Guertler, Oliver and Kraekel, Matthias (2012). Dismissal Tournaments. J. Inst. Theor. Econ.-Z. Gesamte Staatswiss., 168 (4). S. 547 - 563. TUBINGEN: J C B MOHR. ISSN 0932-4569

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We consider a dismissal tournament where the loser gets fired. Although the firm takes possible selection failures into account when choosing the optimal tournament design, the selection efficiency of a dismissal tournament is often rather low. This is because low-ability workers, possessing relatively poor outside options, have strong incentives to secure their jobs.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Guertler, OliverUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Kraekel, MatthiasUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-477223
DOI: 10.1628/093245612804469827
Journal or Publication Title: J. Inst. Theor. Econ.-Z. Gesamte Staatswiss.
Volume: 168
Number: 4
Page Range: S. 547 - 563
Date: 2012
Publisher: J C B MOHR
Place of Publication: TUBINGEN
ISSN: 0932-4569
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS; RISK-TAKING; SABOTAGE; CONTESTS; SELECTION; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; INFORMATION; EMPLOYMENT; PRINCIPAL; CONTRACTSMultiple languages
EconomicsMultiple languages
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/47722

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

Altmetric

Export

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item