DANIELE MARCHESI

THE WEAK LINK:
EU-UN COOPERATION AND EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST
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EU-UN COOPERATION AND EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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Abstract

The objective of this PhD thesis is to explain why and under what conditions the EU cooperates with the UN in the field of security and development. It focuses specifically on the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). To do so, the thesis presents and analyses a broad empirical research that I carried out on 6 case studies across the Maghreb, Levant and Middle East, via extensive direct observation, expert interviews and the use of primary sources, in addition to the study of secondary literature.

The research adopts an original rationalist meta-theoretical approach using insights coming from rational-choice institutionalism, liberalism, organizational theory, neo-functionalism and bureaucratic politics to identify the key explanatory factors: capacity and legitimacy, unity and integration. It then carries out a comparative qualitative analysis based on 12 variables and a typology of approaches to cooperation (dependent, ceremonial, predatory, dismissive), applicable both to the EU as a whole and its component actors.

The findings show that the EU’s individual decisions to cooperate with the United Nations tend to be inversely linked to its relative power and cohesiveness over a specific issue. The picture is one of instrumental multilateralism, motivated mostly by resource dependence on the UN or by Europe’s frequent lack of cohesion, particularly in the MENA region. Collectively, the EU adopts multilateral strategies of cooperating with the UN when it is obliged by the context, when it is divided, fragmented or generally weak.

This is confirmed also by contrasting development and security policy. It would seem that the tendency to cooperate is greater in the high politics security field, which is characterized by inter-governmental policy-making, diverging policy preferences of EU member states and a high need for international legitimacy. EU Cooperation with the UN on development policy is often more elusive. EU member states use the UN both to mask their division on a policy and to reinforce their independent status and role within the international system. The European institutions, instead, tend to use cooperation with the UN to gain ground and voice in areas from where they would be otherwise excluded.

The thesis is divided in 8 chapters. The Introduction presents the key questions and research design. Chapter 2 looks at the conceptual framework more in detail and operationalizes the explanatory factors and variables. Chapter 3 provides an analytical overview of the mechanisms and logics of EU-UN cooperation across development and security. Chapter 4-6 analyse the specific case studies in the MENA. Chapter 7 synthesizes and illustrates the key findings against the two main hypotheses on resources and cohesion and other intervening factors. Lastly, the Conclusions discuss the significance and limitations.
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List of Abbreviations

AU  African Union
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP  Common Security and Defense Policy
CONUN  Working group of the Council on the United Nations
DCI-Migr  Development Cooperation Instrument - Migration and Asylum
DEVCO  Europeaid- Development and Cooperation directorate (European Commission)
EC  European Commission
ECH
EEAS  European External Action Service
EIDHR  European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI  European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
ESDP  European Security and Defense Policy
EU  European Union
EUBAM Rafah  EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah
EU POL COPPS  EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization
HR/VP  High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission
IFS  Instrument for Stability
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IOM  International Organization for Migration
IRFFI  International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
MAMA  Maghreb-Mashrek working group of the Council
MEDA  Mediterranean policy financing programme
MENA  Middle East and North Africa
MEPP  Middle East Peace Process
MINURSO  United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NATO  North Atlantic Treat Organization
NGO  Non governmental organization
NSA LA  Instrument for Non State Actors and Local Authorities
OCHA  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PEGASE  Euro-Palestinian Mechanism for the Management of Socio-Economic aid
PSC  Political and Security Committee
RELEX  Directorate General for External Relations (European Commission)
TIM  Temporary International Mechanism
UN  United Nations
UN/DPA  UN Department of Political Affairs
UN DPI  UN Department for Public Information
UN DPKO  UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNDG  United Nations Development Group
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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My mother and father gave me the curiosity that pushed me this far.

This thesis is dedicated to Elena. Per la sua pazienza e il suo amore.
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PART I

INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Introduction

The objective of this thesis is to analyse the relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) and to explain the circumstances and factors that favour or hinder their consistent cooperation in the field of security and development. Specifically, I will look at how this relationship articulates in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the bridge for Europe between the regional and the global.

The UN has a central role in the international system and a key function as international legitimizer (Claude 1966). Consequently, as the EU was progressively increasing its activity in international affairs, its presence within - and interaction with - the UN became an important frontier and benchmark for the development of a common European foreign policy framework. Eventually, the EU came to peg its own international identity to that of the UN, framing itself as an ‘instinctive’ multilateralist and a ‘natural partner’ of the United Nations (Ferrero Waldner 2005). Yet, beyond the comfortable image and the apparent political, financial and operational commitment of the EU to the UN lays a much more nuanced reality, which deserves to be researched and understood for its crude motivations and underpinnings as much as for its rhetoric. The EU’s commitment to the UN is actually a weak commitment grounded on weakness.

In this introductory chapter, I explain how I intend to demonstrate this “weak link” throughout my thesis. I will now turn to define more clearly the topic, research question and argument. I will then look at how the key literature has addressed and attempted to answer the puzzle of EU’s commitment to multilateralism. Finally, I will look at my research design and my methods, before providing a brief outline of what is next.

I.1 Relevance, research question and main argument

To illustrate the multitude of areas where the EU and its member states can interact with the UN and UN agencies and the relevance of this problem to international relations and European studies, I will start by briefly looking at the 2011 international engagement on Libya, across the security-development spectrum. The international
military intervention (with a strong European participation) was launched under an extensive mandate from the UN Security Council (Res. 1973 of 11 March 2011). The compromise was reached in New York after intense negotiations with an important if ambiguous contribution of the four EU member states present in the Security Council, three of which voted in favour (France, the United Kingdom and Portugal), while one, Germany, abstained. This resolution and the preceding one provided also the template for the international sanctions against the Gadhafi regime, which were enforced and expanded by the EU and its institutions. The EU also launched a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission on Libya (EUFOR Libya), which never became operational but was supposed to be initiated at the request of the United Nations.

In the heat of the crisis, intense interaction occurred on humanitarian and long-term development issues. Humanitarian relief inside Libya and at the borders was led by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the actions for post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building were prudently but busily prepared in New York by the UN secretariat and the various relevant UN agencies. Eventually a UN political mission (UNSMIL) was launched in the fall of 2011 to facilitate coordination of the international support to Libya’s political transition. The EU and its member states are funding these activities and have also been involved in responding to the humanitarian situation and relaunching longer-term development cooperation. But the UN is not only active now; it was present in Libya already before the crisis with various agencies and a resident coordinator, supporting the country’s development in various sectors including gender equality, migration and agricultural development. So was the EU, which had set up a small but growing cooperation programme and was in the process of negotiating its first legally binding agreement with Libya when the crisis started.

All these constitute “interaction opportunities” between the EU and the UN, whose functional and geographic mandates in Libya as elsewhere strongly overlap. Yet, a close observation of the specific case of Libya shows that cooperation is not a given nor smooth. Rather, interaction often translates in divergent strategies, latent or open conflict, frustration, and poor outcomes. Clarifying what are the conditions determining cooperation can contribute to our understanding of what is the nature of the EU as an international actor and whether indeed, it is motivated to work with the UN by ideas about multilateralism in world politics or rather by interests.
I.1.1 Research question

How can we explain these varying degrees of collaboration, competition and conflict, both from a political and operational perspective? Is this changing over time and across policy issues? And what is it that motivates the EU and the UN to cooperate, when they do? Why does practice so often not match the rhetoric? And why, how and when are the EU and the UN able to overcome their differences and work together across the security and development spectrum? The guiding research question of this thesis will, then, be:

Why and under what conditions does the EU cooperate with the United Nations?

This question calls not only for an investigation of structure, that is the conditions or parameters within which the EU and the UN can cooperate, but also for an understanding of agency: the motifs that actually lead the foreign policy actors, states and institutions, to choose to work with the UN. Importantly, the question focuses on how the EU interacts ‘with the UN’ as a political framework and as an operational actor. It does not look in detail at how the EU coordinates ‘within the UN’ or on its ‘internal effectiveness’ within the various bodies of this organization. The aim is to understand how different conditions and factors affect the capacity and willingness of the EU to cooperate with the United Nations for its foreign policy goals.

Finally, the question is specifically targeted to the security and development field and to the MENA region. The Middle East and North Africa brings some specific features to the understanding of EU-UN relationship. Its centrality to EU foreign policy, the high level of institutionalization of the policy framework with a strong role for supranational institutions, in parallel with the continuous strong interest by member states make it a salient and interesting case, in understanding EU-UN cooperation across time and policies. The study of development and security further allows me to grasp the varying responsibilities and logics across pillars and the different patterns of cooperation in “high” or “low” politics. In short, the case study will help clarify the effect of proximity and relevance on the EU’s determination to work with the UN. To what extent is the objective to promote a prosperous and peaceful neighbourhood consistent with the mantra working with the UN?
I.1.2 Argument

I argue that the EU’s willingness to cooperate with the United Nations tends to be inversely linked to its resources and cohesiveness, that is to its power. Depending on the level of analysis, this lack of power can be identified in the single component actors of the EU foreign policy, whose role and autonomy vary across the system, or in the system as a whole. Ultimately, the thesis of Robert Kagan that multilateralism is the strategy of the weak might be closer to truth than one might think (Kagan 2002). This research suggests that the more the EU is weak, the more it will be motivated to work with and through the United Nations structures.

The narrative that depicts the European Union as essentially or ‘instinctively’ prone to channel its policy through multilateral institutions conceals what is actually a clearly self-interested, instrumental and rational behaviour by the various actors participating in the European foreign policy system, including member states and supranational institutions. Collectively, the EU adopts multilateral strategies of cooperating with the UN, when and where it is obliged to do so by the context, when it is divided, inexperienced or lacks resources and coherent policies of its own. Conversely and perhaps speculatively, it can be argued that, to the extent that the EU foreign policy becomes more consistent, coherent and assertive (in other words, “strong”), the EU’s tendency to work through multilateral institutions is going to decline.

A comparison of development and security policy could help to elucidate this. Inter-organizational interaction varies from sector to sector, but the tendency to cooperate seems greater in the “high politics” security field, which is characterized by a weak role of supranational institutions, intergovernmental policy-making, diverging policy preferences of EU member states and a high need for international legitimacy. The UN provides legitimacy for member states independent policies, status within the international system and cover for possible intra-EU divisions. Cooperation with the UN is often more elusive on development policy, where EU supranational institutions have a stronger role and the pressure to coordinate the member states’ remaining independent policies is lower.

In other words, EU-UN cooperation can be described as a resultant of opposing bids for legitimisation both on the world stage (member states) and at the internal EU level (European supranational institutions). EU member states use the United Nations both
to mask their division on a policy and to reinforce their independent status and role within the international system. The European supranational institutions, instead, tend to use cooperation with the UN to gain ground and voice in areas from where they would be otherwise excluded. In this sense, when member states are cohesive on a EU initiative or where the European institutions have a strong and established role (such as the European Commission in long-term development cooperation), working through the UN is often perceived as a costly business (for effectiveness, visibility and control), in which it is not worthwhile to embark.

In the next section, I will examine a few suggestions coming from academic literature on how to tackle the problem of EU cooperation with the United Nations, which will help me in building up my own case for an eclectic and problem-driven approach.

I.2 Literature review: suggestions for an eclectic problem-based approach

Studies over the nature and purpose of the EU’s relations with the UN have multiplied in the last six years, following the pioneer volumes by Karen Smith and Katie Laatikainen and Wouters and al in 2006, which attempted the first comprehensive overviews from an International Relations and legal perspective (Hoffmeister, Wouters, and Ruys 2006; Laatikainen and Smith 2006). In 2009, Jørgensen could still make the point that research on the relationship between European foreign policy and multilateral institutions was unsatisfactory because scarcely integrated and organized (Jørgensen 2009a, 2). Yet, since 2006 the academic response has been rich and has increasingly concentrated around coherent research projects and networks. This literature has been predominantly stemming from and targeted to EU studies and EU foreign policy specialists but has also attempted to open a debate about multilateralism in general within International Relations; in particular, by contrasting the approach of the EU with the established literature on the United States (Foot, MacFarlane, and Mastanduno 2003; Patrick and Forman 2001; Ruggie 1992, 1993, 1998).
An effort to systematize the various possible factors influencing the EU’s presence in international organizations was attempted more recently by the edited books of Jørgensen (2009b) and Blavoukous and Bourantonis (2010). Among other things, this literature has tackled the central question of this study, namely why and under what conditions, does the EU cooperate with international organizations, looking in particular at internal, external and constitutive factors. In the next pages I present the main suggestions offered by the varied literature organizing them around the three analytical concepts of Ideas, Interests and Institutions. The objective is to explore alternative explanations of my initial puzzle, before I present my own research design.

1.2.1 Ideas: identity and rhetoric

An important strand of the literature on EU Foreign Policy, particularly of that which has worked on modelling and conceptualising the EU as a “normative power” (Aggestam 2008; Laïdi 2008; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Manners 2002; Whitman 2011) has linked the tendency of the EU to work with the UN to a set of ideational concepts (ideas, values, norms) that constitute its identity or strategic culture as an international actor. The starting point and key empirical underpinning of this literature is often official discourse from institutions and member states. References to the UN and to the commitment of the EU to work within and empower the multilateral system are ubiquitous in the founding documents of EU Foreign Policy, including the Lisbon Treaty and the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003; European Union 2009). In this view, one of the constitutive features of the EU’s self image as a postmodern international actor is its inclination to pursue multilateralism as a goal for itself (Cooper 2004), notwithstanding the costs that this might have in terms of actual effectiveness (Manners 2008). The concept and idea of ‘effective multilateralism’ has played a pivotal role in this narrative, in building the EU’s identity and sustaining its determination to work with and within the UN. It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse the complexities of this term, but literature has amply underlined the way this concept has developed in the short term, particularly in the aftermath of the Iraq debacle to compose the divide within EU member states and to distinguish the EU nascent strategic identity from that of the US - particularly under the G.W. Bush administration (Biscop and Andersson 2007; Bouchard and John Peterson 2010).
However, while several authors have stressed the role that ideas play in international relations (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Goldstein 1993, 5; Hurrell 2002), how these ideas feed into the policy process and materialize into actual decisions and operational consequences remains difficult to pin down. Beyond constructivist and sociology literature, which has introduced the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Checkel 2006; March and Olsen 2004), a notable attempt to look for causal mechanism has come from the normative institutionalist literature (Schimmelfennig and Thomas 2009; Thomas 2011a), through the concept of “rhetorical entrapment” (Schimmelfennig 2001). In applying this concept to EU-UN relations, Lewis, for example, tried to show how entrapment into the “work with the UN” mantra, provides an explanation of why EU member states decided to channel funds for reconstruction through the United Nations in Iraq, following the division over the US-led invasion in 2003 (Lewis 2009).

The role of ideas on EU’s approach towards multilateralism has therefore been recognized by academia, also thanks to the conspicuous tendency of the EU to declare its passion for multilateralism in its official discourse. However, two key problems remain with ideas as explanatory factors. Firstly, weighting and testing the impact of ideas remains an elusive endeavour and empirical corroboration is still rather anaemic. Secondly, as noted earlier, considering that the rhetorical commitment to the UN has remained rather constant, it is difficult to explain through ideas how and why there is practical variation in EU-UN cooperation. Ideas however do provide a very powerful tool to benchmark reality against rhetoric (Manners 2008). Let’s now turn to interests and institutions.

I.2.2 Interests: states between legitimacy and power

It would be naïve to assume that the EU only has a principled approach to multilateralism. Its motivations are often inspired by rational considerations and the ‘logic of consequences’: ultimately by preferences and interests (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Pollack 2006, 32). In particular, in approaching the problem of EU-UN cooperation from the side of interests, authors coming from the rationalist schools of neo-realism and liberal-institutionalism have tried to answer the question of why do states build up and then use multilateral institutions to promote their interests. Neo-realists look at power balancing and perhaps at voice opportunity (Grieco 1996, 289). In this view, the EU (and the UN) is mostly seen as a vehicle of the member states’
foreign policies, which collaborate only when their preferences converge in order to obtain more leverage on the international system (Moravcsik 1993). Neoliberalism, instead, would look at the lack of information and at the need to lower transaction costs for states as a motivation to decide to create or delegate their power to institutions (Keohane 1984). In the next paragraphs I will look mainly at interests of states, power and legitimacy. I will then close by mentioning the interests beyond or before the state.

At what level of analysis do we place these interests and preferences (Singer 1961; White 1999)? In EU studies, just as in International Relations interests are first and foremost associated with nation states as a key level of analysis. A general concern has therefore been to distinguish between various member states on the basis of their preferences towards working with the UN related at different levels with their relative power, closeness to US policies, interventionist culture or Europeanism. The variation in the member states preferences will then also explain the variation in strategies at the UN (Hill 2010). A useful distinction has been made also between the big three, and France and the UK in particular as UN Security Council permanent members (Hill 2006), and middle powers within the EU, particular the Nordic states (Brantner and Gowan 2009, 44; Laatikainen 2006). Chapter 3 will provide a map of EU member states preferences towards working with the UN.

With the aim of identifying the sources of preferences, scholars have looked at the problem of power (Baldwin 1979; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 130–135; Toje 2010). Some explain Europe’s penchant towards multilateralism as a consequence of its relative weakness in terms of hard power (Kagan 2002; Toje 2010, 29–30) and its need to rely on strong multilateral organizations. This view has been criticized by those who point to the fact that the US was very powerful when it set up the foundations of the post war multilateral system (Jørgensen 2006, 203; Ruggie 2003). While this criticism is very valid when discussing about the establishment of multilateral institutions, deciding whether to use or not institutions that already exist may indeed have something to do with power (Grieco 1996, 287–290).

As for any authority, legitimacy, both internal/domestic and external/international is considered an important interest for states. Some authors have suggested that working with and through the UN reinforces internal, domestic legitimacy of member states
(and the EU as a whole) as in Europe the UN has a positive image in the public (European Commission 2011b; Toje 2010). Concerning external legitimacy, Claude argued already in 1966 that the UN, while being clearly inefficient during the Cold War, still served a crucial function as a forum for collective legitimation and recognition of states (Claude 1966). EU member states can seek legitimization by working through the United Nations directly, or by making the EU work with the UN.

Finally, any review of how interests affect foreign policy-making cannot transcend from covering the interests of non-state actors, which are gaining considerable influence in today’s international relations, as well as sub-national actors such as bureaucracies or interest groups (Allison and Halperin 1972). This includes transnational groups, lobbies and NGOs that can play an active role, for instance in international agenda setting (Jørgensen 2009a, 10); epistemic communities, which tend to be particularly important on technical matters, as can be for instance development cooperation as opposed to crisis management (Adler and P. M. Haas 1992; P. M. Haas 1989). Finally, also institutions if considered as agents rather than as structures, have interests of their own. This perhaps, brings us back to the original question on the level of analysis. Let’s then turn to how the literature has treated institutions.

### 1.2.3 Institutions: agents and structures of EU-UN cooperation

The debate on EU-UN relations obviously has an institutionalist bias, as both the EU and the UN are institutions. EU foreign policy in particular is a highly institutionalised environment, where it is hard to deny that institutions play an important role both as agents and structures.

**Agents**

As we finished the previous section discussing possible institutional interests, we will begin this one by considering the institutions as agents. Within the EU, this agency is associated with the European Commission or with the High Representative for CFSP and his/her staff. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the External Action Service and the new High Representative and Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP). But agency, albeit a very composite one, can be attributed also to the EU as a whole, depending on the level of analysis (Carlsnaes 2007, 546,555). In general, the focus
given to institutional agents in understanding EU-UN interaction has been rather weak and has focused around three areas.

Firstly, institutions have an interest in working with the UN as a means to reinforce their own position within the system, increase coordination and integration and gain power (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 12–13). This debate has looked at the strategy pursued by institutions to increase their presence and interaction in international organization in order to also increase their role and presence in EU internal coordination (Taylor 2006). This can be linked to neo-functionalist explanations around opportunism and spill over across pillars and issues, particularly in areas where competences are overlapping (E. Haas 2004), for example across the development-security spectrum. Another explanation comes from the Principle-agent schematization, which has been used extensively in EU studies, to conceptualize the tendency towards autonomisation or slack of institutions (agents)(Klein 2010; Pollack 2007).

Secondly, inter-organizational theory has tried to map how two or more organizations establish and consolidate their interaction (Jonsson 1986; Tardy 2005; Haugevik 2007; Biermann 2009; Koops 2011). Everything stems from initial functional or geographic overlap, or what we called above “interaction opportunity”. This has generally increased after the end of the Cold War. Once the overlap is established, this literature has highlighted the choice existing between cooperation (ranging from ‘information sharing’ to ‘coordination’ until ‘joint decision-making’) adaptation and conflict between separate institutions (Biermann 2007, 165). This choice will primarily depend on the asymmetry in the relationship, as overreliance on another’s resources is generally avoided (Ibid 2007, 168) but also on different organizational cultures (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 719).

Thirdly, studies have highlighted the tendency that institutions have to copycat, emulate or reproduce by default their own structures in the cooperation with other organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Literature on ‘isomorphism’ has been important in discussing the tendency of the EU to reproduce itself (particularly in the Mediterranean, Bicchi 2006), but also to create structures that attempt at adapting and reducing the contrasts. Interaction, in general will lead to more institutionalization and structuration (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This literature will tell us more about how
cooperation is formatted but is less powerful in explaining when and why cooperation occurs.

One way to do that is to break up organizations into their component parts, including different bureaucrac services or elites (Allison and Halperin 1972). European foreign policy analysis (Hill 2002; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; White 1999) has dissected institutions as places inhabited by persons who have themselves their strategies, their preferences and tend to inform their behaviour in accordance to those and not only based on what the states principals tell them to do. Turf war and bureaucratic politics are clearly a major issue in EU foreign policy (Dijkstra 2009) and play a role also on interaction with the UN. Similarly, it has been noted that the high level of instability and fragmentation of executive power in the EU could also be a potential explanatory factor (Jørgensen 2009a, 11).

**Structures**

Let’s now consider institutions as structures. This second level of analysis brings us back to more traditional International Relations theory considerations, namely to liberal institutionalism and neo-institutionalism. Without going back again at the question of why international institutions are established in the first place (Keohane 1984, 1988), research has focussed on the effects of the EU institutional structure on its capacity and tendency to work with the UN. Abundant evidence has been given of the costs of intra-EU coordination (not least in terms of time and resources) on the EU’s external impact in terms of actual policies, capacity to negotiate, build coalitions and influence the wider UN membership (Brantner and Gowan 2009; Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Rasch 2008; Smith 2006). The EU seems to prioritize internal cohesion over external effectiveness, strategic thinking and “outreach”. Others have looked at how the EU’s performance varies depending on the type of international organization and at its decision-making procedures (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010; Kissack 2010).

Finally, legal issues and institutional navel-gazing have also been a major area of focus. Legal scholars have problematized the fact that the EU institutions don’t fit well within the UN framework (Capiau, Govaere, and Vermeersch 2004; Hoffmeister, Wouters, and Ruys 2006) and looked at legal or political personality, representation rights and membership in various UN bodies (Emerson et al. 2011). Some
commentators also discussed the impact of EU institutional reform on European performance, particularly in the UN Security Council (Drieskens 2008; Van Langenhove and Marchesi 2008; Pirozzi, Juergenliemk, and Spies 2011).

I.2.4 Gaps and problems

The idea of this literature review was to provide an orientation on possible explanations of EU-UN cooperation based on three key analytical dimensions: ideas, interests and institutions. Taking this literature as a starting point it is possible to argue that commentators have given preponderant importance to internal factors in understanding why the EU cooperates with the UN. Be it the preferences of member states, the need for domestic legitimacy or the internal institutional structure of the EU. All this, of course, happens within a post Cold War structural context, which has seen a substantial enhancement of the role of both the UN and the EU in peace and security.

There are some key gaps in this literature. I mention four here, which will then be addressed in the following section on research design. 1) There is insufficient analysis of the impact of power at various levels within the EU, on the commitment of the EU to work with the UN. 2) It is still not clear what are the drivers and processes that lead the various EU foreign policy actors to choose to cooperate with the UN, when they do. In particular, the role of institutions such as the European Commission within this relationship is under-researched. 3) The literature is still strongly focussed on security\(^1\). Comprehensive work on the area of development cooperation is scarce. 4) There has not been any major treatment of the MENA region taken as a whole and at the impact of geography on this relationship.

Finally, two more overarching issues deserve mentioning. Firstly, the role of institutionalization is still prone to conflicting interpretations, which should be clarified. Much of the literature has argued that more institutionalisation of EU-UN interaction would help cooperation by making the relationship more efficient,

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\(^1\) See for instance the recent edited volume on EU-UN cooperation in the security field by Krause and Ronzitti (2012).
structured and oriented to mutual learning (Adriaenssens 2008; Koutrakou 2011; Tardy 2005). Indeed, institutionalization is an observable trend in EU-UN relations but to what extent has that really helped cooperation? Did it increase the “UN reflex” in states as well as EU institutions? Or did it instead increase rivalry? Secondly, the question of Europeanization or EU integration remains open. What is the impact EU institutional reform on the inclination to work with the UN and through multilateral institutions? Is what makes the EU favour multilateralism its sui-generis character as a non-state semi-supranational and semi-intergovernmental polity (Cooper 2004; Jørgensen 2009a, 11)? This thesis will explore this line of argument, by identifying and controlling the evidence coming from the field.

The next section elucidates my research design and how I intend to take stock of the existing literature to build a fresh understanding of why the EU and its actors cooperate with the UN.

I.3 Research design

This section will look at the research design of my thesis in order to clarify how I intend to answer my research question concretely. As already mentioned, the scope of the research is EU-UN interaction in development and security in the MENA region. I will look at the theoretical framework and sketch some provisional hypotheses. And will then discuss my case study approach and show how this is relevant for my work. First of all, though, I will give a few short definitions of the terms of the analysis.

I.3.1 The EU and the UN: definitions

The European Union

This study looks at European Union foreign policy as “a multi-pillar, multi-level and multi-locational web of interlocking actors and processes” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 34). This open and multi-layered definition of EU foreign policy allows to compare the cases when member states decide to voice their policy through the European Union institutions and when they decide to act independently (White 2004). Member states independent activity (national foreign policy) will also be marginally analysed, as it is part of the broader EU foreign policy system, in as far as these policies are relevant to the EU. Equally, this definition allows factoring in the
independent contribution of the European Commission and the Council Secretariat to the EU’s foreign policy, particularly in the policy areas where these have a strong competence. My analysis, therefore, will look both at the level of the individual European composing actor and at the level of the EU as a whole.

The United Nations

Part of the complexity that characterizes EU-UN relations comes from the different roles and functions that the UN can play in its relations with the EU. In this study I take two main perspectives on the UN. The UN is (1) a legal/normative/political framework, providing legitimacy and cover for specific policies or operations and (2) an independent operational actor on its own right, with its agencies and programmes and with the peacekeeping, peace-building and political mediation operations around the world. The different actors in the EU have different priorities. Member States tend to view the UN as a political and legal reference in their foreign policy concepts. On the other hand, the European Commission is most often confronted with the UN at the operational level, particularly in the development field, where the UN and specialised agencies and programmes are key partners in various countries and sectors. Each example of cooperation with the UN will be analysed for this double function of “Political Framework” (structure) and “Operational Partner” (agent), to see how EU foreign policy actors’ motivations can change across this distinction.

Having broadly defined the objectives of this study, the scope and definitions, in the following section I will provide a first sketch of the key theoretical underpinnings and hypotheses, which will be expanded and operationalized in the next chapter.

1.3.2 Independent and intervening variables: sources of weakness

The meta-theoretical approach of this thesis is rationalism (Pollack 2006; Snidal 2002). The normative or constructivist arguments for cooperation that were analysed above in the literature review will be used mainly as a benchmark for alternative explanations and perhaps to compare the reality with the rhetoric used at the official level. Actors within the EU (member states and supranational institutions) are informed by necessity, by instrumentality and by utility-seeking considerations within a set of constraints. Beyond this crucial rationalist assumption the approach is problem-driven analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010). I will use the
insights of various theoretical paradigms (liberal-intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, rational-choice institutionalism, organizational theory and bureaucratic politics), without trying to synthesize them into a single framework. The fact of working on one single geographic region (the MENA), allows me to consider external factors (e.g. the role of external players) relatively constant and to focus instead on internal factors.

Two provisional hypotheses

Within this theoretical narrative, my first hypothesis is oriented toward linking cooperation with the UN to a specific series of needs, on the part of the EU foreign policy actors. These needs can be grouped broadly in terms of legitimacy (ideational needs) and capabilities (material needs). In practice, the EU tends to work with the UN when it has specific institutional or political needs/interests to do so. I preliminarily assume these needs/interests to depend on the lack of expertise, access, and resources as well as on the lack legitimacy

Hypothesis 1: The less the EU has expertise, access, resources or legitimacy towards a particular issue, the more it will seek cooperation with the United Nations.

The impact of lack of expertise, access, resources and legitimacy as a driver for cooperation will be explored and tested in the case studies. These four dimensions will vary across time, issue area and actor involved (or level of analysis). They are valid not only in relations to the specific external action objective problem, but are also related to the institutional struggle for power within the European Union (Koenig-Archibugi 2004).

The second hypothesis is complementary to the first one and is also based on internal dynamics. However, in this case we look at the impact of EU cohesion on EU-UN cooperation.

Hypothesis 2: The more the EU is divided on a particular issue area and the less it is institutionally integrated, the more it is likely to work with the United Nations.

Both in academia and in policy, it is often assumed that internal EU cohesion (member states’ alignment in terms of preferences and institutional coherence) will strengthen the natural inclination of the EU to work with the UN. This assumption was reinforced by the “Iraq trauma”, which led an important part of the scholarship to
associate lack of EU consensus with the incapacity to work with the United Nations. On the contrary, I put the accent on the observation that EU-UN cooperation is the product of the current fragmented nature of EU foreign policy. On the one hand, EU member states often revert to the UN to dissimulate their internal division (Koops 2011, 83–87) and promote their national interests. On the other hand, the contested nature of European integration in foreign policy produces incentives for the various EU institutions to seek cooperation with the UN.

**Intervening variable: inter-organizational institutionalization**

Finally, the study tests the impact of institutionalization of cooperation over time. Literature on international relations has generally agreed on the fact that over the last decades, there has been a general increase in interdependence, institutionalisation and structuration in the international system (R. O. Keohane and Nye 2011). A diachronic analysis looking at the period from 1991 to 2010 will allow me to assess the impact of this process on EU-UN cooperation. This is not a principal hypothesis like for the two preceding one, but is considered an intervening variable, because it tests the impact of a strategy (not always intentional) which is supposed on enhance cooperation. The objective is to see whether the array of institutional structures that have been created over the years to enhance and facilitate cooperation between the EU and the UN (e.g. Communications, legal and administrative agreements, partnerships, joint trainings), have actually played a role (including in fostering socialization between the two organizations).

**Intervening variable: The more institutionalized the relationship between the EU and the UN, the more cooperation.**

The thesis suggests that the institutionalisation of the relationship is mainly ceremonial and routine-oriented and can be explained as a case of organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). As such, it has not had a major impact on the tendency to cooperate and work with each other and actually has sparked rivalry on some issues.

**1.3.3 Case studies: from sphere of influence to effective multilateralism?**

After building deductively the conceptual tools for analysis and providing an appropriate further operationalization of explanatory factors, the thesis will work its
way across an inductive qualitative analysis of a series of cases studies of EU-UN interaction in the MENA region. I have selected a range of bounded “micro” case studies – instances of EU-UN interaction - that was representative of the population (interaction between the EU and the UN) allowing for variation across the cooperation – non-cooperation spectrum. Micro studies are grouped in three “macro” cases/areas according to geographic and analytical criteria: (1) the Maghreb (Algeria and Morocco); (2) The Mashreq (Lebanon and Palestine) and (3) countries formally outside of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Iraq and Libya). Of course, the MENA region will be assessed and evaluated also in reference to existing empirical studies of operations in other regions of the world, particularly in the Balkans and in Africa in order to ensure that some general lesson can be drawn.

Due to their total number (6) the micro cases studies will have to be represented in a simplified qualitative way, but a more detailed picture will come per sub-regions (macro-case), which will allow for a clear understanding of the differences and of the impact of the context. This in turn, will allow a further refining of the concepts and the testing of hypotheses and explanatory factors.

The next section will discuss in more detail how the three sub-regional macro case studies are relevant to my research question, the logic behind my case selection and how I intend to proceed.

A. Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco and Western Sahara

The focus on the Maghreb will allow me to zoom in into a region, which is extremely close to the EU, highly economically dependent on the EU with a supposedly high EU leverage. I assume that this entails a tendency of the EU to adopt a “sphere of influence approach” based on its self-interest (Mckinlay and Little 1978; McKinlay and Little 1977; Walt 1987; Marchesi 2008; Pace 2011), rather than giving priority to working with multilateral institutions. EU Foreign Policy is strongly embedded within the institutionalized framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This entails a strong and established role for supranational institutions (especially the European Commission). At the same time, some member states maintain strong bilateral links with these countries while the rest of the EU membership is less active. The UN is present on the development front with specific agencies and programmes as well as on security, on the Western Sahara.
conflict. In this context, our hypotheses seem to suggest that cooperation is going to be limited, although the case of Western Sahara will be particularly interesting.

Within this context, my micro cases (instances of EU-UN interaction) are:

1. The EU bilateral external cooperation portfolio (articulated across exclusively development issues and security related) for Morocco and Algeria (1995-2012) – To what extent does the EU cooperate with the UN? And why?

2. The EU foreign policy interaction with the UN on the Western Sahara conflict (1991-2010) (support to political mediation, participation in MINURSO). To what extent does the EU cooperate with the UN? And Why?

B. Levant: West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon and the Middle East Peace Process

EU engagement in the Levant is more articulated as compared with what happens in the Maghreb. This region has been a strategic priority for European foreign policy since the beginning of European Political Cooperation. The EU has a strong presence, which is embedded on the long-term in the EMP and ENP but also in other strategic frameworks such as the 2000 Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region. On short-term crisis management, though, member states’ preferences divergence is a constant. The salience for international politics also increases the need for international legitimacy. The institutional framework is more diversified both on the EU side (with stronger presence of Council Secretariat, High Representative and EU Special Envoy) and on the UN side (which is very active diplomatically and on the field). The continuous, painful persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict makes the whole area particularly fragile and reinforces the security nexus for all development operations. This also means that all operations are at the “border” between issue areas and pillars within the EU. This context favours turf wars and competition for policy space and intra-EU legitimacy between states and institutions. According to our hypotheses this should stimulate cooperation with the United Nations. The micro cases should allow us to better test and weight the explanatory factors.

Within this context, my micro-cases (instances of EU-UN interaction) are:

3. EU external cooperation portfolio (articulated across exclusively development issues and security related) in the West Bank and Gaza (1995-2011). To what extent does the EU cooperate with the UN and why?
4. EU foreign policy interaction with the UN on the Middle East Peace Process (2003-2010), including diplomatic initiatives and crisis management in Lebanon and Gaza. To what extent does the EU cooperate with the UN and why?

C. Outside of the Euro-Med Partnership: Iraq an Libya

Obviously, this case is on many grounds internally heterogeneous. However, I used it to control and test the effect of high institutionalization of foreign policy on EU-UN cooperation, given that both Libya and Iraq, while being linked to the MENA region in various ways, are excluded from the EMP and ENP mechanisms. There is also an issue of lack of access in general/operational terms, as in both cases the EU institutions had no presence on the ground. Proximity plays a role in Libya while for Iraq external actors (and namely the US) are a strong intervening factor. Finally, both countries were the subjects of an international military intervention. In general, this macro case is extremely salient to EU foreign policy and in particular to my puzzle of why and under what conditions does the EU work with the UN.

My micro cases in this context will be two:

5. Crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in Iraq (2003-2011). To what extent did the EU cooperate with the UN and why?

6. Crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building in Libya (2011). To what extent did the EU cooperate with the UN and why?

I.3.4 Comparative analysis

Above I have explored the key parameters of my case studies. These will be further developed in the coming chapters. What was important here was to show the basic research design that will be adopted to answer the research question.

Scientific knowledge is always based on some form of explicit or implicit comparison (Gerring 2001, 157) and my work is not an exception to this rule. My hypotheses will be refined and tested across the set of cases that are compared through qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin 2000). Table 1 provides a schematic impression of how the cases are organized analytically.
Table 1. Conceptual matrix of EU-UN cooperation and Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign policy issues</th>
<th>Political framework</th>
<th>Operational partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>1; 3</td>
<td>1; 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border areas (Conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building activities, etc.)</td>
<td>4; 5; 6</td>
<td>2; 3; 4; 5; 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>2; 4; 5; 6</td>
<td>2; 4; 5; 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, a study that aims at offering such a wide, broad view of a phenomenon is bound to sacrifice in depth and parsimony. Some simplifications and a degree of descriptive imprecision are necessary to bind together such a complex and diverse subject (Gerring 2001, 200–229). However, there are key advantages in this comprehensive design. First, it allows a comparatively more wide-reaching understanding of EU-UN cooperation. Referring to a resolution of the UNSC and cooperating on the ground with UNDP are certainly very different things. Yet, a solid analysis can also identify common features and similar factors affecting both these dimensions of multilateral action. Secondly, it provides a more representative understanding of EU-UN interaction, at least in the Middle East and North Africa. At this level, the picture that I will provide is pretty precise. Thirdly, in comparison with a smaller-N and “deeper” study, it will lead to a more probabilistic understanding of the situation. In social science in general, and when attempting to understand the causes behind the interaction of two large organizations in particular, deterministic explanations are suspicious at best, inaccurate in many cases. Finally, this study will

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2 The numbers (1-6) refer to the list of case studies made in the previous section (I.3.3). As will be clear in the empirical part of the thesis, the case studies might overflow the categorization offered by the table as many of the issues covered present both security and development dimensions at the same time. In this sense, the use of “units of analysis”, e.g. more simple and circumscribed instances of interaction will help refine the analysis. All together I have analysed 15 such “units” (see Table 38 in Chapter 7).
be relevant to other smaller and more specialized accounts of EU-UN cooperation, contributing, I hope, to the understanding of the general puzzle.

Before moving on to chapter 2, the next section will briefly discuss my methods.

**I.4 Methods: qualitative comparison and observation**

In this section I will look at methods. This aspect represents an important part of the originality of my work. Although this might be considered a “large-N” study, for the various instances of interaction (or ‘units of analysis’) that I identified, the analysis remains mainly qualitative. However, it is also informed by an original compilation of quantitative data on aid funding levels and peacekeeping contributions. As a result, the qualitative variables are measured as much as possible through objectively verifiable indicators, allowing for a limited use of graphs and statistics, which will help illustrate the key findings.

**I.4.1 Sources**

As is shown in the last section of this introduction, the outline of the thesis is quite straightforward, with a conceptual first part and then an empirical part. The analytical and conceptual framework is largely based on secondary literature from International Relations and European Studies. I have given a flavour of this literature earlier in this chapter, but references to existing studies have informed my all work. Importantly secondary literature contributed also to my empirical chapters, as it was not possible to carry out specific field studies for each and every one of the case studies. Historical accounts and explanations already established of some of the cases were used to provide the comprehensive picture that was needed to answer my research question.

The bulk of my work, however, is based on the first-hand internal documentary information that I gathered through direct observation in four years working within the European Union on the MENA region. In addition to various missions carried out

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3 My direct experience in the EU, over the period 2007-2012, include the Cabinet of External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner Ferrero Waldner, the MENA
“on the job” mainly in the Maghreb and in Palestine, I have also carried out three specific research missions in New York (2007 and 2011), Palestine (2008) and Jordan (2011), where I interviewed personnel from both the UN and the EU. In Brussels I had the opportunity to meet and interview (semi-structured interviews or unstructured observation complemented by field notes) most of the experts involved on this topic in the EU and the UN. Expert interviews as well as observation allowed me to explore possible explanations, clarify empirical doubts and retrace decision-making processes (Flick 2009, 165–175). I also used some key surveys carried out internally by the European Commission on staff working with the United Nations.

I.4.2 Participant observation: risk and opportunity

Factoring in this “participant observation” into a scientific research product is a critical methodological problem (P. A. Adler and P. Adler 1987; Manheim and Rich 1995, 199–221). “Participant observation” method is rarely used and can be contested on the grounds of its lack of objectivity (and replicability), which can lead to the production of highly subjective data. It can also entail ethical problems in disclosing information. Yet, direct observation has the important advantage of providing a very high level of external validity, as the researcher has the possibility to directly verify the data and behaviours that he seeks to explain (Manheim and Rich 1995, 201). It has been noted how the inherent weakness in terms of subjectivity and risk of bias can be tempered through appropriate techniques and a rigorous methodology (Ibid 1995, 214–220).

In my case field notes were a crucial instrument and it is very important to ensure that they contain sufficient detail and that they are reliable. Triangulating with hard data (official documents, papers, reports, publications, notes, briefings, etc.) issued by the institution while I was working within it, was important to ensure scientific rigour.

While my closer colleagues in the European Commission were largely aware that I was also doing research while working, most interlocutors did not know (this excludes the ones who I explicitly contacted for a research interview and that are cited unit of DG DEVCO/Europeaid in the European Commission and the Delegation of the EU in Libya.)
in the text). The long period that I had for making observations insures that I could fully “blend in” into the organization, without ever being perceived as a possible threat. This allowed me to access all the main information and processes relevant to my research. However, this did create pressure towards “going native” and adopting the identity of the particular institution I was to study. Coping with this issue has not always been easy, and it was important to maintain my constant contact with academia, with my supervisor and with other researchers/colleagues. Overall, direct participation has been very useful for my research, and the advantages it gave me in terms of direct understanding of the problem of EU-UN interaction largely outweigh the costs.

Finally, the ethical questions are also an important factor with direct observation, as and more than with other research methods. Ensuring that I had the necessary authorization from the EU to carry out the research was an important precondition to work. For the interviews I had to ensure confidentiality and make sure that specific statements or positions were checked by the people responsible.

1.5 Outline and structure

The thesis is divided in eight chapters. After the introduction, Chapter 2 will provide elaborate the analytical framework. It will discuss the two main hypotheses in detail and operationalize them into testable explanatory factors. Chapter 3 opens the empirical part by mapping the key actors and procedures of EU-UN cooperation in the security and development field and zooming on the specificities of the MENA region. A detailed set of statistical data will be provided and discussed on EU-UN funding in the Mediterranean region. Chapters 4 to 6 will focus on the case studies, respectively the Maghreb, Mashrek and Iraq/Libya. Chapter 7 synthesizes the main findings and closes the empirical part of the thesis. Finally, Chapter 8 provides the conclusive remarks and considerations.
Chapter 2. Analytical Framework: a Tale of Weakness

The aim of this chapter is to elaborate an analytical framework to explain the problem of why and under what conditions the EU cooperates with the UN. From the outset, I have committed to focus my study on this problem rather than on demonstrating a specific theory. As a consequence I will adopt an eclectic analytical approach to test various complementary explanations. Analytical eclecticism does not attempt to create a new synthetic and intrinsically coherent theory but tries primarily to get closer to the resolution of a particular puzzle, while maintaining an organic perspective (Sil and Katzenstein 2010).4

EU-UN relations have intensified after the end of the Cold War in a context that has multiplied the opportunities for interaction. Functionalism and then liberal institutionalism explain this ‘fact’ as the result of the increasing economic and political interdependence and ‘problem pressure’ linked to globalization (Haas 1961; Keohane 1984). This has raised the demand for international regimes and, put more simply, for international - and inter-organizational - cooperation (Biermann 2009). Against this theoretical backdrop, we still have to understand what are the conditions that motivate and explain the specific decision within the EU to cooperate with the UN on a particular issue and to not cooperate on another.

My approach to this builds around two guiding theoretical assumptions. The first is rationalism.5 We assume that actors are generally able to calculate their interests on the basis of cost/benefit analysis and will try to pursue these interests within constraints. The second assumption, is based on the acknowledgement of the deeply fragmented, multilevel and multi-actor nature of the EU foreign policy system

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4 “Eclecticism underscores the value of research that consciously and selectively adapts specific components from diverse explanatory frameworks originally developed in separate research traditions. Analytical eclecticism frames and analyzes problems as they are understood and experienced by political actors rather than focusing on problems intended to illustrate the intellectual coherence of a particular explanatory framework or the rigorous application of a specific methodological tool. Eclectic approaches are essentially pragmatist in their orientation.” (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 3).

5 For a discussion of this meta-theoretical perspective see Snidal 2002 and Pollack 2006
Within this narrative, rationality and agency in the decisions to cooperate with the UN have to be looked for in the actors composing the EU foreign policy system. Yet, the interests and preferences of these actors are partly based on their relative position and power/resources within the system itself. This implies the need to open the EU “black box” and to focus on a series of internal factors such as national preferences, actor resources and institutional structures (See for instance discussion by Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010, 169-177).

In the first section of this chapter, I will look more in detail at the dependent variable of my study: cooperation. I will define it and then analyse the different functions (external and internal) of EU-UN cooperation within the EU foreign policy system. In the second section, I will focus on operationalizing the two main hypotheses that I have briefly spelled out in the introduction as stemming from rational and institutional theoretical narratives. Having identified the explanatory variables I will be able to explore and test them qualitatively in the empirical part of this thesis.

2.1 EU-UN cooperation and its functions

2.1.1 The dependent variable: cooperation

A clear definition of ‘cooperation’ as the dependent variable and explanandum of my thesis is essential. The central problem is defining variation. Using a rational-choice scheme we argue that for any given ‘opportunity for interaction’, which occurs when there is functional or geographic overlap on a common problem, different EU actors will intentionally move on a continuum of cooperation options. Inter-organizational theory has offered some definitions of these options or types of cooperation (Jonsson 1986; Biermann 2007, 161,165–166; Haugevik 2007; ). EU actors can decide to simply ignore the UN (1), to share information and loosely coordinate with it (2), or to adopt joint decision-making mechanisms and pool/transfer resources (3). Along this continuum of increasing cooperation, the dependence between the EU and the UN

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6 We have already defined EU foreign policy as “a multi-pillar, multi-level and multi-location
will increase. The most intensive (and demanding) type of cooperation will be substantiated through the commitment of troops to peacekeeping operations, the engagement in joint political initiatives or the channelling of funds through UN structures. For my analytical comparison, I will assign three values from 0 to 1 to each type of cooperation, from the least intensive to the more intensive (see table below).

Table 2. Variation in the dependent variable (cooperation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction opportunity (Common problem, functional and geographic overlap)</th>
<th>Type of interaction</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing Dependence</td>
<td>Information Sharing/ Loose Coordination or Reference</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint decision making/ Transfer or Pooling of Resources</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having given this relatively simple and workable definition of ‘cooperation,’ I will now explore this concept a little further to elucidate what are the functions, external and internal, that cooperation with the UN plays within the EU foreign policy system. Analysing these functions can help me identify the main drivers and variables that affect the decision to cooperate.

2.1.2 External functions: is multilateralism effective?

External effectiveness is a key function and explicit goal of foreign policy, as the EU and its member states have to respond to external crises and challenges coming from the outside world. From this angle, working with the UN can be seen as a means to achieve a particular result such as stabilizing Libya, bringing peace to the Middle East or safeguarding Europe’s interests in North Africa. Member states and actors that web of interlocking actors and processes” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 34).
have the possibility of carrying out independent foreign policy towards specific problems will evaluate the need to work through the United Nations to obtain the desired results. This is true also for supranational institutions in areas where they have autonomous powers and legal competences. The EU is committed to an ‘effective multilateralism’. Working with the UN, therefore, is not only a “milieu goal” per se, but also an instrument to obtain results (Kissack 2010, 17–19). Within this instrumentalist paradigm actors will therefore calculate the benefits against the costs of a multilateral approach (Caporaso 1992).\(^7\)

On the benefits side, cooperation with the UN can provide the concrete capacities (material resources) that are needed to achieve a set goal (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 13). It can provide specialized staff and other assets that allow, for example, launching a robust peacekeeping mission in Africa, delivering humanitarian aid in Haiti or brokering a peace-settlement in the Caucasus. Secondly, the UN will bring legitimacy to the action, by increasing its global inclusiveness, representativeness and impartiality (Claude 1966). Legitimacy here is not an abstract, immaterial concept but can have very tangible effects on a foreign policy initiative. It will provide more international acceptance, the possibility to engage other actors and share the burden of implementation. It will also reassure the recipient of the policy against possible allegations of neo-colonial interventionism on the part of the promoters. Finally, in the longer term, it will provide for a solution to scale down the effort, and eventually pull out if necessary: an exit strategy. In short, legitimacy and capacities can be looked at from an effectiveness perspective as concrete reasons to work with the UN.

There are also costs. As discussed in the previous section, cooperation is often associated to a loss of independence. In addition to this, pooling resources and sharing decision-making power with the UN implies transaction costs, endless negotiations and discussions in formal forums such as the UN Security Council or 5\(^{th}\) committee of the UN General Assembly, as much as in coordination meetings among donors. Cooperation can sometimes translate into implementation nightmares and obligations,

\(^7\) In a key study on rational choice motivations for states to work through international organizations, Abbott and Snidal (1998) mention in particular two key logics: centralization (which calls mainly on the I.O.s capacity to pool resources, assets and risk of different states) and independence (which ensures both legitimacy and efficiency to a particular action).
which rarely contribute to a more effective final outcome. This is why, particularly when one of the actors has acquired what it perceives as sufficient experience or can count on its independent sources of legitimacy (for example domestic legitimation, or broad regional support), cooperation is seen as a burden, or even as an obstacle towards the desired result. In sum, the impact of working with the United Nations for external effectiveness will have to be assessed on a case by case basis and will depend largely on the resources of the EU in each particular policy context.

2.1.3 Internal functions: cui prodest?

EU foreign policy, however, does not serve only external goals. It needs to be understood also for its internal functions (Bickerton 2011). Keukeleire and MacNaughtan have attempted to typify these various dimensions of EU foreign policy and in addition to external objectives they have identified “inter-relational objectives” (increasing cooperation and socialisation with the other EU member states), “integration objectives” (promoting the process of European integration) and “Identity objectives” (asserting the European identity versus the others) (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 13). In the next paragraphs I will apply this typology to EU-UN cooperation.

Inter-relational - dissimulating

EU foreign policy-making serves the purpose of diffusing tensions inside the EU, producing solidarity and reinforcing internal interdependence. One of the primary purposes of the EU after all, is to facilitate relations among the EU members themselves. The importance given by EU states to internal coordination is a typical example. Bickerton maintains that this gives the “illusion of foreign policy” to a

8 In Kosovo, for instance, European states, together with the US, did not feel like they needed to wait for the UN Security Council mandate to launch a NATO air campaign against Serbia. The Balkans were primarily a European problem and an agreement within the “West” was considered sufficient to legitimize a military intervention. For a comprehensive discussion of the Kosovo case see the volume by Sterling-Folker 2006

9 There is extensive research on the formalistic nature of European foreign policy and on the priority of process/form over content/substance. See for instance, Weiler and Wessels “EPC collective shelter against the call for more active foreign policy” (1988, 251); Allen and Wallace (1977). The ‘process’ mind-set has been also applied to multilateral cooperation, for
series of countries that have implicitly decided to retreat from international affairs (Bickerton 2011, 15,23–25). The United Nations, with its plurality of forums of discussion, offers the perfect setting for this “epiphenomenal” foreign policy (Bickerton 2011, 24–25). As argued with my second hypothesis, working with the UN as an actor and coordinating within the UN as a political forum, is also a way to dissimulate the inconsistencies and the divisions that fester within the EU. It shows activeness and relevance even when the EU disagrees or lacks interest. Some times, this is done in the knowledge that discussions at the UN are not going to lead to any solution and that the status quo will persist. EU coordination within the Security Council is an example of this internal function of the United Nations. Information sharing, briefing and meetings have increased over the years with the placet of France and the UK, who saw these as a way to diffuse the pressure to reform substantially the EU presence within the UNSC and perhaps lose their privileged position as permanent members (Hill 2006; Marchesi 2010).

**Identity – symbolizing and differentiating**

Foreign policy also serves the function of reinforcing identity (Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Manners 2002). Sometimes the real purpose behind an initiative is to wave the flag at the camera and show to the world and to the domestic public that the EU exists. Often the more the EU is divided and uncertain about the substance of a policy, the more it will be obsessed about visibility and protocol. In this sense, as a universal forum, the UN offers a unique stage for the EU to show its presence on the world stage. The image of the EU as a “Champion of Multilateralism” (Lucarelli 2007, 12) and a frontrunner in the UN (European Commission 2003) has come to symbolize the EU’s specific identity in comparison particularly with the US. This dynamic works quite consistently in the security sector, because here cooperation with the UN is at

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10 Toje considers the status quo orientation as one of the main features of EU foreign policy (Toje 2010, 29,153). Our discussion in the following chapters of the conflict of Western Sahara draws very much on the inter-relational and dissimulative function of the United Nations

11 The EU@UN website refers proudly to more than 1000 a year [http://www.europa-eu-un.org/](http://www.europa-eu-un.org/) (accessed on 6 March 2012)
the centre of the EU’ identity since the European Security Strategy (European Council 2003, 2008; Toje 2010). In the development sector, the identification with the UN is weaker. In fact, within the myth of the EU as the “global Good Samaritan” (Bickerton 2011, 29–32; Carbone 2007), the UN has a place as a normative reference for the Millennium Development Goals (European Commission 2008, 2010c), but it is not essential. As a result, the insistence on visibility for EU operations has been identified both in the EU and in the UN as a major obstacle to more cooperation in development and humanitarian affairs (European Court of Auditors 2009, 15).

Integration – empowering

Finally, foreign policy within the EU has always been looked at from the perspective of European integration in general (Koenig-Archipugi 2004; Pijpers, Regelsberger, and Wolfgang Wessels 1988; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). This is true, not only in terms of institutional reforms and arrangements but also in terms of informal and operational practices. Interacting with the UN can be a promise of more integration for some member states or for the EU institutions themselves who have a vested interest in promoting more transfer of powers (Krotz 2009, 560). In this sense, the UN can play the role of empowering certain actors within the EU foreign policy system in relations with others. It can act as a bridge between pillars and competences particularly by reinforcing the need for cross-pillar coordination of positions and for common representation. Table 3, below, synthesizes the different functions that the UN can play for the EU foreign policy system both externally and internally.

Table 3. External and Internal Functions of EU-UN Cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Functions</th>
<th>Internal Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enable</td>
<td>Brand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentor</td>
<td>Identify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share burden</td>
<td>Symbolize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate, centralize</td>
<td>Distinguish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivate-provide policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimize (independence, impartiality)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In sum, understanding the functions that EU-UN interaction play within the system of EU foreign policy can help identify the conditions and factors that stimulate or obstruct cooperation with the UN. The next section will look at these factors in greater detail.

2.2 Making the hypotheses operational

In this section I elaborate more in detail and operationalize a set of variables that can condition EU-UN cooperation. In the introduction, I formulated two main hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 links the motivation to cooperate with the UN with the lack of material and ideational resources on the part of the EU and its actors. Hypothesis 2 links cooperation to the lack of unity and integration in the European Foreign Policy system. When relevant, I will adapt the variables identified both to the level of the individual European composing actor (level 1) and to the level of the EU as a whole (level 2).

2.2.1 Hypothesis one: material and ideational resources

Hypothesis 1 was roughly defined in the introduction as follows.

- The less the EU has expertise, access, resources or legitimacy towards a particular issue, the more it will seek cooperation with the United Nations.

Rational-choice institutionalism would postulate that, as interaction with the UN comes at a cost in terms of autonomy, a rational actor will seek deep cooperation, including pooling of resources and decision-making powers (the most costly category of interaction) only when it calculates that there is a benefit in this. As noted by Biermann, “the struggle to reduce dependence is a major factor limiting the quality of cooperation” (Biermann 2007, 168). To be rational, the decision to cooperate should not be narrowly considered as ‘the most efficient’. Rather, it is the one that better
responds to the specific needs of an actor in a specific situation and within given constraints (Pollack 2006; Snidal 2002). Needs depend on the power of each specific actor: the resources that it has to achieve its objectives. Barnett and Finnemore, effectively explain that power in international organizations can derive from at least two sources:

“(1) The legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and information” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 707).

Without following the constructivist interpretation taken by Barnett and Finnemore, I expand the two sources of power to the broader concepts of ‘ideational resources/legitimacy’ and ‘material resources’. These concepts are applied both to states and institutions. I will begin from material resources.

**Material resources: capacities**

Material resources can be associated with the organizational strength, material assets, skills and knowledge of an actor: what we will broadly define its ‘capacities’. I distinguish here between four variables. (1) The actor’s expertise on a particular field, which is based on the time that it has spent working on it (experience). (2) The possibility that the actor has to work on a problem or region (access). (3) The human and other capital available to the actor such as staff, funding, knowledge and information (capabilities). (4) The existence or not of an independent vision, strategy or approach towards a particular problem (policy). According to rationalist literature (including both realist and liberal accounts) states use international organizations to achieve their specific interests and goals. The UN, in particular, has accumulated a considerable amount of competences, skills and capabilities in a variety of fields from development to security, which can serve the specific needs of states and other organizations such as the EU. Based on this instrumentalist interpretation of

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12 Other institutional and social constraints such as habit, socialization and norms (March and Olsen 1984) can produce appropriateness motivated behaviour and path dependence. However these constraints vary mainly in the medium to long term (Pierson 2000), so in explaining decisions over specific instances of interaction we can maintain these factors constant.
multilateralism, it is expected that the more an actor is in need of material resources, the more it will turn to the United Nations system and to multilateral solutions to achieve its objectives. A materially strong actor, in contrast, will have at least the option to act unilaterally.

Assessing the value for each variable is primarily a qualitative endeavour but will entail a detailed analysis of the case studies, including in quantitative terms. To provide a better comparative basis for the analysis I have attributed a fuzzy set of values from 0 to 1 to describe the variation of the variables. Importantly, the four variables can ‘add up’ independently to give a low or high value of ‘material resources’ from 0 to 4.

**Table 4. Variation on “Material Resources”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material resources (capacities)</th>
<th>Variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>0 - 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Ideational resources: legitimacy_

Ideational resources, on the other hand, are associated primarily to the elusive concept of legitimacy (Kratochwil 2006), which we pragmatically define as the authority (legal, moral, political) of an actor within its broader environment. I have divided this concept in four variables. (1) In highly institutionalized contexts such as EU foreign policy, legitimacy is linked typically to a specific ‘legal competence’ based on a Treaty or other formal document. (2) More politically, legitimacy can be related to a mandate coming from principals or peers. In this sense, it can also derive from the

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13 For a discussion see for instance Abbott and Snidal (1998)

14 I base this analysis on a number of objective indicators such as quantitative analysis of the level of aid flows and peacekeeping contributions, analysis of the organizational capacities for each case study, historical analysis of the context and of national and European positions.

degree of inclusiveness of the decision making process and on the general domestic support. I synthesize all this “input” perspective on legitimacy in the variable of ‘political support’, which can be applied both to states and institutions. (3) Thirdly, legitimacy can derive from external ownership or the ‘acceptance’ by the recipients of the specific policy. This can be marked, for instance, on a direct call from the target country for a EU operation. (4) Finally, we can relate legitimacy to outputs and therefore to the ‘reputation’ and prestige of an actor based on previous experience in a particular domain or country.\textsuperscript{16}

As in the case of material resources, we hypothesize that the weaker an actor will be in terms of ideational resources/legitimacy, the more it will rationally turn to the UN, as a key source of legitimacy in international affairs (Claude 1966, 367; Finnemore and Barnett 2009, 50–51; Hurd 2008). The table below illustrates the values that I have attributed to the variables, which add up to a maximum of 4.

Table 5. Variation on “Ideational Resources"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideational resources (Legitimacy)</th>
<th>Variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal competence</td>
<td>0 0.5 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political support</td>
<td>0 0.5 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>0 0.5 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>0 0.5 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>0 - 4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both sets of variables therefore, are expected to be inversely proportional to cooperation with the UN. A relatively low level\textsuperscript{17} of either legitimacy or of capacities is sufficient to generate cooperative behaviour.

\textsuperscript{16} In this case, the assessment will be imminently qualitative but will also be based on objective indicators such as competences established by the treaties and informal practices (see chapter 3), interviews and surveys to establish ‘reputation’ and analysis of the historical contexts and positions of the various actors involved (‘acceptance’ and ‘political support’).

\textsuperscript{17} For the statistical elaboration and graphic illustration I fixed the demarcation point at 2.
2.2.2 Typology of approaches to interaction

Material and ideational resources are obviously interdependent. Expertise and capabilities have an impact on credibility, reputation and effectiveness over a particular issue. They therefore affect ‘output-legitimacy’. However, for conceptual clarity I will maintain these two dimensions distinct, which allows me to assess how their chemistry affects the approach of the EU to cooperating with the UN. I argue that the level of material and ideational resources of each actor within the EU foreign policy system in any given circumstance conditions its intention and motivation to interact with the United Nations. This, in turn, affects the EU’s approach to interaction. The interplay of these variables can produce four possible configurations.

**Dependent approach**

If there is a need for both legitimacy and material resources, actors will express their full dependence on the UN. Dependence will produce substantial cooperation including joint decision-making and pooling or transfer of resources. Within this constellation of variables the UN is a key enabler for the EU or for a EU actor to operate. However, dependent cooperation, as noted above, is generally avoided. Therefore, in the long term I expect the EU to try to reduce its dependence on the UN, if possible, by increasing its legitimacy and material resources.

**Ceremonial approach**

In cases where the specific EU actor possesses important capacities (material resources), but weak legitimacy (ideational resources), the pattern of interaction will tend to be largely ceremonial (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Ceremonial interaction is based more on rituals, myths and symbols of multilateralism than on substantial cooperation. It normally entails arrangements for information sharing and loose coordination, without leading to a meaningful involvement in decision making or channelling of policies and funds. In short, cooperation will occur under these

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18 For distinction between input and output legitimacy applied to multilateralism and the UN see Keohane (2006). For the general debate applied to the EU see Scharpf (1999) and Lord and Magnette (2004)
circumstances and can be relatively stable in time, but it will be more based on form than on substance. Under this configuration specific EU visibility is not a problem as the primary objective of cooperation is really to show alignment with the UN and therefore acquire legitimacy.

**Predatory approach**

When there is a large level of ideational resources (i.e. the actor is legitimate within the system) but a low level of capacities, the approach to cooperation will be predatory. Instrumentalism in this case is more pronounced, because the actor or the EU as a whole approaches the United Nations to achieve specific practical objectives while being relatively confident of its own authority and status. Under this configuration of variables our European actor plunders the assets of the UN organization that it needs (e.g. access, expertise, human resources) on an ad hoc basis. In turn, if the EU decides to transfer resources to the UN in these circumstances, it will be very concerned about its own visibility, control and representation in the management of the operation. This situation can lead to conflict and frustration about the need to cooperate.

**Dismissive approach**

If the actor within the EU, or the EU as a whole can count on considerable ideational and material assets, its behaviour will tend to be dismissive towards the United Nations. In this case, we expect interaction to be rather atrophic in scope and quantity and limited to loose coordination and information sharing, with operations remaining separate. Importantly, lack of cooperation under this configuration should be distinguished from a simple burden sharing or division of labour arrangement. Rather, a clear interaction opportunity would exist, the UN is ready to cooperate more ambitiously but the EU has no interest to do so.

Figure 1 below illustrates the four possible configurations of variables. These are obviously not deterministic straightjackets but just qualitative scenarios that can help characterize EU-UN interaction. They will orient my empirical analysis and facilitate comparison.
2.2.3 Hypothesis two: unity and integration

While the first hypothesis can be adapted both to level 1 (internal EU actors) and level 2 (EU as a whole), the second hypothesis is relevant particularly to ‘level 2’ analysis, looking at the EU as an unitary actor. In the introduction I had tentatively defined it as follows.

- *The more the EU is divided on a particular issue area and the less it is institutionally coherent, the more it is likely to work with the United Nations.*

Given the complexity of the EU system, its fragmentation and the reticence of member states to relinquish sovereignty in external relations, coherence has been a critical problem for EU foreign policy, both in theory and practice (Nuttal 2005).\(^{19}\)

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\(^{19}\)Nuttal, has distinguished three dimensions to this problem, looking at institutional coherence (that is agreement and common purpose among the various institutions that compose the EU, including Council and Commission/community), horizontal coherence (that is coherence among different policy issues such as trade, development or security) and perhaps most importantly, vertical coherence (that is agreement amongst the member states,
Keeping the system together and achieving a sense of unified and integrated activity has been a constant preoccupation in the evolution of the EU as an external actor and has also been studied by constructivists as motivated by appropriateness-driven behaviour and socialization (Thomas 2011). Yet, although the quest for coherence comes at a price, particularly in multilateral forums (Smith 2006), European Foreign Policy literature has generally associated it to a search for effectiveness, impact, scale and credibility in the international scene (Ginsberg 2001). The mantra is that if the EU is not cohesive it does not exist and cannot exert influence internationally.

Unity

In the previous section (2.1) we have discussed how producing unity and identity is one of the primary internal functions of the EU foreign policy. Reference to UN processes and resolutions (or to an even more elusive commitment to multilateralism) often serves EU member states as a default minimum common denominator agreement on a divisive issue. Also, working through the UN even in the absence of a EU mandate, gives a benefit to France and the UK who have a privileged status in that organization.

If the EU is completely divided, it will probably not be capable of deploying a EU operation. However, member states might decide to support a UN action nationally and, at the same time, deploy an accessory EU operation (e.g. humanitarian aid or economic sanction), in support of the UN.\(^{20}\) In contrast, when the EU is united on a particular issue, it can decide not to work with the United Nations but put forward a unilateral EU policy. In this case, its approach to cooperation will not be obsessed by ritualistically referring to the UN but will be relatively more shrewd\(^{21}\) and problem-oriented. It will choose to work with the UN depending on the specific context and need, namely, depending on the variables linked to hypothesis one (capacities and legitimacy).

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\(^{20}\) Note that in this situation of substantial division EU support for the UN will tend to be rather ‘ceremonial’ following the definition presented in the previous section.

\(^{21}\) Term borrowed from Koops 2011.
The level of unity, therefore, will be an important factor in understanding the motivation of the EU to work with the United Nations, complementing the factors elaborated under hypothesis 1. We identify here two main variables/indicators looking at (1) the member states’ ability to reach a common position and/or (2) to identify a joint line of action. The less the EU is capable of achieving a unified position or launching a joint action, the more it will need the UN to act as a formal anchor of agreement. The table below shows how we have operationalized the variables linked to unity focusing indeed on positional unity (position) and operational unity (action). As with the previous variables, the range for unity is fixed between 0 and 4.\textsuperscript{22}

**Table 6. Variation on “Unity”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Integration*

A second factor under hypothesis 2 puts the focus back on institutions and has to do with what we call the ‘level of integration’. Some authors coming from both realist and liberal traditions (Cooper 2004; Toje 2010) have linked the EU’s tendency to work with the United Nations to its postmodern character as a polity that is not fully a state nor an international organization but is based on an ambiguous balance between supranational and intergovernmental features. Intergovernmental features, based on sovereignty are more adapted to United Nations. The European Commission, for instance, as the pivotal institution of the ‘community method’ and supranationalism, is notoriously excluded from full membership in most of the UN’s forums,

\textsuperscript{22} Qualitative analysis (literature and interviews) will allow me to establish a degree of unity on this simple scale for both variables where 1 will measure the middle ground situation where a certain consensus exists but some states disagree without completely preventing a common position or a joint action.
programmes and agencies. One could argue then, that in the areas where the EU displays a more integrated profile it is less prone to working with the United Nations.

We identify two indicators for this meaning of integration. (1) First, integration is a function of the ‘decision-making procedures’ existing in a particular policy field. Whereas in development cooperation decisions are taken by majority voting and at least for the EU budget the European commission/EEAS can count on a strong mandate, in CFSP/CSDP unanimity remains the rule. I expect that intergovernmental policy making increases the incentives to cooperate with the UN as states actors obtain benefits from this. With majority voting, these incentives are weaker. (2) A second indicator is the degree of ‘institutional coherence’, as defined by Nuttal. This is linked to the ability of institutions within the EU foreign policy system (mainly the Commission, the Council Secretariat structures and the EEAS) to produce synergies on key problems and challenges; the clear division of labour among them and therefore the lack of turf wars and bureaucratic wrangling about who does what.

As discussed in the previous sections, the UN can help an institution increase its legitimacy and capacities within a contested foreign policy system. Therefore, the more a field is crowded by institutions, the more there will be competition for visibility and recognition and hence cooperation with the United Nations. Institutional coherence is typically low in areas that span across pillars or in new policy fields, where EU institutions are exploring their mandate and the possibility to expand it. In short, the level of integration as a whole will depend largely on the issue area at hand, ranging from security and development and passing through grey/across pillar areas. The table below displays the two variables with the total value for ‘integration’ ranging from 0 to 4.

**Table 7. Variation on “Integration”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making Procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Intergovernmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Grey areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This second hypothesis can complement the first one on ideational and material resources adding a layer of complexity and increasing the explanatory power of the framework. In terms of interaction approaches I will consistently use the typology that I have introduced above (dependent, ceremonial, dismissive and predatory) but I will adapt them when discussing unity and integration. At this level in fact, the main dividing line is really between ceremonial cooperation and more substantive approaches. But one can also expect that the EU will cooperate more in security than in development with the UN, because in security it is less integrated, more fragmented and more often divided. Maximum cooperation will be experienced in areas that articulate across pillars, where intra-EU legitimacy is contested and cooperating with the UN is an opportunity to build up credibility and expertise. This discussion will be expanded further in the next chapter, which will map the different policy fields.

**Figure 2. Matrix of interaction – Unity and Integration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Substantive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ceremonial</td>
<td>Integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.3. Summing up

My objective in this chapter was to establish an analytical framework for my study. First I gave a definition of the dependent variable and analysed the functions that EU-UN cooperation play within the EU foreign policy system. Cooperating with UN does not only serve external purposes for the EU but plays also a series of important internal functions for its different actors, fostering interrelations, promoting
integration and building identity. Secondly, against the backdrop of the EU’s multi-
actor and multilevel system I have deductively identified four internal factors that can
be reconciled with a rational-choice and institutional perspective on cooperation. Each
variable has been operationalized through a set of objectively measurable
variables/indicators that will be useful for comparative analysis. These variables will
be tested empirically on six cases taken from EU-UN interaction in the Mediterranean
and Middle East region, with the objective also to establish the correlation between
each of them and EU-UN cooperation.

Before moving the specific case studies, Chapter 3 will draw up a general map of EU-
UN cooperation across the development and security field, assessing the actors
preferences in each field and beginning the zoom on the Middle East and North Africa
region.

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23 Due to their internal heterogeneity each case study was also split into 2 or 3 more bounded
“units of analysis” (in total 15). These instance or examples of interaction allowed a sharper
analytical focus.
PART II

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Chapter 3. Mapping EU-UN Cooperation

This chapter will spell out the main mechanics of EU-UN cooperation in security and development, outlining how players take the decision to cooperate with the UN and what are their general preferences. The main objective is to explore the different policy processes and assess their impact on EU-UN cooperation in accordance with the analytical framework elaborated in the previous chapters. The Lisbon Treaty has eliminated formally the EU pillar structure but this subsists in substance. The policy processes and the distribution of power among actors remain very different in security and development.

I will first look at the security field, namely at the ‘CFSP/CSDP pillar’, and then at the development cooperation sector, within the ‘Community pillar’. Thirdly, I will analyse how cooperation is organized in the area that lies in between these two pillars, mainly dealing with fragile countries and crisis situations. I will conclude each section with a brief zoom into the specificities of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, in order to prepare the subsequent analysis and comparison of the case studies.

3.1 Security: intergovernmental policy making and the UN

The United Nations is at the core of the security policy of the EU. This is fully acknowledged in the EU treaties and other key policy statements. Article 21 of the TEU states that “(the Union) shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the UN”. Article 220 of the TFEU gives specific responsibility to the High Representative and the Commission to manage...
relations with International Organizations and especially the UN. In turn, the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003 and reviewed in 2008 puts the UNSC at the centre of any international intervention by the European Union (European Council 2003, 9, 2008). Yet, this rhetorical commitment does not prevent the EU from acting unilaterally on occasion. Indeed, the vagueness of the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’ leaves ample room for interpretations by the different member states.

3.1.1 Policy formulation and coordination: member states and institutions

Given the predominance of member states in the policy processes of the security field, it is wise to elaborate a bit on their preferences towards working with the UN before moving on to the institutions. In line with liberal approaches to foreign policy analysis, the domestic arena is a key explanatory factor (Milner 1997; Putnam 1988; M. E. Smith 2004). Historically, the European public has been very favourable to the UN (Brantner and Gowan 2009; European Commission 2011b). Amid a general reluctance towards military interventions, a UN mandate is an important factor for domestic support to security operations. Thus, the UN is a source of legitimacy first and foremost towards the internal domestic constituencies. In this context, a few states have a particular position over cooperation with the United Nations that it is worth to look at in more detail: the permanent members, Germany and Italy and the so-called ‘UN-Lobby’ including mainly the Nordic countries and the neutrals such as Austria and Ireland (Brantner and Gowan 2009, 44).

France and the UK: exploiting the privilege

France and the UK’s policy towards working with the UN is based on maintaining and reinforcing their privileged position and status within the organization as a means


26 “The main reason why we want to involve the UN is legitimacy” Conversation with member of the Libya team, in UK cabinet office, ECFR conference (Chatham house rule), London, 5 July 2011. The Eurobarometer polls recorded from 2003 to 2011 shows a general support and steady majority of people expressing trust in the United Nations as an institution in all EU member states except for Greece and Cyprus (European Commission 2011b)
also to accentuate their leadership role within the EU. This happens frequently on Middle East issues as shown by the contact group created for Nuclear proliferation in Iran or the 2011-2012 initiatives by France and the UK at the UN Security Council on Libya and Syria. Each time that the EU works with the UN, France and the UK are strengthened in their quality as permanent members. In addition, their higher responsibility in crisis management also guarantees a boosted presence within the UN secretariat (for instance in the Departments for Political Affairs-UNDPA or for Peacekeeping Operations –UNDPKO), which gives them firmer control on what the UN does and thinks.

**Germany and Italy: a beauty contests for status**

Germany has an important impact on EU cooperation with the UN. Its membership in the Organization in the 1973 has opened the way for the European Community to obtain observer status in 1974. Then, since reunification, Germany has been hesitant between the goal of promoting a stronger EU presence in the UN and the idea of pursuing its own national permanent presence within the UNSC (supported in this by France and the UK)(Roos, Franke, and Hellmann 2008). Due to its GDP, Germany is by far the biggest EU contributor to the UN general budget and has been very keen in promoting its own role within the organization, being elected 5 times as non-permanent member. Its security role, however, is constrained by public opinion and the constitutional law. The Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s and the expansion of UNIFIL in Lebanon are the only occasions when German blue helmets have been above 1000.

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27 This policy has been tenaciously pursued and has resulted in the wording of article 34 of the Lisbon treaty (ex 19 TEU), which in substance gives priority to the obligations as UN members over EU coordination and coherence (Biscop and Drieskens 2006; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011; Bourantonis and Tsakaloyannis 1997; Degrand-Guillaud 2009a; Marchesi 2010)

28 This included key phases in the recent politics of the MENA region such as the period between 2003-2004 with the Iraq war and 2011-2012 with the so-called Arab Spring.

29 Own elaboration from data available on the UN website on peacekeeping statistics: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/ (accesses on 8 March 2012)
Italy, on the other hand, has resolutely promoted a common European presence in the United Nations and has firmly opposed Germany’s bid for a permanent seat, de facto preventing a common European position on UN reform.\textsuperscript{30} This was largely motivated by the fear for a loss of status within the EU and in New York and has had consistently the highest priority in Italian foreign policy (Drieskens, Marchesi, and Kerremans 2007; Fulci 1998; Marchesi 2010). Italy has itself sat 6 times in the Security Council as non-permanent member and, through its presence in UNIFIL, has been the biggest European troop contributor to UN peacekeeping between 2006 and 2010.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{The Nordic and neutrals: the UN lobby:}

The Nordic countries, together with the other neutrals (Austria and Ireland), have a more ideological approach to cooperation with the UN on security. The UN is a cornerstone of their national security identity and they have contributed vastly to the working of the organization.\textsuperscript{32} Of course, they also have prosaic reasons for favouring the United Nations. Through the UN these countries were able to punch above their weight in international affairs, holding key posts in the Secretariat and in peacekeeping and political mediation initiatives. Laatikainen has noted how the EU’s growing presence at the UN and the strong pressure for internal coordination has generated some frustration about reduced visibility (Katie Verlin Laatikainen 2006).

\textit{The role of institutions}

EU member states have safeguarded the principle of unanimity for decision-making in security policy and limited the role of institutions. The Commission is associated to CFSP (and has some specific functions for example in funding and sanctions) but has

\textsuperscript{30} Italy (supported by Spain) has been at a key sponsor of an extensive interpretation of article 34 (ex 19) of the TEU and has promoted the first EU-UN joint declaration on crisis management during its EU presidency in 2003 (UN Secretary General and Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2003).

\textsuperscript{31} Own elaboration from data available on the UN website on peacekeeping statistics: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/ (accesses on 8 March 2012)

\textsuperscript{32} Eurobarometer polls show an higher than average support for the United Nations in all of these countries (European Commission 2011b).
refrained from claiming a stronger role in security, while being jealous about its prerogatives in broader external relations (Dijkstra 2009). When states decided to delegate powers to institutions to represent common positions or implement joint actions, they preferred doing this via a High Representative (and its administrative structure in the Council Secretariat), rather than giving more power to the distrusted European Commission. The creation of the External Action Service with the Lisbon Treaty has not changed this pattern. The first evidence from practice suggests a further side-lining of the Commission from policy making in CFSP, even though the High Representative (HR/VP) is now also Vice President of the Commission (Blockmans and Wessel 2009; Whitman and Juncos 2009).

Channelling security policy at the UN through the emerging EU structures has been controversial (Fulci 2001; Marchesi 2010; Rasch 2008). States were very careful in maintaining specific procedures and firewalls (for example article 34 of the TEU) against excessive meddling by EU institutions on UN Security Council deliberations (Drieskens 2008; Marchesi 2010). Internal coordination on UNSC issues has been gradually reinforced, but ambiguously. Decisions on security positions has been largely taken in capitals and New York but a degree of ‘Brusselisation’ of the policy process has occurred, with efforts to synchronize the agendas. It is now common practice to discuss what is happening in the UNSC in the relevant Council Working Groups, the Political and Security Committee or in COREPER II. Information sharing from member states that are present in the UNSC has been formalised - something that would have been very difficult to imagine during the EPC years (Fulci 2001). Specific Council Working Groups, such as the CONUN or CODUN (disarmament) and COHOM (human rights), discuss issues concerning the UN in general (such as

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33 Some member states have seen in this coordination and information sharing on UNSC issues as a means to promote integration, while France and the UK, have approached it largely as an inter-relational instrument to diffuse pressure on them and dilute tensions with other EU member states. (Marchesi 2010)

34 See for instance the internal document approved by the Council in 2002 (Council of Minister of the European Union 2002)
UN reform or human rights), but are not very operational (Kissack 2010, 15; Laatikainen and Degrand-Guillaud 2010).35

Progressively, also forms of common EU representation at the UN on security have emerged, including in the UNSC. For example, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the obligation to invite a representative of the HR/VP to the UNSC, when a EU common position has been reached (article 34 TUE).36 An important output of this complex institutional machinery are the frequent references to the UN in CFSP positions (Klein, Kunstein, and Reiners 2010, 19). Referring to the UN process has become a default formula to reach some EU consensus on difficult issues.37

3.1.2 EU-UN operational cooperation in security

The UN is often a partner for specific CSDP operations or on CFSP political negotiations involving a mandate for the High Representative. Indeed, the United Nations, with its much superior structures and experience in peacekeeping, has been very important to the operational development of the European Security and Defence Policy.38 Most ESDP missions have been deployed in countries where the UN has a peacekeeping or peace-building mission (Gowan 2009a, 117) and the joint actions

35 Interview n°1 (European Commission official DG Relex), Participant Observation CONUN meeting, Brussels, December 2007
36 This was followed in 3 May 2011 by the adoption of an enhanced status for the EU in the General Assembly. UN General Assembly, Participation of the European Union in the Work of the United Nations, (A/RES/65/276), New York, 3 May 2011
37 It has been argued that this behaviour is motivated by the logic of appropriateness rather than of consequences. It denotes a degree of entrapment of the member states in cooperating with the UN and in finding some kind of EU agreement at all costs(Lewis 2009). Yet, this can also be understood in rational terms as different member states use the “UN language” for different purposes: the UK and France take it as a blank check to then negotiate feely in the UNSC on behalf of the EU, other pro-Europe states, as a way to adopt at least a degree of collective action, all as a means to open news arenas for discussion (inter-relational) and perhaps even with a genuine expectation that this can facilitate a solution.
38 See for instance the statement by EU High Representative Solana on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of UN peacekeeping: "The European Union has formed a partnership with the UN to work together in the area of crisis management. (…) The EU and the UN are working effectively together on the ground under some of the most difficult circumstances.”, Brussels, 29 May 2008, http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_7912_fr.htm (4/4/2012).
establishing the missions often refer to UNSC mandates and resolutions, with few exceptions. Table 8 lists all CSDP operations until 2010 showing which follow directly on a UN initiative.\textsuperscript{39}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME (Acronym)</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Initiative and organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONCORDIA (FYROM)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>UN-NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTEMIS (RDC)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM (Bosnia- Herzegovina)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA (B-H)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>UN-NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL PROXIMA (FYROM)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>UN-NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM (Moldova and Ukraine)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST LEX (Iraq/Brussels)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to AMIS II (Sudan/Darfur)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Civ/Mil</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>EU-AU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMM Monitoring Mission (Aceh/Indonesia)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa (RDC)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPAT (FYROM)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>UN-NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>UN-NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX KOSOVO</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM GEORGIA</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>UN-AU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU SSR Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Civ</td>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR – Atalanta (Indian Ocean)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM SOMALIA</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Mil</td>
<td>On-going</td>
<td>UN-AU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{39} By mid 2012, 3 more operations were about to be launched by the Council in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP/NESTOR), in Niger (EUCAP/SAHEL) and in South Sudan (EUAVEC South Sudan) and planning was undergoing on a border security mission in Libya. See the Council conclusions on CSDP, 3183rd Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 23 July 2012 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131971.pdf (accessed in 30 July 2012)

\textsuperscript{40} This table is elaborated and updated from the work of Fulvio Attinà (Attinà 2008, 6–7)
**The evolution of CSDP-UN operational cooperation**

Since the launch of CSDP in 1999, cooperation with the UN secretariat has increased and has been institutionalised. The Joint Declaration on Crisis Management of 2003 paved the way for regular follow up, generating a score of meetings, steering groups, trainings and information-sharing practices from the desks to the highest political level. From 2003, joint operations were launched in the field of security (civilian and military) in Africa and in the Balkans. UN officials are regularly invited to meetings of the EU Council, at all levels. Yet much of this is largely formalistic. It does not really go beyond information sharing and does not entail joint decision-making or pooling of resources between the two organizations.

In his analysis Gowan distinguishes four main historical phases of CSDP-UN cooperation. He argues that from 1999 to 2002 the relationship was characterized by inaction, as the EU and the UN had still not identified the terms of a possible collaboration. Then, between 2002 there was a phase of experimentation, which led to the first ESDP deployments in the Balkans and in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a degree of mentoring from the UN to the EU. This paved the way for institutional convergence from 2003-2006 with the many joint statements and common operations again in Africa and the Balkans. Finally, after 2006 the EU has taken a more selective, ad hoc approach, launching hybrid operations where cooperation mechanics with the UN were identified on a case-by-case basis (Gowan 2009a, 118). In 2011, the Council adopted a paper prepared by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the EEAS that attempts to put some order in the panoply of options through which CSDP can support the UN (European External Actions Service (EEAS) 2011).

This evolutionary scheme is coherent with my rational-choice argument that with the increase in ideational and material resources on the part of the EU, cooperation with

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41 See the following documents: UN Secretary General and Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2007; Council of Minister of the European Union 2008b; 2008a; European External Actions Service 2011
the United Nations tends to become less spontaneous. A general analysis of European security operations, confirms that decisions on whether to really invest in joint-operations with the UN depend on rational considerations by the EU member states about the context of the operation, the previous experience and reputation of the UN and the relative weakness of the EU structures in that circumstance (Grevi et al. 2009).

In addition to this, CSDP development seems to have had an impact on the EU states willingness to work through UN peacekeeping. I will analyse this aspect in the next section.

The EU and UN peacekeeping

The launch of CSDP in 1998-1999 occurred in a phase in which UN peacekeeping had reached an all time low. To some, it appeared that CSDP was bound to substitute UN peacekeeping, at least in Europe and its periphery (Attinà 2008). As shown by the graph below, the EU 27 member states’ relative weight in terms of troop contributions has steadily decreased from 54% in the 1990 to 6% in 2011, even though Europeans continue to shoulder up to 40% of the peacekeeping budget (UNRIC 2008).

Figure 3. Peacekeeping contributions in terms of troops

This pattern is partly explained by the negative experience with UN peacekeeping in the mid-nineties (particularly in Somalia and in the Balkans), which tainted UN reputation. The UN struggled to adapt to the new challenges of peace-building, which often implied interventions in internal conflicts and civil wars rather than cease-fire
monitoring between sovereign states (MacQueen 2011; Spillmann et al. 2001). Other organizations and arrangements came to the fore, particularly at the regional level, which it was not necessarily easy to subsume under the UN Charter and Chapter VIII (Graham and Felicio 2005). The EU itself gradually started to view itself as a suitable alternative to UN operations (Attinà 2008; Gowan 2009a; Ojanen 2011; Tardy 2009).

In addition to this, maintaining soldiers in UN peacekeeping operations abroad is relatively expensive for the EU states’ shrinking defence budgets as compared with other developing countries, which receive a net benefit in contributing troops. As a consequence, Europeans have tended to engage in security operations where they can get control and visibility (Attinà 2008). In this sense NATO or CSDP are preferable to the UN. The European leadership in the expansion of UNIFIL in Lebanon is the only case where this trend was inverted and accounts for much of the bump in contributions in the years 2006-2010 (see Figure 4 below). Yet, while this was saluted as a return of the EU to UN blue helmet peacekeeping it is actually a good example of the European cautious approach (Mattelaer 2009). The EU acted as a ‘clearing-house’ for member states substantial contributions in troops, which, however, were conditioned on a stronger control on the operation via specific institutional arrangements in New York and in the field.

\[42\] Benefits include higher salaries, social allowances and training.

\[43\] More detail in Chapter 5 below.
3.1.3 Security and the MENA

EU multilateralism in the security sector can be explained by the European public’s support for the UN and its general opposition to robust interventions unless they are visibly covered by the UNSC. This is consistent with liberal institutional approaches and is particularly relevant in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In general, member states find specific advantages in referring to the UN and working with it, as a central arena to showcase their contribution to international affairs. For France and the UK, in particular, the UN is a key anchor for their status as leading members of the international community and of the EU.

Below the surface, however, there are many problems and constraints to EU-UN security cooperation. EU integration in security and defence through the development of CSDP has coincided with a decreased interest on the part of EU states in participating directly to blue helmet peacekeeping. In addition, EU-UN institutional cooperation has increased but remains rather formalistic. After an initial mentoring period, CSDP has partly emancipated itself from the UN and cooperation now varies considerably on a case-by-case basis. Since 2011-2012 there have been some attempts to cooperate institutionally on conflict prevention and mediation in particular (the UN has also established an DPA/DPKO/DFS integrated Liaison Office in Brussels), but this is still rather embryonic.
Looking specifically at Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Europeans seem reluctant to use CSDP for robust operations in this region. As can be seen from Table 8 above, none of the three CSDP missions deployed between 2005 and 2006 in Palestine and Iraq is really military in nature. On the other hand, there is a long history of support to UN operations up until the European leadership role in Lebanon in 2006 and the strong backing to UN observation in Syria in 2012. According to my explanatory framework, Europeans have seen UN peace operations as opportunities to maintain a presence in regional security in a context characterized by lack of intra-EU cohesion and relative weakness. So far, intervening independently in the MENA and in the Arab world has been perceived as too risky for an organization that is still inexperienced in security and generally risk avert (Toje 2010).44

I will now turn to the development field

3.2 Development: high politics for EU-UN cooperation

Development cooperation is a key component of the EU’s identity as an international actor (Bickerton 2011; Carbone 2007; Manners 2008) and a tool of its foreign policy.45 The EU, together with its member states, is a giant in this field, providing more than 50% of global Official Development Assistance (ODA). The European Commission, managing the Union budget (and European Development Fund) accounts for around 20% of the overall European effort. Germany, France and the UK are the other major donors in absolute terms with Nordic countries being the most generous in relative terms.46 The most important characteristic of this policy field for the EU is that competences are shared. The Union policies, managed via the

44 In addition to this, the strong security role of the United States in the Middle East has crowded out the Europeans from the region at least since the 1956 Franco-British Suez war debacle (Daalder, Gnesotto, and Gordon 2006; MacQueen 2011).

45 For a detailed discussion of European development policy see: Holland 2002; Bourdet et al. 2007; Frisch 2008; Carbone 2007; 2009; 2011

46 Statistics are available both on the OECD-DAC website (www.oecd.org) or via the European Union Donor Atlas (http://development.donoratlas.eu)
Community method and with a leading role for the European Commission, continue to coexist with member state policies under a relatively vague duty of coordination.\(^47\)

Also in this field, the official rhetoric can be misleading. The development sector is very competitive and even intra-EU cooperation is not easy. Notwithstanding the philanthropic pledges on global poverty, external assistance is also an instrument for geo-economic penetration and political influence (Mckinlay and Little 1978; Morgenthau 1962; Walt 1987) and the race for resources and visibility can be fierce. This is compounded by the fact that EU integration in security policy has left very few instruments to states for independent foreign policy other than external development assistance. As a result, Member states have allowed only limited European coordination and have resisted the efforts to have a single voice in multilateral financial institutions, development banks and programmes.\(^48\)

### 3.2.1 Agenda setting and policy coordination

The United Nations has an important role in setting the global development agenda, particularly through the UNDP sponsored Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which have become a standard also for the European Union.\(^49\) The major political guidelines of development policy are negotiated within acrimonious intergovernmental processes at the United Nations,\(^50\) while donor-led institutions such as the G8, the G7 or the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD-

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\(^47\) See articles 209 and 210 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (TFEU). Similar procedures discipline ‘technical and financial cooperation’ and ‘Humanitarian aid’ which are regulated in the following articles.

\(^48\) See, for example, point 7 on “Position on improving the voice of the EU27 within International Financial Institutions” for each member state in the “EU donor profiles” (European Commission 2010d).

\(^49\) According to the Treaties, poverty reduction is the primary objective of European development policy in accordance with the UN sponsored MDG. However poverty reduction is not the priority for economic, financial and technical cooperation (Articles 212, 213 TFEU). Therefore, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which descends from this separate strand of policy, is less constrained by ‘multilateral obligations’. See also article 8 of the TUE.

\(^50\) It is the UNGA that established the first ODA target to 0.7% of GDP in 1970. This processes was then sustained through many international summits and conferences often hosted by the UN (United Nations 2008, 147–163).
DAC) are used to sustain and control the commitments to the aid targets. The EU Treaties call the Union and its member states to respect the commitments to international objectives established in the framework of the UN and other international organizations (particularly the MDGs).\textsuperscript{51}

The UN has also an important role in coordination and oversight, supervising the work of the myriads of actors through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the 5\textsuperscript{th} Committee of the General Assembly and other coordination structures such as the UN Development Group (UNDG) and the UN System Chief Executives Board of Coordination (CEB). Common EU representation in these instances is very limited. As noted by the Commission already in 2001 there is more coordination on UN General Assembly political issues than there is in the 5\textsuperscript{th} Committee or the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (European Commission 2001a). On the contrary, EU common institutions are relatively well represented in donor groups such as the OECD-DAC. In this organization the EU has been traditionally quite active and is present both with the European Commission and fifteen EU member states.

3.2.2 The role of the Commission in implementation mechanics

In the day-to-day implementation of development policy, the Commission has a major role and important resources.\textsuperscript{52} It has independent competence for the execution of the EU budget and is responsible of facilitating the coordination and ensuring complementarities with the member state policies.\textsuperscript{53} The technical nature of the policy area as well as the necessity for long-term predictable strategies further increases the power of the Commission over implementation. Once the main allocation of funds

\textsuperscript{51} Article 208.2 TFEU.

\textsuperscript{52} The responsibility for development assistance in the Commission is now firmly in the hands of the newly established DG for Development and cooperation –Europeaid (DÉVCO) which has resulted from a merger of two Commission directorate generals in 2011. In 2011 this directorate general was the biggest one for human resources in the whole Commission (and much bigger than the EEAS), with staff in both Headquarters and delegations

\textsuperscript{53} Article 210.2 TFEU. See also the principles of the European consensus for development (2005) and of the European Code of Conduct on division of labour as well as of the various international commitments to aid effectiveness (Accra Agenda for Action 2008; Paris Declaration 2005).
(programming) is done under the EEAS leadership and with bargaining by states and the Parliament, the bureaucracy can control key policy choices, design new projects, develop best practices and maintain relative independence from national pressures. As I will show in the next section, the Commission can also decide whether to channel funds through the UN or not. According to our analytical concept, we would argue that the ideational resources (legitimacy within the EU system) and material resources (capacities) of the Commission in this field are both generally high.

**Controlling operational cooperation with the UN**

Cooperation with international organizations is also a general objective of the EU policy.\(^{54}\) According to the financial regulations and the legal bases for the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) – as well as for the Instrument for Stability (IfS)\(^{55}\) – the decision on the implementation modality for each specific operation is taken by the Commission, which includes also the option of working through international organizations.

Once this decision is taken, it will not be possible to change this approach, unless a modifying financing decision is adopted, with a similar, rather heavy, procedure.\(^{56}\) This means that dialogue with the United Nations has to start very early in the process of preparation of each operation in the field or it will be very difficult to cooperate substantially afterwards. The proposal on the type of modality to be used is elaborated at the Delegation level, in coordination with the Headquarters of DG Europeaid. The more political services such as the EEAS (or before 2011 DG RELEX) are hardly involved in this decision. The Commission informs the member states at the relevant management committees or locally but, normally, the choice on the implementation

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\(^{54}\) Article 212.3 TFEU on technical cooperation. See also the many references in the main regulations on external assistance in the European Neighbourhood and in developing countries for the EU budget, as well as for the European Development Fund (EDF).

\(^{55}\) See the latest version of the EU financial regulation and the 2006 regulations on the ENPI and IfS instruments (European Union 2006a, 2006b, 2010)

modality is left entirely to “technical” considerations by the Commission. These are based on passed experience, effectiveness, costs and added value.\textsuperscript{57} As a consequence, the European Commission has an important leverage on the decision to channel aid to the United Nations.

\textit{Ups and downs in the evolution of Commission-UN cooperation}

\textbf{Ups: isomorphic and functionalist logics}

In this context, the European Commission has increased its cooperation with the UN secretariat importantly since 2001, when at the dawn of the ‘effective multilateralism’ turn it took a leadership role in promoting a functional partnership. This was done through a degree of isomorphic alignment between the two organizations, which harmonized their structures and procedures with the objective to facilitate the transfer of resources and knowledge.

This began with a Joint Declaration on development and humanitarian aid signed in 2001 and two key Commission’s communications on “building an effective partnership with the UN” and on “the choice of multilateralism” (European Commission 2001a, 2003a). The main obstacles to cooperation were identified, with the crucial limit being in a “piece-meal” approach to cooperation (European Commission 2001a, 5). Part of the strategy to improve the situation was based on an agreement with the UN on a Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA), which was to facilitate joint operations by harmonizing the legal and administrative processes. In the following years (2004-2006) the European Commission also signed six partnership agreements with specialized agencies of the UN to enhance its cooperation with them (UNDP, WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO,

\textsuperscript{57} Interview n°2 (EU Delegation official), 27 February 2012. See also the survey made by the European Court of Auditors on motivations to channel assistance through the UN, stating that the decisions are based on the “capacity to deliver, such as its experience, expertise, logistical capacity (including access to insecure zones) and past performance”(European Court of Auditors 2009, 15). Similar conclusions came from the own Commission evaluation, which adds to expertise also legitimacy and unique mandate, consistently with our analytical framework (ADE for the European Commission 2008, 22–25,28)
WFP) and elaborated specific guidelines on visibility and reporting. Biannual high-level meetings in the development field take place with the UN to review cooperation. There are regular joint training sessions for officials, constant contacts at the desk and field level and even attempts towards joint programming and monitoring and communication.

Progressively, EU funds channelled through the UN increased from € 250 million in 1999 to 1.430 million in 2005, more than 15% of total financial assistance that year (European Commission, 2008). This situation has itself stimulated the appetite of the UN, which has gradually reinforced its representation in Brussels (24 specialised agencies) to tap the funding opportunities.

Figure 5 below gives an illustration of these numbers, showing also the specific weight of the MENA. In 2005-2006, about 30% of this concerned the MENA region, particularly the West Bank and Gaza and Iraq. This percentage later went down considerably following a hasty wind down of operations in Iraq and the MENA region was accounting for about 8% of total aid delivered through the UN in 2010.

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58 For a summary on this see the website of the European Commission Europeaid Directorate (www.ec.europa.eu/europaid)
Downs: Reining in cooperation

This evolutionary process described above is consistent with neo-functional and inter-organizational theory (Adler and Haas 1992), including the apparent isomorphic alignment among organizations, which I have described (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Yet, this period of ‘glorious’ intensification in cooperation was contemporary to the general overhaul of EU external assistance, which was launched in 2001 to increase the effectiveness and credibility of the Commission as a donor and improve the ratio of disbursement against commitments (Carbone 2011; OECD-DAC 2009, 131–134). The United Nations certainly benefitted from that momentum (which peaked in 2006) as channelling through UN programmes is a good way to bring up the ratio of disbursements.

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However, as shown by the graph above, after the peak in 2005-2006, EU channelling of development assistance through the UN has substantially decreased. This is consistent with my hypothesis 1, which argues that an increase in reputation (ideational resources) and capacities might lead to a decrease in cooperation. In fact, once it became more confident about its own donor effectiveness (second half 2000s), the Commission started building its own firewalls against an excessive cooperative zeal by the task managers - for whom handing money to the UN can often appear an easy and sensible solution.60 Following an internal evaluation and a report from the Court of Auditors (ADE for the European Commission 2008; European Court of Auditors 2009), the management of DG Europeaid developed an instruction note with a set of key questions that need to be answered by the task managers to justify cooperation with the United Nations (and other international cooperation). No more default channelling of aid, therefore, but careful and rational assessments on whether ad hoc cooperation can bring added value as compared to other alternatives (European Commission (DG Europeaid) 2009). The establishment of new partnerships was interrupted in favour of thematic cooperation61 and considerations about effectiveness now prime over the idea of having to cooperate with the United Nations at all cost.62

**Structural and bureaucratic constraints to cooperation**

There are both objective and subjective constraints to cooperation. Structurally, the Commission is not a member of the UN, does not have a seat on the board of key programmes, such as UNDP and cannot have direct access to its decision-making and control (or audit) mechanisms. In addition, in the development field the European Commission is itself a multilateral donor for EU member states funding. This is why

60 Interview n°2 (EU Delegation official), 27 February 2012

61 Interview n°3 (European Commission Official, DG Europeaid), 25 June 2010

62 The 2001 Commission Communication on a partnership in development and humanitarian aid was already quite clear on the need to take an instrumental and rational approach based on comparative advantage, added value and relevance of the EU interests (European Commission 2001a, 7–9,11). The European Court of Auditors continues to monitor specifically channelling of aid through the UN as testified by also by the special 2011 report n°3, looking specifically at conflicts affected countries [http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/7913076.PDF](http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/7913076.PDF) (5/4/2012)
the European Commission does not generally contribute to the core budget of the UN, with very few exceptions. In short, 70-80% of all assistance delivered multilaterally by the European Commission is earmarked to specific projects and programmes and is therefore not supporting structurally a particular organization (OECD-DAC 2009, 132). The Commission has to justify to the European Parliament and the member states where is the added value of “federating” EU funds in Brussels to then “park” them in the UN (which then itself often delegates to NGOs).63

A second typology of constraints are linked to ‘subjective’ factors, based on bureaucratic rivalry. In the Commission, the overall perception of the UN has been rather poor. As a rule, working with the UN entails important administrative costs (a maximum rate of 7% on any operation for overheads to which other administrative costs are regularly added) and visibility costs, together with the loss of control linked with having to work with a big and often uncoordinated bureaucracy. The paradox, therefore, is that cooperation with the UN can end up increasing transaction costs, whereas channelling aid through multilateral institutions should actually lower them.

3.2.3 Member states: the ‘bilateralization’ of multilateralism

The approach of member states is not too different from that of the European Commission. Member states are adopting increasingly a rational (effectiveness based) approach to channelling their aid to the United Nations, assessing on a case-by-case basis whether an organization can provide the sufficient performance and visibility and deliver consistently on the donor’s objectives.64 Notwithstanding the repeated calls from the United Nations to pledge un-earmarked funds to the core budget of its different programmes and agencies, many member states resist this and prefer

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63 Relations with the Parliament have been particularly tense over the Middle East and particularly on Iraq and the Palestinian territories, where the Commission supported large trust funds managed by the UN and World Bank. See chapters 5 and 6 below. Similar issues were also raised on the Balkans. See for instance Tom Vogel, “Frauds provoke backlash against EU funding for UN”, European Voice, 7 May 2009.

64 See for instance the UK Department for International Development (DfID) which has developed a framework to evaluate the performance of multilateral organizations to channels its assistance accordingly. (OECD-DAC 2012a, 13). Similar approaches are taken by Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany and others.
committing to specific projects, sectors and countries on which they have an interest (often based on former colonial ties or specific political and economic links) (European Commission 2010d; OECD-DAC 2009, 113–209). This modality can ensure a wider impact and lower transaction costs without sacrificing the control over the operation (Milner and Tingley 2010).

In addition, EU development policy is a disincentive for states to commit un-earmarked funds to the UN. In fact, as the funds going to the EU budget are obligatory and not earmarked, member states (especially those with a small cooperation budget), want to keep at least some control and national visibility over their remaining funds. Over the years, EU institutions have been by far the largest channel of member states multilateral aid and their relative weight has grown at the expense of the UN and World Bank, which have to deal increasingly with non-core ‘earmarked’ assistance. This process has been described as the “bilateralization of multilateral aid” (OECD-DAC 2012a, 5). The table below provides a view of the aid strategies of the OECD-DAC EU member states and the United States.

### Table 9. Chapter 3: Development assistance of EU member states in 2010 by aid channels (bilateral/multilateral)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of ODA Flows 2010[^65]</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>FI</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>GR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>US$ million</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>3,004</td>
<td>2,871</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>12,915</td>
<td>12,985</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% GNI</strong></td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BILATERAL</strong></td>
<td>612</td>
<td>2,051</td>
<td>2,109</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>7,787</td>
<td>8,036</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MULTILATERAL</strong></td>
<td>596</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>5,128</td>
<td>4,950</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. UN</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. EU</strong></td>
<td>325</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>2,926</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. WB</strong></td>
<td>151</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Others</strong></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% ODA TO MULTI. (core)</strong></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% ODA TO UN core</strong></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimate % of total UN which is core</strong>[^66]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^65]: Elaborated from the OECD DAC website (www.oecd.org). The figures are relative to core funding to multilateral institutions. They therefore do not include project funding that is channelled via international organisations, as is the case for most of the Commission funding to the United Nations.

[^66]: The last row of the graph is an estimate elaborated from the analysis made by the OECD-DAC report on multilateral aid 2008 (OECD-DAC 2009, 113–209). It shows how the UN
The European Commission and the member states have an instrumental approach to multilateralism in the development field. The analysis of the policy area shows the degree of control that the Commission has over the decisions to channel EU aid towards the UN. I also looked at how EC-UN cooperation has increased in recent years following isomorphic and functionalist logics, peaking in 2005-2006. Notwithstanding the attempts to partner strategically with some UN programmes and agencies, the Commission has maintained a rather ad-hoc approach. Consistently with my explanatory framework, the key motivation behind the decision to channel assistance through the UN or the WB is the expertise, logistics and legitimacy that these organizations can provide in some specific cases.

Member states in their bilateral aid policies behave in a similar way. Even though this can be damaging for the UN’s organizational and financial sustainability, EU states have tended to prefer earmarked financing to supporting the core budget of UN programmes and agencies. All EU donors prioritize organizational relevance, system is used extensively for non-core funding (which is normally counted under bilateral funding). Through this method states can tap the benefits of working with multilateral institutions while retaining the control and visibility. Most of Commission aid to international organizations, including the UN, takes this form (non-core), UNRWA being the main exception.

67 The figures on the United States show that this still has a cautious approach on funding the core budget. However the United States does use earmarked (non-core) funding, particularly to organizations with specific mandates such as the World Food Programme and UNRWA (OECD-DAC 2009, 206).
efficiency and accountability in their decisions to channel funds to multilateral agencies, with the goal to maintain a tight oversight and control. There is no blind commitment to supporting the UN in the development field, but rather a lucid policy to use it when and where it can bring some added value.

This approach is compounded in the MENA region where the EU and some of its member states are leading players in economic and technical cooperation, trade, and foreign direct investment, while the UN is not very active outside conflict zones. The table below, provides a snapshot of the bilateral financial assistance flows from the 15 member states that are also part of OECD-DAC and of the European Commission. The comparison also gives a hint of the general interest of different member states for the region.

**Table 10. European aid flows to the MENA region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mio US$</th>
<th>ODA to MENA</th>
<th>% MENA of TOT ODA</th>
<th>MENA countries in top ten recipients</th>
<th>% Bilateral of total ODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2893</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Iraq, Egypt, Morocco</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>2033</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>WBG, Morocco, Egypt</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, WBG</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>48% (mostly debt relief to Iraq released in 2008)</td>
<td>Iraq, Egypt</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Morocco, WBG</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Iraq, WBG</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>WBG</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68 This was an EU priority during the negotiations for the 2012-2013 UN budget (Mayr Harting 2011) and is also coherent with the increasing demands coming from the European and national parliaments about transparency and efficiency public spending.

69 Figures elaborated from the European Commission, EU donors profiles (European Commission 2010d). Note that debt relief initiatives affected particularly Iraq. See in particular the distorted figures for Austria.

70 Note that bilateral figures here include also money that is channelled through the UN system for specific projects (non-core funding).
The MENA is mostly composed of middle-income countries - MICs (with Palestinian territories as a notable exception). As a consequence, the United Nations is structurally under-funded as most of its core funding is focused on low-income countries (OECD-DAC 2009, p.48). UN system-wide coordination in the Arab world has also been limited, creating an image of relative inefficiency and lack of independence from the host country, which in MICs funds most of its activities.\(^7^1\)

EU institutions are well established in the development sector, playing a central role in the Barcelona process and the ENP and don’t need to cooperate with the UN. The EU’s approach in the Mediterranean is strongly geared towards “reform promotion” rather than pure poverty reduction, therefore transcending from the MDG agenda and other UN targets.\(^7^2\) This is clear in North Africa, while the situation is more nuanced in the Middle East, where there are more non-EU donors involved and instability and conflict increase the interest for multilateral intervention.

In the next section, I will briefly focus on the policy area between security and development, where we expect cooperation with the UN to be more intense.

\(^7^1\) The “One UN” framework has not been tested in the MENA and inter-agency coordination is left to the resistant coordinator (often from UNDP) who has however limited traction on the different UN offices, agencies and programmes.

\(^7^2\) Even in the field of loans, where the World Bank could play a role as elsewhere, the EU has established and reinforced progressively the presence of the EIB, which, beyond the discussion among the organizations via the ‘Luxembourg process’ is a clear competitor of the World Bank. So the WB itself has been relegated to some key trust funds and otherwise to a role as a standard setter, for example on public finance management.
3.3 Grey areas: between security and development

So far I have sketched a map of the policy processes and actors in security and development. Obviously though, these two fields are both part of what should be a coherent foreign policy and are deeply interrelated, especially in fragile countries. This interrelation is well established in academia and policy and has become explicit in useful concepts such as ‘human security’, ‘comprehensive approach to security’ (Kaldor 2007; Major and Mölling 2009; Youngs 2008) and in important UN reports on peacekeeping (Brahimi 2000; Butros Butros Ghali 1992) and reform (High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004; Secretary-General 2005). In this section I will briefly analyse some of the specificities of the elusive policy field between security and development, which is a fertile ground for EU-UN cooperation. First, let’s look at a practical definition.

3.3.1 An elusive field: crisis response and peacebuilding

Both the EU (and the European Commission in particular) and the UN have spearheaded the recognition of the security – development nexus (European Commission 2001b). A common definition, however, is still missing, as is a shared template on how this should be applied operationally on the ground. Disagreement lies also within the two organizations themselves and is the cause of important turf wars and policy debates. Gourlay has shown how different interpretation of policy priorities and sequencing of security and development exists among key departments within the UN such as UNDPKO, UNDPA and UNDP (Gourlay 2009, 14–28). Similarly, within the EU, the European Commission has promoted a structural approach to security, giving priority to long term stabilisation and prevention, whereby the Council Secretariat and the team of the High Representatives have taken narrower - crisis management- perspective on security (European Council 2003, 11).

In both the UN and the EU, conflict about the interpretation of this problem is primarily based on bureaucratic rivalry among institutions, services and departments for influence, policy space and recognition. Therefore, to be pragmatic, I will avoid a general definition of this ‘grey area’ and will rather consider two main subfields of EU external relations.
- Development operations led by the European Commission, which have security implications as they affect conflict prevention or are related to post conflict stabilization, reconstruction and rehabilitation. These can be dealt with through specific short-term instruments like the ‘Instrument for Stability’ (which includes facilitated procedures to work with the UN) but also and perhaps more substantially, through ordinary development instruments (like the DCI or the ENPI) with work on governance, police and judiciary structures, electoral assistance and observation, etc.  

- CSDP operations led by the Council Secretariat institutions such as the CPCC (Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability) and CMPD (Crisis Management and Planning Directorate), when they are mostly civilian in nature. Civilian crisis management has been an area of intense confrontation and bureaucratic/legal competition between the Commission and the Council structures, especially when operations are extended over time (Dijkstra 2009; Ioannides 2010; McCallum 2009). This competition has been integrated as such in 2011-2012, in the complex organigramme of the EEAS.

These are the policy areas where substantive cooperation with the United Nations (joint decision making, pooling of resources) has been more extensive. Indeed, joint operations are typical in areas of fragility, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building (Gourlay 2009). For example, in 2006 (the peak year for EU-UN cooperation) more than half of total EU aid to the UN was going to five major areas of political crisis: Iraq, West Bank and Gaza (WBG), Afghanistan, Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo (ADE for the European Commission 2008, 22).

3.3.2 Explaining cooperation: necessity and opportunism

There are various factors that explain the higher than average level of cooperation between the EU and the UN in the policy areas between security and development. I identify three main ones. Firstly, interviewees have mentioned an announcement effect, which is sought in crisis situations and can be achieved by collaborating with multilateral organizations and particularly the UN. Meaningful responses to crisis take time to be formulated, discussed and implemented, but the logic of international media coverage and domestic politics creates the need for quick and decisive action. Supporting the United Nations, which can always absorb funds and resources within its on-going operations and standing structures, is often a useful first stage solution. The Libya refugee crisis in 2011 offers a recent example, but a similar reliance on the UN programmes and agencies is also typical during the periodic crisis in the West Bank and Gaza, or in times of food crisis, as in 2009.

Secondly, as argued in chapter 2, there is an element of institutional opportunism of the European Commission, the Council Secretariat or the EEAS, which is coherent with neo-functionalist explanations. The Commission, for example, can increase its presence in CFSP and promote functional spill-over by working on the margins of its community competences with the UN. Financial assistance channelled through the UN system has given to the Commission a sit at the table on sensitive issues such as Iraq and Afghanistan reconstruction, Sudan and Yemen electoral processes and the Middle East Peace Process. As an important donor, the Commission was also able to impose its presence in new UN body such as the Peace-Building Commission and maintain it after the Lisbon Treaty.

74 Interview n°2 (EU Delegation official), 27 February 2012
75 Given this situation, the Commission, the UN and the World Bank have developed a common framework for dealing with post-conflict or post disaster needs assessment and planning missions (European Commision, United Nations Development Group and World Bank 2008)
76 Of course also principal-agent theory, which stems from similar rationalist assumptions as functionalism arrives at the same conclusions(Pollack 2007)
Finally, and more importantly, the UN has vast capabilities, expertise and competences in crisis situations, which makes it the absolute reference for any operation. The EU has had a lot to learn from the UN on crisis response, conflict management and Peace-building and only in recent years has started to build up the confidence and capabilities necessary to deploy independently in these situations. In addition, acting in conflict and post conflict situation often entails obtaining access to politically difficult contexts where logistics, standing capacities and expertise are valued assets. Obviously the UN is also needed for its neutrality and impartiality. In short, in this grey area between security and development, the UN has often a relatively high level of material and ideational resources.

3.4 Summing up

This chapter analysed the key policy processes sustaining EU-UN cooperation in security and development: the main actors and their preferences, the legal commitments and institutional constraints as well as the main trends of cooperation. As expected in my analytical framework, it would seem that the policy sector has a considerable impact on the tendency of the different actors leading EU foreign policy to work with the United Nations. The pressure on the EU to coordinate both internally and externally with the UN in security and in crisis areas appears to be stronger than in the development sector, where a default reflex to turn to the UN is avoided. In general though, the approach to the UN can be described as rather instrumental across policy areas.

In security, the EU strongly relies on the UN, particularly in the MENA region, where interventions need a solid platform of international legitimacy to be accepted. Although operational problems do exist, it would seem that here the gradual institutionalisation of EU-UN relations has brought many advantages in smoothing and facilitating coordination. In this field the EU can – at least on paper - either deploy operations side by side to the UN, provide a short-term bridge in view of UN deployment or, vice versa, take up on UN operations or deploy independently under UN mandate.

In the development field, on the contrary, notwithstanding the very vast acquis of declarations and commitments to coordination and coherence, the context is not
always favourable to cooperation with the UN, particularly in the MENA. The EU and its Member States have a leadership role in this field and channelling of funds through the UN is used only if efficient and necessary.

While in other regions, the EU might be tempted to follow the UN leadership on the ground, in the MENA this has been less the case, also due to the ‘reform oriented’ and Eurocentric nature of operations, in the framework of the ‘Southern neighbourhood. For the same reasons also the logic of donor coordination, coherence and division of labour is weaker in this region and there is a higher tendency towards competition between multilateral donors, including within the UN. However there are also important examples of cooperation in the region, particularly the crisis situations, where the UN can provide the required material and ideational resources for the EU and its actors.

In conclusion, this chapter reinforces the framework that we have designed in the previous pages and strengthens our argument that EU cooperation with the UN can be understood using rational choice and liberal institutional approaches and taking a fundamentally instrumental perspective to it. In the next pages we will further test our hypotheses going more in detail into the case studies that we have selected.
Chapter 4. The Maghreb: Algeria, Morocco and Western Sahara

This chapter is centred on EU-UN cooperation in the Maghreb region. I will use my analytical framework and the two rational-choice hypotheses on resources and coherence as operationalized in chapter 2. The general objective is to assess empirically why and under what conditions does the EU cooperate with the UN in the Maghreb. The focus on the Maghreb allows me to zoom in a subsection of the MENA region particularly close to the EU, highly economically dependent, with a supposedly high EU leverage.

EU Foreign Policy in the Maghreb is deeply embedded within the institutionalized framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Some member states and particularly France, Spain and Italy maintain strong bilateral links in this region while the rest of the EU membership is less active. There is, instead, an established role for supranational institutions, especially the European Commission, which has held a central role in the implementation of the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona Process) and the ENP. The UN is present on the development front with numerous specialized agencies and programmes, as well as on security, on the Western Sahara conflict.

In this context, our hypotheses would suggest that EU-UN cooperation is going to be limited. The relative strength of the EU in this region (particularly of the players that are leading its policy here) and its proximity entails a comparatively stronger tendency of the EU to adopt an instrumentalist ‘sphere of influence’ approach, rather than giving priority to working with multilateral institutions (Mckinlay and Little 1978; Walt 1987). In the next section, I will set the policy context that creates the interaction opportunity. I will analyse two case studies: the first on development cooperation towards Algeria and Morocco from the 1990s, the second looking

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77 The Maghreb region normally includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, the five parties of the Arab Maghreb Union. However, since we are focussing particularly on
specifically at the security field and at Western Sahara. Both case studies are biased towards long-term policy making, whereas I will focus on short-term crisis management in the next chapters.

4.1 The EU bilateral external cooperation portfolio for Morocco and Algeria (1995-2010)

The first case study focuses on the development assistance of the EU to Algeria and Morocco from 1995 to 2010, the period since the launch of the Barcelona process. Algeria and Morocco are the largest countries in the Maghreb region, with similar populations of around 35 million and an important economic dependence on the EU in terms of trade, foreign direct investments (FDI) and remittances from the emigrant community. As these two countries are also the key stakeholders to the Western Sahara dispute, this case on development cooperation will also allow me to set the context for the following one, which focuses specifically on the security situation and the frozen conflict.

4.1.1 EU development cooperation in the Maghreb: unilateralism at work

Analysing development cooperation towards Morocco and Algeria entails allowing for an important amount of within case variation. While both are usually described as middle-income countries (MIC), Algeria has a much higher GDP level than Morocco (which is described by UNDP as a Lower Middle Income country) due to its hydrocarbon exports and is therefore also much less dependent on external aid. While in Morocco, poverty reduction is a key concern in much of the country, in Algeria the central issue is rather economic diversification and capacity development. Even in Algeria, though, the benefits of hydrocarbon exports struggle to trickled down and poverty continues to be an issue for large sections of the populations, particularly in the rural areas.

the Mediterranean dimension of the policy, Mauritania will not be discussed. Policy on Libya will be analysed specifically in a chapter 6.
The EU policy

The EU has established bilateral relations in both Morocco and Algeria. For the EU, the key objective of financial assistance is to strengthen political dialogue and provide access and support to reform strategies of these countries. In the view of the recipient countries, on the other hand, financial assistance is seen as a partial compensation for the politically costly reforms that they are asked to undertake. Poorer and more reform-oriented (or pro-western) Morocco benefits from an average of €200 million a year in financial assistance from the EU budget, mainly through budget support programmes (European Commission 2010f). This has been consistently one of the biggest envelopes of EU financial assistance in the world. Since 2008 Morocco has also been granted an “Advanced Status” within the European Neighbourhood Policy, which provides further opportunities for market integration, political dialogue and access to EU programmes. While Morocco is an aid “darling” for the EU, Algeria currently receives the smallest per capita aid allocation in the MENA region (excluding Israel) averaging 54 million euros per year for the 2007-2010 programme (European Commission 2006), with actual commitments at 46 million per year. Algeria is a difficult partner within the southern neighbourhood. It had traditionally maintained a nationalist foreign policy as a champion of third world non-alignment and socialist economic policy. With the hydrocarbon-driven recovery from the crisis of the 1990s the Algerian authorities maintained an ambiguous position towards the EU, ratifying the Association Agreement only late in 2005 and choosing not to formally join the ENP through an action plan (Darbouche 2008). Aid levels have remained fairly constant since the late 1990s, focussing on technical assistance and support for economic transition.

In the Maghreb as a whole, national bilateral development activity is limited to a few member states, which, as discussed, have strong interests in the region, mainly France

78 For a systematic study of factors behind aid allocation in the EU see Reynaert 2011.
80 Only in 2010 was a sector budget support cautiously introduced (European Commission 2010b).
and Spain. Other member states are less active, with a few specific projects carried out by Germany, Italy and Belgium (OECD-DAC 2012b). For all, the European Commission and the EU delegations are the main channels for development assistance and coordination.

The EU strategy and priorities for these countries are identified in the Country Strategy Papers and in the various documents in which the policy is framed, including the Association Agreements, the European Neighbourhood Action Plan, agreed with Morocco in 2005 and the subsequent agreement on a Advanced Status and the less ambitious Road Map with Algeria, signed in 2008. In terms of financial assistances these documents are then further articulated in the National (multiannual) Indicative Programmes (NIP), which are normally structured over three year periods. The priorities within these programmes are rather wide ranging, notwithstanding the obligation coming from the European Consensus for Development to keep priorities to three. In Algeria priorities for the period 2007-2013, for example were the reform of the justice sector (governance), the support to economic transition and diversification and support to the delivery of basic services (European Commission 2006, 2010a). In Morocco instead, the priorities are governance, environment and economic development (European Commission 2010f). Of course these priorities are very broad and undetermined but they are further specified in the actual programmes that are launched annually and are also indicatively programmed in the NIPs.  

In short, the EU’s presence in these countries is strongly grounded in the neighbourhood paradigm of EU ‘acquis’ norm diffusion and partnership. The EU’s overall ideational and material resources are quite high.

The UN policy

There is a strong and obvious alignment in these programmes with what is planned and done by the United Nations in both countries. An analysis of the UNDAF documents for Algeria and Morocco shows the frequent overlaps in the field of

81 For the Commission’s Annual Action Programmes containing the specific financing decisions for each project see the European Commission, DG Europeaid website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/ap/aap
governance, environment and, again, economic reform.\textsuperscript{82} As mentioned above also the UN system in the Maghreb has a very large mandate and works through technical assistance on reform and modernization in various sectors. A degree of overlap is somehow inevitable given the fact that development assistance is to be based on the national and sector strategies of the partner countries. However, as explained in Chapter 3, the UN is more constrained by the middle-income development context whereby it has to constantly justify its added value and lobby for project funding.\textsuperscript{83}

Overall, the UN projects in the Maghreb have provided technical assistance in specific areas such industrial development, heritage, environment, but also governance. In Algeria, the United Nations had a lot of visibility between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, when the country was slowly coming out of the terrorism years and was then also hit by an earthquake in 2003, killing more than 2000 people. UN presence was then downgraded following terrorist attacks at the end of 2007, which targeted specifically the UN compound killing 23 people. In Morocco, instead, as the donor community is bigger, the UN plays an important coordinating role, while the World Bank is active with loans.

\textbf{Table 11. EU Budget Development Assistance channelled via the UN}\textsuperscript{84}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European Commission Financial Assistance</th>
<th>Percentage channeled through the UN system</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (1995-2010)</td>
<td>3.2 billion euro</td>
<td>6.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (1995-2010)</td>
<td>0.9 billion euro</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.1 billion euro</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{82} The strategic documents for the United Nations activities in Morocco, including the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) are available at \url{http://www.un.org.ma/spip.php?rubrique28}. For Algeria see the UN country website at \url{http://www.dz.undp.org/}.

\textsuperscript{83} See, for example, the mid term review of the UNDAF 2007-2011 for Morocco. Available at \url{http://www.un.org.ma/spip.php?rubrique28} (accessed on 28/3/2012).

\textsuperscript{84} Elaborated from the figures of the National Indicative Programmes and the ‘CRIS’ Commission’s internal financial management database.
When we go at the implementation, the table 11 above shows how there have been basically no funds channelled through the UN in these two countries by the European Commission (figures on member states' bilateral aid do not substantially change the picture). Specialised agencies on the ground are associated in donor coordination groups but are not used to deliver funding. My observation, interviews and analysis shows that in the Maghreb there is very little ‘substantial cooperation’ (joint decision making and pooling of resources) between the EU and the UN on the ground and the European Commission, as well as the member states, have chosen not to use the UN for their development activities in this region. Even information sharing and basic loose coordination is reduced to a minimum, to a point that redundancies are not uncommon in sectors where both organizations are working.\textsuperscript{85}

\textbf{4.1.2 Assessing the hypotheses: we can do it ourselves!}

According to the thesis this weak cooperation outcome can be explained with rational arguments and calculation of EU actors in relations to their relative power (ideational and material capacities). According to our hypothesis 1, “\textit{the less the EU has expertise, access, resources or legitimacy towards a particular issue, the more it will seek cooperation with the United Nations}”.

Firstly, hypothesis 1 tentatively identified the need for access, resources or expertise as a motivation for cooperation with the United Nations. In chapter II, I have further specified these factors into (1) Access, (2) Capabilities – human and financial resources, (3) Policy and (4) Experience. I group these four factors in the concept of material resources, or capacities. As discussed in the previous pages the EU has a high level of ‘capacities’ in the development field in the Maghreb. This if we look at the member states and at the Commission, in particular. The Commission has a very good access to these partner countries thanks to an established presence through strong delegations on the field, and a central role in the subcommittee and committee dynamic in the context of the Association agreements. Funding and staff resources are

available and relatively abundant as compared to resources dedicated to the region by most member states and the United Nations. Finally, in the Maghreb in particular the high level of Europeanization of the EU policy reinforces the Commission’s power (Morisse-Schilbach 1999). It provides a high level of confidence to the European Commission on its position within the EU foreign policy system and limits the incentive on working with the United Nations.

Secondly, the hypothesis mentions legitimacy, which was operationalized in the four factors of (1) Legal competence, (2) Political mandate, (3) Acceptance from the partner country, (4) Reputation. From the analysis of the previous pages, it appears that the Commission is relatively powerful (or resourceful) also on this dimension when working in the Maghreb. The EU member states have as a whole delegated to it the designing and devising of development cooperation in Algeria and Morocco which has reinforced the institution's authority both internally and vis-à-vis the partner countries. The table below provides the values for each of the 8 variables/indicators.

Table 12. Configuration of variables for Ideational and Material Resources (Resources) in Case Study 1 – Development Cooperation in the Maghreb -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 (High)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 (High)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the next sections I will analyse these two dimensions of capacity and legitimacy with some representative examples. The examples or ‘units of analysis’ are more than anecdotal: they have been selected by looking at a cross section of the instruments
that the EU uses in the Maghreb, in particular technical assistance and budget support.\textsuperscript{86}

\textit{Technical assistance - providing European capacities}

Technical assistance consists mainly in the recruitment and deployment of experts to assist the target institution in carrying out a particular policy or set of tasks. Technical assistance makes up about 20\% of the cooperation portfolio for grants in Morocco and up to 100\% in Algeria (excluding civil society support). In the Maghreb, technical assistance is strongly geared towards European expertise often specialized in the approximation to the EU \textit{acquis}. Although the assistance is ‘un-tied’, the experts working are for a great part made up of Europeans sub-contracted by European consulting firms. This, not only suites EU member states (where these firms are established and pay taxes), but is often requested by the partner government itself, which in many cases prefers senior international experts to local ones. Technical assistance has also been gradually enhanced by the “twinning” instrument, which was used extensively in enlargement countries. This is public technical assistance, or technical assistance carried out by civil servants from EU member states. The objective of approximation to the EU \textit{acquis} is one of the conditions for this type of aid, which is by definition carried out by European administrations.\textsuperscript{87} The UN is therefore completely excluded.

\textsuperscript{86}In the past, the European Commission has also used macro-financial assistance (DG ECFIN), for instance towards Algeria in 1991-1994, that is, loans. However, today and for the past ten years, financial cooperation in the Maghreb has been associated to non-reimbursable grant money. Another key channel of assistance is civil society, which is mostly supported through small grants funded by instruments such as the European Instruments for Democracy and Human Rights or Non State Actors and Local Authorities. However in terms of funding, these operations are relatively marginal when compared to support to government institutions through technical assistance or budget support. Importantly, international organizations are often also eligible for funding through these “calls for proposals” mechanisms, but the European Commission has a preference for delivering directly to NGOs, which can be more easily controlled (Direct observation, Algeria, Libya, Brussels, 2008-2012).

\textsuperscript{87}For example, support to the Association Agreement Programmes (SAAPs) that constitute the framework for twinings constitute 25\% of the cooperation portfolio for Algeria for the 2007-2013 period. They represent 70\% of the technical assistance for Morocco in the same period.
As I have shown in Chapter 3, in formulating and implementing its projects the European Commission follows a set of rigid rules and programmes, which in general are quite impervious to external influence, including from the UN. Inclusion as an implementing partner in a project has to be triggered very early in the process, during the identification of the needs, and well before the financial decision is taken. As a consequence, there are regular complaints about the lack of consultation in the areas where the UN is active and has a strong capacities and added value. A good example comes from the governance sector and justice in particular, which are key areas of UN expertise. The strengthening of the rule of law has been an important stated aim for the EU in both Morocco and Algeria, particularly from 1995, but even before (Roberts 2003). Following an apparent opening to reform from key sections of the Algerian government in the early 2000s, the UNDP office in Algiers was requested to support the reform of the justice system, and in particular of the prison administration. Both these elements were ascribed in the governments reform plan.88 UNDP therefore launched two operations in these areas in 2002 and 2003, including capacity building, provision of equipment and training (including training on human rights). These projects were small in scale but visible and lasted until 2006 and 2010.89

Having itself identified the justice system as a priory area for support in both the 2000-2006 strategy document and the 2007-2013 one, the European Commission prepared two much larger technical assistance projects of 15 million (2004) and 17 million (2007) Euros in the justice and prison reform areas. Yet, even though the financing decisions pays lip service to the UNDP pre-existing programmes, there was no discussion according to my interviews on the possibility of using UNDP expertise for carrying out the EU projects, let alone to fund directly the on-going UN activities.90 Consultations were carried out for the formulation of the 2007 prison reform programme, but although UNDP expressed the interest in assisting in the

88 Interview n°7 (Former UN official in Algeria), 17 August 2011
89 For information on UNDP activities in the Justice sector see: http://www.dz.undp.org/Projets_Cooperation/Projets_cooperation.htm (consulted on 23/3/2012)
90 Interview n°8 (Official from the EU Delegation to Algeria), 10 December 2010
implementation of the project, the possibility was dismissed by the Commission, for which the EU programme was going to be much more ambitious than previous experiences. This, even though, the level of EU acquis in the area of justice is relatively limited and therefore the need for exclusively European expertise was less imperative. In this specific case, the intervention of the European Commission had the effect to crowd out the UNDP from the justice sector, although from 2011 it has restarted its activities in the modernization of the justice sector, in a smaller scale.

Similar examples can be found in the area of investment promotion or health or even in post-crisis rehabilitation, where the UN had a strong expertise. The European Commission has consistently avoided the possibility of working through the United Nations. According to my observation, this approach is motivated by the unwillingness to lose autonomy, the concerns with the lack of visibility and the high costs linked to working with the UN. To this one can add the diffuse belief among the staff that the UN is relatively weak and inefficient in these countries.

91 Interview n°8 (Official of EU delegation to Algeria), 10 December 2010, Interviews n°9, 10, 11 (UN officials working on the MENA region), 7 March 2011
92 See formulation reports for the EC programme Justice II, 2006 (EC Internal documents viewed by author). The 2007 EC-Algeria Financing Agreement for Justice II (reform of the penitentiary sector) mentions the following on contributions of other donors to the sector: point 1.4 Technical Administrative Provisions: “There is no donor coordination properly in Algeria. Among donors, coordination is limited to information exchange. Most of the programmes of support to the prison administration consist of partial bilateral actions with very weak financial allocation. They will be probably without notable incidence on the proposed projects. The Delegation of the European Commission organizes periodic meetings of coordination with the Member states during which it will expose the progress of the project” (EC Internal Document viewed by autor).
93 All three UNDP projects in the justice sector (2 closed and one on-going in 2011) are around 1 million euros, with around 50% funding from the Algerian government. http://www.dz.undp.org/Projets_Cooperation/Projets_cooperation.htm (consulted on 23/3/2012)
94 Interview n°2 (Official of EU Delegation), 27 February 2012 and direct observation
Table 13. Configuration of variables (resources) for unit of analysis “Technical Assistance”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>4 (High)</td>
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**Budget support – it's legit!**

The other main channel of EU aid in the Maghreb has been by far budget support. I will use the analysis of this instrument to test specifically the second part of the first hypothesis, on legitimacy and ideational resources. The more an organization disposes of ideational resources within the European foreign policy system, the less it will tend to work with the United Nations.

For grant money, budget support has slowly developed as the prominent tool in the Maghreb, in particular in Morocco and Tunisia (in the MENA region it is also used in Jordan and Egypt). The tool, in constant development, evolved from the experience with the structural adjustment facilities (SAF), which were based on strong and fixed conditionality, grounded on International Financial Institutions’ standards (European Commission 2011a).

The main orientation for sector budget support was given by the 2000 communication on Budget Support “Community support for economic reform programmes and structural adjustment: review and prospects” (European Commission 2000). Objectives vary, but over time in the neighbourhood the Commission used budget support mostly to promote sector reforms (rather than to support general national poverty reduction strategies as in the ACP area). These reforms in the neighbourhood, and in the Maghreb in particular are generally technocratic (they rarely had an impact on democratization) EU-oriented and linked to the association to the EU or to market integration. Budget support is also a response to the aid effectiveness agenda...
developed after the 2005 “Paris declaration” on increasing ownership of recipient countries, alignment to the recipient country's strategies and use of the country system of public finance. However, for the Commission the instrument became a means to reinforce its role in leading the policy dialogue with the partner countries and raising it to an higher, more strategic level, as opposed to the more technical (project level) discussions typical of technical assistance. 95

This instrument bypasses the United Nations specialized agencies active in the Maghreb, but it is very relevant to the work of the international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank and the IMF. Two of the three key eligibility criteria for the instrument are dependent on some kind of endorsement by international organizations.96 Macroeconomic stability is normally established in consultation and coordination with the ‘Article 4’ annual consultations of the IMF, while the Public finance management assessment is carried out within the standards set largely by the World Bank.97

In practice, the Commission uses the assessments coming from the World Bank or the IMF to reassure some member states, such as Germany, which have regularly expressed scepticism over the use of budget support (Schmidt 2006), particularly in middle income countries. This emerges from our analysis of the financing decisions documents for budget support programmes, both in Morocco and Algeria. The

95 In Morocco, budget support increased from about 50% of the total aid delivered in the country in the period 2000-2006 to around 80% with the ENPI instrument from 2007. The instrument was introduced also in Algeria, with the 2010 annual action programme (available on DG Europeaid website).

96 The three eligibility criteria for sector budget support are (1) macroeconomic stability, (2) reform of the public finance management system, (3) a credible sector strategy. “This instrument was gradually promoted by the European Commission and was included also in the ENPI regulation (Reg.1638/06), which is mainly geared to promoting reform, support policies and strengthen institutions (Art.2). The regulation foresees the provision of EU funds for sectoral or general budget support if the partners’ public finance management system is sufficiently transparent, reliable and effective, and where it has put in place properly formulated sectoral or macroeconomic policies approved by its principal donors, including, where relevant, the international financial institutions (Art.15)” (European Union 2006a)

97 See for instance the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Framework, a reputed Public Finance Management Assessment methodology sponsored and hosted by the World Bank secretariat (www.pefa.org)
decision on whether the instrument can be used is taken on the basis of independent considerations of the Commission and of the experience with this instrument (which in North Africa, largely precedes the establishment of any specific international assessment framework). The endorsement from these organizations is used for its legitimizing effect and is mainly ceremonial, while the European Commission boasts both its expertise in formulating and implementing these programmes, and its specific approach to them particularly in the Maghreb (DG Europeaid, EC 2007; European Commission 2011a).

Cooperation with IFIs is in general positive in the Maghreb (particularly in Morocco and Tunisia) and is being reinforced, for instance through the regular meetings with the IFIs under a ‘Commission-WB Memorandum of Understanding for a Strategic Partnership for the MENA’ and the so-called ‘Luxembourg Process’ (including the Commission, IMF, WB, and EIB). Good coordination is particularly important for the European Commission as an increase in the loan levels by IFIs, in particular in Morocco, can undermine the leverage of the grant money coming from the Commission. New grant/loan blending instruments such as the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) should be seen also in this light. This is not only effective means to increase the impact of projects by joining up with development banks, but also a way to maintain the leverage of the necessarily limited grant money, by having a central seat on the project’s management board. But in Morocco and Tunisia the

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98 Cooperation with the IFIs in the Maghreb is more developed than it is with the UN. There is regular exchange of information, stopovers of WB officials to Brussels before negotiating with partner countries and occasional visits of Brussels staff to Washington, Policy co-ordination, i.e. structural adjustment, governance and Private sector development (workshops), co-financing of programme preparation and co-operation on specific operations in Algeria (in the past), Morocco and Tunisia including joint public expenditure reviews. See the World Bank website’s page on cooperation with the European Union in the MENA: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/PARTNERS/WBEU/0,,contentMDK:20421974~menuPK:581208~pagePK:64137114~piPK:64136911~theSitePK:380823,00.html (23/4/2012)

99 This could be pictured as a decrease in the relative ‘capabilities’ volume.

100 Direct observation and interview n°12 (EU Delegation official with extensive experience in the MENA) email interview, 14 September 2011. See also the DG Europeaid webpage for the Neighbourhood Investment Facility:
EC and the World Bank have also worked on joint programmes, where the Commission provides money and the WB loans on the basis of the same project objectives.\footnote{EAMR 2011 second semester Morocco – internal. See for instance the Programme supporting the reform of the public administration (PARAP). Joint operations with the UN are more rare, but in Morocco there is a case in the Health sector where MDGs targets are monitored jointly with UNFPA (PASS programme). Information available on the website of the EU delegation in Morocco.}

In general, it would seem that through budget support, the European Commission has gradually reinforced its credibility in implementing EU development policy, with specific instruments and policies. The UN is generally excluded from budget support while other international organizations (IFIs) play a highly ceremonial role, helping maintain the support of member states for the Commission’s methodology.

This example casts some light in the need for some legitimacy for the EU, particularly in using budget support in the Maghreb, with middle-income countries. The European Commission has the support of southern member states on its strategy, which increases the absorption capacity of aid in these countries. However, it needs the support of IFIs to maintain the support of northern member states, which have a more prudent position on the use of budget support, and a lower interest in maintaining a high level of development assistance in these countries.

Table 14. Configuration of variables (resources) for unit of analysis “Budget Support”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Support in the Maghreb</th>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 (High)</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\url{http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/irc/investment_en.htm} \(23/4/2012\)

\footnote{EAMR 2011 second semester Morocco – internal. See for instance the Programme supporting the reform of the public administration (PARAP). Joint operations with the UN are more rare, but in Morocco there is a case in the Health sector where MDGs targets are monitored jointly with UNFPA (PASS programme). Information available on the website of the EU delegation in Morocco.\url{http://ecas.europa.eu/delegations/morocco/projects/list_of_projects/project_fr.htm} \(23/4/2012\)
4.1.3 Explaining

This case is based on the observation that EU development cooperation with the United Nations in the Maghreb region is very limited and reduced mainly to loose coordination and information sharing. There is basically no channelling of aid through the United Nations (nor through other international organizations like the World Bank). If anything, this trend has increased in the years from the 1990s, as the EU has progressively emancipated itself from the IMF and the WB by moving from structural adjustment to the instrument of sector budget support (Schmidt 2006). At the level of technical assistance the paradigm of EU approximation, EU integration and EU-orientated reforms is dominant also in areas where the UN has a clear experience on the ground and globally, such as governance, rule of law and rehabilitation. As both in terms of capacities and legitimacy EU institutions don’t feel the need to work with the UN, the behavioural pattern is largely dismissive, with the notable exception coming from areas of specific expertise (such as migration and refugees), where international organizations can count on an exclusive mandate.102

Our hypothesis 1, linking cooperation to lack of capacities (material resources) and legitimacy (ideational resources) is sufficient to explain this case. The European Union is powerful enough in the Maghreb region to do without the United Nations. The key member states which are leading the policy in the Maghreb, France, and to a lesser extent Italy and Spain, have Europeanized the Maghreb policy using Europe as a legitimizing tool and instrument, rather than the UN. Other EU members, lack the interest to actually oppose this pattern or block the policy, as this is still generally considered as the domaine réservé of Southern EU states (Gillespie 2009). Some might contest that the substance of the EU policy – especially in crisis phases103 - towards the Maghreb is decided in a few key national capitals (Roberts 2003). Yet, it

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102 But even here, the EU does not like to maintain dependence and has financed also alternative organizations, with exclusively European membership, such as the International Centre for Migration Management Policy Development (ICMPD) (www.icmpd.org). Similarly, in difficult situations in the MENA and Balkans, the European Commission often uses IMG (International Management Group), a newly established international organizations with expertise in providing technical assistance, as an alternative to UN agencies.
is a fact that the European Commission has been given an important and institutionalized role in carrying out long-term development cooperation in the framework of the MENA and then ENPI regulations on behalf of the EU member states.

As this became clear with Barcelona in 1995, interaction with the United Nations has remained atrophic and the Commission (but the same can be expected from the EEAS) has been unwilling to give up its autonomy. The justification for sidelining the UN lays at two levels. On the one hand, the proximity and EU integration agenda of the neighbourhood (particularly in the Maghreb) has primed over the Millennium Development Goals and poverty reduction as policy objectives. On the other hand, the idea of adding a further multilateral step to implementation went against the need to speed up disbursements and increase absorption capacity, which became a crucial priority from the administrative reform of 2000 (Carbone 2007; Holland 2002; Mold 2007).104

As a result, going back to the analytical scheme elaborated in chapter 2 the behaviour of the EU toward the UN has ranged from being dismissive to ceremonial. It can be labelled dismissive with technical assistance, where EU institutions can count on a high level of material and ideational resources. While with Budget support interaction has been mostly ritualistic and ceremonial, as some lip service to IFI expertise is needed to fence the doubts regularly expressed by some northern member states.

103 See the reaction to the 2011 “Arab Spring”.
104 This partially explains also the acceleration on budget support, which has a higher absorption capacity than technical assistance.
4.2 The EU foreign policy interaction with the UN on the Western Sahara conflict (1991-2010)

The story changes considerably when looking at security, and specifically at the case of Western Sahara, which has been a constant disturbing factor in the security context of the region for almost 40 years. Here the UN has played a major role both as a political framework since 1970s when the conflict started, and as an operational actor from 1991 when the MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) peace operation was launched. The UN has had an important role also in the political meditation effort, through the good offices of the UN Secretary General and its Special Representative (also head of MINURSO) and the Personal envoy. Specialized agencies have also been active on the conflict in Western Sahara, particularly the UNHCR, which has coordinated refugee relief and confidence building measures in the camps in Algeria and elsewhere.

The conflict in the Western Sahara is one of the most prominent features of Algeria-Morocco relations. In this case study I therefore turn to how the EU has been involved in this frozen conflict and to what extent it has cooperated with the United Nations in its management and resolution. Over the years there has been a strong, albeit passive,
EU cooperation within the UN and a complete reliance on the United Nations initiative to mediate a solution on Western Sahara (Gillespie 2009, 94). This is strikingly different from the picture of the development sector.

For this case, therefore, I will test in particular my second hypothesis, which states that “the more the EU is divided on a particular issue area and the less it is institutionally integrated, the more it is likely to work with the United Nation”. Considering that the Western Sahara conflict obviously falls in the security domain, where member states maintain strong control of the policy outcome, this second hypothesis allows me to focus better on the impact of different state preferences.

In the next sections I will look at the main determinants of the conflict and at the positions within the EU, to show how the EU is divided on this issue. I will then look at how cooperation with the UN is articulated.

4.2.1 Main features of the conflict

The Western Sahara conflict has languished in the European neighbourhood for more than thirty years, with considerable costs. Apart from the human suffering that it causes for the stranded and displaced populations affected, it is the most important irritant in the relations between Algeria and Morocco. This frozen conflict hampers all efforts for meaningful sub-regional integration in the Maghreb, for instance through the Arab Maghreb Union established in 1989, but damages also cooperation in the Sahel, a key region for Europe’s security. Morocco’s relative isolation in Africa and its exclusion from the African Union (of which the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic –SADR- is a full member) have also put an important obstacle to the development of this organisation as the overarching collective security mechanism in the continent. As a whole, the lack of a solution to this problem (whatever this might be) is an open wound to the EU’s strategic objective of promoting a ring of friends in its neighbourhood.
Historical accounts of the conflict\(^{105}\) often start from the period of Spanish colonization, as sanctioned by the 1884 Berlin conference and at the subsequent formation of a Western Saharan national identity, distinguished from Morocco, which, among other things, was under French rule. In 1975 Spain relinquished the territory abruptly to Morocco and Mauritania with a tripartite agreement. Faced with the Polisario Front\(^{106}\)’s fighting, Mauritania soon gave up any claim to the territory but Morocco in 1976 decided to occupy it. A conflict between Morocco and the Polisario front, supported by Algeria, ensued and is still going on today, albeit since 1991 a UN administered cease-fire is in force.

While being a bilateral decolonization problem between Morocco and the Polisario Front representing the SADR, the issue was multilateralized from the inception with a strong role for the United Nations system, through the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, the Security Council and the Secretary General and its envoys. In fact, this is a good case for assessing the effect of United Nations involvement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping (Gillespie 2009; Goulding 2003, 199–214; Jensen 2005, 116). After 1991, it was targeted by renewed international activism starting with the Settlement Plan proposed by the Secretary General, on the wave of the positive momentum in multilateral affairs following the international intervention in Iraq. As a consequence the UNSC decided to deploy the MINURSO mission with the purpose of organizing and implementing the referendum of self-determination. The referendum, though, was hijacked by the problem of the identification of voters, which was never clarified. Notwithstanding the fact that the MINURSO mission is now primarily a peacekeeping operation, the UN involvement has always been under Chapter VI of the Charter on Dispute Settlement, with the

\(^{105}\) For an historical analysis of the conflict see Hodges 1983; Bontems 1984; Zoubir & Volman 1993; Barbier 2000; Jensen 2005; Zunes & Mundy 2010.

\(^{106}\) The Polisario Front represents the Sahrawi national liberation movement. Polisario is a Spanish abbreviation of Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro ("Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el-Hamra and Río de Oro").
Fourth Commission on Decolonization treating the subject on the General Assembly side (Jensen 2005; MacQueen 2011).

Although it is impossible to discern right from wrong in this conflict most observers and historians agree on number of points.

a. This conflict is nested within the broader rivalry between Algeria and Morocco for regional hegemony. During the Cold War these two countries represented two opposing ideologies and were already at odds over their common borders since the “Sand Wars” of 1963. Both sides, have used the Western Sahara conflict has a means to reinforce nationalism and as an excuse to stall their relationship, which has led, among other things to the closure of the land borders in 1994.

b. External powers have had a key role in supporting either self-determination or integration in Morocco. France and the United States are at the forefront of those sustaining Morocco. France took this position following its cultural economic and historical ties with Morocco, while the US did it to maintain stability in an important area at the entry of the Mediterranean and to prop-up Morocco as a traditionally pro-western and moderate Arab-country. Algeria, on the other hand, has always upheld the right of the Saharawi for self-determination, supporting politically, diplomatically and economically (and also militarily) the Polisario front, whose main de facto headquarters are in the Tindouf refugee camps in South-western Algeria.

c. Given a clear difference of perspective amongst the parties and their unwillingness to compromise, it became rapidly clear that a solution was going to be difficult to get to through UN mediation. Morocco, as the de facto administrator of the territory, has an interest in maintaining the status quo. Yet, no external power with the potential to influence Morocco for a solution has ever found the interest to do so and the UN good offices were not sufficient so far (Jensen 2005, 48,56).

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107 Interview n°13 (Former UN official), 25 March 2012.
The building up of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy has coincided with the multilateralization of the conflict in Western Sahara and the setting up of the MINURSO operation in 1991. There was therefore considerable opportunity for interaction between the EU and the UN on this issue. Let’s now turn to see how this interaction has actually taken place in practice. Doing that, however, means analysing a conflict within the conflict: the conflict within the EU itself.

*The EU: between division and lack of interest*

The role of the EU in the conflict has been very modest (Benabdallah 2009; Darbouche and Colombo 2010; Gillespie 2009), notwithstanding the potential influence that it could have in its solution. The EU maintained a “policy of disengagement” (Darbouche and Colombo 2010), due to different preferences among the member states or simply lack of interest. As a consequence, no European state has actually recognized the SADR (although a few have diplomatic relations with the Polisario) and there has been a general lack of willingness to take sides and to bear the consequent costs. France provides a strong cover for Morocco (supported in this by the US) and is probably the only member state with enough influence by itself to put pressure on Morocco for a solution. Yet it decided not to do that, and has insisted on leaving the issue to the UN. This allows Paris to control the situation while keeping a low profile, which partly shields it from criticism coming from the supporters of the SADR. France has effectively prevented the EU from having a strong position on this issue and taking initiative. Any innovative declaration on the Western Sahara will be blocked already at the level of the Maghreb/Mashrek Council Working Group (MAMA), or earlier and will rarely reach the PSC. 

Spain has maintained an approach of “active neutrality” on the Western Sahara conflict, which has often put it at odds with France and Morocco (Nunez Villaverde 2005, 107). First, it felt a “moral” obligation to ensure that any solution guarantees some kind of self-determination for the people of the territory for which it is still the de jure administrator. In Spain there is the vastest portion of European public

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108 Senior German diplomat (Chatham House), IAI Conference, “The Reform of the UN Security Council, What role for the EU”, 14 May 2010
interested in the topic and promoting the rights of the Saharawi people. So there is a
domestic concern, particularly in the left of the Spanish political spectrum. Finally,
Spain is also interested in maintaining good relations with Algeria, as this is a critical
energy provider for its domestic market (Gillespie 2009, 94). Yet, this position has
been rather ambiguous. Spain has been increasing ties with Morocco, with which it
has an interest in maintaining good relations due to proximity and the enclaves in
Ceuta and Melilla. To a certain extent Spain (and other member states, such as
Portugal and the UK) also benefits from the status quo, which has allowed it to exploit
the resources available in Western Sahara in terms of fisheries and phosphate and
explore the territorial waters for oil and gas. These factors have in time created a
wavering positioning of Spain, depending also on the political party in power.

Most other member states simply lack the political interest to get involved into this
conundrum, knowing the position of France and Morocco. The UK has been rather
close to the United States, promoting stability but also leaving this area to the French
influence. The only voices consistently concerned over respect of human rights in the
Western Sahara territories have been the Scandinavian states (Scholdtz and Wrange
2006). Overall, though, no European state is too keen at having a possibly weak state
in that area of the world, which is important for EU security. It is assumed in several
quarters in Brussels that Western Sahara would be better managed and controlled if
administered by Morocco (albeit, with a important status of autonomy) than by
SADR.110

The EU is therefore divided on this issue. As a consequence, Western Sahara is a “no
man’s land for CFSP” (Gillespie 2009, 93), from which the High Representative was
excluded and on which the EU was never willing to nominate a special envoy, as in
the case of the Middle East and of other conflicts.111

109 For instance, a great part of the NGOs working on Western Sahara are Spanish
110 Interviews n°4 and 6 (European officials), April-November 2011
111 This has perhaps partly changed with the creation in July 2011 of the post of EU special
   representative for the Southern Mediterranean. However, even here, the official will be
The European Commission, which as seen in the previous section, has an important role in the Maghreb, was forced to maintain a very low profile on the Western Sahara file, not having the mandate to act. Political dialogue with Morocco (as with Algeria), which was led by the Commission before the Lisbon Treaty, has rarely touched upon the painful issue of Western Sahara. As a whole, the Commission has an interest in reinforcing the relations with Morocco, which has traditionally been one of the keener reformer and an “easy to work with” partner within the ENP. Advances on trade, fisheries and transport have all opened a window to international cooperation for various technical services in the Commission, which not surprisingly focus on technocratic implementation. This consideration towards Morocco has not changed fundamentally with the EEAS.

This, however, has gone hand in hand with a degree of frustration over the lack of progress, which prevents deeper regional integration in the area, and over the lack of voice for the Commission, notwithstanding its strong position within Maghreb policy. ENP strategic documents, for instance, regularly mention the importance for the EU to “enhance its involvement in solving protracted conflicts”, citing also Western Sahara (High Representative and European Commission 2011). Yet these references are notable for not providing any specific proposal on this issue. The Commission has had to avoid this issue, beyond Humanitarian aid, declining to fund even the small confidence building measures managed by UNHCR.

The only EU institution that has generally maintained some interest for the conflict and an active role, has been the European Parliament. It has adopted several resolutions favouring the self-determination of the Saharawi people and the respect of responsible for the whole MENA region, against the backdrop of the “Arab spring”. The Western Sahara is hardly going to be the priority.

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their rights by Morocco (Gillespie 2009, 95). In 1992 it has halted the signature of the fourth financial agreement with Morocco over human rights concerns and in 2012 it has temporarily blocked the extension of the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement. However, the attention on this conflict has been rather sporadic and linked to phases of renewed visibility for the issue such as with the 2005 so-called “Independence Intifada”, the regular resurgence of violence around the camps, or the periodic adoption of a fishery agreement. In addition, the Parliament has somehow imported the divisions within the member states on the conflict (including domestic divisions among political parties, as in the case of Spain).

4.2.2 Assessing the hypotheses: dissimulating and empowering

In this difficult context, EU cooperation with the UN, both as a political framework and as an operational actor has been quite substantial. The core argument of hypothesis 2 is that the lack of EU unity and internal fragmentation are themselves important factors behind the EU alignment with and within the UN. Following the analysis that I have done so far, I can fill in a table of values for each variable ‘unity’ and ‘integration’ as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positional</td>
<td>Decision Making Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 (Low)</td>
<td>1 (Low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next sections will focus on this aspect more in detail looking at the examples of political mediation and peacekeeping, and at humanitarian aid.

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The UN and political mediation - the illusion of coherence

Although Europe would have the leverage necessary to play a direct role in conflict resolution it has renounced to do so, due to its differences. Instead, the EU strongly supports the UN mediation effort led by the UN Personal Envoy and the UN/DPA staff. Notwithstanding the differences that I have underlined, EU coherence within the fourth committee of the UNGA has been solid and in the plenary as well, at least since the UN took full charge of the situation in 1991. The EU presidency has increasingly been tasked with voicing the precooked position of the EU at the UN, as well as in negotiations with Morocco. For years now this common position has been to “support efforts to find a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will allow for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, as envisaged by the Security Council” (British EU Presidency 2005).

France favours the constant referral of this issue to the UNSC, which reinforces its status as a permanent member. Its recognized role as a privileged interlocutor of Morocco and as an influential player within the conflict increases its legitimacy within the international system, as well as within the EU. Although it is not a UNSC permanent member, Spain has a similar view and has used the United Nations to assert its status as an independent and influential player in the Maghreb. It has, for instance, insisted on its inclusion in the “Friends of Western Sahara” contact group, meeting regularly in the margins of the negotiations by the parties under the auspices of the UNSG Personal Envoy. Other member states, less implicated are all happy to use the UN channel to maintain a degree of activeness and information and “reinforce multilateralism”, while reducing to the bone their involvement in this thorny issues. This picture is consistent with the analytical framework of this thesis that has described the UN as a vehicle for inter-relational and identity objectives for the EU member states.

116 All main UN documents, including reports, resolutions and main position papers are available in the webpage dedicated to the conflict: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.giKWLeMTIsG/b.2400739/k.5A47/Publications_on_Western_Sahara.htm (accessed on 3/9/2011). See also elaboration on UNGA votes by (Rasch 2008).
Table 16. Configuration of variables (cohesion) for unit of analysis “support to political mediation”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support to Political Mediation on Western Sahara</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The more fragmented is the EU foreign policy system, the more each player seems to have a interest in working together within the UN. A similar mechanisms works also at the operational level.

**The UN as a military actor - the choice of weakness**

At the operational level, the EU is also obviously hampered by its division. As a consequence, the EU regularly encourages “the parties to work towards (…) a solution, within the framework of the United Nations” and to work with the UNSG Personal Envoy to the conflict and of the Special Representative to MINURSO (British EU Presidency 2005). In the security field, therefore, the EU’s support for the UN has materialised in the contributions to the MINURSO operation itself, which have been constant over the years, even if this has become itself an element of inertia. Taking 2010 as an example, seven EU member states were participating to the mission with 32 military observers out of a total of 233 uniformed personnel.

Obviously, participation on the part of Europeans serves also the purpose of reinforcing the control on the mission, which immediately from its deployment became entangled in the issue of voter identification and registration and had to be prolonged annually now for twenty years, notwithstanding its initial limited mandate.

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117 Reflecting for instance, the key 2005 UNSC resolution S/RES/1598.
France carefully prevents any modification or expansion of the mandate. In 2010-2011, for instance, the UNSC discussed the possibility of including human rights violations monitoring in the mandate of MINURSO. This followed complains from pro-Saharawi activists and Polisario that this is the only UN peacekeeping operation not to have any human rights competence (principally because it was not initially designed to be a peacekeeping operation). UNSC resolution 1979 of 27 April 2011 mentioned the importance of human rights and welcomed some steps taken by Morocco to reassure about its commitment to protect human rights, but did not give any new mandate to MINURSO due to France opposition.119

Table 17. Configuration of variables (cohesion) for unit of analysis “Support to Minurso”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support to MINURSO Peacekeeping</th>
<th>Unity</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positional</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Decision Making Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 (Low)</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The humanitarian angle - the will of power*

What about other actors within the EU foreign policy system? We have already mentioned the role of the European Parliament as a human rights watchdog. The High Representative, the EEAS and the Commission instead have been prevented from intervening directly by the division among member states. But while this was acceptable for the High Representative, which had an otherwise marginal role in the Maghreb, it has been frustrating for the Commission, which as an established presence in this region. As a consequence, through cooperation with the UN, the Commission carved a role for itself on the margins of conflict management, in the

humanitarian support of the Saharawi refugee camps in South-western Algeria.\textsuperscript{120} As explained in Chapter 2, if the EU member states are not capable of reaching a substantive agreement on an issue, EU institutions are often required to cooperate with the UN on accessory foreign policy domains.

Indeed, since 1993, through its office for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHO) the Commission has provided an average of €10 million per year to support the humanitarian needs of the population in the camps for a total of over 150 million euro effectively becoming the largest donor to the population in the refugee camps (DARA 2009). Since 2005, Spain has also stepped up its cooperation to 20 million a year, but the Commission has maintained a steady flow of aid and a very visible role in the camps.\textsuperscript{121}

To access, the remote territory and deal with the Sahrawi authorities, which are thirsty for recognition, the Commission channels an important part of its funds through the UN agencies on the ground, mainly UNHCR and WFP. This cooperation with the UN has actually increased since 2003, reaching more than 50% of the total EU commitments to this area, mainly at the expenses of international NGOs also active in Tindouf (European Commission evaluation 2010). UNHCR is now also granted a general coordination role on aid to the camps and relations with the authorities.

The reason for this shift away from NGOs is linked to transparency and operational problems, but is also largely motivated by the interest for the Commission to maintain this operation absolutely neutral, apolitical.\textsuperscript{122} The Office of ECHO in Algeria for

\textsuperscript{120}Olli Rehn, Acting Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian aid said in 2009 on committing a further 5.5 million euro to the crisis: "These refugees are trapped in one of the world's oldest "frozen" and forgotten conflicts. As long as this conflict remains in a political and diplomatic deadlock, the refugees remain almost totally dependent on international aid for their survival. The Commission is committed to assisting these vulnerable people until a political solution can be found for their plight." European Commission, Press release, IP/09/871, 4/6/2009.

\textsuperscript{121}Interview n°16 (European Commission official, DG ECHO), 22 September 2011. See also DG ECHO website on Western Sahara \url{http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/north_africa_mid_east/algeria_en.htm} (23/4/2012).

\textsuperscript{122}Interview n°16 (European Commission official, DG ECHO), 22 September 2011.
instance is kept separated from the Delegation that manages development operation (the European Commission cannot fund the camps with bilateral development aid, as this would be interpreted as a formal recognition), and has regular coordination meetings with UN agencies in Algiers and in the field. Coordination, coherence and visibility problems with the UN are recurrent, but overall the relationship is satisfactory for the Commission. And while it is certainly true, as noted by Gillespie that the humanitarian operations are a sort of “guilty acknowledgement” from member states on their inability to settle the conflict (Gillespie 2009, 92), they also offer a way for the European Commission to play a role on this problem from which it would be otherwise excluded.

To play this role, the Commission needs the United Nations, which over the years has offered the mandate (ideational resources) and the access (material resources). The table below shows the values for the European Commission on the ‘Resources’ variable under Hypothesis 1.

Table 18. Configuration on variables (resources) for unit of analysis “humanitarian support to Saharawi refugees”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Humanitarian aid to the Saharawi refugees (Commission)</th>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 (Low)</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the situation is very difficult on the ground, through the UN, the European Commission is able to have access to this problem and is, therefore, regularly consulted by the member states on the situation. Similarly, the European Parliament

regularly poses questions on the operations, thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the Commission in the EU foreign policy system.

4.2.3 Explaining

When looking at the EU’s role in the Western Sahara, one needs to explain why Europe channels so much of its policy through the United Nations, both as a political framework, in New York and in the negotiations amongst the parties, and as an operational actor in peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs. The previous sections suggest an explanation, which stems mainly from our second hypothesis on lack of internal cohesion. The United Nations is used to dissimulate the incapacity of the EU to act as a whole, due to division among key member states. The EU has chosen to be powerless on Western Sahara, and is therefore highly dependent on the multilateral system to dilute its divisions, while at the same time, maintaining a role (particularly for individual member states).

Figure 7. Illustration of configuration for variables (cohesion) in Case Study 2

On the other hand, the first hypothesis on ‘Resources’ is also useful in explaining the situation. Having estimated the value of the variables for each of the examples/units of analysis that I have analysed we can obtain an interesting picture of the situation. The EU would be ‘ceremonial’ on Political Mediation, where its reliance on the UN is relatively formalistic. On the other hand, it would be dependent in the military domain
in its support to MINURSO, where both ideational and material resources are relatively low. Finally, the impact of the lack of ideational and material resources on cooperation with the UN, offers a rational explanation of the specific Commission’s approach to this issue. Given that the Commission has a relatively high level of legitimacy in humanitarian affairs, but is missing specific material resources, its approach to cooperation with the UN could be defined as ‘Predatory’. As in the refugee camps the Commission has limited access, relying on the UN brings in not only ideational resources, but also material resources in terms logistical support (access and capability). It thus provides a link to a solid structure and a long-term approach, which the Commission cannot display on this issue without running the risk of giving recognition to the SADR and upsetting the member states.

**Figure 8. Illustration of configuration of variables (resources) in Case study 2**

![Diagram showing the configuration of variables (resources) in Case study 2](image)

### 4.3 Summing up

The objective of this chapter was to explore the cooperation of the EU with the UN in the Maghreb region, looking at both the development and security field. I have first presented briefly the context of the region. This is characterized by proximity to the EU, which is here capable of exerting a considerable leverage through a variety of tools both at the bilateral and union level. Relations with the Maghreb countries are
structured within a rather institutionalized framework, in particular the Barcelona Process since 1995 and the European Neighbourhood Policy since 2003. For all these reasons, it could be expected that in this region, the “sphere of influence” approach in terms of policies, particularly amongst the leading member states, would predominate over the objective to strengthen effective multilateralism.

In effect, in the period between 1991 and 2010 the EU member states closer to this region have substantially Europeanised and institutionalized their policy towards the Maghreb while maintaining also their independent bilateral ties (Fernández and Youngs 2005; Morisse-Schilbach 1999). In this context the EU has been the preferred channel for foreign policy (beyond bilateralism) and the United Nations has not been particularly called for. Among other things this is proven by the meagre amount of aid channelled through the United Nations, which has remained generally low, even in areas where the United Nations has presence and expertise, as on governance and post crisis rehabilitation in Algeria. Yet, the first case study also shows how the multilateral rubber stamp is looked for on policies were EU institutions face some degree of opposition, or reluctance from member states. The European Commission carefully refers to its consultations with IFIs to justify its decision to use the budget support approach.

The second case study, on the conflict of Western Sahara allowed us to test, in particular, the second hypothesis namely on the impact of integration and institutional coherence on the EU’s tendency to work with the United Nations. The second case also casts light on an area, the security sector, where the member states have been very reluctant to transfer competences to supranational institutions and the EU as a whole is short on resources. The EU has been always divided on the issue of Western Sahara and unwilling to find a consensus. As a consequence it has reverted to the United Nations as a framework for its policy and has consistently supported the mediation efforts by the UN envoy and MINURSO.

In this context, a relatively weak European Commission, deprived of a clear mandate to work on this conflict, was able to assume a role by funding with humanitarian assistance the refugee camps in Algeria. To do this the Commission has used the UN structures such as UNHCR to provide expertise and legitimize its action. Once again, this seems to confirm our hypotheses that the Commission cooperates substantially
the United Nations for opportunistic reasons. It does it to gain legitimacy internally within the EU and reinforce its position within the European Foreign policy system or on specific issues at the cross roads between development and security.
Chapter 5. The Levant - West Bank and Gaza, and the Middle East Peace Process

This chapter will analyse EU-UN cooperation in the Levant region, looking in particular at the Palestinian territories and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). In the next sections I will focus first on development cooperation in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG),\textsuperscript{124} to then touch on the key instances of security cooperation. Of course, though, any distinction between these two policy fields in the Middle East is rather theoretical, as in practice the on-going Israeli-Arab conflict situation makes all actions strongly interrelated in a supposedly integrated approach to peace building.

5.1 Development assistance to the Palestinians (2000-2010)

Description and analysis of the EU’s role and action in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not lacking.\textsuperscript{125} Most authors acknowledge the activeness of the EU as a donor in the West Bank and Gaza over the years but question its impact in political terms. A common criticism is that the EU has overall supported the status quo, rather than contributing to a substantial solution (Le More 2005, 2008; Tocci 2005, 2009). In this view, by providing consistently high levels of funding to the Palestinians the EU has sought to gain access to a political negotiation that was led by the United States by virtue of its privileged relationship with Israel. However, so far it has not managed to use these assets strategically (including the strong trade and economic links with Israel) and to leverage them to promote a solution. On the contrary, it has partly relieved Israel from its responsibilities towards the Palestinian population and has

\textsuperscript{124} In the text I will use alternatively the expression West Bank and Gaza (which is typically used by international donors) and Palestinian territories.

\textsuperscript{125} The key sources for this chapter are the rich secondary literature on EU foreign policy in the Middle East, focusing on early days of European Political cooperation (Allen and Pijpers 1984) to the most recent developments (Asseburg 2009b; Bulut 2010; Dosenrode-Lynge 2002; Müller 2011; Musu 2010; Roberson 1998; Tocci 2005; Youngs 2006). I also use internal documents – which are all available upon request - and statistics as well as expert interviews, carried out between 2008 and 2012.
supported (at least until the early 2000s) an unaccountable and often corrupted Palestinian authority.

Here, I shall focus on the role of the United Nations in this situation, focussing on when and why does the EU work with the UN in delivering its assistance to the Palestinians. In this respect, Le More has used the effective expression that “the US decides, the EU pays and the UN feeds” (Le More 2008). At first sight, in fact, it is obvious that in supporting the Palestinian Authority (PA) the EU cooperates extensively with the UN and well above the regional and global averages. Looking at the European Commission, for example, 40% of assistance to the Palestinians, refugees or not, went through international organizations in 2010.126

5.1.1 EU players

In development cooperation, the Commission is a reference player. Its personnel make up the bulk of the technical cooperation office in East Jerusalem (since 2010 EU Representation) and there is also Commission’s project staff at the EU Delegation in Tel Aviv. Managing a programme averaging €500 million in new commitments a year in the period 2007-2010, the Commission is responsible for the biggest share of total EU assistance towards the Palestinian territories and has increasingly sought to coordinate the development efforts of the member states. The table below shows the European Commission assistance between 2000 and 2010.

126 EU Office in Jerusalem, External Assistance Management Report, Second Semester 2010, January 2011 – Internal Document – Available upon request. Funding through I.O.s was for around 280 million out of ongoing commitments for around 700 million euro.
Table 19. EU aid flows to the Palestinian People

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct and Indirect Financial Support</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>90.25</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>141.75</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>219.1</td>
<td>199.9</td>
<td>1,727.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Building</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>27.75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>133.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure Development</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>127.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Support to the Private Sector</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>83.76</td>
<td>90.07</td>
<td>71.43</td>
<td>91.85</td>
<td>103.27</td>
<td>97.26</td>
<td>111.81</td>
<td>100.55</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>171.59</td>
<td>108.4</td>
<td>1,150.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid, Food Aid (excluding UNRWA)</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td>52.81</td>
<td>34.94</td>
<td>36.98</td>
<td>36.78</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>59.21</td>
<td>43.76</td>
<td>57.15</td>
<td>45.51</td>
<td>450.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Jerusalem initiatives</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to civil society</td>
<td>28.07</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>16.36</td>
<td>15.78</td>
<td>16.28</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>130.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP, RRM, IFS (excluding UNRWA)</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>225.2</td>
<td>148.5</td>
<td>325.9</td>
<td>270.9</td>
<td>255.23</td>
<td>280.9</td>
<td>349.99</td>
<td>563.28</td>
<td>497.76</td>
<td>518.41</td>
<td>436.1</td>
<td>3,872.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet, as compared with the Maghreb, in the Near East the Commission is not alone. As can be seen from Table 20, member states have very solid cooperation programmes and the two CFSP missions and the EUSR are also active in development and capacity building.

Table 20. Financial commitments to Palestine by EU member states127

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

127 Table extrapolated from Muller: Müller 2011, p.87,107,127.
Donor coordination has improved quite importantly over the years, including at the global political level, as donor coordination has become more structured progressively since the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) was established to support the Oslo agenda. The EU Delegation has taken the lead role with member states, both at the Heads of Missions and Heads of Cooperation levels. In the absence of a Country Strategy Paper (CSP), the Delegation, with the Member States, has established a diagnosis of the situation and listed the EU focal sectors creating a non-biding reference framework where all member states and the European Commission have different responsibilities.

In addition to this, the European Parliament is also a vocal player. In particular, since a Country Strategy Paper and multiannual programme for the Palestinian Territories was never adopted due to the constant crisis, a large amount of funds is appropriated annually for emergency situations from the EU budget on top of what is planned in the Multiannual financial framework. In this process, the European parliament is a key ally for the European Commission on budget increases and has been particularly sensitive to the requests coming from UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East). There is therefore competition not only among member states, but also among EU institutions.

Within such a massive cooperation portfolio, the EU can count on important capabilities and a solid expertise. Yet the situation is more complex as compared with the Maghreb with more difficulties in terms of access and a weaker general legitimacy. The table below provides the general picture of the variables under the first hypothesis.

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128 At local level, coordination mechanisms are quite complex but the EU plays a central role. Four Strategy Groups have been established under the umbrella of the Local Development Forum, which meets regularly under joint chair of Norway, the World Bank (WB), UNESCO and the Palestinian Authority, and where all donors are present. The four Strategy Groups (SG) are: 1. The Governance SG co-chaired by the Ministry of Planning and the Commission (the Head of Delegation); 2. The Economy SG (co-chairs: Ministry of Finance and WB); 3. The Infrastructure SG (co-chairs: Ministry of Public Works and USAID); and 4. The Social Development SG (co-chairs: MoSA and UNESCO). Under each of the four Strategy Groups, several sector working groups have been created. The EU Delegation chairs or is active in most of these groups.

129 Interview n°17 (EC Official, MENA coordination unit, DG Europeaid), 15 May 2011
Table 21. Configuration of variables (resources) for Case Study 3 – Development Cooperation in the Levant/Near East -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 (Medium)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 (High)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.2 Assessing the hypotheses

I will focus here on three key areas of work, which are emblematic of the work of the EU towards the West Bank and Gaza (WBG). Support to UNRWA, direct financial support to the Palestinian authority and capacity building through technical assistance.

**UNRWA - the trusted partner and the access door**

The Commission cooperates very closely with the UN when it lacks access or expertise in a particular area or issue. This is the case with Palestinian refugees who are under the mandate of UNRWA. This Commission has a longstanding relationship with this agency, since the 1971. This is the only UN body, which the Commission is funding substantially in its core budget (27% of the total operating budget in 2008), with an important and steady contribution of more than €100 million per year in average over the 2000-2010 period, accounting for slightly more than 28% of total Commission spending in the occupied Palestinian Territories (UNRWA 2009, 7).

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Table 22. European Commission support to UNRWA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to the general fund</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Response</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad Hoc Support Projects</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Annual</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>1150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This cooperation is justified principally by the unique mandate that UNRWA has to work with Palestinian refugees in the all region, its experience and competence. The Commission of course depends on UNRWA for its specific mandate on working with the refugees. UNRWA provides an unmatched access to the Palestinian refugees, particularly in Gaza, where since 2006 the EU does not have official contacts with the Hamas authorities.

Table 23. Configuration of variables (resources) for unit of analysis “Support to Palestinian Refugees”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support to Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)</th>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 (Low)</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{131}\) Figures elaborated from internal Commission information system (CRIS).
Yet, to avoid losing too much control on implementation, the EU has built a close relationship with UNRWA, where it plays a leading role in management and structural reform. The Commission has progressively increased its role in the Advisory Committee of UNRWA, where it is observer and especially in the Subcommittee for programming, which it has chaired for three years in 2007-2010. Similarly, visibility has been put on the EC-UNRWA partnership itself, rather than on individual projects.\(^{132}\)

UNRWA has also an important information gathering function on the ground, feeling the temperature among the Palestinian public opinion.\(^{133}\) For instance, UNRWA played a particularly important role following the “Cast Lead” intervention by Israel in Gaza (in winter 2008), as the international community had important problems in accessing the area, even for humanitarian assistance. At that time, the Commission’s strong relationships with UNRWA allowed it to have a facilitated access, information and understanding of the situation on the ground. This was followed by an unprecedented increase in the funding by the EU for the years 2007 and 2008. Indeed, in Humanitarian affairs cooperation with the UN is very pronounced. The EU and the UN used extensively the “Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning” which had been signed on 25 September 2008, just before the Gaza crisis. (EC, UNDG, WB 2008). Joint missions were rapidly dispatched for damage assessment and the Commission\(^{134}\) used the UN (OCHA) Flash Appeal to plan and deliver its immediate response. UNRWA and other organizations (including UNDP and OCHA) channelled most of the EU recovery and food security effort.\(^{135}\) On longer-term reconstruction needs, where political sensitivities are higher, the situation was slightly different. After the Gaza crisis the Commission insisted in having its own


\(^{133}\) Interview n°18 (EEAS Official) 4 February 2011

\(^{134}\) DG ECHO, in particular, has developed strong relationships both with UNRWA and with OCHA and regularly co-chairs the donors coordination group, but also the FAO and the WFP.

\(^{135}\) See spike of humanitarian assistance in 2008 and 2009 in Table 22, above.
separate damage assessment report, although this was done in close cooperation with the UN, which admittedly has much more experience and capacities in this field.  

Direct budgetary support and the WB - from mentor to competitor  

While cooperation with UNRWA is somewhat inevitable for the European Union and testifies more to the EU’s commitment to Palestinian refugees than to the UN itself, cooperation with the World Bank on Palestinian affairs is more illustrative of the dynamics that underlie the EU’s approach to cooperation with international organizations. While throughout the 1970s and 1980s aid to the Palestinian people was channelled mainly through UNRWA and NGOs, following the Oslo accords, the European Union has delivered an important part of its assistance as ‘direct budgetary support’ to the constituting Palestinian authority. This increased particularly since 1997 as a result of the decision of Israel to freeze the monthly transfers of tax revenues to the Palestinian authorities). What was initially just a ‘Special Cash Facility’ (to bridge the financing gap of the PA) became non-reimbursable direct budgetary assistance with the second intifada.  

As pointed out by Le More this was a way for the EU to show its commitment to state building but also to respond concretely to what was termed the “Aid for peace” agenda. In the 1990s Europe, being excluded from the forefront of the political negotiations, effectively took up the role of “payer”, particularly in terms of humanitarian support (Le More 2008). With the second intifada, and the Camp David agreements, the international approach changed and more focus was put on state building and on consolidating the finances of the Palestinian authority. The World

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137 This instrument is completely different from budget support as analysed for the Maghreb. Here are not done against the achievement of agreed reform results but to meet specific needs such as the payment of pensions, fuel or social allowances.  

138 The Second ‘Al Aqsa’ Intifada started in September 2000, leading to a recrudescence of violence, which further complicated the work of donors on the ground and particularly the delivery of ‘project’ technical assistance.
Bank spearheaded this approach. For the European Union, which lacked expertise in this instrument, direct financial support allowed not only to reinforce the structure of the nascent authorities but also to disburse increasing amounts of moneys as compared with project support.

So, to do this, the European Commission aligned with the strategy of the World Bank and in the years between 2000 and 2005 channel an important part of its aid towards the World Bank\textsuperscript{139}. My archive research showed that this was motivated by a need to coordinate better the aid with other key donors. The World Bank, in particular had strong advantages, having been requested by the Palestinian authority to coordinate state building funding and having also an important backing from the United States. As a world body, the Bank could also attract assistance from non-EU donors. In addition to this, by channelling through the WB, the EU responded to calls from both the European Parliament and its anti-fraud office OLAF to seek more coordination with other donors and partners in its activities in the Palestinian territories\textsuperscript{140}.

The World Bank served well this purpose and the European Commission and member states worked extensively through the so called ‘PFRP-Trust Fund’ which focussed specifically on the public finance management reform in the run up to the Palestinian elections of 2005, contributing 65 million euro in 2004 and 70 million euro in 2005. This was considered efficient, notwithstanding the loss in visibility and also allowed the EU to increase its understanding of the finances of the Palestinian Authorities and its expertise of direct financing\textsuperscript{141}. In turn, it paved the way for the EU taking a

\textsuperscript{139} The last such commitment to the WB Trust Fund (TF) was done in 2005 for 70 million euro. As argued by Le More 2008, since 2005 with the refurbishment of the donor coordination mechanism and the establishment of the AHLC, the EU and the EC where given a much greater role in coordination, in recognition of their funding (Le More 2008, 92–95). This might suggest that the pressure for the EU to use the WB to channel its funding has decreased since.

\textsuperscript{140} EC Internal briefing on WB Trust funds in Iraq and Palestine: available upon request. See Parliament Hearing by Benita Ferrero-Waldner.

\textsuperscript{141} The European Commission continued to channel aid also independently, particularly in the utilities (e.g. fuel).
stronger role in 2006, when the victory of Hamas in the elections led to the decision by the Quartet to channel funds through the Palestinian authority President’s office.

The Commission, then, took the lead in setting up the TIM, which built up on pre-existing mechanisms of the European Commission and of the World Bank. The instrument was launched and managed by the Commission in cooperation with the World Bank that was responsible directly for one of the three financial windows. The operation could obviously count on the support of the UN within the Quartet (see next section). On the other hand, convincing the US took more time and the involvement - quite reluctant initially - of the World Bank, which was then led by Paul Wolfowitz (close to US President George W. Bush), was instrumental to getting the green light.\(^{142}\) The European Commission considers the operation, which was set up relatively quickly, a success. Initially designed for three months it was prolonged and lasted 21 months disbursing a total of 650 million euros, of which 188 million came from EU member states.

Following this successful experience the European Commission gained even more confidence and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner took up to propose another instrument, aligned to the Palestinian authority’s 2008-2010 reform programme in the follow up to the Annapolis summit. The Commission services then proposed a second instrument, which was called PEGASE (Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d'Aide Socio-Economique) and was launched at the Paris Donor Conference in December 2007 where the EU as a whole pledged more than 3.6 billion to the PA over three years. From 2008 to 2010 almost one billion euro were channelled through PEGASE and the mechanism is well placed to continue working in over the next period, as the Palestinian authority approved the 2011-2013 reform plan.

\(^{142}\) Interview n°19 (European Commission official), 10 September 2011. The TIM was a mechanism that had to be endorsed by the Quartet and therefore by definition by the United Nations and the wider international community. Yet the World Bank was rather reluctant to support it, notwithstanding the fact that the European Commission has called strongly for its participation and its cooperation. Actually the initial concept paper was drafted with the help of the WB which then, however started taking time (perhaps due to higher-level doubts from WB President Paul Wolfowitz, who was close to US President G.W.Bush). Finally an
Although the Commission is very clear in saying that the PEGASE mechanism is not competing with the World Bank, which is actually involved in supporting the reform process of the PA together with the IMF, there are some key elements that show how the Commission has sought to emancipate itself completely from Bank mentoring. Firstly, a key condition for Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s team was that the mechanism had a strong European identity. The name and the brand indeed, both made clear that Europe, the EU and the Commission were in charge. The managing mechanism is fully Commission based (since 2008 managed within the EU Representation in East Jerusalem), with the Netherlands supporting the management of funds coming from member states. Importantly, the mechanism had to be open to all donors and in fact, non-EU donors were targeted for funding (Switzerland used the mechanism and from 2011 also from Japan). Finally, the WB also launched in 2008 its own trust fund to support the Palestinian Reform Plan (PRDP), but this suffered from undercommitments, particularly in 2009, although non-EU donors still prefer this mechanism for their contribution.

So, going back to our argument, we could say that, having gradually increased its reputation and experience, the EU approach has moved from being predatory (initial lack of expertise and access, but strong political support on the need for action), to being dismissive versus the WB by 2008. (See table below).

Table 24. Configuration of variables (resources) for unit of analysis “Direct Budgetary Assistance to the Palestinian Authority”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.5 (High)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
<th><strong>Total</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Support</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 (High)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

agreement was struck by which the WB would be managing one of the three windows contained in the programme.
The Commission, with a strong mandate from the member states and, very importantly on Palestine, from the European Parliament, has increasingly sought to have a coordinating role for member states’ assistance programmes and a presence in the political process, including via the Quartet. To do this, the Commission has then first built up a strong relationship with the World Bank and reinforced its capacities to increase its credibility and be able to act independently. The opportunity came in 2006 when the Quartet was seeking for a new financing option to keep the Palestinian territories afloat while bypassing Hamas. Through these instruments the Commission has gradually strengthened its direct access to the PA, avoiding the mediation of international organizations and also achieving important savings in terms of administration costs.

*Technical assistance in the security and justice sectors - the UN as a bridge*

A third important aid delivery method is technical assistance. Since Oslo one of the key objectives of the EU was to strengthen institutional capacities of the Palestinian National Authority to allow for a negotiated and sustainable two-state solution of the conflict as spelled out since the Berlin European Council of 1999. This area of cooperation is small in relative terms, within the financial portfolio since technical assistance does not necessarily require important funds, but is demanding in terms of time and human resources. The fact that it was not possible for the EU nor the Commission to adopt a country strategy paper for Palestine, considering the continuous state of crisis, led to a rather disorganized approach towards sector support with technical assistance, with ad-hoc projects funded in many sectors and several overlaps among donors. Also from the beneficiary side, the Palestinian Authority being constantly absorbed by emergency and struggling financially and economically by the occupation, usually favoured direct budgetary support.143

This being said, following the launch of the Road Map and the revamping of donor coordination in 2005, working on capacity building in a variety of sector became more feasible. Most EU projects are managed through European consultants, as

143 Interview n°19 (European Commission official), 10 September 2011
happens in the Maghreb, but some operations are contracted with the United Nations, including the WHO (mental health and psychosocial services), UNESCO (Nablus), UNCTAD (Customs) and UNDP (Governance), which is recognized for its specific expertise in areas of fragility. As in the case of Maghreb, governance is a sector that is particularly interesting for EU-UN cooperation because it is an area where various EU institutions can engage. In the justice sector, for example, Member states and the European Commission have worked quite extensively, through technical assistance and equipment. This has been done mostly independently but cooperation with the United Nations (and particularly UNDP) has somewhat increased since the EU has deployed the CSDP mission EUPOL COPPS in January 2006 and its mandate was latter extended to the justice sector in 2008 (Asseburg 2009a, 92). The Commission has reinforced its cooperation with the UN at the margins of the operation also to ensure that it was not left out from this important sector. I will focus on these issues particularly in the specific section on CSDP instruments.

As discussed in Chapter 3, following the new guidelines of the European Commission, the decisions on joint operations have to be justified in terms of their added value. In general, the more the operations can link up to broader EU approaches with the European Neighbourhood Policy and the MEDA, the more the Commission tends to work independently and dismiss cooperation with the UN as costly and not fully satisfactory in terms of visibility and reporting. Interview and reports show that much depends on the local capacity of the specific organization, as this can vary very much within the UN System.


145 The UN itself has sometimes expressed some frustration about this ‘selective’ approach of the EU, and has recently opened its own UNDG trust fund for supporting the Palestinian reform plan. Interviews n°9,10,11 (UN officials working on the MENA region), 7 March 2011.
5.1.3 Explaining

In the development field the EU is one of the key players in the West Bank and Gaza. It certainly is the first donor. It has been criticized vehemently for not being able to translate this asset into actual influence on the settling of the conflict (Asseburg 2009a, 75), playing a subordinate role to the United States. Yet, in the years it has increased its activity also in areas that are sensitive such as the justice and civil security sectors and it has shown leadership in designing and devising instruments that could respond to the emergency needs of the Palestinian people.

Throughout the analysis above I have identified a series of key factors that have conditioned the assistance towards the Palestinian people and cooperation with the United Nations. Firstly, in the Palestinian territories there is a strong mandate and presence of the United Nations. While some institutions such as the UN Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East (UNSCO), struggle to coordinate the array of agencies and programmes that have very different capacities, other organizations, such as UNRWA, have an absolutely irreplaceable role in the territories and a capital of experience and presence which makes them essential. In addition to this the weak institutional capacities or various boycotts of the Palestinian authority have reinforced the need to work through different implementation partners that could claim sufficient neutrality and impartiality.

Secondly, the development field in the Levant is very complex and congested. Aid per capita in the Palestinian territories has consistently been among the highest in the world and a large amount of donors (not only European), international organizations and NGOs are active in the field. This increases the need for coordination and division of labour and the UN’s status as a universal organization makes it a safe haven for all. However, complexity also means that there is a lot of competition for influence and visibility and a constant need for improvement, efficiency and innovative solution. In such a competitive environment, cooperation with the United Nations, when it is not obligatory, must be justified by added value on a case-by-case basis.

Thirdly, there is a constant meddling of security concerns in a fragile and conflict prone environment. On the one hand, the crisis situation has has prevented the EU and the Commission from adopting a long-term strategy and programme and making full use of the MEDA and ENP methodologies. On the other hand, this has increased the
inter-institutional strife within the EU over competencies, mandates and leadership, among member states but also between the Commission and Council structures (the Parliament has also been a quite vocal actor). In this context, according to our argument, cooperation with the United Nations is used as a lever to gain more credibility, access and influence. Counting on strong operational relations with respected organizations such as UNRWA and the WB, the Commission was able to maintain a leading role in the field.

Fourthly, in supporting the Government of Israel, the US has maintained a suspicious approach towards multilateral organizations and the UN in particular. As a consequence the EU as a whole has tended to differentiate itself by favouring multilateral solutions and has been relatively open to cooperation with the United Nations.

This backdrop largely explains the fact that the EU (and the European Commission as the lead donor) has used the UN structures extensively in the West Bank and Gaza. As mentioned, assistance channelled through the UN accounted for 40% of total but goes up to more than 80% of what is not channelled directly to the government system as direct budgetary support.

However, over the years, European ideational and material resources in the Palestinian territories increased. The EU established a key presence in the Donor coordination mechanisms from which it had been initially marginalized in the Oslo process. It increased its direct access and leverage with the Palestinian authorities, particularly with Prime Minister Fayyad. It improved its experience and understanding of the budgetary and economic dynamics in the Palestinian Authority. Its capabilities also increased both in terms of staffing and instruments used (including ESDP since 2005). All this, had an impact also on ideational resources, with legitimacy of the common EU institutions increasing gradually over independent member states approaches (Müller 2011). Albeit key member states kept on carrying out their independent political approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the leadership of the Commission in the development field, particularly over the 2006-2007 period was reinforced and became more recognized.

As a result, the EU has progressively sought to emancipate itself from the United Nations and other international organizations and has changed its approach to
cooperation. The dependency on the United Nations gradually transformed into a more confident ‘selective’ approach ranging from what we have described as predatory, to ceremonial or formalistic. This physiological tendency, was also reinforced by the broader realization by Headquarters, particularly in DG DEVCO, between 2007 and 2008, that the Commission was now channelling too much of its funds through the United Nations and was therefore losing out in visibility, accountability and leverage.

The EU has also become more demanding. In the case of UNRWA, where Europeans have no choice but to work with the UN (dependent), they have gradually sought to use their position as main donor to the general budget to influence the running of the organization. The Commission has enhanced its participation in the advisory committee while remaining an observer to the board, and has become the chair to the subcommittee on programming, which has spearheaded the organization’s internal reform programme. The whole EU is on the driving seat of the organization functioning by virtue of its role as lead donor. As for direct financial support to the Palestinian authorities, the EU has built up its own visibility gradually and shrewdly, from a situation in which the main players were clearly the World Bank and the IMF. After some years of learning, it has led the effort to design new instruments such as the TIM and PEGASE in particular with the latter it actually started competing with the WB and the UNDP trust fund in channelling aid from EU and non-EU donors. The WB and IMF continue to supervise the results of the reform and state building effort of the Palestinian authority, but have progressively lost some of their operational capacities in terms of actual funding.

Finally, on technical assistance, the EU has used its own instruments and expertise coming from the ENP and MEDA process. In this area cooperation with the United Nations is decided on a case-by-case basis depending on actual convenience and added value. Not surprisingly, cooperation concentrates in the governance, police and justice sectors, where the UN is stronger, but also where there is more competition from CSDP mechanisms and member states structures and projects.
In the following pages I will focus specifically on the politico-military component of the EU’s activity in Middle East and CSDP instruments, to show what are the main characteristic of EU-UN interaction in high politics matters.

**5.2 EU-UN security cooperation in the Levant**

The EU’s political and security engagement in the Levant is more articulated than in the Maghreb. All policies in the region are strongly affected by the Israeli-Arab conflict, which has been a strategic priority for the Europeans since the beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Allen and Pijpers 1984). The poor European reaction to the 1967 six days war and the following turmoil leading up to Yom Kippur 1973 and the Arab oil embargo were among the key factors behind the decision to experiment with political cooperation (Müller 2011, 29; Musu 2010, 40 and ff.). In time, the Europeans have built up a presence, somewhere at the crossroads between the launch of CFSP, the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Madrid and Oslo process. Some very comprehensive historical work has been carried out on the European
involvement in the Middle East crisis from a security point of view.\textsuperscript{146} This wealth of literature generally concords in pointing to a series of key milestones following the building up of EPC in the 1970s, and the role of France, the UK and Germany in brokering the consensus for a negotiated two-state solution, which was eventually accepted formally by all parties of the conflict (Müller 2011; Musu 2010). This European common Middle East policy has been complemented since 1995 by the long-term institutionalized frameworks of the EMP and ENP. In 2000, the EU also experimented with a Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region, which however has been left dormant.\textsuperscript{147} Other strategic papers have been advanced including an Action Strategy in 2008, aiming to support the Annapolis process.\textsuperscript{148}

However, below the declaratory surface of what seems a relatively coherent, comprehensive (and even progressive) policy, the EU member states are deeply divided over the fundamentals of the conflict, including the degree of support to Israeli policy versus Arab positions and the role of the United States.\textsuperscript{149} This division lingers throughout but emerges with particular pain in short-term crisis management, when member states have to adapt to new events and provide quick answers. Member states have sought to maintain a tight control on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and have delegated tasks not the Commission but to Council led institutions, including a EU special representative since 1996 and the High Representative for CFSP. In this sense, the institutional legacy of the EPC structure and methods has remained very strong in the Middle East.

\textsuperscript{146} This chapter is based mainly on the historical work of Allen & Pijpers 1984, Musu 2010, Bulut 2010, Asseburg 2009a, 2009b and Tocci 2011.

\textsuperscript{147} Common Strategy 2000/458/CFSP of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region. Musu attributes this to the collapse of the Camp David talks Musu 2010, p.65

\textsuperscript{148} All the main documents and positions of European foreign policy on the MEPP are available on the EEAS website: http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/eu-positions/eu_positions_en.htm (23/4/2012)

\textsuperscript{149} An important obstacle to a more proactive role of the EU has traditionally come from the United States, which has been very jealous of its leadership role as a mediator in the Israeli-Arab conflict.
In the United Nations, the EU member states have steadily increased their alignment on Middle East issues since the 1980s to reach averages of 95% voting coherence from 1994 on (Luif 2003; Rasch 2008). In this sense, the institutional developments from EPC to CFSP and CSDP have had limited impact, as the fundamental agreements on the key political positions were taken very early on. This was due to a structural alignment in policy preferences after the Cold War and to a call for a coherent voice coming from external actors, including the Palestinians.\footnote{Interview n°21 (Official of the EU Delegation in New York), March 2011, see also Birnberg 2009.}

With the launch of ESDP/CSDP, the EU has put two security operations on the ground in the region, both civilian in nature: EUBAM Rafah (2005), which was supposed to facilitate the Egypt-Gaza border crossing and EUPOL COPPS (2006), training Palestinian Authority’s police. In 2006, EU Member States have also accepted to deploy large amounts of troops within a UN peace operation in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in exchange for stronger control on the strategic management of the operation in New York and on the field. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this was a major return to UN peacekeeping following the negative experiences of the 1990s in the Balkans, where the EU has acted as a clearing-house to coordinate and catalyse EU commitments.

As for the United Nations, it has been one of the key actors in the conflict, since the first resolutions proposing a settlement plan and then establishing the state of Israel in 1949. During the Cold war, the UN peacekeeping concept developed mostly in the Middle East, with the first ever truce observation operation, UNTSO, in 1949 to the first peacekeeping operation with UNEF between Israel and Egypt in 1956.\footnote{For a good overview of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War see MacQueen 2011(MacQueen 2011).} The UN now constitutes a key framework for the negotiations but is also an important actor operationally, with a special coordinator under UN/DPA, UNSCO since 1994\footnote{See the website of UNSCO: \url{http://www.unsco.org/about.asp} . For an overview of the complex UN set up in the West Bank and Gaza see Le More 2008, p. 98 and ff.} and three peacekeeping mission in the region: UNTSO (1949), UNDOF in the Golan
Heights (1973) and UNIFIL (1978 and expanded in 2006) in Lebanon. Since 2002, the United Nations is also a member of the Quartet.

5.2.1 Assessing the hypotheses

The opportunity for interaction between the EU and the UN in this field is extensive. Using the existing literature, internal EU documents and my interviews in the region, I will now try to show what are the actual conditions that move the EU to cooperate in the security field with the United Nations in this difficult context. To do this I will work around some key examples of EU’s engagement since the establishment of CFSP in 1992: the establishment and running of the Quartet; the two CSDP missions established in 2005-2006 and the involvement in UNIFIL in 2006. The main driver for the EU to actually use UN structures in the security field is the need for ideational and material resources (hypothesis 1). However, in this case the lack of cohesiveness of its member states and structures also contributes to the explanation (hypothesis 2). As I have done in the previous pages, after each example I will provide a small table with the configuration of the key explanatory variables in that particular circumstance. The table below provide an estimate of the variables for the case study as a whole.

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Table 25. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for Case Study 4 – Security and the Middle East Peace Process -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Resources</td>
<td>Ideational Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Making Procedure</th>
<th>Positional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making Procedure</td>
<td>Positional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Quartet and international legitimacy

The Middle East Quartet (EU, US, Russia and the UN) is certainly an illustrious example of interaction and cooperation between the EU and the UN. In 2002, it was saluted as an experiment of multilateral diplomacy that could tame the unilateral approach of the United States to the broader Middle East, which was brewing under the neo-conservative administration of G.W. Bush and its “War on Terror” (Tocci 2011). It was established around the time when the EU was also working on the concept of “Effective multilateralism”, and can therefore be interpreted as an outcome of this approach, although it actually anticipated by several months the European Security Strategy (Tocci 2011, 3). According to Tocci it is a form of “Crystallized Multilateralism”, in the sense that it has remained flexible and informal even though its membership is fixed, meetings and outputs are regular and it was endorsed by the

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154 As noted by Musu the Quartet was established almost by accident in April 2002, when Secretary of State Colin Powell met in Madrid with HR Solana and the Spanish Foreign Minister and rotating president of the EU council Ana Palacio, the UN Secretary General Annan and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (Musu 2010, 64).
Yet, the European interest for the Quartet stems mainly from its lack of leverage on the MEPP and from the substantial policy disagreements between member states, which the Quartet partly dissimulates.

Thanks to the Quartet, the EU and the UN have increased their role (at least formally) in the politics of the MEPP, from which they have been excluded by the US and Israel (Le More 2008). Israel traditionally “abhors” multilateralism (Tocci 2011, 25) and the UN - where it is constantly isolated - and has been very suspicious of Europe’s alleged pendant for it.156 The period preceding the establishment of the Quartet was marked by various illustrations of this lack access to conflict resolution efforts. High Representative Solana and the Spanish Presidency were freshly coming from an unsuccessful mission to the Palestinian territories, where they had been prevented by Israel to meet with President Arafat in Ramallah (Musu 2010, 66): rather humiliating for the biggest donor to the Palestinian Authority. In addition, the UK and France were disagreeing on whether to continue following the US peace initiative. This awkward situation had shattered the ambition of the EU to put forward an autonomous mediation effort, in a phase of relative benign disengagement of the US. In this sense, in Europe the Quartet was interpreted as an instrument to tame the unilateralist “Axis of Evil” policy, which the US was developing 2002, or at least give this impression.

As a matter of fact, the most important attribute of the Quartet was that, thanks to the UN, it ‘looked multilateral’ (Tocci 2011, 24). The UN provided legitimacy particularly towards the Arab world, which had been excluded. It also provided fresh

155 UNSC resolution 1435, 14 September 2002. Some argued that the Quartet signalled the official ‘multilateralization’ of the conflict (Müller 2011, 53; Musu 2010, 70). The EU had lobbied for a long time for this approach, calling, for instance, for a comprehensive regional peace from all parties involved in the conflict as opposed to the bilateral/unilateral approach envisaged by Israel and the US, which had always prevailed in the past leading to separate peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan.

156 According to Ginsberg, one of the reasons for the Israeli insistence in 1991 that the EC be only an observer to the Madrid peace conference instead than a full party, was that in the past it had “insisted on the United Nations as the appropriate forum for negotiations towards a comprehensive peace settlement, knowing that this was totally unacceptable to Israel” (Ginsberg 2001, 107; Musu 2010, 49).
information from the Palestinian territories, through its presence on the ground.\textsuperscript{157} This became particularly important after the 2005 Palestinian elections, when both the US and the EU decided to boycott the Hamas government and soon lost all direct access to the Gaza strip. Europe’s presence was welcomed by the Palestinians and was eventually accepted by Israel, which felt reassured by the leading role of the US.\textsuperscript{158} And in fact, the leading role of the US and its unaltering support of the Israeli policy remained unchanged. This became clear since the endorsement of Israel’s unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip in 2004 in violation of the Road Map. Tellingly, the UN participation to the forum soon started to be criticized, including from the inside, as it rapidly appeared that the process was not very neutral.\textsuperscript{159}

Still, for the EU the Quartet marked a milestone in its involvement in the Middle East, giving it “an higher political relevance and resonance” (Musu 2010, 67). After its establishment, through a series of proposals from German FM Fischer and then the Danish EU Presidency, the EU was able to influence the final draft of the “Road Map for Peace” (initially outlined by US President George W. Bush). This was a period when the EU was otherwise strongly fractious over the need to intervene in Iraq so the Quartet also allowed diffusing tensions among member states.

Overall, though, Europe continued to play a subsidiary role in the MEPP, its comparative advantage remaining markedly linked to the financial support to the Palestinian Authorities. The Commission was given representation together with the High Representative and the Presidency, and left its mark by designing the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) and financing substantially the Office of the Quartet representative (through UNDP), when this was established in 2007.\textsuperscript{160} Obviously, this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157} Interview n°18 (EEAS official), 4 February 2011
\item \textsuperscript{158} Russia had a largely residual role at this stage following past sponsorship of the Madrid peace summit.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Interviews n°10,11 (UN officials working on the MENA region) 7 March 2011. See De Soto 2007 cited also in Tocci 2011, p.18.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Considering the complicated legal status of the office, the Commission had to channel the funding through UNDP, which itself offers staff and offices for the team of Mr Tony Blair,
\end{itemize}
lack of institutional coherence facilitated the usual turf wars and quarrels about competencies and protocol and visibility which were resolved partly only with the Lisbon Treaty, limiting representation to the HR/VP.

Table 26. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for the unit of analysis “Middle East Peace Process Quartet”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The EU and the MEPP Quartet</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material Resources</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideational Resources</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2.5 (Medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making Procedure</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>0 (Low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cooperation with the United Nations in CSDP operations

In its constant quest for “a seat at the table” the EU eventually was able also to put forward two CSDP missions. The opportunity came in the context of the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from Gaza announced by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in December 2003, which was packaged by the US and the EU as consistent with the Roadmap (Müller 2011, 55). This led to the brokering of an agreement on Movement and Access between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which also called for a “Third Party” to play a monitoring role. The EU offered to take up this role and with the previously “unthinkable” consent of Israel and the Americans deployed the EUBAM Rafah mission on the Border between Gaza and Egypt in November 2005 (Musu 2010, 74). The operation was relatively small but it was the first time that EU

the Quartet’s representative. Overall the EU has been funding more than 50% of the administrative costs for running the little team, in Palestine and London. (EC Internal Documents viewed by the author, Interview n°17 (EC official, DG Europeaid), 15 May 2011.)
military personnel were deployed in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{161} A few weeks later, in January 2006 a second ESDP mission was launched to assist the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme (PCPDP), again in support to the peace process and with the blessing of the Quartet (Asseburg 2009a; Bulut 2009; Müller 2011). EUPOL COPPS in particular, was set up in close cooperation with the United States, which focussed on the training of the National Security Forces and Presidential guard, while the EU took charge of training the general civilian security (Police and Justice).\textsuperscript{162} Muller argues that France, Germany and the UK saw at the time the opportunity for the EU to step forward and contribute visibly to security sector reform, just as the United States was distracted by the collapse of Iraq and by Afghanistan.

The membership of the Quartet was certainly not the only condition that allowed for this autonomous EU mission in West Bank and Gaza: by 2005 the EU could already count on some successful experiences with ESDP in the civilian field in Africa, the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. A civilian mission in the Justice sector had also been launched in Iraq (EUJUST LEX) in summer 2005.\textsuperscript{163} Although there were no major references to the UN in the mandates of the missions, on the ground, coordination and information sharing with the United Nations agencies, programmes and offices went relatively smoothly. On the other hand, as the EUPOL COPPS mission expanded its mandate to the justice sector in 2008, some problems of coordination emerged with UNDP for instance, as sector area is much more congested by donors (Bouris 2011)\textsuperscript{164}.

\textsuperscript{161} Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah). Note that a part from the Quartet, there is no reference to the UN in the joint action.

\textsuperscript{162} Interview n°18 (EEAS Official), 4 February 2011, and Bulut 2009


\textsuperscript{164} In fact, as in 2008 the Palestinian internal struggle stabilized around a division between the West Bank and Gaza, Europe followed the US in the “West Bank first” approach and reinforced its support to security sector reform. On 24 June 2008, Germany also organized an international conference specifically on civil security and the rule of law in Berlin, where further funds were raised and EUPOL COPPS was eventually strengthened (EC internal note to file, 2008, Available upon request) and its mandate expanded to the Justice sector.
Of course the victory by Hamas immediately complicated things and EUBAM RAFAH was substantially downgraded in capacities and became dormant when Israel decided to impose a blockade on Hamas. Similarly, EUPOL COPPPS could start real work only with the Transition government in mid 2007 and had to limit its operations to the West Bank (Asseburg 2009a).

Notwithstanding this, EUPOL COPPPS has been relatively functional. Of course, the presence of a CSDP civilian mission, managed by the Council secretariat structures, not to say the expansion of its tasks, immediately opened the issue of coordination with the ‘Community’ instruments, managed by the European Commission (Dijkstra 2009, 447). The Commission reinforced its programme in the Justice sector. In attempting to build bridges to the CSDP mission, the United Nations became again very useful for the European Commission. As it became clear that the Palestinian police was severely under resourced, together with other donors the Commission stepped forward to provide the equipment needed particularly through the Instrument for Stability. The implementing partner identified was UNOPS, which was already at the forefront of the PCPDP structure and has a solid track record for procurement, project management, infrastructure and training support. As a result the UN maintained and reinforced its role in the police reform programme and the Commission gained access and credibility in an area at the crossroads between development and security, where it does not have expertise of its own, but fears competition from other EU institutions.

165 See discussion on ‘Gray Areas’ in Chapter 3.
166 See contribution agreement Addendum n°3 to Contribution Agreement IFS-RRM/2008/160-898 (internal, available upon request). The Instrument for stability (IFS) uses the United Nations extensively as an implementing partner, having to deal mostly with crisis and emergency situation where Commission’s access is very limited (about 20% of all IFS funds are channelled through the UN system- but in Palestine the figure is much higher including projects with UNDP, with UNRWA and with UNMAS on demining following the Gaza ‘Cast Lead’ operation in 2008-2009)
167 similar collateral actions have been launched by the Commission around the EUBAM-RAFAH operation, both through the IFS and with AENEAS (dealing with migration and border management).
Table 27. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for the unit of analysis “CSDP operations in the Middle East”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSDP operations in the Middle East</th>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.5 (Low)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Unity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making Procedure</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>0 (Low)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNIFIL - peacekeeping through the United Nations

To complete this overview of the EU-UN security interaction in the Middle East, we have to briefly look at the on-going UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, which was reinforced in the summer 2006 following the Israeli campaign against Lebanon and the Hezbollah militias (Assenburg 2009a; Gross 2009; Makdisi et al. 2009; Mattelaer 2009; Müller 2011, 58–59).

The EU struggled to reach a consensus against the backdrop of the tenacious US defence of Israel and its insistence that a ceasefire should be called by the UN only after the Israeli operations were concluded and its security ensured. Given the US unmovable position even a cohesive front from Europe would have been useless and that offered the justification to EU member states to issue independent statements and positions on the crisis. This continued until the UNSC finally unanimously adopted Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006, 33 days after the beginning of the war (Müller 2011, 59).
Resolution 1701 called for the reinforcement of the UNIFIL mission,\(^{168}\) which had been present on the ground since 1978, and gave it a more robust mandate. This was not a multinational mission,\(^{169}\) nor a CSDP mission, but it became by all means a European-led UN operation (Makdisi et al. 2009). EU member states formed the core of the forces Italy, Spain and with initial reluctance France,\(^{170}\) offering the bulk of the troops and capacities both for the ground and maritime operation. This was the first time since the disappointments of Africa and the Balkans that such a substantial number of EU troops formed part of a UN operation. In 2009, a Euromesco report on UNIFIL noted that since 2006, 80% of all UN military personnel in the Middle East are from Europe (Makdisi et al. 2009, 11).

Before 2006, UNIFIL had been criticised extensively for not being effective and for perpetuating the situation on the ground without really doing much to solve it. UNIFIL had to focus on humanitarian work mostly and on observing the (numerous) violations of the ceasefire. In addition to this UN credibility was at an all time low in the region because of the incapacity to interrupt the hostilities (Makdisi et al. 2009, 1). Yet, with UNIFIL the EU took up the burden and the leadership of the operation and refurbished it substantially in an initiative that was broadly welcomed and considered as a major show of responsibility for the EU and of its renewed willingness to take on hard power (ibid, p.11). The UNSG, in particular, insisted on a contribution by Europeans and was famously invited to participate at the Extraordinary General Affairs and External Relations Council of 25 August 2006 when pledges were made. Commentators have generally recognized EU institutions, such as the PSC and the European Council played a central stage (Gross 2009, 165; Müller 2011, 59), although


\(^{169}\) For a famous precedent of peacekeeping efforts outside the UN in Lebanon see the multinational force (MNF) established in 1982 during the civil war with US, French, British and Italian troops.

\(^{170}\) EU members troops came from Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Ireland, Germany, Poland, adding up to more than 7600 troops or more than 50% of the overall UNIFIL troops (Mattelaer 2009, 12–13). See figures 3 and 4 on Peacekeeping contributions in Chapter 3.
special summits as well as the UNSC itself were also used extensively to showcase national positions and leadership (Gross 2009, 166).

The price of the EU’s commitment, though, was a substantial amendment of the military and oversight structure of the operation with the inclusion of a Special Military Cell in New York staffed with European senior military staff in parallel to the normal UN/DPKO structure (Mattelaer 2009, 11–12). As Gowan notes “European units wore blue helmets but circumvented cumbersome UN logistics and administration to get troops on the ground” (Gowan 2009b, 59). Germany also participated to the operation through the Maritime Task Force (MTF, a first for the United Nations), which further lowered the risk of direct confrontation with Israeli forces (Mattelaer 2009, 14).

This was not the first European contribution to security in Lebanon. European troops were already contributing with minor contingents to UNIFIL and France, Britain and Italy had famously contributed to the Multinational Force during the 1982 Israeli invasion. Yet, in this occasion Europeans accepted to put their troops under the UN flag. Using the United Nations was necessary do to the lack of both ideational and material resources by the EU at that stage. The UNIFIL mission, however unsuccessful, had a long experience of the terrain, while Europeans lacked credibility towards the Lebanese that partly blamed them for the delays in calling a ceasefire. The EU was also perceived as lacking sufficient impartiality in that context, namely by Syria and Hezbollah (Makdisi et al. 2009). As noted by Gross, the idea of deploying the troops under an ESDP label (as had already happened in the DRC) was briefly ventilated in the discussions but remained a “no go area” due to the complex military dimension, the size of the mission, the impervious regional context and the opposition of the UK (Gross 2009, 52).

Initially, even the more “robust” UN operation was not very well received by the some sectors of the Lebanese population and there were episodes of stone throwing

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171 Makdisi et Al also mention the idea of deploying through the “Battlegroup” concept, which was designed explicitly to support UN peacekeeping operations (Makdisi et al. 2009, 12)
and other forms of protest (including a terrorist attack on the Spanish contingent), until the second half of 2007 when the situation stabilized (Makdisi et al. 2009, 25). Lack of acceptance on the ground, therefore but also a weak legitimacy following the hesitations during the war. Of course the EU offered most of the capabilities, particularly through NATO countries and procedures (Mattelaer 2009, 15). However the UN provided a first bridge to the ground and the experience that was needed to be successful. The UN also ensured visibility for key EU members such as France, while Italy was going to enter the UNSC as a non-permanent member in January 2007 and the centre-left government was keen in displaying an even handed approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict (Menotti 2007).

Table 28. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for the unit of analysis “Lebanon crisis and peacekeeping”

| Crisis Management on the Lebanon Crisis and UNIFIL II |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Material Resources** | **Ideational Resources** |
| Experience | 0.5 | Legal Competences | 1 |
| Access | 0 | Political Support | 0 |
| Capabilities | 1 | Acceptance | 0 |
| Policy | 0 | Reputation | 0 |
| **Total** | 1.5 (Medium) | **Total** | 1 (Low) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Unity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making Procedure</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1 (Low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After a substantial paralysis during the war, all member states agreed that the EU should play an active role on the ceasefire and reconstruction, although there was considerable competition for leadership between France, Italy and Spain. The UN therefore provided the perfect venue to increase European presence in Middle East security, while maintaining impartiality and legitimacy. Needless to say, although CSDP tools were not deployed, broader EU tools were substantially activated from damage assessment and humanitarian aid and demining to the long term development
and reform support and support to Palestinian refugees via UNRWA in a similar pattern as in the West Bank and Gaza.\footnote{172}

\section*{5.2.2 Explaining}

The three examples that I have examined for this case study give a clear picture of the articulation and dynamics of EU-UN security cooperation in the Middle East. I have selected them because they provide a relatively comprehensive picture of the areas of cooperation in the field of security, ranging from the political framework, managed via the Quartet since 2002 to the civilian law enforcement operations via CSDP to full scale military peace-keeping on the Southern border of Lebanon.

We have hypothesized that EU’s weakness is the overarching determinant of the EU’s decision to rely on the United Nations for its foreign policy, in security as in development. More than an ideological or normative adherence to the concept of multilateralism, the tendency to the EU to cooperate quite assiduously with the United Nations in the Middle East can be understood in general as a rational calculation, based on its position of relative political, institutional and diplomatic weakness in this region. Indeed, the case of Palestine and the Middle East peace process is particularly compelling. In the security field the EU has been historically excluded from playing a leading role at least since the 1956 Suez war, which effectively put an end to the France and British security influence in most of the area where they used to exercise a UN mandate. Since then, Europe has been trying to regain access to this region, which is crucial to its security, but had to play a subsidiary role to the United States which guarded jealously its privileged role and its special relationship with Israel.

The UN on the other hand, had played an important role at the beginning of the conflict when it developed considerable experience in mediation, interposition and observation through pioneering peace operations. Yet, it also became increasingly subordinated to superpower interests in the period of the détente, when UNDOF, UNEF II and UNIFIL were launched as buffers between Israel and the Arabs

\footnote{172 For the key projects see the website of the EU delegation in Lebanon \url{http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/lebanon/projects/case_studies/index_en.htm}}
Then, when the détente finished from 1979, the leadership of the United States and Israel’s suspicion of its involvement in the peace process marginalized the UN from the political game (MacQueen 2011, 86–88). European member states, and particularly France, used both Europe (the European Community first and then the EU) as well as the UN, to regain clout within the region (Müller 2011). As a matter of fact, the EU tried to bring the MEPP back into the United Nations framework since its Venice declaration of 1980. Over the years, Europeans have continued to cherish their cooperation with the UN and within the UN. This partly explains the great attention that was put from the beginning of EPC in coordinating and aligning on Middle East issues in the UNGA (Luif 2003). When the opportunity for increasing its security role emerged from the Oslo process, and particularly after the failure of Camp David in 2000, at the end of the Clinton Administration, the EU used times and again the multilateral card. The Quartet was eventually the occasion to enter the peace mediation effort in a formal way, and the EU facilitated the inclusion of the United Nations in the team, to ensure international legitimacy, to counterbalance the US influence and to insure information from the ground. When the Quartet was established in 2002, the EU was coming from two years of divisions and disappointments over a possible ‘European initiative’ and the political forum gave the opportunity to regroup under the multilateral and UN flag. This was a time when the winds of war over Iraq and the impending European divisions over the US push towards an intervention for regime change were already looming. The role of the UN in the Quartet, though, has remained ceremonial in nature. It provided legitimacy to what continued to be US driven agenda (Tocci 2011), to which European resources were abundantly committed. Once it had gained that access and recognition, the EU started seeking more visibility and responsibility also independently from the UN. For example, the two ESDP operations EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM RAFAH were endorsed by the Quartet but independent from UN operations on the ground (TIM and PEGASE are similar examples on the development field). They were proudly identified as EU operations with EU capacities. Civilian capacity building operations though fall squarely into that cross pillar policy field where institutional competition is strong. Breaking up the EU
foreign policy system, the involvement of Council structures through CSDP pushed the European Commission to step up its operations in the area in the governance, police and justice sectors. In these areas, the Commission cooperates substantially with the UN, which provides it with useful expertise and access, as well as acceptance from the various parties and donors involved.

But the deployment of independent CSDP operations in the Middle East has remained confined to civilian peace building. After the Lebanon war in 2006 the EU decided to use the UN structures by beefing up with EU troops the existing UNIFIL operation. This decision can certainly not be attributed exclusively to the EU. It depended also on the specific will of the Lebanese government, which certainly has the experience of other types of international forces. Yet, although it wanted to play a role, the EU as such was clearly in deficit of legitimacy following the division and impotence demonstrated during the crisis and was anyway not confident about deploying a major military operation through its own CSDP structures in a volatile area such as Lebanon. It lacked both capacities and cohesion on this term. The UN was therefore the perfect solution at that time and place.

Figure 10. Illustration of configuration of variables (resources) in Case Study 4
5.3 Summing up

In this chapter I have focused on the Middle East region, and presented two separate cases of EU-UN cooperation in the development field and of EU-UN interaction in the security field. The Middle East is a sort of unreachable dream for Europe. It has constantly been a key priority and even a raison d’être for the common European foreign policy but Europeans have not managed so far to fully emancipate themselves from the role of sparring partners of the United States. So, while Europe is closely and directly affected by the politics of the Middle East, its leverage in the events of this region, and most importantly in brokering a peace settlement between Israel the Palestinians is very low. The first reason for this is certainly the deep-seated divisions among member states, as expected under Hypothesis 2. In this context, the EU has been broadly UN friendly. The UN itself has a very strong mandate in the region, and a lot of experience and capacities both in the development and security field.

Distinguishing between development and security in Palestine is partly fictional as these two issues are always linked in a territory that has been so continuously characterized by crisis, conflict and fragility. Also, as pointed out by many commentators (Bouris 2010; Le More 2005; Tocci 2009) in the Middle East development policy has been to a great extent the only policy of the EU, in absence of more influential role in the political process, and lack of progress in general. In general, though, all cases show that the EU’s approach to the UN can be explained with the evolution of its resources and influence in the region, as well as with its internal cohesiveness. Cohesiveness has been always particularly elusive for two reasons. The first reason is that each Member States has a different position on this issue. The second reason is that the Middle East has been characterized by a high degree of competition and numerous turf wars between intergovernamental and community based institutions. In line with our initial hypotheses, all this has eventually created incentives for cooperation with the UN.

In the development field, cooperation is intensive particularly over Palestinian refugees, where the UN has a unique mandate, through UNRWA. The EU has funded extensively this organization and has progressively increased its leverage over the management and reform of the organization itself. But the EU has also been at the forefront of direct funding to the Palestinian authority since Oslo. On this field it has
built on its legitimacy and strong political support at the domestic level, also confirmed by the European parliament to maintain an independent and autonomous role, putting forward innovative mechanisms with which it has competed with and predated the capacities of other donors and international organizations such as the World Bank. On the other hand, in the sensitive areas, across pillars, where Council structures where also increasingly active be it though the EUSR, the High Representative or the CSDP missions, the European Commission has in general maintained a strong cooperation with the United Nations. Of course, this depends also on the expertise of the UN in these areas. Working with it in these areas has been useful for the Commission notwithstanding the costs.

In the security field, the situation is similar but here the reliance on the United Nations is even stronger as the EU’s security role in the Middle East has generally been limited by the US and Israel. The EU is also more fractious and divided in the Middle East. In this difficult context, the UN has allowed the EU to differentiate itself from the US and provided it with a degree of international legitimacy and recognition. It has also been used, as is often the case, as a common denominator under which to dissimulate divisions and differences. Finally, it has helped some leading member states - and particularly France, given the UK’s stronger alignment with the US - to maintain a visible profile on this global problem. Once the Quartet forum was set up, the EU has been reassured by the presence of the United Nations within an American-led political framework but has sought, perhaps vainly, to build up its own security identity, including through CSDP. Overall, though, the Lebanon crisis in 2006 showed that the EU is not ready yet to launch large-scale “robust” military operations in the area through its own CSDP structures. Therefore, on an ad hoc basis, the UN can still provide a very useful channel for putting troops on the ground.

In the next chapter I will look at two cases that are outside of the EU institutional framework of the EMP/ENP, to see what is really the impact of this on the work of the EU and on its tendency to work with the United Nations.
Chapter 6. Outside of the European Mediterranean Policy

The objective of this chapter is to control the impact of the institutionalization of foreign policy over EU-UN cooperation. To do this I will analyse security and development policy towards two countries, Iraq and Libya, which have been at the margin of the broader European institutionalized policy frameworks of the Barcelona process and the Neighbourhood policy.

As has been discussed in the previous pages, institutionalization and Europeanization often imply a more assertive role of supranational agents, which can count on the ideational resources that are assured to them by a strong political mandate and legal competence. This results in a relatively stronger position within the EU foreign policy system and, according to my rational-choice institutional hypothesis 1, to a weaker tendency to seek cooperation with international organizations and the UN in particular. In reverse, where the general EU policy is less institutionally dense, and member states assertively maintain their own independent national agendas and structures, institutions can be expected to look instrumentally for the ideational and material support of international organizations.

According to this view, Iraq and Libya can be singled out as countries where the common institutional framework have been weaker and the EU has maintained a looser foreign policy machinery in the face of very critical challenges. Both countries have been significantly isolated within the international community since the 1980s and have been targeted by stringent international and UN sanctions, increasing that isolation. There are obviously also important differences between them. While Libya has a strong geographic proximity with Europe, an observer status within the European Mediterranean Partnership and has been considered relatively unimportant for the global balance of power, up until the 2011 crisis. Iraq, on the other hand has been a central focus point for international diplomacy and for the United States, particularly since the end of the Cold War.

The UN played also a different role in the framework of the international intervention. In the 2003 Iraq crisis, the UN was chiefly a stumbling stone for the US-led coalition that sought to topple the Saddam Hussein regime. In Libya, on the other hand, the UN was used extensively as a vehicle to legitimize an intervention in the 2011 civil war.
The UN also played an important role in the post-conflict reconstruction phase, according to a scheme, which, as we will see, has gradually improved in the years from Iraq 2003 and Libya 2011. The UN had a heterogeneous presence on the ground and experience before the crises. In Iraq its presence was very strong due to the previous UN mandated intervention in 1991 with the subsequent sanction regime and peacekeeping operation on the Kuwait border (UNIKOM)\textsuperscript{173}, in addition to the IAEA led process of WMD inspections. In Libya, on the other hand, before 2011 UN presence was limited to the activities of a few programmes and agencies in the context of what was considered a relatively wealthy and stable country. Also the EU was weak, as it was trying to establish itself and had very limited presence and experience, outside of a few interested member states.

Within this context, we would expect the EU to rely on the United Nations and channel its policy through it for two main reasons: firstly, because of the general lack of access to these two countries and secondly, because of the strong fragmentation and competition among EU foreign policy actors for resources and influence. Indeed, a key constant in Libya and Iraq has been the prominent role that the United Nations played in both crises and therefore the many opportunities for interaction, cooperation and conflict with the EU.

The next section will address in more detail the case of European foreign policy in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, and at cooperation with the United Nations. I will tackle this case by focussing first on crisis management in 2003 and at the EU’s behaviour against the backdrop of the US-led military intervention, and then at post-conflict peacebuilding. In section 2, I will look at EU-UN development and security cooperation in Libya, particularly during and after the 2011 crisis. This is the last case study that I will analyse in my thesis. I will focus first on how the UN has been used as a political framework to ground the decision to intervene and then I will analyse the challenges of reconstruction. As already shown in previous chapters, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction is at the crossroads of development and security and

is a particularly fertile ground for cooperation with the United Nations in general and by EU institutional actors in particular. I will then conclude by providing some explanations and by summing up on the impact of the institutional framework of the Barcelona process on EU-UN cooperation.

6.1 The case of Iraq: emerging from dependency

The European painful navigation of the 2003 Iraq war has been extensively analyzed by international relations and European foreign policy scholarship. It is an established fact that Europeans divided themselves over the US intention to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in the aftermath to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Between 2002 and 2003, the United States, together with the UK, attempted to build-up a multinational coalition around this goal and were faced by the opposition of an important part of the international community, with a leading role of France and Germany. As a consequence of this opposition, the UNSC was branded as irrelevant and eventually bypassed by the US, which launched a massive operation in Iraq resulting in the fall Saddam Hussein and in a long, bloody and expensive occupation by coalition forces (mainly US) lasting until the end of 2011.

Europe’s presence in Iraq was characterized by very little institutionalization. Iraq has always been detached from the European Mediterranean policy and the ENP and the European Commission did not have a strong role. The policy towards Iraq was fragmented and competitive with very little actual discussion at the EU level (Crowe 2003). After the first Gulf War, the UK and France were particularly active within the United Nations. The UK developed a strong partnership with the United States in the management of the UN mandated No-flight-Zone in the South of Iraq. While France, played an important role in the Oil for Food programme and in the Iraqi oil sector in general.

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174 This section is based mainly on the work of (Crowe 2003; Gordon 2004; Lewis 2009, 2009; Malone 2006; Menon 2004; Youngs 2006).

6.1.1 Assessing the hypotheses

There is not much that can be added to the understanding of the events that led to the European division in 2003, yet this case is crucial to our study of EU-UN cooperation. I will focus the next pages on the particular aspect of EU-UN interaction in the crisis phase and then on the post-conflict reconstruction.

The crisis - breaking up within a political framework

In the run up to the invasion Iraq was the center of the focus of the international community. In Europe, it was framed as a crucial challenge for multilateralism and for the EU’s credibility as a foreign policy actor. In that context, Iraq was “simply too tough a test” for CFSP (Crowe 2003, 535). Information sharing and coordination was attempted both in New York, via the “Article 19” framework and in Brussels until it became clear that the positions of the UK and Spain on the one hand and France and Germany on the other were simply irreconcilable. As mentioned by Crowe, given this division, by summer 2002 the discussions were held primarily in New York and the EU apparatus (including the Article 19 machinery) was completely bypassed (Crowe 2003, 534).

Table 29. Configuration of variables (cohesion) for the unit of analysis “Irak crisis management”

| Case 5: Iraq crisis management 2002-2003 |
|---|---|
| **Unity** | **Integration** |
| Positional | 0 | Decision Making Procedure | 0 |
| Operational | 0 | Institutional Coherence | 1 |
| Total | 0 (Low) | Total | 1 (Low) |

By the summer of 2002 there was not much that could be done and a wedge had opened within CFSP. This was, to some extent, against the initial desire of the UK, which under the Blair government had tried to build a bridge between the US and the EU and to play a leadership role in the building up of a European security identity (Howorth 2003a). As described by Menon this crisis of CFSP actually led the EU to speed up developments on various fronts. By the end of 2003 the EU had adopted its first Security Strategy and launched the first ESDP missions in the Balkans and Africa, notably in strong cooperation with the United Nations (Menon 2004).
Authors argue that the division among member states on Iraq was linked primarily to the position vis-à-vis the United States and about the use of force (Howorth 2003b; Menon 2004). The strong ideological stance of the G.W. Bush Presidency, against the backdrop of the post 9/11 “War on Terror” created a divisive climate, which led the EU to break up explicitly. As noted by Lewis, for example, in the height of the crisis, Germany declared that it would have been against the intervention with or without the United Nations legitimation. Whatever the interpretation, this case could be seen as an exception to our complementary hypothesis that EU division normally leads to alignment under the United Nations.\textsuperscript{176}

However, there are signs also in this case that the hypothesis is correct. The Council of Ministers and European Council continued to meet on the Iraq question in November 2002 and then in 2003 until April and fell constantly on the United Nations and on the UN process as the lowest common denominator solution, on which all could agree to dissimulate their divergence. For example, a divisive European Council was held in Brussels on the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} of March 2003, right at the start of the US operations. Interestingly the Presidency declaration states at paragraph 67. “We believe that the UN must continue to play a central role during and after the current crisis. The UN system has a unique capacity and practical experience in coordinating Assistance in post-conflict States. The Security Council should give the United Nations a strong mandate for this mission.” (Council of the European Union 2003a).

Similarly, all European countries referred to multilateralism and legality as the basis for their position and action in Iraq. Even if the United States openly identified in the unwillingness of the UNSC to back its policy on Iraq a failure of multilateralism that justified unilateral action - as was already alleged in the 2002 National Security Strategy (US President G.W. Bush 2002), the UK and Spain, were much more

\textsuperscript{176} Yet this ‘error’ effect can be explained by the centrality of the United Nations to the specific case of the US intervention. The UN was indirectly involved in the debate between “Old Europe” and “New Europe” because the United States G.W. Bush administration had explicitly challenged the UNSC relevance at the center of the international system and had made Iraq the crucial test of this. As pointed out by Malone, the UN was not functional to US interests in Iraq but it also did not bend to US interest (Malone 2006).
nuanced (Youngs 2006). The UK, for example, attempted to ground its intervention on UN legitimacy, which rested in previous UNSC resolutions violated by Iraq and notably on Resolution 1441 of November 2002. This was done mainly for domestic reasons, as Tony Blair struggled to rally his own party behind the military intervention in Iraq.\(^{177}\) Similarly, other countries that later joined the coalition in supporting security and reconstruction in Iraq, such as Italy, insisted on the United Nations legitimacy that justified their presence in Iraq and support for the intervention, notwithstanding the strong domestic opposition to the war.

During the military campaign, since the European Union was divided it used the UN venue to disburse humanitarian aid, through the remnants of the “Oil for Food” Programme, which had been running during the sanctions years. Also the European Commission activated its humanitarian structures and worked mainly through the UN and the Red Cross organizations on the ground (Prolog Consult 2010). Yet, the actual war lasted only a few days and by 9 April 2003 the immediate problem became the organization of post-conflict reconstruction, institution building and democratic transition. As we have seen, Europeans had insisted on a strong political backing from the United Nations. However, while the EU was able to regroup around the idea of giving a leading role to the UN, it continued to be strongly divided on the substance post-conflict Iraq and on the role of the US in European foreign policy (Menon 2004).

**Post-conflict - making up within an operational partnership**

UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003) adopted on 22 May 2003, recognized the role of occupying powers to ‘Coalition’ states and gave an important position to the United Nations in coordinating the reconstruction. This allowed Europe to join the effort for reconstruction and development assistance. At this operational level the United Nations played an absolutely crucial role, mainly through the ad hoc Trust Fund mechanism that was established by the UNDP and the WB (International

\(^{177}\) For instance, the UK Attorney General Lord Goldsmith issued an advice that the intervention could be considered legal shortly before the war was started (BBC News 2010)
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq - IRFFI). Here again, we witness the dynamics of interrelation that are typical of crisis situations, when the European Union is relatively weak, divided and lacks access and resources.

As the military operations ended, the European Council in Thessaloniki welcomed the central role given to the UN in the post-invasion phase and tasked the European Commission and the High Representative to present a proposal to channel assistance to Iraq (Council of the European Union 2003b). In response, the European commission with no direct presence in Iraq and under pressure to deliver quickly presented a proposal for the Madrid Summit of October 2003 whereby its Iraq reconstruction assistance for 2004 (200 million euro) would be completely channeled via the United Nations Trust Fund and invited member states to do the same (European Commission 2003b).

As explained above, the EU lacked both experience and access in Iraq following the toppling of the Saddam regime. The Commission had been cut out by the autonomous policies of member states and the sanctions against the regime. When interviewed EU officials justify in this way the channeling of EU funds through the UN. “There was no security on the ground and years of sanctions had cut off the EU from Iraq whereas the UN was very experienced.” Other states, which had opposed the war, such as France and Germany, could work in Iraq only indirectly, through the United States (Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund).

For extensive information on this mechanism, history and sources of funding see the Multi-partner Trust Fund Office gateway of UNDP: http://mptf.undp.org/ (accessed on 27 May 2012). However impressive in absolute terms (almost 1 billion euro committed at the Donor conference in Madrid on 24 October 2003), one should not overestimate the material resources committed by Europe at this stage. In relative terms the commitment was very low, a small percentage of what was invested by the United States through its separate tool (Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund).

Interview n°19 (European Commission official) 10 September 2011. Evaluation of the European Commission (ADE for the European Commission 2008). Note also that the needs assessment phase for Iraq post-conflict reconstruction had been carried out under the leadership of the UN with the participation also of European Commission staff.
Nations (Youngs 2006). As a consequence, at least in the initial phase of post-conflict reconstruction the EU was consistently in support to the United Nations. Yet, in the case of Iraq, this rational-choice motivation can perhaps also be complemented with a contingent strong normative attraction towards the principle of multilateralism. That is, the clear ideological division over Iraq, which in Europe also led to the definition of the ‘effective multilateralism’ dogma in the ESS, created a strong momentum in the EU to pair up with the UN as a point of distinction from the US. In short, there was also a clear identity objective behind the decision to support the United Nations in Iraq because of the particular context of division and strife on this issue that had damaged the image and functioning of the EU (Lewis 2009).

**Opportunity and dependency in post conflict peace-building**

Cooperation with the United Nations continued through the post-conflict and stabilization phase. Iraq is actually a school case of cooperation as between 2003 and 2007 almost all of the EU development assistance to Iraq was channeled via the IRFFI mechanism coordinated by the UN Development Group (UNDG) and the WB. Most of the funds actually went to UNDG and UNDP as the WB was criticized for not having sufficient capacity on the ground, particularly as the European Commission opened its own delegation in Baghdad in 2007.

Most analysts note that the division among member states remained quite strong, yet the United Nations ensured a common umbrella for European presence in an important theatre, which was dominated by the United States (John Peterson 2004; Schwartz 2008; Youngs 2006). For illustration, the table of variables below reflects the situation of post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building immediately following the 2003 both in terms of capacities (hyp. 1) and cohesion (hyp.2).

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181 Among its operations, for example, the EU financed a part of the establishment and running costs of the UNAMI mission, which coordinated the UN presence in IRAQ and was established by UNSC resolution 1546 (2004).
Table 30. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for the unit of analysis “Iraq post-conflict peacebuilding”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 5: Iraq post-conflict peacebuilding 2003-2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material Resources</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gradually, though as the deep wounds left by the 2003 division started healing and the EU continued increasing its ambition as a foreign policy actor, a gradual dispassion from the United Nations started to take place. This detachment rested on various elements that are related to our hypotheses on resources and cohesion.

First, Europeans decided in 2005 to increase its support to governance and institution building in Iraq. On the one hand they assisted the organization of elections, mainly via UNDP, which led to the first democratic elections in Iraq in 2005. On the other hand they increased the focus on security sector reform (SSR) and launched a specific ESDP civilian integrated mission in the field of justice reform to train judges and police. EUIJUST Lex was deployed in mid 2005, before other similar operations in the Middle East and was stationed initially in Brussels and then in Bagdad, notwithstanding the still strong divisions amongst member states (Korski 2009, p.232; Banks 2010). Cooperation with the United Nations at this level was good but Europeans were beginning to restore their unity of purpose and importantly an independent and collective presence in Iraq.

Secondly, with the channeling of large sums or more than 200 million euro per year through the IRFFI mechanism, the EU became progressively more demanding on results and visibility. Whereas initially it was accepted that reaching the Iraqi people
in such a difficult and unsecure environment meant also abiding with suboptimal results and sacrificing on donor visibility - which was also considered a risk for the recipient in the phase of the anti-Western insurgency - in the medium term this situation became less satisfactory. Various donors launched routine evaluations, which found that some aspects of the management of the funds needed improvement (UNDG and World Bank 2009). Reporting by the UN and the WB was initially reputed slow, unclear, uneven or even sloppy.\(^{182}\) This was not a general trend, but concerned a few cases, which however were enough to reinforce the stereotypes and frustration. In addition to this, despite the efforts of the UN, the perceived ownership of the operations by the Iraqis was low (Youngs 2006). In parallel, the European Parliament started to take interest in the case. In 2007 and 2008 various parliamentary questions were made to the Commission on why and how funds were managed via the UN in Iraq. The Parliament asked to vision the audits and at the end of 2007 and again in 2008 the Parliamentary committee on budgetary control (COCOBU) even threatened to suspend the approval of the external relations budget pending clearer information on this by the European Commission.\(^{183}\) Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner had to appear more than once in front of the committee to explain the situation and reassure the European Parliament. Still, this led to further strife between the Commission and the UN and WB headquarters as these were asked to provide audits of their operations through IRFFI and were visited by verification and other missions in Washington, New York and Iraq.\(^{184}\) It looked as though the phase of expansion of EU aid through the United Nations, which had characterized the period between 2003

\(^{182}\) Interview n°22 (European Commission official, DG Europeaid, 20 March 2011).


\(^{184}\) See for instance the report on the “Field trip of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq Donors Committee” in May 2008, by MEP Paulo Casaca, one of the most vocal critics of the European Commission in Committee on Budget Control (COCOBU). Available at www.europarl.europa.eu (13/4/2012).
and 2007, mainly due to the operations in Iraq and the Palestinian territories was coming to an end.

Third, by 2008/2009, the US surge in Iraq was giving the first positive signs in terms of security on the ground and more political space and independence to the democratically elected authorities of Iraq. This was also compounded by a resurgence of revenues from oil production and exports. In this context, the EU had more access and was able to set up independent operations in Iraq and increased its appetite towards the development of independent bilateral relations with Baghdad.

Within the Commission services, with the acceptance of the member states, there was a push to downsize the overall allocations to Iraq, and to normalize the bilateral cooperation by shoring up the IRFFI mechanism and building up, instead, a stronger EU presence in Baghdad, with the capacity of managing projects independently. In this context, while the EUJUST LEX continued to be reinforced and prolonged, the first bilateral contracts with the Iraqi authorities were signed by the European Commission in 2009, with an overall reduced portfolio, which quickly went from 200 million per year in 2004-2005 to about a tenth of the size in 2010. A country strategy paper was adopted in 2010 and a first multiannual indicative programme for 2011-2013 was adopted (EC, Italy and Sweden 2010). In this new situation the UN continues to be a key partner, but it is now in competition with government agencies and NGOs.

6.1.2 Explaining

As with previous cases I have tried to provide a rationalist account of EU-UN cooperation on Iraq, looking at the United Nations as a political framework and as an operational partner. The table below provides the values that were estimated for each variable for this case study seen globally, including both crisis and post conflict.

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See in particular pages 17-21. Interestingly, the Iraq national indicative programme is also one of the few examples of joint programming, as the document integrates European Commission, Italian and Swedish programmes.
Table 31. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for Case Study 5 – Iraq 2003-2011 -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 (Low)</td>
<td>1 (Low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Unity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making Procedure</td>
<td>Positional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Low)</td>
<td>0 (Low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraq has had a key role in the definition of the role of United Nations in the post cold war security environment from the first gulf war in 1991 to the US led intervention of 2003 and the subsequent peace-building effort (Malone 2006; Pickering 2008). It has also contributed immensely to the definition of the doctrine of multilateralism of the EU and of both the theory and practice of cooperation with the UN (Biscop 2005; Hill, Peterson, and Wessels 2011).

I have shown briefly how cooperation with the United Nations on Iraq and the EU’s commitment to it, at least formally, has been quite impressive, both politically and operationally. This, of course, if one excludes the actual war between March and May 2003, when the coalition forces led by the US and the UK occupied Iraq after failing to obtain an explicit UNSC mandate. I have already noted how this division within the EU and the sidelining of the UN was due more to the position towards the US, than to the UN itself. In fact, as is to be expected according to our hypothesis 2, the EU remained broadly committed to the UN in the face of its division, both before, and particularly after the invasion.

After the invasion, the peace-building operations have been strongly coordinated with and by the UN. Europeans have continuously promoted a strong role for the United Nations, including the UK, which as the junior partner in the coalition administrating
Iraq has been by far keener to include the UN as compared with the US (Youngs 2006).

Some have argued that this regrouping around the United Nations can be understood via normative institutional arguments or entrapment and cooperative bargaining. Lewis, for example claims that the EU moved from the paralysis until 20 March 2003, when it was blocked on a lowest common denominator solution of “let the UN do it” via the Oil for Food Programme, to a more progressive and leading role regrouping around a mandate to the European Commission to assist Iraq over the summer 2003. In this view the change would have been motivated by the need to get on with business and to play a role in post war Iraq, but also to recompose around a EU presence in this country, in the face of the long efforts made in building up CFSP and ESDP (Lewis 2009).

I would rather put the accent on the rational motivations by the various actors of the European foreign policy system, mainly based on their relative weakness in terms of material and ideational resources. First of all, there was no real alternative to working through the “Oil for food” programme in delivering humanitarian aid to Iraq in March 2003, as the military operation were starting. The only thing that Europeans could do was to channel their aid via the existing structures of the UN, to which some member states (and particularly France) had been chief contributors, and with which they were, therefore, rather familiar.

Once the operations were over and a UNSC resolution was passed to base the reconstruction effort and that would de facto legitimize the occupation (Res.1483/2003), the EU had no choice, once again, but to work with the UN. Beyond some member states that participated directly to the operations (UK, Spain) or decided to contribute to the reconstruction efforts made by the coalition (Italy, Netherlands, Poland and others), all the other EU members did not have the access nor the legitimacy to channel aid towards Iraq. The UN and the WB via the IRFFI provided a good means to do that from 2004.

The European Commission, was charged to find a solution together with the High Representative as most member states wanted to maintain a distance from the intervention while, at the same time, they build up some level of European presence. This was an important incentive for the Commission to increase its role in this country,
from which it had been excluded by the previous lack of Europeanization of the policy and by the general isolation of Iraq. The European Commission lacked any substantial means to channel this aid and therefore the IRFFI trust fund designed together with UNDP and WB was the only way to play. As predicted by my hypothesis 1 and by the general analytical concept, the European Commission used the United Nations to increase its access, legitimacy and credibility within the European foreign policy system, in an area, peace-building, which is at the cross roads between development competences and security competences (Dijkstra 2009).

The security context, which deteriorated after the first months of occupation made it even more difficult to carry out independent operation in Iraq. The European Union had to work with the UN. According to our graph, it was in a situation of strong dependency.

Figure 11. Illustration of configuration of variables for Case Study 5

This situation of dependency and forceful cooperation did not last forever. As I explain in my hypothesis, the EU tends to avoid it. It generates a degree of frustration over visibility, reporting, results and was also targeted by the European Parliament, which further increased the pressure on the European Commission, in particular to

186 Interview n°22 (European Commission Official, DG Europeaid), 20 March 2011
identify alternatives to channeling its development cooperation exclusively via the UN. Gradually, the EU built up its own legitimacy and credibility in Iraq, in particular by reinforcing its relationship with the newly elected authorities. This led to the establishment of an independent CSDP mission in the Justice sector in 2005. In the meantime the EU also increased its trade with Iraq and its political relations. The increasing relationship with the authorities and the acceptance of the EU presence on the ground further offset the need for the UN to provide ideational resources. Indeed, one of the criticisms on the IRFFI by the Iraqis (to a large extent unfair) referred the lack of ownership in the mechanism. Eventually, being in a stronger position, the EU started designing its more typical bilateral instruments of cooperation and the IRFFI mechanism (which was financed prominently by Europeans and the Commission) was closed in 2008-2009. The EU continues to work with the UN on the ground but now cooperation is more ad hoc (more “predatory”) and based on specific assessments on the convenience and added value of specific operations as elsewhere in the region.

We moved therefore from a strong division of member states, and weakness of institutions to a more solid presence of the EU on the ground, a stronger legitimacy and more access to the country, which gradually brought to emancipation from the United Nations and the development of a more autonomous foreign policy.

### 6.2 The case of Libya: coordination and competition

Libya is particularly interesting to our understanding of EU-UN cooperation. This case shows how the cooperative behavior varies depending on the specific situation of relative power of the EU: what we have described as its material and ideational resources. Libya has been an unexplored territory for the EU for many years (not so for the UN), and Europe was only starting to position itself in the country as the 2011 Revolution started. As we will see in the next pages, the post-conflict situation after the revolution as certainly increased the opportunities of cooperation with the UN, but has not changed the underlying trend, which sees the EU establishing its presence in the country and slowly emancipating itself from the United Nations.

#### 6.2.1 Assessing the hypotheses

After a brief overview of the situation before the 2011 revolution, I will look at EU-UN cooperation during the crisis and then in the immediate post-conflict phase.
EU-Libya relations before 2011 - opening shop

For forty-two years, under the regime of Colonel Khadafy, Libya maintained a rather intractable foreign policy. In the 1980s a policy of support to international terrorism around the world led Libya to a direct confrontation with the United States. In 1986 the US, under the Reagan Administration, carried out an air strike over the Khadafy compound of Al Azizia in Tripoli with the objective of punishing Khadafy for its policy and possibly to eliminate him. Colonel Khadafy survived the raid and in the subsequent years remained even more estranged from the international community. This was further compounded as a result of the bombing of the Pan American flight over the skies of Lockerbie in Scotland, which killed more than 200 passengers mostly Americans in December 1988 (Pinta 2006, 273–276).

As a consequence of this, the Libyan regime also remained at the margins of the European initiatives in the Mediterranean in the post-Oslo phase. It was never a full member of the Barcelona process. Libya was the only country on the Mediterranean with which the European Union did not have any official legal agreement. Some member states, and particularly Italy, maintained an interest-based relationship with this country, focused on the energy supply, economic investments and migration but the European Union as such, was completely absent from the scene.

The situation started changing at the turn of the century, when Colonel Khadafy announced a series of diplomatic moves meant to break the international isolation and turn Libya more towards Europe. In 1999, the UNSC sanction regime was suspended following collaboration by Libya on terrorism. This paved the way for the gradual ‘normalisation’ of Libyan foreign policy with the total lifting of sanctions in 2004 (Youngs 2006, 136–139) and a “policy of engagement” from Europe. This new approach was driven mainly by member states’ strong commercial interests to gain access to Libya’s rich and largely untapped resources and market. The EU institutions took a supporting role already with Commission President Prodi. A key step in this sense, was taken by External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero Waldner, who

\[187\] Libya acquired observer status to the EMP in 2002
played an important role in the liberation of a group Bulgarian medical personnel accused of infecting children with HIV in Benghazi (Pierini 2008). This case, which was finally closed in 2007, was considered the last impediment to absorbing Libya within the Euro-Mediterranean policy. Indeed, immediately following this diplomatic success, the GAERC of 15 October 2007 called for the Commission to prepare the negotiation mandate for a Framework agreement with Libya of a roughly analogous nature to the Association Agreements with the other countries of the region (Council of the European Union 2007). Negotiations were effectively opened in November 2008 under the leadership of the European Commission.189

In parallel with the negotiations of the Framework Agreement, the European Commission adopted the first Country Strategy Paper for Libya and the related Multiannual Indicative programme, which allocated cooperation funds for 60 million euros over the 2011-2013. The documents were adopted in 2010 and planned projects in the field of migration, trade integration and SMEs, technical assistance and the health sector (European Commission 2010e).

EU Cooperation on migration and border management however, had already started since 2005-2006 under strong pressure from Italy and was slightly more conspicuous than in other sectors. Various small projects had been launched from 2005-2006 but these were implemented through international organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UNHCR and UNODC.190 The main reason behind the cooperation with these organizations, notwithstanding the regular complaints over the lack of visibility, was the expertise and - in the case of the

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188 See also the document “Memorandum sur le relations entre la Libye et l’Union europeenne” signed between Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and Secretary of State El-Obeidi on 23 July 2007.


190 Projects at this stage were financed through the programme AENEAS that in 2007 became the programme on Migration and Asylum. See the website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/migration-asylum/index_en.htm (19/3/2012)
UNHCR - the exclusive mandate. Yet, cooperation was also spurred by the lack of presence of the European Commission in Libya, given the fact that there was no permanent Delegation there, nor any substantial experience of cooperation with the authorities. An additional problem was linked to the lack of independent civil society organizations through which to channel aid. Finally the Libyan regime itself had an ambiguous approach towards cooperation in this area and the European public opinion and European Parliament were very suspicious of the human rights standards for migration management in Libya (Colombo and Abdelkhalilq 2012; Hamood 2008; Joffé 2011). It was therefore essential to work through credible and respected organizations such as UNHCR and IOM.

Table 32. Configuration of variables (resources) for the unit of analysis “EU cooperation policy in Libya before the crisis”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU cooperation policy in Libya before 2011</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material Resources</td>
<td>Ideational Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Legal Competences 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Political Support 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities 0.5</td>
<td>Acceptance 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy 0.5</td>
<td>Reputation 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1 (Low)</td>
<td>Total 1 (Low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, given the scarcity of material and ideational resources before the revolution, the European Commission was constrained to work with international organizations in Libya. Contrary to the EU, the UN had both presence and experience in Libya. UNDP, in particular, led the coordination of official and private donors in Libya through a Donor Coordination Group and managed a functioning technical cooperation

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191 A small bilateral cooperation programme of 8 million euro for the period 2007-2010 was allocated for medical technical cooperation mostly in Benghazi as a response to the HIV/AIDS infection that had affected 400 children.

192 Yet, the EU also tried to avoid dependence on IOM and UNHCR by funding also separate organizations, including the Vienna based International Center for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).
programme covering several sectors. Other agencies such as UNESCO and FAO were also present, all acting largely as pools of expertise and institutional advise for the Libyan state, which would pay for the technical assistance mostly with its own resources. In this context, the EU relied on the UN for information and access for its first explorative missions and tentative steps in Libya. Beyond this, however, opportunities for cooperation were limited by the fact that the EU still had very few activities in Libya.

Against this backdrop, the EU sought to open its own office in Tripoli to have a more direct presence and manage the increased activities in cooperation, trade and political affairs. All this was in preparation as the “Arab Spring” hit Libya by surprise, with the uprising starting in Benghazi on the 17 February of 2011 and then spreading rapidly to the rest of the country.

Crisis management - cooperating with the UN

The 2011 Libyan crisis has increased exponentially the need and opportunity for interaction and cooperation between the EU and the UN. The UN played its role both as a political forum and as an operational actor and the EU member states involved have used extensively the United Nations instruments to achieve their objectives in Libya.

As the crisis started, on 17 February 2011, Europeans tried to achieve a consensus to condemn the repression made by the Gaddafi regime, within the EU bodies and particularly the PSC. Most member states were quite keen in condemning the regime’s violence against the protesters from the outset, as France in particular wanted to repair the negative image it had created over its hesitant reaction to the Tunisian events the previous month. Italy - together with Malta, with many interests a stake and a large number of citizens in Libya was the most reluctant initially to

condemn the regime (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2011; Koenig 2011).

Table 33. Configuration of variables (cohesion) for the unit of analysis “Libya crisis management”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 6: Libya crisis management 2011</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Low)</td>
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</table>

An initial compromise was reached on the 21 February when the EU Foreign Affairs Council issued a statement condemning the violent crackdown of demonstrations by the Gaddafi regime (Council of the European Union 2011b). The key game, however, was played in New York and among capitals with France and the UK bypassing the hesitancies of the EU by spearheading a first resolution at the UNSC on 26 February 2011, after securing support also from the Arab League. UNSC Resolution 1970 called the Gaddafi regime for restraint and imposed targeted sanctions on the regime including asset freezes, travel bans and a general arms embargo. This consensus at the global level, forced the wider EU membership to follow through quickly and on 28 February the Council of ministers implemented the UNSC resolution and enforced its own additional sanctions.

Yet, the situation did not improve on the ground. After intensive violence by its troops and Special Forces in Tripoli and western Libya, the Gaddafi regime was able to stabilize most of the Tripolitania region and turned towards Eastern Libya and the central port city of Misrata. Negotiations efforts by the African Union in particular

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194 There is an extensive and increasing literature on the 2011 Arab Spring. For an evaluation of Europe’s response to it, including on the specific case of Libya see the Middle East and North Africa chapter of the 2012 ECFR European Foreign Policy Scorecard (Marchesi, Korski, and Levy 2012).

195 Press release of the Council “Libya: EU imposes arms embargo and targeted sanctions”, 7081/11, 28 February 2011. The decision was latter followed by an implementing regulation, see press release 7203/11 of 2 Marc 2011.
proved unsuccessful although some argue that more time should have been left for mediation (Roberts 2011). The focus on the crisis remained very high. The UN Special coordinator was charged with the management of the Humanitarian relief operations particularly on the borders with Egypt and Tunisia, where refugees were starting to amass. The European Union, allocated 60 million euro in Humanitarian Aid to the crisis, an important part of which was disbursed through the UNHCR, UNICEF and the WFP, in addition to the International Committee of the Red Cross and IOM.196

The United States, after an initial reluctance, became also more vocal in supporting an international intervention, which was also considered by the Arab League by the beginning of March (Reuters 2011). On 11 March the EU went a step further openly stating at the highest level that Gaddafi was no longer considered a legitimate interlocutor (European Council 2011). Eventually, on 17 March 2011, UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted giving a very extensive mandate for a No-Flight Zone (NFZ) and calling the UN members to carry out “any necessary action” to protect the civilian population (UN/DPI 2011a).197 For the first time, the UNSC openly referred to the principle of the Responsibility to Protect in a specific crisis, which was considered a breakthrough (International Peace Institute 2011; Reike 2012). The compromise was reached in New York after intense negotiations with an important if ambiguous contribution of the four EU member states present in the Security Council, three of which voted in favour (France, the United Kingdom and Portugal), while one, Germany, abstained. Importantly, in the run up to the Resolution, information on the


197 The imprimatur of the UN was facilitated by the recognition of the Arab league and by a series of reckless statements made by Gaddafi and members of its regime, which produced an unusual sense of urgency in the international community.
negotiations was given by the members of the Security Council to the broader EU membership, at the PSC and MAMA working group.198

The UN maintained a primary role as a political forum at this stage. France and the UK, in particular, used it to gather the legitimacy necessary for a more decisive intervention in the crisis, including through the military (Euractive 2011). France, also used its chairmanship of the G8 to retain a international leadership role, but the UN stayed at the center of the effort for reasons of legitimacy and effectiveness. On the one hand, in 2011 prominent emerging powers, including Brazil, India and South Africa, were seated in the UNSC as non-permanent members, together with Germany and Portugal for the EU, which further increased the UNSC’s legitimacy and representativeness. The Arab League remained also very supportive of the UN track. On the other hand, the ‘constructive abstention’ of both Russia and China over the UNSC effort on Libya, allowed this forum to take swift and effective executive decisions over the crisis.

As Resolution 1973 was agreed, the reflection was already well underway on who would have implemented the NFZ under the UN mandate. The EU internal division - with Germany (but also Poland) staunchly opposed to a military intervention - substantially ruled out the use of CSDP for this challenging task.

The EU did formally launch a CSDP mission on Libya - EUFOR Libya - on 1 April 2011, which was to be based in the operational headquarters in Rome (Council of the European Union 2011a). However, EUFOR Libya was not linked to the enforcement of the No-Flight Zone and never became operational. Its mandate, in fact, was to support a humanitarian evacuation (perhaps around Misrata) and was largely anachronistic by the time it was adopted (Gomes 2011). Evacuations of foreigners were mostly concluded by April and the humanitarian situation never completely went out of hand, requiring a military operation. Apart from this, EUFOR Libya was designed to be at full disposal of the United Nations and in particular OCHA, which was supposed to trigger its deployment with an explicit request. Yet the United

198 Direct observation, MAMA and PSC, March, April 2011.
Nations considered such a mission unnecessary at that stage (Traynor 2011) and was anyway entangled with its own political and operational difficulties, so the request never came.\(^{199}\)

As for the enforcement of the No-Flight Zone, Europe as a whole lacked the capabilities to carry out such an operation autonomously, particularly in terms of recognizance, intelligence, air refuelling and targeted bombs (Nielsen 2012). This is why ensuring the participation of the United States was a crucial condition for a sustainable and effective NFZ. In addition to this a campaign was launched towards Arab states and the Arab League to ensure the participation of as many countries as possible from the region, once again to ensure acceptance and legitimacy.\(^{200}\)

The situation remained suspended for some days, as the troops of Colonel Gaddafi were gaining ground against the insurgents on the Eastern front and were approaching the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. On 19 March 2011 France organized an international meeting in Paris with potential force contributors, with the idea of establishing an ad hoc “coalition of the willing,” which was the preferred option of France as it would have ensured both visibility and control. At the Summit, French President Sarkozy was able to announce that the coalition was already operational and that air strikes to establish initial air dominance and enforce the NFZ were already underway together with Allies (The Guardian 2011). The US played a crucial role at the beginning and throughout, together with the UK. Several EU countries participated from the beginning to the operation,\(^{201}\) which was eventually absorbed by the NATO in the “Unified Protector” mission on 31 March 2011, following a difficult negotiation (International Institute of Strategic Studies 2011; Traynor & Watt 2011).

\(^{199}\) Discussions about possible CSDP deployment in post-conflict Libya, however, did resurface after the fall of Gaddafi and different concepts were discussed by member states throughout 2012. Direct observation, EU Delegation to Libya, Tripoli, 2012.

\(^{200}\) Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan eventually participated to the operation in various degrees.

\(^{201}\) EU member states participating to the operation, which was closed on October 2011 were Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden (although not a NATO member) and the UK. Information available on the NATO website.
The NFZ was established without major problems but it became rapidly clear that the interpretation by the intervening countries of the UNSC resolution was quite extensive and bordered the ‘regime change’ approach. On these grounds it has been criticized as an instrumentalization of the United Nations to the advantage of a Western agenda that wanted the disposal of Colonel Gaddafi infringing on the principle of neutrality (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2011; Roberts 2011).

The situation on the ground evolved substantially in late summer 2011. The rebel forces made some breakthroughs in Western Libya starting from the Nafusa Mountains and Misurata and then ousted Gaddafi from Tripoli. Then, on 20 October, the tyrant was captured and killed in Sirte, his hometown, preluding to the closing of the NATO operation. This was hailed as one of the most successful operations by NATO and Europe as a whole (although not by the EU) as the objective (implicit and explicit) was reached with no casualties and rapidly and with Europeans not having to put any troop on the ground.

While they were largely excluded from the military domain, EU institutions played a relevant role in the accessory operations including the humanitarian aid, even during the crisis phase. Here again, the United Nations (OCHA) were given a leadership role in the coordination of the global effort and indeed the EU itself and its member states channelled extensive funds through various UN agencies and programmes with a specific mandate in these situations (in particular UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR and OCHA).


202 This view was supported also by the BRIC countries that had initially abstained from the resolution, including Russia, China (to a lesser extent) and Brazil. Germany, on the other hand, maintained a low profile throughout the crisis and while not directly supporting the operations facilitated them in indirect ways to avoid criticism from the public opinion.

203 For ECHO the percentage of aid channelled through the UN in this case is around 20%. Much more was channelled through the Red Cross and the IOM. The rest through NGOs. Source: EDRIS database. Available at: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/ (13/3/2012)
Table 34. EU Humanitarian aid during the Libyan crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Commitments in Euro (Cash and in-kind)</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Commitments in Euro (Cash and in-kind)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>70.574.084</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.150.000</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.836.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.000.000</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>14.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>139.650</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.827.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>730.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.978.924</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.500.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>910.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4.450.000</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>180.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.942.584</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>75.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>11.091.053</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.659.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.770.752</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>16.381.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>51.200</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>13.651.934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total EU</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>151.114.863</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet, it is once the humanitarian situation stabilized that the European Union - and the EEAS- rapidly looked at the possibility of supporting the transition authorities in Eastern Libya without waiting for the UN. \(^{205}\) In fact, until 20 September 2011, when the NTC was officially recognized as representing Libya at the UN, this was blocked operationally by its mandate for impartiality and neutrality and could not act on anything going beyond humanitarian aid. On the contrary, the EU set up an office in Benghazi and with the support of member states and allocated funding to programmes that had were already designed to support the transition to democracy, while maintaining the communication channels with the UN. In practice, the EU was already looking beyond the crisis phase and its longer relations with Libya. The difficult post-conflict peace-building phase had already started but was to intensify. This was another area of strong interaction between the EU and the UN. Let see how.

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\(^{204}\) EDRIS database. Available at: [https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/](https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac/) (13/3/2012)

\(^{205}\) Importantly, by early April, the main European players in Libya had agreed politically that the NTC was the only legitimate interlocutor.
Post conflict - competing with the UN

As discussed above, beyond the provision of humanitarian aid and the implementation of sanctions, the European Union institutions, and particularly CSDP, were excluded from the crisis management phase in the Libya uprising, due the internal divisions within the EU.

Yet the European Union was drawn back in quickly with the discussion on the post conflict scenario and peace-building as the member states started recognizing the National Transitional Council (NTC) as a legitimate counterpart to discuss the future of Libya. The NTC, established in Benghazi, played an important role in inducing the international community to condemn the Gaddafi regime and establish a coalition to protect the civilian population. By mid February 2011, several European member states had recognized this provisional body and by March, France, the UK, Italy and others, had established a diplomatic presence in Benghazi, in what looked like a race by Europeans and the US to show their support to the nascent authorities.

In this context, while the NATO campaign was in full swing, the member states had a major preoccupation: legitimacy.206 The Arab countries, and particularly Qatar, were behind the operation and were supporting generously the NTC and the Libyan population, seemed to be grateful for the NATO operation, which had interrupted the advance of the Gaddafi forces a few kilometres from Benghazi. Yet the front of support for the intervention remained fragile with criticism coming rapidly from the Arab League, Russia and China. This criticism obviously had repercussions also domestically, for instance in Italy, were the support for the military operation was rather wavering and some caveats were put on the use of the military assets. For this reason, Europeans focussed on showing that the operation had as wide a recognition as possible and tried to ensure that the burden of post-conflict peacebuilding would be shared among many. They insisted on giving the leadership role in coordination to the United Nations and in ensuring the swift implication of EU institutions, from the EEAS and the High Representative, to the European Commission. However, at this

206 Interview n°23 (European NATO member government official), 5 July 2011.
operational level, EU-UN cooperation was far from easy, and actually lent itself to frequent misunderstandings and competition.

By mid March 2011, explorative missions by the EU were being launched primarily to show support to the transitional authorities and to identify possible venues for cooperation. As the financial cooperation portfolio had not been formally suspended, the EEAS and the European Commission had the power to modify the few programmes already on-going in Libya before the crisis and revert them to the east of the country. As the political decision my member states to support the rebels had been taken, this could be done swiftly. In mid-April, the High representative started calling for the opening of a technical office in Benghazi, which was established in May and funds from the Instrument for Stability, the ENPI and the EIDHR/NSA LA were allocated in support to the health sector, capacity building, education and support to civil society. These operations were meant also to show the commitment of the European Union to support the new authorities.207

The UN, on the other hand, was largely paralysed at this stage, even though Europeans continued to put it theoretically at the centre of post-conflict reconstruction. In fact, its mandate for impartiality and neutrality prevented it from openly supporting the NTC while the NATO operations were still on-going and with the official authorities still in Tripoli. The United Nations, for instance, had to maintain a small presence in Tripoli, so it was impossible for it to build up a presence in Benghazi. In this sense, with the objective of the Europeans moving implicitly from civilian protection to regime change, the United Nations was inevitably side-lined. Some doubts were also raised about the capacity of the UN to carry out such operations given a not too effective management of the humanitarian operations in the previous month. Finally, a degree of competition started to surface among bureaucracies, as the

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EU and the Commission were keen in having a visible role in coordinating European peace-building support.208

While being excluded from direct intervention during the operations, the UN supported the initial capacity building initiatives done by the European Union and other donors. And the Secretary General launched the internal preparation for the post-conflict assessment, where the United Nations was expected to play a leadership role, with the capacity of providing an overarching donor coordination umbrella to include also non-European players, particularly from the Arab world. The SG nominated a Special Envoy for Libya, Ian Martin, who started the preparation through a series of inter-agency thematic groups that would coordinate the post-conflict needs assessment (PCNA) process. Then, following the liberation of Tripoli, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2009 on 16 September 2011 launching the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), designed to assist the political transition and post-conflict recovery. A donor meeting was held in Paris in September, where the EU, the UN and the WB, designed the main mechanisms of coordination and division of labour over different sectors. The EU took charge of border management, civil society and media, while the UN maintained overall coordination and took the leadership over security sector reform and the DDR of the militias, as well as electoral support (BBC News 2011).

By the mid 2012 the EU had new and on-going programmes contracted for more than 50 million euros (about 34% of which was implemented through international organizations – UNICEF, IOM, UNHCR) and an additional availability of more than 50 million euros under ENPI and other instruments for the following years (2012-2013). See table below.

208 Interview n°24 (EEAS official), 10 September 2011, Direct observation 2011-2012
Table 35. EU cooperation portfolio (contracts) in Libya as of Jun 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Financial Instrument</th>
<th>Total contracted in Euro (On-going projects in June 2012)</th>
<th>Contracted to UN and IOM</th>
<th>% contracted to UN or IOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>26.800.000</td>
<td>12.300.000</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>3.000.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>3.822.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI-Migr</td>
<td>15.600.000</td>
<td>5.600.000</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFS</td>
<td>3.400.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>52.622.000</td>
<td>17.900.000</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, the general approach here was supposed to be the less intrusive as possible. Libyan authorities were keen to reclaim sovereignty over the post-conflict reconstruction and the donors also careful at not creating a situation of donor congestion or overlaps in a country, which will eventually have sufficient resources to finance its own development.

Table 36. Configuration of variables (resources) for the unit of analysis “Libya post-conflict reconstruction”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 6: Libya post-conflict reconstruction</th>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Legal Competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Political Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.5 (High)</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in table 36 on the variables above, in the post-conflict phase the EU was in a relative position of strength in Libya. As is typically the case in post-conflict situation, the actual human resources on the ground were relatively few and the EU Delegation by January 2012 still had barely six staff, none of which was actually

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209 Own elaboration on internal documents (CRIS). Information Available also on the webpage for annual programmes of the DG Europeaid website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/ap/index_en.htm
permanent. This compared to the big UNSMIL staff on the ground, with around 150 people supporting the transition (electoral assistance, political affairs, protection and humanitarian aid, etc.). However, looking at actual development funding, the EU was by far the biggest donor, with projects on-going or in preparation touching already almost all sectors of transition and development. In addition, while the mandate of UNSMIL was temporary and subject to periodic revision by the UNSC members and, potentially, to the resistance by the Libyan authorities, the EU was clearly working under a long-term timeframe. The EU perspective in 2011 and 2012 was that of establishing a permanent diplomatic and economic presence with a partner and neighbourhood, based also on a relatively clear mandate from member states to support democratic transition and development. 210

According to our hypothesis, this different perspective and the rebalancing in the positions of power of the EU and the UN as Libya exits the situation of crisis, might make the EU’s approach towards working with the UN colder and more dismissive as time goes by. 211

6.2.2 Explaining

The international reaction to the Libyan uprising provides a good overview of the different forms of European interaction with the United Nations, of its motivations and limits. As for the previous case study, the table below provides an overview of the values per each variable for the case study seen as a whole, crisis management and post conflict peace-building.

210 Direct observation. EU delegation to Libya, 2012. See also the Council conclusion of 23 July 2012, following the elections for the constitutional assembly of July 2012: “The EU reiterates its determination to further strengthen its engagement with Libya, a key neighbour for Europe with whom the EU wishes to establish long-term and mutually beneficial relations, including in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and regional initiatives such as the Union for the Mediterranean. The EU further supports enhancing synergies with other regional initiatives such as the 5+5 Western Mediterranean Forum (...)”.

211 This seems coherent with what Axelrod and Keohane have called the “Shadow of the future”. The expectation that an actor has of the evolution of the relationship in the future will have an impact on cooperation (Axelrod and R. O. Keohane 1985, 231)
Table 37. Configuration of all variables (resources & cohesion) for Case Study 6 – Libya 2011 -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Resources</th>
<th>Ideational Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 (High)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integration</th>
<th>Unity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making Procedure</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Coherence</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0 (Low)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Legal Competences          | 0.5                  |
| Political Support          | 0.5                  |
| Acceptance                 | 0.5                  |
| Reputation                 | 0                    |
| Total                      | 1.5 (Medium)         |
| Total                      | 2 (Medium)           |

However, as we have seen, there is considerable variation in the context of the variables before, during and after the crisis in Libya. Before the crisis the EU had a relatively weak and fragmented presence in Libya. This presence was expanding following the slow and uncertain reintegration of Libya within the community of nations after a long period of isolation. This expansion was driven predominantly by the commercial, security and energy interest of member states (with Italy in a dominant position) and was characterized by a contained competition for influence in the country, at the frontier of the Euro-Mediterranean policy.

Just as France and Spain had done it in the Western Maghreb, Italy tried to draw in the EU institutions, with the objective to share the burden of cooperation with Libya and with an agenda strongly focussed on migration and border control. By 2008, the relationship was framed within the broader negotiations for a binding agreement that was supposed to “normalise” Europe’s relationship with Libya in an institutionalized set-up analogous to the rest of the region. The European Commission played an important role. Yet the lack of presence and knowledge of the country and the relatively weak expertise in the field of migration and border management, forced the EU to build strong cooperation channels with the international organizations present in Libya, including the UN and the IOM.
Crisis management

The 2011 crisis broke this pattern, with some EU member states attempting to take a leadership role in the ousting of Colonel Gadhafi and therefore in the breaking of the existing status quo. The EU military instruments were jammed by the unwillingness by Germany to adhere to the UNSC resolution for a NFZ, which had been strongly sponsored by the UK and France. The EU however, eventually sponsored the activation of NATO, which was needed to aggregate the indispensable American military assets. NATO also served to reassure some countries, such as Italy, that were looking for a reliable institutional framework as a safeguard from the activeness of France and the UK, which was perceived as a threat to its former leadership and interests in Libya.

In this situation of latent mutual suspicion within the EU membership, the UN was the key framework for legitimation and a venue to build up an international coalition. The UK and France were able to create in the UNSC the international consensus for their plan to intervene in Libya. UNSC Resolution 1973 (2011) went as far as to refer to the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, an absolute first (International Peace Institute 2011).

In Europe, France and the UK benefitted from the increased visibility and prestige given to them by the promotion and the brokering at the UN of a deal over sanctions first and then the intervention. At the operational level, the UN mandate allowed Germany to promote and implement the sanctions on Libya notwithstanding its opposition to the military intervention.212 Even though the EU was openly divided, the UN framework still allowed operational engagement in the following months, which was accepted by everyone. All the statements by the EU and, most notably, the various decisions over sanctions, constantly referred to the mandate given by the United Nations.

212 Although no direct participation to the NATO operations was granted by Germany, its passive acceptance of them was clear. See for instance the positive appraisal by German Chancellor Angela Merkel on the role of NATO in summer 2011 (The Local 2011)
Yet, as shown above, the adherence to the UNSC mandate was somehow mystified and distorted. NATO progressively interpreted the mandate in a very extensive way and was accused of promoting regime change. This had repercussion on the case of Syria, where throughout 2011 and 2012 the UNSC was not able to issue a strong condemnation on the fear by Russia and China that this would eventually lead to another international intervention (Hersh 2012; The Economist 2012). This behaviour fits well our characterization of a ‘ceremonial approach’ to cooperation with the UN. The United Nations was needed less for its actual capacities and material resources than for the formal imprint of international legitimacy that it ensured. Access and capabilities were available to NATO and experience on Libya was relatively weak for everybody, including the United Nations after years of isolation.

On the other hand, the UN ensured the legality of the action (if not its legitimacy) and reinforced the political support domestically for the leading member states, particularly France. It also strengthened the regional acceptance in the Arab world where the European reputation was at an all time low, against the backdrop of the hesitation over the democratic movements that were hitting North Africa.

**Post-conflict peacebuilding**

EU-UN cooperation in the post-conflict phase was prepared carefully, as Europeans wanted to have a presence on the ground while avoiding at the same time to be seen as playing an excessively intrusive role in peace-building and transition. Coordinated assessment missions were therefore launched in Paris and the EU strongly supported the deployment of UNSMIL. A division of labour was agreed upon in the Paris summit in September, granting a coordinating role to the Libyan authorities and acknowledging the experience and capabilities of the UN in the post-conflict phase, in security sector reform and electoral assistance. At this stage, the EU could also count on the various partnerships and best practices that it had developed with the UN in

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213 France and the UK had the leadership on this particular file while the role of the United States and of the Obama Presidency has been characterized as more passive, but still essential for the success of the operation. For a debate on the so-called “Leading from behind” doctrine see the comment by Remnick for the New Yorker (Remnick 2011).
terms of post conflict need assessment as well as electoral assistance. On paper, therefore, the organization of donor coordination was improved.

Yet, Europeans (and particularly the EU institutions) were inevitably looking at a new long-term paradigm of EU-Libya relations, where the UN’s role was hard to establish. A paradigm, which was already on the brink of being established before the crisis had started and envisaged the inclusion of Libya within the broader Euro-Mediterranean and neighbourhood framework. What is more, the new transitional Libyan authorities themselves started growing uncomfortable with the fact of having a UN political mission deployed in the country, creating an impression of crisis, and statelessness. As early as November, an important government reshuffle, including at the prime minister level, substantially changed the cards on the table and many of the agreements made in Paris had to be reviewed, partially stalling the post-conflict needs assessment process. By the end of 2011, Europeans were already beginning to complain about “having to wait for the UN.” If the situation further stabilizes in the medium term and the oil revenues recover to their previous levels, there is therefore ground for potential competition between the EU and the UN. It might be exaggerated to define ‘dismissive’ the approach of the EU institutions at this stage, but it can be predicted that the legitimacy and acceptance that Europe currently has in Libya and its totally different perspective on the region, will eventually reduce the incentives for cooperation with the UN. This particularly, once the UN’s capacities on immediate post-conflict reconstruction will no longer be perceived as essential.

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214 Interview n. 24 (EEAS official), 10 September 2011
215 Direct observation and informal interviews with European personnel about to deploy to Libya, 17-19 January 2012
In this context, it might actually be the UN that adopts a predatory approach on the EU. With a lot of funding available but relatively small administrative capabilities to execute activities directly (small EU Delegation) and scarcity of implementing partners (few NGOs, and still weak national authorities), the EU has few alternatives to the UN, which has little or no own funding in Libya but important capabilities (particularly until UNSMIL is on the ground). What is more, although the UNSMIL mission is temporary and linked to a ‘transition’ situation, the various UN programmes and agencies (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF, ect), naturally seek to re-establish themselves in the medium to long-term in Libya. In this sense, an initial EU funded project can be an excellent way to gain credit and credibility with the Libyan authorities for the future.

6.3 Summing up

In this chapter I attempted to combine the analysis of two apparently different cases in the Middle East and North Africa. Iraq and Libya certainly are very distinctive contexts for cooperation between the EU and the UN, yet, as this chapter highlights, they present also considerable similarities. Both countries have been pariahs of the international community under very rigid sanction regimes throughout the 1990s. As a consequence they were not included in the institutionalized schemes that the European Union devised towards the region in those years, remaining two frontier
areas for European foreign policy. Both countries, in addition were the targets of military intervention in 2003 and 2011 to which Europe participated, without its military structures of CFSP but with some of its member states. Both cases are also examples of the engagement of the international community in peace-building and state reconstruction, with the important challenges in terms of national ownership, coordination of donors and players, division of labour and prioritization of security over development.

The empirical evidence seems to corroborate the hypothesis underlying our study: rational choice explanations linked to the weakness of the European Foreign Policy System offer a valid explanation of the motivation of the EU to work with the United Nations. In Iraq, where Europe was extremely divided politically by the strong stance of the United States and where access and experience and capabilities was very low, also due to the security situation, the EU was strongly reliant on the United Nations both before and after the crisis. We have characterized this approach as ‘dependent’ toward the valuable resources that were offered by the United Nations both during the crisis and afterwards. It is undeniable that there was also an ideological and normative dimension to the reliance on the United Nations in Iraq, in the height of the contrast with the US over multilateralism in international affairs. The European debacle on Iraq, in fact, led to a momentous pioneering phase, which saw the adoption of the European Security Strategy and the establishment of the European doctrine of Effective Multilateralism. Working with the UN, therefore also responded to an important identity objective for Europe in contrast to the G.W. Bush administration.

Yet, the chapter also demonstrate that rationalist motivations amply justified working with the UN in the two cases. Europe had no other alternatives to play a role in Iraq but to regroup within the legitimacy of the UN umbrella and to take advantage of the UN capabilities, access and experience in Iraq, which Europe lacked in 2003-2004. The European Commission, in particular, took the opportunity of the division within Europe to build up its presence on the ground, in a post-conflict context where any activity is at the cross-roads between development and security. As is often the case in these situations, the political momentum and the urgency meant that the EC had more humanitarian and development funding that it could actually spend directly. So, it established a strong working relationship with the UN and the WB. Yet, with the years, the situation changed. While Europe became more confident and united on the
long-term development of Iraq, it started emancipating itself from the United Nations (and WB) intermediation and mentoring and progressively designed its own independent strategy and tools, including through CSDP.

The template is similar in the case of Libya. An important difference here rested on a much more limited US role and on a division among member states which was less explicit and, importantly, did not involve France and UK, who actually resume their “entente cordiale” during the 2011 crisis. Europeans and particularly France and the UK played a leading role in the military intervention, although this was launched through the NATO structures and not via CSDP. The strongest proximity of Libya to the EU and the more stable security environment, at least in the first months after the toppling of the Gaddafi regime, meant that Europe’s access and experience in this country was higher than in Iraq. As a consequence, while the UN legitimacy was sought carefully and the UNSC was constantly acclaimed as the leading player in the various summits and contact group meetings on reconstruction, the approach was rather ceremonial. The whole donor coordination scheme, which was set up carefully and thoroughly during the crisis and in preparation for reconstruction and development, was rapidly side-lined as redundant and cumbersome once the regime fell. This further shows that, although, policy learning can lubricate and improve inter-institutional relations it does not in itself remove the imminently rational factors that motivate or inhibit cooperation. If the transition of Libya maintains a certain pace, one can expect that EU-UN cooperation will slow down just as Europe attempts to normalize its relations with Libya within the broader Euro-Mediterranean context.
PART III

MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 7. Synthesizing the Empirical Findings

My aim in this chapter is to synthesize the findings coming from the empirical analysis carried out so far. Overall, it appears that the analytical framework built in chapter 2 has broadly resisted the test of facts. According to this approach, decisions on cooperation with the UN can be explained (and are perceived) as rational calculations based on self-interest. The key argument is that, given a specific interaction opportunity, the EU will cooperate with the UN if it is weak and has a particular need to do so in terms of ideational or material resources. The UN therefore, plays the function of empowering the EU and its actors in carrying out policies that they would be otherwise incapable of maintaining unilaterally. The alternative narrative that views cooperation with the United Nations as motivated by normative or ideological considerations or conceptualizes the EU as a staunch paladin of multilateralism “no matter what” is often contradicted by empirical analysis. Normative motivations can be complementary and provide additional insights on a decision to work with the UN but they are mostly secondary and are not necessary by themselves to the explanation.

In the next pages I will examine these issues more in detail in three main sections. The first two sections will present the key findings against the two main hypotheses. First, I will look at the impact of resources (capacities and legitimacy) on EU-UN cooperation. Second, I will look at the issue of unity and integration, and how these two factors have an impact on our problem. The third section will discuss the secondary intervening factors and conditions that have been considered throughout the case study and whose role needs to be better qualified. They include geographical proximity, institutional reform, socialization and rhetoric.

Before turning to the major findings, Table 38, below, provides a summary of the values for the dependent and independent variables per each of the case study and unit of analysis addressed in the preceding chapters. On the basis of these quantifications, I have elaborated the illustrative graphs used in the case study chapters and below.
Table 38. Summary of the values for all independent variables (resources & cohesion) and for the dependent variable (cooperation outcome)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case studies</th>
<th>Units of analysis</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Explanandum Cooperation Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case study 1: Development cooperation in Morocco and Algeria</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget Support</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case Study 2: Western Sahara conflict</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political mediation</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping Minurso</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case Study 3: Development cooperation in the West Bank and Gaza</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refugees and UNRWA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct budgetary assistance</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical assistance on Security sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case Study 4: Security in the Levant</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the MEPP Quartet</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CSDP in the ME</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping Lebanon (UNIFIL)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case study 5: Iraq 2003-2011</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-conflict peace building</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Case Study 6: Libya 2011</strong></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis management</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-conflict peace building</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.1 Looking for resources: the UN’s empowering function

I begin by recalling the first hypothesis behind this study:

Hypothesis 1:

- The less the EU has expertise, access, capabilities or legitimacy on a particular issue, the more it will seek cooperation with the United Nations.

The simple idea behind this hypothesis is that the scarcer are the resources of the EU on a particular issue or topic the higher will be its inclination to work with the UN. This hypothesis stems from a rational-choice and instrumentalist approach to cooperation acknowledging the costs inherent to any type of coordination and joint-decision making, in terms of autonomy, visibility and transaction costs. Within this paradigm the willingness of any actor to embark in cooperation is conditioned by the existence of a clear need or benefit (Pollack 2006; Snidal 2002). Further, in chapter 2 I have distinguished within the broad category of “resources”, the material and ideational. Material resources can be broadly labelled as capacities. I have identified four main factors: experience, access, capabilities and policy. Ideational resources, on the other hand, are all related to legitimacy (both internal and international). I have used four variables: legal competence, political support, acceptance and reputation.216

This hypothesis has proven the most resilient across the various case studies analysed, and the variables have all shown a high level of correlation with our dependent variable ‘cooperation.’217 The figure below, illustrates this correlation combined for

216 See Chapter 2. Each of the factors is measured on a 0-0,5-1 scale and introduced into a specific matrix. The two main variables (ideational and material resources) then, go from a minimum value of 0 to a maximum of 4. 2, is considered a cross-over point from one quadrant to the other. The matrix is then used for graphic elaboration and Comparative Qualitative Analysis (Ragin 2000). The graphs provided do not aim to give a deterministic appreciation of the conditions of EU-UN cooperation but allow informing and illustrating better the qualitative analysis.

217 My own calculations of correlation between independent and dependent variables on the basis of the values syntesized in Table 38 above, using Microsoft Excel, resulted in the following. Correlation between ‘Ideational Resources’ and dependent variable = - 0.8; Correlation between ‘Material Resources’ and dependent variable = - 0.73.
ideational and material resources on the basis of the values presented in Table 38, above. Cooperation with the UN decreases with the increase in EU legitimacy and capacities.

**Figure 13. Overall linear correlation between variable “Legitimacy” and explanans “cooperation”**

As discussed in Chapter 2, the hypothesis was used to understand not only what motivates cooperation but also the approach by which different EU actors undertake cooperation and interaction, along the models that I have designed of “dependent”, “ceremonial”, “predatory” and “dismissive”. The figure below shows the relations between the two main variables and these models of interaction.
7.1.1 Finding 1: Europe’s main weakness

The main finding is that the European Union uses the UN and multilateralism to empower itself to do things it cannot do unilaterally. Europe’s structural weakness in terms of capacities and legitimacy means that it frequently has to rely on the United Nations in the MENA region, particularly outside of the Maghreb. Some important examples of dependency on the UN have been analysed particularly in areas such as crisis management, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. There are no few cases in the MENA region, and I have identified at least one such situation in each of the chapters on Maghreb, Levant and countries outside of the EMP.

In the policy areas where the EU is weaker and less capable (particularly in conflict situations) it has developed together with the UN a large experience of successful interaction and can count on a set of methods and practices that are tested. In some cases the dependency is linked to a specific mandate or expertise of an organization that becomes indispensible for the EU. There is no going around UNRWA, for example, in dealing with the Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza and neighbouring Arab countries. Even though the EU has important capabilities and has been the leading donor to UNRWA for many years now, it continues to do so relentlessly, because otherwise it would not have access to large parts of the...
Palestinian territories and population, namely in Gaza, particularly since the boycott of Hamas. A similar situation has characterized the EU’s policy in Iraq following the 2003 US-led invasion. The EU and the Commission in particular was obliged to utilize a UN instrument, such as the IRFFI, to channel its development assistance because the security situation and the weak presence of Europeans in Iraq after the war made it impossible to do otherwise. Finally, on the Western Sahara conflict Europe would perhaps have the potential to act in terms of access and capabilities but has no policy or legitimacy to do so. It therefore happily passes the buck to the UN with its everlasting MINURSO operation.

Figure 15. Examples of strong “dependency” on the UN

7.1.2 Finding 2: instrumental or selective multilateralism

An important challenge for the study was to generalize a judgement on EU-UN cooperation within a specific country or region or even a single policy sector. The six case studies presented, in this sense, all display a large degree of internal variance and heterogeneity. This is due mainly to two reasons.

First, the EU’s tendency to work with the UN varies across time. A key discovery is that with an increase of experience (material resource) and reputation (ideational resource) the EU will tend to emancipate itself from the international organizations
with which it has been working and carry out the task independently. This is a typical phenomenon in inter-institutional relations (Biermann 2007, Haugevik 2007). This general trend cannot be captured fully by the matrix of variables or the graphs presented, which are static snapshots. However, it emerges quite consistently from the interviews and empirical research and I have tried to articulate it in the narrative and historical analysis. One example is the use of the World Bank to channel direct budgetary assistance to the Palestinian authorities. In the mid 2004-2005 the EU channelled extensive funds through the Bank, gained experience and reputation and then developed its own European independent instruments, such as the TIM or Pegase in 2006 and 2008. Another example is Iraq, where the EU has progressively marginalized the United Nations to build its own direct relationship with the Iraqi authorities. This tendency has been discussed by some of the inter-organizational literature (Biermann 2007; Koops 2009; Tardy 2011). This literature has, for instance, spelled-out the pattern by which a younger, more inexperienced organization, uses a more senior one for mentoring, to then become fully independent (Jørgensen 2006, 206; Biermann 2007, Tardy 2009). This physiological pattern to organizational development can produce frustration and rivalry between the two organizations, which have to coexist while competing for limited resources, political support and visibility, especially when the road to independence and specialization leads itself rather to duplication.  

The second reason behind this within-case variation is explained once more through rational-choice. When it is not in a completely dependent position, the EU will evaluate the costs and benefits of cooperation based on the specific circumstances and will base its policy accordingly. For example, when formulating technical assistance projects in the security sector in the West Bank and Gaza, the Commission assesses on a case by case basis whether it would bring any added value to work with UN agencies or not. UNOPS has served well the purpose of flanking the complementary/competing CSDP EUPOL COPPS operation in the police reform area

218 As noted by Tardy, there is an element of “inherent competition” in any inter-institutional relationship (Tardy 2011, 33)
and rule of law. This “ad hocism” and selectivity (coupled with demanding reporting requirements) can be disruptive for the UN, which prefers long-term predictable donor relationships that allow autonomy in planning and implementation (Gourlay 2009, 85).

Related to this, is the desire of the EU to diversify its implementation channels, to avoid creating a dependency on a particular actor. Commission Headquarters have promoted this approach particularly since 2007-2008, following the “UN rush” period, which climaxed in 2006-2007 with huge operations implemented in Iraq and the Palestinian territories (and Afghanistan). In normal situations international organizations need to participate to open calls for proposals or tenders, in competition with NGOs and private contractors. This irritates the UN. On the contrary, in crisis situations the EU and the Commission have the procedural possibility to quickly grant funds to a trusted implementing partner that can ensure results even if at higher costs in terms of visibility and autonomy. Therefore, the more the context is characterized by high security and implementation risks, the more the EU will turn by default to the UN. This explains in part the higher than average percentage of UN channelling for emergency instruments such as the Instrument for Stability, or Humanitarian aid.

7.1.3 Finding 3: legitimacy and capacities, form and substance

There is a linkage between material resources and legitimacy (ideational resources). In most cases analysed a low level of material resources for the EU couples with low levels of legitimacy, recognition and credibility. The two variables, however, are not completely dependent one from the other, which would lead only to cases in which the EU is either completely dependent or completely dismissive of the UN. Instead, there are interesting cases where the two sets of variables are inversely distributed.

Once the decision to cooperate and interact has been taken, this variation in factors can provide an explanation for the approach to cooperation and the probability for the relationship to last in the long term. Here we introduced the concepts or categories of ‘ceremonial’ and ‘predatory’ EU behaviour, which have contributed to elucidating our puzzle. On conflict resolution in Western Sahara, what the EU and its actors really need is legitimacy. They would have the capacities to act and decide, but they are hindered by the difficult regional context, the lack of international and domestic political support to break the status quo and the internal division. When cooperation
takes place in this context, particularly in the security sector, it is largely ‘ceremonial’, formalistic and is often not conducive to an important political and material investment from the EU. The European contribution to crisis management in Libya has followed this template. The EU and particularly some member states have committed important resources to this endeavour and have shown willingness to use them during the crisis. The UN was used as a political and operational framework to maintain a rubber stamp of international legitimacy on the change of regime that Europeans have promoted much in excess to the UNSC mandate. The graph below shows the values of the variables for ideational and material resources on three issues where cooperation takes place but is rather superficial, cosmetic, or as we defined it ‘ceremonial’.

**Figure 16. Examples of “ceremonial” cooperation**

An opposite example can be taken from Palestine, where on development cooperation in general the Commission has built up a considerable capital of legitimacy within the EU and with the Palestinian authorities. Yet, in the security sector there are specific sensitivities. The EU uses the United Nations to carry out definite technical assistance projects, often in support to its CSDP operation, in a territory that is hostile to external meddling and under the strict supervision of Israel. The case of humanitarian assistance the Saharawi refugees in Algeria is an additional example. The EU needs the UN to give that aura of impartiality and neutrality to its action and keep the SADR
authorities at harms-length. It needs access and policy, more than legitimacy as such. Cooperation takes place in all these cases, yet when the variable are so inverted, at least in relative term, cooperation is even more instrumental, as the EU actors involved can count on an good degree of internal legitimacy and credibility. We have defined the type of behaviour that can result from this situation: ‘predatory’. In the figure below shows three examples from the one discussed in previous chapters.

**Figure 17. Examples of “predatory” cooperation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacities</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predatory</td>
<td>Dismissive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid to Saharawi</td>
<td>T.A. in security sector WBG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP operations in Palestine</td>
<td>Ceremonial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.1.4 Finding 4: the UN as a social lift

As argued in Chapter 2, the UN can be used for internal empowerment within the EU foreign policy system. Here we have to use the two sets of variables under hypothesis 1 in combination. The more an institution or a specific member state is weak in relative terms within the EU foreign policy institutional balance, the more it will tend to cooperate with the UN. The UN is used as a ‘social lift’ for progression in the system.

This is consistent with the rationalist claim (liberal and neorealist) that weak or small states have a stronger tendency to favour multilateral solutions (Keohane 1969, 291; Toje 2010, 181). France, for instance, was cut out from Iraq post-conflict
reconstruction due to its posture before the war. Subsequently, it was one of the most eager proponents of EU engagement via the UN in Iraq, while being careful at avoiding the legitimization of the US-led military operation. As a club of middle and small powers, EU member states are generally all keen in promoting multilateral solutions, especially in the security field (Laatikainen 2006; Toje 2010, 29).

This logic applies also to institutions and not only to states. In areas where the institutional context is very dense with actors, both national and supranational, each of these actors will be more likely to work with the United Nations than would otherwise be the case. A comparison of development in the Maghreb and in the Levant seems to corroborate this hypothesis. Where the Commission is faced by the competition of CSDP operations (Iraq, Palestine), we have seen it work with the UN to establish a position and presence in these operations and potentially complement/coordinate member states initiatives. We have mentioned also the case of Western Sahara, where the Commission is excluded from the conflict itself and has used the UN to work in the refugee camps of Tindouf to have at least an accessory presence on this issue. In the Levant, the Commission has gradually established a leading and supportive position in the managing board of UNRWA to increase its visibility and coordination role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the contrary, interaction with the UN is limited to loose coordination and information sharing in Morocco and Algeria, even in areas such as governance, post-conflict rehabilitation and the rule of law, where the UN has substantive expertise and capabilities. In the Maghreb the European Commission is much more established than in the Near East (and the UN is weaker), has a stronger mandate stemming from the European Neighbourhood Policy and Barcelona process and the full backing of the leading member states, which have delegated to it the implementation (and formulation to a certain extent) of development policy, particularly from the 2000s.

7.1.5 Finding 5: policy issues and resources

Findings in terms of policy sectors are mixed. There appears to be an impact on EU-UN interaction when a policy sector is stabilized and the Commission, for example, does not feel threatened by other organizations in its competences. The extreme case here is development cooperation in the Maghreb, where exists a strong, resourced, long-term strategy promoted by the EU as a whole and clearly delegated to the EC
(with the Lisbon reform the EEAS is also strongly involved). In this context, the space for the UN is small. References to UN standards and goals as well as loose coordination with UN agencies can resurface in a ceremonial way when, as in the case of budget support, the Commission is challenged in its policies by some member states. In general, EU-UN cooperation on development policy (outside of crisis situations) is less common than in the security sector where the EU is weaker, less experienced and therefore more reliant on the United Nations.

The graph below shows how the values for our variables are generally much higher in the case of development cooperation than with security. This graph looks at the six main case studies analysed in the previous chapters, giving a general combined view perhaps over-simplistic but still quite useful.

**Figure 18. Illustration of configuration of variables (resources) for all 6 main case studies**

To see the impact of the policy field to its full, though, it is better to turn to the second hypothesis on EU cohesion, which assessed the influence of EU unity and integration on its willingness to work with the UN. I will turn to this in the next section.
7.2 Unity and integration: keeping it together

The second hypothesis looks at the influence of EU cohesion on its willingness to work with the UN. As argued in Chapter 2 this hypothesis was considered as complementary to the first hypothesis, as it applies mainly to the EU as a whole, while the first hypothesis can apply both to the EU and to its composing actors. Literature (and institutional reform) on EU foreign policy has intensively focussed on the issue of coherence and consistency as a key element of actoriness and power in international relations and a traditional problem for the EU (Nuttal 2005; Toje 2008a). For the concept of cohesion I analysed both the level of “unity” or consensus among member states on a position or on an action, and the degree of “integration”. Integration was assessed as a function of the decision-making procedure used on that issue and of the “institutional coherence” in that particular policy area. The idea was that maximum cooperation would be experienced in areas that articulate across pillars, where intra-EU legitimacy is contested and cooperating with the UN can help credibility and expertise.219

The hypothesis stated:

**Hypothesis 2:**

- The more the EU is divided on a particular issue area and the less it is institutionally coherent, the more it is likely to work with the United Nations.

The results of the empirical research on this hypothesis are more mixed and the interpretation is more complex and sometimes misleading than for hypothesis 1.220 This is mainly due to the fact that unlike with hypothesis 1, a high level in the variables “integration” and “unity” does not exclude EU cooperation with the UN as a

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219 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 above.

220 As for the variables “Ideational and Material resources” I have calculated the correlation between Unity and Integration and the dependent variable on the basis of the values sintesized in Table 38 above, using Microsoft excel. This resulted in the following figures, which denote a much lower level of correlation as compared with the variables under hypothesis 1. Correlation between ‘Unity’ and dependent variable = - 0.65; Correlation between ‘Integration’ and dependent variable = - 0.33.
whole. The causal link is therefore less direct, as compared to the variables linked to ideational or material resources. There can be cooperation when the EU is cohesive. But these variables will affect the nature of the cooperation, which will be more substantial, shrewd and problem-oriented when they are high as opposed to ceremonial and formalistic, when they are low. Correlation with “cooperation” is therefore less stringent, as mentioned above, but the two variables can still yield some interesting findings, if complemented with the previous hypothesis on resources.

The overall finding is similar to what comes out of hypothesis 1. Rather than a normatively driven staunch promoter of multilateral solutions, the EU can be described as a “clumsy multilateralist”: it often uses the UN to dissimulate its internal divisions and half-baked institutional structures (Koops 2011, 83–87) and smuggle itself into international politics.

**Figure 19. Approaches to interaction (hypothesis 2)**

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221 Each of the factors is measured on a 0-1-2 scale and introduced into a specific matrix. The two main variables (Unity and Integration) then, go from a minimum value of 0 to a maximum of 4. The matrix is then used for graphic elaboration and Comparative Qualitative Analysis. 2, is considered a cross-over point from one quadrant to the other. Note that, although specific more undefined models have been identified for this scheme, it can also be interesting to combine these with the models elaborated for hypothesis 1 (dismissive, ceremonial, dependent, predatory).
7.2.1 Finding 6: Policy issues and coherence

Taking off from where we left in the previous section, the first trend to put in focus is that cooperation decisions in the development field are generally harder to take than in the security field, where member states are in charge. The graph below gives an overall view of the status of the variables in each major case study, showing how overall, the factors “unity” and “integration” reinforce the trend already established with the primary hypothesis on ideational and material resources.

Figure 20. Illustration of configuration of variables (cohesion) for all 6 main case studies

Obviously, we are looking here at tendencies, and it would be a mistake to interpret the graphs as anything more than a visual aid to what remains a qualitative analysis. Yet, there is consistency with what was expected and what comes out from the “Resources” variables analysed above. For instance, it would seem that the more the EU is integrated (e.g. the community method is used and one institution is clearly in the lead), the less it will tend to work with the UN.

Case 3 provides an example of when the Unity/Integration variables might enrich the analysis under hypothesis 1. Cooperation on Palestinian refugees with UNRWA is
strong on the field but taking only the variables on unity and integration one could expect the EU not to cooperate with the UN because the policy field is clearly under the control of the European Commission and member states agree on the overall policy. In this case, cooperation is explained through the first variables on legitimacy/capacity, which had already described the strong dependency of the Commission on UNRWA, in terms of both material and ideational resources. Working with UNRWA is inevitable. The difference between the Maghreb, where cooperation is quite low, and the Levant (where cooperation is overall frequent) can be explained with our hypothesis 2 by looking at the larger extent of competition that comes to the Commission from member states development agencies in the region and with the less unified position of the member states, particularly in areas that touch the security sector. Also the crisis situation in the Palestinian territories (even when working on long-term development) prevented the EU from centring all its actions around the Barcelona processes and on long-term programmes as in the Maghreb. Another explanation is linked to the higher need for international legitimacy in the Middle East as this is at the centre of global attention with many more actors involved. Finally, the UN itself invests to a greater extent in its presence in the Palestinian territories (including through the contribution of non-EU donors), as part of its mandate towards the refugees, peace-building and towards poverty reduction in general.
The unity/integration hypothesis, though, is particularly adapted to the security field, as the variables identified are biased towards member states, which have a key role in this field.

I consistently found that in the security field cooperation between the EU and its member states and the UN is more frequent and, although there is a lot of variance, I have not found one single case in which the attitude of the EU could have been described as fully dismissive towards the United Nations. This might cast some doubts on the old adagio that cooperation in high politics is always harder (Hoffmann 1966, 882). In the security field, legitimacy is more grounded on the United Nations and the UN Security Council than is the case in development (Ojanen 2011, 68; Tardy 2011). This is particularly so in the MENA region, where the poverty reduction agenda under the Millennium Development Goals is less salient and is supplanted by concerns on investment climate, regulatory convergence, structural reform and, since the 2011 Arab Spring, democratic transition. But also in terms of capacities the EU
still has a lot to learn in the field of security from the United Nations, as some interviewees from the UN have underlined. Perhaps Libya is the case where we can expect competition and conflict between the EU and the UN to surface more in the post-conflict reconstruction phase, due to the fact that the EU member states are relatively united around the objective of supporting stabilization. Yet, even in the case of Libya, the disagreements and competition that do exist between key member states such the UK, Italy and France, are likely to keep the UN into the picture. The UK, for instance, has been reluctant to raise the profile of the EU through a CSDP operation.

7.2.2 Finding 7: Boundaries, opportunities and spill-over

The distinction between security and development is particularly interesting to the impact of integration, one of the two key variables of hypothesis 2. According to our argument the transfer of powers to supranational or intergovernmental institution can affect cooperation with UN. Different institutions have different preferences and motivations towards cooperation with the UN.

The Council Secretariat seems, overall, keener towards cooperation with the UN. Its newer institutions had to gain credibility within the EU foreign policy system in a context where member states were sceptical and the European Commission suspicious and protective of its prerogatives (Dijkstra 2009; Sabiote 2010, 181). Working with the United Nations has helped build this recognition and credibility (ideational resources) both internally and externally. High Representative Solana and his team’s autonomy from member states remained limited as compared with the Commission, but also with the parallel structures in the United Nations, from UNDPA to UNDPKO. Similarly, its capabilities (staff and funding) and internal legitimacy (lack of parliamentary and judiciary oversight) have been weak, relatively to the Commission’s structures. Against this backdrop, they were among the first proponents of the “Effective multilateralism” concept and have promoted consistently strong cooperation with the UN in the Middle East as an opportunity to represent the EU.

222 Interviews n°18 and n°10 (UN officials from agencies and programmes active in the Middle East)
The Commission in comparison can sometimes view cooperation with the UN as a failure. An admission on its part that it is incapable of carrying out a particular task with its own means. It has been more challenged by the UN partners with which it has to interface and struggles to find a common language.

Yet, the Commission has also promoted the multilateral doctrine since the 2000s. The case studies have shown how the Commission has been an important vehicle of cooperation with the UN. It has done so opportunistically in cross-pillar issues such as peace building, where through the UN it could gain a view and a voice also into CFSP. The fact that “boundary areas” are fertile grounds for competition between member states and institutions and for functional spill-over has been widely discussed by literature (Dijkstra 2009, 437; White 2004, 57) including neo-functionalist scholarship. But the impact of UN cooperation on this dynamic is underexplored. This study shows how the UN is frequently used to gain ground and promote intergovernmental or supranational integration across development and security policy. The Commission, for example, uses UN agencies and programmes, as well as donor coordination groups, as an opportunity to coordinate or represent member states (Taylor 2006) or, as already discussed, to gain voice in areas from which it would be excluded. The case of Iraq is particularly telling but also smaller issues, such as the financing of the Quartet office for the MEPP, give an insight on the Commission’s motivation (or lack of) in working with the UN.

Policy areas across pillars, where there is ambiguity in competencies and/or a high institutional density - more than one institution involved - are those where cooperation is more intensive. Even if there is a loss in terms of visibility, EU institutions are eager to work with the UN when this can help increase their relative weight in a competitive environment or promote a specific supranational or intergovernmental integration solution. The leading example of this phenomenon is in the competition over the security sector reform of the Palestinian authority between the Commission and CSDP structures after 2005, and in how both initiatives strongly rely on the United Nations both as a political framework and as an operational partner.

The graph below illustrate how all the examples analysed that score low on the variables for “integration” and “unity” and that lay in between development and
security policy, tend to lead to an approach that seeks cooperation with the UN with a predominance in the “predatory” quadrant.

**Figure 22. Illustration of examples of EU-UN cooperation laying across policy fields**

![Diagram showing examples of interaction at the crossroad of development and security: values for the Integration/Unity variables.]

**7.2.3 Finding 8: UNdivided attention**

“Unity” is the second variable within hypothesis 2. The argument on unity being inversely related with cooperation with the UN is not counterintuitive perhaps but goes against a relatively dominant narrative. This sees the lack of consensus in European foreign policy as an obstacle to EU’s effectiveness in general, and to the EU’s “frontrunner” role in the UN in particular (European Commission 2003a). Accordingly a more united Europe would be a better partner for the UN and a formidable player within the UN (Degrand-Guillaud 2009b; Hoffmeister, Wouters, and Ruys 2006; Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Rasch 2008). The findings from my research don’t contest the assumption that unity would increase Europe’s weight in the international scene. Rather the findings suggest that fragmentation among member states is often paired with steadfast commitments to UN cooperation.

It is when the EU is divided that it leans the most on the UN’s shoulders. This pattern is well visible in the security sector, when one compares for instance Iraq with Libya. In the first case the EU was completely divided at the UN during the crisis and the
military intervention but then hassled with millions of euros around the UN flag on reconstruction. In the second case, Europeans were more solidly united in New York (beyond the abstention of Germany) on the military intervention and then took a much more formalistic approach to cooperation with the UN, which was already showing signs of fragility in summer 2011. There is a correlation between lack of European unity and solid cooperation with international organizations. In this sense, this study contributes to the literature that has linked the EU’s passion for multilateralism to its chronic disunity (Bouchard and Peterson 2010; Hill, Peterson, and Wessels 2011). Examples are countless in general and are several also within our six case studies, ranging from Western Sahara to crisis management in Libya and post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq. In general one can count that a disunited Europe will fall back at least on a reassuring UN process or reference or that its member states will chip in some contribution to a UN operation and “wave the UN flag”. Whether more unity could mean consistently less cooperation with the UN is less straightforward. Yet, in the cases that we have analysed, where the EU’s member states are capable to reach a consensus beyond a lowest common denominator solution, this consensus does not necessarily include working with the UN. Long-term development cooperation comes again into mind but also Libya, where the European relative success through the NATO operation has given it some confidence for the post-conflict phase.
This argument/finding is the most difficult to reconcile with the rational-choice meta-theoretical approach that informs this study. Is the habit of member states to dissimulate their divisions with the UN fig leaf really a consequential self-interested behaviour? Or, is it rather motivated by preoccupations about the “appropriateness” of showing unity in the international stage and about the importance of finding some kind of agreement to promote a European identity, however insignificant to the actual solution of the problem? I will come back to the problem of appropriateness latter in the chapter, as this certainly plays a role in the equation. Yet, at this point it is important to show that the “unity” factor does not invalidate the rationalist structure of this thesis; on the contrary. The empirical qualitative analysis and the process tracing carried out for each of the case study has allowed to elucidate at least in part what are the motivations of the individual actors involved in the final decision to cooperate with the UN.

The fragmented, multi-actor, multi-level and contested policy space of European foreign policy allows member states to pursue separate interests while promoting a multilateral strategy, which often leads a common position or joint action which can
be ambiguous or anaemic. As explained in chapter 2, when the UN performs the function of dissimulating the EU’s internal divisions member states are actually thinking about very concrete benefits. For France and the UK, working with the UN immediately translates in a leadership role in New York where they can count on their privileged status. So, for instance, the division of the EU on Libya translated in French and British activeness in New York in forging a Security Council resolution. The strong division on Iraq over the war, still left Europeans with the need and appetite to play a role in the future in one of the biggest oil producers in the world. The UN was the only way in which the EU states that had remained outside of the operations could come back into the game. For those, like the UK, who actually participated in the military operations, getting the UN on board was even more crucial to help legitimize their position. During the Lebanon crisis in 2006, the EU was paralysed and managed to call for a cease-fire only very late. The debate was transferred in New York where key member states (including Italy, then serving as non-permanent member) could play a visible role in building the consensus for a reinforcement of the UNIFIL mission, which was then endorsed in Brussels.

All these examples concern what Kirchner has defined the “politics of compellence” (Kirchner 2010, 29–30) or crisis management requiring the use of hard power. Yet, similar situations occur regularly also with frozen conflicts, most notably in the Western Sahara, where the low common denominator position of supporting the UN process allows France to control the situation without taking too much responsibility. Things can rapidly change. Divisions in the short term can sometimes become tacit or open agreements on the long-term once post-conflict reconstruction lends itself to long-term development cooperation. Once that happens, cooperating with the UN closely can become less urgent, less indispensible. Look here at the change in the approach of the EU on Iraq after 2007.

7.3. Intervening factors: space, time and “speed” of cooperation

Having analysed the impact of what we have identified as the primary determinants of EU-UN relations, we can turn to three secondary factors that have been sounded throughout the study: proximity, integration and the role of institutionalization,
socialization and rhetoric.

### 7.3.1 Proximity in space

Proximity is a concept easy to grasp intuitively but difficult to define theoretically beyond the obvious indicator of geographic distance. In assimilating the EU to a “small power”, Toje notes that one of the characteristics of these actors is that they give high importance to logistics and location in defining their interests and deploying their policies (Toje 2010, 29–30). In turn, Kirchner notes the role of geography in Europe’s security policy (Kirchner 2010, 29-30) shown by the higher investment and impact of Europeans in their immediate neighbourhood.²²³ What does this mean for cooperation with the UN?

While focussed exclusively on the MENA region this study provided some variation in terms of proximity. I used geography first of all as a presentation and structuring criteria in the treatment of the case studies, which were grouped in the Maghreb (chapter 4), the Levant (Chapter 5) and countries outside the EMP framework, one from North Africa and the other from the Middle East (Chapter 6). Can one identify different patterns when looking at North Africa (including Libya) as compared with the Middle East (including Iraq)? The empirical study shows that cooperation is wider and deeper in the Middle East than it is in North Africa. Certainly, in the Middle East the presence of the UN and of other international organizations is stronger as the issues there have higher global security relevance and the Palestinian territories, in particular, are extremely dependent on aid. There is therefore more opportunity for interaction with the EU as compared to the Maghreb. Still, we found two different channels through which geography influences EU-UN cooperation.

Firstly, Geography indirectly influences the level of reach and “access” of states and institutions on a specific problem. For example, it appears that EU-UN post-conflict cooperation in Libya is much less substantial and structural than in Iraq after 2003,

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²²³ See also the work on geographic proximity done from a neo-realist point of view by Stephen Walt, who argues that geographic proximity magnifies threat perception and therefore has an important impact on foreign policy (Walt 1987, 22–23).
with more potential for conflict. After the initial ritualistic (or ceremonial) oaths of confidence and friendship, problems, misunderstandings and frustration in Libya were already surfacing by summer 2011. Part of the answer comes from geography. Logistics in Iraq are much more complex than in Libya, which is just a few kilometres from Italian and Maltese territory. Establishing a European presence in Tripoli is much cheaper than maintaining it in Baghdad. As a consequence, supporting a strong role of the UN in Libya to provide a first entry point in the country is not so essential as in the case of Iraq early after the occupation.

Secondly, foreign policy towards geographically closer countries is typically grounded on self-interest in a “sphere of influence” (or “Ring of friends”) approach, (Mckinlay and Little 1978; 1977; Walt 1987, 23–24), which has largely inspired European policy in the Mediterranean. In North Africa, in particular, the leading member states have invested very much on a European framework that would help defend their extensive interests and traditional links in a disguised form. France and other former colonial powers such as Italy and Spain have Europeanized their policies in the Mediterranean through the Barcelona process and the ENP (Morisse-Schilbach 1999) and this has given a tremendous credibility and confidence to the European Commission (and the EEAS) to carry out its policies autonomously, albeit within stringent political guidelines. As analysed in Chapter VI, Libya and Iraq have remained outside the EMP framework, which reduced the internal authority of supranational institutions, as the policy space remained contested between member states and the EU. Yet, while EU member states have clearly expressed the wish for Libya to be integrated within the EMP framework in the medium-term, this will hardly happen for Iraq, also due to geographic location.

In sum, in cases that are particularly impervious, such as Iraq, the EU has needed the support of the UN to access the actors in the ground, share the burden of costs and show its own presence. In turn, closer to Europe and particularly around the Mediterranean basin, Europeans tend to follow a more Eurocentric approach loosely modelled on enlargement. They devise their heavily institutionalized policy frameworks of approximation and normative and regulatory diffusion, which have little need for the United Nations - and even subtly challenge its role both in security and development. In this sense, a stabilization of the West Bank and Gaza with the possibility also there to formulate and implement a long-term multiannual
development programme could reasonably be expected to lead to a further reduction of cooperation with the UN. We are already seeing the hints now, in the progressive devising of European mechanisms of direct budgetary assistance to the Palestinian authorities and the subsequent marginalization of the World Bank. Similarly, while discussions about the expansion of the EMP or the ENP also to Iraq were still velleitary in 2011-2012, the ‘normalization’ of development policy with it has already led to the closing down of the UN/WB run IRFFI programme. As the EU develops its own resources to run its business, one can expect a thorough review before a decision is taken to relinquish money, visibility and implementation power to the UN.  

7.3.2 Integration over time

A separate question concerned EU internal institutional reform and the degree to which this affected EU-UN cooperation. Has EU integration in foreign policy since the EPC increased the willingness of the EU to cooperate with the UN?

The various units of analysis (or examples of interaction) assessed by this study gave the opportunity to make a diachronic examination and compare qualitative observations across time. All the cases analysed concern the period following 1992. However most of these cases are actually grounded in some type of European action before the birth of CFSP, particularly under the European Political Cooperation framework. Therefore, from the analysis of the background and context of all the cases it would appear that while EU cooperation within the UN was certainly less developed before 1992,  cooperation by member states and institutions with the UN was not necessarily less pronounced. In the Middle East and on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the European countries have been promoting a stronger role for the United Nations, opposed on this by both Israel and the United States, at least since the Venice declaration in the 1980 (Müller 2011). The Commission has been funding UNRWA since the 1970s. The logic behind it was the same as it is today: European member

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224 The discussions in 2011-2012 on Libya’s transition between the EU, UNSMIL and UNDP on these issues are a clear case in point (direct observation, 2011-2012)

225 See, for instance the increase in coordinated votes at the UN General Assembly since 1992 (Luif 2003; Rasch 2008)
states were excluded from the political process and used the UN to leverage support on their participation (access) from the Arab world and Palestinians. Also, the leading promoter of a European engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict was France, who has traditionally used the UN to assert its role in international affairs and in Europe.

The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam have generated opposing tensions on EU-UN cooperation. On the one hand, they have increased the competition among institutions within the EU in the security field by strengthening the intergovernmental paradigm. This has created an incentive to cooperate with the UN to obtain recognition, given the UN experience, reputation and mandate in peace and security (Ojanen 2011). The Middle East, where since 1996 member states appointed a Special Envoy, has been a celebrated theatre of this institutional competition. In addition to this, the EU looked for mentoring from more experienced organizations including the UN in a context characterized by the infamous capabilities/expectation gap (Christopher Hill 1993).

On the other hand, the Treaties have also created the potential for future competition with the UN. With time the consolidation of CSDP structures has started to challenge the UN as a venue for channelling member states’ security policies (especially in civilian crisis management), particularly at the regional level, in the Balkans, but also globally (Attinà 2008; 2010; Tardy 2011). A relevant example is the establishment of EUPOL Copps, where the EU decided to deploy its own rule of law and police training mission rather than strengthening the existing UN operations. Post revolution Libya could perhaps be another example. In the same period, European contributions to blue helmets have decreased or have been granted, as in the case of UNIFIL in 2006, under condition of a tighter oversight.

The study therefore, has not identified a generally keener tendency to work with the UN in parallel to the progressive development of a new and institutionalized European foreign and security policy structure. The problems and drivers of cooperation remain the same. This is perhaps also because, notwithstanding the many reforms since 1992, the characteristic ambiguities of the EU have remained remarkably constant, including the multi-layered multi-actor and contested nature of foreign policy. Will the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon change this?
The Lisbon Treaty

I have already referred throughout the study to some of the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. However I have not focussed specifically on these for two main reasons. Firstly, most of the issues examined concern the period until 2010, before the entry into force of the Treaty. Secondly, even in the case of crisis management in Libya or where the period after 2010 was mentioned, the innovations of Lisbon will take some time to sink in completely and affect the operating methods of the European foreign policy actors. Even though there was some initial enthusiasm about the possible impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU-UN cooperation, the full impact of the Treaty will be clearer in the course of the next few years, with the EEAS staffing completed, a new European Commission nominated and the new 2014-2020 multi-annual Financial Perspectives adopted.

Having said this, based on the Treaty provisions and on the first experiences with implementation, it is possible to advance some educated guesses on the impact that this will have on EU-UN cooperation (Krause and Ronzitti 2012; Van Langenhove and Marchesi 2008; Pirozzi, Juergenliemk, and Spies 2011). The general objective when drafting and adopting the text was to increase the coherence between the EU and the member states (vertical coherence) between institutions (institutional) and between policy areas (horizontal). In this sense 2011 was a transition year, where both the European Commission and the new European External Action Service (EEAS) were undergoing deep transformations difficult to evaluate. Overall, though,

226 see the speech of 8 February 2011, Speech/11/77 by HR/VP Catherine Ashton at the UN Security Council in 2011: “As you know, we have a long-standing commitment to effective multilateralism with a strong UN at the core. Regional organisations are building blocks for global governance, with a dual responsibility. First, a responsibility to enhance security, development and human rights in their own region. And second, to support UN efforts to promote these goals around the world. When I spoke to the Security Council last year, I updated you on the progress regarding the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the promises this held for strengthening the EU’s contribution to addressing international concerns.(…) In our view the Lisbon Treaty and the External Action Service are not just good for Europe. They also make us a better partner for the UN. We are grateful for your help in recognising this.”

leadership, concentration of authority and legitimacy were still lacking.

At the apex of the structure the new High Representative and Vice President of the Commission post seems to catalyse rather than solve all the pervasive ambiguity of the system. The first to occupy this post, Baroness Catherine Ashton has made the achievement of a “comprehensive approach” in foreign policy a key objective of her tenure. At a lower level, the foreign policy, security and crisis management structures have all been fitted within the new EEAS. However, confusion, lack of coordination and bureaucratic rivalries are still going on in full swing, as the response to the 2011 “Arab Spring” has shown. In development cooperation, the dramatic turf wars that were fought by member states, Commission and Parliament during the formulation and implementation of the reform, led to the partial undermining of the initial objectives of merging the “payer” with the “player”. As a consequence, while the EEAS is now responsible for the programming phase in development assistance, it is still the Commission at Headquarters and in delegations that is in charge of identifying, formulating and implementing the individual programmes under the EU budget. This includes the decision on whether or not to channel funding via the United Nations. A stronger coordinating role has also been attributed in theory to the EU development policy structures over the member states, but how this will translate in reality remains to be seen. So, at least for what development cooperation (and humanitarian aid) is concerned, the reform has not reduced the fragmentation and competition that existed between bureaucratic structures in Brussels. Things are only slightly better in the CSDP domain, as even here, the divisions between former Council secretariat structures and former Commission structures perdure within the EEAS. Also the role of the European Parliament, while generally reinforced, will remain ambivalent in foreign policy.

In this context, one can argue for the applicability of our analytical framework also to

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227 The EEAS organigramme now even includes a Managing Director responsible for “crisis response and operational coordination,” which has been quite involved on the Arab Spring. However this actor has only a formal coordinating role at the height of the crisis, without having the staff nor the funding (humanitarian and development aid still resting firmly in the hands of the Commission) to actually increase internal coherence throughout the crisis cycle
these changed circumstances. In general, the more the EU foreign policy system is coherent and centralized the more the factors under hypothesis 1 (legitimacy and capacity) will have to be applied to the EU as a whole rather than its individual components.

The findings from this study on cooperation in the MENA show that coherence is likely to reduce the push factors to work with the UN and reinforce a self-interested and unilateralist approach to foreign policy. But we are not there yet. If anything, the tendency is not for more coherence, but rather for renationalization (ECFR 2011). The MENA is undergoing a period of great instability and competition for external influence from actors like Turkey, China, Russia or the Gulf Cooperation Council. Against this backdrop, the EU will likely maintain its current approach of selective or “shrewd” multilateralism (Koops 2011). It will choose whether to work with the UN, depending on its relative power in the particular context and challenge at hand.

7.3.3 Speeding up cooperation? Institutionalization, socialization and rhetoric

In the introduction I have represented institutionalization as an ambiguous characteristic of EU-UN interaction, an “iron cage” that is more the result of cooperation than a factor of it (DiMaggio and Powell 1984). Liberal institutionalist literature has normally considered institutions as a prerequisite for cooperation among states, facilitating, stabilizing and “speeding up” effective interaction on common problems (Keohane 1988, 384). In the study I have tried to analyse whether this interpretation could be applied to cooperation among organizations rather than states, and particularly to EU-UN cooperation. After all, as Tardy puts it: “no other UN-Regional Organization relationship has reached an equivalent level of inter-institutional linkages” (Tardy 2011, 29). So I had made the following secondary hypothesis:

- The more institutionalized the relationship between the EU and the UN, the more cooperation (inter-organisational coherence).

The findings tend to show that this is not true necessarily. Institutionalization in a context of inter-organizational cooperation can often generate more problems than it solves (Biermann 2007; Jonsson 1986; Koops 2009; Tardy 2011). Relationships between organizations typically reach a phase of plateau/maintenance (Haugevik 2007,
4). The EU and the UN seem to be kept together more by routine and responsibilities than by desire...

Notwithstanding the progressive institutionalization of cooperation between the two organizations (Tardy 2009)\textsuperscript{228}, we have not seen a substantive change in the general tendency to cooperate with the UN. As shown in Chapter 3, the rapid increase in the use of UN structures from 2001 to 2007 has been imposed primarily by the need to guarantee the disbursement of vast quantities of reconstruction funds in Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza (and Afghanistan), when alternatives were lacking. Operations have been facilitated by institutionalized cooperation and the creation of specific legal and political mechanisms. Yet, this increase in “channelling” has risen more than an eyebrow in European capitals and in the European Parliament and the European Commission soon happily accepted to roll back and return to the previous rates. The Commission now goes out of its way to ensure that cooperation with the UN is strictly restricted to cases where a clear added value in terms of effectiveness exists. Joint trainings, regular meetings and other procedures have been designed to speed up cooperation when it occurs but, in general, inter-organizational institutionalization has not played a decisive multiplying role.\textsuperscript{229}

Related to this is the issue of socialization. Over the years the EU has increased its contacts and knowledge of the UN. However, the socialization of the two bureaucracies in a set of common beliefs, values and identities has been limited; even within relatively homogenous epistemic communities dealing with technical issues such as accountability, accounting, reporting or management standards in development cooperation. Rivalries and misunderstandings persist and are grounded in an ontological difference between the EU as a regional polity with a global ambition and the UN as a universal sovereign-based organization. In our interviews,

\textsuperscript{228} For instance the agreement on the FAFA on development assistance in 2002 the various partnership agreements with UN agencies and programmes following 2005 or the many joint statements on security and crisis management in 2003, 2007 and 2011.

\textsuperscript{229} In a way, the effects of inter-organizational institutionalization have been off set by the primary need of the EU/Commission to be visible and to manage autonomously its resources.
several bureaucrats involved in interacting with other organizations voiced rather more frustration and impatience about inter-agency rivalry than a rosy view of multilateralism. Conflict includes competition for leadership, recognition and resources of member states, turf wars about competences, different administrative cultures, excessive formalism and rigidity and quarrels about visibility.

The EU has created structures that are specialized in dealing with the UN (and the UN has opened large offices in Brussels). However, the imperative of cooperation has remained circumscribed to the relatively marginalized specialists of EU-UN interaction, without trickling down to the operational and geographic services in the Commission and EEAS that are responsible for formulating and implementing policies and solving problems. The same can be said for the UN. Although there are plenty of exchanges and cross-fertilization on issues such as crisis management, human security, post-conflict needs assessment, poverty reduction, public finance management and electoral observation, officials are encouraged by hierarchy to maintain autonomy and independence. The impression from our observation is that member states foreign policy bureaucracies are on the whole more sympathetic to the United Nations than EU officials. In the years, the European Union has sought to consolidate itself as an independent foreign policy actor with its own identity and has increasingly competed with the UN as a channel for states’ development and security policy. Against this background, stereotypes about the slowness, inefficiency and overstretch of UN structures might have even worsened with the increasing contacts. These points, however, will need to be further explored by research, including with deeper studies on the perception that the EU has of the United Nations.

Finally, considering the heavy rhetorical commitment to multilateralism and the UN, we have tried to sound throughout the study the possible influence of discursive entrapment over rational serf-serving calculations by the leading actors. Literature on normative institutionalism has explored quite extensively this topic (Schimmelfennig and Thomas 2009; Schimmelfennig 2001; Thomas 2011a). The discourse on the normative obligation to multilateralism is certainly a very relevant feature of

In a similar way, ‘division of labour’ and ‘donor coordination’ are great ideas, just as long as they don’t translate in being coordinated by the UN.
interaction, particularly in the configurations that we have defined as “ceremonial”. As a reminder, these describe the contexts in which the EU and/or its composing actors have significant material resources to tackle the problem at hand but lack in ideational resources i.e. legitimacy. In these cases cooperation might be more formal than substantial, but it is still motivated by a concrete need on the part of the EU, rather than being forced by a vague and agreeable normative commitment to the UN. The case of Iraq is pertinent. On this case, Lewis has argued that the EU’s decision to come together within the UN was justified by a degree of rhetorical entrapment over multilateralism and by an acquis of intergovernmental bargaining that has prevailed over the differences of the member states, promoting consensus (Lewis 2009). In constructivist terms, one could argue that, in that context, working with the UN suddenly appeared the appropriate thing to do. Certainly the quickness with which member states decided to bridge their differences on Iraq’s post-conflict reconstruction was remarkable and demonstrates the resilience of European institutions, formal and informal. Yet, as was discussed in the specific case study, the decision to work with the UN was very rational in itself. Once it was established that some kind of EU presence in Iraq was useful to promote very substantial interests from most member states in being there, working through the UN was really the only practicable solution. The EU lacked the access, capabilities, the policy and legitimacy to be on the ground directly with development assistance.

7.4 EU-UN cooperation and power

In this chapter I have analysed the main findings of my research. I argued that the EU’s willingness to cooperate with the United Nations tends to be inversely linked to its capacities and legitimacy on the one hand and its unity and integration on the other hand. Depending on the level of analysis, this lack of resources and cohesion can be identified in the single component actors of the EU foreign policy whose role and autonomy vary across the system or in the system as a whole. Ultimately, the thesis of Robert Kagan that multilateralism is the strategy of the weak might be closer to truth than one might think (Kagan 2004). This research shows that the more the EU is weak, the more it will be motivated to work with and through the United Nations structures. The figure, below, based again on table 38, certainly is an oversimplification but provides an illustration of this ‘negative correlation’ existing between “power” –
defined indeed as the combined presence of resources (material and ideational) and cohesion (unity and integration) and cooperation with the UN.

Figure 24. Correlation between all the independent variables (Power) and the EU-UN Cooperation

The narrative that depicts the European Union as essentially or normatively prone to channel its policy through multilateral institutions conceals what is actually a clearly self-interested, instrumental and rational behaviour by the various actors participating in the European foreign policy system, including member states and institutions. Collectively, the EU adopts multilateral strategies of cooperating with the UN, when and where it is obliged to do so by the context, when it is divided, inexperienced or lacks resources and coherent policies of its own. A comparison of development and security policy seems to confirm this. Inter-organizational interaction varies from sector to sector, but the tendency to cooperate seems greater in the “high politics” security field, which is characterized by a weak role of supranational institutions, intergovernmental policy-making, diverging policy preferences of EU member states and a high need for international legitimacy. The UN provides legitimacy for member states independent policies, status within the international system and cover for possible intra-EU divisions. Cooperation with the UN is often more elusive on
development policy, where EU supranational institutions have a stronger role and the pressure to coordinate the member states’ remaining independent policies is lower.

As argued in the introduction to this work, EU-UN cooperation can be described as a resultant of opposing bids for legitimisation both on the world stage (member states) and at the internal EU level (European supranational institutions). EU member states use the United Nations both to mask their division on a policy and to reinforce their independent status and role within the international system. EU institutions, instead, tend to use cooperation with the UN to gain ground and voice in areas from where they would be otherwise excluded: as a “social lift”.

More speculative is the question of whether this would work also the other way round. Would a powerful, unified and assertive EU consistently snub the United Nations? This is a difficult claim to maintain. The analysis does show that when tracking cooperation on a specific issue over time, if the variables improved for the EU, this was also reflected in a weaker degree of cooperation with the UN. The case of the abandonment of the World Bank trust fund in Palestine once the experience with TIM and PEGASE had proved successful is a clear case in point. But there are others. Reputation and prestige are a very cheap way to acquire authority and power (Thompson 2003). Therefore, one could expect that with increasing technical expertise cumulated also in the security and peace-building field, the EU will move gradually from being fully dependent on the UN to adopting a more selective approach, as one can already notice in Libya.

230 I thank Hanna Ojanen for this citation (Ojanen 2011).
8. Conclusions

The objective of this thesis was to explain why and under what conditions the EU and the United Nations cooperate in the field of development and security. The core underlying issue is a classic puzzle of international relations studies: is cooperation driven by shared values or rational interests? More figuratively, is the relationship between the EU and the UN really based on Love or Logic? What hides behind the much-publicized motto of “Effective Multilateralism”? The short and banal answer to these questions is that the EU cooperates with the UN by sheer necessity. So when, where and why is it necessary to work with the UN?

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was chosen as a case study for its salience to European foreign policy and international affairs and because it offers sufficient internal variation to be representative of the general problem. But other examples of EU-UN interaction can be found all over the world and in all policy fields. They reflect the increasing activeness of the EU (and of the UN) in international affairs, the growing interdependence of problems and issues requiring joint and multidimensional international responses and the continued reliance of states on international organizations to promote their goals in peace, security and development. This interaction has gradually brought to a bloated institutionalization of EU-UN relations. Yet, this has not always resulted in an actual increase of cooperation – nor it has produced “harmony” (Axelrod and Keohane 1985, 226). In many cases the dependent variable (EU-UN cooperation) manifests itself in the form of neglect, competition and conflict.

Against this very concrete and evolving backdrop, the research design was built around the problem rather than on a particular theory. The broader goal was to explore a developing field in international relations but also to push forward the

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In acknowledging this interpretation, the theoretical backdrop of this thesis is a functionalist and liberal institutionalist one (Haas 1961, Keohane and Nye 2011), although as explained in Chapter 2, I used eclectically several other theoretical schools to explain what motivates the specific instances of EU-UN cooperation.
understanding of the specific empirical case of European foreign policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East from the year 2000 to 2012.

Authors and practitioners have underlined the fact that the EU’s approach to multilateralism is linked to the nature of its multilateral political system, which has generated a habit or a normative preference to work through negotiations and institutions (Cooper 2004, Manners 2002). My thesis maintains that this “instinct” for multilateralism is rather produced by a generalized lack of capacities and legitimacy throughout the EU foreign policy system and by the constant division and rivalry among member states and institutions. The EU’s cooperation with the United Nations can be understood and explained as motivated by its weakness both external and internal. As I put it in the Introduction: it is a weak commitment, grounded in weakness.

In these last few pages, I will provide some concluding remarks on the main idea, method, limitations and overall significance of this thesis.

**The main idea**

In the first two chapters of this work, I introduced the main themes and questions of the thesis, discussed the functions of the UN for EU foreign policy and advanced the two main hypotheses through which I tested the argument. Hypothesis 1 linked EU-UN relations to the lack of material and ideational resources. ‘Resource dependence’ is typically listed as one of the main rational motifs for cooperation in inter-organizational literature (Tardy 2011, 25; Haugevik 2007, 11). In this thesis, I merged material and ideational resources into one single hypothesis, while keeping these factors distinct to develop an original typology of four approaches to cooperation (dependent, ceremonial, predatory and dismissive), which has proven quite useful.\(^{232}\) Legitimacy and material resources are not always aligned: there are cases where the EU has a relatively high level of legitimacy but low capacities and in which it will exploit the UN with *ad hoc* cooperation arrangements (‘predatory behaviour’); cases

\(^{232}\) See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.
where material capacities are copious but legitimacy scarce, in which the EU will, instead, adopt a ceremonious and formalistic approach in its relations with the UN.

Hypothesis 2 complemented the first one by testing the impact of unity and integration on the EU-UN relationship. Borrowing again from inter-organizational literature, this hypothesis is related to ‘organizational survival’ (Haugevik 2007, p. 9) or what I have termed in my second Chapter, the ‘identity function’ of cooperation with the UN. In difficult cases, where the EU is divided, undecided or incoherent, cooperating with the UN is used to dissimulate the lack of clout and vision as a foreign policy actor. Working with the UN in these cases, also allows some member states to revert fully to their position of privilege in the ‘Concert of Nations’ and to the self-perpetuating system of rituals, practices and relationships that characterizes foreign policy in and around New York. Again, delivering through the UN constitutes a means for states to ensure the survival of cherished privileges.

Through these hypotheses, the thesis maintained an eclectic and problem-based theoretical approach grounded on two key assumptions. The first one was rationalism. Rationalism as a meta-theoretical approach assumes that actors can normally calculate the costs and benefits of cooperation even if they are constrained. Consequently, agency was assessed as following a specific logic linked to the interest in increasing resources and in ensuring survival. This has proven an insightful perspective even in a subject – EU and multilateralism - that is intrinsically pervaded by rhetoric, values, norms and identities. Acknowledging these complicating factors, I did not take a narrow interpretation of rationality but I maintained a systemic and relational understanding of it, in which actors specify and identify their own interests on the basis of their relations with others within a system of foreign policy (White 2004). In this sense, this research went beyond inter-organizational theory, which focuses mostly on unit-to-unit interaction, and looked inside the ‘black box’ of the EU

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233 In particular, I focused on how interests generate a motivation or resistance to work with the UN. It is argued in this thesis, that this motivation or resistance is linked to systemic and relational considerations about relative power within the EU and towards specific problems. When an actor needs capacities or legitimacy it will work with the UN.
borrowing insights from bureaucratic politics (e.g. the rivalry between different strands of the European Commission and the Council Secretariat in promoting cooperation with the UN), institutionalism (e.g. the importance of legal and institutional competences in triggering cooperation, the opportunistic behaviour of institutions) or even neo-realism (the importance of assessing relative power within a given system).

This multifaceted interpretation of rationality is intimately linked to the second assumption underpinning this study: that EU foreign policy can be understood only as a multilevel system of governance, where the domestic level, the member states level and the European/institutional level constantly interact in generating different foreign policy outcomes (M. E. Smith 2004; White 2004). Rationality and agency in the decisions to cooperate or not with the UN were looked for often in the actors composing the EU, rather than in the EU as a whole. Of course, not all actors have an essential role at all times. As discussed in chapter 3, in each policy field there are leading actors that have a stronger role in agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation. The analysis of cases from development and security policy ensured an equal treatment of member states, the European Commission and Council Secretariat institutions – now the EEAS, while several mentions were made of the European Parliament.

**The method**

My methodology had the ambition to combine a comparative qualitative approach with quantitative tools and data. Thanks to my participant observation experience I was able to access an important number of original internal documentation on EU-UN cooperation as well as interviews, which helped me to ground my qualitative analysis of the topic on objectively verifiable and operationalized indicators. In total, I have identified 4 factors (Capacities, Legitimacy, Unity, Integration) and 12 variables that could be measured (to a certain extent) over a 1-4 scale,\(^\text{234}\) giving me the possibility to

\(^{234}\) These are: (1) Material Resources/Capacities (Access, Expertise, Capabilities, Policy); (2) Ideational Resources/Legitimacy (Legal competencies, Political Support, Acceptance,
carry out some graphical extrapolation.\textsuperscript{235} Outside of the main hypotheses, in the preceding Chapter, I have also assessed the impact of three additional intervening factors that have a lot of resonance in the literature: proximity, institutionalization, and socialization/rhetoric.

The EU-UN relationship has progressively gained a central place in the academic debate on EU foreign policy and international relations.\textsuperscript{236} This secondary literature offers an array of explanations both empirical and theoretical of why the organizations cooperate in this or that domain and also of why this cooperation is often dysfunctional. However, such a systematic and unified attempt to analyse and test empirically a set of possible explanatory factors that condition and qualify this relationship over time and across policies was still missing. Crucially, this remained a predominantly qualitative and non-deterministic exercise. I have resisted the temptation to make speculations or predictions about the future.

While this method was applied only to the MENA region and the research design has been tailored to this specific context, this approach can be adapted to other contexts. It was argued in several sections of the thesis that the logics behind the European Neighbourhood and Euro-Mediterranean processes are particularly resistant to the demands of global multilateralism. Yet, are the key determinants of EU-UN interaction in Asia, in the Balkans or in Africa really so different from those active in the MENA? Of course the analysis of the specific regional factors would be essential to make the explanation realistic and credible. Yet, the framework developed in this thesis can be generalized and could offer some interesting perspectives on when, why and how the EU and the UN cooperate.

Finally, being EU specific, the methodology can be applied also to other international organizations and it has indeed been tangentially applied in this research to the World Bank or IOM, for example. Obviously, however, few organizations offer the same

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\textsuperscript{235} This included a limited use of linear correlation, putting together dependent and independent variables. See Chapter 7, figures 14 and 25 and related footnotes.
array of ideational and material resources, challenges and opportunities to the EU as the United Nations, so the method would have to be fine-tuned accordingly.

**The plot**

In chapter 4, 5 and 6 I have analysed in detail the case studies from three different sub-regions in the MENA. In the Maghreb, the EU can count on an important set of assets and resources both in terms of capacities and legitimacy. Its economic and political leverage in the region is significant and the long-term management of foreign policy is firmly in the hands of supranational institutions such as the European Commission and the EEAS. In this context, the EU is dismissive of the UN and rarely channels development funding and its foreign policy in general through it. Cooperation between the two organizations is limited to loose coordination and some information sharing. Sometimes the UN is used as a reference and standard-setter for some activities but most of these are rather grounded in Eurocentric norms and objectives. In the security field, on the contrary, and particularly on Western Sahara, cooperation with the UN is significant. Here, supporting multilateralism has translated into actually ‘passing the buck’ to the UN to carry out the political mediation that Europe has renounced doing. The divisions on this frozen conflict have generated a paralysis of any EU initiative, while at the same time various member states have an interest in getting the UN involved. France, in particular, can maintain a leading and watchful role on conflict mediation from its position in the UNSC, without taking direct responsibility for a solution.

In the Levant or Near East the situation is different. The sub-region is more central to the global peace and security agenda and the United Nations has been involved there from the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The EU, on the other hand, has been struggling to build up a presence for itself in the political resolution of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and has instead taken a leadership role in the development, humanitarian support and institution building of the emerging Palestinian authority. Given this situation the EU, overall, has been supportive of the

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UN. The UN has given the EU an entry point to play a role in the crisis, through agencies such as UNRWA or via the various UNSC resolutions and peace operations that have been deployed over the years. This general support has varied quite a lot in intensity over time and depending on the specific issue at hand (development or security). As expected, the more the EU’s presence and position has strengthened, the less the EU has been willing to share decision-making powers or funds with the United Nations. As Europeans were consolidating their own image and reputation in the region, the initial political, normative and operational dependency on the UN slowly metamorphosed into a more limited ceremonial reference to the multilateral framework.

I have also analysed, in Chapter 6, the crisis management and peace-building efforts in Iraq and Libya. First, these cases allowed me to control the impact of institutionalization and namely the Barcelona process and the ENP on my problem, as in these countries the EU had to work outside of these frameworks. Secondly, Iraq and Libya are both prominent episodes of cooperation in conflict situations where Europe was confronted with the need for hard military power. As expected by hypothesis 2, the empirical analysis shows that the lack of consensus among member states during a crisis produces reliance on the UN, at the same time as it undercuts the use of EU structures or the launch of EU initiatives. In turn, I tested the factors under hypothesis 1 in order to explain the nature and degree of cooperation of the EU with the UN in these different cases. For example, the low level of both legitimacy and material resources explain the high dependency that Europe has had on the UN during both crises. By contrast, the two cases differ considerably in post-conflict peace building. Iraq is a major case of EU-UN operational cooperation (at least until 2007-2008), while Libya promises to strain the relationship quite a lot due to the competition of the two organizations in coordinating political transition. As compared with Iraq, the level of EU assets in Libya is much higher. EU-UN relations are, therefore, rather ceremonial and could potentially deteriorate.

Taking stock of all this, in Chapter 7 I put together eight (8) broadly defined empirical findings related to the different factors identified in the conceptual framework and illustrated through comparative graphs and figures. As anticipated, power (defined as the combined presence of ‘resources’ factors and ‘cohesion’ factors) is inversely correlated to cooperation with the UN. In most cases cooperation is based on ad hoc
considerations by the relevant actors (or even by specific departments) on whether working with the UN in a specific situation will increase capacities, legitimacy or both. Importantly, the empowerment function played by the UN is not exclusively referred to external objectives, such as “peace and security in the MENA”. Rather, the UN is often instrumental to internal goals such as ‘integration objectives’: helping to promote a particular vision on the future of EU integration. Similarly, the fragmented, multilevel and contested nature of the EU foreign policy system (particularly in the security field, or across pillars) provides the incentive to work with the UN, as this often becomes a vehicle to increase influence. Having a solid relationship with the UN can serve as a “social lift”, increasing the authority, credibility and status of the actor involved.37 Finally, a crosscutting finding is that the EU’s inclination to work with the UN evolves in time with the increase (or decrease) of its relative capacities, legitimacy and cohesion as contexts change and experience is accumulated. This is a compelling argument for maintaining a diachronic and dynamic analytical approach.

**The limits and questions ahead**

As for any research, also this one has some clear limitations, which become open questions for my future work or for other scholars who might be interested in pursuing this exploration.

A first key weakness lies in the scope of the study. As I had pointed out already in the Introduction, taking such an ambitiously broad area of research - encompassing different policy areas, organizations and case studies - entailed some sacrifices in analytical depth and descriptive precision. Some problems and examples could have been better elaborated in order to justify more clearly the quantified values given to the variables and the subsequent conclusions. Yet, with the famous metaphor of the “Elephant and the blind men”, one could argue that the wide vision provided by this thesis is just as essential in getting closer to the truth about EU-UN cooperation, as the more detailed case studies about a particular problem, a specific policy area or a short timeframe.

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37 Thus, cooperation increases the chances for “organizational survival” (Haugevik 2007, 9).
To palliate this weakness and deficiency one can only plea for more studies and understanding of the contexts in which EU-UN interaction develops. Area studies and case studies about the Middle East and North Africa have been a precious source of information for this thesis, but there will never be enough. The MENA, in particular, is a region only in the organograms of states, international organizations and corporations, but is extremely diverse and heterogeneous. Each sub-region and country would therefore deserve a specific study and particularly the Maghreb, which has been comparatively more neglected by scholars than the Middle East.

A second important limit of this research is in its inescapably Eurocentric nature. In analysing EU-UN cooperation I have chosen to put the focus decisively on the EU side of the equation. To this term, I have given a broad interpretation, including institutions, member states and sometimes the idea of ‘Europe’ as a whole. Most of the agency and rationality has been attributed to the EU. Although I have made several references to the UN’s presence, capabilities and views, I had to forgo providing any sophistication on the agents and structures that move the UN, its secretariat and its agencies. Since 2010, for instance, there has been a tangible change in approach at the UN, in trying to increase its political affairs and conflict prevention capabilities, whose impact on cooperation with the EU in areas such as Libya or Syria still needs to be understood. Even more concretely, what is the effect on coordination with the EU of the UN’s own incoherencies, such as the recurring one between the UN long-term “Country Teams” and the supposedly short term “Peace Operations”? Why is the “One UN” policy so difficult to apply to the MENA and what does that mean for Europe. There is plenty of academic work on the UN as such but much more would be needed to better understand the motivations behind its relations and reliance on regional organizations and particularly on the EU (Hettne and Soderbaum 2006; Graham and Felicio 2006; Sidhu 2009). This is a clear gap,

perhaps ascribable to the fact that most scholars addressing this topic – as myself - have been coming from EU studies.

Thirdly, there is the troubling question of external factors. As noted in several occasions, the main focus of this concept and research design was internal. Yet, when looking at Syria in mid 2012, there is no doubt that the big constrains to cooperation lay outside of the EU, in the UNSC structure and in “emerging” international actors such as China and Russia. I have left these elements in the background. As discussed in the Case Study on Iraq, when the UN is paralysed, then the interaction opportunity is missing and no cooperation can take place. However, the analysis of the EU’s diplomatic action “within the UN”, and of its influence in getting its vision through, is critical to a more refined understanding of EU cooperation “with the UN”. Luckily, also this field of study is quickly developing, following the pioneer work of Smith and Laatikainen in 2006, and is producing some interesting ideas not only in academia and think tanks, but also in practice, as the EU’s presence in the UN evolves following the Lisbon Treaty.

A Weak Link

In discussing the relevance of the topic, I mentioned in the Introduction the case of the international engagement in Libya in 2011, as an example of intensive interaction between the EU and the UN in a crisis situation exploding in North Africa. The developing situation in Syria in mid 2012 is another, even more persuasive example of the importance of an effective cooperation between regional organizations and the UN. The EU has supported materially the mandate of Mr Kofi Annan to mediate a solution to the civil war. Not least – and among other things - by providing a considerable number of armoured cars to the UN monitoring mission... Yet, by summer 2012, the EU member states and the rest of the international community had failed to secure a UNSC resolution that would serve the interests of the Syrian people, demonstrating the serious shortcomings of the UN system in its current form.

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239 I expanded on this specific Case Study in Chapter 6.
This study did not set out to provide recommendations to improve the standards of EU-UN cooperation - let alone the UN system. What it did aim to do was to offer a frank analysis of the main structural limits of this relationship in order to better understand it and perhaps contribute indirectly to its improvement. Anyone who has been involved in this domain as a practitioner or as a scholar is well aware of the day-to-day difficulties that surround the necessary interaction and coordination between the EU and the UN. Many would agree that what is most damaging, both politically and operationally, is the excessive expectations that are put on cooperation itself and the veil of hypocrisy and rhetoric that surrounds vacuous expressions such as “Effective Multilateralism”. It would be more productive to assess realistically where and when these two big administrations can cooperate substantially and where, instead, the specific pattern of their material and ideational interests makes this improbable and even distractive for the attainment of the policy goal. A clearer and more stringent division of labour between the two would probably be the best solution in these cases. However, the preferred arrangement for member states is often opacity and overlap, as this is how they remain involved and they retain the ultimate control.

In sum, a genuinely strategic, effective and mutually reinforcing partnership between the EU and the UN will be hard to achieve. Yet, all hope is not lost. This thesis shows how, ironically, the primary insurance on the endurance and reinforcement of the EU-UN relationship rests safely on the promise of Europe’s perpetual weaknesses. In its everlasting incompleteness and ambiguity as a regional integration experiment trying to find its place in the international system will continue to lay the EU’s need to grudgingly cooperate.

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