Religiosity, country context, and participation in public life

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Richard Norrie BA Hons MSc (Oxon)

aus

Dundee (Großbritannien)

Referent: Prof. Dr. Heiner Meulemann

Korreferent: Prof. Dr. André Kaiser

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Foreword

Every thesis tends to begin with some highly presumptuous, Oscars-style thank you speech. This thesis is no different. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisors Heiner Meulemann and André Kaiser for listening to my ideas, and for their encouragement, support and criticisms. In addition, I thank Hans-Jürgen Andreß for his interest in my work and advice, even though I know the sociology of religion is not exactly his cup of tea. I thank my mentor Pascal Siegers for teaching me so much (i.e. putting up with me) and for helping me to develop a sense of confidence that was needed in order for me to engage in academic life. I also extend my gratitude to my SOCLIFE colleagues too numerous to mention in their entirety, but most notably Hawal Shamon and Romana Careja for their many instances of help and support. Also, I extend my gratitude to the academic staff at the University of Cologne for their input via the courses which they led that have proven so useful to me in the writing of this thesis. *Danke schön* also to the German Science Foundation (DFG) for keeping the stipend coming and making this all possible.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Topic and research questions

Despite the predictions of the more optimistic proponents of modernism and despite real declines in the numbers of adherents in Western societies, religion remains a political flashpoint across the world, even in the apparently most secular societies. Whether it is questions relating to abortion or the publication of satirical cartoons mocking religious figures, religion retains the power to ignite fierce passions which can in extreme cases lead to unrest, violence, and even murder. Religion remains on a global scale the source of much of political behaviour and it is often reached for in times of crisis as a way of understanding the conflicts and circumstances that people find themselves in and as a way of attempting to resolve them. Sadly, the interventions of religion often tend to inflame political conflicts particularly when they take place across religious boundaries, as is the case in Northern Ireland and across the Middle East. In the latter case, we have seen as a response to Western hegemony and Israeli occupation over the years that religion has come to the forefront as a means of expressing outrage and fermenting dissent. All too often, its methods have been obscene and bloody and far from the message of peace and understanding that religion at its best presents. In the West itself, increasingly political elites have found themselves in the grip of religious extremists and messianic tendencies that have been the cause for alarm and have served to further entrench conflicts rather than to heal them.

Accordingly, students of political participation and civil society cannot afford to ignore religion as a source of explanation. The presence of examples of religion at its most explosive and obnoxious in the headlines should not however be taken as representative of the actions of all religious people. Instead we need a dispassionate account of how religious people behave in everyday life in forms of political and social behaviour that are not so immediately attention-grabbing. We need an account of religion that details how religion behaves on the day to day level, so we can understand the roots of religious conflict when it flares up. We need to understand under what *contextual* circumstances religion can have a strong bearing on societal organisation. Furthermore, from a scientific perspective, the dominant theories within the sociology of religion have tended to focus overwhelmingly on predicting and explaining religious vitality in terms of numbers of adherents and attendees. New research is needed that can show how the types of macro-level changes that these theories identify as having causal influence on religiosity, impact upon the social behaviour of the religious in wider society and beyond pulpit and pew.

This thesis attempts to meet these goals by aiming to ascertain what it is about the country hosting the religious individual that either enables public participation or makes it less likely for them. Three areas of public life are explored. They are: (1) conventional political participation – defined by modes pertaining to the occupation and influencing of government; (2) civil society – thought of as that independent space between state and individual that seeks to express the interests of the latter in response to the former;

and (3) unconventional political participation – which seeks to influence government and affairs through ways external to the conventional route of politics that are defined by their tendency to more directly challenge authority.

1.2 Theoretical departure

It is theorised that religiosity, when thought of in something akin to a theoretical de-contextualised social vacuum, is linked to these three modes of public behaviour – positively in the cases of conventional political participation and civil society, and negatively in the case of unconventional political participation. It is argued that religiosity offers motivations, means, and opportunities for mobilisation that make participation in the first two cases more likely. However, religion is often thought of as socially conservative and authoritarian, which is expected to steer religious individuals away from unconventional political participation due to its authority-challenging nature.

This thesis then draws on two schools of thought within the sociology of religion in order to place firmly these individual-level theories within the country context. They are *secularisation theory* and *religious economies theory*, which is also referred to as either the rational choice or the supply-side approach. Secularisation theory links decline in religious attendance to modernisation. It is argued that the advent of modernisation makes religious beliefs more untenable whilst religion fails to find itself socially useful and thus falls into disrepair and confined to the private sphere. However, this theory has been challenged by Casanova (1994) who has argued that

religion *can* re-manifest itself within civil society in a response to secularisation as it loses its legitimacy within politics proper.

Religious economies theory by contrast, sought to explain religious vitality by conceiving of religion as subject to social forces analogous to those of the market-place. This school contends that religions rise and fall depending on the amount of effort that the clergy puts in, in order to satisfy the religious needs of the people. Their efforts are conditioned by two factors that delimit the religious market place – namely the level of religious freedom allowed to the individual through the separation of religion and state, and the level of competition between different providers of religion. Where the clergy's income is more suspect to doubt due to the lack of religious state support and the availability of competitors who can provide an alternative service, so it is expected that they will work harder and be more successful in filling the houses of worship. Where they are assured their income and have no competitors, it is thought according to this school, that they will become lazy, their product will suffer and declines in religious adherents will follow.

The individual-level theories linking religiosity to the three modes of public participation are contextualised using these theories. It is expected that religiosity will become less pronounced in its effect on conventional political participation due to effects associated with secularisation when modernisation is at its greatest. Conversely, it is predicted that religiosity will increase its effect on civil society participation as religion re-orientates itself to the modern secularised world. Thirdly, it is predicted that secularisation will occur where modernisation is greatest and thus religion

will lose that which makes it distinct more and more so that it increasingly loses its innate deference to authority. This would manifest itself in a lessening of its negative effect on unconventional political participation.

The contextualisation of the individual-level theory of religiosity linking it to conventional political participation and civil society using religious economies theory, stems from the supposition that under conditions of greater separation of religion and state, the clergy will work harder and become more familiar with the tenets of their religion and this will transfer on down to the faithful. It is expected that concurrently will come greater religious assertiveness and enthusiasm that should cause religious people to participate more in both conventional political participation and civil society, where conditions of separation of religion and state are greatest. However, with this greater self-assurance of religion would come a greater familiarity with itself and this is expected to be manifested in an increasingly negative effect of religiosity on unconventional participation. As religion becomes more assured of itself, so its predispositions become more activated and this includes its innate authoritarianism that renders unconventional political participation suspect.

1.3 The thesis

The empirical results in themselves provide only passing evidence in support of these theories. This is not seen as disappointing but exciting as it offers the chance for new perspectives and theoretical insight beyond the obvious and dogmatic. On the secularisation side, it is found that modernisation nearly always has an effect on religiosity's impact on conventional political

participation, civil society participation, and unconventional political participation. However, given that effects are often not in the expected manner, some theoretical revisions to secularisation theory have to be offered. It is argued that under conditions of greater modernisation, religiosity is not privatised in the sense that it leads individuals away from conventional political participation. Since this is not happening, it cannot be said to be 'deprivatising' by re-manifesting itself within civil society, even though its effect is more pronounced under modern conditions.

Instead it is argued that religiosity is associated with increasing *organisational* behaviour in conventional political participation and civil society under conditions of greater modernisation because modernisation itself makes organisational life more difficult due to a lack of alternative motivating secular ideologies and the stresses that modern life places on the individual. Religiosity becomes more advantageous to making these forms of behaviour possible by providing the ideological motivation that can sustain participation despite the increased costs. Regarding unconventional participation, it is found that religiosity becomes less hostile to unconventional political participation under conditions of greater modernisation but only with regard to those modes of behaviour that are potentially the least challenging and threatening to authority. Where the challenge is greatest and the most direct, this secularising effect of modernisation is not enough to overcome religion's aversion to unconventional politics. It is argued that secularisation theory needs to be revised so as to incorporate the irony that when religion is potentially at its

most powerful in terms of its mobilising capacity, it is also at its weakest since it lacks the numbers to have real influence.

Regarding religious economies theory, no energising effects of greater separation of religion and state are found with one or two exceptions. The fact that they are exceptional is taken as informative in itself and it is argued that as there is no consistency, we cannot reasonably expect the kind of mechanisms derived from the religious economies school to be functioning. Instead, it is supposed that greater participation in some but not all types of civil society organisation can be explained with reference to the types of organisation themselves and how they relate to the separation of religion and state. It is argued that religious people participate more in religious, cultural, and educational type organisations when separation of religion and state is at its highest, as they are frozen out of the state by legal restrictions. Thus, they have a greater incentive to participate in civil society. When the functions that these organisations carry out are undertaken by the state and in way compatible with religious teachings, then there is less need for religious people to provide these themselves in civil society. Additionally, a positive effect of separation of religion and state on religiosity was found pertaining to boycotting. It is argued that in secular society religiosity has much more to boycott, hence this result. Effects were not observed in the other indicators of unconventional political participation because petitions and protests are senseless in a highly secularised state as the constitution forbids enactment of religious laws. Even though the religious would want to engage in such activity, they do not and under such

circumstances religious people will resort to boycotting as they do have control over their own consumption and can maybe exert influence through its pointed application. Effects were not evidenced concerning conventional political participation. This is put down to the fact that at either end of the spectrum of separation of religion and state, there are upward pressures on religiosity's relationship to conventional politics that serve to cancel each other out. In conditions of full establishment, religious people participate because they are *for* something; under conditions of full separation, they participate because they have something to be *against*. It is thus suggested, that the most promising direction for further study would be to explore effects of separation of religion and state shorn of religious economies theory.

1.4 Overview of chapters

In Chapter 2, these hypotheses are given their fullest explanation along with the concepts they utilise. A review of the relevant literature is also presented. In Chapter 3, we concern ourselves with data, measurements, and their validity. An introduction is offered to the World Values Survey which forms the bases for our empirical exploration. Additional data sources at the macro-level are also introduced. Measurement instruments are introduced, discussed, and assessed for validity, using empirical methods of validation. With Chapter 4, our empirical analyses begin with the study of conventional political participation and religiosity. Chapter 5 concerns itself with the exploration of religiosity and civil society whilst Chapter 6 explores unconventional political participation. All of these three empirical chapters

make extensive usage of multilevel modelling. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the investigation and argument by bringing all the findings together in an attempt to synthesise them into a coherent body whilst making revisions to the two theoretical approaches proposed in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2 - Constructing and contextualising a theory of religiosity and participation in public life

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter religiosity is linked to public participation and then this individual level theory is contextualised by identifying what exactly it might be about the country hosting the individual that makes different the effect of their religiosity on their behaviour from that of another individual in another country. The theoretical argument begins by outlaying religiosity as something that is a property of individuals that one could reasonably expect to aid participation in conventional political action and civil society. This is done through an extension of the theory of political participation, associated with Verba and his colleagues. Regarding unconventional political participation, it is predicted that due to religion's often conservative and authoritarian nature, religiosity ought to steer individuals away from unconventional political participation due to its authority-challenging nature. These individuals theories assume context does not matter.

Once these individual links are established between religiosity and public participation, they are then situated in the country context, using secularisation theory and religious economies theory. Secularisation is understood as the reduction of the social significance of religion brought about by the onset of modernisation resulting in religious decline and religious privatisation. Thus, modernisation is predicted to reduce the strength of the effect of religiosity on participation in mainstream politics. However, drawing on an influential work by Casanova (1994), it is also

argued that the result of religion drawing away from conventional politics is that it re-manifests itself in civil society so that modernisation is predicted to increase the link between religiosity and civil society participation. With unconventional political participation, it is argued that the effect of modernisation will be to bring about secularisation that makes religions less conservative so that the link between religiosity and the avoidance of participation in unconventional elite-challenging forms of participation is reduced almost up to the point of non-existence.

The alternative to using secularisation theory to contextualise our theory is to use a different strain of theory from the sociology of religion, namely religious economies theory. This theory predicts that religious competition and religious freedom, as seen as stemming from the separation of religion and state, delimit the religious opportunity structure and condition the religiosity of the country through a direct effect on the clergy who become more active in encouraging religious attendance under these conditions. It is argued that under religious free-market conditions, religiosity will become more vital and more assertive of itself and this will translate itself into greater positive effects on conventional political participation and civil society participation. With regard to unconventional political participation, it is expected that with greater quality of services provided by clergy due to market-forces unleashed by separation of religion and state will come a greater familiarity with the tenets of religion so that the authoritarian streak within it becomes more pronounced. Thus, it is expected that with greater

separation of religion and state will arise a more negative effect of religiosity on unconventional political participation.

The theoretical argument begins by looking at individual links between religiosity and participation along with a summary of the relevant literature. Then the theories of secularisation and religious economies are introduced, along with a review of the empirical evidence and some criticisms. Finally, hypotheses are proposed that form the basis of the subsequent empirical chapters. But before any of this is possible, it is first essential to define our key terms and delineate the spaces between them.

2.2 Conceptualising religiosity

The concept of 'religiosity' is in common usage in the social sciences even outside of the niche that is the sociology of religion, where it will consistently appear if only as a control variable. Nevertheless, it often escapes explicit definition. Scholars will freely band the term about and are very interested in what it is that is expressive of religiosity without explicitly stating what it actually is. A definition is wanting and much has to be inferred back from the dimensions and indicators that are utilised by social scientists when it comes to measurement. Definitions of 'religion' by contrast are ten-a-penny in sociology. This thesis follows Bruce (2002b) in defining religion:

"I follow common usage in defining religion substantively as beliefs, actions and institutions predicated on the existence of entities with powers of agency (that is, gods) or impersonal powers or processes possessed of moral purpose (the Hindu notion of karma, for example), which can set the conditions of, or intervene in, human affairs." Bruce 2002b:p2)

What is now missing is an understanding of what 'religiosity' is. A definition is hard to find within the literature – its definition is often taken for granted. Indeed, one paper (Mokhlis, 2009) that sets out to define the concept ends up by giving definition after definition of religion without addressing the question of whether or not there is a distinction between religion and religiosity.

The approach used in this thesis, builds on the distinction made by Georg Simmel, for whom a fundamental conceptual distinction in sociology was that between form and content. 'Form' referred to a set of social arrangements existing between human beings that were expressive of certain 'content' which was the desires and impulses of these individuals which caused forms to come about (Simmel, 1950; Furseth & Repstad, 2006). It was the task of sociology, according to Simmel, to outlay the various forms through which content was manifested, independently from that very content. Thus, for Simmel, the term 'religion' was a form and 'religiosity' was the content that expressed itself within (Furseth & Repstad, 2006). Religiosity was thus thought of as "a state or a spiritual rhythm lacking any object" (Simmel 1997, p165 / cited in Furseth & Repstad, 2006). Religiosity is thus to be understood as a drive towards religious ideals that manifests itself in the social relationships that religion provides.

Building on this approach, religiosity is considered to be something that is possessed by individuals which can vary in the same way as a continuous variable does. Religions themselves are seen as being rather like categorical variables – which one either belongs to or not, which are either in existence

or not. Religiosity is thus understood to be the *varying degree of commitment held by individuals to the belief systems and institutions of the religions – that is independent of the actual religion in question.*

What about spirituality? Is it conceptually distinct from religiosity? Zinnbauer et al. (1999) attempt to clarify the two terms before resolving what they see as something of a false opposition within the literature[1]. For Zinnbauer et al., the social science cannon has generally turned up the following generalised definitions:

"... religiousness was predominantly associated with formal/organisational religion, and spirituality was more often associated with closeness with God and feelings of interconnectedness with the world and living things." (1999, p896)

The argument of Zinnbauer et al. is that traditionally, social science has tended to consider religiousness as encompassing spirituality with the two concepts having not been seen as diametrically opposed. More recent approaches however, have sought to locate these two concepts as polar opposites, with religiousness denoting that done within monolithic and lugubrious religious institutions, whilst spirituality comes to be seen as something youthful and dynamic that is practiced independently and reflective of a personal development or quest. Religiousness is the institution, spirituality is the individual's own unique voyage of personal discovery. This though is an error as it overlooks both the institutional environment that surrounds spirituality and also the personal voyage that occurs within the old religious traditions. Empirically, people will also tend

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[1] Zinnbauer et al. speak of 'religiousness' and not religiosity. For our purposes, they are treated here as inter-changeable.

to identify themselves as both religious and spiritual and so it is both a theoretical and factual error to hold the two separate. Instead, we need an approach that can successfully merge the two:

"As such, spirituality is the heart and soul of religion, and religion's most central function. Spirituality has to do with the paths people take in their efforts to find, conserve, and transform the sacred in their lives. Whereas religion encompasses the search for many sacred or non-sacred objects of significance, spirituality focuses specifically and directly on the search for the sacred. As with religion, spirituality can take individual and institutional, traditional and non-traditional, and helpful and harmful forms." (Zinnbauer et al., 1999:p909).

This extract is showing how these two concepts can be synthesised. Spirituality is to be seen as part of religiosity – the development of the individual that spirituality implies is also central to religiosity. What unites them for Zinnbauer et al. is that they both contain aspects pertaining to the orientation of the individual towards the sacred. In the sense that they are different, it is that spirituality does not attempt to order the world along religious lines (Zinnbauer et al. 1999). Thus, this thesis treats spirituality as part of religiosity.

2.3 Conceptualising public behaviour – conventional, unconventional political participation & civil society

The *explicandum* of this study is termed loosely 'public participation' which is seen as an umbrella concept covering all sorts of social behaviour that is carried out in places where the discourse is not conceived of as something akin to a private conversation and/or there is a felt influence on wider-society itself. Anyone can join in and effects can be felt by everyone. Three

modes of public participation are identified of interest for this study, namely: conventional political participation, unconventional participation, and participation within civil society. These are not conceived of as exhaustive of what could be classified as public participation. Other forms might be a public lecture or a religious sermon. It is simply the case that this dissertation focuses on only three aspects of a much wider social phenomenon, because they have the greatest consequences for our social order and life-chances.

2.3.1 Conventional vs. unconventional political participation

Political participation has been defined by Verba & Nie (1972) as:

"...those activities that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" (Verba & Nie, 1972:p2)

For Verba & Nie, political participation is behaviour aimed at affecting influence over and upon government both in terms of personnel, law-making, and policy. It is not just confined to voting or running for office but extends to include such behaviours as membership of political parties and the contacting of officials. For Verba & Nie, political participation has to be something meaningful that is not merely performative or symbolic. It has to be expressive of a meaningful conversation between governed and governor. They exclude psychological orientations relating to perceived political efficacy, for instance, but stress that these may have explanatory roles to play. Their definition of political participation relates only to government. It is not intended to include participation in other spheres that may have a democratic element, such as schools. They stress that their interest is in

acts of participation that are within the rules of the system, meaning behaviours that are "generally recognised as legal and legitimate" (Verba & Nie, 1972:p3). This is not to say that extra-legal modes of participation are not of academic interest or necessarily wrong. Rather, it is to restrict the scope of their investigation. The problem is that they are ignoring different forms of political participation that are equally of substantive interest since their definition is too restrictive.

An important distinction that is often made within the study of political participation is that between conventional and unconventional participation. Such a distinction can be found in the work of Barnes & Kaase (1979) who treated conventional political participation as behaviour revolving around the process of elections and reflective of traditional institutional processes, whilst the unconventional forms of participation were considered to occur externally and are construed of as radical, innovative, and deinstitutionalised. These dimensions whilst conceptually distinct tended however to carry some considerable correlations between them, such that we can consider both to be different means towards a common end, with individuals using both or either routes of participation depending upon circumstances or the likelihood of carrying successful influence.

There have been many other attempts made at classifying forms of political participation made within political science. However most have at their heart the distinction between the conventional and the unconventional (Grasso, 2010), give or take some 'gymnastics of meaning'. One alternative to the conventional/unconventional distinction is offered by Inglehart (1977) who

saw that the distinction lay between elite-directed activities and elite-directing activities. Later, the latter category was renamed 'elite-challenging' (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). The former is reflected in such activities as voting, membership of a political party, party canvassing, or trade union activity. The latter includes new social movement activities, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, occupations, and unlawful strikes. Given the indicators offered by Inglehart are more or less the same as those used by Barnes & Kaase and their associates, we can use the terms conventional and unconventional without too much concern.

2.3.2 Civil society

Civil society is often political in nature but nevertheless remains distinct from the conventional mode of political participation, although as we shall see, it shares some overlap with the unconventional mode. The idea of civil society has long animated the imaginations of social and political theorists with empirical social scientists coming to the game relatively late. Attention to civil society was further heightened in the wake of the dissolution of the old communist order in Eastern Europe. In more recent times, civil society has been witnessed at its most powerful, persuasive and challenging to authority, in the Arab Spring, whilst in the United Kingdom, the concept is traduced here and there as a stop-gap to plug the holes left by radical and drastic cuts in government spending - this being the so-called 'big society' of David Cameron.

The term 'civil society' is widely in usage but its definition is often taken for granted and as self-explanatory, even though as we shall see, it is quite an intricate concept. Anheier (2004) provides us with a definition:

"...most analysts would probably agree with the statement that civil society is the sum of institutions, organisations and individuals located between the family, the state and the market in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests." (Anheier, 2004:p20)

According to Calhoun (2011), civil society has taken on various shades of meaning across the course of academic history. Fundamentally though, it is referring to:

"... society distinct from the state, organized ideally as a realm of liberty, with freedom of religion, association, business activity, conversation and the press. The promise of civil society was that social life could be self-organising, even in complex, large-scale societies, and that it could thereby be more free than if left to government officials or to technical experts." (Calhoun, 2011:p2)

For Diamond (1994), civil society is a section of society distinct from the state. This idea is key to the understanding of this concept and is found elsewhere (e.g. Anheier, 2004; Ekiert & Kublik, 2000; Taylor, 1990). Civil society is a sphere for individuals organised into associations that are bound by legal or social rules that govern conduct within it. Diamond writes:

"It is distinct from 'society' in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state." (Diamond, 1994:pp5-6)

For Diamond, civil society is about citizens co-operating to achieve their desires as an intermediary between individual and state. The relationship is one whereby individuals act together in order to ensure the state is compliant with their wishes. Thus, so much of civil society participation is conducted within voluntary associations. Civil society both makes demands upon and attempts to be regulative of the state. This means that civil society does not include voluntary associations that are designed to fulfil needs and desires described as "inward looking" (Diamond, 1994:p5), namely recreation, entertainment or spirituality. Nor does it include individual or family associations. Diamond's conceptualisation of civil society is distinctly political without being political in the sense that it is enmeshed within the executive, legislative, or judicative branches of government. Civil society is in dialogue, competition, and even sometimes conflict with the state, but without ever seeking to occupy it. Accordingly, political parties as voluntary associations would be excluded here.

Diamond stresses civil society organisations must be civil in the sense that they eschew violence. Civil society is not limited to democracies. It can exist outside in a "tentative or battered form" (Diamond, 1994:p6). However, once this space is opened up, it becomes possible for those opposed to the values of civil society to participate within and to operate in manner destructive of it (Ekiert & Kublik, 2000; Calhoun, 2011). It may exist outside of democracy and indeed did so under the state-socialism of the former Soviet bloc according to Ekiert & Kublik, (2000). Civil society organisations there tended to be severely hampered in their capacity to operate. Ekiert & Kublik

identified three distinct types of civil society organisation that operated under state socialist regimes: (1) pseudo-autonomous – such as most trade unions; (2) semi-autonomous - some churches and religious organisations; and (3) illegally autonomous – dissident groups. The term has also been applied in research undertaken in colonial-era Africa. Bratton (1989) has written that civil society was an important source of solidarity and resistance to imperial rule, both through traditional sources of organisation but also encompassing more modern forms of association, such as labour unions and professional associations. Such associations pressed the case for greater rights and ultimately independence. Much like in Soviet-era Eastern Europe, they could be either suppressed or co-opted by the state. Action varied in shape and size across African countries with "the Christian churches in Kenya and Burundi; Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal and Sudan; lawyers' and journalists' associations in Ghana and Nigeria; farmers' organisations in Zimbabwe and Kenya; and the mineworker's unions in Zambia and South Africa..." (Bratton, 1989:p412) evidencing that civil society action appears as often as not to be conducted along religious lines.

Thus, we can conceive of civil society as a universal phenomenon that is occurring even outside of democratic circles although its movement and development may very well be restricted there. Along these lines, Sivan (1990) has argued that Islamic civil society organisations have provided an example of alternatives to corrupt post-colonial states but simultaneously are possessive of values anathema to those of civil society.

2.3.3 Conceptual distinctions and conceptual overlap

Three areas of public participation have been conceptually demarcated – conventional political participation, unconventional political participation, and civil society. However, these three modes of behaviour should not be regarded as empirically non-concurrent in individual behaviour and preferences, since political actors often choose the appropriate method depending on situation and circumstance. Thus, we could expect that at times political parties will delve into unconventional political behaviour particularly during times of crisis and upheaval, or when their participation in the conventional stream is restricted, or they do not have enough support within parliament or amongst the electorate (as is common with far-left parties in Britain).

Similarly, unconventional specialists may enter the political mainstream and combine conventional and unconventional means in order to maximise their effect. Civil society is always heavily engaged with the conventional mode of political participation, although by definition it abstains directly from participation in parliament and elections as these contest the occupation of the state. Civil society organisations are also often at the heart of political demonstrations and things like petitions and boycotts.

It should be clear then that these three concepts can achieve empirical overlap. The inter-relationships between them are laid out in the Venn diagram displayed in Figure 1. Conventional political participation may at times overlap with unconventional political participation which can overlap with civil society, but civil society always must remain distinct from the

conventional route of politics even though they are locked into at times a mutually-antagonistic relationship.

Figure 1: Three modes of public participation – distinctness and overlap

2.4 Related work to the study of religion and political participation

Much work has been devoted to making the link between religion and politics explicit. Norris & Inglehart (2004) have argued that there has been decline in voting for religious political parties over time although religiosity remains an excellent predictor of right-wing voting choice – greater in fact than indicators of socio-economic status with 70% of the most religious voting for the right. Religiosity showed an inconsistent relationship to measures of political participation and interest. Religious attendance was associated negatively and significantly with political discussion and interest and less participation in more direct and confrontational modes of participation (unconventional participation). However, belonging to a religious voluntary association was linked to greater "confidence in major political institutions, voting participation, support for democracy, social

tolerance and trust, political interest and propensity to sign petitions, or participation in consumer boycotts" (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:p192). Thus, it seems the wider social political impact of religiosity is made apparent through religious voluntary association membership which by nature, tends to get more stuck-in in the running and problems of society than religious attendance alone. The findings of Norris & Inglehart can be subject to doubt since they do not account for the nested structure of their data in their modelling.

Religiosity has been identified as a source of social capital and thus an enabling resource for political participation. Campbell (2004) has argued that Evangelical Christians only come into politics when their core beliefs are perceived as threatened and that the tight social bonds between them can bring about rapid mobilisation. Putnam (2000) has argued that church goers are more likely to vote and participate politically whilst Peterson (1992) has linked church attendance to the fostering of civic skills that enable democratic practice, and greater political conservatism. McClerking & Daniel (2005) have argued that church attendance boosts political participation by increasing the political resources of individuals in a manner comparable to party membership and fosters social relationships which create bonds of obligation that deter political free-riding. Crucial to their analysis is the 'flavour' of the church in question – churches wherein politics is seen as a more pressing concern produce more participants than otherwise. Patterson (2005) has argued that Protestantism is associated with greater democratic practice due to its tradition of 'bottom-up' organisation

whereby church members have a greater say over church organisation, which transfers into democratic political practice. However this would be only a sufficient relationship as data from Brazil showed no Protestant advantage over Catholics in both conventional and unconventional forms of participation whilst data from Chile confirmed an advantage but only within the unconventional mode (Patterson 2005). Secret et al. (1990) also found a link between religiosity and increased participation in America, amongst both blacks and whites. Robnett & Bany (2011) found that amongst black Americans, church involvement and a highly politicised church community, result in a gender gap in participation in favour of men. Miller & Wattenberg (1984) have found that increased religiosity is linked to greater conservative voting preferences, increases voter turnout and political campaigning, but does not affect other forms of participation. Middendorp (1989) argues that political factions can be classified on two axes – left-right and libertarian-authoritarian – with the votes along both lines being predicted by greater religiosity. Religiosity has also been linked to greater voter turnout by Macaluso & Wanat (1979), Gerber et al. (2008), and by Norris (2002).

Religion remains a significant electoral cleavage although in the United States it is a constantly evolving one. For instance, Brooks & Manza (2004) found Evangelical Protestants and Catholics, relative to other denominations; had shifted towards the Republican Party. Jews tend towards the Democrat Party. Mainline Protestants are centrists, black Protestants right of centre, whilst Catholics are left of centre. These findings are closely supported by Hoffman & Miller (1997) who showed Protestants of

both liberal and conservative colours were the most conservative whilst Jews were the most liberal. Indeed, the American religious cleavage has been argued to be shifting from one based on denominations to one based on the level of religious orthodoxy and commitment and that the effect of religiosity on presidential choice has become more influential (Layman, 1997). In Europe, religious people are more likely to opt for Christian democratic parties and Catholics more likely to opt for the centre-right in elections (Van der Brug et al., 2009). Outside of the developed world, little research is immediately forthcoming. One study did find increasing levels of Christian political involvement in Ghana (Yirenkyi, 2000).

Religion is also seen as a powerful influence on political attitudes and the values they stem from. Religiosity has been tied to conservative political positions (Froese & Bader, 2008). Across 8 western nations, religious affiliates were found by Hayes (1995) to be more disapproving of abortion and female employment, whilst having more trust in institutions and favouring more religious involvement in politics. Religiosity was found to predict economic and cultural conservatism, along with racism and nationalism in Flanders (Duriez et al., 2002). In America, foreign policy attitudes were found to vary across denominations, with Catholics being relatively dovish whilst Evangelical beliefs were associated with more hawkish stances in some cases (Jelen, 1994). Wilcox found that church attendance interacted with denomination so that fundamentalists who attended frequently were more hawkish across a range of political subjects. In Arab and Islamic societies, the importance of religion can be overstated,

with Tessler (2003) arguing that political and economic factors are of greater importance. Tessler & Nachtwey (1998) found that support for political Islam was associated with hawkish stances regarding conflict resolution and aside from this, personal religiosity was unrelated. Religious fundamentalism has been linked to authoritarianism and prejudice towards minority groups whilst religiosity that sees itself as a quest of personal development does not (Hunsberger et al., 1999; Hunsberger et al., 2005; Altemeyer et al., 2009). Schwartz & Huismans (1995) found religiosity was correlated with values of tradition, conformity, and security, and inversely related to values pertaining to hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. Roccas & Schwartz (1997) found religiosity to be correlated with values of tradition, conformity, and benevolence with these relations being conditioned by the level of separation of religion and state, although analysis was restricted to a limited number of countries. The theoretical framework of Schwartz concerning the study of values has been highly influential. In a meta-analysis of studies incorporating this outlook, Saroglou et al. (2004) found that overall, religious people tended to favour societal conservation at the expense of change.

Of course religiosity is not the only factor in explaining political participation. In fact, as source of explanation, it is somewhat marginal within the literature. Political participation has been strongly tied to socio-economic status (SES) (Mishler, 1979; Verba et al., 1978; Verba & Nye, 1972; Parry et al., 1992). The SES model works as an excellent predictor of participation in the study of conventional political participation. Participants

tend to be from higher class backgrounds and be better educated; however the SES model does not supply an explanatory mechanism (Brady et al. 1995). A resources based explanation was thus put forward by Brady et al. (1995) whereby it was argued that individuals need resources in order to participate, in the form of time, money, and social connectivity. This serves to connect SES to political participation as higher statuses come with greater resources. Social capital, being a resource in itself, is frequently a source of explanation whereby individuals with greater connectivity and social trust are more likely to participate (Goerres, 2009; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). Social capital is seen as fostering participation by connecting people to opportunities to participate and by shaping the values of individuals leading to personal identification with a political cause (Passy & Giugni, 2001). Social capital has also been associated with increasing the information relating to opportunities to participate that are channelled through both formal and informal participation (McClurg, 2003). Trust has also been linked to unconventional participation – Kasse (2007) found lower trust in conventional politics and higher interpersonal trust was related to greater participation in this mode.

Another side of the discourse concerns explanations for changes in patterns of political participation. One school looks at an emerging democratic crisis whereby advanced societies are suffering a decline in civic behaviour necessary for sustaining democracy (Putnam, 2000). It has been noted that party membership is in decline (Wattenberg, 1996) and that publics are more distrusting of government (Nye et al. 1997). However, the counter

argument is that losses can be offset elsewhere by new forms of participation. Barnes et al. (1979) argued that conventional participation would decline in advanced modern societies whilst unconventional participation would increase. Similarly, Inglehart (1977) has argued that what he calls elite-directed forms of participation are set to decline in advanced democracies whilst elite-challenging or elite-directing forms are set to rise with changes in individual values being seen as having especial explanatory power. Modern societies are said to produce individuals less concerned with material wellbeing and thus people come to exhibit post-materialist values which lend themselves towards elite-challenging protest politics. Inglehart & Catterberg (2002) did indeed find increased levels of unconventional political participation in the most developed societies, whilst in the new democracies such behaviour had diminished with this put down to dissatisfaction with the way democracy had developed there. Norris (2002) found that falls in turnout have been registered in only 10 of the post-industrialised societies and stability in the rest of the West excepting a few instances of increasing turnout. Elsewhere, in developing societies in Latin America and Asia, rises have been evidenced. Party membership has been found by Norris to be a thing of less-developed societies with media penetration been seen as having crucial explanatory import, whilst protest politics is on the rise.

In summary, studies that focus on religion and political participation look at religiosity either as something determining choices and attitudes or as something that enables participation. What is missing is an appropriate

consideration of social context by allowing for variation across countries that can be explained by macro-level variables. Existing studies mostly fail to locate themselves within the dominant theoretical currents of the sociology of religion. Additionally, religiosity and its link to unconventional political participation are under-researched. This thesis serves to address these shortcomings.

2.5 Related work to the study of religion and civil society participation

Much attention has been aimed at the relationship between religiosity and civil society participation and each approach has its own unique flavour. Ruiter & De Graaf (2006) found participation increased with church membership and attendance. They also found religious volunteering had a spill over effect whereby participants in religious civil society were also more likely to participate in secular civil society. Ruiter & De Graaf found an interesting interaction, whereby voluntarism rises with levels of national devoutness, but also that national devoutness interacts with church attendance at the individual level and reduces its effect. Norris & Inglehart (2004) found that religiosity is empirically linked to participation in religious based voluntary associations which are also more evidenced under modern conditions of human and political development. In wider civil society, greater political development was significantly associated but human development had only a positive but insignificant bearing. Religiosity was found to be positively associated with higher levels of membership with Protestants having the greatest number. Religious attendance was found to be linked more to organisations that offered more welfare-orientated services such as

services for the elderly and infirm and youth organisations, than political or leisure based groups – the only organisation that did not show a positive relationship with religiosity was trade union membership. These results are interpreted by Norris & Inglehart as confirming social capital theory's stipulation that "social networks and personal communications derived from regular churchgoing play an important role, not just in prompting activism within religious-related organisations, but also in strengthening community associations" (Norris & Ingelhart, 2004: pp189-90). The concept of social capital is also used by Greely (1997) in order to link religious attendance to volunteering in both secular and non-secular concerns.

Webb & Abzug (2008) also found church attendance to be positively related to civil society participation. Caputo (2008) found civil society participation was related to both intrinsic religiosity and church attendance. Interestingly, socialisation was found to have an effect with greater parental religiosity and parental voluntary activity being related. Fundamentalism also had an impact. Perks and Haan (2011) also explored the effect of religious socialisation and concluded that in Canada, youth involvement in religious organisation is positively related to community participation in adulthood, although levels of religious youth involvement were in decline. Early life involvement is seen as being sufficient to develop a civically minded character.

Taniguchi (2010) found that in Japan, religiosity is significantly and positively related to volunteering. However, as Bryant et al. (2003) would argue, perhaps the link between religious attendance and participation is

because they are more likely to be asked as they are seen as more desirable, reliable and trustworthy. Bryant et al.'s thesis is that it is not so much about the person who volunteers but rather the likelihood of them being asked to volunteer. They argue that those who appear to conform more to conventional standards of morality and decency are more likely to be asked than those who do not. This is because they represent something that is perceived as good and therefore are considered trustworthy with less risk attached to them.

The activities of religious organisations have come to scholarly attention too. Chaves & Wineburg (2009) found that increased funding made available to American faith-based organisations by the Bush II administration did not increase their involvement in civil society related work. Rather, the taking of government money was done by those religious organisations that had been active prior to governmental intervention. For Chaves & Tsitsos (2001), at least in the United States, religious organisations are part of a welfare system that includes also the state and secular organisations. Additionally, Littlefield (2009) found that African-American religious organisations were more likely to provide economic, social and legal services on a voluntary basis than white religious organisations.

Some scholars have asked if the various components of religiosity might be interacting with each other. Cnaan et al. (1993) found no relationship between volunteering and intrinsic religiosity. Rather, it was more to do with high levels of personal religiosity when placed within religious social networks. These findings are interesting but the statistical methodology

employed is far from sophisticated. These scholars are drawing inferences in some instances, from bivariate t-tests alone. Similarly, Becker & Dhingra (2001) found no differences between liberal and conservative religious types in the likelihood of volunteering nor were they more likely to volunteer in religious organisations as opposed to secular ones. They concluded that it is not a matter of religious commitment but rather the extent to which one is integrated into a religiously based church network. One volunteers if one is asked to and many respondents in qualitative interviews told how they were recruited through personal church based contacts. Volunteering is a social network effect. However, their research is not entirely convincing as strength of religious commitment is measured through a single dummy variable which does not capture the richness of religiosity. Also, their sample is of New Yorkers only.

Lam (2002) has also asserted the importance of different aspects of religiosity, including the effects of fundamentalism, when investigating civil society participation. Lam found all faiths, except Judaism, increased the chances of participation and that fundamentalists were more likely to participate than liberals. Lam (2006) later concluded that there was a "double negative Catholic effect" whereby individuals living in Catholic countries were less likely to volunteer but that also Catholics were less likely to volunteer independently of which country they were living in. Also, the number of Protestants living in the country had a positive significant effect, indicating that any Protestant advantage is not so much down to a dead cultural footprint but equally something conditional on a living Protestant

culture. These findings of Lam were in no way conditional on the level of secularisation of the country, as measured by aggregate levels of believing and belonging. Halman & Luijkx (2006) asked if religiosity regardless of denomination mattered at the macro level. They argued that religion would leave a cultural footprint of altruism that leads to voluntary associations. They concluded there was only an effect on institutional trust and not voluntarism. Meulemann (2008) argues the 'bottom-up' structural organisation of Protestantism is conducive to autonomous free associations. Indeed, Curtis et al. (1992) saw that all of their top six countries, in terms of size of civil society, were predominantly Protestant, although large numbers of Catholics living within these countries poses problems for such a thesis. However, later analyses by Curtis et al. found some evidence for greater civil society activity in countries with Protestant and mixed-Christian countries than Catholic countries (Curtis et al., 2001).

Religious economies theory (see below for explanation) was applied to voluntary association participation by Borgonovi (2008). Although no supporting evidence was found relating such market-type mechanisms to church attendance, a positive relationship between pluralism and participation in religious organisations was present. This is not, according to Borgonovi, at the expense of secular civil society which remains buoyant despite this increase in religious activity associated with religious organisations. Also, being part of a religious minority had no effect on volunteering. At the macro-level, a greater number of religious adherents are

associated with a greater likelihood of volunteering in religious organisations, but not in secular ones, she argues.

Religiosity is of course not the only source of explanation. Wilson & Musick (1997) argue that volunteering in formal organisations (civil society) was related to human capital, number of children within the household, and informal social interaction, as well as religiosity. Perhaps the most consistent result is that of the relationship between education and civil society (Wollebæk & Strømsnes 2008, Webb & Abzug 2008, Ruiter & De Graaf 2006, Meulemann 2008). Occupational status also matters. Webb & Anzug (2008) found professional, managerial, and military occupations being more likely to participate than other professions. Generally speaking, it is the winners who tend to participate (Bryant et al. 2003). Meulemann (2008) reports higher earners having greater propensity to get involved. However, Taniguichi (2010) reports that it is the marginalised who volunteer although this may only apply in Japan where less value is placed upon associational involvement. Age has also been shown to be relevant and tends to follow a curvilinear pattern (Taniguichi, 2010; Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006). Effects of age and education are not entirely consistent however with Halman & Luijkx (2006) reporting no relationship. Webb & Anzug found more children increased participation. Marital status was linked by Taniguichi (2010) and Bryant et al. (2003), whilst employment has been linked by Taniguichi (2010). Webb & Anzug (2008) found men participated more whilst Bryant et al. (2003) and Halman & Luijkx (2006) found it was women doing more.

Civil society varies in size from country to country. For instance, it was widely believed that the United States was the associational country *par excellence.* However, Curtis et al. (1992) showed that America's associational behaviour is indeed greatest although this is largely due to the volume of American religious associations. When these are excluded from the analysis, there was no statistically significant difference between America and thirteen of the other countries included in the analysis. Other countries in the analysis of Curtis et al. with large civil societies were Australia, Northern Ireland, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands. Countries with less developed civil societies were France and Japan. Economic development is one variable that has been empirically linked to civil society participation. Empirically, there is a relationship between civil society and economic development, as unearthed by Meulemann (2008) and Curtis et al. (2001). However, Ruiter & De Graaf (2008) found no such relationship between economic development and civil society. Also, Curtis et al. (1992) remind us that just because there is a general statistical trend, it does not mean that something is true in every country. For instance, voluntary associations tend to be more numerous in countries with greater levels of industrialisation and urbanisation, but not in Japan, France, and West Germany, all of which are highly industrialised and urbanised.

Another related area, is the organisation of the state. Curtis et al. (2001) argue that liberal democratic and social-democratic regimes will have more developed civil societies than traditional corporatist regimes. Some empirical evidence was found to support this position but models were deemed

suspect by Curtis et al. due to problems relating to multicollinearity. Meulemann (2008) tested the same hypothesis and found type of political regime showed some effects, with social democracies seemingly having more active civil societies, although liberal regimes showed some traces of effects too. Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001) concluded that statism reduces involvement in associations, especially new social movements. Corporateness was found to encourage involvement, especially in old social movements. Legacies of communism have also been investigated. Wollebæk & Strømsnes (2008) report lower levels of social capital in countries such as Russia and Romania as measured by trust and voluntary associations. On the contrary though, Curtis et al. (2001) found some evidence for an actual discrepancy in favour of the Eastern bloc, although this disappears when removing unions from the dependent variable. Halman (2003) concluded that civil society participation is positively related to both the level of democratic entrenchment and the age of the democratic system. The link was further evidenced by the findings of Parboteeah et al. (2004), Curtis et al. (2001), and Meulemann (2008). However, this finding is questioned by Ruiter & De Graaf (2006) who found that volunteering within civil society was actually negatively linked with democratic level. They did find that democracy was related to greater likelihood of holding a membership of a voluntary association as opposed to doing actual unpaid work for them, pointing to potentially a civic lethargy in more democratic countries, whereby people are happy to join but contribute their actual time and labour less and less.

Like political participation, the effects of religiosity tend to be positive on civil society participation, with some exceptions. Additionally, effects at the country-level are better developed both theoretically and empirically. However, cross-level interactions are usually left unexplored.

2.6 An individual-level theory of religiosity and participation

This section begins with discussing religiosity's link at the individual level to conventional political participation and civil society participation. Subsequently, the discussion moves on to unconventional political participation, which due to its authority-challenging nature which stands in contrast to the conservative and authoritarian nature of religion, demands a separate theoretical outlook. The following section is something of a thought experiment whereby the reader is asked to imagine religiosity in a de-contextualised social vacuum. This is sufficient to establish that religiosity should have an effect on different forms of public behaviour, were context not to matter. The resulting theories will be contextualised later on since nothing is free of social context.

Why do individuals participate in politics? This was the question posed by Verba and his associates in a number of seminal works in the canon of political science (e.g. Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978). In a more recent paper (Brady et al., 1995), the answer was put succinctly – people participate because they want to, because they can, and because the opportunity was presented to them. In short, participation results when individuals have some combination of: (1) the motivation to do so, (2) the means needed, and (3) the possibility of being mobilised. It can be argued

that religiosity can provide individuals with each of these three enablers. The links between religiosity and conventional political participation and civil society are first outlaid. Then a different explanation is put forward for unconventional political participation.

MOTIVATIONS: Religiosity may provide motivations to participate since religious doctrines are moral doctrines that are often at odds with the prevailing tendencies of contemporary political and social life. Also, religions offer a supernatural incentive structure whereby compliance with religion's moral imperatives is met with heavenly rewards whilst non-compliance is rewarded by infernal punishment (Silberman et al., 2005). Thus, a religious believer will be in possession of the realisation that something is wrong, that there is a divinely authored solution and that they will be rewarded or sanctioned depending upon their actions.

According to Sherkat & Ellison (1999) the literature contends that religion may be beneficial to political participation due to motivations stemming from their ideologies. Religions may:

"...(a) provide a groundwork for the framing of movement issues, (b) enhance the resonance of movement positions, (c) generate social legitimacy to enhance mobilisation and stave off repression, and (d) lend narratives to social movements that help provide a rationale for action and a foundation for collective identities and group solidarity" (Sherkat & Ellison, 1999:p370).

As much might equally be applied to segments of civil society, namely those concerned with welfare, social justice, and more immediate economic issues. Similarly, Ziebertz (2011) argues that:

"Religions potentially represent an answer to the societal quest for common goals and shared values. Religions can arouse spiritual commitment and charity, motivating individuals to play an active part in civil society." (Ziebertz, 2011:pp11-12)

The possibility of religion arousing altruistic passions is also raised by Silberman et al. (2005). Furthermore, religion may promote participation as a form of civic duty (Macaluso & Wanat, 1979). Religion is thus an ideological source of motivation for action in both conventional politics and civil society.

MEANS: Religiosity may provide the means to participate by providing the *transferable* social and organisational skills that can be accrued through participation in religious services (Peterson, 1992; Secret et al., 1990; Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Indeed, it has been demonstrated that civic skill acts are frequently performed during participation in religious services (Brady et al., 1995). Religious people will have an advantage over non-religious people in that they have already developed the skills needed to participate and thus will be better equipped to thrive within conventional politics and civil society and less likely to drop out.

Churches and the like, also constitute a resource in themselves as they provide meeting spaces, leadership within the community, fundraising capacities, and perhaps most importantly the perception of legitimacy within the community (Williams, 2002).

MOBILISATION: Religious attendance will bring people into greater contact with the wider community allowing greater possibility of recruitment (Wilcox, 1987). It has been argued that religious institutions provide popular

recruiting grounds for political movements (Norris, 2002). In an influential work in the development of social capital theory, Granovetter (1974) argued that getting a job was more likely to happen for those with a greater number of so-called 'weak ties' to individuals in their social network, as individuals with more of these were more likely to be exposed to greater awareness of job opportunities. We might apply the same idea to link religiosity and political participation - religious people will accrue more weak ties when they are actively attending religious services, meaning they have greater likelihood of being recruited and greater knowledge of opportunities for recruitment.

Social capital derived from church attendance has been used by Greely (1997) as an explanation for connecting individuals to further opportunities for volunteering. Norris & Inglehart (2004) used a pretty similar argumentation for justifying a link between religiosity and civil society. Social capital theory, they state, links religiosity through religious attendance to participation in faith-based organisations and community groups. They argue this is brought about through the provision of meeting places that provide fertile soil for informal social networks to be formed and also through the provision of welfare services. Similar theoretical grounds were used by Ruiter & De Graaf (2006) to link religiosity to civil society participation.

The theoretical link between religion and these modes of participation is further fleshed out by Williams (2002), for whom religion compliments social movements as they require organisation, a movement culture based on a

guiding ideology plus the social sophistication necessary to navigate successfully through political life. Religion supplies not only the ideology but also the organisational basis. Religious services within churches are ritualised affairs and ritual is thought, Williams argues, to increase feelings of solidarity and emotional connections which can instil a collective identity as people will come to emphasise with each other thus making political participation more likely as the problems that can motivate the individual are multiplied as the individual comes to identify more with others.

Religiosity has also been linked theoretically to voting turnout. Macaluso & Wanat (1979) contend that voting is seen as a civic duty and that religiosity promotes this for two reasons:

"(1) religion promotes "order, ritual, duty, legitimacy and respectability" which are thought to encourage the idea of fulfilling the obligations of citizenship, and (2) the sense of civic duty is reinforced through religious service attendance whereby the individual is more in contact with others who place great emphasis thereon." (Macaluso & Wanat, 1979:pp160-1)

Religious people are thus not only spurred on by their faith but also by their fellow faithful who will sanction them socially if they do not meet their civic obligations.

Also, if we take religious people as responsive to the direction of religious elites, then another way of looking at religion and politics can emerge. Gill (2001) has written that religious authorities may attempt to harness the coercive power of the state since they have none themselves. He argues religious leaders may take advantage of their standing in the community to challenge governments in order to preserve what authority and credibility

they have. Thus, religious leaders have a vested interest in public participation and therefore we could legitimately expect them to be likely to mobilise their flocks for participation, so that the religious would have an advantage over the non-religious and thus be more likely to participate, so Gill's argument runs. Religious attendance can also influence participation directly through politically based sermons (Secret et al., 1990).

The discussion so far has focused on conventional political participation and civil society participation and it has been established that we can speak of religiosity as having a 'public 'drive'. Whilst it is true that the same arguments applied to conventional politics and civil society could also be applied to unconventional political participation, it is argued that these theoretical arguments in this case do not hold. This is because religiosity tends to be politically conservative in nature (Middendorp, 1989; Duriez et al., 2002) and to be supportive of authoritarianism (Hunsberger et al., 1999; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2009; Hunsberger 2009). Religiosity is also linked to conservatism, tradition and conformity (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Cukur et al., 2004). Given that religiosity is linked to authoritarianism and religiosity's respect for tradition and conformity, it is hard to justify a theory that would predict that religiosity encourages individuals to participate in political action that is characterised by its challenge to those in positions of authority and its relative novelty (when compared with the conventional path that is). Thus, with regard to unconventional political participation, it would be better to expect the converse – that given its conservative and conforming

nature and the empirical link between religiosity and authoritarian outlooks, religiosity would be negatively linked. Whilst one can argue that although religiosity provides motivations, means, and opportunities for mobilisation, nevertheless, it is expected that the conservative nature of religiosity would override such a facilitating public drive in relation to unconventional political participation and guide them down the conventional path of participation where the challenge to authority is not so direct. Conventional participation by contrast would be appealing to religious people because it allows them to have their political say whilst causing minimal disruption to the authorities that their religion conditions them into respecting. Remember that Norris & Inglehart (2004) found strong negative relationships between religiosity and authority challenging modes of participation. So in addition to its 'public drive', religiosity also has an 'authoritarian drive' which serves to dampen participation that threatens authority.

This section has argued that conventional political participation and civil society participation will be more likely for the religious, but that unconventional political participation will be less likely. These theories are considered as 'acontextual' – that is to say that under artificial conditions whereby the societal context does not matter, these relationships would hold. Now the discussion turns to how one contextualises these theories. Two macro-level theories of religion are subsequently presented, along with the related empirical evidence and some criticisms. They are *secularisation*

theory and *religious economies theory*. Thereafter, they are synthesised with the theoretical ideas outlined immediately above.

2.7 Defining and conceptualising secularisation

Secularisation theory is the dominant paradigm in the sociology of religion, although not everyone agrees as to its definition, character, or even its empirical veracity. The theory is an old theory and has its roots in the work of Durkheim and Weber. Sometimes the definition of secularisation is presented simply as a decline in numbers of adherents or participants in religious ceremonies (*e.g.* Norris & Inglehart, 2004). However, according to Wilson (1982) the correct sociological definition of the term is more subtle:

"... by the term *secularisation*, I mean that process by which religious institutions, actions, and consciousness, lose their social significance" (p149)

We are not to understand secularisation as a process the end of which is the condition of perfect atheism amongst the people who make up the society. Instead, we are to imagine a society where atheism *may* exist but it does not have to in order to be consistent with the idea of a secularised society. Paramount is that the society would be one where religion would have no role in the ordering of society, its governance, or in influencing the ways that individuals conduct themselves in their interactions with others. In short, religiosity may still exist in a society that has undergone perfect secularisation but if it did, it would be expected to be a private affair, according to Wilson. This definition has gained currency in social science. Bruce's (2002b) formal definition of secularisation is roughly the same as Wilson's only more systematic:

"In brief, I see secularisation as a social condition manifest in (a) the declining importance of religion for the operation of non-religious roles and institutions such as those of the state and the economy; (b) a decline in the social standing of religious roles and institutions; and (c) a decline in the extent to which people engage in religious practices, display beliefs of a religious kind, and conduct other aspects of their lives in a manner informed by such beliefs." (p3)

Drawing on the work of Casanova (1994), we can think of secularisation as having three key attributes that can be observed empirically. They are (1) separation of religion and state, (2) decline in religious belief and attendance, and (3) the privatisation of religion. Separation of religion and state, also known as *laicism*, is best summarised by quoting the First Amendment of the United States constitution:

"Congress shall make no law [1] respecting an establishment of religion, or [2] prohibiting the free exercise thereof..." (The Constitution of the United States, Amendment 1)

There are two attributes of the concept that is spelt out in the above illustrious extract. Firstly, there is the so-called establishment clause [1] that stipulates that the American legislature shall not pass laws which found themselves on religious precepts or establish an official state religion, as there is for example in the England where Anglicanism is the state religion. Secondly, there is the so-called free exercise clause [2] which grants individuals their right to choose and practice their religion (or even no religion) free from the interference of government and without fear of sanction. This legal application of the concept of separation of religion and state has been used in the social sciences as the basic definition for use in academic studies concerned with its measurement (e.g. Fox 2006).

The second indicator identified by Casanova is decline in levels of belief and attendance. These are self-explanatory. However, there is some conceptual conflict here between Casanova and Wilson. Remember, for Wilson secularisation means lack of social significance or religion, and it followed that religiosity could still exist in a secularised society. Yet for Casanova, declining faith is tantamount to a necessary indicator. Decline however, is not the same as non-existence. So a society that has experienced decline but still possessed some pockets of religiosity would be consistent with both theorists. Any remaining mismatch between can be cleared up by Bruce (2002b) - individual religiosity was for Wilson, not necessary for secularisation to be true but Bruce expands on this by expecting diminished levels of religiosity where religion has lost its social significance as something highly probable if not quite necessary. Thus, individual religiosity is seen as valid indicator of secularisation.

Casanova (1994) identifies the privatisation of religion as his third indicator of secularisation. Privatisation is not to be understood here as the term is normally used in political and economic discourse – namely, the divesting of the state of its apparatuses and their transfer over to private ownership. Rather, Casanova is using the term to mean the condition of secularisation whereby religion is confined to the private sphere and is not welcome in public discourse or as the foundation for political deliberation, policy, and law. Privatisation refers to incidences whereby religious voices that explicitly articulate religious reasons for supporting or opposing something are unwelcome in public life.

2.8 Theoretical explanations for secularisation

So far, we have seen how secularisation is defined and how the concept can be manifested empirically. Now we turn to explanations put forward for secularisation. For Bruce (2002b), the principle cause is *modernisation.* However, in Bruce's authoritative reading of the literature, there is not one secularisation theory, but rather several that all point in the same direction, with the decline of religion under conditions of modernity as the outcome. In the summary that follows, the four most notable strands of secularisation theory are identified from the literature. They are termed Durkheimian secularisation, Weberian secularisation, Berger's secularisation, and Norris & Inglehart's secularisation.

2.8.1 Durkheimian secularisation

For Durkheim (1914|1997), religion was the essence of community for pre-modern societies. It provided the community with ideology necessary to hold it together along with the rituals through which individuals could come to recognise themselves as bound to one another. For Durkheim, modernisation was the process of the change from mechanical solidarity characterised by community interrelations, to organic solidarity which is characterised by impersonal relationships between individuals. As society modernised and grew, new institutions arose, in a process known as societal differentiation, which took on the work that had previously been the responsibility of the religion to undertake. One such example would be the rise of state-welfare that took over the responsibility of caring for the poor. These functionally equivalent modern institutions were not governed by

religious precepts however. Instead, they have their own codes to govern themselves by – it is not the church that has dominion over them; instead they are increasingly autonomous. It is this institutional autonomy that is key to bringing about secularisation in that religion is no longer necessary for ordering societal interrelations as social institutions have their own function-specific integrative systems. The implication is that religion is no longer needed and falls into disuse, which is manifested in privatisation and declining incidences of individuals' recourse to religion (Durkheim, 1914|1997; Pickering, 1984; Furseth & Repstad, 2006).

The influence of Durkheim can be seen in the writings of Wilson (1982). Secularisation for Wilson is primarily brought about by what he terms 'societalisation'. This is the process by which social organisation shifts from being defined by the community to the society. Whereas before, individual relations were personal and between already-acquainted people in the community, they have become impersonal and anonymous in society, Wilson argues. Societalisation as a process can be thought of as mapping onto the transition from *gemeinschaft* (community) to *gesellschaft* (society) that was put forward by Tönnies (1887|2002) as characteristic of the process of modernisation as it effects human social organisation. Relationships under modernisation are thought of as being between "role-performers" and not "total persons" and this process is adjudged by Wilson to have occurred in every sphere of social life (p154).

To understand why religion declines with societalisation, Wilson has to argue after Durkheim that religion is the guiding light of community

relations. It provides individuals with rules to follow and knowledge of how to do so, as part of the maintenance system of social order. With modernisation comes socialisation which breaks up the community meaning that the social order that religion affords it is no longer applicable to the modern world. Religion does not necessarily disappear; instead it struggles to find its place as in modern society, social systems run according to new function-specific rules.

The Durkheimian strand of secularisation theory is fleshed out further by Bruce (2002b), for whom, modernisation means structural differentiation, which in turn means the fragmentation of social roles and institutions where they had once been unified (Bruce gives the family as an example which evolved from the primary unit of production to being concerned only with raising of children). Structural differentiation leads to societal differentiation, which refers to the extent that human beings are distinct from each other. This is because different groups have different interests and come to follow rules that are designed to reflect these interests that come into being at the expense of the original guiding social order, which just so happens to be religion, leading to its greater disuse.

2.8.2 Weberian secularisation

For Weber modernisation was characterised by the rise of rationality. Human behaviour becomes increasing guided by goal-orientated ways of thinking that no longer require religion as a source of motivation. Increasingly, modern societies are governed by bureaucracies that thrive on their rationality. This, results in what Weber famously called the

"*Entzauberung der Welt*" meaning the disenchantment of the world. Modernisation is characterised by rationality which comes at the expense of tradition. Religion is traditional for Weber and so it is dispensed with. Modernity increasingly comes to represent what Weber pessimistically called a "*stahlhartes Gehäuse*" or 'iron cage' as it is famously translated. Forms of religious expression being part of the traditional exuberance of humanity, all became outmoded and what was left was something oppressive and restrictive of the human character, namely rationalised bureaucracy (Turner, 2000; Furseth & Repstad, 2006; Poggi, 2008). However, Weber's theory of the hegemony of rationality is according to Furseth & Repstad (2006) at best only a description of modernity and no comprehensive theory of how exactly modernity *leads* to reason and instrumentality at the expense of religion is put forward, although causal effect is attributable to rationality and modernisation in his writings.

It was thus down to Weber's intellectual descendents to flesh out this line of thinking and it is for this reason that we should talk of a Weberian strand of secularisation rather than Weber's secularisation. This strand is defined by its insistence on the modern mind, with its emphasis on rationality, technology, and scientific education, being accountable for secularisation. Weber proved highly influential on Wilson for instance, for whom the modern mind is a rational one with rationality perceived of as being encapsulated within the words 'planning', 'calculable' and 'predictable' (Wilson, 1982). Religion, with its focus on divine revelation and its inability to be held up to empirical and logical scrutiny will fall by the wayside, as the

rational mind commits itself to the "eradication of the incidental, the whimsical, the wayward, the poetic, and the traditional" (Wilson, 1982:p156).

Rationality also replaces religion as it is traditional and tradition is insufficiently placed to be useful in the modern world. Religious institutions are bound to lose out because their competitors can outdo them in "all the techniques of modern science and organisation" and are "unhindered by the types of impediment to the adoption of rational systemisation" (Wilson, 1982:p177). New systems meet new problems wherever they arise in a new way that is based on "technical expertise and bureaucratic organisation" (Wilson, 1982:p177) which religion cannot do as well and thus it falls behind and into disuse. For Wilson, secularisation is in part brought about by an improvement on the prevailing mind-set that displaces the old system that was grounded on religious ideas by out-competing it in a changed social world.

Religion is also hindered by the increase of levels of education that accompanies modernisation. For Wilson, it is as much the content of education as the level, with modern education stressing technical and scientific knowledge whereas traditionally it espoused moral religious truths. Religion loses its plausibility in the face of science because scientific knowledge through its openness as represented by its willingness to be put to empirical testing, bears the credibility that religion by its obliqueness and insistence on faith despite the evidence, does not (Wilson, 1982).

Bruce (2002b) also took up the baton from Weber. He maintains that the rise of modernisation entails the rise of rationality and the rise of technology that lead to a new way of thinking, which is characterised by the modern individual placing themselves at the centre of things rather than God, and recognising themselves as having mastery over their own fate through the application of technology. Because of rational thought and technology, human beings no longer need to make recourse to appeals to the gods in order to try to survive. Why should they pray for a bounteous harvest when they can develop an understanding of the science of agriculture and apply technologies that could make it a near surety? Thus, the argument goes, the rational individual in command of science and technology sees himself as the solution to his problems and God is no longer required. Thus, religion falls into disuse and decline.

For Norris & Inglehart (2004) rationalism which is thought of as entailing "empirical standards of proof, scientific knowledge of natural phenomena, and technological mastery of the universe" (p8), is linked within the literature to secularisation as it is diametrically opposed to religion. However, there is no direct conflict by necessity whereby science 'defeats' religion, despite its insistence upon empirical evidence over mystical supposition or divine revelation through prophets (Bruce, 2002b). Science serves instead to weaken religion in the wake of its diffusion into different sects and denominations, precisely because it offers a coherent and unified discourse. Religion, being shattered with the growth of pluralism into jagged shards, cannot put forward a coherent defence against science which is

monolithic and strong, and thus its credibility is damaged (Bruce, 2002b). Bruce writes:

"The gradual accumulation of scientific knowledge gave people insight into, and mastery over, an area that had once been a mystery; the need and opportunity for recourse to the religious gradually declined. Science and technology do not create atheists; they just reduce the frequency and seriousness with which people attend to religion." (Bruce, 2002b:p27)

Science in conjunction with technology as facets of modernisation tends to weaken religion by reducing the amount of ground that religion has to stand on.

2.8.3 Berger's secularisation

There are two Bergers, young and old. The young Berger was a proponent of secularisation theory, the old Berger a critic. In this section we devote ourselves to outlining the theory that the young Berger put forward in the 1960s as an explanation for secularisation. At a later stage, his about-turn will be discussed.

The young Berger linked religious pluralism to secularisation as manifested in declining levels of religious influence at the individual and institutional levels (Berger, 1980). For Berger, the transition to modernity was characterised by things such as religion becoming a matter of free will and personal taste. For Berger, religious beliefs could only be maintained in the presence of others who adhered to the same beliefs. His argument is that religious beliefs are vulnerable to empirical contradiction and thus require that the individual believer always be encouraged by others of the same belief so that what is lost in credibility is offset by united enthusiasm and

fervour. However, modernisation leads to pluralism, both institutional and religious. Different peoples are introduced into the social milieu with the effect being deleterious on the social plausibility structures surrounding the individual, so that religious beliefs no longer seem so credible. The social plausibility structure is in effect diluted. When an individual is surrounded by like-minded individuals, they are less exposed to doubts as to the veracity of their faith as belief is reinforced through mutual affirmation. In the presence of individuals with different and competing outlooks, there comes more doubt and more uncertainty, so that all religious belief systems come to look suspect and accordingly religious faith goes into decline. Also, for Berger the transition to modernity changes the character of religion. Whereas before, religion was a matter of fate, under modern conditions it becomes a matter of choice which increases the likelihood of religion being rejected (Berger, 1981). These ideas, however, date back to Durkheim (Pickering, 1984) who saw Protestantism as the beginnings of religious choice and this opened up the possibility of the rejection of religion.

The link between secularisation and pluralism is also touched upon by Bruce (2002b). He wrote that modernisation also diminishes the stature of religion by bringing new peoples into the state through expansion of borders and migration. For smoother running and in the interests of social harmony, the state secularises so as to be inclusive and avoid antagonising sections of its society. In modern times, religion could find a new direction as the national identity as a form of civic religion but only in the absence of pluralism. Otherwise, national identity tended to be secular. Pluralism,

Bruce argues, also undermines religion as the presence of competing religions tends in sum, to undermine the credibility of all religions, as they cannot all be true and thus perhaps all are false?

2.8.4 Norris & Inglehart's secularisation

This contemporary theory of secularisation was put forward by Norris & Inglehart (2004). Using data from the World Values Survey, they found that secularisation was a universal social phenomenon in all advanced modern societies. However, the explanatory theory they put forward was a novel theory of secularisation, as the previous theoretical approaches they had found wanting. It is important to note that Norris & Inglehart are using a different definition of secularisation from Wilson and Bruce. Secularisation is merely the decline of "practices, values, and beliefs" (pp4-5), which are merely a sufficient indicator of the decline of the social significance of religion, albeit a highly probable one for others. It is frustrating that they have not used the same definition of secularisation since they cite Bruce's work favourably as a conceptual clarification of secularisation. Concurrent with Wilson and Bruce's secularisation is the idea of decline with societal advance, although rather than 'modernisation' being the key concept, the concept of 'development' is used. Development is seen as being typified by transition through three distinct levels – agrarian, industrial, and culminating in the post-industrial.

Norris & Inglehart's theory is that different countries, as distinguished by their level of development, will expose their inhabitants to varying degrees of threats and risks. Undeveloped countries will exert greater levels of threat

and risk on individuals than developed countries. The crucial variable is 'human security' which is placed under threat by anything inclusive of "environmental degradation to natural and manmade disasters such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, and droughts, as well as the threat of disease epidemics, violations of human rights, humanitarian crisis, and poverty" (p14). Development in turn, serves to alleviate human insecurity with direct results of industrialisation being an alleviation of poverty, uncertainty, and threats to life. This is done through the creation of better sanitation, better nutrition, better access to clean water, better healthcare, and improvements in education. The establishment of state provision of welfare also helps to secure individuals against threats to their wellbeing. Thus, the transition from agrarian to industrial societies is pinpointed as the key stage in the reduction of human insecurity.

The level of human security is related by Norris & Inglehart to religiosity. The theoretical reasoning for this is that religion provides sources of explanation and emotional reassurance which prove good and useful for human beings in conditions where they find themselves faced with assorted threats. The reassurance that religion provides - that all this suffering is part of some divine plan - allows people to bring their existential anxiety under control allowing them to go about their daily life. It is stated that religion is useful for existentially-insecure individuals because it gives them a framework that provides certainty of mind which enables them to tolerate greater threats and actual uncertainty. Those who are secure find ambiguity

and uncertainty of outlook more tolerable and thus have less need for religion.

Religions exist to underwrite the uncertainty that goes with insecurity. Of the transition from agrarian to industrial society, Norris & Inglehart write:

"... under conditions of existential insecurity that have dominated the lives of most of humanity throughout most of history, the great theological questions concerned a relatively narrow constituency; the vast majority of the population was most strongly concerned with the need for reassurance in the face of a world where survival was uncertain, and this was the dominant factor explaining the grip of traditional religion on mass publics." (Norris & Ingelhart 2004:p20)

Where modernisation/development can deliver advances that can reduce the uncertainty of living and surviving, so religion which offers a psychological crutch, is no longer requisite for individuals and thus will suffer a decline. In post-industrial societies, where industrialisation happened first and development followed, religion is expected to be at its weakest. Greater levels of human security are related to lessened levels of expressions of religiosity.

This is seen as a probalistic theoretical relationship which does not by necessity demand that religion disappear totally – indeed Norris & Inglehart state that religion in advanced economies may remain albeit in an attenuated form, such as the symbolic carrier of national identity.

2.8.5 Commentary

As we have seen there are numerous explanations but they are all pointing in the same direction – modernisation leads to secularisation. What it is about modernisation that matters varies depending on the explanation in

question. There are indeed other ways that we could think about modernisation resulting in religious decline (see Bruce, 2002b for a full exposition). For instance, once could reason that the rise of the free individual, who is faced with a rapidly expanding opportunity structure filled with thrills and delights that result from increased production and can cater for even the most specific of niche tastes, is less likely to opt for religion simply because it is just not exciting enough. Religion has always struggled to compete with rock 'n' roll, particularly among young people. Dobbelaere (1993) adds that secularisation can be brought about by the development of a youth-culture that celebrates individualism at the expense of community based values as espoused by religious precepts, that simultaneously makes up for the losses imposed by modernisation by offering outlets for "massification and emotionalism, pleasure and ecstasy" (p28).

Thus, there are many different explanations and secularisation is more of a *mish-mash* of theories than one specific theory (Bruce, 2002b). However, their combined weight is theoretically strong enough for social scientists to presuppose an empirical link between modernisation and secularisation. The question now arises, what is modernisation, and what does it mean to be modern?

2.9 Conceptualising modernisation

Bruce (2002b) defines modernisation as:

"Modernisation is itself a multifaceted notion, which encompasses the industrialisation of work; the shift from villages to towns and cities; the replacement of the small community by

the society; the rise of individualism; the rise of egalitarianism; and the rationalisation both of thought and societal organisation." (p2)

For Yi (2006) modernisation can be conceived of as having two distinct parts. Modernisation is thought of as being an object of individuals or countries. Yi maintains that individuals may be in possession of "intellectual modernisation" whilst countries may have "institutional modernisation". These two forms of modernity are umbrella terms that encompass a series of dimensions. The conceptual distinctness of these dimensions is not thought to translate into a 'multiple modernities' approach. The dimensions fall together and are self-supporting so that, for Yi, we can speak of an "organic whole" that is all-encompassing of society itself.

Intellectual modernisation for Yi, has the following dimensions: (1) individual subjectivity and self-consciousness – individuals are individualised and come to govern themselves; (2) a rational and contractual public cultural spirit – this rational spirit encompasses faith in technology and science and governs individuals in the dealings with others in an arena with distinct norms and values; and (3) a socio-historical ideological narrative – an optimistic cultural ideology that projects history as the movement towards increased rationality with liberation achieved through reason, technology and science.

Institutional modernisation, Yi argues, is a necessary companion of intellectual modernisation that is manifested in: (1) the rationalisation of economic operation – production becomes more calculable and predictable and incorporative of science and technology; (2) the bureaucracy of

administrative management – society is organised by bureaucracy which is rational in direction; (3) the autonomy of public sphere – a civil society that is independent of the state and autonomous; (4) the democratisation and contradiction of public power – as established by democratic systems of selection of government and rule of law.

The term 'development' also appears in the literature and has been used by Norris & Inglehart (2004) where others have used 'modernisation'. Portes & Kincaid (1989) have defined development as having three distinct dimensions. They are: (1) economic growth brought about by industrialisation; (2) social welfare improvements through greater standards of living; and (3) citizenship through the establishment of political groups for individuals and social groups. Development has been conceived of in the following manner:

"The essence of development is to improve the quality of life. This generally calls for higher incomes, which are the result of gains in productivity and technological advances among nations. Economic progress, in turn, depends on a number of other development objectives: better education, improved health and nutrition, a cleaner environment, a reduction of poverty, more equality of opportunity, an enhancement of individual freedoms, and a richer cultural environment." (Gereffi & Fonda 1992: p420)

From the above quote we can see that there is quite a great deal of division between the two concepts. Development as a concept seems to be an expression of how we would like our lives to be, rather than something descriptive of the way that societies evolve, which is one of the assumptions behind the concept of modernisation. However, many of the benefits that are seen as 'development' will be the result of modernisation. The above extract

mentions increased productivity which will be only possible with industrialisation and technology, which are fundamental to modernisation. Education is also mentioned and this is part of modernisation too. Better health and standards of living are likely to accompany modernisation as greater medical knowledge of treatments and cures will come with greater scientific inquiry. Thus, we can look at the term 'development' as more aspirational than 'modernisation'. However, it is brought about by modernisation so that the two terms can be treated as synonymous as the causal correlation between them would be presumably sufficiently large enough to use them interchangeably.

2.10 Empirical evidence for secularisation

The studies referenced in this section for the most part either point to correlations between indicators of modernisation and religiosity, or declines in religiosity in advanced modern societies, or both.

The chief conclusions of Norris & Inglehart (2004) are: (1) that all economically advanced societies have moved towards greater levels of secularisation; and (2) nevertheless, the world has gotten more religious due to the expanding population growth of less-advanced economies. Religious attendance has fallen they argue. Also, religiosity was linked to greater modernisation across a variety of indicators of both religiosity and modernisation. Effects however, are not purely the result of macro-level processes. One's individual socio-economic standing within any given society may also bear effect. Whilst modernised societies tend to be richer societies, many nevertheless have substantial levels of poverty and

according to Norris & Inglehart's theory those living in conditions of poverty would be expected to demonstrate greater religiosity. Indeed this relationship is born out empirically – in post-industrial countries the poor are almost twice as religious as the rich whilst inequality, as measured by the GINI index, is strongly and significantly correlated with religiosity.

The link between insecurity and secularisation was further evidenced by Immerzeel & van Tubergen (2011) who found that higher religiosity is linked to job insecurity, unemployment, parental employment status, experience of war, loss of a partner, lower social welfare spending. Negative correlations were found with indicators of both religious attendance and intrinsic religiosity. They conclude that economic insecurity is more important than existential security in explaining religiosity. Also, in a study of 60 countries, Ruiter & van Tubergen (2009) found that religious attendance was greatly influenced by personal and social insecurity and also by level of urbanisation and level of education (both at the individual and country levels – although effects were slight). Wuthnow (1977), measuring religiosity through the number of religious books published per annum, found it correlated negatively with GDP per capita, and urbanisation. Conversely, the number of religious books published was correlated with literacy, university enrolment, number of scientific journals, and energy consumption.

Dobbelaere (1993) locates a decline in religious adherence that stems from the 1960s and is common to European countries. This is a trend evidenced by the European Values Survey, which includes measures of church attendance and religious belief. Doebelaere argues that declines in religiosity

have occurred that are distinct from life-cycle patterns and that the only people to show no change are women excluded from the labour-market. This is interpreted as evidence of how modernity rationalises as employed women are subject to rationalising forces and a sense of technocratic mastery over fate whilst housewives are kept apart from this. Cohort and gender effects are explained according to the level of exposure to modernity. For Dobbelaere, decline began in the 1960s and at different rates for Protestants and Catholics. Belief was said to have declined long before and by the 1960s with attendance being merely the keeping up of appearances. It took the development of a "leisure culture" in the 1960s and 1970s to cut the bonds of duty between church and individual by promising more fulfilling alternatives (p27).

Evidence for religious decline in advanced modern societies comes from Iannaccone (2002), who using ISSP data, reconstructed time-series trends for 30 countries leading back to 1920. This was done by using estimations of respondents' religiosity when they were children and that of their parents at the same point in time. Iannaccone's work shows overall decline in nearly all countries analysed. Whilst conceding his data offers much evidence of decline, Iannaccone does his best to construe the evidence unearthed as non-reflective of secularisation by arguing away certain cases and by conflating level of attendance with decline.

Voas & Crockett (2005) who, using the British Household Panel Survey, found that decline has occurred in both measures of belief and religious attendance. Decline is seen as generational with approximately half of

parental religiosity handed down to the offspring. These results were closely mirrored in another study by the same authors (Crockett & Voas, 2006), who found that religious affiliation was widespread at the start of the 20th century but was found in fewer than half of those born in the 1970s.

In Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, religiosity is low and getting lower, according to Bruce with declines having been evidenced in both levels of belief and attendance (Bruce, 2002a). Bruce also concluded that the Baltic countries showed a relationship between religiosity, industrialisation, and GDP per capita. In Australia too, decline has been evidenced. McCallum (1987) found declines occurring between 1966 and 1985 across an array of indicators although decline was much more pronounced among Protestants than Catholics. Also, McAllister (1988) found declines in Australian religious attendance across all denominations, which were attributed to generational changes brought about by changing patterns of socialisation. Results were also supportive, to a degree, of a link between socioeconomic development and declining religiosity, although observed declines were much more pronounced among Protestants than Catholics.

For some, the collapse of communism in eastern Europe was supposed to refute secularisation due to what was seen as a religious renaissance in the immediate aftermath of the transition to free-markets and democracy. However, Need & Evans (2001) found no evidence of a rise in church membership in former communist countries amongst the youngest age group and that younger people were less likely to be religious after the transition and that this was in keeping with the expectation of generational

decline implicit in secularisation theory. Lack of religiosity was also linked to education and urban residence, being male, and having had membership of the communist party during the Soviet era. Declines have also been noted in both West and East Germany with East German religiosity becoming much more diffuse coupled by a collapse there in trust in church authorities (Pollack, 2002). It is in the former DDR that the collapse is most pronounced suggesting path-dependency pertaining to either its troubled history or greater share of Protestants. Traditional Christian beliefs were also found to have declined in Germany by Shand (1998) whilst Wolf (2008) found declines in German religious attendance and intrinsic belief.

Declines in religiosity have also been evidenced among Jews although a small but growing minority is for stricter observance (Sharot, 1991). Elsewhere, it was found that immigrant Jews had declined in their levels of religiosity in modern societies. Across four Israeli migrant populations (Moroccan, Iraqi, Polish, and Romanian), declines had occurred but were greatest where older generations had been the most religious (Sharot et al., 1986). Among Catholic adolescents, a weakening of traditional beliefs was found in the more modernised societies in a study by Weigert & Thomas (1974), although only one school from each of the five societies investigated was selected leading to problems relating to representativeness. Generally though, predominantly Catholic countries tend to escape the worst effects of secularisation although they are not immune to it (see also Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Presumably this is due to the ascribed nature of Catholicism as opposed to the more voluntary nature of Protestantism.

Not all studies support secularisation as evidenced through declining religiosity in advanced societies. For instance in Canada, Hartnagel & Klug (1990) found stable church attendance between 1973 and 1982 and evidence of increasing religious conservatism and support for the papacy amongst Catholics. However, the sample was restricted to one western Canadian diocese and was not reflective of the Canadian population as a whole. This finding is contradicted by Eagle (2011) who found using the Canadian General Social Survey, substantial declines between 1986 and 2008. Eagle's research is backed up by Clark (2000) who also found declines since the 1980s. Immigrants were found to attend more with attendance higher in rural areas with religious people being more connected with the community as a whole. Support for secularisation may also come from a study of immigrants in 8 western countries (van Tubergen, 2006) whereby it was found that immigrants from countries with higher levels of modernisation tended to be less religious.

Much attention has been devoted to the study of religion in America. It is seen by some as being an exception to the general rule (Tiryakian, 1993) or as even refuting secularisation theory (Gill, 2001), since religion is apparently in rude health despite America being for so many the pinnacle of modernisation. The conventional wisdom is that in recent times American religious attendance has been relatively stable. For instance, Hout & Greeley (1987) found between 1940 and 1984 very little by way of change, although there was a decline in Catholics' attendance that was attributed not to secularisation but rather due to the church's inability to move with the

times, regarding sexual relationships and birth control. Presser & Chaves (2007) reviewed a variety of studies and also concluded stability. Caplow (1985), citing a myriad of sources also concluded American stability, which stood in stark contrast to decline across many European countries. This links to the work of Aarts et al. (2008) who found, using data from Western Europe and North America, the most common pattern was for a downward decline in religious belief and attendance, although there are some exceptions whereby stability is evidenced, most-notably the United States which showed decline in religious belief but stability in religious attendance.

Researchers have studied American religious attendance, looking for overall trends but also have attempted to separate out age, cohort and period effects. Firebaugh & Harely (1991) concluded there had been stability of late in the United States which breaks down into a declining across-cohort trend offset by increases within cohorts, which transpires to be nothing more than life-cycle effects repeated in one birth cohort after another. Miller & Nakamura (1996) also concluded stability had occurred in the U.S., but explained this by arguing that age effects associated with an ageing population were being offset by declines in successive cohorts. This research was done using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and Bayesian cohort analysis. Elsewhere, Sasaki & Suzuki (1987) concluded that the U.S. had seen stability between 1952 and 1982. This was contrasted with decline in the Netherlands, and stability in Japan.

Such findings were questioned by Schwadel (2010) who argued that earlier studies focusing on trends in age, period and cohort in the United States,

have been flawed. This is because they have been reliant on questionable assumptions necessary to overcome the problem of identification inherent in any model that seeks to separate out age, period and cohort effects simultaneously. Schwadel argues that by using multilevel cross-classified models, this problem can be surmounted. Schwadel found using the GSS, that overall the picture of religious attendance can be described as one of stability although there was a "small period-based decline" occurring in the 1990s (p21). Interestingly though, trends do emerge once certain controls are applied. For instance, a negative cohort trend emerges once controls are added for education and minority ethnic position. The interpretation is that more and more people have been exposed to these effects due to rising levels of education and minority populations which suppress cohort trends.

The problem with these studies of American religious attendance that point to overall stability is they tend to rely on either the GSS or Gallop opinion polls that are highly subject to a social desirability response bias (Hadaway et al., 1993). One study found that the common figure of 40% weekly attendance fell to as little as 22% once a more sophisticated measurement was used (Hadaway & Marler, 2005). Time diaries have been confirmed as the more accurate measurement of religious attendance (Rossi & Scappini, 2011). Presser & Stinson (1988) found that self-administered interviews and time-diaries reduced social desirability bias greatly; religious attendance fell by about one third when compared to interviewer-led surveys. Using time diary data collected from young people in the United States, it was shown that there were declines in religious attendance and that misreporting had

grown in recent times. Declines amongst American children using the time diary method were also found by Hofferth & Sandberg (2001). Thus, those studies using fancy models to separate out age, period, and cohort effects are flawed because they have tended to use GSS data which is subject to too high a social desirability bias and thus misleadingly reveal a picture of stability. What time-diary studies we have are not sufficiently representative to conclude firmly that decline is happening but nevertheless they utilise a better method and thus we can argue that further studies using more representative time diary data would in all probability show overall decline. Such thoughts gain credibility when one takes into consideration declines in levels of support for traditional beliefs concerning gender roles and homosexual rights, among all Christian groups in the United States (Petersen & Donnenwerth, 1998). This is backed up by a marked decline in confidence in American religious institutions (Hoffman, 1998). Stability may also be illusionary in the sense that demographic trends mask secularising trends. Norris & Inglehart (2004) found the United States was an outlier within the broader pattern of secularising modern societies, although it is within touching distance of Ireland on some of their indicators. Nevertheless, once controls are applied to account for large influxes of Hispanic immigration, "a significant movement toward secularisation" is evidenced (p25).

Outside of the West, little work has been undertaken concerning religious trends of growth or decline. One study by Kim et al. (2009) found in Korea that religiosity had grown between 1985 and 1995 but then arrested by

2005. Growth was mostly located amongst Catholics. It is also important to keep in mind Norris & Inglehart's (2004) finding that the non-developed world is becoming more religious due to population growth.

Research into religiosity and academia has tended to show that academics can be quite religious. Gross & Simmons (2009) found that while professors are more likely to be less religious than the population as a whole, nevertheless many could be classified as religious moderates. Religiosity was found to decline with academic prestige with atheists most prevalent amongst the social sciences. Albrecht & Heaton (1984) found using American data that religion and education were negatively linked with the exception of Mormons, indicating only a sufficient negative relationship. It is stressed that these are studies of *American* individuals whereby the social context as a whole tends to be a lot more religious and thus this is not an absolute test of the link between religiosity and education.

One study attempts to measure the level of separation of religion and state. Fox (2006) found that government involvement in religion has in fact increased slightly between 1990 and 2002 and that economic development is associated with higher governmental involvement. Muslim countries have higher levels of governmental support for religion; democracies have higher levels of separation of religion and state although only the United States had full separation. The actual increase of governmental involvement in religion could be seen as evidence against secularisation. As too can the positive link between economic development and government involvement. However, the rise is slight and over a short time span so it could be just a broader

fluctuation in a larger negative trend. Also, Fox shows an empirical relationship between birth mortality and separation of religion and state in the expected direction which serves to throw into question his results, as birth mortality should rise with modernisation (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). It is however most likely that separation of religion and state is most reflective of country-specific political settlements rather than broad social trends.

This review of the supporting evidence of secularisation has shown, that there is a strong trend towards decline in advanced modern societies as we would expect from secularisation theory. Additionally, there is evidence of empirical relationships between religiosity and indicators of modernisation in the expected direction. These countries are increasingly pluralistic and often have high levels of separation of religion and state, which we will see later have been predicted to prompt religion in the other direction, towards growth. There is a great deal of evidence for declining religiosity amongst individuals, and thus lessening social significance. However, this has not stopped the emergence of more nuanced theoretical conceptions of secularisation and criticisms.

2.11 Rethinking secularisation – Casanova's public religions

An important rethinking of secularisation theory was put forward by Casanova (1994). He argues that because of structural differentiation (increasing division of labour), institutions develop their own rules and the implication of this is that those who adhere to religious rules are frozen out as religious precepts are incompatible with modern institutions in the public sphere. Essentially, they have no object to which they can be applied

because secular norms and rules based on rationality have supplanted them. Thus, religion retreats to the private sphere and is said to be privatised, or so the theory went. The term privatisation is thus used by Casanova to describe both a process and an end result. It is in no way referring to the way that state assets are transferred from public to private hands, as the term is commonly used in popular discourse. Religion under modernity becomes privatised due to the fact that functional differentiation of institutions is occurring as a necessary condition of modernisation, so Casanova maintains. Thus, privatisation would entail that religion would have no more influence upon public life such as in politics or civil society. Religion becomes effectively shut out as the norms and rules by which these institutions operate preclude the foundations upon which religion is based.

Nevertheless, it is Casanova's contention that privatisation is a sufficient indicator of modernisation that is commonly misunderstood to be necessary due to the liberal and enlightenment biases of academic discourse. Thus, Casanova's work retreats from robust empirical analysis despite the fact that his book is littered with informative case studies. His intention is to lay out the terms in which religion *may* participate in the public sphere in a reaction against modernist/enlightenment chauvinism:

"In modern differentiated societies it is both unlikely and undesirable that religion should again play the role of systemic normative integration. But by crossing boundaries, by raising questions about the autonomous pretensions of the differentiated spheres to function without regard to moral norms or human considerations, public religions may help to mobilise people against such pretensions, they must contribute to a public debate about such issues. Irrespective of the outcome or the historical impact of such a debate, religions

will have played an important role... they will have functioned as counterfactual normative critiques." (p43)

In essence, Casanova sees an opening for religion to renew itself by becoming some sort of moral custodian outside of the state and manifesting itself within civil society. The empirical examples of religion performing publically are the role of the Catholic Church in the Solidarity movement in Poland during the fall of communism, the role of Protestant Evangelicalism in rise of the New American Right, the role of Catholic bishops in the on-going American abortion debate, and liberation theology as progressive Catholicism in Latin America. As a counter example of actual existing privatisation, the example of the Catholic Church in Spain is offered which suffered a marked decline and privatisation in the wake of the death of Franco and the fall of fascism.

These case studies, whilst empirical, are not intended by Casanova as some sort of measurement of the extent of privatisation nor an empirical test as understood by quantitative social scientists. They are understood as assisting the formation of a normative critique by showing what indeed is possible for religions within modern societies that have undergone functional differentiation and separation of religion and state. Privatisation is thus to be understood as an "historical option" despite the fact that it is "dominant historical trend" occurring in most countries that simultaneously experience a decline in religious adherence (p213). It is important to Casanova for us to recognise that privatisation is optional and not pre-

determined although it tends to be the "preferred option" nevertheless (p215).

The presence of religions within civil society is termed 'deprivatisation':

"... deprivatisation in the sense of relocation of religion from a premodern form of publicness to the public sphere of civil society is a transitional phase which is conditioned by the very success of the move." (Casanova, 1994:p222)

Deprivatisation is thus referring to the sense that religion has given up its claim to a privileged position in society through state establishment and has reconciled itself to a position within secularised society whereby it seeks to sway people through moral criticism. It will find greatest success in such a role when modern societies find themselves faced with an ideological deficit:

"When secular ideologies appear to have failed or lost much of their force, religion returns to the public arena as a mobilising or integrating normative force." (Casanova, 1994:p227)

For Casanova, deprivatisation may take one of three forms. They are: (1) mobilisation against the violation of traditional values by state or market; (2) the attempt by religion to moralise state and market by challenging them on the assumption that they can exist by their own rules alone; and (3) an attempt to instil in society the idea of collective identity and a common good in opposition to prevailing liberal theories that reduce all to the level of individual choices.

Casanova's work is useful because it allows us to look at secularisation in a new way. However, it does nothing to actually measure the extent of privatisation, or deprivatisation for that matter. What empirical evidence

that is given is not intended as an attempt at scientific observation and measurement. Indeed, the case studies themselves do nothing to illustrate how religiosity is either linked to the public or the private spheres among everyday individuals. The evidence given refers solely to the policies and actions of religious institutional elites. What is missing is whether or not individual-level religiosity is public or privatised in the sense that it leads individuals either to or away from public participation.

The idea that religions are not privatised in modern societies despite declining stature does however receive support from a European study of youth, wherein it was found in the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, UK, Ireland, Finland, Croatia, Israel, and Poland, that young people favoured a public role for religion. Only in Turkey was privatisation favoured (Ziebertz, 2011) and this can be accounted for by the traditions of Atatürk. Perhaps in the other countries, it is the case that democratic norms take precedence over norms of laicism and thus young people welcome religion in the public sphere because to do otherwise would be to remove a democratic privilege? Also, Bush (2007) has found an absolute decline in the number of religious civil society groups but also an absolute rise in the number of religious human rights organisations that could be reflective of the role of religion as transforming into some sort of social guardian with civil society, much as Casanova has theorised.

2.12 Secularisation theory – sufficient and probabilistic

Secularisation is seen as highly likely to occur in modernised societies. However there is not a causal relationship between modernisation and

secularisation that is both necessary and sufficient. Instead, the causal relationship is regarded as merely sufficient however probable it might be. There are some counter tendencies which buck the trend of declining social salience. Basically, religion is set to decline under modernity, unless it can find a task to fulfil that will make it useful. For Bruce (2002b), there are two possible causes that religion can adopt. First, there is cultural defence. Religion can re-emerge under modern conditions if secularism is forcibly promoted or if an ideology perceived as alien is seen as imposed upon an unwilling people. Unified resistance is however only possible in the absence of religious pluralism. In such circumstances, religion can revitalise itself to provide a source of resistance. Examples would be Poland during the collapse of Communism and the Iranian Revolution. A second instance in which religion can re-emerge is cultural transition. When individuals and societies undergo change at an alarming and threatening rate, they may fall back on religion as something familiar, comforting and reassuring (Bruce, 2002b). Evidence for religion as some sort of cultural defence against foreign imposition can be seen in the work of Pollack (2002) who found that church attendance in the former DDR increased precisely around the time of the democratic revolution but declined palpably shortly thereafter. This is interpreted as the church providing some sort of independent space for resistance and assembly that allowed it a break from the longer-term trend of secularisation.

Secularisation is not something that will occur evenly and at a consistent rate both within countries and across countries (Bruce, 2002b). There is

room within this theory for path dependency. These sentiments are echoed in the work of Martin (2005) who stresses that allowances in the path from sacred to secular should be made, depending upon the distinct histories of the countries in question. For Martin, differences between Protestant and Catholic countries and religious pluralism have to be factored in to our theoretical reasoning although overall, secularisation remains valid.

Religion can indeed arise as a reaction against modernisation, but not sufficiently to offset the wider downward trend (Bruce, 2002b). Wilson (1982) wrote that individuals left marginalised by the process of modernisation are susceptible to finding an emotional sustenance through religion. Also, the Fundamentalism Project (e.g. Marty & Appleby, 1994) has identified religious fundamentalism as a backlash against the losses sustained by religion in modern times.

2.13 Criticisms of secularisation theory

Secularisation theory has been criticised for necessitating some sort of 'golden age' of faith, whereby everyone was religious. Critics of secularisation (e.g. Stark & Finke, 2000) rule the secularisation thesis as historically invalid as they can point to numerous instances from the medieval world whereby the people are distinctly untutored in religious ways. Wilson (1982) addresses such criticisms by arguing that it is enough to point out that on the whole religion had a greater social significance in the past than it plays today. This response is echoed by Bruce (2002b), who adds that in Britain each possible indicator of religiosity is in "regular and constant" decline over time, for between 50 and 100 years or so (p73). Thus, positing a golden age

as a rebuttal of secularisation is something of a fallacious argument – it is enough to show religious decline. Additionally, Stark & Finke's (2000) evidence put forward in a chapter entitled *Secularisation R.I.P.* is highly selective; it is focusing on every example of non-religion they can muster with nothing added that might count in the other direction.

The example of the United States is often held up to refute secularisation theory. After all, where could be more modern? Yet, religious rates of belief and attendance are markedly higher than most other developed economies (Campbell & Curtis, 1994; Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Bruce argues in response that there is evidence of decline in popularity of religion and that following Wilson, one can argue for an internal secularisation within American churches (Bruce, 2002, Wilson, 1982). He also states that despite the loud voices of the American religious right, attempts to conquer the mainstream are doomed to fail due to the strong secularisation of the American state and the insistence upon scientific values by the social and academic mainstream. Thus, religion cannot gain a foothold and can only remain truly religious in the margins. It is also noted that Americans tend to exaggerate church attendance for reasons of perceived social desirability and thus the actual occurrence may still be comparable to the standard of the rest of the developed world (Hadaway et al., 1993 – also see above discussion of American case).

Criticism for secularisation theory also came from a surprising quarter. Whereas once Berger had been a major proponent of the theory, in 1999 he came out in his dotage as a critic. He wrote:

"My point is that the assumption that we live in a secularised world is false. The world today, with some exceptions... is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labelled 'secularisation theory' is essentially mistaken." (Berger, 1999:p2)

It is frustrating that Berger seems to treat the expectations of secularisation theory as applicable to the entire world. It is plainly apparent that the theory expects the declining social significance of religion in only the most modernised areas, since there is a causal link between modernisation and secularisation. It is also noted that both secularisation in advanced societies and increasing religiosity overall on a global scale are both possible, as Norris & Inglehart have argued (Norris & Inglehart, 2004).

Berger (1999) came to regard secularisation theory as no longer valid because (1) counter-secular religious movements exist; (2) people are still quite religious even in modern societies; (3) more demanding religions have flourished than those seemingly better suited to a secularised world; (4) evidence of Islamic resurgence and greater assertiveness; and (5) an Evangelical upsurge in Asia, the South Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union, and Latin America.

The first criticism can be countered by stating that the numbers of the faithful in counter-secularisation movements that are growing are not enough to offset the losses made elsewhere (Bruce, 2002b) and consistent with Wilson's idea of religion continuing on in the margins of society. Most of Berger's criticisms fail to address the fact that secularisation is only to be expected in the most advanced societies, and even then one may still expect

to find religion within as access to modernisation is not equally distributed (Wilson, 1982, Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Thus, one may well expect religion to be there – what is most important is that it has declining relevance for the operation of the social system. The fact that religion seems to be resurgent in certain parts of the less modernised world is very interesting and perhaps a weakness of the sociology of religion is that it focuses far too much on religion in advanced countries and is theoretically as well as empirically blind elsewhere. That said such cases do nothing to trouble the validity of secularisation theory in advanced modern societies.

A nuanced critique of secularisation has been attempted by Davie (1994). She has argued that Britons are characterised religiously as "believing without belonging" meaning that although people go to church less and less, they nevertheless are maintaining a commitment to religious belief despite this. Britons are to be seen as 'unchurched' rather than non-religious. Davie (1999, 2004) later extended this thesis to apply to Europe which she deems the exceptional case where "if nowhere else – the 'old' secularisation thesis would seem to hold" (Davie, 1999:p65). She goes on to ask if Europeans are not just "differently religious" (Davie, 1999:p65) as opposed to secular because they attend religious services less but retain religious belief. If Europe is indeed "differently religious" then, in Davie's eyes the whole world is religious and secularisation is not true.

Davie's case for European exceptionalism can be criticised as it does not take into account declines in other non-European advanced economies such as Australia (McCallum, 1987; McAllister, 1988), Canada (Eagle, 2011;

Clark, 2000), Japan and New Zealand (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Nor does it make allowances for the tendency for Americans to exaggerate their religious attendance thus putting them more in line with the European case. Finally, it does not take fully into account the definition of secularisation put forward by Wilson, and thus the level of European belief is irrelevant for the secularisation thesis if it is not manifesting itself socially in religious attendance. Essentially, Davie looks to discover vibrant religion in order to say something critical about secularisation. However, the very fact that it needs to be discovered speaks volumes about the European case that is not that exceptional once we take into account American exaggerations and secularising advanced non-European countries.

Davie's account of the British as 'believing not belonging' has been challenged empirically by Voas & Crockett (2005), who argued that decline in belonging has been accompanied by a decline in belief whilst what belief that does remain is dismissed as too vague to necessarily qualify as 'religion'. In short, those with meaningful religious belief tend also to be participating in religious services. These findings were echoed by Aarts et al. (2008) who found in most cases no widening of the gap between Christian believing and belonging in Western Europe and North America that would indicate a long-term trend towards believing not belonging. They too conclude that belief and belonging tend to accompany each other. Moreover, as this study will show, factor analysis will tend to load measurements of believing and religious attendance onto the same common factor (see Chapter 3 for details).

2.14 Religious economies theory – a challenge to the secularisation paradigm

Within the sociology of religion, there are two competing principle explanations for religion as a social phenomenon, secularisation theory and religious economies theory. The latter approach, being revisionist, controversial and something of an upstart, argues that religious practice is determined by the efforts of clergy who respond to pseudo-market forces within the religious economy. This theory is most prominently put forward by some combination of Stark, Finke, and Iannacone (e.g. Finke & Stark, 1988; Stark & Finke, 2000; Stark & Iannaccone, 1996; Stark et al., 1995, Stark & Iannaccone, 1995). The theory receives its fullest explanation in the book of Stark & Finke (2000) entitled *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion.* The theory presented therein stems from rational choice theory and the work of economist Gary Becker. Thus, the theory is also often referred to as the *rational choice* approach to the sociology of religion and also the *supply-side* approach.

The point of departure for Stark & Finke's theory is that religions need to be thought of as existing in a religious economy. A religious economy is considered as the sum total of the amount of religious activity in any given society. Stark & Finke, assume that individuals are rational in the sense that they attempt to make rational choices that satisfy their preferences and tastes, given whatever restrictions there might be on their information held and understanding. This is not to say that all goals are rational – the idea is that one can behave rationally in pursuit of an irrational goal if your

information is sufficiently deficient. Individuals look for the best possible deal when making religious choices and thus it follows that the deals on offer must play a role, so that it is down to 'ecclesiastics' (priests, imams, rabbis etc.) and religious organisations to provide the best possible religious product in order to entice adherents. This approach is often termed the supply-side approach to the sociology of religion, as it focuses on the efforts of religious organisations and their staff in order to explain religious vitality.

For religions to be convincing to adherents, sufficient for them to maintain their attachment but also to attract new followers, ecclesiastics have to "display levels of commitment greater than that expected of followers" (p112). Priests and their ilk have to demonstrate that they are the most committed in order to keep their flocks faithful and in attendance of religious services. Thus, Stark & Finke arrive at the crucial hypothesis, that:

"Vigorous efforts by religious organisations are required to motivate and sustain high levels of individual religious commitment." (p113)

Thus, we can expect countries to be more or less religious depending upon the efforts of religious providers – the clergy. The level of effort they put in is socially influenced. Two macro-level variables, which are essential in describing the religious economy as a whole, are identified by the proponents of religious economies theory. They are: (1) religious freedom as the absence of state regulation of religion, also conceived of as separation of religion and state; and (2) level of inter-religious competition.

These two variables are interrelated. Regulation of religion, as conceived of as lack of separation of religion and state, is seen as a precondition for

religious pluralism which is a necessary condition for competition. Pluralism refers to the "number of firms active in the economy; the more firms there are with significant market shares, the greater the degree of pluralism" (p198). Religious firms capture a monopoly if they are forced upon the masses via means of forceful coercion by the state (p199). Religious monopolies will attempt to exert influence over other institutions and the extent of their success would allow us to describe such societies as sacralised. Conversely, religious deregulation of society will result in de-sacralisation and rising pluralism as more suppliers are permitted access to the religious economy.

Deregulation or more specifically, the greater separation of religion and state, is predicted to increase levels of religiosity:

"Our model of religious economies holds that the demise of religious monopolies and the deregulation of religious economies will result in a general increase in individual religious commitment as more firms (and more motivated firms) gain free access to the market" (Stark & Finke, 2000:p200).

This theoretical expectation is because religious providers who are not dependent upon the state for financial support will have to work harder in keeping up attendances and satisfying their followers than those who are assured an income regardless of what they do. Kept clergy are expected to be lazy clergy, Stark & Finke argue, because they get their money regardless of what they do and thus do not have to be quite so engaged and entrepreneurial. Also, when the state is actively hostile to religion, it crushes

the room for entrepreneurial clergy to operate through repressive measures, best exemplified by the practices of the Soviet Union.

To summarise, ecclesiastics who are kept and/or have little freedom to proselytise will be less industrious and less fervent than those under conditions of religious freedom. This results in lower religious attendance as the product is simply not good enough. Stark & Finke also point out that laity under conditions of religious state establishment will come to regard religion as free, in which they have no immediate interest in up-keeping and thus tend to take it for granted and not attend.

The second variable at the macro-level is religious competition:

"To the degree that religious economies are unregulated and competitive, overall levels of religious participation will be high. (Conversely, lacking competition, the dominant firm[s] will be too inefficient to sustain vigorous marketing efforts, and the result will be a low overall level of religious participation, with the average person minimising and delaying payment of religious costs)" (Stark & Finke, 2000:p201).

Competition is seen as having an increasing effect on levels of religious attendance. I have been unable to find a full explanation of this beyond the reiteration of the dogma that competition leads to efficiency and better produce. We can however improvise and argue that because religious providers in the presence of competitors are likely to lose out if they cannot satisfy their religious customers, as someone else in the religious market will take up that unmet demand and satisfy it. Thus, religious providers in a competitive market have the incentive to work harder at satisfying their followers, become more efficient, produce better products, and religious

attendance is accordingly greater. In non-competitive or monopolistic circumstances, the converse is true. Religious providers have no incentive to work as there is no risk that their followers will desert them to go over to another supplier as none exist. Thus, religious products are expected to be less desirable, less satisfying and production less efficient, so that people tend to drop out, resulting in low religious attendance.

2.15 Empirical evidence for religious economies theory

Stark & Finke (2000) are at lengths to present the empirical evidence for their case as being cut and dry:

"So now, more than a decade later, only a few recusants continue to claim that religious phenomena are exempt from principles such as supply and demand. As ought to be the case, most social scientists changed their minds about these matters on the basis of a very large and still-growing empirical literature supporting the new approach, a literature notable for its diversity as to time and place" (p218).

Finke & Stark (1988) found that pluralism was associated with greater levels of church membership, but only once controlling for the percentage of Catholics within the population. This result was replicated using data from 1890, 1916, and 1926 by Finke (1992|cited in Stark & Finke, 2000). However, such studies have been criticised for producing results that stem from multicollinearity, which in turn stems from an autocorrelation between the percentage of Catholics and number of religious members (Olson 1999). Hamberg & Pettersson (1994) found in Sweden that competition increased religious attendance. Bruce (1992) however, found the converse relationship when using data from England and Wales from 1851. Also, Aarts et al (2008) found that believers were no more likely to attend religious services

under conditions of religious pluralism than not. Chaves & Gorski (2001) carried out a mammoth review of the empirical evidence as available up until 2001. In total, 193 statistical empirical tests were found with the vast majority showing a negative relationship between pluralism and religious vitality. They also note that historical evidence points away from the religious economies school of thought. For instance, religious deregulation in the form of greater laicism has occurred in Europe and Canada where religious decline has been evidenced.

The evidence then is far from offering the support that Stark & Finke claimed. That said, evidence in support along with that to the contrary was rendered highly questionable by the brilliant paper of Voas et al. (2002). They successfully argued that correlations between any measure pertaining to the concept of religiosity and pluralism (as measured in the standard way) are likely to be non-zero due to a mathematical truism rather than anything empirically factual. Simulations were run whereby no correlation was specified at the outset, yet analyses showed remarkably similar results to published findings elsewhere. It was thus inferred by Voas et al. that there was no additional relationship other than a mathematical one, and that the prospects for religious markets theory were bleak.

After Voas et al., research into the effect of religious competition/pluralism was set back to year zero. Work has begun anew on the relationship between religious vitality and pluralism/competition, which takes into account the recommendations made by Voas et al. in order to avoid mathematical contamination. However, with such allowances made,

Borgonovi (2008) found no positive relationship between pluralism and religious vitality. Chaves & Gorski (2001) argued that research into completion/pluralism had to become more nuanced and to seek a patchwork of exceptions rather than a general rule. They also argued that competition is likely to occur within rather than between denominations and that religious markets are divided along class and ethnic lines; that where religious groups are manifested as voluntary associations, they must compete with others but also secular alternatives such as sports, politics and mass entertainment. Where religious identity is more akin to national identity, competition must be thought of as expressions of political, social or cultural conflict.

Pluralism/competition is only one side of the religious economies argument. Elsewhere, state withdrawal has been associated with greater vitality, namely America and Russia (Chaves & Gorski, 2001). Fox & Tabory (2008) have shown that countries with greater degrees of separation of religion and state are characterised by higher levels of religious attendance which is interpreted as supportive of Stark & Finke's theory. Ruiter & van Tubergen (2009) also found that religious regulation diminished religious attendance. Chaves et al (1994) found a strong negative relationship existing between state regulation and the religious participation of Muslims which extended to include those living in Christian majority societies. However, Bruce (2002a) concluded that Scandinavian religious decline has been accompanied by constant pluralism and relaxing religious regulation. Other cases that have not met the expectations of religious economies theory have

been Wales (N.B. disestablishment in 1920) (Crockett & Voas, 2006), Australia and Japan (Australia having high separation of religion and state, whilst in Japan these were separated after World War II) (Campbell & Curtis, 1994).

Indeed, correlations between separation of religion and state, and high religiosity, may be down to the overbearing influence of post-colonial societies, many of whom incorporated republican style constitutions or were forged in Marxist political ideologies, and thus have secular constitutional arrangements, even though overall religiosity in the country is high which can be attributed to a low level of modernisation. Furthermore, the effect of establishment on the Anglican Church has been overstated. Whilst it is indeed an established church, nevertheless, much of its income comes from the collection plate so that it has to fend for its own interests and yet has still suffered declines in attendance against a backdrop of ever increasing pluralism.

2.16 Hypotheses for testing – situating an individual level theory of participation within the country-level social context

Now we can turn back to our individual level theories and finally place them firmly within their social context. Gill (2001) has written that most comparative political scientists regard religion as something peripheral with this possibly being attributable to their belief in the secularisation thesis. This, Gill writes, is an error because "religious beliefs and organisations are deeply ingrained in almost every nation" and thus to ignore religion is perilous to the task of explaining politics (p118). Gill is correct that we need

to account for the role of religion in politics, due to the strong moral imperatives that it contains alongside the social capital that it can muster through its prolonged history often at the heart of the community. However, Gill in the same paper also dismisses secularisation because many people still believe in God and because religious organisations still exist. Rather, what we need to do is to take secularisation theory and incorporate it into our theoretical models linking religion and political participation, both in the conventional and unconventional modes, but also within civil society. This is necessary given the voluminous amounts of evidence presented above for secularisation occurring in advanced modern societies. We might also use religious economies theory to provide a contextualised theoretical counter-point. I hesitate before doing this, as there is little empirical support linking pluralism/competition to religiosity and only patchy support linking religious deregulation. However, given there is a link between religiosity and separation of religion and state in some studies and that the effect of Voas et al.'s (2002) paper is effectively to reset such research back to year zero, I shall utilise this theoretical approach, although I remain sceptical as to the mechanisms it posits regardless of any such correlations.

Why contextualise? Simply because our macro-level theories of the sociology of religion lead us to believe there is variation in individual-level religiosity across countries depending on their level of modernisation or religious freedom. It follows that we should not expect the behaviours of religious people to be uniform across these variables either. So, the question arises – how might we go about contextualising our individual level theory identified

prior? In previous sections of this chapter, it was argued that religiosity provides individuals with the motivation, the means, and the mobilisation, that are close to necessities for participation in conventional politics and civil society. Furthermore, it is also innately authoritarian which should guide people away from unconventional participation. The act of contextualising these individual level theories of participation is brought about through the positing of so-called cross-level interactions. These are models that state there is an effect of an individual level attribute on an individual level outcome that is moderated by a variable at the macro-, or in this case, the country-level. This macro-level variable thus alters the effect of the relationship between the individual-level attribute and individual-level outcome from country to country.

From the above literature review of sources relevant to the testing of secularisation theory it is clear there is a substantial weakening of religion in the most modernised countries. Modernisation is thus identified as having theoretical and empirical links to secularisation, which manifests itself in declining religiosity among individuals. How might modernisation affect the relationship between religiosity and participation in public life?

First we concern ourselves with conventional political participation. In societies that have *not* undergone pronounced modernisation, it is expected that religion will be both stronger and thus more vocal and assertive in advancing its moral teachings and interests on political discourse and the machinations of government. It is expected that religion will be welcomed as a source of legitimacy in which political actors can frame themselves, in

order to justify their presence and actions and to win support. Thus, where modernisation is low, we expect the effect of religiosity to be positive on conventional political participation. However, in societies where modernisation has been greater, it is expected that religiosity is much weaker and that the public drive of religiosity has been significantly attenuated. This is because secularisation has occurred, whereby religion has become more diffuse and has been replaced by other sources of rational legitimacy resulting in religion's privatisation. Essentially, we are expecting that religion is no longer welcome in conventional politics because politicians have instead to make recourse to rational sources of legitimacy and that potential supporters are no longer galvanised by religion so that they have no advantage over unbelievers. We expect, following Casanova, that religion will be unwelcome in this segment of the public sphere so that it serves to guide individuals away from it. It is predicted that where modernisation is higher, the effect of religiosity on conventional political participation will be lower than elsewhere. Thus, we can formerly state our first hypothesis:

H1. The level of societal modernisation will interact with individuals' religiosity in its effect on conventional political participation and the effect of the interaction will be negative.

Now we turn our attention to constructing hypotheses relating to civil society, religiosity and modernisation. Casanova argued that in modernised societies that have undergone secularisation, religion must forgo participation in conventional politics as a means to contesting the

occupation of the state and the laws that it lays down. Instead, they can find voice in civil society as moral commentators and self-appointed guardians. Building upon this, in civil society, we would expect religion to be welcomed as it is both a sphere where religion can prove itself as an alternative to the state and thus gain credibility and support, but also because of the values of civil society that preach democratic inclusiveness. However, we would expect civil society to be more populated by the religious in modernised societies, precisely because they have been frozen out of the contestation of the state and the legislative process – that is conventional political participation. To some extent, the religious have accepted defeat in the process of modernisation but those that remain still want to have societal influence nevertheless. Their religion, even in attenuated form commands it. Whereas conventional politics is closed to religion, in civil society it is welcomed due to the openness of this arena and its values of inclusiveness. Thus we have the hypothesis:

H2. The level of societal modernisation will interact with individuals' religiosity in its effect on civil society participation and the effect of the interaction will be positive.

Now we turn our attention to unconventional political participation. Previously, I argued that religiosity, which has been linked empirically to authoritarianism, would tend to distance itself from unconventional political participation since the latter tends to be authority challenging. But how might this relationship be influenced by the societal-level of modernisation given what we know from secularisation theory? It is predicted that the

effect of modernisation will make religion less distinct from secular ways of life and thus we would expect a diminishing of the distinction between religion and non-religion. We are expecting that religion will become less authoritarian as it blends into secular ways of thinking and acting. Thus, we expect in societies that have undergone modernisation to find that religiosity may still steer individuals away from authority challenging behaviour, but that this effect is much less than that in societies that have so far not undergone modernisation. Thus, we can state the hypothesis that:

H3. The level of societal modernisation will interact with individuals' religiosity in its effect on unconventional political participation and the effect of the interaction will be positive (i.e. the effect of religiosity becomes less negative).

Now we turn our attention to constructing cross-level interaction hypotheses derived from religious economies theory. The macro-level variable identified as having a possible role in moderating the effect of religiosity is the level of separation of religion and state. This variable is interpreted as being a measure of the extent to which the religious economy is regulated and thus is constitutive of the amount of religious freedom which is a precondition for religious competition according to Stark & Finke (2000). This variable has been selected because of some of the empirical studies cited above that have shown a link in the expected direction as predicted by religious economies theory. Religious pluralism/competition is not identified as such, because of the methodological problems associated with its measurement and application in regression based analyses.

First, we concern ourselves with conventional political participation. Following religious economies theory, it is predicted that where the religious market is less regulated, religious firms will have more need to work harder in order to secure their income and will have more freedom which is expected to enliven them. We would expect this enthusiasm to transfer from religious firms and their staff to religious followers because as everyone knows, enthusiasm is contagious. If religious people are more enthused by their religion, we would expect them to be more forceful in attempting to have influence through conventional politics in order to have their moral beliefs enacted on a wider scale. Where religions are heavily regulated and in the presence of established religion, we would expect that religious firms would become lazy and their messages would be less transferred to their followers who thus have less motivation in order to get involved. We can also argue that where religious providers are supported by the state, they will become lazy and thus the religious institutions themselves, namely the churches and mosques *etc.* will become less effective in linking individuals into politics than they would otherwise be. Thus, we have the hypothesis that:

H4. The level of separation of religion and state will interact with individuals' religiosity in its effect on conventional political participation and the effect of the interaction will be positive.

Now we turn our attention to the theoretical relationship between civil society, religiosity and separation of religion and state. From the religious economies school of thinking, we would predict that where the religious

economy is less regulated, where there is no established religion and no restraints on religious activity, religion will be more vibrant and will thus be more assertive of its ideas and morals in an attempt to order the wider society along religious lines. Thus, we would expect more religious activity in civil society when separation of religion and state is greater. Otherwise, we would expect religious activity in civil society to be lessened, as when the state restricts religious freedom or when there is an established faith, we would expect religious firms to be lazy and less capable of doing what is necessary to get people excited by religion, and thus there will be less religious activity in civil society. The same argument about religious institutions becoming less effective as sites of mobilisation under conditions of religious establishment can also be used to justify this theory. This hypothesis is stated thus:

H5. The level of separation of religion and state will interact with individuals' religiosity in its effect on civil society participation and the effect of the interaction will be positive.

Now we turn out attention to religiosity, unconventional political participation and separation of religion and state. Religious economies theory can be used to predict that greater separation of religion and state means greater deregulation of the religious economy and thus more vibrancy amongst the religious which is accompanied by greater attention to religious teaching. Through better teaching it is expected that the authoritarian drive within religion will come more to the forefront as clergy become better at conveying religion's true message. Thus, we have the hypothesis:

H6. The level of separation of religion and state will interact with individuals' religiosity in its effect on unconventional political participation and the effect of the interaction will be negative (i.e. the effect of religiosity becomes more negative).

In case this exposition has not been enough, the theoretical model for conventional political participation is presented graphically in Figure 2 as an example of the kinds of theories that are being specified here.

Figure 2: Cross-level interactions - a theory of religiosity, country context, and conventional political participation

These hypotheses are put forward in the knowledge that to date nothing quite like this has been done and are further justified as contributing to a literature that has not too much to offer by way of contextualised individual-level effects. It is stressed that these theories are derived from secularisation and religious economies theories and do not represent the ideas of their

original proponents. It is my contention that these derivations are reasonable given the foundations of these theories and serve to actually advance them by looking at their 'knock-on' effects rather than just using them to explain religious attendance levels. With reflection, there is much more to the idea of *vitality* than mere numbers in the houses of worship and any good theory that looks to explain this must look further afield to its effect on society at large. These hypotheses are to be used as a launch point for empirical inquiry. If they do not find empirical confirmation then theoretical revisions shall be necessary.

2.17 Summary

This chapter has laid out the theoretical groundwork for this thesis. Arguments were made drawing on the literature of political participation, that religiosity will encourage activity in conventional political participation and civil society, because it is a source of motivation, means to participate, and opportunities for mobilisation. However, because religiosity is linked to authoritarianism, it was argued that religiosity would be negatively associated with unconventional political participation as this tends to be authority challenging in nature. Then we turned to the literature on secularisation and religious economies theory. From these theories, it was identified that the country level of modernisation and the level of separation of religion and state could be theoretically expected to influence individuals' levels of religiosity, and that indeed there was a (varying) degree of empirical evidence that could be interpreted as providing support for these theories. Secularisation theory and religious economies theory were then synthesised

with individual level theories of participation in order to propose some hypotheses to be tested in subsequent chapters. These are summarised in Table 1. Before we go onto our empirical analyses, it is necessary to have a discussion of data, methods, operationalistion, and validity, in order for us to have any confidence in the results that follow.

Table 1: The principle hypotheses and their theoretical expectation

Hypothesis	Expectation
1. Modernisation decreases the effect of religiosity on conventional political participation.	-
2. Modernisation increases the effect of religiosity on civil society participation.	+
3. Modernisation increases (makes less negative) the effect of religiosity on unconventional political participation.	+
4. Religious free-market conditions increase the effect of religiosity on conventional political participation.	+
5. Religious free-market conditions increase the effect of religiosity on civil society participation.	+
6. Religious free-market conditions decrease (makes more negative) the effect of religiosity on unconventional political participation.	-

Chapter 3 - Data, measurement, and validity across cultural contexts

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to identify appropriate measurements of the concepts identified in the theoretical outline that was laid out in the last chapter. This is done through a meticulous analysis of validity across cultural contexts. It must be remembered that such labours are necessary, particularly in country comparative research. This is because the application of questionnaires may be uneven despite the best intentions of the survey designers, and may be understood and thus responded to differently due to cultural differences that filter and distort the intended meanings of the concepts alluded to in surveys. This can lead potentially to culturally specific responses that are in effect incomparable across contexts. Thus, comparisons between their responses would be a fool's errand.

This chapter offers an analysis of validity across cultural contexts, of the principal measurement instruments used in this study, namely measures of religiosity, conventional political participation, unconventional political participation, civil society participation, modernisation, and separation of religion and state. This chapter opens with a brief account of the data used and an exploration of why context might matter, before continuing to offer a summary of the ways in which each key concept in this study is conceived of and measured in the social sciences along with original empirical analyses of validity.

3.2 The World Values Survey

The individual level data used throughout this study come from the World Values Survey series (WVS, 2009). This project began in 1981 and the first wave consisted of 20 countries. Since then, four other waves have followed, which were carried out between 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2004, and 2005-2008. This study uses wave 5 only due to questions of measurement availability and the desire to test hypotheses on the same dataset. Where possible, country samples were collected using probability sampling (WVS). This dataset is not a random sample as inclusion is dependent on the resources and willingness of the country in question to participate, so results should be treated with caution as they are not representative of the world as a whole. Accordingly, it should be kept in mind that statistical tests applied will suffer as a result and thus should bear the caveat of being heuristic rather than purely scientific.

Nevertheless, what the WVS loses by way of it being non-random can be offset to a degree by its scope. The WVS provides data on a substantial number of countries which cover the majority of the world's population (WVS). The use of this data set can be defended not only on grounds of its inclusiveness but also by the fact that there is no alternative if one wants to entertain hypotheses relating to such broad macro trends as modernisation and separation of religion and state. Thus, whilst the WVS is imperfect, it is the best resource available that provides a large enough range of countries for country-level and cross-level interaction hypotheses to be investigated.

Wave 5 of the WVS contains data on 80 countries. These are: Andorra, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Taiwan, Colombia, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Vietnam, and Zambia. In total, it contains data on 82,992 individuals.

Regrettably, not all this data can be used due to missing measurements. In each instance it is strived after to keep the number of countries as large as possible so that results are as representative as possible and also for reasons pertaining to the application of multilevel analysis which this study makes copious use of.

The WVS is extensive in the broad range of themes that it amasses data on. It contains data on individuals' attitudes and behaviour germane to the fields of work, family, religion, politics, and leisure time. It supplies also a full set of basic demographics so that the effects of social stratification on individual attitudes and behaviour can be observed. The WVS is thus, the appropriate data source that offers information on beliefs and behaviour across the world that allows us to investigate the hypotheses proposed in the preceding chapter.

The research design is in the terms of Prezworski & Teune (1970) a most-different systems design rather than a most-similar one as we are looking to test for the relevance of systemic factors. As Norris (2002) notes, the disadvantage of such an approach is the loss of "richness and depth" (p10) that comes with case studies of countries with much in common. Increasing the range of dissimilarity increases the complexity according to Norris since cultural and political traditions have greater variance. She is however keen to stress that there are advantages too – most-different systems design allow us to test grand theories pertaining to the macro-level such as societal modernisation, for instance. They cannot be tested where there is not enough range in the macro-variables in question. Choosing a most-similar systems research design might increase the comparability of the data but this would be at the expense of the validity of the research design due to insufficient variance at the country-level.

3.3 The influence of cultural context on survey methodology

Why might the social context be important when considering comparative datasets and what contextual factors may play a role? Let us imagine two individuals, the interviewer and the respondent. The interviewer has some ideas, in the form of a question, which he or she wishes to convey to the respondent, whom it is hoped will then relay a truthful answer. Culture could alter the reception of content due to the fact that different words and ideas may have different connotations in different cultures or different meanings. For instance, asking an Irishman, an American, and a Frenchman if they were 'republicans' might elicit the same response, but the

intended meanings would be totally different. Thus, when survey designers intend one thing, culture may act as such, that the survey question is understood in a different manner, and thus the response is not indicative of what is desired and cannot stand as a measurement of the concept under investigation when it is applied across contexts simultaneously.

Country of residence is identified as the cultural-specific factor that could most affect responses. This may affect things because translations of surveys across languages are never exact and thus certain words may have certain connotations unique to the culture and history of the country in question that will result in responses being incomparable to those taken from other cultural contexts. For instance, Gary King and his associates (King et al., 2004) have shown that what is interpreted as political efficacy differs between countries. Before we begin to describe the key concepts and their measurement, it must be stated exactly what is mean by validity. Then we turn to assessing the validity of our measurements.

3.4 Different types of validity

The understanding of validity and its different types as applied within the social sciences is taken from an authoritative paper by Adcock & Collier (2001). Validity is understood as being the process "specifically concerned with whether operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure" (p529). Validity is to be distinguished from reliability. Reliability assumes validity and is concerned with the accuracy of a valid measurement. A measurement can be valid in the sense that it is tapping into the desired concept, but unreliable in the

sense that there is a great deal of measurement error resulting from the measurement process. At this point, we are thus concerned with whether or not our measurements truly reflect the concepts that interest us.

Firstly, a measurement instrument is deemed to be valid when:

"scores… derived from a given indicator… can meaningfully be interpreted in terms of the systemized concept… that the indicator seeks to operationalise." (Adcock & Collier, 2001:p531)

There are three processes of validation identified by Adcock & Collier. They are (1) content validation, (2) convergent/discriminant validation, and (3) nomological/construct validation.

Content validation is the assessment of whether or not the measurement instrument is capturing the ideas expressed in the systematised concept. This process is based on a reasoned discussion of the possible measurement instruments with primary focus on the wording of the questions used, and having no statistical or empirical moment.

Convergent/discriminant validation is when it is asked if an indicator is empirically associated with other indicators that are all closely related conceptually. It is thus a statistical procedure. Convergent validation asks if indicators perform in the same manner as other conceptually related indicators. Discriminant validation asks if the indicator performs differently in relation to other non-conceptually related indicators that are reflective of other concepts. Validity is determined if the items perform in the same manner and do not relate empirically to other conceptually distinct items.

Related to this, is criterion validation, whereby one conceptually-related variable (known as a criterion variable) is assumed to be the gold standard by which all other possible measurement instruments are judged. This process can be criticised due to the fact that criterion variables are few and far between and if they indeed represent a gold standard of measurement, then why not use them in your research instead? (Adcock & Collier, 2001)

Nomological/construct validation is according to Adcock & Collier, when an item is said to be valid if it performs in an expected manner when tested against another variable that is reflective of something conceptually distinct but is known to bare a cast-iron empirical relationship to the concept of which the item is hoped to be reflective of. If prior research told us that educational attainment was strongly and consistently related to subjective well-being then we would judge a new measurement of educational attainment to be valid if it correlated strongly with subjective wellbeing. This approach can be criticised for validating an instrument by another that in itself may not be valid, whilst also the availability of such a cast-iron empirically-related variable may be lacking (Adcock & Collier, 2001).

3.5 Existing approaches to measuring religiosity

Systematisation is the process of identifying the attributes of a concept and stipulating their relationships to the underlying concept and to each other, through bonds of necessity and/or sufficiency (Adcock & Collier, 2001). A quick appraisal of the literature however reveals, as we shall see, that there is in fact no consistent systematisation (and thus operationalization) of the concept of religiosity.

One approach is to consider religiosity as conceptually simple, so that it is possible to measure it by a single variable. Religiosity is thus operationalised by one indicator alone, be it some measure of belief or religious institutional participation (Witter et al., 1985; Kendler et al., 1997). This approach is common, particularly when religiosity is used as a control variable, but it has also been used when it constitutes the key explanatory variable. For instance Ruiter & De Graaf's (2006) paper on civil society participation used religious service attendance to measure religiosity. This approach is insufficient to capture the full gamut of religiosity because, as Davie would counter, belonging is not the only facet of religiosity that matters. Thus, it is generally considered best to measure religiosity by treating it as a multi-dimensional concept with multiple indicators in order to capture the nuances that escape single variable measurements. However, as we shall see, there is some question as to whether or not these more subtle theoretical approaches to measurement actually are born out empirically.

The first attempt to consider religiosity as multi-dimensional was made by Stark & Glock (1968). Religiosity was thought of as having five distinct dimensions. These were belief, practice, knowledge, experience, and the consequential. Belief referred to the extent that the individual was accepting of religious teachings. Practice was the extent to which individuals were participating in religious services, along with rites and rituals. Knowledge referred to the level of mastery of the theology of the religion in question. Experience meant the personal experiences of religious phenomena and

feelings of the individual. Finally, the consequential dimension was the level of impact that religion had upon the day-to-day life of the individual.

Stark & Glock offer us what may serve as a systematized conceptualization of religiosity, with each dimension seen as an attribute of the concept of religiosity as well as being a continuous variable in its own right. However, Stark & Glock say nothing about the relationships between these attributes in terms of necessity and sufficiency. Another criticism of this approach is noted by Mueller (1980), who wrote that the dimension of knowledge would identify as religious those who have some knowledge of religion but are hostile to it - for instance, staunch atheists such as Richard Dawkins or Christopher Hitchens. On a similar theme, the knowledge dimension was found to be least empirically related to the other dimensions of religiosity (Weigert & Thomas, 1974). Elsewhere, high correlations were found between these dimensions, which would suggest that they are in a sense measuring the same thing or that each is a precondition for the other (Gibbs & Crader, 1970). Support for the idea of belief as the fundamental cause of the other dimensions is given weight by Clayton & Gladden (1974) who found that the dimension of ideological commitment had the strongest bearing on their data whilst a common factor was found so that they concluded religiosity was not multidimensional. Mueller in turn has concluded that the dimensions of practice, feeling, experience, and emotion are empirically indistinct whilst belief is all-encompassing (Mueller, 1980). There is also some support for distinctiveness of these dimensions (*e.g.* Weigert & Thomas, 1974).

The multidimensional approach to religiosity was further refined by Cornwall et al. (1986). They argued that Stark & Glock were correct to assume a multi-faceted conceptualisation of religiosity but had erred in the sense that they had included dimensions that were more peripheral than essential. Instead, the kernel of religiosity could be found in only three dimensions of religiosity. They were (1) belief/cognitive – referring to that specifically believed, (2) affective – detailing the strength of emotional attachment to religious beliefs, and (3) practice – meaning individuals' upholding of certain behaviours that are encouraged by the religions. Additionally, there are 2 modes of religiosity, namely the personal and the institutional. The former relates to religiosity as something more intimate and acquired through individual discovery, whilst the latter refers to religion as it is handed down from long-established institutions such as churches and mosques. Thus, when cross-tabulated, six distinct attributes of religiosity emerge. They are: traditional orthodoxy, particularistic orthodoxy, spiritual commitment, church commitment, religious behaviour, and religious participation. Empirically, these dimensions were found to have a large degree of distinctness, although data was restricted to Mormons. Those criticisms pertaining to necessity and sufficiency and weighting levelled at Stark & Glock would apply equally as well here.

The Duke Religion Index (DRI) measures religiosity by decomposing it into such dimensions as the organisational, non-organisational, and the intrinsic (Koenig & Büssing, 2010). Essentially, what we have here are two aspects that deal with behaviour, be it in the presence of others and

institutionalised, or done in solitary confinement, and one that is to do with the inherent quality of the individual's subjective relationship to religious belief (Storch et al., 2004). Storch et al. in their empirical analysis of the three dimensions identified by the DRI found that despite its theoretical underpinnings that specify distinct dimensions, all items indicative of these dimensions were found to be loading onto a common factor, and thus each could be concluded to be a valid indicator of the same concept.

Another approach is that of Kendler et al. (1997), who found two dimensions of religiosity, which they labelled personal devotion and personal conservatism. Personal devotion was composed of the importance of religious beliefs, frequency of church attendance, consciousness of religious purpose, frequency of seeking spiritual comfort, frequency of private prayer, and satisfaction with spiritual life. The second dimension of personal conservatism was made up of items measuring a literal belief in the bible, a belief in being 'born again', belief in God, and belief in a rewarding and punishing God. This approach suggests that there is one common dimension of religiosity for the majority but that there is a minority who are subscribing to a fundamentalist outlook that distinguishes them from the rest.

Chatters et al. (1992) theorised a 3 dimensional conception of religiosity. The three dimensions they identified were (1) organisational religiosity, (2) non-organisational religiosity, and (3) subjective religiosity. These are understood as two measures of practice and one pertaining to the individual's intrinsic belief. The practice dimensions are related to that done with others (most

notably church attendance) and that done privately (prayer for instance). The subjective dimension was operationalised in a way that attempts to grasp how vital religious beliefs are and is analogous to the affective dimension as outlined by Cornwall et al. (1986). Empirically, these dimensions were sustained, but were considered likely to be inter-correlated so that we can think of these dimensions as being distinct but nevertheless part of the same concept of religiosity, which acts as a kind of 'umbrella' term for these sub-concepts.

It would seem that a multi-dimensional framework is best theoretically. The question is: Are there empirically distinct dimensions of religiosity or merely one common factor despite all these multi-dimensional theoretical outlooks? The studies explored above would point towards there either being one common factor or several dimensions which are in fact sub-dimensions of an over-arching concept and are accordingly highly inter-correlated. Thus, if one assumes a common factor approach, reflective of empirical indistinctness, one would not be erring by too much as even if two items are reflective of two different dimensions of religiosity, they are nevertheless part of the over-arching concept of religiosity and are merely measuring different facets of the same thing and thus, miss-measurement is not occurring.

3.6 Operationalising religiosity

The literature tends to posit the concept of religiosity as having multiple dimensions or components. Many of these approaches, particularly those stemming from psychology are designed for small scale designs whereby the researcher has control over what goes into the survey and what does not.

This study does not however have any power over the survey design, nor would a multi-indicator measurement of some 40 indicators be appropriate in the WVS, given limitations of time and space and the desire of the principle investigators to measure as wide a variety of attitudes and behaviours as possible. This study follows Cornwall et al. in assuming three theoretical dimensions of religiosity – belief, affect, and attendance – as this approach is striking a nice balance between detail and parsimony. Then it is assumed that these will tend to presuppose one another so that empirically, these dimensions will be indistinct. This approach to measurement is defended on grounds of parsimony and availability of indicators within the WVS.

Now we have to come up with some sort of measurement using the existing items within the WVS that is valid across country-specific contexts. This segment thus proceeds by identifying three indicators of religiosity in the WVS, and provides a discussion of their content validity. The WVS is possibly over laden with potential indicators of religiosity. However most are not of use as they are asked in a minority of countries, or, tend to offer only binary responses meaning that the gradation of religiosity of the individual is impossible.

The first indicator of interest is an assessment of the importance religion plays in the life of the individual:

For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life [...] Religion [...] Would you say it is:

(1) Very important

(2) Rather important

(3) Not very important

(4) Not at all important

This item, subsequently referred to as IMPREL[2] is found in the vast majority of country-samples. It is reverse coded so that higher values come to mean greater levels of religiosity.

This item is deemed to pass the requirements of content validation, as it is clearly referring to religiosity although it does not refer to a specific attribute or dimension of religiosity – it could be in fact all-encompassing. There is a small chance that an atheist who feels oppressed by religion might adjudge religion to be important in their life regardless of their non-belief; the likelihood of such an interpretation would be small however.

The second variable of interest is a subjective measure of the importance of the character of God to the individual respondent:

How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate – 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important:

(1) Not at all important... (10) Very important

This item appeared in nearly all countries and will subsequently be referred to as IMPGOD.

This item can be interpreted as capturing the dimensions of belief and religious affect, as it presupposes that the individual believes in the religious claim that there is a god and that they have some sort of emotional

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[2] Each variable used in this study is assigned a signifier in similar fashion. In case it gets confusing a full list of all variables and their signifiers is supplied in Appendix A.

attachment to it. God is a central figure in most religions. Thus, this item passes content validation.

The third indicator of religiosity that is of interest is a measure of religious service attendance. Respondents were asked:

Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?

    (1) More than once a week

    (2) Once a week

    (3) Once a month

    (4) Only on special holy days/Christmas/ Easter days

    (5) Other specific holy days

    (6) Once a year

    (7) Less often

    (8) Never practically never

This item also appeared in most country-samples. Although categorical and ordinal, it is treated as capturing an underlying continuous variable of religious service attendance. Categories (4) and (5) are merged into each other. This variable is reverse coded so that greater numbers mean higher attendance. Hereafter, this variable will be referred to as RELATT.

This item is on the surface a valid measurement of the attendance dimension of religiosity. One possible hang-up could be that it would label people as religious who only go out of social convention and have no faith. However studies have shown believing and belonging tend to accompany

each other in practice (Voas & Crockett, 2005; Aarts et al., 2008). One question of validity is whether or not those items used are equally and fairly applicable to all cases (Adcock & Collier, 2001). We might ask if it is fair to use a measurement of religious attendance for measuring religiosity within Islam-dominant social contexts? The problem of the Islamic case for any measurement strategy is well illustrated by Gonzalez (2011):

"In Kuwait, men are encouraged to attend mosque for their prayers and women are encouraged to pray at home. While the reading of the Qur'an is facilitated by the imam for men, women will read during their prayers or worship time at home by themselves or with other women." (p346)

On this basis, it is apparent that the application of some measurements will favour men and reflect more their religiosity, whilst others will be more favourable to women and would be measuring their religiosity better but possibly at the expense of men. However, question wording in the WVS as applied in Islamic countries makes allowances for this problem so that it is surmounted. Elsewhere, religious attendance is recognised as subject to social desirability response bias (Hadaway et al., 1993), although it has been concluded that if indeed it does lack reliability in itself, it retains validity as an indicator of overall religiosity, as those that over-report, tend to be intrinsically highly religious (Brenner, 2011).

Having determined the face-value appropriateness of these indicators, we progress with some simple correlation analyses before moving onto factor analysis in order to assess convergent validity.

3.6.1 Correlation analysis of indicators of religiosity

In Table 2 are presented the pairwise correlations of items IMPREL, IMPGOD, and RELATT along with their statistical significance (at the 5% level) and some descriptive statistics. Along with the overall correlation, correlations are given for each country-specific sample. When aggregated across all countries, the correlations are positive and substantial. That between IMPREL and IMPGOD is highest at 0.70. Correlations between these two variables and RELATT - 0.54 and 0.50 respectively - are slightly lower but nevertheless substantial by social science standards and seem promising for building a case to establish validity. Needless to say, all these correlations are statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 2 also presents the correlations of IMPREL, IMPGOD and RELATT as they stand within each country.

Table 2: Indicators of religiosity – descriptive statistics and correlations

	N	IMPREL(1) mean	IMPREL(1) s.d.	IMPGOD(2) mean	IMPGOD(2) s.d.	RELATT(3) mean	RELATT(3) s.d.	Pairwise correlation (* 5% significance) (1)~(2)	(1)~(3)	(2)~(3)
Overall	82,992	3.09	1.05	7.79	2.99	4.03	2.19	0.70*	0.54*	0.50*
Sample specific										
Andorra	1003	1.97	0.96	5.36	3.34	2.13	1.66	0.63*	0.58*	0.51*
Argentina	1002	2.84	1.00	8.32	2.62	3.32	2.06	0.50*	0.49*	0.44*
Australia	1421	2.29	1.09	6.09	3.37	2.61	1.97	0.74*	0.68*	0.57*
Bulgaria	1001	2.52	0.98	5.70	2.77	3.19	1.57	0.48*	0.29*	0.42*
Burkina Faso	1534	3.80	0.51	9.11	1.68	5.70	1.90	0.24*	0.24*	0.18*
Canada	2164	2.82	1.05	7.41	2.97	3.45	2.10	0.69*	0.64*	0.54*
Chile	1000	2.99	0.97	8.66	2.19	3.51	2.13	0.40*	0.39*	0.32*
China	2015	1.82	0.93	3.58	2.91	2.93	1.87	0.53*	0.50*	0.56*
Cyprus	1050	3.21	0.97	8.51	2.35	3.56	1.81	0.47*	0.31*	0.29*
Egypt	3051	3.95	0.25	9.91	0.71	4.28	2.38	0.00	0.01	0.03
Ethiopia	1500	3.73	0.63	9.21	1.56	5.81	1.50	0.05	0.45*	0.22*
Finland	1014	2.48	0.95	6.01	3.00	2.90	1.58	0.73*	0.56*	0.52*
France	1001	2.26	1.02	4.68	3.14	2.20	1.71	0.69*	0.54*	0.56*
Georgia	1500	3.77	0.52	9.20	1.36	4.00	1.57	0.34*	0.16*	0.20*
Germany	2064	2.07	1.02	4.48	3.20	2.65	1.76	0.73*	0.68*	0.71*

	N	IMPREL(1)		IMPGOD(2)		RELATT(3)		Pairwise correlation (* 5% significance)		
		mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	mean	s.d.	(1)~(2)	(1)~(3)	(2)~(3)
Ghana	1534	3.88	0.40	9.78	0.75	5.98	1.48	0.16*	0.31*	0.08*
Great Britain	1041	2.35	1.07	5.58	3.35	2.74	2.07	0.73*	0.67*	0.57*
Guatemala	1000	3.77	0.56	9.72	0.94	5.59	1.66	0.23*	0.36*	0.21*
Hong Kong	1252	2.23	0.70	4.31	2.77	2.22	1.68	0.41*	0.34*	0.43*
India	2001	3.27	0.90	7.52	3.07	4.86	1.78	0.27*	0.23*	0.18*
Indonesia	2015	3.93	0.31	9.57	1.34	5.43	1.65	0.24*	0.15*	0.16*
Iran	2667	3.72	0.61	9.43	1.54	4.24	2.18	0.23*	0.28*	0.05*
Iraq	2701	3.95	0.25	9.84	0.68	3.39	2.49	0.27*	-0.01	0.01
Italy	1012	3.04	0.89	7.84	2.31	4.44	1.72	0.65*	0.60*	0.57*
Japan	1096	1.81	0.90	5.01	2.67	3.30	1.26	0.48*	0.26*	0.33*
Jordan	1200	3.95	0.25	9.90	0.73	6.56	1.56	-0.01	0.17*	0.03
Mali	1534	3.89	0.36	9.17	1.59	5.68	1.89	0.23*	0.11*	0.05*
Mexico	1560	3.41	0.82	9.43	1.49	4.66	1.90	0.38*	0.43*	0.28*
Moldova	1046	2.98	0.89	8.13	2.32	3.67	1.55	0.57*	0.36*	0.41*
Netherlands	1050	2.08	1.05	4.69	3.22	2.49	1.92	0.73*	0.67*	0.62*
New Zealand	954	2.19	1.08	5.35	3.47	2.52	1.96	0.81*	0.72*	0.66*
Norway	1025	2.17	0.93	4.21	3.07	2.42	1.53	0.73*	0.55*	0.55*
Peru	1500	3.22	0.91	8.98	1.87	4.66	1.76	0.37*	0.27*	0.28*
Poland	1000	3.31	0.78	8.70	2.00	5.17	1.47	0.55*	0.53*	0.43*
Romania	1776	3.46	0.73	9.17	1.63	4.30	1.57	0.43*	0.26*	0.27*
Russian Fed	2033	2.42	0.94	6.02	3.09	2.66	1.56	0.55*	0.48*	0.53*
Rwanda	1507	3.35	0.56	9.45	1.37	6.67	0.94	0.08*	0.10*	0.02
Serbia	1220	2.86	0.88	7.12	2.58	3.82	1.49	0.46*	0.37*	0.39*
Slovenia	1037	2.32	1.02	5.42	3.21	3.38	1.90	0.66*	0.57*	0.59*
South Africa	2988	3.59	0.73	9.16	1.54	4.81	2.00	0.35*	0.43*	0.30*
South Korea	1200	2.52	1.01	5.65	2.82	3.89	2.18	0.60*	0.62*	0.62*
Spain	1200	2.24	1.04	5.34	3.03	2.71	1.97	0.61*	0.55*	0.60*
Sweden	1003	2.09	0.93	3.93	3.05	2.12	1.40	0.63*	0.54*	0.55*
Switzerland	1241	2.41	1.02	6.35	3.14	3.09	1.88	0.66*	0.64*	0.55*
Taiwan	1227	2.51	0.85	6.13	2.40	2.53	1.68	0.44*	0.37*	0.32*
Thailand	1534	3.50	0.62	7.98	1.42	5.32	1.39	0.28*	0.25*	0.23*
Trinidad & Tob	1002	3.67	0.70	9.67	1.29	4.71	1.89	0.20*	0.33*	0.05
Turkey	1346	3.64	0.72	9.36	1.53	3.75	2.27	0.47*	0.27*	0.22*
Ukraine	1000	2.57	0.95	7.19	2.66	3.36	1.64	0.53*	0.51*	0.60*
United States	1249	3.11	0.99	8.25	2.66	3.88	2.26	0.68*	0.60*	0.44*
Uruguay	1000	2.43	1.11	7.32	3.07	3.63	2.15	0.53*	0.36*	0.28*
Viet Nam	1495	2.20	0.84	4.83	3.06	2.63	1.79	0.30*	0.29*	0.32*
Zambia	1500	3.70	0.61	9.18	1.55	5.45	1.75	0.27*	0.28*	0.16*

The majority of samples show correlations between the variables. In sum, 47 out of 53 samples showed positive and significant correlations amongst all 3

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variables. The strength of these correlations tends to vary, suggesting that while the variables may very well have measured religiosity successfully, some samples have been more successful than others. In 5 countries, no complete sets of correlations were found – this is put down to the fact that religiosity in such countries is so high that there is insufficient variance in the variables to produce correlations. Thus, these indicators may well be valid but correlation analysis is not necessarily helping us here to determine this.

3.6.2 Exploratory factor analysis of indicators of religiosity

The best method of establishing that measurements are both valid and comparable across groups is confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Tran, 2009; Gregorich, 2007). This is a form of factor analysis that imposes a theoretical framework upon the data and allows one to undertake hypothesis testing (Tran, 2009; Gregorich, 2007, Kline, 1993). CFA was attempted but problems relating to convergence and identification proved so difficult (and time consuming) to surmount, that results could only be achieved through the imposition of major constraints on the model that could not be theoretically justified. With such constraints in place, the CFA model was not passing the appropriate tests to establish model fit, even at their most basic, namely the establishment of configural invariance (a common factor structure), and when the dataset had been rigged by using countries already known to hold a factor structure in common. Thus, we regretfully dispense with CFA and instead turn to exploratory factor analysis (EFA). This method does not allow one to impose a theoretical framework but is advantageous in

that it always produces results. EFA is applied to the 3 indicators of religiosity using the principle factor method of extraction. To better grasp the structure of the data, varimax rotations of the original factor matrix are presented in Table 3.

Overall, the variables IMPREL, IMPGOD and RELATT all load onto the same factor, with IMPREL and IMPGOD having slightly higher factor loadings than RELATT. EFA returns a one factor solution which suggests that there is only one dimension of religiosity despite the multiple dimensions proposed by some notable scholars as discussed above. Of that underlying latent variable, IMPREL, IMPGOD and RELATT are manifestations and the fact that they are loading onto a common factor and are inter-correlated would be indicative that they are each and on their own, valid indicators of religiosity. How does it transpire when one looks at each sample specifically?

In Table 3, we can see that the majority of cases returned via EFA, one factor solutions. In only 6 cases out of 53 was a 2 factor solution returned and in all these incidences, no substantial loadings onto that second factor were registered. The cases of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Trinidad & Tobago all did not present first factors onto which all three variables were loading substantially (defined as less than 0.3 following Tran (2009)). There are also incidences were a one factor solution onto which all three variables did not load. The cases of Ghana, Mali, and Rwanda, returned 1 factor solutions only not all three variables had substantial loadings. Our conclusion here echoes that made after the correlation analysis – that there is within country specific samples, evidence for the validity of these items

but there are exceptions where EFA is not producing the expected results. This problem is swept aside since factor analysis is not a good method when dealing with highly skewed variables where there is little variance. As such, models where no 1 factor solution onto which all variables load are returned do not necessarily represent a test of validity so well. With this in mind, we conclude that the weight of the evidence points towards a single factor with three attributes. Religiosity is thus measured by standardising these three variables, so that their scales are comparable (OECD, 2008), and averaging them. The resulting index has a Chronbach's alpha of 0.81 (0.71 un-standardised). It is termed RELIGIOSITY and is deemed to be valid within reason across different cultural contexts. Weighting is assumed equal and averaging across the three indicators is used in order to capture the wider gamut of religiosity whilst reducing the likelihood of mis-measurement inherent in a one-item approach.

Table 3: Exploratory factor analysis of indicators of religiosity (varimax rotated solutions)

Sample	IMPREL			IMPGOD			RELATT			Variance	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2
Overall	0.80	-	0.36	0.78	-	0.40	0.62	-	0.61	1.63	n/a
Sample specific											
Andorra	0.78	-	0.40	0.72	-	0.48	0.68	-	0.54	1.58	n/a
Argentina	0.68	-	0.54	0.64	-	0.59	0.63	-	0.61	1.26	n/a
Australia	0.86	-	0.26	0.79	-	0.38	0.73	-	0.47	1.89	n/a
Bulgaria	0.58	-	0.66	0.68	-	0.54	0.52	-	0.73	1.06	n/a
Burk Faso	0.45	-	0.80	0.40	-	0.84	0.39	-	0.85	0.51	n/a
Canada	0.82	-	0.32	0.76	-	0.43	0.70	-	0.50	1.75	n/a
Chile	0.59	-	0.65	0.54	-	0.71	0.54	-	0.71	0.92	n/a
China	0.74	-	0.46	0.75	-	0.44	0.65	-	0.57	1.53	n/a

Sample	IMPREL			IMPGOD			RELATT			Variance	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2
Cyprus	0.61	-	0.62	0.60	-	0.64	0.44	-	0.80	0.94	n/a
Egypt			1.00			0.98			0.98	0.03	0.00
Ethiopia	0.47		0.78			0.92	0.53		0.71	0.55	0.04
Finland	0.82	-	0.32	0.80	-	0.36	0.64	-	0.60	1.72	n/a
France	0.78	-	0.39	0.79	-	0.37	0.66	-	0.57	1.68	n/a
Georgia	0.47	-	0.78	0.51	-	0.74	0.31	-	0.90	0.58	n/a
Germany	0.82	-	0.33	0.83	-	0.31	0.80	-	0.36	2.00	n/a
Ghana	0.49	-	0.76		-	0.94	0.45	-	0.80	0.50	n/a
Great Britain	0.85	-	0.27	0.78	-	0.39	0.73	-	0.47	1.87	n/a
Guatemala	0.52	-	0.73	0.38	-	0.86	0.51	-	0.74	0.67	n/a
Hong Kong	0.55	-	0.69	0.62	-	0.61	0.58	-	0.67	1.03	n/a
India	0.46	-	0.79	0.42	-	0.83	0.39	-	0.85	0.53	n/a
Indonesia	0.40	-	0.84	0.42	-	0.83	0.31	-	0.90	0.43	n/a
Iran	0.49		0.76			0.90	0.39		0.85	0.47	0.02
Iraq	0.43		0.81	0.43		0.81			1.00	0.37	0.00
Italy	0.78	-	0.39	0.76	-	0.43	0.72	-	0.49	1.69	n/a
Japan	0.60	-	0.65	0.63	-	0.60	0.45	-	0.80	0.96	n/a
Jordan	0.31		0.90			0.99	0.32		0.90	0.20	0.01
Mali	0.39	-	0.85	0.36	-	0.87		-	0.96	0.32	n/a
Mexico	0.63	-	0.60	0.50	-	0.75	0.55	-	0.70	0.95	n/a
Moldova	0.67	-	0.55	0.71	-	0.50	0.51	-	0.74	1.22	n/a
Netherlands	0.84	-	0.29	0.80	-	0.36	0.75	-	0.44	1.91	n/a
New Zeal	0.89	-	0.21	0.85	-	0.28	0.78	-	0.39	2.12	n/a
Norway	0.81	-	0.35	0.81	-	0.34	0.65	-	0.58	1.72	n/a
Peru	0.53	-	0.72	0.54	-	0.71	0.44	-	0.80	0.77	n/a
Poland	0.73	-	0.47	0.66	-	0.56	0.63	-	0.61	1.36	n/a
Romania	0.57	-	0.67	0.58	-	0.66	0.42	-	0.83	0.84	n/a
Russian Fed	0.68	-	0.54	0.72	-	0.48	0.65	-	0.57	1.41	n/a
Rwanda		-	0.93		-	0.97		-	0.95	0.15	n/a
Serbia	0.62	-	0.61	0.64	-	0.59	0.54	-	0.71	1.08	n/a
Slovenia	0.76	-	0.42	0.78	-	0.40	0.71	-	0.50	1.68	n/a
South Africa	0.60	-	0.64	0.50	-	0.75	0.57	-	0.68	0.93	n/a
South Korea	0.74	-	0.45	0.75	-	0.44	0.76	-	0.42	1.69	n/a
Spain	0.72	-	0.48	0.76	-	0.42	0.72	-	0.48	1.62	n/a
Sweden	0.75	-	0.44	0.75	-	0.44	0.68	-	0.54	1.58	n/a
Switzerland	0.81	-	0.34	0.74	-	0.45	0.72	-	0.49	1.72	n/a
Taiwan	0.62	-	0.62	0.58	-	0.66	0.51	-	0.74	0.97	n/a
Thailand	0.47	-	0.78	0.45	-	0.79	0.43	-	0.82	0.60	n/a
Trinidad & Tob	0.51		0.73			0.92	0.45		0.80	0.52	0.04

Sample	IMPREL			IMPGOD			RELATT			Variance	
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2
Turkey	0.59	-	0.66	0.55	-	0.69	0.39	-	0.85	0.81	n/a
Ukraine	0.66	-	0.56	0.74	-	0.45	0.72	-	0.48	1.50	n/a
United States	0.83	-	0.30	0.73	-	0.47	0.65	-	0.58	1.64	n/a
Uruguay	0.55	-	0.69	0.50	-	0.75	0.51	-	0.74	0.82	n/a
Viet Nam	0.49	-	0.76	0.51	-	0.74	0.50	-	0.75	0.75	n/a
Zambia	0.50	-	0.75	0.40	-	0.84	0.42	-	0.83	0.59	n/a

3.7 Operationalising political participation

Like religiosity, political participation is also thought of as having distinct dimensions. Verba & Nie (1972) identified four modes of participation. They are voting, campaign activity, communal activity, and particularised contacting. The first two are found only during election times. Voting is an individual's participation in the electoral process. Campaign activity was reflected by measures relating to participation in political campaigns, attending meetings, and persuading others how to vote. Communal activity and particularised contacting are the modes of political activity that take place independently of the election process. It is defined by measures relating to participation in voluntary associations that predominantly aim to solve a local community problem, as well as the contacting of political figures with a social problem in mind. This is distinguished from the final mode of political participation, particularised contacting, which reflects individuals operating on their own by contacting officials with the aim of solving solely a personal problem. These modes of participation were found to bear up in empirical application in a follow-up work by Verba, Nie & Kim

(1978), where they were tested using data from seven countries with distinct cultural backgrounds.

The establishment of cross-cultural validity is encouraging but Verba and his colleagues did not account for the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation. Such a distinction can be found in the work of Barnes & Kaase (1979) for whom conventional political participation could be thought of as encompassing such things as political discussion, party organisation, attendance of political meetings, whilst the unconventional forms of participation were considered to be inclusive of boycotts, illegal strikes, damage to property and violence against the person. This distinction can be criticised however for over-simplifying things by ignoring internal sub-divisions within the categories of conventional and unconventional participation. For instance Sabucedo & Arce (1991) found that political participation was divided along two meaningful dimensions, the first of which was 'within system versus out of system' which can be easily mapped onto the dimensions of conventional and unconventional. The second empirical dimension that was found corresponded to whether or not the action was perceived of as 'progressive versus conservative'. The resulting typology of Sabucedo & Acre of political participation was fourfold. The four types of political participation, two of which might be seen as conventional and two unconventional, were: (1) electoral persuasion – political meetings, persuading others; (2) conventional participation – voting, correspondence with the press, legal public demonstrations, authorised strikes; (3) violent participation –damage to private property and armed violence; (4) direct non-

violent participation – boycotts, non-authorised strikes, non-authorised demonstrations, taking possession of buildings and disrupting traffic.

The WVS contains several items pertaining to the concepts of conventional and unconventional political participation. Conventional political participation is understood as behaviour that takes place within the executive or legislative branches of the political system (however democratic or otherwise). Thus, two possible indicators of political party involvement are available. The first is:

Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organisations. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organisation (read out and code one answer for each organisation) [...] Political Party [...]

2. Active member

1. Inactive member

 0. Don't belong

This sub-item is subsequently referred to as PARTY. It is a sub-item that is part of wider series of questions discussed below in relation to the concept of civil society. It is recoded as 1-0 with categories 1 and 2 collapsed into one category that is representative of overall participation, be it active or inactive.

The second item measuring political party participation as an indicator of conventional political participation is as follows:

Did you vote in your country's recent elections to the national parliament?

1 Yes

2 No

This item is subsequently referred to as VOTE. It is recoded as 1-0 with 1 representing having voted. Such self-reported indicators of voting behaviour have been noted to be subject to social-desirability response bias (Katosh & Traugott, 1981; Anderson & Silver, 1986). However Katosh & Traugott found that alternating between a validated and self-reported measurement of voting behaviour did nothing to alter the empirical relationship between voting and its various predictors. Additionally, this indicator is not too likely to be misunderstood across country contexts since voting is not an abstract concept but a real process common across the globe, regardless of how free and fair elections might be. Thus, we can conclude such a measure to have content validity although some questions of reliability remain.

Concerning party membership, we resort to something akin to criterion or construct validity. It is not quite exactly either of these since we do not have a criterion variable whilst we do not know enough about party participation across the full spectrum of development in order to attempt construct validation through comparison to a conceptually distinct variable that bears a cast-iron empirical relationship. What is done is to compare PARTY to a variable that is *highly likely* to bear an empirical relationship to it. Respondents to the WVS were asked:

I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? [...] Political parties

1 A great deal

2 Quite a lot

3 Not very much

4 None at all

This variable was reverse coded so that high numbers represent greater confidence in political parties and is referred to as CONFPARTY. It stands to reason that those involved in political parties would be more likely than those who are not to have more confidence in them. PARTY was regressed on CONFPARTY (for full details see the Appendix B). Indeed, across all countries, CONFPARTY bares a positive relationship to PARTY although the amount of explained variance as measured by pseudo-R^2 is not very great. Within countries, in the vast majority of cases, the relationship is both positive and significant. There are some exceptions, enough to raise some doubts, but nothing to challenge one's perception that this is a valid measurement given the weight of the evidence. The amount of explanatory power does vary from country to country but this variance is not especially large. Thus, we term PARTY a valid measurement if not quite exact.

Indicators of unconventional political participation are also available in the WVS. Respondents were asked if they had ever or would ever participate in a particular form of unconventional political action in recent times. The exact wording was:

Have you or have you not done any of these activities in the last 5 years?

	Have done	Not done
Signing a petition	1	2

Joining in boycotts	1	2
Attending peaceful/lawful demonstrations	1	2

These items are subsequently referred to as PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST. These variables were selected as the best way of measuring unconventional political participation as they specifically identify a time scale – i.e. the last 5 years. Alternative approaches in the WVS have no such time scale. This is a problem because if I protested when I was 21 and am now 81, this approach would identify me as a protester, even though that was a long time ago. The approach used here is best as it locates unconventional activity close to the specific point in the life course when it is taking place. These items are all recoded as 1-0 with 1 representing a positive score.

3.7.1 Exploratory factor analysis of indicators of political participation

An attempt at validation of these variables is attempted using EFA. As the literature often points not only to a conceptual distinction but also a repertoire of political action of which some tend to specialise in some activities more than others (Verba & Nie, 1972), it is expected that PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST will all load onto one common factor representing the unconventional mode of political participation. Furthermore, it is expected that PARTY and VOTE will load onto a different common factor representing conventional political participation. People tend to specialise in some political methods over others but also will use the appropriate method when it is most suitable. Thus, we expect some correlation between these two dimensions in line with Barnes & Kasse

(1979) and allow for this by using an oblique method of rotation in our EFA (promax). Since all these variables are binary, a tetrachoric correlation matrix is first computed as the basis for our EFA. EFA was asked to return 2 factors. This process is carried out across and within countries.

The results of EFA can be found in full in Table 4. To summarise, overall it is the case that PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST all load onto a common factor (1) whilst VOTE and PETITION onto a separate factor (2). The factor loadings are strongest for factor 1 with all above 0.7, suggesting that those who sign petitions also are likely to boycott and protest. On factor 2, the loadings of VOTE and PARTY are substantially lower and are surpassed by their uniqueness. This is probably down to the possibility that party members are likely to vote but most voters are not party members. We conclude that there is overall a conventional and an unconventional dimension of political participation. The repertoire of the latter is much more predictable than that of the former. Indeed, it is also true that there is a weighty correlation between both factors at 0.55 suggesting that although people can specialise in different behaviours, specialisation is not always at the expense of other methods.

Table 4: Exploratory factor analysis (promax rotations) of conventional and unconventional political participation

	VOTE			PARTY			PETITION			BOYCOTT			PROTEST			Factor 1		Factor 2		Correlation
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Factor 1	Factor 2	Unique	Variance	Proportion	Variance	Proportion	
Overall		0.37	0.87		0.39	0.80	0.71		0.52	0.82		0.30	0.73		0.45	1.85	1.09	0.86	0.51	0.55
Andorra		0.50	0.74		0.46	0.79	0.72		0.41	0.79		0.41	0.77		0.42	1.79	1.03	0.66	0.38	0.31
Argentina			0.93		0.52	0.73	0.82		0.32	0.43	0.43	0.45	0.80		0.33	1.81	0.96	1.10	0.58	0.49
Australia	0.32		0.90		0.40	0.84	0.82		0.33	0.84		0.28	0.68		0.43	1.96	1.03	0.32	0.17	0.11
Brazil		0.82	0.34	0.39		0.78	0.72		0.48	0.90	-0.38	0.10	0.92		0.06	2.32	0.70	0.93	0.28	0.08
Bulgaria		0.68	0.57		0.64	0.53	0.84		0.31	0.98		0.06	0.81		0.31	2.42	0.78	1.05	0.34	0.28
Burkina Faso		0.56	0.76		0.42	0.77	0.43	0.40	0.47	0.91		0.16	0.90		0.20	2.20	0.95	1.37	0.59	0.56
Canada			0.91		0.42	0.79	0.77		0.47	0.87		0.23	0.70		0.29	2.10	1.01	0.80	0.39	0.45
Chile		0.45	0.80			0.97	0.84		0.30	0.67		0.55	0.74		0.40	1.72	1.01	0.29	0.17	-0.14
Cyprus		0.45	0.82		0.45	0.67	0.75		0.39	0.86		0.27	0.89		0.21	2.28	0.96	0.73	0.31	0.36
Ethiopia		0.40	0.81	0.50		0.77	0.95		0.12	0.88		0.23	0.73	0.30	0.23	2.62	0.98	0.70	0.26	0.35
Finland		0.52	0.69		0.47	0.80	0.71		0.47	0.80		0.30	0.82		0.38	1.89	0.98	0.73	0.38	0.31
France		0.40	0.85		0.46	0.57	0.73		0.49	0.70		0.49	0.72		0.33	2.01	1.07	1.18	0.63	0.57
Georgia		0.34	0.89		0.39	0.76	0.87		0.31	0.85		0.14	0.84		0.28	2.37	0.97	0.81	0.33	0.43
Germany		0.55	0.72		0.52	0.68	0.75		0.40	0.75		0.43	0.79		0.38	1.98	1.01	1.12	0.57	0.52
Ghana		0.43	0.82		0.39	0.81	0.76		0.39	0.81		0.34	0.66		0.59	1.73	1.05	0.51	0.31	0.29
GB		0.80	0.34		0.84	0.29	0.91		0.16	0.85		0.25	0.99		0.01	2.54	0.51	1.41	0.28	0.02
India			0.92		0.46	0.80	0.50		0.54	0.98		0.21	0.80		0.20	2.22	1.04	1.56	0.74	0.77
Indonesia			0.93		0.35	0.76	0.43		0.62	0.80		0.35	0.72		0.46	1.67	1.11	0.80	0.53	0.50
Japan		0.55	0.71		0.52	0.68	0.71		0.45	0.54		0.71	0.66		0.58	1.45	1.04	0.97	0.69	0.52
Malaysia		0.65	0.62		0.59	0.58	0.69		0.53	0.77		0.39	0.88		0.23	1.99	0.79	1.04	0.41	0.36
Mali		0.36	0.88		0.36	0.67	0.67		0.60	0.73		0.42	0.67		0.47	1.75	1.15	0.86	0.56	0.52
Mexico		0.60	0.69		0.38	0.82	0.69		0.42	0.91		0.29	0.60		0.47	1.83	0.94	0.99	0.51	0.46

	VOTE Factor 1	VOTE Factor 2	VOTE Unique	PARTY Factor 1	PARTY Factor 2	PARTY Unique	PETITION Factor 1	PETITION Factor 2	PETITION Unique	BOYCOTT Factor 1	BOYCOTT Factor 2	BOYCOTT Unique	PROTEST Factor 1	PROTEST Factor 2	PROTEST Unique	Factor 1 Variance	Factor 1 Proportion	Factor 2 Variance	Factor 2 Proportion	Correlation
Moldova		0.41	0.87		0.39	0.77	0.69		0.55	0.85		0.28	0.50		0.57	1.71	1.02	0.98	0.59	0.58
Morocco		0.57	0.69	0.70	0.38		0.64		0.29	0.83		0.32	0.85		0.24	2.51	0.88	1.92	0.67	0.61
Neth		0.53	0.70	0.55		0.69	0.71		0.47	0.75		0.48	0.70		0.45	1.77	1.03	1.06	0.62	0.51
Norway		0.44	0.72	0.47		0.80	0.64		0.62	0.73		0.42	0.66		0.54	1.56	1.05	0.78	0.53	0.46
Peru		0.35	0.89	0.51		0.74	0.75		0.44	0.77		0.43	0.50	0.32	0.51	1.58	1.03	0.82	0.54	0.41
Poland		0.35	0.84	0.32		0.91	0.74		0.35	0.85		0.29	0.51	0.40	0.37	1.96	0.99	1.12	0.56	0.52
Romania			0.94	0.71		0.50	0.73		0.18	1.02		0.13	0.78		0.18	2.56	0.89	1.44	0.50	0.51
Russ fed		0.30	0.89			0.97	0.63		0.43	0.88		0.27	0.73		0.43	1.88	1.07	0.65	0.37	0.47
Serbia		0.48	0.79	0.52		0.72	0.73		0.34	0.92		0.16	0.92		0.20	2.42	0.97	1.19	0.47	0.53
Slovenia		0.48	0.77	0.52		0.74	0.59		0.53	0.81		0.31	0.81		0.40	1.75	0.90	0.76	0.39	0.33
South Africa		0.36	0.83			0.83	0.66		0.58	0.88		0.22	0.86		0.21	2.06	1.04	0.43	0.22	0.25
South Korea			0.94	0.38		0.75	0.78		0.41	0.73		0.44	0.68		0.37	1.87	1.08	0.55	0.31	0.33
Sweden		0.49	0.77	0.50		0.71	0.73		0.48	0.67		0.51	0.70		0.51	1.54	0.92	0.62	0.37	0.27
Switz		0.55	0.67	0.55		0.70	0.60		0.59	0.55		0.65	0.64		0.63	1.32	1.04	1.00	0.78	0.54
Taiwan		0.56	0.72	0.43		0.75	0.93		0.24	0.84		0.21	0.63		0.37	2.35	0.96	1.46	0.59	0.61
Thailand		0.48	0.76	0.36		0.74	0.69		0.56	0.82		0.32	0.73		0.36	1.90	1.02	0.60	0.32	0.29
Trin & Tob[3]	1.01	0.00		0.30		0.88	0.93		0.11	1.01		0.04	0.94		0.01	2.85	0.69	1.33	0.32	-0.24
Turkey			0.89	0.38		0.86	0.91		0.20	0.97		0.02	0.98		0.02	2.90	0.97	0.19	0.06	-0.15
Ukraine	1.06	0.00		0.43		0.68	0.89		0.28	0.39	0.77	0.01	0.88		0.22	2.32	0.53	2.20	0.51	0.41
USA		0.71	0.37	0.77		0.46	0.60		0.53	0.74		0.46	0.71		0.50	1.88	0.86	1.66	0.75	0.54
Viet Nam	0.98		0.05	1.00	0.00		0.46		0.77	0.98		0.04	0.93		0.12	3.02	0.60	1.08	0.22	0.15
Zambia		0.44	0.82	0.47		0.63	0.71		0.48	0.79		0.40	0.74		0.30	2.08	1.05	1.25	0.63	0.59

[3] A so-called Heywood case with an incidence of a negative uniqueness – to be interpreted with caution but given the solution to this model fits the general pattern both across and within countries, it is not too much of a problem.

When we look within countries, we see a similar pattern. In all countries, PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST all loaded onto factor 1 (although there were some incidences of cross-loadings). The difference was in the loadings onto factor 2 – often VOTE and PARTY would load onto the same factor but sometimes one or the other or both would be absent or would cross-load. Correlations between the two factors also varied in strength.

It is difficult to infer convergent/divergent validity in this case since these are concrete and real behaviours that whilst they may very well be reflective of the same concept or not, do not have to be present together in real life simultaneously. In short correlation is not the same as causation as we all know, and equally not the same as conceptual belonging. Also, there is no reason why in some incidences, voters for example might not be using the unconventional repertoire as they are particularly radicalised due to political circumstance and thus it does not necessarily mean we have non-validity. However, the fact that PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST are being responded to in the same manner across all countries suggests that these items are being understood in the same manner. Given that the questions are fairly similar, and that there is a recurring pattern within countries, we can be reasonably confident of validity regarding our measures of unconventional political participation.

3.8 Operationalising civil society

Civil society is conceived of by Anheier et al. (2004) as being composed of four distinct dimensions. They are: (1) structural – measuring the scale of civil society in terms of it actual numbers, including measures of economic,

social and organisational composition; (2) legal and political space – the extent to which civil society actors are free to move, as guaranteed mostly by law; (3) impact-related – the actual contributions and effect upon society at large; and (4) value-related – pertaining to the norms and cultural expectations of civil society.

Malena & Heinrich (2007) build upon the framework of Anheier et al. They provide an extended list of valid indicators for each dimension, although no empirical validation is undertaken. The first dimension is structure and looks to assess the extent of civil society organisation within a country. It has the following attributes: (1) the breadth of citizen participation – stressing the extent of civil society organisation in terms of its spread across wider society with indicators being the number of individuals who participate in non-partisan politics, donate to charity, belong to civil society organisations, do volunteer work, or participate in collective community activities; (2) depth of citizen participation – the frequency and extent of individuals' engagement with indicators being how much time and effort the devote along with the number of associational memberships they have; (3) diversity within civil society – the extent to which civil society is open to the meek and marginalised, as indicated by the level of female and minority involvement along with rural populations; (4) level of organisation – being the stability and maturity as well as the ability to exert a collective will as indicated by the presence of broad coalitions within civil society, both internally and internationally; (5) interrelations – the extent that organisations are communicating with one another; (6) resources – the

amount that civil society has to offer, in terms of its financial, human, and technological resources.

The second dimension of Malena & Heinrich pertains to the environment in which civil society actors operate. It is not part of civil society itself, but outlays the rules of the game, which either enable of disable action. This dimension is focusing on whether or not democratic rights such as freedom of conscience and assembly, along with regime stability (political, economic, societal), are present.

The third dimension of civil society described by Malena & Heinrich, reflects the values that individual actors hold, practice and promulgate. Reflective values pertain to support of democracy, transparency, tolerance, non-violence, gender equity, poverty eradication, and environmental stability, and it is stressed that not every actor within civil society will hold them. Thus, the ratio of those who uphold civil society values versus those who do not, is taken as the approved country-level indicator.

The fourth dimension of civil society is the impact that is has on wider society. It deals with the level of activity and how effectual and successful it might be. This encompasses four indicators, these being the influence on public policy, the holding of state and private corporations to account, response to social interests, and the empowering of citizens.

The approach of Malena & Heinrich and Anheier et al. is very well developed. It provides a conception of civil society that allows us to grasp what civil society is, who its actors are, what they believe, and what they can achieve

within the limits imposed upon them by the social order. They provide a powerful theoretical construct and an abundance of indicators are put forward. However, here we only need concern ourselves with dimension 1, namely that concerning structure because we are interested in the effects of religiosity on individual behaviour in civil society. Thus, voluntary organisations are taken as our indicator of civil society participation.

Voluntary associations are also identified as indicators of civil society by Fukuyama (2001). Civil society organisations are by nature, voluntary, autonomous, and are capable of collective action in pursuit of common interests (Anheier et al., 2004). What sort of organisations can be included within this umbrella concept? Diamond (1994) identifies in total seven distinct types. They are (1) economic – organisations representing the interests of production and commerce; (2) cultural – representing ethnic or religious interests that promote or protect rights and cultural practices; (3) informational and educational – organisations devoted to promulgation of ideas and information; (4) interest-based – representing the interests of certain groups such as pensioners or war veterans; (5) developmental – organisations looking to improve the quality of community life; (6) issue-orientated – representing some sort of cause such as environmental protection or land reform; (7) civic – nonpartisan groups working to improve the political system in a manner supportive of democracy.

It has already been noted that civil society does not always attract virtuous characters. Civil society should be operationalised to include all types of organisation and actors, regardless of their ideological colour. Additionally,

with regard to the problem of comparing across countries, Malena & Heinrich (2007) state that whilst civil society is distinct within countries in its particular flavour, nevertheless they have enough in common to allow us to make comparisons.

The WVS contains two approaches that could be used to serve this purpose, that have been employed at different times in different waves. The first reads as follows:

Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organisations. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organisation (read out and code one answer for each organisation)

	Active member	Inactive member	Don't belong
Church or religious organization	2	1	0
Sport or recreational organization	2	1	0
Art, music or educational organization	2	1	0
Labour union	2	1	0
Political party	2	1	0
Environmental organization	2	1	0
Professional association	2	1	0
Humanitarian or charitable organization	2	1	0
Consumer organization	2	1	0
Any other (write in)	2	1	0

Such items are usually treated by summing them, and then either treating the summations as either a count variable or recoding them into a binary variable (*e.g.* Curtis et al. 1992, Ruiter & De Graaf 2006). This approach is

termed *total aggregation*. A more subtle approach to aggregation of these sub-items has been proposed by Van der Meer et al. (2009). They argued that the civil society voluntary associations could be classified into three broad categories. They were: (1) activist organisations – such as environmental organisations, humanitarian groups and peace organisations; (2) interest organisations – such as trade unions, professional associations and consumer groups; and (3) leisure organisations – such as sports clubs, cultural and social organisations.

Van der Meer et al.'s classification system is based on the "primary aims" of the voluntary association in question[4]. Leisure organisations are aimed towards the personal sphere, interest organisations concern themselves with the market, and activist organisations focus their attention on the state. Leisure organisations exist to offer opportunities to socialise. Interest organisations serve to advance or defend the interests of a particular social group. By contrast, activist organisations exist to advance the cause of others beyond the immediate social circles of the activists themselves. Strong differences were recorded across countries in terms of frequency of occurrence, and patterns of correlates differed across organisation types. These differences show that total aggregation can be dangerous and that important distinctions could be lost. This is not to say there are not similarities among groups, in terms of correlates (Van der Meer et al., 2009).

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[4] It is worth noting that this system of classification was done theoretically and not empirically due to the fact that constraints on the individual's time budget mean that one is often likely only to participate in one organisation if at all, and thus any method that looks for correlations from which to infer conceptual belonging of types of behaviour, would be of limited value simply because in the real (busy) world, they are unlikely to exist together – there are simply not enough hours in a day!

Van der Meer et al. attempt to find a system of aggregation that does not fall into the pitfall of total aggregation whereby important differences might be lost in terms of patterns of correlates. They pose a solution whereby the researcher finds somewhere reminiscent of the middle ground between total aggregation and none at all. Nevertheless, an intermediate level of aggregation still may result in the problem associated with total aggregation, and this is because they base their system of classification on the commonality of aims of the different groups rather than on the specific locations of society from which they stem. By way of example this can be better explained. Take Arthur Scargill, former British miners' union leader and Digby Jones, former leader of the *British City Board of Industry*. Under Van der Meer et al.'s system of classification, both would qualify as being involved in interest organisations and thus would be lumped together in the same analysis. Yet both have strongly contrasting social backgrounds (bourgeois vs. proletarian) that entail separate interests and thus advocate the positions of totally opposing social types (bosses vs. workers). How could we expect a regression of interest group activity on class background in this case to be trustworthy? Van der Meer et al.'s approach is welcome and technically very impressive but they are liable to falling into the very trap they hoped to avoid.

Ultimately, any system of aggregation will lead to problems of correlates being obscured. Perhaps it is best just to select those organisations that are of theoretical interest and avoid aggregation altogether? Another criticism that can be levelled at Van der Meer et al. is that they do not allow for

organisations that provide welfare services and that some organisations, such as religious organisations escape classification. For instance, religious organisations can advocate religious positions, or those of the oppressed and downtrodden, or provide services of the sick and needy, or opportunities to socialise and pass the time – thus, what are they? The variety of religious organisations has been evidenced by Chaves & Tsitsos (2001). Best, is to select those groups that are of substantive interest as identified by theory and where possible avoid aggregation altogether.

Thus, this study selects only those items measuring civil society involvement that are reflective of some sort of desire to organise the world along religious lines, rather than focus on organisations that only go as far as to meet a desire, as this is more in keeping with our theory. Four items are selected as being of particular theoretical interest. Religious organisations are seen as of interest as they represent that niche of civil society that is on religion's own terms. This variable is termed RELORG. It is through charities and humanitarian organisations that civil society is found to be at its most politically involved and influential, whilst religion has always been historically involved in both. Thus charitable/humanitarian organisations are chosen and this variable is termed CHARORG. The environmental movement is seen as part of the new politics (Norris, 2002) and is perhaps archetypal as a new social movement, since it makes no appeal to traditional class-based politics. Thus, environmental organisations is selected and termed ENVORG. Lastly, art, music, or educational

organisations[5] are chosen, since religion often wants to impose itself on society, and culture and education are important battle grounds in this regard. Debates over evolution and decency in popular culture in the United States testify to this. This variable is termed CULTORG. All these variables are re-coded in the same fashion as PARTY, so that simple binary measurements, spanning active and inactive organisational memberships are produced.

One imperfection of these items is that they only measure if someone is involved in voluntary associations or not; they do not however measure the number of associations to which one belongs (Norris, 2002). Thus, someone with 1 association membership will score equally with someone with several memberships. These items are taken as valid in terms of the content for the breadth of civil society, but not the depth (Malena & Heinrich, 2007). There are also some questions relating to their reliability. Morales (2002) has argued that the wording of the questions can have substantial impact on measurements and that there are both effects pertaining to the principal investigators of the survey in question (house effects) and effects produced by different waves of the same series (within-house effects). In criticism, she is far too keen to point out discrepancies without stating that her own data show a lot of consistency within some measurements and as such, it appears she is extenuating the negative.

Again, we attempt something similar to criterion or content validation. Using the same wording as used in CONFPARTY, respondents were asked how

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[5] Subsequently referred to as cultural/educational organisations for brevity's sake.

much confidence they had in religious institutions, charitable/humanitarian organisations, and the environmental movement. These variables were all reverse coded in the same manner as before and are termed CONFREL, CONFCHAR, and CONFENV respectively. In the case of RELORG, overall it is positively linked to CONFREL. Within countries, the effect is near uniformly positive and significant with only 6 exceptions, of which the Peruvian case is the only one to show a significant (and negative) relationship. The amount of variance explained in these regressions tends to be small but not insubstantial by social science standards. Additionally, there is little variance in this amount as measured by pseudo R^2. A similar story can be told of CHARORG in its relationship to CONFCHAR – only 14 cases did not show a positive and significant relationship. There is variance in both the magnitude of the β-coefficient and pseudo R^2 but not too much. The case of ENVORG is slightly more troubling. Overall, the relationship with CONFENV is as expected – positive and significant. When one looks with countries problems emerge - 21 out of 54 cases did not return positive and significant effects of CONFENV. Of these, only 7 were negatively related. Pseudo R^2 was again low and relatively invariant. Thus, we conclude that the weight of the evidence points towards successful measurement. Those cases where the expected results were not found may not necessarily mean lack of successful measurement – it could be that in these countries the environmental movement for instance has been unsuccessful so that confidence is low amongst members. The evidence presented is not intended to be unequivocal but only as a pointer towards validity and thus we persist with each dependent variable analysed so far despite their imperfections as

the methods used so far have not been sufficient to damn them in their entirety. For fuller description of these analyses of validity, the reader is referred to Appendix B. No exploration of CULTORG was possible as no variable was immediately forthcoming to validate it. We generalise from the other dependent variables that this is likely to be valid since in most cases the other variables seem valid[6].

3.9 Operationalising modernisation

The concept of modernisation is often split between that of the individual and that of the wider social milieu (Yi, 2006). The idea of modernity being split between the individual and the institution is also found in the work of Smith & Inkeles (1966). They write:

"The term may refer to two quite different objects. As used to describe a society, 'modern' generally means a national state characterised by a complex of traits including urbanisation, high levels of education, industrialisation, extensive mechanisation, high rates of social mobility, and the like. When applied to individuals, it refers to a set of attitudes, values, and ways of feeling and acting, presumably of the sort either generated by or required for effective participation in a modern society." (p353).

Again, we see here modernity divided between the individual and the institution, but that both tend to accompany each other. Indicators of individual modernity include: a sense of efficaciousness, openness to new experiences, forward-thinking, civic-mindedness, a scientific worldview, autonomous decision making, and belief in control over fertility and reproduction. Smith & Inkeles found, using data from Argentina, Chile,

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[6] Participation in civil society tends to be positively related to higher social statuses, as we saw in Chapter 2. A quick look at Table 18 shows CULTORG is positively linked to higher educational attainment and subjective social class.

India, Pakistan, Israel, and Nigeria, that the scale they derived from the above mentioned indicators was internally consistent within contexts. These findings have been challenged by Armer & Schnaiberg (1972) who replicated Smith & Inkeles' scale. They found overall that these approaches had reasonably internal consistency as assessed through convergent validation but failed tests of divergent validation – indicators conceptually related to modernity were found to have a stronger relationship to theoretically distinct concepts (namely alienation, anomie and socio-economic status) than they did to each other.

At the macro-level, VVD & CGG[7] found by using factor analysis that certain indicators of modernisation were all loading onto a common factor. The indicators they selected as representative of modernisation were: literacy rate, urban population ration, percentage of people living in towns, per capita consumption of electricity, number of automobiles, work force composition, road coverage, agricultural mechanisation, wealth, and number in higher education.

In the last chapter it was argued that development and modernisation may be thought of as synonymous as they share common indicators. The most influential approach to measuring development is through the Human Development index (HDI) which is compiled by the United Nations. It is measuring three indicators of development, namely, life-expectancy, standard of living (GDP per capita in dollars adjusted for PPP), and level of education. It has been criticised for the equal weighting of its component

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[7] This is how these authors are credited. What these initials stand for is anyone's guess.

measures (Despotis, 2005). Elsewhere, Lai (2003) has shown that with weights derived empirically and using principal component analysis, that different rankings will emerge with different weightings, but that the original HDI with assumed equal weighting is closely correlated with its weighted cousin. However, the HDI is taken as valid as it has criterion validity due to its correlation with internet usage and CO_2 output which are taken as sound indicators of modernisation[8].

For the purposes of this thesis, modernisation is treated as something that is a property of countries which is deemed to weaken or strengthen the relationship between religion and forms of political and civil society participation. Modernisation is measured by the human development index (HDI) made available by the United Nations. Scores range from between 0 and 1 with higher scores indicative of greater development. The HDI was used by Norris & Inglehart (2004) as an indicator of modernisation. They stress that its advantage is that it provides more clues as to the condition of the actual living conditions of human beings, than purely monetary measures such as GDP per capita.

3.10 Operationalising the separation of religion and state

Separation of religion and state is measured using the Religion and State index (RAS) as developed by Fox (2006; 2008). This measures:

"(a) state support for one or more religions either officially or in practice; (b) state hostility toward religion; (c) comparative government treatment of different religions, including both benefits and restrictions; (d) government restrictions on the practice of religion by religious

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[8] The relationships between these variables and others can be seen by following this link: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data-explorer

minorities; (e) government regulation of the majority religion; and (f) legislation of religious laws" (Fox, 2006).

As we can see, in terms of content validity, this index is clearly measuring both the extent to which religious institutions are beholden to the state and the extent to which it imposes constraints on religious activity. Thus, it fits very nicely with the theoretical ideas of Stark & Finke outlined in the last chapter. Data are taken from 2002 as it is the closest time point to the WVS data. In its original form, it runs from 0 to 77.6, with the United States comprising the zero-point whilst Saudi Arabia has the maximum score. So that it represents separation of religion and state, it is reverse coded. The resulting variable is referred to as RAS.

Because its methodology derives from qualitative binary coding undertaken by a team of expert researchers, it is assumed that there is not too much measurement error as the compilers will have acquired direct knowledge of state-religious affairs. It is also found to be strongly correlated with the level of religious pluralism (r=0.66, countries =55)[9], as we might expect from Stark & Finke, as religious pluralism presupposes religious freedom in their line of thinking (Stark & Finke, 2000). However, there is the problem of equal weighting with us once more and Fox's solution is to brush it aside because he cannot think of a better one (Fox, 2006). Whilst factor analytic methods might provide a better weighting system, we would not expect a different weighting to radically alter the index from its original form.

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[9] The index of pluralism is measured as $1-\sum p_i^2$ with p being the probability of belonging to the ith denomination (Voas et al., 2002) and using WVS data. Higher values mean greater pluralism. For details of denominational classification, see below.

3.11 Control variables

To ensure that effects are independent of other effects and that we are not dealing with spurious correlations, controls are applied within our models at both the individual and country-levels. Denominational affiliation was measured using two questions. The first asked: "Do you belong to a religious denomination?" Responses were either yes or no. Those who answered in the affirmative were then asked to identify the denomination in question. From these two items, one variable was constructed, with those answering in the negative to the first question coded as having no denominational identification. The rest were classified as belonging to the major world religions – namely Catholicism (CATHOLIC), Protestantism (PROTESTANT), Orthodoxy (ORTHODOX), Islam (MUSLIM), Judaism (JEW), Hinduism (HINDU), and Buddhism (BUDDHIST). Finally, those who were not easily classified were lumped together in an 'other' category (OTHER). Gender was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male (FEMALE). Age was measured in years (AGE). Education was measured as either 'low', 'medium', or 'high' (EDUC). Class was identified on a 5-point scale based on respondents' subjective self-appraisal (CLASS). Finally, post-material values were measured using the 4-item index provided in the data set (POSTMAT). This measures whether people value maintaining order in the nation, giving people more say in political decision making, fighting rising prices, and protecting freedom of speech (Carmines & Layman, 1997). Extensive research has been undertaken to assert its validity (Carmines & Layman, 1997). It is treated as a continuous variable. In addition to the HDI and RAS, the level of political freedom is controlled for at the country-level, by the Polity IV index

(Marshall & Jaggers, 2001). This ranges from -10 to 10 and represents the opposing poles of autocracy and democracy (POL_IV).

3.12 Summary

It is necessary to note that measurement invariance at the individual level is unlikely across country contexts. We can however demonstrate validity if not reliability. Conclusions however must be taken with a pinch of salt as such problems are only ever managed and not surmounted in comparative research. This has to be defended on pragmatic grounds, as if comparative social scientists insisted on strict measurement invariance then simply there would be no comparative social science. Furthermore, Adcock & Collier (2001) make the point that evidence of validity is only ever indicative and never final and this is what I have demonstrated. If the reader has any doubts remaining, then they would do well to read the next few chapters wherein consistency in the relationships is often evidenced whilst clear patterns in the effects of religiosity are seen across countries – if indeed the data were nonsensical due to their incomparability, then this would not be occurring. The effect may be impressionistic but like all impressionist paintings, recognisable forms can still be seen.

This chapter has taken extensive care to select data and measurements that are best suited to answering the research questions proposed in Chapter 2. The WVS was chosen as a data source because it contains the widest range of countries in order to fully gauge the effects of modernisation and religious freedom. Appropriate items for the key individual level dependent variables and independent variables were selected based on previous approaches and

their content validity. These were then validated empirically. Finally, a discussion of the operationalization of the key macro-level variables was provided, with valid measurements proposed. Now we have our theory, data and our measurements, it is time to put them to work with some empirical analyses, starting with conventional political participation and religiosity.

Chapter 4 – The effect of country context on the relationship between religiosity and conventional political participation

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the effect of religiosity on conventional participation as moderated by the country-level context. The qualities of the hosting country that may moderate this relationship were identified in Chapter 2, by drawing on the two competing macro-level theories of the sociology of religion, namely secularisation theory and religious economies theory. The two macro-level variables that were identified in Chapter 2 and operationalised in Chapter 3 were the country's level of modernisation and level of separation of religion and state. It was argued that modernisation would have the effect of reducing the effect of religiosity on conventional political participation (Hypothesis 1), whilst the level of separation of religion and state would have an increasing effect (Hypothesis 4). This chapter is concerned with testing these hypotheses. This is done using the WVS along with those macro-level data sources identified in Chapter 3. Analyses are conducted of two indicators of conventional political participation, namely voting (VOTE) and membership of a political party (PARTY). Multi-level logistic regression models are estimated in order to test these theories.

It is found that voting behaviour does not vary across countries as measured by their level of modernisation or their level of separation of religion and state. It is concluded that the effect of religiosity is positive on voting behaviour. Thus, both Hypotheses 1 and 4 do not find confirmation with regard to voting. Regarding participation in political parties, it is found that

the likelihood of participation is increasing in line with the country level of modernisation but showing no variation with separation of religion and state. Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 4 are in these instances also not confirmed.

4.2 Modelling conventional political participation

Both dependent variables, PARTY and VOTE are binary in nature and so the appropriate form of analyses would be the logistic family of regression models. However, it is not appropriate to run a standard logistic regression model since we have clustered data, whereby individuals are found to be nested within countries. This presents a mathematical problem for us since the assumption of the independence of observations, made when running logistic regressions, is violated. This is potentially a problem as it leads to the underestimation of standard errors which would affect significance testing and could lead to Type I errors whereby true null hypotheses are rejected (Hox, 2010; Luke, 2004; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Accordingly, multi-level models are estimated that account for this problem (Hox, 2010, Luke, 2004; Snijders & Bosker, 1999).

For both dependent variables the same modelling procedure is carried out. *All* models are estimated using HLM 6.06 and with full maximum-likelihood estimation. First, an empty model is estimated whereby the dependent variable is regressed without any predictor variables (Model 1) along with a random intercept component. This allows us to decompose the variance in the dependent variable between micro and macro levels. Next, the dependent variable in question is regressed on the index of religiosity (RELIGIOSITY) compiled in Chapter 3, in order to estimate its direct effect along with

random slope and random intercept components (Model 2). Then controls are introduced at the individual level for denominational affiliation (Model 3). This in order to separate out from the effect of RELIGIOSITY any faith-specific effects, which might be compounding its effect. Further controls for basic individual characteristics and socio-demographics are then introduced (Model 4), in order to weed out confounding statistical influences and to test for spurious dependencies. These controls are age (AGE), gender (FEMALE), educational attainment (EDUC), subjective social class (CLASS), and post-material values (POSTMAT). Additionally, a quadratic term is fitted for age (AGE^2). Once these possible individual level effects have been accounted for, controls are introduced at the macro-level. They measure the level of modernity (HDI), the level of separation of religion and state (RAS), and the level of democracy (POL_IV) (Model 5). Then two further models are estimated. First, a model is estimated with a cross-level interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and HDI (Model 6). This is in order to test Hypothesis 1. Subsequently, a model is estimated with a cross-level interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and RAS (Model 7), so that we can test Hypothesis 4. This completes the modelling process, which is carried out for both the dependent variables, PARTY and VOTE.

Model 6 is expressed algebraically in the equation below. Model 7 is identical except that the interaction is between RELIGIOSITY and RAS:

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_{ij}}{1 - \pi_{ij}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1.RELIGIOSITY_{ij} + \beta_2.CATHOLIC_{ij} + \beta_3.PROTESTANT_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_4.ORTHODOX_{ij} + \beta_5.MUSLIM_{ij} + \beta_6.JEW_{ij} + \beta_7.HINDU_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_8.BUDDHIST_{ij} + \beta_9.OTHER_{ij} + \beta_{10}.FEMALE_{ij} + \beta_{11}.AGE_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_{12}.AGE^2{}_{ij} + \beta_{13}.EDUC\_MID_{ij} + \beta_{14}.EDUC\_HIGH_{ij} + \beta_{15}.CLASS2_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_{16}.CLASS3_{ij} + \beta_{17}.CLASS4_{ij} + \beta_{18}.CLASS5_{ij} + \beta_{19}.POSTMAT_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_{20}.HDI_j + \beta_{23}.RAS_j + \beta_{24}.POL\_IV_j + \beta_{25}.RELIGIOSITY_{ij}.HDI_j + u_{0j}$$

$$+ u_{1j}.RELIGIOSITY_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

π is the probability of conventional political participation (be it VOTE or PARTY), i is the ith individual and j is the jth country. In addition, robust standard errors are estimated to take into account any inflation of standard errors brought about by heteroskedasticity. All continuous variables are grand mean centred in order to limit possible effects of multicollinearity, particularly where interactions and quadratic effects are concerned, and to ease interpretation of the constant[10]. RAS and AGE have been divided by 100, so that coefficients are not too small so that they cannot be presented when rounded up to two decimal places. Population averaged models are reported. Robustness testing of the results is carried out, in order to test for any influential country cases that might be serving as the exception that forces the rule by exerting too much influence on the regression analysis (Van der Meer et al. 2010). Conditional regression coefficients are then estimated in order to gauge any uncovered interactions properly. Tables 5 and 6 present descriptive statistics for each country included in our analyses.

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[10] With the exception of POL_IV and POSTMAT for which the zero-point is meaningful.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 4: Individual level variables

Country	VOTE		PARTY		RELIG		AGE		FEMALE		EDUC		CLASS		POSTMAT	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	Sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Argentina	0.79	0.41	0.11	0.31	-0.13	0.76	42.55	17.59	0.53	0.5	1.65	0.74	2.46	0.82	1.87	0.65
Australia	0.95	0.21	0.1	0.31	-0.66	0.91	50.45	16.86	0.55	0.5	2.4	0.74	2.9	0.88	2.09	0.61
Brazil	0.88	0.32	0.1	0.3	0.42	0.5	39.96	15.68	0.58	0.49	1.57	0.75	2.16	0.86	1.79	0.62
Bulgaria	0.68	0.47	0.05	0.22	-0.53	0.67	47.36	16.51	0.54	0.5	1.98	0.68	2.31	0.83	1.46	0.54
Burk Faso	0.62	0.49	0.18	0.38	0.64	0.47	34.31	13.92	0.49	0.5	1.25	0.54	1.97	1.01	1.62	0.58
Canada	0.74	0.44	0.16	0.37	-0.21	0.86	48.21	17.8	0.58	0.49	2.04	0.73	2.92	0.91	2.18	0.59
Chile	0.72	0.45	0.14	0.35	-0.02	0.69	42.93	16.98	0.55	0.5	1.78	0.73	2.64	0.92	1.84	0.63
China			0.13	0.33	-1.29	0.83	44.76	13.32	0.54	0.5	1.54	0.61	2.34	0.89	1.56	0.58
Cyprus	0.87	0.34	0.19	0.39	0.05	0.64	41.63	15.98	0.51	0.5	2.07	0.76	3.17	0.88	1.79	0.65
Egypt	0.31	0.46	0.03	0.18	0.56	0.39	41.02	14.5	0.62	0.49	1.65	0.7	2.53	1	1.59	0.53
Ethiopia	0.8	0.4	0.26	0.44	0.64	0.47	29.93	10.21	0.49	0.5	1.6	0.69	2.38	1.08	1.89	0.64
Finland	0.77	0.42	0.14	0.35	-0.56	0.76	47.52	17.49	0.52	0.5	1.93	0.75	2.84	0.85	1.86	0.6
Georgia	0.77	0.42	0.01	0.1	0.37	0.41	45.41	17.19	0.53	0.5	2.29	0.54	2.64	0.93	1.65	0.58
Germany	0.8	0.4	0.05	0.22	-0.9	0.85	50.44	17.49	0.56	0.5	1.74	0.71	2.8	0.85	1.94	0.63
Ghana	0.8	0.4	0.51	0.5	0.78	0.33	33.86	14.07	0.49	0.5	1.38	0.59	2	1.04	1.73	0.56
India	0.92	0.28	0.66	0.47	0.16	0.64	41.37	14.71	0.43	0.5	1.72	0.8	2.52	1.17	1.68	0.56
Indonesia	0.91	0.29	0.16	0.37	0.69	0.37	36.1	13.94	0.48	0.5	2.14	0.72	2.97	0.87	1.6	0.58
Iran			0.09	0.28	0.43	0.49	32.69	12.77	0.5	0.5	1.87	0.77	3.11	0.99	1.64	0.61
Italy	0.89	0.31	0.1	0.31	0.06	0.7	45.62	15.62	0.5	0.5	1.93	0.78	2.84	0.92	2.01	0.61
Japan	0.75	0.43	0.07	0.25	-0.8	0.6	48.15	15.74	0.56	0.5	2.17	0.58	2.69	0.86	1.84	0.56
Jordan			0.01	0.08	0.91	0.28	37.59	14.4	0.51	0.5	1.88	0.81	3.02	0.85	1.56	0.56
Malaysia	0.53	0.5	0.24	0.42	0.38	0.48	31.84	11.93	0.5	0.5	1.94	0.58	2.79	1.04	1.74	0.58
Mali	0.62	0.48	0.41	0.49	0.68	0.4	37.25	14.85	0.5	0.5	1.3	0.6	2.88	1.1	1.64	0.59
Moldova	0.67	0.47	0.09	0.29	-0.05	0.62	42.78	16.85	0.53	0.5	2.06	0.53	2.8	1.03	1.67	0.61
Morocco	0.34	0.48	0.03	0.17	0.69	0.32	37.17	13.38	0.51	0.5	1.29	0.54	2.38	0.78	1.55	0.61

Country	VOTE		PARTY		RELIG		AGE		FEMALE		EDUC		CLASS		POSTMAT	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	Sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
New Zealand			0.17	0.37	-0.78	0.93	49.25	16.39	0.55	0.5	2.43	0.6	2.93	0.92	2.11	0.56
Norway	0.83	0.37	0.17	0.38	-0.93	0.76	45.78	16.06	0.5	0.5	2.29	0.76	3	0.88	2.12	0.49
Peru	0.9	0.3	0.07	0.26	0.27	0.58	37.62	14.9	0.51	0.5	1.86	0.74	2.42	0.88	1.95	0.64
Poland	0.68	0.47	0.08	0.26	0.35	0.58	45.96	17.82	0.49	0.5	1.62	0.71	2.44	0.92	1.76	0.58
Romania	0.89	0.31	0.04	0.19	0.32	0.49	48.68	17.38	0.54	0.5	1.83	0.73	2.4	1.03	1.57	0.59
Rwanda	0.29	0.45	0.68	0.3	0.02	0.14	34.65	14.15	0.51	0.5	1.21	0.47	1.7	0.98	1.87	0.68
Slovenia	0.72	0.45	0.07	0.25	-0.61	0.84	46.19	17.84	0.54	0.5	2	0.7	2.8	0.88	1.95	0.59
S. Africa	0.69	0.46	0.37	0.48	0.44	0.55	38.82	16.58	0.5	0.5	1.84	0.53	2.38	1.23	1.7	0.61
S. Korea	0.76	0.42	0.07	0.26	-0.43	0.84	41.38	14.01	0.5	0.5	2.44	0.66	2.98	0.81	1.48	0.55
Spain			0.05	0.21	-0.74	0.83	46.21	18.48	0.5	0.5	1.6	0.74	2.71	0.63	1.76	0.65
Sweden	0.86	0.35	0.11	0.31	-1.04	0.73	47.73	16.99	0.5	0.5	2.34	0.73	3.16	0.9	2.2	0.51
Switzerland	0.75	0.43	0.16	0.36	-0.52	0.84	52.45	16.14	0.55	0.5	2.2	0.64	3.37	0.78	2.08	0.63
Taiwan	0.76	0.43	0.07	0.26	-0.59	0.61	43.88	16.05	0.49	0.5	2.16	0.78	2.83	0.91	1.48	0.57
Thailand	0.95	0.23	0.17	0.37	0.36	0.41	45.35	15.73	0.51	0.5	1.51	0.71	2.85	0.77	1.78	0.5
Trin & Tob	0.69	0.46	0.19	0.39	0.51	0.47	42.61	17.33	0.55	0.5	1.65	0.65	2.74	1.05	1.72	0.57
Turkey	0.76	0.43	0.05	0.22	0.31	0.57	36.48	13.86	0.5	0.5	1.62	0.69	2.97	0.92	1.81	0.65
Ukraine	0.87	0.34	0.07	0.25	-0.35	0.72	42.38	16.77	0.66	0.47	2.27	0.63	2.66	0.91	1.55	0.56
USA	0.78	0.42	0.51	0.5	0.04	0.83	47.96	17.03	0.5	0.5	1.95	0.5	2.87	0.92	1.98	0.63
Uruguay			0.08	0.27	-0.44	0.88	46.53	18.65	0.56	0.5	1.44	0.74	2.39	0.9	2.08	0.65
Vietnam	0.92	0.28	0.16	0.37	-0.82	0.65	40.75	15.85	0.49	0.5	1.51	0.63	2.16	0.57	1.8	0.54
Zambia	0.64	0.48	0.41	0.49	0.58	0.46	29.79	11.88	0.49	0.5	1.7	0.69	2.5	1.27	1.82	0.6

Table 6: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 4: Country characteristics

Country	Proportion of...									HDI	POL_IV	RAS
	NONE	CATH	PROT	ORTH	MUS	JEW	HIND	BUD	OTH			
Argentina	0.17	0.74	0	0	0	0	0	0.06	0.02	0.75	8	30
Australia	0.4	0.23	0.31	0.02	0	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.93	10	2.5
Brazil	0.13	0.6	0.23	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.68	8	2.29
Bulgaria	0.16	0	0	0.74	0.1	0	0	0	0	0.73	9	36.72
Burk Faso	0.02	0.31	0.08	0	0.53	0	0	0	0.05	0.3	0	1.88
Canada	0.29	0.4	0.16	0.01	0.01	0	0	0.01	0.12	0.88	10	3.52
Chile	0.23	0.6	0.17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.76	10	20.33
China	0.89	0	0.04	0	0.02	0	0	0.03	0.01	0.64	-7	48.14
Cyprus	0.05	0	0	0.49	0.45	0	0	0	0	0.8	10	16.54
Egypt	0	0	0.06	0	0.94	0	0	0	0	0.61	-3	62.92
Ethiopia	0.02	0.02	0.19	0.65	0.11	0	0	0	0.02	0.31	1	21.05
Finland	0.14	0	0.83	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.86	10	32.88
Georgia	0.02	0	0	0.94	0.03	0	0	0	0	0.7	6	32.83
Germany	0.43	0.21	0.33	0.01	0.01	0	0	0	0.01	0.88	10	19.88
Ghana	0.03	0.21	0.55	0.04	0.15	0	0	0	0.03	0.46	8	4.32
India	0.06	0	0.03	0	0.08	0.01	0.76	0.02	0.05	0.49	9	22.87
Indonesia	0.01	0	0.07	0	0.92	0	0	0	0	0.57	8	45.22
Iran	0.01	0	0	0	0.98	0	0	0	0.01	0.67	-6	66.59
Italy	0.12	0.87	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.84	10	13
Japan	0.64	0.01	0.02	0	0	0	0	0.31	0.03	0.87	10	8.5
Jordan	0	0.01	0	0.01	0.98	0	0	0	0	0.71	-3	60.51
Malaysia	0.02	0.07	0.05	0	0.57	0	0.08	0.2	0.01	0.73	3	57.52
Mali	0.02	0.02	0.01	0	0.93	0.01	0.01	0	0.01	0.35	7	17.42
Moldova	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.92	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.61	8	32.34
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0.99	0	0	0	0	0.6	-6	51.86
New Zealand	0.34	0.14	0.48	0	0	0	0.01	0	0.02	0.89	10	10.5

Country	Proportion of...									HDI	POL_IV	RAS
	NONE	CATH	PROT	ORTH	MUS	JEW	HIND	BUD	OTH			
Norway	0.32	0.01	0.63	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.02	0.93	10	25.27
Peru	0.12	0.71	0.14	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.7	9	22
Poland	0.02	0.94	0.01	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.76	10	22.21
Romania	0.01	0.08	0.05	0.86	0	0	0	0	0	0.77	9	24.5
Rwanda	0.52	0.3	0	0.15	0	0	0	0	0.51	0.43	-3	9.77
Slovenia	0.29	0.65	0.02	0.02	0.01	0	0	0	0.01	0.81	10	11.96
S. Africa	0.17	0.12	0.59	0	0.02	0	0.02	0	0.07	0.59	9	2.5
S. Korea	0.29	0.21	0.23	0	0	0	0	0.25	0.02	0.85	8	1.88
Spain	0.2	0.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.89	10	22.46
Sweden	0.26	0.02	0.71	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.89	10	12.17
Switzerland	0.2	0.41	0.33	0	0.02	0	0	0	0.04	0.9	10	20.5
Taiwan	0.31	0.01	0.04	0	0	0	0	0.19	0.45	0.94	10	1.67
Thailand	0	0	0	0	0.03	0	0	0.97	0	0.64	-1	21.5
Trin & Tob	0.07	0.2	0.44	0	0.05	0	0.23	0	0	0.72	10	4.79
Turkey	0.01	0	0	0	0.99	0	0	0	0	0.65	7	47.21
Ukraine	0.31	0.07	0	0.6	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.7	7	19.99
USA	0.3	0.2	0.32	0	0	0.02	0	0	0.15	0.9	10	0
Uruguay	0.55	0.34	0.07	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.74	10	8.54
Vietnam	0.21	0.06	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.15	0.56	0.55	-7	53.5
Zambia	0.05	0.34	0.46	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.12	0.36	5	29.94

4.3 Empirical analysis of conventional political participation

4.3.1 Voting

In Table 7 are presented the results of the multilevel analysis of the dependent variable VOTE. There are 49,402 cases at level-1 and 39 cases at level-2. Model 1a is the so-called empty model that is estimated in order to calculate the variance patrician coefficient (VPC) that is used to determine the proportion in the dependent variable at level-2, in this case countries. In this incidence, it is also the same as the intra-class correlation (ICC) which denotes the similarity between two members of a level-2 unit. It is calculated using the formula (Snijders & Bosker, 1999):

$$vpc = \frac{\sigma_v^2}{\sigma_v^2 + \frac{\pi^2}{3}}$$

σ_v^2 is the variance at level-2 whilst the variance at level-1 is constant in a multilevel logistic regression at $\frac{\pi^2}{3}$. From Model 1a, the VPC tells us that 17% of the variance in the dependent variable can be found at the country-level[11]. Model 2a introduces RELIGIOSITY along with a random slope in addition to the random intercepts component. In this model the effect of religiosity is both positive and highly significant.

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[11] Random effects by way of the variance components are made reference to in the following analyses but can be found in full in Appendix D.

Table 7: Multilevel logistic regression of having voted (VOTE)

	Model 1a b/se	Model 2a b/se	Model 3a b/se	Model 4a b/se	Model 5a b/se	Model 6a b/se	Model 7a b/se
CONSTANT	1.17***	1.11***	0.91***	1.11***	0.85*	0.85*	0.84*
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)
RELIGIOSITY		0.31***	0.26***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
CATHOLIC			0.26***	0.28***	0.28***	0.28***	0.28***
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
PROTESTANT			0.27***	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
ORTHODOX			0.29***	0.36***	0.36***	0.37***	0.37***
			(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
MUSLIM			0.21*	0.30**	0.32**	0.32**	0.32**
			(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
JEW			0.41	0.28	0.28	0.28	0.28
			(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
HINDU			0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
			(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
BUDDHIST			0.19***	0.13***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
OTHER			-0.08	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05
			(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
FEMALE				-0.15***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.16***
				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
AGE				4.66***	4.77***	4.78***	4.76***
				(0.57)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)
AGE2				-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.13***
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
EDUC MID				0.22***	0.22***	0.22***	0.22***
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
EDUC HIGH				0.48***	0.49***	0.49***	0.48***
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 2				-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CLASS 3				0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 4				0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
				(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
CLASS 5				-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
				(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
POSTMAT				0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI					-0.50	-0.37	-0.53
					(0.75)	(0.72)	(0.76)
RAS					1.17	1.16	1.28
					(0.84)	(0.84)	(0.86)
POL_IV					0.03	0.03	0.04
					(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
HDI*REL						-0.24	
						(0.24)	
RAS*REL							-0.20
							(0.26)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

There is also significant variance in slopes across countries (at the mean of RELIGIOSITY), as demonstrated by the variance component for RELIGIOSITY (0.13, p=0.00), indicating that while the trend is overall positive between religiosity and voting, the effect is not uniform across countries. In Model 3a, controls are introduced for religious denominational identification. The effect of this is to slightly reduce the effect of religiosity on voting although it remains both positive and highly significant. As the reference category for denominational identification is 'NONE' we can draw some inferences as to the effect of denominational identification as a whole. In Model 3a, we can see that identification as Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim and Buddhist significantly increases the likelihood of voting. However, those who identify as Jewish, Hindu, or some 'Other' religion are not significantly different from those with no denominational identification. Thus, we can say that identifying with a religion, independent of the level of commitment is sufficient to raise the likelihood of voting although only in the cases of some of the major world faiths (and not all). Next in the modelling process, we add more individual level control variables in order to test for any spurious relationships between religiosity and voting (Model 4a). Introducing these control variables reduces the effect of religiosity quite substantially but not enough to either change the polarity of the regression coefficient or to alter its level of significance – these remain positive and high respectively. Also, the effects of religious denominational identification are not substantively changed from how they were in Model 3a. As for the newly introduced controls themselves: women are significantly less likely to vote than men; AGE follows a significantly curvilinear trend

with increasing age linked to increased voting up to a point whereby the effect tails off. EDUC is significantly linked to greater voting with roughly a linear trend evidenced. However, there is no stratification of voter turnout by CLASS nor does POSTMAT make any difference. In Model 5a, controls are introduced at the country-level. As we can see, there are no significant direct effects of either HDI or RAS on the level of voting. Nor does their inclusion do anything to alter the results substantively from the last model. POL_IV is also insignificant. Now we turn our attention to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 and how they relate specifically to voting behaviour. Model 6a introduces an interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and HDI. The effect is negative but insignificant. Thus, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 1 as it pertains to voting behaviour – there is no interaction between level of modernisation and religiosity in their effect on the likelihood of voting.

One after another, each country is removed from the data set and each time, Model 6a is re-estimated in order to test for the possibility that individual countries are exerting an overbearing influence on the regression results. In not one incidence, did the interaction effect prove anything other than negative and insignificant. Thus, we can have a degree of confidence that this result is robust with respect to overly-influential cases at the country-level and can continue to uphold our failure to confirm Hypothesis 1.

In Model 7a, an interaction is introduced between RELIGIOSITY and RAS. Again, the interaction coefficient is negative and insignificant, so we must reject Hypothesis 4 *vis-à-vis* voting behaviour and conclude there is no interaction between religiosity and separation of religion and state in their

effect on the likelihood of voting. Again, the same procedure was undertaken in order to test for overly-influential countries. There were no incidences whereby a significant interaction effect was found. The Egyptian case was exceptional in that in its absence, the interaction effect was positive in contrast to all the others, whereby a negative effect was found. However, it was insignificant – there are influential cases, but none strong enough to force us to alter our conclusion, that Hypothesis 4 can be rejected and so we can be confident within reason, to its robustness. Thus, we have to go with Model 5a and conclude that religiosity is positively linked to the likelihood of voting, in line with our general theoretical reasoning, but that this relationship does not vary across countries, at least in regard to their level of modernisation or separation of religion and state. What variation there is in the effect of religiosity across countries is picked up only by the random effects structure of the modelling.

4.3.2 Party membership

Next, we can turn our attention to participation in political parties, as measured by the dependent variable PARTY. The results of the multivariate multilevel logistic regression analyses are displayed in Table 8. The step-wise modelling process is identical to that just outlined above. At level-1 there are 58,683 cases and at level-2 there are 46. Model 1b is again the empty model from which the VPC can be estimated. Indeed, the proportion of variance at the macro-level is put at 27%.

Table 8: Multilevel logistic regression of membership of a political party (PARTY)

	Model 1b b/se	Model 2b b/se	Model 3b b/se	Model 4b b/se	Model 5b b/se	Model 6b b/se	Model 7b b/se
CONSTANT	-1.64***	-1.59***	-1.64***	-1.97***	-2.35***	-2.34***	-2.35***
	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
RELIGIOSITY		0.06**	0.04	0.06**	0.10***	0.10***	0.09**
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
CATHOLIC			0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
			(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
PROTESTANT			0.15*	0.15**	0.16**	0.16**	0.16**
			(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
ORTHODOX			0.11	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
MUSLIM			0.04	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.08
			(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
JEW			0.11	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
			(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)
HINDU			-0.09	-0.10	-0.16	-0.17	-0.17
			(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
BUDDHIST			-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
			(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
OTHER			-0.07	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
			(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
FEMALE				-0.30***	-0.34***	-0.34***	-0.34***
				(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
AGE				1.03***	1.14***	1.15***	1.15***
				(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
AGE2				-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
EDUC MID				0.26***	0.29***	0.29***	0.29***
				(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
EDUC HIGH				0.42***	0.48***	0.48***	0.48***
				(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 2				0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CLASS 3				0.15***	0.16***	0.17***	0.16***
				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CLASS 4				0.23***	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***
				(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
CLASS 5				0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15
				(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
POSTMAT				0.10***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***
				(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI					-3.38***	-3.53***	-3.39***
					(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.86)
RAS					1.62*	1.64*	1.59*
					(0.90)	(0.90)	(0.90)
POL_IV					0.03	0.03	0.03
					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI*REL						0.59***	
						(0.16)	
RAS*REL							0.09
							(0.23)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Model 2b introduces RELIGIOSITY as the sole independent variable in the model along with an accompanying random slope term. The effect of RELIGIOSITY upon belonging to a political party is both positive and highly significant with variance across countries when this is held at its mean (variance component 0.11, p=0.00).

Next, in Model 3b, controls are added for denominational identification. By doing so, the effect of RELIGIOSITY reduces and is no longer significant. On this basis, we would say that the link between religiosity is more to do with certain cultural influences imparted by certain religious traditions rather than the level of religious commitment *per se*. It is indeed the Protestant tradition that matters, as from Model 3b we can see that it is the only denomination that is significantly distinct from no denominational identification. However, once controls are further added for basic individual characteristics and demographics in Model 4b, we see that RELIGIOSITY independent of denominational flavour is both positively tied to party participation and returned to statistical significance at the 5% level – religiosity does indeed matter! Their addition does nothing too much to dramatically alter the effects of denominational identification from as they were in Model 3b – Protestantism remains the only one of the major world faiths to be linked to party participation. As for these control variables themselves, women participate less than men whilst AGE follows a curvilinear effect whereby there is growth in the likelihood of participation with age up to a point before the onset of decline, much the same as was revealed in our empirical analysis of voting. Again, EDUC is a strong

predictor of participation, with roughly a linear increase in the likelihood of participation evidenced with increasing educational attainment. However, unlike voting, this form of participation is stratified by CLASS, with something like an up-turned U-shape found. It is evident that those in the middle and upper-middle classes are involved in political parties the most, but that those at the extremities of the class system tend to be withdrawn. Additionally and again unlike voting, post-material values matter with greater levels being associated positively with party participation. Model 5b sees the introduction of HDI, RAS and POL_IV. Both RAS and HDI are negatively and significantly linked to the party mode of conventional participation. POL_IV is insignificantly linked. These variables do nothing to change the results from as they were in Model 4b. Next, we introduce interaction terms in order to address the theoretical questions that this chapter is concerned with. In Model 6b, an interaction term is introduced between HDI and RELIGIOSITY. The effect is both highly significant and positive. This is not in line with the theoretical prediction and thus we must reject Hypothesis 1 as it pertains to party participation as a mode of conventional political participation - this being the hypothesis that modernisation will be coupled with a step back from the conventional mode of political participation by the religious. In fact, on the basis of this model, the converse is true. Greater modernisation is associated with greater likelihood of participation in political parties by the more religious.

Once more, the possibility of countries with overbearing influence on the results was considered. In no incidence did the removal of any country prove

sufficient to provide anything other than a positive and highly significant interaction. Thus, we can consider the conclusion made regarding Model 6b as robust in this regard and uphold the rejection of Hypothesis 1.

In order to fully understand the effects of religiosity as the level of modernisation varies, conditional regression coefficients have been calculated and are presented in Table 9. Here we can see that at the minimum level of HDI in our dataset, the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negative and significant if only at the 10% level. By the mean level, the effect has become positive and highly significant and by the maximum the effect is more positive still and also highly significant.

Table 9: Effect of religiosity on party membership by country modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6b)

	Minimum HDI b/se	Mean HDI b/se	Maximum HDI b/se
CONSTANT	-0.94***	-2.34***	-3.23***
	(0.31)	(0.18)	(0.33)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.14*	0.10***	0.24***
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The interaction in Model 6b is presented in its fullest by way of a conditional effects plot[12] in Figure 3. There we can see that participation in political parties is more likely in less modern societies, but that the effect of

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[12] All conditional effects plots used in this thesis take each categorical variable at its reference point, whilst all continuous variables with the exception of POL_IV and POSTMAT are grand mean centered. Ideally, all plots would be presented so that the y-axis is measuring predicted probabilities. The problem is that when coefficients are exponentiated, logit models become multiplicative rather than additive so that the slopes for RELIGIOSITY across the spectrum of the macro-level variable in question, become weighted by their constants. This results in a distorting of the interaction effects found in the modelling. When the distorting effect is too great, conditional effects plots are presented with the logarithm of the odds of whatever the dependent variable might be as the y-axis. Otherwise, they are presented with predicted probabilities, as this is more comprehendible option and allows the reader to better judge the scale of the effects.

religiosity is something of an equalising one, whereby two individuals, each from different ends of the modernisation spectrum, who are both highly religious, are more comparable in terms of the likelihood of participation than two individuals who have no religiosity. The fact that the conditional regression coefficient is positive and significant in countries with a mean-level of modernisation and above, is consistent with existing research referenced earlier which tends to stem from advanced societies. The fact that the effect is seen as negative in undeveloped societies, is something of a novel finding, and is worthy of further inquiry.

Figure 3: The effect of religiosity on party participation - conditional effects plot for Model 6b

Another way to view this interaction is to regress PARTY on RELIGIOSITY plus individual level controls, within each country and then to present the

β-coefficients for RELIGIOSITY graphed against HDI, as seen in Figure 4[13].
There we can clearly see an upward effect in the strength of the effect of
RELIGIOSITY on participation in political parties, as modernisation rises.

Figure 4: The effect of modernisation on the effect of religiosity on participation in political parties (results of country-specific logistic regressions with controls)

Model 7b sees the introduction of an interaction term between RAS and
RELIGIOSITY. Its effect is negative but insignificant. Thus, we can reject
Hypothesis 4 that the effect of religiosity on party politics will be greater
where levels of separation of religion and state are higher.

Once again, overly-influential cases were tested for. The removal of not one
country from the dataset was sufficient to produce a significant interaction

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[13] These graphs could be very easily presented for other interactions, but for the sake of
brevity, they are not. They are presented only to give the reader some idea of how the cross-
level interaction might be working in a visual manner, so we can be confident of linear
trends.

effect, although the removal of Vietnam did cause the regression coefficient to flip its polarity although it was highly insignificant. Thus, we uphold the conclusion that Hypothesis 4 cannot be sustained.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter, conventional political participation has been analysed using the contextualised individual level theories derived from secularisation theory (Hypothesis 1) and religious economies theory (Hypothesis 4). Multivariate multilevel logistic regressions were carried out on two indicators of such behaviour, namely voting and participation in political parties. In both instances, were the theories found not to have empirical support. The effect of religiosity on voting was found to be neither influenced by the level of modernisation of the country nor the level of separation of religion and state. What was found was that across all countries, religiosity is tied to voting despite certain unmeasured country-specific idiosyncrasies. With regard to political party participation, the effect of religiosity was found to increase with the level of modernisation, contrary to our theoretical expectation. The level of separation of religion and state was found not to be having any meaningful effect as a moderator of the relationship between religiosity and political party involvement. These unexpected results will be discussed with explanations put forward in Chapter 7. Next, our attention is turned to participation in civil society and the effects of religiosity and country context.

Chapter 5 – The effect of country context on the relationship between religiosity and participation within civil society

5.1 Introduction

The theory of religiosity, modernisation and civil society participation posited that religiosity would be frozen out of conventional political participation in more modernised countries but would re-manifest itself in civil society as something politically neutered but nevertheless interested in being involved in directing and ordering society as some sort of moral guardian. However, in the last chapter we saw that modernisation was not serving to exclude religiosity from conventional political participation. In fact it seemed if anything that the converse was happening with regard to the involvement of the religious in party politics. However, this does not preclude that an energising of religiosity in civil society is not also happening in more modernised societies (Hypothesis 2). It is this theme that is addressed here in this chapter along with our hypothesis that religious free-market conditions should serve to energise religions so that they have more desire for involvement in civil society (Hypothesis 5). In this chapter are presented multilevel logistic regression models of several indicators of civil society participation in order to test these hypotheses.

It is found that level of modernisation does increase the likelihood of participation in civil society organisations, so that we can confirm support for Hypothesis 2. However, only with regard to religious organisations and cultural/educational organisations do we find support for Hypothesis 5. Thus, this hypothesis is only partially confirmed.

5.2 Modelling participation within civil society

In Chapter 3, several indicators of civil society participation were identified as being both reasonably valid and of use in this study. They were religious organisations (RELORG), charitable/humanitarian organisations (CHARORG), environmental organisations (ENVORG), and cultural /education organisations (CULTORG). It was further argued that aggregation of these items in the WVS, whilst desirable on the grounds of parsimony, would in all probability have the undesired effect of masking effects that were unique to certain types of civil society organisation behind 'averaged out' explanations that were true for none. Thus, these items are analysed in their own right with aggregation avoided. As these variables are all coded as binary, the logistic family of regression models is again used. Due to the nested structure of the data, multilevel techniques are applied with individuals deemed nested in countries. This is in order to deal with the problem of the violation of the assumption of independence of observations. In fact, the modelling process is identical to that employed in the last chapter, with the sole difference being the dependent variables in question. Again, the modelling begins with (1) the estimation of empty models in order to decompose the variance between macro and micro levels. Then a model (2) with civil society participation regressed on RELIGIOSITY with a random slopes component, is estimated. This forms the base for all further models. Subsequent stages in the modelling process are: (3) the adding of controls for denominational identification; (4) the adding of further controls at the individual level; (5) the adding of controls at the macro level; (6) testing an

interaction between religiosity and HDI (Hypothesis 2); and (7) the testing of an interaction between religiosity and RAS (Hypothesis 5).

Again, the cross-level interaction in Model 6 can be expressed formally as:

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_{ij}}{1-\pi_{ij}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1.RELIGIOSITY_{ij} + \beta_2.CATHOLIC_{ij} + \beta_3.PROTESTANT_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_4.ORTHODOX_{ij} + \beta_5.MUSLIM_{ij} + \beta_6.JEW_{ij} + \beta_7.HINDU_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_8.BUDDHIST_{ij} + \beta_9.OTHER_{ij} + \beta_{10}.FEMALE_{ij} + \beta_{11}.AGE_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_{12}.AGE^2{}_{ij} + \beta_{13}.EDUC\_MID_{ij} + \beta_{14}.EDUC\_HIGH_{ij} + \beta_{15}.CLASS2_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_{16}.CLASS3_{ij} + \beta_{17}.CLASS4_{ij} + \beta_{18}.CLASS5_{ij} + \beta_{19}.POSTMAT_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_{20}.HDI_j + \beta_{23}.RAS_j + \beta_{24}.POL\_IV_j + \beta_{25}.RELIGIOSITY_{ij}.HDI_j + u_{0j}$$

$$+ u_{1j}.RELIGIOSITY_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

π is the probability of civil society participation, i is the ith individual and j is the jth country. In addition, robust standard errors are estimated in order to make allowances for possible heteroskedasticity in the models. RELIGIOSITY, HDI, RAS, and AGE have all been grand mean centred so that any possible effects of multicollinearity are reduced[14]. Variables AGE and RAS have been divided by 100 so that results can be presented as rounded up to 2 decimal places. Population averaged models are reported with robustness testing for overly-influential cases at level-2 also carried out. In Tables 10 and 11 are presented the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables for each country included in our analyses.

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[14] Again with the exception of POL_IV and POSTMAT since the 0 points are meaningful.

Table 10: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 5: Individual level variables

Country	RELORG		CHARORG		ENVORG		CULTORG		RELIG		FEM		AGE		EDUC		CLASS		POSTMAT	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
Argentina	0.4	0.49	0.15	0.36	0.1	0.31	0.17	0.38	-0.13	0.76	0.53	0.5	42.6	1.76	1.65	0.74	2.46	0.82	1.87	0.65
Australia	0.45	0.5	0.31	0.46	0.15	0.36	0.32	0.47	-0.66	0.91	0.55	0.5	50.5	1.69	2.4	0.74	2.9	0.88	2.09	0.61
Brazil	0.77	0.42	0.2	0.4	0.07	0.26	0.15	0.35	0.42	0.5	0.58	0.49	40	1.57	1.57	0.75	2.16	0.86	1.79	0.62
Bulgaria	0.04	0.2	0.02	0.14	0.01	0.12	0.03	0.17	-0.53	0.67	0.54	0.5	47.4	1.65	1.98	0.68	2.31	0.83	1.46	0.54
Burkina Faso	0.49	0.5	0.08	0.27	0.11	0.32	0.11	0.32	0.64	0.47	0.49	0.5	34.3	1.39	1.25	0.54	1.97	1.01	1.62	0.58
Canada	0.52	0.5	0.31	0.46	0.15	0.36	0.33	0.47	-0.21	0.86	0.58	0.49	48.2	1.78	2.04	0.73	2.92	0.91	2.18	0.59
Chile	0.43	0.5	0.22	0.41	0.13	0.34	0.26	0.44	-0.02	0.69	0.55	0.5	42.9	1.7	1.78	0.73	2.64	0.92	1.84	0.63
China	0.1	0.3	0.08	0.27	0.1	0.3	0.14	0.35	-1.29	0.83	0.54	0.5	44.8	1.33	1.54	0.61	2.34	0.89	1.56	0.58
Cyprus	0.14	0.35	0.13	0.33	0.07	0.26	0.13	0.34	0.05	0.64	0.51	0.5	41.6	1.6	2.07	0.76	3.17	0.88	1.79	0.65
Egypt	0.01	0.12	0.02	0.15	0.01	0.1	0.01	0.12	0.56	0.39	0.62	0.49	41	1.45	1.65	0.7	2.53	1	1.59	0.53
Ethiopia	0.79	0.41	0.29	0.45	0.29	0.45	0.45	0.5	0.64	0.47	0.49	0.5	29.9	1.02	1.6	0.69	2.38	1.08	1.89	0.64
Finland	0.79	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.1	0.3	0.19	0.39	-0.56	0.76	0.52	0.5	47.5	1.75	1.93	0.75	2.84	0.85	1.86	0.6
Georgia	0.07	0.26	0	0.07	0	0.07	0.01	0.12	0.37	0.41	0.53	0.5	45.4	1.72	2.29	0.54	2.64	0.93	1.65	0.58
Germany	0.37	0.48	0.1	0.3	0.05	0.22	0.14	0.34	-0.9	0.85	0.56	0.5	50.4	1.75	1.74	0.71	2.8	0.85	1.94	0.63
Ghana	0.92	0.27	0.22	0.41	0.27	0.44	0.4	0.49	0.78	0.33	0.49	0.5	33.9	1.41	1.38	0.59	2	1.04	1.73	0.56
India	0.68	0.47	0.57	0.5	0.59	0.49	0.64	0.48	0.16	0.64	0.43	0.5	41.4	1.47	1.72	0.8	2.52	1.17	1.68	0.56
Indonesia	0.67	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.37	0.48	0.3	0.46	0.69	0.37	0.48	0.5	36.1	1.39	2.14	0.72	2.97	0.87	1.6	0.58
Iran	0.39	0.49	0.24	0.43	0.1	0.3	0.19	0.39	0.43	0.49	0.5	0.5	32.7	1.28	1.87	0.77	3.11	0.99	1.64	0.61
Italy	0.22	0.42	0.21	0.41	0.08	0.27	0.17	0.38	0.06	0.7	0.5	0.5	45.6	1.56	1.93	0.78	2.84	0.92	2.01	0.61
Japan	0.12	0.33	0.05	0.21	0.05	0.21	0.16	0.36	-0.8	0.6	0.56	0.5	48.2	1.57	2.17	0.58	2.69	0.86	1.84	0.56
Jordan	0.03	0.17	0.03	0.17	0.01	0.07	0.01	0.1	0.91	0.28	0.51	0.5	37.6	1.44	1.88	0.81	3.02	0.85	1.56	0.56
Malaysia	0.34	0.47	0.14	0.35	0.1	0.3	0.22	0.41	0.38	0.48	0.5	0.5	31.8	1.19	1.94	0.58	2.79	1.04	1.74	0.58
Mali	0.67	0.47	0.4	0.49	0.44	0.5	0.39	0.49	0.68	0.4	0.5	0.5	37.3	1.48	1.3	0.6	2.88	1.1	1.64	0.59
Moldova	0.33	0.47	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.26	0.15	0.36	-0.05	0.62	0.53	0.5	42.8	1.69	2.06	0.53	2.8	1.03	1.67	0.61
Morocco	0.05	0.21	0.05	0.22	0.02	0.14	0.07	0.26	0.69	0.32	0.51	0.5	37.2	1.34	1.29	0.54	2.38	0.78	1.55	0.61
Norway	0.38	0.49	0.32	0.47	0.07	0.26	0.2	0.4	-0.93	0.76	0.5	0.5	45.8	1.61	2.29	0.76	3	0.88	2.12	0.49

Country	RELORG		CHARORG		ENVORG		CULTORG		RELIG		FEM		AGE		EDUC		CLASS		POSTMAT	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
New Zealand	0.43	0.5	0.38	0.49	0.21	0.4	0.39	0.49	-0.78	0.93	0.55	0.5	49.3	1.64	2.43	0.6	2.93	0.92	2.11	0.56
Peru	0.38	0.49	0.12	0.33	0.07	0.25	0.15	0.35	0.27	0.58	0.51	0.5	37.6	1.49	1.86	0.74	2.42	0.88	1.95	0.64
Poland	0.23	0.42	0.11	0.31	0.08	0.27	0.12	0.33	0.35	0.58	0.49	0.5	46	1.78	1.62	0.71	2.44	0.92	1.76	0.58
Romania	0.1	0.3	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.08	0.02	0.13	0.32	0.49	0.54	0.5	48.7	1.74	1.83	0.73	2.4	1.03	1.57	0.59
Rwanda	0.86	0.34	0.29	0.45	0.2	0.4	0.16	0.37	0.68	0.3	0.51	0.5	34.7	1.41	1.21	0.47	1.7	0.98	1.87	0.68
S. Africa	0.83	0.38	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.3	0.46	0.44	0.55	0.5	0.5	38.8	1.66	1.84	0.53	2.38	1.23	1.7	0.61
S. Korea	0.47	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.08	0.27	0.27	0.44	-0.43	0.84	0.5	0.5	41.4	1.4	2.44	0.66	2.98	0.81	1.48	0.55
Slovenia	0.29	0.45	0.17	0.38	0.07	0.25	0.17	0.37	-0.61	0.84	0.54	0.5	46.2	1.78	2	0.7	2.8	0.88	1.95	0.59
Spain	0.21	0.41	0.09	0.29	0.05	0.21	0.09	0.29	-0.74	0.83	0.5	0.5	46.2	1.85	1.6	0.74	2.71	0.63	1.76	0.65
Sweden	0.54	0.5	0.33	0.47	0.1	0.3	0.25	0.43	-1.04	0.73	0.5	0.5	47.7	1.7	2.34	0.73	3.16	0.9	2.2	0.51
Switzerland	0.47	0.5	0.35	0.48	0.23	0.42	0.3	0.46	-0.52	0.84	0.55	0.5	52.5	1.61	2.2	0.64	3.37	0.78	2.08	0.63
Taiwan	0.19	0.4	0.18	0.38	0.05	0.22	0.1	0.3	-0.59	0.61	0.49	0.5	43.9	1.6	2.16	0.78	2.83	0.91	1.48	0.57
Thailand	0.37	0.48	0.19	0.39	0.2	0.4	0.23	0.42	0.36	0.41	0.51	0.5	45.4	1.57	1.51	0.71	2.85	0.77	1.78	0.5
Trin & Tob	0.75	0.43	0.25	0.43	0.17	0.38	0.31	0.46	0.51	0.47	0.55	0.5	42.6	1.73	1.65	0.65	2.74	1.05	1.72	0.57
Turkey	0.03	0.16	0.02	0.15	0.01	0.11	0.03	0.17	0.31	0.57	0.5	0.5	36.5	1.39	1.62	0.69	2.97	0.92	1.81	0.65
Ukraine	0.17	0.37	0.05	0.23	0.04	0.19	0.09	0.28	-0.35	0.72	0.66	0.47	42.4	1.68	2.27	0.63	2.66	0.91	1.55	0.56
Uruguay	0.27	0.45	0.07	0.26	0.06	0.24	0.13	0.34	-0.44	0.88	0.56	0.5	46.5	1.87	1.44	0.74	2.39	0.9	2.08	0.65
USA	0.66	0.47	0.3	0.46	0.17	0.37	0.27	0.44	0.04	0.83	0.5	0.5	48	1.7	1.95	0.5	2.87	0.92	1.98	0.63
Vietnam	0.12	0.32	0.15	0.36	0.11	0.31	0.09	0.29	-0.82	0.65	0.49	0.5	40.8	1.58	1.51	0.63	2.16	0.57	1.8	0.54
Zambia	0.96	0.2	0.27	0.44	0.22	0.41	0.41	0.49	0.58	0.46	0.49	0.5	29.8	1.19	1.7	0.69	2.5	1.27	1.82	0.6

Table 11: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 5: Country characteristics

Country	NONE	CATH	Proportion of...PROT	ORTH	MUS	JEW	HIND	BUD	OTH	HDI	RAS	POL_IV
Argentina	0.17	0.74	0	0	0	0	0	0.06	0.02	0.75	47.6	8
Australia	0.4	0.23	0.31	0.02	0	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.93	75.1	10
Brazil	0.13	0.6	0.23	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.68	75.3	8
Bulgaria	0.16	0	0	0.74	0.1	0	0	0	0	0.73	40.8	9
Burkina Faso	0.02	0.31	0.08	0	0.53	0	0	0	0.05	0.3	75.7	0
Canada	0.29	0.4	0.16	0.01	0.01	0	0	0.01	0.12	0.88	74	10
Chile	0.23	0.6	0.17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.76	57.2	10
China	0.89	0	0.04	0	0.02	0	0	0.03	0.01	0.64	29.4	-7
Cyprus	0.05	0	0	0.49	0.45	0	0	0	0	0.8	61	10
Egypt	0	0	0.06	0	0.94	0	0	0	0	0.61	14.6	-3
Ethiopia	0.02	0.02	0.19	0.65	0.11	0	0	0	0.02	0.31	56.5	1
Finland	0.14	0	0.83	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.86	44.7	10
Georgia	0.02	0	0	0.94	0.03	0	0	0	0	0.7	44.7	6
Germany	0.43	0.21	0.33	0.01	0.01	0	0	0	0.01	0.88	57.7	10
Ghana	0.03	0.21	0.55	0.04	0.15	0	0	0	0.03	0.46	73.2	8
India	0.06	0	0.03	0	0.08	0.01	0.76	0.02	0.05	0.49	54.7	9
Indonesia	0.01	0	0.07	0	0.92	0	0	0	0	0.57	32.3	8
Iran	0.01	0	0	0	0.98	0	0	0	0.01	0.67	11	-6
Italy	0.12	0.87	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.84	64.6	10
Japan	0.64	0.01	0.02	0	0	0	0	0.31	0.03	0.87	69.1	10
Jordan	0	0.01	0	0.01	0.98	0	0	0	0	0.71	17.1	-3
Malaysia	0.02	0.07	0.05	0	0.57	0	0.08	0.2	0.01	0.73	20	3
Mali	0.02	0.02	0.01	0	0.93	0.01	0.01	0	0.01	0.35	60.1	7
Moldova	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.92	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.61	45.2	8
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0.99	0	0	0	0	0.6	25.7	-6
Norway	0.32	0.01	0.63	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.02	0.93	52.3	10

Country	NONE	CATH	Proportion of... PROT	ORTH	MUS	JEW	HIND	BUD	OTH	HDI	RAS	POL_IV
New Zealand	0.34	0.14	0.48	0	0	0	0.01	0	0.02	0.89	67.1	10
Peru	0.12	0.71	0.14	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.7	55.6	9
Poland	0.02	0.94	0.01	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.76	55.4	10
Romania	0.01	0.08	0.05	0.86	0	0	0	0	0	0.77	53.1	9
Rwanda	0.02	0.52	0.3	0	0.15	0	0	0	0	0.43	67.8	-3
S. Africa	0.17	0.12	0.59	0	0.02	0	0.02	0	0.07	0.59	75.1	9
S. Korea	0.29	0.21	0.23	0	0	0	0	0.25	0.02	0.85	75.7	8
Slovenia	0.29	0.65	0.02	0.02	0.01	0	0	0	0.01	0.81	65.6	10
Spain	0.2	0.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.89	55.1	10
Sweden	0.26	0.02	0.71	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.89	65.4	10
Switzerland	0.2	0.41	0.33	0	0.02	0	0	0	0.04	0.9	57.1	10
Taiwan	0.31	0.01	0.04	0	0	0	0	0.19	0.45	0.94	75.9	10
Thailand	0	0	0	0	0.03	0	0	0.97	0	0.64	56.1	-1
Trin & Tob	0.07	0.2	0.44	0	0.05	0	0.23	0	0	0.72	72.8	10
Turkey	0.01	0	0	0	0.99	0	0	0	0	0.65	30.4	7
Ukraine	0.31	0.07	0	0.6	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.7	57.6	7
Uruguay	0.55	0.34	0.07	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.74	69	10
USA	0.3	0.2	0.32	0	0	0.02	0	0	0.15	0.9	77.6	10
Vietnam	0.21	0.06	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.15	0.56	0.55	24.1	-7
Zambia	0.05	0.34	0.46	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.12	0.36	47.6	5

5.3 Empirical analysis of civil society participation

Before we commence with the discussion of the results of our statistical modelling, the reader's attention is drawn to Figure 5. In this graph, we see data taken from Wave 2 of the European Values Survey (1990-3). Respondents were asked to rate how important varying reasons were for motivating their volunteering in civil society, on a scale of 1 to 5 with higher numbers representing greater importance. As we can see in Figure 5, many different possible reasons were given for volunteering, that relate to either some sort of identification with those in need, or a sense of civic duty, or some sort of selfish interest. Additionally, religious belief is given as a possible motivation. In general, most of the possible reasons are fairly evenly distributed. However, what is most striking is the number of people who are prepared to say that religious belief is of no importance in motivating their voluntary behaviour. This is consistent with the secularisation literature which tends to identify (but not solely) Europe as increasingly irreligious to the point where religion is socially irrelevant. What is most striking is that the closest comparator is the reason "I did not want to but could not refuse" which must be regarded as the most pathetic reason offered. Fortunately, most people have a bit more spine and tend to volunteer for better reasons. However, the fact that religious belief can be compared to this 'non-reason' and not to the more altruistic or idealistic possible reasons, speaks volumes as to the social relevance of religion in contemporary European society.

Figure 5: Reasons for volunteering - results from the European Values Survey

The fact that religiosity does not motivate voluntary behaviour for so many, reflects the fact that Western societies have seen declines in both religious belief and participation in religious services. For those who remain in possession of religiosity (both in terms of belief and/or attendance) does it still motivate voluntary behaviour? To this question we now turn, along with the contextual hypotheses that form the basis of this thesis.

5.3.1 Religious organisation membership

In Table 12 are presented the results of multilevel logistic regressions of the dependent variable RELORG. There are 59,152 observations at level-1 and 46 at level-2. Model 1c is the empty model from which the VPC can be estimated. Indeed, some 44% of the variance is found at the country-level.

Table 12: Multilevel logistic regression of religious organisation membership (RELORG)

	Model 1c b/se	Model 2c b/se	Model 3c b/se	Model 4c b/se	Model 5c b/se	Model 6c b/se	Model 7c b/se
CONSTANT	-0.39**	-0.32**	-1.25***	-1.36***	-1.48***	-1.50***	-1.52***
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)
RELIGIOSITY		0.92***	0.77***	0.78***	0.86***	0.85***	0.84***
		(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CATHOLIC			1.12***	1.12***	1.11***	1.15***	1.15***
			(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
PROTESTANT			1.55***	1.56***	1.68***	1.71***	1.71***
			(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
ORTHODOX			0.86***	0.86***	0.84***	0.88***	0.87***
			(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
MUSLIM			0.72***	0.74***	0.67***	0.71***	0.70***
			(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
JEW			1.27***	1.26***	1.27***	1.31***	1.30***
			(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
HINDU			0.76***	0.77***	0.71***	0.74***	0.73***
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
BUDDHIST			1.04***	1.05***	1.03***	1.07***	1.07***
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
OTHER			0.94***	0.94***	0.94***	0.97***	0.96***
			(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.23)
FEMALE				-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AGE				0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
				(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
AGE2				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
EDUC MID				0.05*	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*
				(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
EDUC HIGH				0.17***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
				(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
CLASS 2				-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
				(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
CLASS 3				0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
				(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CLASS 4				0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
				(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CLASS 5				0.08	0.10	0.10	0.10
				(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
POSTMAT				0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
HDI					-1.23	-1.66*	-1.32
					(0.95)	(0.97)	(0.94)
RAS					3.60***	3.66***	3.05***
					(1.14)	(1.13)	(1.10)
POL_IV					0.00	-0.00	0.00
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
HDI*REL						0.93**	
						(0.38)	
RAS*REL							1.01**
							(0.45)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Model 2c adds RELIGIOSITY along with a random-slopes component. Unsurprisingly, its effect is both positive and highly significant although not uniform across all countries, as the variance component for RELIGIOSITY is statistically significant (0.47, p=0.00) (*n.b.* when RELIGIOSITY is held at its mean). Model 3c subsequently builds on its predecessor by introducing controls for denominational identification. This has the effect of reducing the effect of RELIGIOSITY somewhat although it retains its statistical significance at the 1% level. As for the effects of denominational identification themselves, unsurprisingly, all denominations are significantly more likely to participate in religious organisations than the unaffiliated. Next, Model 4c further extends the number of controls at the individual-level. Their effect does nothing too much to radically alter the effects from as they were in Model 3c. In themselves, nothing much by way of significant effects is found. It is only EDUC that matters, with the more educated being significantly distinct from those with low education. Otherwise, all other controls are unrelated – FEMALE, AGE, CLASS, and POSTMAT are all statistically insignificant. Model 5c introduces HDI, RAS, and POL_IV. Doing so slightly increases the effect of religiosity and shakes up the coefficients for denominational identification somewhat, but not so much that they are too different from the last model. The only other notable difference is that having a middle level of education is now mildly significant at the 10% level. The effect of HDI is also insignificant whilst the effect of RAS is positive and highly significant. Now we turn to the investigation of the interaction effects that serve as the tests for the main hypotheses that are the subject of this chapter, as they relate to religious organisations. Model 6c introduces the

interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and HDI. Its effect is significant and positive. Thus, we can confirm Hypothesis 2 that religiosity increases its effect on civil society participation as born out in religious organisations, under conditions of greater modernity. However, as we shall see later on, we will have to alter our theoretical explanations in order to reconcile this finding with those of the previous chapter.

When the regression is re-estimated multiple times, each time removing one country at a time, the interaction effect remains positive and significant, despite some minor fluctuations in its magnitude. Thus, we can be confident that the model as it pertains to this data, is robust *vis-à-vis* influential level-2 cases.

Table 13 presents the conditional regression coefficients for the interaction effect of Model 6c. From this table, we see that the effect of RELIGIOSTIY at the minimum of HDI in the dataset, is positive but as HDI increases, that effect is getting stronger and stronger. Note also, that the effect of religiosity is highly significant across the range of HDI in our data.

Table 13: Effect of religiosity on religious organisation membership by country modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6c)

	Minimum HDI b/se	Mean HDI b/se	Maximum HDI b/se
CONSTANT	-0.84**	-1.50***	-1.91***
	(0.40)	(0.27)	(0.41)
RELIGIOSITY	0.48***	0.85***	1.08***
	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.11)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI is presented as a conditional effects plot in Figure 6. From this, we can see that the effects of RELIGIOSITY are unsurprisingly substantial on participation in religious type organisations, but that modernisation does increase that effect somewhat. It is also clear that religious organisations are more likely to occur in underdeveloped countries than elsewhere.

Figure 6: The effect of religiosity on participation in religious organisations as moderated by country-level modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6c

Another way of looking at this interaction is presented in Figure 7. Logistic regressions were run within each of the countries in the sample, with RELORG regressed on RELIGIOSITY plus all other individual level controls. In Figure 7, the β-coefficients for religiosity for each country are graphed against HDI. From this graph we can see an upward trend of modernisation

on the effect of religiosity on participation in religious organisations despite the apparent 'noise' of the data.

Figure 7: The effect of modernisation on the effect of religiosity on participation in religious organisations (results of country-specific logistic regressions with controls)

Model 7c introduces the interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and RAS. Its effect is also significant and positive. Thus, we can confirm Hypothesis 5, that religiosity increases its effect on civil society participation as born out in religious organisations, under conditions of greater separation of religion and state.

Model 7c was also re-estimated 46 times, each time with one country after another being removed, in order to test the robustness of the model with regard to influential cases at the macro-level. Regarding the interaction term, in no incidence did it reverse its polarity nor lose significance, despite

some minor fluctuations in magnitude of the regression coefficient and p-value.

In Table 14, the conditional regression coefficients for the interaction of Model 7c are presented. We see that the effect of religiosity is increasing as RAS increases. Across the range of RAS in our sample, the conditional regression coefficients are increasingly positive and significant.

Table 14: Effect of religiosity on religious organisation membership by separation of religion and state (conditional regression coefficients Model 7c)

	Minimum RAS b/se	Mean RAS b/se	Maximum RAS b/se
CONSTANT	-2.77***	-1.52***	-0.74*
	(0.45)	(0.26)	(0.43)
RELIGIOSITY	0.43**	0.84***	1.10***
	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.12)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

This interaction is presented as a conditional effects plot in Figure 8. There we can see that the difference in the effect of religiosity on participation is much more pronounced at the maximum level of separation of religion and state than at the point where it is minimal. Generally speaking, religious organisations are more prevalent in countries with greater separation of religion and state than elsewhere.

Figure 8: The effect of religiosity on religious organisation participation as moderated by separation of religion and state - conditional effects plot for Model 7c

This interaction can also be viewed in an alternative manner. In Figure 9, we have presented the β-coefficients from country-specific logistic regressions of RELORG on RELIGIOSITY with controls, graphed across the range of RAS in our sample. Again, a positive upward trend is evidenced lending confidence to our multilevel modelling.

Figure 9: The effect of separation of religion and state on the effect of religiosity on participation in religious organisations (results of country-specific logistic regressions with controls)

5.3.2 Charitable/humanitarian organisation membership

Now we turn our attention to participation in charitable or humanitarian organisations as another manifestation of civil society. In Table 15 are presented the results of multilevel modelling of the dependent variable CHARORG. There are 58,666 cases at level-1 and 46 at level-2. From Model 1d we calculate the VPC – it is estimated that 28% of the variance in the dependent variable lies at the macro-level. Model 2d introduces RELIGIOSITY along with a random slopes component.

Table 15: Multilevel logistic regression of charitable/humanitarian organisation membership (CHARORG)

	Model 1d b/se	Model 2d b/se	Model 3d b/se	Model 4d b/se	Model 5d b/se	Model 6d b/se	Model 7d b/se
CONSTANT	-1.48***	-1.41***	-1.37***	-2.09***	-2.24***	-2.24***	-2.24***
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
RELIGIOSITY		0.21***	0.21***	0.19***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
CATHOLIC			-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
PROTESTANT			0.11*	0.13**	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**
			(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ORTHODOX			-0.26***	-0.24***	-0.25***	-0.26***	-0.25***
			(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
MUSLIM			-0.24**	-0.15	-0.15	-0.15	-0.15
			(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
JEW			0.24	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.13
			(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)
HINDU			-0.03	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
			(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
BUDDHIST			0.05	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
OTHER			-0.11	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
			(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
FEMALE				0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AGE				0.99***	1.01***	1.02***	1.01***
				(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
AGE2				-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
EDUC MID				0.31***	0.32***	0.32***	0.32***
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
EDUC HIGH				0.67***	0.68***	0.69***	0.68***
				(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 2				0.12**	0.12**	0.12**	0.12**
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 3				0.21***	0.21***	0.21***	0.21***
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 4				0.36***	0.36***	0.37***	0.36***
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 5				0.56***	0.56***	0.57***	0.56***
				(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
POSTMAT				0.11***	0.11***	0.12***	0.11***
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI					-0.88	-1.55*	-0.90
					(0.84)	(0.86)	(0.84)
RAS					1.41*	1.42*	1.35*
					(0.78)	(0.78)	(0.76)
POL_IV					0.01	0.01	0.01
					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI*REL						0.89***	
						(0.20)	
RAS*REL							0.07
							(0.29)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

RELIGIOSITY is positively linked to participation in charitable/humanitarian organisations, although the effect does vary to some extent across countries, as evidenced by the significant variance component (0.10, p=0.00) (*n.b.* when RELIGIOSITY is held at its mean). Model 3d introduces controls for denominational identification. Their introduction does nothing to alter the effect of RELIGIOSITY from the last model. Denominational identification alters the likelihood of participation in some instances, in others not, as compared to those without identification. Protestants are more likely to participate than the non-affiliated whilst Orthodox Christians and Muslims are less likely. For all other confessions, there are no statistically significant differences. Next, Model 4d introduces further controls at the individual level. Their doing so makes only one difference – Muslims are no longer significantly less likely to participate than those who do not identify with any denomination. RELIGIOSITY remains positive and significant. Women are significantly more likely to participate. AGE follows a significant inverted U-shaped trend. EDUC is associated with greater likelihood of participation as are CLASS and POSTMAT. Model 5d introduces HDI, RAS, and POL_IV at the macro-level. Their introduction does not change the substantive message from that of Model 4d. HDI has no statistical significance, whilst RAS is positive and significant if only at the 10% level. POLITY_IV is positive in effect but insignificant. Model 6d introduces the interaction term for RELIGIOSITY and HDI. It is positive and significant – thus we can confirm Hypothesis 2 that modernisation increases the effect of religiosity on participation in civil society as manifested in participation in charitable and humanitarian based organisations.

Model 6d was re-estimated 46 times, with each time one country after another being dropped from the dataset. No influential cases at the country level were identified that did anything to alter the significance and polarity of the interaction effect.

Table 16 presents the conditional regression coefficients that stem from the interaction in Model 6d. We can see that at the minimal level of HDI, the effect of religiosity on participation in charitable/humanitarian organisations is negative but insignificant. By the mean level, it has switched its polarity and become significant. Once HDI has reached its maximum, the effect of RELIGIOSITY has become even more pronounced.

Table 16: Effect of religiosity on charitable/humanitarian organisation membership by country modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6d)

	Minimum HDI b/se	Mean HDI b/se	Maximum HDI b/se
CONSTANT	-1.62***	-2.24***	-2.63***
	(0.34)	(0.21)	(0.35)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.15	0.20***	0.42***
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.04)

* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

This interaction is presented graphically as a conditional effects plot in Figure 10. When HDI is minimal, participation in charitable/humanitarian organisations is greater. However, religiosity has something of an equalising effect making participation by the highly religious in countries at the different ends of the range of modernisation, much more comparable than that of those totally without faith.

Figure 10: The effect of religiosity on participation in charitable and humanitarian organisations as moderated by country-level modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6d

Model 7d introduces an interaction term for RELIGIOSITY and RAS in order to test Hypothesis 5. Its effect is positive but insignificant – thus we fail to confirm Hypothesis 5, as it pertains to charitable and humanitarian organisations, that the effect of greater separation of religion and state increases the effect of religiosity on participation in civil society.

When we remove one country, re-estimate the model, then remove the next country and re-estimate the model 46 times, in no incidence does the message change, despite minor fluctuations in the β-coefficients and p-values. Thus, we can safely assume there are no country-level cases with an overbearing influence on our modelling.

5.3.3 Environmental organisation membership

Next the analysis shifts its attention to the dependent variable ENVORG, which measures participation in environmental type organisations. The results are presented in Table 17. There are 58,686 cases at level-1 and 46 cases at level-2. Model 1e is again the empty model; from this some 31% of the variance in the dependent variable is estimated to be at the country-level, as measured by the VPC. Model 2e introduces RELIGIOSITY along with a random slopes component. Religiosity is negative in effect but statistically insignificant. Also, the variance component for RELIGIOSITY is significant, meaning there are unmeasured effects of religiosity that are country specific (0.08, p=0.00) (*n.b.* when RELIGIOSITY is held at its mean). Model 3e introduces controls for denominational identification. Their introduction makes the effect of religiosity less negative but it is still insignificant. Also, only Orthodox people are significantly distinct from those with no denominational identification. Model 4e builds on its predecessor by introducing further controls at the individual level. The effect of RELIGIOSITY becomes positive but remains insignificant. No changes of note are registered in the effects of religious denomination. Women are significantly less likely to participate whilst AGE follows a familiar curvilinear trend. EDUC and CLASS both follow a pattern that is more or less linear, positive, and statistically significant. POSTMAT is also significantly and positively tied to participation in organisations concerned with the environment. Model 5e now introduces controls at the macro-level, namely HDI, RAS, and POL_IV.

Table 17: Multilevel logistic regression of environmental organisation membership (ENVORG)

	Model 1e b/se	Model 2e b/se	Model 3e b/se	Model 4e b/se	Model 5e b/se	Model 6e b/se	Model 7e b/se
CONSTANT	-1.91***	-1.85***	-1.78***	-2.34***	-2.79***	-2.79***	-2.80***
	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.05
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
CATHOLIC			-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06
			(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
PROTESTANT			0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
ORTHODOX			-0.36***	-0.34***	-0.39***	-0.40***	-0.39***
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
MUSLIM			-0.18	-0.12	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
			(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
JEW			0.22	0.18	0.19	0.18	0.19
			(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
HINDU			-0.14	-0.13	-0.17	-0.17	-0.17
			(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)
BUDDHIST			0.03	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.09
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
OTHER			0.03	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
			(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
FEMALE				-0.09***	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.09**
				(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
AGE				0.24*	0.26*	0.26*	0.26*
				(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
AGE2				-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
EDUC MID				0.18***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
				(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
EDUC HIGH				0.37***	0.42***	0.42***	0.42***
				(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 2				0.16***	0.15***	0.16***	0.15***
				(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CLASS 3				0.23***	0.23***	0.24***	0.23***
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 4				0.36***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***
				(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 5				0.43**	0.46**	0.46**	0.46**
				(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
POSTMAT				0.14***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***
				(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
HDI					-3.84***	-3.82***	-3.84***
					(0.90)	(0.89)	(0.89)
RAS					1.17	1.18	1.16
					(0.78)	(0.78)	(0.78)
POL_IV					0.05	0.05	0.05
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
HDI*REL						0.23	
						(0.17)	
RAS*REL							-0.20
							(0.23)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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Their introduction does nothing to alter the effects from as they were in the last model. HDI is negatively and significantly linked to participation whilst RAS is positively tied but insignificant. POLITY_IV is insignificant. Model 6e introduces the interaction effect for RELIGIOSITY and HDI in order to test Hypothesis 2 as it pertains to participation in environmental type organisations – that modernisation increases the effect of religiosity on civil society participation. As we can see from Table 17, the interaction term is insignificant and thus we cannot confirm this hypothesis. Model 6e is re-estimated 46 times, with each time one country after another being taken out of the dataset, in order to test for influential country-level cases. When Switzerland is dropped from the data, the interaction coefficient is now 0.29 with a standard error of 0.17 and a p-value of 0.09[15]. Accordingly, we can now tentatively confirm Hypothesis 2. Table 18 presents the conditional regression coefficients that stem from this revealed interaction in Model 6b.

**Table 18: Effect of religiosity on environmental organisation membership by country modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6f/restricted sample)**

	Minimum HDI b/se	Mean HDI b/se	Maximum HDI b/se
CONSTANT	-1.20***	-2.80***	-3.80***
	(0.31)	(0.19)	(0.36)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.06	0.05	0.13***
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.04)

* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

We see as the minimum level of HDI within our newly restricted sample, that the effect of religiosity is negative, but insignificant. At the mean level, it is

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[15] In all incidences where overbearingly-influential cases are found at level-2, the relevant parameters are reported in text. For full details of all re-estimated models using subsets of the data, see Appendix C.

now positive but still insignificant. It is only towards the maximum level that this effect attains significance, with its magnitude growing as HDI increases.

This interaction is presented graphically in the form of a conditional effects plot, in Figure 11. As we can see there is a disparity between the least developed and most developed societies, in line with previous findings. Yet, the interaction is too weak to be having any equalising effect as we witnessed earlier. Indeed, the effects of religiosity are paltry across the spectrum of HDI.

Figure 11: The effect of religiosity on participation in environmental organisations as moderated by country-level modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6 (restricted sample)

Model 7e subsequently introduces an interaction term for RELIGIOSITY and RAS. This is to test Hypothesis 2 is it pertains to environmental organisations – that conditions of greater religious freedom and deregulation

will increase the effect of religiosity on civil society participation. Again, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed as the interaction term is statistically insignificant.

Model 7e was re-estimated 46 times, removing one country at a time, from each model. In this incidence, the absence of not one country was sufficient to alter either the polarity or significance of the interaction coefficient. Thus, we consider this finding robust with respect to possible influential cases at the macro level.

5.3.4 Cultural/educational organisation membership

Now we turn our attention to the analysis of the dependent variable CULTORG, which measures participation in civil society organisations concerned with culture or education. The results of multilevel logistic regressions are presented in Table 19. At level-1, there are 58,798 cases and 46 at level-2. Model 1f is the empty model and from this, it is estimated that some 27% of the variance in the dependent variable can be found at the country-level. Model 2f subsequently introduces RELIGIOSITY along with a random slopes component. The effect of RELIGIOSITY is found to be positively related to participation and significant if only at the 5% level. Also, there is significant variance in this effect across countries, as measured by the variance components (0.07, p=0.00) (*n.b.* when RELIGIOSITY is held at its mean). Model 3f introduces controls for denominational identification. Their addition reduces ever so slightly the effect of RELIGIOSITY on participation.

Table 19: Multilevel logistic regression of cultural/education organisation membership (CULTORG)

	Model 1f b/se	Model 2f b/se	Model 3f b/se	Model 4f b/se	Model 5f b/se	Model 6f b/se	Model 7f b/se
CONSTANT	-1.37***	-1.31***	-1.27***	-2.21***	-2.45***	-2.46***	-2.47***
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)
RELIGIOSITY		0.09**	0.08**	0.13***	0.14***	0.13***	0.13***
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
CATHOLIC			0.03	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
			(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
PROTESTANT			0.09*	0.12***	0.12***	0.12***	0.12**
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ORTHODOX			-0.08	-0.08	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10
			(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
MUSLIM			-0.31***	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.22**
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
JEW			0.30	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.29
			(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
HINDU			-0.17	-0.13	-0.13	-0.14	-0.14
			(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)
BUDDHIST			-0.01	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09
			(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
OTHER			-0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
			(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
FEMALE				0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
				(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
AGE				-1.12***	-1.16***	-1.17***	-1.17***
				(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
AGE2				0.03***	0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
EDUC MID				0.35***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***
				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
EDUC HIGH				0.83***	0.88***	0.89***	0.89***
				(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
CLASS 2				0.11**	0.11**	0.11**	0.11**
				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
CLASS 3				0.24***	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 4				0.43***	0.45***	0.45***	0.45***
				(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 5				0.38**	0.40**	0.40**	0.40**
				(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
POSTMAT				0.13***	0.14***	0.14***	0.14***
				(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI					-1.82**	-2.14**	-2.10**
					(0.84)	(0.84)	(0.84)
RAS					1.65**	1.64**	1.42*
					(0.75)	(0.74)	(0.73)
POL_IV					0.02	0.02	0.02
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
HDI*REL						0.57***	
						(0.17)	
RAS*REL							0.42**
							(0.17)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Protestants participate more than the non-affiliated whilst Muslims do so less. Otherwise, denominational affiliation of any sort does nothing to distinguish individuals. Model 3f introduces further individual-level controls. Their effect is to increase the effect of RELIGIOSITY on participation and this is now significant at the 1% level. Muslims still are less likely to participate than the non-affiliated but the effect has attenuated somewhat, whilst Protestants are somewhat more likely than they had been in the preceding model. No significant differences were found between men and women, whilst the effect of AGE follows an inverted U-shaped trend. EDUC and CLASS are both positively linked to participation. With EDUC, the effect is more or less linear, whilst for CLASS, the effect increases before levelling off at the highest level. Finally, POSTMAT is positively linked to participation. Model 5f introduces HDI, RAS, and POL_IV at the country-level. Their introduction does nothing to change the message of the model from as it was in Model 4f. HDI is negatively linked to participation whilst RAS is positively linked to participation. POLITY_IV is insignificantly related. Model 6f introduces an interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and HDI. This is to test Hypothesis 2 – that modernisation increases the effect of religiosity on civil society participation – in this case in cultural/educational organisations. The interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level and thus we can confirm Hypothesis 2 in this instance.

Again, the by now familiar procedure was carried out for checking for influential cases at the country-level – it was found that in no incidence did the interaction effect switch its polarity nor lose its significance. There are

influential cases in the model, and in some cases, the interaction effect can be said to be even higher than we have estimated it at in Model 6f as fitted to the complete dataset. However, these differences are not so great so as to alter the substantive message of the model, and thus we persist with the one estimated on the full dataset.

Table 20 presents the conditional regression coefficients for the interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI in Model 6f. On this basis, we can say that where HDI is minimal, the effect of religiosity on participation is negative but insignificant, but as HDI increases to its mean level within the dataset, the polarity is reversed and this newly positive effect is also significant at the 1% level. By the maximal level of HDI within the dataset, the effect is greater still and also highly significant.

Table 20: Effect of religiosity on cultural/educational organisation membership by modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6f)

	Minimum HDI b/se	Mean HDI b/se	Maximum HDI b/se
CONSTANT	-1.60***	-2.46***	-2.99***
	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.34)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.09	0.13***	0.27***
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI is presented graphically in Figure 12. We can see that overall, participation in cultural or educational organisations is greater in less developed countries, but that the effect of religiosity is an equalising one – religious individuals are more comparable across the spectrum of modernisation than those without religion (*n.b.* the slope for the minimum level of HDI is insignificant).

Figure 12: The effect of religiosity on participation in cultural and educational organisations as moderated by country-level modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6f

Next, in Model 7f, an interaction term is introduced between RELIGIOSITY and RAS, so that we can test Hypothesis 5 – concerning the prediction that religiosity will increase its effect on civil society participation under conditions of greater separation of religion and state. The effect of this interaction is positive and significant at the 5% level. We confirm Hypothesis 5 on this basis. Once again, the same procedure was undertaken for testing for influential cases at the country level; only in the case of Iran did the interaction effect lose significance. When Iran is omitted from the dataset, the interaction coefficient has a value of 0.30 with a p-value of 0.108. It fails to be significant at the 10% level but only just. Given that its insignificance is so slight and given that there is probably some inflation of the standard

errors brought about by close correlations between for instance CLASS and EDUC, and HDI and POLITY_IV, we can afford to sweep this result under the rug and persist with Model 7f as it is applied to the complete dataset. Indeed, when POLITY_IV is removed from the model and Iran is omitted from the sample, the interaction becomes significant (p=0.069).

Table 21 presents the conditional regression coefficients that stem from the interaction in Model 7f. Here we see that the effect of religiosity is negative and insignificant at the minimum level of religion and state, positive at the mean and significant, and more positive yet at the maximum and also highly significant.

Table 21: Effect of religiosity on cultural/educational organisation membership by separation of religion and state (conditional regression coefficients Model 7f)

	Minimum RAS b/se	Mean RAS b/se	Maximum RAS b/se
CONSTANT	-3.05***	-2.47***	-2.11***
	(0.31)	(0.19)	(0.30)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.04	0.13***	0.24***
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

This interaction is presented graphically in Figure 13. We see that countries with the highest level of separation of religion and state have more participation in cultural/educational organisations, and that religiosity makes individuals less comparable across the spectrum of separation of religion and state. Indeed, at the lowest level of RELIGIOSITY, individuals at the lowest level of separation of religion and state are broadly comparable with individuals of the same level of RELIGIOSITY at the highest level of separation of religion and state. Increasing RELIGIOSITY drastically alters

things, making individuals very different in terms of the likelihood of participating in this sphere of civil society.

Figure 13: The effect of religiosity on participation in cultural and educational organisations as moderated by separation of religion and state - conditional effects plot for Model 7f

5.4 Summary.

This chapter has been concerned with the role of the individual's religiosity in civil society as it is moderated by the hosting country's levels of modernisation and religious freedom. We have been chiefly concerned with the testing of Hypotheses 2 and 5. The former expected that as modernisation increases, so religiosity would increase its effect on civil society participation. The latter hypothesis expected that as the religious market became more deregulated, freer, and without state establishment of religion, the effect of religiosity would become greater too. Indeed these

hypotheses have found some support but what is apparent is that what can matter when answering these research questions is the particular sphere of civil society in question.

This chapter examined civil society as it manifests itself in four distinct spheres that are distinguished by the purpose they have. The four types of organisation were: (1) religious organisations, (2) charitable/humanitarian organisations, (3) environmental organisations, and (4) cultural/educational organisations. Hypothesis 2 was confirmed with regard to religious organisations, charitable/humanitarian organisations, and cultural/educational organisations. It was only confirmed with regard to environmental organisations once one overly-influential case had been identified and removed from the dataset. Hypothesis 5 was confirmed only with regard to religious organisations, and cultural or educational organisations. It went unconfirmed with respect to charitable or humanitarian organisations, and environmental organisations. The possible reasons for these conflicting results will be discussed in Chapter 7. Now we move on to our exploration of unconventional political participation and how religiosity is conditioned in its effects by the country-context in which the individual lives.

Chapter 6 – The effect of country context on the relationship between religiosity and unconventional political participation

6.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the exploration of religiosity and unconventional political participation. In our theoretical chapter, it was outlined that religiosity would tend to lead individuals away from unconventional political participation. This was because religiosity is often seen within the literature as conservative and authoritarian whilst unconventional political participation is seen as radical and authority challenging, and thus the two are simply incompatible, like water and oil, from a theoretical standpoint. This individual-level theory was then contextualised and two key hypotheses were proposed and it is their testing that is the key concern of this chapter. With Hypothesis 3, it is expected that religiosity will increase its effect, that is to say make the effect of religiosity less negative, on unconventional political participation, as modernisation increases. Hypothesis 6 expects that the effect of religiosity will become more negative as the level of separation of religion and state increases. These hypotheses are investigated using multilevel analysis.

The results show that modernisation does make the effect of religiosity less negative but only in 2 out of 3 indicators analysed here – signing petitions and taking part in boycotts, but not attending protests. Thus, Hypothesis 3 receives only partial confirmation. Level of separation of religion and state in no incidence makes more negative the effect of religiosity on unconventional

political participation and thus Hypothesis 6 is rejected. In one case, that of boycotting, a positive interaction is found but otherwise the observed effect is null.

6.2 Modelling unconventional political participation

In Chapter 3, indicators of unconventional political participation were identified. They were PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST. As these variables are binary in nature, they are modelled using logistic regression-based techniques. As the data is nested, again with individuals deemed nested within countries, multilevel techniques are applied. The modelling process is by now familiar to us and needs no further repetition, other than to say that Hypothesis 3 is tested by an interaction effect between our measure of modernisation, namely the HDI index, and RELIGIOSITY (Model 6), whilst Hypothesis 6 is tested by an interaction between separation of religion and state, as measured by the RAS index, and RELIGIOSITY (Model 7). Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this chapter are presented in Tables 22 and 23.

Table 22: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 6: Individual level variables

Country	PETITION mean	sd	BOYCOTT mean	sd	PROTEST mean	sd	RELIGIOSITY mean	sd	AGE mean	sd	FEMALE mean	sd	EDUC mean	sd	CLASS mean	sd	POSTMAT mean	sd
Argentina	0.3	0.46	0.03	0.18	0.2	0.4	-0.13	0.76	42.55	17.59	0.53	0.5	1.65	0.74	2.46	0.82	1.87	0.65
Australia	0.73	0.45	0.12	0.32	0.15	0.36	-0.66	0.91	50.45	16.86	0.55	0.5	2.4	0.74	2.9	0.88	2.09	0.61
Brazil	0.75	0.44	0.65	0.48	0.62	0.49	0.42	0.5	39.96	15.68	0.58	0.49	1.57	0.75	2.16	0.86	1.79	0.62
Bulgaria	0.09	0.29	0.02	0.13	0.09	0.29	-0.53	0.67	47.36	16.51	0.54	0.5	1.98	0.68	2.31	0.83	1.46	0.54
Burkina Faso	0.16	0.37	0.14	0.35	0.25	0.43	0.64	0.47	34.31	13.92	0.49	0.5	1.25	0.54	1.97	1.01	1.62	0.58
Canada	0.67	0.47	0.19	0.39	0.2	0.4	-0.21	0.86	48.21	17.8	0.58	0.49	2.04	0.73	2.92	0.91	2.18	0.59
Chile	0.19	0.39	0.03	0.18	0.2	0.4	-0.02	0.69	42.93	16.98	0.55	0.5	1.78	0.73	2.64	0.92	1.84	0.63
China	0.06	0.24	0.04	0.18			-1.29	0.83	44.76	13.32	0.54	0.5	1.54	0.61	2.34	0.89	1.56	0.58
Cyprus	0.24	0.43	0.12	0.33	0.3	0.46	0.05	0.64	41.63	15.98	0.51	0.5	2.07	0.76	3.17	0.88	1.79	0.65
Ethiopia	0.37	0.48	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.64	0.47	29.93	10.21	0.49	0.5	1.6	0.69	2.38	1.08	1.89	0.64
Finland	0.4	0.49	0.14	0.35	0.06	0.24	-0.56	0.76	47.52	17.49	0.52	0.5	1.93	0.75	2.84	0.85	1.86	0.6
Georgia	0.05	0.23	0.03	0.17	0.15	0.36	0.37	0.41	45.41	17.19	0.53	0.5	2.29	0.54	2.64	0.93	1.65	0.58
Germany	0.36	0.48	0.05	0.22	0.15	0.36	-0.9	0.85	50.44	17.49	0.56	0.5	1.74	0.71	2.8	0.85	1.94	0.63
Ghana	0.05	0.21	0.02	0.15	0.09	0.29	0.78	0.33	33.86	14.07	0.49	0.5	1.38	0.59	2	1.04	1.73	0.56
India	0.27	0.45	0.15	0.36	0.19	0.39	0.16	0.64	41.37	14.71	0.43	0.5	1.72	0.8	2.52	1.17	1.68	0.56
Indonesia	0.07	0.26	0.04	0.2	0.17	0.38	0.69	0.37	36.1	13.94	0.48	0.5	2.14	0.72	2.97	0.87	1.6	0.58
Japan	0.49	0.5	0.05	0.22	0.03	0.17	-0.8	0.6	48.15	15.74	0.56	0.5	2.17	0.58	2.69	0.86	1.84	0.56
Jordan	0.04	0.2	0.03	0.17	0.05	0.22	0.91	0.28	37.59	14.4	0.51	0.5	1.88	0.81	3.02	0.85	1.56	0.56
Malaysia	0.09	0.29	0.03	0.18	0.05	0.22	0.38	0.48	31.84	11.93	0.5	0.5	1.94	0.58	2.79	1.04	1.74	0.58
Mali	0.22	0.41	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.46	0.68	0.4	37.25	14.85	0.5	0.5	1.3	0.6	2.88	1.1	1.64	0.59
Moldova	0.1	0.3	0.04	0.2	0.16	0.36	-0.05	0.62	42.78	16.85	0.53	0.5	2.06	0.53	2.8	1.03	1.67	0.61
Morocco	0.08	0.28	0.07	0.26	0.18	0.38	0.69	0.32	37.17	13.38	0.51	0.5	1.29	0.54	2.38	0.78	1.55	0.61
Norway	0.49	0.5	0.16	0.37	0.14	0.34	-0.93	0.76	45.78	16.06	0.5	0.5	2.29	0.76	3	0.88	2.12	0.49
Peru	0.23	0.42	0.04	0.2	0.24	0.43	0.27	0.58	37.62	14.9	0.51	0.5	1.86	0.74	2.42	0.88	1.95	0.64
Poland	0.17	0.37	0.02	0.15	0.05	0.22	0.35	0.58	45.96	17.82	0.49	0.5	1.62	0.71	2.44	0.92	1.76	0.58
Romania	0.06	0.23	0.01	0.11	0.06	0.24	0.32	0.49	48.68	17.38	0.54	0.5	1.83	0.73	2.4	1.03	1.57	0.59

Country	PETITION mean	PETITION sd	BOYCOTT mean	BOYCOTT sd	PROTEST mean	PROTEST sd	RELIGIOSITY mean	RELIGIOSITY sd	AGE mean	AGE sd	FEMALE mean	FEMALE sd	EDUC mean	EDUC sd	CLASS mean	CLASS sd	POSTMAT mean	POSTMAT sd
Rwanda	0.08	0.28	0.04	0.19	0.16	0.37	0.68	0.3	34.65	14.15	0.51	0.5	1.21	0.47	1.7	0.98	1.87	0.68
Slovenia	0.26	0.44	0.05	0.21	0.09	0.28	-0.61	0.84	46.19	17.84	0.54	0.5	2	0.7	2.8	0.88	1.95	0.59
S. Africa	0.13	0.33	0.1	0.31	0.15	0.35	0.44	0.55	38.82	16.58	0.5	0.5	1.84	0.53	2.38	1.23	1.7	0.61
S. Korea	0.39	0.49	0.06	0.24	0.11	0.32	-0.43	0.84	41.38	14.01	0.5	0.5	2.44	0.66	2.98	0.81	1.48	0.55
Sweden	0.71	0.46	0.18	0.38	0.15	0.36	-1.04	0.73	47.73	16.99	0.5	0.5	2.34	0.73	3.16	0.9	2.2	0.51
Switzerland	0.7	0.46	0.15	0.36	0.18	0.38	-0.52	0.84	52.45	16.14	0.55	0.5	2.2	0.64	3.37	0.78	2.08	0.63
Taiwan	0.11	0.32	0.03	0.18	0.08	0.27	-0.59	0.61	43.88	16.05	0.49	0.5	2.16	0.78	2.83	0.91	1.48	0.57
Thailand	0.08	0.28	0.03	0.17	0.04	0.21	0.36	0.41	45.35	15.73	0.51	0.5	1.51	0.71	2.85	0.77	1.78	0.5
Trin & Tob	0.75	0.44	0.69	0.46	0.65	0.48	0.51	0.47	42.61	17.33	0.55	0.5	1.65	0.65	2.74	1.05	1.72	0.57
Turkey	0.56	0.5	0.27	0.44	0.27	0.45	0.31	0.57	36.48	13.86	0.5	0.5	1.62	0.69	2.97	0.92	1.81	0.65
Ukraine	0.08	0.27	0.03	0.17	0.17	0.38	-0.35	0.72	42.38	16.77	0.66	0.47	2.27	0.63	2.66	0.91	1.55	0.56
USA	0.67	0.47	0.2	0.4	0.11	0.31	0.04	0.83	47.96	17.03	0.5	0.5	1.95	0.5	2.87	0.92	1.98	0.63
Uruguay	0.8	0.4	0.29	0.46	0.71	0.45	-0.44	0.88	46.53	18.65	0.56	0.5	1.44	0.74	2.39	0.9	2.08	0.65
Vietnam	0.06	0.23	0	0.05	0	0.06	-0.82	0.65	40.75	15.85	0.49	0.5	1.51	0.63	2.16	0.57	1.8	0.54
Zambia	0.13	0.34	0.13	0.33	0.26	0.44	0.58	0.46	29.79	11.88	0.49	0.5	1.7	0.69	2.5	1.27	1.82	0.6

Table 23: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 6: Individual characteristics

Country	NONE	CATH	PROT	ORTH	MUS	JEW	HIND	BUD	OTH	HDI	RAS	POL_IV
			Proportion of...									
Argentina	0.17	0.74	0	0	0	0	0	0.06	0.02	0.75	47.56	8
Australia	0.4	0.23	0.31	0.02	0	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.93	75.06	10
Brazil	0.13	0.6	0.23	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.68	75.27	8
Bulgaria	0.16	0	0	0.74	0.1	0	0	0	0	0.73	40.84	9
Burkina Faso	0.02	0.31	0.08	0	0.53	0	0	0	0.05	0.3	75.68	0
Canada	0.29	0.4	0.16	0.01	0.01	0	0	0.01	0.12	0.88	74.03	10
Chile	0.23	0.6	0.17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.76	57.22	10
China	0.89	0	0.04	0	0.02	0	0	0.03	0.01	0.64	29.41	-7
Cyprus	0.05	0	0	0.49	0.45	0	0	0	0	0.8	61.02	10
Ethiopia	0.02	0.02	0.19	0.65	0.11	0	0	0	0.02	0.31	56.51	1
Finland	0.14	0	0.83	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.86	44.68	10
Georgia	0.02	0	0	0.94	0.03	0	0	0	0	0.7	44.72	6
Germany	0.43	0.21	0.33	0.01	0.01	0	0	0	0.01	0.88	57.68	10
Ghana	0.03	0.21	0.55	0.04	0.15	0	0	0	0.03	0.46	73.24	8
India	0.06	0	0.03	0	0.08	0.01	0.76	0.02	0.05	0.49	54.69	9
Indonesia	0.01	0	0.07	0	0.92	0	0	0	0	0.57	32.34	8
Japan	0.64	0.01	0.02	0	0	0	0	0.31	0.03	0.87	69.05	10
Jordan	0	0.01	0	0.01	0.98	0	0	0	0	0.71	17.05	-3
Malaysia	0.02	0.07	0.05	0	0.57	0	0.08	0.2	0.01	0.73	20.04	3
Mali	0.02	0.02	0.01	0	0.93	0.01	0.01	0	0.01	0.35	60.13	7
Moldova	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.92	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.61	45.22	8
Morocco	0	0	0	0	0.99	0	0	0	0	0.6	25.7	-6
Norway	0.32	0.01	0.63	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.02	0.93	52.29	10
Peru	0.12	0.71	0.14	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.7	55.56	9

| Country | Proportion of... | | | | | | | | | HDI | RAS | POL_IV |
	NONE	CATH	PROT	ORTH	MUS	JEW	HIND	BUD	OTH			
Poland	0.02	0.94	0.01	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.01	0.76	55.35	10
Romania	0.01	0.08	0.05	0.86	0	0	0	0	0	0.77	53.06	9
Rwanda	0.02	0.52	0.3	0	0.15	0	0	0	0	0.43	67.78	-3
Slovenia	0.29	0.65	0.02	0.02	0.01	0	0	0	0.01	0.81	65.6	10
S. Africa	0.17	0.12	0.59	0	0.02	0	0.02	0	0.07	0.59	75.06	9
S. Korea	0.29	0.21	0.23	0	0	0	0	0.25	0.02	0.85	75.68	8
Sweden	0.26	0.02	0.71	0	0	0	0	0	0.02	0.89	65.39	10
Switzerland	0.2	0.41	0.33	0	0.02	0	0	0	0.04	0.9	57.06	10
Taiwan	0.31	0.01	0.04	0	0	0	0	0.19	0.45	0.94	75.89	10
Thailand	0	0	0	0	0.03	0	0	0.97	0	0.64	56.05	-1
Trin & Tob	0.07	0.2	0.44	0	0.05	0	0.23	0	0	0.72	72.77	10
Turkey	0.01	0	0	0	0.99	0	0	0	0	0.65	30.35	7
Ukraine	0.31	0.07	0	0.6	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.7	57.57	7
USA	0.3	0.2	0.32	0	0	0.02	0	0	0.15	0.9	77.56	10
Uruguay	0.55	0.34	0.07	0	0	0	0	0	0.04	0.74	69.02	10
Vietnam	0.21	0.06	0.01	0	0	0	0	0.15	0.56	0.55	24.05	-7
Zambia	0.05	0.34	0.46	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.12	0.36	47.61	5

Model 6 can be stated algebraically as[16]:

$$\log\left(\frac{\pi_{ij}}{1-\pi_{ij}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1.RELIGIOSITY_{ij} + \beta_2.CATHOLIC_{ij} + \beta_3.PROTESTANT_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_4.ORTHODOX_{ij} + \beta_5.MUSLIM_{ij} + \beta_6.JEW_{ij} + \beta_7.HINDU_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_8.BUDDHIST_{ij} + \beta_9.OTHER_{ij} + \beta_{10}.FEMALE_{ij} + \beta_{11}.AGE_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_{12}.AGE^2{}_{ij} + \beta_{13}.EDUC\_MID_{ij} + \beta_{14}.EDUC\_HIGH_{ij} + \beta_{15}.CLASS2_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_{16}.CLASS3_{ij} + \beta_{17}.CLASS4_{ij} + \beta_{18}.CLASS5_{ij} + \beta_{19}.POSTMAT_{ij}$$

$$+ \beta_{20}.HDI_j + \beta_{23}.RAS_j + \beta_{24}.POL\_IV_j + \beta_{25}.RELIGIOSITY_{ij}.HDI_j + u_{0j}$$

$$+ u_{1j}.RELIGIOSITY_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

π is the probability of unconventional participation (as measured by the indicator in question), i is the ith individual and j is the jth country. Simply switching HDI with RAS in the interaction term will give us Model 7. Again, robust standard errors are estimated in order to make allowances for heteroskedasticity in the models. Population averaged models are reported. RELIGIOSITY, HDI, RAS, and AGE have all been grand mean centred so that any possible effects of multicollinearity are handled. Again, RAS and AGE have been divided by 100, so that results can be presented as rounded up to 2 decimal places.

6.3 Empirical analysis of unconventional political participation

6.3.1 Signing petitions

The analysis begins with the dependent variable PETITION. Results of the multilevel modelling are presented in Table 24. There are 46,184 cases at

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[16] With the exception of when the dependent variable is PROTEST; since the effect of AGE is not found to follow a quadratic trend, it is modelled in a linear fashion.

level-1 and 41 at level-2. From Model 1g, it is estimated that around 35% of the variance in the dependent variable is to be found at the country-level. In Model 2g, RELIGIOSITY is introduced alongside a random slopes component. This forms the base for all subsequent models. The effect of RELIGIOSITY is negative and highly significant in line with our broader theoretical reasoning, although it varies across countries (0.06, p=0.00) (*n.b.* when RELIGIOSITY is held at its mean). Model 3g adds controls for individual denominational identification. The effect of their introduction on the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negligible – it remains negative and significant at the 1% level. Muslims and Hindus sign petitions significantly less than those with no denominational identification, whilst Jews sign more often. These are the only denominational effects observed. Model 4g adds further controls at the individual-level. This causes a substantial reduction in the strength of the effect of RELIGIOSITY from as it was in the preceding model. Also, the regression coefficient is now significant only at the 10% level. This suggests that a substantial part of the effect of RELIGIOSITY observed in previous models, but by no means all, is actually down to correlations between RELIGIOSITY and other individual-level factors. Elsewhere in Model 4g, Muslims still are less likely to sign a petition than the non-affiliated, but the effect is somewhat lessened and the coefficient is now only significant at the 10% level. Jews still sign petitions more than the non-affiliated but again, the regression coefficient is not as strong as it had been. Hindus remain distinctly unlikely to sign petitions – which can perhaps be put down to low levels of literacy within the Indian subcontinent.

Table 24: Multilevel logistic regression of having signed petitions (PETITION)

	Model 1g b/se	Model 2g b/se	Model 3g b/se	Model 4g b/se	Model 5g b/se	Model 6g b/se	Model 7g b/se
CONSTANT	-0.84***	-0.81***	-0.76***	-1.54***	-1.97***	-1.97***	-1.95***
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.06*	-0.08**	-0.09***	-0.10***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
CATHOLIC			0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
PROTESTANT			0.01	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
			(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
ORTHODOX			-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05
			(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
MUSLIM			-0.21**	-0.13*	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
JEW			0.35*	0.30*	0.37*	0.35*	0.37*
			(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)
HINDU			-0.41***	-0.41***	-0.42***	-0.43***	-0.42***
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
BUDDHIST			-0.03	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
OTHER			-0.07	-0.03	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
FEMALE				-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
				(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
AGE				0.51***	0.58***	0.57***	0.57***
				(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
AGE2				-0.05***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
EDUC MID				0.36***	0.40***	0.40***	0.40***
				(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
EDUC HIGH				0.68***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 2				0.13*	0.13*	0.13*	0.14*
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 3				0.24***	0.26***	0.26***	0.26***
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
CLASS 4				0.40***	0.44***	0.44***	0.44***
				(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
CLASS 5				0.32**	0.34**	0.33**	0.34**
				(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)
POSTMAT				0.20***	0.22***	0.22***	0.22***
				(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI					2.06**	0.88	2.04**
					(0.83)	(0.88)	(0.83)
RAS					3.21***	3.20***	2.49**
					(1.01)	(1.01)	(1.10)
POL_IV					0.03	0.03	0.03
					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI*REL						0.72***	
						(0.14)	
RAS*REL							0.48**
							(0.21)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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No significant differences can be found between the sexes when it comes to signing a petition, whilst the effect of AGE follows a familiar upturned U-shape trend. The likelihood of signing a petition increases more or less linearly with educational attainment whilst the effect of social class is that the likelihood of signing a petition rises concomitantly before levelling off somewhat at the upper echelons of the social structure. Finally, post-material values are associated with greater likelihood of petition signing. Model 5g introduces controls at the macro-level. The effect of religiosity now becomes more negative and is now significant at the 5% level. Muslims are no longer distinct from the non-affiliated, although Jews and Hindus remain so. The effects of AGE, CLASS, EDUC, and POSTMAT are not substantively different from as they were in Model 4g. HDI and RAS both have a positive and highly significant effect on petition signing. The effect of POL_IV is insignificant. Model 6g introduces an interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and HDI, in order to test Hypothesis 3 – that the effect of religiosity on unconventional political participation increases (becomes less negative) with the level of the hosting country's modernisation. As the interaction coefficient is both positive and highly significant, we can confirm this hypothesis in this instance.

Model 6g was re-estimated 41 times, each time with one country after the other being removed from the dataset, in order to test for any overly-influential cases at the country-level. In no incidence did the interaction coefficient either lose its significance or reverse its polarity, despite some

fluctuations in its magnitude. Thus, we can consider this finding to some degree robust in this respect.

In Table 25, the conditional regression coefficients for this interaction can be found. At the minimum level of HDI, the effect of religiosity is negative and highly significant. At the mean, the effect is less negative than before but still highly significant. Once HDI has reached its maximum, the effect is now positive and significant at the 1% level.

Table 25: Effect of religiosity on signing petitions by country modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6g)

	Minimum HDI b/se	Mean HDI b/se	Maximum HDI b/se
CONSTANT	-2.32***	-1.97***	-1.75***
	(0.37)	(0.17)	(0.30)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.38***	-0.09***	0.09***
	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)

* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Figure 14 presents the interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI in the form of a conditional effects plot. We can see things are very much dependent on your level of religiosity and the level of development of the country in which you live. When HDI is minimal, someone with minimal RELIGIOSITY is far more likely to sign a petition than someone with maximal RELIGIOSITY. When HDI reaches its observed mean in the dataset, the effect has lessened, whilst when it is at its maximum, the relationship has become positive. Regarding levels of petition signing across countries as measured by the level of HDI, this is best summed up visually as it is hard to account for in written word.

Figure 14: The effect of religiosity on signing petitions as conditioned by the country level of modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6g

PETITION was regressed (logit) on RELIGIOSITY plus controls at the individual level in each country and the β-coefficients are graphed against HDI, as presented in Figure 15. We can see an upward trend with the effect of RELIGIOSTY rising, in line with our multilevel modelling.

Figure 15: The effect of modernisation on the effect of religiosity on signing petitions (results of country-specific logistic regressions with controls)

Model 7g introduces an interaction between RELIGIOSITY and RAS, so that we can test Hypothesis 6 – that the effect of religiosity on unconventional political participation decreases (becomes more negative) with the level of separation of religion and state. The interaction coefficient is both positive and significant at the 5% level and thus we cannot confirm Hypothesis 6.

Model 7g was also re-estimated 41 times, with each time one country after another been removed from the dataset, in order to test for any influential cases at the country-level. In all but one incidence, removal of a country did not change the significance and polarity of the interaction coefficient, give or take some fluctuations in its strength. The exception was when Turkey was removed from the dataset – the interaction coefficient had a value of 0.34 with a standard error of 0.21, and a p-value of 0.102. Removal of POL_IV in

order to counter any potential enlargement of standard errors due to strong inter-correlations between macro-level variables reduces the p-value to 0.10 whilst further removing HDI actually serves to increase it. Thus, we cannot actually find a way to lower the p-value below the 10% threshold. It is concluded that the positive and significant result found in Model 7g when applied to the full dataset, is due to the overbearing influence of Turkey and that in actuality the relationship is in effect null.

6.3.2 Boycotting

Now we turn our attention to the analysis of the dependent variable BOYCOTT. The results of the multilevel analysis are displayed in Table 26. There are 44,681 cases at level-1 and 41 at level-2. Model 1h is again the empty model from which it is estimated that some 31% of the variance in the dependent variable is to be found at the country-level. Model 2h introduces RELIGIOSITY into the model along with an accompanying random slope. Again, the effect of religiosity is negative and highly significant. Additionally, there is significant variation in the effect of religiosity across countries (0.14, p=0.00) (*n.b.* when RELIGIOSITY is at its mean). Model 2h introduces controls for denominational affiliation. The effect of their introduction is to attenuate the effect of RELIGIOSITY somewhat, although it remains negative and highly significant. Protestants, Orthodox, Hindus, and 'Other' are all less likely to boycott than those with no denominational identification. All other religious groups are not significantly different from the reference category.

Table 26: Multilevel logistic regression of having participated in a boycott (BOYCOTT)

	Model 1h b/se	Model 2h b/se	Model 3h b/se	Model 4h b/se	Model 5h b/se	Model 6h b/se	Model 7h b/se
CONSTANT	-2.03***	-1.95***	-1.80***	-2.73***	-3.09***	-3.09***	-3.08***
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.26***	-0.22***	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.16***
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
CATHOLIC			-0.08	-0.05	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
PROTESTANT			-0.22***	-0.18***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
ORTHODOX			-0.42***	-0.43***	-0.45***	-0.46***	-0.45***
			(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
MUSLIM			-0.11	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
			(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
JEW			0.40	0.36	0.35	0.35	0.35
			(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.24)
HINDU			-0.58***	-0.55***	-0.56***	-0.56***	-0.56***
			(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
BUDDHIST			0.03	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
OTHER			-0.21***	-0.16***	-0.17***	-0.18***	-0.18***
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
FEMALE				-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.24***	-0.24***
				(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
AGE				0.36**	0.37**	0.37**	0.37**
				(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
AGE2				-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
EDUC MID				0.47***	0.50***	0.50***	0.50***
				(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
EDUC HIGH				0.84***	0.89***	0.89***	0.89***
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 2				0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 3				0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CLASS 4				0.19**	0.19**	0.19**	0.19**
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 5				0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07
				(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
POSTMAT				0.32***	0.33***	0.34***	0.33***
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI					-1.64***	-1.86***	-1.65***
					(0.55)	(0.60)	(0.55)
RAS					2.56**	2.55**	2.24**
					(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.11)
POL_IV					0.02	0.02	0.02
					(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI*REL						0.21	
						(0.21)	
RAS*REL							0.35
							(0.25)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Model 4h introduces further controls at the individual-level. Their introduction further attenuates the effect of religiosity – it becomes less negative - although it is still significant at the 1% level. Denominational effects do not differ too much from the last model. Women are significantly less likely than men to engage in boycotts. AGE follows an inverted U-shaped trend. EDUC is near-linearly related to boycotting. Only those from CLASS 4 are significantly distinct from the reference category (CLASS 1). POSTMAT is significantly and positively linked to the likelihood of boycotting. Model 5h introduces controls at the country-level. The impact of their introduction is to sharpen the effect of RELIGIOSITY somewhat, by making it more negative, although there is no change in its significance. Denominational effects along with the other individual level controls do not alter. HDI is negatively and significantly linked to boycotting whilst RAS is positively and significantly linked. POL_IV bears no significant relationship to boycotting. Model 6h introduces an interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and HDI in order to test Hypothesis 3 – that modernisation increases (makes less negative) the effect of religiosity on unconventional political participation, in this case boycotting. The interaction term is positive in line with our theory, but statistically insignificant. Thus, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 3 in this instance.

When we apply the same process of checking for influential cases that was used earlier, we find one country whose removal, causes the interaction effect to be both positive *and* significant, if only at the 10% level. This country is Rwanda, and when it is removed from the dataset, the interaction

regression coefficient is 0.31 with a standard error of 0.19 with a p-value of 0.09. Thus, we can now confirm Hypothesis 3 given the principle that it is unwise to let one case define the rule for all cases. Conditional regression coefficients, derived from Model 7h - as estimated using a dataset missing the Rwandan case - for the effect of RELIGIOSITY as conditional on the level of HDI, are presented in Table 27. We can see clearly that the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negative and significant at the minimum level of HDI but this effect is becoming less negative as HDI increases and by its highest level, the effect is still negative but statistically insignificant.

Table 27: Effect of religiosity on boycotting by country modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6h/restricted sample)

	Minimum HDI b/se	Mean HDI b/se	Maximum HDI b/se
CONSTANT	-2.24***	-3.03***	-3.53***
	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.29)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.27***	-0.15***	-0.07
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.05)

* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

The interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI found using the restricted dataset is presented as a conditional effects plot in Figure 16. There we can see that boycotting is more prevalent in societies with minimal modernisation. We can also see how religiosity is attenuating in its effect as modernisation, as measured by HDI, increases. By the time HDI has reached its maximum level in our dataset, the effect is negligible. The other thing to note from this graph is that the effect of religiosity is to make individuals from the extremes of development, much more comparable than two individuals from the same location who are totally irreligious.

Figure 16: The effect of religiosity on boycotting as conditioned by the country level of modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6h (restricted sample)

Model 7h introduces an interaction effect between RELIGIOSITY and RAS in order to test Hypothesis 6 – that the effect of religiosity decreases (becomes more negative) under conditions of greater separation of religion and state. Again, the interaction term is positive but statistically insignificant. Thus, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 6. However, when the process of removing one country at a time and re-estimating the model is applied in order to test for overly-influential cases at the country-level, three cases emerge in which their exclusion produces interaction effects that are both positive *and* significant. These countries are China, Burkina Faso, and Uruguay. When all three are excluded simultaneously, then the regression coefficient for the interaction between RELIGIOSITY and RAS is 0.55 with a standard error of 0.23 and is significant at the 5% level. In Table 28, conditional regression

coefficients are presented, showing how the effect of RELIGIOSITY changes with rising levels of RAS. They are calculated based on the use of a restricted dataset that excludes China, Burkina Faso, and Uruguay. We see that the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negative and significant at the minimum level of RAS, less negative at the mean but still significant, and less negative still and insignificant at the maximum.

Table 28: Effect of religiosity on boycotting by separation of religion and state (conditional regression coefficients Model 7h/restricted sample)

	Minimum RAS b/se	Mean RAS b/se	Maximum RAS b/se
CONSTANT	-3.96***	-3.07***	-2.53***
	(0.43)	(0.24)	(0.44)
RELIGIOSITY	-0.40***	-0.18***	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.06)

* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Once more, we can graph this interaction using a conditional effects plot (Figure 17). There we can see that countries with the highest level of RAS have more prevalent incidences of boycotting but that the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negligible. In countries with average and minimal separation of religion and state, the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negative, so much so that two religious individuals taken from the extremes of RAS are less comparable than two individuals from the same circumstances who are not religious.

Figure 17: The effect of religiosity on boycotting as conditioned by separation of religion and state - conditional effects plot for Model 7h (restricted sample)

6.3.3 Attending a protest

The final dependent variable analysed in this chapter is PROTEST, which captures involvement in legally sanctioned demonstrations. The results of our multilevel modelling are presented in 29. At level-1 there are 43,867 cases and at level-2, 40. From Model 1i, the VPC is estimated, with roughly 27% of the variance in the dependent variable being attributed to the country-level. Model 2i introduces RELIGIOSITY with a random slopes component. In line with our theoretical reasoning, the effect is negative and highly significant, with variation across countries (variance 0.17, p=0.00) (*n.b.* when RELIGIOSITY is at its mean). Next, in Model 3i, controls are introduced for denominational identification.

Table 29: Multilevel logistic regression of having attended a protest (PROTEST)

	Model 1i b/se	Model 2i b/se	Model 3i b/se	Model 4i b/se	Model 5i b/se	Model 6i b/se	Model 7i b/se
CONSTANT	-1.42***	-1.37***	-1.22***	-2.13***	-2.67***	-2.67***	-2.67***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.33)
RELIGIOSITY		-0.17***	-0.13**	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.07
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
CATHOLIC			-0.09*	-0.06	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
PROTESTANT			-0.25***	-0.21***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.23***
			(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
ORTHODOX			-0.07	-0.06	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
MUSLIM			-0.27***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***
			(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
JEW			0.43**	0.43**	0.45**	0.45**	0.45**
			(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
HINDU			-0.41***	-0.40***	-0.41***	-0.42***	-0.41***
			(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
BUDDHIST			-0.09*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
OTHER			-0.17**	-0.12*	-0.15*	-0.15*	-0.15*
			(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
FEMALE				-0.27***	-0.29***	-0.29***	-0.29***
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
AGE				-0.08	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
				(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
AGE2				-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
				(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
EDUC MID				0.36***	0.38***	0.38***	0.38***
				(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
EDUC HIGH				0.72***	0.77***	0.78***	0.77***
				(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 2				0.17**	0.15**	0.15**	0.15**
				(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 3				0.21***	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 4				0.19**	0.18***	0.18***	0.18***
				(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
CLASS 5				0.16	0.14	0.14	0.14
				(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
POSTMAT				0.32***	0.34***	0.34***	0.34***
				(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI					-3.10***	-3.32***	-3.10***
					(0.62)	(0.73)	(0.62)
RAS					1.77**	1.77**	1.74**
					(0.69)	(0.69)	(0.72)
POL_IV					0.05	0.05	0.05
					(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
HDI*REL						0.30	
						(0.29)	
RAS*REL							0.04
							(0.46)

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

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Their introduction makes the effect of RELIGIOSITY somewhat less negative. Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and 'Other' are all significantly less likely to protest than the reference category, namely those with no such denominational identification. Jews are significantly more likely to protest than the same reference category. Model 4i increases the number of controls at the individual level. Their introduction causes RELIGIOSITY to become less negative and to no longer be statistically significant. Denominational effects are also somewhat attenuated by their introduction. However, the only real substantive difference is that, Catholics and Buddhists are now no longer significantly distinct from those with no denominational identification. Females are significantly less likely to protest than males. AGE does not follow a curvilinear trend. The likelihood of protesting increases significantly in a near linear fashion with increasing levels of educational attainment. By contrast, the effect of class identification is curvilinear with those identifying with CLASS 3 most likely to protest whilst CLASS 5 and CLASS 1 are indistinct. Model 5i introduces country-level controls. No substantive differences are registered. RELIGIOSITY remains negatively and insignificantly tied to the likelihood of protesting. HDI is negatively and significantly linked to the likelihood of protesting whilst RAS is positively and significantly linked. The effect of POL_IV is positive but insignificant. Model 6i introduces an interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI to test Hypothesis 3 – that the effect of religiosity on the likelihood of protesting increases (becomes less negative) as levels of modernisation rise. The interaction term is positive but statistically insignificant and therefore we cannot confirm Hypothesis 3.

Model 6i was re-estimated 40 times, with each time one country after another being removed from the dataset, in order to assess whether or not there were countries that were exerting an overbearing influence on the results. No cases were identified, in which the omission of one country could produce a significant effect. Thus, we still cannot confirm Hypothesis 3.

Model 7i shifts our attention to the testing of Hypothesis 6 – that the effect of religiosity decreases (becomes more negative) as the level of separation of religion and state increases – by introducing an interaction between RELIGIOSITY and RAS. Again, the effect was positive but insignificant.

The same procedure for checking for overly influential cases was undertaken and again, no incidences were found whereby the removal of one country produced a significant effect. Thus, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 6 either.

Thus, we have to look to Model 5i and accept that the effect of religiosity on protesting does not vary systematically across countries, at least as far as modernisation and separation of religion and state are concerned. However, Model 5i shows an insignificant and negative effect of RELIGIOSITY, but this is not really coherent with either our theorising or prior results which have tended to show negative effects of religiosity in all but the most advanced societies. Thus, the suspicion arises that there might be one or more country-cases that are exerting an overbearing influence on the regression results. Indeed, when Morocco is removed from the dataset and Model 5i is re-estimated, the regression coefficient for RELIGIOSITY is -0.10 with a standard error of 0.06 and a p-value of 0.07. The effect is now significant if only at the 10% level, but we can at least confirm a negative effect of

religiosity on protesting, in line with our more-general theoretical outlook, even though our hypotheses remain unsupported *vis-à-vis* protesting.

6.4 Summary

This chapter has been concerned with unconventional political participation and particularly the testing of Hypotheses 3 and 6. These have been evaluated through the analysis of three measures of unconventional political participation, namely the signing of petitions, participation in boycotts, and engaging in protests. Concerning Hypothesis 3, support has been found pertaining to petitions and boycotting. The analysis of protesting did not produce any supporting evidence. Regarding Hypothesis 6, no support was found regarding boycotting, petition signing and protesting. An interaction in the opposite direction from the theoretical prediction was found pertaining to boycotting but otherwise the effect was null. This chapter concludes our empirical exploration of the effects of religiosity on various forms of participation. Now we move on to try and synthesise the findings of the last three chapters into something coherent, from which we can posit revisions to the theory of the sociology of religion.

Chapter 7 – Conclusions, revisions of theories, and the future of religious research

7.1 Introduction

We have come to the end of our exploration of religiosity, country-context, and forms of public participation. In this chapter, the hypotheses and empirical evidence are summarised. Additionally, an attempt is made to provide a theoretically coherent summary of what we have uncovered through our empirical explorations of the World Values Survey data. Revisions for the theories of secularisation and religious economies are put forward. Finally, the limitations of this study are assessed and directions for future research are tentatively opened up for discussion.

7.2 Review of hypotheses and empirical findings

We begin this recap of our theory and summary of our results with a discussion of those derived from secularisation theory. A summary of these is presented in Table 30.

Regarding conventional political participation, it was hypothesised that country-level modernisation would decrease the effect of religiosity at the individual level (Hypothesis 1). This was justified, using secularisation theory on the grounds that religion would become weakened in form and frozen out of the political mainstream due to effects of secularisation brought about by modernisation. However, it could not be confirmed empirically.

Table 30: Summary of hypotheses derived from secularisation theory and empirical findings

Hypothesis	Expectation	Indicator	Empirical Finding
1. Modernisation decreases effect of religiosity on conventional political participation.	-	VOTE	0
		PARTY	+
2. Modernisation increases effect of religiosity on civil society participation.	+	RELORG	+
		CHARORG	+
		ENVORG	+
		CULTORG	+
3. Modernisation increases (makes less negative) the effect of religiosity on unconventional political participation.	+	PETITION	+
		BOYCOTT	+
		PROTEST	0

No interaction was found between religiosity and modernisation with regard to voting. A positive interaction was found regarding membership of political parties. In both analyses of voting and party membership, religiosity was found to be for the most part positively linked to conventional political participation, in line with our more general theoretical positioning (with the exception of countries with a minimal level of modernisation when it comes to party participation).

In light of secularisation theory and its re-imagining by Casanova, civil society could be seen as a replacement for conventional politics in the eyes of organised religion. Religion was viewed under modern conditions as

having given up its claims to supremacy over the state and as having the possibility of reinvention, in its so-called "de-privatisation", as a social and moral guardian within civil society. Thus, it was hypothesised that under conditions of greater modernisation, religiosity would be more pronounced in its effect on civil society participation than elsewhere (Hypothesis 2). Indeed, our empirical analysis tended to favour Hypothesis 2. Positive interactions were found when each of the four of the indicators of civil society utilised in this study were analysed. Since religiosity is not becoming less linked to conventional politics, we cannot accept a Casanovian framework as this implies a transfer from this field into that of civil society – one is at the expense of the other. Thus, the expectation of Hypothesis 2 is met although the theoretical underpinning requires some refining.

Unconventional political participation was seen as requiring a different theoretical framework since it is authority challenging in a way conventional politics is not. It was expected that religiosity should usher people away from such a mode of participation since religiosity is often empirically supportive of authority and conforming to it. This expectation of a negative link between religiosity and unconventional political participation was contextualised using secularisation theory. It was expected that under conditions of greater modernisation, religiosity would not discourage individuals from participating as much as it did elsewhere due to secularisation having depleted its authoritarian drive (Hypothesis 3). Results tended to favour Hypothesis 3 – 2 out of the 3 indicators analysed provided supportive evidence whilst the third provided a positive albeit insignificant

effect. Thus, the weight of the evidence confirms Hypothesis 3 but the lack of complete support requires explanation still.

Our alternative theorising stemmed from religious economies theory. Hypotheses derived from this school of theory, alongside the results of our empirical analyses, are presented in Table 31. Regarding conventional political participation, it was hypothesised that conditions of a religious free-market as brought about by separation of religion and state and the religious freedom that flows from it, would enliven and embolden religion so that religious people would feel more confident in themselves and their faith and participate more (Hypothesis 4). In both voting and political party participation however, no supportive evidence was found. In both cases, the interaction effects were insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 4 goes unconfirmed.

With civil society, something similar was expected – greater levels of separation of religion and state along with greater religious freedom were supposed to enliven religion so that religious people would feel more confident in their religion and thus participate more in order to impress religion's influence on civil society (Hypothesis 5). Some evidence was found to support this hypothesis, but equally, some evidence did not. In two out of four indicators – religious organisations and organisations associated with culture and education - this was found to be the case.

Table 31: Summary of hypotheses derived from religious economies theory and empirical findings

Hypothesis	Expectation	Indicator	Empirical Finding
4. Religious free-market conditions increase effect of religiosity on conventional political participation.	+	VOTE	0
		PARTY	0
5. Religious free-market conditions increase effect of religiosity on civil society participation.	+	RELORG	+
		CHARORG	0
		ENVORG	0
		CULTORG	+
6. Religious free-market conditions decrease (makes more negative) the effect of religiosity on unconventional political participation.	-	PETITION	0
		BOYCOTT	+
		PROTEST	0

However, regarding charitable or humanitarian organisations and environmental organisations, no positive and significant interactions were found.

The relationship between religiosity and unconventional political participation was also expected to be affected by the level of separation of religion and state. It was argued that with greater separation, religiosity would become more confident in itself and that proponents would be more enthusiastic about their religion and this would transfer into a greater familiarity with religious teachings so that the natural suspicion of religion of authority-challenging behaviour would be enhanced. It was predicted that

the effect of religiosity would become even more negative with greater levels of separation of religion and state (Hypothesis 6). Across three separate measures of unconventional political participation, no evidence was found to support this line of theoretical reasoning. In two cases – namely signing petitions and protesting – null effects were found. It was only participation in boycotts whereby a significant effect was found and it was positive. Thus, we can reject Hypothesis 6 with the unexpected results found empirically requiring some discussion.

7.3 Integrative conclusions and discussion regarding secularisation theory

So, what are we to make of all this? Firstly, regarding secularisation theory, it is evident that while advanced modernised societies are witnessing a decline in the social relevance of religion, manifested most strikingly in declining levels of belief and attendance, this does not mean we are seeing an accompanying privatisation of religiosity, in terms of the influence of religiosity on the behaviour of religious individuals. In the most modernised societies, religiosity is a strong predictor of both voting and participation in political parties. It also strongly influences participation in civil society organisations. Whilst modernisation does not quite *overcome* religion's innate suspicion of unconventional political participation, it is the case that these forms are not quite as alien to religion as they are in less modernised societies. Indeed, it was found that with regard to petition signing, religiosity had a positive effect in the most modernised societies. Religiosity under modernity has not however got over its aversion to more confrontational

forms such as boycotting and protesting enough to embrace them. Perhaps, with time, we shall expect religiosity to lose its aversion to these but that is a question for the future. What matters now, is that we see in the most modernised societies, where the effects of secularisation are expected to be the most pronounced and indeed are with regard to falling levels of belief and attendance, a greater ease amongst religious people in participating in forms of organisational behaviour than elsewhere. This defies our theoretical expectation – one that is reasonably derived from secularisation theory - and calls for some revisions to be made.

It is illuminating to first of all consider the difference between the types of dependent variables analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. Firstly, why is it that we have positive interactions between religiosity and modernisation when political parties and civil society organisations are analysed but not with regard to voting? Types of political participation have been classified according to the level of initiative that they require (Verba et al., 1978). If this is so, then we can also infer from this that forms of all types of participation are also more or less costly to the individual, both in financial and non-financial terms.

Voting is for the most part low-cost in that it requires little by way of money and is not (relatively) time consuming. Admittedly, there are some instances where voting can cost you your life, but such examples are the exception rather than the rule. Generally, to vote, all it requires is no less than a couple of hours maximum plus the means of transport to get there – the pencil is usually supplied. Importantly, it is also a solitary activity that

requires none of the types of attitude that make associational life possible, namely willingness to compromise, open-mindedness *etc.* Membership in political parties and civil society organisations by contrast are far more resource-demanding. The minimum required of membership in most organisations regardless of their type, is money – membership fees must be paid either monthly or yearly. Already, the member has sacrificed far more than the voter has of his resources. Further involvement in organisations will eat into the individual's time budget – organisations will have meetings and campaigns that will require the more-active member to sacrifice their free-time. For the most involved, such organisations will have executive positions to fill – chairpersons, treasurers, educators *etc.* – such that it is clear that being a member has potentially far greater costs to the individual than voting.

It is argued that this qualitative difference between voting and organisational membership is a possible source of explanation for the disparities in findings from our multilevel modelling. The most modernised societies are suffering from a decline in organisational membership – think back to the conditional effects plots in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. There we saw that the probability of participating in organisations of all types, tended to be much lower when modernisation was at its highest than when it was at its lowest. This finding is in line with Putnam's work on declining associational life in the United States (Putnam, 2000).

What is put forward here is that modernisation leads to a decline in associational life for two reasons. Firstly, there is a crisis of ideology in the

most advanced societies whereby the old political allegiances have been undermined by a combination of a shifting class structure (Gray & Caul, 2000; Evans & Tilley, 2011) and the political manoeuvrings of the political parties in a mad dash towards the centre, known as 'triangulation'. The old ideologies of left and right have to some degree been replaced in the mainstream of political discourse by a (neoliberal) pragmatism and 'managerialism' and as such do not quite have the same power to galvanise individuals into action as for instance nationalism and socialism once did. The second possible reason is that modern life itself makes organisational life difficult. Here we can directly resort to Putnam (2000) who argued that social capital in the form of organisational life was collapsing in the United States as a result of generational changes, greater involvement of women in the labour force, increasing television consumption, and urbanisation. Putnam can be challenged on his thesis (*e.g.* Andersen et al., 2006), however, its use is it allows us to theorise that modernisation makes organisational life difficult.

With these two arguments in mind, we can then posit the explanation for why religious people participate more than non-religious people in the most modernised societies, as religiosity offers an ideological resource that enables participation which provides them with the ideology needed to sustain involvement and which is also strong enough to make the costs of participation in organisations brought about by modern life seem, in short, less costly. Religiosity is thus an ideological advantage that enables organisational participation for the religious. As the non-religious are

without it, they are less likely to have reason to participate and to not have the kind of ideological resources that make the increasing costs of organisational involvement that are brought about by advanced modernisation, seem less costly.

To summarise the argument, modernisation makes participation in organisations more costly and there is also an ideological crises in the most modernised societies. Thus, religious people in the most modernised societies have a relative advantage over the non-religious that makes organisational life easier and so they are more likely to join organisations and to sustain membership. Remember, because voting is relatively cost-free, no interactions are found in our analyses – the effect of religiosity is positive and uniform across the spectrum of modernisation as modernisation does nothing to make voting more costly (*n.b.* the absence of a main effect of HDI on VOTE).

So, far we have an explanation of one side of the interaction between modernisation and religiosity in its effect on organisational membership. Now we can turn our attention to ask why the effect might be negative or null in societies with the lowest levels of modernisation. Remember in the empirical chapters of this thesis, it was found that in the least modernised societies, the effect of religiosity was negative with regard to political party participation and null regarding all types of civil society organisations (excepting religious organisations). The explanation for these findings is simple. These societies have not undergone too much modernisation and thus the ideological deficit is not so great as to disadvantage the non-

religious whilst the costs of organisational life are not so great either, as such that religiosity can serve to make them seem less.

Regarding political parties, the negative effect observed under conditions of minimal modernisation may well be explained by levels of political corruption. It has been argued that corruption decreases with the level of modernisation (Treisman, 2000). It could be that where modernisation has been low, political parties are more corrupt and thus the strong moral codes of religion (remember religiosity is more stringent under such circumstances) serve as a disadvantage for the religious in terms of the ability to participate. We know that religious people tend to be more moral (Bloodgood et al., 2007; Stack & Kposowa, 2006; Conroy & Emerson, 2004) when it comes to things like corruption and honesty. Thus, when they are presented with it in political parties on a day to day basis, they would be more likely to abstain.

This line of argument is lent weight by the theoretical ideas of Norris (2002). She argues that in the older democracies, political parties have switched from being "mass branch parties" to "catch-all parties". The former, first conceptualised by Duverger, are characterised by a core of committed party activists at the heart of a bloc of loyal voters. The latter type, conceptualised by Kircheimer, sees the political party as de-coupled from its traditional base of support and as having abandoned its ideological fundamentals in order to attract as many people as possible – the catch-all party tries to please everyone (Norris, 2002). Such parties rely on mass-media in order to get their message across and to mobilise turnout. They have become

professionalised, are often state subsidised, and are media savvy. The implication is they no longer require grassroots canvassers and local networks. By contrast Norris argues, in under-developed societies where media penetration and levels of literacy are low, the political party still has a vital role to play in political communication. Elections are characterised by more traditional means such as rallies and voting drives that stress verbal communication. According to Norris, a result of this 'personal touch' is that political 'clientalism' is much more common with promises made to local communities and vested interests in return for electoral support.

Norris' theories are relevant and supportive of the theoretical interpretations of the findings of this thesis. Using these ideas, we can link the shift to catch-all parties to the ideological benefits of religiosity. Catch-all parties, predominantly found in post-industrial societies try to appeal to everyone and end up appealing to no-one, since they have no strong message capable of galvanising a particular community. The religious individual will be at a relative advantage since they have an ideology stressing public commitment in a weakly ideological environment. Non-religious individuals will tend to find themselves ideologically lost at sea, and will tend not to get involved or sustain commitment. At the same time, given the 'clientalism', or put more simply, the corruption that goes with the face-to-face approach of political campaigns in undeveloped societies, religious individuals will be more likely to find this disdainful and abstain from party involvement in line with the findings of this thesis.

Does this theory hold up in the case of religious organisations? It might be argued that it is unreasonable to expect a relative advantage in favour of religious people in more modernised countries simply because non-religious people will not participate in religious organisations. Indeed, from Figure 6, we can see that when religiosity is minimal in countries with maximal modernisation, the probability of membership of a religious organisation is null. However, one can argue that the advantage in fact is not between the religious and the non-religious but the devoutly religious and the less devout, of whom the latter will be much more secularised in their ideological outlook and thus would have more difficulty sustaining organisational memberships.

Another possible source of explanation comes from the literature on fundamentalism (Bruce, 2008; Marty & Appleby, 1994) which sees its subject matter as a backlash against modernisation. Whilst it is inappropriate to classify our religious organisational participants in more modernised societies as fundamentalists, it could be that these religious people are reacting against modernisation as well, but in a more moderate and restrained fashion. Perhaps greater organisational behaviour by the religious is more likely in modernised societies because somehow they are offended by modernisation that offers no place for religion as a source of public legitimation and morals and this offence is enough to galvanise them into action? Perhaps such an offence is compounded by declining religious numbers and the public deriding of religion by trendy commentators and attention-seeking comedians? Such an explanation may be appealing, but

the fact that no variation in the effect of religiosity on voting across the spectrum of modernisation has been found speaks against this. The explanation has to be specifically to do with the nature of organisational behaviour as opposed to that of the act of voting.

One could further speculate that the effect of secularisation on religiosity makes it less distinct and thus less of an obstacle to participation within more modernised countries when it comes to face-to-face activity as the religious and the non-religious are more capable of working together and have less to disagree upon.

Now all there remains to be done is to integrate the findings concerning unconventional political participation into the discussion as so far we have only discussed conventional and civil society participation.

With increasing levels of modernisation, it was found that unconventional political participation became less negative in effect regarding two measures – namely signing of petitions and boycotting. Regarding protesting, no such interaction was found. Thus, with some unconventional methods, religiosity overcomes its innate hostility to authority challenging behaviour so that by the time modernisation reaches its maximum level within the data, the effect on petition signing is positive whilst it is null for boycotting. These findings can be explained by looking at the level of challenge and threat to authority inherent in each mode of unconventional political participation.

Petitions are impersonal – the individual never confronts those to whom the petition is addressed. All that is presented to the authority figure being

petitioned is a name on a piece of paper alongside other names on a piece of paper. Thus, the challenge is low. Boycotting is slightly greater in its affront to authority as it threatens to take away from the powerful that which sustains them, namely money. Protesting is by far the most challenging to authority as more often than not it involves some encounter with the police who are dressed 'appropriately' for the occasion.

In general, it seems that modernisation lessens the effect of religiosity on the less challenging modes of unconventional political participation. Modernisation, associated with secularisation, is depleting religion such that it is no longer quite so suspicious of those modes of unconventional political participation that are the least offensive to authority – in a sense religion mellows and even comes to embrace the most benign methods of this form of authority-challenging behaviour. It is becoming less-distinct. However, the challenge to authority inherent in protesting is still too much for modernised religion and thus we cannot see any effect of modernisation in our empirical analyses. This interpretation is lent weight by the fact that religious groups along with some notable youth organisations, are increasingly using petitions to garner support for the issues they are concerned with, such that we can say petitions have become part and parcel of religious civil society[17].

To summarise our argument, modernisation makes organisational behaviour more difficult so that religiosity becomes advantageous. When modernisation is minimal, religiosity steers people away from the political

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[17] With thanks to Pascal Siegers for drawing this to my attention in a personal communication.

parties as they cannot provide a culture that is acceptable to religion's greater demands on individuals' morality. Since the costs of voting are minimal and thus constant across the spectrum of modernisation, religiosity has nothing to help overcome, hence no variation in its effect. Finally, modernisation depletes religion in its pro-authoritarianism and this manifests itself in a lessened negative effect of religiosity on modes of unconventional political behaviour when modernisation is highest, although the most challenging modes remain unpalatable.

How might this relate to the paper of Ruiter & De Graaf (2006)? Recall that they found the effect of religiosity on volunteering within civil society organisations was decreasing as national devoutness increased. The explanation put forward was that where national devoutness is low, religious people have to work harder to sustain volunteering but where the social context is more religious, they do not have to work quite so hard since the social milieu founded on religious values of altruism is more encouraging of volunteering net of individual religiosity. Thus, the religious can afford to relax a little bit more, safe in the knowledge that the religious social context will sustain volunteering. Essentially, it could be argued that the relationships uncovered in this thesis directly map onto that found by Ruiter & De Graaf albeit with a different explanatory mechanism put forward, since there is a country-level correlation between modernisation/development and national devoutness to which causal effect is attributed – countries with a higher HDI have a lower level of national devoutness. However, this dissertation has not found consistent effects across all indicators and this

calls into question the explanatory theory put forward by Ruiter & De Graaf – why is it the case that voting behaviour for instance is not subject to the same effects as organisational behaviour when we have theoretical and empirical reasons to believe religion would encourage it as a form of civic duty with a contextual effect equally plausible? This finding and the explanation put forward in this thesis, that modernisation leads to a secular ideological deficit that makes religiosity more compatible with organisational behaviour (as it has a relative advantage) which at the same time is becoming more and more difficult to sustain due to the pressures of modern life, trumps the explanatory framework of Ruiter & De Graaf as it can deal with the voting anomaly.

Similarly, Stavrova et al. (in press) have, using a social norms framework, argued that the effect of religiosity on individual subjective well-being increases as the level of national devoutness increases. Again, if we take modernisation/development as a proxy for the social norm to be religious (national devoutness) then these scholars should be aware that their explanation might not be functioning in every case of every outcome. Accordingly and as a friendly challenge, these scholars might want to find an outcome that is influenced by religiosity but whereby the relationship is not varying across the spectrum of the social norm to be religious and put forward an explanation compatible with their own theory that can account for such a deviant case, in a similar manner to how I dealt with conflicting results pertaining to voting and protesting.

7.4 Integrative conclusions and discussion regarding religious economies theory

Essentially, the argument was that religion would become more assertive and more confident in itself and this would manifest in a greater demand placed on conventional politics and civil society in order to shape society in line with religious teachings, under conditions of greater religious freedom and separation of religion and state. Additionally, it was argued that religious precepts would become better understood so that that the authoritarian drive inherent within religion would become stronger and religious individuals would adjust themselves in line with this. This, it was expected, would then spill over into a greater aversion to the unconventional modes of political participation, again under conditions of greater religious freedom and separation of religion and state. This theorising, derived from the religious economies school, has for the most part not found empirical support. No evidence was uncovered to show variation in the effect of religiosity on conventional political participation across the spectrum of separation of religion and state. Furthermore, some evidence was found for greater separation of religion and state positively influencing the effect of religiosity on civil society participation, but equally there was evidence for it not doing so. With regard to unconventional political participation, mixed findings were also found but the fact that no increasingly-negative effect was found in any of the indicators casts doubt on the likelihood of a religious-economies style mechanism of the type theorised here. Instead, we have to consider the specific nature of each indicator and how it relates on a

theoretical level to the concepts identified by our theory – namely the separation of religion and state and religiosity.

Why might there be no variation in conventional political participation across the spectrum of separation of religion and state? Let us imagine two pure forms of the state that represent the polar opposites of the concept of separation of religion and state. First, let us consider at one end *the theocracy*, where religion and state are one (*e.g.* Iran). There, religion is accepted in all parts of government, such that there is strong encouragement for religious people to participate. Political parties will make strong appeals to religion in order to project legitimacy as this is granted to them by religious authorities. Religious people will be more likely to participate in political parties because such religiously-endorsed parties have the most influence, the most legitimacy, and most importantly every chance of being successful. Religious people are more likely to be rewarded in their participation and sustain involvement. Similarly, in the theocracy, a religious person will be more likely to vote since the candidates on offer will be approved by religious authorities and thus very appealing to the religious voter. Thus, in the theocracy, there is an upward pressure on the effect of religiosity on conventional political participation.

Now we turn our attention to its polar opposite, *the secular state*, where religion and state are constitutionally separated (*e.g.* the USA). In the secular state, political parties will be more likely to appeal to non-religious people or at least suppress their religiosity to broaden their appeal to a secular audience. Additionally, political parties will have scant chance of

enacting religious laws so that religious party participants are not rewarded so much for their participation. However, the fact of laicism would offer plenty to antagonise religious people and spur them into action as when a state secularises it becomes open to others whose very existence is offensive to most religious tastes – homosexuals for instance. Also, the secular state makes laws that are equally unpalatable to the religious – such as the legalisation of abortion. Thus, while the state might not necessarily be open to the religious, an upward pressure on the effect of religiosity on conventional political participation is also felt as the very secularism of the state that excludes the religious also serves to antagonise them into action.

To complete the argument, we now need to combine these two strands of reasoning. At one end of the spectrum of separation of religion and state, we have the theocracy where there is an upward pressure on encouraging religious people to participate, whilst at the other, in the secular state, there is also an upward pressure. If we put these together and then imagine the regression line for the effect of separation of religion and state on the effect of religiosity on conventional political participation, we can see why a slope of zero is plausible as the upward pressure from the theocracy is cancelled out by the equally upward pressure of the secular state. In the theocracy, religious people participate because they have everything to be *for*; in the secular state, religious people participate because they have everything to be *against*.

A consideration of the nature of separation of religion and state can also illuminate our findings concerning its effect on the behaviour of religious

individuals in civil society. Recall that it was only with regard to religious organisations, and cultural/education organisations that we found significant effects. No effects were found for charitable/humanitarian organisations or environmental ones. Religion has always been interested in culture, viewing it as a way through which it can pass on religious ideas concerning the way things are and the way things ought to be – religious culture is thus instructive and normative. Similarly, religion has always been interested in having a role in education as it is where the mind is most impressionable. Again, imagine the pure forms of the theocracy and the secular state. In the theocracy, cultural and educational instruction along religious lines will be provided by the state so that that there is no need for religious people to provide these in civil society. In the secular state however, religion will be frozen out of the classroom so that there is an impetus for religious people to take to civil society in an attempt to exert the right influence on culture and education. One could make a similar argument for religious organisations – in the theocracy when separation of religion and state is minimal the content normally expressed in religious organisations is expressed in the state so religious people have less incentive to participate, whereas in the secular state, when separation of religion and state is optimal and religion is frozen out of the state, there is a great incentive to take part. Recall from Figure 8 just how unlikely religious organisations were when separation of religion and state was minimal.

The lack of significant effects of separation of religion and state on environmental organisations can be explained if we argue that religion has

no environmental interest that could be expressed in the state – there is no divinely prescribed response to global warming! With regard to charitable/humanitarian organisations, the null-effect can be explained in a similar manner so that organisations do not offer anything *specifically* religious that the state could take up, whilst humanitarian organisations themselves are usually concerning themselves in affairs outside of the state in which they are hosted.

With unconventional political participation, results were mixed. It was only with regard to boycotting that a significant result was found, and it was not in the direction of our theoretical expectation. Thus, we can conclude that the religious economies-derived explanation put forward was not happening. The issue of boycotting is perplexing. Possibly it is the case that religious people boycott more when separation of religion and state is maximal because they are so affronted by the secular society which they find themselves in. There is simply an abundance of things to boycott from a religious point of view, which would not be present in a more restrictive theocracy. Thus, the idea of boycotting something does not seem so unacceptable to religious people after all. The fact that no significant results for interactions between separation of religion and state and religiosity pertaining to petition signing and protesting is consistent with this as in a secular society, there is no sense in petitioning government or demonstrating to have something changed as the constitution will not allow it – their cries fall on deaf ears – and so there is no upward pressure in the secular state. Instead, religious people take the only action they can which

is to protest through their consumption (boycotting), this being something they do have control over. They can have influence and be rewarded through its withdrawal, so much so that in the most secular states, there is no longer a negative discrepancy in favour of the religious in the likelihood of boycotting and they boycott in equal measure with the non-religious. In a theocracy with a high degree of state establishment of religion, petitions and protests would be more likely since the right sets of ears can be found, but there is less need for unconventional political participation since the theocratic state does less to antagonise the religious and so no upward pressure. Thus, you get slopes with a coefficient of zero as the effects of separation of religion and state on the effects of religiosity on protesting and petition signing.

Whatever the reasons for the results found with regard to those hypotheses derived from religious economies theory, what is most striking is that they are far too inconsistent to be compatible with the reasoning that was put forward in Chapter 2, and thus it seems the case that this was unhelpful in trying to make sense of the data.

7.5 Revising the theories of the sociology of religion and directions for future research

Both theories from the sociology of religion require some substantive revisions now that our empirical analyses have been completed and explanations put forward.

Secularisation theory is all too often focused on measuring decline in belief or attendance in whichever country the researcher in question has in mind.

However, the definition of secularisation is the declining social relevance of religion and thus studies need to focus not just on counting bums on pews, for instance, but also to look at the effect religiosity has on the wider social order as modernisation advances. This is what this study has done in looking at the effect of religiosity on public participation. With this change of direction in mind, we can revise the expectations of classical secularisation theory which tended to posit a privatisation of religion accompanying modernisation and decline in belief and religious attendance. Instead, we have argued that religiosity does not become privatised in the sense that it guides individuals away from participating in the theatres of public life. Religiosity somewhat paradoxically becomes an advantage that enables participation in organisational life even when in terms of numbers it is in decline. This is the irony of modernity – religiosity has the potential to be the most influential precisely when it is in shortest supply. Secularisation theory needs to understand that secularisation is to be understood as both decline in religious numbers *and* relatively greater religious action and thus we can speak of a paradox of the simultaneous lessening and increasing social relevance of religion in the modernised world. Additionally, theorists need to look at the advantages of religiosity in the context of the disadvantages of non-religiosity. It needs to be explored what it is about the negative pole of religiosity that makes organisational participation unlikely in order to illuminate the qualities of religiosity that truly matter. Thus, researchers need to move away from religiosity and start to identify secular alternatives that suppress participation in organisations, be it values of consumerism or egoism or what have you.

Casanova provided a fascinating counter-point to secularisation with his thesis on the deprivatisation of religion in the modern world. This thesis shows that privatisation does not occur with secularisation, at least in the terms it is conceived of herein. However, the idea that religion retreats from the conventional political sphere if only to re-manifest itself in civil society was not supported. The so-called deprivatisation of religion should instead be thought of as applying equally to organisational life across both the conventional mode of politics that contests the composition of the state, and civil society that acts independently as its regulator. It is not the quality of religion that is changing with regard to non-authority challenging modes of behaviour. In a sense, what is apparently an increasing public nature of religiosity is illusionary – it is my contention that it is the effects of modernisation that deplete secular alternatives to religion so that religion itself becomes advantageous without undergoing too much transformation. Transformations of religion are only felt in the unconventional mode.

Religious economies theory has a troubled empirical history. To date, its concern has been mostly to do with explaining bums on pews and like secularisation theory its proponents need to look at the knock-on effects that are implicit within the theory. This thesis makes a contribution to this but the results were not encouraging for this as a worthwhile line of inquiry. Given that consistent effects were not found and given Borgonovi's (2008) most recent findings, plus the unrealistic nature of those studies linking greater separation of religion and state to greater religious vitality, the recommendation is that this line of theory gradually be phased out.

Certainly, some further studies ought to focus on further testing the theory that greater competition leads to greater religious vitality as research into this matter was effectively reset to zero by Voas et al. (2002) so that we can say the jury is still out on this one. Future studies of this theory should take into account Voas et al.'s recommendations for dealing with the index of pluralism when applied in regression models, but most importantly should find ways of assessing whether or not the religious market is truly competitive, since pluralism is only a necessary but not sufficient – and thus a proxy – indicator.

Explorations of the effect of separation of religion and state on the behaviour of religious people is a promising line of inquiry opened up by this thesis. Indeed, some interesting main-effects of this variable were found in its empirical analyses that require further empirical validation. Most promisingly is the line of theorising – that religious people orientate themselves in terms of their public participation depending on whether or not the state is open or closed to them by law. This would require that separation of religion and state as a concept be divested of the theoretical baggage it has acquired from religious economies theory. Furthermore, we need to better explore the possibility of religious people compensating for their exclusion from the state through manifestations within organisations in civil society.

7.6 Limitations of this study

Of course, every study has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. The strengths are the novelty of theoretical design along with measurement

items and data that have a degree of validity whilst utilising a large number of macro-units so that the ranges of the key macro-level variables are large enough for us to draw inferences. This allows the development of novel and stimulating theoretical insights. That said, the validity of the index of religiosity was not meeting the stricter tests imposed by the confirmatory factor analysis framework. Indeed all indicators have some level of measurement error arising from problems with application across different contexts and in-house effects. This would be true of any cross-comparative research, however. What matters is that the measurement items used in this thesis have some basis for comparison and that was established in Chapter 3. It is important that we stuck with a most-different systems research design in order to keep the range of modernisation and separation of religion and state sufficiently large enough so that they have enough variance so that the effects specified in our theoretical section might be seen empirically. Had we opted for a most-similar design, this would not have been possible as such macro-level variables would not have had enough variance. Conversely, such a design would mean items at the individual level would be more comparable since cultural differences would be less pronounced. In mitigation, it needs to be stressed that a balance needs to be struck, when assessing cross-level interaction models, between a research design that allows a wide range at level-2 in the independent variables, and level-1 variables with a degree of comparative validity. The data selected and the labours undertaken in Chapter 3 are sufficient to confirm this.

This study has focused on differences between countries. It has been concerned with variations in effects of religiosity on different outcomes of behaviour, as conditioned by country-level variables identified by theory. Accordingly, cross-sectional data was used. This is troublesome as from such data correlations can be found, but 'causality' cannot be ascertained. The way to do this would be through panel datasets and the appropriate statistical models. However, there are not enough of these surveys in number to state with confidence, if the kinds of interactions put forward in this thesis are happening. Longitudinal causal models need to be used in conjunction with comparative work using cross-sectional data sources such as the WVS. Additionally, so called pseudo-panel designs may be fruitful, since the WVS and other similar country-comparative surveys multiple waves over time.

7.7 Final words

We have reached the end of our exploration of the effects of religiosity on forms of public behaviour as they vary across countries. This thesis provides an interesting way of looking at the dominant and competing theories of the sociology of religion. It has made a novel interpretation and application of these theories and fills a gap in the literature through its use of cross-level theorising that stresses variation across countries that reconcile macro and micro levels. Such approaches are few in number. If there is one over-arching 'moral' that encapsulates my contribution to the discipline that I would want other researchers to take over, it is that what is apparently self-evident in theory is not always matched by empirical evidence. It is up to us

to reconcile them so that theory leads to evidence which leads back into better theory and so on, in a dialectic of ever-increasing refinement and improvement.

For every ending is but a new beginning. The findings of this thesis are not intended to be taken as the final word on the research questions raised. They are intended to be open questions in themselves that serve to open up new debates in the sociologies of both religion and politics. They also raise the possibilities of new questions and theories which can advance academia by making further scholarship possible. I look forward to seeing where this takes us and what others may make of it as the discipline evolves. We, as social scientists cannot however afford to dwell on our theories and rest on what laurels we might have, but instead need to find ways to further refine them so that they never fall into the trap of being dead dogmas. It is hoped that this thesis does this by presenting something that invigorates the sociology of religion in a manner that is intellectually stimulating and rewarding to the reader.

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Appendix A – Newspeak: List of all variables used and their signifiers

AGE – Age of respondent

AGE2 – AGE squared

BOYCOTT – Participated in a boycott in the last 5 years

BUDDHIST – Buddhist

CATHOLIC – Catholic

CHARORG - Membership of a charitable or humanitarian organisation

CLASS – Subjective social class

CONFCHAR – Confidence in charitable and humanitarian organisations

CONFENV – Confidence in the environmental movement

CONFPARTY – Confidence in the political parties

CULTORG – Membership of a cultural or educational organisation

EDUC – Educational attainment

ENVORG – Membership of an environmental organisation

FEMALE – Gender

HDI – Human development index (level of country modernisation)

HINDU - Hindu

IMPGOD – Subjective importance of GOD

IMPREL – Subjective importance of religion

JEW – Jewish

MUSLIM – Muslim

NONE – No denominational affiliation

ORTHODOX – Orthodox

OTHER – Other denominational affiliation

PARTY – Membership of a political party

PETITION – Signed a petition in the last 5 years

POL_IV – Polity IV measure of country democracy/autocracy

POSTMAT – Post-material values

PROTESTANT – Protestant

PROTEST – Attended a lawful demonstration in the last 5 years

RAS – Religion and state project (separation of country religion and state)

RELATT – Individual's frequency of religious attendance

RELIGIOSITY – Religiosity of the individual

RELORG – Membership of a religious organisation

VOTE – Voted in the last general/presidential election

Appendix B – Validity testing of dependent variables

Table 32: Logistic regressions of PARTY on CONFPARTY

	N	β-CONFPARTY	s.e.	p-value	pseudo R^2
Overall	69873	0.50***	0.11	0.00	0.03
Sample specific					
Andorra	992	0.81***	0.16	0.00	0.04
Argentina	979	0.39**	0.15	0.01	0.01
Australia	1301	0.29*	0.15	0.06	0.00
Brazil	1469	0.50***	0.10	0.00	0.03
Bulgaria	965	0.87***	0.17	0.00	0.06
Burkina Faso	1270	0.25***	0.07	0.00	0.01
Canada	2041	0.43***	0.09	0.00	0.01
Chile	976	0.31**	0.11	0.01	0.01
China	1703	0.41***	0.11	0.00	0.01
Colombia	2978	-0.01	0.09	0.89	0.00
Cyprus	1039	0.13	0.09	0.14	0.00
Ethiopia	1335	0.71***	0.08	0.00	0.06
Finland	992	1.03***	0.14	0.00	0.07
France	989	0.97***	0.18	0.00	0.07
Georgia	1325	1.44***	0.35	0.00	0.11
Germany	1982	0.76***	0.14	0.00	0.03
Ghana	1493	0.42***	0.06	0.00	0.03
Great Britain	961	0.48***	0.14	0.00	0.02
India	1596	0.32***	0.06	0.00	0.02
Indonesia	1869	0.22**	0.08	0.01	0.00
Iran	2488	0.18*	0.09	0.05	0.00
Italy	975	0.82***	0.15	0.00	0.04
Japan	960	0.81***	0.18	0.00	0.04
Jordan	929	0.33	0.35	0.35	0.01
Malaysia	1199	0.28***	0.09	0.00	0.01
Mali	1195	0.51***	0.06	0.00	0.05
Mexico	1512	0.57***	0.08	0.00	0.04
Moldova	1028	0.61***	0.13	0.00	0.04
Morocco	1063	0.97***	0.20	0.00	0.09
Netherlands	980	1.04***	0.19	0.00	0.06
New Zealand	758	0.80***	0.17	0.00	0.03
Norway	1015	0.55***	0.15	0.00	0.01
Peru	1465	0.83***	0.14	0.00	0.04
Poland	921	0.24	0.19	0.21	0.00
Romania	1684	0.53***	0.16	0.00	0.02
Russian Fed	1882	0.07	0.13	0.60	0.00

	N	β-CONFPARTY	s.e.	p-value	pseudo R^2
Rwanda	1171	0.39***	0.07	0.00	0.02
Serbia	1166	1.06***	0.13	0.00	0.08
Slovenia	971	0.78***	0.20	0.00	0.03
South Africa	2908	0.41***	0.04	0.00	0.02
South Korea	1193	0.04	0.15	0.82	0.00
Spain	1163	0.05	0.19	0.78	0.00
Sweden	978	0.65***	0.17	0.00	0.02
Switzerland	1178	0.70***	0.13	0.00	0.03
Taiwan	1216	0.72***	0.15	0.00	0.03
Thailand	1509	0.74***	0.10	0.00	0.04
Trinidad & Tob	975	0.24**	0.12	0.04	0.00
Turkey	1292	0.18	0.14	0.19	0.00
Ukraine	864	0.63***	0.16	0.00	0.03
United States	1201	0.20**	0.10	0.04	0.00
Uruguay	980	0.63***	0.14	0.00	0.04
Viet Nam	1409	0.22***	0.12	0.08	0.00
Zambia	1390	0.45***	0.06	0.00	0.03

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 33: Logistic regressions of RELORG on CONFREL

	N	β-CONFREL	s.e.	pseudo R^2
Overall	71510	0.59***	0.01	0.05
Country Specific				
Andorra	1000	1.09***	0.10	0.12
Argentina	986	0.49***	0.07	0.04
Australia	1338	1.47***	0.09	0.18
Brazil	1492	0.62***	0.07	0.05
Bulgaria	955	1.01***	0.22	0.08
Burkina Faso	1449	0.41***	0.06	0.02
Canada	2092	0.75***	0.06	0.07
Chile	992	0.44***	0.07	0.03
China	1176	1.42***	0.12	0.20
Colombia	3013	0.42***	0.04	0.02
Cyprus	1032	0.81***	0.11	0.08
Ethiopia	1449	0.81***	0.07	0.10
Finland	999	1.14***	0.11	0.11
France	969	1.04***	0.13	0.12
Georgia	1379	0.54**	0.20	0.01
Germany	1939	1.38***	0.07	0.20
Ghana	1530	0.84***	0.11	0.06
Great Britain	945	0.90***	0.09	0.10
India	1784	0.12*	0.06	0.00
Indonesia	1954	0.18**	0.08	0.00
Iran	2637	0.61***	0.05	0.04
Italy	990	0.88***	0.11	0.07
Japan	1001	2.77***	0.23	0.38
Jordan	1172	0.37	0.33	0.00
Malaysia	1200	-0.03	0.09	0.00
Mali	1391	0.49***	0.09	0.02
Mexico	1529	0.58***	0.06	0.05
Moldova	1038	0.76***	0.09	0.07
Morocco	1158	0.85***	0.31	0.02
Netherlands	916	1.54***	0.11	0.25
New Zealand	799	1.51***	0.12	0.20
Norway	1016	0.61***	0.08	0.04
Peru	1481	-0.10*	0.05	0.00
Poland	988	0.44***	0.09	0.02
Romania	1764	0.81***	0.15	0.03
Russian Fed	1817	0.63	0.09	0.04
Rwanda	1490	-0.12	0.10	0.00
Serbia	1150	1.44***	0.12	0.17

	N	β-CONFREL	s.e.	pseudo R^2
Slovenia	1011	0.89***	0.09	0.10
South Africa	2959	1.05***	0.06	0.13
South Korea	1191	1.06***	0.08	0.14
Spain	1182	1.02***	0.09	0.13
Sweden	978	0.74***	0.09	0.06
Switzerland	1209	0.88***	0.08	0.09
Taiwan	1221	1.09***	0.11	0.10
Thailand	1517	0.47***	0.07	0.02
Trinidad & Tob	992	0.39***	0.08	0.02
Turkey	1320	0.25	0.20	0.01
Ukraine	883	1.20***	0.14	0.11
United States	1210	1.29***	0.09	0.18
Uruguay	992	1.02***	0.08	0.17
Viet Nam	1372	0.92***	0.10	0.09
Zambia	1463	1.24***	0.17	0.12

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 34: Logistic regressions of CHARORG on CONFCHAR

	N	β-CONFCHAR	s.e.	pseudo R^2
Overall	69695	0.30***	0.01	0.01
Country Specific				
Andorra	997	0.53***	0.12	0.02
Argentina	933	0.23*	0.12	0.00
Australia	1322	0.49***	0.09	0.02
Brazil	1454	0.19**	0.08	0.00
Bulgaria	863	0.12	0.27	0.00
Burkina Faso	1186	-0.44***	0.12	0.02
Canada	2028	0.27***	0.07	0.01
Chile	955	0.41***	0.09	0.02
China	1278	0.28**	0.12	0.01
Colombia	2922	0.36***	0.08	0.01
Cyprus	1028	0.33***	0.11	0.01
Egypt	2972	0.13	0.16	0.00
Ethiopia	1398	0.96***	0.08	0.10
Finland	1000	0.45***	0.11	0.02
France	993	0.29***	0.10	0.01
Georgia	1180	0.49	0.58	0.01
Germany	1894	0.64***	0.11	0.03
Ghana	1384	0.31***	0.08	0.01
Great Britain	963	0.50***	0.10	0.02
India	1085	0.07	0.06	0.00
Indonesia	1815	0.58***	0.07	0.03
Iran	2587	0.34***	0.06	0.01
Italy	974	0.61***	0.12	0.03
Japan	837	0.88***	0.23	0.04
Jordan	1014	0.03	0.19	0.00
Malaysia	1198	0.64***	0.12	0.03
Mali	1109	0.42***	0.07	0.02
Mexico	1504	0.24***	0.07	0.01
Moldova	1024	0.87***	0.15	0.07
Morocco	1015	0.26	0.16	0.01
Netherlands	971	0.63***	0.11	0.03
Norway	1015	0.28**	0.10	0.01
Peru	1419	0.21**	0.09	0.01
Poland	889	0.11	0.14	0.00
Romania	1395	0.46*	0.27	0.01
Russian Fed	1706	0.14	0.12	0.00
Rwanda	1368	0.20***	0.07	0.01
Serbia	1121	0.28	0.18	0.01
Slovenia	996	0.58***	0.11	0.03

	N	β-CONFCHAR	s.e.	pseudo R^2
South Africa	2723	0.03	0.05	0.00
South Korea	1194	-0.02	0.14	0.00
Spain	1140	0.80***	0.15	0.04
Sweden	985	0.59***	0.10	0.03
Switzerland	1205	0.48***	0.09	0.02
Taiwan	1212	0.54***	0.11	0.02
Thailand	1513	0.54***	0.09	0.02
Trinidad & Tob	968	-0.03	0.09	0.00
Turkey	1280	0.24	0.21	0.00
Ukraine	775	0.48**	0.19	0.02
United States	1181	0.69***	0.10	0.04
Uruguay	966	0.44**	0.16	0.02
viet nam	1425	0.44***	0.12	0.01
Zambia	1336	0.14**	0.06	0.00

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 35: Logistic regressions of ENVORG on CONFENV

	N	β-CONFENV	s.e.	pseudo R^2
Overall	69733	0.38***	0.01	0.01
Country specific				
Andorra	992	0.45***	0.14	0.01
Argentina	883	-0.05	0.13	0.00
Australia	1294	0.51***	0.12	0.02
Brazil	1452	0.26**	0.13	0.01
Bulgaria	792	0.11	0.35	0.00
Burkina Faso	1197	-0.04	0.11	0.00
Canada	2037	0.22***	0.09	0.00
Chile	953	-0.01	0.11	0.00
China	1348	0.17	0.11	0.00
Colombia	2797	0.55***	0.10	0.03
Cyprus	1031	0.28*	0.14	0.01
Egypt	2753	0.25	0.21	0.00
Ethiopia	1363	1.07***	0.08	0.13
Finland	989	0.98***	0.17	0.06
France	984	0.35**	0.13	0.01
Georgia	1169	-0.65	0.60	0.02
Germany	1923	1.00***	0.16	0.06
Ghana	1408	0.52***	0.07	0.03
Great Britain	956	0.37***	0.12	0.01
India	1262	0.31***	0.06	0.02
Indonesia	1793	0.32***	0.07	0.01
Iran	2554	0.19**	0.08	0.00
Italy	953	0.47**	0.18	0.01
Japan	922	0.08	0.22	0.00
Jordan	989	0.60	0.58	0.02
Malaysia	1198	0.20	0.14	0.00
Mali	1155	0.47***	0.07	0.03
Mexico	1509	0.13	0.09	0.00
Moldova	1009	0.26*	0.15	0.01
Morocco	936	0.33	0.24	0.01
Netherlands	975	0.84***	0.14	0.05
New Zealand	696	0.45***	0.14	0.02
Norway	1014	0.55**	0.21	0.01
Peru	1394	0.06	0.11	0.00
Poland	870	-0.06	0.18	0.00
Romania	1354	0.51	0.40	0.01
Russian Fed	1749	-0.09	0.14	0.00
Rwanda	1300	0.52***	0.09	0.03
Serbia	1080	0.55**	0.24	0.02

	N	β-CONFENV	s.e.	pseudo R^2
Slovenia	963	0.32*	0.17	0.01
South Africa	2662	0.05	0.06	0.00
South Korea	1195	-0.02	0.15	0.00
Spain	1133	0.56***	0.19	0.02
Sweden	985	1.04***	0.19	0.05
Switzerland	1199	0.64***	0.11	0.03
Taiwan	1212	0.59***	0.19	0.02
Thailand	1509	0.33***	0.09	0.01
Trinidad & Tob	942	0.03	0.10	0.00
Turkey	1238	0.45	0.29	0.01
Ukraine	847	0.36	0.22	0.01
United States	1203	0.89***	0.12	0.05
Uruguay	971	0.44**	0.17	0.02
Viet Nam	1401	0.45***	0.14	0.01
Zambia	1240	0.33***	0.07	0.02

* $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Appendix C – Re-estimated models on restricted samples

Table 36: Re-estimated multilevel logistic regressions using restricted samples

	ENVORG 6e (-Switzerland)	PETITION 7g (-Turkey)	BOYCOTT 6h (-Rwanda)	BOYCOTT 7h (China, B.Faso, Uruguay)	PROTEST 5i (-Morocco)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
CONSTANT	-2.80***	-1.99***	-3.03***	-3.07***	-3.29***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)
RELIGIOSITY	0.05	-0.08**	-0.15***	-0.18***	-0.10*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
CATHOLIC	-0.04	0.03	-0.06	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
PROTESTANT	0.07	0.05	-0.20***	-0.19***	-0.23***
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
ORTHODOX	-0.40***	-0.05	-0.45***	-0.46***	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.07)
MUSLIM	-0.13	-0.14	0.02	-0.04	-0.19***
	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.07)
JEW	0.11	0.37*	0.36	0.37	0.46**
	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.21)
HINDU	-0.17	-0.42***	-0.56***	-0.57***	-0.42***
	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
BUDDHIST	0.09	0.03	0.10	0.09	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)
OTHER	0.06	-0.01	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.15*
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)
FEMALE	-0.10***	-0.04	-0.24***	-0.23***	-0.28***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
AGE	0.27*	0.59***	0.41**	0.39**	-0.35**
	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
AGE2	-0.02***	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.06***	
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
EDUC MID	0.20***	0.40***	0.49***	0.48***	0.35***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
EDUC HIGH	0.41***	0.75***	0.89***	0.86***	0.75***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
CLASS 2	0.16***	0.13*	0.02	0.02	0.17**
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
CLASS 3	0.24***	0.26***	0.09	0.10	0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
CLASS 4	0.38***	0.45***	0.18**	0.18**	0.18**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
CLASS 5	0.46**	0.35**	0.06	0.09	0.13
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
POSTMAT	0.15***	0.23***	0.35***	0.34***	0.34***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI	-4.01***	1.91**	-1.98***	-1.69***	-3.82***
	(0.89)	(0.85)	(0.58)	(0.59)	(0.60)
RAS	1.26	3.60***	2.80**	2.15*	1.96***
	(0.79)	(0.78)	(1.14)	(1.13)	(0.65)
POL_IV	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
HDI*REL	0.29*		0.31*		
	(0.17)		(0.19)		
RAS*REL		0.34		0.55**	
		(0.21)		(0.23)	

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Appendix D – Random effects from Chapters 4, 5 & 6

Table 37: Multilevel logistic regression of VOTE: Random effects

	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 5a	Model 6a	Model 7a
N1	49402	49402	49402	49402	49402	49402	49402
N2	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
Constant	0.67***	0.80***	0.81***	0.79***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***
Religiosity		0.13***	0.14***	0.11***	0.11***	0.10***	0.10***
Covariance		-0.13	-0.14	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07
VPC	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.18

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 38: Multilevel logistic regression of PARTY: Random effects

	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b	Model 5b	Model 6b	Model 7b
N1	58683	58683	58683	58683	58683	58683	58683
N2	46	46	46	46	46	46	46
Constant	1.20***	1.24***	1.30***	1.42***	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***
Religiosity		0.11***	0.11***	0.07***	0.07***	0.05***	0.07***
Covariance		-0.09	-0.10	-0.11	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
VPC	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.30	0.20	0.20	0.20

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 39: Multilevel logistic regression of RELORG: Random effects

	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 3c	Model 4c	Model 5c	Model 6c	Model 7c
N1	59152	59152	59152	59152	59152	59152	59152
N2	46	46	46	46	46	46	46
CONSTANT	2.57***	2.85***	2.48***	2.48***	1.73***	1.72***	1.67***
RELIGIOSITY		0.47***	0.33***	0.33***	0.33***	0.29***	0.30***
Covariance		0.16	-0.04	-0.04	-0.17	-0.16	-0.12
VPC	0.44	0.46	0.43	0.43	0.34	0.34	0.34

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 40: Multilevel logistic regression of CHARORG: Random effects

	Model 1d	Model 2d	Model 3d	Model 4d	Model 5d	Model 6d	Model 7d
N1	58666	58666	58666	58666	58666	58666	58666
N2	46	46	46	46	46	46	46
CONSTANT	1.25***	1.38***	1.21***	1.25***	1.03***	1.01***	1.03***
RELIGIOSITY		0.10***	0.09***	0.09***	0.10***	0.06***	0.10***
Covariance		-0.04	-0.06	-0.11	-0.08	-0.05	-0.08
VPC	0.28	0.30	0.27	0.28	0.24	0.24	0.24

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 41: Multilevel logistic regression of ENVORG: Random effects

	Model 1e	Model 2e	Model 3e	Model 4e	Model 5e	Model 6e	Model 7e
N1	58686	58686	58686	58686	58686	58686	58686
N2	46	46	46	46	46	46	46
CONSTANT	1.46***	1.45***	1.34***	1.41***	0.85***	0.85***	0.86***
RELIGIOSITY		0.08***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07	0.07***
Covariance		-0.02	-0.04	-0.06	0.02	0.02	0.01
VPC	0.31	0.31	0.29	0.30	0.21	0.21	0.21

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 42: Multilevel logistic regression of CULTORG: Random effects

	Model 1f	Model 2f	Model 3f	Model 4f	Model 5f	Model 6f	Model 7f
N1	58798	58798	58798	58798	58798	58798	58798
N2	46	46	46	46	46	46	46
CONSTANT	1.20***	1.23***	1.15***	1.19***	0.90***	0.89***	0.87***
RELIGIOSITY		0.07***	0.06***	0.05***	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***
Covariance		0.04	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.01
VPC	0.27	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.21	0.21	0.21

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 43: Multilevel logistic regression of PETITION: Random effects

	Model 1g	Model 2g	Model 3g	Model 4g	Model 5g	Model 6g	Model 7g
N1	46184	46184	46184	46184	46184	46184	46184
N2	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
CONSTANT	1.78***	1.67***	1.61***	1.56***	1.15***	1.11***	1.14***
RELIGIOSITY		0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.03***	0.05***
Covariance		-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.12	-0.08	-0.11
VPC	0.35	0.34	0.33	0.32	0.26	0.25	0.26

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 44: Multilevel logistic regression of BOYCOTT: Random effects

	Model 1h	Model 2h	Model 3h	Model 4h	Model 5h	Model 6h	Model 7h
N1	44681	44681	44681	44681	44681	44681	44681
N2	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
CONSTANT	1.46***	1.44***	1.45***	1.41***	1.14***	1.13***	1.14***
RELIGIOSITY		0.14***	0.14***	0.11***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
Covariance		-0.18	-0.17	-0.13	-0.12	-0.11	-0.12
VPC	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.26	0.26	0.26

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 45: Multilevel logistic regression of PROTEST: Random effects

	Model 1i	Model 2i	Model 3i	Model 4i	Model 5i	Model 6i	Model 7i
N1	43867	43867	43867	43867	43867	43867	43867
N2	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
CONSTANT	1.21***	1.20***	1.21***	1.28***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***
RELIGIOSITY		0.17***	0.17***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***	0.15***
Covariance		-0.16	-0.16	-0.16	-0.13	-0.12	-0.13
VPC	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.20	0.20	0.20

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 46: Re-estimated multilevel logistic regressions using restricted samples: Random effects

	ENVORG 6e	PETITION 7g	BOYCOTT 6h	BOYCOTT 7h	PROTEST 5i
N1	57552	45952	43388	41860	42839
N2	45	40	40	38	39
CONSTANT	0.83***	0.99***	1.12***	1.20***	0.81***
RELIGIOSITY	0.07***	0.04***	0.09***	0.09***	0.15***
Covariance	0.03	-0.07	-0.09	-0.13	-0.16
VPC	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.27	0.20

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Appendix E – Curriculum Vitae

Richard Norrie

Date of Birth: 08/01/1982

Place of Birth: Dundee, Scotland

norrie@wiso.uni-koeln.de

Educational History:

2009-2012: GK SOCLIFE Research training group, University of Cologne

2007-2008: Nuffield College, University of Oxford

2006-2007: NCTJ @ Warwickshire College

2003-2006: University of Warwick

2002-2002: University of Glasgow

2000-2002: Warwickshire College

1994-1999: The Trinity School, Leamington Spa

Qualifications:

MSc in Sociology (Oxon)

BA with honours (1st class) in Sociology

A-levels in History, Mathematics and Biology

AS-level General Studies

GCSEs in: Art 3D, English, English Literature, German, History, Mathematics, Double Science, Religious Education S/C

Key Skills Communications (Level 3)

NCTJ pre-entry certificate in newspaper journalism

Papers presented at the following conferences:

Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) 2012 'Annual Meeting', Phoenix, Arizona, USA

Centre for Political Analysis 2012 'International Conference: Religion and Politics in the Globalisation Era', Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

European Association for the Study of Religions (EASR) 2011 'New Movements in Religions: Theories and Trends', University of Budapest, Hungary

GK SOCLIFE 2011 'Time in Context, Time as Context', University of Cologne, Germany

European Sociological Association (ESA) 2011 'Social Relations in Turbulent Times', University of Geneva, Switzerland

European Survey Research Association (ESRA) 2011 'The fourth Conference of the European Survey Research Association', University of Lausanne, Switzerland

British Sociological Association (BSA) 2011 '60 Years of Sociology', London School of Economics, London

Grants/Scholarships:

2012: Travel grant from Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) to attend their annual meeting in Phoenix, Arizona

2009-2012: Full scholarship for doctoral research project as member of research training group GK SOCLIFE funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG)

2005: Research grant from University of Warwick for project entitled 'Cosmopolitan Migrant Identities'