Structuring Legislative Behavior
How Institutions Shape Political Interaction in Parliament and Beyond

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INTRODUCTION

"Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion."

– Edmund Burke (1774)

In his description of the trustee model of representation, Edmund Burke pictures a member of parliament (MP) who, free from external influences, must account for his decisions solely to his own conscience. This description of a free mandate is also reflected in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. It reads: "They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or instructions and responsible only to their conscience" (Article 38 I of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany). The mere term free mandate may provoke confusion and raise the question what it needs and can be *free* from. In particular, if the standards of the coercion-free discourse (Habermas, 1990) of a deliberative democracy are applied to the form of interaction of these MPs, freedom might quickly be regarded as an impossible to achieve ideal. For example, the free mandate prima facie seems to conflict with MPs acting strategically towards other MPs in order to increase re-election chances. Furthermore, the free mandate reduces the formal linkages between the MP and the constituency. Therefore, it enables the influence of political parties, for example through enforced party discipline, which also seems to be in conflict with the definition of the free mandate at first glance (Patzelt, 2003; Kędzia and Hauser, 2011).

As the MP's mandate can clearly not be free from any external influence at all, this leads to the question of which factors have a structural impact on the work of political representatives in parliaments. Only if it is evident what influences the behavior of MPs is it possible to analyze legislative behavior in an unbiased way as a political science scholar as well as to make up one's mind as a citizen about the functioning of a core institution of

democracy. This applies regardless of how exactly the parliamentary mandate is defined in a country's constitution. Hence, it is not only of scientific but also of societal relevance to identify which factors have a structural influence on the behavior of MPs and parties in parliament and how these factors are interrelated (Bäck, Debus and Fernandes, 2021).

To analyze the influence of these factors, the focus of this dissertation is on the daily political behavior of MPs and parties in parliament. Studying daily interaction offers the possibility to both analyze the immediate impact of changing conditions as well as to infer on changes on a larger scale. Taking into account the general effects and implication of time and timing, it enables a distinction between exogenous and endogenous factors through the analysis of long and continuous time periods. Furthermore, the focus of the analysis is at the very heart of democratic deliberation and the mechanisms that influence political behavior in this context. Thus, the first research question that is central to this dissertation asks: What factors influence daily political behavior of parties and MPs in parliaments? Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide an exhaustive answer to this question by identifying all factors and their mechanisms at work. It aims at identifying and categorizing potential factors as well as at presenting theoretical and methodological approaches to analyze them in interaction in its entirety, and at performing this kind of analysis for selected factors in the following chapters in detail.

While this first question regards the system of parliaments only, its implication go far beyond this arena. As the decisions and actions taken in parliament are decisive for the policy output as well as the general political climate in a country, they inevitably affect voters and their perception of politics. MPs try to anticipate this dynamic by adapting their daily behavior in order to strategically influence voters in their favor. Voters in turn evaluate the performance of politicians and parties in the past as well as the content and credibility of election pledges and base their voting decisions on this in conjunction with other strategic considerations (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006). Furthermore, they decide which actors are present in the parliamentary arena and also indirectly which rules they set for themselves and in which way they interact (Wlezien and Soroka, 2007). Thus, legislative behavior not only has consequences that go beyond the parliamentary context, but ultimately feed back to it as well. Therefore, the second research question that is central to this dissertation asks: How does daily political behavior in parliament influence public perception? Again, the primary goal is not an all-encompassing study, but to provide a structure and an exemplary implementation.

Taken together, the theoretical and methodological contribution and the overall argument of this dissertation is threefold: First, I provide a structure of the different categories of factors that shape political behavior in parliament and how they interact with each other. The argument is that in the institutional context of a parliament, multiple factors always affect legislative behavior simultaneously. Only if these are considered at the same time and in their interaction can political behavior be meaningfully studied in this context. Second, I provide examples of theoretical and methodological applications on the bases of this framework by analyzing the daily interaction in parliaments. I argue that this is a particularly useful environment to analyze the structural influences on legislative behavior. The respective studies reveal how electoral cycles, populist radical right parties and minority governments have a substantial impact on legislative behavior that has not been studied before. Third, I argue that political behavior in parliament and the explanatory factors identified in this context have a substantial impact beyond the institution of parliament. Using the example of the influence of coalitions and institutional context, I show how these factors influence voters' perception of party messages. This is important as it affects voting behavior and thus, again, legislative behavior itself.

To this end, the dissertation is organized as follows: The introductory chapter presents a basic structure that combines the most important factors for the aforementioned research questions into categories and depicts their respective interdependence. It is followed by the four chapters that focus on a particular element of these categories and analyze its effect within the overall framework. The conclusion synthesizes the results of the individual chapters and provides an outlook on future research opportunities that are subsequent to these findings.

1.1   Political Behavior in Parliament and Beyond

Before I discuss the individual factors that structure political behavior in parliaments and beyond in detail, and address the relevant strands of literature, I first briefly introduce them and outline their linkages. Figure 1.1 orders the categories of factors (on the left side with examples next to them) that are central to explain political behavior in parliament and shows their interconnection as well as their relation to the public opinion of voters. Three main categories structure the daily behavior in parliaments: Institutional rules, political actors, and (institutionalized) forms of interaction. These categories are ordered by their average persistence. Institutional rules often have the longest lifespan and, in some cases, have hardly changed in countries since the introduction of a democratic system. Political actors can also have long time horizons, especially with regard to political parties, but some of them may also disappear again after a single electoral period. Institutionalized

Figure 1.1: Structuring Political Behavior in Parliament and Beyond

forms of interaction, by contrast, may change regularly during a legislative period, for example in the case of bill co-sponsorship. However, this is only on average the case. There are political parties that have already outlasted various political systems or certain forms of institutionalized interaction that have persisted for decades.

All three sets of factors influence each other, which I focus on in several parts of the dissertation, and have an impact on political behavior in parliaments. The term "political behavior in parliaments" or "legislative behavior" refers to any form of behavior of actors in the institutional context of parliaments and its effects and implications (Meller, 1960). This definition appears to be very broad, encompassing all areas that actors in parliaments can substantially deal with, but also the way in which they engage with them. However, the large scope does not seem surprising, given the complexity of parliaments in terms of their structure, actors and substantive focus. The complexity itself implies that the aim here is not to present all possible aspects of these interrelationships, but rather to describe the fundamental effects of the overarching factors and to go into detail about individual factors. While the following chapters two to four engage with political behavior in parliaments mostly in the form of speech behavior during parliamentary debates, it only represents a subfield of possible types of behavior. Therefore, the relation ties in with the first central question of the dissertation. This research question is outlined in the figure inside the left of the two circles on the upper right side, pointing to the corresponding intersection.

The daily political behavior in parliament itself then mediates the effect of the three factors mentioned before on both the policy output (through bills and laws) but also on the general political climate in a country. This entire complex, in turn, has an impact on how voters perceive political actors and decisions and thus potentially influences their future voting decisions. This connection thus speaks to the second central question of this dissertation and is listed in the circle on the right. The fifth chapter therefore addresses the implications beyond Parliament. The central focus here is on the question of which actor-specific and institution-specific factors have an influence on voters' perceptions of party messages.

As speech behavior in parliamentary debates is a central type of legislative behavior that is analyzed in this dissertation, its relevance shall be briefly highlighted here before it is described and analyzed in detail in the following chapters. While the direct effects of parliamentary speech behavior on political output has always been contested in the scholarly debate and has not reached a clear conclusion (Austen-Smith, 1990; Maltzman and Sigelman, 1996), it is undisputed that parties consider parliamentary debates as important as speaking time is highly in demand (Proksch and Slapin, 2015). In fact, even though the motives of MPs and legislative parties may be primarily vote-seeking, this does not mean that legislative debates are simply cheap talk without any consequences (Martin and Vanberg, 2008). Depending on who the audience of the particular speeches is, these debates are part of the political deliberation in a country that has an impact on the interaction between different parties and between parties and citizens. Consequently, the "talk culture" in parliament can actually have an effect on the democratic stability in a country (Steiner et al., 2004).

The following part of the introduction illustrates the complexity of the two intersections that are central to this dissertation and introduces the central object of investigation in each of the following chapters. Furthermore, it introduces the central strands of literature and in how far they touch upon the daily interaction in parliaments. At this point, a remark on the scope of the following studies should be made. This dissertation and its theoretical outline are tailored to parliamentary systems in advanced democracies with a focus on the past thirty years. While the implications might potentially be transferred to other systems, divergent structures and actors need to be taken into account and, if necessary, supplemented or modified.

1.1.1 Institutional Rules

Turning first to the effect of institutional rules on legislative behavior, one of the most important structural factors is the respective electoral system. How the characteristics of different electoral systems structure political competition and representation has long

been the focus of political science (Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005). Electoral rules shape the behavioral incentives of parties and MPs in different ways. Although some parties are generally considered to be more vote-seeking, re-election is an incentive for all parties (Strøm and Müller, 1999). The most obvious influence is the type of the electoral system: Depending on the electoral system, voters use different shortcuts to make their electoral decision (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005). Thus, they have a strong influence on how parties and MPs behave to convince voters. Furthermore, electoral institutions and procedures define whom a single MP or party competes against and who is the potential audience that decides on a possible re-election (André, Depauw and Shugart, 2014). Especially the difference between proportional representation and majoritarian systems as well as the size of electoral districts have a major influence: Electoral systems that encourage personal vote-seeking allow a greater number of MPs to engage in parliamentary debates and express more diverse opinions (Proksch and Slapin, 2015). Additionally, the timing of elections and the procedure to initiate (early) elections can influence legislative behavior. Looking at the electoral cycle, past studies show that it has an effect on legislative behavior with regard to agenda-setting (Martin and Vanberg, 2014), the frequency of speaking behavior (Fukumoto and Matsuo, 2015), and issue attention (Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu, 2019; Sagarzazu and Klüver, 2017).

A second major sub-field is the general institutional structure of the parliament. This relates, firstly, quite fundamentally to whether the parliament is unicameral or bicameral. Depending on the respective balance of power, the two chambers in bicameral systems can be relevant veto players that have a major influence on the policy bargaining process (Tsebelis, 2002). The balance of power can vary significantly between the two chambers, ranging from equal institutions to a purely symbolic additional chamber (Heller and Branduse, 2014). Furthermore, bicameralism may be related to representing territorial interests and the challenge to combine sub-national issues with national policy-making (Russell, 2001). Committee systems, on the other hand, are more of a borderline example between institutional rules and institutionalized forms of interaction (Martin, 2014). These systems do not only vary strongly between parliaments, but the committees themselves also vary within parliaments. This variation is strongly connected to the distinction between consensus vs. majoritarian democracy (Lijphart, 1999). A crucial difference between the committees is the capacity of a committee to influence or determine parliamentary output (Mattson and Strøm, 1995; Martin and Vanberg, 2011). In particular, the right to rewrite a bill provides a committee with considerable policy power (Martin and Vanberg, 2014). These differences thus have an impact on the importance for MPs and legislative parties to be represented in the respective committees or to chair them and hence affect the power status of the parties among themselves but also of MPs within their party.

Last, I will discuss here are the internal parliamentary rules, which define the instruments available to the actors in parliament. These instruments concern the types of bills that can be introduced and the procedures of how they become laws. First of all, they define the scope of what parliaments can take decisions on. Furthermore, parliaments differ in their tradition of bill proposals from government and opposition (Rasch, 2014). In some countries it is common for the opposition to initiate their own proposals, while in others they primarily try to influence existing government proposals through motions and amendments (Döring, 2001). Moreover, bills can differ in a procedural way, e.g. if emergency bill procedures or royal degrees exist. However, these instruments are not only strictly bound to the law-making context. They also can come in the form of question times or general debates that allow the opposition to scrutinize government work. These instruments can have a strong influence on the power of the opposition and their role in the legislature (Dahl, 1966; Garritzmann, 2017).

Apart from the different types of instruments that political actors in parliaments can use, agenda-setting rights are fundamental as they "regulate which issues and proposals are to be considered, and how the issues are finally decided" (Rasch, 2014). The differences have important consequences for legislative behavior and output. Döring (2001) shows that the amount of government control over the legislative agenda influences the complexity and number of bills and is related to budget deficits. It is important to keep in mind that all restrictive rules for debates and amendments in modern democratic parliaments are endogenous and can therefore be modified. Hence, it is a way in which legislators explicitly or implicitly restrict their own freedom of action with the aim to achieve better outcomes (Fiorina, 1987; Rasch, 2014). But at the same time, institutional rules are often sticky and barely changeable by an individual MP, and thus have a strong and long lasting influence on their behavior and role in parliament (Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012).

Electoral Cycles

Returning to the strong influence that elections have on MPs' behavior, the second chapter addresses a sub-field of this strand of literature that is comparatively under-researched. I argue that the timing in the electoral cycle is key component that affects the behavior of parties in parliament. Previous studies have identified this effect and included it as a control variable in analyses but have rarely focused on the direct mechanism in their research. Furthermore, individual case studies have started to examine how the electoral cycle affects parties in parliaments (Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu, 2019; Borghetto and Belchior, 2020) but a comparative perspective has not been taken. I propose that electoral pressure has an influence on the expressed conflictuality in debates that does not affect all parliamentary groups equally.

I expect the effect to be different for government and opposition parties as they follow very different incentives in parliament (Hix and Noury, 2016). However, I also expect major differences within these two groups. In the case of government parties, those parties that are free to introduce their own bill proposals should also present them as positively as possible with elections approaching. For opposition parties, on the other hand, the effect of timing should depend on how strong their influence on the policy-making process is. Using translated sentiment dictionaries (Proksch et al., 2019), I analyze how the tone of debates on government bill proposals changes throughout the legislative cycle in six national parliaments. By controlling for a party's manifesto position on the particular issue being debated, I can distinguish between the initial conflict potential of the bill and the strategically used sentiment of the speaker.

The results show that there is not a uniform trend towards the end of the legislative cycle but instead a significant difference between government and opposition parties. For the former, single-party governments become particularly positive towards the end of the cycle, as they can sell their ideal position to voters more easily than coalition governments. For the latter, a negative trend can be seen for those opposition parties that can exert greater influence on legislation either under minority governments or through more opposition power as they switch from a policy-seeking to a vote-seeking mode. These results show how institutional rules (in this case the timing of elections) can interact differently with certain political actors (controlling for parties' ideology) or can have a different effect on certain institutionalized forms of interaction (such as minority vs. majority governments).

1.1.2 Political Actors

Like institutional rules, political actors in parliaments have a key influence on legislative behavior. One of the most prominent actors that structure political behavior in parliaments are political parties. Heider and Koole (2000, p.249) define legislative parties as "an organised group of members of a representative body who were elected either under the same party label or under the label of different parties that do not compete against each other in elections". This definition already leaves a large range of possibilities for how these types of parties may look like in detail. First of all the plain number of parties and more precisely the effective number of parties in parliament has a strong influence on legislative behavior (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). It is dependent on the electoral system as mentioned above and has important consequences for government-building and policy-making as it makes certain government types more probable and has an influence on the number of potential veto players in the legislative process. However, despite their number, legislative parties can vary greatly in terms of ideology, size, resources, hierarchy, and many other properties that have a strong influence on the functioning of a parliament

(Saalfeld and Strøm, 2014). Some of these properties can have a rather direct influence on legislative behavior, such as "the less a party depends on resources provided by the party organization, the more it will seek votes or office." (Müller and Strøm, 1999, p.286). Other effects can be a more complex matter.

The effect of the ideology of a party has for a long time been primarily analyzed in the context of electoral competition (Downs, 1957; Robertson, 1976; Petrocik, 1996; Meguid, 2007). This makes sense in so far as government-opposition dynamics are a very important factor for parliamentary behavior and these two groups follow a different logic in their behavior that cannot necessarily be distinguished by their ideology (Dahl, 1966; Martin and Vanberg, 2011; Hix and Noury, 2016). On the one hand, government parties usually set the reference point for bill debates by proposing legislation and provided they have a majority or stable support in parliament, these bills are passed. Opposition parties, on the other hand, act as scrutinizers, attacking the government and offering alternatives through questions and debates (Helms, 2008).

Therefore, spatial models of inter-election political competition have concentrated mostly on the making and breaking of governments. Whereas "in electoral competition, policy positions are assumed to be instrumental for political parties; in government formation, they are assumed to be sources of intrinsic value" (Benoit and Laver, 2006, p.41). However, some recent studies are trying to bridge this gap between the government-opposition divide and the ideological divisions within a party system. Louwerse et al. (2017) for example show that the government-opposition divide in voting in parliament is related to the government's ideological composition: "The more ideologically extreme a government/coalition is, the higher levels of government/coalition-opposition voting will be". Moreover, parties' ideology can also have very immediate consequences for legislative behavior: New parties might act as issue entrepreneurs and put issues on the agenda that otherwise would not have been discussed or would have been discussed very differently (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020). Furthermore, speeches in parliament do not only signal parties' preferences on certain policies, but also parties' preferences on the use of legislative time (Pedrazzani, 2017).

Party discipline and hierarchy is another example of how the different factors can interact and influence legislative behavior. A weaker party discipline within a party system might be due to a party's struggle to combine different interests. This might be the case if a legislative party consists of different ideological fractions or needs to reconcile different regional interest. This can be even stronger the case when a parliamentary fraction consists of different parties as it often happens in Spain (Cordero and Coller, 2014). However, it might also, in the comparison between parliaments, be due to different institutional structures like electoral systems that encourage parties to allow more rebellious behavior of their MPs in order to engage with their constituencies (Kam, 2009; Proksch and Slapin,

2015). It also highlights that party disagreement and heterogeneity of preferences cannot be analyzed as the same phenomenon (Close and Núñez, 2017).

Moving one level below, not only political parties as the main organizations in parliaments, but also the individual MPs that they consist of and their characteristics have a major impact on political behavior in parliament. Although both types of actors are strongly associated, as ideologically similar MPs generally select themselves into the same legislative parties (although independent MPs play an important role in some parliaments as well), the distinction between the two actors is relevant from both a theoretical and a methodological perspective. This is important since parties, as described above, are not unitary actors and the degree of their unity differs (Kam, 2009). Assumptions about, for example, the ideological position of a legislative party could therefore be biased if intra-party differences are not taken into account or if the position of the party leadership is assumed to be representative of the entire party. In addition, MPs have further characteristics relevant to legislative behavior that would be lost at the party aggregate level.

One of the most researched areas in this regard is the analysis of the influence of gender on legislative behavior (Barnes, 2016): Women generally have a distinct impact the agenda of political parties, both in terms of issues and ideological direction (Kittilson, 2011; Greene and O'Brien, 2016). Furthermore they bring new policy issues to the parliamentary agenda (Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Devlin and Elgie, 2008). Regarding parliamentary debates, women also talk differently from men. This is true both in terms of quantity but also with regard to the topics they speak about (Mendelberg, Karpowitz and Goedert, 2014; Bäck and Debus, 2019). These observations are closely related to the question of how representation of different parts of society can be implemented in the political arena of parliament. In particular, the conceptual distinction between substantive, descriptive and symbolic representation and their effects is central here (Pitkin, 1967; Mansbridge, 2003). This is also related to the question of how citizens actually want to be represented and what they understand under representation (Wolkenstein and Wratil, 2021). Thus, which individuals represent the population in this arena has a major impact both on political behavior in parliaments themselves and on the political climate beyond. Many important contributions on the question of what representation in this context means and what it should look like have been made with regard to the characteristic of gender. However, this applies to and has also been looked at for other characteristics such as immigration background (Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Aydemir and Vliegenthart, 2015) or age (Stockemer and Sundström, 2018).

Other actors can have an important influence on the political behavior in parliaments as well. This might for example include actors from another political level (e.g. reaction to increasing competence transfer to the European level (Auel, Rozenberg and Tacea,

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2015)), lobby and interest groups (Giger and Klüver, 2016; Coen and Katsaitis, 2019), interaction with different media types (Midtbø et al., 2014), and many more. However, it is rather the interaction of legislative parties and MPs with these other actors that has an effect on legislative behavior and thus is not in the center of this dissertation.

Populist Radical Right Parties

The third chapter takes a closer look at the effect of a certain party type entering the parliamentary arena, namely populist radical right parties (PRRPs). While the influence of this party type on other parties as well as their interaction has been on the agenda of political science scholars for the last decades, as described above, its effect on the daily interaction in parliaments has hardly been studied. Previous research has looked at which strategies have led to electoral success (Meguid, 2005, 2007; Spies and Franzmann, 2011; Van Spanje and de Graaf, 2018) or their influence on other parties (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020) as well as voters (Bischof and Wagner, 2019). These studies show that this party type can achieve electoral success by introducing new issue dimensions (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012). Based on these findings, this chapter asks how the interaction with other parties functions in an institutionally constrained arena such as parliament.

I argue that after the entry of the new PRRP, the government-opposition conflict remains the dominant divide in parliamentary debates. However, PRRPs manage to polarize and become the center of attention in debates on issues like immigration that are particularly salient to them. I use two different text-as-data approaches to analyze parliamentary debates in the national parliaments of Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden after the entry of a PRRP. On the one hand, I scale different types of debates with the wordshoal algorithm (Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016) in order to analyze their polarization. On the other hand, I use a simple dictionary approach in order to compare how often each party is addressed by the other parties in parliament.

The results show that PRRPs seem to dominate parliamentary debates especially when immigration is discussed. In these cases, the main dimension of conflict becomes a division between the PRRP and all other parties. In addition to the polarization of certain substantial debates, the results also show significant differences between countries and party types. Hence, for one thing, the results underline the unique nature of the parliamentary context in analyzing the interaction of political parties. Moreover, the link between political actors (PRRPs), institutional rules (different behavior in distinct types of debates), and institutionalized forms of interaction (different behavior under varying forms of government) is evident.

1.1.3 Institutionalized Forms of Interaction

In comparison to institutional rules and political actors, it could be argued that, with regard to institutionalized forms of interaction, this subject is already a matter of legislative behavior to be studied itself. While this is generally true, these factors can also influence (as independent variables) other forms of legislative behavior themselves. As already mentioned in previous sections, government-opposition dynamics are one of the most important factors for parliamentary behavior (Hix and Noury, 2016). Therefore, their configuration and the interaction within the two groups as well as the consequence of these have a major impact on legislative behavior.

Connecting to the previous section, government and opposition have different instruments and capabilities that are supposed to ensure "the right of the majority to govern and the right of the minorities to be heard" (Huber, 1994, p.1). Proceeding from these institutional rules that define the basic rights of the government and the opposition, one of the most important forms of interaction in parliament is the way in which these two groups organize themselves. In addition to the distinction between single-party and coalition governments, the analysis of different government types focuses on the difference between majority and minority governments (Strøm, 1990). In this context, previous studies have shown that the absence of a formal investiture vote with an absolute majority criterion (Rasch, Martin and Cheibub, 2015; Cheibub, Martin and Rasch, 2019) and the presence of strong parliamentary committees (Strøm, 1990) promote the occurrence of minority governments. The majority status of a government can affect legislative behavior as minority governments tend to be less stable, although they tend to do equally well with regard to efficiency and pledge fulfillment (Artés and Bustos, 2008; Moury and Fernandes, 2018; Klüver and Zubek, 2018). Thus, under minority governments legislative parties and MPs face a larger threat of government failure and early elections.

As with the case of minority governments, for coalition governments the process of coalition-building and the chances of government survival have been on the scholarly agenda for longer than the daily interaction in parliament (Riker, 1962; Warwick, 1995). However, how coalitions organize themselves and deal with divergent ideas has moved into focus (Andeweg, 2008). Once again, institutional structures and instruments play a crucial role for the interaction of parties in coalition governments: For example, strong committee systems as well as the installation of junior ministers help coalition partners to watch each other and avoid ministerial drift in the policy-making process (Martin and Vanberg, 2011). Furthermore, issues that are more attractive for the government as a whole tend to get introduced earlier whereas unattractive issues are often postponed (Martin, 2004).

While the academic emphasis has traditionally been more on governments and coalitions (see Dahl (1966) as an important exception), the active interaction and organization of the opposition has recently moved into focus (Andeweg, 2013; Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006). Russell et al. (2017) as well as Seeberg (2016) show that non-government influence on policy change, e.g. through amendments to bills, is more extensive than the literature so far suggests. Interaction and coordination of opposition parties in comparative perspective thus represents an opportunity for further research (Kaiser, 2008; Garritzmann, 2017).

Apart from the forms of interaction that evolve around the government-opposition divide, another set of interactions concerns many of the above mentioned instruments that legislative parties and MPs can use. Although in principle all forms of interaction based on these instruments are of interest, two examples are briefly discussed here. The first example concerns a fundamental task of parliaments, namely the initiation of legislation. In this context, parliaments can differ, first of all, both in their rights and traditions concerning how bills are initiated and who can do it (Rasch, 2014; Saiegh, 2014). A particularly salient question for legislative scholars in this context is when and why MPs collaborate in initiating bills. Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) show for the US-context that the timing of legislators' co-sponsorship decisions are more supportive of co-sponsorship as intra-legislative signaling than as extra-legislative position-taking. On the other hand, Koger (2003) argues that co-sponsorship is a signal to agenda-setters and a form of position-taking for constituents. Again, these mixed results show that the decision of (co-)sponsoring bills are very much dependent on a number of factors mentioned above, such as electoral systems (Bräuninger, Brunner and Däubler, 2012), government and coalition types (Martin and Vanberg, 2011; König et al., 2022), as well as the ideological position of the involved parties (Sciarini et al., 2021).

Once a bill proposal has been drafted and has not died e.g. during the committee stage, it will eventually be voted on in a plenary session. This is generally another example where the strong influence of the government-opposition divide shows up (Morgenstern, 2004; Hix and Noury, 2016). However, Louwerse et al. (2017) look at when parties support bills from other parties even when they are not together in a coalition. They find, in line with the interconnection argument of this dissertation, that the majority status of cabinets, cabinet ideology, as well as norms about cabinet formation play a crucial role in the explanation of when and why government and opposition vote together. Concluding, when looking at the intitutionalized forms of interaction, the linkage between the three categories of important explanatory factors becomes most apparent. Taking minority governments as an example in the next section, they are particularly common when institutional rules facilitate them. Furthermore, this form of government coalition becomes more likely when a particularly large number of parties are present in parliament.

Minority Governments

Focusing on the differences between government types, chapter four concentrates on the effect of minority governments on the daily debates in parliaments. Drawing on the existing literature, which has so far focused strongly on stability (Strøm, 1990; Kalandrakis, 2015) and pledge fulfillment (Artés and Bustos, 2008; Moury and Fernandes, 2018; Klüver and Zubek, 2018), we look at whether the tone of opposition parties during government bill debates is significantly different under minority governments in comparison to majority governments.

We argue that speakers from opposition parties remain positive vis-à-vis government bills under minority governments, even when they disagree with the cabinet, whereas they turn more critical in the same situation under majority government. This relationship is mediated by the formalization of the support agreement between opposition and government. Analyzing the tone of government bill debates with translated sentiment dictionaries (Proksch et al., 2019), we look at all speeches from four parliaments with alternating minority-majority governments for more than 20 years. We take into account the degree of formalization of the minority government, which can range from no support parties at all to support agreements with broad policy concessions and control for the policy area of the respective bill proposal.

The results show that opposition party speakers are indeed more positive under minority than under majority governments than we would expect given the ex ante policy conflict between the opposition and the government. This effect stays constant throughout different types of support agreements between opposition and government. This is underlined by the finding that the difference between minority and majority governments does not travel to question times in parliament. Thus, we can argue that the difference is due to a more flexible policy-making approach under minority governments. We conclude that minority governments have an under-appreciated consequence by fostering more conciliatory debates. These results once again underline the importance of differentiating between different legislative instruments (comparison between bill debates and question times) and actors (political parties with varying ideological stances).

1.1.4 Effects Beyond Parliament: Voter Perception

While the previous subsections have looked at factors that influence political behavior within parliaments, this section goes beyond the parliamentary arena. As outlined above, legislative behavior can have an impact beyond the parliamentary context as voters perceive these actions and take them into account in their voting decisions. These electoral choices, in turn, have consequences for the factors that structure legislative behavior. Turning to the voter, I ask how the previously discussed factors affect the perception of

voters directly or indirectly. In general, all of these factors can have an influence on how voters perceive the political reality. Ultimately, this can lead to the situation where the same signal can have a different effect on the voting decision of voters depending on their priors and heuristics. The most obvious link here is between political actors in parliament, especially parties, and their perception and evaluation by voters. Even more debated than the discussion of the extent to which MPs are responsible only to their conscience is the question of which factors have an influence on the political perception and action of voters (Schattschneider, 1960).

Since voters have complete information about their choices only in theory, they must, like in other situations of uncertainty, resort to heuristics to make up their minds (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). Thus, the question arises to what extent people, when provided with additional information, engage in rational updating or if they only use selected information to revise their view (Mutz, 2007). Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) conclude that voters take their perception updates of party positions rather from observable action than from manifesto promises. Thus, legislative behavior and its consequences can have a substantial effect on voting decisions. One area that is being studied in particular is how the affiliation with certain actors (especially political parties) affects the perception of political processes, statements and actors. Especially in the context of polarized two-party systems, studies show that loyal voters evaluate political decisions and processes "through the lens of their party commitment" (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014). Party cues can influence citizens' opinions substantially as turning down a claim for support from a preferred party is effortful and can result in objective facts being perceived differently by loyal partisans of different parties (Bartels, 2002; Petersen et al., 2013). While this kind of in-group vs. out-group division is most applicable in two-party systems, recent studies have increasingly started to look at multiparty systems in Europe (Bäck, Fredén and Renström, 2021; Pannico, 2020). However, the attitude of voters towards parties that belong neither strictly to the in-group nor to the out-group is still understudied.

While many studies in this regard concern the effect of party affiliation on the perception (bias) of voters, several other aspects are important. Another strand of literature analyzes not only the influence of the author of a message, but also the way in which a message is delivered. Especially the tone of a message can have a strong effect on the perception of statements and party messages (Mattes and Redlawsk, 2014; Haselmayer, Hirsch and Jenny, 2020). Furthermore, research shows that partisan elites are a particular important driver of partisan identity (Bisgaard and Slothuus, 2018). On the one hand, this highlights the general importance of political elites in the context of parliaments. On the other hand, it is also important with regard to differences between government and opposition. Looking at the question whether voters are able to pick up on efforts of

different party organizations to tailor their messages to regional contexts, Shikano and Nyhuis (2019) find an incumbency effect in the way that voters are better in identifying positional differences for government parties. Moreover, certain forms of interaction in parliament can have an effect on how voters perceive political actors: For example, being in a coalition government with another party has an influence on the party perception of voters (Adams, Ezrow and Wlezien, 2016; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Fortunato et al., 2021; Spoon and Klüver, 2017)

But not only the perception of actors and their messages, also institutional structures can have a significant impact on voters' perception and behavior: As "contexts are critical for understanding the decisions people make because they affect different people differently, and people's decisions, in turn, shape the nature, shape, and stability of these contexts" (Anderson, 2007, p.592). For example, the likelihood of voter turnout is influenced by the party system as well as the type of government. Moreover, Huber, Kernell and Leoni (2005) find that institutions that assist voters in retrospectively evaluating parties like strong party discipline and few parties in government also increase partisanship. Furthermore, how these factors influence the perception of voters also depends on their cognitive resources like political sophistication, interest, and education (Huber, Kernell and Leoni, 2005; Dancey and Sheagley, 2013; Alt, Lassen and Marshall, 2016).

In summary, there are many actor-related but also institutional factors that have an impact on voters' perception. However, also voters can influence the whole structure shown in Figure 1.1 both directly and indirectly. This connection is most apparent through parliamentary elections, when voters choose the actors who can subsequently transform the other factors that influence daily parliamentary behavior. This is even more straightforward, but not a regular occurrence, in the case of referendums that directly affect the political structures or constitution of a country.

Party Perception in Multiparty Systems

The fifth chapter follows up on recent findings in the area of perception of party messages and examines in detail the extent to which they can be applied to multiparty systems. It ties in with how voters perceive statements of parties, depending on whether they belong to their in-group or out-group (Aldrich et al., 2018; Fernandez-Vazquez, 2019) and combines it with literature on institutional context and the extent to which this influences the credibility of statements (Dahlberg, 2013; Carroll and Kubo, 2018). Moreover, in the evaluation of statements, I distinguish between agreement and credibility.

I hypothesize that a statement from a party that a voter did not vote for but would like to see in government will have a similar positive effect on approval of the statement as when it comes from the in-group party. Furthermore, I expect the institutional context to

have a strong effect on the credibility of the statement: I argue that people evaluate party messages as more credible when they have more trust in the institutional arena from which the message was sent. Using a preregistered survey experiment in Germany with more than 1800 participants, I examine in a vignette design the extent to which the perception of party statements changes when the respective party label and the institutional context changes. As part of a survey, participants have to evaluate six statements on different policy topics in terms of their agreement and credibility.

The results suggests that the perception of party statements in multiparty systems is influenced by factors that go beyond the dichotomous effect of in-group vs. out-group differences: Not every party that does not correspond to a person's intended vote choice is automatically an out-group party. Furthermore, regardless of the author of the statement, trust in the institutional context has a significant positive impact on the perceived credibility of the statement. Thus, this last study combines all three aforementioned factors that influence political behavior in parliament: I look at the effect of institutional trust in parliament (as the entire set of rules that apply here) in comparison to other contexts. Moreover, I analyze the perception of parties with different ideologies as main political actors in parliaments as well as the effect of coalitions as an institutionalized form of interaction.

1.2   A Short Note on Methodological Approaches

As much as this dissertation draws on the theoretical insights derived from the studies mentioned above, it builds on the latest methodological developments in the social sciences. Two methodological approaches and developments in particular have made the analyses possible. These are briefly introduced here before the concrete application is described in detail in the respective chapters. The first one to mention is quantitative text analysis. Language is without a doubt both structuring and transforming (political) institutions and behavior and being a mirror for these structures and transformations at the same time (Chomsky, 1979; Chen, 2013; Ricks, 2020). Even though humans are generally better at comparing and interpreting short pieces of text, it is only through the use of computational methods that it becomes possible to process and analyze large amounts of textual data.

The applications that have emerged in recent years are enormous, spanning from simple dictionary search approaches to sentiment analysis (Liu, 2015; Proksch et al., 2019), scaling models (Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016) and topic models (Roberts et al., 2014; Lind et al., 2021), as well as word embeddings, the coefficients from neural network models predicting the use of words in context (Rheault and Cochrane, 2020; Rodman, 2020), providing researchers with a broad toolkit. They make it possible

to analyze on a large scale what topics appear in an analyzed context and in what way they are talked or written about. In addition to the development of new methods, a major advance in the collection and storage capacity of textual data is also responsible for the increased use of quantitative textual analysis (Schwalbach and Rauh, 2021). The focus of the quantitative text analyses in this dissertation lies on parliamentary speeches. The main source for these speeches is the Parlspeech data set, which covers parliamentary speeches in the key legislative chambers of nine representative democracies (Rauh and Schwalbach, 2020).

However, as much as these methods offer new possibilities, they also come with its own pitfalls that need to be kept in mind (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). One of the most important things when conducting a quantitative text analysis is to be aware of the environment and context in which the analyzed text was produced. Only if the right theoretical assumptions about the data-generating process are made, it can be prevented that, for example, texts are compared which are not comparable or conclusions are drawn which the respective text cannot provide (Slapin and Proksch, 2014; Proksch and Slapin, 2015). Yet, also from a methodological perspective, several things need to be taken into account in order to avoid incorrect application. Things like text preprocessing steps or selecting lexical features are often used but their consequences are far from trivial and can have substantial effects on the results of an analysis (Monroe, Colaresi and Quinn, 2017; Denny and Spirling, 2018). By considering and working around these potential stumbling blocks, quantitative text analysis offers the possibility of making political behavior and its change measurable over long periods of time.

The second methodological approach is the immense development of methods of causal identification (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), especially in the realm of survey methodology (Mutz, 2011). Survey experiments such as vignette or conjoint designs offer the possibility of tracing causal relationships and can moreover in many cases be integrated well into existing survey structures. They combine experiments' causal power with the generalizability of population-based samples (Mullinix et al., 2015). However, even though these methods provide important means of revealing causal relationships, as with the methods of quantitative text analysis, possible pitfalls need to be considered and limitations need to be addressed.

While there seem to be general differences in the performance of different types of survey experiments when validating them against real-world behavior, it is important to keep in mind that the respective experiment should always be chosen with respect to appropriateness to the analyzed context (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto, 2015). This is both true in terms of mirroring well the choice that a participant would also have to make in the outside world but also with regard to ethical considerations. In this regard, concerns about the external validity regarding the strength of the stimuli and the lack

of realism in experimental settings have been voiced (Barabas and Jerit, 2010). Furthermore, the question arises to what extent treatment effect estimates can be generalized especially if they stem from (convenience) samples from platforms like Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Even though studies show that such samples can be generalized for many research questions, this should be evaluated for each analysis and adjusted if necessary (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012; Coppock, 2019). As noted above, ethical considerations need to be emphasized, especially when deception may influence the cognition and behavior of survey participants (Sieber, 1982). Potential influence must therefore always be kept at a necessary minimum and needs to be approved by an ethics committee.

TWO

GOING IN CIRCLES? THE INFLUENCE OF THE ELECTORAL CYCLE ON THE PARTY BEHAVIOUR IN PARLIAMENT

Abstract

Most analyses dealing with the interaction of parties in parliament assume their interests to be fixed between elections. However, a rational perspective suggests that parties adapt their behaviour throughout the legislative term. I argue that this change is influenced by incentives and possibilities to shape legislation and the need to distinguish oneself from competitors. While for government parties it matters whether they have to share offices, for opposition parties the influence on policy-making is important. By examining the sentiment of all parliamentary speeches on bill proposals from six established democracies over more than twenty years, I analyse institutional and contextual effects. The results show that single-party governments tend to become more positive towards the end of the legislative cycle compared to coalition governments. On the other hand, opposition parties under minority governments, or with more institutionalised influence on government bills, show a more negative trend in comparison to their counterparts.

2.1 Introduction

During the last session of the Austrian parliament before the 2017 parliamentary elections, Chancellor Kern used his speech to call for unity and further active collective policy-making. The speakers of his coalition partner ÖVP, however, did not join in and even refused to approve some joint government initiatives, although they had been able to implement many policies from their election manifesto over the past four years. However, the opposition parties were equally belligerent in their speeches. The Greens accused the governing parties of being 'fake' and controlled by large donors[1]. Would this debate have happened in the same way at any other time in the four years prior to the election? Probably not. Many commentators interpreted this behaviour in view of the upcoming election.

This specific excerpt from a debate gives reason to believe that the timing of the parliamentary cycle has an influence on the parliamentary discourse. I examine how the electoral cycle structurally influences the conflictuality of speeches in parliament. Previous studies show that both the topic under discussion and the overall political context have an impact on consensus and conflict in parliamentary debates (De Giorgi, Moury and Ruivo, 2015; Palau, Márquez and Chaqués-Bonafont, 2015). I argue that the timing in the electoral cycles is another key component that affects the conflictuality of the speeches of different parliamentary groups. I also argue that government and opposition are subject to different factors that have an influence on how strongly the electoral cycle affects their behaviour in parliament (Hix and Noury, 2016). For government parties, it is particularly decisive to what extent they can implement their own ideas in bill proposals and if they need to distinguish themselves from a coalition partner when elections approach. For opposition parties, the opportunity to influence the policy-making process is important. This influence can be increased either under minority government that rely on opposition support or by the institutional context.

In order to analyse these changes in behaviour, I use full transcripts of parliamentary speeches from Austria, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, Spain and Sweden from the past twenty to thirty years. These cases provide different government types and vary with regard to government and opposition rights. I analyse the sentiment of speeches on government bills in parliament (Liu, 2015; Proksch et al., 2019). I assume that a more positive tone can either be an indicator for praising achievements in policy-making or a desired influence on policy-making in a situation where a party is not able to pass legislation by itself. In contrast, a more negative tone is an indication of a more conflictual appearance. If parties are in a position of power, on the other hand, they will use more

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[1]Reported in the Austrian national newspaper Der Standard (*Letzte Sitzung: Kern wirbt im Nationalrat für Miteinander*, 2017)

positive language to communicate their policy achievements to voters.

The following section outlines the current state of research on parliamentary behaviour of government and opposition parties and my hypotheses. After describing the data sources and research method, I analyse the results and conclude with the implications for further research. The results show that single-party governments tend to be more positive when elections come closer. However, this effect does not apply for government parties in coalitions. In contrast to previous results, opposition parties do not show a general negative trend. However, opposition parties under minority government show a more negative trend compared to their counterparts. The same applies to opposition parties when parliamentary institutions provide more possibilities to influence legislation. These results have important consequences for the analysis of parliamentary parties. On the one hand, future analyses need to take time into account in order to avoid biased results. On the other hand, the level of conflict affects citizens' perceptions of the responsibility and legitimacy of parties in parliament (Andeweg, 2013; Goetz, 2014).

2.2 Theoretical Foundations of Party Behaviour in Parliament

Government and opposition parties have different instruments as well as agenda-setting opportunities that are supposed to ensure "the right of the majority to govern and the right of the minorities to be heard" (Huber, 1994, p.1). Most models that analyse the interplay of these two groups in parliament consider their interests stable throughout the legislative cycle or even during several terms (Döring, 2001; Tsebelis, 2002; Otjes and Louwerse, 2018). Some emphasise the importance of the government type as well as institutional features like parliamentary agendasetting rules or opposition rights for the behaviour of parties. However, these are not expected to change throughout the electoral cycle. Important exceptions are Bräuninger and Debus (2009) as well as Martin and Vanberg (2008). In their study of which party group initiates bills, Bräuninger and Debus take into account whether elections are approaching but find different effects per country. Martin and Vanberg, on the other hand, analyse how coalition governments discuss issues that are more internally divisive as elections draw near. Although such models may be well suited to describe long-term developments, they must be complemented by a short-term perspective if we take strategic party behaviour seriously.

Outside the legislative arena, the effect of the legislative cycle on party behaviour has recently moved into focus. Sagarzazu and Klüver (2017), Seeberg (forthcoming) and Van Der Velden, Schumacher and Vis (2018) examine in case studies how the issue attention of parties changes over the course of the cycle by analysing press releases. In compar-

ative studies, on the other hand, Jennings and Wlezien (2016) look at the change of voter preferences over the electoral cycle and Müller (2020) analyses how the coverage of campaign pledges in newspaper articles changes. Individual case studies have started to examined how the electoral cycle affects parties in parliaments (Borghetto and Belchior, 2020; Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu, 2019). While these studies have advanced our understanding of the time-dependent strategic behaviour of parties in parliaments, conclusions have so far been limited to specific party systems in a particular institutional context. Based on the findings of these studies, I propose that parties' motives in parliament change throughout an electoral term depending on different factors. How this change affects party behaviour depends both on their position in parliament and on the institutional possibilities to influence policy-making.

Whereas the two studies by Bräuninger and Debus (2009) and Martin and Vanberg (2008) look at the initiation of bill proposals, I argue that focusing on the daily interaction in parliament offers an even more detailed insight into the impact of the electoral cycle on party behaviour. While bills generally require preparation time and the timing of their introduction is subject to strategic considerations, parliamentary interaction in debates offers a more immediate insight into the strategic behaviour of all parties. The literature on speech-making in parliament generally implies that the electoral pressure discourages shirking and is therefore beneficial to the interests of voters. In contrast, Fukumoto and Matsuo (2015) show in their study of the Japanese House of Councillors that MPs who run for re-election allocate fewer resources to parliamentary activities when elections are closer. However, when they speak they try to be more efficient by delivering longer party messages. Furthermore, in their analysis of manifestos and party representatives' statements, Baumann, Debus and Gross (2021) find that approaching elections have an impact on the issues that different parties focus on in campaign messages. In addition, Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu (2019) show that regarding economic issues, public opinion and the reaction to opposition attacks play an increased role at different phases of the cycle.

In this analysis, I turn to another key factor, namely the expressed conflictuality in debates. I conceptualise conflict as the continuum between what Ilie (2003) calls "adversariality" and "cooperativeness" in parliament: "on the one hand, a spirit of adversariality, which is manifested in position-claiming and opponent-challenging acts, and, on the other, a spirit of cooperativeness, which is manifested in joint decision-making and cross-party problem solving processes" (Ilie, 2003, p.73). I propose that electoral pressure has an influence on the expressed conflictuality in debates. Especially with the increase of technical possibilities for automated text analysis, the analysis of sentiment as a measure of conflictuality has become an important tool in the social sciences (Young and Soroka, 2012; Liu, 2015). More importantly, sentiment analysis is a theoretically well-founded way of measuring conflict across countries (Proksch et al., 2019).

I interpret the expressed sentiment of a speaker in a speech as a combination of the proximity of their own position to the discussed matter - in this analysis a bill proposal - as well as a strategic consideration of which sentiment is best suited for achieving one's goal. My expectation results from the general assumption that approval of a discussed matter results in a more positive language. Additionally, the willingness to act cooperatively is reflected in a more positive debate tone as well. On the other hand, negative sentiment can be an expression of positional distance or a more fundamental aversion to cooperation. It is thus central to the speaker's behaviour which issue is discussed in a debate and which goals are pursued with the speech. For example, in their study of parliamentary opposition in Spain, Mújica and Sánchez-Cuenca (2006) found that there is significantly less consensus in debates on government bills, while debates on issues that could not be clearly reduced to a left-right axis showed significantly more consensus. Furthermore, the broader political situation, such as an economic crisis, can have an impact on the general level of conflict (De Giorgi, Moury and Ruivo, 2015; Palau, Márquez and Chaqués-Bonafont, 2015). In addition, and independently of this, the electoral cycle provides incentives for individual groups in parliament to show more consensual or conflictual behaviour.

What consequences does this have for theoretical assumptions about the behaviour of parties in parliaments? As elections approach, a party's focus shifts to representing the interests of potential voters or their own constituency. This is very likely to have an impact on the behaviour of MPs. I assume that parties have a greater interest in jointly shaping policies at the beginning of the legislative cycle than at the end of it. This leads to a lower willingness to compromise at the end of the cycle, which could be expressed in more negative language regardless of the topic under discussion. A more negative debate tone during the end of the electoral cycle has been found in other studies before (Proksch et al., 2019). However, I assume that the effect of upcoming elections is not the same for all parties in parliament. For this reason, the effect might not be significant if all parties are examined in the same analysis. As Hix and Noury (2016) identify government-opposition dynamics as the most important factor for parliamentary voting behaviour, I expect the behaviour of both groups to be influenced by different factors. It seems plausible that government parties adopt a more positive tone in their debates when elections approach as they have a general incentive to sell their government work to voters as particularly positive. At the same time, I assume that opposition parties will be more negative in their speeches during this period in order to signal the need for a change of government. This divide is reflected in the first hypothesis:

H1: *While the tone of government parties becomes more positive as elections approach, the tone of opposition parties becomes more negative.*

In the same way that the behaviour of the two groups differs at the aggregate level, I assume that different factors within the two groups lead to varying behaviour over the

legislative cycle. In how far the government-opposition divide is structuring the behaviour in parliament should depend on characteristics of the different parliaments as well as parties. For this reason, I examine both groups separately. The following sections outline these factors.

2.2.1 The Change in Government Behaviour over the Legislative Term

The literature distinguishes between different types of government from different perspectives. One of the most obvious differences is between single-party governments and coalition governments. It has important implications for the expected behaviour in parliament: Whereas single-party governments can propose legislation as they wish (given they possess a majority of seats in parliament and the party is united with regard to the policy), coalition governments need to find a compromise in conflictual policy areas. From a theoretical perspective, there are different models of how government parties voice dissatisfaction and deal with disagreement (Martin, 2004; Martin and Vanberg, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014). In this context, it is important to look at the issues that government coalitions deal with at different points of time. Prominent studies show that the choice of issues accommodates the policy goals of both coalition members. First of all, issues that are more attractive for the government as a whole tend to get introduced earlier whereas unattractive issues are often postponed (Martin, 2004). This is in line with the finding that coalition partners communicate with their potential voters more on internally divisive issues when parliamentary elections approach (Martin and Vanberg, 2008).

In addition, coalition partners use the institutional features of parliament for scrutiny purposes (Martin and Vanberg, 2011). This is associated with a longer time until a bill is passed. Therefore, a delay in the legislative process is used as a proxy for parliamentary scrutiny. Those scrutiny mechanisms result in the observation that ministerial drafts are more likely to be changed the greater the policy divisiveness of coalition partners. These studies lead to the conclusion that policies in a parliamentary system reflect, to a large extent, a compromise among the policy positions of coalition partners (Martin and Vanberg, 2014). However, how easily this compromise is reached might differ between countries and parties and therefore has an effect on the behaviour in parliament. I assume that in the case of a coalition government, the party behaviour might be more conflictual towards the end of the term as the different parties want to signal a distinct position to their voters. This assumption is in line with the findings by Sagarzazu and Klüver (2017), who show that differentiation of issue attention of coalition parties in Germany increases towards the end of the electoral cycle. Additionally, as Martin (2004)has shown, introduced bills tend to be more conflictual at this time. For single-party governments, however, the effect would be the opposite: the closer elections are, the more positively their own legislative

work is presented to the voters.

> **H2a:** *The tone of government parties in a coalition government becomes less positive the closer the next elections compared to a single-party government.*

An additional factor might also have an influence on the timing during the legislative cycle when we look exclusively at coalition governments. It might be easier for a party in government that holds the prime minister's office to signal a position to potential voters (Crabtree et al., 2020; Klüver and Spoon, 2020). Since the government's position is often highly associated with this office, media attention is often disproportionately focused on the largest coalition partner. The smaller coalition party might feel the need to distinguish itself more in order to communicate its own position. For this reason, the smaller coalition parties might express themselves less positively at the end of the term than their bigger coalition partner in order to signal their specific position to the voters.

> **H2b:** *The tone of a junior coalition party becomes less positive the closer the next elections compared to the tone of the prime minister's coalition party.*

Furthermore, Martin and Vanberg (2011) analyse government coalition behaviour from the perspective of legislative institutions. They find that coalition parties can scrutinise each other if strong legislative institutions are present. Since this can have a substantial influence on the interaction of parties in the debate, I include it as a control variable for the analysis of the government parties.

2.2.2 The Change in Opposition Behaviour over the Legislative Term

Martin and Vanberg (2011) focus, in their analysis of parliamentary behaviour during the legislative process, mainly on government coalitions. They argue that "strong parliaments do not simply serve as oversight bodies for the cabinet as a whole (...)" but instead allow "multiparty governments to resolve intra-government tensions" (Martin and Vanberg, 2011, p.157). This implies that opposition behaviour is largely irrelevant for governmental bills, even though the authors leave a small leeway for the case of minority governments which they do not analyse in detail. This is in line with most of the literature that defines the goals of opposition parties as proposing alternatives to the potential voter rather than shaping policies actively (Dahl, 1966; Andeweg, 2013).

However, recent studies have shown that the influence of opposition parties is stronger than suggested so far. Seeberg (2016) shows that opposition parties are more important to policy change than assumed. Additionally, Russell et al. (2017) demonstrate that non-government influence on amendments to bills in parliament is more extensive than the literature suggests and can be carried out for different reasons. These studies show that

it can be reasonable for opposition parties to engage in the policy-making process and to collaborate with government parties. As Barnes (2016, p.29) puts it: "Collaboration is one of the only tools they [out-of-power legislators] have to advance their legislative agendas". Moreover, this study is similarly interested in the impact of parliamentary interaction and discourse that does not necessarily influence policy outcomes directly. There is also evidence for non-policy considerations in the behaviour of parties in parliament. Looking at voting behaviour, Tuttnauer (2018, p.293) shows that "the better a party is placed to compete for office with the current government, in terms of size and governmental experience, the more likely it is to conflict with the government in plenary votes". Therefore, not all opposition parties should be expected to engage in policy-making activities in parliament. In how far this influences the party behaviour of opposition parties, should be associated with the respective parliamentary system and the possibilities that they offer.

How does this translate into parliamentary behaviour? On a general level, opposition parties might follow a more conflictual strategy the closer elections are. This could also be related to the fact that voters perceive policy shifts from opposition parties much less than from government parties (Plescia and Staniek, 2017). Therefore, they might engage in policy-making at the beginning of a cycle by criticising government bill proposals less negatively than during the times of elections. This general trend is already expressed in the first hypothesis. However, I expect this effect to be stronger for opposition parties, which have a higher possibility to influence legislation. These parties might use their influence by collaborating with government parties and actively change government bill proposals at the start of an electoral cycle. However, once elections are approaching they need to signal alternatives to their potential voters. Therefore, I assume that they will follow a more conflictual strategy and adopt a more negative attitude towards the government parties in comparison to their counterparts. Two important aspects affect the expected change of opposition parties throughout the legislative cycle.

One important factor for the influence of opposition parties is the presence of a minority government. In minority situations, the government is by definition dependent on the support from at least one opposition party or MP. Even though government parties often try to rely on support agreements, this enlarges the possibility for all opposition parties to shape policies (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006; Artés and Bustos, 2008). Additionally, countries that traditionally witness the formation of minority governments regularly might have a smaller government-opposition divide as issue-specific coalitions in parliament are changing more often (Strøm, 1990). De Giorgi, Moury and Ruivo (2015) as well as Palau, Márquez and Chaqués-Bonafont (2015) demonstrate, in their case studies on Portugal and Spain, significantly more consensus in the behaviour of the parliamentary opposition under minority governments. While I expect this effect on average also for this study, I assume a different effect throughout the electoral cycle. The increased possibility of

influencing policy should have a more positive effect on the tone of speeches the further away elections are in comparison to opposition parties under majority governments.

H3a: *The tone of opposition parties becomes more negative the closer the next elections in the case of minority governments compared to majority governments.*

A country-specific factor that might lead to differences in the behaviour of opposition parties is the institutionalised policy influence. I assume that in the case of higher institutionalised influence of opposition parties, position-taking will be less structured by a government-opposition divide than in systems with less opposition influence. This influence is higher in the Scandinavian countries and Italy, lower in many central European countries and lowest in Great Britain (Strøm, 1990; Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006; Martin and Vanberg, 2011). Overall, parliamentary rules allowing opposition parties to influence policies are associated with fragmented opposition party systems. As a consequence, less deliberative rules lead to more merging of opposition parties and a stronger threat for government parties (Maeda, 2015). Garritzmann (2017) identifies three major determinants of institutionalised opposition power: a strong committee system, agenda-setting rights and the possibilities to scrutinise the government through interpellations and questions. These variables give opposition parties in different countries varying possibilities to intervene in the legislative process. Regardless of the success of this effort to exert influence, I assume, in line with the previous hypothesis, that opposition parties will attempt to do so more at the beginning of the cycle. Therefore, as elections approach, I expect a more negative trend from opposition parties with more influence on legislation compared to those with less influence.

H3b: *The tone of opposition parties becomes more negative the closer the next elections in parliaments where opposition parties have higher influence on government policies compared to systems with lower influence.*

Models that look at the effect of the legislative term usually consider the end of the term to coincide with new elections and the possibility of a change in government and opposition. However, a new government formation does not necessarily need to concur with the end of the legislative term. In parliamentary democracies, the government is always dependent on the support of a parliamentary majority. Proposed effects might be less detectable in terms when the government changes during the term as this change might lead to similar effects as a new election and interrupt the 'normal' change in party behaviour during the term. Therefore, the analyses below are carried out in a robustness test only for 'normal' electoral periods in which the government does not change between two elections and without snap elections.

2.3 Empirical Strategy

In order to analyse the changes in party behaviour during the legislative cycle, I use full transcripts of parliamentary speeches from Austria, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, Spain and Sweden. These are mostly drawn from the ParlSpeech data set, which contains annotated full text vectors of 6.3 million plenary speeches in the legislative chambers of key European states (Rauh and Schwalbach, 2020). The data set has been supplemented with speeches from the Irish Parliament provided by Herzog and Mikhaylov (2017). In order to make the raw data usable, the original documents of the parliamentary records had to be scraped from the archives of the respective parliamentary websites. The documents were then read into R (R Core Team, 2019) and processed with the packages *stringr* (Wickham, 2013) and *quanteda* (Benoit et al., 2018) to obtain an annotated data set suitable for analyses. The selection of cases is based on two criteria in particular. For one thing, the cases are most similar in the sense that they are parliamentary democracies that have existed for more than 30 years. On the other hand, they show a strong variance with regard to theoretically important variables both within and between cases. Table 2.1 gives an overview of the distribution. The share of minority and coalition governments are measured as shares of all observations in the whole corpus.

To compare the party behaviour, I selected only speeches on bill proposals that were initiated by the government. Due to differences in the working procedures in the parliaments[2], this leads to different sample sizes for the countries although the time frames are comparable. On the one hand, there are differences in the initial number of speeches that are held in parliament on average. On the other hand, speeches in parliaments are distributed among different parliamentary activities, which are allocated at different proportions of the total time (in addition to bill proposals e.g., question times). The division depends on the working procedures of the respective parliaments. In order to classify the speeches, the titles of the debate topics had to be available for each country. For this reason, not all countries from the ParlSpeech data set could be included.

To analyse the changing strategies of parties in parliament, it would be possible to measure position-taking towards a proposed bill. This is technically possible through the use of scaling methods such as Wordfish or Wordshoal (Slapin and Proksch, 2008; Lauderdale and Herzog, 2016). However, one would have to assume that all debates on bills can be scaled on one overarching scale. Even though it is imaginable that the government-opposition divide is quite strongly structuring those debates, it is very unlikely that it does so equally across policy fields. Additionally, positioning oneself in parliament further

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[2]The parliaments examined in this study differ in their tradition of bill proposals from government and opposition. In some countries it is common for the opposition to initiate their own proposals, while in others they try to influence existing government proposals through motions and amendments.

Table 2.1: Case Selection

Country	Minority Governments	Coalition Governments	Parliamentary Strength	Opposition Influence	Years Covered
Austria	7.7%	100%	high	medium	1996-2017
Denmark	100%	94.2%	high	high	1998-2019
Ireland	22.4%	100%	low	low	1992-2011
New Zealand	74.1%	44.4%	low	medium	1987-2017
Spain	53.5%	0%	low	low	1996-2015
Sweden	84.6%	57.7%	high	high	1991-2018

away from one party might result in a position that is closer to another party. Therefore, the mechanisms of position-taking are rather complex. In contrast, expressing a sentiment that is more negative (or positive) does not necessarily mean being spatially closer to a party that is also expressing a negative (or positive) sentiment. For example, the sentiment of a radical left party towards a bill proposal on an economic policy issue of a centre-left government party might be similar to that of a centre-right party. The policy position of the two parties, however, might be very different. For this reason, a sentiment analysis of the bill debates is conducted to analyse the party behaviour during the legislative cycle.

Actors express sentiment in speeches in relation to other speakers and the topic of discussion, e.g., to other parties and/or the government, and to a legislative bill. I follow Proksch et al. (2019, p.102) in their notion of sentiment as "a one-dimensional quantity expressed using a relatively language-specific and possibly institutionally fixed set of lexical resources". To conduct the sentiment analysis for all parliamentary speeches on bill proposals in the six countries, I use translations of sentiment dictionaries by Proksch et al. (2019) respectively in Danish, English, German, Spanish and Swedish. The authors have shown that the translated versions capture a comparable measurement of the tone of a speech. It is important to consider language-specific and parliament-specific aspects which lead to a general mean difference in the tone of different languages in parliament. For example, Rauh (2018) concludes that sentiment scoring works better for positive messages than for negative messages for the German language. However, these differences are taken into account in the later analysis with country fixed effects. To analyse the expressed sentiment, I use the formula proposed by Lowe et al. (2011) of a log-ratio of positive over negative counts:

$$log\frac{pos + 0.5}{neg + 0.5} \tag{2.1}$$

This allows to capture only the relative positivity and negativity of a given speech in parliament[3]. The resulting score forms the basis of the dependent variable. If a party has spoken more than once during a bill debate, I analyse the tone of the combined speeches of all speakers of that party during one debate. The total amount of speeches per country varies due to differences in the parliamentary culture and the length of the investigation period: The smallest amount of individual speeches can be found in the Austrian case with about 195,000 speeches in 20 years and the largest amount in New Zealand with about 925,000 speeches in 31 years. In some cases, the data sets were slightly reduced at the beginning or end in order to analyse only full legislative periods.

In a further step, I deleted all speeches that did not belong to a speaker of a party (e.g., speeches by the chair). Then I separated the speeches according to whether they dealt with a government bill. In a final step, I deleted all debates in which only one party spoke or less than four speeches were made in total. Thus, purely procedural speeches are excluded that either serve to introduce a bill formally or initiate a voting procedure. These restrictions reduce the total sample by less than 10%. In a final step, I aggregate all speeches of the same party per bill debate during a parliamentary session, which I can identify with the respective title and date of the debate. These aggregations per debate and day form the unit of analysis and the basis for calculating the sentiment scores. This process results in a data set with roughly 114,000 sentiment observations of 53 parties. In this context, it needs to be stressed that parties are not unitary actors and the behaviour and position of their MPs cannot be expected to be completely consistent. Parties and their leadership differ in the way they interact with backbenchers, and the electoral system of a country has a considerable influence on these decisions (Proksch and Slapin, 2015). However, this study is interested in the behaviour of parties as a whole. Nevertheless, intra-party differences and changes over time would be an important field for future research.

The main independent variable is the time before the next election. From a theoretical perspective, there are different approaches of how to specify this variable. The simplest implementation is to use the days until the next election. In order to control for the fact that not all countries and legislative periods are of the same length, this measure can also be transformed to a variable that measures the proportion of time passed in a legislative period. However, it seems unlikely that time will cause a uniform change throughout the entire term (Koop, Reh and Bressanelli, 2018). On the one hand, parties might switch to a campaign mode at a certain point before the election. For this reason, it is possible to use a dummy for the year before an election, as it is used as a control variable in other studies (Proksch et al., 2019). However, this measure is also a simplification, as there will be

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[3]Appendix SM2.1 shows examples of speeches that have a very positive and negative score for each country. Note that these examples are only parts of speeches and punctuation is already removed

changes within the election period and the cut-off point will not be the same for all parties and countries. Alternatively, it is possible that time has an influence over the whole term, but with varying degrees of intensity. I assume that the same range of days immediately before the election has a greater influence than earlier in the term. In order to account for the changing importance of the days before an upcoming election, I use the (natural) logarithm of the number of days before the next election as an independent variable and use the previous three specifications in robustness tests. Although this specification is theoretically most plausible, it should be noted that it leads to just a few cases for the distances right before the election and therefore provides less common support as well as potentially larger confidence intervals in the regression analysis. When estimating interaction effects, this has to be taken into account in order to avoid false conclusions about the present effect (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu, 2019).

All relevant information about the length of the cycles and government types (coalition governments, minority governments and support parties) are taken from ParlGov (Döring and Manow, 2018). The coding of strong institutions for government coalitions is taken from Martin and Vanberg (2011) and the information on opposition influence from Garritzmann (2017)[4]. Additionally, I include characteristics of the parties as control variables that might influence the sentiment of the parties structurally. These are two dummy variables, whether the party is a mainstream party or whether the party is a challenger party (Meguid, 2007). The structure of the data is such that the sentiment variable is nested in debates, which in turn are nested in electoral cycles and these are nested in the respective countries. Therefore, I use a multilevel regression model including a debate-level and an electoral cycle-level as well as country fixed effects in order to analyse the interaction of the effect of timing and the relevant variable for government and opposition parties on the sentiment.

However, from this model alone it is not distinguishable whether the effect is due to strategic changes in behaviour over time or if it correlates with a general change in the conflict potential of the bill proposals discussed in parliament. Both results would be relevant, but would mean something different. Therefore, I need a proxy for an initial conflict potential for each discussed bill. There is no feasible way to assign a unique value of conflict to each bill debate topic for each country. For this reason, I use the issue area of the respective debate as a proxy. Needless to say, it would be naïve to assume that there is no variance of conflict between parties within issue areas. Nevertheless, this procedure reflects the widely accepted approach of projects, such as the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2019), that party competition takes place on the basis of lines of

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[4] I code countries that score above 0.6 in the Opposition Power Index as countries with high opposition influence for two reasons. On the one hand, the score divides the original sample by Garritzmann (2017) in half. On the other hand, there is a substantial gap between the closest countries above and below this threshold.

conflict relating to such issues. The potential for conflict between parties in a particular area is thus strongly related to the extent to which their respective positions in that area differ on a general level.

I use the information available on the topic of the debate, to classify the policy area for each of these bill proposals according to the classification scheme proposed by Klüver and Zubek (2018). In a next step, I merge the data with a data set from the Manifesto Project, that contains the respective positions of the parties in the different issue areas. From the position-taking of parties in their election manifestos, it is possible to estimate each party's positional difference to the position of the proposing government party or government coalition mean. I use the resulting difference score as a control variable in order to be able to attribute the changing behaviour with more certainty to the underlying mechanism. By using this control variable, I take the essential component of agenda-setting power seriously. The resulting time effects for the government parties are thus either related to the strategic use of sentiment in the debates or the strategic addressing of more or less conflictual matters between the government parties within a topic area. For opposition parties, the link to the strategic use of sentiment is even more plausible, since these parties have no influence on the agenda-setting of governmental bill debates.

2.4 Results

Before I take a closer look at the analysis of the influence of time on the sentiment of parliamentary debates, the dependent variable itself must be examined more closely. Figures SM2.1 and SM2.2 in Appendix SM2.2 illustrate that the vast majority of the variable is between -1 and 1.5 with a mean of 0.38. This high concentration of the variable should be taken into account in the following analysis. As expected, the sentiment of government parties is on average more positive than that of opposition parties and there are substantial differences between countries. Furthermore, Figure SM2.3 in Appendix SM2.3 shows the plotted sentiment values broken down by country as well as government-opposition status throughout the legislative cycle. No uniform trend is apparent, but a positive trend for government parties and a negative trend for opposition parties can be seen for most cases. The figure also illustrates that speech observations for all countries are evenly distributed over the legislative cycle.

In regression model 1 (Table 2.2), I analyse the complete data set with a focus on the differences between government and opposition. In contrast to other studies, the model shows a positive trend for approaching elections[5]. I insert an interaction effect into the regression, which checks whether the sentiment before the election changes differently for government and opposition parties. It is significant and basically equalises the pos-

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[5]This means a negative coefficient for the distance to the next election.

Table 2.2: Regression models

	Dependent variable:				
	tone				
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
Log(Days Before)	−0.021***	−0.043***	−0.011	−0.019**	−0.017**
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Log(Days Before)*Opposition	0.022***				
	(0.004)				
Log(Days Before)*Coalition		0.036***			
		(0.009)			
Log(Days Before)*Not PM Party			0.012		
			(0.008)		
Log(Days Before)*Minority				0.023**	
				(0.007)	
Log(Days Before)*Opp. Power					0.019**
					(0.007)
Mainstream Party	0.001	−0.011	0.060	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.053)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Challenger Party	−0.002	−0.125**	−0.136***	0.004	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Opposition	−0.338***				
	(0.026)				
Coalition		−0.211***			
		(0.062)			
Strong Institutions			−0.057		
			(0.046)		
Minority				−0.087	
				(0.047)	
Support Party				0.030***	0.030***
				(0.007)	(0.007)
Opp. Power					−0.268***
					(0.062)
Manifesto Difference	−0.013***	−0.010	−0.009	−0.016***	−0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Country F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.837***	1.010***	0.811***	0.598***	0.592***
	(0.043)	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Observations	112,708	35,535	24,950	77,173	77,173
	All	Government	Coalition	Opposition	Opposition
	Parties	Parties	Gov. Parties	Parties	Parties
Log Likelihood	−93,114.930	−30,278.280	−20,969.050	−64,243.010	−64,245.670
Akaike Inf. Crit.	186,259.900	60,586.570	41,964.100	128,518.000	128,521.300
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	186,404.300	60,713.740	42,069.720	128,666.100	128,660.100

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Figure 2.1: Interaction plot: Government vs. opposition.

itive effect on tone during the legislative cycle for opposition parties: This confirms my assumption about the effect of elections on government parties. Contrary to my hypothesis and previous findings, however, the sentiment of opposition parties does not change throughout the legislative cycle. Figure 2.1 illustrates this interaction effect: While there is a positive trend for government parties, the sentiment for opposition parties remains largely the same throughout the term. The party-specific control variables do not show a significant effect on the sentiment.

In order to analyse whether the mechanisms of the theoretical assumptions on coalition behaviour translate into the sentiment of parliamentary speeches, I subset the data set by only selecting government parties. As in the previous model, there is a positive effect of approaching elections on sentiment in parliamentary speeches (Model 2a). I add an interaction effect that estimates the impact of timing on different government types. This effect is significantly negative for coalition government parties and thus has a similar equalising effect for this group as in the previous model for opposition parties: While coalition parties show a relatively constant sentiment throughout the legislative cycle, parties from single-party governments become much more positive as elections approach. Figure 2.2 displays these interaction effects. It shows a more positive sentiment for single-party governments immediately before the election than for coalition governments. This indicates that single-party governments use, in particular, the time prior to an election to present their bill proposals in a very positive manner, as they count disproportionately more in the logarithmic model. While the mainstream party dummy has no effect in all models on government parties, challenger parties are particularly negative.

Figure 2.2: Interaction plot: Single-party vs. coalition government.

Model 2b takes a closer look at coalition governments (reducing the sample size to cases with coalition governments). I examine whether the effect is different on the party of the respective head of government compared to the other coalition parties. However, the two types of government parties do not show a significant interaction effect. As the literature on coalition governments distinguishes between different legislative institutions, I created a dummy variable for countries with strong legislative institutions and for those without them. This variable also does not show a significant effect. If we follow Martin and Vanberg (2011) with regard to the effects of legislative institutions, we should not expect a significant change in the sentiment of the opposition parties as they are not expected to be influential on government policies. However, as outlined above, there are good reasons to believe that the actual picture might be more complex. For this reason, Models 3a and 3b look specifically at opposition parties (reducing the sample size to opposition parties).

Model 3a examines whether the presence of minority governments has an effect on the tone of the debate. Minority governments, in general, do not show a significant effect on the tone of opposition parties. However, opposition parties are significantly more positive throughout most of the time of the electoral cycle under minority governments and only become more negative just before the election (Figure 2.3). Due to a positive trend for opposition parties under majority parties, the estimate for these parties is higher than the estimate for minority governments just before the election, which neutralises the general positive effect of minority governments. Therefore, the model confirms the different time effects for opposition parties under minority and majority governments. However, this significant difference is due to both the negative trend for minority governments and the

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Figure 2.3: Interaction plot: Minority vs. majority government.

unexpected positive trend for majority governments. Furthermore, support parties under minority governments are significantly more positive than other opposition parties.

One factor that might differentiate between countries is the institutionalised influence of the opposition on government policy-making. Model 3b shows that in countries with more opposition power to influence legislation, the sentiment of the opposition is generally more negative. However, there is also a significant interaction effect with the time variable. The plot of the interaction effect (Figure 2.4) demonstrates that while opposition parties in parliaments with weak opposition rights tend to show a positive trend with approaching elections, this trend is slightly negative in parliaments with strong opposition rights. However, the effect is less substantial compared to the previous significant interaction effects. In addition, it must be emphasised once again that the significant effects for both opposition models are also based on the positive trend of the respective counterparts (opposition parties under majority governments and opposition with weak influence on legislation). This finding does not contradict the theorised mechanisms. However, it contradicts the assumption that opposition parties in parliament generally enter a negative campaigning mode as elections approach.

The manifesto difference to the government has the expected significant negative effect for the first model as well as both opposition models: The further away a party is from the estimated government position in a policy area, the more negatively it expresses itself. This result underlines the importance of the topic for shaping the respective debate. This ties in with previous findings that opposition consensus varies significantly between issue areas (Mújica and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). Furthermore, it shows that the sentiment of

Figure 2.4: Interaction plot: Weak vs. strog opposition influence.

opposition parties is strongly influenced by their ideological distance to the government's expected ideal point. In the case of the two government models, the a priori policy distance has no significant effect. This makes sense, since the variation of the variable is very small and, by definition, becomes zero for all single-party governments. Taken together, the findings confirm that the parties' behaviour is a result of the issues discussed as well as strategic considerations.

2.4.1 Robustness Tests

In order to ensure the validity of the results, I run various robustness tests. In a first test, I exchange the time variable in my models with the three specifications described in the empirical strategy section. The results (see Tables SM2.2 to SM2.4 in Appendix SM2.4) hardly change with the other specifications. Only when I use the dummy variable (year before an election) do the interaction terms of the time variables with minority government and opposition power become insignificant. However, as this variable provides the heaviest simplification, this is also where most of the variation and thus explanatory power is lost. Additionally, I calculate the multilevel regressions as OLS regression models. All interaction effects remain significant.

Secondly, I estimated all models with significant results once again with a subset of cases where the legislative term is complete (see Table SM2.5 in Appendix SM2.5). As described above, the effect could be altered by early elections if actors gear their behaviour to a full period and conditions change in the middle of a normal cycle. However, the results remain significant for this modification. Furthermore, I run the main models with

an additional variable that measures agenda capacity (specified as number of speeches per year and country). However, this has no substantial influence on the results (see Table SM2.6 in Appendix SM2.6).

As a last robustness test, I run the main models and exclude one country at a time to test whether the results were driven by specific countries. Only the interaction effect between the time variable and the government-opposition dummy becomes just insignificant ($P = 0.058$) with the exclusion of New Zealand. This might support the assumption that the effects are rather related to the differences within both groups. Additionally, the interaction effect between opposition power and the time variable becomes just insignificant ($P = 0.08$) with the exclusion of Sweden. However, all other 22 models produce the same significance levels results and thus underline the robustness of the results.

2.5   Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, I look at the changing motivations of parliamentary behaviour for different party groups in parliament. Starting from the premise that the proximity of elections is a decisive factor for party behaviour, I propose that this has different implications for different party groups in parliament. I argue that the timing of elections has an impact on the expressed conflictuality in parliamentary debates. In the case of government parties, those parties that are free to introduce their own bill proposals should also present them as positively as possible with elections approaching. For opposition parties, on the other hand, the effect of timing should depend on how strong their influence on the policy-making process is. I analysed the sentiment of speeches on government bill proposals in six national parliaments as a proxy for the degree of conflict which is expressed by the speakers of a party in a debate: A more negative tone serves as an indication of a more conflictual behaviour, which could be interpreted as more vote-seeking. A more positive sentiment, on the contrary, can be an indicator of more cooperative behaviour, for example when opposition parties try to influence the government's policy proposals or government parties that try to sell their proposals to the voters.

The results show that there is no general trend towards the end of the legislative cycle. This may seem surprising at first, but it also makes sense, since the theoretical expectations for different parties are not the same. The breakdown by party groups shows significant differences. The analysis of government parties comes to the conclusion that the impact of the legislative cycle differs significantly between single-party and coalition governments. The former become much more positive as elections approach. This indicates that such governments can always express their ideal positions in bill proposals. Therefore, it is more attractive for them to sell these ideal positions to their voters as particularly positive when elections are close. This mechanism cannot be implemented to

the same extent by coalition governments, since they always compete with their coalition partners and thus need to compromise. As a consequence, coalition governments are not fundamentally more negative, but the trend towards the end of the cycle is significantly more positive for single-party governments.

Contrary to my hypothesis and previous findings, opposition parties do not become generally more negative towards the end of the cycle. Instead, the effect of time on opposition parties is particularly determined by whether they can exert more influence on government proposals. This effect can be interpreted in such a way that opposition parties in these situations try, on average, more frequently at the start of the legislative period to influence government proposals through cooperative behaviour, while they criticise the government more strongly through negative sentiment before the election. Furthermore, the difference between minority and majority governments matters for opposition parties. In this respect, opposition parties under minority governments follow the same logic as those with more influence on policy-making since the government is dependent on opposition support. However, the difference in trend is also driven by a positive trend of the respective counterparts (opposition parties under majority governments and with weak institutional influence on legislation).

In summary, the results show that parties in parliament adjust their behaviour to the preference order of their own goals. However, the extent to which this is reflected in behavioural changes in parliament, in this context more or less conflictual speeches, depends strongly on the context. Thus, this study complements the existing literature on strategic behaviour of parties in parliament with regard to timing. While previous studies looked at agenda-setting (Martin and Vanberg, 2014), the frequency of speaking behaviour (Fukumoto and Matsuo, 2015), issue attention (Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu, 2019; Sagarzazu and Klüver, 2017) or the impact of major political crises (De Giorgi, Moury and Ruivo, 2015; Palau, Márquez and Chaqués-Bonafont, 2015), I examined the influence of strategic considerations on the way MPs speak. Furthermore, it is innovative by comparing different government and opposition constellations in varying parliamentary settings.

What kind of implications do these findings have? On the one hand, there is a technical perspective. The analysis of parliamentary speeches and debates has moved into the focus of political science (Proksch and Slapin, 2015). While new methods have emerged to analyse these speeches, theoretically sound assumptions are needed about how, when and why parties and MPs express themselves in their speeches. If the behaviour of parties towards legislative initiatives changes systematically throughout the legislative cycle - as this study shows - this has to be contextualised in analyses of parliamentary speeches. For example, if a speech by a single-party majority government MP is particularly positive just before an election, this could be related more to the timing of the debate than to her

approval of the content of a bill. By controlling for time effects on the different groups in parliament, we can prevent potential bias in analyses and misinterpretation of speech behaviour. It is also possible to link the conclusions to other studies or it could be checked whether other routine procedures in parliament are also influenced by the electoral cycle. For example, Müller and Louwerse (2020) examine the impact of the electoral cycle on electoral surveys which may be influenced by a change in public behaviour in parliament. In addition, it could be examined to what extent the influence of the electoral cycle on extra-parliamentary activities such as press releases (Sagarzazu and Klüver, 2017; Seeberg, forthcoming; Van Der Velden, Schumacher and Vis, 2018) are related to the results of this study.

On the other hand, the implications can also be considered in relation to normative aspects. The discussion on the understanding of different actors' roles in parliament is particularly important. This question ties in particularly with studies on what constitutes a responsive and responsible opposition (Andeweg, 2013; Goetz, 2014). On the one hand, it might be desirable if the opposition participates constructively in the legislative process, resulting in proposals that represent a larger part of the population. On the other hand, this may lead to a situation where government and opposition are no longer clearly distinguishable for the voter and political decisions are perceived as without alternative. In this area, further research is needed to determine what kind of sentiment constitutes a preferable debate. Relevant questions in this context are: When can we consider a very negative sentiment in debates as harmful to parliamentary cooperation and when can we consider an excessively positive tone or positions of parties that are perceived as too similar as equally harmful? The effects on the electorate would also be interesting with regard to the electoral cycle: To what extent, for example, is electoral campaigning perceived in parliament? This study has set a reference point by demonstrating that the electoral cycle structurally influences parties in their behaviour depending on their role in parliament.

THREE

TALKING TO THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES

Abstract

In many Western European states, right-wing populist parties made it into the national parliaments. This presents other parties in parliament with the challenge of how to behave towards the new party. While the scholarly literature has addressed interaction with the populist radical right in the electoral arena, we know little about how it functions in an institutionally constrained arena such as parliament. This study asks in what way these structures affect the position-taking and confrontation in speeches. Using different text-as-data approaches, I analyze parliamentary debates in four Western European parliaments after the entry of right-wing populist parties. The results show that government-opposition dynamics continue to structure parliamentary debates by and large, but right-wing populist parties succeed in polarizing debates on immigration. They also become the center of attention in these debates. These results have important implications for the analysis of strategic party interaction in the parliamentary context.

3.1 Introduction

"Wir werden sie jagen![1]" - We will chase them. With these words Alexander Gauland, one of the leading figures of the populist radical right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), described their upcoming role towards the government after the AfD had succeeded in entering the German parliament for the first time in 2017. Regardless of actual intention, the statement expresses confidence in the power to influence the behavior of other parties. Or, to frame it in the same rhetoric: the ability to chase them to a place where they otherwise would not have gone. Additionally, several German MPs stated that debates in parliament had 'become rougher' and direct confrontation had increased with the entry of the AfD[2]. This study analyses how the interaction of parties in parliamentary debates is structured after populist radical right parties (PRRP)[3] have entered.

The phenomenon of PRRPs growing stronger and putting mainstream parties under pressure is nothing new. In the last 20 years, they have entered many parliaments in Western Europe; in some, they even supported governments. Therefore, the development became a focus of political science. Commentators have examined the influence of these parties using two preponderant perspectives: On the one hand, there has been a discussion as to whether they drive mainstream parties towards certain policies, such as tightened immigration laws (e.g. Mudde, 2013). On the other hand, the reaction of other parties in the electoral arena has been an often debated topic over the last decade (Meguid, 2005, 2007; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020). Another area, however, has barely been taken into account, namely the daily interaction in parliaments - the heart of democratic deliberation. I address this research gap in this study.

I analyze the patterns of party behavior when PRRPs have entered parliament. On a theoretical level, I combine the findings from research on electoral campaigning with theoretical assumptions about the effects of institutional settings in parliament (Helms, 2008; Rasch, 2014). I argue that both perspectives must be considered when attempting to formulate an explanation of how parties behave in parliament. The focus lies in the interaction with PRRPs in the field of immigration in comparison to other areas. To analyze the behavior in parliament, I use parliamentary debates from four European national parliaments that have witnessed the entry of prominent PRRPs. Using correspondence analysis allows me to derive positions from political texts that provide the basis of my analysis (Schonhardt-Bailey, 2008; Petrovic et al., 2009). Furthermore, a dictionary ap-

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[1] Quotation from a statement during the election-day party for the German parliamentary elections 2017.
[2] Quotation from an interview with a SPD member in the German newspaper Tagesspiegel.
[3] For the definition of PRRPs, I refer to De Vries and Hobolt (2012) describing them as parties that mobilize new issues (such as immigration or European integration), that see themselves as anti-establishment and that are reluctant to compromise. However, I do not follow the notion that these parties cease to be challengers as soon as they participate in government.

proach enables me to measure the addressing of others by parties and thus contextualize confrontation in parliament.

The results show that assumptions from party competition in the electoral arena cannot be transferred to the parliamentary arena. In general, debates in parliament continue to follow a government-opposition structure after the entry of PRRPs. In contrast, debates on immigration reveal a division between the new parties and all other parties. Furthermore, they become the center of these debates as they are disproportionately often addressed by other parties in debates on immigration. However, this confrontation is driven to a larger extent by left-wing parties which seem to expect a bigger electoral advantage. In the following section, I look at why parliaments are a constrained environment and therefore different from the electoral arena. Next, I argue in what ways parties interact in this environment and hypothesize what this interaction looks like after the entry of a PRRP. After the introduction of the data set and the methodological approach, I present the results from which I draw my conclusions and open questions that should be addressed in future research.

3.2 Parliament as a Constrained Environment

Previous studies dealing with the influence of PRRPs on the behavior of other parties have often focused on the electoral arena. In most cases, they analyze which strategies have led to electoral success, such as an increase in vote share or entry into parliament (Spies and Franzmann, 2011; Van Spanje and de Graaf, 2018). To a lesser extent, the success of these parties is evaluated in terms of influence on other parties (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020) or voters (Bischof and Wagner, 2019). These studies show that PRRPs, as issue entrepreneurs, achieve electoral success by introducing new issue dimensions (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012). Furthermore, they found in the electoral arena that, especially on such issues, PRRPs pull the position of mainstream parties in their own direction (Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020). In contrast, this study focuses on how party competition structures and influences daily interaction in parliaments when PRRPs enter and stay in parliaments. Although scholars of party competition have recognized the differences between the electoral and the parliamentary arena, they only recently started to focus more on the parliamentary context, "precisely because it is where all relevant parties make choices about policies" (Field and Hamann, 2015). This seems all the more necessary since several studies have shown that party systems and positions can undergo considerable change between elections (Laver, 2005; Mershon and Shvetsova, 2008). Only if we take the institutional setting as the basis for the competition between parties in a parliament can we formulate meaningful expectations of their behavior.

Three aspects are particularly important: Agenda-setting rules, the specific nature of parliamentary debates, and government-opposition dynamics. They generate incentive structures as well as institutional possibilities and constraints that are very different to the incentives that structure party manifestos or party behavior during elections in general. Parliamentary rules determine when parties can put issues on the agenda and how long and often they can speak in the plenary (Rasch, 2014; Proksch and Slapin, 2015). As a result, a single party never has full control over which issues are discussed in a given debate. Contrary to manifestos or interaction on social media platforms, parties are therefore 'forced' to talk about certain topics and not always allowed to talk about the topics of their choice. It is possible for MPs to talk about issues that do not correspond to the intention of the party that has put the issue on the agenda. Nevertheless, they must always stick to the debate in some way.

This is strongly related to the fact that the position that a party or MP takes during a debate is almost always tied to a reference point, such as a legislative proposal, an amendment or a parliamentary question. Only very rarely are broad policy areas discussed in their entirety in debates. These very specific reference points do not always allow us to draw conclusions about the aggregate position on the issue and its salience. Moreover, the positions that are expressed always reflect the attitude towards the actor who set the reference point or, in this case, the agenda. For these reasons it is not possible to draw conclusions about broad positions and reactions of parties in the same way through issue attention and statements.

This in turn is connected to the division between government and opposition. Hix and Noury (2016) identify government-opposition dynamics as the most important factor for parliamentary behavior. The parties in these two groups follow a different logic in their behavior and therefore cannot necessarily be distinguished by their ideology (Dahl, 1966; Martin and Vanberg, 2011). On the one hand, government parties usually set the reference point for bill debates by proposing legislation and provided they have a majority or stable support in parliament, these bills are passed. Opposition parties, on the other hand, act as scrutinizers, attacking the government and offering alternatives through questions and debates (Helms, 2008).

In how far the institutional government-opposition divide is structuring parliamentary debates also depend on characteristics of the different parliaments. I expect that, in systems where the influence of opposition parties is higher (e.g. through legislative committee systems), position-taking will be less structured by a government-opposition divide than in systems with less opposition influence. This influence is higher in the Scandinavian countries and Italy, lower in many central European countries and lowest in Great Britain (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006). Additionally, countries that traditionally witness the formation of minority governments might show a smaller government-opposition divide as

coalitions in parliament change more frequently (Strøm, 1990). Against this background, theoretical expectations are formulated in the following section which adjusts existing theoretical implications appropriately and raise new parliament-specific expectations.

3.2.1 Expectations of Parties' Interaction

The interaction of parties in parliamentary debates can be analyzed in several ways. In terms of interaction with PRRPs, for example, Valentim and Widmann (2021) examine how their presence affects the sentiment of debates. In this study, I turn to two other important quantities, namely the relative positioning and the mutual confrontation. If we take the institutional characteristics described above seriously, we should expect parliamentary debates in terms of position-taking to be primarily characterized by a government-opposition divide. This expectation serves as a baseline expectation for any parliamentary debate. However, there are statements by parliamentarians, as quoted at the beginning, who have perceived a fundamental change in parliamentary debates after the entry of PRRPs. In particular, parties that are in opposition with a PRRP may face a dilemma. While it can be strategically important to distance themselves from these parties, they still need to criticize the government in order to present an alternative to potential voters. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that PRRPs, once they enter, will bring about such a strong change on the fundamental structures within parliament. Therefore, I expect that even after the entry, the division into government and opposition will determine position-taking in parliament. Thus, opposition parties will be closer to PRRPs if they are in opposition together regardless of their ideology.

However, the respective topic of the debate plays a decisive role for position-taking. For example, I expect position dynamics to change for issues where PRRPs take a particularly extreme position on the one hand, and where potential voters of other parties demand a clear demarcation on the other hand, such as immigration. On this issue, opposition parties in particular may find it more important to distance themselves from the PRRP than to take a stance against the government. Down and Han (2020) have found that mainstream parties make the election of PRRPs less likely if they do not adopt their positions. They would thus refrain from differentiating themselves more clearly from the government position in order to distinguish themselves more clearly from right-wing populist positions. This strategy may also be due to the fact that voters are often more familiar with the extreme positions of the PRRPs on these issues. Thus, distancing is used as a signal only in very specific debates from both sides and leads to a stronger selective polarization. I expect this effect to be particularly strong in debates on immigration.

Selective Polarization Hypothesis: *On issues that are particularly impor-*
tant for PRRPs, all other parties position themselves further away from them.

As described above, the positioning in parliaments is to a large extent influenced by the parliamentary rules and a government-opposition divide. However, the composition of the parties in parliament can also have an influence on the way of *how* debates are held. This leads to the second relevant aspect, namely how often and when parties address or confront each other during debates. In this context, several strategic considerations are important. On the one hand, the behavior of the addressee matters. I expect PRRPs to succeed in being at the center of the debate, especially on issues that are particularly salient to them and where they take a more extreme position. As with position-taking, I expect increased direct confrontation by other parties here. Similarly, the assumed intention is a communal delegitimization of the new party. Confrontation with the new competing party is therefore particularly attractive on issues where its position is to be depicted as particularly illegitimate. However, this high level of attention might not necessarily be against the interest of the PRRP. It likely increases the party's chances of benefiting from media coverage and more general also becoming the center of the debate outside of parliament. In addition, the unique position of the party on this issue is hereby underlined and the other parties are more difficult to distinguish from each other. Overall, this leads to a disproportionate attention and thus a domination of these debates by PRRPs.

Selective Domination Hypothesis: *On issues that are particularly impor-*
tant to them, PRRPs become the center of attention in parliamentary speeches.

While there may be a common intention to delegitimize the PRRP, parties' incentives to engage in direct confrontation vary. Contrary to position-taking, ideology is a key factor here. I expect that left parties are on average more likely to confront PRRPs directly. This expectation stems from the assumption that direct confrontation is less subject to the constrained environment set up than position-taking. By addressing them directly, left-wing parties can distinguish themselves without escaping patterns of government and opposition. This is an opportunity especially for left opposition parties facing a right-wing government. In this way, they can distinguish themselves from center-right parties, even if they criticize the government jointly.

On the other hand, center-right parties can be expected to avoid direct confrontation with the new party. Particularly in contrast to position-taking, this reflects much more a well-considered choice in terms of influence on voters. While parties have to position themselves in their speeches anyway, they are less constrained in deciding to what extent and in which debates they address and confront other parties. This reflects the theoretical approach by Meguid (2005, 2007) that center-right mainstream parties try to avoid confrontation with PRRPs, while center-left mainstream parties try to gain profile by doing

so. As issues like immigration are very important for the voters of PRRPs (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020), center-right parties fear to increase the salience of the issue through direct confrontation and to lose votes.

> **Confrontation Hypothesis:** *Left parties confront PRRPs more often by addressing them directly.*

In principle, I assume that the hypotheses are applicable to any democratic parliamentary context. Nevertheless, there are substantial differences between countries that need to be taken into account and should affect the strength of the expected effects. The first decisive factor is whether cooperation with the respective PRRP is rejected by all major parties in parliament or whether coalitions are being considered or have already been established (Heinze, 2018). Examples of such an exclusion are Sweden and Germany. In both cases, center-right parties have so far refused to cooperate, at the expense of the chance of a right-wing majority in parliament. Such a cordon sanitaire, on the other hand, did not exist in Denmark and the Netherlands. In both cases, there was cooperation in the past in the form of a tolerated minority government. This form of government is another factor that blurs the division into government and opposition - even more when these are supported by PRRPs. Especially in Denmark where changing alliances are common, this might also influence the expectation on party interaction and weaken the expected effects (Christiansen and Pedersen, 2014).

> **Country Variation Hypothesis:** *The preceding effects are smaller in countries where coalitions with PRRPs are not ruled out.*

3.3   Empirical Strategy

To implement the theoretical framework outlined above, I use full transcripts of parliamentary speeches in the countries Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands and Germany. The ParlSpeech data set, which contains annotated full-text vectors of 6.3 million plenary speeches in the legislative chambers of key European states, forms the basis for implementation (Rauh and Schwalbach, 2020)[4]. The case selection of these countries is theoretically driven by the idea of having as similar cases as possible in order to make the effects comparable. In all cases, PRRPs have won over 10% of the votes in national parliamentary elections. Furthermore, all countries are multiparty systems with at least six parties in parliament and all of these parliaments have strong legislative institutions and rather strong opposition rights (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006; Martin and Vanberg, 2011). In order to ensure that the period is as long as possible, but also as comparable as possible, I analyze the first three legislative periods in Denmark and the Netherlands, the first

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[4]German debates more recent than 2018, as well as the debate titles for the Dutch debate, had to be scraped additionally from the respective parliamentary websites

Table 3.1: Case Selection

Country	PRR Party	Entry Date	Right Parties	Left Parties
Denmark	DF	1998-03-11	V, KF	S, RV, SF, EL
Germany	AfD	2017-09-24	CDU/CSU, FDP	SPD, Greens, Left
Netherlands	PVV	2006-11-22	VVD, CDA, CU	PvdA, GL, D66, SP
Sweden	SD	2010-09-19	M, C, KD, L	S, MP, V

two in Sweden and the first legislative period in Germany after the entry of the PRRP. Table 3.1 shows the selected countries with the considered parties for each country. In this context, it should be mentioned that the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) was already present in parliament in the pre-1998 term. Individual members of the Progress Party had split off and founded the party in 1995. Furthermore, in the case of the Netherlands, a PRRP, Pim Fortuyn List, was already present in parliament before the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) entered. Despite its brief participation in government, however, it was only in parliament for a total of four years. Both factors, like many other possible variables, could affect a comparison between before and after the entry of the respective party. Since the focus of this analysis is on post-entry behavior, these factors should be taken into account but make a comparison of countries possible.

The use of parliamentary debates to extract party positions is a less common instrument in political science than using manifestos, expert surveys or roll-call votes. Nevertheless, apart from roll-call votes, it is the only data source that allows a direct inference of the position of a party in a parliament. In addition, the methodological approach of deriving positions from text has become increasingly important, especially due to improved data availability. Speeches in parliament do not only signal parties' preferences on certain policies, but also their preferences as to the use of legislative time as well as their position in parliament (Hix and Noury, 2016; Pedrazzani, 2017). One could argue that every positioning of parties (whether in manifestos or debates) should be considered as cheap talk as long as it does not manifest in actual legislative action. However, parliamentary debates usually take place during the time of related legislation or if the topic is part of a general debate. Furthermore, parties consider parliamentary debates as an important stage as speaking time is highly in demand (Proksch and Slapin, 2015). Also, the measurement can be easily replicated and promises the "ability to process large amounts of text quickly and, hopefully, accurately" (Budge and Pennings, 2007, p.123).

Besides the complete set of speeches, I analyze the positions in subsets with speeches on the issue of immigration as well as education as a control case to compare the party positions in these areas separately. On the one hand, new cultural dimensions, such as immigration, show a potentially higher degree of conflict in Western European party systems (Kriesi et al., 2012). Although not all PRRPs have a clear niche party profile, immigration

is often a core subject of emerging PRRPs entering the political system (Mudde, 2009; Pardos-Prado, Lance and Sagarzazu, 2014; Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, 2016). Consequently, it is the most likely case for the expected behavior described in the Selective Polarization Hypothesis and the Selective Domination Hypothesis. I selected debates on education as a control case as the behavior should not be expected here. In order to contextualize these particular debates, I also conduct all analyses with the respective full samples of speeches.

As a first step, I apply the salience measurement approach by Rauh (2015) to identify the debates dealing with immigration and education. For the topic of immigration, I use a search string from Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2009), which I translate and extend for this paper and I create a new dictionary to identify education debates. Similar to the manifesto approach, all speeches containing statements[5] held by members of a political party in a certain time span (here a legislative term) serve as data for the measurement of the party position in this issue area. Once the debates have been selected, the individual speeches are aggregated at debate level according to parties, since this analysis does not focus on individual MPs. This data set forms the basis for the analyses of party positions. Appendix SM3.1 shows a summary of all numbers of speeches included for each analysis.

Additionally, it is important to take into account that different parliamentary rules provide different groups in parliament with instruments that vary considerably across countries. Very simplified, these can be broken down into government and opposition instruments. While the former focus mainly on the preparation and adoption of bills, the latter are designed for government scrutiny. However, there are significant differences, such as what types of question time are available to the opposition, how institutionalized private member bills are and, who sets the agenda (Rasch, 2014). But nevertheless, the expected differences in the dynamics of the debates are similar for all countries. For this reason, these two general types of debates are also considered separately in the analyses in order to examine the extent to which effects differ between these types of debates.

I use the resulting data sets to run a correspondence analysis (Benoit et al., 2018) for all parties in parliament that hold at least 5 % of the seats in parliament (Petrovic et al., 2009). Correspondence analysis is a non-parametric scaling method and is similar to principal component analysis and has the advantage that it can scale documents on several dimensions. This can help to separate government-opposition dynamics from ideological positions. Schonhardt-Bailey (2008) shows that correspondence analysis is particularly useful for the analysis of parliamentary debates as these tend to be structured by several dimensions. As with all scaling techniques, the analysis relies heavily on the selection of the texts as well as on the interpretation of the produced scales by the researcher. In order

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[5]Speeches are only considered if they include at least three keywords or if the speech and the debate topic contain at least one keyword. This reduces the number of speeches for the subsamples considerably.

to scale the debates to analyze the party positions for each country, I preprocess the data in order to minimize the influence of parts of the text that do not substantially contribute to its meaning. However, preprocessing can have a strong impact on the results of quantitative text analysis (Proksch and Slapin, 2009; Denny and Spirling, 2018). Therefore, Appendix SM3.2 lists all preprocessing steps. Moreover, the analysis is calculated as a robustness test without preprocessed text data as well as normalized position scores in order to avoid biased results. The transformation and the results are listed in detail in Appendix SM3.2. All main effects of the analysis stay significant throughout the different models.

I use the scaled positions in order to calculate the distance to the PRRP's position for all other parties. I use the distance on the dimension with the highest eigenvalue as it constitutes the most important dimension for the respective party positions. These distance measures are all calculated on a legislative term aggregated level to account for changing government-opposition dynamics while drawing on sufficient speeches to calculate positions. This variable forms the dependent variable of an OLS regression model. The main independent variables are government-opposition affiliation and the debate topic. As control variables, I use a left-right dummy to analyze whether parties with different ideologies behave differently beyond the government-opposition divide. Furthermore, I control for the seat share of the respective PRRP in parliament and the number of legislative periods after entry. In addition, I control for government type and in the case of minority government, I control for PRRP support for the government and in an interaction term whether this has a different impact on government and opposition parties. Furthermore, the regression is run with country fixed effects in order to control for country specific factors.

For the analysis of which parties address the PRRP most frequently, I use a simple but informative dictionary approach. The dictionaries of the respective countries contain the names of the relevant parties as well as different forms and abbreviations, if used in the respective languages. I then count for each party how often it addresses every other parties and what proportion of all party addresses the PRRP has. This approach is only an approximation of how often parties in parliament address each other. Instead of the party, individual speakers could be addressed and the parties could use other names among themselves (e.g. the 'Merkel-Party' for the CDU). Nevertheless, this approach offers a reasonable estimate. Moreover, this limitation to the party brand and not individual MPs is justified by the case selection. As all countries in the analysis have a PR electoral systems where a high level of party discipline exists, the party label has a great influence on the electoral decisions of citizens and the behavior of parties in parliament (Slapin and Proksch, 2008). Furthermore, greater differentiation could lead to further problems such as the appearance of the same MP name in several parties or in various offices not affiliated

with the party. I use these count variables in different ways and aggregation levels. First, I analyze what proportion of all party mentions the PRRPs make up, and whether this share is larger in certain debates. Secondly, I use a logit model to analyze whether the probability of these parties being named is higher for left or right parties and to what extent this effect interacts with the type of the debate. For the debate topics, I use the same dictionaries and identification strategy as for the analysis of party positions. The model also includes all control variables that were used for the analysis of the positions.

3.4   Position-Taking in Parliament after Entry

Before turning to the analysis of the party positions in relation to the PRRP, I first look at the raw positions to assess their plausibility as a first robustness check. Figures SM3.4 to SM3.7 in Appendix SM3.3 show the plotted party positions from the first legislative period after the entry of the respective PRRP for all debates as well as for debates on immigration only. The party positions from all debates show a clear government-opposition divide in all countries. This divide varies in its intensity between countries, but is always consistent. The PRRP is often one of the parties that is furthest from that of the government parties. This is in line with the expectation, as these parties very rarely cooperate with government parties. If we now turn to the positioning in the immigration debates, it is evident that the respective PRRP in all cases takes an extreme position. While the PRRP position in Denmark is still relatively close to the other opposition parties, the other countries show a strong polarization. This provides a first indication of the confirmation of the Selective Polarization Hypothesis.

Turning to the results of the regression analysis of all included debates, several factors stand out that are significantly related to the positioning of a party in relation to the PRRP. First, there is a strong and significant effect of government or opposition affiliation. The distance to the PRRP of parties that are in opposition together with them is substantially smaller than that of government parties. This confirms that by and large government-opposition dynamics structure position-taking in parliament. Furthermore, the type of government seems to be an important factor as well. The distance between parties and a PRRP decreases in cases of minority governments and even more when it is supported by an PRRP. However, in this case the distance to opposition parties increases in comparison to government parties. This makes sense and should be applicable to any minority support party.

If we take a look at the effects of the individual debate topics, the effect of debates on immigration supports the hypothesis. The distance to the respective PRRP is significantly larger in these debates. This increased polarization in debates on immigration could be related both to particularly extreme positions of the PRRP and to an increased distancing

Figure 3.1: Correspondence Analysis

of all other parties. The control case of the education debates, on the other hand, has no significant effect on the distance to the PRRP. With regard to the distinction between government and opposition debates, the analysis shows a significantly larger distance in government debates. This finding could be related to the fact that the common criticism of government parties in e.g. question times leads to more similar measured positions than in legislative debates. The term number after entry has no significant effect whereas the size of the PRRP fraction in parliament shows a small positive effect. Finally, the differentiation between left and right parties is not significantly correlated to the distance to the PRRP. This underlines the finding of previous studies that the line of conflict in parliaments is characterized more by government-opposition dynamics than by ideology (Hix and Noury, 2016).

3.5 The Confrontation of PRRPs

As a second part of the analysis, I examine which parties are addressing PRRPs particularly often. First, I look at the share of the mentions of PRRPs in all party mentions of each party. Put differently, how often does a party address a PRRP when addressing other parties in parliament. These values are based on the same legislative periods after the entry of the new party as the position analyses. Tables 3.2 to 3.4 show the average shares of right-wing and left-wing parties as well as the variation between the different

debate topics. Looking at the proportionate mention in the debates, a couple of things stand out: In all countries, the average share for all types of debates is substantially higher for left-wing parties than for right-wing parties. When comparing the different types of debates, the disproportionately high shares in debates on immigration are most striking. As expected, the debates on education hardly differ from the average in all debates. Comparing the averages between the countries, the high shares of the AfD in Germany are noticeable in particular.

Table 3.2: PRRP Share of Party Mentions in all Speeches

Party	Share Left Parties	Share Right Parties	Share Total
DF	27.8%	9.7%	21.8%
AfD	36.8%	30.2%	34.2%
PVV	13.4%	10.7%	12.2%
SD	18.5%	11.9%	14.7%

Table 3.3: PRRP Share of Party Mentions in Speeches on Immigration

Party	Share Left Parties	Share Right Parties	Share Total
DF	35.7%	13.8%	28.4%
AfD	68.0%	44.5%	58.6%
PVV	32.0%	24.4%	28.7%
SD	37.0%	35.4%	36.1%

Table 3.4: PRRP Share of Party Mentions in Speeches on Education

Party	Share Left Parties	Share Right Parties	Share Total
DF	21.1%	10.1%	17.4%
AfD	28.8%	26.3%	27.8%
PVV	10.3%	7.8%	9.1%
SD	19.6%	8.4%	13.2%

The baseline expectation[6] of the shares in Germany is slightly higher than in the other countries due to fewer parties in parliament. Nevertheless, the shares are disproportionately higher here - especially in debates on immigration: While in all debates in Germany every third addressing of another party is directed at the AfD, in debates on immigration it is more than every second. However, also about 28% of all party mentions in Denmark and the Netherlands as well as more than one-third in Sweden are extremely high values for immigration debates, considering the large number of parties in the respective parliaments.

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[6]With an equal distribution of all party mentions, the share would be 20% in Germany, about 17% in Denmark and about 14% in Sweden and the Netherlands.

Figure 3.2: Likelihood of PRRP Mentions in Speeches

The descriptive results already give an insight into the dynamics of the confrontation between the parties. To look at this confrontation from a different point of view, I use a logit regression to analyze which characteristics of speeches increase the probability that a PRRP is addressed. Figure 3.2 shows the predicted probabilities for all variables (regression model in Appendix SM3.4). Comparing the different debate topics, the observation from the descriptive statistics is confirmed. While the probability of addressing a PRRP in debates on education hardly differs from all debates, it is substantially increased in debates on immigration. Furthermore, the probability of a PRRP being mentioned is substantially higher in a left party's speech compared to a speech that is given by a right party. Together, the analysis confirms the hypothesis that PRRPs strongly dominate debates on immigration. It also supports the hypothesis that the addressing of PRRPs is related to the ideological position of the respective party. PRRPs are significantly more likely to be addressed in speeches by left-wing parties.

With regard to the control variables, it is noticeable that the probability of a PRRP being addressed increases in legislative periods in which a minority government is supported by these parties. This could be related to the party's stronger involvement in the legislative process. Furthermore, government debates also show a higher probability of PRRPs being named. In comparison to the analysis of the positions, the respective seat share of the PRRP has a substantial positive influence on the probability of it being addressed. The country fixed effects also reveal significant differences. The probability of the respective PRRP being mentioned is highest in Germany and lowest in the Netherlands.

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However, this could also be related to the different average length of speeches which is substantially lower in the Netherlands. Interestingly, the probability is also lower in opposition debates and increases in the legislative terms after the entry of the party. This increase is significant, but substantially weaker than the other effects.

3.6   General Trends and Country Variation

What general lessons can be learned from the analyses? First, the division into government and opposition continues to determine the dynamics of most parliamentary debates, despite the entry of PRRPs. At the same time, however, there are issues where polarization between the PRRP and all the other parties is evident - most notably debates on immigration. This underlines the assumption that the parliamentary arena is not comparable to the electoral arena. Parties are subject to different constraints in this arena, which have an impact on their strategic positioning. This is also related to the finding that whether left-right ideology has an effect on the behavior towards a PRRP depends on the form of interaction. Left-wing parties seem to expect an advantage from directly confronting PRRPs in parliament without the basic government-opposition dynamics being reduced. However, it should be emphasized that this is only a very rough classification and represents the broader trend. Qualitative differences in the respective party groups and within parties should be the focus of future research.

In addition to these basic trends, the variation between the four countries studied should be highlighted as well. These are illustrated particularly well by two examples. In the case of position-taking, Denmark shows a significantly lower level of polarization between the PRRP and the other parties. There are several possible explanations for this. For example, stable minority governments were actively supported by the Dansk Folkeparti during the period observed. This factor also appeared as an important variable in the regression analysis of the distance to PRRPs. In contrast, in Germany and Sweden, any cooperation with the right-wing populists at the national level has so far been rejected. In the Netherlands, there was similar support for two years, but this coalition broke down due to disagreement on immigration issues.

Germany, on the other hand, is a distinctive case for the analysis of the addressing of the PRRP. Here, the AfD is addressed in every third case that other parties mention a party. Especially for debates on immigration, this amount is substantially higher. This could be attributed to the strong rejection of any cooperation from all other parties. On the other hand, another possible explanation is that the strong confrontation is also related to the effects of the refugee crisis and its consequences. However, both analyses give reason to believe that the other parties' public political approach to the PRRP has an influence on the dynamics in parliament. This variation between countries also highlights

the need for future qualitative research. In this context, further channels of parliamentary behavior should be focused on, which allow for an analysis of the interaction of the other parties with right-wing populist parties in parliament.

3.7   Conclusion

The behavior of parties towards PRRPs has been a much debated topic over the last decade (Meguid, 2007; Abou-Chadi, 2016). However, this debate has been predominantly connected to the electoral arena. In this field, studies have shown that mainstream parties increasingly adopt positions from PRRPs, even if there are differences between countries (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016; Wagner and Meyer, 2017; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2020). I argue that while these analyses have provided valuable information on the parties' behavior during elections, they are not transferable to the parliamentary context. Only if the institutional context is taken into account it is possible to theorize and empirically test party behavior in parliaments. Using improved quantitative text analysis methods capable of processing large amounts of newly available data, I analyze speeches from four Western European parliaments to identify the interaction of other parties with PRRPs after they have entered parliament.

Looking at the general positioning of parties in parliaments, parliamentary behavior is by and large structured by government-opposition logic after PRRPs have entered. However, this changes for debates on issues that are of electoral importance to PRRPs, namely debates on immigration. In most cases, the main dimension becomes a division between the PRRP and all other parties in these debates. On the one hand, this can be attributed to the particularly extreme positions of these parties. Another explanation might be that all other parties clearly distance themselves from the new party in order to delegitimize its position. At the same time, however, this also means that the positions of all other parties become more similar in contrast to the PRRP.

As position-taking in parliament is heavily influenced by institutionalized dynamics, I also analyze when and by whom PRRPs are addressed during debates. The results show that PRRPs seem to dominate the debate especially when immigration is discussed. It could mean that they successfully make themselves the center of the debate, which possibly also increases their external visibility. This phenomenon might also contribute to MPs' and the press' perception of an impact of PRRPs on the parliamentary discourse. However, they are not addressed equally by all parties. Left-wing parties are generally more likely to confront the right-wing populist parties directly. Ideology thus seems to play a stronger part in this context: While center-right parties may be afraid of losing voters, left parties expect to gain profile in the confrontation regardless of their affiliation to government or opposition.

All in all, this study has taken some first steps in analyzing the behavior of parties in parliament towards PRRPs. Therefore, it comes with limitations that need to be addressed in future research. First, I treat parties as unified actors and therefore do not address the variation between MPs. An analysis on the MP-level could provide valuable information on the dynamics within parties. However, it also comes with methodological hurdles that need to be taken into account to ensure the robustness of the results. Furthermore, recent studies show that party behavior changes during the legislative cycle (Pardos-Prado and Sagarzazu, 2019). Additionally, it would also be relevant to take a closer look at the behavior of the PRRPs and whether it changes for example in situation when they support minority governments. Further studies would therefore profit from a connection to a more qualitative analysis of the position-taking in speeches. These might also include quantitative methods such as topic models to attach more meaning to abstract spatial party positions. On a theoretical level, future studies should look at the extent to which the results can be transferred to other party types. For example, it could be examined whether green or left-wing populist parties generate similar effects in parliament with different issues. This study offers a possible framework.

Despite these limitations, the findings of this study are of scientific as well as societal relevance and the resulting implications require further discussion that also go beyond this study. On the one hand, it shows that, despite institutional constraints, PRRPs become somewhat isolated in most parliaments on issues such as immigration. This reflects in particular qualitative findings from Germany and Sweden, while it is much less evident in Denmark (Heinze, 2018). It remains to be discussed to what extent such behavior benefits these parties by staging themselves as victims of the others and, to pick up on the initial quote, by chasing everyone away from them, or whether this is a consequent rejection of their positions towards immigration. On the other hand, the analysis shows that PRRPs succeed in being at the center of the debate, especially in discussions on immigration. The impact of this confrontation, which originates in particular from left-wing parties, on parliamentary and political interaction has not been fully explored either.

FOUR

COURTESY AND COOPERATION? OPPOSITION RHETORIC UNDER MINORITY GOVERNMENTS

(co-authored with Sven-Oliver Proksch and Jens Wäckerle)

Abstract

Minority governments continue to constitute a puzzling phenomenon. As they can fail any time due to the lack of a stable parliamentary majority, such governments need to adopt a flexible policy-making approach in parliament. We examine how minority governments affect opposition rhetoric in legislative debates. Using speeches from four parliaments with alternating minority-majority status, we argue that speakers from opposition parties remain positive vis-à-vis government bills under minority government, even when they disagree with the cabinet, whereas they turn more critical in the same situation under majority government. This effect stays constant throughout different types of support agreements between opposition and government. We find that the difference for opposition parties vanishes for question time debates and thus can be attributed to differences in policy-making style. Minority governments have an under-appreciated consequence by fostering more conciliatory debates.

4.1 Introduction

As the prevalence of minority governments across the world increases, they raise questions about how they manage to govern effectively without a numerical majority in parliament. Empirical findings, on the one hand, suggest that such governments perform similarly to majority governments. In his groundbreaking work, Strøm (1990, p.238) concluded that "minority governments are just as effective as majority coalitions", a finding that received repeated empirical corroboration (Artés and Bustos, 2008; Cheibub, Przewoski and Saiegh, 2004; Cheibub, 2006; Moury and Fernandes, 2018). But scholars still try to understand what exactly differentiates minority from majority governments, emphasizing that the former constitute "one of the most intriguing paradoxes in the study of coalition building" (Kalandrakis, 2015, p.309) and that such governments are "bewildering in the sense that they, as any government under parliamentarism, come from, and must remain responsible to, parliaments in which majorities decide" (Rasch, Martin and Cheibub, 2015, p.6). Even politicians' views on minority governments are mixed, with some perceiving them as unstable and insecure and others praising their cooperative aspect. Former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard described her experience with minority government as "everybody's got their hand on the grenade and anybody can pull the pin".[1] A contrary view suggests, however, that minority governments can lead to a more cooperative policy-making style. For instance, the Irish Member of Parliament Richard Bruton (Fine Gael), at the time in opposition, once thanked a government minister "for his tenacity in debate and also his generosity at times in conceding changes where there was a consensus in the House that change was necessary".[2] Similarly, Tom Enright (also from Fine Gael) drew a positive view about the level of cooperation between opposition and government: he thanked the Minister "for her courtesy and co-operation" and added that she "listened attentively and generously accepted meritorious points, which was important."[3]

Understanding how minority governments affect the tone of parliamentary debates, here understood as the level of expressed hostility, is ever more crucial given that there is a clear trend towards *more* minority governments across parliamentary democracies. Increasing electoral volatility and fractionalization of party systems coincides with a higher frequency of minority governments, as traditional coalition partnerships between parties become more difficult to maintain. For instance, in 2018, almost *half* of all national governments in the EU were minority cabinets (12 out of 28). The key difference between minority and majority governments is that, in the former, cabinets must actively persuade some opposition parties in parliament to support their policies, whereas parties that form a majority coalition government do so in cabinet and use their parliamentary majority

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[1]Quotation from an interview in the 2015 Australian television series *The Killing Season*.
[2]Quotation from a speech on an education bill during a Dail debate on 16 December 1998.
[3]Quotation from a speech on an electricity regulation bill during a Dail debate on 29 June 1999.

to pass legislation. Public opinion on minority governments suggests that they are, in fact, often viewed positively from the voters' perspective: the attribution of responsibility works similarly for minority and majority governments (Fisher and Hobolt, 2010), and there appears to be no difference between citizens' perceptions of government accountability under minority or majority governments (Vowles, 2010). In fact, citizens oftentimes express an explicit preference for minority government over majority government, at least to the extent that it favors their partisan preference (Dufresne and Nevitte, 2014).

An implicit assumption of minority governments is that cabinets need to work harder towards reaching a consensus in parliament, thereby increasing the strength of the legislature versus the executive (Christiansen and Seeberg, 2016). In this study, we examine if opposition parties in legislative debates are less hostile under minority than under majority governments, and if so, under what conditions minority governments produce more courtesy and cooperation in debates. The answer to this question has important normative implications, as politicians oftentimes reject minority government as an undesirable form of government, even though research suggest that they can be equally efficient (Strøm, 1990; Artés and Bustos, 2008; Moury and Fernandes, 2018; Klüver and Zubek, 2018). Furthermore, we test if the formalization of the relationship between government and opposition under minority government affects the tone of legislative debates. Our empirical results demonstrate that opposition party speakers are more positive under minority than under majority governments than we would expect given the *ex ante* policy conflict between the opposition and the government. Thus, even though minority governments do come with the higher risk of early termination, they are associated with less negative rhetoric from opposition parties.

Our study proceeds as follows. We first discuss the rationale of minority governments and present our theory that connects policy-making to legislative debate sentiment. On the basis of a text analysis of 650,000 legislative speeches between 1990 and 2018 in four parliaments with a history of both minority and majority governments, we demonstrate that opposition rhetoric in debates on government bills under minority government is significantly less hostile compared to the same situation under majority government, while this effect is not apparent for question times. In such instances, opposition parties *remain* positive towards government bills, even when they have fundamental policy disagreements with the government.

4.2   The Rationale of Minority Governments

Minority governments form because they are in the interest of both governing and at least some opposition parties. Policy-seeking opposition parties can collaborate with minority governments on specific policies without becoming part of the cabinet and being

collectively responsible for the entirety of government policy, while parties that form minority governments can reap all ministerial offices without controlling a majority of seats in parliament (Strøm, 1990; Kalandrakis, 2015). Even though minority governments tend to be less stable in terms of their duration, they tend to do equally well with regard to efficiency and pledge fulfillment (Artés and Bustos, 2008; Moury and Fernandes, 2018; Klüver and Zubek, 2018). Two contextual features support the formation of minority governments: political institutions and party competition. With regard to political institutions, the absence of a formal investiture vote with an absolute majority criterion (Rasch, Martin and Cheibub, 2015; Cheibub, Martin and Rasch, 2019) and the presence of strong parliamentary committees (Strøm, 1990) promote the occurrence of minority governments. Lijphart (1999, 101) describes powerful committees as the "most important feature favouring minority governments". As these increase the agenda-setting rights of legislatures, they decrease the incentives to enter the cabinet (Martin and Vanberg, 2011). Furthermore, other institutions increase the likelihood of minority governments: a confirmatory investiture vote requirement, the requirement of a constructive vote of no confidence, the right to tie legislative proposals to votes of no confidence and the rules for the state budget procedure all positively influence the probability of minority governments (Lijphart, 1999; Christiansen and Damgaard, 2008; Clark, Golder and Golder, 2013). With regard to party competition, increasing polarization (larger policy disagreements) and fractionalization (the emergence of new challenger parties) render established majority coalition patterns no longer viable.

Figure 4.1 shows the average effective number of parliamentary parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) after parliamentary elections over time and the share of minority governments among all governments on the first day of each year for 37 parliamentary democracies (country list in Appendix SM4.1). Party systems become increasingly fractionalized: Whereas the average number of parties in parliament was three and a half in the 1950s, it has meanwhile increased to around four and a half. Whereas only slightly more than 20% of governments in the 1950s were minority governments, more than 30% of governments in the 2010s were minority governments. In 2018 and 2019, more than 40% of governments were minority governments.

Minority governments come, however, in many shapes. First, just as in the case of majority governments, they can be single-party or coalition governments. Second, they vary in the degree to which governments can rely on opposition support parties (Field, 2009; Kefford and Weeks, 2018). Additionally, minority governments can be subject to special dynamics, for example through the explicit support of regional parties or independent MPs. At one extreme, minority governments may form legislative ad hoc coalitions, in which the government approaches different opposition parties depending on the issue. Especially in Denmark, this form of changing alliances is common (Christiansen and Ped-

Figure 4.1: Effective number of parliamentary parties and minority governments over time

Note: Left: Average effective number of parties in newly elected parliaments in a year. Right: Share of governments each year that are minority governments. Lines are loess regression lines.

ersen, 2014). At the other extreme, a minority government can enter a very strong form of ties with opposition parties, so-called support parties, as is common in New Zealand and Sweden (Bale and Bergman, 2006). Typical confidence-and-supply arrangements are meant to assure the support of an opposition party on budgetary matters and on motions of confidence, but even under such arrangements support parties are free to choose whether to support a particular government bill on a policy issue. The range between ad hoc coalitions and strong support agreements also reflects a trade-off between risk aversion and policy influence (Strøm, 1990).

The performance and stability of a minority government is often related to the fact that it is able to govern effectively and survive in office (Warwick, 1995). Taylor and Herman (1971) show in an early study that majority governments are more stable and effective than minority governments and that single party governments last longer than coalition governments using data from 1945 to 1969 for 196 governments. Clark, Golder and Golder (2013) find similar results for an extended data set. Analyzing eleven Western European countries from 1945 to 1998 using data from the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy Project (Andersson, Bergman and Ersson, 2014), they show that less than a quarter of governments stayed in office for their maximum term. On average, single-party majority governments stay in office the longest, while coalition minority governments stay the shortest (Clark, Golder and Golder, 2013, 494f.).

However, government performance and stability can also be defined by indicators of legislative success and the electoral performance of the governing party in the subsequent election (Strøm, 1990). Focusing on electoral pledge fulfillment, studies confirm that minority governments can work as effectively as majority governments (Thomson et al., 2017; Moury and Fernandes, 2018). Klüver and Zubek (2018) extend this work by illustrating the conditions under which minority governments demonstrate legislative reliability: ideological proximity between government and opposition allows minority governments to govern effectively and implement policies. Green-Pedersen (2001) shows that Danish minority cabinets have governed successfully by relying on changing coalition partners in seeking support for policy proposals. However, opposition parties also benefit from minority governments as they are able to pass legislation that is close to their own policy position (Artés and Bustos, 2008). While the literature thus highlights the legislative bargaining scenario as the core area in which minority governments act, the logic of policy-making under minority government has not been linked to what actually happens on the parliamentary floor. This is the main goal of the analysis that follows.

4.3 Theory: Legislative Debate Tone under Minority and Majority Governments

Participating in legislative debates is one of the key activities of members of parliament, in which MPs engage in position-taking on specific policy issues (Proksch and Slapin, 2012, 2015). In contrast to party position-taking during electoral campaigns, where parties and their candidates are free to emphasize issues they deem important and to ignore others, parliamentary position-taking is embedded in an institutionalized agenda and bargaining process. Most importantly, parliamentary politics is characterized by government agenda-setting (Tsebelis, 2002; Rasch and Tsebelis, 2011). By proposing legislation, either through cabinet ministers or the parties that belong to the government coalition, governments implement their pledges and provide a focal point for debate.

In situations with majority governments, the opposition has limited resources to alter legislation. In such instances, the parliamentary floor provides the opposition with the opportunity to criticize and attack the government (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). In situations with minority governments, however, policy-making cannot be limited to a coalition bargain, as some opposition parties are necessary to form legislative majorities. Christiansen and Seeberg (2016) have argued that minority governments offer policy concessions not only in order to muster majorities, but also to reduce the criticism from the opposition.

Turning to the parliamentary floor, MPs take stances on bills proposed by the government, and the response in speech relates to the content of the proposed policy in the bill. Legislative debate is therefore particularly suited to an analysis of the tone of debate, i.e. sentiment analysis (Proksch et al., 2019). A positive (less critical) tone in a response to a bill proposal suggests approval, while a negative (critical) tone indicates opposition. A key concern with sentiment analysis is the focal point of the bill. MPs express views about a policy as a function of the distance between their position (or their party's position) and the bill. The closer the government bill to the preference of a party, the more positive MPs from that party will respond to the proposal during debate. The expressed tone in legislative debates should thus turn more positive the smaller the distance between the proposed policy and the policy preference of the MP.

4.3.1 Formalization of Support Agreements

Minority governments differ with regard to the formalization of opposition support, which may impact how opposition parties criticize government parties in parliament. We interpret the various possibilities from the point of view of a formateur whose party does not have a majority in parliament. If the formateur is interested in forming a government, she is confronted with various possibilities, the feasibility of which is also related to the respective institutional context of parliament. These possibilities differ in terms of their expected stability, the inclusion of the opposition and the flexibility of the actor in policy-making (see Table 4.1). At one end of the spectrum, there are single-party minority governments without any support party. This option would provide the formateur with maximum flexibility in policy-making during the period of government, as coalitions could always be sought ad hoc with the most proximate opposition party. Therefore, the inclusion of many opposition parties in policy-making is high. However, this option would also entail high uncertainty regarding the necessary opposition support. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is reduced the more the support of opposition parties is formalized. The lowest level is the so-called confidence and supply agreement. These can be commitments to support the government in investiture votes or budget decisions.

Alternatively, selected policy areas can be included into support agreements. The spectrum ranges from very specific areas that are of high importance to the respective support party to comprehensive agreements that pre-structure the cooperation over a long period of time. The stronger these support agreements are, the more the formateur party is tied to cooperation in the respective policy areas and the less other opposition parties are involved in the policy-making process. However, the minority government buys stability with these commitments, as the compromise in the agreements increases the incentives for support parties to keep the respective government in office. In this regard, a coalition agreement can be seen as an extended form of a broad support agreement that turns a sup-

Table 4.1: Formalization of Minority Government Support Agreements

	No Support Party	Confidence and Supply Agreement	Support Agreement for Selected Issues	Support Agreement with Broad Policy Concessions
Expected Stability	low	⟶		high
Potential for Opposition Influence	high	⟵		low
Policy-Making Flexibility	high	⟵		low

ported minority government into a coalition government with a majority in parliament. In such a formation, the formateur negotiates a coalition agreement with the coalition partner in which all policy compromises for a legislative period are recorded. In addition, both parties provide ministers. Thus, the flexibility in policy-making and the involvement of the opposition is minimized.

4.3.2 Empirical Implications for Opposition Rhetoric

As a baseline we expect the average opposition party communication in parliament to be more negative the further away the party stance is from the policy proposal that is being debated. The association between expressed sentiment and the party's proximity to the government should be observable regardless of the majority status of the government. This leads to our first hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 1 (Baseline Expectation)** *An increase in policy distance to the government position results in more negative sentiment expressed on the floor.*

As a minority government needs to obtain a legislative majority on its bills to be successful (and continue to govern), it will need to make more costly policy concessions to parts of the opposition, and these costs increase the further away the opposition (e.g. Strøm, 1990; Klüver and Zubek, 2018). Compared to a scenario where the government possesses a legislative majority and does not compromise, opposition parties should thus adopt on average a more positive tone in government bill debates, as the opposition always extracts policy concessions under minority government.

Hypothesis 2 (Minority Government) *Under minority government, an increase in policy distance to the government position leads to less negative sentiment expressed on the floor than under majority government.*

Finally, the impact of proximity to the governmental policy proposal is also influenced by the relationship between government and opposition in parliament. It should make a difference if an opposition party has formal opportunities to shape government bills. The more formalized the ex ante influence of the opposition on government bills, the less policy distance should matter. When minority governments form ad hoc coalitions with opposition parties, potentially all opposition parties can actively influence policies. In contrast, the presence of a policy agreement between the government and support parties resembles a coalition agreement. In this case, only the support parties, but not other opposition parties, are likely to extract policy concessions and are therefore more positive in their responses to government policies. Thus, we expect the smallest effect of policy distance on sentiment the more formalized the government support. Our third hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 3 (Formalization of Support Agreements) *The effect of policy distance on sentiment is smaller for opposition parties that have a formalized support agreement with the minority government.*

We now set out to test these hypotheses using legislative speech data from parliaments with traditions of minority and majority governments.

4.4   Data: Legislative Speeches in Four Parliaments

Empirical studies of minority governments oftentimes focus on countries where such governments are the norm, in particular on Denmark (e.g. Christiansen and Pedersen, 2014; Klüver and Zubek, 2018). For our purposes, however, it is crucial to consider only countries that alternate back and forth between minority and majority governments in order to study the within-country effect of government type on legislative debate. We therefore choose four established parliamentary democracies with this alternation pattern: Spain, Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands. For each parliament, we match speeches to bill-level information including the policy area of the bill and the bill initiator. This case selection ensures a significant share of minority governments, but with sufficient variation in government status since 1990.

Figure 4.2 shows the occurrence of minority governments in the sample. While Sweden has been predominantly ruled by minority governments, the opposite is true for the Netherlands. Spain and Ireland constitute countries where about half of the time minority governments are in power. The institutional context in which minority governments form

Figure 4.2: Occurrence of Minority Governments in Sample

are also different as a result for this sample. Whereas the Netherlands is an example for a strong parliament, Sweden and Spain have parliaments with moderate strength, and Ireland is an example of a country with a weak parliament (Martin and Vanberg, 2011). Most importantly, our data cover a wide range of different formalizations of minority governments. As Table 4.2 shows, the minority governments during the period under investigation show all possible patterns. While some governments such as the Irish Ahern I cabinet only had confidence and supply agreements, others such as the Dutch Rutte I cabinet had policy agreements on selected issues (in this case with the right-wing party Party of Freedom PVV). Finally, other governments such as the later governments led by Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson had support agreements with broad policy concessions to support parties. Thus, our sample covers both *formal* and *substantive* minority governments (Strøm, 1990). We collected legislative speeches in Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden between 1990 and 2018.[4] For speeches made in the Irish parliament, we use the data set provided by Herzog and Mikhaylov (2017). For Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands, we use the ParlSpeech database (Rauh and Schwalbach, 2020). Appendix SM4.2 shows the number of speeches for each country as well as the processing steps involved in the corpus construction. In line with our theoretical argument, we only selected debates on government bills.[5]

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[4]In Spain, the data range from 1996 to 2018, in Ireland from 1990 to 2013, in the Netherlands from 1995 to 2015 and in Sweden from 1990 to 2018. We exclude caretaker governments from the analysis.

[5]In Ireland, we did so by filtering for debate titles containing "act" or "bill", but not "private member". In Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands we used data from the parliamentary archives to identify the bill types from the debate titles.

[6]All government labels are based on ParlGov (Döring and Manow, 2018).

Table 4.2: Support Agreements in the Sample

	No Support Party	Confidence and Supply Agreement	Support Agreement for Selected Issues	Support Agreement with Broad Policy Concessions	Share of Minority Governements in all Governments
Ireland	Haughey IV[6] (1989-1992) Reynolds I (1992-1993)	Ahern I (1997-2002)	-	-	33%
Netherlands	-	-	Rutte I (2010-2012)	-	14%
Spain	Zapatero I + II (2004-2011) Rajoy IV (2016-2018) Sánchez I (2018-)	-	Aznar I (1996-200)	-	71%
Sweden	Bildt (1991-1994) Reinfeldt II (2010-2014)	Carlsson III (1990-1991) Löfven I (2014-2018)	Carlsson IV (1994-1998) Persson I (1996-1998)	Persson II (1998-2002) Persson III (2002-206)	88%

The minority governments were classified based on Afonso (2015), Bäck and Bergman (2016), Bale and Bergman (2006), Field (2009), Field (2016) and Kefford and Weeks (2018).

4.4.1 Dependent Variable: Legislative Sentiment

Our goal is to explain the variation in bill-level sentiment of opposition parties following the approach proposed by Proksch et al. (2019), calculated as the logged ratio of positive to negative words expressed in a legislative speech. Sentiment has recently emerged as a reliable measure to identify party-specific differences in campaigns, executive speech, and parliaments. Crabtree et al. (2020), for example, find that the sentiment that parties use in electoral manifestos varies depending on their incumbency status. Rauh, Bes and Schoonvelde (2020) look at the sentiment of speeches by national leaders and European Commissioners on European integration and find that public opinion and the strength of Eurosceptic parties have a substantial effect on the tone of executive speeches. Proksch et al. (2019) show that government and opposition parties can be distinguished based on their legislative sentiment and that the tone reflects the level of legislative conflict. Finally, Slapin and Kirkland (2020) look at the differences in the use of sentiment by rebels in the British parliament and find evidence of different use of certain sentiment types such as anger and fear.

Figure 4.3: Party-Level Sentiment by Government-Opposition Status and Government Type

We use translated sentiment dictionaries from Proksch et al. (2019) to calculate sentiment in all parliaments. This measure has been shown to capture legislative conflict and performs specifically well in a multilingual context on the basis of a translation of the Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary (Young and Soroka, 2012). We do not claim that sentiment is directly comparable between countries, which is why we use country-fixed effects in all models and standardize the sentiment estimates within country. As a result, the mean sentiment within a country is set to zero and the standard deviation to one, alleviating concerns about different country averages as well as variance of sentiment that could be due to language differences or traditions of parliamentary debate. Figure 4.3 shows the average sentiment for government and opposition parties for different formalizations of minority government (using a model with country fixed effects). Overall, there is strong evidence that government speakers are consistently more positive than the opposition when debating government business, corroborating findings by Proksch et al. (2019). Additionally, we find that both government parties and especially opposition parties are *more* positive in bill debates under minority than under majority government. The results furthermore show that, on average, support parties are slightly more positive than other opposition parties. In short, these results demonstrate that the tone of legislative debate is substantially more positive under minority than under majority government.

We validate sentiment as a quantity of interest for the analysis of parliamentary debates in a twofold manner (see Figure 4.4 and Appendix SM4.3). First, we expect opposition sentiment to be more negative when the parliament as a whole is more polarized. High aggregate polarization of a parliament may be due to the entry of parties that strongly

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Figure 4.4: Party System Polarization, Opposition Sentiment and Length of Parliamentary Debate

oppose the established parties. A more polarized parliament makes it more likely that the major parties are politically divided, leading for example to a strong opposition party that is ideologically far from the government and opposes legislation. We find such a relationship in debates in Ireland, Sweden, Spain and the Netherlands: The left panel in Figure 4.4 shows that opposition sentiment in highly polarized parliaments is considerably more negative than in less polarized parliaments. Second, to illustrate the substantial use of sentiment as a measure in the parliamentary context, we describe the relationship between opposition sentiment and the length of bill debates in words, controlling for policy distance of parties, policy area and country. In line with findings by Proksch et al. (2019) that underline a higher likelihood of unanimous decisions in parliament when the opposition speaks more positively, we expect shorter debates when the opposition strikes a more positive tone. Conversely, the opposition is expected to use the parliamentary arena to the fullest extent to voice its negative sentiment towards government legislation. The right panel in Figure 4.4 describes this finding for debates in our sample: more positive opposition sentiment is associated with shorter debates (in words spoken by all participants), while debates get considerably longer when the opposition opposes a bill.

4.4.2 Independent Variables

The central explanatory variable in our model is the policy-specific distance between the parties in parliament and the government. In an ideal world, we would be able to get estimates of party positions on each government bill and use these to predict sentiment.

Table 4.3: Overview of Policy Areas

Policy Area	Examples
Agriculture	Agricultural regulations, fishery, food inspection
Budget and Taxes	National budget, taxation
Civil Rights	Minority rights, gender equality, police, courts
Defence	Military, defence/army policy, veterans
Economy	Market regulation, banking system, consumer protection
Education	Schools, universities
Environment	Environmental protection, climate change, energy
EU	European integration, treaties
Internationalism	Foreign affairs, trade, international treaties
Labour	Labour standards, employment training, unions
Welfare	Health, social security, housing
Immigration	Immigration, refugees, integration
Decentralization	Rural development, subsidiarity

Note: Policy Area categories based on Klüver and Zubek (2018)

Since these estimates are unavailable, we resort to policy area-specific preferences.[7] To identify the policy area of a debate, we follow the coding procedure proposed by Klüver and Zubek (2018), assigning bills to policy areas as described in Table 4.3. We proceed to hand code policy areas based on bill titles and descriptions of the bills, where available. All bills were initially coded by two separate student assistant coders, and inter-coder reliability for the four parliaments ranged between 65% and 75%. The authors resolved any remaining disagreement for bills on which the coders disagreed.[8] Finally, based on the policy area classification of these bills, we merged parties' policy preference data from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2018).

To code a party position on each policy area from the manifesto data, we follow Lowe et al. (2011) and use logit transformations to scale the policy categories. This scaling provides more valid policy positions than previously used saliency or relative proportional difference approaches.[9] The logit policy position scales provide us with sufficient variation across parties and policy areas within the same parliament over time.

Figure 4.5 shows the predicted levels of sentiment in minority and majority government for the different policy areas (with country fixed effects), allowing us to examine for which policies the differences are the most substantial. Overall, the order of policy

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[7]An alternative would be to code the debate specific preferences from the speech data themselves. However, this would mean that we would use the speech data twice (as a dependent and an independent variable). To avoid this endogeneity problem, we resort to using the policy areas using the manifestos as an exogenous source.

[8]After applying this procedure, less than 10% of speeches were delivered on topics that did not belong to a policy area. These include procedural bills, constitutional debates, electoral reforms, certain debates labelled simply as "domestic" and others.

[9]Appendix SM4.4 lists the corresponding manifesto items for each policy area in table SM4.14.

Figure 4.5: Sentiment in Different Policy Areas by Government Type

areas in terms of expressed sentiment shows high face validity: consensual valence topics such as education and topics with rather broad support such as the EU foster more positive debates, while debates in more contentious policy areas such as immigration and civil rights are more negative. The results show that the positive effect for debate under minority government is present in all but one policy area.

We calculate a party's policy distance to the government position as follows. In single party governments, the government position on the bill proposed in a policy area equals the position of the prime minister's party in that policy area. For coalition majority governments, we calculate the government position as the seat-weighted position of all cabinet parties in the policy area (Martin and Vanberg, 2011). Finally, we calculate for each party the absolute policy distance to government.[10]

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[10]In Appendix SM4.6 we present results using an alternative calculation of the policy distance. Instead of using the government's position, we calculate an expected policy compromise that the government is likely to make on any bill, given the bargaining scenario in the policy area under consideration. This changes the distance for parties in minority governments. In minority governments without support parties, we assume that the minority government will reach out to the most proximate pivotal opposition party such that it gains a parliamentary majority, thus minimizing policy losses. Finally, in minority coalitions with support parties, we assume that support parties have an influence on policy-making proportional to the salience they attach to the policy area (Bale and Bergman, 2006). We therefore calculate the policy-area specific coalition compromise including support parties, weighted by seat share and salience. Based on these policy positions, we calculate for each party the absolute policy distance to the position of the bill that is being debated. The estimates using this alternative calculation show that the results remain the same. Thus, our results are robust to either assumption, i.e. whether one considers the distance to the government or to the expected policy the government is proposing as the reference point the opposition is using.

4.4.3 Models

Our unit of analysis is a party-government bill observation. Our main independent variables are the absolute distance of the party to the government, the party status, and the interaction between them. In total, this gives us $N = 20,307$ opposition party bill observations across the four countries. We run OLS regressions with fixed effects for countries and policy areas. All analyses are reported with standard errors clustered at the party level. We subset the data set to opposition parties and supporting parties only. The results for government parties can be found in Appendix SM4.5 and are briefly discussed at the end of this section.

4.5 Results

Table 4.4 presents the results for the models testing our hypotheses. Model 1 shows a negative effect of policy distance to the government on expressed opposition sentiment. For these parties, policy distance is connected to more negative speech. Legislative debate thus mirrors actual conflict between opposition and government. This result supports Hypothesis 1. For a test of Hypothesis 2, we investigate the effect of a minority government on opposition sentiment, as tested in models 2 and 3. Model 2 shows that opposition parties are considerably more positive under minority government than under majority government. Model 3 adds the interaction effect between policy distance to the government and government status. This interaction effect is statistically significant and positive, meaning that the policy distance has a much smaller effect on expressed opposition sentiment under minority government. When added, the effect of policy distance to the government on sentiment is -0.011 for opposition parties in minority settings, while it is -0.044 for those in majority settings.

This relationship is further illustrated by the first two panels of Figure 4.6. Substantively, the effect is quite large: our model predicts that an opposition party with the largest policy-specific distance to the government will use slightly more positive than negative words under majority governments (approximately 120 positive to 100 negative words), but will use 15% more positive words under minority governments. For illustrative purposes, we provide excerpts of opposition speeches in the Irish Parliament in Table SM4.21 in Appendix SM4.8. These include speeches given by MPs from the same party in the same policy area with a comparable policy distance to the government under minority and majority setting. The examples demonstrate how speeches are more positive when opposition parties face minority governments, even though they were held in seemingly very similar situations and sometimes even by the same MP.

Table 4.4: Opposition Sentiment under Minority and Majority Government

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	−0.134	−0.177*	−0.145	−0.172*	−0.142
	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.074)
Policy Distance to Government	−0.026*	−0.024*	−0.044***	−0.025*	−0.043***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Minority Government		0.125***	0.074		
		(0.036)	(0.044)		
Supporting Party	0.062	0.030	0.024		
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.065)		
Policy Distance to Government x Minority Government			0.033*		
			(0.013)		
Baseline: Opposition in Majority Government					
Opposition in Minority Government				0.123***	0.079
				(0.037)	(0.044)
Supporting Party with policy agreement				0.215***	0.140
				(0.057)	(0.079)
Supporting Party without policy agreement				−0.103	−0.085
				(0.075)	(0.129)
Baseline: Policy Distance for Opposition in Majority Government					
Policy Distance to Government x Opposition in Minority Government					0.029*
					(0.014)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party with policy agreement					0.042
					(0.025)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party without policy agreement					−0.017
					(0.042)
Policy Area-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	20,307	20,307	20,307	20,307	20,307
R^2	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.005	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005

Note: *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$

So far, we have subset the data to only include opposition and support party speakers. In Appendix SM4.5, we run Models 1 through 3 for the government parties. Policy distance to the government compromise position does not affect expressed government sentiment. This makes sense as there is considerably less variance as government parties are ideologically more proximate than opposition parties and conflict between government parties has presumably already been solved before the discussion of policy in parliament. Additionally, we see no effect of minority governments, neither on overall sentiment, nor on the effect of policy distance. The change in parliamentary debate tone under minority governments is therefore entirely driven by opposition and supporting parties.

To analyze Hypothesis 3, we present the third and fourth panels in Figure 4.6, which show the predicted relationship between opposition party sentiment and distance to the government for support parties. Opposition sentiment is conditional on the formalization

Figure 4.6: Effect of Policy Distance on Legislative Sentiment

of support agreements, as expected in Hypothesis 3. Policy distance does not appear to affect support parties' sentiment, with or without policy agreement. Support parties without agreements are somewhat more negative, while those with policy agreements are the most positive opposition parties. This discrepancy could also explain the null effect of the supporting party dummy in models 1 and 2. Model 4 in Table 4.4 differentiates the status of opposition party by support status. Influence on policy conditions a party's sentiment towards government policy: Parties with policy influence (supporting parties with policy agreement and opposition in minority government) are much more positive than those without (opposition in majority governments and supporting parties without policy agreement). The interaction term between policy distance and government status in Model 5 in Table 4.4 is again statistically significant for pure opposition parties: Policy distance has a smaller effect on opposition sentiment under minority than under majority government. The estimate for supporting parties with policy agreement is larger than for opposition parties, but not statistically significant partially due to a much smaller sample size. For supporting parties without policy agreement, the interaction term is even negative, albeit with a lot of uncertainty attached.[11]

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[11] We ran all models separately for each country, as shown in Appendix SM4.7. We find that, on average, opposition parties are more positive in minority settings but that the rate at which the opposition sentiment turns more negative appears similar to majority situations. The results are less robust at the country level due to missing within-country variation in terms of the formalization of minority government support agreements and level of policy conflict. Analysis of legislative conflict that relies on measurement on the policy area level, which is the case for all manifesto or expert survey based estimates, will be severely limited on the country level. We therefore resort to a cross-national analysis in this study.

Overall, we find mixed support for Hypothesis 3. While the results support the smaller negative effect for opposition parties under minority government, they merely suggest an even larger effect for supporting parties, at least when they have reached a policy agreement with the government. Further research should extend the sample and look more closely at the role of supporting parties for minority government.

4.5.1   Robustness Test: Budget Debates

We complement our analysis across all policy areas with a robustness test that investigates legislative sentiment patterns in budget debates only. Passing the budget constitutes one of the most important legislative decisions: without a budget, none of the other policies can be funded. The focus on budget debates moreover has several advantages that render it particularly useful for our purposes. First, the passage of a budget is an absolute minimum action for any government. Constitutions mandate that the government presents a budget on an annual basis. In contrast, the government is free to choose which bills to introduce into the legislative arena. One may potentially worry that minority governments, even though they are efficient in what they implement, propose substantially different bills (that are easier to pass) than majority governments. The focus on annual budget debates addresses this issue and controls for agenda-setting and potential bill selection effects by holding the policy issue constant. Second, the underlying policy conflict in budget debates is redistributive in nature and typically concerns the trade-off between public spending and taxation. This allows us to match the policy to well-measured partisan preferences. Finally, an analysis of budget debates constitutes a hard test for the purposes of our study. Usually, minority governments enter confidence-and-supply arrangements with support parties on the issue of the budget. Thus, if we find sentiment differences between minority and majority governments in budget debates, we can more confidently conclude that there are important and substantial differences in legislative debate between these two types of governments.

We select all budget debates in the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Ireland from the corpus. Subsequently, we aggregate MPs' speeches by party for a given budget debate and introduce the same set of variables as before. Results appear in Appendix SM4.9. The findings support our previous conclusions: The opposition speaks more positively in debates under minority governments than under majority governments compared to what one would expect given the policy conflict between the parties. Supporting parties, in particular with policy agreements, are also more positive. Furthermore, there is a significant counterintuitive trend for supporting parties with and without policy agreement to adopt a more positive tone with increasing distance to the government. We note, however, that the trend is based on position estimates from only one policy area, and the observations are based on a limited sample of support parties. A possible explanation for the result

could be that the support relationships are largely well established. Therefore, parties (such as the Left Party in Sweden) might express support for governments in budget debates, even though they are further away from the government in the budget related policy dimension. In exchange for ensuring the survival of their respective governments, they are likely to receive budget concessions in important policy areas.

4.6   Discussion: Are All Debates More Positive Under Minority Government?

Our findings suggest that hostility in parliamentary debates under minority governments is lower than the policy conflict would suggest, in particular when compared to majority situations. This raises the question whether the parliamentary interaction between government and opposition is *generally* more positive and conciliatory under minority government. If this were true, we would find similar effects in other debates in parliament. In particular, question time sessions provide the opportunity for the opposition to challenge the government on a multitude of issues (Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011). These issues include the implementation and evaluation of policies, local priorities, or more general questions about the stability and future of the current government. Importantly, the government has only limited control over the agenda that is set during question time. In most cases, ministers or the prime minister herself are available for opposition questions and the opposition speakers can choose what to talk about. Furthermore, question time is not commonly used for policy-making directly: we expect policy concessions to happen during or before the substantial debates on the policies. Therefore, if the more conciliatory debates under minority government described above are due to a generally more positive atmosphere in parliament, we would expect to find more positive sentiment also during question time.

However, this is not what we find. Table SM4.23 in Appendix SM4.10 replicates our analysis in question time debates. The difference in sentiment of opposition parties in minority and majority governments is not statistically significant, controlling for country and distance to the government (on a general left-right dimension). Only supporting parties that did not reach a formal policy agreement are more negative, hinting at their weak position outside of investiture and budget debates. Opposition parties are more negative the larger the ideological distance to the government position, indicating that question time debates do have an ideological component and are not purely procedural. Overall, these results do not suggest a generally more conciliatory debate and leave us with explanations centered around policy-making. The strategic positions that opposition and government parties find themselves based on different kinds of support agreements shape their approach to the tone of parliamentary speeches.

4.7   Conclusion

Our analysis suggests that minority governments have an unexpected consequence for parliamentary deliberation. Using government bill debates from four parliaments with alternating minority-majority governments, we demonstrate that opposition MPs speak *more* positively on such bills under minority government compared to majority government. The necessity to make policy compromises with parties outside cabinet thus leads to a more conciliatory opposition rhetoric. This does not mean that government and opposition parties become indistinguishable from each other under minority government: the differences between them remain, but their MPs jointly speak more positively. Our analysis furthermore allowed us to disentangle under what circumstances MPs' tone in government bill debates varies. Our results support a perspective focused on policy concessions. Speakers from opposition parties remain positive vis-à-vis government bills under minority government *even* when they strongly disagree on policy with the cabinet, whereas they turn much more negative in the same situation under majority government.

Minority governments need opposition parties to pass legislation in parliament. Policy-making is only possible if opposition parties across the ideological spectrum take a more positive stance under minority than under majority government. A conciliatory tone enables cooperation of the government with a wider range of potential parties. Is conciliatory debate under minority government generally a desirable feature of parliamentary democracy? After all, a positive tone comes close to a deliberative and respectful interaction between representatives, something that has a value on its own from a deliberative democracy perspective. However, a more critical assessment would suggest that minority governments may actually mute true conflict in parliamentary debates, while policy-making is efficient and cooperative.

There are a number of aspects that our study has not examined. For instance, our analysis has been silent on the effect of challenger or populist parties in parliament, at least to the extent that this is not captured by the policy distances between the parties in parliament. Moreover, there are a range of other parliaments with experience of minority government that we have not covered in our study. Minority governments are increasingly prominent in parliamentary democracies. Our results show that there is an unexpected consequence to this development with debates getting more courteous and cooperative, at least when government legislation is concerned.

WHOM TO TRUST AND WHEN? THE CONTEXT DEPENDENCY OF PARTY MESSAGE PERCEPTION IN MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS

Abstract

Voters follow their in-group party no matter what they are talking about. Research as well as public perception have repeatedly confirmed this assumption for highly polarized countries. But what if reality is more nuanced? In this study, I ask how the perception of party signals works in multiparty systems and whether voters take into account the institutional context when the evaluate party communication. Thus, I combine in-group or out-group perception research with literature on the influence of the institutional context to analyze the effects on agreement with a statement as well as its credibility. Using a survey experiment in Germany, I examine in a vignette design the extent to which the perception of party statements changes when the respective party label and the institutional context are altered. I analyze the extent to which the evaluation of the statements depends on the participant's relation to the party and in what context the statement was said. I find that higher trust in the institutional context has a positive effect on the perception of the credibility of a party message. Furthermore, a dichotomous in-group vs. out-group divide does not reflect the complexity of a multiparty system. The results of this study have implications for the effects of party communication and voter polarization.

5.1   Introduction

In order to make an informed decision in elections, it is important for voters to know what positions political parties adopt. Political parties use a wide range of channels to communicate their positions to potential voters such as manifestos, speeches or social media. However, how these statements are perceived and interpreted by voters is not always clear. The origins of differences in perceptions of statements have an impact on the voting decisions of citizens and thus on policies that are adopted in a country. Furthermore, it can affect a country's political climate. If party messages are consistently received differently, this will have an impact on the daily political discourse and might affect polarization within society (Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010; Kalmoe, Gubler and Wood, 2018). Therefore, it is important to analyze what kind of perception biases can occur and what causes them.

In this study, I analyze voters' perception of the credibility of party messages and their agreement with them in a multiparty system. Based on previous research, we know that voters perceive party statements differently depending on their relation towards a party. While statements by an in-group party are evaluated much more positively and as more credible, the opposite is true for statements by the out-group (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Kam, 2005). I argue that for multiparty systems this dichotomy between in-group and out-group parties needs to be extended. It should make a difference if a voter does not vote for two parties but wants one of them as a coalition partner in government for her party of choice. A statement from such a preferred coalition party can achieve a similar bonus in agreement as the in-group party. Furthermore, I argue that it makes a difference to voters in which institutional context a statement is articulated. If there is more trust in the particular context, this should also increase the perceived credibility of the statement. Therefore, the study speaks to existing research in different ways. On the one hand, it ties in with how voters perceive statements of parties, depending on whether they belong to their in-group or out-group (Aldrich et al., 2018; Fernandez-Vazquez, 2019). On the other hand, it combines it with literature on institutional context and the extent to which this influences the credibility of statements (Dahlberg, 2013; Carroll and Kubo, 2018).

Using a preregistered survey experiment with a representative sample of German voters, I examine the extent to which the perception of party messages changes when the respective party label is altered and when the respective institutional setting is manipulated. I present the participants in a vignette design with actual statements from parties controlling for their own party preferences and other relevant data like political sophistication (Atzmüller and Steiner, 2010). In the vignettes the statements are randomized accompanied by different party affiliations and an institutional context. I analyze the extent to which the evaluation of the respective party statements (agreement and credibility)

depends on the participant's party affiliation and in what context they were said. The German case is particularly well suited for this study, as it offers a range of six medium or large national parties that are influential in the political arena and offer different ideological programs and coalition potential. I find that voters take the institutional context into account when they evaluate party statement. Furthermore, a dichotomous in-group vs. out-group does not reflect the complexity of a multiparty system. The results of this study have important implications that go beyond the effects of party communication and voter perception.

5.2 Theoretical Foundations of Party Perception

On the day of an election, voters have to decide and pick a party or candidate (or abstain). The final decision on the ballot can have many reasons and might be based on complex considerations. A fundamental factor is how parties are perceived by their potential voters. In order to present themselves as positively as possible, parties use various communication channels. In principle, these tend to work well in the sense that they give citizens the opportunity to perceive the positions represented by the parties. For example, party's left-right position expressed in manifestos is generally strongly linked to the aggregate perception of voters (van der Brug, 1999). However, party communication and its perception does not only play a major role in the electoral decision of citizens. It also affects the general political climate of a country. For example, Wirz et al. (2018) show that right-wing populist parties' communication through media has an effect on peoples' emotions and cognition towards immigrants. This is connected to the fact that the content and the sender of a party message influence whether journalists consider the message to be interesting for reporting (Helfer and Aelst, 2016). The study of perceptions of party communication therefore has implications that go beyond consequences for electoral outcomes.

Perception bias in relation to parties and their positions remains a relevant but by no means new topic. It likewise concerns research in the fields of political psychology, political communication and, with its implications, electoral and party politics. Past research has focused often on two important outcomes of perception bias: e.g. changes in public opinion and the perception of the political environment or election results (Slothuus and Bisgaard, 2020; Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014; Alt, Lassen and Marshall, 2016). This study takes the focus one level below and asks to what extent individual statements by political actors are perceived differently. Generally, parties and their members produce more than enough output that potential voters can learn about them and update their perceptions of the respective parties. After voters have consciously or unconsciously chosen to receive information about a party through a particular communication channel, they have to

evaluate the information and then decide whether and how it will affect their further actions. By focusing on messages, I regard the ultimate voting decision as a process: "campaigns are dynamic events that occur over time, and deciding whether and how to vote is a process that also occurs over time" (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006, p.4). Moreover, I take into account that this decision is very complex and depends on many different personal and environmental factors.

Taking the statement or signal of a party or candidate as a basis, the different perceptions that voters have can relate to different attributes of that statement. First, this can be a different perception of the underlying position that the statement is meant to express. This expressed position can refer both to a latent scale such as an economic right-left position or to a positive or negative position towards a concrete political decision. Closely related to the perceived position (but not necessarily the same) is the agreement or disagreement with a statement. Thus, the basic correlation that citizens agree with a statement they perceive closer to their own position appears logical in principle. However, other attributes of the statement can lead to higher or lower agreement for the same position. For example, voters might agree more with a message from their in-group party even if they evaluate its position similar to an out-group party statement. This difference may be related, among other things, to a third attribute examined in this study, namely the credibility of a statement (Fernandez-Vazquez, 2019). This is closely related to what other studies name the believability of a statement (Morris, 2018). This means a confidence that a party is willing to implement a demand if it is able to do so. It is possible that citizens perceive the position of a statement close to their own and thus agree with the position, but do not trust the respective sender to be interested in a serious implementation.

The fact that a statement is perceived as less credible can be triggered by various things: For example, if voters think it only serves a campaign purpose, or if legal or financial factors conflict with it. This relates to studies on trust and evaluation of parties' pledge fulfillment. Although citizens are generally able to distinguish between fulfilled and unfulfilled election promises, the stereotype of promise-breaking politicians is widespread (Thomson and Brandenburg, 2019). As citizens' perception of messages as pledges depends on subjective impressions of the message (Dupont et al., 2019), perception of credibility is a possible way to capture if citizens regard a message as worth to take into account. In summary, the underlying logic is that citizens, faced with a lot of information, have to decide not only how they assess and whether they agree with a statement, but also whether they think it is worth processing. In how far party cues eventually influence citizens' opinion and ultimately their behavior also depends on what is at stake (Slothuus and Bisgaard, 2021). This study therefore focuses on the perception of the message alone and not the resulting actions. The following section looks at factors that might influence

citizens' perception with regard to agreement with a statement as well as its credibility.

5.2.1 Sources of Perceptual Bias

One of the most researched sources of perception bias in relation to political parties is a person's own political attitude and party affiliation. "Individuals interpret information through the lens of their party commitment" (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014) and "perceive the world in a manner consistent with their political views" (Jerit and Barabas, 2012). This works as a binary heuristic for citizens that feel attached towards their in-group party and opposed to an out-group party. Once such a categorization is in place, people tend to overlook nuances within the same group and emphasize the differences between objects belonging to different categories (Vegetti and Širnić, 2019). Therefore, party cues can influence citizens' opinions substantially as turning down a claim for support from a liked party is effortful (Petersen et al., 2013). This can go as far as objective facts being perceived differently by loyal partisans of different parties (Bartels, 2002).

The influence on perception can manifest itself in various forms where motivated reasoning leads to biased processing. For example, people with strong party preferences evaluate the tonality of messages from and about their party more positively (Haselmayer, Hirsch and Jenny, 2020). Partisanship also has a strong effect on responsibility attributions and a weaker effect on evaluations of governments performance (Tilley and Hobolt, 2011). For this study, we can expect that shortcut biases make voters perceive messages differently if they are attached to a party brand. Citizens generally place statements under the label of their in-group party closer to themselves and, conversely, statements from other parties further away. Slothuus and Bisgaard (2020) showed that citizens' policy opinions changed immediately and substantially when their party switched its policy position - even when the new position went against citizens' previously held views. The same effects can be expected for the evaluation of the credibility and the agreement with an in-group party message - defined here as the message from a party that a citizen votes for.

> **In-Group Party Hypothesis:** *Information about the party affiliation of the sender of the statement makes people who identify with the party evaluate the message as more credible and closer to their own position.*

Past research with regard to party perception had a stronger focus on the two-party system in the US. However, recent studies have increasingly started to look at multiparty systems in Europe (Bäck, Fredén and Renström, 2021; Pannico, 2020). In this context, it is important whether being in a coalition with another party has an influence on the perception of voters (Adams, Ezrow and Wlezien, 2016; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Fortunato et al., 2021; Spoon and Klüver, 2017). While the affiliation to in-group and

out-group is much easier in a two-party system, the allocation in a multiparty system is more complex. This could mean that the cue of a party that does not correspond to the voting preference, but is nevertheless very close to the preferred party, also functions as an in-group cue. This is in line with the finding that people tend to see their own group as holding a diversity of opinions on issues but view out-groups as holding homogeneous opinions (Quattrone and Jones, 1980). For this reason, in multiparty systems the in-group could rather consist of several parties. As in many Western European party systems the probability of a single-party government has decreased with an increasing number of parties in parliaments, government preference can serve as a proxy for this in-coalition group. Nevertheless, whether a voter perceives parties as close and wants to see the parties in government together is not necessarily related to the fact that they hold the same position on all issues. Moreover, a voter's in-coalition does not have to correspond to a coalition that is likely or has already been formed in reality. Nonetheless, I assume that the in-group party and in-coalition party differ in their effect on perceptions. While a voter may be more inclined to approve an in-coalition position, I suspect they may find these parties less credible to implement it. For the voter, this might (together with other factors) justify the choice of an in-group party as opposed to other parties. These assumptions lead to the following hypotheses:

> **In-Coalition Hypothesis I:** *Information about the party affiliation of the sender of the statement makes people evaluate the message as closer to their own position if the party belongs to the in-coalition.*

> **In-Coalition Hypothesis II:** *Information about the party affiliation of the sender of the statement makes people evaluate the message as less credible if the party belongs to the in-coalition compared to an in-group message.*

While the effect of the sender of a party message has been studied more frequently, the effect of the institutional context of a party message, understood as the medium through which the message was sent, on the perception of citizens has been addressed less. This initially poses two questions: In what institutional contexts do parties send messages and in what way do voters receive them and how do these contexts influence perception? The institutional context can be, on the one hand, the direct message of the party. For example, a party can reach citizens directly through its manifesto, a speech in parliament, press releases or social media. On the other hand, party messages can also reach citizens indirectly when being commented on in the media. Comparing broadcasted debates and newspaper coverage of electoral campaign, Walter and Vliegenthart (2010) find that the communication channel has an important influence on the party message but this also depends on the level of control they have on the channel. Turner (2007) finds that citizens perceive ideological bias in television news where the channels function as ideological signals to the viewer. In this study, I therefore focus on unmediated party

positions in order to avoid an interaction of different biases such as associations with the broadcasting style of a TV channel. I focus on the difference between statements made in parliament, in election manifestos, and on Twitter.

For direct messages, several factors can have an impact on their perception by citizens. Statements in some contexts might be more "costly" than in others although the sender does not change (Alt, Lassen and Marshall, 2016). Fernandez-Vazquez (2019) finds that voters tend to discount popular statements by parties as they might not reflect the party's sincere views. Since manifestos primarily serve vote-seeking purposes, people might downgrade the credibility of statements made here. Additionally, there is a motivation for parties to "strategically craft campaign statements based on electoral need" (Eichorst and Lin, 2018), meaning that when the need for a clear party brand does not exist, parties prefer to rely on vague statements to reduce the risk of limitation in future elections. However, there is evidence that election promises are more than cheap talk for voters and that they retrospectively punish broken promises (Born, van Eck and Johannesson, 2018). This ties in with the question of whether voters do respond to party position shifts during electoral campaigns (Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu, 2011; Fernandez-Vazquez, 2014). While findings so far have been mixed, an explanation that highlights differences between the individual voters might help our understanding of the consequences of electoral campaigns. Especially as we do not know with what kind of information voters update their perception of parties' positions in the end (Seeberg, Slothuus and Stubager, 2017).

With regard to parliament, trust in legislatures has steadily declined throughout Europe by and large (Leston-Bandeira, 2012). In comparison, however, the level of trust in Germany is relatively high. For example, 55% in 2021 say they tend to trust the national parliament, while 58% say they tend not to trust political parties (European Commission, 2021). This finding could indicate that parties are generally trusted more when they operate in a parliamentary context. By looking at the effect of coalition participation, Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) conclude that voters take their perception updates of party positions rather from observable action than from manifesto promises. However, they also find this effect diminished for more informed voters. This might increase credibility for statements from a parliamentary context as these might be perceived as being attached to actual legislation.

Another source increasingly used by citizens for information about political parties is social media. In principle, confidence in this source is very low in Germany. Only 12% of all people say they tend to trust online social media (European Commission, 2021). However, at the same time, it gives citizens the opportunity to learn about specific members of a party and outside the constraint of a uniform image of a party as social media such as Twitter can be used by party representatives to express opinions that differ from the party line (Castanho Silva and Proksch, 2021). This experience could also lead to citizens

perceiving statements from social networks as generally more extreme. However, it does not mean that citizens will ignore the information. Messages about candidates sent via Twitter - regardless of the candidate of focus - resonate just as strongly with potential voters as those sent via the traditional media (Morris, 2018). Moreover, the potential perception that politicians can say what they think without partisan constraints could make the statement more credible to some voters.

While the differences described above could result in differences in perception for the different arenas, there are other factors that could have an impact on the respective effect. For example, partisan elites are an important driver of partisan identity (Bisgaard and Slothuus, 2018). This might be important as different arenas might trigger a picture of a specific representative. In this context, Nicholson (2012) finds that for the US context that in-party leader cues do not persuade but out-party leader cues polarize. This might lead to the conclusion that the effect of the institutional environment on perception might have different effects for statements of the in-group and out-group party. Probably the most important effect, however, is the personal association that citizens have with the respective institutional contexts. While there might be average differences with regard to institutional trust, the individual trust of a voter will have a stronger effect on its perception. In contrast to the effect of the sender, however, I expect here primarily an effect on the evaluation of credibility and less on the agreement with a statement.

> **Institutional Context Hypothesis:** *People evaluate party messages as more credible when they have more trust in the institutional arena where the message was sent.*

The two ways that a different perception of a statement can come about due to the sender or the institutional context may furthermore be influenced by individual characteristics of the receiver. An important variable in this context is the political sophistication of a citizen. In past studies, sophistication has shown different effects on citizens' perceptions. This is not only the case for the positional perception of a statement. Political information also has a strong effect on the perception of the sentiment of a statements (Sigelman and Kugler, 2003). Regarding the positional perception, past studies show that politically aware people are less likely to be swayed by 'easy' party cues and more likely to rely on an issue-relevant value (Kam, 2005). Additionally, people with weaker priors (younger or with less knowledge) tend to update their perception of a party brand more quickly and are therefore easier to influence on average (Lupu, 2013). Furthermore, the general level of education has an influence on the perception of political statements. Bos, Van der Brug and De Vreese (2013) show this for the perceived legitimacy of right-wing populist rhetoric. While the studies cited point in the direction that more sophisticated voters are less influenced by cues, other studies come to the conclusion that only these voters can use cues to better assess positions. Additionally, only sophisticated voters are

able to discern both institutional and political differences in source credibility (Alt, Lassen and Marshall, 2016). However, while politically interested citizens might be the group that can identify candidates' and parties' positions best by using heuristics, this might also be misleading in case of disagreement within a party (Dancey and Sheagley, 2013). As previous studies do not show a clear picture of the relation between political sophistication and party cues, I include political sophistication as a control variable in the later analysis without strong hypotheses about its effect.

5.3   Case Selection

In order to test the theoretical assumptions, I analyze party message perception in Germany. Research on perceptional bias with respect to political parties has its strongest roots in the U.S. party system (Schattschneider, 1960). Among other things, this can be ascribed to the fact that the attribution to in-group and out-group is much more clearly divided in a polarized two-party system. Aldrich et al. (2018) find that the effective number of parties increases perceptual deviation and affects the ability of citizens to place parties on a left-right scale. Additionally, position changes by multiple parties seem to confuse people (Busch, 2016). However, multiparty systems in Western Europe have also moved into the focus of studies of party perception recently (Bäck, Fredén and Renström, 2021; Pannico, 2020; Bisgaard and Slothuus, 2018; Haselmayer, Hirsch and Jenny, 2020; Wagner, Tarlov and Vivyan, 2014). Nevertheless, the more complex situation of party perception in multiparty systems is still not sufficiently studied. Especially the cue taking from possible coalition parties as in-coalition group has not been taken into account.

Germany is particularly well suited for this study, as it consists of six medium to large national parties that offer different ideological programs. None of the parties currently has the prospect of governing alone. Moreover, the parties are not divided into clear political blocs. Thus, several coalition options are possible in principle. Additionally, the parties' positions on different issues overlap and are not completely polarized. This yields the possibility that certain positions will be supported by different party compositions. In terms of statements, I look at party messages on multiple issues. These issues are selected on the basis that a certain number of parties have a clearly determined position on them. These issues also fall into different policy areas and therefore have potential variance in salience for both parties and participants. These include issues that have proven effective in previous studies of party positions (Bäck, Fredén and Renström, 2021).

The survey was carried out with a representative German sample in cooperation with the company Lucid. A total of 1853 participants completed the survey. Participants who do not hold German citizenship are not included in the analysis, as they are not eligible to vote in the parliamentary elections in Germany. Participants who did not complete the

survey were also discarded. It is important to notice that the survey was conducted just before the German parliamentary elections. This has several advantages for the validity of the results. While party perceptions might be subject to change over the legislative cycle, it is of particular interest prior to elections, where a direct influence on the electoral decision can be expected. Moreover, participants are likely to be generally more attentive to the way they perceive parties, which makes the influence of singular events on the perception of individual parties less likely.

5.4   Empirical Strategy

In order to analyze the influence of the actor-specific and institution-specific factors on the perception of party messages, I conduct the survey experiment in early September 2021. The survey experiment, which is central to answering the hypotheses, is integrated into a larger survey. This survey contains general questions on age, gender, and education of the participants. It also contains questions on party and coalition preferences, which are necessary to calculate the treatment effect of the respective party in the vignettes. The same applies to question on general trust in institution and institutional context treatment in the vignette. Furthermore, political sophistication is analyzed by asking a knowledge question about the political system in Germany.

Survey experiments have become an increasingly used tool in political science that allow to "combine experiments' causal power with the generalizability of population-based samples" (Mullinix et al., 2015). Central to this survey are vignettes in which participants are presented with a statements on several issues from the six major German parties. Vignette designs have become increasingly popular for the analysis of voter perception: For example, Gschwend, Meffert and Stoetzer (2017) use a vignette survey to analyze how coalition signals influence voting behavior. A vignette design uses short descriptions of situations or persons that are usually shown to respondents within surveys in order to elicit their judgments about these scenarios. Through the systematic variation of levels of theoretically important characteristics a large population of different vignettes is typical. This is used to identify the importance of those vignette factors which causally affect individual responses to the contextualized but hypothetical vignette settings (Atzmüller and Steiner, 2010). I use distinct policy positions expressed by different parties for the vignettes. Provided that participants in the survey are randomly assigned to a message that includes one of the possible party labels or no party label and to different institutional contexts, we can use the differences in the evaluation of the statements to analyze the influence of the two factors on perceptions.

Figure SM5.11 in Appendix SM5.1 displays an example of the vignettes with a statement of the CDU/CSU on corporate taxation. The first part of the vignette contextualizes the position in terms of author and institutional context and consists of the actual position. For instance, in this example, either "CDU/CSU", "FDP", "AfD" or "a German party" is randomly assigned as the party label, as all these concrete parties represent this position. As mentioned above, the institutional context varies between statements made in parliament, in election manifestos, and on Twitter. Below, participants are asked to evaluate the statement with regard to credibility and agreement. These are measured on a scale from 1 to 7 (analogous, for example, to the setup by Morris (2018)). To avoid confusion, participants are given information about what is meant by the agreement to the statement and by the credibility of the statement according to the research design in advance[1]. In order to use as little deception as possible, I select positions from the respective current election manifestos of the parties for the statement. National manifestos represent a broad basic consensus of a party and thus it should not be against a party's interest to be associated with it. At the same time, voters are not presented with a false image of a party or an image based only on individual opinions. However, in order to analyze possible effects of an institutional context, this context is manipulated and presented differently. I do not expect this to have any lasting influence on the voter's decision regarding an election. Nevertheless, participants of the survey were informed about this at the end and the experiment was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Cologne. In total, the survey contains six vignettes for each participant. This kind of presentation is close to reality insofar as voters are often confronted with the positions of the different parties on salient issues before an election.

There are some aspects that are important with regard to the choice of a statement. First, rather short and compressed policy positions are closer to the reality of what citizens get to see in newspaper articles or headlines. Additionally, they are better as there are less possibilities that participants evaluate different parts of the statement. The complexity of the statement is important as "individuals are better able to place parties in the ideological space if parties use less complex campaign messages" (Bischof and Senninger, 2018). The tone of a statement does have different effects on the perception of statements and party messages as well (Mattes and Redlawsk, 2014; Haselmayer, Hirsch and Jenny, 2020). For this reason, I chose rather general positions that contain as little as possible sentiment words. Although statement ambiguity does not seem to have consistent influence on the effect of party heuristics by and large Milita et al. (2017); Frenkel (2014), I only include

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[1]The information reads: "Below we ask you to rate how much you agree with the position listed and how credible you think the position is. By your agreement, we mean to what extent you share the stated position. By the credibility of the position is meant to what extent you think the party is committed to the implementation of this position."

positions with clear claims and without ambiguous explanations. In order to cover as wide a spectrum of issues as possible, I include statements from different areas. These include two statements that are associated with an economic left-right dimension, two statements that are associated with the GAL-TAN dimension and two statements with either high or low salience in the 2021 electoral campaigns. All six statements are listed in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Vignette Versions

Vignette Statement	Topic	Specification	Party Choices
The **prosecution of cannabis** possession should be significantly relaxed in the future.	GAL-TAN	GAL	FDP; Greens; Linke; SPD; a party
Video surveillance of public spaces should be significantly expanded.	GAL-TAN	TAN	AfD; CDU/CSU; a party
The **minimum wage** should be raised significantly.	Economy	left	Greens; Linke; SPD, a party
The **tax burden for companies** should be significantly reduced.	Economy	right	AfD; CDU/CSU; FDP; a party
Germany should have completed a **coal exit by 2030** at the latest.	Salience	high	Greens; Linke; a party
The EU should have a permanent **seat on the UN Security Council**.	Salience	low	CDU/CSU; FDP; SPD; a party

In order to analyze how certain personal traits influence the perception of the statements, the survey consists of several questions which are used as independent variables in the analysis. First of all, participants are asked what party they would vote for in an upcoming election. Furthermore, I include the question which parties a participant would like to see in a prospective coalition government. This allows to identify if participants consider multiple parties as their in-coalition or if there is a qualitative difference. Simple knowledge questions about the German political system are used to measure political sophistication. Additional to the measurement of political sophistication, I include a question on the level of education as in previous studies (Dahlberg, 2013). Another important variable for the analysis of the political context is institutional trust. For this reason, I ask participants about their trust in various institutions, including parliaments, political parties, and social media. For more general information, I also include questions about demographics in order to see if my sample matches the German average population.

I use OLS regression models for each of the two dependent variables agreement and credibility. The models are calculated with fixed effects for the respective vignettes and the standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The main models include the

results for all six vignettes for the two main independent variables: the categorical variable of the relationship towards the party and the scaled trust in the presented context as described above. Furthermore, political sophistication is added as a control variable. The categorical variable used to examine the effect of the sender party on the perception of the statement has seven different characteristics. The statement or signal can either come from the in-group party (the party that a participant would vote for), an in-coalition party (a party that a participant would like to see in a coalition government), an out-group party (a party that a participant would neither vote for nor that a participant would like to see in a coalition government) or a neutral party (without party label). For the last three characteristics, a distinction is also made as to whether the respective position coincides with the position of the in-group party or not. Participants that answered "do not know" for the evaluation of agreement or credibility are excluded but are included for other statements if they did not answer in the same way there. In addition, to compare potentially different effects for the different vignettes, they are analyzed separately for the issue areas. Furthermore, an attention check[2] is included in the survey. Respondents who did not pass this check were excluded from the analysis. The same applies to respondents who answered all twelve vignette ratings with the same value, as it can be assumed that they did not pay attention to the questions. Participants who answered "don't know" for a single vignette were only excluded for that vignette. This results in small differences in the number of observations for the analyses of the individual vignette groups.

5.5 Results

Before I look at the results from the vignette experiment, I first turn to some descriptive statistics regarding the participants and the two dependent variables. As with any experiment conducted online, it has to be made clear that this cannot be a perfectly representative sample of the total population (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz, 2012). Certain parts of the population are not reached here or at least have a significantly reduced probability of being represented. Nevertheless, the distribution of certain characteristics in the sample can provide information on the extent to which it is similar to the average of the overall population and thus more comparable. With regard to age, the only strong exception is the under-representation of the group of people older than 65. The distribution of party preferences shows a strong similarity with the polls at the time of the experiment as well as with the outcome of the 2021 Bundestag election. While the SPD and AfD are doing slightly better, the CDU/CSU and the Greens are slightly below their average poll ratings.

Another consideration is how the two dependent variables of agreement and credibility

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[2]Participants were asked to answer the question "How do you rate the current economic situation in Germany?" with "rather bad" regardless of their actual perception.

relate to each other. On the one hand, we should generally expect a positive correlation, since people are more likely to find statements they agree with credible. On the other hand, the correlation should not be too strong. This could be an indication that the difference between the two concepts was not picked up by the participants. For example, it is quite plausible that a statement one disagrees with entirely is not perceived as very credible if it comes from a party one dislikes. Looking at the two dependent variables, we can see the expected positive correlation. However, with a correlation of 0.32 they do not seem to measure the same concept. Table SM5.24 in Appendix SM5.3 shows a cross table of the two variables. It reveals that despite the positive correlation, all combinations of the two 7-point scales occur. Thus, it can be assumed that the two scales were interpreted by the participants as being different. The two variables are therefore used as dependent variables in different OLS regression models in the following.

5.5.1 Party Relation Effects

Table 5.2 shows the pooled results for all vignettes for both the agreement (columns one and two) and the credibility (columns three and four) of the respective statement. Since the comparison with the in-coalition signals is of particular relevance for the evaluation of the hypotheses, the same regression is presented for both dependent variables once with the in-coalition signal with the same position as the in-group party and once with the in-coalition signal with an unequal position as the in-group party as the reference category. Figures SM5.14 to SM5.17 in Appendix SM5.4 show the point estimates with confidence intervals for the four regressions in Table 5.2.

Turning first to the effect on agreement with the in-coalition having the same position as the in-group as reference category (first column), we see that there is no statistical difference between the evaluation of the reference category compared to the case where the signal comes from the in-group party. However, both signals are evaluated with significantly more agreement than statements from a party without a label or an out-group party with the same position. The same is true for any signal with a different position than the in-group party. If we now take the in-coalition signal with a different position to the in-group as a reference category in the second column, two things become clear: On the one hand, the agreement in this category does not show any significant difference to signals of the out-group and neutral group, if they represent the same position as the in-group. On the other hand, the signal is evaluated significantly more positively in contrast to neutral or out-group statements, if these also do not correspond to the in-group. This means that the sender has an influence on the agreement, but at the same time the content of the statement does not become insignificant as a result.

Turning now to the effect of the different senders on perceptions of credibility, we can

Table 5.2: Regression Model Full Sample

	DV: Agreement		DV: Credibility	
	Dependent variable:			
	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal = In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal ≠ In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal = In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal ≠ In-Group)
In-Group Signal	0.106	0.379***	0.303**	0.469***
	(0.095)	(0.106)	(0.095)	(0.091)
In-Coalition Signal (≠ in-group)	−0.273*		−0.166	
	(0.122)		(0.108)	
In-Coalition Signal (= in-group)		0.273*		0.166
		(0.122)		(0.108)
Neutral Signal (≠ in-group)	−0.684***	−0.412***	−0.516***	−0.350***
	(0.095)	(0.106)	(0.092)	(0.091)
Neutral Signal (= in-group)	−0.311***	−0.038	−0.399***	−0.233*
	(0.094)	(0.105)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Out-Group Signal (≠ in-group)	−0.888***	−0.615***	−0.627***	−0.461***
	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.087)	(0.085)
Out-Group Signal (= in-group)	−0.371***	−0.098	−0.347***	−0.182*
	(0.090)	(0.102)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Institutional Trust	0.110***	0.110***	0.194***	0.194***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Sophistication	−0.033	−0.033	0.181***	0.181***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Topic Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ID clustered s.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	4.683***	4.410***	3.649***	3.483***
	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.106)	(0.101)
Observations	10,139	10,139	10,139	10,139
R^2	0.129	0.129	0.088	0.088
Adjusted R^2	0.128	0.128	0.087	0.087
Residual Std. Error	1.640	1.640	1.554	1.554
F Statistic	115.770***	115.770***	75.529***	75.529***

Signal labels in the Table: *$p<0.05$; **$p<0.01$; ***$p<0.001$

In-Group = The party a participant voted for

In-Coalition = A party a participant would like to see in government

Neutral = A neutral party label

Out-Group = A party that a participant would neither vote for nor like to see in government

(= in-group) = Signal with the same position as the in-group party

(≠ in-group) = Signal with a different position to the in-group party

see differences compared to the effects on agreement. In this case, there are no significant differences for the in-coalition group depending on whether the statement had the same position as the in-group party. In both cases, the statement is evaluated as significantly less credible than by the in-group. However, in both cases, statements from the in-coalition are evaluated as more credible than neutral statements and statements from the out-group. Thus, as expected, the sender seems to play a bigger role for people in evaluating the credibility than the content of the statement compared to the evaluation of agreement with the statement.

5.5.2 Institutional Context Effects

Next, I look at the effect of the respective institutional context on the perception of the statements. Before I come to the results of the vignettes, I first compare the average values of the participants' trust in the three different channels Twitter, political parties and German parliament. Here, as expected, the average trust of participants is highest for the parliament and lowest for Twitter. However, the average values of 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 are very close to each other and the standard deviation is high between 1.5 and 1.7. If we take the value of institutional trust in the respective randomly selected institutional context of the vignette statements as an independent variable, we can see a significant positive effect. Participants agree significantly more with the statements and perceive them as more credible if they have greater trust in the respective institutional context. For the assessment of credibility, this means that participants on average rated a statement more than one point higher in credibility on a scale of 1 to 7 if they strongly trusted the institutional context compared to participants with very little trust. Thus, the variable institutional trust not only has the expected positive effect on credibility, but also a positive effect on agreement. However, in line with the original expectation, the effect on agreement is significantly lower. At this point, it can also be mentioned that the control variable political knowledge had no influence on the average agreement. However, there is a significant positive effect on the assessment of the credibility of the statements.

5.6 Discussion

What do the results from this survey experiment tell us about party perception in multi-party systems and how do they relate to the results from the subsamples for the different vignettes? First, I showed that evaluating agreement and credibility of party statements are different things. Even though the two are weakly correlated, it is possible for voters to find statements very credible even though they disagree with them, and vice versa. Secondly, I demonstrated that the effect of the sender on the perception of statements in multiparty systems is more complex than the well-known contrasts between in-group and

out-group parties in two-party systems. With regard to the agreement with a statement, the information that it was made by an in-coalition party can have the same positive effect as with an in-group party in perception (if the statement does not contradict the position of the in-group party). Hence, not every party that does not correspond to a person's intended vote choice is automatically an out-group party.

While there is also a positive effect of the in-coalition party on the perception of credibility, it is significantly lower compared to the in-group party. Thus, in this case in particular there is a difference that can ultimately have an effect on the electoral decision if the positions of two parties appear particularly similar to a voter. Thirdly, the results show a consistently significant positive effect of trust in the respective institutional context on the perception of the statement. This is important and should be given more attention in future studies, otherwise there is a risk that it will not be apparent whether the perception of a statement is due solely to the sender in question. In addition, one could argue that the effect in the setting of this study is still underestimated as, for example, the statements are not shown in the layout and environment of the respective context, which might evoke even stronger emotions about the respective context.

If we now turn to the subsamples for the respective two vignettes belonging to a thematic category, small differences can be identified. The smallest differences can be found with regard to the effect of institutional trust. It is significant throughout all subsamples and the effect on the perception of credibility is stronger than the effect on agreement in all cases. With regard to the influence of different party groups, the results by and large stay the same. However, the significance values for some group differences vary. For the statements on GAL-TAN issues, this does not make any substantial difference for the interpretation of the results. As for the statements on economic issues, in the case of credibility, we can see that analogous to the evaluation of agreement, here too is no significantly lower perception of the in-coalition party compared to the in-group party.

A substantially more different result can only be observed for the statements on issues with high or low salience. Here, it is noticeable for the evaluation of agreement that the in-coalition party with a different position than the in-group party is evaluated more positively on average than the in-group party (although not at a significant level). Two possible explanation seem plausible: On the one hand, the effect of the sender might be more pronounced on issues that can clearly be located on an ideological space. In these cases, it might be easier for voters to use the party label as a shortcut. On the other hand, in the case of highly salient issues, it could be that a specific party in particular is seen as competent in this area (as in this case, the Greens on climate policy). This means that the effect of the in-group position of other parties vis-à-vis this party is less strong. Nevertheless, this supports the claim that the effect of party labels on the perception of party signals is considerably more complex in multiparty systems than in two-party

systems.

5.7 Conclusion

This study suggests that the perception of party statements in multiparty systems is influenced by factors that go beyond the dichotomous effect of in-group and out-group differences. Using a vignette experiment with a representative German sample, I show that both the respective relationship of a voter to the party and the institutional context of the message are relevant for the agreement to a statement as well as the evaluation of its credibility. With regard to the sender, the effects of the different party relations are more nuanced than in two-party systems. Not every party that does not correspond to a person's intended vote choice is automatically an out-group party. For example, signals from an in-coalition party can have similarly strong positive effects on the perception of a statement as the favored in-group party. Furthermore, regardless of the author of the statement, trust in the institutional context has a significant impact on the perception of the statement. In addition, I show that it is informative to distinguish between agreement with a position and its credibility.

The results are not only important as voters base their vote choice on the perception of parties. Moreover, it is important for the public discourse if citizens perceive parties differently not on the basis of what they (actually) say but on the basis of how they perceive it in a certain context. Thus, a more nuanced perception in multiparty systems might have negative effect on polarization if it prevents a strong in-group/out-group identification. However, how these effects influence things like vote choice, polarization, and party competition is left for further research. Additionally, future studies might look at how this translates to different political systems with different democratic experiences and programmatic party linkage (Carroll and Kubo, 2018).

SIX

CONCLUSION

This dissertation set out to analyze which factors influence legislative behavior and how they affect political behavior in parliaments and beyond. To this end, the introduction presents a categorization of the most important factor groups and a structure of how they relate to each other and to the political world beyond parliaments. The subsequent three chapters analyze the daily interaction in parliament in comparative studies with a focus on one selected factor from each of the introduced categories. The fifth chapter then goes beyond the political behavior in parliament and looks at the effects on voters' perception of parties. While the findings and their implications from each chapter are discussed at the respective sections in detail, the broader implications from this dissertation as a whole are presented here as well as an outlook on future research.

Returning to the introduction, I argued that although MPs might have a free mandate from a legal perspective, they are certainly not free from external influence. Thus, a basic premise for this study is the assumption that parliaments are a specific type of political arena with a distinct set of rules, actors and, institutionalized forms of interaction that influence political behavior in parliament and beyond. It is important to acknowledge this both in theoretical and empirical frameworks when asking and answering questions in this context. The chapters two to four show examples of how the three categories can influence legislative behavior: The electoral cycle has an effect on the level of conflict in parliamentary debates but its impact varies between different types of government and opposition. While populist radical right parties do not change the general government-opposition divide once they enter parliament, they do succeed in polarizing certain types of debates, such as debates on immigration, where they become the center of attention. Furthermore, minority governments have a positive effect on opposition rhetoric in parliamentary debates on government bill proposals and this effect stays constant throughout different types of support agreements between opposition and government. The fifth chapter then

goes beyond the parliamentary arena and shows that the institutional context also has an effect on voters' perception of party messages and that a binary in-group vs. out-group divide does not describe the effect on voter perception well in multiparty systems. Three main conclusions (respectively arguments) result from these analyses.

The first central conclusion is that the mechanisms of the different factors that explain legislative behavior can in principle be the main subject of individual analyses. However, they always have to be seen and analyzed in their interaction with other factors as well as within the overall context. Thus, all previous chapters emphasize the importance of controlling for the institutional context and related factors even when one particular aspect is the focus of each study. Looking at the effect of electoral cycles, for example, cannot lead to valid results if the analysis does not take into account the differences between different forms of government. Examining the influence of populist radical right parties on the discourse in parliament would lead to biased results if one did not distinguish between different types of debates and did not take into account the government-opposition divide. The results of the study of the effect of minority governments on opposition rhetoric would be different if we had not controlled for the ideological positioning of the political parties on the issues of the respective debates. Furthermore, all of these studies show the merits of a comparative perspective looking either at different countries or multiple parties. However, it is equally important to evaluate the comparability of the respective contexts both theoretically and empirically as this conclusion already implies.

Second, the analysis of daily interaction in parliament provides important opportunities to examine the impact of institutional structures on legislative behavior and enables a distinction between exogenous and endogenous factors. Looking at speech behavior in parliaments, as in the case of this dissertation, offers the chance to observe and analyze precisely the effects of time and timing quantitatively over a long period of time. This becomes particularly evident in the second chapter, where the exact change in legislative behavior of different groups in parliament before elections is examined. All three parliament-focused studies are only possible because accurate data on the substantive content of the debates and the actors participating in them were collected. This kind of data also offers the opportunity to qualitatively check what was said in the individual debates in parliament and whether this is adequately captured by the quantitative measurement methods.

The third key conclusion is that the effects of institutional structures in parliament extend beyond and ultimately feed back into the parliamentary arena. The last study highlights the importance of the institutional context for the perception of voters (in this case with regard to party messages). It is therefore important to examine the institution-specific implications within one arena, but just as important to consider their implications for other arenas. Neither electoral campaigns of parties nor electoral decisions of voters

are independent of political behavior and interaction in parliaments. Likewise, the electoral arena has a fundamental influence on legislative behavior and output. Analyzing the interconnections between different arenas is thus just as relevant as analyzing the interaction of different factors within an arena.

The results and implications of this dissertation have both scientific and societal relevance. Parliaments are central institutions of decision-making in a democratic political system. Understanding the institutional effects and their implications is thus central to political science research. However, understanding these effects and implications is as central to citizens. Only in this way will citizens be empowered to evaluate the democratic quality of a country's system and institutions and adapt their political actions accordingly. One remark should be made at this point on the implications that result from this dissertation. Science cannot give final answers to the question of how people should organize their coexistence in a democratic state. However, it can and should give answers to the question of how certain political structures and policies affect it. Thus, in addition to the empirical focus of this work, a normative component always resonates. Nevertheless, it is primarily the goal of this research to expand the knowledge of its focus areas and not to make final conclusions or judgments. In this context, it is important to mention that the influencing factors and their relative power do not necessarily have to be known by the actors that are affected. Thus, for a further assessment, the question arises to what extent these are intended actions and reactions.

What lessons can be learned from this dissertation for future research? While the consideration of the contextual effects of parliaments should be even more at the center of legislative studies, this holds true for any institutional environment. Therefore, further studies should start to theorize and analyze more closely the interactions of different institutional factors rather than picking one and "controlling" for others. As mentioned in the introduction, the focus of the individual analyses in this dissertation lies on parliamentary democracies. Broadening the analyses and thus comparing them with presidential or autocratic systems offers the opportunity to expand our knowledge of how legislative institutions function. A comparison with the mode of operation of other political institutions that are relevant to the policy-making process may also be considered. In both cases, however, the evaluation of comparability needs to take a central role.

Future fields of research are also opening up with regard to the effects beyond the parliamentary arena. For example, the results of this dissertation underline that the institutional context has a clear influence on voters' perceptions, in this case the evaluation of party messages. However, it remains to be analyzed which mechanisms exactly lead to this evaluation. Qualitative studies in particular could thus help to understand which understanding of legislative (party) behavior voters have in mind and how this is evaluated. This ties in with the argument made in the introduction, that it is not always possible

to disentangle when a certain (change in) behavior of MPs is intentional or e.g. part of a more passive adaption to the institutional context. The studies in this dissertation can be used as a starting point for these future projects.

APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

SM2   Appendix to Chapter 2: Going in circles?

SM2.1   Most Positive and Negative Speeches per Country

Table SM2.1: Speech Examples per Country

Country	Very Positive Example	Very Negative Example
Austria	ich freue mich dass alle mittun im interesse der kolleginnen und kollegen die diese neue ausbildung genießen können und damit eine bessere berufschance haben aber vor allem in unserem interesse als patientinnen und patienten um ein bisschen mehr sicherheit zu haben (ÖVP 2013)	es stört besonders dass in brüssel korruption herrscht und beitrittsgelder verschwendet werden das glauben laut dieser umfrage 60 prozent der österreichischen bürger weiters stört die bürgerinnen und bürger dass wir uns nach unsinnigen vorschriften aus brüssel richten müssen (FPÖ 2008)
Denmark	viser sig at være et rigtig godt initiativ og derfor gøres det permanent socialdemokraterne er glade for det tiltag og støtter forslaget tak for den meget brede tilslutning til at permanentgøre kompetencebeviset for unge der er på produktionsskole det er et lille men vigtigt forslag for det betyder at man får den anerkendelse (Social Democratic Party 2014)	jeg synes bare jeg på dette tidspunkt som ordfører vil meddele at dansk folkeparti stemmer imod bare for at der ikke skal være nogen tvivl jeg skal ikke komme med yderligere argumentation for jeg kan ikke finde mere argumentation men skal bare henvise til hvad jeg har sagt sidste gang og forrige gang og forrige gang og forrige gang og for lidt siden under debatten om (Dansk Folkeparti 1998)

Country	Very Positive Example	Very Negative Example
Ireland	on report stage amendment no 1 is in the name of deputy richard bruton i thank the deputies for a very constructive and enjoyable debate during which new insights were advanced i welcome the constructive ideas that came forward i look forward to the successful operation of this institute and hope it will have a fundamental impact on activity and performance elsewhere within the system question put and agreed to (Fianna Fáil 1999)	it will be a job to bring that down are they stupid outrageous it is bad legislation rubbish it is a vicious attack on the poor and particularly on women the minister ought to be ashamed of himself it is an outrageous bill it is running away from the issue they are afraid of it (The Worker's Party 1992)
New Zealand	i think we are doing a good job to try to cover all the particular diverse environments (...) overall the government and the local government and environment committee are very happy with this bill and we support it passing as soon as possible (National Party 2014)	terrible government what have they done for the truancy service then that is shocking (New Zealand First 2016)
Spain	simplemente quiero agradecer a los portavoces de todos los grupos parlamentarios sus comentarios estoy convencido de que sus aportaciones enriquecerán el real decreto ley que traemos hoy a convalidación y que se va a tramitar como proyecto de ley asimismo quiero anunciar que hoy es un buen día porque según parece se ha llegado a un acuerdo entre el parlamento europeo el consejo y la comisión para avanzar en el mecanismo de resolución único (Partido Popular 2014)	si no he dicho nada todavía rumores el señor aguirre ha acusado o mejor dicho ha comentado retiro lo de acusado porque no es una acusación el señor núñez pérez no ha habido réplica ya que no lo ha dicho el señor presidente lo digo yo el señor presidente me ha dado la palabra y no creo que sea usted señor núñez quien la quite o quien la de mantenga la cortesía parlamentaria le tenía que pedir respeto el señor presidente y no yo puedo seguir en el uso de la palabra señor presidente rumores (PSOE 1997)
Sweden	jag tror att detta är en förutsättning för öppenhet och för fortsatt öppenhet och att eu relationen är garantin för en korrekt framtida historieskrivning i turkiet och för respekten för minoriteter tidigare lyssnade (Kristdemokraterna 2010)	frågan gällde avgifter för kartor som har nämnts här tidigare även då var regeringen snabb att föreslå att det var näringen dvs de enskilda lantbrukarna som skulle belastas med kostnaden något som vi även då motsatte oss det är inte rimligt att utökade kontrollformer som genomförs på ett ur näringens synvinkel ineffektivt sätt skall finansieras av lantbruket (Kristdemokraterna 1998)

SM2.2   Distribution of Tone

Figure SM2.1: Distribution of the dependent variable for government and opposition.

Figure SM2.2: Distribution of the dependent variable by country.

SM2.3   Country Trends

Figure SM2.3: Country trends for the dependent variable.

SM2.4 Robustness Checks: Time Specification

Table SM2.2: Year Before Election Dummy

	Dependent variable:				
	tone				
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
Year Before	0.033***	0.072***	0.030**	0.022	0.021
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Year Before*Opposition	−0.027***				
	(0.007)				
Year Before*Coalition		−0.057***			
		(0.016)			
Year Before*Not PM Party			−0.038*		
			(0.015)		
Year Before*Minority				−0.020	
				(0.013)	
Year Before*Opp. Power					−0.016
					(0.013)
Mainstream Party	0.001	−0.011	−0.023**	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Challenger Party	−0.002	−0.125**	−0.136***	0.004	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Opposition	−0.195***				
	(0.005)				
Coalition		0.037			
		(0.024)			
Strong Institutions			−0.059		
			(0.046)		
Minority				0.058**	
				(0.019)	
Support Party				0.030***	0.030***
				(0.007)	(0.007)
Opp. Power					−0.147**
					(0.046)
Manifesto Difference	−0.013***	−0.010	−0.009	−0.016***	−0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Country F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.695***	0.716***	0.819***	0.476***	0.480***
	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Observations	112,708	35,535	24,950	77,173	77,173
	All	Government	Coalition	Opposition	Opposition
	Parties	Parties	Gov. Parties	Parties	Parties
Log Likelihood	−93,118.990	−30,277.950	−20,965.330	−64,245.390	−64,246.470
Akaike Inf. Crit.	186,268.000	60,585.900	41,956.650	128,522.800	128,522.900
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	186,412.500	60,713.080	42,062.270	128,670.800	128,661.800

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

<div align="center">

Table SM2.3: Days Before Election Variable

</div>

	Dependent variable:				
	tone				
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
Days Before	−0.00005***	−0.0001***	−0.00002	−0.00003*	−0.00003*
	(0.00001)	(0.00002)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Days Before*Opposition	0.0001***				
	(0.00001)				
Days Before*Coalition		0.0001***			
		(0.00002)			
Days Before*Not PM Party			0.00002		
			(0.00002)		
Days Before*Minority				0.00004*	
				(0.00001)	
Days Before*Opp. Power					0.00003*
					(0.00001)
Mainstream Party	0.001	−0.011	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Challenger Party	−0.002	−0.125**	−0.135***	0.004	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Opposition	−0.237***				
	(0.007)				
Coalition		−0.044			
		(0.027)			
Strong Institutions			−0.057		
			(0.046)		
Minority				0.033	
				(0.020)	
Support Party				0.030***	0.030***
				(0.007)	(0.007)
Opp. Power					−0.173***
					(0.046)
Manifesto Difference	−0.013***	−0.011	−0.008	−0.016***	−0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Country F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.736***	0.810***	0.815***	0.502***	0.505***
	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.035)
Observations	112,708	35,535	24,950	77,173	77,173
	All	Government	Coalition	Opposition	Opposition
	Parties	Parties	Gov. Parties	Parties	Parties
Log Likelihood	−93,123.930	−30,288.460	−20,981.750	−64,257.640	−64,259.210
Akaike Inf. Crit.	186,277.900	60,606.930	41,989.500	128,547.300	128,548.400
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	186,422.300	60,734.100	42,095.120	128,695.300	128,687.200

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table SM2.4: Cycle Variable

			Dependent variable:		
			tone		
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
Cycle	−0.057***	−0.142***	−0.038*	−0.043*	−0.049*
	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Cycle*Opposition	0.057***				
	(0.012)				
Cycle*Coalition		0.121***			
		(0.027)			
Cycle*Not PM Party			0.042		
			(0.025)		
Cycle*Minority				0.052*	
				(0.021)	
Cycle*Opp. Power					0.053*
					(0.022)
Mainstream Party	0.001	−0.011	0.008	0.001	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Challenger Party	−0.003	−0.125**	−0.135***	0.004	0.004
	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Opposition	−0.230***				
	(0.007)				
Coalition		−0.046			
		(0.027)			
Strong Institutions			−0.059		
			(0.046)		
Minority				0.029	
				(0.021)	
Support Party				0.030***	0.030***
				(0.007)	(0.007)
Opp. Power					−0.176***
					(0.047)
Manifesto Difference	−0.013***	−0.010	−0.008	−0.016***	−0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Country F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.733***	0.814***	0.816***	0.503***	0.509***
	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Observations	112,708	35,535	24,950	77,173	77,173
	All	Government	Coalition	Opposition	Opposition
	Parties	Parties	Gov. Parties	Parties	Parties
Log Likelihood	−93,116.110	−30,271.930	−20,966.250	−64,243.240	−64,244.350
Akaike Inf. Crit.	186,262.200	60,573.850	41,958.510	128,518.500	128,518.700
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	186,406.700	60,701.030	42,064.130	128,666.500	128,657.500

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SM2.5 Robustness Checks: Full Terms

Table SM2.5: Full Terms Models

	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
			tone		
Log(Days Before)	−0.024***	−0.040***	−0.011	−0.015*	−0.010
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Manifesto Difference	−0.011***	−0.005	−0.001	−0.015***	−0.015***
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Support Party				0.035***	0.035***
				(0.007)	(0.007)
Mainstream Party	−0.005	0.027*	0.092	−0.012*	−0.012*
	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.064)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Minority				−0.005	
				(0.054)	
Opp. Power					−0.217**
					(0.079)
Challenger Party	−0.034***	−0.071	−0.078	−0.019*	−0.018*
	(0.008)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Opposition	−0.368***				
	(0.030)				
Coalition		−0.158*			
		(0.069)			
Strong Institutions			−0.069		
			(0.050)		
Log(Days Before)*Opposition	0.026***				
	(0.005)				
Log(Days Before)*Coalition		0.033***			
		(0.010)			
Log(Days Before)*Not PM Party			0.011		
			(0.010)		
Log(Days Before)*Minority				0.019*	
				(0.008)	
Log(Days Before)*Opp. Power					0.010
					(0.008)
Constant	0.872***	0.932***	0.801***	0.569***	0.553***
	(0.057)	(0.088)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.065)
Observations	80,523	25,677	15,958	54,846	54,846
	All	Government	Coalition	Opposition	Opposition
	Parties	Parties	Gov. Parties	Parties	Parties
Log Likelihood	−65,140.970	−21,544.250	−13,105.340	−44,450.550	−44,458.350
Akaike Inf. Crit.	130,311.900	43,118.500	26,236.680	88,933.100	88,946.710
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	130,451.400	43,240.800	26,336.490	89,075.700	89,080.390

Note: $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$

SM2.6 Robustness Checks: Agenda Capacity

Table SM2.6: Agenda Capacity Variable

	Dependent variable:				
	tone				
	Model 1	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3a	Model 3b
Log(Days Before)	−0.018***	−0.046***	−0.017**	−0.018**	−0.016**
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Log(Days Before)*Opposition	0.020***				
	(0.004)				
Log(Days Before)*Coalition		0.035***			
		(0.009)			
Log(Days Before)*Not PM Party			0.011		
			(0.008)		
Log(Days Before)*Minority				0.026***	
				(0.007)	
Log(Days Before)*Opp. Power					0.022**
					(0.007)
Agenda Capacity	−0.001***	0.0004***	0.001***	−0.001***	−0.001***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Mainstream Party	0.024***	−0.028**	0.017	0.029***	0.029***
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.053)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Challenger Party	0.005	−0.141***	−0.170***	0.011	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Opposition	−0.329***				
	(0.026)				
Coalition		−0.203**			
		(0.062)			
Strong Institution			0.063		
			(0.051)		
Minority				−0.110*	
				(0.047)	
Support Party				0.023***	0.024***
				(0.007)	(0.007)
Opp. Power					−0.224***
					(0.061)
Manifesto Difference	−0.014***	−0.011	−0.009	−0.016***	−0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Country F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.840***	1.012***	0.712***	0.630***	0.626***
	(0.042)	(0.074)	(0.057)	(0.048)	(0.050)
Observations	112,708	35,535	24,950	77,173	77,173
	All	Government	Coalition	Opposition	Opposition
	Parties	Parties	Gov. Parties	Parties	Parties
Log Likelihood	−93,070.700	−30,278.810	−20,958.160	−64,193.690	−64,195.420
Akaike Inf. Crit.	186,173.400	60,589.630	41,944.320	128,421.400	128,422.800
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	186,327.500	60,725.280	42,058.060	128,578.700	128,570.900

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SM3 Appendix to Chapter 3: Talking to the Populist Radical Right

SM3.1 Overview Speech Data

Table SM3.7: Overview Speech Data

Country	Immigration Debates	Education Debates	All Other Debates	Legislative Periods
Denmark	7649	11348	199888	3
Germany	1851	1405	36090	1
Netherlands	6023	22309	354546	3
Sweden	4394	10588	100463	2

SM3.2 Preprocessing Steps and Robustness Tests

In order to analyze the parliamentary speeches with the help of correspondence analysis, the speeches must first be converted into a corpus and then into a document frequency matrix. During this conversion, various pre-processing steps are conducted. The purpose of these is to analyze only parts of the speeches that have significance for the position adopted. These steps include: The exclusion of speeches with less than 50 words, removing punctuation/numbers/symbols, removing stop words, and stemming of the words in the respective language. Even though these steps make sense, they constitute a manipulation of the original data. Denny and Spirling (2018) found that this manipulation can have a significant effect on the results of quantitative text analyses. For this reason, I have calculated the scores for all countries without the mentioned pre-processing steps. The second model (Table SM3.8) shows the results without these steps. All main effects remain the same. The only noticeable difference is that debates on education also have a significant positive effect. To ensure the comparability of the respective sub-samples, I carried out an additional robustness test. I normalized the scores from each correspondence analysis to values between 0 and 1, meaning that the most different positions two parties can take in a given period and debate type is 1. All main effects remain significant in this model as well. In contrast to the model without preprocessing, however, education debate has a significant negative effect.

Table SM3.8: Robustness Tests on Pre-Processing

	Dependent variable:		
	Distance to PRRP		
	Main Model	No Pre-Processing	Normalised Scores
Left Party	0.023	0.048	0.012
	(0.073)	(0.076)	(0.022)
Opposition Party	−0.887***	−0.892***	−0.282***
	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.023)
Education Debate	−0.068	0.434***	−0.057*
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.022)
Immigration Debate	0.291***	0.322***	0.149***
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.022)
Term Number	0.009	−0.047	0.005
	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.019)
Minority	−1.098***	−1.193***	−0.261***
	(0.195)	(0.203)	(0.058)
PRRP Support	−0.653***	−0.494*	−0.151**
	(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.055)
PRRP Size	0.094***	0.080***	0.022***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.005)
Government Debate	0.324***	0.389***	0.055*
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.022)
Opposition Debate	−0.158*	−0.188*	−0.051*
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.022)
Denmark	0.315	0.324	−0.056
	(0.249)	(0.259)	(0.075)
Netherlands	0.474**	0.850***	−0.029
	(0.171)	(0.178)	(0.051)
Sweden	0.990***	1.109***	0.129
	(0.251)	(0.262)	(0.075)
Opposition Party*PRRP Support	0.514***	0.475**	0.155***
	(0.151)	(0.157)	(0.045)
Constant	1.685***	1.735***	0.710***
	(0.220)	(0.229)	(0.066)
Observations	522	522	522
R^2	0.499	0.549	0.492
Adjusted R^2	0.485	0.536	0.478
Residual Std. Error (df = 507)	0.694	0.722	0.207
F Statistic (df = 14; 507)	35.998***	44.071***	35.041***

Note:		*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SM3.3 Correspondence Analysis for All Debates and Immigration Debates

Figure SM3.4: Positions in Denmark 1998-2001 for all debates (left) and immigration debates (right), government parties: S and RV

Figure SM3.5: Positions in Germany 2017-21 for all debates (left) and immigration debates (right), government parties: CDU/CSU and SPD

Figure SM3.6: Positions in Netherlands 2006-2010 for all debates (left) and immigration debates (right), government parties: CDA, CU and PvdA

Figure SM3.7: Positions in Sweden 2010-2014 for all debates (left) and immigration debates (right), government parties: M, C, L and KD

SM3.4 Logit Model PRRP Mentions

Table SM3.9: Logit Model of Party Mentions

	Dependent variable:
	PRRP Mention
Left Party	0.628***
	(0.018)
Opposition Party	0.251***
	(0.017)
PRR Size	0.008
	(0.005)
Minority	0.517***
	(0.059)
Immigration Debate	1.037***
	(0.027)
Education Debate	−0.014
	(0.027)
Government Debate	0.375***
	(0.014)
PRR Support	0.646***
	(0.036)
Term Number	0.200***
	(0.020)
Germany	1.480***
	(0.079)
Netherlands	−1.084***
	(0.034)
Sweden	0.221***
	(0.032)
Constant	−4.850***
	(0.053)
Observations	610,367
Log Likelihood	−89,103.460
Akaike Inf. Crit.	178,232.900
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SM4 Appendix to Chapter 4: Courtesy and Cooperation?

SM4.1 Prevalence of Minority Governments

Table SM4.10: Prevalence of Minority Governments

	Majority Coalition	Majority Single Party	Minority Coalition	Minority Single Party	Old/New Democracy
Australia	7	5	0	2	Old
Austria	10	0	1	0	Old
Belgium	8	0	0	0	Old
Bulgaria	3	1	1	3	New
Canada	0	6	0	3	Old
Croatia	5	0	5	1	New
Cyprus	9	0	3	1	Old
Czech Republic	8	0	3	2	New
Denmark	0	0	11	1	Old
Estonia	11	0	2	2	New
Finland	15	0	0	0	Old
France	14	0	3	2	Old
Germany	7	0	0	0	Old
Greece	3	7	0	1	Old
Hungary	9	0	1	1	New
Iceland	10	0	1	0	Old
Ireland[1]	6	0	3	0	Old
Israel	15	0	13	0	Old
Italy	12	0	4	0	Old
Japan	19	3	1	1	Old
Latvia	13	1	9	0	New
Lithuania	9	2	6	0	New
Luxembourg	5	0	0	0	Old
Malta	0	7	0	0	Old
Netherlands[1]	6	0	1	0	Old
New Zealand	2	3	4	5	Old
Norway	2	0	4	4	Old
Poland	12	1	3	2	New
Portugal	3	2	1	3	Old
Romania	7	1	13	1	New
Slovakia	10	1	3	1	New
Slovenia	12	0	4	0	New
Spain[1]	0	2	0	5	Old
Sweden[1]	1	0	2	5	Old
Switzerland	7	0	0	0	Old
Turkey	4	8	2	1	Old
United Kingdom	1	8	0	0	Old

Notes:
[1]: Included in the analysis of debate sentiment

SM4.2 Datasets and Descriptives

Table SM4.11: Number of cases at each stage of data processing

Country	Ireland	Netherlands	Spain	Sweden
Complete dataset	1,028,809	900,796	262,352	362,820
Subsetting for government bills	199,235	429,171	16,937	91,478
Deleting bills with unknown policy areas	194,514	381,723	16,028	89,269
Deleting speakers from parties without policy positions	170,603	377,379	15,207	89,184
Number of parties	11	13	29	9
Number of bills	1,296	1,472	512	2,432
Number of bill-party combinations (cases)	5,036	9,316	3,519	12,712

Figure SM4.8: Policy Areas of Government Bills by Country

Figure SM4.9: Policy distance to Bill by Country

Figure SM4.10: Polarization of Legislature by Country

SM4.3   Sentiment, Debate Duration and Polarization

Table SM4.12: Sentiment and Debate Duration

	Dependent variable:
	Length of Debate in Words
Average Policy Distance of the Opposition	−0.020
	(−0.064, 0.024)
Average Opposition Sentiment	0.091
	(0.048, 0.135)
Average Government Sentiment	−0.161
	(−0.202, −0.119)
Government Conflict	0.021
	(−0.013, 0.055)
Netherlands	0.568
	(0.454, 0.682)
Spain	0.140
	(−0.023, 0.302)
Sweden	−0.561
	(−0.666, −0.457)
Constant	9.186
	(8.952, 9.421)
Observations	5,409
R^2	0.127
Adjusted R^2	0.124

Table SM4.13: Polarization and Sentiment

	Dependent variable:
	Average Opposition Sentiment
Polarization in Seats	−1.527
	(−3.884, 0.831)
Netherlands	−0.006
	(−0.268, 0.257)
Spain	0.129
	(−0.200, 0.457)
Sweden	0.113
	(−0.140, 0.366)
Constant	0.570
	(−0.330, 1.469)
Observations	31
R^2	0.098
Adjusted R^2	−0.041

SM4.4   Coding Policy Areas

Table SM4.14: Overview of Policy Areas with CMP variables

Policy Area	Examples	CMP Codes
Agriculture	Agricultural regulations, fishery, food inspection	Right: per406 + per703 Left: per407
Budget and Taxes	National budget, taxation	Right: per414, Left: per409
Civil Rights	Minority rights, gender equality, police, courts	Right: per603 + per605 Left: per201 + per202 + per604 + per705 + per706
Defence	Military, defence/army policy, veterans	Right: per104 Left: per105
Economy	Market regulation, banking system, consumer protection	Right: per401+per402 Left: per403+per404+412+per413
Education	Schools, universities	Right: per507 Left: per506
Environment	Environmental protection, climate change, energy	Right: per410 Left: per416+per501
EU	European integration, treaties	Right: per110 Left: per108
Internationalism	Foreign affairs, trade, international treaties	Right: per109 Left: per103+per106+per107
Labour	Labour standards, employment training, unions	Right: per702 Left: per405+per701
Welfare	Health, social security, housing	Right: per505 Left: per503+per504+per606
Immigration	Immigration, refugees, integration	Right: per601+per608 Left: per602+per607
Decentralization	Rural development, subsidiarity	Right:per302 Left: per301

Note: These codings are based on Klüver and Zubek (2018).

SM4.5 Main Results for the Government

Table SM4.15: Sentiment under Minority and Majority Government (Government Parties

	Dependent variable:		
	Government Sentiment		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Intercept	0.319**	0.315**	0.322**
	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.106)
Policy Distance to Government	−0.013	−0.011	−0.025
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Minority Government		0.014	−0.008
		(0.045)	(0.061)
Prime Minister Party	−0.004	−0.006	−0.001
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.055)
Policy Distance to Government x Minority Government			0.044
			(0.059)
Policy Area-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,033	10,033	10,033
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001
Adjusted R^2	0.0003	0.0002	0.0004

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SM4.6   Main Results with Alternative Conception of Policy Disagreement

We present the main results using an alternative conception of policy disagreement. Rather than using the government position on the policy area under consideration, we calculate the distance between a party and the expected policy compromise. In single party majority governments, the position of the bill proposed in a policy area equals the position of the prime minister's party in that policy area. For coalition majority governments, we calculate the coalition compromise, weighted by the seat shares of all coalition parties in the policy area. In minority governments without support parties, we assume that the minority government will reach out to the most proximate pivotal opposition party such that it gains a parliamentary majority, thus minimizing policy losses. Finally, in minority coalitions with support parties, we assume that support parties have an influence on policy-making proportional to the salience they attach to the policy area. We therefore calculate the policy-area specific coalition compromise including support parties, weighted by seat share and salience. Based on these policy positions, we calculate for each party the absolute policy distance to the position of the bill that is being debated.

Table SM4.16: Sentiment under Minority and Majority Government

	Dependent variable:				
	Opposition Sentiment				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	−0.136	−0.180*	−0.146	−0.176*	−0.141
	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.073)
Policy Distance to Government	−0.024*	−0.023*	−0.044***	−0.023*	−0.043***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Minority Government		0.128***	0.075		
		(0.036)	(0.042)		
Supporting Party	0.042	0.011	0.016		
	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.064)		
Policy Distance to Government x Minority Government			0.033**		
			(0.012)		
Opposition in Minority Government				0.126***	0.077
				(0.036)	(0.042)
Supporting Party with policy agreement				0.196***	0.098
				(0.057)	(0.075)
Supporting Party without policy agreement				−0.106	−0.104
				(0.081)	(0.144)
Policy Distance to Government x Opposition in Minority Government					0.031*
					(0.012)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party with policy agreement					0.074
					(0.042)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party without policy agreement					−0.007
					(0.056)
Policy Area-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	20,307	20,307	20,307	20,307	20,307
R^2	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.005

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SM4.7 Country-level Analysis

Table SM4.17: Country-level Analysis of Opposition Sentiment (Ireland)

	Dependent variable:				
	Opposition Sentiment				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	−0.013	−0.041	−0.040	−0.041	−0.035
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.083)
Policy Distance to Government	−0.048***	−0.048***	−0.048***	−0.048***	−0.049***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Minority Government		0.065	0.063		
		(0.058)	(0.067)		
Supporting Party	−0.267***	−0.313***	−0.314***		
	(0.052)	(0.041)	(0.060)		
Policy Distance to Government x Minority Government			0.002		
			(0.042)		
Opposition in Minority Government				0.065	0.070
				(0.058)	(0.073)
Supporting Party without policy agreement				−0.248***	−0.657***
				(0.061)	(0.082)
Policy Distance to Government x Opposition in Minority Government					−0.005
					(0.043)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party without policy agreement					0.205***
					(0.027)
Policy Area-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,192	3,192	3,192	3,192	3,192
R^2	0.005	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Adjusted R^2	0.004	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.006

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table SM4.18: Country-level Analysis of Opposition Sentiment (Netherlands)

	Dependent variable:				
	Opposition Sentiment				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	−0.428***	−0.440***	−0.438***	−0.440***	−0.432***
	(0.128)	(0.132)	(0.129)	(0.132)	(0.126)
Policy Distance to Government	−0.052	−0.052	−0.053	−0.052	−0.053
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)
Minority Government		0.081	0.074		
		(0.057)	(0.045)		
Supporting Party	−0.065	−0.137	−0.136		
	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.083)		
Policy Distance to Government x Minority Government			0.005		
			(0.040)		
Opposition in Minority Government				0.081	0.119
				(0.057)	(0.067)
Supporting Party with policy agreement				−0.056	−0.334***
				(0.076)	(0.072)
Policy Distance to Government x Opposition in Minority Government					−0.028
					(0.036)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party with policy agreement					0.252***
					(0.039)
Policy Area-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,646	5,646	5,646	5,646	5,646
R^2	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.009
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.008

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table SM4.19: Country-level Analysis of Opposition Sentiment (Spain)

	Dependent variable:				
	Opposition Sentiment				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	0.084	−0.011	−0.019	−0.011	−0.019
	(0.163)	(0.165)	(0.176)	(0.165)	(0.176)
Policy Distance to Government	−0.023	−0.017	−0.013	−0.017	−0.013
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Minority Government		0.261**	0.279*		
		(0.093)	(0.111)		
Supporting Party	0.432*	0.300	0.300		
	(0.174)	(0.172)	(0.177)		
Policy Distance to Government x Minority Government			−0.009		
			(0.021)		
Opposition in Minority Government				0.261**	0.287**
				(0.093)	(0.110)
Supporting Party with policy agreement				0.562**	0.510*
				(0.178)	(0.232)
Policy Distance to Government x Opposition in Minority Government					−0.013
					(0.020)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party with policy agreement					0.030
					(0.046)
Policy Area-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,009	3,009	3,009	3,009	3,009
R^2	0.012	0.028	0.029	0.028	0.030
Adjusted R^2	0.011	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.028

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table SM4.20: Country-level Analysis of Opposition Sentiment (Sweden)

	Dependent variable:				
	Opposition Sentiment				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	0.006	−0.067	−0.050	−0.062	−0.051
	(0.059)	(0.085)	(0.123)	(0.082)	(0.123)
Policy Distance to Government	−0.0003	0.001	−0.009	−0.003	−0.009
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.026)
Minority Government		0.079	0.061		
		(0.068)	(0.113)		
Supporting Party	0.029	0.019	0.018		
	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.076)		
Policy Distance to Government x Minority Government			0.011		
			(0.029)		
Opposition in Minority Government				0.077	0.053
				(0.067)	(0.111)
Supporting Party with policy agreement				0.157*	0.181
				(0.075)	(0.131)
Supporting Party without policy agreement				−0.119	−0.058
				(0.067)	(0.106)
Policy Distance to Government x Opposition in Minority Government					0.016
					(0.029)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party with policy agreement					−0.010
					(0.033)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party without policy agreement					−0.050*
					(0.024)
Policy Area-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,460	8,460	8,460	8,460	8,460
R^2	0.0001	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.004
Adjusted R^2	−0.0001	0.0002	0.0001	0.002	0.003

Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

SM4.8   Examples of Opposition Speeches in Ireland

Table SM4.21: Illustration of Opposition Sentiment Values

Government Form	Year	Party	Policy Area	Speaker Name	Policy Distance	Sentiment Value	Speech
Minority	1991	Fine Gael	Labour	Mr. Alan Shatter	0.66	2.4	I appreciate the Minister's explanation. As one of the social partners had raised this issue I felt it was important to give the Minister an opportunity to respond to it and in the light of the Minister's explanation I am quite happy to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Section 1 agreed to.
Majority	1994	Fine Gael	Labour	Mr. Paul Bradford	0.7	-0.59	The deficiency in section 4 is that there is no appeals procedure except to write back to the Minister who refused the applications. That is unsatisfactory as the court of higher appeal is the one which rejected the claim in the first instance and the Minister is judge and jury. I appreciate the Minister of State is not in a position to offer any alternative. The procedure cannot be described as effective when that is all it [1530] involves. This section is unhelpful and should be more transparent.
Minority	1998	Democratic Left	Economy	Mr. Pat Rabbitte	1.58	1.22	I too bemoan the fact the Minister kept us at the grindstone and we missed what was a very exciting match. I thank the Minister for her courtesy during the debate on the Bill, particularly on Committee Stage. Contrary to my prediction, I acknowledge she took on board a number of matters advocated by me on behalf of my party and by my colleagues in the other parties. The Bill is a better one as a result of the amendments made and I wish it every success in the years ahead.
Majority	1993	Democratic Left	Economy	Mr. Pat Rabbitte	1.43	-1.61	There will be three new boards, three new chief executives, three new headquarters, and all of the energy-sapping, time-consuming rivalry which accompanies this style of reorganisation. The Bill is the weakened offspring of rowing parents who, for the sake of public appearances, patched up their row in a compromise that has more to do with politics than with industrial strategy.
Minority	1990	The Labour Party	Decentralization	Mr. Brian O'Shea	0.09	2.4	I would again like to refer to my suggestion of introducing guidelines to advise local authorities. The Minister reacted positively towards this suggestion but she has said the guidelines may await the coming into being of the Environmental Protection Agency. I suggest that is neither desirable nor necessary and I ask that she give an assurance that the guidelines will be with the local authorities at the same time as management are advised of the new legislation coming into operation.
Majority	2010	The Labour Party	Decentralization	Mr. Eamon Gilmore	1.15	-1.61	The Minister did not try very hard to find it. It was moved last Thursday. This is nonsense.

SM4.9 Analysis of Budget Debates

Although debates on the respective budget proposals of governments provide a high degree of comparability, it must be pointed out that there are significant differences between countries and over time. These differences are, on the one hand, whether the budget is spread over several debates over the legislative year and, for example, evaluated after a certain period of time. On the other hand, the countries differ in whether individual parts of the budget form the basis of separate debates. Both factors have an impact on the length and topic of the speeches. In order to make this as comparable as possible, we only consider the annual debate in which the government presents the entire budget for the first time and then puts it to the vote. Usually these debates take place between September and November. However, due to changes of government or elections, this date may also be postponed.

Table SM4.22: Analysis of Budget Debates

	Dependent variable:				
	Opposition Sentiment				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	-0.406^{***}	-0.491^{***}	-0.472^{***}	-0.491^{***}	-0.472^{***}
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.108)	(0.090)	(0.107)
Policy Distance to Government	0.009	-0.002	-0.016	-0.002	-0.018
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.070)	(0.039)	(0.070)
Minority Government		0.295^{**}	0.251		
		(0.111)	(0.144)		
Supporting Party	0.760^{***}	0.686^{**}	0.684^{**}		
	(0.223)	(0.218)	(0.218)		
Policy Distance to Government x Minority Government			0.023		
			(0.071)		
Baseline: Opposition in Majority Government					
Opposition in Minority Government				0.295^{**}	0.322^{*}
				(0.112)	(0.138)
Supporting Party with policy agreement				0.988^{**}	0.412
				(0.367)	(0.647)
Supporting Party without policy agreement				0.959	-0.647
				(0.618)	(1.529)
Baseline: Policy Distance for Opposition in Majority Government					
Policy Distance to Government x Opposition in Minority Government					-0.002
					(0.067)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party with policy agreement					0.326
					(0.226)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party without policy agreement					1.232^{*}
					(0.617)
Policy Area-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	634	634	634	634	634
R^2	0.036	0.047	0.048	0.047	0.056
Adjusted R^2	0.033	0.042	0.042	0.041	0.045
Note:					$^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$

SM4.10 Question Time

Table SM4.23: Sentiment under Minority and Majority Government in Question Time Debates

	Dependent variable:				
	Opposition Sentiment				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	−0.094***	−0.092***	−0.048	−0.090***	−0.047
	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Policy Distance to Government	−0.059*	−0.059*	−0.123*	−0.061*	−0.122*
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.052)
Minority Government		−0.003	−0.067		
		(0.036)	(0.050)		
Supporting Party	−0.008	−0.007	−0.014		
	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.110)		
Policy Distance to Government x Minority Government			0.087		
			(0.053)		
Baseline: Opposition in Majority Government					
Opposition in Minority Government				−0.003	−0.071
				(0.036)	(0.050)
Supporting Party with policy agreement				0.051	0.106
				(0.099)	(0.154)
Supporting Party without policy agreement				−0.178*	−0.409***
				(0.086)	(0.067)
Baseline: Policy Distance for Opposition in Majority Government					
Policy Distance to Government x Opposition in Minority Government					0.090
					(0.052)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party with policy agreement					−0.006
					(0.075)
Policy Distance to Government x Supporting Party without policy agreement					0.350***
					(0.063)
Policy Area-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	51,867	51,867	51,867	51,867	51,867
R^2	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.005

Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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SM5 Appendix to Chapter 5: Whom to Trust and When?

SM5.1 Vignette Example

Figure SM5.11: Vignette Example

Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Aussage und bewerten Sie diese anschließend.

Die CDU/CSU hat auf Twitter die Position geäußert, dass die Steuerlast für Unternehmen deutlich gesenkt werden sollte.

Niedrig			Mittel			Hoch
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Zustimmung

Glaubwürdigkeit

Translation: Please read and rate the following statement. The CDU/CSU expressed the position on Twitter that the tax burden for companies should be significantly reduced.

SM5.2 Survey Statistics

Figure SM5.12: Age Groups

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Figure SM5.13: Party Preference

SM5.3 Dependent Variables

Table SM5.24: Cross Table Dependent Variables

	Credibility	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Agreement								
1		38.28	6.91	2.79	3.76	2.56	5.12	10.59
2		11.79	21.16	6.90	4.57	4.61	5.92	3.85
3		10.54	16.00	24.42	8.85	10.76	5.12	2.61
4		7.21	9.70	12.33	39.58	6.78	3.95	2.34
5		7.07	17.65	28.59	20.95	40.57	21.20	8.39
6		7.07	14.65	15.12	12.79	21.49	38.16	11.42
7		18.03	13.93	9.84	9.49	13.24	20.54	60.80
Sum		100	100	100	100	100	100	100

SM5.4   Estimates Plots

Figure SM5.14: Effects on Agreement (Table 5.2 - Model 1)

Reference Category: In-Coalition Signal (= In-Group)

Figure SM5.15: Effects on Agreement (Table 5.2 - Model 2)

Reference Category: In-Coalition Signal (≠ In-Group)

Figure SM5.16: Effects on Credibility (Table 5.2 - Model 3)


Figure SM5.17: Effects on Credibility (Table 5.2 - Model 4)

SM5.5 Subsample Results

Table SM5.25: Subsample GAL-TAN Statements

	Dependent variable:			
	DV: Agreement		DV: Credibility	
	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal = In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal ≠ In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal = In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal ≠ In-Group)
In-Group Signal	0.247	0.530**	0.483**	0.594***
	(0.182)	(0.174)	(0.155)	(0.148)
In-Coalition Signal (≠ In-Group)	−0.283		−0.111	
	(0.223)		(0.191)	
In-Coalition Signal (= In-Group)		0.283		0.111
		(0.223)		(0.191)
Neutral Signal (≠ In-Group)	−0.594**	−0.311	−0.367*	−0.256
	(0.189)	(0.179)	(0.159)	(0.154)
Neutral Signal (= In-Group)	−0.405*	−0.122	−0.253	−0.142
	(0.193)	(0.188)	(0.166)	(0.164)
Out-Group Signal (≠ In-Group)	−0.708***	−0.424**	−0.410**	−0.299*
	(0.171)	(0.160)	(0.144)	(0.139)
Out-Group Signal (= In-Group)	−0.369*	−0.086	−0.236	−0.125
	(0.174)	(0.168)	(0.147)	(0.141)
Institutional Trust	0.099***	0.099***	0.167***	0.167***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Sophistication	−0.111	−0.111	0.109	0.109
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Topic Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ID clustered s.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	4.557***	4.274***	3.514***	3.403***
	(0.187)	(0.179)	(0.161)	(0.161)
Observations	3,393	3,393	3,393	3,393
R^2	0.042	0.042	0.081	0.081
Adjusted R^2	0.039	0.039	0.078	0.078
Residual Std. Error	1.740	1.740	1.538	1.538
F Statistic	16.384***	16.384***	33.079***	33.079***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table SM5.26: Subsample Economy Statements

	Dependent variable:			
	DV: Agreement		DV: Credibility	
	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal = In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal ≠ In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal = In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal ≠ In-Group)
In-Group Signal	−0.006	0.689***	0.223	0.545***
	(0.141)	(0.160)	(0.154)	(0.161)
In-Coalition Signal (≠ In-Group)	−0.695***		−0.323	
	(0.183)		(0.186)	
In-Coalition Signal (= In-Group)		0.695***		0.323
		(0.183)		(0.186)
Neutral Signal (≠ In-Group)	−0.675***	0.020	−0.608***	−0.285
	(0.139)	(0.158)	(0.148)	(0.156)
Neutral Signal (= In-Group)	−0.399**	0.296	−0.602***	−0.279
	(0.136)	(0.155)	(0.147)	(0.154)
Out-Group Signal (≠ In-Group)	−1.081***	−0.386**	−0.809***	−0.486***
	(0.127)	(0.148)	(0.135)	(0.145)
Out-Group Signal (= In-Group)	−0.514***	0.181	−0.556***	−0.233
	(0.131)	(0.151)	(0.143)	(0.150)
Institutional Trust	0.052**	0.052**	0.220***	0.220***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Sophistication	−0.165**	−0.165**	0.262***	0.262***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Topic Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ID clustered s.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	4.496***	3.801***	3.515***	3.192***
	(0.147)	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.160)
Observations	3,478	3,478	3,478	3,478
R^2	0.262	0.262	0.110	0.110
Adjusted R^2	0.260	0.260	0.108	0.108
Residual Std. Error	1.551	1.551	1.588	1.588
F Statistic	136.845***	136.845***	47.777***	47.777***

Note: $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$

Table SM5.27: Subsample Salience Statements

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
| | DV: Agreement | | DV: Credibility | |
	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal = In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal ≠ In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal = In-Group)	(Ref: In-Coalition Signal ≠ In-Group)
In-Group Signal	0.112	−0.119	0.217	0.240
	(0.156)	(0.172)	(0.154)	(0.153)
In-Coalition Signal (≠ In-Group)	0.231		−0.023	
	(0.197)		(0.179)	
In-Coalition Signal (= In-Group)		−0.231		0.023
		(0.197)		(0.179)
Neutral Signal (≠ In-Group)	−0.712***	−0.942***	−0.540***	−0.517***
	(0.149)	(0.168)	(0.145)	(0.144)
Neutral Signal (= In-Group)	−0.162	−0.392*	−0.314*	−0.291
	(0.157)	(0.167)	(0.153)	(0.150)
Out-Group Signal (≠ In-Group)	−0.832***	−1.062***	−0.642***	−0.619***
	(0.144)	(0.160)	(0.138)	(0.138)
Out-Group Signal (= In-Group)	−0.153	−0.383*	−0.181	−0.158
	(0.150)	(0.166)	(0.146)	(0.142)
Institutional Trust	0.181***	0.181***	0.192***	0.192***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Sophistication	0.179**	0.179**	0.164**	0.164**
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.061)
Topic Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ID clustered s.e.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	4.221***	4.452***	3.630***	3.607***
	(0.166)	(0.171)	(0.158)	(0.153)
Observations	3,268	3,268	3,268	3,268
R^2	0.087	0.087	0.075	0.075
Adjusted R^2	0.084	0.084	0.073	0.073
Residual Std. Error	1.608	1.608	1.531	1.531
F Statistic	34.411***	34.411***	29.508***	29.508***

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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
Eidesstattliche Erklärung
nach § 8 Abs. 3 der Promotionsordnung vom 17.02.2015

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