather an open subsystem of knowledge, which includes all kinds of information from diverse experiences and knowledge. Still, linguistic evidence is used carefully since linguistic structures as realizations of conceptual processes differ from these underlying structures. Correspondingly, similar linguistic forms result from differing conceptualizations.

For the discussion about which conceptual mechanisms are at work, i.e. how the meanings under discussion are created, which conceptual parts are used and how different domains are combined, the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2010) is integrated and discussed in detail. For the description of the conceptual constructions of individual expressions of emotion, this approach provides an

important starting point and theoretical background. In addition, other frameworks are integrated to capture the relevance of language use and language-specific structure for meaning creation. It will be shown that conceptual metaphor plays a role for the concept SEAT OF EMOTION of the body part terms. For the complex emotion expressions, conceptual metonymy is presumed as the main device. Furthermore, an intermediate level of "linguistic conceptualization" is defined to explain the non-prototypical usage of lexical material, especially the verbs and stative verbs in combination with body part subjects. It will be argued that shared conceptual aspects found in the abstract target concepts and in the source domain (as the prototypical context of the verbal meanings) are extracted and realized as linking features between these concepts. This is combined with discussions about the view that conceptual metaphor is not the only structure underlying linguistic metaphors (Grady 1999, Glucksberg et al. 1997, Evans 2006, 2010a). Linguistic mechanisms also create and affect polysemous meanings and figurative language.

To sum up, the research topics of this work are the following:

- conceptualization of body part terms in Beaver: what do the semantic networks look like?
- description of the cognitive mechanisms giving rise to the distinct meanings
- awareness of Beaver speakers of the relationships holding between the different senses of the polysemous body part terms
- conceptualization of linguistic metaphors expressing emotions: what are the underlying conceptual strategies?
- roles of conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy in the individual idiomatic expressions
- role of the mental lexicon, linguistic structure and language use
- interplay of linguistic and cultural knowledge

The structure of this paper is as follows. The interplay of culture, language and thought is discussed in chapter 2: the notion of cultural models is introduced in chapter 2.1., followed by a description of the mental lexicon and its relationship to cultural models (2.2.). Its structural organization including polysemy and the conceptual ingredients are focused on in chapter 2.3. Chapter 3 comprises a delineation of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT): literal and figurative meanings, embodiment and cognitive models (ch. 3.1.) constitute important concepts for the specific data. After defining conceptual metaphor and metonymy in the subchapters 3.2 and 3.3., recent developments in metaphor research and other approaches to figurative language are presented in combination with the examination of specific aspects of the CMT (ch. 3.4.).

After an introduction to the Beaver language and a description of the linguistic and metalinguistic data (ch. 4), the Beaver data is presented in chapter 5. First, each body part term under discussion is presented as a complex network of interrelated meanings and conceptualizations. The usage of these lexical items in expressions of emotions are introduced in a descriptive fashion in the subsections of chapter 5. In chapters 6.1. and 6.2., problematic theoretical considerations of the CMT are discussed. The conceptualizations underlying the linguistic constructions are described with the notion of "linguistic conceptualization" (ch. 6.3.). Thereafter, the data are not divided with respect to the included body part terms, but analyzed according to linguistic patterns (6.5. & 6.6.). The empirical and theoretical sections are combined in a modified approach to conceptualization, non-literal and figurative language and the relationships between them. In the last sections, topics for further research brought up in the present work are presented.

2. CULTURAL MODELS & THE MENTAL LEXICON

Investigating cultures and the relationship between language and culture often feels like starting out on a bold venture. In cognitive linguistics as well as in anthropology, various theoretical frameworks have elaborated models to grasp the complex notion of culture in relation to linguistic structures (Holland & Quinn 1987, Geertz 1973, Kachru & Kahane 1995, Palmer 1996, Jackendoff 2007). The mental lexicon of a language opens one door for investigating how the links between cognition, knowledge organization and communication are intertwined (Aitchison 2003, Wierzbicka 1992, 1997). In the following chapter, theoretical concepts relevant for the description of the body part terms in the Beaver mental lexicon will be introduced and discussed. After a classification of the notions of culture and knowledge in relation to language, cultural models are defined (ch. 2.1.1.). Then, the mental lexicon will be discussed, defining meanings and concepts and how these can be examined in relation to cultural models (ch. 2.2.). Finally, polysemy, figurative extensions and the resulting network design of lexicon structures are introduced (ch. 2.3.).

2.1. CULTURE, LANGUAGE & KNOWLEDGE

The cognitive linguistics approach allows for, or even claims the interrelation of linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge, defining meanings as parts of the cognitive system directly linked to language use (Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1988, Evans & Green 2006). For example, the meaning of the lexeme "heart" is assumed to be represented as the concept of HEART established via everyday experiences through time in a speech community. It includes – besides linguistic features – all kinds of information usually not considered to be

linguistic. Two-level advocates (e.g. Bierwisch 1982, Bierwisch & Lang 1987, Lang 1991) – stating that the level of linguistic knowledge is divided from the level of conceptual knowledge (Schwarz 2005: 281) – criticize this inclusion of "non-definitional information". They deny the point of realizing that the latter knowledge is indeed linguistically relevant, especially for figurative language or socio-culturally based usages, as will be seen throughout this work. As semantic units, meanings of lexemes are parts of cognitive domains, and thus fully involved in the cognitive system without constituting an independent mental structure. Encyclopedic knowledge therefore is an essential part of the mental lexicon, together with linguistic knowledge located at the level of conceptual structure.

People take their culture and language with their categorizations of the world for granted, i.e. not like products for understanding the world. Rather, they are understood as tools to think and talk about reality just as it is. This is due to the fact that the whole speech community – as communication partners – shares this model and acts according to it, in general behavior and in linguistic behavior (Holland & Quinn 1987, Wierzbicka 1997). Speakers acquire and use their native language, and with it the concepts and classifications included. They usually do not challenge how the world around them is affected and regulated by their speech. Since speakers use language first and foremost to communicate with each other, and not for consciously organizing the world or for being aware of each linguistic feature and its function, certain aspects remain subconscious. The mutual power of socio-culturally influenced exposure to the world and the way of talking about it is similar to the hen and the egg paradox. The linguistic classifications are indeed created by the speakers and their attempts to categorize the world around them. Yet, speakers are not conscious of their influence on their language as well as of the linguistic impact on their cultural concepts (Palmer 1996, Wierzbicka 1999).

The (bidirectional) dependencies as well as the mutual interactions between language and culture determine to what extent culture is included in meaning creation. They also affect how speakers realize cultural influences in talking about the world and the things in it. Moreover, cultures influence the organization and structuring of linguistic manifestations, resulting in variation in the classifications and semantic and conceptual networks in the languages of the world. To quote Geertz:

> "[Culture] [...] denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life" (1973: 89).

This definition could be used for language as well as for culture. As will be seen throughout this thesis and in detail in chapter 5, language, and foremost the lexicon in use with its fixed expressions, figurative language, and collocations, provides evidence for the reality of culture. It is exactly here that specific ideas, concepts, and relations are stored in an easily accessible form. At the same time, other ideas have not been considered worth lexicalization. Thus, investigating the semantics of a language contributes to the understanding of cultural meanings. Furthermore, it accounts for the implicit suppositions which are connected to them and which are implicitly understood by the community members, but not accessible to outsiders. To use Sapir's words: "Vocabulary is a very sensitive index of the culture of a people" (Mandelbaum (ed.) 1949: 27). Moreover, both language and culture are historically transmitted systems, and both show flexibility, and heterogeneity. There is one significant difference between the two: while cultures must be able to adapt to quickly changing conditions or environments instantaneously, languages need and do not without some time lag. Instead, linguistic meanings are extended or modified in the long-term. First, they mimic the known (past) reality, before modified meanings are

conventionalized and truly come to refer to the entities or ideas now found in one's culture.

There exists a common basis for experiencing the world determined by human perceptiveness, and the experiences we are able to have. This is subsumed under the notion of "embodiment" (see ch. 2.1.1. below and ch. 3.1.2.). From here on, variation appears due to differing individual experiences with the adjacencies, and diverse living conditions. These give rise to varying conceptualizations, and varying needs for certain expressions and lexicalizations, while other ideas, activities or entities are not realized as significant enough for being memorized in fixed expressions in the lexicon. In short, there are some meanings linguistically encoded in one culture or community, but not in others. These differences are grounded in cultural models as assumptions and ways of thinking (see ch. 2.1.1. below) in relation to various environmental settings and differently realized experiences. The similarities found in many languages and cultures, on the other hand, mirror the universality of human conceptualization patterns. Equivalently, Wierzbicka (1997) state that linguistic universals provide the common groundwork from which variation found in the world's languages (and cultures) is developed. Consequently, studying one of these two sides will also lead to a better understanding of the other one. If we comprehend forms, functions, and patterns of universals, we are able to infer characteristics of the culturally shaped variations found worldwide, and vice versa.

2.1.1. CULTURAL MODELS

For further investigation of the relationship between culture and language, or the role cultural aspects play in the organization of meaning, the concept of "cultural models" (Holland & Quinn 1987) has been established. The aspects described below are similar to Lakoff's "universal cognitive models" presented

in chapter 3.1.3., emphasizing the relationships holding between cultural models and linguistic and cognitive structures.

Cultural models show characteristics which both advance and complicate meaning availability and accessibility. Before these are presented, the notion of "embodiment" – discussed in more detail in chapter 3.1.2. – is briefly introduced as a similarly relevant and influential factor.

Embodiment includes all interaction with the world, i.e. observation of and experience with physical objects, our body and events in the world. This is contrary to principles like the mind-body-dualism proposed by rationalist approaches like Generative theory advocated by Chomsky and others. Cognitive linguistics denies the idea that language can be investigated without reference to the human body and the consequences following due to the way we experience the world. Therefore, cognitive linguistic approaches investigate cognition and language against the background of embodiment (Gibbs 2003, Evans & Green 2006). This is bound to the hypothesis that our understanding of reality is affected by our bodily conditions. Accordingly, it contradicts objectivist definitions of language as a tool for an objective description of the world. Reality is not objectively perceived by humans. Rather, it is construed according to our physical capabilities or facilities, also including our neurological organization. An obvious example is presented by our visual system with three different color channels as opposed to other species whose physical build constitutes two or four photo-receptors. The "reality" we see, i.e. visually perceive, is – even if only to some degree – a different one than other organisms realize. Such bodily features correlate with more abstract cognitive aspects, since such experiences are cognitively processed.

Embodied experience constitutes a major reason for conceptual correspondences. For example, a person bodily experiences warmth when the first caretaker holds her/him near, but also when s/he takes care of her/him in other ways or, in other words, shows affection for that person. This first

embodied experience of affection leads to a conception of affection which includes warmth (Kövecses 2000: 93). How this experience is further conceptualized and included in linguistic structure will be discussed in chapter 3.

Cultural models include cultural knowledge accumulated by many generations via numerous experiences, and also include knowledge about linguistic behavior and language in general. Patterns for communication, such as when to talk, how to talk to whom in which situations and so on, are compiled in the cultural system as well as knowledge about meanings and usages. Every culture, or every community experiences the world around itself in slightly different ways. To a certain extent, different groups have different experiences by virtue of unequal environments and living conditions. For example, a community living in the mountains makes other experiences concerning sun movement, day and nighttime, distances, and horizontal as well as vertical axes than communities living alongshore in plain areas. This example only reflects a few geographical aspects, but climate, nutrition, neighboring communities, etc. all exert influence on how reality is realized in a group (Wierzbicka 1992). The different conceptualizations are not only a result of direct environment, but also of the exposure to it. There are differences in how experience is put into words, how and how often these words are used, and to what extent they are conventionalized, lexicalized, grammaticalized, and readily available. As Locke puts it:

> "[communities, CP], by their customs and manner of life, have found occasion to make several complex ideas, and given names to them, which others never collected into specific ideas." (2004 [1690]: 31)

A first indication that such a model is not simply a mirroring of the world is the fact that there may exist several, alternative models, intra- and inter-

culturally.[3] The availability of other models alludes to the fact that there may be some inconsistencies. Yet, these do not lead to abandonment of the whole model system, but to the existence of alternatives for cases where an existing and established model does not fit. This could be called a case of subconscious acknowledgement that the cultural model is just a model, and not a one-to-one copy of the existing world. Still, speakers do not switch consciously to an alternative model when they realize that the other one does not fit. Due to the incoherence, cultural models are better understood as numerous domains of diverse culturally shared schematizations, designed for the performance of (cognitive) activities (Holland & Quinn 1987).

Cultural models emerge parallel to an individual society as a whole, and the same holds for their "intrinsic persuasiveness" (Holland & Quinn 1987: 9). They are hierarchically organized, in the sense that one may be partially used in a more general one or vice versa, following the rule "what people need to know in order to say the things they say" (Holland & Quinn 1987: 5). Furthermore, cultural models have a subtle character, appearing in nearly every marginal aspect of life, but also in important cultural domains like marriage or politeness. Here, both linguistic as well as non-linguistic aspects of action and behavior are meant. Community members are born into societies which already act in accordance with their traditional models, leading to a kind of subliminal, natural, and indirect set of instructions. Members gain insight into the cultural knowledge and socially required behavior stored in these cultural models. Hutchins calls this phenomenon "referential transparency": "Once learned, it becomes what one *sees with*, but seldom what one *sees*." (1980: 12) However, these models are also challenged by the community members, leading to a co-existence of alternative, sometimes even conflicting models which indeed may exist adjacently.

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[3] One example are western societies which are on the one hand science-oriented and on the other religion-based.

Cultural models as defined here are not to be paralleled with expert or scientific models which are required to be completely coherent. Instead, they show inconsistencies, and contradictory aspects. These are used whenever one model does not fit or explain a certain phenomenon in a useful way. Also, models may in some situations be abandoned in favor of other, more adequate ones. To sum up, cultural models encompass a huge amount of expertise and cultural knowledge, but the whole system is variable and not always coherent, showing other characteristics than scientific theories.

2.1.2. CONTEXT

In this section, several levels of context are presented, the importance of which is reflected in language use (Leckie-Tarry 1995, Evans 2010b): as Evans points out, figurative language is not exclusively processed in our cognitive system, but is also affected by the usage of linguistic structures in communication. Therefore, linguistic and non-linguistic contexts are briefly introduced.

In cognitive linguistics approaches, the role of several levels of context is assumed to be fundamental. Despite the heuristic importance of Saussure's distinction between 'langue' (competence) and 'parole' (performance), the investigation of language in use and context is advocated here. It is oriented towards speakers' definition of language as a communication tool and thus used in real situations by individual language users. As Kress & Hodge (1979:13) put it: "without immediate and direct relations to the social context, the forms and functions of language are not fully explicable". Moreover, language is bound to social interaction, allowing the exchange of experiences and knowledge in the social reality of a community. This social reality is "not a 'fact', but an ongoing accomplishment, the often precarious result of the routine activities and tacit understandings of social actors" (Giglioli 1972: 13).

To explain the diverse relationships holding between the different levels of context, the concept of schemata was introduced to the scope of context interpretation (e.g. Dijk & Kintsch 1983). Schemata are defined as

"[…] a valuable means of explaining the relationship between the various levels of context and providing an explanation of the means of access from one level of situation to another, from one knowledge system to another" (Leckie-Tarry 1995:22).

This enables speakers to interpret texts, and to trigger and deduce missing information. Widdowson (1983) emphasizes the cognitive nature of schemata or "frames of reference" (1983: 91), as they provide for the organization of knowledge in long-term memory. Moreover, they allow for predictions via their stereotypic images which are imposed on actual situations to ease their understanding and their classification in existing and known patterns.

The relationships between the different levels of context play an essential role. For example, the context of a situation is dependent on existing schemata with which former situations have been experienced, thus, the cultural context is needed for providing an appropriate pattern. Furthermore, such a pattern is modified whenever new situations are included, so that the context of culture is constantly adjusted, procuring assimilated patterns for new situations which in turn are processed against the slightly changed cultural background knowledge.

Cultural context is a level – alternatively termed "Members' Resources" by Fairclough (1989:141) – which includes intricate and extensively structured knowledge organized in an overall system which enables the creation and interpretation of meaning. This level contains schematic, actual knowledge about the world, about (physical) processes and phenomena, about one's language etc. Experiences made by the community, and the structured processing of them, are represented in this knowledge: "[I]t refers to the factual, institutional and ideological background knowledge prevalent within any society or culture [...]"

(Leckie-Tarry 1995: 23), thus constituting the knowledge resources of a community. Furthermore, knowledge of semantic relations and their organization is detached from specific texts, and stored in an independent, abstracted way. In other words, knowledge of how the linguistic stock of one's language is organized, and how to use this stock, is subsumed in this contextual category.[4]

2.2. THE MENTAL LEXICON

In this subchapter, the mental lexicon will be described in relation to cultural models and communication. Prior to that, the basic phenomena – i.e. concept, word, meaning – are introduced.

2.2.1. CONCEPTS

Concepts are mental representations of concrete objects, abstract phenomena and their classifications. It is important to draw a distinction between words and lexical items on the one hand and concepts on the other. Lexical entries are linked to conceptual memory, but they should not be understood as the linguistic equivalents of concepts. They are evoked by words or other lexical forms, but they are not intrinsically linguistic. Thus, there exist concepts that are not involved in word meanings at all, and thus do not show any direct links to linguistic forms. Rather, they are structural elements of human

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[4] Another important area are traditional stories and narratives which show links to cultural models which to a certain degree constitute and modify meanings, and include meanings and concepts in contexts which may help to understand the relations between older and newer meanings. Statements like "we need a teacher", "those older people would have known", or "I lost my mom early so she couldn't tell me all these things" (all answers to linguistic questions about linguistic structure, not, for example, culture or tradition) clearly indicate that besides cultural and world knowledge linguistic and conceptual knowledge is also transmitted over generations.

cognition, organizing our cognitive system. As cognitive structures they represent our knowledge of the world, and they guide our thoughts about and interactions with the world (Frawley 2005). The whole conceptual system may be defined as patterns of ontological categories for processing and classifying of our environment, and transmitting between language and world (Sambor 2005). Concepts are results of mental processing and are organized in conceptual groups as result of experiences. Established concepts are not individual, independent, and unlinked categories to think with. Rather, the occur in linked schematic patterns – worked out of the 'world's chaos' via abstracting away from minor differences –, interrelated with similar as well as opposite concepts and resulting in a hierarchy of salience and embeddedness. Therefore, concepts structure experience by establishing reoccurring patterns or similarities, leading to more abstract schemas. These again, can be "filled" by individual instances of new (combined) experiences and their linguistic manifestations.

Furthermore, concepts do not constitute primitives or single simple meanings. Again, this is due to the fact that their meaningful function results from their systematic organization, i.e. the relations to all other concepts within the knowledge system:

> "Their meaning consists in their position within the cognitive grid, at the same time determining the function of a semantic category in terms of its linguistic manifestations." (Zelinsky-Wibbelt 1993)

The hierarchical structure of conceptual networks spreads out in both vertical and horizontal dimensions, providing for dependent, embedded or dominant levels as well as for similarity, or paradigmatic levels (Zwitserlood 2005, Langacker 1988). 'Families of concepts' arise from this organization, smaller networks again structured according to their parts as well as to other families. The crucial point is not all that members of such families are necessarily linked to a (or the) common semantic core, i.e. one stereotypical, prototypical,

ideal or best member. Instead, members may show connections to other, more similar parts of the family, while links to the most salient member become indirect, via intermediate links to other members of similar salience. This will be seen in more detail in chapter 5.1., where derived meanings are established on the basis of other derived, non-prototypical senses.

That "there are not always one-to-one correspondences between conceptual and lexical units" (Zwitserlood 2005: 104), becomes apparent regarding polysemous instances which evoke conceptual aspects of the literal as well as the intended figurative meaning of lexical material. As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.7., the Beaver body part term -*dzéé* "heart" constitutes a lexical entry point to a complex conceptual network with several senses and conceptual domains. Besides the specific conceptualization of the body part term as SEAT OF EMOTION in the target meaning of, for example, *sadzéé' xááts'at* "I am angry (my heart falls out)", the literal and basic meaning (i.e. the concrete conceptual aspect BODY PART) is available in metalinguistic discussions about this idiomatic expression. Concepts are abstract phenomena to which we have only restricted and indirect access. Hence, linguistic forms are most often considered and examined in order to grasp the underlying representations. Yet, their meanings already show diversity and evoke numerous conceptual domains. The conceptual network of a polysemous lexical item therefore includes interrelated concepts which play various roles in the conceptualization and interpretation of the intended meanings. For example, in English, we find several lexical items linked to the concept of ANGER, so that here many lexical constructions (e.g. "rage, fury, incensement, ire, wrath", but also "fume, boil, simmer, explode", etc.) refer to or display one concept. On the other hand, a lexeme like "head" is included in and linked to several conceptual domains (e.g. BODY, LEADERSHIP, FORCE, HEIGHT, BASE, etc.).

2.2.2. LEXEMES & MEANINGS

In cognitive linguistics, a lexeme or linguistic unit is paralleled with a mental unit, standing in relationships to other, linguistic as well as conceptual, units, and creating a kind of lexical and conceptual network in long-term memory (Schindler 2005). The lexicon is realized as one pole of a continuum, of which grammar constitutes the other pole. Both ends include symbolic units, the lexicon specified symbols (words) and the grammar schematic units or "established patterns" (Schindler 2005). Words are defined as conventionalized relations between phonological, syntactic (or combinatory) and conceptual information ("sound-grammar-meaning triples") (Zwitserlood 2005: 103); the interfaces of these three are then captured and managed by the lexicon (Frawley 2005).

Lexical item are defined as basic and fixed linguistic units in competence, while words are interpreted as an uttered part in communication situations in performance. Both are not just independent items, rather they constitute a "family of related meaning-form pairs" (Zwitserlood 2005: 103).

Meanings are defined as 'mental representational units' (Schwarz 2005: 279) of conceptual structure. To understand and use for example the Beaver verb *xáá-'ah* which can be roughly translated as "start/open" in English, a speaker needs to have knowledge about the different activities involved in the act denoted by the lexeme and defined by socio-cultural conventions. Therefore, the interpretation of a linguistic form is typically interconnected with conceptual knowledge in an inseparable way. Speakers have to rely on their knowledge about (and conceptualization of) the world and about the language as well as about the code of the statement. In Beaver, the form *xáá-'ah* "start/open" shows a different semantic and conceptual structure than for example the English equivalents, as is reflected by the following usages and collocations:

(1) *médzine*   *xáádyįį'ah*   "turn on the radio"

(2) *tsatsónét'a*   *xáádyįį'ah*   "turn on / pre-heat the oven"

(3) *adéé'ǫ*   *xáádyįį'ah*   "open the door"[5]

This makes perfect sense, keeping in mind that languages offer ways of talking about the world which differ in many degrees. Hence, encyclopedic knowledge – as the basis of the projected mental mirror of the unorganized world outside – must be related to the linguistic realizations or manifestations of the underlying conceptualization patterns.

To use Murphy's example, the meaning of the English phrase "be treated like a dog" (Murphy 2005: 271) does not refer to essential definitional aspects of the meaning of DOG. Nevertheless, the expression allows for insight into socio-cultural aspects of the speech community. On the one hand, it reveals the fact that dogs are involved in social life in a specific way in the speech community using such an expression. On the other hand, it uses this encyclopedic knowledge just stated – as a part of the concept of DOG – to express a situation which shows similar cognitive components. It is exactly this combination of knowledge in concepts going beyond the traditional aspects of meaning. It calls for evaluative features of lexical units and for the creation of metaphors or figurative language in general. This also implies that for example, for the Beaver body part term *-dzéé* "heart", discussed in detail in chapter 5.7. The links to emotions and personality traits are not only linguistically established, but also rest on culture-specific knowledge. Thus, non-linguistic or encyclopedic knowledge must be considered in the analysis of language in order to account for all influential aspects.

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[5] Note that the verb stems alters when the meaning implies "open with a key": *méhxadat'áhe'éh xádįǫ.*

The meanings of words are numerous, including different semantic, pragmatic or grammatical contents. They constitute the mental aspects of lexical items which are represented in the lexicon and activated in language processing (Sambor 2005). This mental level is important in a two-fold way, first, meaning may be situated or defined as an aspect between purely lexical phenomena and non-linguistic concepts, acting as a bridge between language and mind (i.e. cognition). How this (in-)direct relationship between lexical material and concepts emerges in linguistic structure and what mechanisms are at work when non-literal meanings are established are some of the questions discussed here. Second, meaning and meaning relations are crucial not only for competence, but also for performance. Thus, they allow for the investigation of the mental lexicon as a conventionalized network. They also enable the exploration of different and differing meanings in language use, where modification of meanings, modulations of new senses, etc. are instantiated.

2.2.2.1. COMMUNICATIVE ASPECTS OF MEANINGS

Meanings of words are often investigated at their structural level, while the examination of their communicative functions in context is often neglected, or at least thrust into the background. The communicative role of meanings is investigated in relation to its generating affects for the usage, processing, and understanding of lexical items. It is assumed that the meanings and weight of a word are developed through time and usage of this word in social, communicative activities (McConnell-Ginet 2008, Evans 2010a). Moreover, as McConnell-Ginet points out: "[...] certain aspects of meaning arise, are sustained, and are sometimes transformed in social practice." (2008: 506). Consequently, meaning is defined as a network of senses and usages which found and maintain the complete complex organization.

McConnell-Ginet defines the concept of "lexical significance" (2008: 499), which goes beyond the notion of lexical meaning and word-meaning pair:

besides the components "semantic representation" and "reference" the additional aspect "conceptual baggage" is included.

Semantic Representation & Reference

Semantic representations subsume all semantically relevant linguistic aspects of a word, so that its argument or event structures, pragmatic characteristics and so on are included under this level. Hence, extension and intension of a word – i.e. relationships to other words as well as its own compositional components – will be found at this level of lexical significance. McConnell-Ginet calls this component "mind-oriented", since the representations are organized in the speakers' minds, and included in the knowledge of a word if fully acquired. However, this does not imply that knowledge of semantic representations is always explicit and directly accessible to speakers.

The second component – reference – has been highlighted by formal semanticists for a long time, focusing on the referential and content aspects meanings show. Indeed, the relations between linguistic forms and the physical entities denoted are essential for systematically communicating about things in the world, but also for expressing abstract concepts like emotions, opinions, etc. As McConnell-Ginet puts it: "Referential meaning embeds language in the rest of life, creating the possibility for socially shared and thereby extended or collectively enriched access to the world" (2008: 510).

Conceptual Baggage

The last component – conceptual baggage – does not constitute a part of the linguistic meaning of a word, but subsumes different kinds of additional aspects which appear when using a lexical item:

"[...] connotations, but also encyclopedic knowledge, stereotypes or prototypes, and background assumptions, as well as knowledge about social practices in the course of which the word gets used." (McConnell-Ginet 2008: 512)

This baggage may have salient communicative impact via the inferences it triggers, which often constitute a salient part of the significance of an utterance. Additionally, the baggage can be compared to the influential character of ideologies, which determine speakers' language and reasoning. It can affect speaker and/or hearer unconsciously, so that some inferences may arise in the hearer without the speaker being aware of them, or which s/he would even reject.[6] Conceptual baggage is neither definable in terms of implicatures nor explicatures, since it is "typically not even meant, much less said" (McConnell-Ginet 2008: 514). Thus, is also not to be included in what the speaker says or what the speaker means. The relevant fact is that this baggage has communicative effects on speakers and hearers:

"[...] there is simply a linguistic trigger that leads a speaker's audience to activate certain background assumptions already in some sense available to them" (McConnell-Ginet 2008: 514)

Conceptual baggage plays an important role concerning the speakers' and hearers' understanding of a lexical item, as well as in semantic changes (Traugott & Dasher 2002). These result in meaning extensions, elaboration, changes in usage and so on. There is no need for conscious realization or awareness on both the speaker's and hearer's sides; the baggage is activated independently of their intentions. Usage in natural contexts (i.e. in discourse) causes the baggage to be linked to a lexical item, implying that cultural and social background aspects play some role in shaping this baggage. Nevertheless, this does not mean

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[6] See Kitzinger (2005) for a detailed study.

that every use in every situation modifies this baggage, since the distribution of influential usage is not "democratically apportioned" (McConnell-Ginet 2008: 515). And the effects are not only those recognizable by the communicating partners, but foremost those which affect subsequent discourses and long-term usages of that word.

Conceptual baggage – although not a part of lexical meaning proper – can influence the usage of expressions, but also meaning extension and further senses or usages of a lexical item. Such aspects are reflected in metalinguistic statements of speakers:

> Consultant101: And that word **t'oits'at** ("s/he is dead"), you know, it sounds like a person just don't care he is dead or not. That's what it sounds like, so it's better for them to say **matl'ǫę' ǫlį** "s/he is dead (lit. her/his end is there)", you know, more polite way.   (metaphors140)

> Consultant505: To me it's just as well say while you're thinking of everything. **xadáá azisé'** ("moose hide"), and "white man's [moose] hide". That sounds like in- it's coming to where you have a camp, and you have tents and tarps. It also is- means that.   (misc_verbs001)

2.2.3. STRUCTURES OF THE MENTAL LEXICON

The mental lexicon is defined as the cognitive organization of the complex structures and relationships holding between concepts of words in the speaker's mind:

> "The mental lexicon, the dynamic organization of words in the mind, is the backbone of language ability, comprising a vast and complex network of mental representations, associations, and processes." (Libben et al. 2011)

The modeling of this phenomenon often applies a network model (e.g. Langacker 1988) to comprehend and visualize the assumed structures of words, meanings and concepts. The mental lexicon is not to be paralleled with a dictionary, the organizations differ in complexity and arrangements. How the mental lexicon works is investigated by linguists and psychologists (Aitchinson 1994, Libben & Jarema 2002): the research questions deal with the retrieval of lexical knowledge, the number of words speakers have (an adult speaker is said to know about 150,000 words), and how they manage to coherently use this huge amount of lexical forms. The complex organization of the mental lexicon is fundamental for such processing operations, since the relationships and various levels allow for the fast applications. What is of special interest in this work, is the organization of lexemes in relation to one another. Furthermore, the focus is on the organization of different meanings of one lexeme, i.e. structures of polysemous networks and how these look like in the mental lexicon.

For the investigation of figurative expressions in a specific language, an overall picture of the corresponding semantic and conceptual networks of meanings stored in the mental lexicon provides a salient superstructure. This is especially true if this language is not analyzed in as much detail as linguistically well described languages like English or German. Semantic shifts, kinds of polysemy, and transferred meanings arise in relation to language-internal linguistic patterns and meaning relationships. Semantic and lexical networks are structures one needs to comprehend in order to understand how non-literal and figurative meanings and usages made their way into conventionalized language use.

In this work, parts of the Beaver lexicon will be described and examined as parts of the mental lexicon. This means that mental representations, organization of meanings and corresponding conceptualizations and conceptualization patterns are included and focused on. This seems to be a favorable approach for the aims of this thesis, which are to understand the

structure and organization of the mental lexicon. This especially holds for non-literal and figurative meanings and the relations to their literal pendants, patterns of non-literal and figurative language, their relation to the world, to cognition and conceptualization and their accessibility for native language users. To give an example, in figure 2.1., the polysemous network of the lexical item *-zís* "skin/hide" is presented as part of the mental lexicon of Beaver speakers:

The notion of a mental lexicon – as well as the cognitive linguistics approach used here – already implies that lexical and mental units have to be considered to complete the picture. Yet, to equate lexical units with mental units is not enough, since this locates lexical entries deeper in the mental world of speakers, but does not bring us closer to its nature. The idea to parallel lexical units with mental units mainly emphasizes the fact that linguistic expressions are essentially linked to mental processes, and that language constitutes a part of our cognition, without being divided from it or creating an independent subsystem within it. Hence, to investigate linguistic networks, one should keep in mind that these systems are rooted in an overall cognitive system, and that both interact with each other on diverse levels. What such relations and interdependencies look like, is one of the great questions of cognitive linguistics (and psychology) still to be answered. This work discusses some of these aspects, and offers empirical evidence for prevailing theoretical assumptions.

Figure 2.1.: conceptual network of *-zís* "skin/hide".

The mental lexicon of a language is defined not only as storing all lexical items available in a language. In addition to this function, it systematically organizes meanings and forms, and somehow links related meanings and forms to one another to enable communication. The principles of economy and efficiency underlie communication as a highly complex social action, so that the construct of a mental lexicon is also based on these principles, since it developed from the need of valuable communication. Consequently, the functions of lexical organization, semantic shifts, polysemy and the like came into existence by meeting the pragmatic demands of a speech community.

It is not sufficient for a speaker to show linguistic competence in social interaction and particularly in communication. Cultural knowledge, as well as participation in cultural and social activities are as essential as the knowledge of the code. Moreover, these skills are interwoven, combining in a complex system of interdependent areas. So, what speakers exhibit is better called "communicative competence" (Hymes 1966), extending Chomsky's idea of linguistic competence. As Giglioli puts it:

> "[...] a person endowed with mere linguistic competence would be a sort of cultural monster. He would know the grammatical rules of his language, but he would not know when to speak, when to be silent, which sociolinguistic options to select from a repertoire on what occasion [...]" (1972: 15)

What can be implicitly understood from this notion is that social meaning is a factor not to be disregarded or excluded from the investigation of meanings in general, and especially of non-literal and figurative meanings as parts of the mental lexicon. Speakers are offered linguistic choices between several linguistic expressions to communicate what they intended to communicate, although decision making is to a certain degree influenced by their language with its fixed expressions, and lexicalizations which are easier to access or automatically

available. Nonetheless, the choice of one way of expressing the intended meaning over another is also a social one.

Furthermore, relationships between basic, prototypical meanings of the linguistic material and their non-prototypical senses and figurative usages are at least partially a result of the cultural organization of personal experiences. These effects are recognizable and available for members of a community, sharing the same knowledge, and cultural background, while outsiders fail to access the whole collection of information stored in the mental lexicon.

Linguistic units as mental units are interlinked and stored in the lexicon in long-term memory. Semantic memory is understood as a "network of concepts, interconnected by means of labeled arcs which specify the relations between concepts" (Zwitserlood 2005: 104). These serve as basis on which a mental lexicon operates, using some but not all of the existing concepts for linguistic meaning creation and organization. This mental level of words provides an interrelated, bound subsystem of cognition without constituting an individual and somehow autonomous module. Hence, analyses of linguistic meanings are dependent on or at least influenced by features of organization and the processibility of conceptual structure.

Lexical structures in the mental lexicon are not completely random or senseless. Taking into account the systematic and hierarchical organization of the mental lexicon, the complex interrelatedness of lexical items to each other clearly reflect motivation of lexical organization in the mental lexicon. For example, the Beaver form-meaning relation *saa* "sun" may be an arbitrary one, but the forms *ízáa* "month (lit. (its) sun)", *saa adástl'íze* "calendar (lit. sun paper)", and *sáátl'ulé* "rainbow (lit. sun rope)" show meaningful relations to each other and to the form for "sun" on the conceptual and linguistic level.

2.2.4. The "Cultural" Lexicon

To gain insight into cultural models in relation to linguistic forms, conceptualizations and the mental lexicon, some approaches attempt to grasp cultural knowledge by analyzing the lexicon and referential meanings, but the results are not uncontroversial.

When looking at non-literal expressions in the languages of the world, we see that there are some parallels appearing in nearly every language, whereas at the same time a great deal of such figurative forms in a language show idiosyncratic characteristics. These must be understood against the cultural background of the speech community. Near-universals are based upon our perception of the world: embodied experiences we all have as humans with the restricted possibilities we have, namely as seeing, hearing, feeling, and structuring organisms.

Goddard & Wierzbicka (1994) emphasize the importance of culturally salient words as "conceptual tools that reflect a society's past experiences of doing and thinking about things in certain ways; and they help to perpetuate these ways" (1994: 22). This does not mean that a society is fully dictated by its amount of concepts. Rather, these concepts realized in the lexicon exert subliminal influence to some degree on the community as a whole. At the same time they are designed by cultural and historical aspects in combination with embodied experiences. This collective heritage which is based on an implicit agreement of all community members leads to idiosyncratic ways of thinking about entities or actions in the world. These are established as common or typical, and result in lexicalized or fixed expressions. Wierzbicka (1992, 1997) advocates the value of lexicons for investigating cultural phenomena, stating that they – analyzed appropriately – are indeed able to provide insights into culturally defined concepts, and world views.

Holland & Quinn (1987) remark that new approaches doubt that regularities in the lexicon are able to uncover culturally shared knowledge. Hence, they define the relationship between cultural models and semantic domains as "complex and indirect at best" (1987: 16). They deny procedures by which research can derive the one from the other. In chapter 5, the practicability of the lexicon for investigating culturally based conventions and models will be tested. This will be done by analyzing metalinguistic discussions and polysemous networks, as well as usage patterns for lexical items, complex expressions, and finally figurative language.

Wierzbicka (1997, 1999) on the other hand, confirms human universals in language and the lexicon, but focuses on those parts in a lexicon that go beyond such universals. These parts are shaped by the diverse cultural needs found in individual communities. Especially the structuring of everyday life is tangible via the structure and content of individual lexicons. This is related to the fact that everyday life is something everyone has to cope with permanently and everywhere. Consequently, these areas of life need structure and a conceptualization of why and how one has to act. This organization is available to all community members via the lexicon with all its conventionally lexicalized, grammaticalized, grouped and ordered entries (Wierzbicka 1997).

The knowledge of every day experience is stored in memory in another way less often used knowledge is, resulting in a conceptual domain that is under "conscious and voluntary control whereas other pieces are less available for introspection and articulation" (Holland & Quinn 1987: 8). A continuity view is assumed here, i.e. the domains are not completely divided, but rather taken as two end points of a continuous scale. This implies that the whole set of such classes is connected via diverse kinds of mutual relationships. This is exactly what conceptualization is about, what is more important for a speech community is held more dear, and thus processed more easily and more profoundly than aspects which are (at least at a certain time) less relevant.

Significant domains are subject to intense usage, hence constituting main areas of cultural conceptualization, and being involved in subordinate concepts as an underlying basis. The linguistic pendants therefore constitute polysemous network structures which vary cross-linguistically. As a consequence, fundamental differences entail a slew of further differences in all subordinate fields. This affects all kinds of action, also – and not only – including the action of accomplishing understanding, transmission of knowledge, etc., everything which can best be achieved by verbal communication. In Beaver, for example, the lexical item *-zís* with the prototypical meaning "skin/hide" is additionally conceptualized as CONTAINER. This is reflected by the derived senses and usages of the lexeme. As a consequence, expressions for "bags" extend the meaning of *-zís* from the body part "skin/hide" to *tyúú zís* "water bag (lit. water skin/hide)" and *tl'ǫéédze zís* "gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)" (see ch.5.1.).

Concepts and families of concepts linked to linguistic items are not fixed and completely stable constructs. Rather, they are constantly changing, and meet the needs of speech communities to express new experiences or to deal with new situations. Motivations for meaning shift develop on the one hand from the need to denote abstract entities which impede "easy" or direct conceptualization, and new entities in the speech community's environment. On the other hand, meaning shift motivation is linked to Geeraerts' pragmatic principles (Blank 2005). According to this idea, research has to cope with two opposing principles of increasing efficient communication: the speaker-oriented principle of product optimization on the one hand, and the hearer-oriented principle of perception or receive optimization on the other. Therefore, polysemous items consisting of a network of senses result from such principles of meaning shift in relation to the wishes of communication partners for successful communication. From an extensional point of view, such networks can be defined as prototypical categories with fuzzy boundaries, and points of overlap with other, at some point similar categories. Concerning the intensional meaning, an established

network is not only based on linguistic knowledge – encyclopedic knowledge provides further essential meaning aspects and relations to be considered in order to produce relationships between categories and concepts.

When the need comes up to denote a new meaning, existing linguistic form-meaning pairs are subject to modulation. Out of possibly complex meaning structures, some prototypical sense is modified according to relevant meaning aspects of the new concept. This modulation provides for and supports a radial structure of categories. This again promotes creation and modulation of linguistic metaphors and metonymies, since these phenomena also show fuzzy boundaries, and do not favor the distinction between linguistic and encyclopedic knowledge (Schwarz 2005, Geeraerts 2003).

2.3. THE LEXICON & POLYSEMY

In this section, theoretical assumptions about polysemous structures as found in the mental lexicon are compiled. Furthermore, the notion of figurative meanings are discussed with some Beaver examples.

2.3.1. POLYSEMY

Based on the aspects just discussed, a new meaning is defined as a lexicalized semantic innovation, developed via an associative relation to an existing meaning of the lexical unit in question. As a synchronic result of the lexicalized innovations, polysemy comes into existence. Put simply, polysemy is defined as the ability of one word to have multiple related meanings. Such a coexistence of several senses is promoted by the fact that established and conventionalized meanings do not necessarily die at the moment new meanings are established. Rather, lexicons include many words with many meanings.

In cognitive linguistics, polysemous lexemes are characterized by the relationships that hold between the different senses, creating a semantic whole (Geeraerts 2006). Compared with the mental lexicon, a polysemous word shows similar structures in miniature: a network of meanings interrelated via association, similarity, and contiguity, resulting in a hierarchical organization within the network. Not all meanings of a polysemous word are absolutely equal concerning their status within the polysemous network. Furthermore, polysemy is also ruled by the economy of language, and hence, the principle of least effort. Accordingly, a restriction suppressing meanings of lower status in polysemous networks, and therefore favoring an increase in lexical items, is unfavorable.

The meaning structure of a word may reflect its semantic development, although this is usually only possible to some degree. One seldom finds paths to follow the development back to its very beginning, i.e. synchronic results are at best only partly transmittable to diachrony (Blank 2005). The synchronic structure of a meaning or concept does not necessarily reflect the complete history of meaning, at least not explicitly, and is better seen as an instantaneous picture lacking an origin or recipe. Formally established meanings may die, semantic bridges between senses break down and lead to homonymy on the one hand, and folk etymologies on the other, since speech communities – and not only linguists or more generally, scientists – try to make sense of the linguistic inventories and meanings (Blank 2005; Schwarz 2005).

In addition to the points just discussed, still another aspect concerning polysemy and meaning shift plays a role in meaning accessibility: the distinction between rule-based, and therefore predictable polysemy, and idiosyncratic polysemy, restricted by individual lexical behavior (Blank 2005:1330). Predictable meaning shifts are defined as analogous transfers of established similarities or contiguity relations. Here, cross-linguistically well-known patterns of metaphor or metonymy are applied to express an intended meaning. This can be observed in the systematic conceptualization of body parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS in

Beaver. The use of body part terms for this meaning aspect constitutes a predictable pattern to express emotions and personality traits (see also ch. 6). Such applications of patterns do not always end up in lexicalization, however. Speakers create a new sense in analogy to known polysemous expressions (e.g. 'institution/building/persons' of the term "school" in English) in a communicative situation, whereas conventionalization is neither consciously intended nor forced. Hence, some of such outcomes will indeed be used by the speech community, and will therefore get lexicalized over time, while others will keep their status and characteristics as ad hoc innovations. The important aspect is the fact that meaning shift here is not bound individually to the lexical items affected, but constitutes instances or tokens of a shift type or pattern. "Discourse traditions" frame the rules for these analogies, but also the scope of application. In Beaver, not only do body part terms in their realization as SEATS OF EMOTIONS constitute examples for meaning structures, but also specific, conventionalized linguistic patterns like [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] described in detail in chapter 6.

Idiosyncratic polysemy on the other hand, restricts the rule-based, but productive usage of specific polysemy patterns. Blank (2005) uses the example of a *Polizeiwache* "police post / station house", where the sense "time spent in location" cannot be transferred to this item in analogy to, for example, "school" in "after school the children went home": "*after police post the officers went home". In Beaver, semantic and structural patterns employed for emotion and disability idioms are not used in combination with all body parts included in emotion concepts: e.g. the often applied pattern [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] is blocked in combination with the body part term -*dzéé* "heart": **sadzéé' nadyué* "you have no heart" (metaphors001).[7]

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[7] Instead, another pattern in negative form is conventionalized: *adyuu sadzéé' ghǫ́lįį* "my heart is not there, does not exist". It has to be noted that this token of the pattern [BODY PART DOES

In meaning shift – resulting in polysemous structures – contiguity and similarity are the most basic and important associations. The similarity between two concepts – be it naturally or socio-culturally based – provides an "associative-semiotic basis" for metaphor, while the contiguity of concepts gives rise to metonymic structures (Blank 2005). The latter results in expressions like *sadzagé' nadyué'* "be stubborn (lit. have no ears)", where the metonymic chain EAR/INSTRUMENT – PERCEPTION/ACTION – HEARING/ SENSORING – OBEDIENCE/ MENTAL ACTION is applied, reflecting juxtapositions which hold between the parts of this chain, consistent with the embodiment hypothesis and similar models found across languages and cultures. However, this chain is not only based on embodiment, i.e. the structure cannot be imposed in exactly the same form in every language which has lexicalized the sensory perception of "hearing" to "listen (i.e. consciously hearing)" and to "obey" in the same way. Cultural models play an important role in creating and modifying such concepts. In the Beaver culture, the act of "not listening" is not linked to obedience as is known in our western traditions. Teaching and learning are not understood as explaining and listening. Rather, (younger) persons are advised to listen to the experiences had by elder people. They do not get instructions for how to do things, but rather field reports, which they process before they have their own experiences (Mills 1986).

2.3.2. FIGURATIVE MEANINGS

Figurative language originates in usages of lexical items in non-prototypical linguistic contexts, so that the new use of the word goes beyond its literal meaning. Figurativity is predestined to be linked to prototypical meanings. Rosch (1975) established the notion of prototypical organization of lexemes, an

NOT EXIST] additionally blocks usage of the other pattern typically used in combination with other body part terms (see ch. 5.7.3.3. and 6.5.7.).

approach further applied to polysemous meanings of one lexeme (Lakoff 1987, Langacker 1988). Prototypicality refers to the finding that the internal structure of word fields or polysemous lexemes constitutes a radial organization of meanings. These show distinct levels of closeness to each other and to the best example, i.e. the most prototypical meaning. The link to prototypical or basic meanings is not a necessary or sufficient condition for "good" metaphors or metonymies (see chapter 2.2.1.). What seems to be more important here are the type and value of the relationship developed between the known, conventionalized form-meaning pair, and the new sense to be established on the basis of similarity or contiguity associations (Geeraerts 2003). Still, prototypes show a special salience here, since they offer conventionalized meaning and usage patterns, and their meanings are often on a basic level. As will be shown in chapter 5, *sadee* "my eye(s)" in the construction *sadee nadyué'* meaning "I am blind (lit. "I have no eyes")" is indeed linked to the prototypical meaning of the semantic network – i.e. the concrete body part –, and refers to it via metonymic relations (INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION). *sadzéé'* "my heart" in emotion expressions, on the other hand, does not primarily constitute or refer to the prototype of the network HEART, but the already transferred sense SEAT OF EMOTION. The culturally based elaboration of the BODY PART meaning presents a gradual deviation from the basic meaning, while both conceptual aspects remain available. The SEAT OF EMOTION function is put in focus and applied in forms like *sadzéé' xaats'at* "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)", and then used in analogy to the relation between EYE as body part and SEE.

Therefore, innovations can have as their starting points any level in the semantic structure of a word. Meaning shifts are based on available conceptualization aspects of the linguistic source material. It is exactly this typical, well-known meaning detail or component on which both hearer and speaker rely as their "cognitive reference point" for new senses of existing linguistic items (Blank 2005). Furthermore, this meaning allows the speaker to

use as few forms as possible, while it gives essential hints for the hearer to relate a known form to a new meaning. As will be shown in detail in chapter 5.1., derivative meanings of the lexical item *-zís* "skin/hide" like "bag, backpack" are conceptualized using the conceptual aspect CONTAINER of the prototype meaning "skin/hide", and not the most salient feature BODY PART. These network structures show that further derived conceptualizations can have as their basis already derived, non-basic conceptual aspects. Hence, less prototypical senses – which may include potential aspects predestined for association like their prototypical pendants (Dirven 2003) – and encyclopedic aspects or conceptual baggage can be chosen as a basis for new meanings. As a result, the conceptual relationship between the additional sense and the prototypical meaning is situated in encyclopedic or cultural knowledge.

Figurative senses and usages are not completely arbitrary, but nevertheless one out of many possible focus and usages. They are based on all kinds of similarity or contiguity associations, as well as socio-cultural rules and linguistic patterns. There is no clear cut in the metalinguistic statements between meanings with confirmed origins and concepts on the one hand, and meanings lacking any known diachronic 'biographies' on the other hand. Coherence of explanations is not always found, since humans' tendency and need for classification of the world may result in inconsistent models: the one which best suits the context is adopted in individual situations. To give an example, in Beaver several concepts are expressed via the linguistic pattern [*tyu / dǫ / bwil / dlúk* (cause) *-xį*] "water / hunger / sleep / laughter (causes) die/kill.sg":

(4) *dǫ sazéhxį*   "I am starving (lit. hunger causes that I die)"

(5) *tyuyazexį*   "I am drowning (lit. water causes that I die)"

(6) *bwil sazéxį*   "I am very tired (lit. sleep causes that I die)"

(7) *dlúk sazéxwį*   "I die laughing (lit. laughter causes that I die)"

The first two forms apply the metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT in a descriptive fashion, and the other two are figurative manifestations of this conceptual structure.

While these literal meanings are most often given immediately, the underlying conceptualization of these intended meanings is less apparent, at least for some of these constructions. Asked for the "drowning" idea, speakers refer to the descriptive aspects of this term, after all, water causes the death of a drowning person. Additionally, drowning is a concrete event. Asked, however, why "sleep is killing you" in the case of FATIGUE or why "laughter is killing you" in the case of PAROXYSM OF LAUGHTER, speakers show uncertainties. These concepts are more abstract and the linguistic realizations show figurativity difficult to explain:

Consultant101: [[laughter]] "Laughing kill you."

Researcher: You can say that?

Consultant101: Mhm, that's what it is, [dluk sazéxį] ("I die laughing (lit. laughter causes that I die)"). That's "you couldn't stop laughing", that's what it means, but as we say dluk sazéxį ("I die laughing (lit. laughter causes that I die)") means "you died with laughing".

Researcher: That's because you can't breathe? Or why is that?

Consultant101: Aha ["yes, right"] I don't know. nǫhdluk sazéxį ("I die laughing about you (lit. laughter about you causes that I die)").

Researcher: What does that mean?

Consultant101: I couldn't s- "I laughed at you so hard I died."

Researcher: And then you can say bwil sazéxį ("I am very tired (lit. sleep causes that I die)")?

Consultant101: Mhmm.

Researcher: And that means? When would you say that?

Consultant101: "Sleep kill me." bwil sazéxį ("I am very tired (lit. sleep causes that I die)").

Researcher: So, It- just like you're falling down? Or what is it?

Consultant101: No, you're just- you're dying.

Researcher: You're dying?

Consultant101: Well, when you go to sleep you're dead, that's what it means.

Researcher: Ah, ok, yeah, it's kind of almost like being dead, I guess.

Consultant101: Once you fall asleep you're gone, that's why they call that-

(metaphors100)

A possible analysis extracts the conceptual aspect of UNCONTROLLED PHYSICAL EVENTS similar to death. This feature can be identified in all forms. In these instances, the person affected by the respective force takes on the role of an experiencer not retaining control over oneself. That means, the concept of SELF-CONTROL and a feeling of being overwhelmed is the linking aspect establishing the relations between the meanings manifested via this construction. The "linguistic conceptualization" (see ch. 6.3.) is based on the conventionalized pattern known from the form for "to drown" and "to starve" and the shared conceptual aspect UNCONTROLLED PHYSICAL EVENTS (water / hunger / sleep / laughter).

In this chapter, the structure of the mental lexicon has been described. Besides cultural models, the basic terms concept, lexeme, polysemy and figurativity have been introduced. Their definitions are relevant for the next chapter, where theories of cognitive and linguistic structures will be introduced.

3. CONCEPTUAL & LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES: METAPHOR & METONYMY

This section focuses on the relationships between linguistic and conceptual structures. One of the first and still most important cognitive approaches to figurative language and thought is presented in detail: the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) describes specific cognitive mechanisms which are based on embodied experience and which are manifested in linguistic forms (Lakoff 1980, 2006[1993], Kövecses 2000, 2007, 2010, Kövecses & Csábi 2009). The definitions of conceptual structures resulting in figurative language – i.e. conceptual metaphor and metonymy – constitute a huge theoretical construct. This model contains highly relevant hypotheses about the relations between these two phenomena of thought as well as between them and linguistic structures. Recently, other frameworks bring up new aspects in this discussion and offer alternative descriptions of and approaches to linguistic metaphors and their conceptualizations (e.g. Glucksberg et al. 1997, Evans 2006).

The present work concentrates on the CMT, but does not follow all of the theoretical hypotheses. In combination with the other approaches, alternative explications fitting the Beaver data will be presented in chapter 6. In the present chapter 3, basic assumptions needed for the comprehension of the theories of figurative language and thought are included: first, the notions of literal and non-literal language, the embodiment hypothesis and universal cognitive models are introduced (3.1.). Then, the CMT and its the main characteristics are described: conceptual metaphors in their organization and variations are discussed in detail (3.2.), followed by a similarly intense exploration of conceptual metonymy (3.3.). In chapter 3.4., recent developments in cognitive theories dealing with figurative

language will be introduced. Finally, chapter 3.5. gives a short introduction to basic emotions and their verbalization.

In contemporary CMT and related frameworks, 'metaphor' and 'conceptual metaphor' are no longer used for the linguistic realizations, but for the underlying mappings in the conceptual system. This follows from the assumption that it is not language in which metaphors are created, but our cognitive system which allows for linguistically expressing one thing via another. The results of these – for example, English expressions like "you waste your time" or "she is a block of ice" – are denoted as 'metaphorical expressions' or 'linguistic metaphors'. TIME IS SPACE, on the other hand, constitutes a conceptual metaphor. This distinction is also reflected in the typographical conventions: conceptual metaphors and metonymies appear in capital letters. Linguistic manifestations are not marked, while concepts, conceptual aspects and domains are displayed in small capitals and linguistic forms in quotation marks.

3.1. BETWEEN LANGUAGE, BODY & THOUGHT

In CMT, metonymy is defined as conceptual mapping inside one domain or "domain matrix" (Dirven 2003: 14), where one concept "provides mental access to another" (Radden & Kövecses 1999: 21). Metaphors are defined as mappings between two different domains or frames:

> "A conceptual metaphor is such a set of correspondences that obtains between a source domain and a target domain, where metaphorical linguistic expressions [...] commonly make the conceptual metaphors [...]

manifest (though there may be conceptual metaphors that have no linguistic metaphors to express them)" (Kövecses 2006:123).

Hence, metaphorical expressions are the "[…] derivative of two conceptual domains being connected" (Kövecses 2005: 121), strengthening the fact that metaphors are not linguistic outputs in the first place, but are verbalized expressions of metaphorical concepts in thought, and body.

conceptual metaphor	source domain	target domain	linguistic manifestation
LOVE IS A JOURNEY	JOURNEY	LOVE RELATIONSHIP	"we are at a crossroads"
conceptual metonymy	domain matrix		linguistic manifestation
PART FOR WHOLE	CROWN / CEPTRE / … / REGALIA / EXECUTIVE / … / MONARCHY		"the crown has decided"
INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION	HEAD / BRAIN / MIND /…/ THINKING / WORRY		*satsíí' nakǫįl* "I worry (lit. my head is heavy)"

Table 3.1.: Domains and domain matrices in conceptual metaphor and metonymy

Source domains are conceptual constructs – or frames – from which a concept or part of a concept is taken to show similarities with the target domain or structure. These similarities are used to talk about the target domain. Domains are not linguistic phenomena, but mental constructions for organizing knowledge and experience. They are used to act in the world and to talk about the world, and therefore also similar constructs like cultural models (see ch. 2.1.). Thus, the domains form a conceptual systems found in every speaker's mental world and are partly reflected in their ways of linguistic and other behavior. This also shows how deeply interwoven such conventionalized concepts are with everyday life and culture. They accompany us in all situations in life, organize our experiences accordingly, and are manifest in the ways we talk and behave.

To give some well-known examples, in expressions like "Christmas has arrived", "she is in trouble" and "he is at a crossroads in his career" metaphorical concepts and non-literal language is attested (Lakoff 2006[1993], Fauconnier 1997, Kövecses 2010): the conceptual metaphors TIME PASSING IS MOTION (i.e. "Christmas" moved in time), STATES ARE LOCATIONS (so that persons are "in" psycho-somatic states), A CAREER IS A JOURNEY (possible directions in a career are like "crossroads") are applied respectively.

Definition of domains and domain matrices is a complex task, especially in the discussion of metaphor and metonymy. Langacker's definition of a conceptual domain indeed specifies the phenomena, but at the same time introduces terms which again lack a clear and unequivocal description:

"Any coherent area of conceptualization relative to which semantic structures can be characterized (including any kind of experience, concept or knowledge system)." (1991:547)

Notwithstanding, domains and domain boundaries are cognitive structures with an abstract character, and are partially socio-culturally established and therefore not necessarily self-evident or predictable.

The phenomena of metaphorical language and especially metaphorical concepts have been discussed in detail since Lakoff & Johnson's "Metaphors we live by" (1980). Their work – being one of the first to relate cognition with metaphor in such a complex way – states that languages are linked to huge hierarchically organized metaphorical systems at the cognitive level. Although the authors concentrate on English, they opened a wide field to investigate cross-linguistically and to elaborate in cognitive linguistics.

As was already shown, culture is a determining factor concerning how we conceptualize and structure the world around us. Hence, when mappings of structures are created, speakers not only use the given similarities between source and target domain, or their bodily experiences. In addition, they are also

influenced by "the particular communicative, cultural, and historical situations in which we think metaphorically [...]" (Kövecses 2006:138). Source domains are not only isolated entities, but complex frames or models. They constitute a system of culturally influenced meanings, inner relations and inferences, as well as relations to other models. Bearing this in mind, a conceptual metaphor – as a mapping of two different domains – can be defined as an interaction of two culturally structured models.

Cultural models are said to be conceptualizations of experiences in order to make sense of the world, especially of abstract ideas in it, like emotions. According to the CMT, because such abstract concepts have a low structure, conceptualizations are metaphorical, i.e. people use other, unrelated embodied experiences or perceived similarities and 'convert' them. As a consequence, they fit abstract targets which in some way or another show parallels to concrete experiences, as in the example above, where MOTION is used to describe TIME. The definitions of such abstract concepts are created "automatically and unconsciously [...,] as givens that are literal" (Kövecses 2006:201). They are not literal meanings, but are constituted by conceptual metaphor. Yet, conceptual metaphor and metonymy again run without conscious cognitive actions. Kövecses places such definitions of conceptual metaphors at the "supraindividual level of conceptualization" (2006:201): they are understood as inaccessible and automatic, resulting in a feeling that these concepts are literal, for example, that emotions are forces operating inside a person.

Such an extensive and sweeping system like that of conceptual metaphors ruling to some degree the way people think and talk about the world needs verification. Lakoff (2006:188) defines several aspects related to conceptual metaphors as evidence, like the phenomenon of polysemy which can be explained by conceptual metaphors. Linguistic expressions being used with related, but still different meanings for different domains, show polysemous features which are hard to understand without the underlying mapping. For

example, words for travel in English are also used to talk about love ("dead-end street", "look how far we've come" (Lakoff 2006:189)). Without the underlying mapping LOVE IS A JOURNEY the systematic employment of journey concepts and linguistic material is not accounted for. With knowledge of this conceptual metaphor – underlying English forms in this case – the similarities are visible which hold between a journey and a love relationship. That is, to know this part of the conceptual system of the language in question means to realize that the usage of journey expressions in the 'new' love context is not strange but rather intuitively comprehensible.

Similarly, newly created, not (yet) conventionalized metaphorical expressions are often intuitively understood, or felt as fitting the situation. This is true despite the fact that they are not (yet) known to individual speaker-hearers and the whole community. They are also explained with the underlying conceptual metaphor which generates these linguistic metaphorical expressions. The expressions originally belong to the source domain and are then utilized for expressing aspects of the target domain. Hence, even if a linguistic metaphor is heard for the first time by a community member, s/he will very likely be able to grasp what is meant. This works due to the known conceptual basis of the new metaphorical expression. If the whole community starts using such a new expression, it will become conventional just like the already known linguistic metaphors also based on the similarities between the source and target domain. This works because each mapping is "[...] an open-end class of potential correspondences across inference patterns" (Lakoff 2006:194).

In the next sections, the definitions, functions and forms of metaphorical structures in language and cognition will be discussed, starting with a brief review of earlier traditional views.

3.1.1. THE LITERAL – NON-LITERAL CONTINUUM

One of the most important points made by Lakoff and Johnson (1980; also Lakoff 2006[1993]) is that metaphor is not only a linguistic phenomenon. Rather, metaphorical language is based on our ways of thinking about and conceptualizing the world. Thus, metaphorical expressions are the result of cognitive processes which have to cope with all the unstructured and unorganized experiences we have in the real world. Likewise, they are involved in processing our inner states, emotions, and feelings. Since we talk about both, the world outside and our inner states, language is linked to the cognitive processes with which we organize what we experience. This view introduced by Lakoff and Johnson contradicted traditional hypotheses about literal meanings. Traditional assumptions stated that literalness constitutes the main part of a language, that literalness is used for understanding abstract meanings and that grammar does not include any metaphorical concepts (Lakoff 2006[1993]: 187). These were proved to be wrong (Barcelona 2000, Kristiansen et al. 2006, Kövecses & Koller 2006).

The continuity view proposed by, for example, Ortony (1993 [1979]) and Lakoff (2006[1993]) presumes that linguistic metaphor as a figure of speech must not be excluded from natural language usage, or highlighted as a special linguistic 'behavior'. Furthermore, metaphor often shows to have its basis in metonymic structures. Since metonymy is manifested non-figuratively as well as figuratively, it again emphasizes a continuous view of literal, non-literal, and figurative meanings. In addition, the embeddedness of both processes in cognitive as well as natural language structure and usage emphasize their relevance not only in specific (linguistic) forms (Radden 2003, Dirven 2003). This point will also be made clearer as figurativity in some metonymic constructions will be analyzed and discussed (ch. 3.3.). This contradicts the traditional assumption that metaphorical language is not to include in everyday

language, but represents a marked way of consciously creating pictures for special purposes, like rhetorical exquisiteness or poetry. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) showed that metaphorical structures can be found throughout a whole linguistic system, in everyday language just as in every other discourse.

Furthermore, the focus of attention is not on individual linguistic expressions which do not mean what they literally should and are not used for what they literally and prototypically should be used. Rather, the underlying metaphorical concepts are more relevant which give birth to metaphorical expressions like "this idea is founded on stable arguments" (IDEAS ARE BUILDINGS) or "this category includes several subclasses" (CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS). Hence, it is exactly everyday conventional language that is structured via these concepts to be able to express abstract ideas or emotions. This further strengthens the continuity view concerning literal and figurative language. If a huge part of language is said to be organized via metaphorical mappings, a cut between literal and non-literal expressions would blur a distinction neither intuitive nor useful. It is not just an alternative way to talk about many concepts, it is the conventionalized principle found in everyday language in speech communities. This view arose through the analysis and understanding of conceptual structures found deeply embedded in thought and language.

Another traditional argument says that figurative abstract meanings are understood literally, especially "dead metaphors", whose conventionalized character blocks access to (possible) underlying mappings. This was falsified by psychological experiments which tested conventionalized metaphorical expressions and the relation to their underlying concepts.[8] Their results show that people indeed fall back on metaphorical concepts, more precisely on the underlying embodied experiences. These formed the basis of the expressions in

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[8] For the detailed studies see Boroditsky & Ramscar (2002) and Boroditsky (2001).

question, and people use them to make sense of the linguistic forms in relation to the situation at hand. Hence, even 'dead' – or highly conventionalized – metaphors are not understood literally. Rather, the corresponding mappings are used for processing and understanding, and therefore also in on-line interpretations. Accordingly, this disproved the traditional statements that meanings can be literal and abstract at the same time, like LOVE or HATE, which according to the old view, are understood literally, while at the same time they manifest abstract meanings (Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2006).

Research today denies a strict distinction between literal and non-literal meanings because of the huge amount of metaphors with their even bigger number of metaphorical expressions. Cognitive linguistics tries to grasp the whole picture. Therefore, it examines conceptualizations, transfers and their domains, analyzes their forms and functions, and defines their scope instead of separating literal and non-literal expressions. Accordingly, the term 'literal' is only used for "those concepts that are not comprehended via conceptual metaphor" (Lakoff 2006[1993]: 188): there is nothing metaphorical about both the fact and the expression "the chair is near the table" if it is like that.

But how do metaphorical concepts work? Several approaches try to describe the design of conceptual metaphors, to what extent these structures are available in speakers' consciousness, and which cognitive mechanisms – especially cultural models and embodiment – are included (Gibbs 2001, Kövecses, Palmer & Dirven 2003; Kövecses 2005). Before the CMT and other approaches to metaphor are described and discussed, the important notion of embodiment is defined in the next paragraph.

3.1.2. EMBODIMENT

The term embodiment was briefly introduced in chapter 2.1.1. as cognitive structure interrelated with cultural models and linguistic behavior. This

phenomenon is relevant for the Beaver data in a twofold way: first, the body part terms' conceptualizations are tightly linked to the body, but go beyond a physical notion. The embodiment hypothesis allows for a consistent explanation of such extensions to psychological concepts (Lakoff 2006[1993], Gibbs & Colston 1994, 2003, Gibbs & Costa Lima 2004, Rohrer 2006). Second, embodiment serves as a basis for the definition of conceptual metaphor and metonymy in the expressions of emotion, which – despite their abstract character – arise in the body.

Our cognitive system relies on our physical experiences and their processing. The notion of embodiment includes this physiological faculty. Cognitive approaches promote the importance of the dependency relations between bodily experience and human cognitive structure, after all, we can only use language for things and events we experience and process (Lakoff 2006[1993], Lakoff & Johnson 1999, Evans 2003).

Our physical experiences not only lead to mental concepts, but they also constrain possible correspondences or mappings. This is due to the fact that embodied experience is one of the main motivations for metaphors, providing a significant amount of experiences as source domains. At the same time, the forms of embodied experience are limited, while other possible ways of experiencing the world – e.g. via physical or biochemical processes – cannot be taken into account as source domains. This limiting aspect can also be found in the identification of similarities influenced by cultural models, since mappings are possible only where humans perceive parallels. However, here the constraints show other qualities than in embodied experience, since the latter "works automatically and unconsciously" (Kövecses 2005:119).

According to Kövecses, speakers are not aware of embodiment:

"As a matter of fact, it is characteristic of such embodied experiences that they are not conscious most of the time. We experience such correlations in bodily experience preconceptually and prelinguistically." (2005: 117)

Lakoff and Johnson conceive of three different levels of embodiment: "[…] the neural level, phenomenological conscious experience and the cognitive unconscious" (1999: 102). The notion of consciousness is somewhat problematic in this approach, since the last account ("cognitive unconscious") is declared to constitute "the 95 percent below the surface of conscious awareness" (1999: 102). If this is the case, the question of identification and definition comes up on the one hand – how do we describe a phenomenon not consciously available? On the other hand, when such a huge part of thought and language are at an unconscious level, there is "no real place for the two central concepts of conventionality and representation" (Zlatev 2009: 14).

Embodiment exerts relevance and influence on metonymy as well as metaphor, since both are linked to embodied experience (Rohrer 2006). Taking, for example, the experience of increased body temperature while performing an intense physical activity, and taking the very similar experience of heat because of getting angry, one can abstract both into INCREASE IN INTENSITY and INCREASE IN HEAT. Their correlation constitutes the metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT[9], which proves that metaphor is not only in thought and language, but also in the body (Kövecses 2005:118).

For the investigation of emotions and similar abstract mental phenomena in relation to their linguistic manifestations, conceptual metonymy is highly important. This is due to the fact that the target as well as the source concepts admit for inclusion in one domain or domain matrix (Croft 2000, 2002, Panther & Radden 1999). In addition, metaphors often show metonymic origins in

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[9] The definition of this correlation as conceptual metaphor instead of the fitting metonymy HEAT FOR INTENSITY will be discussed in chapter 6.

conceptually contiguous domains. According to Radden (2003), experienced conceptual contiguity allows for "correlation" and "complementarity" as fundamentally metonymic relationships and is also found in metaphor: "correlational mappings within conceptual metaphor should also be seen as metonymic" (2003: 416). For example, "complementarity" as a relationship between contrary parts applies to BODY and MIND: both are tightly linked to each other despite and because of their coexistent oppositeness and unity. It is this specific instance of PART-PART-relations which reflect a metonymic basis. first, mental phenomena take place in the body. Second, linguistic expressions of mental states are indeed related to and supported by body, for example, via gesture and mimic. Third, the body is affected by emotions, personality traits and similar mental phenomena, and reacts to them in specific ways. These physiological consequences are in turn conceptually and linguistically employed to communicate these abstract targets like ANGER, FEAR or LOVE. This again underlines the relevance of the alliances holding between language, body, and thought. Yet, embodiment cannot be seen as an isolated phenomena: Zlatev (1997, 2003) realized this shortcoming, and developed the notion of "situated embodiment" to include socio-cultural features in the notion of "language as situated within socio-cultural practices" (Zlatev 2003: 306). Similarly, Sinha et at. (2000) broaden physical embodiment to "extended embodiment" in order to include bodily and cultural experiences in language not detachable or independent from socio-cultural ideas or processes.

A clear distinction or relationship between metaphor and metonymy needs to be investigated, since the different, but to some degree also similar mechanisms at work in both phenomena are not undisputable. The example of the embodied link between affection and warmth given in chapter 2.1.1., is said to result in the conceptual metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH (Kövecses

2005).[10] Since a real physiological effect is identified for affection, namely WARMTH, which can be perceived and felt in reality, an underlying conceptual metonymy WARMTH FOR AFFECTION is also perfectly convenient for the example as well as the theoretical reasoning. This methodological question will be discussed in chapter 6.

Before conceptual metaphor and metonymy will be discussed in the following sections, universal cognitive models (image- and propositional schemata) as abstracted embodied substance will be introduced. Their forms and functions are included here, since they are linked to embodiment and cultural models and influence meaning elaboration and polysemous structures.

3.1.3. UNIVERSAL COGNITIVE MODELS

To investigate how embodiment and knowledge contained in cultural models is practically used, and how it affects the cognitive tasks on which it operates, Lakoff (1987: 71) assumed two kinds of universal cognitive models, which can be applied to both, models which are culturally shared and practiced, and the more idiosyncratic models of individuals. I will use Holland & Quinn's terminology here, defining "proposition-schemas" (Lakoff's "propositional model") and "image-schemas" (Lakoff's "image-schematic model") as two forms of knowledge arrangement, used for differing kinds of cognitive tasks (Holland & Quinn 1987). It is important to notice that these two models are used for meaning formation in general, and not only for figurative language formation.

Image-schemas – determined and structured by embodied experience – represent abstract representations of these experiences and reflect physiological

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[10] Since these concepts have not been investigated in numerous languages until now, the examples used here should be reduced to the English language to avoid overgeneralizations. Also, as will be shown, such experiences do not have to result in exactly the same metaphors, cf. ch. 3.2.2.

sensory-perceptual abilities. They are to a great extent are constituted by our bodily experiences, and can be understood as abstracted, schematic pictures of experiences had, which lack details, but allow for an extended usage, since the more schematic the stored information, the more targets will fit one schema. They are defined as "pre-conceptual experience" (Johson 1987, Evans & Green 2006), since they are tightly linked to embodiment and real experience, and not to cognitively formed structures in the first place. Hence, they constitute necessary constructs for the establishment of conceptual structure for more abstract patterns.

Lakoff and others explicitly state that without metaphorical mappings there would be no way of conceptualizing abstract entities, features and relationships in an image-schematic form (Lakoff 2006[1993], Hampe & Grady 2005, Kövecses 2010). Using a metaphor allows us to map these somehow intangible or non-physical things to image-schemas. It enables us to talk about them in a way we would talk about things existing physically in the world, and thus physiologically perceived by speakers. To clarify, this hypothesis states that non-physical parts of our world cannot be conceptualized in image-schematic form in language without metaphors. Only these mappings make it possible for us to comprehend the non-physical, invisible, or unknown parts of the world around us. Speakers build analogies and use image-schemas to simulate how the non-physical entity or situation at hand can be comprehended and explained.

The main difference between these two schemas is their functions in the system. While proposition-schemas deal with specific concepts and their relationships to each other, image-schemas concentrate on physical phenomena, and thus are related to the embodiment or "embodied cognition thesis" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). This is based on the idea that the complex conceptual systems found in the world's cultures or speech-communities originate in the interaction between our abilities to create concepts, and our abilities to have experiences in the world. The latter is restricted to our physical characteristics, allowing for the

perception of things and events around us in a specific and limited fashion (Johnson 1987, Evans & Green 2006).

Image-schemas are "gestalts that make multiple relations more immediately apprehensible" (Holland & Quinn 1987: 28). Although Lakoff compared them with visual images, they can take a much more schematic form, taking only the most significant characteristics. The term "image" is not constrained in this context like it is in everyday language, including only visual experience. Therefore, image-schemas are not to be compared to mental images, which show far more detail, and which can be "viewed in mind", like for example, the face of a known person. Rather, it "encompasses all types of sensory-perceptual experience" in an unspecified, abstracted way (Evans & Green 2007: 179). To use Lakoff's example of a candle: "Our knowledge about candles includes a long, thin object schema" (1980: 10). Thus, image-schemas are more sketches than elaborated images, transferring shared knowledge of physical properties like shape, motion, etc. For example, in conceptual metaphors like ANGER IS HOT LIQUID IN A CONTAINER, the image "hot liquid in a container" is used to schematically conceptualize such an emotional condition in order to be able to communicate one's feeling, to talk about it. Note that this image-schema contains another image-schema, CONTAINER, which does not show any specific characteristics or details, and thus suits the term "schema". These schemas rely on repeated embodied experiences, which then lead to non-prototypical containers like "clothing" ('climb *into* your robe', Johnson 1987: 331). The functions of image-schemas also hold for concrete activities or entities (Kempton 1987). Additionally, kinesthetic information is contained in image-schemas.

Image-schemas are emergent, since they evolve through experiences made via interaction with the world, and therefore cannot be defined as innate knowledge (Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987, Palmer 1996). Nevertheless, they constitute a special kind of concept, since they are the first ones to emerge in a

person, and they are the most schematic ones. Hence, they are starting points for other concepts at a lower level in the whole conceptual system. They leave enough room for specification, but at the same time show restricted access for speakers: their deep embeddedness in our cognitive system makes speakers unaware of these concepts (Johnson 1987, de Mendoza Ibánez & Aransaez 1998). We ourselves do not consciously realize that we are constantly physically present in a physical world, nor do we consciously process every experience.

Proposition-schemas determine culturally shared structures for propositions, i.e. concepts, as well as their relationships to each other. As a universal cognitive model, they create and retain fixed structures for conceptual metaphors and build up relations between concepts and schemas, i.e. they establish and manage organization (Holland & Quinn 1987). As propositional forms, they constitute sentence-like parts of the common ground for further conceptualization and linguistic manifestation. These relations are – in a communicative situation – not always visible or traceable, resulting in seemingly empty links for outsiders. But if the communication partners are members of one speech community, they are able to use their shared knowledge about the world to close the gaps in the explicitly formulated information, and to insert the missing parts for review. It is exactly this ability offered by the culturally fixed proposition-schemas that allows community members not to make explicit the complete causal chains involved in a communicative act. It enables the speakers to talk about the world and to infer familiar concepts in an economic way, and at the same time "allow these inferences to be made swiftly and accurately in the first place" (Holland & Quinn 1987: 25). In Beaver, the culturally shaped conceptualizations of specific body parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS are defined as such shared knowledge.

3.1.3.1. THE INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS

The abstract structures of image-schemas as well as their inferences determine the domain based upon these schemata. If a domain is used as the source for another, abstract target domain, its topological structure will be transferred to the new domain. This entails that all inherent inferences which are compatible with the target, will also be assigned to the target domain, not only the schema independently of its structural supplement. Hence, this generalization includes both, linguistic and inferential consequences of image-schemas. It rules out analyses which concentrate on abstract schemas without taking the metaphorical ingredients into account, and therefore miss the important links which lead to metaphorical manifestations of such a mapping. Lakoff defined this "Invariance Principle" as follows:

> "Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain." (2006[1993]: 199)

To take his example of the CONTAINER mapping, the hypothesis states that the image-schematic structure of the source – here, interiors, exteriors, and boundaries – is kept constant. Like this it is mapped onto the corresponding inherent structures of the target, hence onto its interiors, exteriors, and boundaries respectively – whatever these may be. In a mapping like ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, the body of the angry person constitutes the container with its boundaries, while the emotional state is inside it ("s/he is filled with anger", "s/he is bursting with anger", "s/he has so much anger in her/him"), or enters the exterior outside the person / container ("s/he is letting off steam", "s/he blew up at me", "s/he just exploded") (Lakoff 2006[1993]).

As becomes obvious from these examples, similar structures in target domains are used to allow for adaptation of the schematic structure of source domains without violating the image-schematic structure of the targets. There

will be no mapping which links, for example, the goal of a path source domain onto the trajectory of a target domain (Lakoff 1993). Hence, the principle defines certain restrictions on correspondences, based on the limiting characteristics of the target. For example, the English expression "to give someone advice" (or "to give instructions / a kick") does not entail that the receiver 'owns' the "advice" afterwards, due to the constraining target domain feature of "advice" as being neither tangible nor possessable like a concrete and lasting object. In this correspondence, the aspect "receiver possesses given object" of the concept GIVE cannot be mapped onto the topological structure of the target. The "object" in the target domain differs in structure, and lacks the constant characteristic of the source domain object.

What part do both schemas assume in metaphor formation? And what role do they play concerning metaphor processing, and understanding? Lakoff and Johnson (1980) presume that information from the physical world is transfused into non-physical domains by metaphorical thought and language. In metaphors, both image-schemas and proposition-schemas in known, physical fields are mapped onto similar structures in other, non-physical fields. If a concrete domain is mainly defined in terms of physical experiences, it is predestined as a source domain for metaphorical transferences. Furthermore, such physiologically based sources provide the essential input for image-schemas. Non-physical, abstract domains are declared not to be ready for communication (Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2010): we lack the concrete or physical experiences which lead to comprehension and categorization and allow these concepts to be talked about. Put differently, the low structure of abstract entities and their concepts is claimed to request additional substance. Hence, conceptual metaphors are said to express and contain ideas which would not be understandable or discussable if language did not already use verbalized bodily experiences as linguistic sources (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).

3.2. CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR

In the next sections, conceptual metaphor systematics are described. This includes the organization of the cognitive structures, hierarchical levels and their inheritance patterns. Furthermore, different dimensions of variation found in the conceptual metaphor systems – in one language and culture, but also across languages and cultures – are discussed.

3.2.1. CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR ORGANIZATION

In this section, conceptual metaphors will be described according to various levels and classifications. Conceptual metaphors are not independent and unrelated conceptual structures, but are organized in a complex system with hierarchical (vertically arranged) levels in horizontal coordination. In the system, further classifications can be observed, relying on inheritance of structure from higher levels on the vertical axis to more specific conceptual metaphors at lower levels (Lakoff 2006[1993]: 207).

First, several classifications will be described which concentrate on different aspects like conventionalization and ontological function. Then, the organization of conceptual metaphors as a complex system will be presented.

3.2.1.1. METAPHOR CLASSIFICATION

Conceptual metaphors allow in their complexity for numerous ways of possible classification according to the aspect focused on. As will be shown, however, the different classifications show intersections, and should therefore be understood as one classification system rather than independent classes.

Conventionality

One classification parameter is the conventionality of conceptual as well as linguistic metaphors. Both may vary according to their embeddedness in language use in the community and in individual speakers. There exist conceptual metaphors that are less used and thus rather unconventional. On the other hand, others are well-known to all speakers, are used frequently for linguistic manifestation and possess many variants at basic levels. Similarly, linguistic metaphorical expressions are conventionalized to certain degrees, showing a high frequency in use at one extreme. At the other extreme there are quite unconventional linguistic metaphors which are seldom used, but nevertheless understood by all members of a speech community due to the underlying conceptual metaphor (Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2010).

Cognitive functions

Another way of classifying mappings across domains highlights their cognitive functions. A huge number of metaphors are 'structural metaphors', where the source domain applies parts of its structure to the structure of the target domain. For example, the (English) metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY takes structure of the source JOURNEY, and imposes it on the target domain LIFE (Lakoff 2006[1993]).

'Ontological metaphors' are said to enrich otherwise low structures, and to create an existential basis for target domains via a qualified source domain, giving the target a metaphorically 'tangible' status. Accordingly, abstract phenomena become things to talk about, "visual perceptions become containers, actions become metaphorical objects, and states become substances" (Kövecses 2006:128).

'Orientational metaphors' are needed for a coherent organization of numerous metaphors showing parallels at decisive points. For example – as found in many languages – positively connoted abstract phenomena like health,

control, morality etc. all underlie the metaphorical idea GOOD IS UP, and thus are realized linguistically via corresponding orientational linguistic metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2010). In English, many expressions are identified as tokens, for example, "s/he is off the ground" (HAPPY IS UP), "s/he climbs the social ladder" (SUCCESS IS UP). As can be seen, the source domains systematically subsume a great number of concepts (Lakoff & Johnson 1987, Lakoff 2006[1993]).[11]

These generic metaphors are very abstract, and are not consciously available, or at least very restricted in accessibility. Additionally, sources often show to be quite abstract and schematic. Therefore, the reasoning that conceptual metaphor arises due to the fact that the target domains are too abstract and lack their own structure, is disputed, for example, by Croft & Cruse (2004) or McGlone (2007). In this case, more concrete sources would suit the notion of well-known and experienced concepts consulted to make the target structure comprehensible (see also ch.6).

3.2.1.2. INHERITANCE HIERARCHIES & CENTRAL METAPHORS

The vertical organization of conceptual metaphors includes hierarchical structures in which aspects of mappings from higher levels are passed on to ones at lower levels. Since metaphorical meaning extensions of lexical forms take place in connection with more abstract mappings at a higher level in the hierarchy, it would be redundant to modify the meaning in each lower level mapping in which the lexical expression occurs (Lakoff 2006[1993]). Rather, it is by means of the inheritable characteristic that the extended meaning is automatically evoked in every other mapping originating from a higher one.

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[11] In Beaver, *sįdyíge ghǫ́lįį* "I am happy (potential literal meaning: I am up)" and *mayue náskáát* "I respect her/him (potential literal meaning: I cover under her/him)" cannot be unequivocally assigned to the conceptual metaphor discussed here, since neither more extensive linguistic analysis nor metalinguistic statements are available.

Metaphors are hierarchically organized, with a small number of highly generalized mappings at a generic level (Kövecses 2007, 2010). A far bigger number of more specific metaphors are placed at a basic level, inheriting main characteristics of the higher level "parent concepts". Similarly, while source domains in mappings at the superordinate level are also generic, their linguistic manifestations use base level special cases which fit best in the whole metaphorical context (e.g. VEHICLE becomes CAR or BOAT or their inferential characteristics respectively) (Lakoff 2006[1993]). Thus, the number of highly generalized mappings is smaller than the inheriting basic level metaphors. The linguistic manifestations often use correspondences or inferences from these basic level domains.[12] In Beaver, the conceptual structure SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART is identified as positioned at a superordinate level, while, for example, SEAT OF ANGER IS HEART is a more specific conceptual metaphor at a lower level in the hierarchy.

superordinate level	SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART	
basic level	SEAT OF ANGER IS HEART	SEAT OF STUBBORNNESS IS HEAD
	SEAT OF COURAGE IS HEART	SEAT OF WORRY IS HEAD

Table 3.2.1.: Levels of conceptual metaphors

Besides the classifications already mentioned, there is another class of culturally based metaphors which play a special role in understanding. Central metaphors characterize a community, or culture, in that they constitute the

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[12] This generalisation needs more empirical research with cross-linguistic data. So far, it holds for English, but hypothesis states that Beaver shows similar tendencies. Furthermore, the hierarchy (Lakoff 2006[1993]) is at least partly based on introspection, so that maybe not all of these inheritance patterns really exist.

groundwork for many levels of knowledge and of linguistic expressions manifesting these underlying main concepts. These "large-scale conceptual metaphors that organize extensive portions of experience in a culture [...]" (Kövecses 2006:144) give rise to many other metaphors on a lower level in the inheritance hierarchy. It is exactly these central metaphors towards which ideologies are oriented, taking for granted and adopting their way of understanding and organizing the world. In Beaver, SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART – already mentioned above as located at a high level in the hierarchy – constitutes a central concept participating in several conceptualizations of emotions and personality traits.

Central metaphors do not only differ in their linguistic realizations, but also in the source domains that are chosen for framing a target domain. As was already discussed, metaphors are not only a matter of language, but of thought, culture, concepts and body. Accordingly, differences in (central) metaphors lead to variation in cognitive processing: "differences in metaphorical language seem to shape the way people speaking different languages in two cultures think about the same target domain" (Kövecses 2006: 152). Speakers concentrate on different parts of experience because the linguistic realization of their culturally based concepts determines how and what they encode. For example, while English uses the metonymy-based expression "my heart stopped" to express fright, Beaver linguistically utilizes this experience (*madzéé' łííníítl'a* "s/he died (lit. her/his heart stopped running (uncontrolled))") to refer to the death of a person (see chapter 5 for a detailed description).

The term "congruence" is used in this context to refer to metaphors as vertically organized in the inheritance hierarchy and thus related to one another, but differing in their degree of specificity. Concepts at superordinate levels in the hierarchy are defined by their generic character, the lacking of details, and their use as a basis for more specific metaphors. For example (see Kövecses 2006:158), an assumed generic metaphor like AN ANGRY PERSON IS A

PRESSURIZED CONTAINER[13] on its own does not tell anything about what sort of container is meant, what exactly is in the container, if heat is involved, how the pressure came to exist, what characteristics of the content of the container are effected by the pressure, etc. All these 'place-holder' aspects may be substituted cross-culturally in individual linguistic expressions based on this concept, for example, where exactly anger is positioned in the body/container, what happens when the pressure gets too strong, what consistence the content of the container has, what increases the pressure, etc. At this specific level, many linguistic metaphors using the same conceptual metaphor can be found cross-linguistically. Each operates differently on the basic, generic mapping, focusing on different aspects, and choosing differing concrete objects for the abstract, unfed entities found in the generic conceptual metaphor. Hence, there exists a superordinate level metaphor which is found in many languages, but in many different, though congruent, linguistic manifestations, using many distinct, culturally colored, concrete entities to express what the mapping states in general. A well-established example is the conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP. This cognitive form is found in many languages in various realizations, while the opposite form (MORE IS DOWN) is not attested. Another well-known example is the conception of time in terms of space (TIME IS SPACE). As a result, in many languages expressions of time utilize spatial vocabulary (e.g. English *the future is in front of us*, German *diese Zeit liegt hinter uns* "this time is in back of us (lit. lies behind us)", Hungarian *Ez már mind mögöttünk van* "that's all behind us now", Chinese *guoqu* "past (lit. passed/gone by)" (last two examples taken from Kövecses 2007: 48f)).[14]

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[13] This form is disputed due to its relation to the metonymy PRESSURE FOR ANGER, where physiological effects are applied to express the cause, i.e. ANGER.

[14] Note that this metaphor is challenged by linguists and psychologists since the end of the last century (Rice et al. 1999). There is evidence that speakers do not have access to the conceptual metaphor TIME IS SPACE when they talk about time using spatial vocabulary:

Mappings manifested in linguistic expressions do not necessarily comprise complete domains or entire frames: "only certain aspects of either the source or the target participate in metaphors" (Kövecses 2006:124). Consequently, other parts are not used for mappings, in fact these may be either from the source or the target domains. Instead, only specific features of a source domain are 'utilized', while only certain aspects of a target domain are 'highlighted' by the linguistic expressions. Together, they constitute the underlying basic mapping which is assumed to enable communication of the intended meaning.

In a mapping of two domains not only do the basic correspondences of the two manifest in metaphors, but also peripheral characteristics included in aspects of the source domain (similar to conceptual baggage, cf. ch. 2.2.2.1.). The consequences of our knowledge of the source are visible in many entailments also carried over with the basic correspondences. So, taking LOVE IS A JOURNEY as an example, we can – due to our knowledge about journeys and all interrelated aspects (e.g. conditions of roads and vehicles) –, also transfer smaller, less relevant individual features into the target domain and therefore create diverse metaphorical expressions. The linguistic forms which are based on such entailments are still accessible to speakers, since their knowledge allows them to understand the connections grounded on similarities of more basic aspects of the domains. Even if an expression is new, it will be understood

"although the spatial and temporal meanings of prepositions are historically linked by virtue of the TIME IS SPACE metaphor, they can be (and may normally be) represented and processed independently of each other in the brains of modern adults" (Kemmerer 2005: 797 (abstract))

Such results point out that lexicalization patterns and polysemy play a relevant role – linguistic structures do not necessarily point to very similar conceptual structures. The linguistic level must be taken into account in the same way the conceptual level is by Lakoff (2006[1993]) and other CMT theorists.

because of the mappings and entailments which exist between the domains. Speakers can infer what is meant on the basis of the source domains' meaning aspects.

There seems to be no clear-cut line for exactly which aspects or features will be taken as basic, but Grady (1997) made the point that selection depends on primary metaphors. Primary metaphors are abstract metaphors located at high levels of the hierarchy. They are used to create complex ones which are not always accessible without their primary metaphorical parts. Thus, to understand why individual aspects are utilized and highlighted in metaphorical expressions, one has to decompose the complex conceptual metaphor to gain access to the primary core which explains these choices and cultural models. Theoretically, it is quite plausible to reduce complex metaphors in order to gain access to the underlying meanings. Examples are presented in the next parts, where dimensions of variation are discussed. Variation in conceptual metaphor is relevant in this work because the identification of such cognitive structures is complicated by socio-cultural and language-specific differences. Variation patterns allow for a discrimination of idiosyncratic realizations of similar embodied concepts and unrelated conceptualizations.

3.2.2. DIMENSIONS OF METAPHOR VARIATION

Metaphor variation can be found along several dimensions, each linked to differences in some aspect of the mappings, inter-cultural and -linguistic as well as intra-cultural and -linguistic. Cross-cultural variation comes into existence as a result of distinct factors leading to different ways of either conceptualization or manifestation of conceptualization. Here, language-specific structures are also relevant, since they also affect how concepts are manifested. Within-culture variation will be discussed thereafter, highlighting the fact that a culture or a community does not constitute a monolithic whole, but shows variation, change,

and heterogeneity. The traditional view of a speech community as a coherent, monolithic whole was proven false by many authors providing evidence for heterogeneity, subcultural groupings, and variation within one society or community (Kövecses 2010). Taking this for granted, one must assume conceptual variations as well. They lead to some degree to different metaphors, different linguistic metaphorical forms, and different usages of concepts and expressions. The possible dimensions include individual, regional, ethnic, and social-cultural, besides others.

Metaphorical mappings show to have a great deal of potential. We find a huge amount of different connections in the languages of the world reflected in linguistic forms (Kövecses 2010). In fact, in each language, and in each speech community, there are sensible reasons for each of the rules, constraints and classes found. These reasons are grounded in cultural assumptions, models and theories developed during a time of decisive experiences, reflecting the interplay of cultural models and embodiment. As a consequence of variation in experience and processing of experience, diverse conceptualizations appear. Together, they form a cultural model system which in turn generates numerous metaphors and figurative expressions in an individual language not found in others. Domains which are used as source domains for conceptual metaphors already show variability cross-linguistically. These classes are chosen due to the cultural weighting of the ingredients contained in a concept. As Holland & Quinn point out, speakers consider those classes as appropriate source domains that seize "aspects of the simplified world and the prototypical events unfolding in this world, constituted by the cultural model" (1980: 30). This entails that most metaphors grant access – or at least insight – into cultural categories, conceptualization patterns and the existing entailments among them of a given speech community. Additionally, speakers do not realize a concept or class as a whole, but as a conglomerate of characteristics which does or does not fit the purposes of the target domain in which it will be included. If two or more

features of the source domain meet the demands of the target domain, speakers are more willing to use that concept as the source domain (Lakoff 1993, Kövecses 2006). Potential source domains are rejected if one or more aspects contradict any feature of the cultural model of the target domain. In Beaver, the English expression and concept "break one's heart" is not accepted. This is assumed to be linked to the cultural model of autonomous individuals not intervening in other person's decisions or lives, so that such explicitly stated intrusion is avoided (Goulet 1998, Mills 1986). Additionally, the conventionalized Beaver pattern is *sadzéé' tyíhsane* "I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)" already carries out the expressive function for the intended meaning. All this allows us to observe and comprehend at least some aspects of the cultural models underlying linguistic realizations.

The question of universality has been raised many times in the investigation of conceptual metaphors. The contemporary theory states that embodied experience constitutes the origin of metaphor in thought. This means, it forms the basis of (real or culturally created) similarities which are realized due to some sort of experience. Therefore, a great deal of universal parallels are expected in the conceptual systems of languages all over the world. Indeed, the first analyses of different languages supported this hypothesis, for example extracting the HAPPY IS UP metaphor in unrelated languages like English, Hungarian, and Chinese (Kövecses 2006: 156). The linguistic realizations differ in their constructions as well as in the choice of lexical forms used, but the underlying concepts are the same. The MORE IS UP orientational metaphor is presumed to be one of the most central ones and is thus positioned at the highest level in the inheritance hierarchy.[15] Generic level metaphors pass down their main characteristics to more specific metaphors, so that a whole range of

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[15] Note that others, for example, Radden (2003), define this form as metonymic (UP FOR MORE).

metaphors from all levels constitutes a culturally colored conceptual system in an individual community (see also 3.2.1.2.). Here, the influences are specific and individually shaped by factors like living conditions, environment, existing cultural rules and so on, leading to great variation potential in the individual's conceptual and linguistic organization.

As was already discussed, metaphors consist of several components, each of which can constitute the relevant point in variation. Cross-cultural variation may depend on the range of source domains and the scope of target domains, constituting relevant variables in the mechanisms under discussion. Concerning ranges and scopes, the discussion concentrates on metaphors found at lower, and thus more specific levels in the hierarchical conceptual system.

3.2.2.1. SCOPE OF SOURCE AND RANGE OF TARGET

The distribution of both source and target domains, and the relations of these are not easy to grasp. This is the case especially in less described languages where lexicons, dictionaries and linguistic – and especially semantic – analyses do not exist and thus lack for versification and rechecking. The relation between one source and one target domain is not a one-to-one relation. Instead, cognition and experience choose different frames for one target domain to be used as sources of conceptualization of the domain aimed at, and these diverse concepts may co-occur within the target domain. For example, LOVE as a target domain uses various source domains in English, combined in conceptual metaphors like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS AN ARGUMENT, LOVE IS A GAME, etc. This is due to the fact that all mentioned domains provide a conceptual frame for the abstract/emotional idea of LOVE, and show similarities – at least in some aspects – with the target, or are based on related embodied experiences. There is no clear blocking of usage of other sources which also have potential correspondences. Thus, the range of target domains is open to

make available numerous source domains for metaphorized concepts, if they fit the needs to a certain degree.

The same holds with the scope of the source domains. One frame can be the basis of numerous target domains, if it shows parallels with the whole abstract or emotional idea, or with some facets of it. Hence, a source can apply to many target concepts, and there may be overlaps or intersections, i.e. two or more different sources can apply to the same target concept. In Beaver, for example, the linguistic pattern [NO BODY PART] reflecting ABSENCE is applied for negative personality traits (*sadzagé' nadyué* "be stubborn (lit. my ears do not exist)"), but also for disability like *sadzii wǫjué* "be deaf" (lit. "my inner ears do not exist").

As a result, despite universal characteristics of many mappings due to their (embodied) experiential basis, one finds many diverse systems, and a huge amount of altering metaphors established in the world's languages. The conceptualization of time is an often used example, since time is nearly universally understood by means of space because of our experiences. Nevertheless, the concepts, metaphors and linguistic expressions differ to express time from culture to culture. They are subject to socio-cultural aspects influencing which specific conceptual aspects of lexical items are focused and used in other contexts, but also to linguistic conditions regulating available patterns. In conceptualizing spatial relations, speech communities select different parts of the (extended) body or the immediate environment for establishing a spatial system, most of them based on the human body in upright position (see e.g. Heine 1995; Heine, Claudi & Hünemeyer 1991). Some, however, take the horizontally oriented body of, for example, an animal with four legs or swimming humans or animals. These languages create systems which differ at the highest level mappings from those oriented towards the prototypical human body. This choice again reflects experiential (relationship to animals, individual environment), and cultural aspects (social organization as

hunter-gatherer society, status of animals). They generate and modify further mappings, correspondences, and linguistic expressions, and the resulting variations found across languages are due to use of different sources or conceptual aspects in the linguistic manifestations. There are also examples of languages using the same abstract source at a high level in the hierarchy, but organizing the conceptual system differently, i.e. not highlighting the same features or characteristics of the source. For example, focusing on manner or on direction in motion verbs -, which again may result in a changed linguistic realization of the target domain.[16]

Source domains like SPACE, OBJECT, BODY PART etc. can be found in many languages due to their general, unspecified natures'. On the other side, source domains like WAR, FLOWERS or PLAY are more specific ideas with more concrete features. These constitute culturally biased domains, chosen (probably at some point unconsciously) to express culturally shared assumptions about the world, or one's own behavior in this world. Ning Yu (2002) for example attributes the Chinese mapping HAPPINESS IS FLOWERS IN THE HEART to the fact that Chinese mentality is "more introverted". Thus, their HAPPINESS metaphor concentrates on the emotion being inside the happy person and intended for him/her alone, not to be exhibited for all other people around the experiencer. This is unlike the (American) English mappings which express happiness as something visible to others, and as worthy of being seen by all, for example, BEING HAPPY IS BEING OFF THE GROUND (Kövecses 2006:159).

Such differences in the choice of source domains may show consequences on many different levels of the system, depending on where such dissimilarities arise. The Chinese example is placed at a medium level in the inheritance hierarchy, as it is quite generic in character, but at the same time more specific than for example, HAPPINESS IS A PLANT IN A CONTAINER,

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[16] For a detailed study, see Özcaliskan (2003/4).

characterizing FLOWERS, and the HEART as a special place in the body container (Yu 2002). Still, it may give rise to other mappings based on this HAPPINESS metaphor, as well as to many different lexical manifestations of the correspondences found in this mapping. Comprehensibly, individual metaphors are interrelated to numerous other metaphors and integrated in a complex conceptual system. Modifications, changes and innovations affect not only one specific level or one individual mapping, but may draw a line throughout the whole system.

Cross-linguistic variation of metaphors and their diverse aspects occurs due to "differential experience and differential cognitive preferences, or styles" (Kövecses 2006:167). These will be discussed in the following sections.

3.2.2.2. VARIATION IN EXPERIENCE

As was already mentioned, although we all live in the same world, our experiences differ according to our direct environment, social organization, existing communicative patterns and so on. As Kövecses put it: "we are (mostly unconsciously) aware of the context around us" (2006: 167). This phrase raises an important question, namely to what degree speakers are aware of or consciously use transferred concepts to talk about objects, states or actions. This is especially relevant for those abstract phenomena otherwise said to be incomprehensible (i.e., not physical objects, for example, LOVE as opposed to DOG, states like BE *IN* A BAD MOOD as opposed to BE BIG, or actions like *UNDERPIN* AN ARGUMENT / *TAKE* A NAP as opposed to TAKE AN APPLE).

Coming back to the notion of cultural context: cross-culturally related values and (basic) concepts, as well as their organization vary and therefore give rise to different linguistic expressions. The same holds for central metaphors in a society, which form the basis for many other concepts at lower levels of salience. In the European and American tradition, for example, Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995) showed that the medieval idea of the "four humors" was a

central component in life and culture. It influenced many important social aspects, and generated the conceptualization and understanding of emotions, especially ANGER. Still, at the highest, most abstract level in the inheritance hierarchy, AN ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER is said to maintain its (nearly) universal character due to our shared physiological experiences. The place of variation is at deeper levels, where culture-specific concepts in fact derive from the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER metaphor. They constitute part of a complex cultural system of concepts and propositions, and accordingly differ from culture to culture: "[...] culturally unique key concepts fill out generic-level schemas in the creation of cross-culturally differential metaphors" (Kövecses 2006:168).

Another related aspect giving rise to culturally based variations refers to the history of a society or speech community. If a group has always experienced hard living conditions, or has always had to wage war against other groups, it seems likely that such groups will show different concepts of life than groups whose living conditions are less hostile, and whose neighboring groups are not warmongers.[17] What is also of interest here, is the fact that cultures are not entirely free to choose a source domain for such mappings, but that the experiences made in their history have great impact. This is even enlarged by the fact that communities are not aware of such influences, and therefore fall back

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[17] Evidence for conceptual consequences of differing external factors is provided by Kövecses (2002), who showed that the Hungarian concepts LIFE IS WAR and LIFE IS A COMPROMISE can be traced back to the martial history of the Hungarian people due to their geographical situation, while the concepts LIFE IS A GAME and LIFE IS A PRECIOUS POSSESSION found in the American tradition show a completely different, positive basic idea about how life is (or should be) experienced and understood. See also Wierzbicka (1997) for relevant socio-historical reasons which influenced these meanings in the mental lexicon.

on them unconsciously.[18] This partly parallels embodiment which affects conceptualization in a similar way.

3.2.2.3. VARIATION IN COGNITION

As was already shown, the processing of human experiences is not always the same, despite the fact that all humans live in the same world and have the same capabilities of perceiving experiences. Individual living conditions, social organizations and so on lead to differing experiences, which again result in diverse cognitive processes. Furthermore, bodily experiences provide potential sources for metaphorical mappings, but actual utilization is dependent on "differential experiential focus" (Kövecses 2006:170). Out of the numerous bodily experiences, groups may choose to highlight single aspects, and to use only these in mappings, while other features are ignored in cognitive processes involved in conceptualization. Good examples are the conceptualizations of ANGER, which are often based on bodily experience, but which have selected different aspects of our physiology to put into focus (Kövecses 2006:171). Members of, for example, American and Chinese societies made the same experience: both experienced heat and pressure in the state of being angry. And indeed, both use these two aspects in their conceptualization of ANGER., although in different formats. In English, for example, the experience of INCREASE IN TEMPERATURE while being angry is highlighted, while Chinese sets the focus on the experience of PRESSURE. But this is not where the variation ends, since the concepts found in English and Chinese described above are not irrevocable and ever-present, but subject to many influences.

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[18] Parallels to linguistic relativity are visible here, since the phenomena show the same pattern of subliminal influence, operating with such a matter of course that they seem objective rather than individual as in the case of historical experiences, or subjectively modified as in the case of linguistic structures.

Gevaert (2005) traced back the English conceptualization(s) of ANGER back to before 800 A.D., and the number of linguistic metaphorical expressions using the ANGER IS HEAT mapping showed great variation over time.[19] The results of this study underline that such conceptualizations are not ever-lasting. Furthermore, they are exposed to factors which again – after the creation of individual concepts – modify them according to new experiences, changes in life style or living conditions, etc. Following Kövecses, this is taken as evidence "that universal physiology provides only a *potential* basis for metaphorical conceptualization – without mechanically constraining what the specific metaphors [...] will be" (2006:171; emphasis by Kövecses). As a consequence, investigations of concepts should be understood as pictures of (parts of) systems in motion, with no claims as to durability.

Another mechanism of cognition variation can be found in the usage and understanding of metaphor and metonymy. Communities may select the same concepts to be used as sources for figurative language, but the (cognitive) processing of these domains can show salient differences by means of either mapping entities from one domain (metonymic mappings) or from two different ones (metaphorical mappings).[20] Such differences are again the result of culture-specific features, although the reasons are not as obvious and tangible as one might wish.

To sum up, embodied experience, cultural experience, and cognitive preferences are all related to each other. They show dependencies and are often coherent with the whole conceptual system. What I made explicit here it that not

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[19] Before 850A.D. 1,59% of all expressions meaning anger manifested the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT, between 950 and 1050 6,22%, by around 1200 1,71% and by around 1300 0,27%. After 1400 the number increased and today, the ANGER IS HEAT mapping is still dominant.

[20] Systems most often show tendencies to one or the other way of mapping, i.e. probably both appear, but with different values in the system.

only does embodiment (universal bodily experience) generate conceptualization, but that "cultural-cognitive" aspects are also intensively involved in the creation of metaphorical linguistic forms. The main difference between these two is that one is oriented towards universalities of language, while the other is related to variation in culture and language.

3.3. CONCEPTUAL METONYMY

Conceptual metonymy is a highly relevant and frequently used cognitive phenomenon, resulting in different kinds of figures of speech. Its realization patterns are like those of metaphors – bound to cultural models, embodiment and related conceptualizations and structures. But while in CMT, conceptual metaphor involves two independent domains – source and target domain – being related to express a non-literal meaning, in metonymy other mechanisms are at work. This phenomenon is defined as mapping inside one domain or domain matrix. In this cognitive act, access to the target domain is provided via another, related concept or part of the target concept by means of semantic contiguity and highlighting processes. As a prototypical metonymic case, a part of an entity or class is used to conceive of this entity or class as a whole:

> "a well-chosen metonymic expression lets us mention one entity that is salient and easily coded, and thereby evoke – essentially automatically – a target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name" (Langacker 1993: 30).

The present work will concentrate on fixed constructions stored in the mental lexicon and denoting unequivocal referents. Therefore, specific cases of Dirven's (2003) "conjunctive" and "inclusive metonymy" as described in the following sections, will be examined here as parts of the Beaver lexicon.

Metonymic language use in conversation (linear metonymy in Dirven's classification) is not described in detail.

Although metonymy indeed operates automatically, cultural and linguistic conventions must be taken into account to allow for such easy processing[21]. In Beaver, prototypical functions of entities are often linguistically realized to refer to the object, e.g. *mak'éh'ets'ehdii* "table (lit. you eat on it)". This structure implies that both source and target are processed and preserved, as opposed to metaphor, where specific aspects of the actually unrelated source are transferred. Put differently, conceptual juxtaposition or concomitance occur in the case of metonymy, while real or culturally based similarity of two otherwise disparate concepts occur in metaphor. Metaphor utilizes one or more properties of the source suiting the target. Contrary, metonymy focuses on one relation holding between two parts of a domain or concept, so that no substitution of concepts is involved (Warren 2003, Sweep 2009). Consequently, in metonymy, it is this one linguistically realized relation which is processed. In metaphor, there is no such restriction, the realized correspondences can be numerous when they match the conceptual structure of the target. What approximates these two cognitive activities is their classification on a literal–non-literal–figurative scale. Metonymy does not only occur in a literal, descriptive form as in the Beaver example above. Depending on the type of relation chosen and the aspect or part used for realization, conceptual metonymy may underlie non-literal and figurative instances. A Beaver example is *atsóódale* "dogberries (lit. someone's excrements are red)". The result of eating these berries is linguistically manifested to denote the items, and the relationship between the result of eating the entity and the entity itself is processed: EFFECT FOR CAUSE. The conceptual distance

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[21] This means that although someone who does not know the Beaver language understands the relation between "you sleep on it" and "bed", the referent must not be automatically evoked due to the lack of knowledge about the convention of linguistically manifesting a function while intending the object (*mak'éhts'ééstyj* "bed (lit. on it you sleep)").

between these two parts is great enough to evoke figurativity. Although they belong to one domain matrix (NUTRITION-DIGESTION), the relation is neither the only one nor the most prominent. Predestination for figurativity and creative language use are aspects often employed by speakers and speech communities to ensure communication. This is the case not only where abstract concepts refuse direct denotation (e.g. emotions), or where metonymy allows for unequivocal reference (e.g. "the steak wants a coffee" for 'the restaurant customer who ordered the steak wants a coffee'). The phenomenon is also used to overstate or linguistically exaggerate concrete concepts. For example, "I get a hernia", but also "I explode" or "my blood boils" are used to mean 'I am angry', based on the physiological effects PRESSURE and HEAT of ANGER[22]. Metonymy, just like metaphor, can be found in every language, and is used to ease understanding, and processing of the target. Therefore, the idea is to make the world simpler than it actually is for the purpose of talking about it.

Moreover, metonymy is identified in several diverse types in many lexical fields, strengthening its status in cognition and language. In Beaver, metonymy plays an important role in form and function, i.e. for the indirect creation of meaning as well as for the creation of linguistic patterns (ch. 5).

Metonymy operates in cases where it is assumed to be more practical in a given communicative situation not to take a whole concept with all its borderline cases and exceptions for linguistic expression. First, a kind of typical or salient

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[22] The linguistic forms are defined as instances of conceptual metaphor by Lakoff (1987). In this thesis it will be argued that this is controversial, since the metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE is founded on a perfect and real physiological basis for these linguistic metaphors. Our usage of language, i.e. choice of linguistic material, evokes figurativity via overstatement, i.e. our blood is not really boiling, but the feeling of heat due to anger is real. Similarly, we do not explode, but we feel objective pressure inside our bodies caused by anger. Yet, we do not express this anger linguistically via a simple notion like "I feel pressure", but exaggerate this meaning in order to maximize the effect in communication.

example like a stereotype, or an ideal is realized (Barcelona 2002, Radden 2003 Dirven 2003). Second, concrete features of more abstract phenomena are linguistically exploited, for example, the physiological effect of the pressure of ANGER (PRESSURE FOR ANGER).

A prototype already includes the necessary characteristics of the concept meant, and additionally it provides easier access to the relevant aspects (Rosch 1978, Lakoff 1987). The proposition-schema is not deduced from a stereotypical case dominant in the real world, but from an idealized version of how it should be. This aspect serves one of the main communicative functions of metonymy, i.e. the representational function of "unambiguous reference" in the case of referential metonymy (Dirven 2003). Metaphor, on the other hand, is bound to an expressive function, realized as a "conceptualization instrument and force" (Dirven 2003: 105).

Several assumptions concerning metonymy will be examined in the Beaver data. Although metonymy needs not result in lexicalization, in Beaver this device is extensively used for old and new vocabulary. Consequently, it constitutes an important means for conventional extension of the lexicon. In the corpus, several different basic metonymies are identified, giving rise to many linguistic manifestations for concrete entities and abstract concepts of several semantic domains. Thus, metonymy in Beaver establishes a system of interrelated concepts; for example, EFFECT FOR CAUSE, FUNCTION FOR ENTITY, SHAPE FOR ENTITY are numerously applied to express the intended targets. These often comprise content fields like household items, professions, and therefore especially modern vocabulary, but also animals, food, place names and others.

For the description of the Beaver forms and patterns, I use Dirven's classification of metonymy, since special attention is paid to the notion of figurativity, and its relation to metaphor. Dirven (2003) distinguishes three main

types, reflecting the transition from literalness to figurativeness: linear, conjunctive and inclusive metonymy.

3.3.1. LINEAR METONYMY

In the first type, a linguistic syntagmatic form – e.g. a phrase – is understood metonymically if its context provides the necessary information. On its own, the form does not include any metonymic aspect, like for example, "different parts of the country" in "different parts of the country don't necessarily mean the same thing when they use the same word" (Dirven 2003: 79). This form refers to the inhabitants instead of geographical parts only if a corresponding context gives rise to such an interpretation.

Linear metonymy shows a huge amount of specific realizations of WHOLE-PART or PART-WHOLE relations, to name but a few from the most common ones in the literature:

LOCALITY FOR INHABITANTS ("France loves its tower.")
CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED ("He drank the whole bottle.")
PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT ("She reads Goethe.")

In all these cases, the conceptual categories standing for the referents are closely related, but show a different "referential mass than the common expression(s) used for the intended referent", to use Dirven's cognitive definition (2003: 80). This definition fits the properties of examples like "different parts of the country", meaning "inhabitants of the different parts of the country". In the Beaver cases though, the metonymic expressions do constitute the "common expression(s) used for the intended referent". They are not variants or alternatives reflecting the speaker's intentions in specific speech situations. Rather, the speech community (unconsciously) conventionalized and lexicalized those form-meaning pairs at some point in time, systematically using metonymy as an instrument for meaning construction. This means that the

forms are included in the Beaver lexicon as fixed expressions with fixed meanings. The English examples above, on the other hand, are neither lexicalized nor do they constitute fixed meanings of the lexical items which are included in the lexicon. Another important fact excludes all Beaver metonymic expressions described in this work: linear metonymy as defined by Dirven (2003) does not involve a constant shift in meaning. Rather, it depends on the context in which it is embedded in a communicative situation. That means, linear metonymy includes expressions not conventionally used and lexicalized in their metonymic meanings. Consequently, such constructions do not lead to or result in polysemous networks stored in the lexicon. Figurativity does not play a role in this type either: the referent does not show a conceptual distance great enough from the concept of the metonymic form to trigger figurative interpretation.

Since no (lasting) shift in meaning, i.e. no conventionalization, is established via this type, and only stylistic / pragmatic expressions in language use are construed, linear metonymy will not be further investigated in combination with the Beaver data.

3.3.2. CONJUNCTIVE METONYMY

The second type of metonymy shows an important difference from the first one concerning shifts in meaning. While the linear forms of metonymy are context-dependent, conjunctive tokens include both, the original meaning of the expression as well as a lasting meaning extension (broadening). Although this type is located closer to the figurative end of the literal–non-literal continuum, the meaning extension meant here does not necessarily include figurative meanings, though one of the two subtypes of conjunctive metonymy described below results in figurativity (Dirven 2003).

The first and non-figurative subclass subsumes the well-known cases of nouns, for example, "the Times" denoting a magazine with its premises, staff,

and issues, or a building and the institution, with its (concrete and abstract) components and subordinates, e.g. "school" in "the school is angry (meaning 'staff / teacher(s)', 'department', 'headmaster')" or "the school broke up (meaning 'school year')". Here, the constant shift in meaning expands the original meaning without deleting or losing it.

In the Beaver language, many verbal forms are used to denote, for example, household items or professions, so that the literal meaning "s/he talks for the people" only refers to *dane ghaawudyíhe* "translator" if the context allows for or promotes that meaning, otherwise this form is understood literally. "To talk for people" is indeed an important aspect of being a translator. In cognitive linguistic approaches to such figures of thought, this form is described as ACTION FOR AGENT (crucial aspect for entity). The Beaver word for "table", *mak'éh'ets'ehdii* literally means "on it you eat". Again, one of the crucial features of a table is highlighted, and stands for the whole, applying FUNCTION FOR ENTITY. Here, similarity to linear metonymy can be seen, since the literal meanings of these phrases can occur without referring to "table" or "translator" respectively. The relevant difference is their status as lexicon entries: tokens of linear metonymy are not lexicalized nor stored as fixed constructions.

The second subclass contains instances of metonymy which always include a figurative meaning. This is due to the fact that the distance between the denotation and the entity referred to is relatively great as opposed to the first, non-figurative subclass of conjunctive metonymy. To use Dirven's example: a figurative conjunctive metonymy like "crown" for the 'monarch', transfers a concrete object of royal regalia – which itself is one component out of three (prerogatives, executive, regalia), so that the object 'crown' belongs to the next sublevel, together with other subordinates like 'scepter' or 'robe'. This transfer from one (sub-)domain to the target domain has to cover quite a great distance,

and it is this distance that triggers figurative meaning, while the transfer from, for example, "school" to "teacher" also results in polysemous concepts, but this conceptual shift does not include figurativity, because the distance between both exists, yet, is not large enough. Note that a 'crown' itself as well as the component 'regalia' are not the most important aspects in this system. The crucial point here is that the crown is "an almost predestined candidate for figurativisation" (Dirven 2003: 103). People have stored the picture of a crown as symbol for monarchy[23], furthermore, it abstracts from the person representing the monarchy, and from the fact that these persons change over time, leaving the institution as the only referent. To use Dirven's words, such metonymies' functions are "unambiguous reference, or on the contrary, […] exploiting vagueness or ambiguity" (2004: 102). A Beaver example is *xáálo sazáá' ts'a'áhe* "first communion (lit. first time they put it in my mouth)" (see ch. 5.3.).

3.3.3. INCLUSIVE METONYMY

This last type of metonymy is also characterized by a non-linguistic syntagmatic basis, but this basis is not supported by juxtaposition, instead, a relationship of inclusion is established. To use Dirven's example, in "he's got a *good head* on him" (2003: 83), a physical aspect is used to refer to a non-physical, mental aspect, i.e. intelligence. This seems similar to the linear metonymy PART FOR WHOLE, however, inclusive metonymy – as opposed to the linear type – does not allow for the use one for the other and vice versa. Compare "curly hair / curly head" for a linear relationship, with "brains working slowly / *head working slowly" for an inclusive English example. This reversibility is connected with the fact that in linear metonymy, there is no extreme difference between

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[23] This relation seems to be bidirectional: both the non-linguistic behaviour and the linguistic manifestations influence one another.

the two domains involved, for example, hair and head both denote concrete body parts. For "head" and "brains", on the other hand, abstract notions of mental activity are included, constituting a distinct distance between source and target. Since the difference or distance between (concrete) source and (abstract) target is enormous, one cannot include both in one domain, like in the linear type. Neither is this relation to be understood as a mapping from one unrelated domain to another, although the concepts of concrete domains differ to a huge extent from those of abstract (mental) domains. Rather, both constitute different subdomains of one "domain matrix", showing less overt closeness, or relatedness (Croft 2002). Thus, in the case of "good head", the subdomains {mental world} and {physical body} are included in the domain matrix {human being}.

Both metonymy and metaphor involve conceptual processes, the difference for CMT is that in metaphor no domain matrix is established via juxtaposition or conceptual contiguity, where both domains remain intact, like in the metonymic expression "tea is a large meal", where the real event of tea drinking expanded, became socially ritualized and was combined with eating to constitute a meal. The conceptual contiguity between drinking and eating is kept, and both domains along with their characteristics are included and maintained. In metaphor, on the other hand, the source domain (or better, the crucial aspects allowing for correspondences) is embedded in or swallowed by the target, in other words "the source domain is merely 'hypothetical'" (Warren 2003: 91). For example, in the metaphor "drinking Belgian beer is drinking and eating" (example taken from Dirven 2003: 89), some aspects (e.g. nourishing effect, solid consistency) of the source domain 'eating' are mapped onto the drinking of Belgian beer, but the real act of eating does not occur in the real world or in the referent (as it does in "tea" above).

In the example "he's got a *good head* on him" given above, 'intelligence' as an abstract, mental property is figuratively realized as a concrete object. It is

situated in the 'head', which belongs to the subdomain (physical) body parts. Head is connected to 'intelligence' via a metonymic relationship that holds between head and brain, as well as between brain and intelligence. These relationships are part of what Dirven calls "chain of inclusion" (2003: 84). The metonymic relationship classifies the elements in such a metonymic chain as to include one another (e.g. head, brain, grey cells, thinking/thought processes, mind, thoughts, intelligence (taken from Dirven 2003: 84)). The relationship of juxtaposition (conjunctive metonymy), on the other hand, creates a "static whole", like "school", where the different meanings or meaning extensions (building, institution, school year, staff etc.) do not include one another.

This represents and underpins the relation between universal features in language – especially embodiment – and cross-linguistic variation. It should be kept in mind that the organization described above holds for the English language and must not be understood as a cross-linguistic fact found in every language. As a universal phenomenon, concrete (bodily) experiences are systematically used to enable communication about abstract entities. Specific results of conceptualizations of experiences like the metonymic chain linked to "head" are not necessarily universal, although this socio-culturally shaped relationship shows connections to the reality outside linguistic organization (for example, the action of thinking does take place in the brain, which is situated in the head). Indeed, it seems to be universal to locate mind, thinking, intelligence and the like in the head based on experience. However, in Chinese for example, "heart" is conceptualized as SEAT OF EMOTION and SEAT OF THOUGHT, or INTELLIGENCE (Yu 2002). Which part will be used in which way, and which relations or mappings will arise, is a question of socio-cultural, historical and linguistic concepts and the knowledge of individual communities. On the other hand, similar conceptualizations and resulting lexicalizations of MIND in languages around the world reflect the high relevance of this concept and a need to process and communicate psychological and mental aspects (see also ch.5.2.).

There may be different systems combining or highlighting other aspects of the existing relations between HEAD and INTELLIGENCE, or including additional subdomains like SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE as opposed to pure KNOWLEDGE, or FAITH as part of real knowledge about the world. Thus, variation not only occurs at the inter-domain-level – which domains are combined or linked to each other, which are subdomains in a chain etc. – but also at the domain- or extensional level, i.e. what is included in individual domains, what is stored in separate ones. These decisions again are found at different levels. Speech communities conventionalize domains following their cultural models and at the same time the concrete linguistic manifestations of mappings are subject to interpretations of "culturally-conditioned language user[s]" (Dirven 2003: 88). For example, the figurative expression "they are dead slow" could be analyzed by native speakers of English either as metonymic ('they' = their minds) or as metaphorical (PHYSICAL SLOWNESS IS MENTAL SLOWNESS). Again a domain matrix can be assumed here: mental slowness is related to the physical domain, i.e. metonymic structures are evoked. This mirrors the fact that speech communities are not homogenous, and that several explanations based on differing models are plausible.

Concerning the mentioned literal–non-literal–figurative continuum, this metonymy type is positioned closer to the figurativity end, since all instances of this type show figurative meanings, like in "s/he's got a good head on her/him", where INTELLIGENCE is figuratively realized as a concrete object. Examples in Beaver are: *sats̱íídué'* "I am stupid/crazy (lit. my head is not there)", *sadzagé' nadyué'* "I am stubborn (my ears are not there)", manifesting conceptual metonymy with figurative meanings and the conceptualization of the body parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS (see ch.5).

In the last example, despite similar linguistic realizations in Beaver and for example English ("to turn a deaf ear" for 'not willing to listen / know'), different cultural models provide the semantic base. The Beaver concept of 'learning' is

not necessarily bound to teaching and following rules. Consequently, the expression denoting "stubbornness" is not focused on obedience. Children must not first listen and learn what adults tell them, before they are allowed to perform what they were instructed to do. Rather, first-hand experience is promoted, and learning is equated with observing, and not with receiving verbal instructions and providing answers to questions (Mills 1986, Goulet 1998).

In general, the metonymy types discussed are positioned at the turning point between literal and non-literal meanings, i.e. the types differ from each other and from metaphor concerning their degrees of figurativity. Another point of dissimilarity is the degree of meaning shift, be it non-existent or ad hoc as in the linear metonym "different parts of the country", or permanent as in conjunctive metonymies like *mak'éh'ets'ehdii* "table (lit. on it you eat)" which systematically extended and conventionalized its meaning to denote a referent and to be stored in the (mental) lexicon.

The aspects discussed of metonymy and metaphor are important properties for the definitions of both phenomena: especially, these are figurativity and contiguous domains combined in a domain matrix in metonymy as opposed to metaphor, where the source domain is said to be erased in the mapping (Dirven 2003). The appearance of figurativity crosscuts the distinctions made, and cannot be explained by means of them. The notion of a continuum with literalness and metaphor (always figurative) positioned at the two ends fits the described patterns. The different metonymy types are placed at the points of intersection, since the non-figurative and figurative instances metonymy constitute gradual transitions from literalness to figurativity (Dirven 2003: 107).

3.3.4. Conceptual Metaphor, Metonymy & Metaphtonymy

Although conceptual metaphor often attracts more interest in research, metonymy has recently gained increased attention. The origin as well as several problematic aspects of metaphor and the distinction between metaphor and metonymy lie more and more in focus, demanding and generating comprehension and discussion. The most generic conceptual metaphors defined by Lakoff and others also allow for classification as metonymies, as Radden (2003) has shown. In CMT, the step from the physiologically based metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE or rather PRESSURE FOR ANGER to a conceptual metaphor (ANGER IS PRESSURE) by Lakoff (1987: 382ff) is equivocal and allows for an alternative analysis. Lakoff (1987) explains the "common folk theory of the physiological effects of anger" (1987: 281) and connects it to metonymic conceptualizations. In the description following, this is converted to a conceptual metaphor. The CMT legitimates this evolutionary step of conceptual metaphors which have metonymic pendants on a purely linguistic basis. However, if physiological effects can be identified which are utilized for linguistic manifestation – even if exaggerated – then there is no need for conceptual metaphor, i.e. conceptual transfer from an unrelated domain or concept.

Radden (2003) unveils and demonstrates the metonymic basis of conceptual metaphors defined as 'primary or central metaphors' by Lakoff (2006[1993]) and Grady (1997). For example, the primary metaphor MORE IS UP has its origins in correlation and conceptual binding. This means, the two experienced phenomena (verticality and quantity) are so closely related that we do not consciously and ad hoc divide them. But even if they are disconnected, they are still realized as belonging to one domain, therefore questioning the status of MORE IS UP as cognitive metaphorical structure.

The following point is also relevant for the Beaver data and the extraction of underlying conceptualizations. Conceptual metaphors and metonymies are often linguistically realized in the same way, i.e. via figurative idiomatic expressions. Linguistic forms with underlying metonymic structures (e.g. EFFECT FOR CAUSE) show figurative features very similar to forms based on conceptual metaphor. For example, *sadzéé' xááts'at* "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)" includes a metaphorical conceptualization of HEART and a figurative usage of "fall out" (focusing on SUDDEN/UNCONTROLLED MOTION), especially in relation to the subject. On the other hand, *madzéé' dáh'atl'is* "s/he is excited / scared" literally means "my heart is dancing": it includes the prototypical meaning of "heart" as concrete BODY PART and applies the metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE. The combination of "heart" and "dance" evokes figurativity identical to the case of ANGER (*sadzéé' xááts'at*). Yet, there is no underlying figurative and transferred conceptualization of the meaning. Rather, real physiological experience (increased heartbeat) linked to the target EXCITEMENT constitutes the underlying concept. Figurativity is evoked by the verb with its prototypical meaning ("dance"). In chapter 6, these and other examples will be presented and discussed in more detail.

Goossens established the notion of "metaphtonymy" (Goossens 1990) for linguistic expressions which reflect both metaphor and metonymy to certain degrees. He defines and distinguishes two types: "metaphor from metonymy" and "metonymy within metaphor". The first type is found in expressions like "giggle" in *'Oh dear' she giggled, 'I'd quite forgotten'*. The meaning extension from 'to laugh in a nervous way' to 'say while giggling' is a metonymic one, while the further extension to "to say as if giggling" (Geeraerts 2003) is defined as a metaphorical process. Note that this analysis is similar to Dirven's description of figurative conjunctive metonymy (cf. ch. 3.3.2.): for example, "tea" in "tea is a large meal" is defined as a metonymic meaning extension.

The latter type "metaphor within metonymy" refers to expressions like *catch someone's ear* "to ensure someone's attention" (Geeraerts 2003: 21). The example reveals the interplay between the corresponding metonymic chain HEAR – LISTEN – ATTAIN (– OBEY) in combination with the conceptual metonymy ISTRUMENT FOR ACTION (ear for hear/listen). The verb "catch" is used in a transferred, non-physical meaning. However, as Geeraerts points out: "obtaining something is the result of taking hold of it" (2003: 21), and the hearing organ is linked to "hear, listen and attention" through embodiment in a metonymic fashion. Hence, a metonymic interpretation is preferred and sufficient. Other examples are "to bite one's tongue off" and "beat one's breast". These are partially defined as metonymic, since they refer to specific effects of the intended meanings ("be sorry for what one has just said" and "make a noisy open show of sorrow" (taken from Balbachan 2006: 9)). Their metaphoric interpretations are evoked by the fact that these explicated activities do not take place – although they potentially could (and really do in some appropriate contexts). This constitutes the main difference between these instances and, for example, "he exploded" as manifestations of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS PRESSURE (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). The conceptual metonymy PRESSURE FOR ANGER itself is transferred to the metaphoric concept because the expressed action – explosion of an angry person – never occurs in reality. Their metonymic example "get a hernia" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987), on the other hand, fits the definition of the metaphtonymy type "metaphor within metonymy", since an angry person does not really "get a hernia" when angry, but potentially could due to pressure as an effect of anger.

Goossens' metaphtonymy (1990) constitutes an important contribution to the discussion how conceptual metaphor is defined and how the relationship between conceptual metaphor and metonymy looks like. Both of Goossens' types have in common substantial relationships to metonymy, and some of the conceptual metaphors defined by Lakoff offer similar relationships to

metonymic structures. In chapter 5, it will be shown that the expressions of emotion including body part terms in Beaver do not constitute metaphtonymies per se. They are neither metonymies used as metaphors nor metaphors within metonymy as defined by Goossens. For example, *sadzéé' xaats'at* "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)" does not refer to a metonymy in the same way Goossens examples do: a body part falling out does not rely on real experience. Consequently, the data is not classified in terms of this phenomenon.

3.4. BEYOND CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY

In the following section, the recent state of research is provided with respect to conceptual and linguistic metaphors. I discuss those parts of alternative approaches which are relevant for the data presented here and the application of the CMT on these data. At the same time, aspects of the CMT particularly problematic in terms of the Beaver expressions will be introduced. Many parts of the theory are highly relevant and fruitful for the investigation of the relationships between language and thought. Results already achieved clearly reflect the importance of this methodology. However, new frameworks modify and specify some hypotheses with new data and exert alternative levels in the modeling of linguistic and cognitive fields of conceptualization.

3.4.1. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO LINGUISTIC METAPHORS & UNDERLYING CONCEPTS

The theoretical framework of conceptual metaphor constitutes one of the most important and most influencing theories concerning conceptualization and figurative language. This cognitive approach reveals a system deeply embedded in our cognitive structures and affecting linguistic structure in a way which was not described in such details until Lakoff and Johnson's work (1980). In the last

two decades, however, some shortcomings and disputable aspects become clear, as revealed by empirical application of the CMT. As a consequence, several authors critically discussed the CMT and presented alternative approaches (Fauconnier 1997, Fauconnier & Turner 2002, 2008, Glucksberg et al. 1997, Grady 1999, Bowdle & Gentner 2005, Evans 2006, 2009, 2010a, to appear). The alternative frameworks offer elaborations, amendments and complementary strategies of figurative language analysis in relation to the CMT.

Most important, the salience of conceptual metaphor is disputed as main mechanism of figurative meanings and figurative meaning construction. Evans convincingly argues that conceptual metaphors "do not directly motivate language use in an isomorphic way" (2011: 2). Rather, there exist additional mechanisms deeply embedded in the individual linguistic system of every language which generate figurative meanings in language use. Hence, conceptual metaphor as non-linguistic knowledge structure is not the only process included in and responsible for linguistic metaphors.

Furthermore, it is difficult to find solid evidence for these conceptual structures. There is still no direct way to realize conceptual processes, and linguistic evidence is not always as clear as is stated by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (2006[1993]) or Kövecses (2010). Rather, it is equivocal if linguistic expressions are direct indications of cognitive processes. As is also acknowledged by the approaches presented here. Linguistic forms must not parallel or directly mirror conceptual structures, so that a linguistic metaphor does not mandatorily imply conceptual metaphor. Our own intuitions and speculation bias such supposedly strong bonds between language and thought, yet this cannot be taken as clear evidence. Conceptual Metaphor theorists extensively draw upon their own intuitions and use introspection, while broad empirical data is still lacking, especially in combination with an objective analysis unbiased by presumed conceptual metaphors. Glucksberg et al. (1997) already disproved some assumed connections between underlying conceptual metaphors

and linguistic realizations. The fact that – after being offered a suitable correspondence – speakers (and linguists as speakers, too) are biased and no longer open to alternative accounts, has resulted in unconfirmed speculations in some parts of the theory.

In his Lexical Concept and Cognitive Models Theory (LCCM), Evans systematically develops a model which copes with linguistic metaphors not suiting the definitions of the CMT (2010a). He focuses on linguistic metaphors which reflect language-specific patterns of conceptualization and lexicalization, i.e. meaning construction in language use. The notion of "discourse metaphors" (Evans, to appear) as figurative language forms contrasts with conceptual metaphors with respect to their basis: while conceptual metaphors are said to be independent of language, discourse metaphors are "linguistically mediated instances" (Evans to appear: 3) of language use. Similar to conceptual metaphors, they are linked to their conceptual basis, but they are created in language use and consequently are language-specific. Evans uses "frankenfood" as an example to demonstrate the creation of linguistically based structures in communication events (2011: 2). This discourse metaphor comes into existence to facilitate communicative intentions. It relies on the concept of "Frankenstein" which is combined with the concept of genetically modified crops and related connotations. This and similar forms are established in discourse, i.e. in language use, and the new linguistic (and conceptual) forms can, but need not, become lexicalized. Alternatively, they get lost again when they loose salience. Conceptual metaphors, on the other hand, give rise to linguistic metaphors in other forms: they are deeply embedded in our cognitive system and constitute stable mechanisms. These mechanisms are neither language nor discourse based, but rely on essential experiences. Thus, these two types of metaphor are both linked to language and cognition. Yet, discourse metaphors inhere in the linguistic system, while conceptual metaphors have their basis in the cognitive system (Evans 2011).

The cognitive structures associated with discourse metaphors – "lexical concepts" are defined as units "of purely linguistic semantic knowledge" (Evans 2006: 15). The belong to the language-specific level of semantic representation and are conventionally combined with linguistic forms, specifying their semantic arguments. They operate independently of conceptual metaphor and are consulted for polysemy explication besides the cognitive structures presumed by the CMT.

Which meanings of polysemous lexemes will be conventionalized and lexicalized in a language depends not only on best practice experience. It is also subject to the arbitrariness reflected cross-linguistically in different lexicons and grammars. That means, selection does not happen consciously nor systematically. Contexts, figurative predestinations and chance finally influence the inclusion and integration of highlighted conceptual aspects. Especially, the role of linguistic material used to focus on these components needs a deeper analysis. Evans strengthens the inclusion of language-specific structures and language use as affecting figurative language and concepts (2006, 2010).

Furthermore, lexical concepts activate "semantic affordances" which manage to evoke the relevant meanings in language use and the interpretation of figurative meaning (Evans to appear: 24). For example, the English preposition *in* in its various usages and meanings is analyzed in relationship with its lexical concepts which respectively underlie each usage. Thus, in addition to the conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS, lexical concepts like [PHYSIOLOGICAL STATE], [PSYCHO-SOMATIC STATE] or [SOCIO-INTERPERSONAL STATE] are applied by Evans. These are used to differentiate and coherently describe usages like *the cow is in milk*, *John is in love* and *John is in debt* (2006: 15). These meaning nuances cannot be explained by the conceptual metaphor, but need a language-internal foundation. Note that Evans does not question the conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS. Other researchers (e.g. McGlone 2007, see below) argue that its scope is

problematic: since states can be defined as 'being in a location', the mapping might be redundant, overstating the notion of metaphorical transfer. Thus, Evans' account is based on the theory of conceptual metaphor and elaborates the linguistic side of figurative language and thought. The linguistic structures investigated and described within this framework are linguistic metaphors not definable only on the basis of conceptual metaphors. This type (or these types) of metaphor is also realized and exploited by other approaches. Since these expressions often occur in the linguistic form X IS Y (for example, "my lawyer is a shark"), the findings are not easily assignable to the Beaver metaphors which are not realized as explicit similes. Forms with the literal meanings "my heart falls out" or "my minds are plenty" call for a distinct description.

Grady – one of the leading researchers in the circle of the CMT who established the notion of "primary metaphor" – states in his article (1999) that not all linguistic metaphors can be explained purely on the basis of conceptual (and primary) metaphors. Forms like "my job is a jail", but also image metaphors like "my wife whose waist is an hourglass" need another foundation than the postulated correlations based on experience. Therefore, he includes the more classical notion of "resemblance" which reflects the functions of the linguistic forms (Grady 1999). These functions utilize specific attributes of the source and the target concepts because of existing similarities without an adoption of the source's structure. The class of resemblance metaphors is further divided into "behavior-based" and image metaphors. The latter refers to conceptualizations based on image-schematic visual input which reflects resemblance in physical properties. Behavior-based metaphors concentrate on dynamic processes which allow for comparison. An example is "my boss is a pussycat" (Evans to appear: 8), where characteristics of the source are attributed to the target domain. Since we need not having any experience of a correlation between "boss" and "pussycat", but still comprehend the metaphor, a definition

of this and similar forms as conceptual metaphors with their experiential basis is not applicable (Grady 1999).

Bowlde & Gentner (2005) emphasize the conventionality of linguistic metaphors in their Career of Metaphor approach. Similar to Evans, they concentrate on the linguistic side of metaphor and focus on the analogies used between source and target irrespective of similarity of the domains. This means that lexicalization replaces conceptual mapping when the conventionalization process proceeds to a certain point. Their example "roadblock" proves this hypothesis:

> "There was presumably a time when this word referred only to a barricade set up in the road. With repeated use as the base term of metaphors such as Fear is a roadblock to success, however, roadblock has also come to refer to any obstacle to meeting a goal" (2005: 198)

Hence, they classify such instances as a different type of metaphor than conceptual metaphor, because the latter is not dependent of linguistic conventionalization and lexicalization.

Glucksberg et al. (1997) offer an approach with a similar reasoning. The Attributive Categorization Discourse Model describes linguistic metaphors as "class-inclusion assertions" (1997: 52). They state that property matching between two domains mapped in metaphor does not account for the extraction of the relevant attributes. Especially in cases where the features of the target are not known, property matching does not work. Differences in realization of a property are highlighted and lead to distinctions of the domains rather than mapping. For example, "men are wolves" relies on the property of being predatory. Yet, the two concepts of "men" and "wolves" realize different types of (social and carnivorous) predation, a fact which cannot be clearly captured by property matching models (Bowdle & Gentner 2005: 6). Furthermore, when hearers are not familiar with, for example, "Andrew's lecture" in "Andrew's

lecture was a three-course dinner", a matching cannot take place either. Rather, a property attribution process selects potentially fitting properties included in both domains, the source and the target. In the example just given, properties like "bountiful and sumptuous" (Glucksberg et al. 1997: 51) are assumed to constitute attributes of a higher category which comprises members like three-course dinners and lectures, i.e. "things that come in large quantities and high quality" (1997: 52). Furthermore, they challenge the CMT by assuming existing structures whose similarities are reflected in these higher level categories. This means that abstract target domains are not dependent on the mappings. They do not need the conceptual structure of the source concept in lack of their own structure. Rather, both domains are understood as being members of a higher category which is linguistically exemplified by vocabulary of the concrete source domain. For example, "our marriage is a rollercoaster ride" is analyzed as a category-inclusion assertion: both, the source and the target, belong to the category of "exciting and/or scary situations". A "rollercoaster ride" constitutes a literal referent – or linguistically 'best example vocabulary'. Such concrete topics are well-known and easily retrieved from semantic memory, whereas conceptual metaphor meanings must be actively processed as mappings (Gibbs 1992). In the attributive categorization model, the knowledge of the source facilitates access to the shared properties of both domains, so that the target is understood as an abstract member of the respective category.

The approach explains linguistic metaphors as the two just given as examples as category-inclusion assertions and not as manifestations of conceptual metaphor. Additionally, McGlone (2007) suggests that cases where source and target are not taken from unrelated domains – as for example MARRIAGE and JOURNEY – but belong to related concepts, are also problematic when defined as conceptual metaphor realizations. For example, he questions the assumption of a conceptual metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS for forms like "he is in trouble", because "being in a location is literally a type of

'state'" (2007: 123). Consequently, the application of conceptual metaphor is assumed to be beyond its real scope. As a consequence, the notion of conceptual metaphor in figurative language creation and usage is not realized as the one and only mechanism.

Although this approach offers a promising methodology, it must be kept in mind that the described data again do not match the Beaver forms investigated here. Still, the notion of category inclusion is applicable to metonymic structures linguistically manifested in a metaphorical fashion. Metonymic concepts are often realized with linguistic material prototypically related to different, concrete meanings. For example, "he was breathing fire" need not to be analyzed as manifestation of a conceptual metaphor (ANGER IS FIRE). Rather, the underlying metonymic structure HEAT FOR ANGER, more generally, EFFECT FOR CAUSE is processed due to tangible physiological experience. The Attributive Categorization Discourse Model (Glucksberg et al. 1997) operates with "class-inclusion assertions" to deal with this aspect (see above). The linguistic manifestation exploits figurativity and exaggeration through usage of vocabulary prototypically linked to different, more concrete meanings. Extracting the conceptual aspect HEAT (see also ch.6) of the meaning of FIRE allows for category inclusion of both concepts, ANGER as well as FIRE, in a category of concepts comprising the features HEAT (and UNCONTROLLABILITY) in their structure. ANGER – despite its abstract character – perfectly suits into this category which consequently constitutes the domain matrix for the applied metonymy.

Finally, I bring up an aspect which is not directly discussed by the approaches just mentioned. However, it is related to the CMT's focus on conceptual structure as main reason for linguistic metaphor, a point indeed mentioned by the frameworks above. One main argument of conceptual metaphor theorists claims that metaphorically conceptualized abstract concepts do not have their own structure before adopting (parts of) the structure of the

source domain. Lakoff (2006 [1993]) refers to the relations between source and target domains as correspondences which "permit us to reason about" (2006 [1993]: 191) the target. He claims that the "the mapping is primary, in that it sanctions the use of source domain language" (2006 [1993]: 192). Since the correspondences are said to map parts of the target and source structures onto one another, the existence of some kind of structure on the part of the target must be assumed. Notwithstanding, conceptual metaphor theorists state that "they are not clearly enough delineated in their own terms to satisfy the purposes of our day-to-day functioning" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 118), and "none of them can be fully comprehended on their own terms" (177). Kövecses (2010) is even more explicit:

> Try to imagine the goal, choice, difficulty, or progress aspect of love without making use of the journey domain. Can you think of the goal of a love relationship without at the same time thinking of trying to reach a destination at the end of a journey? Can you think of the progress made in a love relationship without at the same time imagining the distance covered in a journey? Can you think of the choices made in a love relationship without thinking of choosing a direction in a journey? The difficulty of doing this shows that the target of love is not structured independently of and prior to the domain of journey. (Kövecses 2010: 9)

Thus, the CMT allots concrete domains to abstract ones due to low or lack of structure on the part of the concept to be communicated. For emotions, this means that speech communities conventionalized specific transfers from concrete domains like CONTAINER or JOURNEY to counterbalance the at best fragmentary conceptual architecture of, for example, LOVE or ANGER. Two things attract attention here. First, the examples for concrete domains are very generic and schematic, calling for a prototypical example from a more specific level (see ch. 3.2.1.2.) for substantiation. Being the case, this challenges the main

reason postulated for the usage of e.g. the domain CONTAINER at all, i.e. the need for concrete substance. Such general concepts like JOURNEY show schematic – abstract in one sense – features filled up or complemented via more specific instances or tokens (Croft & Cruse 2004: 199), i.e. they need elaboration in the linguistic manifestations.

Second, in the body part idioms discussed here, the directionality from concrete to abstract is not clear, at least concerning one part of the whole expression: the body parts applied are conceptualized as SEATS OF EMOTIONS. Body parts in their basic or prototypical meanings are concrete entities, i.e. physical objects. These concepts are transferred to and used as something less concrete containing non-physical, abstract phenomena like emotions or personality traits. In mappings like LOVE IS A JOURNEY, JOURNEY is not abstracted to express the target, on the contrary it enables a description of LOVE on more concrete grounds. The concept JOURNEY is neither highlighted nor modified. In the emotion terms discussed here, specific conceptual aspects of the body part terms included are focused on. For example, SEAT OF EMOTION constitutes a part of the conceptual network of "heart". Being the case, a domain matrix is established allowing for metonymic constructions. Hence, the notion of semantic and conceptual networks including these aspects allows for a continuity view instead of the division of these features as completely different domains.

To sum up the last section, conceptual metaphor as underlying cognitive mechanism still gains high relevance in metaphor processing and comprehension. As a mental strategy, conceptual metaphor relies on experiential correlations and is therefore tightly linked to the embodiment hypothesis. Conceptual metaphor inheres in our cognitive system and is activated in language use, but not affected by it nor by language-specific structures. The approaches and models presented above discuss the importance of the CMT findings to various degrees and modify certain assumption on grounds of

empirical investigations. The relationship between conceptual and linguistic metaphors is focused on in many of the approaches, since it is realized that conceptual metaphor need not to be the only mechanism underlying figurative language. Linguistic structures, language-specific patterns and other (encyclopedic and socio-cultural) knowledge types are included in linguistic metaphors. The inclusion of these factors allow for a coherent description of the forms and functions of linguistic metaphors and their comprehension. In addition, language use, conventionalization and lexicalization are emphasized as playing an important role besides cognitive structures.

3.5. BASIC EMOTIONS:
LINGUISTIC & COGNITIVE EVIDENCE

Since one of the topics in this work are emotions and their linguistic expressions, this section introduces some relevant aspects in relation to the conception of emotion. The domain of emotions is a field often discussed in cognitive linguistics. Their abstract character and the absence of direct access to mental states or activities in general keeps investigations dependent on the indirect approach to language, verbalization of feelings, etc. Ungerer (1995) discusses several approaches to define basic emotions on the basis of physiological and mental effects and experiences, again linguistically expressed and described. Besides (cognitive) linguists such as Lakoff and Kövecses, especially psychologists try to define emotions, to extract basic emotions, and to get an overall picture of how emotions are experienced by individuals. While the mentioned linguists are more interested in the linguistic manifestations of emotional concepts, and in revealing "the 'distinguishing potential' of the metaphorical and metonymic expressions" (Ungerer 1995: 186), psychologists focus on a definition of emotions as such. For both, language constitutes the

entrance point[24], so that an incorporation of all results must be aspired to in order to approximate an understanding of the abstract domain of inner states. Additionally, for linguistics and psychology, researchers' intuitions play an important role in selecting the emotions under discussion.

In emotional psychology, the idea of defining basic emotions has resulted in lists of two up to eleven basic concepts in the last decades. Currently, a list of ca. six basic emotions is widely accepted (SADNESS, ANGER, DISGUST & HATE, FEAR, LOVE & DESIRE, HAPPINESS & JOY). The list presented in Ungerer is based on investigations of natural language data including metaphors and metonymies. Additionally, personal reports and statements extracted from interviews are evaluated. This approach follows Ungerer's statement that:

> To provide a comprehensive description of these basic emotions both the conventionalized metaphors and metonymies of cognitive linguistics and the statements collected by experimental psychology should be taken into account. (1995: 188)

This hypothesis is kept despite the fact that there exist contradictions between features ascribed to one emotion, and as a whole, the definitions are not very precise, leaving space for vagueness. However, since this is far from atypical concerning concepts and conceptual models, the descriptions of the consultants constitute important data and are evaluated as intensively as possible.

The data of the investigations discussed in Ungerer vary in length and form, but are still comparable. All describe physiological and mental experiences of emotions, either in metaphoric or metonymic conventionalized expressions

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[24] In psychology, facial expressions are additional and important objects of investigation.

(Kövecses 1990), or in sentences or phrases characterizing behavior exhibited in connection with specific emotions (Davitz 1969, Shaver et al. 1987).[25]

As a result, basic emotions show relevance and salience for speakers, visible in the numerous descriptions given. Additionally, one single overall concept of emotion is supposed, which suits the known characteristics of a reduced conceptual structure in relation to the basic level concepts which provide for a detailed definition of this superordinate emotional concept.

The basic emotions differ in the scope of physiological effects, and their usages for linguistic expressions. Where physiological experiences are not available in a sufficient amount, psychological statements are found in an increased number. They compensate for this gap in the conceptual structure to guarantee "an adequate description even where there is a shortage of specific physiological statements" (Ungerer 1995: 195).

What is important here is the fact that such statements and conceptual and linguistic metaphors fall into place remarkably well. In the case of physiological statements, this underlines the hypothesis that conceptual metaphors developed from conceptual metonymies, which are close to what the statements express, e.g. "increase of body heat" for ANGER, with linguistic manifestations like "you make my blood boil". But when one evaluates the psychological statements and the conceptual metaphors linked to the corresponding emotion, the relationships change: here, the metaphors do not perform a supportive function anymore, but demonstrate their concept-creating potentials.

The co-operation of linguistic data and speakers' statements implies that speakers' metalinguistic discussions include important insights into the realized relations between language and emotion. The combination of linguistic survey of the existing constructions and evaluation of metalinguistic statements about

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[25] Parts of the statements were judged by other consultants according to the accessibility of the intended emotion.

these forms offers a high potential for a detailed description and comprehension of such parts of mental lexicons. This is the case despite the 'cultural model glasses' speakers wear in cases of conventionalized ways to talk about the world.

From another point of view, psycholinguists and neurolinguists try to gain access to mental activities, to illuminate the huge topic of inner states and emotions: e.g. what is 'love'? Is it an evolutionary development of hormonal and neuronal methods to ensure survival and reproduction? Do we 'love' our children because this feeling is needed to guarantee that a parent will take care of her/his offspring as long as it is needed to spread her/his genes? If this is the case, is this a conscious reality? Or is it more important that we are 'victims' of our physical machinery making us 'feel love' for others without ever accessing the concept of 'selfish genes'? As long as there is no definition of the underlying physical processes, the description of (socio-cultural) concepts and linguistic manifestations will be a temporary one, and will probably have to be modified when deeper insights into emotions and the mind are available. This does not mean that we should stop investigating language in relation to this domain, but it should be kept in mind that we are just at the beginning of comprehension, and that improved methods and hypotheses will arise over the next years.

The specifics and complexities of the constructions discussed here reflect the complex and abstract phenomena of emotions, personality traits and related mental states. Figurative expressions of emotion like the Beaver forms constitute specific data: polysemous structures of body part terms are seldom portrayed in theoretical discussions. Additionally, the second level investigated here – the expressions of emotion containing the figurative usages of the body part terms – does not constitute patterns which are regularly included in the alternative frameworks and their findings. Research on such forms most often is based on the CMT and is consistent with the theory, as the examples in the next paragraphs show. In most cases English structures are investigated, although

studies in other languages are also available. The target SEAT OF EMOTION is found in many of the language-specific investigations. Body parts are cross-linguistically realized as containers for emotions and related psychological phenomena. The conceptual metaphors at lower levels in the hierarchical organized systems show variation, while the central and primary metaphors are identical with those defined by the CMT (for example, ANGER IS PRESSURE IN A CONTAINER, HAPPY IS UP). However, for example, Deignan and Potter (2004) also realize some shortcomings which they identified in their empirical work.

Maalej (2004) explores "figurative language in anger expressions in Tunisian Arabic" in the CMT and concentrates on embodied structures in relation to cultural aspects of experience. Expressions like *haraq-l-i dam-i* "he made my blood burn" and *3saab-i filtit min-ni* "my nerves let me down" are described as manifestations of the conceptual metaphors ANGER IS THE HEAT OF FLUID IN A CONTAINER and NERVES AS A CONTAINER FOR ANGER.

Yu (2002, 2009) offers complex descriptions of Chinese expressions of emotions containing body part terms. He consistently applies the CMT for the manifold applications of various body organs like gallbladder, liver and spleen: for example, *fa pi-qi* "loose one's temper; get angry; flare up (lit. expand spleen-gas)" as manifestation of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS FIRE and ANGER IS HOT GAS IN A CONTAINER (Yu 2002: 350).

Deignan and Potter (2004) apply the CMT in their cross-corpus study, and discuss the combination of metaphor and metonymy as underlying conceptual structures of body-mind-mappings in a study of English and Italian. In addition, they acknowledge the relevance of cultural and linguistic structures for metaphor realization, i.e. their analysis goes beyond embodied experience and the related conceptual metaphors. Their results reveal that "conceptual metaphor theory may not be able to offer a predictive framework for the description of non-

literal language, although it certainly provides a convincing explanation" (2004: 1251). This appraisal refers on the one hand to the limited findings of coherent networks around one conceptual metaphor. On the other hand, variations in the linguistic realizations are not explicable within the CMT, i.e. "by a straightforward mapping of one semantic field onto another" (Deignan & Potter 2004: 1250).

4. BEAVER & THE DATA

4.1. BEAVER

The Beaver language belongs to a Northern branch of the Athabaskan language family. It is an endangered First Nation language in British Columbia and Alberta, and is still spoken in six different reserves by some 150 people. The youngest speakers are in their thirties, but most of the younger generations did not learn this language as their mother tongue. Many of the speakers who collaborated in the DoBeS Beaver Project are elders about sixty years and older.

Most of the few publications on Beaver concentrate on the dialects of British Columbia, the first records are manuals of devotion and primers by Garrioch (1886, 1885). Jean and Marshall Holdstock created pedagogical materials of Doig River (Central) Beaver in the 1980s. Altogether, the statement of Goddard from 1917 still fits the Beaver description situation: "Of all the Athapascan languages of the north that of the Beaver Indians has been most neglected." (Goddard 1917: 403). In the last years, Story (1989), Randoja (1990), Miller (2003) and Schwiertz (2009) – works on phonological and phonetic, but also morphological aspects of the Beaver dialects – were published. Krauss (2006) is an annotated bibliography of the Beaver language from the first sources up to now.

The Beaver First Nations are bi- or multilingual[26] in Beaver and English. English is the dominant language in the area, and Beaver is nowadays seldom used in everyday life. Both languages comprise figurative expressions which

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[26] Many Beaver speakers also speak other neighboring indigenous languages, e.g. Slavey (Athabascan), Cree (Algonquian), Sekani (Athabascan).

differ in their forms, concepts, and usages, but also show similarities in some areas. In the documentation project, English is the metalanguage throughout all sessions with the speakers of this highly endangered language.

As hunter-gatherers, the Beaver traditionally lived in nomadic bands consisting of small families, and met in larger groups in summer time (Ridington 1981). Today, the Beaver Indians live and farm on the reserves, but still use some of their trap lines. Besides used as sources of food, these activities are also realized as a way to maintain their identity. Elders share their skills with younger generations, and their way of learning and teaching reflects the ideology of self-governed and autonomous individuals. Hence, knowledge is often handed down in narrative form, and first-hand experience plays a very important role. Learning is not linked to following explicit and direct instructions.

4.2. THE CORPUS

The Beaver language comprises four dialects spoken in British Columbia and Northern Alberta in Canada: Northern Alberta Beaver, Southern Beaver (extinct), Central Beaver and Low marked Beaver, the last three all spoken in British Columbia. The data of this work reflects the Northern Alberta Beaver dialect spoken at the Beaver First Nations at Child's Lake and Boyer River. About 25 people still speak Beaver there, the youngest are about 50 years old.

The corpus is archived at the MPI Nijmegen(NL) as part of the DoBeS program of the VW Foundation. It mostly consists of elicitations and narratives. In addition, procedurals of traditional activities were recorded and well-established stimuli were used to obtain further data, for example map tasks and several of the stimulus materials of the MPI Nijmegen. Naturalistic data was hardly available, because the Beaver people increasingly use English in everyday life.

I predominantly used elicitation sessions with adequate topics like emotions, metaphors, affection and body parts. Some of the sessions were prepared on purpose for this this work, so that additional forms were included and doubtful ones were rechecked. Furthermore, tokens found in the narratives provided important evidence for the usage of the figurative expressions described here.

4.3. METALINGUISTIC AWARENESS OF SPEAKERS

Speakers' access to and comprehension of linguistic forms and their meanings is included and discussed in this thesis as additional data to gain a deeper insight into the meaning and conceptual structures of the described parts of the mental lexicon. Metalinguistics and folk linguistics as methodological tools to investigate speakers' awareness rely on the ability of speakers to realize or identify words or phrases as composed of a form and a meaning, to discuss these two sides in isolation as well as in relation to each other and to infer underlying conceptualizations. The competence in accessing one's own language and to consciously talk about specific aspects of meaning is expressed in statements and considerations which were recorded in the elicitation sessions.

In general, a fundamental knowledge domain concentrates on the relations between and across meanings. These are also defined as consequences of the way humans conceptualize the world around them, and hence how lexicons are organised. They are often considered in linguistic investigations of the lexicon, since, for example, synonymy, antonymy and hyponymy constitute some of the most basic relations found between lexical forms. Language users are aware of the fact that "meanings evoke each other across lexical forms" (Frawley 2005), and are able to explain that, for example, (near) synonyms have the same meaning by substituting them in a context without or only slightly changing the

meaning of the whole expression or utterance. Intuition also includes knowledge about the compositionality of lexical meanings: in order to understand the whole one has to know and to understand the components as well as the combinatory rules and which conceptual components are utilized in the diverse senses of the lexical material. This processing again goes hand in hand with the principle of economy of language. The question here is how can we restrict rules and forms, how can we restrict the amount of possible constructions and therefore meanings? The notion of grammatical meaning plays an important role, and speakers in a speech community also show intuitions – rooted in the understanding of the principle of compositionality – of grammatical meaning, and hence relate recurring forms to specific semantic patterns.

There are some essential differences between folk linguistics and the science of linguistics as linguists are involved in researching the function and role of the language under discussion, as well as the coherence and uniformity of descriptional models. One difference between linguistic and folk models, is the relation speakers have to their language, and the function they apply to it, namely first and foremost to communicate, thus realizing language not as an abstracted system of rules and patterns, but as a means of communication. Listening to the explanations of native speakers concerning meanings in their language, one important aspect appears over and over again: the function of all words and forms expressed is to communicate within a community. For example, statements like "you have to say which animal, so that they will understand you" in elicitation sessions dealing with "crawl (walk on four legs)", and asking for "they are crawling", demonstrate that language for speakers is first and foremost a means of communication, not only a purely logical and formal structure with rules for correct usage. This is a point often made clear by the Beaver speakers, who always link meanings to their usage in communication, and who explain meanings through their contexts. Speakers hesitate or hold off

when a word is taken out of its context and asked for its meaning without its collocation or its usual entourage.

Linguists, on the other hand, do not mainly participate in this particular function of the language under description, and they do not highlight this aspect. Rather, they concentrate on the structures and forms, and how these work together to constitute the medium or system 'language'. Accordingly, there are discrepancies between the focus of researchers and speakers. While linguists look for formal parallels or differences, relations to semantically similar terms unconsciously come to speakers' minds, and thus, their analogous functions in related contexts, again highlighting the communicative aspects. This means, while for linguists a sentence like "I hunt" evoke the co-text of, for example, paradigms or TAM structures, for speakers, the form triggers concepts like "game", "trap line", "bush", etc.

Similarly, while linguists are interested in (whole) verb paradigms in order to describe this part of the language, speakers intuitively concentrate on first or third person singular and first person plural forms, since these are the most basic ones and are used most often in natural communication or narratives. Similarly, in everyday life situations, speakers seldom use expressions describing what their communication partner does, i.e. construing utterances with second person subjects (e.g. "you go to the city", "you eat"). Reflecting the Beaver concept of humans as self-autonomous individuals not to be governed by others, and also not to interfere or intervene in the actions of others (Mills 1986), paradigm instances of second person forms are most often given in question form (e.g. "do you go to the city?", "are you eating?").

Context is one of the most important features for speakers (see ch. 2.1.2.). The embeddedness of an utterance is crucial for its meaningfulness, and therefore essential in order to make sense, and this is paralleled with grammaticality in the speakers' concept of language use. If missing a context, speakers' access to such forms and meanings is restricted, since the triggering

aspects of language as a communication tool are missing. It is wrong to define such (interim) gaps as lost knowledge on the parts of the speakers. Instead, giving appropriate contexts in which the relevant form can be naturally embedded, facilitates finding the right words.

Also related to diverse perspectives on language, is the fact that linguistics is based on a constant point of view, on one as coherent as possible notion of language, while language users do not insist on such a fixed and rigid idea of how language is defined or how it works. Their relation to language allows for varying perspectives, depending on the situation and context. As was already discussed in chapter 2.1., folk organizations include more than one model, explanation, or classification, due to the fact that the real world better resembles a chaotic mass of entities and actions to be handled and understood, and – as essentially opposed to scientific approaches to a topic – this has to be coped with immediately, in the situation of experience or communication of that experience.

Additionally, there is no need to seek approaches that will resolve the problem of inconsistencies between what people say and what they do. This aspect is realized as reflecting the real and natural behavior of people. Inconsistencies that occur between what people say consciously, and how they unconsciously act must be understood as a typically human imperfection of reflecting one's own actions in a consistent and uniform way. Every one of us fails to act perfectly according to the theoretical assumptions we might intensively advocate in conscious behavior and speech. As we are aware of this, metalinguistic statements can provide relevant data and knowledge to support theoretical assumptions.

In the Beaver documentation project, a huge part of the data was recorded in elicitation sessions. The Beaver language is no longer intensively used in everyday and speakers do not speak Beaver unsolicited with persons who do not know this language. Consequently, English was used as the metalanguage in the

sessions and as a communication tool between the Beaver speakers and the researchers. Natural language data was collected in the form of stories and procedurals of different kinds from various domains, for example, hunting, food, handiwork, etc. The story collection contains traditional stories as well as historical and biographical narratives. Another point worth mentioning is the availability of recordings of the complete sessions, i.e. with all (correct and less correct) Beaver forms, hesitations and discussions. In some speech communities of endangered languages, language ideologies lead to a more restricted regulation of what might be recorded and published[27]. Here, the concepts of performance and competence play an important role: speakers realize the difference between natural language in discourse and consciously produced and pronounced linguistic forms. In combination with an often lower status of the native language in relation to dominant (e.g. national) languages, speakers try to establish a picture of a perfect speech community with perfect knowledge and usage of their native language. For the purpose of this thesis, the inclusion of metalinguistic statements and discussions about potential meanings and underlying conceptualizations constitute data highly valuable and are examined for the interpretation of the different senses of body part terms.

The data used in this thesis is a combination of all available collections and genres just mentioned, although the most important parts are taken from elicitation sessions on the appropriate semantic topics. The selection of the data first concentrated on the body parts terms and then on the idiomatic constructions for emotion expressions including these forms. Partially, these sessions were explicitly recorded for this thesis to recheck and validate forms.[28]

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[27] Personal communication with other DoBeS team researchers.

[28] The whole corpus can be found at http://www.mpi.nl/DOBES/projects/beaver and http://corpus1.mpi.nl/ds/imdi_browser/?openpath=MPI79025%23. I would like to thank Gabriele Schwiertz and Dagmar Jung for the special elicitation sessions on emotions.

4.4. Beaver Metalinguistic Data

The network organization of a mental lexicon is verified by speaker intuitions about the organization of lexical semantic structure. Intuitions are reliable concerning some specific aspects of meaning structure, and the assignment of meanings to forms is one kind of knowledge speakers of a language possess. They can readily assess which information is specifically included in a lexical unit, and which does not belong to the (truth) value of a meaning, but constitutes more additional, variable modification. For example, the classificatory verbs in Beaver include specific, grammaticalized information about their arguments without the need to explicitly mention the entities or the specific properties referred to, while English translations obligatorily have to explicitly put in words, for example, the object in order to capture all meaning aspects implicit in the Beaver form. Furthermore, knowledge about meaning shift and transmission is at work in decisions about which items with the same forms show interrelated meanings (polysemy situation), and which are realized as showing only formal similarities while they re connected to completely different concepts (homonymy situation).

What is of special interest in this thesis, is the accessibility of literal meanings of lexical forms in non-literal or figurative usages. Literal meanings constitute salient information for the understanding of the organization of the mental lexicon and provide a first step to an examination of conceptual structure. For example, the idiom *sadzéé' xááts'at* "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)" is always explained against its literal meaning, i.e. "my heart falls out". The notion of literal meanings provided by speakers is not to be equated with access to the corresponding conceptual links between literal and idiomatic meanings, which are more complicated to access. Still, what seems to be crucial for speakers to mention is the literal meaning of the single components included in such an idiom. The literal meaning is not the intended meaning, but it is too

active in processing to be ignored, and therefore at least worth mentioning for the speakers. That means that the literal meaning must not be focused on or consciously processed in speech. However, especially in elicitation situations, it is available if needed. Furthermore, such constructions are predestined to be consciously processed due to their figurativity and creativity (Dirven 2003).

Access to underlying conceptualizations and conceptual mappings needed for the identification of lexical ambiguity is difficult to extract and rather restricted for quite abstract structures: for example, the form *sįdyíge ghǫ́lįį* "I am happy" could be an instance of the orientational conceptual metaphor HAPPY IS UP, since a (possible) interpretation of the literal meaning is "I am up" (cf. *yídyíge* "up there"). However, this mapping is not available for the speakers, and in combination with the lack of established etymological, historical and socio-cultural knowledge of such conceptualizations in Beaver this hypothesis cannot be verified or consolidated. However, although conceptual structure is not directly accessed or discussed, some statements and intuitions allow for inferences about how underlying conceptualization is organized. Differences in the conceptual makeup of similar linguistic realizations can be recognized on the basis of differing comments on the lexical form, and reoccurring explanation patterns for abstract meanings give hints concerning semantic and conceptual networks.

5. BODY PART TERMS IN THE BEAVER LEXICON

In chapter 3, CMT was described and critically discussed as theoretical framework for figurative language and the relation to conceptual structure. In the following chapter, specific Beaver data is in focus, more precisely, the following body part terms are presented:

Beaver body part term	Translation
-zís	skin / hide
-záá	mouth
-įįdyíí	mind
-tsíí	head
-dzagé / *-dzii*	ear / inner ear
-dzéé	heart

Table 5.1.: Body part terms

All Beaver idiomatic expressions discussed here must be carefully analyzed in terms of their components and as complete constructions. The theoretical specifications and hypotheses made in the CMT suit some parts of the linguistic forms in question, but are not applicable to others, and to the overall picture these idioms present. The conceptual transfer of the organ HEART – and several other body parts plus MIND – to SEAT OF EMOTION allows for a conceptual metaphor analysis in a weaker sense, favoring a gradual transition. Similarly, the predicates used as well as the whole constructions provide features which are problematic for some of the theoretical assumptions.

In the following section, several Beaver lexical items are described and analyzed in relation to their semantic and conceptual networks including conventionalized senses and usages. It is exactly these networks which constitute – as a whole – the conventional meaning of linguistic form. Such networks are defined as encyclopedic in scope. Therefore, they include information and knowledge on different levels, linguistic as well as non-linguistic. The Beaver words will be related to all of their occurrences in the lexicon, many of which are compounds or other complex forms. In addition, they are as well linked to the domains and frames relevant for the meanings involved. Besides these conceptual parameters, linguistic aspects reveal differences in constructions, means of extensions (especially metonymy), and allow for a systematic description of figurativity in the Beaver lexicon.

Transferred, non-literal meanings come to existence – and later are conventionalized – in specific contexts, where ontological aspects further new meanings to arise. Economy and organization of language favor modulation of existing structures above creating completely new units. Therefore, new meanings in known forms have their cognitive/conceptual basis at a different abstraction level than basic and prototypical meanings. The new meanings include differently focused semantic and conceptual input than, for example, "heart" as concrete body part, which is based on concrete referents in the world in a more direct style.

In the case of emotions or personality traits, their abstract values cannot be based on direct perception or concrete experience descriptions, as e.g. visual experiences. Instead, a combination of embodiment, cultural models, and meaning modulation allows for non-literal expressions for abstract entities and concepts. Embodiment offers two types of bodily made experiences: first, physiological effects known in connection with emotions are used in a metonymic fashion to express the less accessible overall concept of, for example, ANGER (e.g. INCREASED BODY TEMPERATURE FOR ANGER) or

EXCITEMENT (e.g. INCREASED HEARTBEAT FOR EXCITEMENT). Second, for less available target concepts two methods are linguistically applied: a) body part concepts are expanded and the conceptualization as SEAT OF EMOTION is established; b) linguistic material of concrete concepts is used in cases where similarities are realized between these concrete concepts and the abstract targets. The results are non-prototypical, figurative usages of the linguistic material. The crucial point here is that this usage is based on conceptual aspects shared by both concepts. This means neither that a take-over of the concrete concept's structure is carried out, nor that the two domains – i.e. the concrete source and the abstract target – are completely unrelated. Rather, due to the focus of shared conceptual aspects, continuity plays a role in such conceptualizations and usages of linguistic material.

How this will be done in detail depends on the combination of cultural models influencing conceptual as well as linguistic patterns in a speech community. For example, body part idioms expressing emotions – if such a pattern is established in a language – may be metaphorical or metonymic in nature. They may show restrictions according to some culturally based taboo or may be realized as individual networks based on real or socio-cultural similarity or contiguity associations.

In order to describe and analyze meanings and concepts in the Beaver language, the network model introduced by Langacker (1987, 2000) and modified by Taylor (2000) will be used. This approach to meanings, lexical items, polysemy, and conceptualization has the advantage of visualizing meanings, as well as relations between these, their lexical forms, and underlying domains. All this is done in coherence to and adaptation of the conceptual structure of meaning networks.

Words are defined as 'access points to cognitive information', so that the methodology of the present thesis suits this notion: the starting points are linguistic forms found in the lexicon. Ethnographic as well as conceptual

knowledge is available in a limited amount or style, while the existing data allows for intensive investigation in the framework. Pragmatic and encyclopedic knowledge as relevant for the mental lexicon and the organization and comprehension of meanings of lexical items are also taken into account.

The lexical units are arranged according to their numerous senses and in relation to their semantic domain(s). Also, they are organized according to semantic domains in which senses other than the prototypical one are involved. The results are complex networks, in which we can visualize the cognitive links that hold between various senses of a linguistic unit and between semantic domains.

Before body part terms included in emotion and personality traits expressions are described and discussed, the Beaver lexeme *-zís* "skin/hide" is presented. This form is not used for the abstract concepts of emotions and personality traits. Rather, it constitutes a complex conceptual and semantic network with usages in different, often concrete domains frequently employed in the Beaver language. The network exemplifies the complexities of conceptual ingredients in meaning and how these are extracted and highlighted for additional senses. Furthermore, the relevance of experiences and cultural models influencing the semantic and conceptual structure is reflected.

5.1. -zís "Skin, Hide"

-zís "skin/hide" is an inalienable noun, i.e. it obligatorily requires an overt possessor marker to constitute a grammatical word. The non-possessed form *-zís* is not a complete unit, and is therefore not accepted by Beaver speakers as a word. For the purposes here, the bare stem *-zís* – as all other body part terms in the following chapters – will be used as the default form to avoid additional

translations, while the dash indicates that this is not a free standing form nor a complete notion.[29]

The examples (14)-(34) show all types of *-zís* found in the corpus. The literal translations in this list given in parenthesis reproduce the literal meanings of the forms as translated and expressed by the Beaver speakers. Accordingly, some of the translations deviate from the (literal) lexical meanings of the individual parts as given in the rest of this thesis:

(14)   *sa*   *-zís*   "my skin"
       1sg.poss.   -skin

(15)   *a-zís*   "hide" (lit. its hide)
       indef.sg.poss.-skin

(16)   *sadee'*   *azís*   "eyelid" (lit. my eye its skin / cover)
       1sg.poss.-eye   indef.sg.poss.-skin

(17)   *a-zís*   "canvas" (lit. its skin)
       3sg.indef.poss.-skin

(18)   *agayáás*   *azizé'*   "factory hide" (lit. white man's hide)
       white.person   3sg.indef.poss.-skin-poss.

(19)   *a-zís*   *níí'íí*   "teepee" (lit. its hide it is standing)
       indef.sg.poss.-skin   be.positioned

(20)   *a-zís*   *xoich'uge*   "teepee" (lit. its hide it is pointy)

       indef.sg.poss.-skin   be.pointy

(21)   *ts'ih*   *-zís*   "mosquito net" (lit. mosquito skin)
       mosquito   -skin

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[29] In the case of *-zís* the difference between the possessed and non-possessed form is not that obvious, since the morphological pattern of possession in Beaver (POSS-lexeme-é' or POSS-Phrase lexeme-é') is fragmentary in the inalienable classes, or even non existent (G. Schwiertz, personal communication).

(22) *sat'údzé'*   *-zís*   "bra, brassiere" (lit. my breast cover / bag)
     1sg.poss.breast-skin

(23) *sadzagé'*   *-zís*   "earmuffs" (lit. my ear cover)
     1sg.poss-ear   -skin

(24) *tyúú-zís*   "amnion" (lit. water bag)
     water-skin

(25) *tyúú-zís*   "water bag" (lit. water bag)
     water-skin

(26) *bwil*   *-zís*   "sleepyhead, late riser" (lit. sleep bag)
     sleep   -skin

(27) *xwei*   *-zís*   "backpack, bag" (lit. carry bag)
     carry   -skin

(28) *saladze'*   *-zís*   "bladder" (lit. my urine bag)
     1sg.poss.-urine-skin

(29) *lidyíí*   *-zís*   "tea bag" (lit. tea bag)
     tea   -skin

(30) *éht'oo* *-zís*   "shellbag" (lit. shell bag)
     shell   -skin

(31) *kú*   *-zís*   "tobacco pouch" (lit. fire skin)
     fire   -skin

(32) *tl'ǫéédze*   *-zís*   "gallon" (lit. onion bag)
     onion   skin

(33) *súúdagán*   *-zís*   "salt shaker" (lit. salt bag)
     salt   -skin

(34) *ts'áátl* *-zís*   "moss diaper" (lit. moss bag)
     moss   -skin

The meaning of a polysemous lexical item like *-zís* "skin/hide" includes all
senses and usages found in the language (Langacker 1987). As will become clear,
the senses and usages reflect several different starting or departure points from

the overall meaning "skin/hide". Accordingly, they show varying semantic and conceptual distance from the basic meaning. Furthermore, diverse thematic/semantic frames and domains are linked to this semantic and conceptual network *-zís* "skin/hide" via the numerous usages. Only taking into account the usages of *-zís* as "skin" or "hide", the frame BODY (PART) is available and allows classification or embedding of this lexical item in the lexicon. This is also reflected in the knowledge and conceptualization of the speakers and therefore part of the mental lexicon. This picture shifts and increases in complexity when the frames related to the different senses in the network are incorporated. The whole structure is detected via investigation of the meanings and usages of *-zís* "skin/hide" as well as via the analysis of the metalinguistic statements of the speakers with reference to literal meanings, contexts, and interpretations of the different forms.

The definition and inclusion of such frames here is understood in relation to the meaning and usage of *-zís* in these lexical and semantic contexts. Accordingly, concepts like HABITATION or INSECT REPELLENT in the cases of "teepee" and "mosquito net" respectively do come up in the speakers' conceptualization of the individual terms. However, these are linked via encyclopedic knowledge of the referents, and not via the linguistic constructions, i.e. the lexical material does not explicitly evoke these domains. This does not mean that they are not part of the speakers' concepts and knowledge, or that they are irrelevant for the overall picture of *-zís* "skin/hide". For example, the concept of HABITATION is linked via world knowledge to the notion of CONTAINMENT in meanings like "teepee" – houses and tents are forms of closed containers, dividing inside and outside. It is not connected through a linguistic relation in the Beaver language. Even though *-zís* "skin/hide" would allow for linguistically referring to this frame – after all, *-zís* is also used to highlight the concept CONTAINMENT, as will be shown below – speakers' statements do not reveal any consciously realized connection when discussing the linguistic items.

In the Beaver language the usage of *-zís* "skin/hide" is not conventionalized to refer to teepees as containers, rather, both descriptive terms for "teepee" linguistically concentrate on the MATERIAL used for such habitations (see ch. 5.2.2.). Similarly, the frame BODY (PART) would indeed manage to include the meanings *tyúúzís* "amnion (lit. water skin/hide)" and *saladze' -zis* "bladder (lit. urine skin/hide)". Yet, the linking aspect is not the usage of *-zís* – as will be shown in chapter 5.1.4. – but the referential meanings of these constructions, i.e. the referents of these terms: parts of a human or animal body.

In conclusion, frames cognitively related to the referential meanings, but not linguistically established via the network, will be not further investigated. In the network discussed here, besides BODY PART (skin, hide, eyelid, amnion, bladder), the following frames are relevant for the individual senses: HABITATION (teepee), CLOTHS (brassiere, ear muffs), HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS (sleepyhead), CONTAINER (bags) and MEASURE (gallon).

Concentrating on the thematic concepts motivated by the inclusion and usage of *-zís,* the following, more abstract and image-schematic concepts are worked out: BODY PART, MATERIAL, COVER, CONTAINER.

In the following sections, these forms will be described and discussed according to these conceptual aspect highlighted in the forms. Besides the semantic analysis, the given translations and additional metalinguistic discussions of the speakers further reveal how they are extracted and used for further senses in the conceptual network of the lexical item *-zís* "skin/hide".

5.1.1. -<u>zís</u> AS BODY PART

5.1.1.1. SKIN, HIDE, EYELID

The basic meaning in this network is "skin/hide"[30], according to metalinguistic statements as well as to typological and ethnographic studies. These define the human body as one main domain of basic meanings, used for and transferred to concepts showing some kind of real or socio-culturally realized similarities, for example, body parts grammaticalized as locative or orientational terms like "up / down (head / foot)", "front / back (face / back)" etc. (see Heine, Claudi & Hünnemeyer 1991, Hopper & Traugott 2003).

The first forms *sazís* "my skin", *azís* "its hide", and *azís* "(its) canvas" do not differ in form, besides the possessive prefixes meaning '1sg.' in "skin", and 'indef.sg.' in the other two. These prefixes refer to the differences of human vs. non-human and inanimate entities of which "skin" or "hide" or "canvas"[32] are part of, or – linguistically – possessed by. Thus, these three can be defined as senses of one polysemous lexical item without requiring any further linguistic material.

The term *azís* "hide (lit. its skin/hide)" has a very high relevance and frequency in the Beaver language. This is not accidental, but rather intensively linked to the Beaver culture and to the traditional ways of life of this people in former times. Furthermore, the development of the usages and derived senses of -<u>zís</u> "skin/hide" also mirror socio-cultural traditions and conventions. Ethnographic research reveals socio-cultural and historical experiences, e.g. the

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[30] In English, the verb "to hide" is related, and both noun and verb are etymologically connected to the notion of "covering". Accordingly, Old English "hide" would be the best term for describing the most basic meaning for the Beaver terms – since in modern English "skin" is conventionalized as term for 'human hide', the inclusion of both "skin/hide" will be used here.

[32] In this form, the possessive prefix seems completely lexicalized, no speaker explains the literal meaning in relation to possession, i.e. explicitly mention "its canvas".

usage of hide as means for transportation of goods, the relevance of hide for traditional daily life (e.g. for teepees, clothes etc.) (Goddard 1996). This is a well-known fact comprised in the embodiment hypothesis. Real-world and first-hand experiences are the starting points for realizations and classifications of the world and its phenomena, conceptually as well as linguistically (see ch. 3.1.2.). In the case of animals' skin, the conceptualization changed quickly in relation to the skin of humans, which was never experienced in other ways than the inalienable part of the human body. Nor was there any active "artificial usage" of this body part. Although animal skin is also realized in parallel to human skin as a prototypical inalienable body part, the everyday life of the Beaver people led to a deviance from this concept. Especially moose and its hide was and partially still is an essential part of the Beaver life in terms of survival in general, and nutrition, clothes, bags and drums, habitation and transportation in particular. In the case of hide this means that the concept of the body part inalienably belonging to a living animal shifted to the thing one separates or divides from a hunted down game. Due to its substance and flexibility, hide was established throughout the world as an important material, just as in the Beaver culture. Thus, the concept of BODY (PART) forfeited more and more relevance, while the notion of MATERIAL increased its pertinence in the conceptualization of the referent due to its usage as such. The results are lexical items denoting e.g. "tepee" (two terms), "factory hide", "mosquito net".

In a next step, the most relevant applications of the material hide – e.g. as cloth and means of transportation – gave rise to focus on the conceptual aspects COVER and CONTAINMENT. Consequently, in the semantic and conceptual network of "skin/hide" in Beaver, these conceptual aspects of the body parts are frequently used as highly relevant concepts. They constitute the starting points for a significant amount of the senses and usages of *-zís* "skin/hide" in the mental lexicon. Lexicalized expressions referring to different "bags" were established, but also terms for "ear muffs" and "brassiere".

5.1.1.2. EYELID

The term for eyelid, *sadee' zís* "eyelid (lit. my eyes' skin)" is translated as "skin of my eye(s)" according to its literal meaning, therefore highlighting the prototypical meaning of *-zís* "skin/hide" as BODY PART. Alternatively, this construction is translated following the conceptualizations of *-zís* as COVER: "cover of my eye(s)" (see also ch. 5.1.3.), highlighting the function of this part more than its substance. Both aspects – BODY PART and COVER – are extracted from the conceptual structure of the basic meaning "skin/hide".

5.1.2. -zís AS MATERIAL

5.1.2.1. TEEPEES

The construction *azís xoich'uge* "teepee (lit. pointy hide)" consists of the inalienable noun under discussion here, and a stative verb *chuuk* meaning "be pointy". The form describes a teepee in a metonymic fashion, focusing on the form of the container, concretely, on the outer tent part which makes up the design of a teepee as a whole. The general metonymy PART FOR WHOLE is used here, which can be further specified as (OUTER) SHAPE FOR ENTITY. The linguistic results are bound to language-specific and socio-cultural conventions concerning the parts literally used and the types of construction. The Beaver language employs several patterns of metonymy regularly used to denote entities in the world. The token under description here is classified as conjunctive metonymy of the first, non-figurative subclass. Although this construction can be used to communicate the literal meaning as intended meaning, i.e. "pointy hide" in an appropriate context, the form-meaning pair *azís xoich'uge* "tepee (lit. its pointy hide)" is conventionalized in the Beaver language. Thus, when asked for the meaning of *azís xoich'uge* without context, speakers refer to "teepee" in the first place, and do not simply translate the literal meaning as "pointy hide" without selecting the specific referent "teepee"

in the world. The literal meaning "pointy hide" is extended and conventionalized to "teepee", so that a lasting meaning shift exists (as opposed to linear metonymy, see also ch. 3.3.).

Since the form of teepees indeed is pointy and the material is hide, the distance between the literal meaning and the intended referent is not far enough to evoke figurativity. Instead, both meanings can be located in juxtaposition on a continuity scale, objectively as well as culturally. Objectively in meant in the sense that someone who knows a teepee can reconstruct and understand the relation that holds between the notion of a "pointy hide" and teepee. Thus, the conceptual aspects SHAPE and MATERIAL of a teepee are reflected in the linguistic form "pointy hide": *chuuk* "be pointy" for SHAPE, while out of all conceptual ingredients of *-zís* "skin/hide" the aspect MATERIAL is transferred and highlighted in this sense. In combination, the whole construction refers to these characteristics which constitute a traditional Beaver teepee.

Another related Beaver expression for "teepee" is *azís nį́'i* "teepee (lit. its skin/hide it is standing (existing in an upright position))". Again, *-zís* "skin/hide" is used to refer to the entity in relation to its form. Here, a positional verb is used in combination with the noun. Like in the form before, metonymy is at work, focusing on the outer form of the housing (SHAPE FOR ENTITY). Figurativity is not evoked here either, since the distance between the referent and the parts used to refer to it is not big enough. Instead, the concept of a teepee is extensively linked to its actual form and material (pointy, upright standing hide): both conceptual aspects (SHAPE and MATERIAL) are expressed by means of *-zís* "skin/hide".

5.1.2.2. CANVAS

In the case of *azís* "canvas", the aspect MATERIAL of the item *-zís* "skin/hide" is most prominent. Regarding the referent of the term in the real world – two-dimensional, flexible material – aspects of "skin/hide" like

CONTAINMENT do not come up as corresponding to similar characteristics found in "canvas" in the first place. Consequently and according to the "Invariance Principle" (see ch. 3.1.3.1.) such features are ignored in the mapping, and in the establishment of this sense of the polysemous item -*zís* "skin/hide".

The recognized and parallelly used aspect MATERIAL of "hide" and "canvas" constitutes one part of the conceptualization of -*zís* "skin/hide" as discussed above. It is detached from a living creature, from the notion of BODY PART or organ, as well as from the concept of CONTAINMENT and COVER. Similarities based on MATERIAL refer to consistency, but also to the function of the substance of skin as 'fabric/cloth' in the traditional use of hide e.g. for teepees and clothes. This implies that the sense "canvas" is not transferred from the prototype or basic meaning "skin/hide" in the sense of "skin of living creature". Rather, it has its point of departure in the already transferred concept of "hide" with a focus on the conceptual aspect MATERIAL which can be separated from the entity with which it was originally associated.

5.1.2.3. FACTORY HIDE

The concept of factory hide (leather) reveals additional socio-cultural aspects which mirror historical and ideological events. The Beaver speakers refer to this kind of leather as "factory" or "commercial hide". It is understood as hide manufactured in a specific way and used by non-native people. As a consequence, "factory hide" is linguistically marked via the explicit inclusion of the term for "white person(s)": *agayáás azízé'* "leather (lit. white person's skin/hide)".

Researcher: Is there a word for "leather"? Would that just be [a<u>zís</u>]?

Consultant505: "Leather"? Would say in moose hide like, **xadáá <u>zís</u>**, that's "moose hide", but "leather". That's kind of- leather [...] **agayáás a<u>zíz</u>é'** ("leather (lit. white man's hide)") [[laughter]] You know, "white man made it" like, you know, "white man's moose hide", yeah. You know the factory tan? That kind. **agayáás a<u>zíz</u>é'** ("leather (lit. white man's hide)")

<div align="right">(misc_verbs001)</div>

Although *a<u>zís</u>* "hide (lit. its skin/hide)" is used in the Beaver culture in a very similar way factory hide is used by "white men" – for clothes, shoes, bags, etc. – the fact that the Beaver people do not buy leather but make their own hide constitutes a realized and significant difference. This is reflected in the linguistic forms which clearly distinguish these two types of 'manufactured hide'.

5.1.2.4. MOSQUITO NET

A similar idea becomes apparent in the term for "mosquito net (lit. mosquito skin/hide)": *ts'ih <u>zís</u>*. Again, the most prominent feature – as described by the speakers – of "skin/hide" in this sense is MATERIAL, referring to the flexible substance. In addition, the notion of COVER is also employed here as correspondence point of "mosquito net". In the discussions found in the corpus, COVER is not mentioned while talking about "skin/hide" in relation to *ts'ih <u>zís</u>* "mosquito net (lit. mosquito skin/hide)". Rather, it is drawn on in explaining "mosquito net" as covering the person, thereby protecting her from the mosquitoes. Note that there is another term in Beaver for "net" used to denote a (fish) net, or a snare: *mįįł* "snare, net" and *łuuge mįįlé'* ("fish net"). This lexical item has "net" as a second meaning derived from the shared function of "snare" and "net" and is not further analyzable, i.e. it is a non-derived form not found in other or more basic meanings. It occurs exclusively in

hunting terminology, and conceptually concentrates on its function as catch or trap, a function not found for "skin/hide" or "mosquito net". In combination with the fact that a mosquito net's function is not to catch mosquitoes, but to protect the inside from mosquitoes, these two concepts of NET are linguistically separated due to their functions. While *mįįł* "snare, net" is an item which does not seem to be linguistically interrelated with other senses, "mosquito net" adopts corresponding features of "skin/hide", which serves as a conceptual source to express the intended meaning.

According its figurativity, it can be stated that the distance of the literal meaning "mosquito skin/hide" from the intended meaning "mosquito net" is large enough to evoke figurative aspects due to the real material used.

5.1.3. -<u>zís</u> AS COVER

5.1.3.1. EYELID

As was already mentioned in chapter 5.1.1., the Beaver term for "eyelid", *sadee' a<u>zís</u>*, is linguistically realized as "skin/hide of my eye", while speakers understand and conceptualize this expression as "skin of my eye" and "cover of my eye". In elicitation sessions, the literal meaning of -*<u>zís</u>* "skin/hide" is given as "cover". In further discussions, speakers realize and mention -*<u>zís</u>* as "skin/hide", but insist on the meaning COVER in this expression. Both features are available via the conceptual network of -*<u>zís</u>* "skin/hide", i.e. both constitute conceptual aspects of its meaning and are extracted for different usages. Thus, the interchangeability of these aspects provides two similar meanings, focusing on slightly different concepts (BODY PART and COVER).

5.1.3.2. EAR MUFFS

The term for "ear muffs" *sadzage' <u>zís</u>* (lit. "my ear(s) skin") is realized and translated as "cover of my ear(s)" ("… See? That one's got a cover …"

(metaphor100)). In this realization, the construction is embedded in the COVER part of the "skin/hide" network and perfectly reflects the referent's function. The term does not constitute a traditional concept, "ear muffs" are a quite modern item of clothing. It is included in the Beaver lexicon via extension of the already existing network and the usage of the established conceptual aspect COVER as departing point for *-zís* "skin/hide".

5.1.3.3. BRASSIERE

The expression for "brassiere", *sat'udze' zís* (lit. my breast's skin) consists of two polysemous items. Besides "skin/hide", the term *sat'udze'* has more than one meaning: "my breast", but also "my milk" is included. Similarly, in combination with the indefinite possessive prefix (*at'udze'*), the form refers to "its (an animal's) udder" and "its (an animal's) milk". "My breast" and "its udder" respectively, are defined as the basic meanings here, and "milk" as the non-basic or transferred sense. This form represents a more complex conceptualization than the terms discussed until now, since two alternative realizations appear. "Brassiere" does not refer to a typical 'bag', but additionally includes a less prototypical idea related to e.g. backing or a holder. The literal meaning is given as "(my) breast bag", referring to the basic meaning of *sat'udze'*, and the non-basic meaning of *-zis* as "bag". Therefore, the usage of the body part term concentrates on the conceptual functional aspect CONTAINER of "skin/hide".

Additionally, this expression is also translated and explained as "cover of my breast". Here, the processed transfer of the basic meaning "skin/hide" to "brassiere" takes place via the conceptual aspect COVER (which itself has its starting point in the concept MATERIAL) similar to the usage of "canvas (lit. its skin/hide)", "eyelid (lit. skin/hide of my eye)" and "earmuffs (lit. my ear skin/hide)". In fact, Beaver speakers translate this form alternatively by directly referring to the aspect of covering.

Furthermore, one speaker gave an alternative expression for "brassiere": *sat'udze' éhdakáádi* with the literal meaning "my breast, it covers it" (clothing_lex001). Asked if *sat'udze' zís* is the right term for "brassiere" – which she verifies – she voluntarily gives this second term and an approximation to its literal meaning: "Yeah, that's 'cover my breast' or something." (clothing_lex001).

5.1.4. -zís AS CONTAINER

In this section, the conceptualization of *-zís* "skin/hide" as CONTAINER will be described. There are several terms including the lexical form, some of which are not concrete (see 5.1.4.4. & 5.1.4.5.)

5.1.4.1. BAGS

The literal meanings of the forms which denote some kind of bag or vessel are explained by translating *-zís* as "bag", and not as "skin/hide". The forms are repeated here:

(35) *tyúú-zís*   "amnion" (lit. water bag)
       water-skin

(36) *saladze'   -zís*   "bladder" (lit. my urine bag)
       1sg.poss.-urine-skin

(37) *bwil   -zís*   "sleepyhead, late riser" (lit. sleep bag)
       sleep   -skin

(38) *xwei   -zís*   "backpack, bag" (lit. carry bag)
       carry   -skin

(39) *tyúú-zís*   "water bag" (lit. water bag)
       water-skin

(40) *lidyíí   -zís*   "tea bag" (lit. tea bag)
       tea   -skin

(41) *éht'oo -zís*   "shellbag" (lit. shell bag)
       shell   -skin

| (42) | *kú* | *-zís* | "tobacco pouch" (lit. fire skin[33]) |
| | fire | -skin | |

| (43) | *tl'ǫéédze* | *-zís* | "gallon" (lit. onion bag) |
| | onion | skin | |

| (44) | *súúdagán* | *-zís* | "salt shaker" (lit. salt bag) |
| | salt | -skin | |

| (45) | *ts'áátl -zís* | | "moss diaper" (lit. moss bag) |
| | moss -skin | | |

The speakers interpret a form such as *xweizís* (lit. carry/pack skin/hide) as "packsack, bag, pouch, sack"[34]. Similarly, *súúdagán zís* "salt shaker" is analyzed as "salt bag", and *éht'oo zís* "shell bag (lit. shell skin/hide)" is translated as "shell bag".

For "box" and "cage", the Beaver language exploits different linguistic constructions, whereas partially the same linguistic material is included: *dachįxeel* "box (lit. wood pack)" contains the element found in *xweizís* "packsack, bag, pouch, sack (lit. carry/pack skin/hide)". *dachįxoile' ééty'i* "cage (lit. it is like a box (lit. wood pack))"[35] conceptually and linguistically refers to "box (lit. wood pack)", and not to "bag" as derived from the conceptual feature CONTAINER of *-zís* "skin/hide".

In the Beaver language, the concept of CONTAINER includes rigid as well as flexible forms and mirrors the idea of a cover that buttresses or supports

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[33] The notion of "skin" refers to the explanations of the Beaver speakers: for 'tobacco pouch' the literal meaning is given as "fire skin" and not as "fire bag".

[34] The speakers do not access the prefix in this construction, which originates in a verb stem with the meaning "carry (on your back)", and is therefore not transparent for the consultants in the case of xwei*zís.*

[35] This form might be an ad hoc creation of one speaker (Schwiertz, personal communication).

something in a three-dimensional way.[36] Since the form used for these senses actually denotes "skin" that covers a living body in a three-dimensional way, such conceptualizations inherited these aspects. As a result, in the network of the term *-zís* "skin/hide" several senses show exactly these correspondences, concentrating on similarity to the conceptual characteristic of "skin" as an all-around container. Other aspects like 'body part of a living creature', are ignored in such senses.

If one detaches oneself from one's own language and concepts, the concept of our skin as a container, vessel or cover appears to be intuitively comprehensible: it focuses on one aspect of skin, besides aspects like skin as MATERIAL (see next paragraph), BODY PART, or outer part of a (living) creature[37].

The translation of *-zís* as "bag" is done by Beaver speakers without an indication of the conceptual idea of highlighting the aspect CONTAINER of the basic concept of the BODY PART "skin/hide". This means, the relation between CONTAINER and "skin/hide" is not consciously embedded in the processing of these terms. When the situational and thematic contexts of the corresponding sessions facilitate discussions on such conceptual transfers, the basic meaning *-zís* "skin/hide" is mentioned. On the other hand, the links existing in the

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[36] In English, "bag" today is linked to any containers without further specification. Furthermore, the adjective "baggy" may refer to e.g. 'puffed out, loosely hanging clothes', making clear the connection to older forms of bags like "pack, bundle, sack". In the German concept of "bag", the notion of a flexible container immediately comes up, due to the fact that a hardcover container is linguistically separated as *Koffer* ("case"), and that "bag" often is used to mean *Tüte* which is made up of thin plastic or cloth. The Beaver terms for "brassiere" (lit. breast bag), and "shell bag" (lit. shell bag) are therefore easily comprehensible for German native speakers in their conceptualizations. "Salt shaker", on the other hand, is not as intuitively understood by Germans, since the literal meaning (salt bag) is more suggestive of a bigger sack of salt, and not of the often little, and non-flexible box or container meant, i.e. form and flexibility (and size) of a container are more relevant aspects in German for the concept of linguistically differentiated containers.

[37] See also above for an etymological description of English "hide" and "skin".

conceptual blending are not accessed. However, this Beaver speakers' approach to the meaning translated as "bag" suits the semantic justification or sanction of this expression. The conceptual links between BODY PART and bags or CONTAINER are not that obvious or self-explanatory in the default situational context of an elicitation session, and a thematic context of manufactured bags. Although the linguistic form used is transparently connected to "skin/hide", the availability of this concept is reduced, since the frame BODY PART is not necessarily relevant in the case of bags and similar containers. Thus, only parts of the network of the polysemous unit -*zís* "skin/hide" are focused on in explaining the meaning of e.g. *xweizís* "packsack, bag, pouch, sack (lit. carry hide)" and other terms denoting bags including the lexical item -*zís* "skin/hide".

Furthermore, (figurative) correspondence features – since influenced by conventionalized and underlying socio-cultural models – may complicate an ad-hoc explanation. More sophisticated interpretations of such structures are not part of a well-known everyday topic of life for Beaver speakers. This is often strengthened by the language documentation situation, where the speakers try to meet their status as 'language teachers'. They avoid discussing aspects of their language which are difficult to understand – for them just as for the outsiders – and to explain.

Still, the concept CONTAINMENT must not be categorically realized as autonomous or self-standing, the linguistic link to -*zís* "skin/hide" as BODY PART is not completely erased. Changes in the thematic context and intensive discussions of the literal meanings promote the realization of the concept "skin/hide" as a whole.

5.1.4.2. BLADDER

Another CONTAINER – *saladze' zis* "bladder (lit. my urine skin)" – refers to a body organ which indeed can be defined as a container for urine. In metalinguistic discussions, speakers do not mention "skin/hide" – or the

prototypical conceptual aspect BODY (PART). Rather, "bag" – as CONTAINER – is the aspect highlighted and given as translation. Although the mappings between 'skin as body part' and 'bladder as body part (and container for body fluid)' seem intuitively comprehensive, since both show similarities in belonging to the same semantic/thematic domain BODY, they are not activated. The conceptualization of "skin/hide" as CONTAINER prevails in the polysemous network of *-zís* "skin/hide" over the notion of BODY PART. So the correspondence between BODY PART and CONTAINER seems not to be as prominent as suggested above. Furthermore, it constitutes the basis for "bladder" in the Beaver language, as the focus on the notion of "bag" in metalinguistic discussions reveals.

Concerning the degree of figurativity of this form, this expression is descriptive and non-figurative. It characterizes the body organ 'bladder' as a container for urine, which it is, with no additional specification concerning its (further) functions, form or position.

5.1.4.3. AMNION / WATER BAG, SHELL BAG, TEA BAG

Besides *xweizís* "packsack, bag, pouch, sack (lit. carry/pack skin/hide)", there are several linguistic expressions including *-zís* to denote bags. Among others:

(46) *tyúú zís*   "water bag (lit. water skin/hide)"

(47) *tyúú zís*   "amnion (lit. water skin/hide)"

(48) *éhťoo zís*   "shell bag (lit. shell skin/hide)"

(49) *lidyíí zís*   "tea bag (lit. tea skin/hide)"

(50) *xwei zís*   "backpack, bag" (lit. carry bag)

These expressions all refer to containers, and in all instances, *-zís* is translated as "bag". In the first case (*tyuu zís* "water bag"), there is not only the conceptual connection between the referent and the notion of "skin/hide" via

the CONTAINER aspect, but also an experiential one. It originates in the usage of hide in traditional life of the Beaver people for containing and transporting water, therefore causing the conceptualization of containers in relation to "skin/hide".

In Beaver, the same construction is used to refer to "amnion". The alternative English term is "bag of waters", also linguistically including the highly relevant fluid as the functional part of this organ. Depending on the speaker asked and the thematic context, the first association and meaning given is either "water bag" as a CONTAINER for water, or "amnion" as BODY PART. In the corpus, a male speaker – who used to hunt and disembowel game – mentions "(moose) amnion" first when asked for the meaning of *tyuu zís* "water bag / amnion (lit. water skin/hide)". Other speakers, on the other hand, come up with the manufactured container "water bag". They concentrate on objects appearing more often in their daily life, because they lack first-hand experience in hunting and intensive exploitation of game terminology.[39]

Many of the BAG constructions in this network are endocentric noun-noun compounds, the first noun constituting the modification or specification of the head, the second noun: *tyúú zís* "amnion / water bag (lit. water bag)", *saladze' zís* "bladder (lit. my urine bag)", *lidyíí zís* "tea bag (lit. tea bag)", *éhťoo zís* "shellbag (lit. shell bag)", *súúdagán zís* "salt shaker (lit. salt bag)".

Most of these examples do not show figurative aspects in their meaning as compounds: when the polysemous noun *-zís* "skin/hide" is used in its sense CONTAINER / BAG. This is also verified by metalinguistic discussions. Accordingly, the compounds are descriptive in using the referents in question for the denotation, e.g. water-bag, shell-bag, etc.

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[39] Traditionally, hunters used to disembowel big game where they killed it, whereas the women cut the big pieces into smaller ones, and also prepared fowl and smaller animals.

On the other hand, the following forms denoting containment referents show figurative transfers: *kúẕíṣ* "tobacco pouch (lit. fire skin/hide)", and *tl'ǫéédze ẕíṣ* "gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)". Here, the modification nouns do not exclusively refer to the content of the respective container. Instead, they apply conjunctive figurative metonymy and metaphor to express the intended meaning.

In the case of *kúẕíṣ* "tobacco pouch (lit. fire skin/hide)", *kun* "fire" is linguistically included in the construction, since the conceptual relation of association between fire, making fire, the equipment for making fire as well as smoking cigarettes is applied. Additionally, the fact that such tobacco pouches indeed often include matches or a lighter, intensifies this link. The lexical form *kun* "fire" occurs in verbs meaning "to dry"(*ashkún* 'I am drying it') and "to be hot" (*tįkun* 'it is hot'). Meanings like "to smoke" and "to burn" are expressed with different, etymologically unrelated forms (*k'adasłiit* 'it burns, it smokes', *dak'úṣ* 'it smokes', *dayúús* 'it burns'). The distance between the concept FIRE linguistically included in the denotation and the real content of a "tobacco pouch" (i.e. fire equipment, cigarettes or tobacco and lighter) is not be wide enough to evoke figurativity. However, in combination with the aspect of concreteness (fire cannot be contained in a container), figurativity is evoked. Note the non-prototypical arrangement of concrete target (smoking requisites) and abstract source (fire) (see also ch. 6.3.).

5.1.4.4. GALLON

In the case of *tl'ǫéédze ẕíṣ* "gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)", two meanings are expressed via this form: the concrete container as well as the abstract unit of measurement. The conceptual and linguistic link to "onions" seems more difficult, and is related to socio-cultural practices and experiences idiosyncratic for Beaver history and living conditions:

Researcher: Is there a word for a "gallon"?

Consultant202: įɫáádyí tl'ǫéédze zís ("one gallon (lit. onion (lit. like a rope) skin/hide"). I don't know how they call tl'ǫéédze zís ("one gallon (lit. onion (lit. like a rope) skin/hide"), but maybe there was onions in it. […] Well, you see like uh- one guy says something, the other guys follow him, they say the same thing, but it's- hundreds of them-, say the same-

(measures001)

The form and size of this sort of container suits the Beaver concept of bags or sacks traditionally used to transport or store onions, so that this parallel in form is conventionalized in the concept of this container. Therefore, the usage and content of a specific container – which as CONTAINER is already linked in the Beaver language to the concept of -zís "skin/hide" – is employed to denote this object.

In the second part of the statement, the speaker gives a striking and sophisticated explanation for establishing such linguistic constructions, which constitutes a folk-model definition of conventionalization. The underlying socio-culturally colored conceptualization of non-literal meanings is not described or justified as comprehensive or obligatory. Rather, the linguistic manifestations are seen as embedded in communication and everyday life which cause subconsciously processed custom and agreement.

An abstract understanding or conceptualization of CONTAINER is found in the second meaning of *tl'ǫéédze zís* "gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)". Here, it denotes the unit of measure and not a concrete entity for containment. The conceptual transfer of -zís from "skin/hide" in the abstract notion of a standardized measure takes place via the concrete, physical object "gallon". The concept CONTAINMENT – which in turn, due to experience, has its starting point in the highlighted conceptual aspect MATERIAL– is applied as the departing point

for the usage of -*zís* "skin/hide" in the sense of "bag". In an additional step – and in analogy to the English conventionalization of "gallon" to "gallon" as measure – this form is understood and realized as the abstract measure of capacity.

5.1.4.5. SLEEPYHEAD

In the case of *bwilzís* "sleepyhead, late riser (lit. sleep skin/hide)", the abstract image-schema of "skin/hide" as CONTAINER itself took some steps of emergence. Intuitively (although as an outsider), the linking aspect "skin/hide" referring to humans seems useful, because in this case only one step of abstraction would suit the idea of efficiency and economy of language. Thus, "skin/hide" is understood not only as containing the physical human, but the psychological or mental parts with human characteristics we have as social beings. Nevertheless, due to the metalinguistic statements, the conceptualization of this term evolved differently:

Consultant505: And then old ladies, they get mad at you if you sleep long time, and when you're younger- xáá bwilzís nííʼííya! ("sleepyhead / late riser (lit. sleep bag), get up!") They say that to you. What does that mean,- bwilzís ("sleepyhead / late riser (lit. sleep bag") "Sleep bag", "sleep bag". […] "You sleep bag, get up!" [[Laughter]] That's what they say to you.

Researcher: Go to sleep? Ah, "sleep bag"! [[Laughter]]

Consultant505: bwilzis nííʼííya! ("sleepyhead / late riser (lit. sleep bag), get up!") You know that means "You sleep bag, get up!" [[Laughter]] That's kinda comical but that's how old ladies call you. [[Laughter]]

(paradigm_sleep002)

The literal meaning of *bwilzís* "sleepyhead, late riser" is not given with reference to human skin, but explained as the idea of a person as a container or bag full of sleep, and therefore not willing or able to get up (early):

5.1.5. SUMMARY OF NETWORK -*zís* "SKIN/HIDE"

-*zís* "skin/hide" comprises a complex semantic and conceptual network with numerous meanings, usages and corresponding domains. The conceptual aspects extracted and focused on for further elaborations are BODY PART, MATERIAL, COVER and CONTAINER. These notions are partially reflected in the speakers' metalinguistic statements where -*zís* is translated as "hide"[41], "cover" and "bag" respectively. In appropriate thematic contexts, the prototypical meaning "skin/hide" is processed and available, indicating the existing relations which hold between the different senses and usages in this network:

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[41] "Hide" is used to refer to the concept BODY PART, but also to highlight the conceptualization of hide as MATERIAL, i.e. to refer to this conceptual aspect also included in the prototypical meaning of the lexeme.

Figure 5.1.: Conceptual Network of *-zís* "skin/hide"

Due to the conceptual aspects constituting parts of the basic meaning, the senses do not show metaphorical or transferred conceptualizations. Rather, conceptual metonymic phenomena are observed: a specific conceptual 'part' of -_zís_ "skin/hide" is processed and highlighted in the usage of this linguistic item (PART FOR WHOLE / CONCEPTUAL ASPECT FOR CONCEPT). Consequently, the concept of -_zís_ "skin/hide" includes characteristics which allude to MATERIAL, COVER, CONTAINER, and MEASURE besides the notion of BODY PART. The way of conceptualization reflects that several meaning aspects are used as points of departure for other additional usages. Thus, the conceptual aspect MATERIAL developed from the prototypical usage of -_zís_ "skin/hide" as BODY PART. COVER and CONTAINER, on the other hand, both have their points of departure in the derived aspect MATERIAL. MEASURE arouse from the aspect CONTAINER, the usage of -_zís_ "skin/hide" in this sense occurs in the meaning "gallon (container)" which is again extended to the abstract meaning of MEASUREMENT:

Figure 5.2.: Conceptual aspects in the network of -_zís_ "skin/hide"

The polysemous form _tl'ǫǫ́édze zís_ "gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)" reflects both meanings – the concrete container and the abstract unit of measurement. Therefore, it highlights the two conceptual aspects of -_zís_ "skin/hide", CONTAINER and MEASURE respectively. Evans refers to similar conceptualizations as "situated inferences" (Evans 2006: 17), since they are established in specific contexts in which an additional aspects is focused on. The

usage of the body part term as MATERIAL finally lead to a shift in meaning of -*zís*.

Despite the conceptualization chain just described, *-zís* "skin/hide" evokes the prototypical meaning aspect BODY PART in addition to the aspect directly used in the respective usage in metalinguistic discussions. The chain is not directly accessed and mentioned by the speakers. Therefore, the corresponding metonymies are defined here as SKIN FOR MATERIAL, SKIN FOR COVER, SKIN FOR CONTAINER. In the case of MEASURE, SKIN FOR MEASURE and CONTAINER FOR MEASURE are established. The BODY PART aspect appears where "skin/hide" is indeed processed as "skin/hide" and specified via, for example, *sadee'* "my eye", as in *sadee' zís* "eyelid (lit. my eyes' skin)".

5.2. EMOTIONS AND BODY PARTS

Like in many languages around the world, in Beaver, body part terms play an important role in expressing emotions, and personality traits. In the corpus, more than 60% of all terms denoting emotion include a body part or organ. The external and internal body parts frequently referred to are the following:

(51) *sadzéé'*   "my heart"   (-*dzéé* "heart")
(52) *satsíí'*   "my head"   (-*tsíí*   "head")
(53) *sįįdyíí'*   "my mind"   (-*įįdyíí*   "mind")
(54) *sazáá'*   "my mouth"   (-*záá'*   "mouth")
(55) *sadzii'*   "my inner ear"   (-*dzii*   "inner ear")

The term -*įįdyíí* "mind" constitutes a special instance of the "body parts" discussed here. Although not a real, physical body part, this classification is cross-linguistically supported by the fact that the concept and usage of this entity is not distinguished from 'real' body parts in many languages of the world. A

concept is created and conventionalized in order to be able to talk about and to refer to significant abstract phenomena of thought, mind, intellect, reason, and soul. The Beaver lexeme *-įįdyíí* "mind" is syntactically as well as semantically embedded in the body part terms' paradigm. It shows the same linguistic behavior as the other body parts used in expressions of emotion and personality traits (e.g. inalienability). Furthermore, speakers comment on this noun without any difference to real body parts also utilized in emotion expressions. (see also ch. 5.4.).

For all of the body parts given above, the networks show more than one basic concept leading to transfer of meanings and usages. Prototypical body parts afford two or more conceptual features which are applied as starting points. This does not hold for "mind". In this case, the conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is the main departing point for further uses of the lexical item *sįįdyíí'* "my mind". This is not surprising, since "mind" does not represent a physiological BODY PART that can be touched or seen. Nevertheless, it is comprehensively included in the concept of a complete human. The holistic conception of humans as a combination of body and soul does not divide into the two classes of body parts and mental parts. When taking into account the more abstract conceptualization of body parts as SEATS OF EMOTION, it becomes clear that these 'parts' can be placed on different ends of a continuum, rather than to two completely different, clearly separated and oppositional classes.

5.3. -ząá "MOUTH"

As will be described in the following paragraphs, the semantic and conceptual network of *-ząá* "mouth" includes two conceptual aspects highlighted in the diverse senses and usages, BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION.

The domains included here are religion[42] and language, where language is directly linked to personality traits like "be talkative" or "chatterbox":

The constructions referring to language specify various forms of speech or speech behavior, indicating intentions, but also personality traits linked to and expressed in ways of talking:

(56) *nazáá' łídíí'a*   "shut up"

                                lit. close your mouth!

(57) *súúga sazáá' ǫlá'*   "sweet talk, persuade s.o."

                                lit. they put sugar in my mouth

(58) *sazáá' ghǫtl'ǫ*   "chatterbox / gossip"

                                lit. lots of my mouth(s)

(59) *sazáá' nadyué'*   "be silent, non-talkative"

                                lit. my mouth is not there

(60) *sazáá' wudyééne*   "talk smart"

                                lit. my mouth is sharp

(61) *sazáá' keets'ééle*   "swear"

                                lit. my mouth is evil

(62) *sazáá' nááwutsat*   "persuade"

                                lit. my mouth is hard/strong

For *nazáá' łídíí'a* "shut up! (lit. close your mouth!)" and *súúga sazáá' ǫlá'* "sweet-talk (lit. they put sugar in my mouth)", -*záá* "mouth" as BODY PART is directly meant and referred to, as is the case in the two instances for *kazáá' ts'a'áhi* "host (lit. they put it in somebody's mouth)" and *xáálo sazáá' ts'a'áhe* "first communion (lit. first time they put it in my mouth)". The metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION comprises the underlying conceptualization of

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[42] Here, religion refers to proselytization and not to traditional beliefs.

these forms (see below). -záá "mouth" as concrete instrument is linguistically manifested and evokes the intended abstract activities, so that the specific metonymy is MOUTH FOR SPEECH.

In the other constructions we find several figurative instances and conceptual aspects not suiting a concrete body part. These transferred figurative meanings are not evoked by the concept of the body part term -záá "mouth" alone nor by the relations between "mouth" and 'ways of talking'. This is also observed in constructions where ANGER or SADNESS are expressed by containing -dzéé "heart". This body part is not directly or perceivably related to these emotions, as the relations are primarily socio-culturally established (see ch. 5.7.3.). In the forms discussed here, the attributes ascribed to –záá "mouth" via conventionalized linguistic and semantic patterns result in figurativity, while "mouth" is realized as BODY PART. Conceptual metonymy constitutes the main phenomenon here. In addition to the BODY PART aspect, the conceptualization as SEAT OF EMOTION is included and highlighted. In the meanings of these idiomatic forms, the instrument is tightly linked to specific speech behaviors and therefore to personality traits like "be a chatterbox" or "be non-talkative". This means that these terms are not only describing how persons talk, but the form refers to the personality traits and attitudes interrelated with such behavior. As a consequence, -záá "mouth" semantically and conceptually contains and evokes more than the mere concrete body part.

5.3.1. -záá "MOUTH" AS BODY PART

5.3.1.1. SHUT UP

The form nazáá' łídíí'a "shut up (lit. close your mouth)" utilizes the body part as instrument for speech. The verb łí-dy-'a "quit-handle/close" does not evoke any transferred meaning, and is also said, for example, by a doctor after

examination of the oral cavity. Alternatively, Beaver speakers use the form *adyuu wunadyih* "stop talking! (lit. don't talk!)".

5.3.1.2. SWEET-TALK / PERSUADE / BRIBE SOMEONE

The form *súúga saz̲áá' ọlá'* "sweet-talk (lit. s/he puts sugar in my mouth)" involves the meanings PERSUADE and BRIBE, so in both concepts sweet-talking to achieve one's goals is included. "Mouth" refers to the prototypical meaning BODY PART, while the idiom figuratively utilizes food vocabulary to bring up shared structure and induce the concepts of PERSUASION and SWEET-TALK. This is linked to socio-culturally based concepts of BRIBE and CONVICTION: the 'Indian way' is to give somebody food to achieve and ensure cooperation.

A metonymic chain combines the conceptual aspects APPEALING, PLEASING of *súúga* "sugar" with the notion of PERSUASION as cause for the action to get the intended result, i.e. to have one's own way:

> Consultant101: [...] Like I- lot of times I heard somebody saying, you know, "Oh, they want this and the-, tell you this a-": súúga saz̲áá' ọlá' ("s/he is sweet talking (lit. s/he puts sugar in my mouth)"). They say, "they put sugar in my mouth". Just so you could, you know, do what they- what they want you to do. súúga saz̲áá' ọlá' ("s/he is sweet talking (lit. s/he puts sugar in my mouth)"). That's what- I hear that, too. I used to wonder what they mean, now I found out later. That's sweet talk, sweet talk.
>
> (metaphors001)

5.3.1.3. RELIGIOUS TERMS

The expressions linked to religion are the following:

(63) *xáálo sazáá' ts'a'áhe*   "first communion"

                                                   lit. first time they put it in my mouth

(64) *kazáá' ts'a'áhi*   "host"

                                                   lit. they put it in somebody's mouth

The linguistic expressions referring to "first communion" and "host" do not show any spiritual aspects mirroring FAITH, or the catholic idea of communion as sharing Jesus' body. Instead, only the concrete act of putting a concrete edible object in one's mouth is expressed in a descriptive realization. No transferred feature or link to the intended abstract meaning and significance of this act is included.

> Researcher: Is there a word for the "first communion"? Do you remember how they called that?
>
> Consultant101: xáálo mazáá' ts'į'ǫ ("1st communion (lit. they put something in his/her mouth)"). xáátse or xáálo mazáá' ts'į'ǫ "They put something in his mouth", that's what it means. "First time they put something in the mouth.". [...] Doesn't matter which. xáátse and xáálǫ. Means the same. mazáá' ts'į'ǫ, "They put something in the mouth".   (metaphors002)

Concerning *-záá* "mouth", the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION is realized, i.e. MOUTH as eating instrument for the act of eating. In a further step, eating as concrete activity is realized for the more abstract religious act. The metonymy PART FOR WHOLE constitutes the underlying phenomenon for the whole idiomatic construction: the physical act as the (only) concrete part of the rite is expressed to refer to the spiritual whole without including or utilizing figurativity.

The expressions discussed here perfectly suit the conventionalized linguistic patterns found for traditional as well as modern and forced terminology and underlying concepts in Beaver. For example, many professions but also household items are expressed via this metonymic pattern employed for "first communion" and "host", for example:

dane ghaawudyíhe	"translator" (lit. s/he talks for the people)
dane aadyíhí	"priest" (lit. he talks to the people)
náátyįį	"prophet/dreamer" (lit. s/he dreams)
mak'éh'ets'ehdii	"table" (lit. you eat on it)

Table 5.2.: Examples of descriptive terms

Another reason for this lack of emotional or spiritual aspects could be the fact that the Beaver people were proselytized, and did not decide to become Catholic on their own. Instead, they were forced to convert and to adopt the western tradition of religious behavior (Goddard 1917, Mills 1986, Goddard 1996). Under such circumstances, it is comprehensible that there is no linguistically manifested spiritual or transcended aspect.

In accordance with the tendency toward the descriptive terms and non-figurative metonymic chains identified above, there is no need to directly include references to the negative context of religion or Catholicism. Such a conscious expression of conceptual baggage via linguistic structure is not observed.

5.3.2. -ẕáá "MOUTH" AS SEAT OF EMOTION

The following constructions still refer to the concrete body part, but at the same time activate the conceptual feature SEAT OF EMOTION.

5.3.2.1. BE NON-TALKATIVE

The idiom *sazáá' ghǫdyué'* "be non-talkative (lit. my mouth is not there)"
is one of the instances of the often applied pattern [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF
EMOTION] identified in chapter 6.4. Meanings like disability, bodily
characteristics and personality traits are subsumed in this pattern. To "be non-
talkative" relies on the metonymic conceptualization INSTRUMENT FOR
ACTION: the body part term *-záá* "mouth" is linguistically expressed to be
non-existent in order to signify that the activity of talking as tightly linked to
MOUTH is not carried out:

Researcher: What if a person is very silent, and doesn't talk lots at all?

Consultant101: ma**záá' ghǫdyué'** ("s/he is not talkative (lit. s/he has no
mouth)") [...] He's a person that's quiet, don't talk about anything, that's
what they mean. He's got no mouth, but it's still there, but he's very quiet,
don't talk about- doesn't open his mouth, that's what it means. ma**záá'
ghǫdyué'** ("s/he is not talkative (lit. s/he has no mouth)"). Just like na**záá'
ghǫtl'ǫ** ("s/he worries (lit. s/he has many mouths)"), just like you're- "he's
got lots of mouths".   (metaphors001)

The speaker explicitly mentions the realized figurative moment of a
missing body part. Hence, the conceptualization as SEAT OF EMOTION is
indirectly included, while the literal meaning is qualified ("[…] got no mouth,
but it's still there […]" (metaphors001)) in respect of the intended meaning
("[…] he's very quiet, don't talk about- doesn't open his mouth, that's what it
means." (metaphors001)). Additionally, the relation between "be non-talkative"
as personality trait and the concrete body part constitutes one part of the
concept of *-záá* "mouth" as SEAT OF EMOTION.

Note that the form for "be mute" is realized via this pattern, too, yet linguistically manifesting *sak'áse'* "my throat / voice" instead of *sazáá'* "my mouth": *sak'áse' nadyué'* "I am mute (lit. my throat is not there)"[43]. Furthermore, the polysemous concept of *sazéége'* "my throat / voice" again reflects the usage of INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION metonymy, i.e. VOICE is an additional sense of the body part term "throat" without any supplemental linguistic material.[44]

5.3.2.2. SWEAR

This construction *sazáá kets'ééle* "I swear (lit. my mouth is evil)" again applies the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION, the "bad words", as described by the speakers, are linguistically realized by the inclusion of the term -*záá* "mouth".

Researcher: Um, are there other things you can say about someone's mouth? When they - I don't know, when they say bad things to other people-?

Consultant101: na*záá' kee*ts'ééle ("you swear (lit. your mouth is evil)"). Means you're swearing too much. [...] You say bad words, or you're swearing, that's what it means. (metaphors001)

The chain includes a third step, since actually not only the words, i.e. the verbal output, are evil, but also the meanings or contents and therefore the

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[43] There is another form with the meaning "be mute": *adyuu wudyih*, lit. "s/he doesn't talk", utilizing the metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE.

[44] "Throat" is also realized in two other body part terms: *sazéége'*, and *sak'us*. The latter form means "my neck", but is also used to refer to "throat". Accordingly, this form is found in expressions for *k'óhsadle sak'us ghadalé'* "necklace (lit. beads are hanging around my neck)", and *sak'uskálé* "collar (lit. it is on my neck)".

thoughts or opinion. Accordingly, the following metonymic chains are identified: MOUTH – SPEECH – THOUGHT or INSTRUMENT FOR VERBAL ACTION FOR MENTAL ACTION.

This construction is also used to imply "shut up, stop talking", in situations where people are rude or gossiping. This pragmatically based implication is communicated by defining the content of the utterance as evil. Linguistically, this is manifested in the metonymic fashion just mentioned, and – in the right situational context – understood as a request or call to stop talking.

5.3.2.3. BOTHER / PERSUADE SOMEBODY

Another Beaver form referring to persuasion in a more negatively connoted way is *sazáá' nááwutsat* "to bother / persuade s.o. (lit. my mouth is hard/strong)". Here, the stative verb *-tsat* "be hard/strong" describes the force and perseverance of the person persuading:

Researcher: Is there something you could say- "you're- you're tongue is sharp"? […]

Consultant101: na*záá'* na- na*zúúdi* nááwu*tsat*, na*záá'* nááwu*tsat*; means "you got a strong mouth". [...] I hear that quite a bit.

Researcher: So, when would you say that?

Consultant101: Ma- it- like- they're talking, they- they're- just like [community member]. Everybody says na*záá'* nááwu*tsat*, you know. They say that to [community member] because he asks, and asks and asks and asks over and over till he got his way, hu?   (metaphors001)

The metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION is combined with the concept of STRENGTH: verbally bothering is linguistically conceptualized as acting in a hard/strong way. The stative verb *-tsat* "be hard/strong" shows high

frequency in the expressions discussed here. Most often, it reflects the conceptual similarity between concrete and mental or psychological DETERMINEDNESS meant in constructions like *sazáá' nááwutsat* "to bother / persuade s.o. (lit. my mouth is hard/strong)".

5.3.2.4. CHATTERBOX / GOSSIP

This construction *sazáá' ghǫtl'ǫ* "I am a chatterbox / I gossip (lit. lots of my mouth(s))" refers to the idea of increase and combines two ways of verbal behavior which are rather negatively connoted in the Beaver culture:

Consultant101: n*azáá' ghǫtl'ǫ* ("you are a chatterbox / you gossip (lit. lots of your mouth(s))"). Just like you're- you're telling them you got "lots of mouths". n*azáá' ghǫtl'ǫ* ("you are a chatterbox / you gossip (lit. lots of your mouth(s))"). That means you're yapping too much. […]

Researcher: Is there a word for "gossip"? Someone gossiping?

Consultant101: m*azáá' ghǫtl'ǫ* ("s/he a chatterbox / s/he gossips (lit. lots of his/her mouth(s))"), that's what it is. Yeah.   (metaphors001)

The linguistic pattern applied here, [LOTS OF BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] (cf. ch. 6.4.), is also used for "worry", *-įįdyíí'* "mind" is linguistically manifested to express "increase in thinking": *sįįdyíí' natlǫ* "worry (lit. lots of minds)". The body part *-záá* "mouth" stands for speech behavior, and the concept of increase of verbal output is linguistically manifested by increase of the concrete instrument instead of the intended verbal output. This conceptualization goes with people talking much, i.e. indeed producing lots of words or verbal output. On the other hand, for the sense GOSSIP, not only the real amount of talk or speech is counted, but what is said is classified as

redundant, and dispensable, and therefore too much, regardless of the actual amount.

5.3.3. SUMMARY OF NETWORK -ZÁÁ "MOUTH"

The semantic and conceptual network of the body part term *-záá* "mouth" is summed up in figure 5.3.:

Figure 5.3.: Network of *-záá* "mouth".

Two conceptual aspects BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION are extracted and used for further senses of -záá "mouth". However, these two facets are not completely divided in the linguistic expressions, the SEAT OF EMOTION branch also includes the BODY PART sense. Both are simultaneously available in these forms and are processed in order to comprehend the intended meanings. The concept SEAT OF EMOTION is based on physiological relations between the body part and the verbal behavior linked to specific personality traits.

5.4. -ịịdyíí "MIND"

This term constitutes a special instance of the BODY PARTS discussed here. Although not a real, physical body part, in many languages of the world a conception of some kind of entity is created and conventionalized in order to be able to talk about and to refer to thoughts, mind, spirit, intellect, psyche, reason, and soul. It reflects the significance of mental states, intellect and emotions as well as the need to realize and communicate these abstract ideas, cross-linguistically and cross-culturally. EMOTIONS are not the only concepts linked to mind: often INTELLIGENCE, KNOWLEDGE, OPINION, but also CHARACTER and THOUGHT in all its diversity – from INSANITY to WORRIES – are tightly related to "mind".[45]

In Beaver, this term shows the same linguistic behavior as the other body part terms used in expressions of emotion and personality traits. It is construed as an inalienable noun obligatorily combined with a possessor, and appears in the linguistic patterns identified for emotions and personality traits (cf. ch. 6.4.).

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[45] In most languages there is never only one term to cover all facets of this concept – rather, several terms overlap each other – nor is it possible to simply translate one term or usage with another in different languages, nor do the terms etymologically originate in identical conceptualizations.

Furthermore, the verb stem *-ty'į* "think" is related to the form *sįįdyíí* "my mind". This considerably enlarges the conceptual network concerning linguistic manifestations as well as conceptual domains embedded in this polysemous linguistic item.

Due to the character of the entity *-įįdyíí* "mind", only one departure point is identified for the idiomatic expressions described in the next sections. BODY PART is not explicitly evoked by any of the meanings; instead the conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is highlighted in the constructions because of the intrinsic abstractness of the concept.

5.4.1. BE STUPID / CRAZY

As already discussed for *sazáá' nadyué'* "be non-talkative (lit. my mouth is not there)", the form *sįįdyíí nadyué'* "be crazy, stupid (lit. my mind is not there)" applies the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION. Mind is realized as SEAT OF EMOTION tightly linked to INTELLIGENCE and THOUGHTS, and is linguistically manifested to refer to the absence of the activities of the mind, i.e. THINKING.

Researcher: I think you told me before that you can say **mįįdyíí' dyué'**, ("s/he is crazy, stupid (lit. her/his mind is not there)") or-

Consultant101: He don't think right, his- he lost his memory or something, that's what it means. He lost his memory. […] "he's got no mind". He can't think right. Everything is a mixture in- that's what- for him, for that person. Just not thinking right, I guess.   (metaphor100)

The translation and associations to MEMORY and the ability of THINKING chain the concept of "mind" to these mental activities. There is another token of this pattern [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] also denoting lack of

intelligence or insanity: *satṣíídué* "be stupid, crazy (lit. my head is not there)"[46]. In combination with *sįįdyíí' nadyué* "lit. my mind is not there", the metonymic chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING (– WORRY)[47] can be identified. It allows the near synonymic usage of these two idiomatic constructions, and the processing or availability of both body parts terms conceptualizing their referents as SEATS OF EMOTIONS when insanity or stupidity is discussed:

> Researcher: Could you say something about a person's head? When they're when they don't understand easily? You know, when a person is a little bit slower?
>
> Consultant101: **mįįdyíí' dyué** "s/he is stupid (lit. s/he has no mind)" Means "no brain", "no brain", **mįįdyíí'** means "mind". "He's got no mind." [...] "No mind."
>
> Researcher: That means they are stupid?
>
> Consultant101: Mhm. **mįįdyíí'** means "his mind".   (metaphors001)

Although asked for "head" in relation to INTELLIGENCE, the first Beaver form given is *mįįdyíí' dyué* "her/his mind is not there". Additionally, "brain" (*-tṣ'iighǫ́'*) is evoked, before "mind" is translated and further explained.

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[46] Additionally, the form *adyuu dane ééty'e* "be crazy (lit. s/he is not like a person)" is available.

[47] This chain reflects all parts as found in the various Beaver conceptualizations of the body part terms included here. Not all of these are relevant in the specific forms. Note also that INTELLIGENCE stands for MISSING INTELLIGENCE and INSANITY, too.

5.4.2. Be powerful / be determined / desire

The concept of *-tsat* "be hard/strong" is not only combined with *sadzééʼ* "my heart", *sazáá* "my mouth" and *satsííʼ* "my head", but also with *sįįdyííʼ* "my mind" to refer to several and to some degree different personality traits and emotions. There are various conceptual aspects highlighted in the different usages of the subpattern [BODY PART IS HARD/STRONG] in combination with -*įįdyíí* "mind".

For "desire", the idea of APPETENCE and LONGING is linked to MIND. Simultaneously, this 'body part' is detached from the person in the sense that the individual does not have full control over her/his desires, i.e. s/he does not voluntarily decide or act in an unsolicited fashion.

Researcher: Could I say mįįdyííʼ na- natsat?

Consultant303: mįįdyííʼ náátsat ("s/he wants something very hard (lit. his/her mind is hard/strong)") What that means? It means something anyway. Oh yeah. mįįdyííʼ náátsat, you want something very hard. You want that, you want this.

Consultant202: You want a woman too much? gáá mįįdyííʼ náátsat ("s/he wants something very hard (lit. his/her mind is hard/strong)")

Consultant303: It's like you want something, hu? With his mind, but he can't get it. (metaphor110)

The conceptual aspect of FORCE is highlighted in this notion of DESIRE, and expressed by means of the stative verb "be hard/strong". Here, the metonymy SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON is not applied, rather, "mind" is realized as an opponent of the person experiencing DESIRE. Following this analysis, the aspect of POWERLESSNESS of the individual experiencing the mental state of LONGING is also included via the usage of *-tsat* "be

hard/strong". It focuses on the consequences for experiencers of the accompanying features of strong or hard entities: LACK OF SOFTNESS and FLEXIBILITY, REFRACTIVENESS of the entity, here "mind", and LACK OF INTERFERENCE or PERSUADABILITY on the part of the experiencing person.

The other meaning of *sįįdyííʔ náátsat* (lit. my mind is hard/strong) is "be powerful / determined". In the first elicitation example given below, an alternative form including *dane* "person, man, human" is given, probably due to the nature of the researcher's question:

Researcher: How would you say "he is very powerful", someone? Like "he's powerful, he's powerful person"?

Consultant404: You could put it **dane mįįdyííʔ náátsat** ("s/he is powerful (lit. the person's mind is hard/strong)").

Researcher: So that means "he has power"? "he has power"? "he has a strong mind"?

Consultant404: Yeah. "He's got a strong mind".

Researcher: Does that mean "he is stubborn" or what does that mean?

Consultant404: No, "his mind is strong".

Researcher: Like he is smart, or he is a wise person?

Consultant404: Oh yeah, he is strong, and he is- you could- just for everything, "strong mind".   (metaphor120)

Researcher: Could I say something about the mind of a person? Could I say **mįįdyííʔ náátsat**?

Consultant101: Yeah.

Researcher: What does that mean?

Consultant101: He's got a strong mind.

Researcher: Does that mean he is smart?

Consultant101: You got a strong mind. You ask to do something, and his mind
    is very strong to do it.

Researcher: Oh, like he is determined to do something?

Consultant101: Yeah, yeah.   (metaphor100)

This usage does not concentrate on the conceptual features discussed above for DESIRE, despite the identical linguistic construction. Instead, the conceptual aspects of PENETRABILITY and RESISTIBILITY of the concept of HARDNESS are utilized, referring to the character of the powerful or determined person. Powerful people are constant and indestructible, i.e. they know what they want and what to do, and are therefore stable, withstanding influences from the outside, paralleling e.g. rocks[48] via the linguistic material included.

The conceptual metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION underlies both meanings of this idiomatic construction, but only "be powerful / determined" also manifests SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON.

5.4.3. BE NOT DETERMINED

The negative form of this idiomatic expression refers to the opposite characteristic of *sįįdyíí' náátsat* "be determined (lit. my mind is hard/strong)": an unassertive, unstable person who does not know what she wants or how to deal with certain situations. The other meaning of the affirmative form, "desire", is not evoked by this construction:

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[48] Besides the similar English idiom, note the German expression *ein Fels in der Brandung sein* "firm as a rock (lit. be a rock in the breakers)" used to refer to a person one can rely on.

Researcher: How about- what else can you say about the mind, mįįdyíí'.

Consultant101: mįįdyíí' adyuu náátsat ("s/he is not determined (his/her mind is not hard/strong)") See? You're- his mind is not strong enough to go ahead to do something. Like if a young kid wants- you ask him to do it, and he kind of wipe out, you know, and he just think 'what I should do'. That's when you say [mįįdyíí' adyuu náátsat, I hear that lots from old people.

(metaphor100)

Researcher: Could you say "his mind is slow"? Like somebody's slow-

Consultant101: mįįdyíí' adyuu náátsat ("s/he not determined (lit. his/her mind is not hard/strong)"). "Their mind is not strong" That's what it means, it's slow, and their mind is not strong. And it's slow, that's what it is.

Researcher: Could you say [*your big mind]?

Consultant101: No. Just strong, that's all-   (metaphor100)

Many antonymic relations are realized via an affirmative and a negated form, as opposed to, for example, many English expression pairs standing in an antonymic relation (see also ch. 5.7.3.3.).

5.4.4. BAD MOOD

The combination of the SEAT OF EMOTION -įįdyíí "mind" with the stative verb -tsééle "be evil" means "be in a bad mood, be grouchy". Similarly to sazáá' kets'ééle, "I swear (lit. my mouth is evil)", it applies the same metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION. The mind is realized as the SEAT OF BAD MOOD and expressed in the construction referring to the negative mental state of FRETFULNESS:

Researcher: How would I say "he is grumpy"? Like "in a bad mood"? "Grouchy"?

Consultant303: mı̨įdyíí' tsééle ("s/he is grouchy, in a bad mood (lit. his/her mind is evil)"). "Upset minded" like, "mad" like. "He's grouchy" like.

Researcher: So you better don't talk to him, hu?

Consultant303: Yeah. mı̨įdyíí' tsééle ("s/he is grouchy, in a bad mood (lit. his/her mind is evil)").

Researcher: That's like "his mind is mean", or something, "bad"?

Consultant303: Yeah. Yeah, "his mind".   (metaphor110)

The speaker's statement "he's grouchy" underlines the metonymic usage of SEAT OF EMOTION for the person meant. Moreover, -į̨dyíí "mind" stands for the MOOD or the BAD TEMPER, i.e. CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED. The stative verb is used in its prototypical meaning describing abstract or mental states.

5.4.5. WORRY

As already attested for the combination of specific body parts with the stative verb -ts'éél "be evil", here again, we find the 'body part' MIND together with the same stative verb -tlǫ "be lots, be many": sį̨įdyíí' natlǫ "I worry (lit. my minds are lots)" reflects parts of the metonymic chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING – WORRY:

Researcher: How do you say "sorrow" in Beaver? "Sorrow"? Like I have lot- or "she has lots of sorrows" or "worries"?

Consultant404: "Worry" means mı̨įdyíí' natlǫ ("s/he worries (lit. lots of mind)"). "Worried lots."

Researcher: "He worries lots"?

Consultant404: Yeah.

Researcher: Does that mean mįįdyííʔ, that's my- what's mįįdyííʔ?

Consultant404: "Mind."

Researcher: Like "my mind"? "I've lots of mind"?

Consultant404: Yeah, you're thinking of all kinds of things in your head.

Researcher: mįįdyííʔ natlǫ? That's "he's worried"?

Consultant404: Yeah, "he's worried lots", and he's thinking lots, you could put it "thinking lots". (metaphor120)

Researcher: How would you tell a person "oh, you kind of look worried"?

Consultant101. nįįdyííʔ natlǫ kʼéyįtyʼis ("you look worried (lit. lots of your minds)"). "You're loo- thinking lots", that's what it means. nįįdyííʔ means "your mind". […] "you got a lot in your mind the way you're looking". That's what it means. "You got a lot in your mind the way you're looking." […] Just like "you got lots in your mind" or "you're worried".

(metaphor100)

Consultant101: And if you're sitting there, not even moving, just looking around, I'll ask you: nįįdyííʔ natlǫ laa? ("are you worried? (lit. lots of your minds)") "You got lots in your mind." nįįdyííʔ natlǫ laa? "Are you worried lots?" Or thinking lots, it's both the same thing.

Researcher: Could you say about somebody "his mind is closed"? Or he is like "he's open minded"? You could say that in English, if the mind is-

Consultant101: No, there's no way to say it. mįįdyííʔ natlǫ ("s/he worries (lit. her/his minds are lots)"), you just sit there, and you- just like you're thinking a- you don't open your mind, you got lots in your mind. That's what it

means. mįįdyíí' natlǫ. I can't say "lock your mind". nįdyįt'a łidyįdyis ("*your mind is closed"), I can't say that, there's no word for it. [[laughter]] (CHECK VERBSTEM!)   (metaphor100)

When talking about "worry" or "have sorrows", Beaver speakers often explain "worry" as an increase in thinking, for example "you could put it 'thinking lots'" (metaphor120). This aspect is not only socio-culturally realized and highlighted: someone worrying busies oneself with one's sorrows over a longer period, and the thoughts are rather numerous or repeated and recapitulated over and over again. This conceptual aspect of "worry" is focused on in the Beaver expression. Linguistically, the instrument is realized via the metonymies INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION, and CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED.

Despite the metonymic chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING (– WORRY), *sįįdyíí'* "my mind" in the linguistic form discussed here cannot be replaced by *satsíí'* "my head". Such a form is not accepted, although this body part is linked to the concept of MIND and INTELLIGENCE (cf. *satsíídué'* "be crazy, stupid (lit. my head does not exist)"). When asked for an expression for WORRY including the term for "head", -*tsíí*, one speaker supplements the idiomatic expression under discussion here with the phrase *satsíít'aa* "in my head": *satsít'aa sįdyį' natlǫ* "I have sorrows in my head (lit. in my head lots of my minds)".

Researcher: Could I say something about my head, when I have lots of worries? Like "my head is full", or my head is- I don't know what does-

Consultant404: satsíít'áá sįįdyíí' natlǫ ("I worry lots (in my head lots of mind)")

Researcher: Would you say that?

Consultant404: Yeah. satsííťáá sįįdyíí' natlǫ, "I got lots of things in my mind."

(metaphor120)

Similarly, another speaker laughs about the idea of modifying this idiom and replacing the two body parts:

Researcher: When somebody's worried, could you say something about his head?

Consultant101: No. nįįdyíí' means "your mind". You can't say *natsíí' natlǫ, you can't say "you got lots of head". [[laughter]]　(metaphor100)

The concept of WORRY is tightly linked to -įįdyíí "mind", as the linguistic construction reveals. Furthermore, the body part term -įįdyíí "mind" is indeed combined with the meaning WORRY in the construction satsíí' nakǫįl "worry (lit. my head is heavy)" (see ch. 5.5.4.3.). So it is not the relation between these two body part expressions and the mental activity discussed here which blocks a connection between HEAD and WORRY. The linguistic construction is fixed – in form and in its linguistic ingredients – and does not allow for modification even with a body part term metonymically also linked to HEAD and WORRY. The statement "you can't say *natsíí' natlǫ, you can't say "you got lots of head"" (metaphor100) accompanied with laughter reflects the realized figurativity of such constructions on the one hand. On the other, it reveals the inaccessibility or at least the restricted availability of such idiomatic forms. The idea of "multiplied minds" or "multiplied mouths" as conventionalized in the Beaver language is no less strange than "multiplied heads". Yet missing conventionalization emphasizes the literal meanings of the combined lexemes and the figurativity which is consequently generated by these meanings. The

images evoked are not known or bound to cultural models which license established figurative meanings and allow for less challenge.

This behavior was also discussed in relation to the anger idiom *adyuu sadzéé' ghólįį* "I am timid / I am heartless (lit. my heart does not exist)". A quite similar (literal) meaning is not accepted by the speakers when realized via another pattern, namely **sadzéé' nadyué'* (lit. no my heart). Here, speakers also laugh about this construction or ask back how this could be (literally) possible, although the literal meaning of the conventionalized expression (*adyuu sadzéé' ghólįį* "I am timid / I am heartless (lit. my heart does not exist)") is paralleled (see ch. 5.7.3.3.).

5.4.6. SUDDENLY REMEMBER

In the expression *sįįdyíí' náátl'a* "(suddenly) remember (lit. my mind runs)" a motion verb is applied to refer to mental activity. For the meaning "suddenly remember", the aspect of suddenness is identified and linguistically realized in this idiomatic form via the verb meaning ("Your man- mind is fast", that's what it means […]. (metaphor100)). The verb stem *-tl'a* "run" occurs in contexts of (fast) locomotion and is also used for "jump" [49]:

Researcher: Or if somebody has a fast, quick mind, like when he-

Consultant101: mįįdyíí' náátl'a ("s/he is smart (lit. his/her mind runs"). That's "run"- you know, you're thinking all over, you- I hear my grandpa used to say: mįįdyíí' náátl'a He used to say, "your mind is- runs fast". If now you- and if somebody start telling you about this, ooh, your mind- like my mind runs way back, that's what he meant. I used to do that, them, too, they're

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[49] Presumably, "dance" is realized with the same verbal stem in combination with the lexical preverb *dah-*.

thinking the same way. That was then, long ago, that's what he meant, my grandpa. mịịdyíí' náátl'a.

Researcher: Like it's all over?

Consultant101: Not all over, but your mind comes- just snaps right now. If somebody's telling you something somewhere else, right away your mind comes back to something […] that's what I guess my grandpa used to mean, "your mind he runs, your mind is fast". Your mind is fast, that's what **náátl'a** means, "it's fast". Yeah. […] Right away you think back. That's what he meant. […].   (metaphor100)

The speaker mentions the fact that one's mind is "fast" and "right away […] comes back" (metaphor100) to known, but previously not available memories. The notion of "just snaps" underlines this important semantic aspect of *-tl'a* "run" in this construction. Additionally, the form allows for the identification of autonomy of MIND, i.e. reduced control of the person suddenly remembering, similarly to *sịịdyíí' náátsat* "desire (lit. my mind is hard/strong)", where a LOSS OF CONTROL over this SEAT OF THOUGHTS is perceived and linguistically indicated.

5.4.1. SUMMARY OF NETWORK *-ịịDYÍÍ* "MIND"

-ịịdyíí "mind" as an abstract entity is construed in analogy to the concepts of body parts in their roles as SEATS OF EMOTION. In its network, only the conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is used as a starting point for further senses and usages.

The conceptual structure of body part terms as concrete entities is not applied here: similar usages only occur where body part terms are realized as SEAT OF EMOTION as well. Therefore, this conceptual network does not show polysemy in the same way as the other body part terms do. Its conceptualization

– i.e. the conceptual facet utilized and highlighted – does not vary in the different idiomatic expressions discussed in this chapter.

Figure 5.4.: *-įįdyíí* "mind"

5.5. -tsíí "HEAD"

The body part term *-tsíí* "head" is included in several expressions, and – unlike the other body parts discussed here – many of the forms denote concrete entities as well as abstract spatial concepts. In this network, several conceptual aspects are identified as departure points for further usages: besides BODY PART

and the transferred and more abstract concept of a SEAT OF EMOTION, -tsíí "head" is realized and extracted as UPPER and FRONT PART.

5.5.1. -tsíí "HEAD" AS BODY PART

-tsíí "head" is included in several other body part terms which are all related to "head", i.e. the prototypical and 'over-all' sense is processed rather than a more specific conceptual feature:

(65) satsííts'ané'   "skull, (upper) backbone (lit. my head bone)"

(66) satsíít'azi   "nape, back of head (lit. between my head)"

(67) satsíígháá'   "hair (lit. my head hair)"

(68) sats'iighǫ́'   "brain (lit. my head-ʔ[50])"

In the expressions satsííts'ané' "skull, (upper) backbone (lit. my head bone)" and satsíígháá' "hair (lit. my head hair)", -tsíí "head" constitutes the modifier of these endocentric noun-noun compounds and specifies the 'bone' or 'hair' referred to accordingly.

In the following two terms, both denoting artifacts, -tsíí "head" stands respectively for 'hair' and 'upper part of the body' in a metonymic fashion: the two opposing metonymies WHOLE FOR PART and PART FOR WHOLE are manifested.

(69) wutsík'aatsi   "comb (lit. it scratches one's head)"

(70) ts'íhk'uł   "parka (lit. head is covered)"

In wutsík'aatsi "comb (lit. it scratches one's head)", the hair (as part of a head) constitutes the intended referent, since the hair is combed and not the

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[50] The meaning of the second part is not known.

complete head. Concerning the clothing term: a "parka" principally covers the upper part of the body, while the head is rather additionally covered by the hood.

Likewise, a "bald eagle" is expressed in a descriptive fashion concentrating on the appearance of its head:

(71) *éhdaa mat͟síí dák'ale* "bald eagle (lit. eagle his head is white)"

The prominent coloration of the eagle's head is explicitly given to lexically distinguish the referent from other "eagles", *éhdaa.*

The Beaver expression for "nod", *dat͟sí naghehdah* (lit. move one's head), constitutes another usage of the body part term discussed here. To express "nod" – including more abstract domains like AFFIRMATION / CONFIRMATION / CONSENT – and mental-physical states like FEELING OF DIZZINESS, physiological parts of the complete concepts are linguistically realized. In the descriptive term *dat͟sí naghehdah* "nod (lit. move one's head)", the concrete body part "head" is meant. The speaker does not include any notion of AGREEMENT or CONSENT in her explanation, neither in the literal meaning nor in her statement about this form:

Researcher: Mmh, what you call when someone is nodding?

Consultant505: […] **dat͟sí naghehdah,** ("nodding (lit. moving one's head)"). "Moving her head" or "his head". **naghehdah** (lit. moving).

Researcher: And that means "moving one's head"? So that could be like "shaking your head for 'no'", would be that, too?

Consultant505: **naghehdah** ("nodding (lit. moving one's head)") That's "nodding the head". Unless you say - but how could we say this. [[laughter]] It's a "no, no, no, no", [[laughter]] that way. You shake your head lots.

(misc_verbs001)

Similarly, in *satsíí naghwút* "I'm dizzy (lit. my head is spinning)", "head" stands for the prototypical and basic meaning, concrete BODY PART. Additionally, it metonymically refers to the whole body and the mental constitution of the person feeling dizzy:

Researcher: Is there a way to say "I'm dizzy"? After I turned around, I'm dizzy?

Consultant101: **satsíí naghwút** [...] **satsíí naghwút** ("I'm dizzy (lit. my head is spinning)") I'm dizzy, my head is spinning.   (qualities001)

Since humans indeed perceive DIZZINESS as a mental state or physiological indisposition primarily in the head, the statement "I am dizzy, my head is spinning" (qualities001) includes both, the description of the constitution as well as the realization of the metonymic usage of "my head is spinning" for "I am dizzy".

5.5.2. -tsíí "HEAD" AS UPPER PART

Here, the image-schema of "head" as 'high, elevated entity' is abstracted away from the body. Conceptualizations of the head of the (human) body as the most upper part of another entity are cross-linguistic phenomena, and are based on embodiment and the significance of our own physiology. In many languages, grammaticalization processes can be observed pertaining to body part terms which result in grammatical items with spatial (Heine, Claudi & Hünnemeyer 1991; Svorou 1993), but also temporal interpretations.

In Beaver, *-tsíí* "head" did not undergo large-scale grammaticalization, i.e. spatial or directional meanings are not expressed with this item. Still, the concept of "head" as UPPER PART is realized and used in the following expressions:

(72) *kwę wuts'ít'oi*   "roof (lit. on (top of) the house's head)"
(73) *mats'ít'oi*   "roof (lit. on (top of) its head)"

A third term is provisionally included here: *atsíí yhís* "Buffalo Head Mountains (lit. its head mountains)". It is not known exactly why the mountains south of the reserves are called *atsíí yhís* (lit. "its head mountains") in Beaver. Further research is needed to comprehend whether the specific form of this landscape is linguistically reflected or whether socio-cultural factors influenced the denotation. Accordingly, the classification of *-tsíí* "head" in this part of the semantic and conceptual network is not certain.

The two terms for "roof" differ in the explicit inclusion of *kwę* "house" and in the (absence of the) possessive prefix, *wu-*. *-tsíí* "head" is not realized as grammaticalized item with an abstract spatial meaning in these forms: the postposition *-t'oi* "on / on top" specifies the location of the house's upper part, i.e. "its head".

5.5.3. -tsíí "HEAD" AS FRONT PART

In the following expression *aláá' tsíí'* "bow, prow (lit. boat's head)", a conceptual aspect other than UPPER PART is focused on. Here, *-tsíí* "head" is applied to refer to the front part of a horizontally aligned entity. The conceptual facet of UPPER PART does not come up here due to this orientation of a boat. Instead, the specific significance of a boat's bow as direction setting and heading is matched by the literal meaning of the expression. The usage of "head" in the

sense of FRONT PART is linked to corresponding experiences and to equivalent realizations of the "head" of vertically aligned animals and humans as front.

5.5.4. -tsíí "HEAD" AS SEAT OF EMOTION

The conceptualization of *-tsíí* "head" as SEAT OF EMOTION is applied for mental states and personality traits. The expressions identified and described here exploit the three most often used linguistic patterns for emotions and personality traits: [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION], [BODY PART IS HARD/STRONG] and [BODY PART IS HEAVY] (see also ch. 6.4.). The SEAT OF EMOTION *-tsíí* "head" does not constitute the actual or true instrument of the activity meant. Rather, a metonymic chain juxtaposes the relevant concrete and abstract parts: HEAD – BRAIN – MIND – VOLITION – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING – WORRY.

5.5.4.1. BE CRAZY

Accordingly, the linguistic form for insanity, *satsíídué'* "I am crazy, stupid (lit. my head is not there)" links "head" to ERRONEOUS or MISSING THINKING, which again is closely related to "mind":

Researcher: Could I also say **matsíí dyué'**?

Consultant404: Yeah, "he's got no head". [[laughter]]

Researcher: Does that have a meaning?

Consultant404: Yeah, **dane matsíí dyué'**, that means a guy has got no, no mind. **dane matsíí dyué'** [...] He has got no mind.   (metaphor120)

The last parts of the following statement reveal that this expression also refers to pathological psychological states, i.e. to insanity, mental disease – and not only to temporary foolish behavior:

Consultant101: […] mįįdyíí nadyué' ("s/he is stupid (lit. no mind)") See? That's another way to say "he's got no mind", "he can't think right". [… [private content]] She went- she lost her mind. And she went in […] hospital. And everybody used to say matsíí nadyué' ááty'á' ("s/he is crazy (lit. his/her head is not there it happened)"), you know, just like she lost- she didn't "lose her head", but she lost her mind. matsíí nadyué' ááty'á' ("s/he is crazy (lit. his/her head is not there it happened)"). That's what they mean. Which means she didn't "lose her head", you know, but she- they mean she lost her mind. That impression people get was that she lost her mind, but in our ways to saying it is "she lost her head". She didn't lose her head, her head is still there.   (metaphor100)

The numerous mentions of -įįdyíí "mind" reflect the contiguity of the concepts juxtaposed in the metonymic chain described above. Although -tsíí "head" is conceptualized as SEAT OF EMOTION in the expressions discussed here, the prototypical meaning BODY PART is still available and included in the explanations of the speakers. The figurativity aspects evoked by the linguistic form – i.e. the literal meaning of a 'missing head' – are justified via the conceptual chain. MIND is realized in its usage here as LACK OF INTELLIGENCE and interpreted as the intended referent. The relation between "head" and "mind" is processed via the metonymy CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED.

5.5.4.2. BE STUBBORN

For 'stubbornness', -tsíí "head" is combined with the stative verb -tsat "be hard/strong": satsíí náátsat "I am stubborn (lit. my head is hard/strong)":

Researcher: Could I say sa<u>ts</u>íí' náátsat?

Consultant404: Oh yeah, you could put it- "my head is strong".

Researcher: What does that mean?

Consultant404: "My head is strong." sa<u>ts</u>íí' náátsat. ("I am stubborn (lit. my head is hard/strong)")

Researcher: Does that mean "I'm stubborn"?

Consultant404: Yeah.

Researcher: Or what does it mean when you say that? What does a person do about who you say that, sa<u>ts</u>íí' náátsat?

Consultant404: That guy is- head is strong.   (metaphor120)

The metonymic chain assembling HEAD with abstract concepts like MIND and VOLITION leads to an interpretation of the attribute "be hard/strong" as concentrating on HARDNESS and IMPENETRABILITY. A stubborn person – referred to via SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON in this expression – is not influenced from the outside due to a LACK OF PENETRABILITY. The mental strength or VOLITION is transferred to the SEAT OF EMOTION *-tsíí* "head" whose conceptualization simultaneously evokes the abstract parts of the chain, i.e. mental states.

Researcher: How would I say "he is stubborn"?

Consultant101: ma<u>ts</u>íí' ná<u>á</u>tsat ("he is stubborn (lit. his/her head is hard/strong))". See? "He's stubborn": ma<u>ts</u>íí' ná<u>á</u>tsat. And if you get mad or something and you don't want to do it: sa<u>ts</u>íí' ná<u>á</u>tsadu ("I am stubborn (lit. my head is hard/strong) and"), I hear, you know. They say that to them.

                                              (metaphors001)

5.5.4.3. WORRY

The parallel processing of "mind" can also be observed in the idiomatic expression for "worry": *satsíí' nakǫįl* "I worry (lit. my head is heavy)". Here, speakers mention "mind" in their explanations and establish the relationship holding between these SEATS OF EMOTIONS:

Researcher: Could I say in Beaver "my head is heavy"?

Consultant404 satsíí' nakǫíl ("I am worried (my head is heavy)")

Researcher: Does that have a meaning?

Consultant404: "My head is heavy" [[laughter]]

Researcher: Would that mean something like I'm worried or- I don't know.

Consultant404: Yeah, when you're worried or something like that, everything come on your mind, that means "your head is heavy". satsíí' nakǫíl.

Researcher: "My head is heavy", well, but it means "I'm worried" or something.

Consultant404: Yeah, that means "you're worried". When you worry too much, your head is heavy.   (metaphor120)

Linguistically, the conceptual metonymy CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED (HEAD FOR WORRY) is manifested in the gradual shift from concrete to abstract in the metonymic chain. Additionally, this is traceable in the concepts of HEAD: in combination with "be heavy", *-tsíí* "head" does not only evoke the conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION, but also the prototypical sense BODY PART. The verb used in this idiomatic expression reflects the physiological experience of DEPRESSION and BURDEN which are linguistically ascribed to the SEAT OF EMOTION via the metonymy SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON.

5.5.5. SUMMARY OF NETWORK -tʂíí "HEAD"

The network presented in figure 5.5. represents the complex polysemous structure of *-tʂíí* "head" with several conceptual aspects extracted and highlighted in the diverse usages.

Figure 5.5.: Network of *-tsíí* "head"

The prototypical conceptual feature BODY PART is employed as a starting point in terms for other parts of the body (brain, hair, skull / upper backbone, nape). Furthermore, it is also used for sensations and movement including the feeling of DIZZINESS and NODDING. Moreover, the expressions for "comb" and "parka" as artifacts related to "head" (via hair and hood respectively) focus on the BODY PART sense of -*tsíí* "head".

As another departure point, the image-schema of "head" as UPPER PART is highlighted in the two lexical forms for "roof". This concept is further abstracted in the realization of HEAD as FRONT PART, focusing on the feature FOREFRONT. This concept is employed for *aláá' tsíí'* "bow, prow (lit. head's boat)" and is elaborated from UPPER PART or rather human's HEAD.

As SEAT OF EMOTION, -*tsíí* "head" occurs in three expressions for personality traits, including the mental state of WORRY. The metonymy CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED is applied for "be crazy, stupid" (*satsíídué'* lit. "my head is not there"), while all forms reflect juxtapositions of the concepts of HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING (– WORRY) in a metonymic chain. Simultaneous processing of the conceptual aspects BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION is indicated in the metalinguistic statements ("[…] her head is still there." (metaphor100)).

5.6. -dzii "INNER EAR(S)" AND -dzagé "EAR(S)"

The Beaver language distinguishes between -*dzagé* "ear(s)" and -*dzii* "inner ear(s)". The form -*dzii* "inner ear(s)" is included in an expression to refer to 'deafness', while -*dzagé* "ear(s)" occurs in idiomatic forms for 'stubbornness' and for "mushrooms" and "dried apple/apricot slices" (both literally "muskeg's ears").

The term for "mushrooms" and "dried apple/apricot slices" *ts'íbee dzagé'* (lit. muskeg's ear(s)) extracts the conceptual aspect SHAPE of -*dzagé* "ear(s)".

This is done due to a perceived similarity in appearance and shape between the referents "ear(s)", "dried apple/apricot slices" and "mushrooms". This image-schematic structure is established and conventionalized via objective similarity, but socio-culturally based aspects also play a role in the perceived connections. The idiosyncratic combination of "muskeg" and "ears" extends the conceptual network of *-dzagé* "ear(s)" to additional usages and domains (food, plant and mushrooms).

Two expressions employing *-dzagé* "ear(s)" and *-dzii* "inner ear(s)" conceptualize the body part terms as SEAT OF EMOTION. Both are included in expressions of the form [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION]:

(74) *sadzagé' nadyué'*   "be stubborn (lit. my ear(s) are not there)"
(75) *sadzii' wǫdyué'*   "be deaf (lit. my inner ear(s) are not there)"

The expression referring to STUBBORNNESS applies the INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION metonymy, although not in the same way as, for example, English. Listening to and obeying instructions is not the main point meant and less relevant than in e.g. western traditions of learning and teaching (Mills 1986, Goulet 1998). Instead, knowledge is handed down in Beaver via first hand reports, often in narrative form, without demanding compliance and obedience or allegiance. This means, these narratives are not meant to be instructional and consequently to be obeyed. Individuals shall make their own experiences which are realized as best practice. Trial-and-error constitutes one significant way of learning, while learning from the existing experience and body of knowledge available in the community is possible, but not mandatory. Hence, the expression *sadzagé' nadyué'* "be stubborn (lit. my ear(s) are not there)" indicates that someone has not listened to the stories or advice of elders, and

probably makes unnecessary mistakes. But the form does not focus on obedience as understood in other cultures.

> Consultant101: **nadzagé' nadyué'** ("you do not listen; you are stubborn (lit. you have no ears)"). Means "you got no ears", 'cause you're stubborn, don't want to listen. [...] means you're not listening, just like you got n- you lost your ears, you can't listen. [...]   (metaphors001)

In ch. 5.5.4., another form for stubbornness is discussed: *satsíí náátsat* "be stubborn (lit. my head is hard/strong)". The stative verb *-tsat* "be strong" often utilized in emotion expressions points to the concept of PENETRABILITY, i.e. the stubborn person does not receive what might be useful, important and available.

The other form containing *-dzii* "inner ear(s)" – applying the same pattern [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] – is conventionalized to express DEAFNESS. This disability concept also uses the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION, but here the metonymic chain is shorter, since further steps from 'hear' to 'listen' (and 'assume/adopt') are not included.

5.6.1. SUMMARY OF NETWORKS -dzagé "EAR(S)" AND -dzii "INNER EAR(S)"

The conceptual aspect SHAPE of the body part(s) *-dzagé* "ear(s)" is focused on in the expression for "mushrooms" and "dried apple/apricot slices", while the prototypical domain BODY PART is not directly evoked or included.

Although both body part terms *-dzagé* "ear(s)" and *-dzii* "inner ear(s)" are included in the same pattern, [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION], the meanings of the idiomatic expressions differ in their realization and conceptualization of the referents: for "be deaf (lit. my inner ears are not there)", the concrete body

part(s) "ear(s)" are focused on, while for "be stubborn (lit. my ears are not there)", a transferred concept is included besides the concrete body part(s). The metonymic chain EAR(S) – HEAR – LISTEN concentrates more on the abstract conceptions of the activities or abilities of these body parts, i.e. 'hear', 'listen', 'comprehend'.

Figure 5.6.: Networks of -*dzagé* "ear(s)" and -*dzii* "inner ear(s)"

5.7. -dzéé "HEART"

Another lexical item at the center of a polysemous semantic network in Beaver, given its application in several different usages and senses in the language, is -*dzéé* "heart". Heart, as a body part, occurs in cognitive and linguistic structures all over the world. The location of this organ in the center of the chest (and the whole body), the heart beat and its relation to pulse, makes it

essential and above all, eminently perceivable. This characteristic does not apply to other organs in similar form, despite their comparable significance and functions.

Cultural models indeed reflect not only a folk conceptualization of body functions, but also scientific / medical assumptions and knowledge concerning this organ due to its accessibility. This accessibility is linked to the fact that the heart is perceivable in a far more intense fashion than other body organs. Humans consciously realize the differences in heartbeat and blood pressure in physical activities, and also in situations of emotional exposure or stress. When a person is nervous, excited, or afraid, the heartbeat increases, and when a person sleeps, it decreases, etc. Similarly, when someone runs fast and for a long time period, her or his heart beats faster and more intensively and therefore can be felt in a more intensive way.

The heart is also intrinsically related to life and death. A typical practice to detect or determine the death of a person is to check his or her heart beat, or pulse. Diversely, kidney or liver failure may also lead to loss of life, but access to these body organs is very restricted. Nevertheless, these other organs are also found across languages for such descriptions. For example, in Chinese, many different organs are included in linguistic expressions denoting emotions or personality traits. Here, a strong relationship to traditional Chinese medicine can be observed (Yu 2009), which constitutes the basis for this elaborate system of relationships between emotions and body parts.

5.7.1. -dzéé "HEART" AS BODY PART

In Beaver, the lexical item *-dzéé* "heart" is associated with several conceptual aspects and frames. The most basic feature BODY PART is essential for several uses of the Beaver term *-dzéé* "heart", and is highlighted in expressions dealing with life, survival and death. Additionally, a metonymic

expression denoting EXCITEMENT or FEAR displays a similar conceptual construction.

In the corpus, the following fixed expressions highlighting the conceptual aspect BODY PART have been identified:

(76) *madzéé' dadyi*   "heart attack"
                                   (lit. his/her heart hurts)
(77) *madzéé' łííníítł'a*   "s/he died"
                                   (lit. his/her heart stopped running)
(78) *madzéé' da'atł'izǫ*   "s/he is excited / scared"
                                   (lit. his/her heart is dancing)
(79) *madzéé' gaak'a da'atł'izǫ*   "s/he survived, is still alive"
                                   (lit. his/her heart is still dancing)

These descriptive constructions apply the conceptual feature BODY PART of "heart" as essential for life in general and as physiologically perceivable in stressful situations, especially in the case of the term for myocardial infarction. In this form (*madzéé' dadyi* "heart attack (lit. his/her heart hurts")), the cardinal symptom is employed to refer to the event in consequence of a heart disease. Similarly, in the case of EXCITEMENT / FEAR, a consequence or result – an increase of heart activity – is linguistically used to express the corresponding mental states in a metonymic fashion (EFFECT FOR CAUSE).

Semantically, these expressions use "heart" in a descriptive manner, while the verbs utilized show figurative aspects in relation to the particular functions of a body organ. In the construction denoting DEATH of a person, the usage of the verb *-t'la* "run" is conventionalized, while the SURVIVAL and EXCITEMENT expressions include the verb *dáh-dlihts* "dance".

Madzéé' łííníítl'a meaning "to die (lit. his/her heart stopped running)" is a metonymy-based construction (EFFECT FOR CAUSE). The underlying conceptualization does not only conform to this Beaver interpretation, but also allows for implementation and usage in other contexts – as is the case in English. In the following discussion, the researcher intended to talk about the English expression "my heart (almost) stopped" referring to a frightful situation. The Beaver speaker, on the other hand, immediately included this expression in the conventionalized Beaver context of death:

Researcher: So there wouldn't be a word for the pulse? When you feel that? Uhm, would you sometimes say "my heart stopped"?

Consultant101: What you mean?

Researcher: I don't know, when you hear some-

Consultant101: If a person dies you just tell them **madzéé' łííníítl'a**. See? […] When a person- after you're sitting there by the bedside, and he start- he stop- breathing? That's what- It's "his heart stop running". That's what it means. "Running", **łííníítl'a**. Yeah. […] See? "His heart quit running". Running and beating, and - they are all the same word.

<div align="right">(metaphors001)</div>

The 'obvious link' between a heart – as included in the literal meaning – and DEATH – the intended meaning – is referred to in the explanation. This mirrors the fact that cultural models and conventionalized expressions seem self-explanatory for native speakers (Holland & Quinn 1987). The similar notion of "breath" as an indicator of life is also mentioned in the statement above.

In the linguistic expression for SURVIVE, the metaphorical usage of *dáh-dlihts* "dance" is conceptually combined with the positive experience expressed

<div align="right">194</div>

by this form. In discussions of this term, a speaker gives the following statement:

> Consultant101: And if somebody falls, and you touch his heart, mad<u>z</u>éé' gaak'a
> da'atl'iz<u>o</u>, they say. "The heart is still dancing", or "jumping". […] They say
> to you, if you fall down and they feel you all over and your heart? That's
> what they- you hear from them. 'Cause I heard that lots of times. […]
> "Dancing" is a word for it, for our language.   (metaphors001)

There is an unequivocal reference to the physiological experiences and situations in which the heart reveals a person's condition ("[…] and you touch his heart […] they feel you all over and your heart?" (metaphors001)).

Ideological aspects are also included in the statements: "for our language" is used as justification in combination with the 'conceptual baggage' of "dance" – in particular its positive connotation – highlighted by the speaker. Consequences of cultural models like implicitness or ostensible mirroring of reality complicate or handicap awareness of figurative constructions as well as of (originally/actually) underlying conceptualizations. At the same time they constitute an alibi for idiosyncracies, and shield or sustain language-specific concepts against influence from outside. Finally, socio-culturally based concepts of elders and knowledge dissemination provide evidential structure for the correctness and conventionality of such expressions. Beaver speakers often refer to former times and ancestors to substantiate their statements ("[...] you hear from them. 'Cause I heard that lots of times."(metaphors001)).

5.7.1.1. EXCITEMENT / FEAR

The other expression in Beaver, combining the notion of "dance" with heart is *mad<u>z</u>éé' dah'atl'is* "be excited / scared (lit. his/her heart is dancing)".

Here, no relation to a positive connotation, or to some notion of a folk model is explicitly mentioned in metalinguistic explanations. The meaning or usage of this expression is context-bound and is not exclusively linked to a positive or negative emotion. Instead, the physical effect of an increased heartbeat – as mentioned above – is applied in a metonymic fashion (EFFECT FOR CAUSE) for at least two emotional or psychological conditions, EXCITEMENT and FEAR:

> Researcher: […] So, there is nothing else you can say about your heart? Like maybe "it jumps" or "it skips", when something happens?
>
> Consultant101: No. No. [[pause]] For somebody that's heart beats fast. mad<u>z</u>éé' da'atl'iz<u>o</u> See? "Your heart is dancing." That's what it means. When you beating instead- jumping instead of saying jumping, you just say dance. […]
>
> Researcher: "'His heart is dancing.' Does that mean he is excited? Or does that mean he is scared?"
>
> Consultant101: "Either way, 'scared' or ... I go like that, when I get really excited? I could feel my heart beating fast.   (metaphors001)

The idiom meaning "be scared, be excited" linguistically parallels the expression for "be still alive, survive", the same verb is combined with the notion of heart: *mad<u>z</u>éé' gáák'a dah'atl'is* (lit. his/her heart is still dancing). Besides the fact that *dáh-dlihts* "dance" evokes figurativity in both constructions, these metonymy-based constructions *mad<u>z</u>éé' gáák'a dah'atl'is* "be still alive, survive" and *mad<u>z</u>éé' dah'atl'is* "be excited / scared" need not be defined as metaphorical conceptualizations. More precisely, the forms allow for classification as linguistically manifesting the conjunctive metonymy PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECT FOR CAUSE (Dirven 1985).

In opposition to expressions for emotion or personality traits conceptualizing the "heart" as SEAT OF EMOTION, "heart" is realized as concrete

body part here ("I could feel my heart beating fast.", "… you touch his heart …" (metaphors001)). More precisely – but not contradictory to the BODY PART concept –, heart takes on the role of an independent, self-governed entity: BODY PART IS AUTONOMOUS ENTITY. This is a consequence from physiological experiences of EXCITEMENT or FEAR, where the person has no control over the bodily reactions linguistically expressed in the form under discussion here.

The explanation of the expression explicitly contains the perception of this physiological effect ("for somebody that's heart beats fast […]" (metaphors001)). As will be seen below, this is not the case for usages of "heart" as SEAT OF EMOTION (ch. 5.7.3.). Furthermore, the statement explains the employed metonymy BODY PART FOR PERSON in explicitly referring to the person meant (also "… I go like that, when I get really excited …" (metaphors001)).

When conjuring up the English and German expressions used in situations of affright – "my heart stopped"; *Mir ist das Herz stehengeblieben* "my heart stopped" –, we can see that the Beaver expression alludes to a more lasting aspect than the English and German forms. "Someone's heart stopped" out of fright only describes a temporally very short moment which is followed by an increased heartbeat. It is exactly this state – having a fast-beating heart – that is linguistically manifested in the Beaver expression for EXCITEMENT or FEAR[51]. Similarly, DEATH and a missing heartbeat go perfectly together indeed, since both concepts define each other.[52]

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[51] The English expression "heart-stopping" meaning "breath-taking, staggering" refers to a similar mental state, which is not exclusively linked to affright. However, this conceptualization is also more metaphorical than the Beaver metonymic and descriptive forms.

[52] The metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT is difficult to include here. Although an effect of death can be the ceased heart beat, it can also be the other way around, i.e. the missing heart beat leading to death.

The usage of different verbs like English "beat", German *schlagen* "bat", *rasen* "speed", and Beaver **dáh-dlihts** "dance", and -**tl'a** "run" constitutes the fact that the activity of the muscle "heart" is linguistically expressed via more concrete source concepts. Biologically, a heart muscle tenses and relaxes, while in most languages transferred meanings are conventionalized, all including conceptual aspects suiting the concept of 'heartbeat' aimed at.

When asked for "pulse", Beaver speakers state that there is no word in their language. This 'lack' can be linked to a differing medical theory, which does not specify this aspect independently of disease contexts. That is, concepts including the (missing) heartbeat, like DEATH or SURVIVE indeed linguistically refer to the heartbeat. However, the used constructions differ, so that no single and uniform or standardized term for "pulse" has been established.

This does not mean that Beaver entirely lacks the concept of pulse or is unable to communicate it. Rather, different conceptual and linguistic strategies are linked to specific contexts in which the heartbeat is salient in socio-cultural as well as linguistic patterns. The ideological concepts of English and Beaver as languages lead to denial or negation of the speakers, stating that there is no word for 'pulse' in Beaver. Beaver speakers are tempted to deny the existence of Beaver "words", although they express very similar meanings compared to English items. This is due to the high status of English in combination with the apparently perfect organization and completeness of its lexicon. Furthermore, the less fixed and more complex Beaver linguistic patterns strengthen this ideological position.

The Beaver expressions given above are defined as linguistically metaphorical as a whole due to the literal meanings of the verbs in combination with "heart" as subject. Concerning the concept of heart, no figurative or metaphorical transmission takes place. It is the concrete BODY PART referred to in these terms, i.e. the prototypical and basic conceptual aspect of the linguistic

item -*dzéé* "heart", while the verbs included are used in non-prototypical contexts, and with non-prototypical arguments, evoking figurativity.

5.7.2. -dzéé "HEART" AS SHAPE

In the network of HEART, another area concentrates on the conceptual aspect SHAPE of a heart in Beaver. Three expressions are conventionalized:

(80) *íídzą́ą*   "strawberries"   lit. its little heart(s)

(81) *adzéé'*   "hearts (in a deck of cards)"   lit. its heart(s)

(82) *dzéék'azi* "spade (in a deck of cards)"   lit. black heart(s)

5.7.2.1. STRAWBERRIES

The linguistic form *íídzą́ą* "strawberries (lit. its little heart(s))" is composed of the indefinite possessive prefix *íí-* ('indef.sg.poss.'), -*dzéé* "heart", and a diminutive marker, realized as *áa-* along with nasalization of the ultimate vowel and falling tone.

In metalinguistic statements about the usage of "heart" in this denotation, Beaver speakers refer to the similar form of this fruit, as well as to its smaller size, hence use of the diminutive form.

Another linguistic item is found in this part of the conceptual network HEART:

(85) *íídzáa* [nickname] (lit. little strawberry (potentially: little little heart))

In linguistic terms, an analysis reveals this construction as double-marked with two diminutive markers. It therefore offers the literal meaning "little little heart". However, the conceptualization is not directly linked to the body part "heart" – as could be assumed in analogy to, for example, English "sweetheart"

– but to the concept of "strawberry" as a sweet and red fruit[53]. Speakers explain this expression in relation to characteristics of the strawberry and do not directly mention relations to "heart", e.g. as a term of endearment such as in English. Anyhow, the relation to the basic meaning BODY PART is to some degree available in an appropriate context: when the literal meaning of "strawberries" is discussed, the conceptual aspect BODY PART is mentioned. This justifies the inclusion of *íídzáá* "[nickname] (lit. little strawberry)" into the HEART network, despite the greater conceptual distance to the other meanings and usages.

5.7.2.2. SPADE

In the other two terms in this subpart of the lexicon, modern life terminology found its way into the Beaver language via expanding the network of the polysemous term HEART, more precisely via a correspondence of SHAPE. Both terms refer to suits in a deck of cards, repeated here:

(83) *adzéé'*   "hearts (in a deck of cards)"   lit. its heart(s)

(84) *dzéék'azi*   "spade (in a deck of cards)"   lit. black heart(s)

The English term 'spade' etymologically originates from Italian *spade* "sword, spade", and therefore – at least linguistically – does not belong to the English HEART network, but to the SWORD/SPADE structure. In German, *Pik* "spade" is associated with "pike" or "lance", whereas a description of the referent in a deck of cards often applies the image of an 'upside-down heart'. Accordingly, the domain PIKE is evoked in German via the linguistic expression, while explanations rely on a similar concept as that found in Beaver (i.e. with reference to an upside-down heart), but which is not linguistically manifested.

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[53] This nickname is particularly – although not exclusively – used for persons with red hair, but also for persons often picking berries.

The "hearts (in a deck of cards)" construction follows the basic meaning of this network, and inherits the inalienability concept, i.e. *adzéé'* with the indefinite possessive prefix literally means "its heart(s)". The inalienability marking is found in most of the usages of body part terms in the Beaver lexicon, although various meanings and usages do not necessarily evoke this concept. Access to the obligatory inalienability as a linguistic rule is restricted, especially in such transferred meanings. That means, the inalienability of body parts or organs is more available and logically more comprehensible than the literal meaning "its (little) heart" for, for example, "strawberries". Several plant part terms are also linguistically realized as inalienable entities, since they constitute an intrinsic part of a plant, and are therefore conceptualized similarly to body parts. For example, *k'at chine'* "willow branch (lit. willow's stick/wood/tree (stick-POSS))", and *dachi ghaayé'* "root (lit. stick's/wood's/tree's root (root-POSS))" refer to the part-whole relation holding between these parts and a whole tree or plant. In the case of terms for fruits and berries, on the other hand, this pattern is not sustained, i.e. these expressions are alienable terms. Although the referents show class membership for at least the two domains PLANT and FOOD, the domain FOOD outweighs the domain PLANT. As a consequence, for example, "berries" are conceptually detached from being a scion: *dáhghuzé'* "gooseberries, black currants (lit. little thorns)", *máásííluu* "(highbush) cranberries, mooseberries". For *íídzáá* "strawberries (lit. its heart(s))", however, the concept of inalienability is linguistically maintained. The literal meaning of this item is most often given immediately, i.e. is directly available. This indicates that the link to the body part – and therefore justification of the notion of inalienability – is to some point accessible. Notwithstanding, in the complex HEART concept, the actually obligatory aspect of inalienability is not kept throughout the network, as the meaning "spade" shows. Strikingly, it constitutes one of the usages found in the corpus without this otherwise obligatory feature: *dzéék'azi* "spade (in a deck of cards)" is

construed and translated as "black heart(s)", without any statement about the missing possessive prefix. Note that for *adzéé'* "hearts (in a deck of cards)", the inalienable form is used (see 5.7.2.3. below).

Several points allow for the hypothesis that the distance in the transfer from the BODY PART frame to the CARD SUIT frame causes the loss of this mandatory marking. The distance between the suit "spade" and the body organ heart is bigger than between "hearts" in a deck of cards and heart as an organ. The combination of "heart" with the color 'black', and the fact that card suits are not a traditional Beaver concept, but were introduced by western traditions, also strengthen this effect. Thus, the figurative aspects increase in *dzéék'azi* "spade (in a deck of cards) (lit. black heart(s))", and loosen or override the inalienability feature elsewhere transferred according to the "Invariance Principle" (Lakoff 2006[1993], see also ch.3.1.3.1.).

5.7.2.3. HEART

The term for "hearts" in a deck of cards – *adzéé'* – is linked via resemblance to the real body part – the card suit is meant to refer to the well-known idealized western image of HEART universally used. However, it is primarily related to the organ heart via the fact that the English language – second and everyday language for all of the speakers – uses "heart" to denote this suit. Still, the possessive prefix is mentioned when asked for the literal meaning, related to the obligatory possessive construction of inalienable nouns.

The referents of the meanings just described belong to modern life vocabulary, and were introduced by non-native people decades ago. Although to some degree influenced by the English (and French) expressions, these currently conventionalized neologisms represent examples of flexibility of the conceptual networks found in the mental lexicon. It reflects their ability to cope with new concepts via extension. The already polysemous concept of *-dzéé* "heart" is

further expanded due to borrowing of the concept, resemblance aspects of the referents and the tendency for economic management of the lexicon.

To sum up the organization of the network HEART so far, two conceptual aspects were identified as departing points for the eight usages of the linguistic form described above: BODY PART for the descriptive expressions "to be still alive, survive", "be excited / scared" "to die", and "heart attack", and SHAPE for "heart", "spade", "strawberries", and finally, "little strawberry [nickname]" as further elaborated from "strawberries". These conceptual aspects are extracted from the prototypical concept of HEART and highlighted in new senses. For those expressions, conceptual resemblance – resting on real aspects of similarity or relationships between the referents – is identified as the main reason for their inclusion in the HEART network. In combination with socio-cultural traditions and patterns, these Beaver meanings and conceptualizations are accessible to the speakers. The last expression *įídzáa* [nickname] (lit. little strawberry) will be defined as indirectly linked to the concept of HEART, since the resemblances between HEART and STRAWBERRY are not the ones in focus here. Rather, the conventionalized association between the fruits and the person denoted by this nickname is decisive.

In the next paragraph, a third conceptual aspect of HEART will be investigated and classified as the departing point: SEAT OF EMOTION is applied for several expressions of emotions and personality traits.

5.7.3. -dzéé "HEART": METAPHORICAL CONCEPTUAL ASPECT

The next part of the HEART network shows a quite restricted and more complicated access concerning the relations between the linguistic terms as well as between the underlying conceptual features giving rise to them. At the same

time, the constructions are still linguistically overt – in the sense that grammaticalization or lexicalization effects do not conceal the lexical inventory.

In the corpus, several figurative constructions employing *-dzéé* "heart" were identified. The express the following emotions and personality traits:

(86) *sadzéé' ghólįį*   "I am brave (lit. my heart exists)"

(87) *sadzéé' náátsat*   "I am flinty, stone-hearted
                             (lit. my heart is hard/strong)"

(88) *adyuu sadzéé' náátsat* "I am soft-hearted
                             (lit. my heart is not hard/strong)"

(89) *sadzéé' xaats'at*   "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)"

(90) *sadzéé' tyíhsane*   "I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)"

(91) *sadzéé' nakǫįl*   "I am sad, worry (lit. my heart is heavy)"

(86) to (88) denote emotions, while (89) to (91) refer to personality traits. The extensive usage of "heart" to express these and related emotions and mental characteristics appears to be striking.

The idioms under investigation here do not rely on real physical activities of a heart as identified in the usages of "heart" in constructions like *madze łííníítl'a* "to die (lit. his/her heart stopped running)". In those expressions, the typical functions of the organ "heart" are used to refer to the intended meanings. In the forms described in this section, socio-culturally established relations between conceptual aspects of the body part terms and the emotions and personality traits are applied in order to communicate the intended abstract concepts. These are not linked to HEART per se as is the case in *madzéé dáh'atl'ïs* "s/he is excited / scared (lit. his/her heart is dancing)", utilizing increased heartbeat for EXCITEMENT. Yet, "my heart is dancing" cannot be defined as a literal expression differing completely from, for example, *sadzéé' xaats'at* "my heart falls out" (literal meaning of "I am angry"). This indicates

that there exist different types of non-literal or figurative language. On the one hand, there are forms supportively exploited for expressing real, physiological experiences conceptualized as effects of an emotion or mental state. On the other hand, we find figurative language which creates important additional substance for communication. This is done by relating specific body part terms as SEATS OF EMOTION to the emotions intended to be expressed. This point will be made clear in chapter 6.

For the idiomatic constructions denoting emotions and personality traits and containing body parts or organs, two statements can be made: first, the body parts are conceptualized as SEAT OF EMOTION, and secondly, they metonymically stand for the whole person: SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON. The conventional realization of body parts as closely linked to emotions, mental states, and personality traits reflects the interplay of embodiment. On the other hand, specific, socio-culturally based relations between individual body parts and emotions or personality traits can be observed.

This complex concept constitutes the starting point for the different linguistic metaphors and metonymies referring to psychological constitutions, mental states and related phenomena. Thus, attributes like "be hard/strong" and "be heavy" are not ascribed to the person, but to a specific body part or organ. The individual combinations of characteristics and body parts are based on a bidirectional mixture of socio-cultural models and physiology or embodied experiences, and compensate the less accessible conceptual structure of emotions.

5.7.3.1. HEART AS SEAT OF EMOTION IN BEAVER

In Beaver, the emotions and personality traits linguistically realized via the inclusion of *-dzéé* "heart" are not restricted to either positive or negative concepts – nor are such constructions in other languages and cultures. Although

at first sight, HEART evokes positive connotations (e.g. in English "have a heart of gold", "to be dear to one's heart", "to lose one's heart to somebody"), this organ is also used to express negative concepts (e.g. in English "to be stone-hearted", "to break one's heart", "be chicken-hearted"). A more useful classification of the usage of "heart" concentrates on the degree of strength or intensity: most of the concepts expressed show a high value and significance, be it positive or negative. Therefore, intensely experienced events, often with socio-cultural valence, like LOVE, GRIEF, PAIN, and GOODNESS (or KIND-HEARTEDNESS) are connected to this organ.

The emotion and personality trait concepts discussed in the next sections (SOFT-/STONE-HEARTEDNESS, BRAVERY / COURAGE; SADNESS, LONELINESS, ANGER) are realized by linguistic constructions including -*dzéé* "heart" with another conceptualization than in the forms above (ch. 5.7.1. – 5.7.2.). As already described (ch. 5.5.1.), the form *sadzéé' dah'atl'is* "lit. my heart is dancing" meaning either EXCITEMENT or FEAR, linguistically depicts the relationship of heart with these emotions. Yet, in these meanings, "heart" is processed and understood as a concrete BODY PART, and is embedded in this descriptive expression with means of the metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE. Both concepts – EXCITEMENT and FEAR – are related to increased heartbeat, since both are connected to agitation, uneasiness or discomposure. EXCITEMENT includes both negative as well as positive feelings, whereas FEAR clearly refers to a negative emotion. EXCITEMENT is a physiological reaction to harmful or generally exciting (i.e. also positive) situations, and is conceptualized via this bodily experience. Thus, it is linguistically more linked to body than to mind. The similarities of all these linguistic constructions are based on their overall figurativity evoked by the inclusion of verbs in non-prototypical usages (*dáh-dlihts* "dance" and *-tl'a* "run", see ch. 6). In the conceptualizations and linguistic constructions discussed in this part, another understanding and processing of -*dzéé* "heart" and its relation to physiological effects prevails.

Before emotion and personality traits are discussed, two expressions of LOVE also employing -*dzéé* "heart" in Beaver are described. These are similar to English expressions: *sadzéé'éh noasdye* "I love you from my heart"; *sadzéék'éh sįda* "s/he sits in my heart". LOVE is strongly associated with "heart", and beloved persons or entities, showing increased salience and importance, are positioned close to this SEAT OF LOVE. Characteristics of "heart" as a concrete body part do not play the most relevant role for this form – the statement given does not explicitly refer to the organ or to physiological experiences:

Consultant101: sadzéé'éh noasdye ("I love you with my heart") means "I love you with my heart". […] sadzéék'éh sįda ("you sit on/in my heart") "He's one of them that's in my heart." […] That means, you know, your heart loves people, he's one of them that's in there, in your heart. sadzéék'éh sįda. […] Or "you're in my heart". […] You know, "you're sitting on my heart", that means that person is one of them in your heart. […] So dear to you or so- you care for that person so much, you just say that to them. You're one of them in my heart. I've said that to a lot of kids.

(metaphor100)

In the construction discussed above, "heart" is not only conceptualized as SEAT OF EMOTION, but also as a seat for the objects the emotion focuses on. The variation in usage of both postpositions -*k'éh* "in/on/at" and -*t'áá* "in", as well as the statement "it's still the same thing. So dear to you [...] (metaphor100)" strengthens the abstract notion of this expression, and – together with the verb stem -*da* "sit" – comes close to the conceptual aspect of "seat surface" in SEAT OF EMOTION.

BRAVERY / COURAGE, STONE-HEARTEDNESS and SOFT-HEARTEDNESS as personality traits display conceptual similarities via the relation to "heart" as SEAT OF EMOTION. Nevertheless, the linguistic and conceptual constructions of the individual traits show diversity.

5.7.3.2. STONE-/SOFT-HEARTEDNESS

The idioms expressing STONE - and SOFT-HEARTEDNESS are constructed as a verb phrase with the stative verb *-tsat* "be hard/strong". The person denoted is not mentioned explicitly, rather, the metonymy SEAT OF EMOTION **FOR** PERSON is applied: *sadzéé' náátsat* "I am flinty, stone-hearted (lit. my heart is hard/strong)". It is not clear how these concepts are used, understood and evaluated in the Beaver community. Furthermore, when asked if STONE-HEARTEDNESS is a characteristic with a negative connotation, the speakers' answers do not focus on the consequences of this trait for others – e.g. that others have to suffer because of unconcerned, cold behavior. Rather, they concentrate on the person being stone- or soft-hearted:

Consultant101: **madzéé' náátsat** ("be flinty, stone-hearted", lit. his/her heart is hard/strong) That's the person, strong hearted person. […] That's the e-expression you give to when somebody's that doesn't cry at- when they lose a family member or something. That what people use, that word. **madzéé' náátsat** ("be flinty, stone-hearted", lit. his/her heart is hard/strong) Because they don't cry.

Researcher: So, is that a good thing to have a strong heart or is it-

Consultant101: I don't know. It hits them later, I guess. I'm very soft hearted, me- I can't stand things like that.   (metaphors001)

The situational context mentioned by the speaker ("lose a family member") evokes a situation where the person has to cope with a devastating event. The consequences of this personality trait have to be borne by this person, and not by others being hit by this flintiness.

The Beaver concept of persons as being self-governed and not influenced by others or controlling the behavior of others, plays an important role in this more objective view (Mills 1986). It is not part of the Beaver socio-cultural model to judge someone's behavior in difficult situations such as situations of grief and loss. Instead, everyone is free in and responsible for her/his own actions and attitude. The statement "it hits them later" (metaphors001) refers to the idea that mental states or the mental constitution of a person is something different than overt behavior, and inner reactions to events. For the analysis of HEART idioms in relation to emotions and personality traits, the concept of STONE-HEARTEDNESS will not be clearly defined as a negative or positive trait, since unequivocal evidence is lacking. As a whole, the literal meaning "someone's heart is hard/strong" refers to a trait of a person who is flinty, or unfeeling in the sense of being stone- or cold-hearted ("That's the person, strong hearted person." (metaphors001)). Therefore, it does not primarily describe social behavior in relation to others, but is related to a personality trait, a way to react to the world.

The negated form of this expression refers to the opposite personality trait: *adyuu sadzéé' náátsat* "I am soft-hearted (lit. my heart is not hard/strong" describes a person who reacts emotionally to events, like crying and screaming in grief in an extroverted way:

Consultant101: [...] sadzéé' náátsat ("I am hard-hearted (lit. my heart is hard/strong)"). "I got a strong heart." sadzéé' adyuu náátsat ("I am soft-hearted (lit. my heart is not hard/strong)"). You know, "you're sad" [...]

sad<u>z</u>éé' adyuu náá<u>ts</u>at - If I see them, you know. Which means you- if you see somebody you just have to cry, "your heart is too soft". […] **adyuu ma<u>dz</u>éé' náá<u>ts</u>at** (lit her/his heart is not hard/strong) See? That's the same way.   (metaphors001)

5.7.3.3. COURAGE

In Beaver, inner strength is linked to bravery and to the heart, again highlighting the overall value of this organ concerning experiences of one's own body (and mental) reactions. The Beaver COURAGE idiom *sad<u>z</u>éé' gh*ǫ́*l*ịị (lit. "my heart exists") shows a different figurative transfer and format than the ones just discussed. The concept of EXISTENCE is employed to refer to this trait, again linguistically focused on the body part term -*d<u>z</u>éé* "heart": the metonymy CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED is applied, so that the existence of -*d<u>z</u>éé* "heart" as the container is expressed instead of the content, i.e. COURAGE.

For TIMIDITY / COWARDICE[55] as the antonymic concept of *sad<u>z</u>éé' gh*ǫ́*l*ịị "I am brave (lit. my heart exists)", the following form is given: *adyu sad<u>z</u>éé' gh*ǫ́*l*ịị "be timid, coward (lit. my heart does not exist)". Here, the relevance of conventionalized linguistic patterns becomes obvious: the form **sad<u>z</u>éé' nadyué'* (lit. my heart is not there) is explained as not being a real Beaver idiom, although the concept of a missing SEAT OF EMOTION is highlighted in this form, too. However, only *sad<u>z</u>éé' adyuu gh*ǫ́*l*ịị "be timid (lit. my heart does not exist)" is referred to by the speakers as a correct form with a 'real Beaver meaning'. Such negated instances of affirmative forms – instead of antonymic lexical items – often carry out functions in Beaver executed by antonyms in other languages, as for example in English (e.g. "brave" – "timid", "flinty" – "tender-hearted").

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[55] Note the English body part expression „gutlessness" as alternative for "cowardice".

In addition, speakers refer to this form in relation to HEARTLESSNESS, which is conceptualized similarly in English:

Researcher: Could I also say "he has no heart"? Does that have a meaning, when you say about someone "he has no heart"? Or you wouldn't say that?

Consultant404: As we say **adyuu madzéé' ólįį** ("s/he is heartless (lit. his/her heart does not exist)"). "He's got no heart."

Researcher: When would you say that?

Consultant404: Well, some people they say he- when you- somebody says something, and then- he doesn't got no- heart for you?

Researcher: That's like he doesn't take pity on other people?

Consultant404: Yeah, that means all that.   (metaphor120)

This variation in meaning and usage reflects missing contextual clues and embededdness in a situation of neither COWARDICE nor HEARTLESSNESS. Accordingly, the choice of one meaning is due to chance in an elicitation session. Yet, these data do not imply incorrect application or lack of knowledge due to the endangered status of the language. Rather, this reflects the varying scope of a source domain (see ch. 3.2.2.1.). The underlying concept of a missing BODY PART or SEAT OF EMOTION is applied to several target domains on the basis of figurative metonymy (INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION), for example in *sadee nadyué'* "be blind (lit. my eyes do not exist)" (see also ch. 6.5.1.).

A similar conceptual variation occurs cross-linguistically, e.g. in German: *ich drehe durch* (lit. "I rotate/skid") means "I'm getting angry" and "I'm getting crazy/excited". Here, variation is not due to lack of knowledge or language death either. It is the basic concept of a feeling of LOSS OF (SELF-)CONTROL and

negative EXCITEMENT which are included in both concepts ANGER and INSANITY.

5.7.3.4. SADNESS / WORRY

The three emotions included in the BODY PART branch of the network of HEART are ANGER, LONELINESS, and SADNESS. The last two are construed in combination with stative verbs, *tyih-san* "be pitiful" and *-koįł* "be heavy", respectively. Similarly to *sadzéé' náátsat* "I am flinty, stone-hearted (lit. my heart is hard/strong)", a typically physical property is applied for *sadzéé' nakoįl* "I am sad, I worry (lit. my heart is heavy)". Here WEIGHT is used to refer to the negative emotions. Physiological effects such as reduced erectness are said to reflect the feeling of depression, and to give rise to such linguistic manifestations expressing HEAVINESS, and meaning SADNESS. The SEAT OF EMOTION is characterized as being heavy via the metonymy CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED, relating the intended emotion to the concrete state of HEAVINESS. "Heart" as SEAT OF EMOTION is not used in consequence of real embodied experience – SADNESS is not objectively linked to heart as is, for example, to EXCITEMENT via increased heartbeat. Rather, a cultural model establishes the relationship between the concept of "heart" as SEAT OF SADNESS and this emotion:

Researcher: Or could you say something about your heart when you're worried? I don't know, "my heart is heavy" or "my heart is sad".

Consultant404: sad<u>z</u>éé' nakoįl ("I am sad (lit. my heart is heavy)")

Researcher: You could say that?

Consultant404: Yeah, you could say sad<u>z</u>éé' nakoįl.

Researcher: What does that mean?

Consultant404: "My heart is heavy."

Researcher: That means "it weighs lots"? Or that means "you're sad"?

Consultant404: Yeah, "your heart is heavy", sad_z_éé'-, how would I put it. sad_z_éé' nakǫįl sįįdyíí' natlǫ'éh ("I am sad, for I worry too much (lit. my heart is heavy, lots in my mind)")

Researcher: Is that something that people say?

Consultant404: Yeah. "My heart is heavy for I worry too much."

(metaphor120)

Linguistically, the heart is "heavy", not the contents of this container or SEAT OF EMOTION. This structure evokes the more concrete aspect BODY PART instead of directly referring to the abstract idea of SADNESS via "sadness is heavy in the (container) heart".

In the statement of the speaker just given, the restricted accessibility of underlying conceptualizations of such idiomatic expressions is unveiled. The somewhat unfavorable question does not ease the revealing of the intended meaning, since both – literal and intended – meanings are proposed as possibilities on a par. Still, the literal meaning is explained as related to the concept of SADNESS. Through the notion of worries, the speaker includes the corresponding figurative expression with the literal meaning "my minds are lots" (see ch. 5.4.5.), combining these two figurative expressions.

5.7.3.5. LONELINESS

The concept of LONELINESS is manifested via another pattern. Here, the linguistic item *-dzéé* "heart" used in the expression is meant to be identified as a person or assigned human emotions: *sad_z_éé' tyíhsane* "I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)". In appropriate contexts, the stative verb is also used to refer to persons being pitiful, or unfortunate: *sį tsísane* "I am pitiful".

Consequently, and in addition to the metonymy SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON, LONELINESS is expressed via personification of the SEAT OF EMOTION "heart". Defining the heart as pathetic is conventionalized as meaning that the person possessing the heart is lonely. Correspondingly, the usage of the stative verb here is not transferred in the same way as, for example, the usages of *dáh-dlihts* "dance" or *-koįł* "be heavy" in the constructions discussed earlier. The verb *tyih-san* "be pitiful" is translated as "weak" by one of the consultants, indicating a socio-culturally based etymology of the verb "be pitiful":

Researcher: Are there other things you can say about your heart? […][56] Like "my heart is broken"?

Consultant303: sad<u>z</u>éé' tyíh<u>s</u>ane ("I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful))") I guess, huh?

Consultant202: Yeah, I guess, ya.

Consultant303: wutséésdane'eh ("because I am lonely"). "Because I'm lonesome." sad<u>z</u>éé' tyíh<u>s</u>ane "I am lonesome (lit. my heart is pitiful)")

Researcher: That's "my heart is broken"?

Consultant202: "Is weak".

Researcher: Oh, "my heart is weak"? And that means I'm-

Consultant202: When you are lonesome, you got a weak heart. That's what it is. sad<u>z</u>éé' tyíh<u>s</u>ane ("I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)").　　　(heart001)

This notion of WEAKNESS – as a physical characteristic 'not strong, fragile' – as explained by the speaker is non-recurring.

The Beaver form "my heart is pitiful" is given in correspondence to the English concept of a "broken heart", while the linguistic manifestation is not paralleled. In both languages, cultural models connect the body part term "heart" with SADNESS or emotional pain, while different conceptual aspects are highlighted via dissimilar linguistic inventories. In the English form, the notion of "forceful damage from outside" is focused. This is an aspect not suiting the Beaver concept of autonomous individuals who do not govern or manipulate others, so that the aspect of violence is not conceptually extracted and explicitly mentioned.

In fact, *tyih-san* "be pitiful" is indeed used and meant in its prototypical sense. What evokes figurativity is the semantic combination of argument and predicate, and the relation to the intended meaning 'SEAT OF EMOTION being pitiful' used to express the SADNESS of the person the heart belongs to.

5.7.3.6. ANGER

ANGER is realized via a linguistic metaphor expressing the idea that the heart as SEAT OF EMOTION falls out of the angry person's body: *sadzéé' xaats'at* "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)". This idiom is most often mentioned first by the Beaver speakers when asked for "anger", and it is also found in narratives where ANGER is described. Nevertheless, in the corpus, a verb stem for this emotion is found: *da-łį* "be angry, be mad". This form is not further analyzable, the verb root does not consist of multiple morphemes, nor is it used figuratively. Although this form occurs quite seldom in the corpus, it cannot be stated that the figurative expression applying the body part term "heart" constitutes the only form. Rather, it constitutes another linguistic possibility to express ANGER, differing from the above mentioned form by the figurative use of its semantic input. Additionally, its frequency is far higher than that of the verb just mentioned.

Speakers react to this form by almost immediately translating the literal meaning, and they comment on it with statements like those given below. In relation to the literal meaning, the figurativity aspects are consciously available for the speakers, while the relation between literal and intended meaning is not directly accessible. As a result, speakers do not give a coherent explanation of this relationship, but often react with laughter and ideological justifications:

Consultant101: sad<u>z</u>éé' xááts'at - means "my heart fell off", "my fa- heart fell out". sad<u>z</u>éé' xááts'at. [[laughter]] That's mean- this is what I mean when I say that n- when I - you know, but this sad<u>z</u>éé' xááts'at, how could you- that'll happen- your heart can't fell off. […] [[laughter]] That means "I'm mad". (metaphors001)

Consultant505: mad<u>z</u>éé' xááts'adu abééts ("s/he is angry (lit. her/his heart falls out) and s/he boils") "She is mad and she's boiling." [[laughter]] […] Just like you- they say in Indian way "your heart is coming out". sad<u>z</u>éé' xááts'at ("s/he is angry (lit. her/his heart falls out). (paradigm_boil001)

Researcher: How would you say "I'm mad"? "I'm angry"?

Consultant202: nad<u>z</u>éé' xááts'at ("you are mad (lit. your heart falls out)") That's "your heart, it come out".

Consultant303: "You're mad." [[laughter]].

Consultant202: Yeah, your heart is not there anymore, it fell off. [[laughter]]

(paradigm_be_lonesome001)

Consultant202: "He got mad." mad<u>z</u>éé' xááts'at, "his heart come out", "he's mad", huh? It come out, that's what the Beaver says, when you get mad,

your heart come out, you got no more heart, huh? Yeah, that's what it

meant.   (littledipper002-transcript)

Consultant606: "He's really mad." Yeah.

Researcher: So, something about his heart?

Consultant606: Yeah, mad<u>z</u>éé' ("his/her heart"). […] A heart- means mad<u>z</u>éé'

xáá<u>ts</u>'at ("s/he is angry (lit. his/her heart falls out)"). Out of his body. His

heart fell out of his body.   (metaphor130)

Consultant101: It's like that- we always laugh about that, and then we say

sad<u>z</u>éé' xáá<u>ts</u>'at. Your heart is- it's gone, but it's still in there [[laughter]].

Without a heart you can't live.   (metaphor100)

In the last statement, the speaker's reference to the prototypical meaning
of "heart" – BODY PART – becomes evident, as well as context-dependence of
the sense SEAT OF EMOTION of this linguistic form. In narratives, where ANGER
is part of the content, but also in elicitation sessions where ANGER is mentioned,
the form is not justified with expressions like "without a heart you can't live"
(metaphor100). Yet, when the literal meaning forms the topic of discussion,
speakers switch to the basic meaning of -dzéé "heart", because the conceptual
aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is not accessible in detail and therefore not
explainable.

In discussions about the descriptive terms meaning "to die", and "to
survive, to be still alive", speakers indeed refer to typical functions and activities
of the heart organ, i.e. beating to keep a person alive. Concerning the figurative
expressions discussed here, such behavior of this organ is not observed. This
implies that the relationship between "heart" as SEAT OF EMOTION and ANGER
is based on a cultural model.

The linguistically expressed ejection or dropping of the heart together with the consequence – the SEAT OF EMOTION of the angry person is gone – manifests the Beaver concept of ANGER by highlighting a specific aspect. It is not apparent what underlying structures give rise to this form, potential aspirants are physiological effects, but also psychological states of ANGER. The speakers' comments do not unequivocally allocate or explain the relations between this linguistic form and one of the concepts. The form can be understood as describing an overflow caused by PRESSURE inside the angry person, but further evidence for PRESSURE is missing. The notion of a sensed LOSS OF CONTROL or SELF-DETERMINATION is presumed here because of the overwhelming impact of ANGER as one of the psychological aspects of ANGER. The socio-culturally based concept of individual persons being self-determined, independent and free in their decision making also influences the conceptualization of this emotion. When one gets angry, one's body reacts to this state as well as one's mind, and one loses part of one's self-control, an aspect in life very important for the Beaver people (Mills 1986). In the Beaver culture, a person does not intervene in another person's decision, you do not give commands or instructions to others. Rather, you bequeath your own experience or knowledge, but the other person still makes her/his own decisions about how to deal with a situation. In chapter 6.5.3., this point will be discussed in more detail and in relation to theoretical assumptions of ANGER as well as to source domains.

In the data (session paradigm_boil001), variation concerning linguistic realization and conceptualization of ANGER in simultaneous usage is observed. Another linguistic metaphor to express ANGER in Beaver (*abééts* […] "she's boiling")[57] refers to HEAT in an angry person without any inclusion of body parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS. Despite different conceptualizations, this idiomatic expression *madzéé' xááts'adu abééts* ("s/he is angry (lit. her/his heart

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[57] This form is given only once by one speaker, so that a calque can be assumed in this case.

falls out) and s/he boils") (paradigm_boil001) does not clash with the SEAT OF EMOTION concept of "heart". The metonymic idea of HEAT as physiological effect of ANGER (HEAT FOR ANGER) is linguistically realized via the exaggeration of HEAT by using the verb for "boil".

5.7.4. SUMMARY OF NETWORK -dzéé "HEART"

According to the descriptions of the individual linguistic instances including *-dzéé* "heart", the following picture of the conceptual network arises:

Figure 5.7.: Network of *-dzéé* "heart"

The basic or prototypical meaning of the linguistic item refers to the prototypical meaning BODY PART. The conceptual aspect BODY PART is adopted and highlighted to express concepts of LIFE/SURVIVAL, DEATH, EXCITEMENT and HEART DISEASE. Focusing on this part, the intended meaning of "heart" as part of these idiomatic expressions is communicated in a descriptive fashion, employing non-figurative metonymy[58]: PART FOR WHOLE (heartbeat for life), and EFFECT FOR CAUSE (heart pain for disease, increased heart beat for EXCITEMENT). Thus, a specification and elaboration of the prototype concept is conventionalized to refer to the meanings described, constituting one part of the HEART network. The transfer proceeds inside one domain (BODY (PART)), and the contiguity of concepts is overt and consciously accessible for the speakers.

For "hearts (in a deck of cards)", "spade (in a deck of cards)", and "strawberries" another departing point from the basic meaning of -*dzéé* "heart" is identified. Via abstraction of the BODY PART, an image-schema concentrating on the SHAPE is extracted – besides influence from the English language. This conceptual aspect is focused in the transfer of "heart" to denote concepts showing similarity with respect to their forms. What the image-schema precisely looks like is difficult to state, since the traditional western form gained entrance into the Beaver culture. The similarity between the organ and strawberries is intuitively comprehensible, yet not conventionalized in every language.

The last conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is applied in expressions for emotions and personality traits. In this part of the network, the target domains are all abstract phenomena, while at the same time, the basic and prototypical meaning HEART is also available. The metonymic and metaphorical expressions all have in common the underlying conceptual aspect of heart as SEAT OF EMOTION – i.e. an 'abstract' or schematic notion of a container for mental states.

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[58] The metaphorical usage of the verbs -*tl'a* "run" and *dáh-dlihts* "dance" are excluded here, since the usage of HEART is described in this part.

Furthermore, they share the conceptualization of emotions as linked to this SEAT OF EMOTION. In addition, the metonymy SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON is included in the linguistic manifestations. Properties or characteristics are not imputed to the person experiencing the emotion, but to a SEAT OF EMOTION linked to the specific emotion or personality trait.

The linguistic realizations show – despite their shared cognitive structure – salient differences reflecting idiosyncratic conceptualizations of the individual emotions and personality traits. Furthermore, the various linguistic patterns identified in the general linguistic realization of emotions via inclusion of body part terms (including "mind") play a linking role: they relate all these "heart" expressions to the other body part idioms via linguistic and conceptual aspects (see ch. 6.4.).

6. ANALYSIS OF
THE BEAVER BODY PART TERMS &
EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION

In this chapter, a classification of the Beaver linguistic forms and their underlying conceptualizations will be presented. The figurative linguistic realizations will not be exclusively analyzed in terms of conceptual metaphor as defined by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (2006[1993]) and Kövecses (2000, 2010). As was shown in chapter 5, both, conceptual metaphor and metonymy allow for similar figurative realizations. Furthermore, conceptual structure is not the only phenomenon responsible for figurative expressions. Language use and linguistic structure are as relevant as the cognitive level (Evans 2009, 2010a, 2010b). The prototypical meanings of the linguistic material are not literally applicable, rather the conceptual networks are extended and elaborated due to specific communicative needs. In a semantic and conceptual network, a transition is assumed from basic meanings and usages to non-literal ones on the basis of highlighted conceptual aspects. This means that both target and source constitute parts of one conceptual structure in the linguistic items discussed here (expressions of emotion including body part terms, ch. 6.1.). At the same time, the difference between abstract and concrete concepts is acknowledged in the definition of "linguistic conceptualization" (6.3.): meanings tightly linked to concrete domains comprise conceptual aspects which are also found in the conceptual structure of abstract meanings. For example, PRESSURE constitutes a conceptual aspect of the meaning of, for example, "burst" or "explode". At the same time, it refers to a physiological effect of abstract concepts like ANGER. Therefore, the shared aspects are also linked to networks of abstract meanings (for example, emotions), albeit in a different quality and distance to prototypical

meanings. Still, they constitute departure points for further senses and usages in the networks of lexemes like "explode". But a transfer of the conceptual structure of the prototypical and concrete source domain is not needed in an approach which does not only focus on the conceptual part of such phenomena. For example, in the case of PRESSURE and "explode" domains like DETONATION of concrete objects need not play an essential role for abstract categories like ANGER. As a consequence, for the expressions of emotion presented in the preceding chapter, metonymy is argued to be the underlying strategy (6.2.). Accordingly, effects of the target domains are identified in both, source and target. This means, those conceptual aspects of the linguistic material are utilized without metaphorical transfer, since they exist in both domains. The figurativity of the resulting linguistic expressions is not understood as a consequence of metaphorical conceptualization, but as a linguistic phenomenon.

The Beaver expressions described here illustrate special cases due to their complex forms already introduced. The mapping SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART is said to use the concept of a BODY PART as source domain. For example, the lexeme -*dzéé* "heart" is used as a source for the creation of the conceptual structure denoting a seat or container for emotions (Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2003). Hence, it enables conceptualization and communication of emotions, personality traits and other related phenomena. Such a concept represents a special case of target domain: it does not constitute the target to be expressed first and foremost as intended meaning. Rather, it is used in combination with a predicate to denote another abstract concept. That means, the SEAT OF EMOTION aspect – and its image-schematic interpretation as a container – is created as an intermediate stage to ultimately express emotions or personality traits. To use the formulation of the CMT, the structures are not captured by X IS Y, but rather by X IS (Y IS Z): for example, not LOVE IS A JOURNEY, but ANGER IS (SEAT OF EMOTION IS HEART).

In the following sections, the Beaver emotion expressions described in chapter 5 will be classified. This is done first, in relation to the conceptualizations of the body part term included in the idiomatic form. Second, they are analyzed according to the predicates used and the underlying conceptual strategy of the whole construction. Simultaneously, some issues of the CMT introduced in chapter 3.4. will be discussed. The most relevant points in relation to the data are:

- the identification of conceptual metaphors on the basis of linguistic material
- the classification of the linguistic forms especially against the background of conceptual metonymies (ch. 6.1., 6.2.)
- the hypothesis that the abstract target domains lack available and sufficient conceptual structure
- the specific and rigid structure X IS Y (ch. 6.3., 6.5.)

The linguistic forms are embedded in a broader perspective, i.e. in the sections of chapter 6.5., they are arranged in accordance to the linguistic patterns identified in the Beaver mental lexicon.

6.1. SEAT OF EMOTION: CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR OR CONCEPTUAL ASPECT?

This next part will focus on the body part terms and their conceptualizations in the emotion expressions. However, to coherently explain the concept SEAT OF EMOTION, the complete idiomatic forms are considered at some points in the argumentation of section 6.1. In the sections 6.2. – 6.6., these complex emotions expressions will be discussed in more detail.

The concept of a container-like place for emotions indicates a certain method. The need to locate emotions or inner states causes the conception of body parts as such seats. Since the emotions are not directly and objectively linked to specific body parts, the choice of particular body part terms correlates with culture-specific models. Socio-cultural, historical, but also already established linguistic patterns influence the choice of body parts, and their conceptualization as SEATS OF EMOTIONS as part of the conceptual network. The relation blends both concepts (BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION) into one flexible concept. Depending on the usage in specific emotion expressions, this concept allows for simultaneous availability with gradual emphasis. That means: first, the relation between SEAT OF EMOTION and BODY PART is not an oppositional one, but a continuous one. Both are involved in an overall concept of the body part term in question. Second, existing conceptual structure is included in the lexical "window" (e.g. -*dzéé* "heart"). It is based on physiological or socio-cultural experiences and models and is combined with the lexical form in different usages and senses.

The linguistic conceptualization matches and blends the concept SEAT OF EMOTION with predicates which are used non-prototypically in such combinations. Specific conceptual aspects of the linguistic material are attributed to SEATS OF EMOTIONS as subjects. Together, they metonymically express the intended meanings, i.e. an emotion or personality trait. Here, particular conceptualization processes occur under the influence of cultural models as well as in analogy to concepts with supporting bodily experiences. The abstract character of physiological and psychological effects like PRESSURE enforces a specific conceptualization of particular body parts. This is needed to locate or substantiate these bodily consequences and reactions like PRESSURE, DEPRESSION, LACK OF CONTROL, IMPENETRABILITY or RESISTANCE. For example, increased heartbeat as a physiological effect of EXCITEMENT constitutes an actual, real world connection to the body organ "heart". This is

utilized to express the intended meaning – i.e. EXCITEMENT (and FEAR in Beaver). On the other hand, effects like HEAT, PRESSURE or PERCEIVED LOSS OF CONTROL are not directly bound to specific body parts. Therefore, they display more abstract or imprecise features, a fact which is compensated via the identification of certain body parts as SEAT OF EMOTION. The elaboration of the concepts of body parts is not applied to create sufficient conceptual structure for emotions and personality traits. Instead, it establishes a domain capable of classifying abstract mental states and of providing linguistic material for communication of these states. This parallels conceptual metaphor to some degree, but differs in the assumption of a seamless transition.

The definition of the concept SEAT OF EMOTION relies on the structures found in the mental lexicon as a whole. This means, it is based on the systematic usage of body parts in expressions for emotions, personality traits and related mental states where real physiological experiences constitute the basis. Furthermore, the metalinguistic statements of the speakers reveal a concept which combines concrete body parts as prototypical meanings of the used lexemes with additional structure. It is this combination which is linked to the abstract targets.

For the analyses of the Beaver forms, the following consequences arise. Instead of applying a rigid definition of the conceptual metaphor SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART, a gradual conceptualization is argued for. The conceptual metaphor separates the two usages of the lexeme *-dzéé'* "heart", while the alternative gradual transition from one sense to the other better suits the data and the metalinguistic justifications. No clear cut is assumed between BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION. Rather, the salience varies according to the conceptual aspects focused on in the individual idiomatic expressions. Such an analysis is not in (perfect) accordance with the CMT, which hypothesizes the obligatory existence of two diverse and clearly divided concepts (Lakoff

2006[1993], Kövecses 2006). In this case, SEAT OF EMOTION and BODY PART would constitute the two parts of a conceptual metaphor (like e.g. LOVE and JOURNEY in LOVE IS A JOURNEY). Here, the alternative description formulated also mirrors the relationships holding between the different senses of such polysemous items, and their availability to the speakers. The established networks are processed in the mental lexicon according to the communicative needs. The intended meaning is chosen without being identified as completely diverse. Neither is the meaning realized as independent from the existing network nor as parasitic on another conceptual structure (as is declared to be the case for LOVE and JOURNEY (Kövecses 2006, 2010)).

In the linguistic manifestations, the body part terms are combined with predicates which are compatible with neither BODY PARTS nor SEATS OF EMOTIONS in their prototypical, literal meanings. Yet both aspects are available and part of the meanings: *madzéé' gaak'áá dáh'atl'is* "s/he is still alive / survived (lit. his/her heart is still dancing)" is explained by the speakers with reference to the concrete BODY PART ("… you touch his heart …" (metaphors001)). By contrast, for example, "wheels" in the English expression "spinning our wheels" are not part of the LOVE concept, but are used to linguistically express the shared conceptual aspect STAGNANCY DESPITE ACTION. Therefore, I state that "heart" is realized and used as including both conceptual aspects with degrees, its prototypical and basic meaning BODY PART as well as the culturally based sense SEAT OF EMOTION.

The transition from BODY PART to SEAT OF EMOTION just promoted – and therefore a mitigation or modification of the strict form X IS Y – allows for a gradual inclusion of the idioms on a continuity scale. To give some examples: *madzéé' dadyi* "heart attack (lit. my heart hurts)" is linked closer to the [BODY PART] end and shows a greater distance to the [SEAT OF EMOTION] end. In *madzéé' dáh'atl'is* "I am excited / scared (lit. my heart is dancing)", "heart" is understood mainly as a body part reacting to physiological effects of

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EXCITEMENT/FEAR (increased heartbeat). The concept of a SEAT OF EMOTION has its starting point in such constructions. The focus of this body part's reaction to EXCITEMENT / FEAR and the linguistic conceptualization – i.e. the non-prototypical usage of *dáh-dlihts* "dance" – indicate modified conceptual structure. Accordingly, *madzéé' dáh'atl'is* "I am excited / scared (lit. my heart is dancing)" includes both aspects: ([+BODY PART], [+SEAT OF EMOTION]).

In *sadzéé' xááts'at* "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)", the conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION is highlighted. This is particularly the case because of the non-physiologically motivated relationship between the potential physiological and psychological effects of ANGER (LOSS OF CONTROL / SELF-DETERMINATION) and the body organ "heart". This body organ neither reacts in a specific way to ANGER nor can it fall out. That means, the predicate ("fall out") alludes to the specific conceptual aspect of heart as SEAT OF EMOTION in the linguistic conceptualization, and not to the concrete BODY PART. In a very similar fashion *sadzéé' tyíhsane* "I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)" highlights the SEAT OF EMOTION aspect, so that both are placed at the other end of the scale ([-BODY PART], [+SEAT OF EMOTION]).

− −	− [SEAT OF EMOTION] +	++
madzéé' dadyi "heart attack" (lit. "his/her heart hurts")	*madzéé' da'atl'is* "s/he is excited / scared" (lit. his/her heart is dancing)"	*sadzéé' tyíhsane* "I am lonely" (lit. my heart is pitiful)
++	+ [BODY PART] −	− −

Table 6.1.: Transition of conceptualizations of *dzéé* "heart".

Such a description supports Langacker's (2000) statement that a complete network with all senses and domains constitutes the speakers' knowledge. When all these aspects are deeply interlinked and to some point available, the idea of

seamless transitions and combined aspects fits well into these cognitive structures. The data reinforce gradual continuums instead of distinct cognitive and linguistic patterns, as is backed up by metalinguistic discussions (see ch. 5). Furthermore, the emotions under discussion exhibit unique structures, supported and motivated by physiological experiences, psychological reactions, and socio-cultural models. Linguistically, the predicates used are prototypically linked to other, concrete entities and events due to their accessibility for all community members in a similar way (see ch. 6.3.). This means the forms rely on best example vocabulary to express the intended meanings. For example, the prototypical vocabulary to express IMPENETRABILITY is "be hard", which itself is prototypically associated with a concrete hard object. Hence, IMPENETRABILITY as part of concrete, physical hardness is more prototypical than the feeling of IMPENETRABILITY when a person is hard-hearted.

The scale crosscuts the classification according to patterns (ch. 6.4.) and the one according to individual body parts: neither are all body part lexemes realized in the same way in one pattern nor are the concepts consistent. That means, besides *-įįdyíí* "mind" none occurs in one and the same conceptual quality. Rather, their conceptualizations change focus according to physiological or psychological experiences on the one hand, and cultural models on the other. Cultural models are applied where physiological or psychological experiences in relation to specific body parts are missing.

įįdyíí "mind" constitutes a special case, since its basic and standard meaning is an abstract SEAT OF EMOTION/INTELLIGENCE without any elaboration of a real world referent, i.e. a concrete body part. Nevertheless, it is not semantically or syntactically marked in the series of body part terms used for emotion or personality trait expressions. That means the form does not behave differently from body part terms and ranks at the abstract end of the continuum.

To sum up, I state that the conceptualization of body parts in expressions of emotion does not reflect a conceptual metaphor precisely as described by the

CMT. Although embodied experience, an abstract target domain (SEAT OF EMOTION) and a conceptual pattern like SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART are available to some point, the mappings of conceptual metaphor do not take place as defined by the CMT. Instead, the relationship between source and target is a flexible and gradual one, and the source domain is included in the target to diverse degrees, dependent on the specific expression (see fig. 6.1.).

6.2. METONYMY AS MAIN MECHANISM

According to the CMT and especially the embodiment hypothesis, we use bodily made experiences for conceptualization (Lakoff 2006[1993], Gibbs & Colston 1994, 2003, Gibbs & Costa Lima 2004, Kövecses 2010). In case of 'low or missing' structure of the target as assumed by e.g. Lakoff, conceptual metaphor copies and therefore creates conceptual structure. As a result, figurativity comes into existence due to transfers between unrelated conceptual domains. Similarly, if physiological effects are abstract– i.e. not directly accessible and not linked to specific body parts – 'invented' connections are conceptually established between body parts and emotions. But if physiological effects are concrete and available, they are used in concept-supporting fashion. They allow for communicating these abstract concepts, typically and in most cases via metonymy. In cases where such effects indeed offer sufficient structure, for example, PRESSURE as a collateral effect of ANGER should be satisfactory for communication purposes (e.g. "I have pressure in me" to express ANGER). Yet, many linguistic manifestations do not utilize real experiences, but apply linguistic metaphor or (figurative) metonymy as means to express these abstract feelings. For example, in English we find expressions like "you make my blood boil", "he exploded", "she jumped out of her skin", "my heart sank into my boots". In Beaver, forms like *sadzéé' xááts'at* "I am angry (lit.

my heart falls out)" and *sįįdyíí' náátl'a* "(suddenly) remember (lit. my mind runs)" reflect this mechanism.

Such idiomatic expressions reveal that figurativity and creativity are as salient for communication as real physical experiences. Similarity or contiguity is needed to make forms comprehensible, but even metonymies are figuratively realized although not necessarily needed. When communicating abstract concepts or especially inner states, emotions and the like, speakers have to make sure that they get across the intended meaning. Therefore, exaggeration ("I explode", "my heart falls out") or similar forms of figurative meaning are realized as pragmatically effective and are (consciously) applied. Such an employment of figurativity supports and ensures a comprehensible structure for communication. Due to the fact that emotions show a special dimensionality or complexity, objectivity, and also (in)accessibility, this is not a mystery for cognitive approaches. Still, this aspect must be accounted for in the embodiment theory (ch. 3.1.2.). The hypothesis "concrete experiences for abstract experiences" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2003, 2010) (i.e. emotions, feelings, personality traits etc.) needs a modification to include the near-universal phenomena of such figurative features mentioned above. For linguistic inclusion of body part terms in emotion expressions, the parameters CONCRETENESS and AVAILABILITY (or KNOWLEDGE) OF BODY PARTS are not necessarily that important. Instead, the folk model of a BODY-SOUL-FUSION in combination with a concealed structure of the target domain EMOTION is crucial for these concepts. Recent biological and neurological approaches to emotions define these as hormonal and neuronal reactions and changes in our biological systems. Taking this into account, the BODY PARTS used in emotion expressions may be seen as figurative folk model substitutions for the biochemical messages causing mental states and changes.

Furthermore, when looking at occurrences of figurative meanings in all domains, Lakoff's and Johnson's (1980) statements that metaphor is intrinsic in

language in general are supported and verified. But this also means that we find linguistic metaphor and figurative metonymy for quite concrete concepts (e.g. "have no eyes" for 'be blind'; "drink the bottle" for 'drink the (concrete) content'; "the waist of my wife is an hourglass" for 'slim waist'). These concepts are not said to 'lack' structure, but are very concretely observable.

For the expressions described here, several conceptual metaphors are supposed by the CMT (for example, ANGER IS HEAT, ANGER IS PRESSURE). What should be dealt with caution is the fact that metonymic and metaphorical conceptualizations are linguistically manifested in quite similar ways. The non-ambiguous correspondence between linguistic and cognitive structures as presumed by CMT theorists relies solely on the analysis of linguistic structure (Glucksberg et al. 1993, Glucksberg et al. 1997, McGlone 2007). Following linguistic and metalinguistic evidence, in chapter 5, many of the Beaver emotion expressions were assigned to conceptual metonymies. Accordingly, additional and metaphorical underlying figures of thought become redundant. The metonymic conceptualizations are grounded in physiological experiences and linguistically reflect perceived bodily effects. However, two facts complicate the situation: first, the usage of body part or organ terms is not only based on embodiment, but also on convention and socio-cultural models. Consequently, unequivocal domains are not objectively detectable. Second, although defined as manifestations of metonymies, some of these forms are linguistically figurative and debatable in terms of classification. Still others do not allow for clear classifications as embodied experience despite their very comparable composition or format.

The main example in the present work – the conceptualization of BODY PARTS as SEATS OF EMOTIONS – differs from the hypothesized target "body" in THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS (Kövecses 2000, 2003; Glynn 2000; Niemeier 2000). Here, mental states and events are presumed to take place in the body as do physiological effects. Accordingly, expressions

used for ANGER in English, such as "get a hernia" (metonymic according to Lakoff & Johnson 1980), reflect the same conceptual structure as "explode" (metaphoric in Lakoff & Johnson 1980). That means, the physiological effect PRESSURE is highlighted and focused on in both. Similarly, both realize the body as a container – which it is. Their linguistic conceptualizations differ in the distance to real and possible physiological effects of PRESSURE, but not in the underlying metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE. Economy in combination with rhetorical effects and predestination for figurativity backs up the usage of lexical items typically used in different linguistic and semantic contexts (Dirven 2003). But still, in "get a hernia" the body is conceptualized as the container for emotions which reacts in a specific way to the PRESSURE evoked by ANGER. The conceptual metaphor proposed by CMT, ANGER IS PRESSURE IN A CONTAINER for "I explode" instead of the metonymy PRESSURE FOR ANGER underlying "get a hernia" does not detect the decisive point between these two linguistic forms: both cognitively focus on the body as a container and its reaction to ANGER. PRESSURE is a physiological effect of ANGER (evidenced in PRESSURE FOR ANGER) and a human body constitutes a perfect container: a closed object with input, openings and clear boundaries. But what is metaphorical about pressure in a person then? This rather sudden transition from metonymy to metaphor on the cognitive level is only indicated by the linguistic manifestation. The justification of the conceptual metaphor – as an "is-understood-as relationship" as opposed to the "stand-for relationship" (Kövecses 2010: 267) of metonymy – is found in the linguistic form. This reasoning hardly seems compatible with Lakoff's focus on cognitive structures and statements like "[t]he language is secondary" (1993: 208). Yet, linguistic evidence is "treated as both the cause and the effect" (McGlone 2007: 115) for conceptual metaphor, resulting in circular reasoning. Note also that the form "to get a hernia" evidences the existent and available conceptual structure of ANGER: the physiological effect of PRESSURE is used in a metonymic fashion without the

need for additional substance from other unrelated concepts. The notion of metaphtonymy (Goossens 1990) is also applicable here, since "to get a hernia" can potentially occur as physiological effect. However, in the situations where this expression is used, it does not refer to an event really happening, but is used metonymically to express the cause (i.e. ANGER). In the Beaver forms, we find similar combinations: domain matrices and metonymic chains at the conceptual level and non-prototypical and figurative vocabulary usage at the linguistic level. Therefore, Lakoff's exposure to linguistic evidence is not followed as sufficient evidence for conceptual metaphor in this work.

For example, in the analysis of *sįįdyíí' natlǫ* "I worry (lit. my minds are lots)", the underlying metonymies supersede conceptual metaphors like INCREASE IN THINKING IS MULTIPLICATION OF SEAT OF EMOTION: INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION and CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED already explain the inclusion of the term *-įįdyíí* "mind" as well as the increase of this SEAT OF EMOTION. This is also justified by the speakers' discussions about this construction (see ch. 5.4.).

Another example is the polysemous network of *-zis* "skin/hide". The metalinguistic statements and linguistic analysis of the different conceptualizations and senses of this lexical item reveal strategies similar to those just described. The most basic conceptual aspect BODY PART is not directly used for the creation of individual transferred meanings. In the case of *sadee azís* "eyelid", there is no transmission, rather, "skin/hide" is specified, but still denotes "skin/hide". Yet, according to the CMT, several hypothesized points of departure in this network mirror the following conceptual metaphors: MATERIAL IS SKIN (*ts'ih zís* "mosquito net"), COVER IS SKIN (*sat'údzé' zís* "bra, brassiere (my breast cover)[59]"), SHAPE IS SKIN (*azís xoich'uge*

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[59] The additional forms in parentheses are the literal forms as realized and translated by the speakers.

"tepee (its skin/hide it is pointy)"), and CONTAINER IS SKIN (*tyúú zís* "water bag"). Now, this is neither necessary nor practical, since a contiguity chain is visible – finally, all targets are conceptual aspects of "skin/hide" embedded in the conceptual network of -*zis*. Hence, the following conceptual metonymic processes are identified: SKIN FOR MATERIAL, SKIN FOR COVER, SKIN FOR SHAPE, SKIN FOR CONTAINER. The network is escalated by the further usage of the lexical 'window' in remote domains. Since they are not actually evoked by the basic meaning "skin/hide", they do not belong to the central part of the conceptual domain (matrix), for example, *ts'ih zís* "mosquito net (lit. mosquito skin/hide)". In the CMT tradition, this suffices to declare conceptual metaphor. Yet here, a continuity view is adopted due to the gradual departures of the various senses from the basic meaning and the distinction between cognitive and linguistic conceptualization. The linguistic metaphors are not assumed as sufficient support for determination of conceptual metaphor as defined by Lakoff & Johson (1980), Lakoff (2006[1993]) or Kövecses (2010). Rather, the linguistic and metalinguistic data suits the suggested metonymic structures as well as the complex semantic and conceptual networks assumed.

For the part of the network of -*dzéé* "heart" focusing on SHAPE, no necessity or requirement for a conceptual structure like X IS Y is identified either. The form of *íídzą́ą́* "strawberries (lit. little. hearts)" or *dzéék'azi* "spades in a deck of cards (lit. black hearts)" is bound to the concept of the organ term -*dzéé* "heart" via linguistic conceptualization: a specific conceptual aspect of similarity which all referents show is applied, in this case SHAPE. The literal meanings are available and explainable for the speakers, and the linking form is realized (HEART FOR SHAPE). But it will not be stated here that both, "spade as card suit" and "strawberries", lack concrete concepts, and therefore copy or absorb the HEART concept. Also, "hearts" as card suit is linked to HEART as a body organ, and indeed origins in the notion of HEART especially concerning the

(idealized) form and color. Yet, only similar aspects are realized via the use of the lexeme *-dzéé* "heart", while the card suit contains its own conceptual structure. This structure additionally consists of aspects not mapping any features of the concept of the body organ HEART.

6.3. LINGUISTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION

In this subchapter, "linguistic conceptualization" is defined. It is elaborated to explain the linguistic and conceptual structures found in the Beaver data.

Concrete experience or concepts are more easily accessible and often ready for communication in another way than abstract concepts are. Still, the linguistic manifestations so far only support the hypothesis that we analyze or extract the knowledge of the use of linguistic material more bound to concrete concepts. We talk in terms of concrete ideas about less concrete ones, because the former are linguistically more prototypical instances of the underlying conceptual aspects utilized for both (McGlone 1996, 2007; Glucksberg & McGlone 1999). This is captured in the notion of "linguistic conceptualization" in this work.

"Linguistic conceptualization" (see ch. 6.3.) is defined as an intermediate step between linguistic forms and cognitive structures. It captures the following point: to ensure and support communication of abstract and not objectively perceivable concepts, speakers resort to linguistic vocabulary tightly linked to concrete and therefore well-known domains. The usage of this vocabulary results in transferred meanings and thus linguistic metaphors. Glucksberg et al. (1997), Radden (2003) and others (e.g. McGlone 2007) rightly propose the notion of category inclusion. They refer to relations between categories and members of these categories which are highly relevant for metonymy,

metonymy-based meaning shift, and transferred concepts.[60] For example, the category "impenetrable entities" includes 'stone' as well as 'hard-hearted person' (as defined in the Beaver model). This allows for describing and explaining relations between conceptual structure and linguistic manifestation.

Abstract concepts like emotions and personality traits are considered highly individual – there is no experiential basis that can be objectively observed by outsiders. Therefore, in combination with economy, analogies to concrete entities are identified. These are linguistically applied via usage of vocabulary prototypically linked to such easily perceivable and sharable concepts. This "linguistic conceptualization" is based on similarities in conceptual structure, not on the lack of it.

In the present work, the conceptual structure of abstract concepts is presumed to exist, elaborated on the basis of psychological and physiological effects. At the level of linguistic realization an economic and stylistic strategy is identified to ensure communication: perceived similarities in conceptual structures lead to extractions of the respective features in existing linguistic forms. The difference between concrete and abstract concepts is their concreteness and their relation to linguistic material: concrete concepts show a richer lexical 'stock', i.e. vocabulary prototypically associated with them. These corresponding lexemes which prototypically belong to the concrete domains experienced in an objective way, are utilized in non-prototypical meanings.

This issue is similar to the distinction between thinking and speaking about ideas. For example, knowledge or comprehension of "violin music", which people are often familiar with but only rarely speak of, nevertheless exists despite missing lexical conceptualization. Specialists – i.e. a 'speech community'

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[60] This also implies that theoretically there is an unlimited number of potential categories, since schematic decomposition admits correspondences at smallest levels. Practically, this is indeed cross-linguistically reflected in non-literal and figurative meanings employing various concepts on the basis of realized and conventionalized similarities in structure.

or 'community of practice' (musicians) with the need to express this conceptual structure – establish the corresponding vocabulary. The elaborated part of the lexicon does not include a completely new set of lexemes. Rather, existing semantic structures are extended and used in non-prototypical ways, allowing for communication of the specific domain at hand.

The issue of structure adoption as presumed by the CMT is also discussed by Croft & Cruse (2004). They question the pertinence of conceptual metaphors in connection with the Invariance Principle: if there is target structure eliding source structure due to mismatches, then "why do they [conceptual metaphors, CP] exist in the first place?" (2004: 201). Furthermore, they raise the issue of highly schematic and abstract structures of some conceptual metaphors, questioning the following parts of CM theorists' argumentation: first, the need for conceptual metaphors to enable treatment of abstract targets and second, the adoption of source structure by the target domain. The schematic character of conceptual metaphors promotes the alternative view proposed here and also by Glucksberg (2001) and Jackendoff & Aaron (1991). It is not a takeover that is taking place, but rather an implementation of a higher level category containing both domains included in the mappings. For example, ANGER and DETONATIONS are both included in a category of phenomena which cause PRESSURE. Lakoff and Johnson's refutation of this kind of criticism focuses on the unidirectional forms of conceptual metaphors. We only find the existing targets expressed in terms of the sources (Croft & Cruse 2004: 202), but not the other way round. In the example just given, ANGER is described in terms of DETONATIONS, while DETONATIONS do not utilize ANGER terms. Note that the argumentation again highlights linguistic and not conceptual structure. This asymmetry is accommodated by the notion of "linguistic conceptualization" in the analysis proposed here. The accessibility of concrete concepts is accounted for in the usage of linguistic material prototypically related to these. In the

abstract context, the shared conceptual aspects – taken from a higher-level category (Glucksberg et al. 1997) – are the relevant and decisive ones:

Figure 6.1.: Mappings in CMT

Figure 6.2.: Category inclusion as alternative organization of abstract and concrete domains

The existence of structure in abstract target domains is strengthened by the fact that there exists more than one source domain for e.g. LOVE or IDEAS (in English). The hypothesis that native speakers are, for example, unable to think of LOVE without thinking of JOURNEYS in English, finds a counterexample in the usage of other source domains of LOVE. When applying another conceptual structure like NUTRIENT (LOVE IS A NUTRIENT (Kövecses 2010)) or RAPTURE, JOURNEY is not included in the processing of LOVE. Due to the fact that love relationships share aspects with journeys – that is, both conceptual structures include similar features –, we adopt linguistic structure of the more concrete phenomena to ensure understanding and communication. When English native speakers think and speak of LOVE as a NUTRIENT, they do

not use the JOURNEY concept. The domains JOURNEY and NUTRIENT are not combinable without LOVE as the point of connection. Rather, both sources show conceptual alliances to LOVE in different aspects ("he hungered for her love" vs. "we've come a long way"). They reflect structures of family resemblance as known from prototype theory (Rosch & Mervis 1975): LOVE overlaps in conceptual structure with each of the sources only in some specific points the sources do not share. The structure of LOVE is abstract, but still, there is structure we can use to realize or create correspondences. The linguistic material reflects and refers to conceptual components (Langacker 1987, 2000) found in both domains, and expresses these already existing image-schematic aspects of the target domain (Glucksberg et al. 1997). As a result, many correspondences are realized and reflected by usage of linguistic material prototypically linked to the concrete domain (e.g. in English for IDEAS ARE FOOD: "swallow", "raw facts", "half-baked idea", "warmed-over theories", "devour a book"). To communicate these topics, "linguistic conceptualization" accesses linguistic material from sources like FOOD or JOURNEY which show similarities in specific aspects.

The "linguistic conceptualization" of target meanings evokes figurativity due to the non-prototypical usage of linguistic material, i.e. abstract concepts are supported via the adoption of lexemes, not via adoption of conceptual structure. This view is not considered by CM theorists, as McGlone rightly remarks: "Lakoff couples this hyper-literal model of metaphor understanding to a hyper-metaphoric construal of literal language" (2007: 123), i.e. he states that language is extremely metaphorical while the analysis of conceptual structures strictly concentrates on the prototypical literal meanings of the linguistic material. This leaves no space for an adequate conception of polysemy, vagueness, conscious distinctions between language and thought and continuity of concrete and abstract concepts. Although focused on linguistic forms, these are only analyzed

as pure products and mirrors of cognitive structure without taking into account an intermediate level argued for in this work.

For example, PRESSURE as a conceptual component is found in the conceptual structure of DETONATIONS as well as in the structure of ANGER ("he exploded"). This means, for figurative use, the corresponding feature basing on perceived similarity between the concepts relates two domains. For example, the English lexical item "explode" and the concept of ANGER are related via the conceptual aspect PRESSURE. This aspect is expressed via best example vocabulary like "explode". Similarly, EXCITING, SCARY SITUATION is not only part of the conceptual structure of the lexical form "rollercoaster ride", but may also be found in the structure of MARRIAGE (McGlone 2007: 116). The results are complex and systematic arrangements of networks which reveal the conceptual aspects extracted in the diverse usages of these lexical items. The aspects are chosen[61] according to relevance and need: the aspect of PRESSURE of the network structure of the category "explosion/denotation" is extracted and focused on for ANGER. For "detonation sensor", on the other hand, the features VIBRATION / SOUND are highlighted.

At the level of "linguistic conceptualization" figurativity and metaphor is applied, but this level is not equated with conceptualization proper. That means the usage of linguistic metaphor is not sufficient to presume conceptual metaphors as defined by Lakoff (2006[1993]) and others (e.g. Lakoff & Johson 1980, Kövecses 2010). "Linguistic conceptualization" is consulted as the intermediate level between conceptual structure and linguistic structure: meanings of the vocabulary utilized are processed in a decompositional way. Accordingly, image-schematic conceptual aspects also included in the target concept are extracted and focused on in the transferred usages of the lexemes.

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[61] 'Conceptual aspects are chosen' does not mean that speakers make conscious choices. Rather, the factors arbitrariness, motivation and conventionalization are involved, leading to cross-linguistic variation in conceptual and linguistic structure.

This level allows for a gradual transfer of conceptual understanding and simultaneous availability of source and target. Consequently, the asymmetrical form X IS Y is modified, so that the missing target structure is not focused on by using linguistic structure of the source. Rather, both domains are processed as mating and matching due to the same conceptual aspects in their structures. The term 'asymmetrical' refers to the theoretical postulate of presumed supremacy and domination of one – the more concrete – domain over the other. This was already questioned by Jackendoff (1983) with regard to spatial and temporal relations (see also ch. 3.2.1.2.). The alternative analysis allows for an inclusion of existing conceptual structures of abstract phenomena utilizing lexemes of prototypically concrete domains. This also means that not only conceptual structures are taken into account when analyzing both conceptual and linguistic structures. Evans (2006, 2010a; see also ch. 3.4.1.) explicitly focuses on linguistic structures and language in use as essentially affecting conceptual networks and figurative meanings therein.

In the following paragraphs, some Beaver constructions will be discussed in relation to "linguistic conceptualization". First, the forms discussed in chapter 5 are again presented, now according to their semantic patterns.

6.4. LINGUISTIC PATTERNS OF BODY PART EXPRESSIONS

The idiomatic constructions discussed in chapter 5 constitute an important means for expressing emotions and personality traits as well as disabilities like blindness or deafness. The Beaver language intensively exploits socio-culturally and physiologically based relations between specific body parts with particular properties or activities and physical and mental states. In addition, concepts of life and death are also included in these patterns. The results are complex expressions comprising body part terms. These can be subsumed and classified in linguistic patterns when emphasizing the ascribed characteristics and

attributes, and not focusing on or dividing the forms according to the individual body parts included.

Taking into account all expressions found in the corpus and described in the previous chapters, the following five patterns are identified:

(I.) [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION]

(II.1) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION SHOWS PROPERTY]
(II.2) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION DOES NOT SHOW PROPERTY]

(III.) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION

PERFORMS (UNCONTROLLED/SUDDEN) MOTION]

(IV.) [LOTS OF BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION]

(V.1) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION EXISTS]
(V.2) [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION DOES NOT EXIST]

In table 6.2., the tokens[62] are organized according to these patterns:

pattern no.	pattern form	body parts	meaning	Beaver form
I.a	NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION	head	crazy, stupid	*satṣíídué'*
		mind	stupid, crazy	*mįįdyíį dyué'*
		mouth	non-talkative	*sazáá' ghǫdyué'*
		ears	stubborn	*sadzagé' nadyué'*
		(brain)	(talk) stupid(ly)	*nats'íghǫ' nadyué'*

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[62] Two expressions are not included in this list: *sįįdyíí' táádyée'ǫ* "lose my mind" (see ch. 5.4.7.) and *súúga saẓáá' ǫlá* "sweet-talk (lit. s/he puts sugar in my mouth)" (see ch.5.3.1.2.).

I.b	NO BODY PART	eyes	be blind	*sadee nadyué'*
		inner ears	be deaf	*sadzii wǫdyué'*
		throat	be mute, dumb	*sak'áze nadyué'*
		flesh	be skinny	*satşán náádyué'*
		penis	gelding	*malįįdyué'*
II.1.a	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION SHOWS PROPERTY: "hard/strong"	Heart	be flinty, hard-hearted	*sadzéé' náátsat*
		Head	be stubborn	*satsíí náátsat*
		Mind	be powerful, determined	*sįįdyíí' náátsat*
		Mind	desire	*sįįdyíí' náátsat*
		Mouth	persuade, bother	*sazáa nááwutsat*
II.2.a[63]	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION DOES NOT SHOW PROPERTY: "hard/strong"	Heart	soft-hearted	*sadzéé' adyuu náátsat*
		Mind	not determined, stupid	*sįįdyíí' adyuu náátsat*
II.b	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION SHOWS PROPERTY: "heavy"	Heart	be sad, worry	*sadzéé' nakǫįl*
		Head	worry	*satsíí nakǫįl*
II.c	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION SHOWS PROPERTY: "evil"	mouth	swear	*sazáá kets'ééle*
		mind	be grouchy, be in a bad mood	*sįįdyé' tsééle*
II.d	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION SHOWS PROPERTY: "pitiful"	heart	be lonely	*sadzéé' tyíhsane*

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[63] II.2.a is the negated form of the pattern II.1.a.

III.a	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION PERFORMS (UNCONTROLLED / SUDDEN) MOTION: "fall out"	heart	be angry	*sadzéé' xaats'at*
III.b	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION PERFORMS (UNCONTROLLED / SUDDEN) MOTION: "run"	heart	die	*madzéé' łííníítl'a*
		mind	(suddenly) remember	*siidyíí' náátl'a*
III.c	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION PERFORMS (UNCONTROLLED / SUDDEN) MOTION: "spin"	head	be dizzy	*satsíí naghwút*
III.d	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION PERFORMS MOTION: "dance"	heart	survive / live	*sadzéé' gáák'áá dah'atl'is*
III.e	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION PERFORMS MOTION: "dance"	heart	be excited / scared	*sadzéé' dah'atl'is*
IV	LOTS OF BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION	mind	worry	*siidyíí' natlo*
		mouth	be a chatterbox	*sazáá' ghotl'o*

V.a	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION EXISTS	heart	be brave	*sadzéé' ghólįį*
V.b	BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION DOES NOT EXIST	heart	be timid	*adyuu sadzéé' ghólįį*
		heart	be heartless	*adyuu sadzéé' ghólįį*

Table 6.2.: Beaver linguistic patterns for emotion and personality trait expressions including body part terms

In these patterns, the idiomatic expressions reveal rich and elaborated conceptualizations of the body part terms included. Additionally, the gradual shifts in focus concerning the conceptual aspects of these complex semantic networks are comprehensible. Both conceptual features – BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION – are included in the overall meanings to different degrees and with varying emphases. This is verified by the meanings of the forms and the metalinguistic statements of the speakers (see chapter 5).

6.5. STRUCTURE OF BEAVER CONCEPTUALIZATIONS & EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTION

In this section, the linguistic patterns introduced in chapter 6.4. will be described and discussed in detail. It will be shown that "linguistic conceptualization" offers a coherent explanation of the Beaver forms.

Following the guidelines of the CMT, the first pattern ([NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION]) would reflect conceptual metaphors like NEGATIVE MENTAL CONSTITUTION IS A MISSING SEAT OF EMOTION, DISABILITY IS A MISSING BODY PART. However, we will see in the following parts that the form of conceptual metaphors – X IS Y – is neither necessarily needed nor conductive to coherently interpreting the Beaver data. Further abstraction of the conceptual structures is suggested. Their more

schematic and generic equivalent at a higher level – NEGATIVE CONSTITUTION IS LACK / LOSS – indicates the dissenting account proposed here: the two meanings do not display clearly separable and unrelated domains. They differ in their concreteness, but are not opposed to each other. Rather, they can be subsumed in a higher level category (Glucksberg et al. 1997).

I propose a continuity view of such structures and concentrate on the shared conceptual parts of these structures – for example, of NEGATIVE CONSTITUTION and LACK / LOSS – without highlighting the differences in domain membership. Instead of disconnecting and keeping apart the concepts included in the Beaver forms, I presume the relation between both concrete source and abstract target domain to rely on shared conceptual aspects. Linguistically, these aspects are realized by lexemes prototypical for the concrete domain. As a result, the conceptual form X AND Y SHARE/SHOW/INCLUDE 'Z_{xy}' is argued for. Here, X and Y are linguistic forms and 'Z_{xy}' the shared conceptual aspect which is linguistically manifested by Z. Z is typically and conventionally linked to a concrete domain, and additionally used in the second, abstract frame. The concrete meaning – the usage of Z in concrete contexts – is a prototypical or best and best known example, but the common conceptual aspect does not originate in the concrete domain. This view also confirms the attributed conceptual metonymies which underlie most of the non-literal and figurative manifestations (except the descriptive forms *saladze' zis* "bladder (lit. my urine skin)", *satṣán náájue* "I am skinny (lit. my flesh / body is not there)"). Thus, the hypothesized cognitive structure X IS Y is not strictly adopted. Rather, I concentrate on the notion of conceptual aspects found in both source and target domain, i.e. X AND Y SHOW Z_{xy}. The patterns and idiomatic tokens constitute supporting evidence for this alternative analysis. As was already described in chapter 5, besides embodiment and linguistic structures, socio-culturally based models also play a role in linguistic conceptualizations, i.e. in the choice of conceptual aspects extracted for linguistic manifestation. Such

mechanisms are also described for the realization of body parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS (see ch. 6.1.). In the following subsections (ch. 6.5.1 – 6.5.6.), specific examples will be used to validate this hypothesis.

6.5.1. PATTERN I [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION]

For the first pattern in table 6.2., [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION], the following conceptual metonymies are identified as conceptual strategies: (MISSING) BODY PART FOR (MISSING) SENSE and (MISSING) SEAT OF EMOTION FOR (NEGATIVE) PERSONALITY TRAIT. In their negative forms, they constitute specific instances of the higher level metonymy (MISSING) INSTRUMENT FOR (MISSING / NEGATIVE) ACTION. The conceptual correspondences suit the tokens found. This means that, for example, (MISSING) SEAT OF EMOTION / BODY PART (at a higher level simply LACK / LOSS) as source domain does not impose rigid, complex structures on the targets, but rather refers to an aspect found in the concepts of the intended meanings.

This first pattern is most often applied and used in the Beaver language. It occurs not only in relation to mental states, but is also utilized to linguistically realize concepts of disabilities: *sadee nadyué'* "be blind (lit. my eyes are not there)", *sadzii wǫjué'* "be deaf (lit. my inner ears are not there)", *sazéége nadyué'* "be mute (lit. my throat is not there)". For all instances, the conceptual metonymy (MISSING) INSTRUMENT FOR (MISSING / NEGATIVE) ACTION represents the underlying strategy, whereas the body part terms reflect a conceptual transition in focus from BODY PART to SEAT OF EMOTION, so that in some expressions the body part is highlighted while others focus on the more abstract conceptual aspect, yet without completely ignoring the concrete prototypical meaning (see chapter 6.1.).

The disabilities concentrating on sensory perception, i.e. the inability to see and hear, refer to the most basic forms of experience. Although they constitute abstract concepts, they do not parallel emotions or inner states not collectively or 'objectively' perceivable and hard to communicate. Rather, they constitute the most important ways of perceiving and understanding the world around and they allow for access to essential and generalized experiences. Therefore, they are defined as the foundation of our worldviews according to the embodiment hypothesis (Lakoff 2006[1993], Evans & Green 2006). Due to their modeling, they have a special place in cognitive theories, since they are in some sense abstract, but also tangible and objective. Thus, they are also defined as concrete: everyone is equipped with the same senses and reacts to stimuli, i.e. light as a visible stimulus is seen, sound as an acoustic stimulus is heard, and so on.

Every language enables speakers to express the ideas of seeing, hearing, smelling, touching and tasting as fundamental and salient abilities. Disability, on the other hand, is not always literally construed, as the Beaver cases show. This is the case despite the fact that Beaver often exploits affirmative and negative construction pairs instead of two distinct lexemes or constructions for concepts in antonymic relation. This means that "to not (be able to) see" would match the Beaver style. Additionally, there is a high number of descriptive terms 'simply' depicting their referents (e.g. *mak'éhts'éésty̨i* "bed (lit. you sleep on it)"; *meeyáhjize* "ball (lit. you push it)"), again offering non-figurative patterns. However, we find the figurative metonymic constructions. They result in linguistic manifestations which focus on the body parts and define them as non-existent to implicitly express that their functions, senses are missing. For muteness – speech does not belong to sensory perception proper – the body part as instrument (*sazéége* "my throat") is also expressed, substituting the action or function.

Although the absence of body parts is as non-objective or incongruent with reality as the idea that an organ falls out of the body (i.e. ANGER in Beaver),

the conceptual mapping is more available, because the correspondence seems more intuitive. For example, when you close, cover, or even lose your eyes, you cannot see. Hence, the metonymy at work here is a specialization of the intended meaning or concept, but less detached from reality than a heart that has been dropped (see ch. 6.5.3.). More precisely, a metonymic chain is applied in such forms, juxtaposing the concepts of eyes and visual perception. Accordingly, speakers use this shorter conceptual distance as well as the metonymic contiguity between literal and intended or communicated meaning for explanation. In contrast, the missing link to reality in the case of a heart that has fallen out because of ANGER seems to be restraining the Beaver speakers in justification.[64]

To express "gelding" and "be skinny", this pattern is similarly used. For "be skinny", the term for "my body / flesh" is included: *satsán náájue* "I am skinny (lit. my flesh / body is not there)". Hence, the focus lies on the missing mass, and not on aspects of "skin", as it the case in the English expression. Here, the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION is not applicable. Rather, the meaning is construed in a purely descriptive form. For *maljįdyue* "gelding", the established metonymy is again at work, the more prominent body part "penis" is realized, and not the removed testicles[65].

The personality traits expressed via this pattern refer mostly to intelligence. No proper emotions are subsumed in this pattern. Parallel to the disabilities discussed above, the meanings apply conceptual metonymy; missing body parts

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[64] This can also be observed for well-known, conventionalized, and traditionally called "dead metaphors" such as 'table leg' or German *Tischbein* "table leg", where speakers do not hesitate to refer to the body part 'leg', while expressions like 'learn by heart' or German *verrückt werden* "become crazy (lit. become disarranged, relocated)" are often dispatched by statements like "that's the way" or German *das sagt man so*, etc.

[65] Probably, the function "reproduction" (with "erection") of 'penis' is highlighted here. Furthermore, "penis" is predestined according to figurativity and effect (Dirven 2003).

are linguistically realized to refer to negative (or missing) mental constitutions. For example, (a missing) mind or head is realized as an instrument for thought and is included in a metonymic chain (HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING (– WORRY)). For detailed descriptions, see the corresponding subchapters (ch.5). The tokens of this pattern are all analyzable via metonymic figures of thought (INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION). The focus on the conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION of the conceptual network for the body part term follows the conceptual strategy of disability. Relationships between culturally based instruments or containers for emotions and the emotions or personality traits as contents are conceptualized similarly to the relations between sense organs and senses. Consequently, no additional metaphorical structures are needed to describe the cognitive as well as linguistic structures.

6.5.2. PATTERN II
[BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION IS STRONG/HARD / HEAVY]

The second pattern in table 6.2. is divided according to the specific properties attributed to body parts as SEATS OF EMOTIONS. The types most often used are [BODY PART IS HARD/STRONG] and [BODY PART IS HEAVY].

[BODY PART IS HARD/STRONG] occurs with HEART, HEAD, MIND, and MOUTH. This pattern using _-tsat_ "hard/strong" is not primarily utilized to express emotions (only "desire" is included here), rather, diverse personality traits (e.g. STUBBORNNESS, FLINTINESS, DETERMINATENESS) are expressed. The stative verb _-tsat_ means "strong", "hard" and "tough", and is used for both concrete and abstract senses (in combination with "ground", "meat", "smell", "person").[66] The conceptual metaphor PHYSICAL HARDNESS IS MENTAL HARDNESS is not assumed here. Instead of such a borrowing of structure

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[66] For "hard", two other verb stems are found in the corpus: _-géét_ and _-tl'a_.

from the concept of a hard object, the view taken here assigns the described features of HARDNESS to personality traits as their intrinsic conceptual aspects. The "linguistic conceptualization" promotes the usage of the lexical item *-tsat* "be hard/strong" to express these aspects. The specific semantic components included in the basic meaning of something hard (as well as something soft/weak) are: IMPENETRABILITY, WEIGHT (CRUELTY), DENSITY, CONTINUANCE, CONSISTENCY, RESISTIBILITY, but also RESILIANCE/TOUGHNESS. They are not taken from the source and mapped onto the abstract target, but are intrinsically included in the concept of FLINTINESS, in Beaver especially IMPENETRABILITY and RESISTIBILITY. A hard object is impenetrable, tight, and not flexible, parallel to persons being hard-hearted, i.e. less vulnerable.

Our limited physiological capabilities cause such realizations. These, in turn promote the accessibility of correspondences to experiences with and conceptualizations of concrete entities and events[67]. The parallel aspect of IMPENETRABILITY is found in both concepts, in HARD-HEARTEDNESS as well as in concepts of concrete objects like rocks. The fact that rocks are impervious, or resist impact from outside is something easy to understand and communicate. Emotions, on the other hand, are so deeply embedded in oneself that it is not self-explanatory or experienced in an objective way via sensory perception. The Beaver concept of HARD-HEARTEDNESS as primarily affecting the hard-hearted person, and not other persons suffering from the 'cold' behavior, suits the idea of IMPENETRABILITY: the hard-hearted person does not (immediately and explicitly) react to events which evoke certain emotions (see ch. 5.7.3.2.).

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[67] It is important to note that the limitations of our physiology also guide and restrict comprehension of concrete experiences – we conceptualize gravity, density and similar phenomena according to cultural models about the world. This becomes visible in comparison to scientific explanations and definitions of such physical facts.

The concept of HEAVINESS includes the aspects WEIGHT, LOAD, PRESSURE/BURDEN and DEPRESSION. In combination with mental states, some of these facets are not metaphorically transferred for concept creation, but are real and objective effects of SADNESS and SORROW or WORRY (Ungerer 1995, Kövecses, Palmer & Dirven 2003). Physiologically, the body reacts to such emotions with a feeling of being over-loaded, and there is an interrelated downward tendency due to DEPRESSION.[68] Consequently, there is no need for transfer of any other conceptual structures concretely representing WEIGHT or DEPRESSION. Instead, linguistic conceptualization resorts to the lexical item *-kǫįl* "be heavy" as linguistic material more tightly linked to concrete entities with similar features. In chapter 5.7.3.4., the Beaver construction *sadzéé' nakǫįl* "I am sad, I worry (lit. my heart is heavy)" is described as realizing metonymic structures in relation to physiological effects of SADNESS. Analogously, *satsíí' nakǫįl* "I worry (lit my head is heavy)" manifests the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy and additionally reflects the metonymic chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING (– WORRY). The conceptual metaphor PHYSICAL WEIGHT IS MENTAL WEIGHT assumed by the CMT overstates the transfer of structure to establish or strengthen the concept of the emotion and mental state, for SADNESS and WORRY respectively (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Kövecses 2000, 2010). In the alternative description of the data, the physiological experiences are assumed to be focused on. Additionally, they are supported by the choice of linguistic material actually connected to concrete entities. Hence, semantic and conceptual aspects included in "be heavy" already constitute part of the structure of SADNESS. This further justifies the usage of this stative verb instead of creating and establishing completely new lexical items.

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[68] The German idiomatic form *niedergedrückt sein* „feel sad (lit. depressed)" expresses exactly the same conceptual aspect.

In table 6.3., the conceptual aspects extracted from the basic meanings of "be strong/hard" and "be heavy" are subsumed:

HARD-HEARTEDNESS	(heart) is hard/strong	IMPENETRABILITY
STUBBORNNESS	(head) is hard/strong	RESISTANCE, IMPENETRABILITY
BE POWERFUL / DETERMINED	(mind) is hard/strong	RESILIANCE/TOUGHNESS
PERSUADE, BOTHER	(mouth) is hard/strong	PENETRABILITY, INSISTENCE
DESIRE	(mind) is hard/strong	RESISTANCE / FORCE[69]
SADNESS / WORRY	(heart) is heavy	WEIGHT, DEPRESSION
WORRY	(head) is heavy	WEIGHT, DEPRESSION

Table 6.3.: conceptual aspects used in pattern II

In a network visualization, the conceptual aspects are arranged in the following form:

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[69] Here, the experiencer has no control over his will, i.e. her/his mind acts uncontrollably.

Figure 6.3.: Conceptual network of –*tsat* "be strong/hard"

6.5.3. PATTERN III [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION FALLS OUT]

In the third pattern in table 6.2., specific activities of body parts are expressed, correlating with an emphasis on the conceptual aspect SEAT OF EMOTION of the terms. While all verbs in their prototypical meanings represent activities not able to be performed by body parts (nor by SEATS OF EMOTIONS), the conceptual aspects included in their networks reveal an additional category or domain which includes both senses, both its prototypical meaning and senses in abstract usages (i.e. X AND Y SHOW Z_{xy}).

Thus, in the case of emotions or mental states including aspects like (LOSS OF) SELF-DETERMINATION – e.g. in ANGER, (SUDDENLY) REMEMBER, DESIRE, BE DIZZY, but also DIE – this feature is linguistically implicated in the forms due to the significance of self-control for self-conception and other Beaver cultural models.

The verbs used include these relevant aspects in their structures (see also ch. 6.5.2. and 6.5.3.):

ANGER	(heart) falls out	SUDDEN MOTION (UNCONTROLLED)
REMEMBER	(mind) runs	SUDDEN MOTION/CHANGE OF STATE (UNCONTROLLED)
DIE	(heart) stops run	PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECT / SUDDEN MOTION/CHANGE OF STATE (UNCONTROLLED)
BE DIZZY	(head) is spinning	LOSS OF ORIENTATION (UNCONTROLLED)

Table 6.4.: Conceptual aspects used for pattern III

The constructions all reflect physiological or psychological effects of the meaning or concept meant and utilize these for linguistic manifestations.

The identified linguistic and structural subpattern [BODY PART FALLS OUT] used to express ANGER constitutes a case including the objective physiological effect of pressure as a potential candidate for underlying metonymic conceptualization. On the other hand, the form does not allow for an unequivocal indication of PRESSURE, as will be discussed in the next part.

ANGER seems not to be conveyed by the simple absence of the organ. In this case, the first pattern suits the idea and is available, but not applied for this emotion: [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] is one of the most productive paradigms (see also ch. 6.5.6.). It highlights the lack of a body part to express disabilities and personality traits like *sadzii wǫdyué'* "be deaf (my ears do not exist)" or *sadee nadyué'* "be blind (lit. my eyes do not exist)" via the metonymic structure INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION. Here, even more obvious than in the case of the patterns [BODY PART PERFORMS UNCONTROLLED/SUDDEN MOTION] assigned to ANGER, no causation is directly included in the semantic structure. Rather, absence is the idea focused on and the crucial aspect – expressed in an image-schematic style – to arrive at the intended meanings. Speakers explain these idioms with a metonymic link between the body part or instrument and the action performed via these instruments. This form can also be accounted for without relation to a conceptual metaphor, so that no copy of structure need to be assumed. The conceptual aspect INCOMPLETENESS / LACK or FAILURE / MALFUNCTION works for both domains or concepts.

According to recent literature and hypotheses of the CMT, the Beaver ANGER idiom would allow an analysis that classifies this expression as a manifestation of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS PRESSURE IN A CONTAINER. The physiological effect of perceived PRESSURE when getting angry is linked via embodiment to this conceptual metaphor. Consequently, the linguistically expressed ejection or dropping of the heart is understood as an overflow caused by this PRESSURE built up inside the angry person and as a copy of the concrete domain's structure, i.e. PHYSICAL PRESSURE. Concerning the

Beaver data, besides this theoretical assumption, there is no further evidence for this conceptual metaphor to be included in the linguistic expression: neither a semantic analysis of this idiom and other related ones indicates pressure, nor any of the statements given by the speakers. Instead, there are other candidates allowing for a coherent explanation of this construction. SELF-DETERMINATION and INDEPENDENCE are already alluded to in chapter 5.7.3. These conceptual features are highly relevant for the Beaver people and might lead to the choice of vocabulary including notions of control.

The act of falling out is an uncontrolled motion, a movement whose single components are not executable individually. Furthermore, an object falling out is more likely to be a passive object, and not a subject with self-control consciously and willingly falling out. Thus, "fall out" in combination with heart as SEAT OF EMOTION reflects and highlights the aspects of SUDDEN MOTION and a MENTAL CHANGE OF STATE which cannot be fully controlled or manipulated by the subject. The Beaver concept of persons as being self-governed, not influenced by others or controlling the behavior of others, plays an important role in many models, and is tightly linked to the concept of self-control (Mills 1986, Goulet 1998). Similarly, statements about instances of intellectual events like "(suddenly) remember" are mostly based on the unexpected advent of knowledge or memories themselves, as well as the notion of suddenness.

The pattern comprising the ANGER idiom is analyzed as being based on the language-specific concept [BODY PART PERFORMS UNCONTROLLED/SUDDEN MOTION] (cf. table 6.4.). The other figurative expressions included here are *sįįdyíí' náátl'a* "to (suddenly) remember (lit. my mind runs)", and *madzéé' łííníítl'a* "to die (lit. his/her heart stopped running)" (see also 6.5.4. below). Both utilize a metaphorical motion of the body parts included, i.e. mind (see ch. 5.4.) and heart. For "die", on the other hand, there exists an indication of well-known physiological effects. "(Suddenly) remember" and the ANGER idiom linguistically manifest SUDDEN MOTION / CHANGE OF STATE, probably combined with lack

of control, or powerlessness, since the activities of the SEAT OF EMOTION are not capable of being influenced by the experiencer. The conceptual difference between the two forms is that *sįįdyíí' náátl'a* "(suddenly) remember (lit. my mind runs)" does not involve any physiological effects. In the case of ANGER, there indeed exist complementary physiological experiences. These are not as concrete and classifiable as, for example, increased heartbeat in EXCITEMENT. Still, pressure, increase in body temperature, etc. are objective and perceivable effects. The question is if these are also conceptualized and linguistically manifested. The alternative description using the formula X AND Y SHOW Z_{xy} seems more evident: *sadzéé' xaats'at* "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)" suits and highlights experienced loss of or reduced (self-)control when a person gets angry, and is combined with the idea of absence of heart as SEAT OF (SELF-) CONTROL. This is an aspect worthy of conceptualization and linguistic realization, in conformance with the essentialness of self-control and individual freedom for the Beaver people.

6.5.4. PATTERN III [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION IS RUNNING]

In the case of *sįįdyíí' náátl'a* "(suddenly) remember (lit. my mind runs)", the metalinguistic statements reveal that one characteristic of this mental activity is LACK OF CONTROL over what you remember, how and when. Here, this reduced self-control is not really negative – so "suddenly remember" does not have a bad connotation, nor is it necessarily another person that influences the one remembering. What is experienced, is a change in mental state, which overwhelms the experiencer[70]:

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[70] Note the similar construction in German: *über jemanden kommen* "overcome", *übermannen* "overwhelm, overcome (lit. to over-man)".

Consultant101: mįdyį náátl'e ("s/he (suddenly) remembers (lit. his/her mind runs (uncontr.)"). That's run- you know, you're thinking all over, you- I hear my grandpa used to say: mįdyį náátl'e He used to say, "your mind is- runs fast". If now you- and if somebody start telling you about this, ooh, your mind- like my mind runs way back, that's what he meant. I used to do that, them, too, they're thinking the same way. That was then, long ago, that's what he meant, my grandpa. mįdyį náátl'e.

Researcher: Like "it's all over"? [researcher understood *natlǫ́* "be lots", CP]

Consultant101: Not all over, but your mind comes- just snaps right now. If somebody's telling you something somewhere else, right away your mind comes back to something. Tell me something like- oh, yeah, that time, too, they used to do this, my grandpa he tell me. And that's why my grandpa- I guess he's- that's what I guess my grandpa used to mean, your mind he runs, your mind is fast. Your mind is fast, that's what náátl'e means, "it's fast". Yeah. […] Right away you think back. That's what he meant. I used to wonder what he means, and now I know what he means, as I get older. Their mind works fast, that's what it means, their mind works fast.

(metaphor100)

So, although it is the person remembering, her/his mind's activity includes fast and uncontrolled aspects reflecting part of the conceptual structure of "(suddenly) remember".

The verb contained in the idiom *sįįdyíí' náátl'a* "(suddenly) remember", -*tl'a* "run", does not evoke the concept of a running animal or stumbling person, Therefore, it is not necessarily an adoption of this conceptual structure. Rather, there exists a similarity between the two forms of a fast and SUDDEN MOTION and CHANGE OF STATE, with the main difference situated on the abstract-concrete continuum. The fast motion or change of state instance clearly

observable in the case of body motion is more available and therefore easier to communicate, but "suddenly remember" also includes this aspect in its structure. Accordingly, "linguistic conceptualization" is at work: there is a tendency to adopt linguistic terminology from the best or prototypical example of FAST and SUDDEN MOTION or CHANGE OF STATE – e.g. "run", or "fall (out)".

The pattern applied for *sįdyį' náátl'a* "suddenly remember (lit. my mind runs)" is also found combining the body part "heart" with the verb stem *tl'a* "run" to refer to death: *madzéé' łííníítl'a* "s/he died (lit. her/his heart stopped running)". For both meanings, "die" as well as "suddenly remember", the aspect of SUDDENNESS is identified and linguistically realized in the expressions via the verb meaning ("Your man- mind is fast", that's what it means […]. (metaphor100)). Both linguistically manifest sudden movements of the SEAT OF EMOTION, which also implies that the activities of the SEATS OF EMOTIONS are not capable of being controlled by the experiencer.

EXCITEMENT theoretically would also suit this pattern, since the increased heartbeat as a physiological effect of EXCITEMENT is verbalized, and also includes the aspect of LACK OF CONTROL – an excited or even scared person does not have full control, neither over her/himself nor over the situation at hand. Yet, this aspect is not highlighted or used to linguistically express this emotion or mental state. Instead, usage of the verb *dáh-dlihts* "dance" focuses more on the MARKED RHYTHMIC MOTION the heart performs in such situations.

sįįdyį́í' náátsat "desire (my mind is hard/strong)" is a similar case, concentrating on the feature of LACK OF CONTROL. The subject is obsessed by this emotion and not self-determined anymore, because DESIRE is a strong force reducing the power of oneself or one's mind. For *sadzéé' tyíhsane* "I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)", the concept of PITY is used to express this emotion which the experiencing person cannot manage in a conscious way. Complete

control is indeed not available for emotions or personality traits in general, but for such negative feelings, this aspect is particularly noticeable. And similarly, when one feels dizzy, one loses orientation and control over one's behaviour or one's situation or condition.

madzéé' łííníítl'a "die (lit. his/her heart stopped running)" or DEATH is self-explanatory concerning control or determination, a dying person does not play an active part. For *madzéé' łííníítl'a* "die (lit. his/her heart stopped running)", the concepts of SUDDEN CHANGE OF STATE and LACK OF CONTROL are applied. The abstract concept of DEATH already contains characteristics suiting the concrete concept of (LOCO)MOTION (here, the cessation of motion). Additionally, the linguistic expressions of this concept ((LOCO)MOTION) refer to a prototypical activity experienced by every person or member of the speech community[71]. They are copied for verbal manifestation and communication of the intended meaning, namely the abstract event of DEATH.

6.5.5. PATTERN III [BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION IS DANCING]

In the constructions with -*dzéé* "heart" conceptualized as BODY PART, figurativity is caused by the non-prototypical usages of *dáh-dlihts* "dance" and -*tl'a* "run". Accordingly, the constructions for "death" (*madzéé' łííníítl'a* lit. 'his/her heart stopped running') and "survive" (*madzéé' da'atl'izǫ* lit. 'my heart is still dancing') are figurative linguistic forms. These verbs are transferred from their prototypical domain LOCOMOTION to describe the tense and relax activities of heart as a muscle: for "death", the end of (LOCO)MOTION is linguistically realized, while "survive / be still alive" refers to the continuation of

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[71] The concept reflected by the linguistic form and especially by the verb with its semantic structure explicitly including the aspect of lack of control requires speakers and hearers to be familiar with this way of linguistic manifestation, foreigners may not be able to get the whole intended message.

(LOCO)MOTION. The mentioned activities of the "heart" can be defined as agitation or motion – and therefore similar to LOCOMOTION, sharing specific conceptual aspects.

These transfers are analyzed as using the "linguistic conceptualizations" of the specific conceptual aspects included in both source and target concepts. The forms in question are defined as utilizing the conceptual components found in, for example, the verb "dance", i.e. MARKED RHYTHMIC MOTION. This aspect is focused on when employing the idiom for *madzéé gáák'áá dáh'atl'is* "survive (lit. his/her heart is still dancing)": it is paralleled in the domain of DANCE as 'artificial human behavior', and in the domain of life and body function, as heartbeat. This metonymic chain from life to function of the organ "heart" is non-figurative, but the usage of "dance" evokes figurativity to some degree. This is due to the fact that this lexeme is tightly linked to other contexts, subjects and usages. Additionally, other aspects from the DANCE domain are available, such as the positive connotation or context of DANCE. In the case of "survive, be still alive", this conceptual baggage (see also ch. 2.2.2.1.) of the linguistic item is used to further support the intended meaning. This means that, linguistically, the concrete activity expressed via the verb "dance" is used to express the less known activity of the heart to refer to the abstract domain SURVIVE. This is done via the shared aspect MARKED RHYTHMIC MOTION. The DANCE concept is more available, since it is concrete and experienced by all members of the speech community in the same fashion. The conventionalized conceptualization of DANCE is defined and established by the cultural models of the community. On the other hand, the function of "heart" is neither well-known nor (ad hoc) explainable.

For EXCITEMENT / FEAR (*madzéé' dah'atl'is* "s/he is excited / scared (lit. his/her heart is dancing)") the same linguistic conceptualization is employed. However, for this emotion speakers no longer refer to the positive connotation of DANCE, i.e. the conceptual baggage is at least not consciously employed. This

suits the fact that EXCITEMENT may be a positive, but also a negative mental state. Still, the same conceptual aspect MARKED RHYTHMIC MOTION perfectly fits the need to express an increased heartbeat as an effect of EXCITEMENT. This is done without consequently evoking concepts of DANCE in its full structure. Merely the parallel characteristic of both concepts EXCITEMENT and DANCE is linguistically expressed via the lexical item *dáh-dlihts* "dance".

6.5.6. PATTERN V [HEART DOES NOT EXIST]

-dzéé "heart" is not included as SEAT OF EMOTION in the realization of the pattern [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] (ch. 6.5.1). Instead, it is found in a separate but similar pattern ([BODY PART DOES NOT EXIST]): *adyuu sadzéé' ghólįį* "be timid, coward / be heartless". This form constitutes the only token identified so far in the corpus.[75] The form is polysemous, referring to TIMIDNESS / RECREANCE as well as HEARTLESSNESS in appropriate contexts. Concerning the meaning TIMIDNESS / RECREANCE, this expression forms the negative equivalent to *sadzéé' ghólįį* "be brave (lit. my heart exists)", constituing the only token found for the affirmative structure [BODY PART EXISTS]. These constructions emphasize the unique status of the body part term "heart" in the class of body parts realized in the described patterns to express emotions and personality traits.

TIMIDNESS / RECREANCE as an antonymic concept of *sadzéé' ghólįį* "I am brave (lit. my heart exists)" is translated as *adyuu sadzéé' ghólįį* "be timid, cowardly (lit. my heart does not exist)". It is construed via negation of the bravery idiom, i.e. no antonymic lexical item is applied. Speakers also refer to this form in relation to HEARTLESSNESS as similarly conceptualized in English:

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[75] The notion of pattern is used here despite the fact that only one token is defined so far, qualifying its status.

researcher: Could I also say "he has no heart"? Does that have a meaning, when you say about someone "he has no heart"? Or you wouldn't say that?

Consultant404: As we say **adyuu sad<u>z</u>éé' ghǫ́lįį** ("s/he is heartless (lit. his/her heart does not exist)"). "He's got no heart."

researcher: When would you say that? […] That's like he doesn't take pity on other people?

Consultant404: Yeah, that means all that. (metaphors003)

This variation in meaning and usage reflects missing contextual clues and embeddedness in a situation of neither COWARDICE nor HEARTLESSNESS. Consequently, the choice of one meaning over another is due to chance in an elicitation session. Yet, these data do not imply a lack of knowledge due to the endangered status of the language or the limited competence of speakers. This is also confirmed by variation in such forms found cross-linguistically. Rather, this reflects the varying scope of a source domain (Kövecses 2006) (see also ch. 3.2.2.1.). The Beaver form *mįįdyíí' náátsat* literally meaning "my mind is hard/strong" of pattern II (see ch. 5.4.2. and ch. 6.5.2) also reflects this context-dependent variation: the form expresses DETERMINACY, POWER and DESIRE.

6.5.7. LINGUISTIC PATTERNS & VARIATION

The patterns I and V described in the preceding paragraphs (6.4. & 6.5.) do not necessarily allow for similar combinations or usages of body parts and properties due to analogous conceptual meanings, nor are they substitutable among each other. For example, when asked for **sad<u>z</u>éé' nadyué'* (lit. "my heart does not exist"), speakers deny this form and reject it as unknown, in form as well as in meaning (see ch. 6.5.7.). Thus, although very similar underlying concepts are evoked, the conventional linguistic constructions block other forms despite appropriate conceptualizations. This reveals the strong conceptual

relations holding between the underlying concepts used to refer to emotions or personality traits, and the linguistic patterns applied. Although a missing or lost heart constitutes the meaning of *adyuu sadzéé' ghólįį* "be timid / heartless (lit. my heart does not exist)", and therefore shows quite similar semantic aspects to **sadzéé' nadyué'* (lit. "my heart does not exist"), the latter is not accepted.

This again substantiates the relevance of conventionalized linguistic patterns and language use (Evans 2010a): it is not only conceptual structure generating and governing figurative language. Influence of the identified linguistic patterns (chapter 6.4.) seems to play a role as determining as the usage of non-linguistic aspects like physical experiences for conceptualizations of emotions, and disability. Once a pattern like [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION] is conventionalized in a speech community, efficiency and economy promote their usage. At the same time a decrease in the transparency of semantic and conceptual aspects of the linguistic forms as tokens is observed. Furthermore, linguistic metaphors strengthen the status of linguistic patterns via the strategies applied in "linguistic conceptualization": established patterns constitute secured methods for new expressions of abstract concepts lacking a substantiated linguistic structure – but not lacking conceptual structure. Concepts whose physiological effects allow for the employment of concept-supporting metonymy or metonymy-based metaphor use conventionalized linguistic ways for communication of intended meanings.

7. CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK

The present work presents a description of linguistic and conceptual structures of polysemous body part terms in Beaver. It aims at presenting the language- and culture-specific conceptualizations of this essential part of the mental lexicon, and shows that body parts constitute a complex field of conceptual and linguistic patterns. Furthermore, emotion expressions comprising body part terms are analyzed with respect to their underlying conceptualizations. The interplay between embodiment, cultural models and linguistic patterns is identified as essential for the linguistic manifestations. This work is also a contribution to cognitive linguistics in that it comprises new evidence to critically discuss theoretical assumptions concerning the relationship between language and thought. More precisely, the specific part terms in the Beaver mental lexicon are examined against the background of conceptual network and conceptual metaphor approaches (Langacker 1987, 2000, Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 2006[1993], Kövecses 2007, Kövecses & Csábi 2009) in order to understand the mechanisms underlying non-literal and figurative language use. The analyses of the data reveal that the relations between cognitive and linguistic structure are highly complex and bound to diverse factors influencing the processing and understanding of linguistic structures. Consequently, embodiment and cultural models, linguistic patterns and conventionalization, conceptual correspondences and linguistic manifestations have to be carefully integrated into descriptions of idiomatic expressions. To sum up briefly:

- the semantic networks of body part terms show gradual transitions between the conceptual aspects BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION

- the figurative expressions are based on conceptual metonymy;
- at the same time, conceptual metaphor and metonymy do not suffice to grasp the conceptual networks of the polysemous body part lexemes
- cognitive, but also linguistic mechanisms determine the distinct meanings and usages: the notion of "linguistic conceptualization" allows for a coherent description of the emotion expressions

In the next paragraphs, results as well as aspects for further research will be presented. First, there is a brief recapitulation of the linguistic and conceptual patterns of the Beaver data, followed by a discussion of the notion of "linguistic conceptualization" introduced to capture the coherence and processing of linguistic material. Thereafter, the theoretical aspects focused on in this thesis – especially the relevance and status of conceptual and linguistic structures for figurative meanings – will be revisited. They will also be associated with phenomena like cultural models and linguistic economy which are equally relevant for the understanding of language-specific forms.

7.1. BEAVER METONYMIES AND PATTERNS

Concerning the Beaver body part terms, the conceptualization SEAT OF EMOTION is identified as part of a structure similar to a conceptual metaphor (SEAT OF EMOTION IS BODY PART). This is based on the realization of the body part terms found in numerous expressions linking emotions, personality traits and mental states to specific body parts. Furthermore, the corresponding metalinguistic statements affirm this additional conceptual aspect for specific body parts. 'Similar to' means that this conceptual structure does not conform to the definition of conceptual metaphor. Rather, a seamless transition from source to target concept and the availability of both in the usages of the

terms are presumed, i.e. both belong to one conceptual network. Accepting this conception of the body part terms, in chapters 5 and 6 it was shown that the main conceptual strategy used is metonymy. Independent of the focused conceptual aspect of the body part term (i.e. BODY PART or SEAT OF EMOTION) we find several specifications of the general metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION for the body part term (not for the whole idiomatic construction). To give two examples: MOUTH FOR TALK in (92) and HEAD FOR WORRY in (93):

(92) *sazáá' ghǫdyuéʼ*   "I am not talkative (lit. my mouth is not there)"
(93) *satsííʼ nakǫil*   "I worry (lit. my head is heavy)"

The conceptual network of <u>*zís*</u> "skin/hide" is the only body term described in this thesis which is not used in expressions of emotion. Here, the points of departure for the derived senses and usages constitute examples of the metonymy WHOLE FOR PART, more specific SKIN FOR MATERIAL in (94) and SKIN FOR CONTAINER in (95), to give two examples:

(94) *a<u>zís</u>*   "canvas (lit. its skin/hide)"
(95) *súúdagán <u>zís</u>*   "salt shaker (lit. salt skin/hide)"

Looking at the meanings of the whole idiomatic constructions, the metonymy BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION FOR PERSON is often consulted for expressions of emotion (but also disability):

(96) *sad<u>zéé</u>' tyíhsane*   "I am lonely (lit. my heart is pitiful)"

Furthermore, CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED is applied in the following examples:

(97) *sadzéé' ghǫ́lįį*   "I am brave (lit. my heart exists)"

(98) *sįįdyíí' natlǫ*   "I worry (lit. my minds are lots)"

EFFECT FOR CAUSE with the specific instances HEARTBEAT FOR LIFE as in (99) and HEARTBEAT FOR EXCITEMENT / FEAR as in (100) constitutes figures of thought regularly found in the Beaver expressions for emotions and personality traits:

(99) *madzéé gáák'áá dah'atl'is*   "s/he is still alive"

                                     (lit. his/her heart is still dancing)"

(100) *madzéé dah'atl'is*   "s/he is excited / scared"

                                       (lit. his/her heart is dancing)"

Another point reflected by the various meanings of the Beaver body part expressions is that identical constructions do not automatically manifest the same underlying conceptual strategies. Rather, metonymic chains, non-literal and figurative structures are all identified for different tokens of the same linguistic pattern. It was shown that expressions equally constituting tokens of the same pattern either rely on figurative metonymic chains or alternatively show only descriptive structures.

Similarly, conceptualizations of the Beaver body part terms in one pattern vary from basic, literal meanings (i.e. concrete BODY PART senses) to SEAT OF EMOTION senses with a gradual mixing of the BODY PART and SEAT OF EMOTION senses in between. For example, *satsíí' náátsat* "be stubborn (lit. my head is hard/strong)" as a token of the pattern II [BODY PART IS HARD/STRONG] relies on a metonymic chain founded on embodiment: the personality traits are linked to psychological states taking place in the head and therefore connected the expressed body part. On the other hand, *sadzéé'*

nááⱡtsat "be flinty, hard-hearted (lit. my heart is hard/strong)" focuses on the SEAT OF EMOTION concept of "heart". Hence, it reflects a socio-culturally created and conventionalized relationship between the personality trait indicated (FLINTINESS / HARD-HEARTEDNESS) and the body part. FLINTINESS is linked to the heart not only via embodiment as in the form above, but also via a combination of embodied experiences with cultural models. In the case of the first pattern, [NO BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION], the descriptive meaning of *satⱡsán náádyué'* "be skinny (lit. my flesh is not there)" depicts the missing substance to express THINNESS. On the other hand, *satⱡsíídué'* "be crazy (lit. my head is not there)" applies figurative metonymy, and reflects the metonymic chain HEAD (– BRAIN) – MIND – INTELLIGENCE – THOUGHTS – THINKING (– WORRY). Here, the pattern does not refer to the real absence of "head", while for "be skinny" a more literal interpretation is available. Rather, the body part term *-tsíí* "head" stands for the abstract target concept INSANITY via the metonymy INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION. This form is figuratively and semantically construed differently than *satⱡsán náádyué'* "be skinny (lit. my flesh is not there)", although both linguistic structures and the lexical items included (body part terms) show some similarity. Gradual shifts and the availability of both conceptual aspects in one linguistic form are found in many Beaver forms.

The data also discloses the danger in cognitive linguistics of explaining cognitive structures on the basis of linguistic forms. Although Lakoff and others explicitly state a clear distinction between linguistic and conceptual structures, evidence for conceptual mechanisms most often consists of linguistic forms. This – of course – is owing to the problem of investigating indirectly accessible conceptual structure, but regardless, this does not justify the overuse of linguistic evidence.

7.2. "Linguistic Conceptualization"

As an attempt to resolve the problematic relationship between linguistic and conceptual metaphor, the distinction between cognitive and linguistic conceptualization is included and elaborated in the analysis in this work. This is done in order to get reliable results about the relationship between cognitive processes and linguistic manifestations thereof. According to the data, these two interrelated sub-areas in semantic and conceptual structure allow for a more objective analysis of the linguistic structure, without reading conceptual structure into the forms. For the Beaver data, linguistic conceptualization is presumed to extract conceptual aspects of lexemes prototypically found in collocations with vocabulary expressing concrete meanings. This makes further adoption of conceptual structure of an unrelated concrete source domain redundant. Consequently, conceptual metaphor is not included in the analyses of the figurative constructions. For example, the usage of the verb of (loco)motion "run" in *sįįdyíí' náátl'a* "(suddenly) remember (lit. my mind runs)" is not defined as including the conceptual domain of LOCOMOTION in the domain of REMEMBER. Rather, the conceptual aspect (SUDDEN) MOTION / CHANGE OF STATE – already included in the existing conceptual structure of REMEMBER – is highlighted and extracted in this usage of the verb. Therefore, the form X AND Y SHARE Z_{XY} is suggested instead of the rigid form X IS Y of the CMT for complex structures like expressions of emotion utilizing body part terms with specific conceptualizations.

7.3. Abstract Domains and Conceptual Metaphors

The notion of "linguistic conceptualization" touches on another assumption in the CMT: the status of abstract conceptual structure. One aspect

of the reasoning for conceptual metaphor is the assumed insufficiency or even lack of structure on the part of abstract targets. Abstract domains – and abstraction in general – are said to be in need of substance taken from concrete concepts. This is questioned here in two ways: first, it is shown that abstract domains like emotions, personality traits etc. do have conceptual structure, but use existing lexical structure to be expressed. Second, if abstract notions have to be substantiated and filled up via structure of concrete concepts, basic conceptual metaphors lose their foundation or means of existence, since they also constitute quite abstract concepts. Although most of the Beaver constructions are described without the inclusion of numerous conceptual metaphors, this thesis certainly does not aim at completely abandoning the concept or the theory. Rather, the data point out that modification of the assumptions about cognitive mechanisms and the relationships between linguistic and conceptual structures must be taken into account.

7.4. STRUCTURAL AND METHODOLOGICAL VARIETY

For this purpose, more cross-linguistic studies and data are needed to verify theoretical hypotheses about the influence of cognitive processes on linguistic structures. Furthermore, this cannot be done in isolation. Other well-known linguistic phenomena like lexicalization, ambiguity and polysemy, analogy in form and meaning as well as conventionalization play their roles in such complex structures as semantic and conceptual networks. The section of the mental lexicon described in this thesis – i.e. body part terms in basic and derived senses and usages – mirrors the complexity of non-literal structures. The forms and meanings cannot be explained only on the basis of the conceptual metaphor X IS Y and the idea of concrete source and abstract target domains. Furthermore, the expressions require careful and distinct analyses due to their complexity at the linguistic and the conceptual level: the idioms contain various

body part terms with different BODY PART / SEAT OF EMOTION conceptualizations to express emotions and personality traits. Furthermore, the conceptualizations of the body part terms differ in their meanings and figurativity from the meaning constructions found on the level of the complete idiomatic expressions.

In addition, the notion of creativity and the linguistic principle of economy, favoring polysemy and vagueness, cannot be excluded from the description of the mental lexicon. As a communication tool, language offers nearly perfect tools for the comprehension of ambiguous expressions: context and conventionalized patterns and rules allow for arriving at the intended meanings created via elaboration of existing linguistic material. Although these are not consciously available processes, speakers have subtle access to such structures and offer relevant contributions to linguistic and cognitive investigations.

7.5. THE RELEVANCE OF METALINGUISTICS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF NON-LITERAL AND FIGURATIVE MEANINGS

The inclusion of metalinguistic statements – where available – clearly enriches the database and gives relevant insights into the mental lexicon. For the investigation of the conceptualizations of body part terms in this work, fruitful comments illuminated the subtle differences and intersections between the different conceptual aspects highlighted in the various usages. No metalinguistic statements were accessible for meanings of the whole idiomatic expressions and the postulated components of the attributes included in source and target domains (e.g. SELF-DETERMINATION in the case of "fall out" and MARKED RHYTHMIC MOTION in the case of "dance"). For further research, carefully elaborated questions and discussion stimuli for additional metalinguistic material

must be devised, since helpful hints and explanations can be expected for these forms as well.

This is also assumed for senses with several consecutively ranked derivations. For example, it seems revealing to further analyze the literal meaning of *tl'ǫ́ǫ́dze* "onion (lit. like a rope)" in constructions like *tl'ǫ́ǫ́dze zís* "gallon (lit. onion skin/hide)". *tl'ǫ́ǫ́dze* "onion" literally means "like a rope" and refers to the idea of highlighting or focusing on the long end of this cultivated plant[76]. Therefore, the conceptual aspect SHAPE of a "rope" is used to refer to the real plant referent. While this relation to "rope" is given by the speakers in discussions dealing with the plant "onion", it is hardly accessed while talking about the container or measure "gallon". Such 'two or more steps back' conceptualization or comprehension is also found to be restricted for the meaning of *íídzáa* "[nickname] (lit. little strawberry (potentially: little little heart))", where the notion of "heart" is not present ad hoc in the speakers' realization of the linguistic form. Phenomena like lexicalization, fossilization and the traditional notion of "dead metaphors" will benefit from metalinguistic statements in cross-linguistic studies.

Finally, a classification of figurative and non-prototypical meanings would be useful for drawing lines between differently caused, differently influenced, and differently processed aspects used in the various senses – especially in the context of speakers' consciousness. For further descriptions of the structures of a mental lexicon, the following classification of what is and is not available for speakers might be elaborated: what deliberately makes sense in the underlying cultural or folk model(s), and what is not the object of any expedient, sensible and intellectual consideration due to the fact that the pivotal point is not available for speakers' awareness and knowledge. According to metalinguistic

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[76] Without any socio-culturally embedded knowledge of the conceptualization, the term could also be translated as "onion skin", which in English refers to the paring of an onion, or – metaphorically transferred to – "flimsy paper".

statements and reasoning, a distinction between transferred or non-prototypical meanings in terms of their accessibility might be established including the following three categories:

1. Conceptual meanings which are accessible as well as explainable, and show availability of the relationships between literal and intended meanings. For example, for English "table *leg*", the realization of a table consisting of parts in analogy to a body and the relation to the concept of the body part 'leg' as a limb of an entity are accessed. For the Beaver expression *ats'ǫ́ts'adé'* "chokecherries (lit. somebody's excrement is hard)" the literal meaning AND the relation to the intended sense are accessible and explained ("because your shit is hard when you eat them"). Similarly, *sazáa ghǫtl'ǫ* "chatterbox (lit. my mouths are lots)", *adzee'* "hearts (card suit)" and many of the descriptive terms found in the Beaver lexicon are described in detail concerning their literal meanings and the relations holding between the senses. Examples are *mak'éh'ets'ehdii* "table (lit. on it you eat)", *mak'éhts'éésty̨* "bed (lit. on it you sleep/lie)" and *dane kweléhe* "policeman (lit. person who puts people in house".

2. Meanings which are only to some degree accessible. Here, the literal meanings are accessible and are explained by speakers, but their relations to the concepts of the prototypical meanings of the parts used are not explainable (in detail). The Beaver terms *náábee* "otter (lit. it swims lots)", *sadzéé' xaats'at* "I am angry (lit. my heart falls out)", but also the container senses and usages of *-zís* "skin/hide" are good candidates: their relations to the basic meanings are to some degree mentioned, but they are not explainable ad hoc.

3. Meanings which are neither comprehensible nor accessible, and reacted to similarly to lexical roots that are not further analyzable (for example, monomorphemic verb stems cannot be further explained; asking for the literal meaning of such items is therefore futile). In Beaver, some cases seem predestined for further investigation, for example, *sjdyíge ghǫ́lįį* "I am happy" might have the literal meaning "I am up". This form is not the topic of any unsolicited metalinguistic discussion and the Beaver speakers do not access the potential underlying orientational conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP. In some discussions, they reject any orientational literal meaning and any link to dimensional qualities. Still, carefully prepared questions and stimuli might lead to elucidating statements.

To avoid any speculative analysis, careful descriptions and discussions with native speakers are needed to shed light on and understand the processes underlying such constructions and their underlying patterns of conceptualization.

Another aspect which comes up in the Beaver data is the investigation of influence of bilingualism and especially of the dominant language, here English. This language is used as metalanguage and communication tool in all sessions, accordingly, inferences are expected and constitute another area to be investigated in future.

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