Universität zu Köln

Buckenmaier, Johannes, Dimant, Eugen, Posten, Ann-Christin ORCID: 0000-0003-0297-4274 and Schmidt, Ulrich (2021). Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions. J. Risk Uncertain., 62 (2). S. 177 - 202. DORDRECHT: SPRINGER. ISSN 1573-0476

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Abstract

Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID ORCID Put Code Buckenmaier, Johannes UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Dimant, Eugen UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Posten, Ann-Christin UNSPECIFIED orcid.org/0000-0003-0297-4274 UNSPECIFIED Schmidt, Ulrich UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-593364
DOI:	10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x
Journal or Publication Title:	J. Risk Uncertain.
Volume:	62
Number:	2
Page Range:	S. 177 - 202
Date:	2021
Publisher:	SPRINGER
Place of Publication:	DORDRECHT
ISSN:	1573-0476
Language:	English
Faculty:	Unspecified
Divisions:	Unspecified
Subjects:	no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Keywords Language ANTICIPATORY EMOTIONS; TEMPORAL RESOLUTION; PUNISHMENT; ENFORCEMENT; CELERITY; CHOICE; CRIME; TIME; CONSEQUENCES; PREFERENCE Multiple languages Business, Finance; Economics Multiple languages
URI:	http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/59336