The Quality of Representation in Latin America:

Linking Citizens with Political Parties

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Diplom Regionalwissenschaftlerin Lateinamerika Saskia Pauline Ruth
aus
Stuttgart
Referent: Prof. Dr. André Kaiser, Universität zu Köln

Korreferent: Juniorprofessor Ingo Rohlfing, PhD, Universität zu Köln

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Chapter 1
Introduction

“The way parties operate and create linkages of accountability and responsiveness to citizens is likely to have major consequences for the viability of democracy and the quality of its outputs” (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 15)

More than a quarter century has elapsed since the ‘Third Wave’ of democratic transition in Latin America (Huntington, 1991), but political systems in the region still struggle with achieving democratic quality. Representative institutions in this region have not yet reached a self-enforcing equilibrium and continue to produce unfavourable outcomes (Kitschelt et al., 1999). As a consequence, after two decades of research on democratic transition and the consolidation of democracy in Latin America, researchers became increasingly sceptical and concerned with the quality of democratic representation. Several deficits have been identified ranging from the weaknesses of vertical accountability mechanisms (e.g. Moreno, Crisp, & Shugart, 2003; Roberts, 2002; Coppedge, 2001) and institutions of horizontal accountability (e.g. Mainwaring & Welna, 2003; O’Donnell, 1994) to the persistence of historical legacies such as clientelism and populism (e.g. Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). Dysfunctional democratic representation, moreover, fosters growing distrust in political parties and dissatisfaction with democracy and endangers achievements of democratic consolidation that have already been made (e.g. Kitschelt et al., 1999; Dalton, 1999; Diamond & Gunther 2001). Hence, the ‘crisis of representation’ in Latin America lies
at the heart of any study concerned with the quality of democracy in this region (e.g. Diamond & Morlino 2005; Mainwaring, Bejarano, & Pizarro, 2006; Hagopian, 1998).

But what are the standards used to evaluate the quality of democratic representation? In line with the competitive model of democracy the quality of democratic representation is usually judged according to the realization of accountability and, especially, policy responsiveness (Schumpeter, 2008 [1942]; Bartolini, 1999, 2000). While repeated elections make political actors accountable to their electorate, competition between these actors for public office and power is believed to make them responsive to the policy preferences of their voters. Developed with a focus on advanced democracies, traditional theories on democratic representation rest upon the prevalent assumption of policy-based competition between political actors – an assumption which is not directly applicable to the context of new democracies.¹

In new democracies political parties are not necessarily linked to their voters based on coherent policy programs and may pursue additional or completely different electoral mobilization strategies like clientelism and personalistic linkages (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Hagopian, 2009). The idealization of policy-based representation through programmatic competition thus hampers awareness from other modes of political representation (Kitschelt, 2000). Linkage strategies that differ from the classic programmatic ones have to be integrated into the concept of party competition if new democracies are to fall into the range of a comprehensive theory of democratic representation (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Powell, 2004). To understand how democratic representation is affected by different linkage strategies we need to investigate how these relationships between political parties and their voters may affect both mechanisms of accountability and policy responsiveness.

¹The assumption even fails to hold in all established democracies since non-programmatic competition is also observable in some of them, e.g. Italy, Greece, or Belgium (see Piattoni, 2001; Roniger, 2004).
This dissertation contributes to the research agenda on the quality of democratic representation in three ways:

(1) I focus on the input-side of the representative process and systematically analyse dysfunctions of policy-based representation. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge the variety of mechanisms that establish the representative link between parties and voters. The different linkages which political parties pursue to connect themselves with the electorate ‘set the tone’ for democratic representation on the system level (see Moreno, Crisp, & Shugart, 2003). Hence, with this dissertation I highlight the importance of party-society linkages for both democratic accountability and policy responsiveness in democratic representation. As Biezen and Saward (2008) frame it the focus lies more on the ‘software’ of democratic representation – i.e. the mediating function of political parties – than on the ‘hardware’ of democracy – i.e. the institutions of representative democracy.

(2) By concentrating on a geographical region that has rather been omitted during the development of traditional theories on democratic representation and party competition I challenge their implicit assumptions and generalizability and help to re-assess them. Hence, with the focus on Latin America I seek to delimit travelling potential of concepts to new democracies, and pave the way for them to feedback on explanations of new developments in representative systems of established democracies.

(3) Finally my empirical contribution lies in the creation of an original dataset on populist presidents and parties in Latin America and the compilation of a database on party-society linkages that merges micro-, meso-, and macro-level information from public opinion surveys, expert surveys, and election statistics covering over 20,000 citizens and more than 80 political parties in 18 Latin American countries.

The remainder of this introduction is structured as follows: in section one I discuss the theoretically beneficial connection between democratic representation and political
competition with respect to democratic accountability and responsiveness. In section two I elaborate on different party-society linkages and their consequences for the quality of democratic representation. In section three I introduce the case selection and the data sources. The last section gives an overview of the four articles that form part of this cumulative dissertation.

**Democratic Representation: Accountability and Responsiveness**

A key feature of the functioning of representative democracy is competitive interaction between political parties for public office and power. The development of the competitive model of representative democracy dates back to the 1940s and 1950s, with Schumpeter (2008 [1942]), Schattschneider (2009 [1942]), and Downs (1957) as famous defenders of the unintended positive effects of party competition for the public. Although competition is by far not the only form of social interaction possible in a democratic setting\(^2\), its importance for the quality of democratic representation has often been emphasized in the literature (e.g. Sartori, 1987; Strøm, 1992). More specifically, political competition is believed to create, as unintended by-products, desirable societal outcomes such as responsiveness (see Bartolini, 1999, 2000; Downs, 1957) and innovation (Franzmann, 2011).\(^3\) Electoral systems and within them political competition are seen as the basic institutional arrangements to implement democratic representation (Powell, 2000).\(^4\)

*Accountability* and *policy responsiveness* are at the core of both theories on democratic representation and political competition (Pitkin, 1967; Strøm, 1992). Repeated, free, open, secret, and fair elections make political actors accountable to their electorate, and political competition between these actors induces them to be responsive to their voters’ policy

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\(^2\) E.g. negotiation and cooperation in consensus democracies (Lijphart, 1999).

\(^3\) Franzmann (2011) mentions innovation as a positive by-product of political competition. However, this dissertation focuses on those aspects of democratic representation that impinge on responsiveness.

\(^4\) See Powell (2000) on the two visions of electoral systems as instruments of democratic representation.
preferences. Policy responsiveness may, thereby, originate in two ways: Firstly, in line with an *accountability perspective* on democratic representation political competition enables voters to hold their representatives accountable by rewarding or punishing them retrospectively, dependent on their performance in the previous term (see Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999). Thereby, institutional mechanisms ideally induce responsive behaviour of representatives to the policy interests of citizens, since these are (according to theory) the voter’s criteria to evaluate whether to sanction them or not. If such institutional accountability arrangements function well, incumbent public officials are induced to be directly responsive to public opinion changes due to ‘rational anticipation’ of the threat of turnover (see Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995; Wlezien & Soroka, 2007). Secondly, according to the *mandate perspective* of democratic representation, responsiveness may also originate indirectly when voters select representatives prospectively according to their policy promises and when these representatives are credible to their promises, implementing the policies desired by their voters (see Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999).

But, elections alone are not sufficient to make representatives accountable for their actions. Like all principal-agent relationships, democratic representation may also be jeopardized by shirking, possibly precluding the institutional mechanisms of accountability from inducing responsive behaviour of elected officials (see Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991; Persson, Roland, & Tabellini, 1997). Hence, citizens need to be informed to evaluate the behaviour of their elected representatives in office to hold them effectively accountable (e.g. Manin, Pzeworski, & Stokes, 1999; Schmitter, 2005). Horizontal accountability mechanisms, for example, may provide citizens with necessary information to effectively use vertical accountability mechanisms (see Persson, Roland, & Tabellini, 1997; Moreno, Crisp, & Shugart, 2003).

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5 This logic is based on the assumptions that public officials are interested in reelection and have access to information about public opinion (Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995).
However, elected representatives will only respond to the policy preferences of their voters (both directly and indirectly) if they are judged and selected by this logic, and voters can only select politicians on this basis if they are offered a clear choice between different and coherent policy programs (Powell, 2000, p. 16). The assumption that democratic representation and political competition are substantially ‘programmatic’ is, however, particularly problematic for emerging democracies. Representative institutions only structure political parties’ scope of action but do not determine they link themselves to their voters (Kitschelt et al., 1999). Consequently, the quality of democratic representation depends on the type of interaction between political parties and voters, i.e. the type of party-society linkages that take hold in a political system. With different forms of party-society linkages prevailing, political competition may foster different forms of accountability and responsiveness. Thus, we need to understand how other forms of accountability relationships may affect the process of democratic representation and we need to understand how policy responsiveness, as one of the most desirable by-product of policy-based competition, is affected by various linkage strategies.

**Linking Citizens and Political Parties**

This dissertation investigates how political parties’ organizational and substantive links with their voters affect the quality of democratic representation, i.e. the realization of accountability and policy responsiveness. Since political parties are the main actors selecting political elites for elected positions in democratic states their importance for democracy has often been emphasized in the literature (Sartori, 1976; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). They have been labelled “the agents of interest mediation” (Kitschelt et al., 1999, p. 5), or “the organizations that institutionalize democracy” (Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 2008, p. 664). Thus, political parties play a dual role in representative democracies. Contingent on their mediating
position between the electorate and political institutions of the state, they are at the same time actors of the state and social organizations (Poguntke, 2002, p. 43). To fulfil their representative function and their role within contemporary democracies, political parties need to be linked with the society. To establish such a representative link with society, political parties, on the one hand, need to build extra-parliamentary organizations to structure their communication with citizens in a durable way. On the other hand, they can pursue different substantive linkage strategies based on programmatic, clientelistic, or personalistic appeals to mobilize electoral support.

**The organizational link**

To enable political parties to fulfil their mediating function in representative democracies, political competition has to provide at least a minimum of stability. Therefore political parties need to invest in organizational structures in order to connect themselves with the electorate in an on-going way. The strength of organizational party structures is usually captured by the institutionalization concept (Mainwaring & Scully 1995; Huntington, 1968; Panebianco, 1988). Political parties institutionalize when they establish regularized and rule-guided intra-organizational processes (routinization) and/or when they invest in the emotional attachment of their followers through organizational incorporation (value infusion) (Panebianco 1988, p. 49; p. 53). Such institutionalized party organizations are crucial for the stability of intraparty competition and, therefore, one foundation to assure vertical accountability of political representatives to citizens. Weakly institutionalized political parties do not provide channels of communication between citizens and elites, they increase the uncertainty of electoral outcomes, and deprive voters of meaningful choices (e.g. Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). Furthermore, political parties that are organizationally linked with society can help counter anti-party sentiments and alienation from politics that are wide-
spread among citizens in Latin American democracies (see Payne, 2006). The reasons why political parties invest in extra-parliamentary organizations, their contribution to the institutionalization of party systems, and the viability of vertical accountability are analysed in the first article of this dissertation (Chapter 2). However, organizational stability is only one factor of meaningful intraparty competition, political parties also need to represent their voters’ policy interests and aggregate them into coherent policy programmes to assure the beneficial outcomes of the competitive model of democracy. Hence, I now turn to such substantive linkages between citizens and political parties.

The linkage concept

The substantive relationship between political parties and the electorate is illustrated through the linkage concept (Kitschelt, 2000; Poguntke, 2000, 2002). In general, the concept describes an interactive connection between the electorate and the state mediated by political elites. This linkage is driven by political parties’ needs for votes to win elections and to secure their survival, irrespective of their office, vote or policy motivations (Poguntke, 2000, 2002).

Linkage forms are usually distinguished according to three factors: (1) Electoral appeal: To connect themselves with the electorate, political parties may address voters either in a direct way (e.g. personal contact, mass media) or in an indirect way (e.g. policy pledges). (2) Character of organizational relations: Political elites may connect themselves to the voter through organizational structures (e.g. collateral organizations, social networks). Formal organizational ties are based on the integration of other political actors into a party’s decision-making process, whereas informal ties are based on loyalty, pressure or blackmailing (Poguntke, 2002, p. 47). (3) Kind of exchanged goods: Political parties may offer either private, club, or public goods in exchange for the vote of their constituency.
Roberts (2002) adds another dimension to distinguish party-society linkages: (4) *their degree of contingency*. This characteristic refers to the time it takes to build a specific linkage type, i.e. how much they rely on the generation of trust, loyalty, and credibility. In this respect linkages may be distinguished according to their short-, medium- or long-term character.

Classically three forms of linkages between political parties and society are mentioned in the literature: programmatic, clientelistic, and personalistic linkages (see Table 1 for an overview of the characteristics of each linkage strategy). These linkage forms are not mutually exclusive. Political actors may pursue different forms of linkages at the same time. It may even be a viable strategy of risk avoidance to pursue a strategic mix of linkage forms (see Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estévez, 2007).

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**Programmatic Linkage**

In line with the model of ‘responsible party government’ (APSA, 1950; Downs, 1957), political parties pursuing a programmatic linkage strategy appeal to their voters with policy programs. These programs entail an ideal of the greater good to the advantage of the whole
society (Pappi, 2000). In this sense parties make indirect policy pledges to a large range of voters which have their own policy preferences and base their electoral decision on them. To root themselves in society political parties maintain formal and informal organizational relations with their social base. The most obvious connection between party elites and their voters is a party membership organization. Other organizational linkages are collateral organizations – like unions or churches – and social movements. Characteristic of these forms of organizations is a horizontal bottom up style that enhances participation and interest aggregation (Kitschelt, 2000; Roberts, 2002). As programmatic parties base their policy programmes on an ideal of the greater good, they are able to offer public policy to their voters. But political parties may also concentrate on specific, distinguishable social groups and, hence, provide club goods (pork-barrel politics). Programmatic party competition may in this sense be directed at the general public as well as particularistic groups (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). The more informally or formally attached programmatic parties are to civil society organizations, the more durable and stable is their linkage (Poguntke, 2000, 2002). Thus, linking a political party in programmatic ways to the electorate may be labelled a long-term strategy. Accordingly, the programmatic linkage demands heavy investments of political elites. Firstly, they have to bear the costs of building organizational structures to solve collective action problems and offer mechanisms of interest aggregation (Kitschelt, 2000). Secondly, programmatic linkages are based on trust and credibility and prone to path dependency effects. If victorious political parties defect from their policy pledges or engage in extreme policy switches over time they may lose the support of even loyal voters in subsequent elections (Stokes, 1999). Hence, political parties linked to their supporters through policy pledges ideally hold themselves responsive to their voters’ policy preferences (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes 1999). Furthermore, programmatic parties that link themselves to the society based on coherent policy pledges provide for other modes of political
participation than just voting. Voters may partake in procedures of interest aggregation through party membership organizations or as members of collateral organizations linked to political parties based on congruent policy positions (Kitschelt, 2000). The connection between a programmatic linkage strategy and the policy congruence between political parties and their supporters plays a role in the third article of this dissertation (Chapter 4). But, political parties in new democracies are often not linked to their voters based on coherent policy programs. They may also pursue other linkages with society like clientelistic and personalistic linkages (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 3). I turn now to these other forms of party-society linkages.

Clientelistic Linkage

The concept of clientelism is widely used and referred to in very different contexts. Thus, it is prone to conceptual stretching (Piattoni, 2001). Different definitions of clientelism are owed to the changing role of patron-client relationships over time and to different research interests. According to the origins of the concept, traditional clientelism describes a dyadic, personal relationship between unequals that builds on fear or obligation as bonds⁶. But modern clientelism differs from this older version in some aspects. First of all, the patron becomes a political party that wants to mobilize electoral support. In addition, the contemporary clientelistic linkage is no more limited to face-to-face contacts but may also be based on group relations (see for example Roniger, 1994, 2004; Piattoni, 2001; Hopkin, 2006).

I follow a conception of clientelism that focuses on those qualities of the phenomenon which directly relate to the electoral process (see Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Piattoni, 2001; Stokes, 2007). The clientelistic linkage is defined as a “direct exchange of a

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⁶ This depiction of clientelism refers to “an archaic phenomenon of traditional and agrarian societies” (Roniger, 2004, p. 355).
citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007, p. 2). This general definition covers both patronage and vote buying, as specific subtypes of clientelistic exchange. Following Stokes, these subtypes are defined as follows: patronage is “the proffering of public resources (most typically, public employment) by office-holders in return for electoral support” (2007, p. 606, italics original), whereas “vote buying is a more narrow exchange of goods (benefits, protections) for one’s own vote” (2007, p. 606, italics original).\(^7\) Clientelistic exchange, thus, takes place closely before or after an election was held (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007).

Furthermore, the clientelistic linkage is characterized through conditionality, i.e. a quid pro quo. In order to avoid the risk of opportunistic defection, clientelistic parties need to build enforcement mechanisms (i.e. monitoring) to guarantee the exclusiveness of the clientelistic exchange. Target identifyability and excludability are important features of clientelistic exchange relationships. Potential groups for this exchange, thus, have to be clearly delineated. Therefore clientelistic parties have to make investments in organizational infrastructure to identify and monitor potential voters (Kitschelt, 2000). These organizational ties are mostly informal and structured in a hierarchical top down manner (Gay, 1998). Clientelistic parties rely on vertical exchange networks between party elites, party brokers, and clients that organize the complex transport of benefits from the top level of the party organization to the bottom in exchange for votes (Roberts, 2002; Levitsky, 2001). The role of party brokers in these networks is to connect party elites with their constituencies. In this respect, informality should not be confounded with lack of organization or institutional weakness (Levitsky, 2001).

\(^7\) Other materially oriented political strategies are pork-barrel politics and programmatic redistributive politics. But both of these strategies do not deliver small-scale exclusive goods, although pork-barrel politics may be a source of patronage when realized (Stokes, 2007).
Due to their direct appeal, goods offered for exchange by clientelistic parties are first and foremost characterized by exclusiveness, i.e. they provide mainly private and club goods. Thus, clientelism “focuses the popular sector’s attention on the immediate acquisition of localized and small-scale goods and services as opposed to a series of more significant, generalized and long term demands” (Gay, 1998, p. 11). Since the clientelistic linkage relies on direct material inducements, this strategy becomes more likely the more voters value such side payments and the lesser they value future benefits from the provision of public goods (Kitschelt, 2000). Concerning the degree of permanence, clientelistic linkages have a long-term character. In general the decline of clientelism has often been predicted, but in fact it has proven to be a highly adaptive strategy even in democratic contexts (see Roniger, 2004; Gay, 1998). This may be because the relationship with the voter is often marked by a dependency aspect and built on repetition (Stokes, 2007). In addition, the party organization as a social network plays an important role in binding voters over time. Thus, similar to programmatic parties, clientelistic practices are based on trust and credibility and thus also prone to path dependency effects (Roniger, 1994).

Political parties that choose a clientelistic linkage strategy have to invest in mechanisms of voter supervision, i.e. monitoring, and they have to build “organizational hierarchies of exchange between electoral clients at the ground floor of the system, various levels of brokers organized in pyramidal fashion, and patrons at the top” (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007,p. 8). Thus, transaction costs for providing the exchanged benefits are high.

Since the relationship between clientelistic parties and their voters is often marked by a dependency aspect and built on repetition, clientelistic parties may take advantage of poverty

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8 Stokes (2007) distinguishes clientelistic club good provision from pork-barrel politics by means of a distributive criterion: benefits from pork-barrel politics are distributed in a whole district and, therefore, non-clientelistic voters in this district cannot be excluded.

9 See Stokes (2007, pp. 617-619) for a comprehensive overview of the relationship between clientelism and poverty.
and lack of autonomy of poor voters (see Taylor-Robinson, 2010; Fox, 1994; Bruso, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004). This may lead to situations of ‘perverse accountability’ with respect to the electoral process (Stokes, 2007; Stokes, 2005). The more dependent clients are on material benefits and the better clientelistic party brokers can monitor their behaviour, the more likely clients can be held accountable for not voting for the clientelistic party.

Furthermore, clientelistic linkages as opposed to programmatic linkages “reduce parties to their most basic, self-referential political function: electing candidates from their ranks into public office” (Roberts, 2002, p. 29). On the one hand, parties pursuing a clientelistic strategy do not provide their voters with mechanisms of interest aggregation; they do not offer orientation in the policy space to their voters, and may even cut across cleavages and cater for highly heterogeneous clients (Gay, 1998; Roberts, 2002). On the other hand, voters in clientelistic relationships, in turn base their voting decision on the exchange of material benefits. The voting act thus loses its capacity to signal policy preferences. Consequently, votes obtained in this way do not entail any information about the policy interests of the voter and are therefore useless for the prospective or retrospective evaluation of a representatives’ policy responsiveness (see Schaffer, 2007; Stokes, 2007; Zechmeister, 2010). Although there may be some kind of clientelistic responsiveness, in order to evaluate the quality of democratic representation only policy responsiveness is of relevance. The effect of the clientelistic linkage on the quality of democratic representation is analysed in two articles of this dissertation. The third article investigates the negative and distortive effects of clientelism on party-voter congruence as an indicator of policy responsiveness (Chapter 4). The fourth article focusses on the effect of clientelism on voters’ uncertainty in the political realm and their ability to form clear and structured policy preferences (Chapter 5).
Personalistic Linkage

This linkage form may also be labelled charismatic or populist appeal. Political parties that maintain such bonds with their voters base their strategy on the personal skills of one or a few (charismatic) leaders. Often these parties are referred to as mere electoral vehicles (Roberts, 2002; Kitschelt, 2000). A personalistic party reaches its voters through a direct, personal appeal (often combined with marketing techniques). Its organizational structure tends to be weakly institutionalized, since party leaders do not want to limit their leverage on the intraparty decision-making process (Weyland, 1999; Kitschelt, 2000). In analogy to this, the pledges personalistic parties make to their voters remain opaque. Party leaders “tend to promise all things to all people to maintain maximum personal discretion over the strategy of their party vehicle” (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 849).

If political parties are mere electoral vehicles for a charismatic leader they are likely to be of short- or medium-term character since the bond with their voters will probably dissolve as soon as the charismatic leader dies or finishes her career. Therefore, to secure the long-term success of a personalistic party “charismatic leaders or their successors will be forced to routinize authority relations and put them on a different grounding” (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 855). Only when the personalistic linkage is combined with a long-term linkage strategy, the risk of an ephemeral life-span may be diminished. The charismatic linkage is combinable with all the linkage types already mentioned (Roberts, 2006). For itself, the personalistic linkage does neither solve collective action problems nor offer alternative forms of participation and techniques of interest aggregation to voters (Kitschelt, 2000).

Closely related to the personalistic linkage type is the phenomenon of populism. Populist parties usually exhibit a direct, unmediated electoral appeal through charismatic leaders, hence, they have an affinity to the personalistic linkage type (Weyland, 2001). In general, the populist ideology is based on the division of the society in two homogeneous and antagonistic
groups: the people versus the elite (Mudde, 2004; Barr, 2009). The exact content of this ideology depends on secondary elements that may be combined with such an appeal (Abts & Rummens, 2007). Regarding the organizational structure populism is normally associated with an uninstitutionalized form of party organization. In the extreme populists use their parties as mere electoral vehicles (again in line with the personalistic linkage type). But there are also populist parties which invested in the institutionalization of their organizational structure (e.g. traditional populist parties). Furthermore, the kind of exchanged goods depends on whether a populist party integrates other ideological elements, pursues specific policy programs, or relies on the support of specific groups of voters. Regarding the degree of contingency, populist appeals are often used by new political parties or new politicians within an existing political party. As such populism seems to be a viable electoral entry strategy to challenge established elites. But populism is also often said to be a transitory phenomenon. Many populists face the problem to maintain the electoral support of the (heterogeneous) discontent mass they promised to represent as soon as they achieve government responsibility. And soon after those populist challengers emerged and took over government (or participated in it), they faded away (Weyland, 2001, Taggart, 2004).

It has been argued in the literature that populism in power has a fierce relationship with democratic representative institutions (e.g. Rovira, 2012; Plattner, 2010). Populism in power may severely affect both the horizontal and vertical dimension of democratic accountability. Especially in presidential systems like those in Latin America, populist presidents face incentives to change the political regime to their own benefit through institutional reform, manipulation of democratic rules, or through the execution of a coup d’état. Therefore, the second article of this dissertation systematically analyses the opportunity structure of populist presidents incentivizing a radical change of checks and balances in Latin American democracies (Chapter 3).
Case Selection and Data

Research on democratic representation identified great differences of political parties and party systems between new and established democracies respectively. For example, Latin American party systems are barely institutionalized and volatility in the region is much higher than in Western European democracies (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). Moreover, party organizations are less based on party membership than their Western European counterparts and competition structures between political parties are often shaped by clientelistic and personalistic means (Coppedge, 2001; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Furthermore, comparing Latin American democracies, Kitschelt et al. (2010) show that the degree of programmatic party system structuration differs greatly in the region. On the one hand, we thus find differences in the structuration of democratic representation between new and established democracies as well as variation within the Latin American region with respect to the utilization of different linkage strategies. Therefore, Latin American democracies offer suitable units of observation to investigate the influence of party-society linkages on the quality of democratic representation. On the other hand, Latin American democracies are ‘most similar cases’ with respect to their institutional and socio-economic contexts (see Przeworski & Teune, 1970). For example, many Latin American countries experienced phases of military rule during the 1970s and phases of re-democratization in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). In addition to this, all countries in this study are presidential regimes and share similar structures of vertical and horizontal accountability (Linz, 1994; O’Donnell, 1994; Mainwaring & Welna, 2003). Latin American presidents are usually perceived to be powerful actors within their political systems, either because they possess strong constitutional powers – like a presidential veto or executive decree authority – or because they rely on strong partisan powers – i.e. majority support in the legislative branch and high
party discipline (Shugart & Carey 1992; Mainwaring & Shugart 1997). Furthermore, most of
the countries studied here deploy pure PR electoral systems for the lower chamber of their
legislatures, and the two exceptions, Bolivia and Mexico, use semi-proportional electoral
systems (Wills-Otero, 2009, pp. 38–39). With respect to the socio-economic context, Latin
America is a region plagued with high income inequality, a large informal sector, and
‘truncated’ welfare states, benefiting only those with formal employment (Díaz-Cayeros &
Magaloni 2009; Rudra, 2004). Furthermore, the Latin American region shares a historical
legacy of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) era that led to continuing financial
crisis in the 1980s as well as the adoption of neoliberal policies in the 1990s (Huber &

Both presidential regimes and economic inequality are features that are related to different
party-society linkages. Presidentialism, on the one hand, incentivizes the use of a
personalistic linkage type through a higher degree of personalization and a direct, unmediated
legitimacy of the president (O’Donnell, 1994, Linz, 1994). High poverty rates and high
degrees of income inequality, on the other hand, make the clientelistic linkage type more
viable for political actors (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2007). Thus, differences in
regime type and socio-economic conditions may cause political actors to pursue linkages
other than the programmatic one, accounting for their variation compared to established
democracies and the variation between Latin American democracies. However, the main
focus of this dissertation lies on the association between different organizational and
substantive linkages between citizens and political elites on the quality of democratic
representation. Consequentially, the general institutional and socio-economic contexts in
Latin America are either controlled for in the statistical analysis or considered a scope
condition in this study.
To assess the relationship between party-society linkages and the quality of democratic representation this dissertation makes use of the growing availability of comparative data based on public opinion, elite-, and expert surveys. For the statistical analyses in this study, the following data sets have been combined to address different questions on the quality of the representational link in Latin America:

(1) **Micro level data** on citizens in Latin American democracies is provided by two public opinion surveys: the Latinobarometer and the Americas Barometer. Firstly, the Corporación Latinobarómetro conducts its public opinion survey on a yearly basis including a large range of questions on attitudes, values, and the behaviour of citizens as well as socio-demographic information about the respondents (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2010). Starting with eight democracies in 1995 more and more countries have been added over the years, and since 2004 the survey covers the following 18 Latin American democracies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Furthermore, the survey instruments have been refined over time and the representativeness of the country samples has been increased to approximately 100% covering both urban and rural regions (Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2010). Secondly, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) issues the Americas Barometer on democratic values and behaviours every two years since 2004. The survey is based on face to face interviews with voting-age adults in 26 countries in North, Central and South America, and the Caribbean. Systematic pre-tests in each country and probability samples ensure the representativeness of the survey both on national and subnational levels (see LAPOP, 2012).

(2) **Meso level data** on political parties’ linkage strategies is provided by the recently compiled Democratic Accountability Expert Survey (DAES - Altman et al., 2009; Kitschelt et al., 2009). This survey was specifically designed to uncover the different relationships
political parties may pursue with their voters in representative democracies. The research instruments are based on the concept of party-society linkages proposed by Kitschelt (2000) and, therefore, they tie in perfectly with the theoretical arguments made in this dissertation. Besides questions on these linkages, the survey includes questions on political parties’ organizational structures as well as their policy positions on several issue dimensions. The whole project covers 85 electoral democracies in Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. More specifically, for the Latin American part of the survey experts have been asked to rate over 80 political parties. This rich source of data is further extended by original qualitative information on political parties based on case studies and online resources (more detailed information is provided in the respective articles of this dissertation).

(3) Macro level data on party system characteristics have been systematically compiled by the author merging several sources. Comparative cross-national information on political parties’ vote and seat shares in Latin American legislatures are scarce and often diverge dependent on the purpose and scope of the respective source (e.g. Nohlen, 2005; IPU, 2013; OIR, 2013). Problematic are especially the handling of small parties, the information on party splits and mergers, as well as the treatment of the frequent praxis in the region of renaming political parties. Therefore, to systematically evaluate party system characteristics in Latin American countries these comparative cross-national databases have been compared with national election statistics as well as research notes on specific legislative and presidential elections resulting in a unique data set that includes small parties and accounts for party splits, party mergers, as well as party renaming.
Overview

This dissertation consists of four articles each highlighting a different aspect of the association between political parties’ linkages with society and the quality of democratic representation. The first and the second article (Chapter 2 and 3), thereby, are concerned with the relationship between party-society linkages and mechanisms of democratic accountability, the third and fourth article (Chapter 4 and 5) assess the relationship between party-society linkages and policy responsiveness.

Chapter two focusses on the empirical diversity of party organizations and the incentive structure of political elites to invest in extra-parliamentary party building in Latin America. By specifying the conditions that make the adoption of an institutionalized party organization more likely, this co-authored article (with Nicole Bolleyer) addresses an important empirical gap. Furthermore, it contributes to the debate on the important role political parties play with respect to the viability of vertical accountability mechanism in the context of new democracies (Diamond & Gunther, 2001; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Mainwaring, Bejarano, & Pizarro, 2006).

In this article we refer to the institutionalization concept that has been fruitfully applied to study party evolution in various contexts already (Mainwaring & Scully 1995; Huntington 1968; Panebianco 1988). In terms of parties’ organizational evolution discussions evolved around two core dimensions of institutionalization that shape the nature of parties’ internal life: value infusion and routinization (e.g. Panebianco, 1988; Levitsky, 1998). Using expert survey data covering organizational characteristics of more than 80 parties within 18 Latin American countries we map out the diversity of party organization in Latin America across parties and countries. By doing so, we examine the usefulness of the conceptual tool in an

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10 Both authors contributed equally to this article.
environment where cleavage structures were not decisive for the emergence of political parties and the state itself gained tremendous influence on the development of political parties and party systems. We show that Latin American parties spread across three of four possible structural configurations of (high or low) routinization and value infusion (i.e. we find a considerable number of ‘mixed’ cases) – reflecting the importance of this distinction. Consequently, we theorize which conditions enable and motivate elites to set up structures conducive either to routinization, value infusion or to both.

Chapter three addresses the question which factors enable populist presidents in Latin America to pursue a radical strategy of institutional change to secure their survival in power. More specifically, the focus lies on the first signs of institutional depletion, i.e. the undermining of horizontal accountability (checks and balances) in favour of the executive branch. Thereby, the article applies an actor-centred approach focusing on the institutional context and the constellation of other political actors in the system that make a radical strategy of institutional change a viable option for populist presidents. Three conditions are considered most decisive in this respect: Firstly, the existence of a ‘power vacuum’ in the political arena, secondly, the presence of divided government between the executive and the legislature, thirdly, the distribution of public support. By means of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) causal combinations of these conditions for the presence or absence of institutional change are identified. Most importantly, the results of the analysis show that popular support in favour of populist presidents is a crucial factor with respect to their success in undermining institutions of democratic accountability.

Chapter four is concerned with the impact of different party-society linkages on the congruence and incongruence between political parties’ advocated policies and the policy
interests of their supporters in the economic domain. Party-voter congruence is often used in studies on democratic representation as an indicator of policy responsiveness. However, the effect of different linkage strategies on the degree of policy congruence has never been tested since studies on policy congruence usually assume a programmatic link between political parties and their voters. To close this gap this article draws on a dataset covering information of 80 political parties and party supporters in 18 Latin American democracies. Results of multinominal logit analysis show that programmatic and clientelistic linkage strategies affect party-voter congruence in completely opposite ways. While programmatic parties are likely to be more state interventionist than their supporters, political parties emphasizing a clientelistic linkage strategy are more likely to advocate a stronger free market position than their supporters. Finally, in line with the expectations, the personalistic linkage type has no significant effect on party-voter congruence.

The fifth and final Chapter of this dissertation analyses the influence of clientelism on citizens’ political orientation in Latin America. Consistent perceptions of the political space in the citizenry are central in traditional theories of political competition. However, I argue that clientelism hinders the development of consistent political orientations by increasing uncertainty in the political realm and inducing indifference of clientelistic voters towards other parties’ policy programs. Thereby, clientelism alters parties’ strategic behaviour in competitive contexts and, finally, leads to reduced policy responsiveness. These arguments are tested by means of logistic multilevel regression analyses based on two hierarchical survey data sets covering up to 18 Latin American countries. The empirical analyses, with the main independent variable measured on different analytical levels, confirm the hypothesized negative effect of clientelism on citizens’ political orientation.
References


Chapter 2
Introduction: Cross-national Research on Party Organization in Latin America

In a widely cited review article on research on Latin American parties, Levitsky urged us more than ten years ago to develop more nuanced conceptual frameworks able to differentiate various dimensions of party organization such as organizational density, level of institutionalization or degree of state penetration, immediately conceding that such efforts are seriously constrained by the lack of data (2001, pp. 106-7). This paper addresses this gap by first conceptualizing and mapping out the diversity of party organization across 18 Latin American democracies, second, by theorizing the conditions that enable or motivate party elites to invest in and build different types of extra-parliamentary party structures and third, by empirically testing these claims across more than 80 parties in Latin America.

Patterns of party building are important for the viability and functioning of Latin American democracy because institutionalized parties are conducive to the stabilization of patterns of party competition as well as the anchoring of political parties in society. While institutionalized party systems provide one foundation for meaningful party competition and thus meaningful choices of voters, linkages of parties as organization to local communities
simultaneously facilitate the channelling of preferences from citizens to those party elites that operate in democratic institutions. Both are crucial elements to assure the electoral accountability of political representatives to citizens (e.g. Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Randall & Svåsand, 2002; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Svåsand, 2013). While the party literature on advanced democracies tries to account for the decline of extra-parliamentary party structures (usually associated with an elaborate membership organization with local branches set up across the country) and the simultaneous strengthening of party representatives in public office, the puzzle in new democracies is why overall elite-dominated parties should invest in extra-parliamentary structures in the first place. If parties are born in the state and if creating a structural and permanent anchoring in society as associated with the mass party model is indeed time-consuming, labour-intense and only chosen when no other feasible option is available (Biezen, 2005, p. 155), (relatively) weakly organized parties as widely observed in Latin American parties seem an obvious outcome. Further considering the diversity of Latin American party organization, the puzzle we encounter in Latin America is reversed: why do parties that operate in an environment incentivizing electoral, ‘catch-all’ strategies that prioritize manoeuvrability11 invest in the creation of permanent extra-parliamentary structures at all, rather than investing scarce resources only temporarily during election time? Similarly, when and why do they build up and maintain a permanent social and community presence?

To address these questions, we provide a systematic mapping of extra-parliamentary party structures using the concept of institutionalization as our analytical starting-point. We conceptualize and capture two separate properties contributing to institutionalization – routinization and value infusion- as distinguished by Panebianco (1988). He associates routinization with increasingly rule-guided and regularized intra-organizational processes,

11 Presupposing a high level of manoeuvrability and flexibility of the party leadership to respond to changes in public opinion and increasingly volatile electorates, these strategies are in tension with stable ties to particular groups and their interests able to cultivate long-term loyalties (Kirchheimer, 1966).
while *value infusion* denotes followers’ growing socialization into the organization, implying their emotional affiliation to the party organization as such (Panebianco 1988, p. 49; p. 53; see on this also Janda, 1980; Levitsky, 1998). We show that Latin American parties spread across three of four possible structural configurations of (high or low) routinization and value infusion (i.e. we find a considerable number of ‘mixed’ cases) – reflecting the importance of this distinction. Consequently, we theorize which conditions enable and motivate elites to set up structures conducive either to routinization, value infusion or to both. We do so drawing on the prolific literatures on party organization (their formation and evolution) in old and new democracies\(^{12}\), conditions that can be systematically grouped, being tied either to the nature of party-state relations, to dynamics of party competition in the political arena or to party-societal relations.

To test our framework, we estimate logistic random-intercept multilevel models with routinization and value infusion as dependent variables using the recently compiled Democratic Accountability Expert Survey (DAES – Altman et al., 2009; Kitschelt et al., 2009) which provides us with structural proxies for routinization and value infusion respectively. Testing our framework, we find that, with the exception of a party’s access to presidential office and the sequence of party and regime formation, which positively affect both routinization and value infusion, each property conducive to parties’ overall institutionalization is significantly affected by different explanatory variables: while party system fragmentation and strong ties to unions significantly increase a party’s probability of having a routinized party structure, party ideological extremeness significantly increases a party’s probability of investing in value infusion.

Our findings highlight that routinization and value infusion neither always go together, nor are they necessarily shaped by the same variables, reinforcing Levitsky’s point (1998) that

institutionalization needs to be treated as a multifaceted phenomenon for scholarship to arrive at a nuanced understanding of party development, not only in Latin America but also in other regions. We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings for Latin American democracy and for cross-national party research more generally.

**Extra-parliamentary Party Building in Latin America**

To map out the diversity of extra-parliamentary party structures in Latin America, we refer to a concept that has been fruitfully applied to study party evolution in various contexts already: party institutionalization, capturing an organization’s development towards consolidation (e.g. Panebianco, 1988; Janda, 1980; Huntington, 1968; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Levitsky, 1998; Randall & Svåsand, 2002). Drawing on Panebianco’s seminal book (1988), discussions on parties’ internal life tended to evolve around two core dimensions of institutionalization: *value infusion* and *routinization* (e.g. Levitsky, 1998; Randall & Svåsand, 2002; Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006). Routinization takes place when processes within parties become more rule-guided, regularized and less dominated by the idiosyncratic choices of leaders, a process becoming visible in an increasingly elaborate infrastructure (1988, p. 49; p. 53). Value infusion shows when party followers – through their socialization into an organization – start caring about the survival of the party as such, rather than seeing it as a mere instrument to achieve a set of ideological goals or being solely attached to the current leader. It denotes the development of an emotional attachment to the party as such. As a consequence, a highly institutionalized organization is separate from and can survive without its present leadership (Janda, 1980, p. 19) and more fundamentally without its party founder (Levitsky, 1998, p. 82).

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13 A party’s autonomy from its environment, a third dimension Panebianco considered as important – which Randall and Svåsand (2002, p. 13) classified as the ‘external dimension’ of party institutionalization – is not considered here, due to the focus on the party’s internal dynamics. Further note that Randall and Svåsand use a different terminology to capture routinization and refer to ‘systemness’ instead.
Naturally, Panebianco’s classical conceptualization reflects his empirical focus on (long-established) parties in Western Europe and, with it, the importance of the mass party as template, an organization in which high routinization and value infusion are linked (Duverger, 1951). Yet while a routinized organization that is also strong in generating organizational loyalty can be considered more institutionalized than an only routinized organization (since both routinization and value infusion contribute to a party’s stability and resilience), they do not necessarily go together. The concepts target qualitatively distinct phenomena: routinization becomes manifest in the nature of party procedures and processes, while value infusion refers to emotional attachment of followers to the organization. This also suggests that they become manifest in different organizational features, through which elites of newly formed parties can attempt to foster routinization or value infusion respectively (see 2.1).

Confronted with patterns of party organization in Latin America distinct from Western Europe, Levitsky (1998) saw the need to differentiate between the two more clearly and urged scholars to unpack the concept and to examine to which extent the two dimensions routinization and value infusion really coincide. Levitsky’s work on the Justicialist Party (PJ) in Argentina (2003) has served as his prime example of an institutionalized party with high value infusion without strong routinization, a configuration successively observed in other Latin American parties such as for example the Peruvian APRA (Graham, 1992; Burgess & Levitsky, 2003). Simultaneously, recent work on new parties in established democracies has highlighted that organizationally new parties formed by individual entrepreneurs (be these defecting politicians or political outsiders) often attempt to routinize procedures to support intra-parliamentary and intra-party coordination as well as conflict resolution with little interest in extra-parliamentary party building conducive to value infusion (Bolleyer, 2013, pp. 216-217). This pattern of functionally driven routinization is relatively wide-spread among
new parties in advanced democracies and can be dominant in new democracies (Svåsand, 2013, p. 265). Biezen’s work on Eastern-Central Europe showed parties to create a branch structures typical for Western Europe, without cultivating an active membership (2005, pp. 155-156), a discrepancy also found in Latin America (Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006, p. 179). Consequently, Levitsky’s work on party institutionalization (a concept that originated in Western Europe) in Latin America and its successive application in other regions (including old and new democracies) highlights that – if the assumptions driving concept formation are made explicit –conceptual travel can be a fruitful enterprise.

**Measuring Institutionalization: Organizational Properties Conducive to Routinization and Value Infusion**

While institutionalization is a suitable conceptual choice, it is rarely measured directly in large-N studies. Strictly speaking, institutionalization denotes the process towards consolidation (Panebianco, 1988, pp. 18-20; pp. 53-55) rather than a fixed organizational property. Furthermore, particularly value infusion is difficult to measure directly across a wide range of cases, since cross-nationally comparable survey data capturing party members’ orientations are rare. To circumvent these limitations, rather than capturing the two dimensions directly, we look at whether party elites have invested in structural mechanisms likely to foster routinization or value infusion respectively or whether they don’t. These structural mechanisms can be measured directly.

*Routinization* of the extra-parliamentary party organization is supported by the *presence of a permanent infrastructure* on the local level as opposed to punctual use of local staff and local offices at election time. The *presence of permanent structures* is not equivalent with the creation of formal party branches in the traditional (Western European) sense but can be assured by networks of local intermediaries (Kitschelt & Kselman, 2010, pp. 3-4; see also
Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006), i.e. permanence does not presuppose a particular organizational form. Neither does it imply that these structures serve a particular purpose or are used for particular activities, as earlier reference to the discrepancy between the presence of an infrastructure and the absence of member activism illustrated.\textsuperscript{14}

This leads us to a second dimension relevant to generate institutionalization: the \textit{activities for which local structures are used}. This usage of structures gives us an indication of whether they are likely to foster \textit{value infusion} among followers. Wilson’s seminal book on political organization (1973) has stressed that most organizations will try to combine the provision of different incentive types to followers to stabilize voluntary support which voluntary organizations such as parties continuously depend on, since their membership is non-compulsory and can exit any time. He distinguishes selective incentives available to individual followers (e.g. career opportunities or access to material resources) from collective incentives (e.g. party identification linked to particular ideological convictions) and solidarity incentives (e.g. involvement in social activities) available to party members generally. Value infusion can be associated with the latter two incentive types, since it captures followers’ \textit{non-instrumental attachment} to the organization. In terms of structural mechanisms, such an attachment is likely to be fostered by on-going, local activities reinforcing the collective attachment to the party as a social group and promoting a cause, while providing solidarity incentives by giving members the possibility to socially engage with others in such activities.

\textsuperscript{14} Note that differentiation is equally applicable in old and new democracies. Other than the programmatically structured party systems in advanced democracies party competition in Latin America can be also strongly shaped by clientelistic and charismatic linkages (Kitschelt et al., 2010). However, these linkages do not generate different kinds of extra-parliamentary party organization. While programmatic parties tend to use party membership organizations or collateral organizations to cultivate a shared attachment to policy positions, clientelistic parties may use similar structures to distribute selective incentives, identify and monitor potential clients (Kitschelt, 2000). Similarly, personalistic linkages can be maintained through a range of organizational structures (Roberts, 2002).
**Party Organization in 18 Latin American Democracies: An Analytical Mapping**

The DAES survey contains items that allow us to capture whether parties a) have established permanent local structures or not\(^{15}\) (a central mechanisms supportive of routinization) and whether parties maintain a social and community presence by holding social events for local members or by sustaining ancillary social groups or not\(^{16}\) (a central mechanism supportive of value infusion). Note that the use of the particular indicator for routinization focuses on *permanency* and therefore does not create a bias in favour of *formal* organization (what Kitschelt and Kselman (2010) call ‘formal extensiveness’). It embraces both formal and informal structures. While the DAES survey contains an item measuring party reliance on local intermediaries (‘informal extensiveness’) separately, cross-tabulation shows that there are no parties that heavily rely on local intermediaries without having permanent local infrastructures as well. Table 1 shows an empirical mapping of the 88 Latin American parties based on the two variables.

**Table 1: Routinization and Value Infusion in Extra-Parliamentary Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Infusion</th>
<th>Routinization</th>
<th>Routinization</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weakly Institutionalized Parties N=25</td>
<td>Functionally Routinized Parties N=24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Value Infused, Non-routinized Parties N=0</td>
<td>Strongly Institutionalized Parties N=39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Based on DAES data.

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\(^{15}\) Question A1: “Do the following parties or their individual candidates maintain offices and paid staff at the local or municipal-level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only during national elections?” Questionnaire DAES, [https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html](https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html) (accessed 7 January 2013).

\(^{16}\) Question A2: “Do the following parties’ local organizations maintain a permanent social and community presence by holding social events for local party members or sustaining ancillary social groups such as party youth movements, party cooperatives or athletic clubs?” Questionnaire DAES, [https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html](https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html) (accessed 7 January 2013).
Table 1 provides several interesting insights. Most fundamentally, the relatively even spread of parties across three of our four categories reflects a high level of diversity in how Latin American parties organize, as frequently stressed by experts (e.g. Levitsky, 2001; Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). Most parties adopt structural mechanisms conducive to either high routinization/high value infusion or low routinization/low value infusion of extra-parliamentary structures, indicating that the two dimensions of institutionalization are empirically linked. At the same time, the number of functionally routinized parties underpins Levitsky’s point that we cannot simply assume such a link ex ante. 24 parties – nearly 30% – have adopted permanent local structures without engaging in ongoing local activities conducive to value infusion among followers, echoing work on party organization in new democracies in Latin America (Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006) but also in Central-Eastern Europe (Biezen, 2003; 2005) and Africa (Svåsand, 2013). Latin American examples are the Republican Proposal Party (PRO) in Argentina, the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) and the Patriotic Society Party (PSP) in Ecuador. We do not find parties that maintain a community presence and foster value infusion without relying on permanent structures at least in some constituencies. The most strongly populated category contains parties that have invested in (some) permanent structures in which membership activities take place on an ongoing basis and ties to ancillary groups are cultivated.

While the literature tends to stress the weakness of party organization in Latin America, Table 1 suggests that while these parties might be less institutionalized than parties in established democracies, strategies of social incorporation should not be simply dismissed as ‘least likely strategy’ of party elites to stabilize a support base in new democracies. In this context it is important to note that this category of (relatively) strongly institutionalized parties includes state-centred party machines such as the Colorado Party (ANR) in Paraguay, labour-based patronage parties such as the Justicialist Party (PJ) in Argentina, and
programmatic mass-parties such as the Brazilian Workers Party (PT). Consequently, our operationalization avoids dismissing any party organization distinct from the mass party model as weakly institutionalized.

The overall distribution suggests a permanent infrastructure facilitates the maintenance of a community presence and the latter is one (but not the only) reason why local party building is worthwhile. The ‘mixed configuration’ of functionally routinized parties suggests that there are other motivations than maintaining societal linkages that lead to investments in permanent local structure such as purely electoral motivations or the distribution of selective incentives (e.g. Social Party of National Unity (PU) in Colombia; Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (PRE)). In the next section we present our framework on factors that shape the capacity and motivation of party elites to invest in the formation or permanent structures and to use them to cultivate an active and loyal membership.

A Framework on Conditions for Party Building in New Democracies: Capturing the Capacity and Motivations of Elites

How can we account for whether Latin American party elites build permanent branch structures (our proxy for routinization) and whether they attempt to maintain a community presence (our proxy for value infusion)? Drawing on the theoretical literature on party formation, evolution and adaptation, we specify – taking an elite-centred perspective – three sets of factors that either enable or motivate party elites to invest in such structures in Latin American democracies, contexts that are commonly considered as unfavourable to extra-parliamentary party building.

Models of party organization developed in Western Europe are prominent analytical tools and frequently referred to in studies on party organization in new democracies. ‘Conceptual travel’, however, has proved a challenging enterprise. Biezen (2005), for instance, highlights
the ‘transformative bias’ of theory building on parties through party organizational models which tend to be conceptualized as responses to ‘predecessor models’ (e.g. Kirchheimer’s catch-all party (1966) or Panebianco’s ‘electoral professional’ party (1988) are considered as successors of Duverger’s mass party (1951)). Yet ‘predecessors’ usually do not exist in the case of relatively recently formed parties in new democracies leading to a conflation of party formation and party change (Biezen, 2005, p. 149; see also Biezen, 2003).

Thus, the question to be asked in new democracies is *which structures do these newly formed parties adopt and why*, not how they adapt their structures already in place. Furthermore, as we may not conflate *formation of new structures with the change of old ones*, we also should avoid conflating *elites’ motivations* driving party building with their *capacity* to make certain organization choices, two analytical distinctions that underpin the following hypotheses that specify conditions incentivizing the formation of party structures conducive to routinization, value infusion or to both.

**Differences in Party-State Relations and Patterns of Party Institutionalization**

Taking seriously the difference between party change and formation, we need to consider problems of resource scarcity that affect party building in new democracies, where parties were – after transition – suddenly confronted with the pressure to run democratic elections and win over volatile electorates. Rather than to expect that state resources *weaken elite motivations* to maintain an already formed membership organization as argued in the literature around the cartel party theorizing party change (Katz & Mair, 1995; 2009), access to state resources such as permanent party subsidies or resources linked to government office should have a positive effect on parties’ capacity to build an infrastructure.\(^{17}\) Thus, *permanent state subsidies* received by the party organization (rather than received by

\(^{17}\) See for a study that shows the positive link between party system institutionalization and state funding in new Eastern democracies Birnir (2005). For a study that shows a significant negative effect of low access barriers to formal party funding on the likelihood of new party death in advanced democracies see Bolleyer (2013).
individual candidates) should increase the capacity of elites to build a permanent infrastructure (a mechanism conducive to routinization), since the latter is a resource-intensive process. Simultaneously, there is no direct link between permanent subsidies and the specific purposes elites use these structures for such as social activities to strengthen member attachment, i.e. value infusion. We therefore arrive at the following hypothesis:

**H1 (Permanent Subsidies Hypothesis):** Parties operating in a system with access to permanent subsidies to the party organization (rather than electoral subsidies) are more likely to be routinized than those that operate in systems without such funding access.

Moving to indirect resource access through government office, the occupation of the presidency is doubtlessly the biggest prize a party can acquire in presidential regimes, especially in Latin America where presidential dominance is a common feature (see for a systematic overview Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; with respect to the concept of delegative democracy see O’Donnell 1994). The link between such indirect resource access through presidential office and routinization is equivalent to the effect we expect from party subsidies, i.e. it should increase a party’s capacity to build a permanent infrastructure. Moving to value infusion, unlike permanent subsidies that tend to be accessed by the large majority of parties gaining parliamentary representation (which all parties studied in this paper have achieved) including very minor ones (Casas-Zamora, 2005), presidential parties tend to be major players in their party systems. They need to gather and sustain support across a wide range of relatively diverse constituencies, which positively incentivizes active attempts to cultivate loyalties (also) through the provision of solidary and collective incentives, rather than to rely solely on selective incentives that are most effective when targeting specific groups (Kitschelt
& Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes, 2007). A party’s time in presidential office should therefore not only affect its capacity to routinize but also its motivation to generate value infusion through organizational means positively.

**H2 (Presidential Office Hypothesis):** The longer a party has taken over presidential office in the regime it currently operates, the more likely to be routinized and to generate value infusion.

**Catch-All Strategies, Party Competition and Patterns of Party Institutionalization**

Arguing that ‘it is difficult to think of a major Latin American party that has not been described as a catch-all party’, Levitsky warned us of ‘uncritical conceptual borrowing’ covering differences between organizationally very distinct parties (2001, p. 107). This drawback seems to at least partially root in the insufficient differentiation between parties’ electoral strategies and their organizational characteristics, which reflects the close entanglement of changing patterns of party competition on the system level with adaptation processes on the party-level (Kirchheimer, 1966; Katz & Mair, 1995). Major parties with weak societal roots – facing electorates in which party identification is weak and volatility high – might indeed tend towards ‘catch-all strategies’, electoral strategies not directed towards mobilizing clearly delineated group support that try to reach all corners of society, a negative specification indicating that the catch-all model is conceptualized in terms of its deviation from the mass party (Biezen, 2005: 149). The picture starts to blur, however, once moving into a Latin American context, where parties are often born in the state and elite-dominated from their inception (Levitsky, 2001, p. 104-6; Biezen 2005, p. 154). Applying Western party models, party organization in Latin America appears as generally weak and we
fail to account for ‘the wide array of party types’ that exist (Levitsky 2001, p. 107), as visualized by our above mapping (see Table 1).

Clearly, a simple transfer of concepts has its limitations. Yet adopting again an elite-centred perspective and focusing on *catch all behaviour as electoral strategy*, we can theorize contextual conditions incentivizing this strategy from the perspective of party elites. Such a strategy presupposes a high level of manoeuvrability and flexibility of elites (e.g. to moderate the party’s position or blur its ideological profile) associated with the catch-all party, which disincentivizes the creation of stable and permanent linkages to particular groups or interests and thereby those mechanisms conducive to institutionalization associated with the mass party. Those *conditions that incentivize the engagement in electoral catch-all strategies can therefore be expected to compromise the extra-parliamentary party building*, a tension that underpins the following hypotheses. It suggests that in countries where incentives for pursuing catch-all strategies are lower and for parties for which catch-all strategies are more difficult to pursue, investments in an institutionalized extra-parliamentary structure are more likely. More specifically, we can derive two hypotheses linking the nature of party competition to the benefits party elites are likely to associate with their organization’s institutionalization.

Unlike the hypotheses capturing party-state relations predominantly concerned with questions of capacity for party building, the following hypotheses refer to *elite motivations* to build an institutionalized organization. The rationale to invest in the latter is stronger for *ideologically extreme parties* and for parties that operate in *fragmented party systems*. Under such conditions, catch-all strategies are difficult to pursue. Since both the creation of permanent structures and the cultivation of loyalty through these structures help to build stable group ties as alternative to catch-all organizational strategies, the following two hypotheses do not differentiate between routinization and value infusion.
**H3 (Party Extremeness Hypothesis):** The further away a party is from the ideological centre, the weaker the incentives for party elites to pursue a catch-all electoral strategy, thus, the more valuable organizational investments and activities to create a stable support base, i.e. the more likely elites invest in routinized structures and structures/activities supporting value infusion.

**H4 (Fragmentation Hypothesis):** The more competitors a party faces in its party system, the weaker the incentives for party elites to pursue a catch-all strategy, the more valuable organizational investments and activities to create a stable base, i.e. the more likely elites invest in routinized structures and mechanism structures/activities supporting value infusion.

**Party-Society Relations and Patterns of Party Institutionalization**

We find significant differences in the extent to which parties can rely on other types of support unrelated to the current regime, which brings us to our last set of explanatory factors. Support of societal groups can help relatively fluid party organizations to stabilize (Randall & Svåsand, 2002). They are able not only to provide resources but also a recruitment pool of loyal followers for the party, which generates the capacity of party elites to build a permanent infrastructure and the motivation to cultivate loyalty through social activities and ancillary organizations.

While parties can be associated with different types of groups (Allern & Bale, 2011; Bolleyer & Bytzek, 2013), ties to labour movements have been stressed as particularly important in the Latin American context (e.g. Collier & Collier, 1991; Murillo, 2001; Burgess, 1999; Valenzuela, 1994; Murillo & Schrank, 2005). The impact on institutionalization of union ties
can be expected to be particularly strong not only because these organizations tend to possess wide-spread local infrastructures that should facilitate the formation of permanent party structures. Unions – similar to traditional mass parties in Western Europe that profited from union ties – tend to pursue a strategy of social incorporation aiming at the cultivation of strong identities, identities that unlike other groups effectively link a strong economic with a strong ideological dimension. We therefore expect union ties to be particularly conducive to institutionalization. Parties with strong union ties do not only have the resources to build an organization but are likely to adopt strategies of social incorporation similar to those employed by unions, which suggests a positive impact on routinization and value infusion.

**H5 (Union Ties Hypothesis):** In a party with historical ties to unions, elites are more likely to invest in routinized structures and structures/activities supporting value infusion than in a party without such ties.

While many parties are created in the current democratic regime, we also find parties that have already existed before and thus outside of it. By default, these parties must have been able to rely on other support than resources made available post-transition. Otherwise they would not have survived the transition. They also cannot have been fully dependent on resources linked to the predecessor regime, otherwise they would have died with it, instead of surviving its downfall thanks to loyalties transcending the latter.\(^{18}\) Similarly, parties that were outlawed in the predecessor regime but re-emerged after the return to democracy must have been able to rely on durable loyalties separate from the former or current regime (Geddes & Frantz, 2007; Hicken & Kuhonta, 2011).\(^{19}\) We therefore need to consider the timing of party

---

\(^{18}\) Examples are the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) in El Salvador, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in Panama.

\(^{19}\) Examples are the Broad Front (FA) in Uruguay, the Socialist Party of Chile (PSCh), and the Justicialist Party (PJ) in Argentina.
formation in relation to the set-up of the current democratic regime, since it shapes a party’s relative dependency on the latter. We can hypothesize that parties that predate the current regime (although their respective position in the predecessor regime might have been different) have a bigger capacity to institutionalize (both in terms of routinization and value infusion) after transition than parties formed during or post transition, since the former had already successfully mobilized support before the current regime was even established.  

**H6 (Formation Sequence Hypothesis):** In a party that was formed before the last democratic transition, elites are more likely to invest in routinized structures and structures/activities supporting value infusion than in a party that was formed in the current regime.

**Data, Measurements and Model Choice**

To test our six hypotheses, the following analysis draws on a cross-sectional data set that combines expert ratings on political parties’ organizational characteristics and electoral statistics in 2008 with data on chief executives from 1978-2008 in 18 Latin American democracies. By focusing on the Latin American region we minimize the need for country-level controls. All countries in this region are presidential regimes and share similar structures of horizontal accountability (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; O’Donnell, 1994) and most of them experienced phases of military rule during the 1970s or 1980s and phases of re-democratization in the 1980s and 1990s (see for example Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005). Our analysis includes all parliamentary parties covered in the Democratic Accountability

---

20 The status of a party in relation to the current regime as captured by H6 is not to be equated with differences in party age. Recognizing the possible influence of the latter variable though, we add a control capturing party age to both of our models.

21 Those are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Expert Survey (DAES – Altman et al., 2009; Kitschelt et al., 2009)\textsuperscript{22} which leads to 88 political parties from 18 countries (for a list of the parties covered per country see Appendix Table A2).

**Operationalization of Dependent and Explanatory Variables**

We capture routinization and value infusion as core dimensions of institutionalization through party organizational characteristics, which are measureable via the DAES data set: item A1 – the establishment of permanent local party structures (*routinization*) and item A2 – the maintenance of a social and community presence by a party (*value infusion*).\textsuperscript{23} As item A1 is measured on a 4-point scale we merge two categories to build a dummy variable where the value 1 indicates that the political party permanently maintains local offices in some or most districts, while the value 0 refers to political parties that either maintain local office only during national elections or do not maintain local offices at all. This coding reflects our conceptual focus on the difference between *permanent and temporary structures*, rather than the latter’s territorial scope. Item A2 is already constructed as a dummy variable and is introduced in our models as such (1 if the party maintains a permanent social and community presence; 0 if not).

Moving to the explanatory variables, six variables are included in our two models, as specified in our theoretical framework. We further add one control variable to assure the robustness of our findings – party age.\textsuperscript{24} Two of our variables are measured at the system-level, the remaining five at the party-level. The former are operationalized as follows: Direct

\textsuperscript{22}For more detail on the survey see https://web.duke.edu/democracy/. For most parties each item from the DAES used in our analysis is covered by at least 5 experts. For eight parties at least one item is covered by only 4 expert ratings, for these parties we inspected each expert rating and in case of different accounts used additional qualitative data to validate the coding. Further note that the results reported in section 5 remain unchanged when excluding these cases.

\textsuperscript{23}See footnotes 6 and 7 for the exact wording of the questions.

\textsuperscript{24}Randall and Svåsand stress – building on Huntington - that the time dimension is crucial to institutionalization. They argue that a party cannot be considered institutionalized if it is not able to survive over time (1999, p. 10). Turning this argument around, party building takes time, which is why we control for party age it in both of our models.
state funding for political parties is wide-spread in Latin America, yet existing funding regimes differ in whether they provide permanent subsidies supporting party organizations or whether they provide electoral subsidies only. Consequently, we create a dummy *Permanent State Subsidies* to test H1 based on the information provided by Casas-Zamora’s seminal study on comparative party funding (2005, p. 30-31, Table 1.6): in 11 of the Latin American countries we cover parties receive such permanent subsidies [1], in seven they do not [0].

*Party System Fragmentation* (H4) is measured based on seat shares capturing the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979). To calculate the index we use seat shares from the last election before 2009\(^2\) (see for descriptive statistics Appendix Table A1).

Moving to the *party-level variables*, we measure the time period during which a party held *Presidential Office* to test H2. For each political party in the study we coded the number of years the party held the presidency since 1980 or the latest return to democratic rule.\(^2\) To measure a political party’s degree of extremeness relative to its competitors on the left-right ideological dimension (*Party Extremeness*) (H3) we adapt the ‘party nicheress’ index proposed by Meyer and Miller (2013).\(^27\) Data on left-right positions of political parties is taken from item D6 in the DAES data set.\(^28\) The indicator is calculated as follows:

\[
e_p = \sqrt{(x_p - X_p)^2}
\]

\(^25\) Data for the distribution of seats is provided online by most countries, detailed resources are available on request from the authors.

\(^26\) Data on presidents and their parties stem from www.rulers.org and www.ipu.org/parline/.

\(^27\) Recent research on Latin America has shown that political elites consistently differentiate themselves and their political parties on a general left–right dimension (Saiegh, 2009; Zoco, 2006). The same picture arises when experts are asked to assess the positioning of political parties on the same dimension (Altman et al., 2009; Wiesehomeier & Benoit, 2009).

where \( x_p \) stands for a party’s position on the left-right scale and \( \bar{X}_{-p} \) for the average left-right position of all other parties in the party system. Thereby, \( \bar{X}_{-p} \) reflects the average left-right position in a hypothetical party system without party \( p \). In two-party systems (e.g. Honduras in the present study) \( \bar{X}_{-p} \) is identical to the left-right score of the competitor party.\(^{29}\)

We further include a dummy variable \textit{Union Ties} to test H5. Coding is based on item A8 in the DAES data set which asks Latin American experts to indicate the most relevant civil society organization a political party is strongly linked to.\(^{30}\) The dummy takes on the value 1 if at least 50% of the experts regard unions as the most relevant civil society organization the party is linked to. In all other cases the dummy is coded 0. The dummy variable \textit{Formation Sequence} (H6) captures the timing of party formation, i.e. whether a party has been formed before [1] or after [0] the latest transition to democratic rule, using the year of the first election since the latest transition to democracy as the reference date. Finally, a party is more likely to be institutionalized the older it is. Therefore we add a control variable capturing \textit{party age} in years from foundation to formal dissolution or up to 2008 to each model.

\textit{Model Choice}

Due to the binary nature of both dependent variables the statistical estimations rely upon a logistic regression model (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; Long, 1997). Furthermore, the

\(^{29}\) The indicator has several advantages compared to other proxies of ideological extremeness: firstly, it is measured on the party level and therefore more closely related to the causal argument made in the previous section than classical measures of party system polarization (Dalton, 2008; Taylor & Herman, 1971). Secondly, the measure accounts for differences between party systems so that a party’s extremeness is relatively high in polarized party systems compared to party systems with low ideological distance. Thirdly, it captures the concept in a single variable compared to the squared party mean solution

\(^{30}\) Question A8: „Political parties often have more or less routine and explicit linkages to civil society organizations such as unions, business or professional organizations, and cultural organizations based on religion, language, or ethnicity. The linkages might include leadership and membership overlap, mutual financial support, reserved positions for representatives of the organizations at National Conventions, etc. Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organizations. ”Categories are [1] Unions, [2] Business associations and professional associations, [3] Religious Organizations, [4] Ethnic/linguistic organizations, [5] Urban neighbourhood or rural associations/ movements, [6] Women’s organizations. Questionnaire DAES, \url{https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html} (accessed 7 January 2013).
application of multilevel estimation techniques is recommended because the data set is structured hierarchically – with parties nested in countries (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). Multilevel analysis accounts for hierarchical data structures where observations within the same context are not necessarily independent from each other. The variance component analysis shows that a considerable intra-class correlation of $\rho=0.36$ is given for routinization and a moderate intra-class correlation of $\rho=0.07$ for value infusion (see Snijders & Bosker, 1999), indicating the appropriateness of multilevel analysis for our purposes. Statistical estimations for both dependent variables rely upon a logistic random-intercept model (Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Hox, 2010). The model is specified as follows:

$$
\log\left( \frac{P_{ij}}{1 - P_{ij}} \right) = \beta_0 + \beta X_{ij} + \gamma Z_j + U_{0j}
$$

subscript $i (=1,\ldots,N_j)$ denotes the level-1 units – here: parties – and subscript $j (=1,\ldots,J)$ refers to the level-2 units – here: countries. The linear predictor of the log odds of a party’s probability to have a routinized party structure is modelled by an intercept $\beta_0$, a vector of coefficients of the party-level covariates $\beta X_{ij}$ and a vector of coefficients of the country-level covariates $\beta Z_j$. For the country-level random effect $U_{0j}$ a normal distribution with a zero mean and a variance of $\sigma^2$ is assumed. Party-level residuals follow from the probability of $y_{ij}$ and are therefore not included in the equation (Snijders & Bosker 1999).

Further note that we are aware that our sample size is relatively small. To avoid over-fitting the models we therefore limit our analysis to two country-level explanatory variables and five party-level variables. Prior to the estimation of each full model, we examined bivariate relationships with each explanatory variable. All variables in the analysis were either significant in the bivariate or the multivariate case. Goodness of fit measures indicate that both full models are preferable to all respective bivariate models.

---

\[\text{In line with a logistic distribution the residual variance of level-1 is } \pi^2/3 \] (Snijders & Bosker, 1999, p. 224). Further note that we are aware that our sample size is relatively small. To avoid over-fitting the models we therefore limit our analysis to two country-level explanatory variables and five party-level variables. Prior to the estimation of each full model, we examined bivariate relationships with each explanatory variable. All variables in the analysis were either significant in the bivariate or the multivariate case. Goodness of fit measures indicate that both full models are preferable to all respective bivariate models.
Results and Discussion

Results of logistic-random intercept estimations for both dependent variables are reported in Table 2, with Model 1 and 2 explaining the effects on routinization and Model 3 and 4 explaining the effects on value infusion. To ease interpretations we report average marginal effects for all predictor variables in the full model (Table 2) as well as predicted probabilities of all significant effects (Table 3).

Concerning model fit both full models (Model 2 and 4) are preferable to the respective baseline model (Model 1 and 3) indicated by the goodness of fit measure (deviance decreases) as well as the amount of country-level variance. For Model 2 the country-level variance decreases from 1.84 in the null model to 1.04 in the full model and for Model 4 it decreases from 0.26 in the null model to 0.00. This conforms to a decrease of 12 percentage points of the intra-class correlation coefficient of the routinization model and 7 percentage points in the value infusion model.
Table 2: Results of random-intercept logistic multilevel analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DV = Routinization</th>
<th></th>
<th>DV = Value Infusion</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Marginal effects</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country-Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent State</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies(^{32})</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party-Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Office</td>
<td>0.32**</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.33***</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Ties</td>
<td>2.63*</td>
<td>0.32*</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Extremeness</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.73**</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation Sequence</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>2.06***</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Age</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
<td>-4.79**</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-4.95***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(1.88)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country-level</strong></td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>variance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (countries)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N (parties)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-class</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>97.96</td>
<td>68.20</td>
<td>120.46</td>
<td>74.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Logistic random-intercept coefficients with standard errors in brackets. Average marginal effects are reported.

For a graphical overview of the significant results in our analysis see Figure 1. Since the coefficient of the sequence of party formation in Model 2 misses conventional significance levels only narrowly (p=0.104), while the average marginal effect is significant at the 90 per cent confidence level, we include this effect in the graphical overview as well. As theoretically expected, political party’s experience in presidential office (H2), party system fragmentation (H4), party-union ties (H5), and a party’s formation sequence (H6) have significant effects on routinization. A political party’s time in presidential office (H2), its

\(^{32}\) Although H1 (unlike H2-6) expects only an impact of state subsidies on routinization, we included the variable in both models to assure the comparability of our results.
extremeness on the left-right dimension (H3), and the sequence of party formation (H6) have significant effects on value infusion. All effects have the theoretically expected positive sign, i.e. they increase the probability that structures conducive to party institutionalization have been created. Figure 1 also shows that only two variables have significant effects on both dependent variables, while another three shape one dimension alone, substantiating our emphasis on the need to analyse routinization and value infusion separately.

**Figure 1: Overview of Explanatory Variables with Significant Effects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(H)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Office</td>
<td>(H2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>(H4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-Union Ties</td>
<td>(H5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Formation Sequence</td>
<td>(H6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We discuss the results grouped along the three sets of factors distinguished in our framework: explanatory variables linked to the sphere of *party-state relations*, *dynamics of party competition*, and *party-society relations* in each of which we found relevant conditions shaping the capacity and/or motivation of elites to invest in organizational mechanisms or activities conducive to our two dimensions of institutionalization.

Considering differences in *party-state relations* we hypothesized that access to permanent party subsidies provided by the state (H1) or government resources (H2) should increase a party’s capacity to build an infrastructure. While, the *Permanent State Subsidies Hypothesis* (H1) – which was only expected to impact the probability of a party’s routinization – cannot
be confirmed, the analysis reveals a positive and highly significant effect of a party’s experience in presidential office on its probability of having both a routinized party structure and infused value for party members, thereby confirming the Presidential Office Hypothesis (H2). Each additional year in presidential office increases the probability of routinization by 4 percentage points (see average marginal effect of model 2). Furthermore, parties with more than 5 years in presidential office have a predicted probability of more than 80 per cent of being routinized. For parties with an experience of more than 10 years in presidential office the average predicted probability of having a routinized party structure even exceeds 90 per cent (see Table 3). Figure 2 also indicates that parties that were able to win the presidency repeatedly (>5 – as most presidents are elected for a four or five year term) have a much higher probability of possessing a routinized party structure. The presidency provides these parties with a comparative resource advantage, thereby, facilitating the capital intensive building of permanent party structures. This finding yields to an interesting conclusion, while presidentialism in Latin America is said to reduce horizontal accountability (O’Donnell, 1994) it seems to be conductive to electoral accountability as it induces political parties to routinize their party organization thereby increasing party system institutionalization (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006).

Furthermore, an additional year in presidential office increases the probability of a political party to infuse their organizations value on average by 5 percentage points (Model 4). The predicted probability of value infusion for parties with more than 15 years of experience in presidential office exceeds 90 per cent, while those parties with no or very few years in presidential office have, on average, a predicted probability of only 24 to 51 per cent (see Table 3 and Figure 2). These results indicate that winning the presidency not only incentivises the building of permanent local party structures but also the maintenance of a party’s community presence. The findings are also in line with arguments made in the
literature that parties holding the presidency face incentives to behave as disciplined, coherent actors, thereby, strengthening the visibility of ideological positions vis-à-vis their supporters and increasing the value of the party label for rank and file members (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Hicken & Stoll, 2011).

**Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Presidential Office (H2)**

Moving on to the dynamics of party competition and their impact on elites’ motivations to invest in extra-parliamentary structure we hypothesized in the theoretical part that these motivations should be stronger for ideologically extreme parties (H3) and parties that operate in fragmented party systems (4). With respect to the former, a political party’s extremeness on the ideological dimension within the party system has a positive and significant effect only on the probability that a party organization incentivises value infusion. A one unit increase in party extremeness induces an average marginal effect of 10 percentage points on a party’s probability of having infused value. Predicted probabilities of value infusion increase from a 28 per cent chance for a party with nearly no extremeness to an 82 per cent chance for a party with high extremeness (see Table 3). This effect is in line with the argument made above that extreme parties cater for homogenous voter groups and thereby differentiate themselves more clearly from their competitors. They do not only invest in the decidability of the offer within their party system, they also increase the potential identification of their voters with the
party’s ideological position or the group identity they address (Bartolini, 2000; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976). For example, the most extreme party in the data set - the FMLN in El Salvador has a very distinct ideological outline and its supporters show high levels of attachment to their party due to the polarized nature of the party system and its extreme position compared to the other contenders in this system (Azpuru, 2010; Zeeuw, 2010).

Concerning the *Fragmentation Hypothesis* (H4) the analysis confirms a significant and positive effect on a party’s probability to possess a routinized party structure, while no significant effect can be found on a party’s probability to invest in value infusion. As shown in Table 3, the predicted probability of parties having built permanent local structures favourable to routinization increases from 56 per cent in party systems with an ENPP of 2 to a 91 per cent in a party system with eight effective parties. Thus, confirming our theoretical argument that political elites face stronger incentives to invest in extra-parliamentary party building conducive to routinization in highly fragmented party systems compared to party systems with few contenders.
Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of Routinization and Value Infusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Explanatory variables</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Predicted probability&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Confidence interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Routinization</strong></td>
<td><strong>Country-Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.37-0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.57-0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.68-0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.77-1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Party-Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presidential office</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.44-0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.70-0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.85-1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.94-1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.98-1.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union ties</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.60-0.80</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.83-1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formation Sequence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.50-0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.72-0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value Infusion</strong></td>
<td><strong>Party-Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.61</td>
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</table>

<sup>a</sup> Fixed proportion only.

Finally the implications of party-society relations for party institutionalization have been theorized in the *Union Ties Hypothesis* (H5) and the *Formation Sequence Hypothesis* (H6). While the former is only significant for the routinization dimension, the formation sequence of a political party significantly impacts both routinization and value infusion. Concerning hypothesis 5, the probability of a routinized party structure is on average 0.32 higher for parties with strong ties to unions compared to parties without such ties. As Collier and Collier (1991) showed, labour movement inclusion within Latin American political
systems in the first half of the 20th century was often shaped by party incorporation. Several political parties in the region established ‘stable, institutionalized alliances’ with labour unions that were either formally or informally structured. To uphold these alliances and secure a long-term electoral support base, labour-backed political parties’ elites faced strong incentives to invest in the building of permanent party structures to coordinate their interaction with labour leaders (see Burgess, 1999, pp. 106-111).

Finally, we argue that the sequence of party formation influences on party elites’ capacity to institutionalize their party’s organization. In line with hypothesis 6 we find that for parties formed before the current regime the probability of routinization is on average 20 percentage points higher than for those formed during the current regime. The predicted probability of party routinization amounts to 84 per cent for parties formed before the current regime compared to 64 per cent for parties formed after the last transition to democratic rule (see Figure 3). Furthermore, the sequence of party formation (H6) relative to the latest democratic transition has a highly significant average marginal effect of 28 percentage points on a party’s probability of value infusion. The predicted probability of value infusion amounts to a 61 per cent chance for parties formed before the current regime compared to a 28 per cent chance for parties formed after the last transition to democratic rule. These results are in line with Geddes & Frantz finding that “authoritarian regimes that repress or outlaw parties freeze the pre-existing party system so that when competition is again allowed, the old parties usually emerge from repression, as from a deepfreeze, little changed and able to command substantial loyalty from voters” (2007, p. 26). Examples for such parties are the Broad Front (FA) in Uruguay or the Justicialist Party (PJ) in Argentina.

To sum up, as already highlighted by Figure 1, routinization and value infusion are influenced by a different set of factors and do not necessarily need to coincide in one party. Simultaneously, we find that a political parties experience in presidential office as well as the
sequence of party formation and regime transition both exhibit a significant effect on a party’s probability of having a routinized party structure and infused value. Finally, our analytical framework that focused on conditions shaping elite capacities and motivations to invest in institutionalized extra-parliamentary structures (in contexts that are commonly considered as unfavourable for party building) led us to identify conditions across three core spheres in which political parties need to operate, characterized by parties’ relations with the state, dynamics of party competition and their relations with society. Both dimensions of institutionalization are significantly affected by conditions located in each sphere (Table 3), which substantiates our decision against a more parsimonious approach, starting out from an either state- or a society centred perspective instead.

Conclusion
This paper examined under which conditions Latin American parties in 18 countries that operate in an environment incentivizing electoral, catch-all strategies invest in the creation of permanent extra-parliamentary structures, rather than investing scarce resources in organizational activities only temporarily during election time. Similarly, it assesses when they build up and maintain a permanent social and community presence. These two organizational features can be associated with the core dimensions of party institutionalization – routinization and value infusion respectively – whose presence or absence are crucial in the context of relatively young democracies where linkages between political elites and citizens tend to be only weakly developed. Political parties are traditionally seen as main mechanisms to assure a connection between the electorate and their representatives. Thus, the conditions under which parties create an infrastructure that allows citizens to engage politically on an on-going basis and, more importantly, to do so (also) for social purposes and thereby form an emotional attachment rather than solely engaging in
politics for functional reasons (e.g. to receive material benefits through clientelistic party networks) have important practical as well as normative repercussions. Mechanisms conducive to value infusion can help counter anti-party sentiments and alienation from politics that are wide-spread among citizens in Latin American democracies (see Payne, 2006) strengthening the legitimacy of the regime. Simultaneously, party organization can provide a channel of communication from citizens to elites, a core element to assure the electoral accountability of representatives (e.g. Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Randall & Svåsand, 2002; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006). By specifying the conditions that make the adoption by political parties of such an infra-structure likely, this article thus not only addresses an important empirical gap – theoretically driven large-N studies on the nature of Latin American party organization are rare (see for an exception Kitschelt & Kselman, 2011). It contributes to an important debate on the quality of democracy and the contribution parties are likely to make in the context of new democracies (Diamond & Gunther, 2001; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Mainwaring, Bejarano, & Pizarro, 2006).

By employing concepts and theories mainly developed in the context of advanced democracies to specify core factors shaping the capacity and the motivations of party elites to invest in particular infrastructures, we demonstrate the usefulness to engage in ‘conceptual travel’ and derive systematic hypotheses around variables identified as important in other regional contexts. This does not necessarily imply the adoption of the same hypotheses, since we need to consider the difference between the formation of new party structures and the change of old ones (Biezen, 2005) and between elites’ motivations to engage in party building with their capacity to do so. Yet as far as parties as organization have to cope with at least partially similar challenges in old and new democracies, variables identified as important in old democracies should not be dismissed as irrelevant from the outset, they might exercise an effect in new democracies as well, even though we might – due to
contextual differences – expect a different one.\textsuperscript{33} Rather than a simple transfer of concepts or theories from one region to another that might lead to ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori, 1978), we propose their contextualization. While doing so takes seriously the specificities of respective contexts, it allows us to systematically specify similarities and differences between party development in old and new democracies in future research.

Levitsky’s work on party institutionalization is not only a core example for this strategy, it has been one conceptual pillar of this paper. Classifying Latin American parties based on our proxies for routinization and value infusion respectively, confirms Levitsky’s important insight (1998) that routinization and value infusion – although as two dimensions of institutionalization they can be complementary, they need to be treated as separate phenomena. Not only do they not necessarily go together, our empirical analysis showed that they are not shaped by the same set of variables. While this paper contributed to the debate on the conditions for certain types of party organizations to emerge, future research will have to explore the actual effects of different dimensions of party organization on the democratic process. Party institutionalization – a precondition for party system institutionalization – is generally considered as beneficial for democracy (Huntington 1968; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995). But once taking seriously that party institutionalization is multidimensional, the challenge becomes to differentiate its various effects. Research has stressed that a permanent local organization can be an important tool for clientelistic parties to allocate selective incentives (Kitschelt, 2000; Levitsky, 2001). This implies that some parties adopt routinized structures that establish functional linkages without contributing to value infusion, the cultivation of an emotional attachment of followers to the party and possibly an identification with the regime in which party representatives occupy core positions. Such functional linkages might support the survival of parties and support internal coherence, which, in turn,

\textsuperscript{33} We expected an opposite effect of access to state funding or government resources on parties in Latin America than ‘cartel theory’ did in Western Europe.
helps stabilizing party competition. Yet this is not equivalent with possible effects of value infusion as specified earlier. Once understanding the conditions for different modes of party formation, future research faces the challenge to understand its consequences. Thanks to the availability of new datasets such as Democratic Accountability Expert Survey (DAES – Altman et al., 2009; Kitschelt et al., 2009) this will be possible, allowing us to go beyond general proxies of party institutionalization (e.g. party electoral volatility) and capture the nature of Latin American party organization in a more immediate and nuanced fashion.
Appendix

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

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<td>9.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>42.12</td>
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</table>

Notes: Calculations based on data from Casas-Zamora (2005), DAES, national election data, [www.rulers.org](http://www.rulers.org) and [www.ipu.org/parline/](http://www.ipu.org/parline/).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Justicialist Party (PJ), Radical Civic Union (UCR), Front for Victory (FPV), Republican Proposal (PRO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Movement for Socialism (MAS), Social and Democratic Power (PODEM(1)), Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), National Unity Front (UN(1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Liberal Front Party (PFL), Liberal Party-Party of the Republic (PL-PR), Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), Progressive Party (PP(1)), Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), Workers' Party (PT), Brazilian Labour Party (PTB), Democratic Labour Party (PDT), Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), Popular Socialist Party (PPS(1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD), Independent Democratic Union (UDI), Socialist Party of Chile (PSCh), National Renewal (RN), Christian Democratic Party (PDC(1)), Party for Democracy (PPD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Colombian Liberal Party (PLC(1)), Colombian Conservative Party (PCC), Social Party of National Unity (PU), Radical Change (MCR), Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA), Citizens' Convergence (CC), Team Colombia Movement (MEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Citizen's Action Party (PAC), National Liberation Parties (PLN(1)), Libertarian Movement Party (PML), Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA), Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), Party of National Conciliation (PCN), Christian Democratic Party (PDC(2));</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG), Grand National Alliance (GANA), National Advancement Party (PAN(1)), Patriotic Party (PP(2)), National Unity of Hope (UNE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH), National Party of Honduras (PNH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN(2)), Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD(1)), Ecological Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), Convergence (CONV)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC(2))</td>
</tr>
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<td>Panama</td>
<td>Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD(2)), Panameñaista Party (PA), Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (MOLIR), Solidarity Party (PS), Democratic Change (PCD), National Liberal Party (PLN(2))</td>
</tr>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>National Party (PN), Colorado Party (PC), Broad Front (FA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), For Social Democracy (PODEM(2), Fatherland for All (PPT), Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A2a-b: Predicted Probabilities of Routinization

Figure A3a-b: Predicted Probabilities of Value Infusion
References


Chapter 3
Populism in Latin America and
the Deconstruction of Horizontal Accountability

Saskia Pauline Ruth

Introduction

The phenomenon of populism poses many challenges to comparativists around the world. Due to different perspectives on the topic researchers especially struggle with conceptual clarity. For the purpose of this article, populism will be defined as a “thin-centred ideology” based on the division of the society in two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the people versus the elite. It is this kind of rhetoric that unites populists around the world. Especially in Latin America populism has a long history, many countries in this region experienced traditional forms of populism in the first half of the 20th century. After the third wave of democratic transition put an end to military rule, populism as well returned, although in different shapes. The reasons for the success of populist contenders are manifold: discontent with political elites, erosion of traditional partisan ties, mediatisation of politics, among other things. By mobilizing these discontent citizens, populists around the world

34 Michael Freeden, “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?,” Political Studies, 46 (September 1998), 748-765, p. 750.
even achieved government positions – either in coalition with established parties or through winning presidential elections.\(^{37}\)

However, comparative research on populism in public office only recently arose.\(^{38}\) Especially with respect to the relationship between populism and democracy it is important to investigate the consequences of populism in public office. Rovira emphasizes that populism may, on the one hand, serve as a corrective to democracy through addressing the underprivileged and incorporating citizens that were not or did not feel represented by established elites. On the other hand, populism may have a fierce relationship with institutions of liberal democracy.\(^{39}\) This potential threat to liberal democracy should not be underestimated, especially in the context of new democracies with presidential systems like those in Latin America. According to Linz presidentialism is conducive to populism for two reasons: firstly, because the personalization of presidential elections enables the access of political outsiders to power, and secondly, because the style of presidential politics – due to the plebiscititarian legitimacy of presidents – is easily combined with a populist appeal.\(^{40}\) Moreover, O'Donnell argues that presidential systems in Latin America resemble characteristics of delegative democracies, where majoritarian elements are strong while republican and liberal elements, like checks and balances or minority rights, are less pronounced.\(^{41}\) Such delegative democracies are not only beneficial for the rise of populist newcomers, they also foster radical behaviour of populist

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presidents vis-à-vis representative institutions. Thus, a populist strategy may be perfectly fit to gain public office playing by the rules of the democratic game, but once in power positions the same populists may turn against core representative institutions to maintain power over time. Therefore, Torre generally opts for the analytical distinction between “populism as regimes in power ... [and] populism as wider social and political movements seeking power.” This article follows the first analytical perspective. Due to the focus on presidential systems in Latin America throughout this article public office will be defined in a narrow, power related sense, which means that a populist party has to win the presidency to be considered as a case. Thus, a populist party is understood here as the party of a president elected via a populist mandate.

The aim of this article is to investigate the behaviour of populist presidents towards representative democracy in Latin America since the 1980s. More specifically, the research question centres on the conduct of populist presidents towards institutions of horizontal accountability. Therefore I take an actor-centred approach focusing on specific constellations in the political arena that shape populist presidents’ behaviour towards these institutions.

The article is organized as follows: The next section elaborates on the definition of populism and its relationship to representative democracy. The third chapter concentrates on the incentive structure of populist presidents. Research design and case selection are discussed in section four. Section five presents the results and the last section summarizes the theoretical arguments and concludes.

**Populism and democracy**

Populism poses a conceptual challenge to comparative researchers. It has been defined along the lines of feature lists or narrow core characteristics (e.g. organizational structure, social

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42 Levitsky and Loxton; O'Donnell.

base) which led to many versions of populism with adjectives\textsuperscript{44}. Instead of focusing on a narrow definition of populism, a minimal conceptualization will be deployed here\textsuperscript{45}. In line with the common reference to an anti-status quo discourse, populism is defined as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”\textsuperscript{46}.

The content of the rather vague ideology is not part of the concept but determined through other ideological, programmatic or personalistic elements (e.g. socialism or neo-liberalism). The combination of the populist discourse with these elements determines the nature of the antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. Thus, the recurrence to an anti-elite rhetoric and the statement to be the true party or person to represent ‘the good people’ in terms of their general will unites all populists. Whereby, other elements help to distinguish different forms of populism – such as left- or right-wing populism, neopopulism, or indigenous populism\textsuperscript{47}.

Concerning the relationship between populism and democracy Rovira as well as Mudde and Rovira have recently advanced the debate about the ambivalence between these two concepts.\textsuperscript{48} Building on Dahl’s definition of democracy these authors theorize potential positive or negative effects of populism alongside the dimensions of public contestation and political participation.\textsuperscript{49}

As mentioned before, a populist appeal is often used by new political parties or challengers within an existing party. As such populism seems to be a viable electoral entry strategy to challenge established elites. Several authors show that populism resembles a political strategy of mass mobilization, where a personalistic leader appeals to a heterogeneous group of

\textsuperscript{45} see Rovira.
\textsuperscript{47} Koen Abts and Stefan Rummens, “Populism versus Democracy,” Political Studies, 55 (2007), 405-424; Mudde.
\textsuperscript{48} Rovira; Mudde and Rovira.
citizens that was formerly neglected by the political elite or excluded from political representation\textsuperscript{50}. In this respect the election of a president via a \textit{populist mandate} may be a response to a crisis of representation and a corrective to democracy itself\textsuperscript{51}.

Then again, the antagonistic nature and the moralistic style of the populist discourse are often directed against liberal democracy, which is based on political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities. Through the anchorage of populism in the imaginary concept of ‘the good people’, populism excludes those parts of society that do not fit into the (however defined) picture\textsuperscript{52}. Hence the populist ideology is rooted in the representation of the people as a homogeneous group and negates the diversity of society inherent in the liberal principle of democracy, thus, resembling a similar logic with authoritarianism\textsuperscript{53}. Taken together populism fosters a democratic practice based on plebiscitarian participation that runs counter to representative democratic institutions, especially parliaments\textsuperscript{54}.

This inherent tension between populism and liberalism is the reason why populists are perceived as a threat to democracy itself. Furthermore, as soon as populists gain government responsibility they face “problems of credibility”\textsuperscript{55}, i.e. they risk to be perceived as unreliable if they behave like their opponents did. Assuming that populists are primarily \textit{office seekers} – since they aspire to replace the incumbent political elite – the moment a populist party reaches government for the first time is a crucial phase in its lifespan. The transition from opposition to government evokes immense pressures on a populist party, especially if the content of the


\textsuperscript{51} Mudde and Rovira.

\textsuperscript{52} Carlos de la Torre, “Populist Redemption and the Unfinished Democratization of Latin America,” \textit{Constellations}, 5 (March 1998), 85-95; Abts and Rummens.


\textsuperscript{54} Torre, 1998; Hawkins; Barr.

\textsuperscript{55} Schedler, p. 302.
populist antagonism not only involved anti-elite appeals but is also directed against aspects of the political system as such.\textsuperscript{56}

To adapt to this pressure populists in public office may radicalize and turn themselves against established liberal democratic institutions. Institutional change triggered by populist presidents may pass through three stages: In the first place a populist president may try to debilitate the horizontal axis of accountability, (re)enforcing delegative democratic structures.\textsuperscript{57} Instruments in this context are for example the excessive use of executive decrees, institutional reforms to weaken the legislature, majoritarian electoral reforms or the co-optation of the judiciary.\textsuperscript{58} In a second stage, radical populist party behaviour may be directed against the vertical axis of accountability leading to types of political regimes labelled as competitive authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{59} Typical forms of actions in this respect are the limitation of oppositional forces, manipulation of election results, and the excessive use of proactive referendums.\textsuperscript{60} The third and final stage leads to the abolition of any kind of democratic facade, for example through a coup d’état. Thus, in the extreme case populism may lead to the abolition of democracy. However, populists may also abandon their antagonistic rhetoric once in office, “choose a path of moderation”\textsuperscript{61}, and engage in ‘politics as usual’\textsuperscript{62}. I argue in this article that the political context in which a populist president acts influences her behaviour towards established liberal-democratic institutions. Based on the literature, the next section identifies relevant conditions that build the incentive structure of populist presidents.


\textsuperscript{57} O’Donnell.


\textsuperscript{59} Levitsky and Way.


\textsuperscript{61} Abts and Rummens, p. 421.

\textsuperscript{62} Schedler, p. 304-305.
Incentives for populist institutional change

Institutional context Especially in the context of Latin American political systems the populist threat should be taken seriously, as Fujimori in Peru and Chávez in Venezuela show. Although the thresholds of success to gain public office in presidential systems are high, they provide favourable conditions for populist challengers, due to the high degree of personalization through the nationwide, direct election of the executive. Furthermore, O’Donnell insightfully notes that some Latin American presidential systems are prone to be delegative democracies. Although vertical accountability is normally implemented, they lack effective horizontal checks and balances necessary for liberal democracies to consolidate. Thus, delegative democracies resemble institutional characteristics favourable for the populist strategy.

As mentioned before, populist presidents may try to change the political regime to their own benefit through institutional reform, manipulation of democratic rules, or through the execution of a coup d’état. Institutional change thus may affect both the horizontal and vertical dimension of democratic accountability. But which factors enable or hinder a populist president to pursue a radical strategy of institutional change? The behaviour of political actors is necessarily interrelated with the context in which they act.

There are several factors that constrain the room to manoeuvre of a populist president and it is important to systematically analyse these conditions. Thus, this article addresses the question which factors enable populist presidents to pursue a radical strategy of institutional change. Here the focus lies on the first signs of institutional depletion, i.e. a change of horizontal checks and balances in favour of the executive. Thereby, this article takes an inclusive approach with respect to the identification of radical populist behaviour.

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63 Linz.
64 O’Donnell.
**Working hypotheses** In this section I identify three conditions that constitute the incentive structure of populist presidents with respect to their behaviour towards the deconstruction of horizontal accountability. Firstly, the existence of a ‘power vacuum’ in the political arena, secondly, the presence of divided government between the executive and the legislature,thirdly, the distribution of public support.

**Power vacuum**

One condition that has been identified by several researchers as conducive to the rise of populism as well as the radical behaviour of populist presidents towards liberal-democratic institutions is the existence of a ‘power vacuum’ in the political arena. The decay of established political elites may be exploited by populist challengers to carry out their radical agenda of institutional change, either by the adoption of new constitutions or the informal depletion of checks and balances. Mayorga identifies two reasons that create such a ‘power vacuum’ in the political arena: the decay and breakdown of traditional party systems and/or a crisis of governability due to executive-legislative deadlocks. An anti-status quo appeal combined with low rates of trust in established political elites and democratic institutions make institutional change viable for populist presidents. Thus, institutionalized party systems and parties with stable societal roots may be a safeguard against radical institutional change. In such circumstances the existing political elite may exert a ‘moderating pull’ on those forces inclined to induce institutional change.

*Hypothesis 1: A ‘power vacuum’ in the political arena leads to the deconstruction of horizontal accountability.*

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68 Mayorga.
69 Levitsky and Loxton.
70 Weyland, 2009, p. 150.
Divided government

Although presidential regimes are conducive to the rise of populist challengers to power, institutional provisions of checks and balances in those systems may considerably constrain populist presidents in realizing their political agenda. Executive-legislative conflicts are at the heart of what Linz conjured as the perils of presidentialism. Cooperation between these two branches of government heavily depends on the seat share of the president’s party (or coalition) in either the single or both chambers of the congress. Especially in Latin-American presidential systems that combine plurality or majority run-off presidential elections with proportional representation formula for the election of their legislatures, situations of divided government frequently occur. Divided government will be understood here as a situation where either an opposition party or stable coalition holds an absolute majority in at least one chamber of the congress, or the party (or stable coalition) of the president holds a minority or a plurality of less than 45% of seats in at least one chamber of the congress.

Populist presidents that assume power in a context of divided government, face incentives to change or circumvent the institutional constraints by the legislature.

Hypothesis 2: Divided government between a populist president and the legislature leads to the deconstruction of horizontal accountability.

However, several studies provide evidence that situations of outright conflict between presidents and legislatures often result in the impeachment or declaration of incapacity of presidents. This seemingly ‘congressional supremacy’ does, however, not always result

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71 Linz.
72 Mainwaring and Shugart.
73 Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination,” Comparative Political Studies, 26 (July 1993), 198-228.
75 E.g. John M. Carey, “Presidentialism and Representative Institutions,” in Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter, eds., Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
from the strength of legislatures. While the military has been the ‘moderating power’ in solving executive-legislative conflicts before the 1980s – a fact that contributed to the conclusion of Linz that presidential systems are prone to regime instability\textsuperscript{76} – Hochstetler illustrates that since the third wave of democracy, the public resumes the role of a moderator in executive-legislative dissolution processes\textsuperscript{77}. This leads us to the third and final condition.

\textit{Popular support}

In presidential systems the executive is not only constrained by the legislature or other institutions of checks and balances but also by its principal. Electorates are not necessarily a ‘passive but cheering audience’ \textsuperscript{78} after they elected a president but rather take an active role in presidential falls and executive-legislative conflicts. The possibility that a presidential mandate may be withdrawn through popular protest challenges one central characteristic of presidentialism: the fixed term limits\textsuperscript{79}.

However, while Anderson shows that informal vertical accountability mechanisms – like popular mobilization – may restrain presidential dominance in executive-legislative relationships, strong popular support in favour of the president may foster presidential dominance and even radical behaviour of presidents to restructure liberal-democratic institutions\textsuperscript{80}. Thus, the margin of safety of presidents and their ability to pursue a radical strategy of institutional change depends on their skill to sustain popular support.

\textit{Hypothesis 3: High popular support for populist presidents leads to the deconstruction of horizontal accountability.}

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\textsuperscript{76} Linz.
\textsuperscript{77} Kathryn Hochstetler, ”Rethinking Presidentialism: Challenges and Presidential Falls in South America,” \textit{Comparative Politics}, 38 (July 2006), 401-418.
\textsuperscript{78} O’Donnell.\textsuperscript{79} Hochstetler.
\textsuperscript{80} Leslie E. Anderson,“The Authoritarian Executive? Horizontal and Vertical Accountability in Nicaragua,” Latin American Politics and Society, 48, (Summer 2006), 141–169.; Carey; Levitsky and Loxton.
The behaviour of populist presidents towards horizontal accountability follows a complex pattern and cannot be explained by a single condition alone. Thus, I assume an interactive pattern of *conjunctural causation* with respect to the conditions that make up the incentive structure of populist presidents. Neither condition is expected to be individually necessary and sufficient to bring about the outcome, but the combination of these conditions may result in different causal paths that lead to a reduction of horizontal accountability.

**Research design and operationalization**

The present study constitutes a first empirical sketch of the conditions that shape populist presidents’ incentives to interfere with institutions of horizontal accountability. The three hypotheses stated in the previous chapter will be tested by means of a Qualitative Comparative Analysis – QCA – which allows to model situations of complex causality. QCA is especially suited for research designs with low- or medium numbers of cases. Based on Boolean algebra the method helps to identify those conditions that bring about a defined outcome. With crisp set QCA both the conditions as well as the outcome are binary coded, classifying their presence (=1) or absence (=0) for each case.

**Case selection** The definition of populism is a debated topic which makes the selection of cases a matter of debate as well. As the arguments in the former section are based on the concept of a *populist mandate*, the units of analysis in the present study necessarily need to be elected presidents that used a populist discourse in their electoral presidential campaign. Interim presidents as well as those who have not finished at least one term by the end of 2011 are excluded. Reelections are only considered if the respective candidate was out of office for

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at least one term. Finally, only elections under minimal democratic conditions are considered, using a polity2 score of 6 or higher as the benchmark\textsuperscript{83}. Based on these criteria a data set has been compiled covering 18 Latin American democracies from 1978-2011 including 89 presidents.

To identify those presidents that based their electoral campaign on a populist discourse I proceeded in two steps: First, I conducted an intensive literature review covering research notes and articles on presidential elections, party systems and electoral systems. Resulting from this review 17 presidents with a \textit{populist mandate} were pre-selected. However, for two cases the literature yields conflicting accounts as to the populist nature of the presidential campaign (see Table 1) and therefore these cases were marked as ambiguous. Second, to validate this coding the data set including comments on the 17 pre-selected cases was send to several experts in the field to benefit from their expertise. The experts were asked to comment on the pre-selection of populist presidents based on the definition described above which was provided with the data set. Overall expert comments clearly objected three pre-selected cases, indicated three additional potential cases, and showed conflicting evaluations of the populist discourse of three pre-selected presidents. Table 1 lists 20 potential cases indicated either by the literature review or expert comments.

In the remainder of this section I will explain \textit{which} criteria were used to exclude cases and \textit{why} some cases with conflicting accounts were included in the analysis. Firstly, cases are excluded from the analysis due to opposing accounts from at least one expert – without conflicting accounts in favour of the coding by another expert. Several experts objected the classification of Alejandro Toledo and Carlos Perez as populist presidents. At least one expert contradicts the coding of Joaquín Balaguer as populist president. No accounts were made in favour of the coding of these presidents by other experts.

Secondly, the inclusion or exclusion of cases with contradictory accounts needs to be justified: For Carlos Menem in Argentina expert judgments range from “borderline case” and “moderately populist in the campaign” to “populist”. Accounts in the literature predominantly evaluate Menem as populist. Thus, I code him as a populist since he based his presidential campaign on an – albeit moderate – populist discourse. With respect to Néstor Kirchner (Argentina) experts judged him capable of a populist campaign but also remarked that he was not very consistent with it and that his campaign was rather mild compared to other populists in this sample. In a similar way, Fernández characterizes Kirchner’s discourse as a “populismo atemperado”. However, the analysis of Kirchner’s discourse shows that he did centre his rhetoric on a victimized “pueblo” and identified the economic elite as the culprit of their poor situation. Therefore, Kirchner will be included as a case in the present study.

Concerning Álvaro Uribe in Colombia, a case which was not included in the pre-selection due to opposing accounts in the literature, expert comments yield conflicting evaluations with respect to his coding as non-populist (one in favour and one against). I follow the reasoning of Dugas in this respect as he shows that, although Uribe broke with the (traditional) Liberal Party prior to his election, he neither based his presidential campaign on an anti-elitist appeal nor did he try to address the poor masses in a direct, unmediated way. Thus, Uribe will not be considered as a president with a populist mandate.

An additional case indicated as a potential populist by one expert is Manuel Zelaya (Honduras). However, accounts in the literature indicate that before and during his

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84 E.g. Victor Armony, “Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America,” paper presented at Claiming Citizenship in the Americas organized by Canada Research Chair, Montreal, November 4-5, 2005; Weyland, 1996.
86 Fernández; María A. Muñoz and Martín Retamozo “Hegemonía y discurso en la Argentina contemporánea: Efectos políticos de los usos de "pueblo" en la retórica de Néstor Kirchner,” Perfiles Latinoamericanos, 31 (2008), 121-149.
88 Ibid.
presidential campaign “Zelaya appeared to be a typical Honduran career politician”\textsuperscript{89}. It was in his second presidential year when he took a turn to the left aligning with Hugo Chávez and initiating a phase of inter-branch conflict that finally led to a military coup in June 2009\textsuperscript{90}.

Thus, Zelaya will not be coded as a president with a populist mandate in this study.

\textit{Alan García’s} second term as Peru’s president was not included in the pre-selection due to accounts in the literature with respect to his moderate appeal during the presidential election in 2006\textsuperscript{91}. However, his discourse might have been perceived as non-populist due to the strong populist discourse of his direct competitor Ollanta Humala in the 2006 race. New data from Hawkins indicates that García’s discourse clearly qualifies as populist during his second presidential campaign as well\textsuperscript{92}.

Finally, the two cases that experts indicated as borderline – Hipólito Mejía and Mireya Moscoso – are included in the analysis based on a re-assessment of the literature\textsuperscript{93}. Using both literature review and expert ratings 15 cases were finally selected for the analysis.


\textsuperscript{90} Ruhl; Hawkins.


\textsuperscript{92} Hawkins.

Table 1: Case selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>1st Term</th>
<th>Pre-Selection</th>
<th>Expert Statements</th>
<th>Final(^a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Carlos Menem</td>
<td>1989-1995</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Néstor Kirchner</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOL</td>
<td>Evo Morales</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Fernando Collor de Mello</td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Alvaro Uribe</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOM</td>
<td>Joaquín Balaguer</td>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOM</td>
<td>Hipólito Mejía</td>
<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Borderline</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>Jaime Roldós</td>
<td>1979-1981</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>Abdalá Bucaram</td>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>Lucio Guítierrez</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>Rafael Correa</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HON</td>
<td>Manuel Zelaya</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Mireya Moscoso</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Borderline</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Alan García I, 1985</td>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Alejandro Toledo</td>
<td>2001-2006</td>
<td>Confl.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PER</td>
<td>Alan García II, 2006</td>
<td>2006-2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEN</td>
<td>Carlos García</td>
<td>1989-1993</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEN</td>
<td>Rafael Caldera</td>
<td>1994-1999</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEN</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Cases were excluded from the final selection if opposing accounts of at least one expert exists without accounts in favour of the coding by another expert. Cases with conflicting and borderline accounts were included or excluded based on a re-assessment of the literature (see discussion above).

**Operationalization**  The outcome variable of *changes in constraints on presidential power* will be captured by the item on “Executive Constraints” from the Polity IV dataset\(^94\). This item is measured on a 7-point scale with high values indicating high degrees of constraints on executive power. To build a dummy variable the yearly ratings of “Executive Constraints” during the first term of the populist president were inspected, if these ratings decrease the outcome takes on the value 1, if ratings increase or stay the same the outcome takes on the value 0. Furthermore, a closer look on the data indicates that before the rise of the populist president all cases fall either into the highest category of the scale, described as “parity or

\(^{94}\) Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr.
“parity or subordination” (7) or into the second highest category (6) that takes an intermediate position between “parity or subordination” (7) and “substantial limitations” (5). Three conditions are expected to be conducive to a decrease in executive constraints: the existence of a power vacuum, a situation of divided government, and ongoing popular support (see Table 3 in the Appendix for details on each case). The binary coding of the condition indicating the existence of a power vacuum is based on the analysis of qualitative case studies and electoral data. The condition takes on the value 1 in the case of a party system breakdown – where electoral support for traditional parties fell below 50% before or during the rise of the populist president – or a severe crisis of governability in the year before the election of the populist president. The construction of a binary condition indicating a situation of divided government during the term of the populist president is based on the distribution of seats in the congress. The condition takes on the value 1 if the presidential party (or coalition) had less than 45% of seats in one chamber or if an opposition party (or coalition) had a majority of seats in at least one chamber. Popular support figures for the president are captured by public opinion surveys. If available the coding of the condition is based on data from the Latinobarometer surveys that inter alia asked respondents to indicate their approval with or confidence in the president. For the cases not covered by the Latinobarometer

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95 Ibid, 24-25.
97 Data on legislative seats was taken from http://americo.usal.es/oir/legislatina/ and http://www.ipu.org/parline/.
98 Data on governmental coalitions was mostly taken from Octavio Amorim Neto “The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy-Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas,” Comparative Political Studies, 39 (May 2006), 415-440. For the countries and years not included in Amorim Neto’s study information was gathered from several sources, available on request from the author.
information from additional surveys and case studies were used to code the condition.\textsuperscript{99} The condition is coded 1 if the populist president experienced continuous popular support figures over 50%.

**Results and interpretation**

Based on the binary coding of the cases the Boolean algebra constructs a truth table covering all possible configurations of the three conditions. With three conditions eight configurations are logically possible. The 15 cases in this study cover six of these configurations, leaving two logical remainders. In line with a conservative approach the outcome of these logical remainders is coded absent to exclude them from the analysis\textsuperscript{100}. Furthermore, the QCA yields no contradictory cases with respect to the empirically observed configurations and the outcome.

\textsuperscript{99} Nestor Kirchner, Evo Morales, Abdalá Bucaram, Lucio Guitiérez, Rafael Correa, Mireya Moscoso, Alan García II, Rafael Caldera, and Hugo Chávez are covered by the Latinobarometer surveys from 1996-2010 [1999], http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/latinobarometro.jsp (accessed 1 July 2013). Data on Carlos Menem is provided by N. Guillermo Molinelli, M. Valeria Palanza, and Gisela Sin, *Congreso, presidencia y justicia en Argentina:Materiales para su estudio* (Buenos Aires: Temas Grupo Editorial, 1999); on Fernando Collor de Mello by Panizza; on Hipólito Mejía by Sagás 2003 and 2005; on Jaime Roldos by Martz; on Alan García’s first term by Graham; on Alberto Fujimori by Carey.

\textsuperscript{100} Schneider and Wagemann.
Table 2: Truth table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Presidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: V= power vacuum, D= divided government, S= public support, C=executive constraints. For details on the acronyms of the presidents see Table 1.

Explaining the presence of the outcome  There is one sufficient path leading to the presence of the outcome: the presence of a power vacuum in the political arena (V) AND strong popular support for the populist president (S). This also means that both of these jointly sufficient conditions are individually necessary for the presence of the outcome (C). \(^{101}\)

\[
VS = C
\]

The five cases that are covered by this causal solution are Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, Alberto Fujimori, Carlos Menem, and Evo Morales. All five populist presidents that pursued a deconstruction of horizontal accountability, did craft new constitutions. \(^{102}\)

As stressed by the ‘power vacuum’ hypothesis populist presidents may rise to power in times where a process of democratic deconsolidation might already have begun \(^{103}\). In such

\(^{101}\) Upper case letters refer to the presence of a condition or the outcome and lower case letters indicate the absence of a condition or the outcome.

\(^{102}\) Detailed information about all the constitutions discussed here was taken from http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/constudies.html.

\(^{103}\) Mainwaring, Bejarano and Pizarro; Weyland, 2009.
situations populists may capitalize on a weak momentum of representative democracy to their own gain. The finding acknowledges the argument made by Mudde and Rovira that the threat of populism is most severe in unconsolidated democracies, where institutions of democratic representation are weakly entrenched in society\textsuperscript{104}. Furthermore, the joint negative effect on executive constraints of a power vacuum in the political arena and on-going public support confirms the thesis of Levitsky and Loxton that populist presidents are invested with a \textit{populist mandate} to disempower those– usually representative – institutions controlled by the existing and distrusted political elite\textsuperscript{105}. Thus, if a populist contender is able to exploit a power vacuum and at the same time manages to maintain ongoing public support she may easily change the rules of the game to her benefit.

Assessing the sensitivity of the results shows that dropping the case of Carlos Menem from the analysis yields a more complex solution leading to the presence of the outcome, more specifically divided government has to be added as a necessary condition\textsuperscript{106}. The exclusion of any other case fails to affect the result of the QCA.

\[
VDS = C
\]

In the case of Menem the reduction in executive constraints was due to his excessive use of executive decree authority at the beginning of his first term\textsuperscript{107}. Unlike the other positive cases, Menem had a near majority in the Chamber of Deputies and a majority in the Senate. In combination with the extensive use of executive decrees, that could only be rejected through the normal legislative process – including a presidential veto – there were few possibilities for

\textsuperscript{104} Mudde and Rovira.
\textsuperscript{105} Levitsky and Loxton.
\textsuperscript{107} John M Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, “Calling out the Tanks or Filling out the Forms?,” in John M. Carey, and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., \textit{Executive Decree Authority}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1-29.
the opposition to check the presidential agenda\textsuperscript{108}. However, when it came to Menem’s ambition to reform the constitution as to enable him to stand for a second term as president, he needed to negotiate with the opposition which limited his influence on constitutional design. In exchange for the inclusion of immediate reelection the opposition managed to incorporate substantial checks on presidential power into the new constitution\textsuperscript{109}.

Contrary to the limiting effect of the Argentinean Constitution in 1994 on executive power, constitutional reforms in the other four cases clearly benefited the executive branch.

A plethora of beneficial changes with respect to \textit{constitutional presidential powers}\textsuperscript{110} were introduced in these new constitutions: the Bolivarian Constitution of 2009 includes the immediate reelection of the president as well as lowered congressional hurdles for presidential appointees\textsuperscript{111}. The Constitution of Ecuador from 2009 introduced the immediate reelection of the president, expanded the regulation of government-initiated referendums\textsuperscript{112}, and the power to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections\textsuperscript{113}. The Peruvian Constitution from 1993 introduced the immediate reelection of the president, established the abolition of bicameralism, and expanded as well as eased executive decree authority\textsuperscript{114}. The Constitution of Venezuela from 1999 introduced the immediate reelection of the president, established the possibility of government-initiated referendums, and expanded and eased the regulations of executive decree authority\textsuperscript{115}.

\textsuperscript{108}Mainwaring and Shugart.
\textsuperscript{110}See Mainwaring and Shugart on the conceptual distinction between constitutional and partisan powers of presidents.
\textsuperscript{112}Breuer.
Furthermore, with respect to partisan powers these presidents faced incentives to engage in institutional engineering of electoral systems to overcome divided government. In line with arguments in the literature that malapportionment works as a check on powerful presidents through the separation of purpose between the executive and legislative branch\textsuperscript{116} in all four cases of divided government changes of electoral procedures increased majoritarian elements and decreased proportionality: in Bolivia’s mixed-member system the number of multi-member districts was reduced to include special indigenous single-member districts\textsuperscript{117}, in Ecuador a change from proportional representation to a mixed-system with a high share of single-member districts took place\textsuperscript{118}, in Peru the separation of purpose was minimized by the abolition of bicameralism and the reduction of the size of the Congress\textsuperscript{119}, in Venezuela bicameralism was abolished as well, furthermore, the share of single-member seats in the mixed-member system was increased by 10 percentage points at the expense of the multi-member districts and compensatory seats for minority parties were eliminated\textsuperscript{120}.

In sum, the analysis showed that the reduction on executive constraints in the case of Menem was due to an informal practice of executive decree authority, while in the other cases formal constitutional engineering led to the reduction of both constitutional and partisan powers. This leads to the conclusion that in situations with divided government populist presidents face stronger incentives to formally change the institutional balance of power in their favour, while in situations of unified government informal or de facto changes in executive-legislative relations may suffice to enforce the presidential agenda. However, in each case the presidents need to uphold the approval of their conduct within the public.

Explaining the absence of the outcome  The analysis of the absence of the outcome identifies a solution with two sufficient paths: the absence of a power vacuum in the political arena (v) AND the absence of a situation of divided government (d) OR the presence of divided government (D) AND the absence of strong public support for the populist president (s).

\[ \text{vd + Ds = c} \]

To evaluate the relative importance of these causal paths we can refer to their coverage scores\textsuperscript{121}. Two types of coverage measures are available: *raw coverage*, which denotes the percentage of the cases covered by the causal path in relation to all cases with the same outcome, and *unique coverage*, which refers to the percentage of cases that are uniquely covered by the respective causal path. In the present analysis no case belongs to more than one configuration, thus, raw and unique coverage scores are identical. The first causal path – vd – has a coverage of 40%, while the second causal path – Ds – has a coverage of 60%. Both paths are completely consistent, i.e. no contradictory cases arise.

The first causal path explaining the absence of the outcome covers four cases: Néstor Kirchner, Hipólito Mejía, and both terms of Alan García (1985 and 2006). These presidents did not rise to power against the background of a governmental crisis or party system breakdown and with their party (or coalition) at the same time managing to gain near or full majority control of the legislature. Therefore, they did not face incentives to reduce executive constraints once in office, since presidents with strong partisan powers can outweigh the lack of constitutional powers and override classical checks and balances\textsuperscript{122}.

Assessing the sensitivity of the results shows that dropping Néstor Kirchner from the analysis yields a more complex solution with respect to the first path, i.e. low public support has to be added to the path – vds – while the second path remains unchanged. Thereby, public support

\textsuperscript{121} Ragin, 2006; Schneider and Wagemann.

\textsuperscript{122} Mainwaring and Shugart.
becomes a necessary condition for the absence of the outcome. The exclusion of any other case fails to affect the result of the QCA.

\[ vds + Ds = c \]

Kirchner can be characterized as a powerful president with both strong constitutional and partisan powers, and although he witnessed ongoing public support he did not change the rules of the democratic game and take an authoritarian turn\textsuperscript{123}. Two reasons may account for this outcome: firstly, the president’s party – the Justicialist Party (PJ) – had a structural advantage vis-à-vis other parties in the system through its dominant position in the Argentinean Senate and a fragmented opposition in the Chamber of Deputies. De facto the PJ developed into a dominant party in the Argentinean party system since 2001\textsuperscript{124}. Secondly, the populist discourse of Kirchner was mainly directed against the economic elite and not against the democratic system as such\textsuperscript{125}. Thus, Kirchner did not face strong incentives to increase executive powers, even though he managed to maintain broad public support throughout his presidential term.

Hipólito Mejía in the Dominican Republic rose to power with a comfortable majority of his party in both chambers of the Congress and he managed to uphold popular support until after the mid-term elections in 2002\textsuperscript{126}. Thus, he did not face incentives to change the electoral system, as it already invested his party with control over the Congress but he had an interest in reforming the constitution as to enable his immediate re-election. After reforming the constitution, however, his popularity decreased immensely prior to the election in 2004 which

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid, pp. 22-23.
\textsuperscript{125} Carlos Moreira and Sebastián Barbosa “El kirchnerismo en Argentina: origen, apogeo y crisis, su construcción de poder y forma de gobernar,” \textit{Sociedade e Cultura}, 13 (2010), 192-200; Fernandez.
he ultimately lost against his predecessor Leonel Fernández from the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD). Alan García (Peru) managed to win the presidential elections in 1985 and 2006 as candidate of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) – a traditional populist party machine. However, he assumed office in times of no power vacuum, depended on the support of a coalition of parties in the Congress in both terms – centre-left in 1985 and centre-right in 2006 – and was unable to maintain public support in both terms and therefore unable to further any considerable change in the rules of the game – not even a re-election bid.

To sum up, we may conclude that both Kirchner and Mejía faced favourable conditions in their political systems that structured their expectations of future success as to leave the system of checks and balances unchanged, while García found himself in the need of sharing power with other political parties and at the same time lacked continuous public support which made it impossible for him to manipulate the rules of the game unilaterally.

The second causal path – the joint positive influence of divided government and low public support on executive constraints – covers six cases: Abdalá Bucaram, Rafael Caldera, Fernando Collor de Mello, Lucio Guitiérrez, Mireya Moscoso, and Jaime Roldós. This part of the solution confirms the arguments made in the literature on the importance of the public as a moderating force in times of executive-legislative deadlock. All cases in the present analysis where the legislative prevailed in executive-legislative conflicts are covered by this path. Bucaram has been declared mentally incapable by Congress after only seven months in

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130 Anderson; Hochstetler; Pérez-Liñán.
office and in a situation of extensive public protest against him, Collor de Mello was impeached by Congress with broad support of the public following the discovery of corruption charges against him, and Gutiérrez – who most excessively tried to alter institutions of horizontal accountability in his favour – had been impeached by Congress in an emergency session and against the background of a strong anti-government mood in the public. Each of these populist presidents maintained a confrontational political style towards the opposition dominated congress but without the possibility to resort to plebiscitarian tactics due to the lack of public support and each president lost the support of the public because she did not meet the expectations raised in her presidential campaign, e.g. anti-corruption politics, integration of marginalized groups, economic improvement for the poor. Thus informal vertical accountability mechanisms – like popular mobilization – may help to restrain presidential dominance in executive-legislative relationships.

While the remaining three cases were able to finish their presidential terms, they were no more successful in changing the executive-legislative balance. Roldós not only faced political challengers in Congress but also within his own party and the situation might have resulted in open executive-legislative conflict if not a sudden plane accident ended his life in 1981. Caldera and Moscoso both had to govern with an opposition controlled Congress and were unable to implement their economic programs and prevent economic crisis in their countries. Since they failed to deliver the promised social welfare benefits they rapidly lost support in

134 Levitsky and Loxton.
135 Anderson.
the public. However, other than the three presidents that had to leave their office early, they did not maintain a confrontational style towards congress.

To sum up, the cases covered by this causal path confirm the important role of the public in presidential systems, especially in situations of outright conflict between the executive and legislative branches.

**Conclusion**

The present article showed that populism in power does not always have to lead to a deconstruction of horizontal accountability. It depends on the institutional context and the constellation of other political actors in the system to make a radical strategy of institutional change a viable option for populist presidents. By means of a QCA I identified several combinations of conditions that are crucial in this respect. The strength or weakness of the traditional political elite, the distribution of power in the legislative branch as well as the presence or absence of public support in favour of a populist president are decisive factors that in different combinations shape the incentive structure of populist presidents.

The empirical analysis showed that in one third of the cases in this study populism posed a threat to liberal democratic institutions. In combination with a power vacuum in the political realm these populist presidents were able to win the public’s favour and mobilize support for their agenda of institutional change. A bad reputation of the political elite may thus be exploited by populist presidents to undermine the power centres of their opponents which are most likely parliaments.

Furthermore, the analysis showed that – in line with Hochstetler’s plea not to underestimate the power of the public in executive-legislative conflicts – popular mobilization is a crucial factor with respect to populist presidents’ success in restructuring liberal democracy. In cases

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138 Hochstetler.
of conflict between a populist president and an opposition controlled legislature the support of the public turns the balance. Thus, similar to Schedler’s argument that weak legislatures may lead to authoritarianism\textsuperscript{139} we may also conclude that institutionally powerful legislatures that are dominated by a weak, discredited, and unpopular political elite may induce populist presidents to change the institutional order into the direction of electoral authoritarianism.

\textsuperscript{139} Schedler.
### Appendix

**Table 3: Condition coding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Populist President</th>
<th>First Term</th>
<th>Power Vacuum</th>
<th>Divided Government (1st term)</th>
<th>Popular Support (1st term)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Menem</td>
<td>1989-1995</td>
<td>Crisis of governability</td>
<td>Near majority (&gt;45%) in the lower chamber and absolute majority in the upper chamber</td>
<td>Strong Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nestor Kirchner</td>
<td>2003-2007</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Absolute majority in both chambers of the congress</td>
<td>Strong Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evo Morales</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Crisis of governability &amp; party system breakdown</td>
<td>Absolute majority in the lower BUT opposition majority in the upper chamber</td>
<td>Strong Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Collor de Mello</td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>Crisis of governability</td>
<td>Minority president without stable coalition in both chambers of the congress</td>
<td>Declining &amp; Low Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hipólito Mejía</td>
<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Absolute majority in both chambers of the congress</td>
<td>Declining &amp; Low Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaime Roldós</td>
<td>1979-1981</td>
<td>Democratic transition</td>
<td>Plurality with &lt;45% in the unicameral congress without stable coalition</td>
<td>Declining &amp; Low Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdalá Bucaram</td>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Minority president without stable coalition in the unicameral congress</td>
<td>Declining &amp; Low Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucio Gutiérrez</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Minority president without stable coalition in the unicameral congress</td>
<td>Declining &amp; Low Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael Correa</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Party system breakdown</td>
<td>The presidents’ party had no seats in the legislature.</td>
<td>Strong Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mireya Moscoso</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Minority president AND opposition majority in the unicameral congress.</td>
<td>Declining &amp; Low Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan García</td>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Absolute majority in both chambers of the congress</td>
<td>Declining &amp; Low Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan García</td>
<td>2006-2011</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Minority president with stable coalition in the unicameral congress.</td>
<td>Declining &amp; Low Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafael Caldera</td>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>Crisis of governability</td>
<td>Minority president with opposition majority in both chambers of the congress.</td>
<td>Declining &amp; Low Popular Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugo Chavez</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>Party system breakdown</td>
<td>Minority president with no stable majority coalition in both chambers of the congress.</td>
<td>Strong Popular Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 4
Introduction

In line with a substantive conception, democratic representation is understood as the connection between citizens’ preferences and the preferences or behaviour of their elected representatives (see Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Pitkin 1967; Powell 2004). Empirical research on this topic has a long history in advanced democracies (e.g. Blais and Bodet 2006; Huber and Powell 1994; Miller and Stokes 1963) and has recently been applied to new democracies like those in Latin America (e.g. Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Otero-Felipe and Rodríguez-Zepeda 2010).

However, assumptions frequently made in studies on advanced democracies may not be easily transferred to contexts of new democracies. As research on party politics shows, the role of political parties in new democracies seems less central and political parties and politicians maintain other forms of relationships with society than the classic programmatic linkage form predominant in (most) advanced democracies (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Especially outside Western European democracies political parties do not compete just in programmatic ways, they may pursue additional or completely different electoral mobilization strategies like
personalism and clientelism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The idealization of policy representation through programmatic competition, therefore, hampers awareness of other modes of political representation (Kitschelt 2000).

The aim of this article is to investigate the impact of party-society linkages on congruence or incongruence between political parties’ advocated policies and the policy interests of their supporters. More specifically, the research question is twofold: On the one hand, I address how different linkage strategies affect the degree of policy congruence between political parties and their supporters. On the other hand, I examine the direction of misrepresentation in case of incongruence between political parties and their supporters. Do political parties position themselves to the right or to the left of their supporters preferred policy interests?

By answering these question, this study contributes to the research areas on democratic accountability and democratic representation in new democracies.

Taking the literature on political representation and party-society linkages into account, theoretical arguments about the relationship between different linkage strategies and policy congruence will be discussed. The basic assumption in the literature on political congruence is that political parties form a programmatic linkage with their supporters. Such programmatic parties mobilize electoral support by making policy pledges to voters (Kitschelt 2000). Therefore, they need to be credible to their policy pledges and refrain from extreme policy switches over time; otherwise they lose the support of voters in subsequent elections (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Stokes 1999). On the baseline, the more a political party pursues a programmatic linkage strategy the more we would expect this party, ceteris paribus, to be congruent to their supporters’ policy preferences. However, political parties may also pursue personalistic and clientelistic linkages with their supporters. The policy pledges

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140 The labels ‘left’ and ‘right’ in this context are used in a mere positional sense relating to the two poles of a one-dimensional issue space and not in a substantive sense referring to the classical ideological left-to-right dimension. Furthermore, the empirical analysis in this article centres on party-voter congruence on an economic policy dimension, where the left-end of the scale refers to a state interventionist position and the right-end of the scale to a free market position.
charismatic parties make to their voters usually remain opaque as personalistic party leaders do not want to limit their leverage on the party strategy (Weyland 1999). As voters of personalistic parties base their decision on the personal qualities of the party leader and not on the program the party pursues, the match between their policy interests and the policies the party pursues is based on chance. Thus, a personalistic linkage strategy is hypothesized to have no systematic effect on a political party’s policy congruence with its voters.

Furthermore, clientelistic practices are most efficient when directed to low income voters as they value material benefits more than higher income groups (Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Stokes 2007a). Assuming that it is rational for clientelistic parties to address poor voters with a vote buying strategy while securing the support of party brokers or private investors with (most likely conservative) policy concessions (Stokes 2005), the policy preferences of poor constituencies will be underrepresented. Thus, on the one hand a clientelistic linkage strategy is expected to reduce, *ceteris paribus*, a political party’s degree of policy congruence. On the other hand, it is expected to distort, *ceteris paribus*, policy representation by skewing political parties’ advocated policies to the right end of the economic policy spectrum.

These hypothesized effects will be tested using multinomial logit analysis covering 80 political parties from 18 Latin American democracies. Latin American parties offer suitable cases for a cross-national comparison as they share similar institutional and socio-economic contexts. Furthermore, they show large variance in their usage of different linkage strategies as well as variance in their degree of party-voter congruence.

The article is organized as follows: In the first part of this article the relevant issues in the literature on democratic representation and party-society linkages are highlighted and theoretical arguments on the relationship between three different linkage strategies and policy congruence are presented. In the second part of the article these arguments are then tested statistically. Finally I conclude and propose an agenda for further research.
Democratic representation, policy congruence, and party-society linkages

Political representation is usually described as a principal-agent relationship, in which a principal selects an agent who is then supposed to act in the best interest of the principal. In representative democratic terms this means that the citizens (principal) select – by some voting rule determined by the electoral system – their representatives (agents) for public offices. These elected representatives are expected to act in accordance with the interests of their voters. By means of this substantive representative link citizens may, therefore, insert their interests or policy preferences into the democratic process. Thus, the connection between citizens’ policy preferences and preferences or behaviour of policymakers is at the heart of representative democracy (see Dahl 1989; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Pitkin 1967). A common measure of this substantive representational link between a principal and her agents is the congruence of voters’ policy preferences with their parties’ policy pledges. There are several types of policy congruence and each emphasizes alternative aspects of the representational link. Usually these types differ in relation to four themes: the comparative approach, the scope of content, the timing, and the actors involved.

Concerning the comparative approach it is possible to investigate the representativeness of political actors with respect to their voters’ policy interests at one point in time – cross-sectional perspective – or over time – dynamic perspective (see Ezrow 2010; Spies and Kaiser 2012; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995).

Concerning the scope of the content a distinction can be made between issue and ideological congruence. Empirical research on substantive representation started in the 1960s with Miller and Stokes (1963) seminal study on policy congruence in specific issue domains (see Achen 1978; Iversen 1994; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Later studies turned their attention to the policy bundles political parties offer to the voter, thereby, evaluating ideological congruence (e.g. Huber and Powell 1994).
Concerning the distinction in relation to the timing within the democratic process, citizens’ policy preferences may be compared to the *policy preferences* of political agents or their behaviour in the policy-making process, i.e. *policy decisions*. In the former case the matching of signals is measured. This measure of political representation centres on an early stage of the democratic process, i.e. the agents’ quality of being policy advocates (see Cox 1997; Powell 2004). Alternatively the focus may lie on the relationship between citizens’ policy preferences and public policy decisions (e.g. Soroka and Wlezien 2005).\(^{141}\)

Finally, concerning the type of actors involved one may distinguish between *dyadic* or *collective congruence*. While dyadic congruence refers to the correspondence of policy preferences between political parties and their supporters on the meso or party level\(^ {142}\), collective congruence evaluates aggregated, institutional correspondence of citizens’ preferences with the preferences of entire legislatures or governments on the system level (Powell 2006; Weissberg 1978). This may lead to different evaluations of policy congruence on different analytical levels, since collective congruence results from the aggregation of dyadic congruence measures, weighted by seat shares, vote shares or cabinet portfolios. Even if party-voter dyads display considerable low degrees of policy congruence, collective congruence may still be high on the system level as long as the distortions of policy congruence are distributed equally around the country mean (Weissberg 1978: 542). Thus, by evaluating collective congruence only, representational deficits of individual parties may be overlooked because of the problem of ecological inference (King 1997). Moreover, misrepresentation in party-voter dyads is most severe for the quality of representation if its distribution is systematically biased to one side of the country mean.

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\(^{141}\) Another research field is interconnected with both of these views on policy congruence that is the investigation of the link between parties’ proposed policy programs and the policies they actually pursue once in office (Klingemann et al. 1994).

\(^{142}\) Dyadic congruence may refer to the link between citizens and their individual district representative or their preferred political party (Barnes 1977; Dalton 1985; Thomassen 1994). If the representational link between citizens and legislators is mediated by political parties, the units of analysis should be party-voter dyads instead of district-legislator dyads (Dalton 1985: 278).
Until now researchers came up with several explanatory factors of policy congruence on different analytical levels. On the national level especially electoral system rules have been at the centre of interest. Other macro level factors affecting policy congruence are the number of political parties and the degree of party system polarization (e.g. Huber and Powell 1994; Pierce 1999). However, empirical findings are somewhat inconclusive. On the party level the effects of several party characteristics, like government participation, candidate selection processes, or the ideological position, on congruence in several issue dimensions have been tested (e.g. Dalton 1985; Spies and Kaiser 2012). Hence, the congruence literature explicitly focusses on the programmatic link between political parties and their supporters. Comparative research on the effects of other linkage strategies on party-voter congruence is missing. This may be due to the sometimes implicit application of models of programmatic party competition (like ‘the responsible party model’) in representational studies on advanced democracies which may have hindered the travelling of empirical research on policy congruence to new democracies (Powell 2004; Thomassen 1994). This article, therefore, centres on the influence of different party-society relations on policy congruence.

The linkage concept is a useful analytical tool to study the relationship between political parties and the electorate and, consequently, the quality of democratic representation outside established democracies and without a predetermined focus on programmatic party competition (e.g. Kitschelt 2000). In general, the concept describes an interactive connection between the electorate and the state mediated by political elites. Linkages are driven by political parties’ need for votes to win elections and to secure their survival, irrespective of whether they are motivated by office-, vote-, or policy-seeking (Poguntke 2000, 2002; Strøm 2011). Although recent research proposes interesting arguments on different programmatic party strategies of mainstream and niche parties in relation to their policy responsiveness (see Ezrow et al. 2011).
1990). The literature on representational linkages usually distinguishes between three forms of party-society relationships: programmatic, personalistic, and clientelistic linkages.

Political parties may mobilize electoral support following a programmatic linkage strategy and appeal to their voters with policy programs. These programs consist of policy bundles concerning a range of solutions to the problems of a society. Political parties’ policy promises are important for the electoral process because they serve as information short cuts for voters, which have policy preferences and base their electoral decision on them (Downs 1957). In this regard, parties that pursue a programmatic linkage strategy induce voters to signal their policy preferences at election time and thus directly foster an important informational prerequisite of policy congruence.

Political parties may also maintain personalistic bonds with their voters and base their strategy on the personal skills of a (charismatic) leader. Hence, personalistic parties are often referred to as mere electoral vehicles for ambitious party leaders (Coppege 2001; Kitschelt 2000; Roberts, 2002). The promises personalistic parties make to their voters remain opaque. Their party leaders “tend to promise all things to all people to maintain maximum personal discretion over the strategy of their party vehicle” (Kitschelt 2000: 849). In turn, voters of personalistic parties hardly reveal explicit information about their policy preferences at election day.\(^{144}\)

Finally, political parties may rely on a clientelistic linkage strategy and directly appeal to voters. Due to this direct appeal, goods offered for exchange by clientelistic parties are first and foremost characterized by exclusiveness. Therefore, clientelism is defined as a “direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 2, italics original). This general

\(^{144}\) The personalistic linkage strategy is often related to populism. Populist parties usually exhibit a direct, unmediated electoral appeal through personalistic leaders (Weyland 2001). Thus, populism has an affinity to the personalistic linkage strategy. But neither is populism the only form of personalistic authority nor is the personalistic linkage the only form of linkage populist parties may pursue (Barr 2009). Furthermore, a charismatic leadership is no necessary condition for a populist party, as the example of Alberto Fujimori in Peru shows.
definition covers both patronage and vote buying, as specific subtypes of the clientelistic exchange. Following Stokes, patronage is “the proffering of public resources (most typically, public employment) by office-holders in return for electoral support” (2007b: 606, italics original), and “vote buying is a more narrow exchange of goods (benefits, protections) for one’s own vote” (2007b: 606, italics original).

There are two different perspectives as regards the combinability of these linkage strategies. One strand of literature supports the argument that political actors may pursue different forms of linkages at the same time and for several reasons. Such strategy mixing may be a consequence of either risk-aversion of political elites (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estévez 2007; Stokes 2007b; Wantchekon 2003) or the parallel appeal to diverse constituencies which according to Gibson (1997) are then combined into one ‘electoral coalition’. Research grouped around the trade-off hypothesis argues that programmatic, personalistic, and clientelistic linkages are only combinable to a small degree (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Kitschelt 2000; Cox and McCubbins 2001). Based on the assumption that both programmatic and clientelistic linkage strategies require different organizational investments parties are precluded to pursue both forms of linkage extensively. Furthermore, the personalistic linkage strategy is usually associated with a weakly institutionalized organizational structure, since party leaders do not want to limit their leverage on the intraparty decision-making process (Weyland 1999; Kitschelt 2000). The institutionalization of the party organization always comes at the expense of the party leader’s autonomy. However, case study research and new comparative data rather support the strategy mixing perspective than the trade-off hypothesis (see Figures 1-a to 1-c).

145 Stokes (2007a) distinguishes clientelistic practices from pork-barrel politics by means of a distributive criterion: benefits from pork-barrel politics are distributed in a whole district and, therefore, non-clientelistic voters in this district cannot be excluded.
146 Due to the long history of clientelistic structures and its adaptation to very different contexts research on this topic is confronted with a variety of sometimes overlapping and sometimes conflicting definitions of the concept (see Hilgers 2011 for a comprehensive overview). I follow a conception of clientelism that focuses on those qualities of the phenomenon which directly relate to the electoral process in democratic political systems (see Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Flattoni 2001; Stokes 2007b).
As suspected by the trade-off hypothesis, Figure 1-a shows a moderate negative relationship between the degree of a clientelistic and a programmatic linkage emphasis of one party ($r=-0.305$, $p<0.01$). However, at least some political parties combine effectively programmatic and clientelistic party strategies at a high degree (see Singer and Kitschelt 2011; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros and Estévez 2007; Hilgers 2009; Gibson 1997). Furthermore, no political parties are observed in the lower left corner of Figure 1-a. This indicates that there are no political parties in the studied sample which rely on a personalistic strategy alone. Thus, the personalistic linkage type does not appear outside a mix with a programmatic, a clientelistic or both linkages.

For example, the Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) was rated highly on both the clientelistic as well as the programmatic strategy by experts. Leonel Fernández from the PLD was reelected as president in the 2008 elections. On the one hand, he has been accused of using public funding for large-scale clientelism during his election campaign (Hartlyn and Espinal 2009). On the other hand, the PLD competes on programmatic grounds with the Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC) for the centre-right, being partly responsible for the decline of the latter in electoral terms (Morgan, Hartlyn, and Espinal 2008).
In addition to this, Figure 1-b shows a positive association between a clientelistic and a personalistic linkage strategy of political parties in the study ($r=0.530$, $p<0.01$). This confirms another argument made in the literature, that a personalistic appeal is most compatible with a party organization that is hierarchically structured, and is therefore likely to be combined with the clientelistic linkage strategy (see Barr 2009; Roberts 2006; Pappas 2009). Finally, the relationship between a programmatic and a personalistic linkage focus seems to be unsystematic (Figure 1-c). A personalistic linkage strategy seems to be an asset that both parties with a high or a low programmatic profile use if they can.

Building upon analytical considerations of elites’ as well as voters’ behaviour in contexts marked by different party-society relationships, in the next section I develop hypotheses on
how these linkages affect policy congruence. More specifically I analyse the issue congruence of party-voter dyads as the matching between voters’ signalled economic policy interests and parties’ signalled economic policy programs at one point in time. A special focus is put on biased misrepresentation on the party level.

**Hypotheses**

The functioning of programmatic party competition can be interpreted as an ‘iterative signalling game’ (Kitschelt 1995: 452). Political parties signal to their potential voters a set of policies they promise to enact when elected into office. Programmatic voters evaluate these policy signals and base their voting decision on their evaluations (Downs 1957). Such programmatic linkage is based on trust and credibility and thus prone to path dependency effects. If victorious political parties defect from their policy pledges or engage in extreme policy switches over time they may lose the support of voters in subsequent elections. Hence, political parties linked to their supporters by policy pledges ideally hold themselves responsive to voters’ policy preferences (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Stokes 1999). The programmatic linkage strategy, thus, constitutes the causal mechanism to bring about policy congruence between political parties and their supporters.

*(Baseline) Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the stronger a political party pursues a programmatic linkage strategy, the higher is the policy congruence between this party and its supporters.*

In contrast to this both clientelistic and personalistic parties do not engage in this policy signalling game. Instead both linkage strategies “reduce parties to their most basic, self-referential political function: electing candidates from their ranks into public office” (Roberts 2002: 29). Votes obtained in this way do not entail any information about the policy interests
of the voter and are useless for democratic deliberation and the retrospective evaluation of a representatives’ policy responsiveness (see Schaffer 2007; Stokes 2007a; Zechmeister 2010). Personalistic parties, as mentioned before, tend to make opaque promises to their potential supporters. Voters in personalistic relationships base their voting decision on the personal skills of a party leader irrespective of the programmatic outline of the political party (Coppeedge 2001; Kitschelt 2000). Furthermore, the personalistic linkage often occurs in combination with a clientelistic and/or a programmatic appeal in the present sample. Thus, if we control for other linkages the match between the policy promises of a personalistic party and the policy preferences of its supporters should reveal no systematic pattern.

Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, a personalistic linkage strategy is expected to have no systematic effect on the policy congruence between a party and its supporters.

In a similar way, clientelistic parties offer no orientation in the policy space to their voters, and may even cut across cleavages and cater for highly heterogeneous clients (Gay 1998; Roberts 2002). Voters in clientelistic relationships, in turn, base their voting decision on the exchange of material benefits. Furthermore, arguments in the literature hint to the fact that clientelism distorts policy congruence towards the right end of the economic dimension. The marginal utility theorem states that clientelism builds on socio-economic disadvantages of some parts of the society as the costs of a vote buying strategy rise with the income of the targeted voters (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Stokes 2007a). Since the clientelistic linkage relies on direct material inducements, this strategy gets more likely the stronger voters value such side payments and the lesser they value future benefits from the provision of public goods (Kitschelt 2000). Moreover, clientelistic parties may combine vote buying strategies to address poor constituencies with policy concessions to party brokers or private investors within the clientelistic network (Stokes 2005). Policy preferences of these patrons are assumed to be more to the right on the economic scale than
the preferences of poor constituencies. On the basis of these arguments two hypotheses can be stated:

**Hypothesis 3:** Ceteris paribus, the stronger a political party pursues a clientelistic linkage strategy, the lower is the policy congruence between this party and its supporters.

**Hypothesis 4:** Ceteris paribus, the stronger a political party pursues a clientelistic linkage strategy, the more distorted its ideological congruence is to the right (pro free market) end of the economic policy dimension.

In the next sections these hypotheses will be tested by comparing cross-sectional data on political parties’ linkage strategies and public opinion.

**Data and measurement**

The following analysis draws on a cross-sectional data set of 80 political parties covering 18 Latin American democracies. Besides the fact that different linkage strategies are prevalent in this region, I focus on Latin American party systems for two other reasons: (1) Notwithstanding the differences between new and established democracies, Kitschelt et al. (2010) recently showed that there are also important differences between new democracies. This is especially true for party-society linkages in Latin America, which vary between and within party systems. (2) Furthermore, Latin American countries share similar socio-economic contexts as well as institutional set-ups. For example, all countries in this study are presidential regimes and share similar structures of horizontal accountability (see Mainwaring 148)

However, it is also argued that clientelism constitutes a functional equivalent in developing countries to social welfare regimes like those in advanced democracies. In this sense clientelism may be seen as an appropriate party strategy in places where political institutions are dysfunctional (Hilgers 2009, 2011; Kitschelt 2000). Furthermore, from a clients’ perspective the exchange of particularistic goods may be perceived as a viable solution to social problems (Auyero 1999; Hilgers 2009).

One could also argue in favour of conditional hypotheses with respect to strategic mixing of linkage strategies. However, pairwise comparisons of interaction effects (both two-way and three-way) were tested insignificant in all models.
and Shugart 1997). These institutional settings are treated as scope conditions in the present study. Additionally, many Latin American countries experienced phases of military rule during the 1970s and 1980s and phases of re-democratization in the 1990s. Two further criteria were used for the selection of political parties: (1) the inclusion of a political party in the Latinobarometer surveys (hereafter LAB) from 2008 or 2009 as well as in the expert survey on democratic accountability mechanisms in Latin America (Altman et al. 2009; Kitschelt et al. 2009) compiled between 2007 and 2009 (hereafter EXPERT). (2) A minimum of 5 respondents per party in the public opinion survey and 5 expert evaluations per party in the expert survey. In total, this study covers 80 political parties from the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For a list of political parties included in the study see Table A1 in the Appendix.

**Dependent Variable**

In the present article issue congruence of party-voter dyads in the economic domain will be used as an indicator for substantive representation. The policy preferences of political parties and their respective voters are measured on a one-dimensional economic issue space. Data on positions of political parties are provided by the EXPERT survey which inter alia asked experts to rank political parties on a state-market dimension using a 10-point scale:

“State role in governing the economy: [1] Party supports a major role for the state in regulating private economic activity to achieve social goals, in directing development, and/or maintaining control over key services. [10] Party advocates a minimal role for the state in governing or directing economic activity or development” (Questionnaire EXPERT, 2008).

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150 For an analysis of the representativeness of presidents as opposed to political parties see Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009).
To match these with the positions of party voters the LAB surveys from 2008 and 2009 provide a valuable database as they ask respondents about their party preference as well as to place themselves on state-market dimension using a 10-point scale:

“Some people think that the State must solve all problems because it has the resources to do it, while others think that the market will solve all problems because it distributes the resources in an efficient way. Using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means “State must solve all problems” and 10 means “Market must solve all problems”. Where would you place yourself?” (Questionnaire LAB, 2008, 2009, author’s translation).

Another alternative would have been to use the classical left–right dimension to compare party-voter dyads in ideological terms. However, the use of the left-right policy space is debated as it may be understood differently by different units of analysis (voters, party elites, experts) and its understanding may differ depending on the context thereby hindering cross-country comparison (see Golder and Stramski, 2010; Zechmeister, 2006).\(^\text{151}\) Therefore, the economic issue dimension will be used to construct the dependent variable in this study. Figure 2 graphically matches the party mean position on the economic scale from the EXPERT survey and the mean economic position of the respective party’s supporters from the LAB survey.

\(^{151}\) Furthermore, while the EXPERT survey uses a 10-point scale for the left-right dimension the LAB surveys use an 11-point scale. Transforming one scale to match the other would only partly solve the problem, as the latter scale disposes of a midpoint (5) while the former does not. This could lead to substantive differences between the two questions. Additionally, comparing item responses in the LAB between the economic and the left-right selfplacement questions the amount of non-response is nearly twice as high in the latter (7 per cent vs. 13 per cent). This might also hint to the conclusion that respondents of the public opinion survey are less familiar with abstract concepts like left and right compared to a more specific issue related question on the state role in the economy.
Different measures of policy congruence and their properties have been extensively discussed in the literature (e.g. Achen 1978; Golder and Stramski 2010). To capture the degree of congruence and the directionality of misrepresentation the median party voter congruence (Golder and Stramski 2010) will be used:

\[
\text{Median Party Voter Congruence (MPVC)} = PM - MV.
\]

PM is the mean party expert position on the economic scale and MV is the median party voter position on the economic scale. By this operationalization we attain a measure that displays at the same time the degree of a political party’s congruence and the direction of its potential ‘incongruence’ with their party supporters. The closer a political party’s MPVC value is to zero the more congruent the party is to its supporters. Moreover, negative values indicate that a political party is positioned to the left of the median party voter on the economic dimension – promoting a stronger state interventionist stance in economic policies – while positive
values indicate that a political party is positioned to the right of the median party voter on the economic dimension – promoting a free market stance in economic policies.

To use this measure as the dependent variable in a multinomial logit regression political parties are assigned into three groups according to their value of MPVC: Congruence (C) referring to the group of political parties with a very high degree of congruence (range -0.5 to +0.5), Left distortion (LD) referring to the group of parties, which misrepresent their supporters to the state interventionist end of the economic domain, (for values <-0.5), and right distortion (RD) referring to the group of political parties, which misrepresent their supporters to the free market end of the economic domain, i.e. less state control of the economy (for values >+0.5). The cut-off points were selected as to assure comparable group sizes for the multinomial logit regression.¹⁵²

**Independent Variables**

Comparative research on party-society linkages has been confronted with a problem of data availability. Due to the lack of direct and reliable comparative measures on the meso- or macro-level, research on political clientelism and personalism, on the one hand, relies on more or less adequate proxy variables, like public spending data, indices of corruption, or content analysis of political speeches (e.g. Hawkins 2009; Keefer 2007). On the other hand, a considerable degree of research on political clientelism and personalism is based on qualitative case studies (e.g. Auyero 1999; Gibson 1997).¹⁵³

A recently compiled data set on democratic accountability covering 18 Latin American countries provides a variety of measures of party-society linkages which are directly related to the concept (Altman et al. 2009; Kitschelt et al. 2009). Experts have been asked explicitly to rank political parties’ emphasis on three different linkage strategies. The questions are

¹⁵² Wald test statistics show that each of the three categories are clearly distinguishable, confirming that we should not merge them ($\chi^2 = 56.20, p < 0.000$).

¹⁵³ Notable exceptions are comparative studies based on subnational data sets (e.g. Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Stokes 2005).
categorical and range from 1 to 4 with higher values indicating a more frequent use of the respective linkage strategy. In building the mean of the expert responses a quasi-continuous measure of a parties’ degree of each linkage strategy is derived.

**Control Variables**

In line with the research literature on policy congruence two sets of control variables are included in the regression models: a set of party level factors and a set of system level factors. Concerning the first set of factors, several party characteristics may influence on the degree of policy correspondence between a political party and its supporters other than their linkage strategies (e.g. Dalton 1985; Ezrow et al. 2011; Spies and Kaiser 2012). First, large parties may be assumed to cater for more heterogeneous voter groups than niche parties. Whereby, the latter are assumed to send clearer signals to their potential voters (Meguid 2005). Thus, the size of a political party is expected to have a negative effect on party-voter congruence. To account for differences between large and small parties their share of legislative seats will enter the analysis as a control variable. Second, the age of a political party may also influence the substantive relationship with its voters. Parties build reputation over time and link themselves more strongly to their supporters (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Furthermore, voters are better able to evaluate political parties’ policy appeals that have been around for more than one electoral cycle. Thus, party age is expected to have a positive effect on policy congruence. Third, the ideological orientation is another party level factor that has been related to the degree of policy congruence of a political party. Two opposing arguments about this relationship can be found in the literature. On the one hand, a bell-shaped relationship between a party’s ideological position on the policy scale and issue congruence is expected (e.g. Dalton 1985; Klingemann 1998). This assumed relationship is

154 Question wordings are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.
155 Data for the distribution of seats is provided online by most countries, detailed resources are available on request.
156 The party age indicator is operationalized by subtracting the formation year of a political party from 2008.
based on the argument that parties with more pronounced positions to either end on the policy scale send clearer messages to their supporters than parties at the centre of the continuum (Downs 1957). On the other hand, a U-shaped relationship between the position of a political party on the policy dimension and policy congruence is assumed (Iversen 1994; Rabinowitz, MacDonald, and Listhaug 1991). This argument refers to the phenomenon that political elites take more extreme positions in the policy space than their supporters (Converse 1975). Centrist parties should therefore be more congruent with their supporters than parties at either extreme of the policy continuum. Therefore, a dummy variable accounting for centrism on the economic scale will enter the analysis as a control variable. A political party is assigned a 1 if it falls into the range of plus or minus 1 standard deviation from the party system mean on the economic dimension.

The second set of control variables accounts for three important party system level factors. First, it may be argued that the probability of voters to find a political party close to their own policy position increases with the number of political parties in a system (e.g. Pierce 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999). Thus, the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) is assumed to have a positive effect on party-voter congruence (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). Second, it is argued similarly that political parties differentiate themselves more clearly from each other in polarized party systems. This may influence both voter perceptions of policy differences between political parties as well as voter proximity to political parties (e.g. Huber and Powell 1994). Thus, party system polarization on the economic dimension is assumed to have a positive effect on party-voter congruence. Finally, as differences between political parties and voters are measured on an economic scale country specific economic contexts may

---

157 Combining party characteristics and party system factors in one analysis is usually modelled admits multi-level analysis. However, statistical tests revealed only a very low explanatory power of the party system level (intra class correlation coefficients <0.06). Therefore, the analysis presented in the next section is based on one-level regression models with standard errors clustered by country.

158 The indicator is constructed using the Taylor-Herman index of party system polarization (Taylor and Herman 1971).
influence on the importance and visibility of policy appeals. To account for socio-economic country differences the GDP per capita will enter the analysis as a control variable.\textsuperscript{159}

Statistical Analysis

The relationship between linkage strategies and policy congruence as well as specific types of incongruence is analysed by employing a multinomial logit regression model.\textsuperscript{160} To evaluate H1 to H4, I apply three multinomial logit regression models with a categorical dependent variable (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; Long and Freese 2006). To account for country specific differences the cluster option has been used. The first model includes only the three linkage strategies of political parties, and subsequent models control for other party and system characteristics.

Table 1 is structured as follows: To ease interpretation I present three group comparisons within each model: the first group comparison contrast the group of right-distortive parties with the group of congruent parties, the second group comparison takes place between the group of left-distortive parties and the group of congruent parties, the final group comparison contrasts the group of right-distortive parties with the group of left-distortive parties. The reference category is always named second. For example, the first column in each model refers to a political parties’ probability of belonging to the group of right-distortive (pro free market) parties compared to the reference category, which in this case is the group of congruent political parties.

In line with the baseline argument the programmatic linkage should yield a positive effect on a party’s policy congruence (H1), thus its beta coefficients are expected to be negative for the two group comparison with congruent parties as the reference category, i.e. the more programmatic a political party the less likely the party misrepresents its voters to the left or to

\textsuperscript{159} Data for 2008 was taken from the World Development Indicator database (World Bank).

\textsuperscript{160} The analysis was implemented using STATA 12.
the right on the economic dimension. According to H2 no effect is expected concerning the relationship between the personalistic linkage and the dependent variable, i.e. the coefficients of all group comparisons should be insignificant. According to H3 I expect an inverse relationship between a political party’s emphasis on the clientelistic linkage strategy and party-voter congruence. Thus, the beta coefficient of clientelism should be positive for both the left- and right-distortion group compared to the group of congruent parties. According to H4 comparing right-distortive parties to left-distortive parties a positive significant effect of clientelism is expected.

The findings in Table 1 show that in accordance with the expectations outlined in H2, the coefficient of the personalistic linkage strategy remains insignificant over all models. Confidence in these results is fairly strong as the standard errors of the coefficients are very high. Concerning this first group comparison (column 1), results indicate that political parties that pursue a programmatic linkage strategy are rather congruent than right-distortive. The effect remains robust when other party and system characteristics are included as control variables in subsequent models. This confirms one part of the baseline argument that a programmatic linkage is related to a higher level of party-voter congruence. However, with respect to the clientelistic linkage strategy the results of this group comparison reveal no significant effect (H3).

As regards the second group comparison (column 2) an interesting – although counterintuitive – finding arises. The negative effect of clientelism in all models indicates that the more clientelistic a political party is the less likely it misrepresents its supporters to the left compared to being congruent (which is not in line with H3). This finding, however, relates to another argument in the literature concerning the combinability of a leftist programmatic appeal with a clientelistic linkage strategy. Party programs are usually grounded on universalistic principles which are more or less combinable with particularistic exchanges. It is, therefore, plausible that the kind of ideologically grounded universalistic principle impacts
the feasibility of clientelism. Especially left-libertarian parties that focus on social inequality
issues and redistribution may compromise their credibility when engaging in clientelistic
practices (see Kitschelt 2000).\textsuperscript{161}

\begin{footnote}
Furthermore, with respect to the counterintuitive effect of clientelism the exclusion of non-programmatic
voters in this study should be considered. Both policy congruence measures are based on truncated data.
Respondents of the public opinion survey were included in the calculation only if they answered both questions
on party preference and self-positioning on the economic scale. This procedure excludes, firstly, party voters that
were either unable or unwilling to position themselves on the economic scale and secondly, respondents which
did not have or communicate a party preference independent from their ability to position themselves on the
economic dimension. Especially the first reason of exclusion poses a substantive problem in relation to
clientelism.
\end{footnote}
Table 1: Explaining Left- or Right Distortion in Policy Congruence – Multinomial Logit Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RD vs. C</td>
<td>LD vs. C</td>
<td>RD vs. LD</td>
<td>RD vs. C</td>
<td>LD vs. C</td>
<td>RD vs. LD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalistic Linkage</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.328</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>-0.999</td>
<td>0.933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(0.858)</td>
<td>(0.755)</td>
<td>(0.423)</td>
<td>(0.646)</td>
<td>(0.619)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelistic Linkage</td>
<td>-0.919</td>
<td>-1.769***</td>
<td>0.850***</td>
<td>-0.847</td>
<td>-1.877***</td>
<td>1.030**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.579)</td>
<td>(0.554)</td>
<td>(0.318)</td>
<td>(0.680)</td>
<td>(0.766)</td>
<td>(0.502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.679)</td>
<td>(1.081)</td>
<td>(0.949)</td>
<td>(0.878)</td>
<td>(1.226)</td>
<td>(1.198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Seat Share</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Age</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.015**</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.015**</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrism</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
<td>-1.725*</td>
<td>1.508</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
<td>-1.725*</td>
<td>1.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.554)</td>
<td>(0.942)</td>
<td>(0.920)</td>
<td>(0.554)</td>
<td>(0.942)</td>
<td>(0.920)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.674***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polarization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>-0.627**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP p.c. 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>11.673***</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>11.543</td>
<td>11.872***</td>
<td>3.705</td>
<td>8.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.020)</td>
<td>(3.513)</td>
<td>(3.181)</td>
<td>(3.964)</td>
<td>(3.916)</td>
<td>(4.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.499***</td>
<td>-1.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.937)</td>
<td>(3.827)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-pseudo Likelihood</td>
<td>-55.546</td>
<td></td>
<td>-53.176</td>
<td></td>
<td>-49.844</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald-χ²</td>
<td>117.08***</td>
<td></td>
<td>116.41***</td>
<td></td>
<td>159.54***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. The second category in each column is the reference category.

α: LD = Left Distortion (state intervention), RD = Right Distortion (free market); C = Congruence
Moreover, in line with H4 the third group comparison (column 3) shows that political parties pursuing a clientelistic linkage strategy more likely misrepresent their supporters to the free market end (right) of the economic dimension than to the state protectionist end (left). Furthermore, the opposite effect arises for programmatic parties. The unexpected strong negative effect indicates that programmatic parties misrepresent their supporters more likely to the left end of the economic scale than to the right end. Both effects are significant on a high confidence level as well as robust over all three models. Inspecting political parties’ predicted probabilities in combination with their linkage mix further confirms this picture as can be seen in Table 2. On the one hand, the three parties with the highest probability of misrepresenting their supporters to the right end of the economic scale score rather high with respect to their emphasis on the clientelistic linkage strategy and low with respect to their emphasis on the programmatic linkage strategy. On the other hand, the three parties with the highest probability of misrepresenting their supporters to the left end of the economic scale score extremely high with respect to their emphasis on the programmatic linkage strategy and extremely low with respect to their emphasis on the clientelistic linkage strategy. In line with H2 we find no clear pattern concerning these parties’ emphasis on the personalistic linkage strategy.
Table 2: Predicted Probabilities of Extreme Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right-Distortive Parties</th>
<th>Predicted Probability</th>
<th>Programmatic Linkage</th>
<th>Personalistic Linkage</th>
<th>Clientelistic Linkage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRIAN</td>
<td>97.02</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP (1)</td>
<td>96.63</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS-PLN</td>
<td>96.29</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left-Distortive Parties</th>
<th>Predicted Probability</th>
<th>Programmatic Linkage</th>
<th>Personalistic Linkage</th>
<th>Clientelistic Linkage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>87.77</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA</td>
<td>83.73</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCdoB</td>
<td>80.06</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Party acronyms are reported in the Appendix.*

These findings hint to an aggregative compensation between programmatically left-distortive parties and clientelistic right-distortive parties, corroborating the decision to analyse policy congruence on the party level as to avoid the ecological inference problem (King, 1997). Further research in this respect may uncover a possible cancelling-out effect of programmatic and clientelistic linkage strategies with respect to collective policy congruence in Latin American party systems (Weissberg 1978). Moreover, this finding urges us to theorize on programmatic parties possible intentions to misrepresent their supporters to the left as to counterbalance a systematic right-distortion of clientelistic parties on the economic policy dimension.

Finally, concerning the first set of control variables party age and centrism seem to have an effect with respect to the second group comparison (left distortion vs. congruence). Older parties and parties with a centrist position on the economic scale are less likely left-distortive than congruent. The finding partly confirms the argument made about the effect of party age. Parties that are around for a longer period are expected to be more congruent than younger
parties. The effect of the centrism dummy confirms that centrist parties are expected to be more congruent – at least when compared to left-distortive parties. Finally, all three system level controls are highly significant for the second and third group comparison. A higher number of political parties in a political system and a higher polarization seem to increase the probability of left-distortion as compared to congruence and decrease the probability of right-distortion compared to left-distortion.

Conclusion

This article has argued that it is important to investigate the influence of party-society linkages other than the programmatic one on the degree of party-voter congruence as well as the direction of potential incongruence, especially in new democracies. Several arguments about the different effects of personalistic and clientelistic linkage strategies on party-voter congruence in the economic domain have been made.

From the results of the statistical analysis some interesting conclusions can be drawn. As expected no systematic relationship between a personalistic linkage strategy and party-voter congruence was detected. With respect to the other linkage strategies the analysis confirms that clientelistic parties more likely misrepresent their supporters to the right (free market) end of the economic scale than to the left (state interventionist) end of the economic dimension, while a strong emphasis on a programmatic linkage induces the opposite effect. Programmatic parties misrepresent their supporters more likely to the left than to the right on the economic dimension. This might hint to the conclusion that the two forms of misrepresentation cancel each other out on the macro level (Weissberg 1978), an effect that deserve further theoretical and empirical research.

Moreover the analysis partly confirms our expectations formulated in H1: programmatic parties are more likely congruent than right distortive. Furthermore, with respect to the
clientelistic linkage the analysis indicates a positive association between clientelism and party-voter congruence when compared to left-distortion. This counterintuitive effect may partly be explained by an adverse relationship between a leftist position on the economic dimension and a clientelistic linkage strategy (Kitschelt 2000) as well as data limitations, more specifically, the exclusion of non-programmatic voters in the present study. As voters of clientelistic parties base their decision on material benefits and clientelistic parties do not provide orientation for their voters in the policy space, it is highly probable that non-programmatic voters are more likely to be clientelistic party voters (Colomer and Escatel 2005).

These findings offer several tasks for future research: Firstly, a potential counterbalancing representation effect of highly programmatic and ideologically left political parties with respect to the misrepresentation of clientelistic parties on the system level has to be analysed in more detail. Secondly, the discrepancy between the spread of political parties and party supporters on the economic scale as well as its consequences for the quality of representation and the application of different models of political competition may be further investigated. Finally, future research should also incorporate non-programmatic voting into models of party competition in contexts where clientelistic linkages prevail.
### Appendix

**Table A1a: Party Acronyms, Number of Observations by Political Party and Data Source**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>EXPERT</th>
<th>LAB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Partido Justicialista</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Unión Cívica Radical</td>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Alianza Frente para la Victoria</td>
<td>FPV</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Propuesta Republicana</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOL</td>
<td>Movimiento al Socialismo</td>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOL</td>
<td>Poder Democrático Social</td>
<td>PODEM(1)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOL</td>
<td>Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario</td>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOL</td>
<td>Frente de Unidad Nacional</td>
<td>UN(1)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Partido da Frente Liberal</td>
<td>PFL-DEM</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro</td>
<td>PMDB</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Partido Progressista</td>
<td>PP(1)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Brasileiro</td>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Partido da Social Democracia Brasileana</td>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>124</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>17</td>
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*Source: Author’s calculation based on data from LAB and EXPERT.*
Table A1b: Number of Observations by Political Party and Data Source (continued)

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Source: Author’s calculation based on data from LAB and EXPERT.
Table A2: Question Wordings from the LAB and EXPERT surveys

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<th>Wording</th>
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<td>LAB</td>
<td>Economic Scale</td>
<td>“Some people think that the State must solve all problems because it has the resources to do it, while others think that the market will solve all problems because it distributes the resources in an efficient way. Using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means “State must solve all problems” and 10 means “Market must solve all problems”. Where would you place yourself?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party Preference</td>
<td>“If this Sunday there were elections, for which party would you vote?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Scale</td>
<td>“State role in governing the economy: [1] Party supports a major role for the state in regulating private economic activity to achieve social goals, in directing development, and/or maintaining control over key services. [10] Party advocates a minimal role for the state in governing or directing economic activity or development.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programmatic Linkage</td>
<td>“Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the attractiveness of the party’s positions on policy issues.” Answer categories: 1=Not at all; 2=To a small extent; 3=To a moderate extent; 4=To a great extent</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Personalistic Linkage</td>
<td>“To what extent do parties seek to mobilize electoral support by featuring a party leader’s charismatic* personality? Answer categories: 1=Very little/ Not at all; 2=To a rather limited extent; 3=Quite vigorously; 4=Very strongly *Leaders have charisma, if their followers are attracted to their “personal magic of leadership [that] arouses[es] special popular loyalty or enthusiasm” (Webster’s dictionary). Leaders project charismatic personal capabilities, if they can evoke emotion, affection, faith, loyalty, and even sacrifice on the part of their followers. Charismatic leadership is thus separate from (1) featuring the competence of party leaders to govern or (2) identifying the leader with attractive policy positions”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Clientelistic Linkage</td>
<td>“Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the capacity of the party to deliver targeted material benefits to its electoral supporters” Answer categories: 1=Not at all; 2=To a small extent; 3=To a moderate extent; 4=To a great extent</td>
</tr>
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Chapter 5
Clientelism and Political Orientation in Latin America

Saskia Pauline Ruth

INTRODUCTION

The quality of representative democracy depends on the presence of free, fair and regular elections and on the competitive interaction of political elites for public office (e.g. Sartori 1976; Schumpeter 2008 [1942]). One of the most prominent models concerned with the quality of representative democracy is the responsible party model (APSA 1950; see also Thomassen 1994). The model rests on the prevalent assumptions of policy-based competition between political parties and policy-based political behavior of the electorate. In such circumstances political elites are induced to be responsive to the interests of their citizens (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Pitkin 1967). In this respect, it is essential for substantive political representation that citizens possess consistent perceptions of the political space.

While the assumptions of the responsible party model are more or less met in advanced democracies, they may be problematic in the context of new democracies (Thomassen 1994). Due to different trajectories of democratization, Latin American democracies did not develop similar patterns of party competition compared to Western European countries which favor the development of responsible parties (Dalton and Klingemann 2007). Thus, the idealization
of programmatic party competition may hamper awareness of other modes of political competition and their consequences for democratic representation. Especially in new democracies political parties do not compete only in programmatic ways; they may pursue additional or completely different electoral mobilization strategies, like clientelism (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).

Programmatic party competition only becomes feasible if citizens base their political behavior on the evaluation of similarities and differences of political parties’ policy offers. One important prerequisite for programmatic party competition is that citizens possess clear and structured political perceptions (Downs 1957; Kitschelt et al. 2010). Clientelism, however, poses incentives for citizens to base their political behavior on a different rationale than parties’ long-term policy programs (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2007). “Clientelism practiced in the extreme … deprives citizens of their capacity to hold parties and politicians accountable for the policies they pursue in office” (Hagopian 1998, 123). Since most studies on political perception focus on advanced democracies (e.g. Dahlberg 2009; Brug 1999), the effect of clientelism on citizens’ political orientation has so far been neglected.

To address this research lacuna, I analyze the causal link between clientelism and political perception in this article. Building upon the literature on party–society linkages, political behavior and political representation, I develop a theoretical model of the causal relationship between clientelism and citizens’ political perception. The key argument is that political parties following a clientelistic linkage strategy decrease the ability of citizens to develop clear and structured policy preferences. Thereby, they prevent citizens from developing the ability to compare parties’ policy proposals and, consequently, lower the overall incentive for political parties to act responsively in substantive terms. To test these arguments I deploy

162 Nevertheless, non-programmatic competition is also observable in some advanced democracies, e.g. Italy (see Piattoni 2001).
several multilevel regression analyses using cross-sectional data from 18 Latin American democracies. Political perception will be operationalized as the ability to place oneself on the left-right ideological dimension. The effect of clientelism on left-right orientation will be tested on different analytical levels: on the meso-level, I inspect the effect of political parties’ use of clientelistic practices on the ability of their supporters to position themselves on the left-right dimension. On the micro-level, I investigate the effect of individuals’ involvement in clientelistic exchanges on their ability to position themselves on the left-right dimension.

In the first section of the article I highlight the relevant issues from the literature on political representation and political competition and develop my theoretical argument. The empirical analysis is structured in two parts: the first part focusses on the political orientation of clientelistic party supporters, the second part analyses the political orientation of clientelistic targets. In the conclusion I summarize the findings and propose avenues for further research.

**THEORETICAL APPROACH**

**The Responsible Party Model**

Political representation is usually defined as the link between citizens’ policy preferences and the policy preferences or behavior of their elected representatives (see Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Pitkin 1967). In a democratic political system, political representation is realized through repeated, free, open, secret, and fair elections. Yet another key feature of representative democracies is competition between political parties in these elections for public office and power. Political parties, thus, fulfill a central role in mediating between citizens and the state by channeling citizens’ policy preferences and selecting political elites for elected positions (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Sartori 1976). From the perspective of the *responsible party model*, political competition between political parties for votes is...
believed to create desirable societal outcomes such as accountability and responsiveness (APSA 1950; Thomassen 1994).

However, the responsible party model rests on the prevalent assumptions of policy-based competition between political parties and policy-based political behavior of the electorate. Thus, for the model to work effectively political parties have to distinguish themselves on the basis of policy programs and be cohesive or disciplined enough to implement their policy promises when elected (supply side). Furthermore, voters need to develop their own policy preferences, evaluate the policy programs of political parties, and relate them to their own preferences within a shared political space (demand side) (APSA 1950; Thomassen 1994). Thereby, the responsible party model sets high requirements for both parties and voters in representative democracies. Nevertheless the model allows us to systematically study the process of political representation by using the requirements of the model to evaluate the effectiveness and the quality of political representation (see Schmitt and Thomassen 1999, 16).

The feasibility of the responsible party model depends on the specific configuration of supply and demand side factors. However, the weakest link of the model are its requirements on the voter side (Thomassen 1994, 252). Consistent policy preferences of voters are essential for substantive political representation. Free, competitive, and repeated elections are not sufficient to induce political parties to be responsive to their voters’ preferences. Voters need to select political elites on the basis of policy promises and perceive irresponsible behavior of political parties to be able to punish them in the next election (Bowler 1990). Consequently, programmatic party competition becomes more likely the higher the level of political orientation in the citizenry is (Kitschelt et al. 2010). Building upon this insight, this article systematically analyses determinants of citizens’ political orientation, in an effort to evaluate the quality of political representation in new democracies.
Political Orientation and Clientelism

Political orientation may be defined in two ways: in general, it refers to a citizen’s ability to develop consistent policy preferences (Converse 1975; Dalton and Klingemann 2007). In a more specific sense, the concept refers to a citizen’s ability to evaluate political parties’ policy programs and relate them to her own policy preferences (Huber 1989; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1995).

Comparative research on party politics usually assumes that political competition is organized in a low-dimensional way, i.e. a left–right ideological dimension that shall enable citizens to link themselves with political parties (Downs 1957; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). Assuming that voters’ policy preferences are structured along a left-right ideological dimension is a strong reduction of the complex political reality, however, empirical studies show that political elites as well as citizens use the left-right schema exactly for the purpose of reducing the complexity of the political realm (Downs 1957; Fuchs and Klingemann 1989).

For Latin America recent research has tested the dimensionality of political competition and shown that political elites consistently differentiate themselves and their political parties on a general left–right dimension (Saiegh 2009; Zoco 2006). The same picture arises when experts are asked to assess the positioning of political parties on the same dimension (Altman et al. 2009; Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009). However, different accounts arise when it comes to voters. On the one hand, Colomer (2005) states that a considerable degree of citizens locate themselves consistently on an ideologically structured left–right dimension. Recent studies, on the other hand, are more skeptical and show that left-right attitudes in Latin America vary across individuals and countries (Zechmeister 2006; Harbers, Vries, and Steenbergen 2012).

A prominent strand of literature refers to three different components of such left-right self- placements: values, social identities and party identification (e.g. Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Huber 1989; Knutsen 1995). However, this literature is concerned with the specific location of citizens in the political space (i.e. left, center, right).
To evaluate the quality of political representation in new democracies this article focusses on the general left-right orientation in the citizenry, i.e. citizens’ ability to position themselves on the left-right dimension. First descriptive evidence shows that the level of left-right orientation differs between established and new democracies: the mean proportion of respondents able to position themselves on a left-right scale in 2009 amounts to 84.5% in Western Europe as opposed to 78.6% in Latin America (Eurobarometer 2009 and Latinobarometer 2009). Differences between new and established democracies in the importance of the left-right dimension as a heuristic to make political decisions as well as differences within the group of new democracies are still understudied topics (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Harbers, Vries, and Steenbergen 2012). Thus, it is important to identify which factors favor the development of left-right orientation.

Classically the lack of general or specific political orientation has been ascribed to the ubiquitous uncertainty in the political realm (Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Downs 1957). Since the two sides of the representational link are interrelated, the structuration of the supply side of political representation plays a decisive role for the reduction of such uncertainty and the development of substantive political orientation (i.e. the demand side). The political context in which individuals are embedded bears, for example, on the availability of information and the ambiguity of political signals (Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Downs 1957; Zechmeister 2006). Furthermore, dependent on the structuration of the supply side, citizens may rely on other information cues than ideological left-right short-cuts to make political decisions. Thus, the structuration of political competition plays an important role in the formation of clear and shared political perceptions. And this is exactly where clientelism gains relevance.

As mentioned earlier, structures of competition between political parties in Latin America are to various extents shaped by clientelistic linkages between citizens and political parties. Though its decline has often been predicted, clientelism persists in many new democracies
and has proven to be a highly adaptive strategy (see Gay 1998). Due to the long history of clientelistic structures and its adaptation to very different contexts, research on this topic is confronted with a variety of sometimes overlapping and sometimes conflicting definitions of the concept (see Hilgers 2011). For the purpose of the present article, clientelism is defined as a “direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, p. 2, italics original). Following Stokes, two subtype of clientelism can be distinguished: patronage and vote buying. The first is defined as “the proffering of public resources (most typically, public employment) by office holders in return for electoral support” (Stokes 2007, p. 606, italics original), while the second subtype refers to “a more narrow exchange of goods (benefits, protections) for one’s own vote” (2007, p. 606, italics original). I follow this conception of clientelism as it focuses on those qualities of the phenomenon which directly relate to the electoral process in democratic political systems (see Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001; Stokes 2007).

Clientelism is, thus, understood as an electoral mobilization strategy based on the distribution of particularistic benefits for voters. It may be distinguished from other – more programmatic – forms of distributional strategies through the conditionality of the exchange relationship. Clientelistic parties target specific individuals and reward them with particularistic benefits conditional on their willingness to support the party – either with their votes or as activists (Stokes 2007). Opposed to such a conditional (direct) exchange, programmatic strategies such as allocational policies or pork-barrel spending are directed to groups or regions and therefore not exclusively targeted and conditional (Schaffer and Schedler 2007).

But how is the relationship between clientelism and an individual’s political orientation established? The effect of clientelism on left-right orientation may be explained by two mechanisms on the micro-level. Clientelism may hinder an individual from developing clear
and structured political perceptions either by increasing the uncertainty in the political realm, or by inducing the indifference of clientelistic voter groups towards the ideological spectrum. Concerning the first mechanism, clientelistic parties increase the uncertainty in the political realm by sending unclear policy signals that blur the distinctiveness between left and right. According to the responsible party model political elites ideally distinguish themselves through party differentials. If citizens receive clear policy signals, they are more able to inform themselves about the ideological spectrum of the political space in a differentiated way. However, clientelistic linkages as opposed to programmatic linkages “reduce parties to their most basic, self-referential political function: electing candidates from their ranks into public office” (Roberts 2002, 29). Therefore, clientelistic parties, unlike programmatic parties, do not provide for mechanisms of interest aggregation. On the contrary, they offer no orientation in the policy space, even cut across cleavages, and cater to highly heterogeneous clients (Gay 1998; Roberts 2002; Zechmeister 2006). Such ambiguity in the signaling process of political representation increases the uncertainty in the political realm.

Concerning the second mechanism, clientelistic parties perpetuate or increase the indifference of their clients to the political space and other parties’ policy differentials. Citizens bound in clientelistic relationships do not care about the policy positions of political parties and potential future benefits through public policy; their only concern is the immediate material advantage that they might receive for their vote (Kitschelt 2000; Stokes 2007). Their political behavior is not built upon the evaluation of information and proximity calculations between their own position and policy programs of political parties within this space. Instead it rests on less time consuming information and bears lower costs for their involvement in political participation. The voting act thereby loses its capacity to signal policy preferences. However, from a client’s perspective the exchange of particularistic goods may be perceived as a viable
solution to social problems (Auyero 1999; Hilgers 2009). In this sense, clientelism reduces the importance of the left-right dimension as a viable cue for political behavior. Both mechanisms lead to the following hypotheses, which are formulated at different analytical levels:

*Hypothesis 1 (meso): Ceteris paribus, the stronger a political party pursues a clientelistic linkage strategy, the lower the probability of its supporters to locate themselves on the left-right continuum will be.*

*Hypothesis 2 (micro): Ceteris paribus, the more often a citizen receives clientelistic inducements during elections, the lower the probability of this citizen to locate herself on the left-right continuum will be.*

To sum up, clientelism may have severe consequences for the quality of ideological representation. Where political competition is structured by clientelistic linkages between political elites and the electorate, it is more likely that citizens are unable to make political decisions based on their policy preferences. Figure 1 gives a graphical overview of the theoretical arguments on which these hypotheses are based.
Alternative Determinants of Political Orientation

As these hypotheses are assumed to hold *ceteris paribus*, other classical explanatory factors influencing political orientation have to be specified and included into the statistical analysis as control variables. Three sets of control factors seem to be relevant: (1) party system characteristics, (2) party linkages, and (3) individual-level characteristics.

The first set of control factors comprises two classic features of party systems, besides their clientelistic structuration, which may influence citizens’ left-right orientation in a country: the number of political parties in a party system and the polarization of party systems. The number of political parties is one of the most studied variables in comparative research on party politics (Dalton 2008; Rae 1971; Sartori 1976). On the one hand, a minimal number of two relevant parties is a necessary condition for competitive interaction as such (Sartori 1976). On the other hand, the number of political parties raises the complexity of competitive interactions, i.e. the more parties there are in a party system the more interaction streams between political parties exist (Sartori 1976). Such a rise in complexity makes it more demanding for citizens to orient themselves in the political space and decide between the
offers made by several political parties (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Jusko and Sively 2005). This may lead to a higher probability for citizens to either base their political decisions on an alternative rationale or abstain from voting, as getting informed about the substantive choices at hand is too time consuming to justify the effort of voting (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). Furthermore, party system fragmentation sets higher requirements for effective elite and voter coordination, like the building of viable electoral alliances or the identification of future governments (Cox 1997; Powell 2000). A high number of relevant political parties in a party system should exacerbate the development of clear and structured political orientation.

Independent from the number of political parties, the polarization of party systems can influence citizens’ left-right orientation. Party system polarization may facilitate the differentiation between political parties due to a more meaningful use of ideological labels and an eased access to such information for voters (Dalton 2008; Zechmeister 2006). Furthermore, party system polarization increases the stakes of political competition. As political parties spread across the ideological dimension governmental programs may differ more drastically (Dalton 2008; Lachat 2007). Thus, with higher levels of polarization citizens should be more apt and willing to develop clear and structured left-right orientation.

The second set of control factors includes the two classical linkage strategies political parties may pursue other than the clientelistic one: programmatic and personalistic linkages (Kitschelt 2000). In line with the literature on the responsible party model I assume a positive effect of a programmatic link between political parties and their supporters on the left-right orientation of the latter. With respect to the personalistic linkage strategy no systematic effect on the left-right orientation of a political party’s supporter is expected, since the policy pledges personalistic parties make usually remain opaque as their leaders do not want to limit their leverage on the party strategy (Weyland 1999; Ruth 2012).
The third set of control factors refers to the influence of several individual-level factors on citizens’ left-right orientation. On the one hand, political sophistication plays a decisive role in the development of political orientation. On the other hand, political experience may further increase the probability of a citizen to develop clear and structured political orientation. Following Downs (1957, 77-79), political ignorance may be removed by education and the acquisition of information. Left-right orientation, in this respect, depends on the general political knowledge of a person and the costs of getting informed about politics. People with a higher level of education have a higher cognitive capacity to evaluate political information. Furthermore, a person’s willingness to pay for costly information depends on the motivational aspect of political sophistication, i.e. a person’s interest in politics (Luskin 1990). Furthermore, the evaluation of political parties’ policy positions may be more demanding for citizens in new democracies, as their democratic practice is shorter. Over time citizens get more experienced with their political system (e.g. electoral rules) and the choice set at their disposal, thereby, they gain more confidence in left-right short cuts as a basis for their political decisions (Brug, Franklin, and Tóka 2008).

**Empirical Analysis**

The following analysis focuses on the effect of clientelism on left-right orientation in Latin American democracies, while controlling for macro-, meso-, and micro-level factors. The hypotheses stated above will be tested by means of two different analyses, each based on a cross-sectional dataset measuring the main independent variable of clientelism on a different analytical level. In the first part of the empirical analysis clientelism is measured on the meso-level as a parties’ emphasis on a clientelistic linkage strategy. In the second part of the empirical analysis clientelism is measured on the micro-level as the direct involvement of
individuals in a clientelistic exchange relationship with party officials during election times.\footnote{Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix.}

**Case selection**

The focus on Latin American countries is advocated for two reasons: (1) Next to the variance regarding parties’ linkage strategies between new and established democracies, Kitschelt et al. (2010) have recently shown that there are also differences within this group of new democracies. This is especially true for the degree of clientelism in Latin America, which varies both between and within countries. (2) Latin American countries share similar socio-economic contexts as well as institutional set-ups. For example, many Latin American countries experienced phases of military rule during the 1970s and 1980s and phases of re-democratization in the 1990s (see for example Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005). In addition to this, all countries in this study are presidential regimes and thus share similar structures of horizontal accountability (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). For the present sample presidentialism represents a scope condition. Therefore, this study allows us to focus on the effect of clientelism while holding other contextual factors constant.

The first part of the empirical analysis is based on a hierarchical dataset that combines information taken from the Latinobarometer survey (hereafter LAB) in 2009 (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2009) and the Democratic Accountability Expert Survey (hereafter DAES) 2007-2008 (Altman et al. 2009; Kitschelt et al. 2009). In total this part covers individuals and political parties in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The second part of the empirical analysis is based on a hierarchical dataset that combines data from the Americas Barometer (hereafter LAPOP)
in 2010 (LAPOP 2010) and the DAES. It includes information on individuals in the same countries as in the first part of the study with the exception of Honduras since the LAPOP in 2010 does not report the respective survey item on clientelism for this country.\textsuperscript{165}

\textbf{Part I: Political Orientation of Clientelistic Party Supporters}

This section addresses \textit{Hypothesis 1} and focusses on the effect of clientelism, measured on the meso-level, on the ability of party supporters to possess political orientation.

Operationalization

The concept of political orientation is operationalized as an individual’s ability to locate herself on a left–right dimension. Therefore, the LAB provides a valuable database as it \textit{inter alia} asks respondents to place themselves on a left–right scale (item Q69ST). To build the dependent variable for this part of the analysis the survey item is recoded into a dummy variable. Respondents that report their position on the 11-point scale obtain the value 1, indicating that they are able to locate themselves on the left-right scale. All other responses, such as ‘do not know’, ‘none’, and ‘no answer’, are coded 0, indicating that the respondent did not report any position on the left-right scale. To match respondents of the LAB with political party scores from the DAES I use the LAB item that asks respondents to report their

\textsuperscript{165} Question wordings for all survey items used in this study are available online: Questionnaire LAB 2009, \url{http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp} (accessed 7 August 2013); Questionnaire LAPOP 2010, \url{http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/docs/2010 Core Questionnaire English.pdf} (accessed 7 August 2013); Questionnaire DAES, \url{https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papersurvey.html} (accessed 7 August 2013).
party preference (item Q35ST).\textsuperscript{166} For all party supporters included in this part of the study the mean rate of selfplacement in 2009 is 84.5\% (standard deviation 3.6).\textsuperscript{167}

With respect to the main independent variable, comparative research on clientelism has been confronted with a problem of data availability. Due to the lack of direct and reliable comparative measures on the party- or individual-level, until recently, research on political clientelism had to rely on more or less adequate proxy variables, such as indices of corruption, or was limited to qualitative case studies (e.g. Auyero 1999; Keefer 2007).

However, recently comparative party-level data has become available. A new data set on democratic accountability mechanisms covering political parties in 18 Latin American countries provides a variety of measures of party-society linkages which are directly related to the concept of clientelism (Altman et al. 2009; Kitschelt et al. 2009). Experts have been asked to explicitly rank political parties’ emphasis with respect to several clientelistic practices. The questions are categorical and range from 1 to 4 with higher values indicating a more frequent use of the respective practice. Two indicators will be used in this first part of the study to operationalize several aspects of clientelism on the party-level: (1) the extent to which a political party offers preferential goods to attract voters (vote buying, item B2). (2) The extent to which a political party provides its voters with employment opportunities (patronage, item B3). An index of vote buying or patronage is derived taking the mean of the expert responses of the respective survey item. Both indicators are positively correlated with \(r>0.8\) at a 99\% confidence level.

Additionally, three sets of control variables are included in the analysis: Due to the small sample size on the macro-level, the number of control variables on this level is confined to two: the fragmentation and polarization of party systems. The former will be measured on the

\textsuperscript{166} Combining the LAB from 2009 with the DAES leads to a better match of political parties and party supporters and a higher number of micro-level units than with the LAPOP in 2010.

\textsuperscript{167} Note that the value differs from the general level of left-right orientation for all respondents (78.6\%) in the survey reported earlier. This hints to the conclusion that party supporters are on average more likely to position themselves on the left-right dimension.
basis of seat shares using the index of the *effective number of parliamentary parties* (ENPP) (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).\(^{168}\) To account for an increasing effect of ENPP the variable will enter the regression in logarithmic form. Party system polarization will be measured by the *Taylor-Herman index* (Taylor and Herman 1971) and is calculated based on the DAES data on political parties’ left-right placement (item D6) and their seat shares in the national legislature. On the meso-level, I control for a political party’s emphasis on a *programmatic* or *personalistic linkage* strategy. Data is taken from the DAES survey which provides expert ratings with respect to both linkage strategies (items E2 and E1). The questions are categorical and range from 1 to 4 with higher values indicating a more frequent use of the respective linkage strategy. The mean expert rating of a party indicates its emphasis on each linkage type. On the micro-level, political sophistication will be measured by the respondent’s level of *education* and the level of *political interest*. Data on both variables stem from two different items in the LAB. Education is measured on a 7-point scale, with higher values indicating higher levels of education (item REEDUC1). Political interest is measured on a 4-point scale with lower values indicating higher levels of interest in politics (item Q32ST). Furthermore, political experience will be controlled for by the respondent’s *electoral experience* as well as the *age* of the respondent. The former is coded as a dummy variable where the value 1 indicates that the respondent voted in the last election and the value 0 refers to all other responses to the question (item Q37STM). The age of a respondent will enter the analysis in linear and squared form to account for a possible curvilinear relationship between age and the dependent variable (item S6).

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\(^{168}\) Data for the distribution of seats is available on request.
Estimation Model

Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable the statistical estimations rely upon a logistic regression model (e.g. Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Furthermore, the application of multilevel estimation techniques is recommended because the data set is structured hierarchically – with individuals nested in parties and countries (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Multilevel analysis accounts for such hierarchical data structures where observations within the same context are not necessarily independent from each other.

Therefore, statistical estimations for the dependent variable of political perception rely upon a three-level logistic random intercept model (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Hox 2010). The model to test Hypothesis 1 is specified as follows:

$$\log\left(\frac{P_{ijk}}{1 - P_{ijk}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta V_{ijk} + \beta X_{jk} + \beta Z_k + U_{0jk}$$

Subscript $i$ (=1,...,I) denotes the units on the individual-level, subscript $j$ (=1,...,J) refers to the units on the party-level, and the subscript $k$ (=1,...,K) refers to the country-level. The linear predictor of the log odds of an individual’s probability of being able to position herself on the left-right scale are modeled by an intercept $\beta_0$, a vector of coefficients on the individual-level ($V$), a vector of coefficients on the party-level ($X$), and a vector of coefficients on the country-level ($Z$). For the random effect $U_{0jk}$ a normal distribution with a zero mean and a variance of $\sigma_e^2$ is assumed. Individual-level residuals follow from the probability of $y$ and are therefore not included in the equation (Snijders and Bosker 1999).\(^{169}\)

\(^{169}\) In line with a logistic distribution the residual variance of level-1 is $\pi^2/3$ (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 224).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 0</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Marginal effects</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Marginal effects</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Marginal effects</strong></td>
<td><strong>β (se)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Marginal effects</strong></td>
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<td>0.10** (0.05)</td>
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<td>‘fairly’</td>
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<td>-0.04***</td>
<td>-0.54*** (0.15)</td>
<td>-0.04*** (0.01)</td>
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<td>‘a little’</td>
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<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.92*** (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.08*** (0.01)</td>
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<td>‘not at all’</td>
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Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. N (country) = 18, N (parties) = 58, N (individuals) = 8431. Average marginal effects are reported. Political Interest reference category = ‘very interested in politics’.
Results and Interpretation

Table 1 presents results for the baseline model and one additional model for each of the two indicators of clientelism. Results for the baseline model are reported first (Model 0), followed by the coefficients and average marginal effects of the model which includes the effect of vote buying (Model 1), and the coefficients and average marginal effects for the model including the effect of patronage on the dependent variable (Model 2).

I have hypothesized that with a higher emphasis of a political party on clientelistic practices the probability of its supporters to possess political orientation should be lower. For both models the analysis confirms a negative effect of a political party’s degree of clientelistic practices on the probability of party supporters to position themselves on the left-right dimension. Both effects are significant at the 95% confidence level. Thus, clientelistic parties seem to offer party supporters alternative cues on which they can base their political behavior. Comparing the average marginal effects in Model 1 with those in Model 2 we can further see that the effect of clientelism is more pronounced for vote buying practices than for patronage. This finding is intuitively plausible since the practice of vote buying targets a broader group of party supporters and thus has a broader scope than the practice of patronage, which is more exclusively directed to core supporters or party activists. Vote buying benefits are usually distributed during election time, while patronage may be seen as an indirect mobilization tool to provide party brokers or activists with public employment to secure their future support during election times (see Nichter 2008; Stokes 2007). The difference, however, is not very large: while the vote buying indicator in Model 1 has an average marginal effect of minus 4 percentage points on the probability of a party supporter to position herself on the left-right scale, the average marginal effect of patronage is only one percentage point smaller. Concerning the model fit, the model which includes the vote buying
indicator fares best with respect to the reduction of the log likelihood and the BIC compared to both the baseline model as well as Model 2.

Although the control variables are not the main focus of this analysis, they merit a closer look. With respect to the macro controls only the polarization of party systems has a significant effect on the dependent variable and the effect points in the expected direction. In line with the arguments made above the polarization of party systems seems to yield more meaningful cues for citizens with respect to the left-right dimension and therefore eases the development of political orientation for them. The effect of polarization is robust over both models and significant at the 95% confidence level. The effect of party system fragmentation is insignificant, however, the sign of the effect hints into the expected direction, i.e. a negative effect on the dependent variable.

With respect to the meso-level factors the personalistic linkage type has no significant effect on the dependent variable, as expected. However, a surprising finding is the negative and insignificant effect of a political party’s emphasis of the programmatic linkage strategy on the dependent variable in both models. This pattern also arises in the bivariate model (not reported, available on request): the coefficient has a negative sign and does not reach common significance levels. While other studies found significant effects of programmatic party-society linkages or programmatic party system structuration on the specific placement of individuals on the left-right scale (Harbers, Vries, and Steenbergen 2012; Ruth 2012), the present findings indicate that this positive association does not hold with respect to the uncertainty or indifference of party supporters towards the left-right scale in general. Hence, this finding hints to the conclusion that programmatic parties should invest more in educating and helping voters to understand what the labels ‘left’ and ‘right’ mean and where they stand on this scale if they wish to attract supporters from clientelistic parties.
With respect to the individual-level controls, the assumed effect of political sophistication is confirmed by the results. The coefficients are highly significant at the 99% confidence level and robust over both models. Higher levels of education increase the probability of respondents to position themselves on the left-right scale and politically interested party supporters are more likely to report their position on the left-right continuum than those with lower levels of political interest. For example, a respondents probability to report a position on the left-right dimension is on average 15 percentage points lower if the respondent is ‘not at all’ interested in politics compared to being ‘very’ interested in politics (see marginal effects in Table 1).

Results for the effect of political experience, however, are less decisive. The distinction of party supporters in voters and non-voters in the last election shows no significant association with the dependent variable. The age of a respondent seems to have a bell-shaped curvilinear effect on a respondents’ probability of perceiving the left-right scale, indicating that young and old supporters are less likely to possess political orientation than middle aged supporters. However, this effect is very weak as can be seen by inspecting the average marginal effects in Model 1 and Model 2 for the respective indicators.

To sum up, the results of this first empirical analysis confirm the main theoretical arguments made above: ceteris paribus, supporters of political parties that strongly pursue a clientelistic linkage strategy are less likely to report their position on the left-right dimension (H1).

**Part II: Political Orientation of Clientelistic Targets**

Finally, this section addresses *Hypothesis 2* and focusses on the effect of clientelism, measured on the micro-level, on the ability of individuals to possess political orientation.
Operationalization

Similarly to the LAB the LAPOP asks respondents to place themselves on a left–right dimension (item L1), this time using a 10-point scale, which will be coded into the same binary dependent variable, with the value 1 indicating that the respondent was able to locate herself on the left-right scale and the value 0 indicating that the respondent did not position herself on the left-right scale. This time, however, not only party supporters are included in the analysis but all respondents of the survey. For the respondents included in this analysis the mean rate of left-right self-placement in 2010 is 79.5% (standard deviation 4.0).

Concerning the main independent variable, the LAPOP survey of 2010 for the first time included a unique item on clientelistic targeting in its questionnaire (item CLIEN1). By means of this question it is possible to operationalize the concept of clientelism on the micro-level. Respondents have been asked how often they were offered any material inducements by party officials during elections in exchange for their votes. Three categories were available for the respondents: ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, and ‘never’. For the 17 Latin American countries covered in this part of the analysis approximately 5% of the respondents report that they have been often targets of vote buying, 8% report they have been sometimes targeted by party officials in an attempt of buying their votes, and 87% of the respondents report that they have never been targeted by political elites with a vote buying strategy. The variable will enter the analysis in its categorical form, with ‘often’ as the reference category.

Since this part of the analysis includes all respondents of the survey, I will control for respondents’ party identification (item VB10). Several arguments in the literature predict a relationship between party identification or loyalty and the probability of being targeted by a clientelistic party. On the one hand, party identifiers may be less likely targets of clientelistic parties since they are assumed to be loyal to their party on other grounds, on the other hand, party identifiers are more easily monitored and therefore less risky targets for clientelistic
parties (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1986; Stokes 2005). To control for this factor I code a dummy variable with the value 1 indicating that a respondent reports that she identifies with a political party and the value 0 for all other responses. First descriptive evidence hints to the conclusion that political parties target party identifiers more likely than non-identifiers (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2: Party Identifiers as Clientelistic Targets (LAPOP)**

![Bar chart showing party identifiers as clientelistic targets](image)

Source: Calculations based on LAPOP data 2010.

To ease comparability of the results in both parts of the empirical analysis, the operationalization of most of the control variables resemble those in the previous section: on the macro-level I control for party system fragmentation (ENPP) and polarization (Taylor-Herman). Furthermore, since no meso-level is included in this part of the analysis, I use parties’ linkage scores from the DAES to calculate the programmatic and personalistic structuration of party systems on the macro-level (items E2 and E1). Therefore, party scores
are weighted with their seat shares in the national legislature. Due to the small sample size on the macro-level, stepwise inclusion of macro controls will be used and only those controls that are either significant in the bivariate or the multivariate case are included in the final model to limit the number of variables on this level. Parallel to the previous analysis, political sophistication will be measured on the micro-level through the respondent’s level of education and her level of political interest. The LAPOP reports the respondents’ level of education in years (ranging from 0 to 18) (item ED), while political interest is measured on a 4-point scale with lower values indicating higher levels of interest in politics (item POL1). Furthermore, partly diverging from the previous analysis, political experience will be controlled for by the respondent’s age only (item Q2), since the LAPOP does not provide a question on voting experience for all countries included in this analysis. The age of a respondent will enter the analysis in linear and squared form.

Estimation Model

Since the dependent variable is measured in the same way as in the previous part of the analysis, estimations equally rely upon a logistic random intercept model (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Hox 2010), with the difference that this time only two hierarchical levels are modelled: the individual and the country-level. The model to test Hypothesis 2 is specified as follows:

$$\log\left(\frac{P_{ik}}{1 - P_{ik}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta V_{ik} + \beta Z_k + U_{0k}$$

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170 Political parties included in the DAES cover on average 93.3% of seats in national legislatures. The lowest coverage is given in Colombia with 83.1% of legislative seats, while the highest coverage of 100% is given in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic.
<table>
<thead>
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<td>Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personalism</td>
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<td>0.04***</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. N (country) = 17, N (individuals) = 28736. Average marginal effects are reported. Clientelistic Target reference category = ‘often’. Political Interest reference category = ‘a lot interested in politics’. The variables Programme and Personalism were excluded from the model due to their insignificant effects in both the bivariate and the full model.
Results and Interpretation

Table 2 reports the results for the baseline model and the coefficients and average marginal effects for Model 3, including the effect of being a target of clientelistic practices on the probability of reporting a position on the left-right dimension.

Concerning the effect of clientelism on the dependent variable the analysis partly confirms the expectations formulated in Hypothesis 2. The variable Clientelistic Target compares the effect of ‘often’ receiving clientelistic benefits during election time – the reference category – to the two other categories ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’ receiving such benefits. For both comparisons the effect shows the expected positive sign, i.e. individuals that are less often involved in a clientelistic exchange relationship are more likely to report their position on the left-right scale. The effect is highly significant for the comparison with the ‘sometimes’ group (p<0.01) and just narrowly under conventional levels of significance for those who ‘never’ receive clientelistic benefits (p=0.103). Figure 3 gives a graphical overview of the predicted probabilities for each group with respect to the dependent variable.

Figure 3: Clientelistic Targets and Left-Right Orientation (LAPOP)

Source: Calculations based on LAPOP data 2010.
The highly significant difference with respect to respondents’ left-right orientation between the ‘often’ and the ‘sometimes’ category as well as the nearly significant effect comparing the ‘often’ category to the ‘never’ category confirm arguments in the literature that clientelistic targets are likely to be uncertain or indifferent with respect to the left-right dimension (e.g. Stokes 2007). Furthermore, the low significance level of the effect of the ‘never’ category may result from the quality of the survey item itself, since questions on political attitudes and behavior face the ‘social desirability bias’ when respondents do not report their own but a socially expected behavior, which in our case would be not to sell their votes (e.g. Holbrook & Krosnick 2010). Thus, the category of ‘never’ having received any clientelistic benefits may include some degree of noise, which may account for the lower level of left-right orientation of this group compared to the ‘sometimes’ category and the insignificance of the effect compared to those who ‘often’ received clientelistic benefits.

Furthermore, with only a few exceptions the effects of the control variables mirror those of the previous analysis. On the macro-level, this time the picture is reversed with a significant effect of fragmentation and an insignificant effect of the polarization of party systems. In line with the theoretical expectations party system fragmentation is negatively related with a respondents’ ability to position herself on the left-right dimension. Arguments made concerning the effect of polarization cannot be confirmed by the analysis. The control variables for the programmatic and personalistic structuration of party systems were finally excluded from the analysis since they showed no significant effects in both the bivariate and the full models.

In line with the descriptive inspections made earlier party identifiers are more likely to position themselves on the left-right dimension. The effect is highly significant on the 99% confidence level. With respect to the other individual-level control variables, only the insignificant effect of the age of the respondents diverges from the results of the previous
analysis. Both effects of education and political interest are highly significant and with their signs in the expected direction. Furthermore, as can be seen by the average marginal effects, the size of both control variables on the dependent variable is nearly identical to the first part of this empirical analysis. With each additional year of education a respondent’s probability to possess a position on the left-right dimension increases by one percentage point. Moreover, a respondent’s probability to position herself on the left-right scale with no interest in politics is on average 14 percentage points lower than the probability of a respondent with ‘a lot’ of interest in politics.

To sum up, the results confirm that, ceteris paribus, individuals that are often targeted by clientelistic parties during election time are less likely to report their position on the left-right dimension (H2).

**CONCLUSION**

This study marks a first step on the way to evaluate the relationship between clientelism and the ability of citizens to develop clear and structured political perceptions. From a political science perspective this topic is of specific relevance as consistent perceptions of the political space in the citizenry are a precondition for the development of responsible and responsive political parties, because only then are citizens able to evaluate and punish irresponsive behavior of political parties (APSA 1950; Thomassen 1994). By offering citizens alternative clues on which they can base their political behavior their votes lose the capacity to signal policy preferences. Thereby the overall incentive for political parties to act responsively in substantive terms is. Consequently, by hindering the development of left-right orientation in the citizenry, clientelism may have severe consequences for the quality of political representation.
In two analyses based on different hierarchical datasets I was able to confirm the expected negative effect of clientelism on individuals’ left-right orientation. Firstly, a political party’s emphasis on clientelistic practices negatively influences the ability of its supporters to position themselves on the left-right scale. Secondly, those individuals that are often involved in clientelistic exchanges during election times are less likely to report their position on the left-right scale.

Based on these findings this article offers various avenues for future research. The next step to disentangle the relationship between clientelism and political orientation would be to focus on citizens’ specific positions on the left-right scale. For example, respondents inclined to answer the survey question but with no clear opinion concerning the substantive meaning of left and right may tend to answer the question by positioning themselves in the center of the scale (Alvarez and Franklin 1994). Furthermore, the effect of clientelism on citizens’ evaluations of political parties’ positions on the left-right continuum and possible distorting effects on the congruence between actual and perceived party positions are worth further studying.
**APPENDIX**

**Table A1: Descriptive statistics part I**

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<th>Variable</th>
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Sources: Calculations based on LAB 2009 and DAES.

**Table A2: Descriptive statistics part II**

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Sources: Calculations based on LAPOP 2010 and DAES.


Hagopian, Frances 1998. Democracy and Political Representation in Latin America in the 1990s: Pause, Reorganization, or Decline? In Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-


