Meanings of Violence and Its Impacts on the Socio-Political Relations among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi, Northern Kenya

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Presented by

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Declaration

I solemnly declare that I prepared the dissertation I am presenting independently and without undue assistance, that I have completely stated the sources and aids used, and that in each individual case I have identified the passages in the dissertation, including tables, maps and images, that are quoted from other works literally or in spirit as a borrowing; that this dissertation has not been presented to any other faculty or university for examination; that it has not yet been published, apart possibly from partial publication approved by the chairperson of the doctoral committee after consultation with the supervising professor, as well as that I will not undertake any such publication before completing the doctorate. I am aware of the provisions in Sect. 20 and 21 of the doctoral regulations. The dissertation I am presenting has been supervised by Prof. Dr. Michael Bollig and Prof. Dr. David Anderson

Prof. Dr. Michael Bollig
Willis Okumu
Meanings of Violence and Its Impact on Socio-Political Relations among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi, Northern Kenya

Abstract
This thesis investigates the ways in which the Turkana and Samburu pastoralists groups use violence to negotiate their day to day relationships. Violence in the form of cattle raids, highway banditries, targeted shootings, torching of manyattas, vandalism of key resources such as schools and dispensaries and displacement of the ‘ethnic other’ are deployed by the two groups to gain power, cement in-group identity and eliminate competitors from common resources. In this study pastoralists’ violence is analysed as a resource and an agency through which individual and collective negotiations of socio-political relations between the Samburu and Turkana are carried out on a day to day basis. While pastoralists’ violence in East Africa has been seen in past studies from a moralist perspective as something negative, ‘primitive’ and as a symptom of break-down of law and order, this study, analyses violence as an a tool in the hands of the individual warrior’s, groups of warriors, political and business elites, deployed strategically to meet well planned ends of gaining power at an individual or collective level.

To understand the changing meanings and purposes of violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi of Northern Kenya, this study approaches violence in Baragoi as a product of structural, proximate and processual factors. The interconnection between these three factors are explored through the following key arguments: that violence among pastoralists in Baragoi is part of a historical contest over socio-physical spaces between the Turkana and Samburu that has been ongoing since the pre-colonial times and has exacerbated over the years through the policies of colonial administrators and independent Kenya governments. Further, the regional instability in Eastern Africa has in effect contributed to the ‘normalising’ of violence through the proliferation of small arms and light weapons among the marginalised pastoralists of Northern Kenya. Historical marginalisation of Northern Kenya has further contributed to ‘normalisation’ of pastoralists violence as incidences of massacres are passed-off as cultural killings based cultural affinities among pastoralists. Passing off massacres as ‘cultural’ illustrates government’s disinterest and inability to govern pastoralist’s borderlands. In the contest over socio-spatial spaces of Baragoi, use and threat of violence in this case determines movement patterns of
people and their livestock, electoral outcomes, grazing patterns, trading routes, location and access to livestock markets.

The changing meanings and purposes of violence is also seen in the way the state interacts with the Samburu and Turkana. Residents narrate chronologies of ‘operations’ where paramilitary police have been deployed to ‘bring peace’ between the two groups. Contrary to the desired peace, these operations have tended to precipitate more violence as the state’s modus operandi of using greater instruments of violence including bombs and helicopter gun-fire have tended to cause deaths of people and livestock. Those who have lost livestock in such operations plan for new cycles of violence aimed at appropriating stock from ‘enemy’ groups and revenging lost lives. In this case the state as an actor in pastoralists’ violence deploys it as a route to inter-communal peacebuilding but it results into more violence.

Violence is also analysed as a tool in the hands of political competitors used to gain power. Local elite conduct political campaigns based on their ‘protection credentials’ that is their ability to provide security for their ethnic groups against ‘enemy’ communities. Proof of protection credentials is tenable only through mobilisation of warriors for war, procurement and supply of arms and ammunition to warriors. Pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi is therefore linked to elite competition for and preservation of political power. Competition for political and economic power among elites further facilitates the patron-client networks between warriors, chiefs and Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) on the one hand and the political and business elite on the other hand and this enables the sale and distribution of weapons used to conduct raids among enemy groups.

Incidences of massacres reveal the inter-connectedness of past narratives of violence, to current violent contest and those of the future. Processual analysis of violence is applied in this thesis in the case of the Baragoi massacre of November 2012. It shows cases of pastoralists’ violence (in this case cattle raids) that have led to massacres in Northern Kenya to have been in situations where secondary actors mobilised for revenge (mostly political leaders). Revenge therefore plays a significant role as a catalyst for collective violence.
This thesis analyses the state as a structural and proximate actor in violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. Through the institution of KPRs, I argue that violence among pastoralists in Baragoi also stems from the local violent entrepreneurship that goes on in grazing lands among KPRs and warriors. The participation of KPRs in raids and highway banditries using government-issued arms and ammunition also reveals the complicity of the state in violence among pastoralists firstly through its neglect and marginalisation of Northern Kenya and secondly through its weak and unsupervised voluntary police unit; the KPRs which exacerbates the informalisation of violence in Northern Kenya.

Violence and culture are also seen as mutually producing phenomena among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. Violence is argued in this thesis has having the capacity to expand the cultural parameters of the traditional practice of cattle raiding. Violence among pastoralists that targets women and children in Baragoi today, reveal changes in the interpretation of female identities. While past studies argued that women and children were protected from violence though norms based on the notion that ‘women belonged to everyone’ as they adopted the identities of their husbands regardless of their ethnicities at birth (in patrilineal societies). This study reveals that increased targeting of women conforms to a more primordialist interpretation of identities among the Turkana and Samburu. The stringent interpretation of identities of women can also be argued to have expanded forms of violence on women such as rape, killing of milking stock and vandalism of women group investments. Stringent interpretation of ethnic identities can further be argued to have led to the diminishing of inter-ethnic marriages among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi.

In summary, this study views violence among the Samburu and Turkana as a key driver of societal change based on its capacity to expand cultural parameters of institutions. It (violence) generates this general effect through the creation of fear that limits or precipitates movements and massacres that lead to displacements and dependency on relief supplies. The study applies several concepts drawn from anthropological theories of violence to explain the history and changing meanings of violence among pastoralists of Baragoi. This ethnographic study is the result of 101 in-depth interviews, 16 focused group discussions, 111 event calendars’ interviews
and secondary data from the Kenya National Archives on the history of migration and settlement of the Samburu and Turkana in Baragoi, police signals, Occurrence Book data and personal notes obtained from respondents during the nine months of fieldwork in Northern Kenya compliment the interviews.

Key words: Samburu, Turkana, pastoralists, violence, Northern Kenya
Bedeutungen von Gewalt und ihr Einfluss auf sozio-politische Beziehungen zwischen den Turkana und den Samburu in Baragoi, Nordkenia

Zusammenfassung


die strenge Interpretation ethnischer Identitäten zu einem Rückgang inter-ethnischer Heiraten zwischen Turkana und Samburu in Baragoi geführt hat.


Schlagworte: Samburu, Turkana, Hirten, Gewalt, Nordkenia
Acknowledgments

My journey as a researcher started in October 2010 when I was awarded an Albertus Magnus (AMP) scholarship by the state of Nordrhein Westfalen (NRW) to pursue a Master of Arts in Culture and Environment in Africa (CEA) at the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Cologne. It is through this programme that my research interest in pastoralists’ livelihoods, violence and inter-communal peacebuilding in Northern Kenya was awakened. I therefore sincerely thank Prof. Dr. Michael Bollig who gave me a chance to come to Cologne in October 2010 and nurtured my passion and curiosity for research in anthropology. As my supervisor, Prof. Bollig has been patient and offered me the guidance and criticism that has made me a better researcher and a better human being. I thank Prof. Dr. David Anderson who showed interest in my work and agreed to become my 2nd Supervisor. His knowledge and experience as a researcher and a historian on violence and politics in Eastern Africa are an invaluable input to my thesis. I also thank Prof. Dr Ulrike Lindner, who agreed to chair my PhD Defense Committee at a very short notice. I further thank Prof. Gerrit Dimmendaal for his kindness and counsel during my stay in Bonn and Cologne. I further thank Jun.-Prof. Dr. Martin Zillinger, for agreeing to be my 3rd Supervisor. Further I thank PD Dr. Elke Grawert (BICC) who reviewed the first three chapters of my draft thesis and offered me the necessary guidance that overaly improved my writing and analysis.

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Amojong Lothuro of Kawap, Chief John Lolosoiya of El Barta, Chief Joseph Lobeyo and volunteer Samuel Emari both of Parkati for many hours of discussions that we had with and for allowing me to attend various *barazas* they convened to discuss security challenges in their villages.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>Albertus Magnus Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Administration Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASTU</td>
<td>Anti Stock Theft Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEA</td>
<td>Culture and Environment in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Christian Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Catholic Diocese of Maralal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAAD</td>
<td>Deutscher Akademischer Auswärtiger Dienst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>District Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPR</td>
<td>Ethiopian Police Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSSCC</td>
<td>Global South Studies Centre Cologne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSU</td>
<td>General Service Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSBA</td>
<td>Human Security Baseline Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAR</td>
<td>Kings African Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHRC</td>
<td>Kenya Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNHRC</td>
<td>Kenya National Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNA</td>
<td>Kenya National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajore</td>
<td>A group of raiders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amakada</td>
<td>AK47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amatidae</td>
<td>Locally made Turkana gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>Bullets/ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awi</td>
<td>Turkana Homestead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awi ang’imoe</td>
<td>Homestead of the enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bao</td>
<td>African board game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baraza</td>
<td>Communal meeting convened by the chief, District Officer or District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emuron</td>
<td>Seer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epuko</td>
<td>Poach for carrying bullets/ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilmerisho</td>
<td>Samburu age-set circumcised in 1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laigwanani</td>
<td>Orator that motivates warriors to go to raids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamayainani</td>
<td>Seer that blesses raiders before they go for raids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leketio</td>
<td>Birth belt worn by mothers to protect sons while on a raid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lkipiku</td>
<td>Samburu age-set circumcised in 1837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loikop</td>
<td>Owners of the land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorora</td>
<td>A compound with many households fenced together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lwuampa</td>
<td>A livestock raid organized by less than 10 warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ng’aandakia</td>
<td>Security trenches used by warriors to defende their homes and livestock during raids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ng’abara</td>
<td>Knives carried along during raids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ng’ibaren</td>
<td>Livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ng’ibaren</td>
<td>Livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ng’irotin</td>
<td>Spies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ng’ipindinga</td>
<td>Routes used by raiders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkeneji</td>
<td>People of white goats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nkoopang’................................................................. Owners of the land

Manyatta.................................................................................. A settlement inhabited by related households

Mashujaa................................................................................... Heroes

Mijoni.......................................................................................... No man’s land

Moran................................. Warriors between the ages of 15-30 initiated and charged with communal security

Msituni........................................................................................ Jungle/bush

Sapana....................................................................................... Initiation ceremony
1.0 Introduction

On the 22nd of November 2014, an 18 year old Turkana man was shot dead in Loworarik grazing field. The body of E. Ekiru was found on the Samburu side of the grazing field. I visited the scene with the police team. Initial reports indicated that Ekiru was shot in a fierce exchange of fire during an attempted raid by the Samburu. At the scene it was established that Ekiru had been shot twice on the neck and once on the back with the bullets exiting from his chest. Police officers were intrigued as there was no evidence of a fierce exchange of gunfire. Two AK47 and one G3 spent cartridges were recovered from the scene. A reconstruction of the scene by the police revealed that only a few people from the Turkana side had crossed over to the Samburu side. These Turkana warriors had come without livestock as there were no traceable or ‘fresh’ footmarks or cow dung to indicate the presence of livestock. Later it was revealed that Ekiru alongside his two friends had actually gone to the Samburu warriors who were grazing at Loworarik to sell ammunition. Apparently, Ekiru and his kinsmen knew the Samburu colleagues and there was an element of ‘mutual trust’ that enabled their transaction. But Ekiru was left behind by his kinsmen and that was when a Samburu marksman hidden away from the venue of the transaction shot him from the back with an AK47 as he was leaving. One of the Samburu warriors who had just bought ammunition from Ekiru then picked Ekiru’s gun (a G3 rifle) and shot him twice on the neck. It was later revealed that the G3 rifle that belonged to Ekiru had been stolen by Turkana raiders from the Samburu of Uaso Rongai. The G3 rifle was a government issued firearm that was assigned to a Samburu Kenya Police Reservist (KPR) who had been one of the two KPRs killed by the Turkana of Kawap in a raid at Uaso Rongai on the 18th of October 2013.

The killing of Ekiru brought a lot of tension and animosity between the Turkana and Samburu as the government could not trace and arrest Ekiru’s killer. In a government meeting, a Samburu chief narrated how Samburu elders and political leaders had helped the killer to escape. He was given a safe passage that enabled him to relocate and settle among his kinsmen in Isiolo. At a meeting convened to reduce the rising tension among the Turkana of Lomerok from where Ekiru hailed, the elders were very categorical to the District Commissioner. They demanded that the killer of Ekiru be brought to them so that they could administer justice on behalf of Ekiru. They...
also demanded that his gun (the G3 rifle stolen from a murdered Samburu KPR) be returned to them. These were their pre-conditions to the government for peace between the Turkana and Samburu. The killing of Ekiru puts into perspective the different ways in which production and reproduction of violence occur in day to day interactions of the Samburu and Turkana. First, violence is not just produced by illegal arms but also through government-issued arms. Secondly, violent action is not just attributable to elites and outsiders but also to the interactions and transactions between the two groups through trade in arms and ammunition. Thirdly, pastoralists’ violence is not only confined to incidences of livestock raids but rather, the killing of a person from an ‘enemy’ community brings some social value to the killer.

Violence or ‘war’ has become part and parcel of daily life among these pastoralists. This thesis seeks to comprehend the ethno-history of violence among pastoralists and its consequences among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi in Northern Kenya. It seeks to analyse the changing meanings and purposes of the culturally embedded pastoralists’ violent practices and its impacts in the socio-political relations among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. It also aims to show that there are fragile mutual relationships between the pastoralists groups in Baragoi, through past cases of marriage and trade linkages, at the same time very quick changes of situations (peaceful action/ warlike situation) and that victims are not victims as individuals (depersonalized) but because they represent ethnic categories.

To do this, this study aims to trace the history of violence among pastoralists’ in Baragoi by giving an analysis of the complexity of actors and their motivations who have contributed to the mutation of violence as a practice from the colonial times to date between the Samburu and Turkana groups of Baragoi. This thesis further seeks to analyse the cultural parameters and institutional frameworks of pastoralists’ violence, how it has changed overtime and the impacts of these changes on day to day decisions such as safety in grazing lands, access to cattle markets, and safety in accessing public utilities such as hospitals and schools.

Violence among pastoralists in Eastern Africa has been explained through a number of viewpoints. Some have leaned on the ecological-functionalist school of thought, particularly the environmental scarcity angle largely borrowing from Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994) and his
colleagues. In applying this concept, many authors of the anthropological orientation have attributed pastoralists’ violence in this region to competition over scarce and diminishing water and pasturelands (Schilling et al 2012; Glowacki and Gone 2013; KHRC 2010; Osamba 2000; Bevan 2008a). Further, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in what anthropologists describe as the Karamoja Cluster\(^1\) has been argued to largely contribute towards violence among pastoralists in this region (KHRC, 2010; Schilling et al, 2012; Bevan 2008b; Wepundi et al 2011; Leff 2009; Bollig & Österle 2011). Incidences of violence among pastoralists have further been attributed to influence by local politicians and businessmen who organize community warriors for raids to raise campaign cash or as a means of creating mayhem that eventually leads to the disenfranchisement of opposing voters (IRIN News 2014, Schilling et al 2012, KHRC 2010, Greiner, 2013). Other scholars have looked at pastoralists’ violence as a consequence of state institutional failure (Chikwanha 2007, KHRC 2010, Amutabi 2010, Fleisher 2000, Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008). Some scholars have gone further to attribute pastoralists’ violence to failure of local institutions (Gray et al 2003; MercyCorps 2011; Kratli and Swift 1999; Eaton 2008b). Violence among rural communities has also been viewed as part of the daily routine of life (Kramer 2007). Lastly, pastoralists’ violence has been viewed as business. Fleisher (2002: 146) in his study of cattle raids among the Kuria along the Kenya-Tanzania border was informed that “war is good for thieving”, to imply that violence facilitates raiding of livestock to meet huge demand for beef in urban centers in Kenya. Similarly, KHRC (2009) in its documentary of violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya found strong business linkages between cattle raiders and elites.

The above studies have expanded understanding of violence among pastoralists in Eastern Africa. They have attributed increased use of violence among pastoralists in Eastern Africa to external factors such as environmental scarcity, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, commercialisation of raids and the role of political competition in influencing violent raiding. While these analyses are significant into understanding the phenomenon of violence; further

\(^1\) “Describes a larger cross-border area of land which covers the Karamoja area of North-Eastern Uganda, parts of South-Eastern South Sudan, South Western Ethiopia and Northwestern Kenya” Powel J (2010:2). Inhabited by pastoralists groups
explanations on why pastoralists’ warriors are increasingly using violence in their day to day relationships with their neighbours is at the core of this thesis. This study seeks to go a step further to broaden the understanding of violence among pastoralists by focusing on the multiple meanings, purposes and forms of violence practiced by pastoralists in Baragoi. While many scholars who have worked in this region have documented the consequences and latent causes of cattle raids, this study seeks to understand the role of violence in pastoralists’ socio-economic and political interactions through the prism of anthropological theories of violence.

Even though the above mentioned authors have written extensively on various aspects of the culture of raiding and increased violence among pastoralists in Eastern Africa, the literature above implies that ‘peaceful’ raiding is a thing of the past and therefore non-existent. Contrary to this view, there is evidence that peaceful small time raiding still occurs; a series of these peaceful raids coupled with revenge and counter revenge precipitates large scale violence that sometimes leads to massacres. Fewer studies have contextualized pastoralists’ violence in this region as a consequence of institutional transformation. In this thesis I look at the actors and factors internal to and external to pastoralists’ societies. I seek to understand how these have contributed to the transformation of the cultural practice of raiding which had more or less known and workable checks and balances that prevented escalation of violence. I argue that violence among pastoralists in its myriad forms must be seen as a resource that interactions between the Samburu and Turkana tend to produce and reproduce to meet specific ends. Moreover, I argue that even though the above postulations explain aspects of today’s violence among pastoralists’, understanding the changing forms and uses of violence as a resource is key to comprehending the inability of peacebuilding intervention measures to succeed in this region.

In this thesis, I analyse pastoralists’ violence not only through as a consequence of resource scarcity but rather; as an expressive action which denotes multi-level contests between pastoralists groups. While violent cattle raids have been broadly documented in Northern Kenya, the location of violent action among herders has been overlooked. Since raids take place within specific geographies in pastoral societies, a focus on the ‘places’ of violence may reveal the various meanings and purposes of raiding, which majorly occur in the grazing lands. This suggests that pasturelands are contested spaces by opposing groups of herders distinguished by
identity markers such as clannism or ethnicity. Raiding hence can be assumed to be used as a tool for negotiating access, user and ownership rights to specific grazing lands. The occurrence of raids within contested grazing lands implies that pasturelands are strategic geographical spheres of production and also areas of specific cultural meanings to different groups. Raids therefore may be used to claim or contest grazing lands as livelihoods spaces, cultural spaces, territorial spaces and lastly, as political arenas that specific groups identify themselves and their leaders with.

Moreover, the escalation or de-escalation of violence among pastoralists have been ignored. Why do violent raids intensify in some communities while others are able to contain it? Schlee (2004) argued that the escalation of violence in pastoralists’ communities is dependent on the interpretation of multi-level relationships and shared interdependencies between herders. Violence escalates when herders sharing common resources identify each other as enemies and therefore have an incompatible relationship that demands exclusivity to the resource. Schlee explains that chances of violence escalation after raids involving stealing of one or two animals depend on the exploitation of these ties. Therefore revenge raids often do not target those perpetrators of the initial raid but their kin living in nearby villages.

Violence among pastoralists’ can also be evidence of elite capture and transformation of the institutional meaning and functions of the cultural practice of raiding. While increased violence has been attributed to institutional change, the identification of new actors within the value chain of violence has been limited. Dave Eaton (2010) identified the ‘traider’ as an intermediate agent who obtains livestock immediately after raids and sends them to the markets. In the context of violence in Baragoi, this study will seek to identity new networks of actors that facilitate pastoralists’ violence to serve different interests.

In this thesis, I conceptualize violence among pastoralists in Baragoi as follows: I analyse violent cattle raids in its traditional form, as a means for replenishing stock after periods of droughts and a source of cattle for payment of bride wealth. I argue that even though cattle raids have become sophisticated over the last five decades, understanding the practice of raiding cannot ignore its very foundations and the socio-economic and political value that it served in its traditional form. I analyse pastoralists’ violence as spatial contests between distinct groups,
indicating that violence through cattle raids is used to negotiate access and utilization of pasturelands among warriors from different groups. I analyse violence as a means of establishing power and hegemony over other groups. The use of violence establishes a clear hierarchy in social relationships, distinguishing the perpetrator, the victim and the observers, and entrenches the position of the perpetrator as the dominant person in the relationship. Violence is examined in its function to communicate the incompatibility and dispute between groups, the killing of victims is also used to convey a grave message to the kin or tribesmen nd women of the victims. Since violence is directed towards the body and may result in death or injury to people and livestock, the use of violence denotes the inevitability of the contest and the view by the two protagonists of the violent act as a zero-sum game.

Violence among pastoralists will be studied as an identity marker, establishing ‘us’ verses ‘them’ as well as geographical spheres of exclusivity while excluding ‘others’ from a given area. Pastoralists’ violence in this case is used to demarcate territories and to lay historical claim on the indigenousness of a people to particular area. Violence thus is the means through which territorial claims based on clans or ethnic identities are launched, contested, won, lost or preserved. So far, pastoralists’ violence in Northern Kenya has not been viewed as a tool for promoting ethno-nationalism. Watson and Schlee (2009:3) describe ethno-nationalism as “a strong sense of difference and a lack of tolerance for sharing territory and resources. When a strong sense of identity is combined with competitive and negative stereotyping of others, conflict is more common”. What could be the role of ethnonationalism in mobilisation for pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi? And how has ethno-nationalistic politics contributed to politically motivated violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi?

I analyse violence among pastoralists in Baragoi as a resource in itself. This analysis will be based on the use of violence as a means of negotiating every day relations between the Samburu and Turkana. This analysis is premised on the assumption that violence is increasingly used as an agency through which political, economic or socio-cultural claims are launched, negotiated and settled. I analyse revenge as a major motivation for the progression of violence from an incident between two individuals to group or collective violence in which mobilisation is carried out based on clan or ethnic identities. Lastly, this thesis moves away from the moralist view of
violence as something negative and ‘primitive, it seeks to understand the persistence of pastoralists’ violence despite decades of peacebuilding by various parties. In my analysis I aim to contextualize pastoralists’ violence and understand its meanings and purposes in the socio-political relations between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi.

1.1 Objectives of the study

i. To understand the multi-level roles of violence in the cultural practice of cattle raids and its implications in the socio-economic and political interactions between the Samburu and Turkana communities in Northern Kenya.

ii. To understand how violence is used to negotiate access to space, land and territories among pastoralists groups in Baragoi.

iii. To establish the network of actors who influence and participate in the business of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi.

iv. To establish the linkages between various forms of pastoralists violence and the incompatibility of inter-communal conflicts resolution systems among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi.

Having read on violence among the Samburu and Turkana in Kenyan media, my mission in Baragoi was to ascertain why violence happens and why it is so vicious between these groups. While it is generally presumed that violent conflict between pastoralists is due to competition over limited pastures and water resources. I sought to find out if there is a deeper meaning and reason to high levels of violence and to establish the roles of different actors in this conflict.

1.2 Main Research Question

What are the meanings and purposes of the socio-cultural practices that constitute pastoralists’ violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi?

i. What is the historical background to violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi?
ii. How is violence deployed to negotiate day to day socio-political relations between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi?

iii. Who are the major actors in conflicts among pastoralists and how is violence used as an organizing principle to rally the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi?

iv. To what extent has violence among the Samburu and Turkana expanded its own cultural parameters and how has this expansion contributed to the targeting of women and children?

1.3 The Study Area

Baragoi has been described as the “epicenter of intertribal violence” (Mkutu 2005:31) and as a “new center of violence” (Mkutu 2005:314). In the recent past it has also been described as the ‘Valley of Death’ (Standard 2012) due to its more recent association with the November 10th 2012 massacre of 42 policemen after a botched police operation to recover raided livestock from a Turkana manyatta at Lomerok. Baragoi however has a century-long history of violent confrontations between the pastoralists groups inhabiting the area; the Turkana and Samburu (Stigand 1910, Lamphear 1976). Violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi has been characterized to be “fuelled by socio-political factors characterized by the threats of expulsion of the Turkana from the District and violent competition over natural resources such as water and pasture” (CEWARN 2004:10). Violent relations between these pastoralists’ and the state is also evident in paramilitary operations, communal punishments and clashes that have continued since early 1900s to date (Rutten 1989; Lamphear 1976; Umar 1997:19; Wepundi et al 2011; Mburu n.d). Studies on pastoralists’ violence have been carried out by scholars in Northern Kenya (Bollig and Österle 2007; Greiner 2013: Sharamo 2014). While Bollig, Österle and Greiner spent their time among the Pokot and analysed the factors that motivated violence between the Pokot and their Samburu, Turkana and IlChamus neighbours. Sharamo (2014) in a more recent study looked at the key role of local politics as a motivation for pastoralists’ violence within the newly devolved system of County governments with a focus on Samburu, Turkana and Borana groups of Isiolo County. Other author’s like (Galaty 2005a: 115) documented series of cattle raids and massacres among the Turkana, Samburu, Rendille and Arial herders who had camped in Elbarta plains (Baragoi) during the drought season of August 1996. His analysis focused on the role of
security forces in abetting cattle raids and he argued that the Turkana were favoured (and therefore more successful in raids) by the security forces due to collusion and ethnic affinity between the Turkana and the local head of police who was a Teso (Galaty 2005a:118). The other work that touches partly on pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi was the PhD thesis of Kennedy Mkutu (2005) which looked at cattle raids in Baragoi as part of a wider study on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons within the Karamoja cluster of Eastern Africa. I chose to conduct my study in Baragoi because even though the area is associated with cycles of violence and is considered as a valley of death by mainstream Kenyan media; no comprehensive study on the nature and motivations for violence among the Turkana and Samburu has been conducted. Baragoi is also unique in the sense that the two pastoralists groups have historical claims on the social and geographical space that is Baragoi and these claims are at the very foundation of the continued strife that influence and motivate new cycles of violence. In choosing Baragoi, I aimed to understand the meanings and purposes of violence among the Samburu and Turkana and how violence is used to navigate day to day relationships of pastoralists within the shared and contested socio-physical space.

1.3.1 Demographic Background of the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi
Samburu North sub-County (Baragoi) is part of the three sub-Counties that make up Samburu County, one of the 47 Counties in Kenya. Samburu County is one of the poorest counties in Kenya with 73 per cent with of its population living below poverty line according to Kenya integrated Household Budget survey (KIHBS 2009). Baragoi is located in the Northern part of Samburu County and borders Turkana County to the north, Marsabit County to the North East and Baringo County to the South-west. It is inhabited majorly by the Samburu and Turkana pastoralists (GoK, 2009). The Samburu are the majority in Baragoi making up 78 per cent of the 58,000 inhabitants (GoK 2009). The Turkana community makes up 15 per cent of the population while the remaining 7 per cent is shared between the Somali, Meru and Kikuyu traders who are mostly located in Baragoi Town. In 2013, 35-40% of Baragoi residents were in need of food aid (Humanitarian Response 2013) while only 3 per cent of Baragoi residents have

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2 A Nilotic community inhabiting border areas between western Kenya County of Busia and eastern Uganda districts of Sorrooi and Tororo

3 Personal observation during my 9 months fieldwork in Samburu North sub-County
high school education as compared to 6 per cent average of Samburu County (Ngugi, Kipruto and Samoei 2013). In Baragoi, only 19 per cent of residents have primary education (Ngugi et al 2013:12) meaning 81 per cent of Baragoi residents have no formal education. In terms of access to water, only 23 per cent of Baragoi residents have access to improved sources of water (Ngugi et al 2013:16)

Baragoi (Samburu North sub-County) is further divided into two administrative units (Divisions) namely Nyiro and Baragoi. Pastoralists can be found in both Divisions. The Turkana for instance live in Parkati location in Nyiro Division. Similarly, Turkana used to live in Kawap center of Kawap location (located in Nyiro Division) before they were evicted through violence and vandalism by the Samburu of Uaso Rongai in October 2013. The Samburu live in Uaso Rongai, South Horr, Tuum, Seren and Arsim locations in Nyiro Division, while in Baragoi Division they live in Latakweny, Ndoto, Suiyan, Baragoi and El Barta locations. In Baragoi Division, the Turkana live in Nachola, Marti and Baragoi town locations.
The map above shows the administrative sub-locations within Samburu North district (Baragoi). It also shows the current violence hotspots areas as well as the road (red line) which acts as the physical boundary of Samburu and Turkana territories. Administratively, the sub-County is served by a Deputy County Commissioner (District Commissioner) who sits in Baragoi town. He is assisted by two Assistant County Commissioners (District Officers) for Baragoi and Nyiro.
Divisions. The Nyiro Assistant County Commissioner is based in South Horr. Under the Assistant County Commissioners are fourteen administrative Chiefs appointed by the Government of Kenya under what was known as provincial administration before the promulgation of the constitution of Kenya in 2010. The chiefs are in charge of day to day administration of these locations and are responsible for reporting security situations such as occurrence of raids to the police or their immediate bosses (Assistant County Commissioners). They are further charged with resolving disputes between villagers and also communicating and effecting government policy at the village level. For instance chiefs arrest brewers of illicit brews and disseminate government policy agendas such as the availability of free primary education or government immunization programmes against diseases such as polio. Chiefs in Kenya work closely with Assistant Chiefs from the various sub-locations at the lowest tier of formal government administration. Baragoi (Samburu North sub-County) is made up of the following administrative units (locations); Baragoi, El Barta, Kawap, Tuum, Uaso Rongai, South Horr, Arsim, Marti, Latakweny, Ndoto, Seren, Suiyan, Nachola and Parkati.

Baragoi (Samburu North sub-County) is a semi-arid area with a maximum of 400mm annual rainfall. The temperatures in Baragoi range from 22 degrees centigrade to 35 degrees centigrade during the dry seasons of November to February. It has two rainy seasons from March to May and August to October. The Turkana and Samburu population in Samburu North sub-County are mostly involved in nomadic pastoralism as a major source of livelihood. However, pastoralists are increasingly settling down to more permanent villages as is the case in Marti Center, Bendera, Ngilai, Uaso Rongai, South Horr Center, Parkati, Logetei, Natiti, Thuree, Nachola, Naling’ang’or and Leilei villages. The settlement of pastoralist’s households does not mean the death of nomadism. Morans from these communities spend most of their time hundreds of kilometers away from home in search of pasture and water. Baragoi however is also noted for its riches in pasturelands especially along the Kawap-Tuum-Nasiischo corridor which attracts herdsmen from as far as Wamba and Archers Post during the long droughts from November to February and again between May and August.
Pastoralist households in Baragoi further draw their livelihoods from the sale of milk (especially by women and girls), sale of charcoal (Turkana women and girls), employment as house-helps by migrant groups and civil servants working and living in Baragoi town (Turkana women). The majority of Samburu and Turkana male adults who have retired from warrior hood are involved in livestock trade. The Turkana owing to lack of livestock markets on their side of the ethnic boundary buy and sell livestock among themselves at Huruma market within Leilei in Baragoi town. Burji⁴ livestock traders also buy goats from Turkana men and these are transported to urban centers in other parts of Kenya. Samburu men on the other hand have access to livestock markets in Tangar and Tuum and Masikita. Both communities however supply their livestock to butcheries within Baragoi town.

In other centers like Tuum, the ‘Soko la Amani’⁵ that was established in 2014 through the efforts of the Tuum Catholic Parish, the Catholic Diocese of Maralal, the Samburu County Government and Turkana and Samburu elders. Apart from facilitating trade among the Samburu and Turkana, the livestock market aimed at bringing these groups together as an avenue for inter-group cohesion among previously warring Samburu of Tuum and Waso Ronagi and Turkana of Parkati and Kawap. The Turkana from Parkati location trek 26 kilometers to attend this market every Monday while Samburu livestock traders from Tuum, South Horr, Lonjorin and Uaso Rongai also participate in trade there.

Baragoi town is the largest center in Samburu North district. As per the last census (GoK, 2009), Baragoi is inhabited by 4,600 residents. The town sits along the Maralal-Marti-South Horr-Loiyangalani Highway. By design the road that passes through Baragoi town headed to Loiyangalani also marks the distinct territories of the Samburu and Turkana. In Baragoi town the Turkana community have settled and own businesses on the southern part of Baragoi town while

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⁴ Agro-pastoral and entrepreneurial community of Cushitic extraction that initially settled in Moyale and Marsabit areas of Northern Kenya. Today recognized as entrepreneurs and livestock traders supplying major urban centers such as Nairobi.

⁵ Meaning ‘market of peace’ perhaps to signify how violent raids have impeded trade relations between the Turkana and Samburu in Nyiro Division of Samburu North sub-County.
the Samburu also own property and reside on the upper side of the town perhaps indicating the security risks that crossing the boundary entails for members of both communities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Sub-location</th>
<th>Ethnic Identity of inhabitants</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>No. of Households</th>
<th>Area in Sq. Kilometers</th>
<th>Population Density</th>
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<td>Samburu</td>
<td>4433</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>185.29</td>
<td>23.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suyan</td>
<td>Marti</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>144.37</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>Baragoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suyan</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>420.73</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nachola</td>
<td>Nachola</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>257.12</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>Baragoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakuprat</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>287.68</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terter</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>348.44</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seren</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>2433</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>365.5</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nyiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Barta</td>
<td>Ngilai</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>285.93</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>Baragoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>57,914</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,245</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,881.1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GoK (2009)
Government offices and major services centers such as the hospital, Baragoi Girls Secondary School, Baragoi Mixed Secondary School, Baragoi Primary School, the Police Station, the DC’s office, the Catholic Church and offices of Christian Children’s Fund (CCF)\(^6\)-the children’s sponsorship NGO offices are located on the ‘Samburu side’ of the town. On the Turkana side of the boundary, one finds the Baragoi slaughterhouse and Baragoi Boys Secondary school as the outstanding public infrastructure; this lends credence to Turkana notions of marginalisation and discrimination in terms of allocation and access to resources and government services in Baragoi. Baragoi is also an administrative unit (location) headed by a chief. It is the only location where one chief administers both the Samburu and Turkana areas in Baragoi town sub-location. In the other two sub-locations, the Chief of Baragoi works with a Turkana assistant chief who heads Naling’ang’or sub-location while a Samburu assistant chief heads the neighbouring Bendera sub-location.

Baragoi town is also a business outpost with Kikuyu, Meru, Somali and Burji businessmen and women some who were born there while some moved to Baragoi in the early 1970s. On the Turkana side of the ethnic boundary there exist many businesses run by Somalis, Kikuyus, Merus and the Turkana; this is enhanced by the local Turkana intermarriages with these settler groups. On the Turkana side women engage themselves in selling charcoal, firewood and milk. On the lower part of the Turkana side is Leilei market; a Turkana business hub with wholesale shops, clinics, photocopy shops, butcheries, hardware’s, M-Pesa kiosks, boutiques and eateries. A walk through Leilei market also reveals the laid back nature of the Turkana men. While their women are engaged in all sorts of small scale income generating activities, Turkana men wake up and come to sit on the verandas of shops along the market streets, chewing tobacco and \(khat\)\(^7\) while sharing the news on security situation of their villages.

\(^6\) CCF nowadays known as ChildFund

\(^7\) Also called ‘\textit{miraa}’ in Kenya, a stimulant whose leaves are chewed as an intoxicant, very popularly among morans and elders of the Samburu and Turkana communities. Slowly being adopted by young women in these areas. Originates from Meru County.
On the Samburu side of Baragoi town, there are fewer shops. A walk on the streets of the Samburu side of Baragoi town also reveals the different roles of men and women in Samburu society; women and young boys and girls are seen hawking milk to Baragoi town residents while the men come to town later in the day to meet friends, drink alcohol on the Turkana side and buy khat. The fragility of inter-communal relations in Baragoi town is evident in the huge presence of Samburu KPRs often armed with German made G-3 rifles and always in groups.

In terms of security personnel, Baragoi town has officers the Kenya Police and the Administration police units. There is a Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) barrack currently being built just 2 kilometers out of Baragoi town, indicating the levels of insecurity that is experienced in Baragoi. Four kilometers from Baragoi town is the Kambi ya Nyoka Operation camp that hosts officers from the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) and the General Service Unit (G.S.U). Another seven kilometers from Baragoi town in Nachola center we also find the Nachola GSU camp that was located there to fend off Pokot raiders who frequently raided the Turkana.

Apart from Baragoi town, other centers within Samburu North sub-County include Marti, Tuum, South-Horr, Lesirkan and Masikita. Marti sits about 49 kilometers from Baragoi town. It is located between Maralal and Baragoi town and it is the place where the Baragoi-Maralal bus makes a stop for passengers to stretch their legs and have health breaks. Marti is an administrative unit (location) headed by a Turkana chief but the town center is shared by Turkana and Samburu residents. The Turkana manyattas are within Marti town, while Samburu manyattas are located behind the Marti Operation camp and fall administratively under Marti sub-location of Suiyan location. Tuum center is located in Nyiro Division and is inhabited exclusively by the Samburu. It sits at the foot of Ng’iro Mountain and the people of Tuum cultivate crops and fruits due to the good soils and ample water streaming down from the mountain. Tuum is also an administrative unit (location), headed by a chief. The distance from Baragoi town to Tuum is 50 kilometers and the area is within some of the richest grazing lands in Baragoi. Just outside Tuum center is the Tuum Operation camp that houses security personnel that were deployed there to stem incessant pastoralists’ violence that occurred between the

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8 Meaning ‘Camp of snakes’ in Swahili language.
Samburu of Tuum and Turkana of Parkati and Kawap. The distance from Tuum to Parkati is 26 kilometers, and many Turkana from Parkati have established strong social networks with the Samburu of Tuum because many have to spend a night in Tuum before finding a vehicle for onward journey to Baragoi town. The Catholic Parish in Tuum also serves the Turkana of Parkati and through this Turkana worshippers from Parkati participate in church activities in Tuum.

South Horr sits at the border between Samburu and Marsabit Counties. It is located about 52 kilometers from Baragoi town and is inhabited by the Samburu and Rendille communities in majority with a sprinkling of other trader minorities. The majority of the Rendille however reside in Marsabit side of the town, although there are Rendille households that I interviewed during this study that were born and bred on the Samburu side of the town. Most people in South Horr, be they Rendille, Turkana, Somali or Meru speak the Samburu language fluently. Masikita is also inhabited exclusively by the Samburu community. It is located about 28 kilometers from Baragoi town and located in the lush El Barta plains. It was originally inhabited by the Ogiek (Stigand, 1910). It is believed that these Ogiek were assimilated by the Samburu in early 1900s. Masikita is also an administrative unit of the government of Kenya (location), headed by a chief.

1.4 Fieldwork, Data collection and Methodology

In my nine months of fieldwork in Baragoi, I visited 14 locations in Nyiro and Baragoi Divisions of Samburu North sub County (Baragoi). In the initial stages I spent time having very informal discussions with Catholic priests and catechists at the Baragoi Parish on drivers of pastoralists violence among the Samburu and Turkana. From these discussions, I learnt of the variety of proximate and latent causes of violence between the Samburu and Turkana. For instance proliferation of small arms and light weapons was always blamed but the priests also pointed at land as an underlying factor in these conflicts. Further in my initial weeks I ventured into Baragoi town just to observe peoples ways of life. Initially everyone was very skeptical about my presence. I started with meeting local chiefs and with the help of my research assistant Boniface and the local priest. I started asking very informal questions about the origins of Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. These historical questions’ enabled me to gain the confidence of my
respondents. Through the chiefs I was referred to elders from the Samburu and Turkana, most of these elders in their late 70s and 80s were usually found just outside the manyatta’s having a nap.

In my discussions with the elders, it was clear that there has been a historical contention between the Samburu and Turkana on which community arrived in Baragoi first. The Samburu insisted on Baragoi being Samburu land and therefore ‘indigenous’ to them. They used the term Nkopang, meaning owners of the land in Kisamburu. The Turkana elders maintained that their forefathers were the ‘original’ inhabitants of Baragoi. Through participant observation, I was able to decipher the social positioning of elders in Samburu and Turkana societies. In these societies, elders sit under specific trees. Normally some would be sleeping while others sitting. Here they share the ‘news’ about previous day happenings in their manyattas. Most of these involve issues of security and grazing patterns of livestock. Under these trees, every elder carries with them a long knife and a spear. While the knife can be used for cutting meat, the spear especially among the Turkana is used very ceremoniously and it is a symbol of authority.

Photo 1: Discussion with Turkana elders at a Nachola manyatta in Baragoi, February 2015, Source: Author
Outside the *manyattas* I also noticed the milking stock being grazed by younger boys and girls armed with bows, arrows and whistles. My enquiries revealed that the whistles were meant to alert male members of the older age-sets (the retired warriors) who were often seated under another tree or in one of the huts in the *manyatta* of the sighting of ‘enemy’ morans. Herding of milking camels, goats and cows by younger boys and girls indicates the division of labour in Samburu and Turkana societies. While older boys *Lchekuuti* \(^9\) accompany the morans to grazing fields, the younger children are socialized into their future roles as herds-boys by grazing milking stock around the *manyattas*. Women can also be seen milking cows, goats and camels and nursing the newly born livestock or building or repairing *manyattas*. As part of the Catholic Diocese Maralal team on peacebuilding and alternative livelihoods among the Samburu and Turkana, I visited many villages where I interviewed retired chiefs, chiefs, KPRs, morans, retired police officers, politicians, women group leaders, catechists and other persons of interest through purposive sampling. I conducted interviews largely centered on history of violence among the Samburu and Turkana communities and actors in pastoralists’ violence.

I visited Baragoi Police Station and Baragoi Administration Police Headquarters to introduce myself to the police chiefs of Samburu North sub-County. This was important as I was researching on sensitive security issues and that required the support, cooperation and participation of the police. At Baragoi Police Station, I met and interacted with the police officers including the Officer Commanding Police Station (OCS). In our informal discussions with police officers, I realized that they were more willing to discuss the events of the Baragoi massacre. I gained their perspectives on how the massacre was organised, how the morans from both sides were mobilized and the roles played by political leaders in organisation of violence. From the police I was also able to observe their response to incidences of violence. In one such case, there was a report by Samburu elders that a severed head of a dog had been found on the Baragoi-South Horr highway near Ngoriche hills. The severed head was placed on the Samburu side of the road and the head of the dog faced a path leading to Bendera village of the Samburu. As per the Samburu complainants this severed head of a dog was part of Turkana witchcraft that was done to ‘prepare the path of raiders’. The Samburu therefore required police action in

\(^{9}\) Meaning shepherds in Samburu language
dealing with ‘likely planned Turkana raid’. The case of the severed head of a dog exemplifies that violence has meaning. The cultural interpretation of this act of witchcraft as a message of impending violence shows that pastoralists’ violence cannot be simplified as mere cattle raids due to scarcity of resources. The placement of the severed head of a dog on a path leading to a Samburu village shows the communicative role of violence (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992). The severing of the head of the dog is a symbolic gesture of the impending severity of the violence directed against the enemy. At the same time, the placement of the severed head on a path leading to Samburu village symbolically communicates well in advance the imminence of war. Association of dog sacrifice and its direction towards the enemy was also found by Knighton (2007: 476) among the Karamojong which is interpreted as a curse against enemies.

My fieldwork was often dictated by ‘news’ of violence incidences from time to time. From October 2014 for instance, a new cycle of violence started from a grazing land shoot-out in Ngorishe and spread into Baragoi town. Being based in Baragoi town and living near the Baragoi District hospital, news of shootings in the grazing fields brought high levels of tension in Baragoi town. Periods of violence thus made Baragoi and its environs a landscape of certain uncertainty (Müller-Mahn 2013). In many cases when a Samburu herder was injured or killed, Samburus would quickly troop into the hospital and the Turkana patients would take off, running to the Turkana side for their safety. In my initial discussions with morans from Logetei, Bendera and Ngilai villages, I learnt that these morans knew each other. Most of them grazed together and many had visited each other’s villages at night during raids. It was worthy of note that many of the Turkana morans in their mid-20s had never gone past the Baragoi sub-District Hospital during the day. Going past the hospital was considered unsafe. Similarly, many of the Samburu morans had never ventured beyond Leilei market during the day. In essence my discussions with Turkana and Samburu morans brought to the fore the role of fear of violence in redefining socio-spatial spaces in Baragoi. Areas declared unsafe were often based on past narratives of violence that community members carried from one generation to the other. These narratives of past violence defined Baragoi landscape in terms of safe and unsafe routes, safe and unsafe settlement areas for both the Samburu and Turkana, safe and unsafe markets, safe and unsafe grazing lands.
Past narratives of violent events later became a basis for the reproduction of violence through revenge acts.

From my location at the Catholic Parish, I was able to walk to many nearby villages like Mnanda, Bendera, Naling’ang’or, Natiti and Logetei. In Mnanda (a Samburu village) I went with Boniface my assistant and a KPR officer to the boreholes where morans were drawing water for their livestock. The organisation of the tasks of drawing water for animals embodies moran ethos of teamwork, togetherness and brotherhood (Wasamba 2009). To draw water into a drinking trough for cattle, in many cases four morans had to enter the borehole and position themselves at different heights on the walls of the borehole. The one at the lowest end scoops the water with a USAID cooking oil container and passes it above him to another until the fourth one pours the water into the trough. Most of this is done while humming. The convinient use of a USAID cooking oil container exemplifies the relief food culture that is entrenched among pastoralists in Northern Kenya. It shows the levels of marginalisation and the ‘distance’ between the state and its citizens in terms of facilitating long term development initiatives. It also shows the existence of ‘ungoverned space’ where Non Governmental Organisations and their international partners fill in the void left by the Kenyan state (Menkhaus 2007; Mkutu and Wandera 2013). Outside the borehole there were armed KPRs providing security to the animals. The guns belonging to the warriors drawing water could be seen in the shade next to the KPRs. In my informal discussions with these morans, I was informed that boreholes were for exclusive use by the respective communities. As the dry season set in, the borehole waters diminished forcing everyone else to compete for use waters from rivers Nasiischo in Nyiro and Langat in Baragoi Divisions respectively. This was partly seen as a contributing factor to conflicts between the Samburu and Turkana.

In Baragoi I also attended church services at the Baragoi Catholic Church. I observed that many of the Turkana and Samburu elites were Catholics. In discussions with the priests, I was informed that many of the local businessmen and politicians were former recipients of education bursaries and scholarships from the Catholic Church. This shows the incapability of many

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10 United States Agency for International Development
pastoralists’ households to afford basic education but also points at the marginalisation of pastoralists in this region in terms of access to basic amenities such as education and the critical role of the church especially the Catholics in filling this void through scholarships for brilliant pastoralist’s children. At the same time the priests blamed these local leaders of promoting violence among the Turkana and Samburu through incitements and supply of arms. Towards the end of August, I conducted my first focused group discussion with Samburu morans in Bendera village. We discussed their roles in Samburu society and their relationships with Turkana morans. During these discussions we explored moranhood as an institution among the Samburu (Wasamba 2009). It became very clear to me that Samburu society holds morans in high esteem given their role as protectors of the community. We explored their relationships with Samburu elites and other leaders. They mostly valued leaders who supplied them with relief food and arms. This point to the patron-client relationship between these two groups and how it can be exploited by elites to foment raids and other acts of violence based on ethnic identity.

In September 2014 I spent time visiting Turkana villages in Logetei where I interacted with morans and retired morans. We explored the root causes of Samburu-Turkana conflict and the consequences of conflicts on pastoralists’ livelihoods. We further discussed the roles of retired morans among the Turkana. I learnt that every evening, Turkana elders and retired morans sit and review the day in terms of pasture options and security challenges. In these meetings, grazing pasture destinations for the next day are also agreed upon. One morning I was dropped by my colleagues from the Catholic Diocese of Maralal at 7am in Logetei because I wanted to witness how morans organise the security for livestock from the kraals to the grazing fields. I observed that before livestock leave the kraals, a group of armed morans as members of the ‘advance team’ take the lead to survey the route that the shepherds and the back-up team will pass through with the livestock. The herds’ boys usually from about the age of 8 up to 13 are the ones who do the actual herding of livestock. Behind the shepherds are the ‘back-up’ team of morans, equally armed to provide security cover for the herds’ boys and the livestock. In all the Turkana and Samburu villages that I visited, I observed that trenches or ‘mahandaki’11, were dug around cattle kraals. These trenches are the places where warriors spend the night, well

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11 In Swahili language
positioned to monitor ‘enemy’ movement and strategically placed for shooting of the enemy. This further point to the role of morans as communal force within a fluid security situation. The security infrastructure such as trenches shows the gravity of insecurity between the Samburu and Turkana and the determination of morans to protect livestock which is the base of pastoralists’ households’ survival.

In October I spent a lot of time in Marti and Suiyan villages where I also interviewed KPRs, chiefs, Samburu and Turkana morans and police officers. Marti is a unique place in Turkana-Samburu relations because it is the only town where the two communities have nurtured friendly relations. This is evident in the close proximity of their settlements. I was informed that the Turkana and Samburu of Marti signed a pact to share information and to protect each other against raider warriors from other villages. Marti town is such a contrast to Baragoi town; in Baragoi one can observe groups of armed Samburu KPRs when they come to the Turkana side. This shows the uncertainty that these communities face when in ‘enemy’ territory. In Marti the
two groups interact more and cases of Samburu and Turkana youth seated together listening to music or playing bao\textsuperscript{12} is common. In discussions with Samburu morans from Marti sub-location of Suiyan location, I was informed of conflict incidences and their causes. Discussions with Turkana warriors also revealed the role of ex-servicemen some of whom were chiefs in organizing revenge raids.

Towards the end of October I visited Tuum for the first time and spent my first few days with the Chilean priest and nuns from Guatemala and Mexico. The priest having lived among the Samburu in Barsaloi and now in Tuum was conversant in Samburu language and we discussed causes of pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu of Tuum and the Turkana of Kawap and Parkati. In Tuum I also interviewed the Assistant Chief of Ijuuk sub-location as well as the Chief of Tuum. My discussions with these chiefs centered on the most recent Turkana raid that led to the loss of about 80 cattle from Tuum airstrip in March 2013. We further discussed circumstances that lead to revenge raids between the Turkana and Samburu.

I also spent the weeks of early November 2014 in South Horr. In South Horr I wanted to understand how ‘Operation Turkana Out of 1997\textsuperscript{13}’ was organised and executed. Here I interviewed a retired moran of mixed parentage from Rendille and Samburu communities. This moran also happened to have participated in the Lomerok raid of 29\textsuperscript{th} October 2012 as well as the Baragoi massacre of 10\textsuperscript{th} November 2012. He outlined how raids are organised among the Samburu. He further highlighted the value of the gun among the Samburu and who receives the gun of a fallen warrior. I also interviewed the chief of Loruko sub-location, an area which was abandoned and its people resettled in South Horr due to heightened Turkana raids. During our discussions at his home, I also noted that he was married to a Turkana woman a rare occurrence given the increased animosity between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. In South Horr, I

\textsuperscript{12} A traditional African board game originating from the coast of East Africa

\textsuperscript{13} Operation Turkana Out was a series of organized violence episodes that aimed at evicting the Turkana from South Horr in 1997. It was led by a retired army officer from the Samburu community and it was executed by the torching of Soweto manyatta that was inhabited by the Turkana. The Turkana were later housed by the South Horr Catholic Parish and thereafter relocated by the church among their kin in Loyangalani, Baragoi and Maralal.
also had discussions with retired chiefs, and two retired military men who explained how the Samburu started acquiring arms and ammunition in the early 1990s.

In mid-November I returned to Baragoi and organised a focused group discussion with KPRs from Samburu villages of Bendera and Ngilai near Ngilai dispensary. The discussions centered on their job as security agents at the local level and their reasons for engaging in raids and highway banditries. One evening we attended a Samburu wedding dance and visited several other lororas\textsuperscript{14} where I witnessed the security vigil that Samburu morans and retired morans have to put up to protect the livestock. I organised for a similar focused group discussion with KPRs from the Turkana community at Nachola Primary School where issues of the imbalance of firepower between the Samburu and Turkana in terms of arming of KPRs was raised.

November 2014 also saw the start of a new cycle of violence, incidents of killings and revenge attacks continued almost every week making my movement into other villages impossible. I spent the end of November conducting interviews with women and women leaders on their experiences of pastoralists’ violence within Bendera, Ngilai, Logetei, Naling’ang’or and Natiti villages. In these discussions, we recorded narrations of personal losses that pastoralists’ women have experienced. Through these interviews I noted that unlike what I had read in many anthropological materials on the cultural requirement for protection of women, children and the aged during raids, there seemed to be none among the Samburu and Turkana. In the words of Hutchinson (2000) women were literally ‘fair game’ in the violence between the Samburu and Turkana.

The data presented in this thesis was collected from July 2014 to April 2015. Archival data was collected from the Kenya National Archives for a period of one month from July to August 2014. Data from the Kenya National Archives contains documentation of ethnic boundary making by colonial administrators for Samburu and Turkana pastoralists. The archival data is further

\textsuperscript{14} An enclosure that houses several households/manyattas among the Samburu and Turkana. Occasioned by insecurity that forced pastoralists’ households to live in larger compounds for security purposes, in Turkana language it is called awi
augmented by secondary literature obtained from Stigand (1910) and Lamphear (1976). This data covers movement into Baragoi by both communities and shows not only the nature of the contest and violent raids that occurred at that time but also the key issues that contributed to violence among the Turkana and Samburu. This period is also partly informed by Spencer’s (1965) documentation of inter-communal relations between the Samburu and Turkana and the role of colonial administrators in fueling violence.

From August 2014, I conducted 102 in-depth interviews. I also collected oral history narratives with morans, retired morans, elders, women, police officers, chiefs and KPRs in Baragoi town, Marti, Natiti, Thuree, Nachola, Bendera, Ngilai, Parkati, South-Horr, Tuum, Lonjorin, Mbukoi, Charda, Kadokoyo, Logetei, Uaso Rongai, Naturkan, Ngoriche, Lenkima and Lesirkan areas. Further, community resource mapping exercises were conducted among the Turkana and Samburu in South Horr, Thuree, Natiti, Uaso Rongai, Tuum, Parkati, Baragoi town, Nachola, Bendera, Ngilai, Marti, Suiyan, Lenkima, Logetei, Marti and Naling’ang’or villages. 101 event calendars’ targeting pastoralists women aged over 55 years and aimed at documenting forms of violence experiences by women and the impact of pastoralists violence on households were drawn in Bendera, Uaso Rongai, Lonjorin, Thuree, Parkati, Natiti, Nachola, Lenkima, Logetei, Naling’ang’or, Suiyan, Marti and Tuum villages. Four biographical interviews of notable raiders and the two retired paramount chiefs from the Turkana and Samburu communities was conducted as well as 11 focused group discussions (FGDs) with groups of warriors, elders, women and local opinion leaders.

During my fieldwork I also attended formal administrative and community security meetings organised by government officials popularly known as ‘barazas’ convened by chiefs from the Samburu and Turkana communities as well as by the office of the Deputy County Commissioner of Samburu North sub-County in South Horr, Charda, Lenkima, Ngilai, Marti, Thuree, Baragoi town, Nachola and Ngoriche hills. Further I visited hospitals to see victims of violent raids, attended livestock markets, animal inoculation days, warrior peace meetings, churches, funerals,
burials, traditional weddings and sapana events during my time in the field and observed discussions, relationships and transactions between members of the Turkana and Samburu communities.

Other sources of secondary data were reports and petitions forwarded to the CDM by concerned citizens from Baragoi over the spiraling violence since early 1990s. Further I obtained secondary data on violence incidences with a special focus on violent raids from 2005 to 2015 from Baragoi Police Station. These came in the form of Occurrence Book (OB) entries, police signals and police chronology of events. I also obtained project reports from the CDM that are relevant to inter-communal relations between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Newspaper cuttings covering incidences of raids and massacres, opinion pieces on the causes of raids in Northern Kenya were also collected from the three leading Kenyan newspapers; the Daily Nation, the Standard and the Star. Lastly I obtained three documentaries on the nature and causes of pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu and Turkana. The Samburu State of War done by NTV journalist Nimrod Taabu (2013) in Baragoi, No Man’s Land a documentary produced by Jeff Lekupe (2011) a Samburu journalist based in Maralal and focused on marginalisation and appropriation of pastoralists lands as the root cause of violence in Northern Kenya and finally the Business of Violence a Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC, 2009) production that delves into the linkages between cattle raiding and elite entrepreneurship in Northern Kenya.

1.5 Chapters Arrangement

In chapter one, I present the problem of violence in Baragoi by briefly introducing the production of violence between the Turkana and Samburu in the grazing lands. I further define the problem of violence among the Samburu and Turkana and how it facilitates the interactions between these groups. Thereafter I present the study objectives and key questions. Further, I present the research design and give an analysis of key themes explored during the ethnographic fieldwork.

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15 Initiation ceremony that admits men into the elderly-stage of life practiced by the Pokot and Turkana where a man spears a bull. Also called sapan or athapan (in Turkana)

16 Nation Television, a private TV station that belongs to the Nation Media Group; the largest media organization in East and Central Africa owned by His Highness the Aga Khan.
In chapter two, I apply historical analysis to trace the history and settlement of the Samburu and Turkana in Baragoi. Through the analysis of archival data, I delve into the contested history of Baragoi as a physical and social space between the Samburu and Turkana. I further analyse the role of colonialism and its impact on pastoralists’ violence between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Further, I analyse violence among pastoralists in post-independence Baragoi and the roles of key actors. Lastly, I analyse violence in Baragoi after 1996 and its impacts in redefining socio-political relations between the two communities. In chapter three, I present an analysis of the role of violence in the social organisation of warrior groups among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. In this chapter, I aim to show the role of culture in the organisation of violence and how this organisation enables group cohesion for defense and aggressions purposes againsts enemy groups.

In chapter four, I focus on the theoretical dimensions of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi. The aim here is to analyse the meanings and purposes of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi by looking at its embeddedness on cultural interpretations of the actors themselves and how this basis of culture is used ingeniously to mask competitions for power between the two groups. To understand the dimensions of violence in Baragoi; I analyse violence as a catalyst to processes of societal change. Further, I analyse violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi as a consequence of strategic actions of herders and those outside pastoral lands, thus linking violence to collective action. I also analyse violence among pastoralists in Baragoi as a communicative tool that hints at the incompatibility of inter-communal conflict resolution systems. Violence among pastoralists in Baragoi is also analysed as part of day to day transactions that occurs in the value chain of the ‘business of violence’, thus underlining violence as a resource that enables the negotiation of everyday life.. I further link violence and marginalisation by analysing the role of ‘ungoverned spaces’ in violent entrepreneurship among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. In my analysis of the basis of violence among pastoralists’ in Baragoi, I also focus on revenge and its role in propelling cycles of collective violence. Violence among pastoralists is further analysed as a basis for power contests from the individual, group, communal and even at the national levels. Lastly, this chapter analyses violence among pastoralists in Baragoi as a means through which identities are created and preserved.
In chapter five I present an empirical analysis on data that pertains to the spatial dimensions of violence and its impact on socio-political relations between the Samburu and Turkana. In this chapter, I analyse the role of contests over land, pasture and water resources in catalyzing social change between communities in Baragoi. Further, I focus on the role of culture as an anchor of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi and how grazing lands are used as ‘staging’ grounds and as warrior’s spaces for the practice of violence. In chapter six, I focus on socio-political power as a key driver for violence in Baragoi. I analyse the changing roles of actors in violence among pastoralists and include an analysis of new entrants of County politicians as power holders and their impacts in local power dynamics. In chapter seven, I focus on processual analysis of violence and the roles of various actors that come into play to facilitate the processes of violence. To do this I present a thick description of the Baragoi massacre and analyse events before and after. Through this case study, I aim at bringing out the progression from conflict to violence and the key actors that facilitated this massacre.

In chapter eight, I focus on the role of the state in violent entrepreneurship by analysing the policing systems in Northern Kenya through the Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs). Through the focus on KPRs I aim to show linkages between weak policing systems, marginalization, illegal sale and distribution of state arms and ammunition and its impacts on pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi. In chapter nine, I apply the concepts of primordialism and performative ethnicity to analyse the expanding cultural parameters of pastoralists’ violence by conceptualizing the increased targeting of women and children during episodes of cattle raids. By focusing on women, children and the aged, I aim to show culture and violence as mutually producing phenomena and their roles in catalysing societal change through displacements, creation of dependency on relief supplies, movement patterns and choice of marriage partners between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Lastly in chapter ten I outline study recommendations and conclusions.
History of Violence and Settlement of Samburu and Turkana in Baragoi

2.0 Introduction

Violent conflict among pastoralist groups in the Karamoja cluster has been a well-documented historical fact (Gray 2009; Bevan 2008a; Onyango 2010; Leff 2009). Conflicts that have occurred in Baragoi can be traced to the contested manner of this pastureland at the beginning of the 20th century. Having been christened as ‘Samburuland’ by colonial administrators and later called Samburu district, the history of Baragoi reveals multiple contests, assimilations and sometimes even periods of co-existence between the groups that were already inhabiting these areas such as the Turkana, Samburu and Ogiek (Stigand 1910). The history of Baragoi is also linked to the battle to control the then Northern Frontier as the British and Ethiopian Empires claimed strategic territories before the borders were finally settled upon (Spencer 1965:xviii; Spencer 1973:159). The history of the migration of the Samburu and Turkana communities into what is today’s Baragoi is vital in understanding the meanings and purposes of violence among these pastoralists.

2.1 Migration History of the Samburu to Baragoi

The Samburu are a pastoralists group inhabiting today’s Samburu County but also settled in neighbouring Laikipia, Isiolo and Marsabit Counties (Wasamba 2009:146; Sperling 1987: 1). They have been described as “nomadic” or “semi-nomadic” by various authors (Spencer 1965; Wasamba 2009; Sperling 1987) to emphasise their reliance on livestock as a basis for their survival. Folklore posits that the Samburu originated from ‘Oto’ (Lesorogol 2002:16; Lemoosa 1998:24). This place of origin is claimed to be “somewhere in the north” (Lesorogol 2002: 16; Waweru 1992:79-80). Lemoosa (1998:24) pinpoints the location of ‘Oto’ to be “the present area south of the Ethiopian Highlands covering Illet in the north-east of the Lake Turkana to Hurri Hills (Ldonyo Lemelepo)”. Another account claims that the first Samburu man ‘Samburi’ landed at Malalua near Leroki plateau from heaven (Wasamba 2009:146). The Samburu are also argued to have split from the Laikipiak Maasai in the 16th Century and moved northwards (Spencer 1973: 149; Mutsotso et al 2015:23). The Samburu are further argued to have originated from three unidentified groups that initially lived in western part of lake Turkana, another group
having inhabited El Barta (Baragoi), and another having arrived from Laikipia (Mutsotso et al 2015:23). Other accounts from Spencer (1973:152) allege that the Samburu left Leroghi plateau due to attacks from the Laikipiak Maasai, while others believed that the movement of the Samburu up north was due to livestock losses and starvation (Spencer 1973:152). The Samburu people speak ‘Samburu’ language. It has been described as a ‘Maa’ language closer to the Maasai language (Wasamba 2009:147). The Samburu language is claimed to be related to Turkana and Karamojong languages (Wasamba 2009:147). The Samburu comprises of two major sections: the Ngishu Narok (owners of the black cattle) and the Ngishu Naibor (owners of the white cattle). The Ngishu Narok are further divided into the following clans: the Elmasula, the Nyarapai, the Il Pisigishu and the Il Ngwesi. The Ngishu Naibor are divided into the following clans: the Long’eli, the Legumai, the Lorogishu and the Loimusi. The El Masula; the dominant Samburu clan takes the lead in all the ceremonies such as the initiation of new age-sets. In Baragoi the above clans reside in the following areas:

- Elmasula (biggest clan)-Tuum, Wasorongai, Ol Doinyo Mara and South Horr
- Lorogishu- Masikita, El Barta (Bendera and Ngilai), Nyiro
- Long’eli- Suiyan, Ngilai, Marti
- Legumai- Marti, Ngilai
- Loimusi-Kurungu, Ndoto
- Il Ngwesi-Arsim, Latakweny
- Il Pisigishu- Seren, Anderi
- Nyaparai (smallest clan)-South Horr

Samburu society is divided into different age-sets that succeed each other. Warriors get circumcised every 13-15 years and are charged with roles such as communal security and taking care of livestock. The name Samburu is claimed, to originate from the word *Samburr* which is the name for the livestock-hide bags that the Samburu used for carrying meat (Lanyasunya n.d). It seems that the word *Samburr* was initially used to identify the Samburu as Stigand (1910) did while addressing an inter-communal peace meeting between the two communities in Baragoi.
The Samburu call themselves Loikop\textsuperscript{17} meaning owners of the land. When they moved to today’s Samburu land, literature shows that the few who kept livestock actually reared white goats which is derived from the word Nkeneji a ‘people of white goats’ (Lesorogol 2008), a term that was initially used by travelers in the Northern part of Kenya to describe the Samburu. Another account by von Hönhel and Teleki (quoted in Stigand 1910:61) refers to the Samburu as Burkeneji or Lo’eborkeneji with the same meaning as explained by Lesorogol (2008). This also shows that the Samburu previously kept small stock and their adoption of cattle and camel herding is due to their interactions with the Borana, Turkana and Rendille communities from the neighbouring districts (Sperling 1987: 5).

Even though the exact dates of the movement of the Samburu into Baragoi area is unknown, Spencer (1973:152) in his fieldwork there in the 1950s was able to trace the Lkipiku age-set (those initiated around 1837) to have captured Mounts Kulal and Ng’iro from the Borana. Stigand (1910) found the Samburu settlements in Baragoi area, South Horr, Barsaloi, Opiroi and Lesirkan. Stigand (1910:81) in his attempts to reconcile the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi noted that each side presented to him a history of claims over “grazing grounds and ancient rights” to imply disputes over historical ownership of Baragoi and its resources. The designation of the Samburu/Turkana boundaries and attempts by colonial administrators to expel Turkana who had settled in Baragoi area before the arrival of the colonizers seem to have given the Samburu a sense of entitlement to Baragoi area. According to archival records, Mr. Kittermaster\textsuperscript{18} who administered the area from Barsaloi is recorded to have sent away the Turkana from El Barta grazing fields due to their constant “quarrelling with the Samburu”\textsuperscript{19}. The contest between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi was therefore ongoing in the early 1900s

\textsuperscript{17} The term loikop has been translated as owners of the land, the word Ngop meaning land and Loi meaning ‘owner’. However, Lesorogol (2008), a researcher married to a Samburu, has translated it as ‘people’ and attributed this naming of the Samburu to the Maasai.

\textsuperscript{18} Colonial Administrator based at Barsaloi before 1912 also served as officer in charge of Northern Frontier District and Acting District Commissioner of Turkana

\textsuperscript{19} KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/8 (1922) ‘Settlement of Certain Turkana in the N.F.D’ Office of the Officer in Charge of the N.F.D to the Honourable, The Colonial Secretary, Colony of Kenya, El Barta, April, 26\textsuperscript{th} 1992
when the British administrators took charge of the area. The contest stemmed initially from competition over water and pasture resources and historic claims of ownership of the geographical space of Baragoi. The conflict between these groups was further aggravated by legitimating of the Samburu as the bona fide residents of Baragoi and the Turkana as the ‘visitors’ in Baragoi with limited rights to resources. To fully understand the dynamics of the contests over Baragoi between the Samburu and Turkana, it is important to look into the migration history of these groups.

2.2 Migration of the Turkana into Baragoi

The Turkana are a nomadic pastoralist group inhabiting the Northwestern part of Kenya (Gulliver 1958:900; Akabwai n.d: 3). The Turkana refer to each other as ‘Ng’iturukana’ and their language ‘Ng’aturukana’ (Ohta 1989:1). A majority of the Turkana reside in Turkana County. Substantial populations of the Turkana can also be found in Samburu, Marsabit, Isiolo and Laikipia Counties. Among the Turkana of Baragoi, the only two clans are represented: the Ng’ibilai and the Ng’issir sections. These groups reside on the Turkana side of today’s Baragoi. The exact time of the movement of Turkana into Baragoi is difficult to ascertain. However, available literature attributes the movement of the Turkana into Baragoi to two major reasons; the Turkana, led by war leaders such as Ebei, constantly ventured into Baragoi to raid livestock from the Samburu. Lamphear (1976) and Mburu (2001) noted the emergence of diviners who through their ability to predict the future consolidated the power to organise for expansionists raids that enabled the Turkana to acquire livestock and move into distant lands during times of drought. Secondly, the movement of the Turkana into Samburuland is attributed to drought in Turkanaland (Stigand 1910; Lamphear 1976). The role of war leaders especially of Ebei is legend that the Turkana of Baragoi still speak very proudly of. Lamphear traces Turkana movement to Baragoi to 1903. According to Lamphear (1976: 231-232), the Turkana, led by their war leaders, were forced by drought to move across “Loriu mountains” into Baragoi plains to exploit abundant pasturelands.

Similarly, Stigand (1910) has argued that the Turkana migrated to Baragoi due to drought and limited pastures in Turkanaland. Indeed Stigand (1910) noted the presence of the Turkana in Baragoi when he made his journey from Nairobi to Abyssinia through Northwestern Kenya.
While on his way from Lesirkan to Baragoi, Captain Stigand was informed by Ogiek elders that “The Turkana and Samburr at Baragoi, it appeared, had fallen out over grazing grounds, and war between them was imminent” (Stigand 1910: 79). Stigand’s account of a meeting with Samburu elders along Baragoi River revealed the simmering tension between the two groups:

“It appeared from their accounts that the Turkana wished to oust them from their grazing ground, and from the well-grassed plains of Em Barta, threatening to fight them if they did not go. They said that they were not strong enough to fight with the Turkana, and they could not move, for they had nowhere else to go” (Stigand 1910: 79).

It seems that when Stigand visited Baragoi on his way to Addis Ababa, the Turkana were already settled in Samburuland. This perhaps explains him being approached by Turkana chief Longelich and Samburu chief Legarbes to resolve the grazing land disputes that contributed to warfare between the two groups. Captain Stigand recorded his verdict to the Turkana and Samburu people as follows:

“Therefore I say to you, Turkana, you must not cross this stream and build your kraals on the same side as the Samburr, and I charge you, Samburr, that you do not move your kraals likewise to the west side of the stream. “Now, this is my decision: You, the Samburr, graze your cattle on the east side of Baragoi, and when you come to water, approach from the east, and water your cattle from that side, and do not let even one lamb cross over to drink from the other side, You, the Turkana, graze your cattle on the west side, and likewise water from that side, and not one man or animal must cross to this side.” Now as to grazing grounds, take this stream as your boundary, and after the stream take this big tree of Baragoi and the rocky peak of doinyo ngiro you all see before you, and let this line be a boundary to you that neither tribe may cross to the other side”. (Stigand 1910: 82-83).

According to Lamphear (1976: 233), the Turkana, under severe ecological pressure occasioned by one-year long drought, moved into Baragoi again and “captured most of it by 1911”. Their movement and war strategy was once again led by Ebei, the war leader. The violent nature of Turkana migration and settlement into Baragoi shows the incapacity of the nacent colonial
administration at this time. The role of Ebei, the war leaders is further captured in Lamphear’s records of Turkana raids in 1913:

“In the meantime, Ebei continued to defy the British in the south. From the end of 1913, he led his armies against the Samburu, driving them entirely out of the lands south of the Lake, and then attacking them and their Rendille allies east of the Lake and threatening the Administration's lines of communication between Marsabit and Loivangoleni” (Lamphear 1976: 237).

Turkana expansion into Marsabit and Samburu districts was therefore driven mostly by the need to escape colonial administrators control pastoralists movements in Northern Kenya. Further migration of the Turkana into Baragoi area was also occasioned by droughts that drove the Turkana to seek and conquer pasturelands in Samburu district. To comprehend the dynamics of violent conflicts among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi, the next section delves into the history of violence and factors that have contributed to this among the two communities.

2.3 History of Violence between the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi

Violence that prevails among the Samburu and Turkana today in Baragoi stems from the violent nature of the formation of Baragoi as a geographical, social and livelihoods space. The history of violence in Baragoi can be divided into four main parts: the pre-colonial period, the colonial period, the post-independence period (the Ngoroko period), and violence after 1996. In the pre-colonial period the culture of raiding was a shared practice accepted by pastoralists as a means of livestock acquisition to enable pastoralists’ survival and fulfillment of social obligations such as payment of bride wealth. The entry of colonialism brought forth a new dimension to the culture of raiding. Colonial officers saw cattle raiding as a breach of order. Policies were therefore put in place to control warrior age-sets among the Samburu and the Turkana. In the immediate post-colonial period independent Kenya’s policy towards the marginalised pastoralist areas of Northern Kenya were officially neglected through Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 (GoK 1965). This Sessional Paper was the blueprint for economic and social development drafted by the Kenyan government that outlined the state’s investment priorities in different regions of Kenya and in various sectors of the economy. The paper (GoK 1965:42) argued for prioritizing the
investment of state resources in areas of Kenya with good rainfall, good agricultural lands and a people ‘receptive to development’. From the late 1960s to early 1980s Ngoroko incursion into Baragoi led to the introduction of KPRs. The post 1996 raids were characterized by ethnic mobilization, involvement of security agencies and increased influence of political leaders contributing to increased violence among the Samburu and Turkana.

2.3.1 The Pre-colonial Period
Cattle raids in the pre-colonial period have been described as aiming to restocking livestock after devastating droughts (Mkutu 2000). This implies that raids conducted during the pre-colonial times were occasioned by the need to survive the impacts of drought and to reestablish herds for pastoralists’ households. Further, raids during the pre-colonial period took place within an institutional framework where there were clear sanctions on the target, timing and objective of raids. Greiner et al (2011) further noted that raids in the pre-colonial period were aimed at conquering territory. Similar insights are expressed by Lamphear (1976) who traced the history of Turkana war leaders’ incursions into Baragoi. The incursions were occasioned by droughts and the need to capture more territory (pasturelands) for survival of communities. Oba (1992) has however argued that the superior military strength of the Turkana during the late 18th century was actually because they mostly survived the rinderpest epidemic, which devastated most of their neighbours’ cattle during this time. According to him military incursions by Turkana war leaders into Samburu were expansionist in nature as they sought more grazing lands for their increased population.

2.3.2 The Colonial Period
The early colonial period was marked by the arrival of colonial administrators in what was designated as the Northern Frontier. Baragoi initially formed part of this region where colonialists decreed emergency laws and movement of non-natives to and within the Frontier occurred only after the issuance of special permits. According to Stigand (1910), the Samburu inhabited only some parts of today’s Baragoi; this can be attributed to lower population density at the time. In his journey through Baragoi, Stigand pointed out that the Samburu lived along Baragoi River. In his description, he alleges that Baragoi River is a permanent water source, much to the contrary today. He further describes other Samburu settlements as being in the Horr
Valley (today’s South Horr) and Nyiro Mountains (today’s Tuum and Waso Rongai areas). Stigand does not describe other Turkana settlements but records meeting them along Baragoi River.

This period is also marked by establishment of colonial administration of Northern Kenya. Attempts at controlling warriors and changing warriorhood as an institution were the major pre-occupations of colonial officers during this period (Odegi-Awuondo 1992). Greiner et al (2011) further noted that the colonial period was marked by setting up of district boundaries aimed at restricting pastoralists’ movement in a bid to keep law and order. Archival records from this time elucidate cases where colonial officers came up with boundaries and attempted to divide grazing lands and water sources as exclusive to particular communities. Lamphear (1976) however blamed colonialism for the violent nature of raids in the early periods of colonial establishment. Citing cases from the Samburu and Turkana, Lamphear argued that the brutality with which colonial soldiers sought to control and administer pastoralists, especially the Turkana of Southern Turkana areas, directly contributed to their incursions and raids on the Samburu of Baragoi. Similarly, Broch-Due (2005: 10) blamed colonialism for “creating and exacerbating conditions of civil unrest, warfare and poverty”, which it had supposedly aimed to stem. This she argues was done through policies such as communal punishments and confiscation of animals as a means of pacification of warring groups. These measures were in effect counter-productive and served to create animosities and opportunities for further episodes of violence as communities who suffered from raids by colonial administrators organised similar raids against their neighbours (Broch-Due 2005:10) Pastoralists’ violence between the Samburu and Turkana can therefore be understood as a phenomenon which was ongoing before the colonial administrators established themselves in Baragoi. However, colonialist policies that sought to treat the Turkana as second-class residents of Baragoi may have enhanced the contest over access to water and pasture resources thus leading to solidification of group identities that would later be used as a basis for organisation for future violence.

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20 KNA/PC/EST/2/11/19 (1957) Rendille-Samburu Boundary, from P.H Jones, District Commissioner, Maralal to the Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province, Nakuru, 29th July 1957
Militarisation of Samburu and Turkana groups can also be linked to their recruitment and participation in wars and expeditions as part of colonial British armed forces. Their participation in these wars was further aided by the organisation of some of these groups through the age-set system. Samburu young men join age-sets after circumcision; those circumcised during the same period are grouped together into an age-set. An age-set therefore also serves as a rallying point of comradeship (more like a life membership club) and enables the construction of group cohesion.

Spencer (1965:151) noted that Samburu morans from the *Ilmerisho* age-set “participated in the punitive expedition against the Turkana in 1914”. In another account by Rutten (1989:51) Samburu young men were recruited by the British colonial administrators as part of the punitive mission against the Turkana that led to deaths of Turkana and the confiscation over 130,000 livestock in 1915. In the run up to the Second World War, Turkana and Samburu warriors were recruited into Kings African Rifles (KAR), Spencer (1973:164) recorded that 348† warriors of the *Ilmekuri* age-set from the Samburu community fought along the British in Burma. The *Ilmekuri* age-set was made of Samburu warriors who were circumcised between 1935 and 1936 (Spencer 1965:81). Many of these warriors who served in the World War II were later recruited to serve as policemen and chiefs within their villages, others were appointed as “Reabsorption Assistants” and made moran Laigwenak (moran leaders) thus linking their military experinece as ex K.A.R with their roles as community defenders²². Some were later accused by the same colonial government of training warriors to conduct violent raids against ‘enemy’ communities.

Similarly, Mburu (2001) noted the recruitment of the Turkana into KAR; “During the Second World War Turkana warriors enrolled in large numbers as Askari for the Kings African Rifles not primarily to fight for King and country as to acquire military skills and weapons for the purpose of punishing their northern neighbours” (Mburu 2001:156)

Even though the colonial period was marked by containment of warriors by forcing them to marry early so that they don’t create chaos (Spencer 1965), the military training offered to warrior age sets through the participation in expeditions and WWII laid the basis of military-like formation that is witnessed in many violent raids today. Mburu (2001) and Gulliver (1958) also

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† KNA DC/SAM/4/1 (1948) Samburu Circumcision records that about 500 tribesmen from Ilmekuri age-grade enlisted in the K.A.R

²² KNA DC/SAM/1/2 (1946) Samburu sub District Annual Report, Maralal
noted how the recruitment of Turkana warriors and how their involvement in colonial wars enhanced their military skills and contributed to violent raids among the Turkana and their neighbours. The colonial period also saw the introduction of collective punishment and trespass fine as a means of controlling raids. Collective punishments were punitive measures adopted by colonial officers to reduce raiding incidences by punishing whole villages in cases where warriors from particular villages were proved to have raided their neighbours\textsuperscript{23}, \textsuperscript{24}. While it has been argued that the colonial period was marked by peace among warriors and less raids (Greiner et al 2011:80), colonial policies such as recruitment of warriors into KAR and punitive expedition missions facilitated their further training in military combat that enabled a more violent form of raids in the ensuing periods. The use of warriors from ‘enemy’ communities as part of punitive expeditions further reinforced enmity between these groups and informed justifications for revenge violence. Colonialism further solidified ethnic identities by drawing boundaries based on ethnicities. Broch-Due (2005:7) analysed the drawing of administrative boundaries along ethnic lines by colonialists as a Eurocentric methodology that had applied in state formation in Western Europe based on singular ethnicities such as Britons forming Great Britain and the Germans forming Germany. She argued that ethnic identity therefore became the basis of administrative and political power building blocks in the colonial and post-colonial states thus precipitating conflicts related to rights to land and access to other resources for those communities who were deemed to be ‘foreigners’ in certain districts. This led to justifications of ‘indigineity’ to certain districts such as Samburu thus contributing to violent contests of the geographical and social space of Baragoi between the Turkana and Samburu. The map in Fig.2 below shows the major access routes to towns and centres of Baragoi and the larger Samburu district in 1954.

\textsuperscript{23} KNA AG/1/342 (1930) The Collective Punishment Ordinance, 1930, Samburu District (for Cattle thefts, Raids etc) General, Attorney General’s Office, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya

\textsuperscript{24} KNA/BB/12/33 (1954) Boran-Rendille Incident at Muddo Koni on 3\textsuperscript{rd} September 1954, from the Office of the District Commissioner Marsabit: Ref: Your Letter L&O:17/11/3/137 dated 21.9.54, to the Provincial Commissioner Northern Province, Isiolo, 4\textsuperscript{th} October 1954
2.3.3 The Post-Colonial Period

This period was marked by the introduction of *Sessional Paper No 10 (GoK 1965:42) on African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya*. Through this paper, the independent Government of Kenya outlined its developmental priorities and clearly stated its disinterest in constructing state infrastructure in arid pastoralists Northern Kenya. This policy paper launched the official marginalization of pastoralists in Northern Kenya in terms of its access to basic
services such as security, health and education. Archival documents during this time indicate a rise in raids but also show continuity in the colonial policy of engaging village elders in dispute resolution through the payment of blood money\textsuperscript{25}.

Archival records from the post-colonial period also record increased movement of pastoralists across their traditional districts\textsuperscript{26}. It also records increased cases of inter-ethnic warfare among pastoralist groups residing in Isiolo, Samburu and Marsabit areas. In most cases incidences of renegotiations of access to water and grazing lands located at inter-ethnic boundaries were carried out in efforts to stem increasing pastoralists’ violence. The government also actively pursued a policy of forcefully taking livestock deemed to be trespassing on certain grazing lands. The policy was punitive as it allowed the police to take up to 25 per cent of the arrested livestock thus encouraging raids aimed at restoring the lost herds (Lamphear 1976).

\textbf{2.3.4 The Ngoroko Period}

The Ngoroko period started in the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Ngorokos were ‘rebel’ raiders from Turkanaland who according to Oba (1992) were former servicemen who acquired illegal arms and conducted raids outside Turkanaland. Bollig (2010) described the ‘state of civil war’ that prevailed during one of the Ngoroko attacks in Nginyang’ area of East Pokot. He argues that Ngoroko had a military organisation and firepower which devastated pastoralists’ households among the Pokot and Samburu. In one instance the Ngoroko shot dead 20 Pokot men, women and children during a raid in East Pokot (Bollig 2010). Mkutu (2005:173) noted the rise of Ngoroko attacks in Baragoi in 1965, this he was told led to the spiraling of violence between the Samburu and Turkana that laid the basis for today’s strife between the two communities inhabiting Baragoi.

\textsuperscript{25} KNA/PC/GRSSA/2/19/3 (1959) Tribal Bond on Boran Tribe in Accordance with Section 12 (1) Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance, Signed by Chief Galma Dida, Headman Halaki Fai, Guro Roga, Buda Luma and Huka Bagasi, Witnessed by P.D Abrams District Commissioner, Isiolo on 15\textsuperscript{th} December 1959

\textsuperscript{26} KNA/DC/ISO/3/10/63 (1961) Stock Trespass to the District Commissioner, Maralal via Rumuruti from M.G Power, the District Commissioner, Isiolo on July 3\textsuperscript{rd} 1961
Skoggard and Adem (2010:4) have attributed the rise of Ngoroko among the Turkana to the emergence of diviners as war leaders who not only blessed warriors before going to raids but participated in the organisation and leading of raiding parties. The rise of the Ngoroko has also been attributed to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons among the Turkana (Skoggard and Adem 2010:4). They argue that the introduction of guns in Northern Turkana enabled the independence of warrior groups from the control of elders. Ngoroko and the culture of violence was aided by the establishment of ‘separate power structures’ set up by great diviners and war leaders who took control of war making. Lamphear (1976) recorded that at the height of his powers, Ebei, the Turkana war leader in the early 1900s commanded up to 3,000 armed raiders from different clans of the Turkana. It is from these bands of fighters that the Ngoroko that terrorized Samburu and Pokot populations into the late 1980s emerged. The impact of Ngoroko raids on pastoralists’ livelihoods in Baragoi is well captured in the chronology of their raids in the late 1960s and 1970s as follows:

“In the early years of independence (1969) the Ngoroko invaded the villages of Lekupe and Lesokoyo at Tuum in Baragoi Division, injuring one and stealing several livestock. In 1970, the Ngoroko raided Baragoi area killing Lentoimaga\(^{27}\) of the Lmekuri age set. In the same year they raided Lepatoiye in Simale taking livestock. In 1972, the raiders invaded Tuum where eighteen of them were killed. In 1980, the bandits raided Lengees and Uaso-Baragoi manyattas injuring many people” (Mkutu 2005:270)

Ngoroko attacks on Turkana and Samburu populations of Baragoi escalated between the mid-1960s to early 1980s. Missionaries who worked in Tuum and Parkati areas recorded the security threat posed by the Ngoroko and their need to obtain arms with the permission of the police (Tablino 2006:74). The indiscriminate nature of the Ngoroko attacks on fellow Turkana of Parkati is also described by Tablino (2006: 75) who noted the fear of the people of Parkati and also of the frequency of retaliatory attacks by Samburu groups from Tuum and South Horr who in their frustration revenged against the Turkana of Parkati. The devastating nature of Ngoroko attacks is further captured by Tablino’s (2006:75) respondent who witnessed the “skeletons of at least fifteen victims” in Parkati area. Bollig and Österle (2011) documented several incidences

\(^{27}\) Father to the current Samburu North (Baragoi) Member of Parliament, Alois Musa Lentoimaga
of Ngoroko attacks among the Pokot in 1977. These attacks provide a preview of the slipping away of the institutional framework that previously guided the cultural practice of cattle raiding. In their work, Bollig and Österle (2011) also documented the rise in retaliatory attacks between the Pokot and Turkana around Kapedo. It can be argued that Ngoroko attacks fuelled the need for Pokot and Samburu communities to acquire arms. This need was later fulfilled by the local political leaders who appealed to the government for arms citing the Ngoroko as a threat to their livelihoods and security. The Ngoroko period was marked by incessant attacks on less armed pastoralist groups.

![Photo 3: The memorial cross at the spot where Fr. Luiggi Graiff of South Horr was killed by Ngoroko bandits in 1981, Source: Author.](image)

In Baragoi, a catholic priest was killed by Ngoroko between Parkati and Tuum in 1981. Fr. Luiggi Graiff was an Italian parish priest from Trento who worked at the South Horr parish. His work required him to administer the gospel to Catholic groups in parish outposts such as Loonjorin, Parkati and Tuum areas. He was attacked and killed when Ngoroko bandits ambushed
them while he was driving from Parkati to Tuum with a group of Turkana altar boys who were being transferred to a boarding school in South Horr (Tablino 2006:75). The introduction of guns among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi contributed in the alteration of social relationships between these two groups. This can be seen in subsequent attacks and solidification of ethnic identities as explained in the effect of violence after 1996 (Mkutu 2000).

2.3.5 Pastoralists’ Violence After 1996
The year 1996, marked a turning point for relations between the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi as raids became more violent. Mkutu (2008) interviewed Samburu warriors who informed him of their acquisition of arms from the Borana and Somali herders. The impact of arms on the relations between the Samburu and Turkana communities was reflecting in increasing numbers of livestock lost during revenge raids. Galaty (2005a:115-118) spent the month of August of 1996 in Baragoi and recorded some of the vicious raids between these groups. He particularly noted the inflow of ammunition and the complicity of the security forces in aiding or abetting cattle raids. Mkutu (2008) estimated that in 1997 the Samburu lost 5,000 animals due to raids from the Turkana, which was significantly higher than the minimal numbers lost in the pre-1996 era when the Samburu still used traditional weaponry. In essence, as Mkutu (2008) argues, the acquisition of arms by the Samburu altered the relations between pastoralists in Northwestern Kenya. Raids became more frequent. Another reason for increased raids after 1996 was the building of strategic inter-tribal alliances for the preservation of hegemonic control over pasturelands. A case in point was the Samburu-Pokot alliance that led to the Lokorkor massacre of Turkanas in December 1996 (GoK 2006; Galaty 2005a: 117).

The year 1996 was thus the beginning of a new phase of pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu, Turkana and the Pokot from the neighbouring Baringo County (Mkutu 2005:172). This period recorded several massacres in Baragoi area such as in Soito el Kokoyo, Lokorkor and Keekoridony areas. It is worth noting that conflict after 1996 escalated due to involvement of a number of new actors. Osamba (2000) blamed raids among the Pokot on the Marakwet on local politics. Raids during this period sought to displace villagers to prevent them from voting for certain candidates in the 1997 elections. The same trend has been visible in subsequent elections. Kagwanja (2014) also noted the increased prominence of illicit traders who hired warriors for
raids. He argued that cattle traders worked together with security officers to facilitate the movement of raided animals from pastoralists’ arid lands of Northern Kenya to urban centers where the demand for beef is high. Kagwanja (2014) further pointed to the increased role of gun merchants who exploited the ‘ungoverned space’ (Mkutu 2008) that is, most of arid Northern Kenya.

Pastoralist violence in Baragoi is therefore very much intertwined with the history of its people, the Turkana and Samburu and their neighbours, the Turkana of South Turkana and the Pokot from East Baringo. From the pre-colonial times when raiding was a cultural practice it transformed from a well-controlled and institutionalised practice to a means of resisting colonial rule in the early colonial period. While it can be argued that colonial policy attempted to control or even stop cattle raiding (Greiner et al 2011), I argue in concurrence with Lamphear (1976) and Spencer (1965; 1973) that recruitment of Samburu morans of Merisho and Terito age-sets in 1914 (as part of KAR punitive expedition on the Turkana) played a significant role in transforming morans into communal paramilitary units. Samburu and Turkana World War II veterans used their military skills to train raiders after the end of World War II (Lamphear 1976; Spencer 1965). As a result colonialism not only contributed to violent conflict through the military conquest of Northern Kenya but also through training of local morans in real war situations. Even though colonial administrators prevented cases of raids through punitive measures such as collective punishment (where cattle belonging to specific clans or villages were confiscated as punishment for raids) or fines for trespass (where 25 per cent of the trespassed herd were confiscated by the state), raids continued in smaller scale during this period only to escalate later after independence.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter sought to trace the history of migration, settlement and violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. It has established that violence among the two communities was ongoing when the colonial administrators gained control of the area in the late 1890s. As captured by Stigand (1910) and Lamphear (1976), the battle over the social and geographical space of Baragoi was spurred by droughts in Turkana that forced the Turkana people to move to Baragoi
in search of water and pasture. Turkana religio-military leadership also contributed to their conquests of Baragoi by 1911 (Lamphear 1976, Mburu n.d). Colonial administration has in a way contributed to the strife and violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. This is evident in the recruitment of warriors from both groups to serve in the Kings African Rifles (Rutten 1989, Spencer 1976). As noted by Spencer and Rutten many of these former combatants later played a significant role in training morans to conduct cattle raids among enemy communities in Baragoi. The post-colonial periods saw the rise of violence as the independent Kenya governments sought to pursue a policy of marginalisation of pastoralists groups who were deemed in official government policy to be ‘unreceptive to development’ (GoK 1965). The absence of the state contributed to increased violence through the Ngoroko attacks that heightened tensions and led to inter-ethnic arms race as communities sought to acquire firearms for self protection. The state’s intervention in the early 1980s led to further militarization of these pastoralists through the introduction of Kenya Police Reservists thus confirming the governments’ inability or disinterest in tackling decades of marginalisation of pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya in terms of provision of basic services such as security and infrastructures. The inter-ethnic arms race peaked in 1996 massacres and large-scale raids that occurred in Baragoi area. The violence witnessed in the socio-political relations among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi must therefore be understood from its historical roots. It is a symptom of decades of neglect that has forced communities to ‘embrace’ violence as a necessity of survival and as resource critical to their day to day manoeuvres of life in the absence of the state within an increasingly predatory environment.
The Role of Violence in Social Organisation of Warriors among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi

3.0 Introduction

Knowledge, motivation, practice and organisation of violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi is passed on from one generation of warriors to another through socialization by elders and other community members including women from early ages. Participation in violence especially cattle raids against ‘enemy’ communities is the hallmark of warriorhood and maleness. Societal pride, recognition and sense of achievement among one’s peers is bestowed upon accomplished warriors, through songs and narrations (Heald 1997). Older males regale younger males with narrations of their conquests as well as their defeats thus instilling in the youngsters the identity of the enemy, a sense of their territory and the need to seek justice (revenge) on behalf of their fathers or to surpass the prowess of their elders in war. This chapter looks into the organisation of violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi; it focuses on the role of violence in the solidification of group identities among warriors. Drawing from similarities in the organisation of violence among the Pokot warriors (Bollig 1990:74-76) and the Karamojong (Knighton 2007: 469-473) this chapter aims to highlight the role of culture in organisation for violence to show the relevance of violence as a practice and a performance in the maintainance of group cohesion and identity among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi (Bollig 1990:75). The characterisation of violence as a performance is seen in the manner in which discussions on impending raids are convened. As Bollig noted, discussions over impending raids or war are led by “men who are known for their ferocity and courage (nyakan) and to a certain emotional state (sirumoi)” (1990:75). Similarly among the Samburu, preparation for war occurs during mini-meetings and night dances where morans exhibit high levels of agitation locally described as “kukula mori”. Emotional preparation for violence is also vital for the success of raids, as Bollig (1990:81) established among the Pokot, warrior leaders prepare their colleagues for raids by exhibiting a state of rage aimed at preparing them for the raid:

28 In Swahili language loosely translates to ‘being in state of rage’
“A man in this emotional state has staring eyes. He takes on a gait which is easy to differentiate from the normal way of walking. When talking he utters short sentences; every now and then he will shout the name of his favourite oxen and those of his ancestors. If he has been a successful raider he will make allusions to his deeds. These ngal nyo pö sirumo (the words of rage) chill the audience and eventually bring other men into the state of sirumo and prepare them emotionally for the raid” (Bollig 1990:81).

It is from these discussions and dances that bravery and leadership in situations of war are exhibited or practiced in readiness for raids or for defence of territory. The role of raiding in enhancing group cohesion among pastoralists’ warriors is well captured in Knighton’s (2007) description:

“In time of war, the leaders and the warriors gather their clan-based cattle-camps into an alomar, which becomes a fighting unit on full alert for the defence of their cattle and people. If you have cattle there you are obliged to participate in attack as much as defence” (2007:469).

Raids among pastoralists however are religio-political events that involve a larger number of actors in its preparation and execution. As noted by Bollig (1990:75) and Knighton (2007:469) cattle raiding is regarded highly among the elders and culture dictates that raiders have to seek the blessing or a religious or ritual leader to foresee the success of their mission. This shows the significance of traditional raiding to pastoralists as a political-cultural and religious event. The success of warriors in raids is seen as collective victory by the raiders’ kin over their traditional enemies. The planning of a raid is often discussed for the first time during a communal feast (Knighton 2007:469; Bollig 1990:75); this further shows that raiding as a practice involves covert participation of all members of society even though it is the warriors who spearhead the violent process of forcefully acquiring cattle from enemy groups. Raiding as a political event among the Turkana is seen in Lamphear’s description of the its leaders as ‘war leaders’ (1976) to signify not only the aim of acquiring livestock but also their power and ability to mobilise their communities into a common cause such as the conquest of a contested grazing land held by enemy groups. Leading war or raids is for those who have shown their ferocity and are well
accepted among peers. Knighton in his study among the Karamojong noted the existence of *ekadedengan*, meaning a fierce warrior, similar to Bollig’s finding of the character of *nyakan* among the Pokot (Bollig 1990:75). War or raids in this case can be seen as a form of socialization where only the brave, ferocious and exemplary leaders take part. The practice of raiding was therefore a platform through which these desired communal values were exhibited, performed, praised and inculcated in the minds of younger generations. In the next section, I look into the role of generation sets in the practice of violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi.

3.1 The Role of Generation Sets in the Practice of Violence in Baragoi

Samburu and Turkana pastoralists are organized into generation sets which are initiated periodically and given the duty of providing safety to communal livestock (Spencer 1973:33; Knighton 2007:475). Spencer defined an age-set among the Samburu to “consist of all those men (age mates) who have been initiated during a certain period of time and they tend, therefore to be approximately of the same age”. Ceremonies that accompany the initiation of new warriors involve a display of bravery among the initiates. A case in point is the *Arelmongo* which requires Samburu boys due for circumcision (*Laiok*) to show their strength and ability to strangle the ox with their bare hands. The completion of the circumcision of a Samburu youth marks the beginning of warriorhood. As noted by a colonial administrator who witnessed the initiation of the Lkimaniki age-set in Kirisia hills in 1948, once a Samburu *laioni* has been circumcised the boy starts to sing “I am a warrior. I did not show fear or run away. Bring me blood to drink.” Among the Turkana, generation sets succeed each other, thus one cannot be in the same generation set with their father; instead they fall within the same set as their grandfather. As Gulliver (1958:902) noted, these sets alternate between the stones (*Imurut*) and the leopards (*Erisait*). Upon initiation after the age of eighteen, a Turkana “youth becomes a young man: he is able to wear a man's mudded headdress and to carry a man's weapons, to fight in war and to marry” (Gulliver 1958:902). Drawing from the Karamojong, Knighton (2007:475) attributed

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29 Strangling the ox  
30 KNA/DC/SAM/4/1 (1948), A.D. Shirreff, Samburu Circumcision, District Commissioner, Maralal 31st December  
31 KNA/DC/SAM/4/1 (1948), A.D. Shirreff, Samburu Circumcision, District Commissioner, Maralal 31st December
cases of unrest and raiding among young warriors to the delay in initiation of these young men and as a means of gaining prestige among girls. Raids and unrest among morans is also as away of putting pressure on elders to expedite the initiation of the morans. Among the Samburu the initiated age-set are called Ilmurani while among the Turkana they are the Ng’imurani. For the Samburu, succeeding of one age-set by another is through circumcision which is done periodically. As Spencer (1973:150-165) and I noted from fieldwork in Baragoi, Samburu age-sets in recorded history have conducted initiation ceremonies involving the circumcision of succeeding age-sets since the 1760s as shown the table below:

Table 2: Names of Samburu Age-sets from 1768-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age-set</th>
<th>Year of Initiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sakanya</td>
<td>1768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lmeishopo</td>
<td>1781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lpetaa</td>
<td>1795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lkuruka</td>
<td>1809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lkipayang</td>
<td>1823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lkipiku</td>
<td>1837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lkiteku</td>
<td>1851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ltarigirig</td>
<td>1865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lmarikon</td>
<td>1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lterito</td>
<td>1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lmirisho</td>
<td>1912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lkileku</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lmekuri</td>
<td>1936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lkimaniki</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lkishili</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lkororo</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lmeoli</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lmetili (Lkishami)</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Drawn from Spencer (1973:150-165) and Author’s fieldwork notes

Generation sets among the Samburu and Turkana are associated with the practice of violence in many ways throughout their history. As noted by Spencer (1973:149), the moran of Ilkipiku age-set captured Mount Ngiro from the Boran while later age-sets the Ilmirisho and Ilmikuri were
drafted as part of Kings African Rifles in expeditions againsts the neighbouring Turkana as well as to participate in the two World Wars (Spencer 1973:159-163). The Ilkileku age-set circumcised in 1921 were noted to have “caused a great deal of trouble by stock-thieving and spear blooding....and this trouble arose largely through the tribal tradition which demands that warriors must prove their manhood by some exploit before winning a wife”. The colonial administrators viewed the institution of moranhood as a source of trouble as captured in the Handing Over Report-Samburu District of 1944:

“The moran by their very nature are a perpetual source of trouble, steps have been taken to clip their wings-firstly by reducing their numbers and opportunities to a minimum by delaying the circumcision of new age grades and encouraging the early marriage of morans and secondly by prohibiting many of their activities which normally are precursors of mischief, such as carrying spears (this applies to Samburu of all age groups), holding meat-feasts in the bush, dancing the ‘Baragoi’ dance e.t.c”

In the handing over report of Samburu district in 1952, Mr. J.M.B Butler in notes to Mr. T.J.F Gavaghan wrote:

“No Samburu moran is allowed to carry a spear until he marries, in other words, until he stops being a moran”

This shows that warriors were expected to display their braveness in defending their communities against traditional enemies. Fighting in war or taking part in cattle raids is thus the essence of warriorhood among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. In the next section I delve into the preparation for raids among the Turkana of Baragoi.

32 KNA DC/SAM/4/1 (1948) A.D. Shirreff, Samburu Circumcision, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, District Commissioner Maralal, 29th December 1948
33 KNA/DC/SAM/2/1 (1944) Handing Over Report-Samburu from M.N. Evans to Mr. W.N.B. Loudon, April 1st, Maralal
34 KNA/DC/SAM/2/1 (1952) Handing Over Report-Samburu from J.M.B Butler to Mr. T.J.F Gavaghan, March, Maralal
3.2 Preparing for Raids among the Turkana

Raids are products of well-planned actions. To understand the processual approach to analysis of violence, we look into how the Samburu and Turkana communities organise themselves for violence. According to Turkana elders\textsuperscript{35}, they encounter attacks from almost all of their neighbours, a condition which made them embrace raiding as a way of life. Traditionally, their main reason for raiding is to obtain livestock (*ng’ibaren*) to which their survival depends (Schilling et al 2012; Mburu 2001; Lines 2009). At other times the Turkana also engage in raids to seek revenge over past atrocities by their neighbours (Lutta 2014; Gakio and Mosoku 2012; Powers 2011). Raids are also pursued by the Turkana as an economic activity (Schilling et al 2012; IRIN News 2014; KHRC 2010). Like any other economic activity, a raid begins by laying a plan. The process begins by surveying of prospective area for raids. Spies (*Ng’irototin*) usually three or four in number are sent to make a reconnaissance tour to the area of interest. The reconnaissance takes a few days as the spies are expected to lie in the thicket and watch the movement of warriors from the targeted community and to ascertain their routine to enable successful ambush.

Among the Samburu and Turkana, the suspicion of having spies from the ‘enemy’ community lying in the thicket or tiptoeing in the dead of the night is real. When elders wake up in the morning footmarks around the compound are traced and analysed to establish whether spies from other communities may have visited to establish the possibility of launching a raid. Many cases of spotting the footmarks of spies are reported to the police as a security threat to the livelihoods of affected herders. An illustration of the sighting of spies is well captured as follows:

“To the post are five Samburu male adults from Munanda village….who report that in the night of 30/04/2008 about six men suspected to be Turkana entered their village on spying duties most likely with the aim of stealing stock. The footmarks were discovered in the morning and as per the footmarks they went around several *manyattas* and finally exited by breaking through the security fence. The footmarks were traced to a nearby *lagga* where they walked towards the Turkana side” (Baragoi Police Post Occurrence Book 30\textsuperscript{th} April 2008).

\textsuperscript{35} Interview with Turkana elders in Nachola, February 2015
The spies are responsible for the following:

i. To identify appropriate routes (ng’ipinda) to be used while raiding for easy and prompt movement of livestock and raiders

ii. To know the location of various ‘ng’aandakia’(where men hide during exchange of fire)

iii. Estimate the appropriate raiding time

iv. Know the estimated number of armed men within the targeted vicinity of the raid.

After three or four days the ng’irototin come back home to meet ajore (the group of raiders). They relay their findings and the ajore deliberates upon them. The deliberations and discussions touch on the departure time, division of labour within the raiding group with commanding heads for each section, the identification of suitable Emuron (a seer) who can foresee the path of the raiders and bless the raid. The ajore then dismisses for preparation and the plan is kept as secret. The preparation includes the following:

i. Each individual must have a gun of any kind but an AK47 (amakada) is preferred.

ii. Each individual must carry a well loaded aruba (for bullets) and Epuko (kind of poach to carry bullets)

iii. A jerican wrapped with rugged clothes to carry water

iv. Small knifes like ‘ng’abara’ and ‘ng’ilenga’ for feeding purposes.

v. Some money for emergency purposes in case of hunger or sickness.

The journey usually begins that very day, especially late evening or early morning. The ‘ajore’ are led by the ‘ng’irototin’ to ‘awi ang’imoe’-home of the enemies where the raid takes place. The main objective of the raid is to acquire as many livestock as possible by engaging in gun battle with those who get on the way. If the raids are successful, the raiders are received with song and ululation by their women.

3.3 Preparation for Violence: The Role of Songs and Narrations

Broch-Due (2005:26) has argued that narrations give “voice” to the intended violation acts thus serves to justify and legitimize these actions and compels the actors in the ‘virtues’ of violence. Narrations further help in shaping violent actions by bringing forth memories of violence in the
past and obligating current generation to ‘do justice’ on behalf of their kin. Through songs, social experiences are shaped and framed to meet current challenges. Solutions for these social challenges can also be sought by drawing parallels with similar situations of the past. Raids whether traditional or ‘modern’ are imbued with psychological preparation and solidification of group solidarity (Coser 1956). Even though the benefits or motivations for raids may be for the individual, songs are composed and sang that portray the act of raiding as of great benefit to the community, to the clan or family of the raider. An example of the song sang to justify a revenge raid among the Turkana is as follows:

| Chorus | Oooooh! Strong are the sons of the union  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Eunae nee, naui nakapakana aaaaah!*2</td>
<td>a) Bring it here, to the house of my father aaaaah!*2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Aguma ng’imoe apethee, nakapakeng ang’abothia aaaaah!</td>
<td>b) The enemies have shot the widow of “ang’abothia”(name of the husband)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Aguma ng’imoe lorionokuwa, (litoronkowa alomoding’ia)*2 aaaaah!</td>
<td>c) The enemies have shot “lorionokowa”(name of a man meaning black headed) in cold blood aaaaah!*2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Eunae nee, naui nakapakang’a aaaaah!</td>
<td>d) Bring it here, to the house of my father aaaaah!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Aguma ng’imoe apethee, lokapakeng ang’abothia aaaaah!</td>
<td>e) The enemies have shot the widow of “ang’abothia”(name of the husband)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Aguma ng’imoe litoronkowa, litoronkowa alomoding’ia aaaaah</td>
<td>f) The enemies have shot “lorionokowa”(name of a man meaning black headed) in cold blood aaaaah!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This song shows the close relationship between pastoralists’ men and women in the production of violence. Guns are owned by men among the Turkana but the custodians of the gun within the household are the women (Onyango 2010). In some cases, the gun is given a lady’s name (in this case referred to as ‘Nasike’, to portray the closeness between a man and his firearm). It also shows that violent action is a lived experience, it is part of daily life and revenge acts are expected, violence therefore oscillates (Elwert et al 1999) from action to reaction. This song therefore puts into perspective the positive role of pastoralists’ households in facilitation of violence among the Turkana of Baragoi. To understand the role of culture in the processes of
violence, in the next sections we look into the organisation for raids among the Samburu of Baragoi.

3.4 Organisation for Raids among the Samburu

Similarly among the Samburu, raids occurred for various purposes. It was a social-cultural and economic activity among the Samburu people (Kaimba 2011; IRIN News 2014; KHRC 2010). The Samburu are also motivated to raid to protect their pastures from intrusion by other groups (Mutsotso 2013; KHRC 2010; Osamba 2000). As with the Turkana, the Samburu also engage in raids for revenge purposes (SCCRR 2013). Further revenge raids may be conducted to draw even over battles lost in the past. Raids are first organized before they are conducted to make them successful. There is no limited or specific number of people required to conduct a given raid but the number can vary depending on the motivations for the raid and its type. The Samburu classify raids in two broad categories: Lwuampa and Njore. Similar categorisations have been recorded by Masuda (2009) in his study of the Banna of Ethiopia. Lwuampa is a raid organized by a small number of warriors ranging between four and twelve. Normally an even number is preferred since it’s believed to have a high probability of success based on past experiences. The prime purpose of Lwuampa is to steal from the enemies without engaging in a gun battle unless the raiders are identified by the enemies either before stealing the animals or when caught during recovery of stolen animals. In this raid, minimal or no destruction is done to the enemies except confiscating a small number of livestock from them, which are then driven away stealthily. In any case rituals are performed before the occurrence of any raid. These include blessings from elders, girls and preferably from a blessing specialist traditionally called ‘Lais’ or ‘Lamayianani’. A Lamayianani often hails from a family known to have been naturally endowed with powers to provide blessings. In most cases nowadays, the warriors may seek the blessings secretly from a Lamayianani without the knowledge of other elders.

Njore is a raid comprising of not less than 50 armed people and has no maximum limits. It’s normally a well-organized raid whose planning and organization can take up to a whole month.

36 For instance the 1st Lokorkor massacre of the Samburu by the Turkana in 1969 and the 2nd Lokorkor massacre by a team of Pokot and Samburu warriors of the Turkana in December 1996
and a minimum of two weeks. Njore mostly takes place as a response to an immediate situation, these can be seen in terms of revenge raids or politically organised raids in which various vested interests of raiders and other actors are galvanized around ethnic identity and warriorhood. The occurrence of a Njore is therefore a consequence of effective mobilisation and planning by the warriors and those who support them. The imminence of Njore in Baragoi town is often noticeable. Morans can be seen purchasing large amounts of food in the shops; many morans can be seen roaming the town in the evenings and at night (NPS 2013). The planning of Njore requires series of meetings to lay appropriate strategies that will ensure the defeat of the targeted enemies. These meetings are usually stage managed/ masterminded by a ‘laigwanani’ (an orator). A Laigwanani is a vastly experienced retired moran most often a junior elder with an excellent track record in planning, organizing and successfully commanding raiders. During these meetings, the prospective raiders are motivated through war songs. They can also be rebuked to make the cowards and undecided lot make informed decisions in regard to the raid. Those who show any form of cowardice and those perceived to be unfit to participate in the raid as a result of cultural considerations are eliminated from the njore at this point.

Moreover, before a final move to launch an attack, a secret perambulation is done in the area to be attacked by a minimum of two and a maximum of four people selectively and categorically chosen. Those chosen must be courageous warriors with a well proven track record in successful spying on enemy territories. The core reason sending the spies are to gain clear knowledge of the terrain and the targeted area of attack. They are expected to achieve the following; to fully understand the terrain, identify the access routes, they should also identify the well-guarded routes, the approximate guns possessed by the enemies and establish the levels of alertness amongst enemy ranks. This exercise takes around a week depending on the time taken to fully gather the information. After such extensive arrangements, with well laid strategies, the raid is then conducted usually at dawn between 4-5 am or before sunset at around 5pm or 6pm. If the raid turns successful, massive looting is usually done and a maximum number of livestock are confiscated. Among the Samburu, successful raids are also marked by songs by the morans. War songs among the Samburu aim to instill bravery among the warriors and to promote the war discourse as a necessity to correct past wrongs. War songs therefore form part of the socialization narratives that children are inculcated in from an early age. Warriors sing these
songs to convey their victory over the common enemy and the ability of the warrior as an individual to contribute towards the required collective effort of the community to stand up and be counted as a defender of the community against the common ‘enemy’. As Spencer (1965) noted, the Samburu warriors invoke the names of their fathers during some of these victory songs to show the high honor and family pride that taking part in war bestows upon the individual warrior but also to the afore mentioned father. War songs therefore present narratives of dehumanisation of the enemy and legitimization of the acts violence as heroic and for the common good of the community.

A famous song after Samburu raids is called *Lkushorodo* [a Samburu War Song]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wooyio wooyio</th>
<th>Wooyio wooyio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wooho Wooh [eeeh]</td>
<td>Wooh Woo (eeeh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nturukunya yieyio wo papa</strong></td>
<td><strong>Exercise perseverance you mum and dad</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lmurun wootua alimu</strong> [chorus]</td>
<td>as I announce to you the dead warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kobore lmuran wotua nkalup</strong></td>
<td>the number of dead warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wo Ipisiai woti ntomoni</strong> [chorus]</td>
<td>exceeds a thousand [chorus]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supuko loo lkaume</strong></td>
<td>The Turkana homesteads we have raided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kirishakita mperia wuanata</strong> [chorus]</td>
<td>With our superior weapons [chorus]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yabayie nkishuang ’youreisho</strong></td>
<td>The last time our community [cattle and children] was living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kira nkera napoyppoy</strong> [chorus]</td>
<td>In fear of adversaries was while we were young children,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kore payee abulu nang’enu</strong></td>
<td>After we grew up and developed bravery,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>kore naigutie lowuoru lebata</strong></td>
<td>We scared away the wild animal and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>neigutie lowuoru lesoro</strong></td>
<td>The ill-motivated human beings [enemies] [chorus]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>naitoki aigutie lepere</strong></td>
<td>May the curse be cast upon you all those who drank the milk of this cattle [livestock]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meibai ntae kule</strong></td>
<td>And yet you fail to assume your responsibility of protecting the community [livestock and children]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kulo kishami lemong’or</strong></td>
<td>Instead, you fight over girls rather than fighting to ensure protection of the community, [chorus]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lmurun woong’or ntoyie</strong></td>
<td>My much treasured cattle, now that you have decided to side with me, lets run away from these village of cowards which have failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nomongor mparakuu</strong></td>
<td>[Chorus] The renowned brave proverbial warrior [Lenaasakale] the community depends on and yearns for your protection against the enemies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lmeirishi lenaasakalai</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nkejek yeishirakini</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nyoshi nati nle owo</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loturia laing’ok yedir</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kedir ltipilit nkong’u</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Loomoidio lemekwet</strong></td>
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This song also shows the way in which victory in war is celebrated as a familial and communal feat. A victorious warrior is seen as a ‘real’ son of his parents and the parents take great pride in identifying with his victory in cattle raids. This song also implies that victory in war is not only seen in joy at the present time but also as a means of avenging past wrongs which the warriors were informed of as children, thus violence is seen to be linked with a peoples past, present and their future aspirations (Galaty 2016). The socialization of warriors into narratives of war therefore emphasizes the need to avenge past defeats as a way of inculcating violent action as a legitimate means of correcting past wrongs (Wood 2007). The killing of the ‘enemy’ does not end the enmity, the mutilation and desecration of the enemy is seen to fulfill the real meaning of victory. Violence is therefore not only just a means of defeating the enemy but a means of dehumanizing and debasing a human being to distinguish ‘them’ from ‘us’ (Tablino 2006). This song therefore seeks to instill group ethos among the warriors as those charged with security of the community. It identifies the enemy and dictates how to relate with the enemy.

3.5 Conclusion

The practice of cattle raiding among pastoralists in Eastern Africa fulfills political, social and economic functions in these societies. Organisation of raids among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi reveals the participation of various key stakeholders in the processes of violence preparation among these groups. The practice of raiding is not just aimed at the acquisition of livestock from neighbouring groups but rather to build internal cohesion among a group of warriors and also to unite the community behind the warriors through events that seek to appreciate and display certain societal values such as ferociousness and other leadership skills deemed critical for success in raids against enemy communities. The practice of raiding therefore not only brings prestige to successful raiders and enables them to acquire cattle to pay bridewealth; it also raises their stature as leaders among their peers and in the eyes of the larger society. Successful raiders (and killers of the enemy) among the Samburu wear copper bracelets to signify their achievements at war.

Socialization into violence among new age-sets starts by the strangling of an ox with bare hands as a display of braveness among the Samburu. In many cases, revenge raids are justified through songs, this shows that every day narratives of raids lost and those won play a big role in
inculcating into young boys their future roles as defenders of their communities for past injustices through revenge raids. Even though the practice has changed over time, this chapter shows that culture plays a big role in the organisation of violence as evidenced by similarities portrayed in my study among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi and those of Bollig (1990) among the Pokot of Baringo, Northern Kenya and Knighton (2007) among the Karamojong of Uganda.
Approaches to the Phenomenon of Violence

4.0 Introduction

This chapter provides the theoretical foundations of violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi who inhabit Samburu North sub-County in Northwestern Kenya. In this chapter, I base my social and cultural analysis of the phenomenon of violence by making the following conceptual assumptions; that violence is strategic action aimed at achieving well planned ends. My analysis of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi is based on the premise that it is beneficial to the communities involved; it is a transaction that utilises the patron-client networks that exists locally and these are exercised to bring positive returns to key actors on both sides of ethnic divide. Turkana and Samburu warriors, ammunition sellers and gun traders involved know and ‘trust’ each other enough to enable the trade in arms and ammunition in spite of the ‘traditional’ enmity and contempt with which these two groups treat each other. I analyse violence as a power contest exercise; the use of violence is aimed at gaining power or asserting the power and hegemony of one community or group of warriors as a collective over the other at any particular moment. Chance of occurrence of violence between groups of herders’ or between a herder and an individual passerby is based on place-identity; how one is identified during periods of heightened violence determines whether they are attacked or not.

Violent acts between herders have meanings. The gorging of the eyes and cutting of limbs of captured raiders by their ‘enemies’ or the collection of genital trophies by the Samburu, cannot simply be ignored, these actions that mutilate the bodies of fallen raiders must draw deeper interpretations and meanings. The culture of raiding and how it legitimizes violent action and behavior among the warrior age-sets among the Samburu and Turkana is also looked into. The central role of revenge in the production and reproduction of violence among the Samburu and Turkana is used in this chapter to draw theoretical meanings of violence in this thesis. Further, the state plays a prominent role in the production and reproduction of violent relations between itself on the one hand and the Samburu and Turkana groups on the other. My analysis of violence in Baragoi further looks into how acts of revenge through raids and torching of manyattas reproduce enmity between the Samburu and Turkana that further fans the violence. In my
The choice of these dimensions of violence is informed by the nature of pastoralists’ violence as observed among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. I analyse violence among pastoralists in Baragoi as a social process given the history of the Turkana and Samburu and how violence between the groups have transformed their relations since 1911. In looking at violence as strategic action, I focus on logistical support that propels violence as well as actors and interests that buttress processes of collective violence. By focusing on the communicative role of pastoralists’ violence, I am informed by my own observations of the symbolism of violence among the Samburu and Turkana and how symbolic acts are interpreted culturally to communicate imminence of violence. Further I focus on the transactions that underlie pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu and Turkana to emphasize the agency of actors in the value chain of the business of violence. By focusing on violence as power relations, my aim is to situate power in the different forms of violence such as raids, highway banditries and attack on women. Similarly, contests over social and physical spaces of pastoral productions are also viewed as power contests over productive spheres of pastoralists’ economy. The focus on culture is critical as it is the basis of socialization for power contests. Culture is vital in understanding violence socialization and how it impacts on narratives that inform future acts of violence. Lastly, I focus on revenge as ‘cog in the wheel’ of pastoralists’ violence. As one of the key motivations for pastoralists violence revenge enables our understanding of violence as a political process.

4.1 Violence as a Catalyst of Social Processes of Change

According to Beck (2011:349) violent actions are processes aimed at reconfiguring relationships between groups or individuals. From this perspective, understanding of violence goes beyond the focus on violent action or the harm that violence causes on the body. She argues that for violence to be part of a societal process, it must be inscribed into societal structure in order to enable the negotiation or renegotiation of relations between groups. Violence is noted by Bowman (2001:
to be a “force” through which old physical and social boundaries are destroyed and recreated. Violence therefore is not just the act of violating someone rather it has long lasting implications on relationships between individuals and societal groups. Similarly, Coser (1956) argues that conflict provides an opportunity for the creation of ‘new situations’ that re-order society. Violent conflict thus is considered as a ‘stimulus’ for societal change. In this case the use of violence catalyses processes through which old social orders are preserved. Further, Broch-Due (2005: 17) views violence as a tool useful in the fragmentation of “old structures” and the creation of new ones. This shows the power of violence in redefining or re-ordering social relationships in society. According to Galaty (2005b) violence involves two different forms of societal fragmentations; its embodiments of “multiple aims, intents or emotions” and its generation of “multiple refractions conveyed along distinct trajectories as people speak of what they have heard, many times over” (2005b:173). In this way violence facilitates the creation and establishment of new social orders among groups. Beck (2011) and Sagawa (2010) have described the practice of violence as a social technique aimed at reconfiguring relationships of power. This is similar to Harrison who observed that:

“Violence is a mechanism for creating discrete groups through the attempted negation of their pre-existing interrelations” (Harrison 1993:18)

Along the same line, Turton (1994: 26) argued that war is a “common ritual language” through which groups show their significance and ability for self-preservation as units distinct from others. Abbink (2000: xii) viewed violence as having “the effect of a ‘creative’ or at least ‘constituent’ force in social relations: deconstructing, redefining or reshaping a social order, whether intended or not”. Acts of violence in this case are seen as having an impact on human relations at both the individual and communal levels and often resulting in the reconfiguration of human relationships. Abbink (2000: xii) further argues that in its aim to redefine and reconfigure relationships violence is used in interpersonal relations to “establish relations of power, force and dominance” by one group over another. Aijmer (2000:1) pointed out the vital role of violence in the formation of social relationships. He described it as a “latent ingredient” to emphasize the critical role that violent action plays in shaping human relations and in defining social and physical boundaries of human interactions.
Watson (2009:178) makes the point that the use of ethnic identities to mobilize groups into violence is a process that “depends on the way in which ideas of the self and of culture and identity are used”. This implies that organisation for group violence often involves the mobilisation of people based on specific identity markers such as ethnicity or clans. Beck (2011) concurs with Riches (1986) that as social process violence takes place within the ‘transactional model’ or the triangle of violence where violent acts are carried out, inflicted upon others and interpreted by some witnesses. The interpretation of violent actions by witnesses determines the possibility of escalation or de-escalation of violent behavior among groups. Mamdani (2001) has argued that violence has the capacity to create a new habitus that disrupts the social relations while at the same time reorganizing people’s ways of doing things. Chronic violence he argues has the capacity of a cyclical effect thereby reproducing itself from time to time to reorganize societal relations. Pastoralists’ violence during raids in manyattas or in grazing lands will thus be examined as a social process seeking to redefine relationships between groups of herders in regards to their rights of access to social and physical spaces of pastoralists production. Further, violence among pastoralists in this study will be analysed as a major determinant in inter-communal relations evident in movement patterns of herders and non-herders, local political relations, settlement patterns, access to cattle markets, choice of marriage partners and even access to and dependency on relief supplies. Analysis of violence as a social process is crucial in this study as it helps us to understand its role in changing communal relations between the Turkana and Samburu. It enables our analysis of the history of pastoralists’ violence and its consequences. It further enables our identification of key actors’ that have sprung up to facilitate the processes of violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Analysis of violence as a social process further enables our understanding of the role of violence as a catalyst of societal change.

4.2 Violence as Strategic Action

Elwert et al (1999:11) have described ‘oscillating violence’ as those violent actions that are characterized by “a typical pattern of alternating appeasement and violence…..between outbreaks of violence and phases of controlled violence influenced by social forces that strengthen oscillation”. From this perspective violence can be considered as strategic when several actors
work in tandem in planning and execution of violence. Recurrence of violence has been linked to breakdown of state’s monopoly of the instruments of violence (Elwert 1999:86). Breakdown of state’s monopoly over violence creates opportunities for ‘violence open areas’ where strategic actors work in tandem to benefit from the markets of violence (Elwert 1999:86). Further, the use of violence as a strategic action is seen in the manner in which political competitors supply ammunition and weapons well in advance before major raids are organised. Subsequently, actors who may engage in violence first assess the conditions, indicating a planned endeavor (Greiner 2013). Violence becomes a viable option when there is a high probability of success is therefore a calculated choice (Aijmer 2000).

Hagmann and Peclard (2011:8-9) have placed resources and repertoires at the center of organisation of violence for the preservation of hegemonies. Resources are “material bases for collective action” (2011:8) such as the presence of a mobilizable group or standing army that can quickly step up to exert revenge in a violence situation. Repertoire is the ideology that helps in whipping up the emotions and justifies violent action as appropriate and legitimate such as ethno-nationalistic politics (2011:9). The use of ethno-nationalism as a means of mobilisation of warriors has been blamed for the rise of violence especially in contests over pasture and political positions and business opportunities in towns. Watson and Schlee (2009:3-4) have defined ethno-nationalism as “a strong sense of difference and lack of tolerance for sharing territory and resources” with the ‘other’. They have argued that the smart use of ethno-nationalistic politics by elites from these communities accompanied by “competitive and negative stereotyping of others” (Watson and Schlee 2009:4) precipitates violent reactions in areas where institutions of arbitration are weak or non-existent. Violence is therefore a means to an end (Buchanan-Smith and Lind 2005). Organisation for collective violence whether motivated by tangible resources such as livestock, land or water is enabled through by drawing upon strategic “social and cultural repertoires in order to give social meaning to violent action” (Hagmann and Peclard 2011:11). Mobilisation for violence in pursuit of communal goals such as protection of land against ‘enemy’ groups often have to draw upon the social meanings of violent action as a means to mobilizing violent actors (Schlee 2004) based on inclusion and exclusion models.
At given times in pastoralists’ history, there have been cases where two distinct identities have formed strategic alliances as a platform for violent raids. Violence can also be a means through which groups can either execute threats or claim opportunities (Korf et al 2010); the use of violence therefore indicates the intention either to maximize group or individual opportunities. It also indicates the collective capacity of the pastoralists groups to guard themselves against external threats. Greiner (2013:221) noted the history of strategic alliances and how these were effective in claiming pasturelands against the Kikuyu community in Laikipia area in the 1990s. Violence in this case was used as a means of launching contestations over land and territories against perceived ‘outsiders’. This points to a more politicized function of pastoralists’ violence and shows its emergent force as a tool for renegotiating territorial claims. Lastly, Kalyvas et al (2008) highlighted the role of violence in the creation and maintenance of group order. Violence in this case is projected towards the common enemy not only to demonstrate the power of the group but also as a means of preserving in-group solidarity “in the face of outside challenge” (2008:1). Analysis of pastoralists’ violence as strategic action is vital in understanding cases of strategic alliances that communities have built from time to time to execute collective violence. It enables our understanding of key interests that drive collective violence and how groups of actors who may have been enemies come into agreement to use violence against a newly defined enemy.

4.3 Violence as a Message-Victims as Examples

Aijmer (2000:1) as well as Schröder and Schmidt (2001: 3) have argued that violence is not senseless but rather replete with meaning and symbolism. Aijmer (2000) further argued that the symbolism of violence facilitates its role as “an expressive device” used in the construction and reconstruction of desired realities by those involved in its execution. Violence is expressive and therefore communicative (Riches 1986). Violence or the threat of it is aimed at conveying certain messages from the perpetrators to their victims and the witnesses. Holtzman (2016:165) aptly captures the communicative role of violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya as follows:

“Viewed as a cultural system, violent acts not only do something but also say something. They may say something to the perpetrators co-ethnics (e.g about their resolve) and to victims (e.g about how far they might go about future actions). Adversaries each have
much to say to observers-for instance, about the legitimacy of their actions or who is the “perpetrator” and who is the “victim”. Since an attack maybe justified as a retaliation for a greater wrong, as a preemptive self-defense or as a police action (e.g recovery of stolen cattle)” (Holtzman 2016:165)

Hendrickson et al (1998) in their work among the Turkana of Northern Kenya noted that cattle raiding is a means through which pastoralists communicate the incompatibility of sharing resources or the intention to shield a common resource away from would-be competitors. They further argued that cattle raids occasioned by competition over resources indicate weakness or absence of institutions for conflict resolution. As explained by Masuda (2009:58), the sound of gunfire signifies the possibility of death or injury to an individual or a group in a particular locality. According to Hendrickson et al (1998) cattle raids among pastoralist groups indicate the incompatibility of institutional systems of resource use. Raids therefore communicate the aim of one group to dominate the utility of a shared resource to the disadvantage of a competing resource user. Raids may be used to set new parameters for renegotiations over the collective use of common resources (Hendrickson et al 1998:190).

Violence during raids further communicates power contests between two distinct groups (von Trotha 2011). In violent situations, the perpetrators assert their power forcefully over the victim(s). The use of violence over the weaker party guarantees domination over strategic spheres of influence such as grazing land or livestock and entrenches the skewed relationship between the two groups until such a time when the victims gain the upper hand through the acquisition of weapons and exert revenge for past violence. In this section, I seek to analyze pastoralists’ violence through the symbolic approach in looking at the communicative role of violence and how the symbolism and performance of pastoralists’ violence displays power contests and configurations among pastoralists groups from time to time. Symbolic approach to understanding violence enables our analysis of the meanings and purposes of pastoralists’ violence and allows this study to move away from a moralist perspective which views violence as breakdown of law and order (Aijmer 2000).
Narratives of past violence and the “performative quality” of violent acts not only cause the physical harm that is intended but also generates debate among witnesses on both sides of the divide (Schröder and Schmidt 2001:6). Performance of violence therefore serves to convey the message of incompatibility and necessity of confrontation between two groups beyond the venue of the contest. Violence narratives are equally used to socialize warrior-age sets as a means of building group cohesion for future wars aimed at settling old scores or gaining ‘balance’ of power. Analysis of pastoralists’ violence as a means of communication allows this study to delve into the symbolism of violence. It broadens our understanding of pastoralists’ violence not only as a one-time event in some isolated grazing land but as a representation of antagonistic relations between groups through space and time. It allows our analysis of violence as a process and not an event by connecting isolated incidences of violence to historical inter-communal hostilities and cultural socializations that legitimizes violence on ‘enemy’ groups.

4.4 Transactional Violence

David Riches (1986) came up with the triangle of violence in which he envisioned a performer, victim and witness (es). This model contributes to the analysis of interactions in violence situations as it places subjectivity at the center of violence analysis and shows that violent actions are contested actions whose interpretations is dependent on the allegiance that witnesses have in relation to the victim(s) or the perpetrator(s) Stewart and Strathern (2002:3). This model has however been criticized by Stewart and Strathern (2002) who argued that Riches triangle of violence did not take into account group or collective violence. Bakonyi and de Guevara (2012:2) have argued that collective violence serves three distinct purposes; it “activates social boundaries, mobilises fighters to take part in violence and Lastly mobilises resources for violent action”. In this study collective violence is exemplified by the massacres and acts of ethnic cleansing during periods of heightened political competition that have been recorded in Northern Kenya (Greiner 2013; Österle 2007). Analysis of collective violence will adopt an emic perspective as a methodological approach to understand motivations for collective violence from the actors’ points of view. Charles Tilly’s repertoire of actions (1981) will also be applied to show how communities plan, mobilise, fund and execute violent raids to achieve various purposes such as self-preservation and political supremacy within a given constituency.
In the case of Baragoi I propose that violence should not be seen simply as a ‘triangle’ of interactions but as a more complex action involving actors who may not be directly involved as perpetrators, victims or witnesses. In this study I seek to broaden this perspective to connect the triangle of violence to a network of actors such as pastoralists’ elites and state security agents who ‘feed’ the triangle of actors to fuel the cycle of violence. My study will adopt an ethnographic case study approach to illuminate cases of day to day transactions in instruments of violence between groups in Baragoi. Further my study looks into how patron-client relationships between these groups encourage and foster transactions into arms and ammunition and their impacts in sustaining competitions over power and influence among pastoralist groups in Baragoi. Analyses of the transactions that fuel pastoralists’ violence are vital in understanding the network of actors that support the ‘business of violence’ in Northern Kenya (KHRC 2009). In this study, transactions reveal the network that supports the business of violence and links pastoralists violence with global trade in small arms and light weapons. Further, analysis of the transactions in instruments of violence helps in our positioning of pastoralists as active actors in violence and not as victims and enables our analysis of pastoralist violence as a resource and an agency that pastoralists use from time to time to navigate day to day socio-political relationships. In this study I analyse transactions in arms and ammunition between elites and warriors as part of the patron-client relationships that facilitate violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi.

4.5 Violence and Marginalization

Several authors have argued that violence among groups stems from perceived or real inequalities in the distribution of socio-economic and political resources (Cramer 2002; Gurr 2000; Greiner 2013:234). Gurr has further argued that vicious violence has higher potential to occur in marginalised areas with weak state systems. Pastoralists’ violence and the value chain of the business of violence enable its operation in areas with limited state presence. This conforms to the argument by Straight (2009) who described the interrelatedness of ‘small wars’ and marginalization. She argues that description of pastoralists’ violence as ‘small wars’ entrenches marginalization of pastoralists in Northern Kenya as it contributes to the attribution of violence to culture and the fight over water and pasture. She argues that understanding pastoralists’
violence within the broad spectrum of political competition and the globalised nature of arms proliferation gives a more concrete prescription of meanings and purposes of pastoralists’ violence.

Straight (2009) further argues that categorization of pastoralists violence as ‘cultural’ further serves to marginalize pastoralists as it masks historical inequalities in resource allocation and service provision that Northern Kenya has suffered since independence. She further argues that culture is used by mainstream media to hide the key actors and issues that propagate in pastoral violence thus enabling its continuity. As Witsenburg and Zaal (2012) have noted, the marginalisation of Northern Kenya, its geographical vastness and aridity presents a golden opportunity for non-state actors to emerge and engage in the business of violence. In my study, linkages between marginalisation and pastoralists’ violence will be analysed through the political economy approach to show how historical and political marginalization of herders in Northern Kenya and violence mutually reproduce each other to serve the interests of elites. Analysis of the linkages between violence and marginalisation is vital for this study as it helps to show the place of pastoralists’ violence in national debates. On the one hand, pastoralists’ violence in this study is shown an issue of little national significance, thus entrenching the plight of pastoralists to the margins of national priorities. On the other hand state marginalization and the presence of ‘ungoverned spaces’ in pastoralists lands is used to support the argument that historical marginalisation in terms of resource allocation and service provision contributes to ‘shadow economy’ run by non-state actors who trade in essential and highly demanded public goods such as instruments of violence. Further, linkages between violence and marginalisation will enable this study to explain the role of the state as a major actor in pastoralists’ violence in Northern Kenya. This will be through the analysis of the role of Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) and their role in pastoralists’ violence.

4.6 Revenge and the Production and (Re)production of Violence

While revenge raids have been well fairly documented (Eaton 2012), its role in reproduction and escalation of violence needs to be further examined. Stewart and Strathern (2002:108) have argued that “revenge is the major motivation in the reproduction and replication of violent
relations”. In other words, acts of revenge spur cycles of violent action as each group claims the position of ‘victim’ in Riches (1986) triangle. Revenge during group violence further blurs the distinction between perpetrators, victims and witnesses as these positions change swiftly. Revenge therefore has a measure of ‘social usefulness in society and this is deployed from time to time to get a sense of ‘justice’ among groups (Wood 2007b: 10). Revenge can also be seen as a form of “self-help” violence that enables the administration of justice on behalf of previous victims (Elwert et al 1999:21). Revenge as a central cog in motivations for violence is argued to provide linkages between culture, psychology and local politics (Stewart and Strathern 2002). In other words, revenge violence is organised as a just cause based on cultural legitimation of violence and aimed at ‘getting even’ by correcting past atrocities. Revenge is therefore critical in mobilisation for violence (Fleisher 2000).

Cultural orientations prescribe the nature of revenge in every violent situation. The planning and execution of revenge motivated violence is a political process (based on mobilisation) that does not just occur spontaneously but is often a response well considered by those seeking ‘justice’. Narratives of revenge therefore are used to inform new cycles of violence as new generations are given the responsibility of settling ‘old’ debts. In this study, I analyse revenge as a mechanism within the social structure of pastoralists social systems used as an ‘organising principle’ historically to settle past debts of violence. Further, acts of revenge are seen as the genesis of collective violence as family members and the clans from which the victim hails feel culturally obliged and justified to avenge the death or the raid of their kin (McFate 2008: 298). Eaton (2012:60) associated cattle raids among pastoralists along the Kenyan/Uganda border with the creation of “asymmetrical retaliations” meaning revenge attacks targeted relatives or clan mates of perpetrators of previous acts of violence. Revenge therefore not only served to ‘get even’ but it widened the cycle of violence by targeting those not directly involved in the initial acts of violence. Revenge violence is therefore seen as a key building block of oscillating violence.

Revenge has been argued to be motivated by accumulated debts that are stored in collective memories and arise out of past incidences of raids, attacks or killings by members of one community upon another (Sagawa 2010:91). Payment of these ‘debts’ are also argued to be
motivated by pride and anger. Pride is gained by standing up to fulfill the duty of avenging the death of a close kin (Diamond 2008) while anger at the devastating loss of one’s kin at the hands of raiders is argued to motivate retaliation (McCabe 2004: 98). Eaton (2012:50) further argues that debts that lead to pastoralists’ violence can also stem from exaggerations of the numbers of livestock stolen in previous attacks. Violent raids thus sets off series of claims and counter claims that serve as a motivation for opposing groups to get even but at the same time is used opportunistically by those who seek to benefit from violence as a premise for further violent raids. Exacting revenge therefore creates more ‘debts’ of violence as it widens the number of actors involved. Cases in which raiders’ use ‘trick routes’ to avoid the hot pursuit of their victims is also blamed for increased pastoralists violence as victims wrongly accuse and attack innocent communities among whom raided livestock passed, this further creates a new web of debts that propel violence (Eaton 2012). Revenge in pastoralists’ violence is therefore analysed in this study as a result of accumulated debts that are used by political actors as the basis for mobilisation for fresh attacks.

Analysis of the role of revenge in pastoralists’ violence is crucial in understanding violence as a process. It illuminates the processual factors that propel conflicts into violence and helps to connect incompatibility of social institutional frameworks for conflict resolution with violence escalation. Acts of revenge violence in this study further enables our analysis of pastoralists’ violence as socio-political interactions where domination and control of ‘enemy’ groups informs the need for revenge to maintain a balance of power. Analysis of revenge violence among pastoralists enables our understanding of the role of violence narratives in socialization for future violence and its motivation for settling past ‘debts’. The concept of revenge enables us to connect place-identity relationships and acts of violence. It enables us to analyse cases of ‘random’ inter-group violence as linked to a wider web of revenge cycles in which the place and the identity of the perpetrator and the victim is critical in violent action. The multifaceted forms of pastoralist revenge violence is also illuminated by looking at how these are organised, from family level revenge, communal revenge raids and politically organised revenge and how these three forms of revenge interact and inform trajectories of pastoralists violence. Revenge is analysed in this study as not only a matter of ‘getting even’ but a means of preserving personal
and communal pride; it is connected to power relations at the individual and group levels. Revenge is therefore analysed in this study as the linkage between past, present and future violent actions. Lastly, understanding revenge as ‘accumulated debts’ may enhance our understanding of pastoralists’ violence not only as isolated incidences but as processes that are culturally embedded and politically motivated.

4.7 Violence as Power

Violence has been defined as “the assertion of power” (Schröder and Schmidt 2001: 3). This means that violent actions denote power contest between rival groups or individuals. The use of violence by one group of actors against another implies a high stakes contest in which parties are not willing to lose (von Trotha 1999). This implies that violence is used instrumentally to settle disputes between people, the ‘settlement’ of disputes is deemed complete by physically subduing an opponent. Von Trotha (2011:32) on the other hand viewed violence as “a form of power: it is a doing, above all a doing-to and on the part of the victim a being-done-to”. This emphasizes the role of agency of violent action. It facilitates asymmetric relations between those involved in conflict. Further, Aijmer (2000:1) argued that violence “offers a strong foundation for the construction of power”. Further linkages between violence and power is found in Abbink’s (1998:274) definition that it “is the human use of symbols and acts of intimidation and/or damaging (potentially lethal) physical force against living beings to gain or maintain dominance”. Violence is therefore a means of domination, connected with the uplifting of the self-worth of the victor among his/her peers or community and the lowering of the self-worth of the victim among his/her peers or community (von Trotha 2011:32) It is a means of overpowering, controlling and eliminating the enemy (Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008; Schlee 2009).

Ken Masuda (2009) and Sagawa (2010:95) have argued that the acquisition and display of firearms as is common among pastoralists in Eastern Africa is symbolism of power. Moreover, violence can be a means of showing one’s individual power among the group. Drawing from his research among the Banna of Ethiopia, Masuda (2009) argued that traditional Banna masculinity and power was constructed around spears and arrows. The introduction of guns in Banna society
simply replaced the instruments of power among male Banna people. Owning a gun therefore replaced owning a spear as a symbolic show of power among males. Warriors as individuals and as groups were socialized from an early age after initiation to show pride and distinction in their new roles as protectors of the home and the community. Spencer (1965:87) in his study among the Samburu, observed the transition from boyhood to manhood among the Samburu and noted the significance of vows that morans made to their mothers “to no longer eat meat seen by any married woman”. In essence the *Ilmugit*\(^{37}\) ceremony which occurs after circumcision of the new moran age-sets sought to instill group discipline and cohesion as it required young Samburu teenagers to ‘behave like men’ and prove their manhood by dissociating with women including their own mothers (Spencer 1965). Refusing to eat meat prepared by women as well as eating in groups with fellow morans therefore not only enhanced group cohesion but also fostered the collective power of the group. Similarly, Heald (2000) noted the critical role of cattle raiding among the Abakuria of Southern Kenya. To be a man meant to be a successful raider. Successful raiding is also linked to success in finding marriage partners and gaining respect among peers and the society at large. Hendrickson et al (1998:192) noted that among the Turkana, “warfare is a rite of passage” that society expects its warrior generation to undertake with pride and honour to their mothers and fathers but also in honour of their forbearers. Violence in this case is an avenue through which individual power is gained and shown to the rest of the community. Violence is used here as the building block of male identity in society (Abbink 1998: 278).

Writing on ethnic relations in the Karimojong neighbourhood Gray (2009:75) argued that the violence witnessed between the Karimojong and their neighbours perhaps indicated “shift in local power structures and control of resources”. Greiner (2013) also linked escalation of pastoralists’ violence among the Pokot and their neighbours to shifts in power structures among these groups. In essence the power to sanction violence among pastoralists is argued to have shifted from the hands of elders to those of elites. Given the centrality of militancy to intra and inter-group relations among pastoralists in Eastern Africa, the shifting of sanction powers from elders to elites presents a new phase through which the practice of violence is carried out, albeit with different aims. Still it presents violence as a dynamic agency as and an ‘everybody

\(^{37}\) Ceremony held to bless new generation of Samburu warriors by elders
resource’ that can be used to claim and preserve power among competing groups (von Trotha 2011).

Analysing the power that an individual acquires among his group by killing a person from an ‘enemy’ group, Poissonier (2010) argues that communities that glorify the killing of their neighbours as a means of upward social mobility should be viewed more as ‘favourite enemies’ rather than ‘traditional enemies’ as is described in anthropological publications. The term ‘favourite enemies’ is used here to denote the preference and socio-cultural meaning that killing members of certain groups bring to their neighbours as opposed to killing any individual from some distant lands. Poissonier (2010:237) in a study on the Konso of Ethiopia noted that: “the killing of ‘traditional enemies’ is beneficial for the well-being and prosperity of the land and the group”. The violence that leads to killing of the ‘traditional’ or ‘favourite’ enemy is associated with the meritorious complex (Poissonier 2010). This implies that the killing of a ‘traditional’ or ‘favourite’ enemy is a means through which warriors gain recognition evident through scarification (the creation of markings on the chest, shoulder and back as evidence of prowess at war and to convey that a person has killed the enemy in battle) and adoption of honorific titles.

Warriors acquiring weapons for individual use in raids are also able to contribute to collective aggressive or defensive use of weapons as a community. By demonstrating good skills in raiding, the use of a warrior’s gun in a raid demonstrates his power to gain livestock that enables his accumulation of wealth and guarantees his independence from his father. His power in the use of instruments of violence is also seen as a communal asset. The practice of violence is therefore a learned experience from the household where young boys are trained to use a rifle at the ages of four or five (Sagawa 2010:95). Socializing of young boys on how to use rifles is aimed at inculcating from an early age their role in the family as defenders of the family herds. Initiation and joining of warrior age-sets is marked by acquisition of personal rifles and the ability to engage in appropriative violence at the individual level (Sagawa 2010). This implies that the individual rifle is seen as a communal resource, just as the individual is part of the larger community. Hence the individual’s rifle can be deployed to bolster collective violence effort in
situations of inter-communal violence (Sagawa 2010). Participation in inter-communal violence and success in it brings pride and recognition to the individual.

Violence can also be a means of obtaining and preserving political power (von Trotha 2011:33). In Northern Kenya, past studies (Osamba 2000; Greiner 2013) have shown that aspiring political leaders have from time to time sponsored violent raids and other forms of conflicts to disenfranchise supporters of their would-be opponents to enable their success at the ballot box. Violent raids have also been organised by political leaders as a means of preserving political power as was the case in Marakwet during the 1997 General elections where the then ruling party KANU faced stiff competition from opposition groups (Eaton 2008). Violence as a means of attaining political power is also explored by Lynch (2015) who noted that cattle raiding as a practice has become highly politicized. She noted that in Turkana and Baringo Counties, contests over administrative boundaries are carried out through politically sponsored violent raids. Similar observations were recorded by Greiner (2013:218) who conceptualized violent raids among the Pokot and their neighbours as “a powerful political weapon” deployed to facilitate contestations over administrative boundaries, land disputes and to eliminate political competition of rival ethnic groups. High prevalence of violence therefore is indicative of the declining power of inter-communal conflict resolution mechanisms and the rise of political leaders and elites who have filled this space to manipulate warrior age-sets into violence for personal gain (Elwert et al 1999:22). Analysis of the various forms of power is critical for understanding forms of pastoral violence. It enables our definition of pastoral violence as a power contests between individuals or groups. Secondly, analysis of pastoralists’ violence as power contest helps in understanding the key interests of the actors in violence and the consequences of their violent actions. Further analysis of pastoralists’ violence as power contests enables us to connect violence with local and national politics. It further enables our understanding of changing power symbolism among pastoralists for instance from spears to automatic rifles.

4.8 Culture and Violence as Mutually Producing Phenomenon

To define culture I draw from Lederach (1995:9) who viewed it as “the shared knowledge and schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to the
social realities around them”. Arguing that traditional cattle raiding is a culturally accepted and shared tradition among pastoralists, Onyango (2010), Oba (1992) and Heald (2000) have outlined the core functions of cattle raiding as: a means of reaching societal threshold of adulthood among males, retaliation for past raids, attaining upward social mobility as a brave warrior, acquiring animals necessary for the payment of bride wealth, setting up the economic independence of an individual by acquiring livestock to build one’s herd and gaining territorial control of a particular grazing field. The practice of cattle raiding and its violent performance is therefore first all interpreted as a shared and commonly understood norm. In line with Galtung’s (1990:291) definition of cultural violence as “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence-exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics)-that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence”. In this regard violence among pastoralist groups in Northern Kenya is expected among the warrior age-sets. Success in violence bestows upon the perpetrator societal honor while cowardice and non-participation in violent raids bestow ridicule.

Sagawa (2010) noted the replacement of spear with guns among Daasanach young men. He noted the increased celebration and blessing of newly acquired guns as part of Banna culture. This is similar to Fukui and Markakis (1994) observation that culture may serve as a motivating factor in violent conflicts that are aimed at laying emphasis on the difference between groups since those who lead such wars of self-preservation are themselves preserved in the memories of their kin through folklore and heroism. This is also in concurrence with (Anderson 1999) who argued that in places where violence is used to access power and to reconfigure relationships between groups, there must be ‘staging areas’ where violence is expected and the threat of violence is real. Cultures of violence therefore designate specific actors and arenas for violence where the threat of violence is real. Pastoralists’ violence especially cattle raids are in themselves acts of cultural performance (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992). Preparation for raids are enacted and re-enacted through matches in military formations, shootings in the air and adorning of military uniforms by morans (Taabu 2013). These performances imply military preparedness to face the ‘enemy’ and courage to defend one’s people. As Abbink (1994) has argued, cattle raiding as a cultural practice produces elements of violence as parts of its practice and
performance but pastoralists violence that is supported by other actors who use warriors as pawns also produces a culture of its own. Analysis of culture and violence as mutually producing phenomenon enables our understanding of the crucial role that culture plays as a baseline of violent socialization among warrior age-sets in pastoralists societies. It further puts into perspective how violence narratives are used to socialize younger boys for future wars. Lastly, analysis of the interactions between culture and violence will help in our understanding of the changing cultural parameters of pastoralists’ violence and may help to explain the targeting of women, children and the aged in pastoralists violence today.

4.9 Violence and Place-Identity Relationships

Scholars such as Hauge (2007), Schlee (2009); Glowacki and Wrangham (2013) and Houtteman (2010) have argued that the built environment bestows upon its inhabitants a distinct identity that gives meanings to their existence. Inhabitants therefore protect their built environment either as their sphere of production, ancestral land (heritage) or territory in which they claim exclusivity or dominance against outsiders. How people identify with a particular place or area determines their dedication and commitment to protect it from others. Wood (2009) has argued that:

“The connection between space and identity is easily and intuitively grasped. Identity is always, or at least usually, formed in some sort of place, in space and time” (Wood 2009:229)

The notion of engaging in violence to reinforce one’s identity as distinct from that of the victim pertains, for example, to the Afar and Karrayu of Ethiopia (Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008:79). The authors argue that violence is “also reproduced through positive sanctions within the two groups as a young man’s failure to confront the ethnic ‘other’ is seen as shameful and, conversely, aggressive attitudes towards the ‘traditional enemy’ are recognized by members of the respective group”. My study seeks to put into context the nature and effect of violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya. It seeks to show that violent actions maybe ‘destructive’ to public order as functionalists have argued but in the case of Baragoi, it serves symbolically to galvanise groups based on ethnic identities. In this case, I will use the symbolic approach to
analysis of violence to point out its ‘constitutive’ meanings and purposes (Stewart and Strathern 2002:2).

Analysis of place-identity during the process of violence enables us to explain how violence adopts a ‘life of its own’ and its ability to create social and physical sanctions that restrict movements and redefine relationships between former neighbours. It further enables our understanding of the periodicity of violence. Place identity relationships further links acts of violence to power contests over spaces and enables our analysis of locations where violence occurs. This will improve our understanding of the changing nature of pastoralists’ violence as it isolates the situatedness of violent action. Lastly, place identity reveals the formative power of violence (Broch-Due 2005:27), it shows the role of violence in shaping human perceptions of identities and how the forging of identities can be the basis of violence, especially during periods when competition for resources is acute. For the purposes of this study, violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya is seen broadly as those culturally embedded threats, witchcraft, symbolism and physical harm that are carried out against defined ‘enemy’ groups and aimed at communicating incompatibility, assertion of dominance, cementing of in-group solidarity or obtaining political advantage by occasioning the eviction and displacement of others.

In summary this thesis is based on the following key propositions; that pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi is rooted on historical claims that have informed multi-layered contests fought over this social and spatial area from the pre-colonial times up to date. The historical claims have been used as a rallying point at different times to solidify group identities and mobilise warrior groups for violence. Secondly, while violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi has been ongoing over the last one and a half century, the meanings and purposes of these actions have changed depending on the immediate interests of these groups. Thirdly, the changing meanings and purposes of pastoralists’ violence has in effect been a driver for social change in Baragoi. Violence has therefore become a significant determinant of people’s behaviors patterns in terms of choice of residency, trading partners, trading routes, water sources, and even marriage partners.
Figure 3: Analytical Framework of the Study

Source: Author (based on analysis of field data)

Legend

1= Linkages to Structural factors in violence
2= Linkages to processual factors in collective violence
3= Violence as a Resource
4= Linkages to incompatible inter-communal conflict resolution systems
5= Communicative role of violence
6= Linkages to ethno-nationalism as a tool for violent mobilisation

As indicated in the analytical framework above, this study situates violence between the Samburu and Turkana primarily on historical claims to land and contestations over indigineity to the socio-physical space of Baragoi. Violent action is seen to be driven by cultural orientations aimed at capturing power in socio-political relationships among individuals and groups. As stated by Blystad (2005), acts of violence among pastoralists in Baragoi can be interpreted by
analysing the meanings conveyed in cultural practices and how these meanings evolve as groups negotiate and renegotiate their socio-political and economic positions and relations overtime.

Cattle raids are used primarily as a means for warrior mobilization and identity assertion among groups. Through raids warriors cement their relationships towards each other as a collective who must focus collectively on the ‘enemy’. In this way pastoralists violence is used as a collective means of protecting resources from others who don’t belong culturally. Cattle raids are therefore used as a ‘launching pad’ for those seeking power at the local, inter-communal or even national levels (Greiner 2013; Kagwanja 2001). Violence meted out during cattle raids is therefore primarily a means of capturing power, whether in the form of resources such as land, water, livestock or as a means to disenfranchise potential opponents from a common electoral area (Straight 2009). Pastoralists’ violence is facilitated especially at the collective levels through patron-client relationships between warriors and the local elite, who supply weapons, incite violence and even bail out those arrested for crimes such as cattle raiding. Violence is therefore enmeshed in identity wars where people engage in war to show their distinction from their neighbours (Schlee 2004). The state is a critical participant in the creation of the violent environment itself through marginalisation (GoK 1965; Mkutu 2007) and also through its weak policing systems which encourage informalization of violence through the KPRs (Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015). The above situations combine to precipitate socio-cultural change among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi as people are forced to adapt to new situations such as living in ‘security villages’, adoption of triple fencing, limiting their mobility to specific places, avoiding certain ‘unsafe’ markets, high dependency on relief supplies due to losses during raids and inability to sustain alternative livelihood options due to insecurity. ‘All out wars’ in pastoralists’ lands are most oftenly driven by revenge and political mobilization based on ethnic identities. Revenge serves as a catalyst for warrior mobilisation and as political capital through which political leaders embrace their opportunity to show their ‘protection credentials’ to their communities by facilitating war through the supply of arms and ammunition to maintain their communal hegemony over ‘enemy’ groups.
Locating Violence: Grazing Lands as Contested Spaces between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi

5.0 Introduction

This chapter attempts to explain the frequent violent raids between the Samburu and Turkana through the prism of grazing lands as contested spaces. I apply the concepts of space, culture and geographies of violence to argue that violence between pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya not only occur due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons but also as a symbolic power struggle over contested spaces such as grazing lands and water-points as spaces with socio-cultural meanings to groups. Grazing lands are analysed as spaces within which culture and violence mutually reinforce each other through socialization, practice and mobilisation. Grazing lands as arenas of violence play a significant role in the initiation, nurturing and establishment of war ethos in the psychology of warriors as well as physically as markers of territory. This chapter further explores how pastoralist warriors exploit their grazing lands as venues of violence, where plans for raids are nurtured and executed. Dominating pastoralists’ spaces guarantees survival and gives socio-cultural meanings to pastoralists’ way of life. Even though pastoralists’ violence stems from the culture of raiding, today’s violent cattle raids are aimed at establishing dominance over strategic geographical spheres of production and protecting places of identity. This shows that violence among the Samburu and Turkana is applied as a means through which strategic grazing lands are acquired and protected during the drought periods and also as a means of protecting group identities by defending places of socio-cultural meanings to specific groups.

It is notable that violence in Northern Kenya takes place in specific conflict corridors. These include grazing lands, inter-communal water pans, rivers and manyattas. Furthermore, recent experiences from Baragoi reveal that violent raids occur during specific periods of the year when access and user rights to grazing lands are fiercely contested and sometimes fatally negotiated. While the nature of these contests can be classified through the scarcity thesis as advanced by Homer-Dixon (1994) and his colleagues, the contest over resources in Baragoi has been ongoing for over a century and these contests are not just about water and pasture but also the historical claims of indigineity to the geographical and social space of Baragoi (Stigand 1910; Lamphear
The location of violent conflicts between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi conform to Straight et al (2016) concept of ntoror among the Samburu. As argued by Straight et al, ntoror are places of sweet grass that attracts claims and counter claims of ownership and indigeneity thus becoming contested landscapes of conflicts. Accordingly, Straight et al (2016:168) argue that: “Ntoror illustrates pastoralist landscapes as agentive: inspiring intercommunity encounter, conflict, and the creation of new identities in the aftermath of environmental and human-made disaster”. Thus the concept of Ntoror links pastoralists’ landscapes with their histories, thus placing the landscape as an active agent which influences the conflicts that pastoralists engage in. Contests over grazing lands in Northern Kenya denote efforts to dominate strategic spheres of production at critical moments for pastoralists’ livelihoods (Watts 2001). The violence witnessed during the dry season in Baragoi therefore represents spatial contests over power to access and user rights to grazing lands. The production and reproduction of violence through cattle raids in Northern Kenya is due to the available physical space coupled with limited state security. This gives opportunities to sub-state actors to deploy violence as a means for negotiating access to scarce resources as well as preserving the physical space within which the resource is located for individual or collective good.

5.1 Historical Background to Contests over Grazing Lands: The Turkana Expansion

The contest over grazing lands in Samburu County might have begun in the late 1800s, when members of the Turkana community moved to Baragoi due to drought. Indeed Captain Stigand (1910), a British Colonial Army Officer and a big game hunter during the early colonial period noted the presence of the Turkana in Baragoi when he made his journey from Nairobi to Abyssinia through Northwestern Kenya. He was also informed of the tension and conflict between the Samburu and Turkana pastoralists over grazing lands and pasture by the Ogiek who at that time lived in Lesirkan. In his documentation of pastoralists’ relations in Baragoi, Stigand noted the fears of the Samburu who at that time were weak in military organisation as compared to the Turkana (Spencer 1965). The bone of contention between the two groups was the grazing lands of El Barta plains.
Stigand (1910) although a passer-by found himself thrust into mediation of pastoralists conflicts between the Samburu and Turkana. He attempted to demarcate pastoralists’ spaces for the Samburu and Turkana respectively. He designated Baragoi River as the boundary between the two groups. From the arbitration efforts of Captain Stigand, one can observe that disputes over pastoral space between these two groups were ongoing over one century ago. The demarcation of ethnic/resource boundaries between these two groups and the need to access pastures during the dry season still contributes to pastoralists’ violence today. Further, the designation of specific resource areas as exclusive to one group is evident today in Baragoi and is a great source of conflict as pastoralists tend to seek pasture for the livestock to avoid decimation during droughts.

The colonial administration noted that even though the Turkana could be assumed to have originated from Turkana County, they were found in Baragoi at the onset of colonial rule. Therefore they had some rights to share resources in the same pastoralists’ space as the Samburu. Their settlement in Baragoi was based on the following reasons as advanced by colonial administrators:

i. They were here before the country was administered. Captain Stigand in his book “To Abyssinia through Unknown land” tells of settling grazing boundaries at Elbarta between the two tribes.

ii. The Samburu being terrified of both Abyssinian raiders from the North and Turkana raiders from the West will not live far away from the Government Boma at Barsaloi even though a detachment of men is kept at Lesergoi North of Elbarta.

iii. The Turkana at Elbarta act as a buffer between raiders and the Samburu to the South and the Rendille to the East.

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38 KNA DC/SAM/3/1 (1931) Present Policy regarding the tribes in the Vicinity of the Horr Valley, from the District Commissioner, Northern Frontier Province, Isiolo to the Provincial Commissioner, Northern Frontier Province, Isiolo, 1st April 1931

39 39 KNA/PC/NFD/4/1/8 (1922) Settlement of Certain Turkana in the Northern Frontier District, Office of Officer in Charge of N.F.D to the Honourable, the Colonial Secretary, Colony of Kenya, El Barta, April 26th 1922.
iv. There is no grazing to spare in Turkana proper and this area is free and can be spared by the Samburu

v. The Turkana have behaved extremely well over the eviction of the tribe under extreme provocation

The battle over Baragoi grazing lands between the Turkana and Samburu was of significant concern to the colonial administrators; Mr. Kittermaster who administered the area from Barsaloi is recorded to have sent away the Turkana from El Barta grazing fields due to their constant “quarrelling with the Samburu” in 1912. Still colonialists were later convinced that apart from the fact that they found the Samburu and Turkana within the Baragoi grazing fields, the Turkana although deemed to be “outsiders” would remain in Baragoi but under the following stringent conditions in regards to grazing:

i. That they were not to go to the grazing or waters on Nysheshe [today called Naisischo] or those under the Mathews Range. That they could water on the Guilguil River (Baragoi river) and graze their stock at no point more than two hours to the South of this River on the Elbarta plains. That they could use the water at Lesorgoi if they did not interfere with the Wandorobo Samburu who watered there on occasions. That they could go as far North as Laisamis beyond Lalerok but must not go as far as Sarima which water was reserved for the Government and the Rendille camel men. That they were not to visit or graze the slopes of Mt. Nyiro or Kulal.

ii. That they were to act as a buffer for raids and protect the Rendill, El Molo Wanderobo or Samburu

iii. That they were not to kill game

iv. That they were to be registered and would be taxed at an low rate

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40 Colonial administrator in charge of Samburu, then based in Barsaloi in 1912

v. That if they failed in any of these provisions they should remember that even though they have the right to graze in El Barta in the eyes of the Government it was Samburu country and they would be turned out at any time should they prove to be troublesome.

That they were not to have any other Turkana as they would be given no further grazing grounds in the N.F.D.

The restrictions placed on the Turkana herders as stated above captures the need to preserve pasturelands for the Samburu with the hindsight of the colonialists that the grazing land primarily belonged to the Samburu and the Turkana were treated as second class inhabitants of Baragoi. However, these restrictions did not take into account the need to access specific rich grazing lands during periods of drought. Further in creating rules that restricted movement of pastoralists and their livestock, these regulations ignored the significance of mobility to nomadic pastoralism. The battle for pastoralists’ space and the violent contests in the grazing lands of Baragoi stem from these historical restrictions which did not allow for the nurturing and evolution of local inter-communal institutions of resource sharing. These restrictions hinged on the power of the colonial government or state authorities to administer or supervise access to grazing lands something which the colonialists did effectively and thus limited pastoralists violence at that time. The upsurge in violence among the Turkana and Samburu after independence to date points to weak or ineffective institutional capacity to arbitrate in pastoralists’ socio-spatial disputes.

Subsequent letters from colonial administrators further attempted to define the social-spatial spaces of different pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. For instance in 1947, the District Officer of Samburu-Maralal, in his communication with the Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley Province, quoted an agreement reached on inter-ethnic boundaries by earlier administrators at South Horr. In this agreement, it was stated that:

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“The El Barta Turkana might use water at Sirima, Lysamis, but they shall not use water anywhere else on this boundary; they shall not graze east of the boundary line, and they shall not make any use of the Horr Valley or Ol Doinyo Mara”.

The quote above further point to the attempts of colonial administrators to restrict the movement of Turkana herders in their in search for pasture and water. Given that Sarima is a distance of 100km from Baragoi and Ol Doinyo Mara is between Baragoi and Sarima, it is inconceivable that the Turkana were expected to pass through the Horr valley all the way to Sarima. This shows a very top-down administrative approach to rangeland management. There is no evidence that the colonial administrators attempted to involve local community elders in formulating resource sharing pacts between the two groups. It is also worthy to note that despite the fact that the Turkana were living at Kawap at the foot of Mt. Nyiro, they were expected to move with animals all the way to Sarima for water, in spite of the abundance of water around Mt. Nyiro and river Nasiischo. The battle for socio-spatial spaces among the Samburu and Turkana is therefore very much linked to their own survival as pastoralists but also influenced by the role of government administrators in drawing arbitrary resource boundaries that not only limited livestock mobility but also consolidated territorial claims leading to exclusivity of certain groups from previously shared resources.

Later in 1956, the movement of Turkana herders in and out of El Barta grazing fields in Baragoi continued to be a matter of grave concern to colonial administrators. This led to conflict between the Turkana who were perceived as “outsiders” and Samburu who were viewed as “owners” of the land. The role of drought in the movement of the Turkana in and out of El Barta plains is further captured in an annual report by the District Commissioner of Maralal:

“There is no doubt that the creeping infiltration of Turkana into and across Samburu still continues. When the El Barta plains became completely denuded of grazing owing to the lack of rain much of the Turkana stock disappeared over the boundary into Lodwar

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43 KNA/DC/SAM/1/4 (1956) Samburu District Annual Report: Intertribal Relations-Turkana
district and at the end of the year when the latter district was suffering more severely larger numbers have infiltrated back into Samburu”.

The movement of the Turkana from Lodwar district to Baragoi is therefore linked to weather patterns and the survival of livestock. Their movement into Baragoi can also be seen as ‘invasion’ of socio-spatial spaces designated for the Samburu through colonial ethnic boundaries. The intensity of contests over grazing lands through raids seems to have gone a notch higher after 1960. The District Commissioner of Maralal district in his annual report of 1961\textsuperscript{44} noted the following situation:

“The Samburu-Turkana relations were generally bad, though more on a tribal than a personal basis. The Samburu demanded the removal of the Turkana to the west of the Suguta, including all those who have over the past 36 years established a prescriptive right to the grazing concession to the east of Suguta. This demand was not meant to cure the ancient tribal animosities, and it followed a year when the two had given equal offense in the tally of stock raids and petty barbs”.

The quote above captures the entry of political dimension to the battle for socio-spatial spaces between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. In 1961 there was a general election in Kenya and the elected Member of Parliament of Samburu district was a Turkana called Peter Areman. He won not because the Turkana were in majority but because by that time a good number of El Barta Turkana had moved to Maralal and settled in Loikas area, given that very few Samburu voted during this election, the Turkana candidate was elected and this irked Samburu politicians who started agitating for the relocation of the Turkana population ‘beyond Suguta valley\textsuperscript{45}'. The narrative of moving the Turkana beyond Suguta valley is still used by today’s politicians to incite violence during the electoral period. From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the battle over pastoralists’ spaces in Baragoi is over a century-old. It is rooted in historical contests precipitated by colonial ethnic boundary making that designated Baragoi as primarily Samburu territory. These contests of spaces have further been exacerbated by droughts and the necessity

\textsuperscript{44} KNA/DC/SAM/1/4 (1961) Samburu District Annual Report: Inter-Tribal Affairs-Samburu-Turkana.

\textsuperscript{45} Euphemism for relocation back to Turkanaland
for mobility of pastoralists’ livestock in search for ample pastures to sustain their livelihoods. Pastoralists’ violence therefore denotes power contests over socio-spatial spaces of production replete with socio-cultural meanings of pastoralists’ memories and identities as distinct groups of people. In the following section, I aim to critically analyse the role of space in the production and construction of violence in contested pastoralists grazing lands. To achieve this, I integrate geographical and anthropological approaches to space, culture, riskscapes and warscapes to capture the interactions between humans and their environments in the construction of violence.

5.2 Contested Spaces and the Production/Construction of Violence

Violence has been described as a practice that has social and spatial dimensions (Tyner 2012: ix). Acts of violence aim to regulate the behavior of people through space (Tyner 2012: ix). Foucault (1979:148) argued that “spaces provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links”. Foucault (1979) envisaged spaces as static and passive arenas that influence human behavior. He however implied that humans do not influence spaces. Michel de Certeau (1984:117) saw spaces as “a practiced places” denoting the interaction between forms such as an empty office building with the people who seek services in it. Georg Simmel (1950) argued that space contains the following distinct properties: exclusivity; arguing that two bodies cannot occupy the same space; space therefore denotes attempts at domination and control. He also argued that space can be seen as boundaries that guide human experience and social interaction. In this sense Simmel saw space as pockets of sub cultures which include specific groups of people for specific purposes while excluding the rest of society. He further argued that social formations arise out of the interactions in social space. Given the exclusivity that social space provides for its members, certain cultural practices draw in specific sub groups that subscribe to the shared practice. Those who are admitted to such social and physical spaces may be admitted on the basis of age, gender, ethnic identity or a given cultural attribute such as bravery or prowess in hunting. For Simmel, the management of ‘personal space’ in situations where one or more distinct groups were within each other’s proximity precipitate confrontations as one group threatens the personal space of the other. Simmel noted that change of location through nomadic migrations altered the relationships between groups as immigrants were seen as ‘strangers’ and their utilization of production areas resisted and
frowned upon by the locals. The ‘strangers’ were seen as encroachers within the productive sphere of the natives. Migration of encroachers can therefore be argued to lead to contests over social and physical spaces which catalyse societal change in terms of forced movement of people due to insecurity within certain spaces.

Witsenburg and Zaal (2012:3) defined “space’ as a concrete area, identifiable on a map, with x and y coordinates, where things happen between people, where the natural environment is visible, where society’s interactions with nature occurs, where human structures are built, and where people move between concrete points”. This definition depicts the socio-physical relations that take place within spaces; however it doesn’t take into account, the relationships that are nurtured when humans own a space and make it a place of identity. Mulugeta and Hagmann (2008:73) in their study of the Karrayu pastoralists in Ethiopian Awash Valley described pastoralists’ space in the following terms; “pastoralist space comprises a territorial and a symbolic dimension. Geographically, it designates the incessantly contracting borders of the Karrayu home territory and the bitter struggle to defend rangeland resources against encroaching adjacent groups, agro-commercial interests and conservationists. Symbolically, it refers to a landscape of meanings that is driven by governmental and outsider recognition of and herders’ identification with ‘pastoralist identity”. In the case of Baragoi, I analyse pastoralists’ space as the socio-physical areas where pastoralists groups interact as collectivities, the places where they derive their identities and memories, their places of rituals and ceremonies, grazing lands, manyattas, livestock corridors, salt licks, livestock markets, cattle dips and water resources used by their livestock in the wet and dry seasons.

Wood (2007a:20) argued that both ‘built’ and ‘imagined’ spaces are critical for the ‘production and construction of violence’. According to him, space is the location of violence and provides the motivation and sometimes even the strategy for violent action. Further, he argues that “space is also connected to its construction, the ways that physically forceful acts are individually and collectively interpreted” (2007a:20-21). According to Wood there exists a strong linkage between space and violence given that violence takes places within defined spaces; territories. Violence can therefore be used as a tool for drawing physical and social boundaries between
groups and individuals (Wood 2007a:21). In defence of territories, violence is therefore a marker of group dominance over physical and social spaces and the resources contained within its boundaries. Wood describes the type of violence used to exclude specific groups out of specific territories as “exclusionary violence” (2007a:24). In his view, exclusionary violence is not only used to establish dominance or exclusivity in resource use but also to demonstrate power over particular spaces of production. Violence over socio-physical spaces are therefore power contests pitting one group against the other. The significance of space for the production of violence is further emphasized by Anderson (1999) who argued that for violence to occur there must be ‘staging areas’ where the threat of violence is real and expected. Staging areas in this case are socio-physical spaces where the practice of violence is cultural legitimate. Staging areas further prescribe individuals or groups who have the legitimate use of violence within these spaces as well as the instruments of violence.

Spaces also give socio-cultural meanings to groups. Mutsotso (2013) noted the role of spaces as avenues of cultural rites that apply violent behavior as a means of upward social mobility. In this case, performance of violent acts in these spaces as a rite of passage admits community members to the next phase of life. The practice of violence within these physical and social spaces not only bestows honor and respect among one’s kin but also places upon them the duty to practice violent action in defense of the social and physical space against the intrusion of those who have not attained similar status but also against those defined as the ‘enemy’. Culture therefore establish strict rules of behavior among group members and legitimize the use of violence to maintain and defend it against outsiders. Foucault (2004) linked violence along the borders with social elite’s pursuance of influence and their attempts to control areas of strategic production. Violence in this case is used to acquire power and influence over geographical and social spaces by elites. Deploying violence to gain exclusive use of geographical spaces can be interpreted as the use of exclusionary force to establish “dominance over spaces” (Wood 2007a:24). Contests over grazing lands among pastoralists groups was also noted as the genesis of violence outbreak between Garre and Degodia pastoralists in North Eastern Kenya (Schlee 2009:217) in 1998. The use of violence can therefore be aimed to assert hegemony over ‘enemy’ communities and entrench exclusive utility of certain socio-physical productive spaces.
Violence can also be a mechanism through which society is ordered. Through violent action distinctions between “them” and “us” is established based on ethnic identities, gender, age etc (Lefebvre 1991). Violence therefore serves as a means through which social stratification of society is established often with the aim of preserving of group interests. Contests over spaces can also be seen in the context of ‘mijoni’. ‘Mijoni’ is a term used to imply no man’s land among the Samburu. Mijoni are areas rich in grazing land but fiercely contested between rival groups to such an extent that no single group has managed to exert exclusive control. As a result they become spaces of insecurity, where no group dares graze their cattle (Witsenburg & Zaal 2012). This ultimately alters the local ecosystem of the area to the detriment of local pastoralists’ livelihoods. Violence in this case serves as a means for effecting environmental change through the alteration of local ecosystems, thus contracting pasturelands and limits the mobility of pastoralists. If violence is territorial and includes the aim of gaining exclusivity in use of resources, then it must be seen as a competition for power and a means to rally collectivities into a common agenda. In this case, space then is the venue within which the struggle for control and access to the vital resources is contested. Lastly, Broch-Due (2005:15-16) has linked density of violence with topography and intimacy, thus implying that wars are fought over and determined by built environments as well as social relationships among the residents. Topography, she argues determines the safety options that those fleeing war can retreat to in order to ‘normalise’ their lives as refugees or internally displaced persons. Intimacy of war on the other part implies the closeness of relations between combatants. Are they strangers to one another? Closeness in social relations between actors in war is argued to play a significant part in the levels of hatred, frequency of war and the choice of revenge technologies. Revenge violence is therefore not only driven by the need “to get even” but also in relations to whether the ‘enemy’ shares the same topographical and intimate space. In the next section I analyse the ways in which culture and violence mutually produce violence in space.

5.3 Culture and Violence as Mutually Producing Phenomenon in Space

In discussing the linkage between culture and violence Wood defines culture as “historically accumulated collections of beliefs and practices which are socially produced and aimed at meeting psychological needs” (Wood 2007b:3). This implies that human behavior is guided by
the socio-cultural and the environmental context within which the human is situated. Culture prescribes rules of engagement with other members of society within certain geographical locations (2007b: 4). Culture may also define how people of different cultural orientations treat each other as neighbours, strangers or competitors. Culture therefore is crucial in determining and shaping human relations especially their identity and meanings of their identities in relation to their socio-spatial spaces. Galtung (1990:291) defined cultural violence as those aspects of cultures that are used to normalize or legitimize violent action among groups. In other words cultural violence are norms, mores and other forms of human socializations that accepts violence as a means to some ends within specific spaces. Similarly, Wood argues that violence incidences are interpreted through the prism of culture (2007b:4). Thus culture is a medium for legitimizing violent action among groups.

Wood views violence as inevitable consequence of socio-spatial relationships in society. He attributes the existence of violence in human relations as critical to sustenance, status and security needs of different groups (2007b:7). Violence is therefore a means through which territories can be gained or protected as well as a means through which group sustenance can be guaranteed. Culture thus prescribes the nature of ‘accepted’ violence, its rules, its location and the intended purposes. Cultures further shape the means, meanings, location and purposes of violence. Wood (2007b:7-8) argues that culture designates what types of violence is acceptable and which ones are prohibited. He further states that when a culture legitimizes violent action as normal, it assigns particular actors to carry out the said violent action under certain circumstances within specific spaces. Cultures of violence are therefore historically developed, socialized into the potential actors and later passed on from one generation to another (Wood 2007b:7). Cultures of violence are dynamic and change depending on the times, technology and violence potential in every generation. In legitimating elements of violent behaviors in society, cultures of violence are enhanced and celebrated as a good thing. Cultures therefore not only legitimize violent actions buts they also project these action into the larger society.

Wood (2007b:10-11) further linked the legitimization of violence within some cultures as an avenue through which male community members compete, preserve or gain power in society.
Violence is therefore a known means of acquiring or preserving power. The power to be acquired or competed for must be something culturally sanctioned like the need to get a wife or household sustenance. The cultural need to get a wife goes hand in hand with the need to raid livestock to meet that goal. Through cattle raids therefore violence is used to gain livestock to meet a critical socio-cultural threshold. Similarly, with the increase in the proliferation of arms and the commercialisation of raids, shrewd businessmen hire warriors who are culturally mandated to conduct cattle raids to do so not for socio-cultural reasons but for commercial gains. Culture in this case is therefore used to gain economic power. Vengeance as a legitimate means of correcting injustice among many cultures is also used by pastoralists’ communities to correct past wrongs or to restore the status quo (Wood 2007b:10). Revenge raids are therefore seen as normal and expected occurrences among pastoralists groups. The normality of revenge further entrenches violence in cattle raids as a means of correcting wrongs, acquiring socio-economic power and prestige in inter-communal relationships.

Among communities that legitimize violence as part of their socio-cultural practices, the physical pain inflicted upon initiates through circumcision or scarification and the place of the violent action are argued to have symbolic meaning to the specific cultural groups. Such spaces of cultural violence are not open to every member of the community but only to those that are “ritually authorized and empowered by the social collective” to perform the violence that transforms a member of society from one age-group to another, to transition a member to a higher social class, or even to admit one back into the fold of the social collective (Broch-Due 2005:19). Socio-cultural transformations of relationships are therefore legitimized through violence within specific spaces. Acts of violence within socio-cultural spaces therefore not only help in building group identity among initiates but also in creating a bond between initiates and the place of initiation, thus enhancing its own identity with the transformation of the lives of its initiates. Violence in this sense is used to create and sustain the bond between humans as social beings and their environments. In expounding on violence over social spaces, the next section analyses grazing lands as landscapes of certain uncertainty to emphasise on the need for inhabitants to negotiate constant risks posed by the built environment and also by the strategies deployed by actors to negotiate their relationships in a harsh environment.
5.4. Grazing Lands as Landscapes of Certain Uncertainty

Contests over grazing lands have the capacity to transform these productive spaces into “territorial units characterized by mutual interactions between its elements whereas risk are regarded as structuring phenomena that shape the landscape into a riskscape” (Müller-Mahn 2013: xviii). This means that the insecurity that prevails in contested grazing lands thus transform landscapes into “risky territories” which avails advantages and disadvantages to different actors within pastoral areas. The nature or severity of the contests has an impact on human and livestock mobility depending on the risk levels of attack or raid. The levels of risk further shape human choices in terms of weapons for defence. The uncertainty and fear that one faces in grazing lands therefore transform grazing lands into places of high risk in which expectations of personal harm is high. Müller-Mahn has defined riskscapes as “landscapes of multi-layered and interacting risks that represent both the materiality of real risks and the perceptions, knowledge and imaginations of people who live in that landscape and continuously shape and reshape its contours through their daily activities” (2013:xvii). Contested landscapes are characterized with formations that endow actors with military advantage such as hilly areas and busy shrubs for easy camouflage. Further, contested landscapes also present areas critical for livelihood sustenance such as good grazing fields and water sources. On the other hand, landscapes under contests are places of ‘inevitable congregation’ since everyone seeks to utilise the common resource thereby increasing the probability of violent contests in the absence of institutional frameworks of resource sharing. Contested landscapes are therefore areas fraught with fear brought about by the violent nature of the contest but also by the strategic location of the area of the contest. Grazing lands as contested landscapes therefore play a significant role in shaping violence that is carried out for material purposes but it also shapes people’s perception of the specific area. Contested areas gain their own reputation as ‘dangerous places’ through human experience of violence. The timing and nature of violence expected in contested landscapes is carried through human memories of past victims and projected to the larger society. Grazing lands therefore are not just landscapes of material contests but also landscapes of violent memories through which human experience is nurtured and future violent action is planned and executed as a compensation for past ‘injustices’.
Nordstrom (1997) introduced the concept of warscapes to imply places of extreme brutality and spaces of insecurity characteristic of civil war situations. She argued that cultures of violence emerge in warscapes as a dynamic reality which shapes and is shaped continually by all actors within and without the locality of the war (1997:123). Warscapes as integral structures of violence are thus critical in shaping the behaviors of actors and victims of violence. The concept of warscapes therefore denotes the daily reality of risk and uncertainty occasioned by insecurity within social spaces. Korf et al (2010) linked the social construction of ‘warscapes’ to the practice of violence. They argued that warscapes have “differentiated arenas, networks and connections of relational spaces in which distinct human trajectories coexist” (2010:386). Warscapes can therefore be seen as areas of socio-physical contests which are part of networks of relationships that promote the use of violence in pursuit of power for territorial or other political purposes.
The map in Fig. 4 above shows the contested grazing and water-points along the Turkana-Samburu border in Baragoi. From the map it can be seen that these contested spaces are all reserve grazing lands that herders use only when they are faced with major droughts. The use of
these spaces leads to the concentration of a large number of pastoralists within these areas precipitating competition over resource use coupled with claims of resource ownership in these areas. Violence during these times of ecological stress is high given the multiplicity of claims and the levels of illegal arms available. In the next section, I apply the above concepts to analyse pastoralists’ violence in the grazing lands of Baragoi.

5.5 Conceptualizing Grazing Lands as Contested Spaces in Baragoi

Drawing from the ideas of Witsenburg and Zaal (2012), Wood (2007a; 2007b), de Certeau (1984) and Simmel (1950), this chapter conceptualizes grazing lands in Baragoi as four distinct spaces: livelihood spaces, socio-cultural spaces, territorial spaces and political spaces. First of all, violent cattle raids in Baragoi have been occasioned by competition over pasture and water resources during the dry seasons leading to violent shoot-outs in specific grazing lands along the Turkana-Samburu ethnic boundary. This finding conforms to that of Ember et al (2012:159) whose analysis of raiding in Turkana County showed that dryer months have a higher intensity of violence contrary to the finding of Witsenburg and Adano (2009) in Marsabit who had argued that raids occur mostly during the wetter months. These contests are therefore partly triggered by the need to access or preserve livelihood spaces. This is well captured in a police signal form Baragoi Police Station (2011):

“Assistant Chief of Kawap location a Turkana male adult aged 40 years reported that unknown numbers of raiders suspected to be Turkana stole unknown numbers of goats and camels from Rendille herders who had relocated to Kawap area in Samburu North from Marsabit in search of pasture” (Baragoi Police Station 23rd September 2011)

In their study that linked topography of pastoralists’ lands and violence, Adem et al (2012:11) found that, plains (grazing lands) are places of strategic importance to pastoral livelihoods. In their view “plains serve not only as key rangelands but also as important staging grounds for herd splitting and coalescing in response to changing resource conditions”. Secondly, grazing lands are venues for cultural rights exclusive to particular groups. The contest over these grazing lands may not necessarily be over the rights to graze in particular areas but to protect specific holy places such as mountains or rivers where warriors from specific groups are circumcised.
Thirdly, grazing lands are further seen by warriors as territorial space exclusive to them as ethnic units. The Samburu see the whole of Baragoi and indeed Samburu County as their territory and the competition with the Turkana of Baragoi during the dry spell imply invasion of their land by ‘outsiders’ even though the Turkana have shared these resources with the Samburu for over a century. The Turkana are “no owners of soil” to paraphrase Simmel (1950:3). Lastly, warriors perceive grazing lands as their political space, the space where the political leaders meet them to strategise on how to subdue the enemy for instance through the provision of arms and ammunition.

Figure 5: Pastoralists Conceptualisation of Pastures

5.5.1 Contested Grazing Lands of Baragoi

In Baragoi contests over ‘productive spaces’ occur during the drought periods. Contrary to the findings by Witsenburg & Adano (2009) that shows pastoralists groups are most likely to cooperate and share their limited resources during periods of drought, my observation in Baragoi disapproves this notion. In Baragoi, access to pasture and water is seen in ethnic terms and pastoralists from time to time use ethnic identities to allow or deny other users access to vital productive resources. For pastoralists’ livelihoods, pasture and water are seen as strategic production resources during periods of drought and thus access or lack of access to these
resources is key to explaining pastoralists’ violence (Lefebvre 1991; Wood 2007a). Further violent raids during the drought period are not necessarily aimed at replenishing the herds. This is because at this time, many herds are physically emaciated. Nonetheless raids during droughts are used to demarcate spheres of influence and to protect specific grazing fields from the encroachment of one’s ‘enemies’ (Wood 2007b).

Many at times the few raided animals may be sold locally to butcheries in the local urban areas or the warriors would just slaughter and eat a raided animal within the grazing field (Fleisher 2000). In the dry seasons in Baragoi, the Turkana and Samburu engage in armed contests over exclusive access to Ngoriche, Mbukoi, Kawap, Polytechnic, Marti and Pillay grazing fields along the Marti-South Horr highway. The contested nature of these grazing lands is captured in interviews below:

“Lnkuume (Turkana) do not belong here. This is our place and our cattle can graze anywhere in Samburuland” (Interview Samburu moran, October 2014 Ngoriche hills)

“Ngor (Samburu) are invading our territory. This road separates our pastures from theirs. But because of their politicians, they are coming in large numbers from Wamba and Archers Post to use our pasture while they preserve theirs for use once ours is over. This is why we raid them so that they can be afraid and move to their side of the (ethnic) border.”(Interview Turkana moran October 2014, Ngoriche hills)

The notion of space as a venue for social interaction (Simmel 1950) and a territorial sphere (Wood 2007a) within which pastoralists strive for exclusivity for their survival is well demonstrated in Baragoi. Nomadic pastoralism thrives on mobility of livestock which requires vast grassland (space) for livestock production. In Baragoi, specific spaces are often contested during the drought periods. Access and use of these spaces by the Samburu and Turkana pastoralists guarantees the continued life of pastoralists’ households and their livestock. Pastoralists’ violence manifests of socio-spatial contests over exclusivity to grazing lands among the Samburu and Turkana. This is illustrated by the frequency of raids in specific pasturelands in Baragoi during the long drought of the year 2011 as shown in the table below:
Table 3: Grazing lands as Arenas of Raids from 2010-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Pastureland</th>
<th>Occurrence</th>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21st November 2010</td>
<td>Naagis</td>
<td>Report of a Samburu raid of Turkana cattle where one Turkana herder was killed and two children injured at Naagis grazing field.</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd December 2010</td>
<td>Marti</td>
<td>Report of a banditry attack by 20 Pokot raiders on Samburu herders at Marti. 7 cattle and 300 goats stolen.</td>
<td>Pokot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th February 2011</td>
<td>Lbaaogol</td>
<td>Report of attempted bandit attack of Samburu herdiers at Lbaaogol grazing field by Turkana raiders where one raider was shot dead.</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th February 2011</td>
<td>Naiyanatir</td>
<td>Report of banditry attack by Pokot raiders on Turkana herdiers at Naiyanatir grazing field in Nachola location. One Turkana herder injured.</td>
<td>Pokot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th February 2011</td>
<td>Mutirata</td>
<td>Report of banditry attack by Turkana raiders on Samburu herdiers at Mutirata grazing field in Suiyan village. One KPR killed and his gun taken by raiders.</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th February 2011</td>
<td>Lowang</td>
<td>Report of shooting of a Pokot raider after Pokots attempted to raid Turkana herdiers at Lowang grazing field next to Nakuprat village.</td>
<td>Pokot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th June 2011</td>
<td>Ndonyongere Mbokoi</td>
<td>Report of a raid at Ndonyongere Mbokoi grazing field where Pokot raiders attacked Samburu herdiers and killed one Samburu herder and made away with unknown number of livestock</td>
<td>Pokot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th June 2011</td>
<td>Ndonyo Nkoroto</td>
<td>Attempted raid at Ndonyo Nkoroto grazing field by about 100 raiders from Turkana. One Turkana raider was killed.</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th June 2011</td>
<td>Ngoriche hills</td>
<td>Raid and rape of a Samburu girl 17 years old by Turkana raiders. 5 camels where stolen from her.</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd July 2011</td>
<td>Nalepito</td>
<td>Report of Pokot bandit attack at Nalepito area in Parkati village. 30 raiders made away with 2786 shoats. Two Turkana morans shot dead.</td>
<td>Pokot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th July 2011</td>
<td>Lasam</td>
<td>Report of 200 Samburu raiders who attacked Lasam area of the Rendille and killed 9 people, injured 3 people and stole unknown numbers of livestock</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th August 2011</td>
<td>Lkayo</td>
<td>Report of a Pokot raid at Lkayo grazing field in Parkati location. A 60 years old Turkana man was killed while his son was injured. Unknown numbers of livestock stolen</td>
<td>Pokot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd September 2011</td>
<td>Karuwaton</td>
<td>Report of a Turkana raid of Rendille herdiers who had crossed into Samburu North in search of pasture at Karuwaton in Kawap location. Unknown numbers of stock stolen. Two goats shot dead.</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th December 2011</td>
<td>Soit Ngiron</td>
<td>Report of cattle raid by the Turkana at Soit Ngiron in Lesirkan location. One Samburu was shot dead while three others sustained bullet wounds.</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s compilation based on Kenya Police Signals from Baragoi Police Station (2014)
The table above indicates that competition over grazing pastures in Baragoi is high during the dry seasons. This is often between the months of October to early March and between May to August. Violent raids are therefore dependent upon seasonality. During my fieldwork conflict in the grazing lands flared in late October 2014. Part of the reason for the flare-up of violence was that there was drought all over Samburu County and warriors from the other two districts; Samburu East and Samburu Central moved with their livestock to join their kin in Baragoi, this brought tension as the Samburu groups moved into the Turkana side of the grazing lands especially in Kawap area. The Turkana argued that this was a strategy devised by the Samburu to exhaust their grazing land while preserving their own for future use while the Samburu warriors argued that they were in Samburu land and therefore had the exclusive right to utilize their grazing lands within Samburu County without consulting the Turkana.

From the table above we can observe that in the 14-month period that is covered, 14 people were shot dead during violent raids in pasturelands while 12 others sustained bullet wounds. This point to a high stakes contest that prevails in grazing lands and the ‘normalcy’ within which violence is used to negotiate access to socio-spatial pastoralists’ spaces among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. The effect of violence in terms of deaths, injuries, rapes and livestock lost points to the agency of violence in achieving specific ends and ultimately in altering socio-political relations between groups. It further points to the role of pastoralists’ space in the production and construction of violent behavior. All the deaths and injuries occurred due to the necessity to carry firearms in the grazing lands. Grazing lands as areas where ammunitions are sold further increases the probability of outbreak of violence whenever access to pasturelands is contested.
5.6 Illegal Arms and Ammunition Trade in Pastoralists Space

Grazing lands as areas in which illegal arms and ammunition are sold and used for practice, defense or attack purposes can be seen in police reports from Baragoi Police Station. In interviews with morans, KPRs and police officers it was established that morans are increasingly engaged in the sale of ammunition to fellow morans in the grazing fields. Such incidences point to the changing nature of pasture lands from contested productive spaces into arenas for transactions of the implements of violence and as warrior’s collective space for interaction and transaction (Simmel 1950). Pastoralists consider those within the warrior age-group to be responsible for handling instruments of violence and engaging in collective protection of ethnic territory, its people and livestock. Weak policing infrastructure within grazing spaces gives rise
to other state and non-state actors who procure the services of warriors-given their expertise of the terrain- to engage in the sale of ammunition further fueling violence.

In interviews with police officers, we posed the question of how illegal weapons that fuel violent cattle raids get to warriors in Baragoi grazing fields. One senior officer informed us that the remoteness of Samburu County helps in the transportation of illegal arms and the response was as follows:

“Communities in Samburu County are believed to be in possession of over 20,000 illegal firearms and the Samburu community acquires their firearms by purchasing them from Somalis who ferry the arms to Isiolo from Moyale along the Ethiopian-Kenya border and also through the Kenyan-Somali border. The firearms are hidden in safe houses in Isiolo until market days at Archers Post where arms are sold clandestinely to willing buyers who are mostly morans but at times also businessmen and politicians. An AK47 goes for KSH 30,000; a G3 rifle goes for KSH 40,000 while an M16 goes for 60,000. A bullet is bought at about KSH 100 depending on demand and supply dynamics” (Interview with a security officer in Baragoi, November 2014).

The Samburu warriors mostly use M16 rifles as their weapons of choice. The M16 is brought into Kenya through Somali traders who traverse the increasingly dangerous Kenya-Somali border. The limited presence of security personnel in these areas and the corrupt few immigration and security officers present at the border enables the smooth entry of M16 guns into Northern Kenya all the way through to Isiolo County which neighbours Samburu County along the Uaso Nyiro river. From there local arms merchants who double up as transporters of goods further take advantage of limited security presence in Samburu County to travel over 180kms into Baragoi area. They carry weapons hidden in sacks to Baragoi from where the weapons and ammunitions are distributed to local gun runners who exchange the guns for livestock, mostly in the grazing lands. The table below shows the types of guns found in the grazing lands of Samburu North:

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46 Interview with a security officer during a security meeting with Morans in October 2014 at Ngoriche hills, Samburu North sub-County
### Table 4: Guns Found in Grazing lands of Baragoi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Gun</th>
<th>User Community</th>
<th>Entry into Samburu County</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK 47/Amakada</td>
<td>Mostly Turkana morans, also available among Samburu morans</td>
<td>Turkana acquire AK47 from Gun-traders from Turkana County. Sold to Samburu households through exchange of animals Also brought in to Baragoi through gun merchants who run transport businesses in Baragoi</td>
<td>Mostly from Turkana North, obtained from traders from South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>Morans recruited as KPRs, mostly among the Samburu</td>
<td>Government issued, available to the Kenya Police Service</td>
<td>German made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK IV, MKII, MK I</td>
<td>Issued to KPRs mostly of Turkana origins, also owned by the local Samburu and Turkana when previous owners are killed during raids</td>
<td>Government issued to KPRs</td>
<td>British made in 1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrabin Rifles</td>
<td>Samburu and Turkana, obtained illegally from government officers</td>
<td>Government issued to police officers</td>
<td>French made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-16</td>
<td>Majorly the Samburu</td>
<td>Somalia-Isiolo-Samburu route</td>
<td>American made, first manufactured in 1960s as a response to the Soviet invention of the AK47 assault rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amatidae</td>
<td>the Turkana</td>
<td>Initially used by the Turkana Ngoroko to attack Turkana and Samburu of Samburland</td>
<td>Locally made by the Turkana In use from 1930</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation based on field data

The table above shows the variety of guns found in the grazing lands of Baragoi. Among the Turkana the AK 47 (*Amakada*) is more popular owing to its weight (lighter) and easier to use when targeting an enemy within a range of 600 meters. The Turkana also have their locally made gun called *amatidae*. Most of these were in use in the 1980s and early 1990s before the influx of illegal and government-issued arms in the area. The use of locally made guns points to a formerly active blacksmiths industry to cater for the high demand for weapons in Baragoi. This further highlights the violent nature of the contest for social spatial spaces between the Samburu
and Turkana of Baragoi. Among the Samburu warriors, the M-16 is the preferred weapon. According to my Samburu informants, the M-16 is their gun of choice due to its ‘devastating’ impact. Unlike the AK47, I was they informed that when a G3 or M-16 pierces vital organs of the human body chances of survival of the enemy becomes minimal. The M-16 is also vital for long distance shoot-outs and can be used for targeting people beyond 600 meters; it is further preferred by the Samburu due to its bomb-sound, which they believe disorients the opponent, thus giving them an advantage in ambush situations. Through government supply the Samburu and Turkana KPRs have other weapons such as the German-made G3 and others such as the MK1, MKII and MKIV, however these are slowly getting phased out since their ammunition are no longer in production. Lastly, the French-made Carrabin rifles are also found in the grazing lands of Baragoi. This weapon is mostly issued to security officer especially those coming for ‘operation’ duties in Baragoi. Some of these are later obtained by warriors either through killing of police officers or sale by officers commanding stations.

5.7 Grazing Lands as Places and Spaces for Warrior Mobilization

Grazing lands in Baragoi have been used in recent times as avenues of warrior mobilization. The political leadership has been noted to travel to grazing areas such as Suiyan, Marti, Ngoriche and Nasiischo River to address warriors. Major raids have often occurred after political incitements by leaders in grazing lands. A case in point was the Baragoi Massacre which occurred weeks after local politicians mobilized youth around Munanda grazing field in the outskirts of Baragoi town. Indeed in a documentary ‘No Man’s Land’ by Jeff Lekupe (2011), the exploitation of grazing lands as warriors’ space where politicians visit and distribute arms and ammunition is evident. Grazing lands as the fiefdom of the warrior is a noted reality along the Maralal-Marti-Baragoi-South Horr-Loyangalani route. This route is situated within the contested grazing

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47 Discussion with Samburu moran-leaders at the DO Office in Baragoi, October 2014
48 Mobilization for Baragoi massacre can be traced to early October 2012 with series of politically organised raids taking place between the Turkana and Samburu. The massacre occurred on 10th November 2012
49 The documentary ‘No man’s land’ captured the role of land in violent conflict among pastoralists in Northern Kenya. It shows meetings between politicians and warriors prior to cattle raids in Samburu-North sub-County
50 Personal observation for 10 months in Samburu North and Police Signals from Baragoi Police Station from 2005-2014
lands between the Samburu and Turkana given that the colonial administrators designated the road as the inter-ethnic boundary between the two groups. In this area, warriors strut the turf alongside their animals loaded with automatic rifles. Nimrod Taabu (2013) in another documentary ‘Samburu State of War’ noted the ‘use of guns more like walking sticks’ in Baragoi grazing lands when he visited Lomirok and Marti areas. The warriors told him that ‘one cannot graze livestock in the area without a gun’. This points to the high stakes nature of the contest for socio-spatial spaces between the Turkana and Samburu.

Warriors themselves use the grazing fields as arenas for their own mobilization before raids. In my discussions with Samburu warriors, I learnt that whenever warriors are seen within Baragoi town buying maize flour and cooking oil in bulk then a raid was in the offing. I was informed that raiders often purchase food items and then retreat to the grazing fields to strategise how to carry out the raid. The grazing field is away from human habitation and far from the watchful eyes of the security forces thus a conducive for the practice of violence such as the testing of firearms. Grazing lands have also been used as training grounds for young warriors. In discussions with chiefs from the Turkana and Samburu communities, we were informed that young warriors are trained to aim and shoot at early ages of eight in the grazing fields. The grazing fields therefore provide exclusionary spaces that enable the practice of exclusionary violence (Wood 2007a).

5.8 Grazing Lands, Spaces of Dominance and Territoriality

The battle to control grazing fields during the drought season in Baragoi is pursued under the discourses of Nkoopang, among the Samburu. It means “owners of the land” in Samburu language. In my meetings with Samburu chiefs, they argued that “Samburu land belongs to the Samburu” and they viewed the Turkana as ‘visitors’ or even encroachers. In many political meetings occasioned by violent raids and deaths in grazing fields that I attended in South Horr,

51 Samburu state of War’ delves into the gun culture of Turkana and Samburu communities and how violent raids using guns have led to massacres and displacements
52 Discussion with Samburu warriors at Bendera village in November 2014
53 Discussion with Samburu and Turkana chiefs at Ngilai Anglican Church in November 2014
Tuum, Baragoi and Ngilai areas, the Samburu political leadership (Samburu County government leaders) spoke of Samburu grazing lands as belonging to the Samburu community. The Turkana’s were advised in these meetings to move ‘beyond the Suguta Valley’ which is euphemism for asking the Turkana of Baragoi to move back to Turkana County, a place they left over a century ago. An illustration of the nature of the contest over space in grazing lands is captured by the following police signal:

“It was reported through phone that today the 25th August 2013 at about 1200 noon the Samburu and Turkana morans were fighting at Mparah grazing field. During the incident two Samburu morans were injured as follows: one aged 24 years was shot on the left lower leg, while another aged 25 years was shot on the right buttock and the bullet lodged in the body” (Baragoi Police Station Police Signal 25th August 2013).

While the above quote doesn’t give reasons for the fight between the Samburu and Turkana herders, the fact that it took place in the grazing field implies that contest was about the utility of the grazing field. Access to these productive spaces is therefore highly contested as can be seen in the injuries sustained by the Samburu herders.

A more recent signal from Baragoi Police Station (2014) further captures the central role access to and utilization of grazing lands play in the violent contest between pastoralists groups in Baragoi:

“It was reported by Ag. Chief Baragoi location at about 11.00 AM that there was a fire exchange between the Turkana and Samburu herders in Loworiak grazing field about 14km south of the station. A contingent of police officers drawn from the GSU, AP, ASTU and the regular police rushed to the area and intervened. On arrival they were met with the sound of F.R.G and rifle fire. The police responded by launching two H.E 60mm bombs. Both parties ceased fire and dispersed. One Samburu male adult aged about 35 years was shot on the back left shoulder. The police suspect that the motive of the fire exchange is the scramble for grazing fields. The Turkana’s are said to have invaded grazing field that is ordinarily used by the Samburus” (Baragoi Police Station Signal 14th December 2014).
The above quote captures the dilemma of many herders during the dry season where they are forced to move to the few places with adequate pasture for the survival of their animals. To guarantee the safe movement of their cattle in these pasturelands, they have to carry firearms to deter raiders from other communities from robbing them of their livestock. To gain access to the eventual pasturelands in an environment where there is no resource sharing formula, they have to use violence to negotiate access and to guarantee the utilization of the grasslands by their livestock. This is in line with Adem et al (2012), who have argued that drought and the necessity of mobility for herders in Northern Kenya contribute to pastoralists violence and makes grazing lands ‘dangerous geographies’. Further the response of the police is also critical in understanding the production and reproduction of violence in grazing lands. As captured in the police report the police chose to launch a bomb to disperse a group of herders engaged in gunfire, the role of the state security apparatus in violence among pastoralists is seen in the excessive violence it uses which detrimental effect even on the environment and thus affecting pastoralists’ livelihoods as a whole.

The Police Signal from Baragoi Police Post (2005) further places the battle for territorial exclusivity during the dry season at the center of pastoralists’ violence among the pastoralists groups in Northwestern Kenya:

“An intelligence report reaching this post from the Samburu and Turkana herdsmen who are currently grazing their cattle at a place called Nasur in East Baringo just a few kilometers from Malaso escarpment is that on the 21st day of December, they were confronted by Pokot tribesmen and ordered to drive their stock from their grazing field back to Baragoi, the said Pokots warned them that if they fail to abide by their order they will be attacked. Due to a severe drought prevailing here at Baragoi, the Samburu and Turkana refused to vacate the area. There is tension currently at the said area” (Baragoi Police Post Signal 23rd December 2005).

The quote above captures the linkages between drought, the essence of livestock mobility and the preservation of grazing lands as spaces of dominance by specific groups. East Baringo district forms part of today’s Baringo County. The district is inhabited by Pokot pastoralists. The
fact that Samburu and Turkana herders moved from Baragoi to Nasur a distance of over 100km shows the intensity of the drought in the month of December. Raids and other forms of pastoralists’ violence in grazing lands are therefore most likely to occur due to drought. The need for preservation of pasturelands for specific group’s exclusive access, mobility of herders with livestock and their concentration in specific rich grazing lands mainly used during dry periods and the sale of arms and ammunition in the grazing fields therefore inadvertently contribute to violent confrontations during periods of scarcity. Raids may therefore occur in places like Nasur during the dry season, when the Pokot who see themselves as the ‘owners of the land’ in Nasur view other herders from Baragoi as encroachers into their socio-spatial spaces of livestock production. Raids in this case are used to gain livestock from resource competitors as well as to create a space of insecurity (Witsenburg and Zaal 2012), that forces these ‘foreign’ herders to move away from the shared and contested pastureland.

Photo 6: An armed Turkana warrior guarding the Samburu-Turkana pasture boundary at Ngoriche along the Baragoi-South Horr highway in October 2014, Source: Author
In my discussions with Turkana elders’ over the history of their contest over the socio-spatial space of Baragoi. They pointed out that the violence among the Turkana and Samburu is rooted in the colonial designation of Baragoi area as ‘Samburuland’ that merged Samburu socio-cultural claims to exclusivity in Baragoi space with their administrative and political interests. Mbembe (2000:267 quoted in Kefale 2011:77) noted a similar situation in Ethiopia where the ethnic and political and administrative boundaries were merged resulting into heightened ethnic solidarities that were later used as a basis of organisation and negotiation for political and economic gains against other groups. Similarly, the designation of Baragoi as ‘Samburu North district’ and later as ‘Samburu North sub-County’ was argued by Turkana elders as erroneous as it gives legitimacy to Samburu claims over the territory of Baragoi. As Kefale (2011:77) has noted, in situations where ethnic identities compete over territorial spaces, there exists a “direct equation between territory and ethnicity”. Violence between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi is therefore not only linked to contests over water and pasture but also to territorial contests stemming from colonial christening of the space as Samburu territory up to its current designation as Samburu North sub-County.

5.9 Grazing Lands as Venues of Violence

Bohle (2007:131), in his analysis of violence in Sri Lanka argued that for violence to occur among groups, the following prerequisites must be in place; the arena in which the violence occurs, the agenda (purpose) that violence aims to achieve, the actors involved in violent action and the types of violent actions that perpetrators carry out against each other. Using the grazing land of Baragoi as a socio-spatial area within which violence occurs (venue), I apply Bohle’s thesis to the analysis of pastoralists violence in Baragoi as follows; first, grazing lands are the arenas of violence with limited presence of state security and the existence of non-state actors such as gun traders who exploit weak policing systems to supply arms to greater Northern Kenya and use warriors to sell ammunition to fellow warriors in the grazing lands. The vastness of grazing lands coupled with limited police presence further encourage violent action since security officers are unfamiliar with the terrain and mostly ill-equipped to prevent violence situations. Most of the times, the police are simply outnumbered, poorly armed and unfamiliar with the rugged terrain of the arid pastoral lands as compared to the warriors who are socialized
to herd and protect their livestock in the grazing lands from the early ages. Historical marginalisation of Northern Kenya can be seen in the poor road and telecommunication infrastructure in the area. This hinders police response to the violence incidences and aids the execution of raids and highway banditries as the warriors are more familiar with the terrain unlike security officers mostly posted from southern parts of Kenya. Most of the grazing lands are in remote areas with limited mobile phone coverage thus relaying of information on violence incidences takes days. The high dependence on nomadic pastoralism coupled with high illiteracy rates among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi implies that violence as a means of asserting individual or group claims to grazing lands will continue due to limited or no education opportunities, these confine warriors to nomadic pastoralism. Thus use of violence to protect livelihoods and territory is almost a necessity.

Secondly, grazing lands can further be viewed as the place where agendas of violence are nurtured and carried out. In Northern Kenya, the major reason for violent raids in grazing lands is to protect collective territory from the encroachment of others. In Baragoi, the battle for protection of territory is pursued as an ethno-nationalistic agenda with the Samburu viewing the Turkana as outsiders and encroachers into their territory. Further, the pastoralists’ violence that occurs in the grazing lands of Baragoi is aimed at protection of pasturelands and water resources during droughts. Violence occurs along resource boundaries as well as on the banks of rivers Nasiischo and Langat. The need to protect specific spaces for cultural practices can also be seen to contribute towards pastoralists’ violence among the Turkana and Samburu. The Samburu for instance raid the Turkana when they use pasturelands along Mt. Ng’iro areas during the drought seasons. Mt. Ng’iro is a holy site for the Samburu used for circumcision of warriors, holding specific prayers and blessings of warriors. The violence at the foot of Mt. Ng’iro is therefore not only about greed for livestock nor are these motivated by the need to exert revenge over past raids. These raids serve to reclaim grazing lands as cultural treasures exclusive to the Samburu. These raids are therefore carried out for self-preservation of the Samburu identity. This in line with Schlee (2004) and Greiner (2013) findings that violent raids can be used as identity markers between distinct groups within a common pastureland.
In the last two decades, political leaders have found the mobilization of warriors in grazing lands under the pretext of ‘protection’ of territories to be a means through which power can be acquired and preserved. Organization of raids during the electoral periods aimed at disenfranchising potential voters of opponents (mostly belonging to different ethnic identities) have taken place in grazing lands. Such raids often serve multiple purposes such as the acquisition of livestock, displacement of opponents (from their voting areas) and mobilisation of warriors as voters and also for targeting perceived political enemies. Violence in the grazing lands is further fueled by the need to revenge for past raids. Warriors organize themselves within the grazing lands and agree to execute a raid either with the victim of a past raid or just by themselves without even consulting a past raid victim. This is in line with Eaton (2012), finding on the organization of warriors for revenge among the Pokot, Matheniko and other Karimojong groups along the Kenya-Uganda border. The legitimation of revenge can therefore be out of a group decision among morans or it can also be politically organised to involve a higher number of warriors.

Thirdly various actors play significant roles in the conceptualization of grazing lands as avenue of violence. Raiders/warriors are the primary actors in the conceptualization of grazing lands as venues of violence. Warriors from the age of 15 till 30 among the Samburu are expected to live in the ‘bush’, their interaction with other members of the society is limited. Among the Samburu boys as young as eight go along with warriors’ to act as shepherds or *lchekuuti*. They are socialized into violence by the older warriors and are slowly introduced to handling of firearms. Warriors going to graze their animals are expected to carry firearms as the sole guarantee of defending one’s life and those of his animals. Pride and prestige of a warrior hinges on his abilities to herd the livestock and to account for all his father’s cattle upon return from the grazing lands (Parenti 2011). Indeed as I was told in Ngorishe; “one cannot graze livestock here without a firearm”.

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54 Interview at Munanda borehole on 4th September 2014

55 Interview with a KPR officer at Ngoriche hills grazing lands on 17 October 2014
Other actors who take part directly or indirectly in the production or construction of violence in the grazing lands include the gun traders who are mostly local elites involved in transport business, some even owning wholesale shops in Baragoi and other towns such as Tuum, Lesirkan and South Horr. These traders use their lorries when ferrying grains and household goods to transport arms from Isiolo to Baragoi with the connivance of the security personnel. The state that has neglected the security needs of the Northern part of Kenya for over half a century has given rise to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and sale of arms. During this study, I interviewed\textsuperscript{56} security personnel including local Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) who revealed that local politicians supply arms to warriors to execute raids to win political support. Incidences of sale of arms and ammunition to warriors by serving security officers\textsuperscript{57} were also recorded during this study.

Fourth, violent actions stemming from contests over grazing space among the Turkana and Samburu can be seen in cattle raids, massacres, shootings of herders in grazing lands and shoot-outs between herders in contested pasturelands. Further, rape of women collecting firewood or burning charcoal is reported in police records\textsuperscript{58}. Shooting of wildlife by warriors for meat or just as targets while practicing shooting skills is also recorded\textsuperscript{59} and further captured in interviews with morans\textsuperscript{60}.

\textsuperscript{56} Interviews at Marti, Tuum and Lonjorin areas in Samburu North sub County in November 2014

\textsuperscript{57} Interview with security officer and one chief at Baragoi town in October 2014

\textsuperscript{58} Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book, 2009

\textsuperscript{59} Baragoi Police Station Signal, 2011

\textsuperscript{60} Interview with morans at Ngilai manyatta, November 2015
Table 5: Conceptualisation of Grazing Lands as Venues of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arenas of Violence</th>
<th>Agendas of Violence</th>
<th>Violent Actors</th>
<th>Violent Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited state security</td>
<td>Protection of territory</td>
<td>Armed morans</td>
<td>Raids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of sub-state actors, e.g. gun traders</td>
<td>Livelihoods protection</td>
<td>Gun traders</td>
<td>Massacres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of small arms and light weapons</td>
<td>Protection of socio-cultural space</td>
<td>Arms transporters</td>
<td>Highway banditries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vast marginalized spaces</td>
<td>Protection of political sphere</td>
<td>The state/ Kenya Police Reservists</td>
<td>Shootings and shoot-outs in grazing lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor road and communication infrastructure</td>
<td>Greed for livestock</td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Rape of women collecting firewood in grazing lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High illiteracy levels and dependence on nomadic pastoralism</td>
<td>Revenge over past raids</td>
<td>Understaffed, demoralized and corrupt police</td>
<td>Shootings of wildlife such as ostriches, zebras and antelopes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation from field data, 2014-2015

From the table above we can observe the transformation of grazing lands into venues of violence construction and production (Bohle 2007; Sharamo 2014). We can further observe that grazing lands are transformed into arenas of violence due to several factors among them the limited presence of state security, the presence of gun traders and the easy availability of firearms within pasturelands of Baragoi. The ease and frequency with which cattle raids and other violent agendas are carried out is facilitated by the historical marginalisation that pastoralists inhabiting Northern Kenya have endured since 1963. Violence whether in the form of raids, highway banditries or shoot-outs between herders serve to fulfill socio-political purposes such revenge (Eaton 2012), to obtain livestock (Parenti 2011) or to eliminate political competition from a common constituency (Greiner 2013). Further, it is observable that violence in pasturelands is fuelled by multiple agendas. The major ones are to protection of territory, livelihoods and socio-cultural spaces. However, due to the influence of politicians and the use of ethno-nationalism as a tool for galvanizing political support as is evident in the phrase ‘move the Turkana beyond the Suguta Valley’, pastures are continually viewed as political spheres and visited by politicians to meet warriors to plan raids, to seek political support or to endear themselves to warriors through the provision of relief food especially during the drought periods.
5.10 Concluding Remarks

The battle over pastoralists grazing lands in Northern Kenya has often been attributed to external factors. Among them one can list the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the mobilization of warriors by politicians and the increased commercialization of raids. The role of geography and how it contributes to pastoralists’ violence has been long ignored. Watts (2000) has however argued that violence is the struggle over geographical space thus placing built environment as a critical factor in understanding violence. Ample evidence shows that a majority of pastoralists’ violence is organized in manyattas but takes place in the highly contested grazing lands. The battle for pastoralists grazing lands is therefore a fierce contest over geography. Gaining access to pasturelands implies violently establishing control and dominance or exclusivity over space and territory. Looking at cattle raids in pastoralists grazing lands as a contest over ‘resource spaces’ widens our understanding of the role and nature of pastoralists’ violence. The role that space plays in the indoctrination of warriors and as the place of violence construction and production among the warrior-age set in many pastoralists’ societies conforms to the recent finding by Straight et al (2016) of the Samburu concept of Ntoror, as pastoralists’ landscapes which attract conflicts and produce violence.

The practice of cattle raiding fits within Galtung’s (2003) definition of ‘cultures of violence’ as the norms used to violence legitimize violence against others. Among pastoralists of Northern Kenya, key performers of violence belong to the same age-set across the ethnicities and are all defined loosely as morans. Drawing from Bohle’s (2007) analysis of violence in Sri Lanka, I argue that the establishment of pastoralists grazing lands as venues of violence and as places for violence socialization and practice gives credence to the classification of grazing lands as socio-spatial areas of violence. This perhaps explains our observation that warriors carry firearms only in the grazing fields, since the grazing field is viewed literally as a “jungle” void of any state regulations. In my discussions with Turkana and Samburu warriors, grazing lands were uniformly described using the Swahili word msituni meaning jungle. Drawing from Wood (2007a) my analysis focuses on grazing lands in Baragoi as contested socio-spatial areas where the production and reproduction of pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu and Turkana of
Baragoi determines aspects of socio-political relations in terms of safety, trade and mobility within livestock corridors.

Violent raids in grazing lands between the Turkana and Samburu indicate the dearth of inter-communal institutions of resource management in Baragoi. The role of inter-communal arbitration and management of grazing reserves was always left to the elders, in my observations; this does not work among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi. Elder-brokered peace initiatives were often short-lived and the cycles of violence resumed after another raid. Through police documents, I learnt of the death of a Turkana community elder61 who was shot dead at an inter-communal peace meeting at Lonjorin (Baragoi Police Station 2008). Violent contests within the grazing lands of Baragoi can be argued to occur due to lack of inter-communal grazing land committees that can be used to enable amicable pasture sharing during periods of droughts.

While pastoralists violence in other parts of Kenya are linked to commercialisation of cattle raids (Fleisher 2000), the case of Baragoi reveals that violence is used more to preserve livelihoods. Violent raiding witnessed in Baragoi mostly aims at protecting pasturelands but also to preserve group identity of group within specific socio-spatial areas. Further, in the height of raids, revenge violence spreads to urban centers like Baragoi town making every possible space a battle field based on ethnic identity. Collective violence that stems from series of raids and revenge attacks lead to a broader contest between the Turkana and Samburu based on historical claims of indigenousness to the socio-spatial area of Baragoi. Place-identity plays a huge role during episodes of targeted violence that spirals from the grazing fields to Baragoi town. At these times chances of a shooting in the evenings along the roads of Baragoi town is always determined by the shooter’s conviction that the target is not part of ‘us’. Lastly, inter-communal peacebuilding efforts should take note of the fact that warrior age-sets are legitimated through cultural norms to make war, while elders are responsible for peacemaking.

61 Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book 2008, 29th April
While peacebuilding approaches among pastoralists have focused on elders as the controllers of warriors, understanding of the egalitarian nature of pastoralists’ societies and the specific roles of each age-group may help in redirecting peace-building efforts towards warriors, through warrior leaders among the Samburu and Turkana.
Cattle Raids in Northern Kenya as a Manifestation of Elite Rivalry and Ethnic Politics

6.0 Introduction

In this chapter I argue that livestock raids and pastoralists’ competition over water and pastures in Northwestern Kenya are manifestations of local ethnic political contests and rivalries aimed at controlling resources by evicting competitors from a previously shared area. The culture of raiding among the Samburu, Turkana, Pokot, Borana, Gabra and Rendille communities has changed over the last 40 years. Whereas elders were the gate-keepers of communal institutions, today new actors are at the forefront of new forms of violent raids. Among Samburu and Turkana communities politicians and shrewd businessmen have emerged to exploit ethnic rivalry that exists between these groups to use it to mobilize raids. Raiding in essence has adopted Karl von Clausewitz dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’. Warriors are armed and paid to carry out raids that serve the ‘selfish’ interests of elites. Competition for political influence is closely intertwined with competition over scarce water and grazing pastures among Turkana and Samburu. Given that pastoralists survive on decreasing pasture and water resources. This study shows that political elites arm their communities during the dry season to gain upper hand in contests to access limited resources. The raids are therefore aimed at solving historical challenges such as access to land as the case of Waso Rongai and Kawap below will show. Cattle raids no longer occur in traditional context of restocking but as a strategic tool used to settle communal challenges such as access to land. This is done through the mobilisation of morans by communal elite

The practice of cattle raids among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya is an age-old tradition that for a long time helped to maintain mutual inter-ethnic relations and supported the pastoralists’ social economy. Till some years ago, the raids had functions of “warrior socialization”, livestock genetic cross-breeding, pasture exploitation, control, and group negotiations. Traditions and peace building protocols, besides the low technology of weapons like sticks and spears, were used to keep conflicts to a bearable level. During these times cattle raids occurred under a set of mutually agreed rules that were laid down by elders and passed from one generation to another. According to these rules, raids took place mainly to replenish
stock after periods of droughts which often decimated the livestock population (KHRC 2010). Furthermore, raids were conducted on neighbouring communities to raise livestock for the payment of bride wealth. The practice of raiding to obtain bride wealth was premised on the notion that warriors had to prove their braveness to potential brides by showing courage and going into ‘battle’ to acquire livestock. Marrying using raided livestock was therefore a manifestation of prestige for the groom and high honor to the bride (Heald 1997; Fleisher 2000).

Cattle raids have in the past therefore been driven by several factors and actors. Among the factors that contributed to this practice was seasonality and environmental change. In this case raids occurred after periods of droughts which most often lead to livestock death. Raids were therefore a means through which pastoralists households maintained sustainability of their livelihoods by restocking (Witsenburg and Adano 2009). Secondly, traditional cattle raiding was driven by the need for inter-communal socio-economic interaction. The practice of raiding brought elders from neighbouring communities together to lay down the rules and to act as arbiters in case warriors violated the raiding stipulations. It further brought neighbouring warriors together as worthy competitors for the young women in their communities and for the pride and praise that accompanied noted prowess and success in cattle raids as expressed in traditional folklore, (Heald 1997).

Traditional cattle raiding was regulated by elders who sanctioned warriors for killing women, children and the elderly. It was considered a taboo and in most cases, when these groups of people were killed or injured compensation in the form of herds of cattle was always given to make peace between neighbouring groups. Warriors who participated in raids were supervised by elders. For a raid to be successful the warriors needed the blessings of the elders and this meant that warriors could not unilaterally venture into unsanctioned raids since this would be deemed as an act of aggression by neighbouring communities. Young women as potential brides of the warriors also played a central role especially by urging their suitors to prove their courage by going for a raid and bringing to the brides homes raided animals as bride wealth, (Heald 1997).
Since the 1970s cattle raiding as a traditional practice has changed tremendously. It has become a manifestation of ethnic competition for resources and political supremacy. Today, cattle raids between the Turkana and Samburu in Samburu North sub-County occur not as a means through which warriors from the two groups acquire livestock for payment of bride wealth but rather as a means through which warriors acting on the behest of elites and community politicians can disenfranchise competitors from the neighboring community from voting for their preferred candidates. In this case cattle raids have transformed into a political tool in the hands of politicians and budding politicians through which potential voters for rival candidates are displaced through sheer violence and burning of their homesteads thus forcing their expulsion from the electoral area (Osamba 2000).

Given the insecurity that has pervaded Northern Kenya since independence; political leaders have perfected the mantra of campaigning on the pretext of ‘protection.’ Thus aspiring politicians use their clout and influence during and after political campaigns to prove their ‘protection credentials’ by supplying arms and ammunition to communities who subsequently use these not only for self-protection but also for aggression against neighbouring groups. There is evidence from our research and also from newspaper articles in Eastern Africa that elites from pastoralists groups and politicians are at the fore front in purchasing weapons and ammunition which are then distributed to community warriors during periods of inter-ethnic tension (Wachira 2015). The purchased weapons are then used for ethnic cleansing purposes with the sole aim of uprooting rival groups from the resource base to guarantee exclusive access to one group to shared inter-communal resources such as grazing land or water sources.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Northern Kenya is facilitated by elite groups who operate legal businesses such as transport and wholesale shops while also clandestinely dealing in the illicit gun markets. The limited presence of security personnel in these areas and their willingness to accept bribes enable the gun trade by pastoralists’ elites in Northern Kenya (Wachira 2015). Guns such as the AK47, G3, HK11 and M16 assault rifles are acquired by elites and passed on to warriors through barter trade in exchange for cattle. Once warriors acquire guns, there are further hired (and paid in cash) to conduct massive cattle raids
by the same elites who seek to meet the huge beef demand of the urban populations such as in Nairobi, Kisumu, Nakuru and Eldoret (also see Eaton 2008; Fleisher 2000; Tablino 2006; Little 1985). The practice of cattle raiding is therefore mostly driven by the economic and political interests of the elites from these regions to the detriment of inter-ethnic cohesion that is needed to sustain resource sharing among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. The objective of this chapter is therefore to show the role of pastoralists’ elite in fuelling conflicts between the Samburu and Turkana communities. It discusses the various actors and their actions in facilitating the business of raiding. The chapter also adds onto and contextualizes the environmental security/scarcity argument and places communal agency and local politics over land at the center of organisation and mobilisation for raids as a means to solving collective challenges in Northern Kenya. In efforts to illustrate the influence of elites in cattle raids in Baragoi, this focuses on chapter several cases among them the Turkana raid of the Samburu of Waso Rongai and the subsequent eviction of the Turkana from Kawap center by the Samburu as a representation of a bigger battle over the grazing lands of Kawap not only as a rich resource for grazing but as a future settlement area for the Samburu given their knowledge of the gazettment of Mt. Nyiro as a government forest (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 1961:813). In the next section, I focus on the role of elites in fuelling violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya.

6.1 Elites and Cattle Raiding in Kenya

Most literature has tended to discuss the root causes of pastoralist raids on competition over natural resources due to droughts and the impact of climate change and thus reiterate the environmental security/scarcity debate (see Witsenburg and Adano 2009). However, cattle raids are far more complex and go beyond resource scarcity. Pastoral raids must be seen within the larger context of political, social, resource and ethnic context. This is because their causes as well as the actors involve political, social, resource and ethnic cleavages. McCabe (2004) noted that raiding is a response to political as well as environmental events and not just scarcity. Thus there is a political ecology angle within which cattle raiding in Kenya should be understood. In the literature, the underlying root causes of raiding have been found by many scholars to emanate from poverty, payment of dowry, accumulation of general wealth, retaliation and culture of revenge, the lucrative cross-border cattle trade, availability and easy access to small arms,
climate change and resource scarcity, ethnic rivalries and politics (Bollig 1993; Fleisher 2000; Krätli and Swift 2003; McCabe 2004; Mkutu 2006; Eaton 2008; Witsenburg and Adano 2009; Schilling et al. 2012).

Schilling and Akuno (2012) studied raids between the Turkana and the Pokot found that raiders reason for engaging in raiding among Turkana were “hunger”, “drought” and “wealth” while the Pokot named payment of dowry, wealth and the defending or expansion of territory. The availability of small arms in Kenya makes raiding more frequent and violent (Mkutu 2008). Raids between the Turkana and the Pokot for instance have involved the use of sophisticated arms. Krätli and Swift (1999) in their study found that some actors could play multiple roles which can fuel conflicts:

“…Of course, the (roles of the actors) may overlap. Individual raiders may engage in illegal trade with looted guns. Cattle traders may also be elders, politicians or administrators, and so may weapon dealers. Security forces may trade in weapons. Politicians may have interests in national/international business. Any of these may have a herd of their own, which may be built up by raiding, or be reduced by being raided by others.” (Krätli and Swift 1999:7)

Thus various actors who do not physically take part in raids covertly fund and support raids for their interest. This is why Eaton (2008) says that cattle raiding is perpetuated and aided by local big men with connections to local administrations and national government. Bond (2012) drawing on her study among the Samburu and Pokot groups in Laikipia, captured the role of elites in cattle raids in the following manner:

“A central point to conflict in Laikipia and Kenya generally is the position of elites, often politicians, in manipulating power dynamics and creating communicative strategies and discourses which serve their own interests. Many respondents in this study said that the politicians are heavily involved not only in the arming but also purposively marginalising their own constituents in order to maintain their dominating power within the political and business arenas” (Bond 2012: 6)
In this study elites are defined as influential people within pastoralists’ societies by virtue of their political, administrative or financial capabilities who use these capacities to influence the behavior of warriors by hiring warriors to conduct cattle raids on their behalf for commercial or political reasons. In the context of Baragoi, elites are chiefs, Members of County Assemblies (MCAs), former councilors, businessmen, teachers, civil servants, Members of Parliament, Senators, Ward Administrators, Constituency Development Fund (CDF) managers and other members of these pastoralists groups who no longer draw their primary survival from pastoralism but retain substantial herds in their home areas through hired labour of extended family members. Further, elite in this context also include security personnel who are not necessarily from pastoralists’ communities but are involved covertly in the trade of raided livestock.

The prominent role of elites in conflicts among pastoralists in Northern Kenya is notable in recent literature and newspaper pieces. Leff (2009), Mkutu (2016:18) and Daily Nation (2012) all allude to the trend in which influential members of pastoralists societies increasingly use their financial and political influence to sponsor raids by paying warriors or by purchasing arms and ammunition for raids. The role of devolved public funds in funding cattle raids in Turkana was also captured in newspaper articles where a Member of Parliament was accused of diverting public funds for these purposes (Daily Nation 2012). This is similar to my own field experience in Baragoi where interviews® with security officers revealed the complicity of public fund personnel in using state vehicles to distribute ammunition in the run up to heightened tension and subsequent violence among the Samburu and Turkana in December 2014. Elites who fuel violent confrontations among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi in pursuit of their personal interests such as votes or business opportunities often portray themselves as community spokespersons and their agendas as communal. This enables the mobilization of warriors as a political force aimed at meting violence at perceived opposition voters under the pretext of ‘protection politics’. CEWARN (2004:25) noted the prominent role that these elites play in fuelling violence in Northern Kenya. In interviews among the Borana and Rendille of Marsabit, Scott-Villiers et al (2014) were informed of the role of local teachers in fundraising for violence as follows:

62 Interviews with various security officials in Baragoi in November and December 2014
“At the moment some teachers are going round the villages collecting KShs. One thousand from everybody both male and female to buy guns. They have been doing this for about three months now - since we are part of them it is difficult for them to hide from us” (Scott-Villiers et al 2014:22)

Elites therefore contribute significantly to violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya in pursuit of their interests to capture and preserve their own economic and political power especially in areas where competition for these two forms of power is between two distinct ethnic groups. Apart from providing logistical support through purchase of arms, elites organise the means of transport usually lorries to ferry warriors to the place of violence.

6.2 Ethnic identity/identity politics and pastoral violence

Ethnicity is a fluid topic that can be manipulated by many interested actors for their own benefits. Lentz and Nugent (2000:2) note that “‘Ethnicity’ is a dazzling, ambiguous category, which is at once descriptive, analytical and evaluative-normative” and has been interpreted by various people not only in academia, but also the world of politics and the media. Ethnicity is such a powerful resource for identification and collectivities. Barth (1994) argues that ethnicity plays a significant role in situations of resource competitions between groups as it can be employed as a mobilisation tool for collective action or war against the ‘other’. Groups will often come together under the banner of their collective identity to achieve aims such as raiding. Most ethnic identities in East Africa are constructed although many groups primordially claim it. Fukui and Markakis (1994:6) have argued that ethnic identities arise out of “specific situations, socially defined and historically determined”. Finally, Watson and Schlee (2009) view collective identification as critical in understanding how resources are claimed and distributed in society. In this chapter I argue that ethnicity is created and constructed into the world of cattle raiding in Kenya. The constructivist postulations on ethnicity which looks it as being ‘created’ is very important for our discussions on elite manipulation of ethnic identities in our study area. Schlee (2008) stated that ethnic groups in northern Kenya are political and military entities and are subject to power politics. Our conception of identity construction is more relevant in Lentz and Nugent (2000) explanation that constructionists lay emphasis on how ethnic identity is
manipulated as a garb for the pursuit of self-interest among local elites. Identity politics remain very strong in Kenya and is manifested in all facets of social and political life. This conforms to Horowitz’s (1985) and Turton’s (1997) conceptualization of ethnic identity as a platform through which local leaders mobilise their populations in pursuit of their interests. Turton (1997) further views the manipulation and exploitation of ethnic identities as a recipe for violence against the ‘other’. Watson and Schlee (2009:2) further emphasizes the role of ethnicity in mobilisation in by arguing that chances of inter-group violent conflict are more pronounced “where collective identifications have become more salient and more ethno-nationalistic”. Similar sentiments are expressed by Watson (2009) in her study of the Konso relations with their neighbours.

In cattle raiding, warriors engaged in raids are subjects of these inventions by elite who play on identity differences to achieve their ends (see also Eaton 2008). Groups in Kenya have often appeal to the ethnic identity to encourage raiding. This is because raiding groups in Kenya often tried to maintain ethnic boundaries or ethnic belonging and attachment which are known to create a sense of social and physical boundary among a group in opposition to others (Horowitz 1985).

According to Turton (1997) ethnicity is a mobilizable base from which identity cleavages among groups, political competition and conflict come to be organized. Posner (2005) has also noted that ethnic cleavages become the axis of political competition and conflict among groups. The author further argues that cleavages that emerge as salient is the aggregation of all actors' individual decisions about the identity that will serve them best by emphasizing these identities to suit their political ambitions. Thus, ethnicity is only instrumental in that it is used as a facade for political competition in which political actors (politicians, community leaders and political groups) will mobilize ethnic identity for political interests. Generally, pastoralists’ communities in Eastern Africa command little political influence and are rather products of elite political manipulation. Krätli & Swift (1999) in particular found that political competition exacerbates inter-ethnic and inter-clan violence among pastoral groups in Northern Kenya by politicians enhancing their reputation and influence by supporting or initiating raids. Van den Broeck (2009) noted that local elites and politicians engage and mobilize warrior militias in organized raids.
against their opponents and also to generate funds for electoral campaigns. They do so through ethnic identity using deep-seated ethnic cleavages among pastoral groups. The argument presented in this chapter theoretically is that so-called pastoral raids which are often seen as resulting from environmental scarcity and ethnic differences are actually not so but are products of identity and elite political manipulation and competition.

6.3 Mobilization theory

Closely linked to the issue of identity politics is the role of mobilization in organizing raids. Groups could mobilize in response to political, social/identity and resource needs. Conflict remains one important need that can motivate groups for mobilization. I use Etzioni’s (1968: 243) definition of mobilization as “a process in which a social unit gains relatively rapidly in control of resources it previously did not control. The resources might be economic or military, but also political.” Thus raids are organized through mobilization with the aim of gaining control not only over resources (getting cattle wealth), but as a means to political power. Jenkins (1983:532-533) notes that the major issues in mobilization are:

- The resources controlled by the group prior to mobilization efforts;
- The processes by which the group pools resources and directs these towards social change; and
- The extent to which outsiders increase the pool of resources.

Thus, the collective action of groups and their array of resources including material and group cohesiveness (in this case ethnicity) are important in mobilization process.

In Ted Gurr’s (1993) seminal work Why Minorities Rebel, he explains that communal groups often have as their focus political mobilization and action in defense or promotion of their self-defined interests. Gurr (1993:167) defines group mobilization as “the calculated mobilization of group resources in response to changing political opportunities” while political mobilization “refers to a communal group’s organization for and commitment to joint action in pursuit of group interests.” Gurr (1993) argues that these groups often mobilize in response to challenges or obstacles posed by other groups. Gurr (1993) maintains that group mobilizations are based on ethnic identity and grievances or ethnic boundary maintenance (in primordial and instrumental
Groups’ mobilization and their collective action depend on members’ shared interests and organization as well as their opportunities (Tilly 1978: 55, cited in Gurr 1993). Thus, in group mobilization, members within the groups usually are recruited through networks and their commitment for collective action is maintained through their collective identity (for instance ethnicity).

Etzioni (1968) notes that in mobilization, existing social patterns are usually supported by a parallel distribution of power, vested interests, social habits and ideological underpinnings and the actors try to maximize support of allies. Among the Samburu and Turkana, mobilization for raiding is supposedly done through ethnic identity, but political actors implicitly manipulate the raiding process for their political interests. This is why Posner (2005:7) statement that “ethnic groups are mobilized or joined not because of the depth of attachment that people feel toward them but because of the usefulness of the political coalitions that they define - a usefulness determined exclusively by their sizes relative to those of other coalitions” is important here. The act of enemy creation has also facilitated raids. Political groups deliberately create enemies through political discourses and this encourages others to engage in raids against their ‘enemies.’

6.4 Change in cattle raids

Several factors have contributed to the changing nature of the practice of cattle raids in Northern Kenya. During the colonial period, the whole of Northern Kenya was referred to as ‘Northern Frontier District’ (Khalif and Oba 2013). It was administered through emergency laws that sought to restrict movement of pastoralists groups by creating artificial resource boundaries. In so doing the colonial government inadvertently created a new window of violent confrontation between pastoralists groups as it zoned off some groups from previously shared inter-communal resources. Cattle raids from the 1900s therefore started becoming an avenue through which military power to access and and utilize resources was exhibited. The need to win contests over resource access brought in new leaders of war, in Samburu North district a Turkana elder63 mentioned a man named Ekuli64 who led the battle to remove Samburu and Rendille herders at

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63 Interview at Leilei, the Turkana village within Baragoi town in September 2014
64 Interview in Samburu North 2015
Lokorkor. Ekului is one of the earliest ethnic-nationalist to emerge out of the Samburu-Turkana cattle raids. The battle of Lokorkor in 1971 led to the first Lokorkor\textsuperscript{65} massacre in which 35 Samburu herders were speared to death and their animals stolen by Turkana warriors. As a famed Turkana warrior, he was the first person to spear a Samburu moran in a battle that lasted the whole afternoon. Turkana warriors thus composed motivation songs in his praise and also as a reminder to the subsequent generations of warriors the enmity with their Samburu neighbours.

Change in the practice of raiding was further evident in the attempts of colonial officers to reduce the interaction of pastoralists groups in Samburu North sub County. In 1922\textsuperscript{66} the colonial administration decided that to delimit the boundary between the Samburu and Turkana by creating a grazing area exclusive to the Turkana as follows;

Taking Baragoi as the S.E corner of the area, the Southern boundary is the River Guilguil. Permission to graze to a distance of 2 hours south of this river Guilguil. Eastern boundary is line Baragoi-Kawop-Lellu-Legerthego-Laiorok (Lalarok), but not across the river. Northern boundary is the line running due west from Lalarok.

In later years the Maralal-Marti-Baragoi-Loiyangalani highway would be the defacto boundary that splits the Turkana and Samburu communities. This not only restricted mobility that pastoralists’ livelihoods depended on but it also forced Samburu households living among the Turkana to move back to the Samburu side. It drew a red line and contributed to ethnic stereotyping that encouraged enmity. For example, Turkana or Samburu herders whose livestock crossed the road to either side had to forfeit them or use force to retrieve their animals.

\textsuperscript{65}Lokorkor is located near Marti center in Baragoi, it is a rich grassland and a famed battle ground between the Turkana and Samburu. Lokorkor was the scene of a second massacre in 1996 involving the Samburu, Turkana and Rendille during which the Rendille who had come from Marsabit County were killed and their camels stolen by the Samburu and Turkana.

\textsuperscript{66}KNA PC/NFD/4/1/8 (1922) Definition of Turkana Grazing Area in Samburu, Ref. Secretariat Letter No. S.11963/6/18 of 7/6/22
According to a KPR officer\textsuperscript{67} based in Parkati, \textit{Ngoroko}\textsuperscript{68} from Turkana County were the first to come to Samburu County with guns. These Turkana \textit{Ngoroko} had earlier acquired guns through trade with the Ethiopians. \textit{Ngoroko} often came through Parkati which is a Turkana village and raided the Turkana of Parkati many times. They would then proceed to Samburu villages such as Tuum, Uaso Rongai, South Horr and Lonjorin. The introduction of guns changed the course of cattle raids as it brought in new actors such as arms traders and in some way opened up the cultural practice of raiding to other actors who are not pastoralists. In an interview with a resident of Parkati\textsuperscript{69}, he said that his father was given two guns by a Catholic priest in early 1980s due to the frequent attacks that the Turkana \textit{Ngorokos} were carrying out upon their kinsmen in Parkati. This was a curious change as cattle raids were never sanctioned against one’s own kin. This shows the rebellious nature of the \textit{Ngoroko} and also the independence that the ownership of guns gave to pastoralists’ warriors; they did not need to seek the blessings of elders before venturing into raids as was the custom.

In the early 1980s, a local Member of Parliament who was also a retired General in the Kenyan Army requested the then President of Kenya, Daniel Moi\textsuperscript{70} to provide arms to the local herders as Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) due to frequency of \textit{Ngoroko} attacks. The whole of North-western Kenya being part of the then vast Rift Valley Province and the political backyard of Moi, he granted the request of the Samburu MP. Villages like Parkati received 20 guns most of these were semi-automatic weapons such as the MK IV or MKI. The introduction of guns in these villages not only provided much needed firepower against the Turkana \textit{Ngorokos} but also slowly replaced spears, bows and arrows as mark of masculinity among Samburu and Turkana men. Using the few security personnel in the area, the KPRs were trained on shooting skills at a

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\textsuperscript{67} Interview with KPR officer at Nakwei on the shores of Lake Turkana in October 2014
\textsuperscript{68}The Ngoroko are identified as a rebel age-set that acquired weapons in Turkana County and moved out of Turkana settlements to raid and rape women at abandon (Skoggard & Adem, 2010). Skoggard and Adem (2010) describe the Ngoroko as an example of the slipping away of culture and a breakdown of the filial relations between fathers and their sons in Turkana society.
\textsuperscript{69}A resident of Parkati village. His father was a chief in Parkati in the early 1980s and was the first man in Parkati to own a gun.
\textsuperscript{70}Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, the 2\textsuperscript{nd} President of Kenya from 1978-2002
\end{flushleft}
hill in Uaso Rongai. This case of providing guns shows the inability or unwillingness of the Kenyan state to provide adequate security to its citizens and points to state weakness in vast pastoralist’s dry lands of Northern Kenya.

6.5 Complex Roles of Different Actors

Change in the cultural practice of raiding among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya can be attributed to a constellation of actors as explained in the following sections:

6.5.1 Colonial Administrators

The role of elders as custodians of norms and mores of society has diminished in the last century (Leff 2009). The colonial administration system in Northern Kenya ignored the role elders played to resolve conflicts. Most of the times, colonial officers demarcated resource boundaries without consulting local elders as indicated in ‘Present policy regarding the tribes in the vicinity of the Horr Valley’ below:

1. The water at Sirima, the Horr Valley and Naiesecho to be inter-tribal as between the Rendille, Samburu and Turkana
2. The Horr Valley to be open to the Turkana as a corridor from North to South
3. The Turkana are not to be allowed manyattas in the Horr Valley but may keep their manyattas at Lonjorin and west thereof
4. The Samburu may have manyattas in the Horr Valley by agreement with the Rendille
5. This policy is the subject to consideration at any time if it found to lead to inter-tribal friction, or if it desirable to place the Turkana elsewhere
6. The Turkana are not to go North of the motor track from Horr Valley to Sirima thence to Lake Rudolf.

Colonial officers also did not understand that pastoralists groups had their own institutions for conflict resolution and mediation. The power and authority of elders to provide leadership especially on how to conduct raids and still live in harmony among pastoralists neighbours was

\footnote{KNA DC/SAM/3/1 (1931) Present Policy Regarding the Tribes in the Vicinity of the Horr Valley, from R. G. Stone, the Provincial Commissioner to the D.C Samburu forwarded to the D.C Isiolo, 23rd August.}
therefore greatly diminished by colonial administrators who literally operated in Northern Kenya under emergency laws until early 1960s (Khalif and Oba 2013). The power of colonial administrators can be seen in their solitary demarcation of the Samburu-Turkana ethnic boundary along a highway, this basically prevented both communities from accessing grazing lands in Ngoriche, Naagis, Nasiischo, Kawap, Lokorkor, Marti, Charda and Losurkoi areas, all these having been previously designated as inter-communal grazing reserves during periods of droughts and under the management of selected elders from the two communities. Thus, the colonial administrators interfered in the traditional process of resource allocation and arbitration thus undermining the power of elders to perform these functions.

6.5.2 Ngorokos from Turkana County

_Ngoroko_ have been described by as a rebel group of raiders from Turkana community who disobeyed elders in their own villages upon owning guns through trade with pastoralists groups from Ethiopia (Skoggard and Adem 2010). The advent of the _Ngoroko_ in Samburu County altered pastoralists’ relations between the Turkana and Samburu communities. The Ngoroko attacked mostly the Turkana at Parkati and the Samburu communities in Tuum, Uaso Rongai, South Horr and Lonjorin villages. Having the advantage of firepower as compared to the locals armed with spears, they easily raided livestock and killed many pastoralists including their own Turkana kinsmen. The Ngorokos attacked their Turkana in Parkati raided livestock and killed many locals (Lamphear 1976). According to survivors of the Ngoroko attacks in the early 1980s, the Turkana of Parkati were accused by the Turkana from Lokori of “not being Turkana enough” or of being Samburu”. In essence the Ngoroko used primordialism (Rex 2002; Eisenstadt 2002:36) to categorise the Turkana of Samburu district as ‘others’ and this enabled them to justify raiding fellow Turkanat just as they raided the Samburu.

To the Samburu, the Turkana whether from Parkati or from Turkana County were declared enemy and derogatorily referred to as _Lnkuume_. While the Turkana refer to the Samburu as _Ngor_. Similar use of ethnic identity marker against the other can be found in many pastoralists and agro-pastoral communities in Eastern Africa, for instance among the Shuwa and Gumuz in

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72 It is a derogatory word used by the Samburu against the Turkana, it translates to “dark and dirty people”

73 Meaning people who apply different colours to their body
Ethiopia (Wolde-Selassie 2009). The seeds of inter-ethnic hatred were therefore entrenched through the actions of the Ngorokos. The fact that Ngorokos could only raid Samburu villages by approaching from the direction of Parkati led to suspicion that the Turkana of Parkati were probably colluding with their violent kin from Turkana district to raid cattle and kill Samburu villagers. Thus, the introduction of firearms into the raiding changed the dynamics of cattle raids and led to the support of political and business actors in providing arms for raids.

6.5.3 Independent Kenya Government and Security Officers

Change in cattle raid can also be blamed upon the attitude and action of independent Kenya governments since 1963. Through the Sessional74 Paper No. 10 of 1965 (GoK 1965), the Kenyatta75 administration deliberately chose to ignore the security and developmental needs of Northern Kenya. Given that Shifta76 war between Kenya and Somalia was fought until late 1960s the emergency law was extended in all of Northern Kenya thus restricting movement of people and animals while giving local administrators the carte blanche to ignore societal structures in decision making processes (Rinquist 2011). According to the records from the Kenya National Archives security officers from this time were involved in ‘communal punishments’. These were security led exercises in which the police would spearhead a mop up of animals from one community to compensate the community that had been raided while at other times security officers themselves conducted raids and confiscated animals from pastoralists’ households. The fact that communal raids could punish every herder including those that had not benefited from a raid by their community warriors enraged many herders from the Samburu and Turkana groups. This led to revenge raids as disaffected warriors organised themselves and conducted raids to ‘return’ the livestock forcefully taken from them by security forces during communal raids.

74 GoK (1965); Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi
75 Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minister of Kenya (1963), President of Kenya from 1964-1978
76 Shifta war was fought between Kenya and Somalia. The then Somalia government wanted to claim the Northeastern and some parts of Eastern Kenya where there are Somali Kenyans as part of Somalia territory.
punishments. One such case of abuse of power by independent Kenya security officers is captured in a letter by Ekiru\textsuperscript{77} (1995):

The District Commissioner  
Samburu District,  
P.O. Box 2 Maralal,  
Baragoi Township,  
P.O. Box Baragoi via Maralal  
12\textsuperscript{th} April 1995

Dear Sir,  
RE: MISUSE OF POWER AND ATTEMPT FOR MURDER  
Please allow me to raise a complain to your office against the District Officer Baragoi Division, the O.C.P.P Baragoi Police Post and Corporal Edward of Baragoi Police Post. As your office is well aware of a raid led by the mentioned officers at Kawap location in Nyiro Division on the 7\textsuperscript{th} of February 1995, I hereby complain bitterly on the act they did to my father Mr. Lokia Kokolion Ekiru.

The officers raided our animals: camels, cows and five goats. They asked some Samburu men to give false information that some of the animals belonged to them. But the Samburu men refused. In the evening of 8\textsuperscript{th} February 1995 all our animals which were confiscated by the officers were given back to us except eight camels and four goats which are missing to date. A he-goat was found at the District Officer’s house and was returned to us. What am very bitter about was the way my father was made to walk naked infront of his two young wives. The old man had followed all their instructions and when he was ordered to go away, Corporal Edward Leparoia opened fire at the old man as he walked away. A bullet passed very closely to the oldman’s ears and the remains of the bullet fell close by. I take this act as a murder attempt on my father. And I demand that appropriate action be taken against the mentioned officers. It has taken us time to report the matter officially. This is because the oldman was sick and when he recovered, he was going to kill himself had he not been restrained by some Turkana elders.

Yours Sincerely,

Lawrence Ekiru

\textsuperscript{77} Ekiru (1995) Misuse of Power and Attempt of Murder, Letter to the District Commissioner, Samburu District, 12\textsuperscript{th} April 1995
6.5.4 Presence of trained military and police personnel among Pastoralists

Taking cue from the colonial administrators’ employment of pastoralists’ warriors as the majority in the police, prison and armed forces, the independent administrations of Kenyatta and Moi recruited massively from pastoralists’ warriors who were deemed to be brave and obedient as required in the disciplined forces. The downside of this is that many of these later retired and were absorbed as village administrators. From my observation, 70 per cent of active village chiefs and more than 80 per cent of retired chiefs in Samburu North sub-County were either police officers or military officers. The influence of this disciplined forces elite contributed to tremendous change in the cultural practice of cattle raiding. In interviews with retired chiefs and security officers, we were informed of how some of these retired officers were crucial in training morans\(^78\) and using their networks to secure arms and ammunition. The fact that General Lenges was elected as the Member of Parliament of Samburu in 1980s and his role in requesting guns and ammunition for KPRs in Samburu district further points to influence of members of the disciplined forces in militarization and mobilization of pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya for violent conflicts and raids. A case in point is the case of ‘Operation Turkanas Out’ in South Horr and drawn from an interview with a Samburu from the Lmeoli\(^79\) age-set:

In 1997 I was in class eight at South Horr Primary School and next to the school was a Turkana manyatta called Soweto. We were neighbours with the Turkana, our girlfirends were Turkana. Conflict between our two communities had started in places like Tuum and Baragoi in 1996 and I remember that the Turkana also stole Rendille livestock at Syambu in 1996. The following year (1997) the Turkana attacked Lonojorin and killed three Samburu, after that we the Samburu became bitter with the Turkana. Our chiefs, councilors and elders had a meeting and a decision was made to ‘deal with the Turkana’. Around Soweto area, there were just 5 Samburu manyattas and ours was one of them. One of the manyattas belonged to a Samburu elder called Lentoiga who had a son called Lucas. Lucas was an ex-GSU officer. He was the leader of ‘Operations Turkanas Out’. He moblised warriors one day at noon and led them in torching Turkana houses at

\(^78\) Morans are the warrior age-set among pastoralists groups usually between the age of 15-30 years old.

\(^79\) Age set circumcised in 1990. Interview 28\(^{th}\) September 2014, South Horr Catholic Parish
Soweto. The following night, Lucas led some Samburu warriors who raided the manyatta of one Turkana elder called Eiyan and stole 50 goats. The Turkana were scared and some of them came to camp at the South Horr Catholic Parish where Fr. Pendezini gave them refuge. The following night, Lucas led Samburu warriors in throwing stones and shooting in the air just next to Soweto manyatta where some Turkana families had remained as they were now protected by the few AP officers based in South Horr. I remember that one Turkana middle aged man decided to move with his goats to South Horr AP camp and the next night Lucas and other Samburu warriors attacked the AP camp and sprayed it with bullets. The Aps responded by shooting one Samburu warrior dead, so they were not successful in that raid.

The killing of the Samburu warrior by the APs brought a lot of tension in South Horr. Some Turkana families asked Fr. Pendezini to organize their evacuation out of South Horr while others remained. At the same time the Turkana from Baragoi mobilised to defend their kinsmen in South Horr by raiding a Samburu manyatta at Keleswa where they stole some livestock. A Turkana forester based in South Horr called Logelae Eiyan was shot in the buttocks while he was at the forestry office compound. The remaining Turkana families later convinced Fr. Pendezini to help them build another manyatta after Soweto had been razed down by Lucas and other Samburu morans. The new manyatta was called ‘Bethany’ and for about two months the Samburu and Turkana of South Horr lived in peace. But later the Turkana attacked Waso Rongai, in retaliation the Samburu warriors led by Lucas attacked Bethany and burnt everything. I was part of the Samburu warriors that attacked Bethany and we made sure all of them moved out except eight families who had become Samburu by adopting our culture such as circumcision. The Turkana families were assisted by Fr. Pendezini to relocate to Loiyangalani, Baragoi and Maralal. After that, Samburu elders met and made a declaration that there will never be a Turkana manyatta in South Horr because we consider them to be our enemy.

6.5.5 Chiefs
In the Government of Kenya administration system, chiefs represent the Office of the President at the village level. Chiefs are therefore influential in the day to day administration of villages.
They solve disputes between their people. At the same time Chiefs have been accused of mobilising for violence among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya, their role in organizing for violence among the Rendille and Borana of Marsabit was noted as follows:

“– these chiefs and sub-chiefs are the ones used to mobilise people and pass messages to villagers, to block the administration from knowing what is happening and organising the attacks. They also get a share of the proceeds or cut from politicians” (Scott-Villiers et al 2014:16)

Given the diminishing role of community elders in arbitration of disputes within communities, chiefs are continually playing a more central role. In Samburu North sub County, chiefs have the knowledge of the illegal arms that are found in each household. Chiefs have the power to appoint KPRs. KPRs report to their chiefs when incidences of raids take place. Raiders cannot enter a village with raided cattle without the knowledge and approval of the chiefs. In my interviews, I was informed that cattle raids changed when “chiefs became thieves”80. The chief of Tuum81 location was for example a known trainer of warriors and preparing them for raids. This was because he was a retired military officer and had the requisite skills and the ethno-nationalistic ideology through which he justified raids. Thus chiefs themselves are embroiled in the business of raiding through both moral and physical support for raids. This helps them to maintain and consolidate their power.

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80 Interview with Mrs. Narumbe at Baragoi AP Command
81 Tuum Location is located in Nyiro Division; it borders Parkati, Kawap, Uaso Rongai and South Horr locations within the same Division.
The picture above was taken after a joint security meeting attended by the sub-County Commissioner, Samburu North in January 2015. Those in the picture from the left to the right include the Assistant Chief of Naling’ang’or of Baragoi town location from the Turkana community. Next to him is the Chief of Parkati Location also from the Turkana community, next to him is the Assistant Chief of Bendera sublocation of Baragoi town location from the Samburu community, and next to him is the Acting Chief of Kawap location, (a former KPR) from the Turkana community and on the extreme right is the Chief of Elbarta location from the Samburu community.

6.5.6 Political and business elites
The role of politics and business interests in cattle raiding emerged in the 1960s but became more pronounced in the 1990s. The contested nature of ethnicised politics among pastoralists in Northern Kenya and indeed in Kenya as a whole has contributed in a big way in the choice of political leadership in the marginalized Northern Kenya. Political leadership is increasingly associated with the ability to protect ones ethnic group against the ‘enemy’ group. As protectors of their communities, political leaders therefore influence government policy in favour of their
community thus contributing to tension and conflict among pastoralists. In Baragoi, the prominent role of political leaders in the conflict was noted in the mid 1990s when a Member of Parliament received livestock from the government as a compensation on behalf of his community (Turkana Community, nd:1):

“On May 28th 1995 Provincial Administration compounded 530 cattle belonging to the Turkana community and gave them the then MP of Samburu East in compensation of Samburu cattle raided by the Turkana” (Turkana Community, nd: 1)

In a study in Marsabit, Scott-Villiers et al (2014) noted the role of political leaders in fuelling violence as follows:

“The political leaders chosen by the people are warlords. The people here would not elect anyone who likes peace. They elect people who are good at speaking against other communities. They like such people because they would speak for them. They also feel that such leaders would liberate them from what we don’t know, and help them have the power to take up and own every place where there are good pastures. They look for people who promote violence to be elected as leaders. They also look at resources like the Constituency Development Fund [CDF]. They may plan using the CDF to buy guns and arm themselves. These are the kind of rumours that we get here.” Scott-Villiers et al (2014:24)

The year 1996 was also a period of heightened political campaign since Kenya was to hold a General Election in 1997. Local Samburu politicians who at that time controlled Samburu County Council are alleged to have sponsored several raids which included burning of houses of Turkana villages in Logetei, Charda and Lomerok areas to disenfranchise potential political opponents for local council positions. The death of the Samburu District Commissioner in 1996 whose helicopter was shot down in Nachola area while tracking raided Samburu livestock pointed to the sophistication of raiders by the early 1990s (Mkutu 2005:173). Raiding at this time was used a means of economic suppression and also as a tool for entrenching ethnic hegemony

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82 The said Samburu DC was Mr. James Nyandoro
of the Samburu over the Turkana. The use of ethnic identity to ferment of fuel violence against
the ‘other’ was well captured by Horowitz (1998):

“….elites do not merely steer the process (of boundary contraction) according to existing
ethnic juxtapositions, but more or less shape them in view of their own material interest,
with wide latitude to foment conflict and violence” (Horowitz 1998:19)

Further cases that give credence to the involvement of political leaders in inciting or justifying
raids in Baragoi can be found in the speeches made during community meetings. A case in point
was an address by a Samburu Member of County Assembly (MCA) at a Samburu leaders’
meeting held in South Horr in October 2014:

“My people, leadership has become something difficult in our County. Reason being that
these raids have never stopped, however we are gathered here today as your leaders to
discuss the way forward. I believe that you are all aware that Ole Lenku\(^83\) will be in
Tuum soon and we need to plan on what to tell him. Recently we lost our cattle in
Wasorongai, Tuum and Simale but what we need more is the evidence that the Turkana
did it. We know that our men followed their footsteps to Marti and also those who lost
everything are living evidence, so we need you to come in good numbers and defend our
tribe even if you lost nothing because we are all fighting a common enemy. I also take
this opportunity to warn you that you should all be alert always because you never know
what happens next and you know this enemy is deadly. If they can come all the way from
Marti to attack Tuum and Wasorongai then we should be alert”.

Kratli and Swift (1999) have further linked illicit businessmen and the supply of weapons to
pastoralists’ areas. They argue that suppliers of illegal arms in Northern Kenya facilitate raids
since they give warriors weapons on credit and this motivates warriors to conduct raids and
acquire livestock to repay their debts (firearms).

\(^{83}\) Former Minister for Internal Security in the Uhuru Kenyatta government
6.6 Cattle raids and politics in Baragoi: Illustrations

In this section, I outline cases obtained from interviews with opinion leaders, morans from the Samburu and Turkana communities and also petitions and letters received from respondents detailing cases of involvement of political leaders and other influential people in Baragoi and beyond in cattle raids:

On the 21st of September 2011, a group of Turkana raiders attacked a Rendile manyatta at Angata in Nyiro Division. The Rendille had relocated there to graze at Kawap due to drought in Marsabit. The Turkana made away with unknown numbers of livestock. The Rendille and Samburu political leaders responded by mobilising for a revenge raid on the 28th of September.
2011 where 107 Samburu and Rendille morans out of which 87 were armed with G3 rifles\textsuperscript{84}, while others armed with AK47 and a few others had spears gathered. Those at the forefront included a nominated Samburu MP, a Rendille MP and Assistant Minister from Marsabit County. They also mobilized a contingent of GSU, regular police, APs and RDU officers who were supported by a white Kenya police helicopter which landed in Tiyale a Turkana manyatta in Kawap location. The politicians alongside the District security command set up a command post at Tuum trading center as the group of Samburu and Rendille morans gathered Turkana livestock from around Kawap in revenge of the Turkana raid of 21\textsuperscript{st} September 2011. As a result 9 Turkana male adults (herders), one Turkana female adult and one Turkana male child were killed alongside 200 camels and 600 shoats caught in the cross fire. Further 21,671 shoats were confiscated alongside 1372 camels and 463 donkeys. This became what the Turkana refer to as the Tiyale massacre.

A second perspective on the role of local elites in influencing cattle raids among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi is captured in police records (Baragoi Police Station 2013) as follows: On the 18\textsuperscript{th} of October 2013 at about 10:46 hours, it was reported to Baragoi Police Station by the Assistant Chief of Baragoi Township location that unknown number of cattle raiders believed to be Turkana invaded Waso Rongai village and made away with unknown numbers of livestock. Unconfirmed reports further indicated that during the incident the raiders are believed to have killed two police reservists and made away with their guns. The police immediately made up a patrol team comprising of ASTU, GSU, AP and regular police and headed to the troubled remote area amid reports of heavy exchange of gunfire between the local KPRs and the rustlers. Shortly after a police chopper arrived in Baragoi from Nairobi carrying senior police officers who flew in to take an overview of the situation. The high powered team of senior security officers included, a Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of Operations at the GSU Headquarters, an Assistant Commissioner of Police and Deputy Director of Operations at Police Headquarters and an, Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of Operations at the AP headquarters. They were briefed by the OCS Baragoi and the GSU Commander in Charge of Baragoi Operation Camp before heading to the scene of murder and cattle rustling. The patrol

\textsuperscript{84} Interview with a retired Samburu moran in September 2014 at South Horr
team reported back at 18:42 hrs after confirming the incident. The team did establish that the rustlers took away 280 cows and 440 goats belonging to 8 Samburu house holds. The raiders were about 200 in number who divided themselves in three groups giving the security team a hard time trying to repulse their advances. As one section of the raiders were engaging the KPRs in a fierce exchange of fire, the other sections of raiders escaping with the livestock met resistance from another team of security officers who were called in from Nachola GSU camp. However the raiders managed to escape with the animals towards Terter valley enroute to Suguta Valley.

On the 20th of October 2013, the acting chief of Kawap location, the Headteacher of Kawap Primary School, his deputy all reported to Baragoi Police Station that on the 18th of October 2013 at about 16:00hrs unknown of raiders believed to be Samburu tribesmen raided Kawap Center and left a trail of destruction on the local primary school, a health center under construction (near completion) and burnt a manyatta thus destroying several houses. During the incident the items reportedly destroyed included learning materials, solar panels and batteries, windpower, research computer, school furniture, 10 bags of cement, 20 pieces of timber, 15 pieces of iron sheets, 10,000 litre water tank, 21 bags of maize, several bags of cereals, teachers quarters were broken into and looted. The heinous act costed the community approximately one million Kenyan Shillings. Two community groups known us Naletae Women Group and Nakwaleb Men Group both are yet to come to terms with the losses they incurred. Naletae Women Group lost nearly 78 chicken and six bags of chicken feed. The women were running a poultry farm within the hostile area of Kawap village. Nakwaleb Men Group got a funding from an NGO (ACTED) and were running a retail shop. Their estimated loss was retail stock of about Kenyan Shillings 120,000 and cash of Kenyan Shillings 30,000. On the same day again, Senior Police Officers arrived to oversee the security situation. On the 22nd of October 2013, Baragoi Police Station Commander, Chief Inspector Owino and a team of police officers together with the victims of Kawap attack visited the scene. Nothing was salvaged except a computer housing case, chicken feeder, burnt metal boxes and electrical apparatus vandalized from the dispensary. As a result of the raid and vandalism of Kawap center 87 households were displaced (all of these later settled among their kin in other Turkana villages).
It is worth noting also that cattle raids before and after the eviction of the Turkana of Kawap Center points to the determination of the Samburu to gain exclusive access to the rich Kawap grazing field which was previously used by the Turkana. Even though the Turkana of Kawap and the Samburu of Uaso Rongai had been raiding each other violently since mid 1990s, the Turkana raid in Uaso Rongai in October 2013 during which 50 herds of livestock were stolen and 2 KPRs killed and their guns taken brought to the fore a new dimension of raiding between the two groups. According to police records\textsuperscript{85} the Samburu warriors in conjunction with the Baragoi town Chief who is also the brother to the local Member of Parliament took part in the demolition of Kawap Center. In interview with police officers in Baragoi, it was established that the land rover belonging to the chief was used to ferry some of the iron sheets and timber that was looted from Kawap School and Catholic Church.

\textbf{Photo 9}: The vandalized Kawap Primary School, in Nyiro Division, Baragoi due to revenge raids by Samburu of Uaso Rongai in March 2014: Source: Author

\textsuperscript{85}Based on incident report from Baragoi Police Station (2013), October
The third example of the involvement of politicians in cattle raids was the February 2015 incident in Marti center about 49 kilometers from Baragoi town. A senior political leader from Samburu County was touring Baragoi area and when he reached Marti, his motorcade stopped at Marti Police barrier and he instructed one of his security aides to hand over a box containing hundreds of ammunition to the police constable who was manning the barrier. This was a curious incident because even though Kenya has a devolved system of governance the security function remains with the national government. Therefore one wonders where political obtain Government of Kenya issued ammunition. Besides, the fact that while handing over the ammunition the political leader allegedly told the officer to distribute the said ammunitions to KPRs in Marti area also draws questions about procedure of arming KPRs. Politicians have no role in arming KPRs according to Kenyan laws and regulations on security matters. The fact that political leaders can access state ammunition and distribute it in broad daylight to citizens’ points to weak accountability framework within the security apparatus. This bodes very negatively for sustainable peace among pastoralists in Northern Kenya given the fact that through the devolved system of governance, local politicians have more financial clout to acquire arms.

A fourth example of the involvement of political leaders in cattle raids among the Samburu and Turkana emanate from interviews with police officers and warriors in Baragoi: At the height of the skirmishes between the Pokot and the Samburu from 2005-2007, Samburu political leaders including the then MP for Samburu West, the former Samburu East MP, prominent personalities within Samburu County Council and other civic leaders made a secret fund that raised the money to buy about 70 illegal firearms from Archers Post. Among the Turkana of Baragoi a Turkana politician was arrested and charged with organizing the Turkana morans to attack and kill policemen during the botched police operation at Lomerok. During interviews informants stated that a former councilor who is also a retired army officer, allegedly trained Turkana morans on marksmanship prior to the Baragoi massacre and was also investigated by police for mobilizing the Turkana manyattas in Baragoi area to raise funds for the purchase of firearms. The suspect was arrested and indicted in court where he was bonded to keep the peace for three months. This

86 Interview with a police officer at the Marti Police Operation Camp in February 2015
87 Interview in August 2014 at Catholic Parish Baragoi
shows the entrenched manner in which political leaders and other elites are implicated in the logistical and technical support for violence as it is an avenue through which power politics is pursued.

6.7 Mobilization of raiders

Just as Stewart (2009), Gurr (1993) and Etzioni (1968) have all espoused, cattle raids are mobilized and done on political and ethnic bases. Elites and politicians continue to play a central role in mobilization for raids and revenge raids. During the dry season from November to February, several raids occurred after politicians and elites on both sides distributed ammunition to morans especially over the Christmas period. In an interview with security personnel in Baragoi town, some government vehicles associated with politicians were used at night to distribute arms and ammunition to morans. Further, the killing of an 18 year old Turkana herder in Naagis grazing field on November 22nd 2014 who was apparently selling ammunition to Samburu morans heightened tension between the two communities and there is evidence that elites from both communities raised funds for purchase of arms and ammunition for subsequent raids (Wachira 2015). Other examples of mobilisation of warriors for raids are captured in police records as seen below:

“To the station is Senior Chief of Baragoi town location who reports that while in the District Officer’s office, he received a call from a member of the Samburu County Council Peace Committee that Samburu morans are being gathered at Ng'oriche dam around Kawap area on a mission believed to be a retaliatory attack against the Turkana of Kawap” (Baragoi Police Station 2012)

The role of politicians and elites in the mobilization of raiders can be seen in the Baragoi massacre of November 2012. During this incident, a police officer estimated that through the efforts of local politicians 600 Samburu morans were mobilized, fed, armed and paid to conduct a raid in Lomirok village. Similarly, the Turkana through the local leaders mobilized for sniper morans (with some allegedly having come from the kinsmen in Turkana County). In the advent

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88 Interview with a police officer at Baragoi town in August 2014
89 Interview with a police officer at Baragoi town in August 2014
of the devolved system of government, it was observed that the senior County officials while touring development projects in the area would go to grazing lands to address warriors. It is curious to an independent observer that these politicians never addressed the warriors from the two communities together. They mostly addressed Samburu morans in Samburu language.

Politicians were also blamed for the evacuation of the Samburu of Marti who had lived cordially with their Turkana neighbours for decades. Given the uniqueness of their relationship the Turkana and Samburu of Marti resisted temptations to betray each other by sharing information of possible threats from raiders from other Turkana and Samburu villages in Samburu North sub-County. However, the intervention of a senior Samburu politician who provided lorries and 500 Kenya Shillings per every Samburu household to enable their relocation to Morijo in order for warriors from other Samburu villages such as Suiyan and Ngilai to raid the Turkana of Marti. In an interview\textsuperscript{90} with a Samburu moran who led the evacuation of Samburu of Marti, he stated that the Samburu of Marti agreed to move because they did not want to be seen to “disobey their leaders”. This point to ethno-nationalism and its effect on inter-communal relations between pastoralists communities who were in all senses and purposes dependent on each other for security and trade in a volatile areas.

Cattle raids in northwest Kenya have become arenas through which constellations of actors build ties and mobilize through politics to achieve their agenda and interests (see Log 2001; Bailey 2001; Baily 1969). A wide range of actors in cattle raids take advantage of these conflicts for political, financial and other interests beyond the raids. Various actors other than the pastoralists become part of the conflict process leading to violent escalations. Actors would often claim to mobilize based on ethnic identities, but in reality they are mobilized politically to undertake raids that serve the interest of political groups.

6.8 Raiding as state/authority failure

One of the key prerequisites of the state is to provide security for the lives and property of its citizens. In return the citizens are expected to obey the laws and pay taxes (Rothbard 2009). The

\textsuperscript{90}Interview at Marti Center in October 2014.
Kenyan state has failed fundamentally in providing security and development for citizens of Northern Kenya. The disparity in development in Northern Kenya as compared to other parts of Kenya can be seen in minimal infrastructure, lack of adequate social services such as schools and hospitals. In the local parlance the pastoralists in Northern Kenya refer to their kinsmen living and working in other parts of Kenya as the ones living in ‘Kenya’. Even though the state has improved the security in Samburu North sub-County with police camps in Marti, Nachola, Tuum, South Horr and Baragoi town, raids still take place in broad day light as was the case on the 19 January 2015 at Baragoi Slaughter House\textsuperscript{91} where the Samburu raided Turkana goat-herders and made away with 200 goats. The Turkana immediately retaliated by raiding 95 goats from Samburu herders next to Baragoi Mixed Secondary School on the same day. The fact that these raids took place about 700 meters from the Baragoi Police Station and Baragoi Command Post of the Administration Police points to the daring nature of Samburu and Turkana warriors and their confidence in their supply of ammunition. It also shows that police officers posted in Northern Kenya still believe that raiding is pastoralist’s culture and therefore it is okay to let it be.

Cattle raids violent and fatal as they have turned to be are still not treated as robbery with violence. The fact that there is no legal framework for classifying cattle raids as robbery with violence points to institutional weakness on the part of the state and its lack of interest in tacking violent cattle raids. Chiefs who have the necessary intelligence from the local level on who the raiders are and where the raided animals are kept often offer to return the stolen animals if there is a real threat of police operation upon their villages but they never give information on who the raiders are. Thus raiders are never prosecuted or disarmed and the vicious of violent cattle raids continue unabated.

\textbf{6.9 Conclusion}

The practice of cattle raiding has functioned for centuries to sustain the pastoralist moral economy. However, societal changes such as colonialism and technological changes such as the introduction of guns and the role of open and pseudo-political actors have altered the social

\textsuperscript{91} Personal observation at Baragoi town
structure within which cattle raids were carried out either to replenish decimated herds or to acquire animals for the payment of bride wealth. In its place, the new actors have continued to emerge, where pastoralist’s warriors are continually used as pawns in a game of political and economic domination by one ethnic group over the other. Cattle raids have therefore turned into a tool for expressing ethno-nationalistic tendencies (see Watson and Schlee 2009) as politicians sponsor raids to eliminate and disenfranchise their opponents while the business elites use the weakness of the state to maintain patron-client relationships with warriors and community members as they seek to gain from the business of selling arms and ammunition.

The newly developed political system is also seen as having opened a new front for inter-communal contestations over power and resources among the Samburu and Turkana. In Samburu County Assembly, the Turkana are in Minority with one ward representative for the entire Turkana population of Baragoi. The Samburu are the majority holding key positions such as that of the Governor, Speaker of County Assembly as well as national positions such as the Member of Parliament as well as the Senatorship for Samburu County. The devolved system as noted by Sharamo (2014) in his study of pastoralists violence in Isiolo County is itself a driving factor for violence as groups compete for political power by organizing and mobilising their support based on ethnic identities.

The chiefs as local administrators play a dual role of acting as agents of the government while at the same time supporting their respective communal agendas when it comes to raids. The same applies to some KPR officers. The linkage through patron-client relationships between chiefs, KPRs, local political leaders enables the distribution of ammunition and the bailing out of arrested raiders. This shows that pastoralists’ elites are involved in violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi because of the power it gives them through mobilization of warriors to conduct raids especially in revenge cases as was observed in the lead up to the Baragoi massacre. The practice of cattle raiding therefore has transformed into a means through which political ambitions and economic interests of the elite are realized and clearly manifested.
From Cattle Raids to ‘All Out Violence’: A Processual Analysis of the Baragoi Massacre

7.0 Introduction

In this chapter I analyse escalation of violence in raids as precipitated by a combination of structural and processual factors. Using the example of the Baragoi massacre, I analyse the key issues that contributed to killing of 42 police officers on the 10th of November 2012. To achieve this I give a critical look at the series of events that occurred to propel the raid into a massacre. My aim is to explain why some raids escalate into ‘all-out violence’ that lead to devastation of pastoralists livelihoods while others are easily resolved through the intervention of local peacebuilding mechanisms. I argue that for raids to become massacres a series of events precede; immediately after a raid occurs, the opportunity or window for dialogue is shut by the entry of secondary actors with vested interests in violent action. Entry of secondary actors not directly affected by the raid prompts the abandonment of ‘soft’ approaches such as inter-communal dialogue and brings into play the pursuit of ‘hard’ solutions such as revenge raids. Secondary actors increase the availability of instruments of violence through procurement and distribution of arms and ammunition in readiness for retaliatory attacks. They shift the focus of the dispute from a single raid to several past injustices against whole communities. The invocation of past injustices or raids is aimed at galvanizing communal support for the planned violence and serves to mobilize warriors and solidify ethnic identity against the ‘enemy’. Once the ‘we’ group identity is solidified; the enemy defined and identified, the ultimate goal of the conflict then changes from recovery of livestock to ‘finishing’ the enemy. I argue that massacres that arise out of raids are therefore products of processes such as warrior mobilisation and distribution of arms based on ethno-nationalistic identities.

While in pre-colonial times morans were mobilized for raids based on the need to replenish decimated herds after droughts or the need to acquire livestock for the payment of bride wealth (Osamba 2000; Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008). Today’s raids are carried out mostly to solidify group identity based on ethnicity for political competition and resource scrambles (Coser 1956; Greiner 2013). Mobilization for big raids are carried out with ethno-nationalistic orientations that
seek to entrench ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality as a prerequisite for raids (IRIN News 2014). Even though cattle raids are carried out by warriors, the violence that accompanies the raids is significantly fueled by ethnic identity politics and ethno-nationalistic mobilisation involving politicians and educated elite (Kagwanja 2001; Greiner 2013; Sharamo 2014). In Baragoi, major raids and massacres have occurred after periods of mobilization based on ethnic identities. In this study I define a massacre as the intentional, indiscriminate of murder or killings of a group of people because of their socio-political orientations such as ethnic identities or political allegiances. Unlike the traditional cattle raid in which the aim of violence is to forcefully acquire cattle, massacres among pastoralists in Northern Kenya aim to achieve several purposes; to convey a message of incompatibility of two or more communities existing within a common geographical area (often in land disputes between communities or to forcefully evict political competitors from a common area of existence in the run up to a competitive political period, thus denying them a chance to cast their ballots and ensure a win for the organisers of the massacre. This chapter therefore looks into the processes of violence escalation. I argue that escalation of conflicts into violence situations depict contested relationships between the two warring groups (Simmel 1955). Using the Baragoi massacre as a case study, I analyse how raids lead to extensive inter-communal conflicts that results into displacement of people and massive loss of lives.

7.1 The Baragoi Massacre

Details on the Baragoi massacre (NPS 2013) are drawn from an investigative report published by the Kenya Police after the Baragoi massacre which outlines the chronology of events prior to and after the massacre and interviews with police officers who participated in the botched operation as well as priests from Baragoi Catholic Parish, morans, elders and women from the Samburu and Turkana communities. The massacre was triggered by a Turkana raid of Samburu livestock at Lesirkan village in Ndoto location on 20th October 2012. Raids between the Samburu and Turkana are often well calculated missions. The 20th of October is a public holiday (Mashujaa Day⁹²) in Kenya and so raiders chose a day when the security personnel were committed in celebrating heroes’ day. The Turkana raiders from Lomerok manyatta in Nachola location made

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⁹² Swahili for ‘Heroes Day’
away with 501 from the heads of cattle Letipila family. According to the police reports (Baragoi Police Station 2012), the raided animals belonged to the following:

i. Nkoyai Letipila-129 heads of cattle

ii. Nginguge Letipila-176 heads of cattle

iii. Zaire Letipila 116 heads of cattle (a nominated councilor)

iv. Eli Letipila 80 heads of cattle

The report further noted that police officers from Baragoi were mobilized to track the stolen animals. In the report (NPS 2013), it is recorded that police caught up with the alleged raiders at Lomerok village where there was an exchange of fire. The police were overpowered by the raiders forcing them to withdraw. On the 21st of October 2012, the Samburu North police were further reinforced by Anti Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) and the police team again proceeded to Lomerok village. They were again overpowered and forced to withdraw. In an interview with a police officer who participated in the botched operation that became Baragoi massacre, I was informed that the failure of the police contingents to recover the raided livestock in two attempts forced the police and administrators to consider using elders in a series of peacebuilding efforts.

As a result of the dialogue by elders the Turkana returned 20 heads of cattle on 23rd October 2012 (NPS 2013). Ten heads of cattle were further returned by Turkana elders on the 25th of October 2012. By this time the police report (NPS 2013:35) indicates that “about 400 armed Samburu morans” had been mobilized for retaliation purposes against the Turkana. Similar sentiments were expressed by a local priest who wondered who was feeding the Samburu morans gathered at the District Commissioner’s office compound and later in Mnanda village of Baragoi. A Samburu moran narrated how ammunition was distributed to them by Baragoi police officers in the presence of local politicians. I was informed that warrior-age sets from all over Samburu County were mobilised by senior politicians from the Samburu community in readiness for revenge raids. Despite the mobilisation of morans for revenge, efforts of elders to return stolen animals continued on the 27th of October 2012 when Turkana elders brought back 14

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93 A specialized unit formed to track and recover stolen livestock
94 Interview at Baragoi town September 2014
heads of cattle. However, as noted in the report (NPS 2013), Samburu elders allegedly rejected eight of these animals on grounds that these did not bear the Samburu clan branding marks. According to the police report, the delay in returning the remainder of the raided animals brought tension in Baragoi town, “as the Samburus roamed Baragoi town with their firearms” (NPS 2013:7). By 29th of October 2012, Samburu warriors camping at the DCs office compound were about 600 (NPS 2013:35) this further indicates a well planned mobilisation effort by actors interested in violence as a means of solidifying ethnic identity. These warriors invaded Lomerok village in attempts to recover their animals on the 29th of October. The Samburu morans made away with 205 camels from Lomerok village but 12 Samburu morans were killed while three Turkana morans were injured. Seven of those killed were buried at Samburu public cemetery, Baragoi on the 1st of November 2012 in the presence of Samburu political leaders. Two bodies out of the twelve killed were never recovered and it is believed that they were eaten up by wild animals.

On the 1st of November 2012, senior police officers from the provincial headquarters based in Nakuru visited Baragoi and held meetings with Samburu North administrators, police officers and elders from the Samburu and Turkana communities. In this meeting Turkana elders were urged to ensure the return of the remaining Samburu cattle while the issue of the raided Turkana camels was not raised nor discussed (NPS 2013). The police officers gave the Turkana elders a deadline of 5th November failure to which a paramilitary operation would be launched against raiders believed to be hidden in Lomerok village (NPS 2013).

In a meeting called by a senior police officer to assess the progress of inter-communal dialogue by Turkana and Samburu elders on the 4th of November, only Turkana elders attended and informed the police of their willingness to return 12 more heads of cattle (NPS 2013). On the 5th of November 2012, at a meeting meant for handing over of the animals by both groups, it was noted that inter-communal dialogue failed due to the failure by the elders from both sides to bring the stolen animals. It was then declared by the Samburu County Commissioner that an operation to recover the stolen animals be launched against the Turkana in Lomerok village. The operation dubbed “Rudisha Ngombe95” thus targeted Turkana village of Lomerok and

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95 'Return the Livestock'
completely ignored the Samburu raiders that had raided the 205 Turkana camels on the 29th of October 2012.

Information from interviews with police officers, chiefs and the police report (NPS 2013) indicate that there was a disagreement among the senior police officers. The officer tasked with the command of operation “Rudisha Ng’ombe” and the head of police units in Samburu North (OCPD) opposed the launch of the operation. They argued that it targeted the Turkana and ignored justified Turkana grievances of 205 camels raided by the Samburu. Their opposition was based on the following points (NPS 2013: 8):

i. The operation would be suicidal due to inadequate number of personnel and unavailability of communication equipment’s

ii. The Turkana had a legitimate complaint of 205 camels that was not being addressed

iii. They wanted the operations to be well coordinated in order that both Samburu and Turkana locations would be hit simultaneously as carrying it out on Turkana alone would occasion serious animosity between the Government and the Turkana as it would appear that the Government is favouring the Samburu

However, the police report (NPS 2013) as well as interviews with police officers indicate that these two senior officers were overruled by the head of police in the Rift Valley. The officers were further instructed to “prepare and execute the operation” (NPS 2013:8). This shows the role of state security officers in the production of violence among pastoralists groups. The fact that the advice of a senior police officer based in Samburu North on recovery of livestock was ignored points to influence from other actors whose interests were most likely commercial and political as far as conducting the raid was concerned. Divergent interests within the state security apparatus have been argued to contribute towards the escalation of violent conflicts (Kratli and Swift 1999).

Events that proceeded after were continued mobilisation of Samburu morans and the reinforcement of police contingents from other parts of Rift Valley that were assembled in Baragoi town in readiness for the paramilitary operation. According to the report, on the 10th November 2012 a “combined force of 132 police officers and hundreds of KPRs from the
Samburu community” (NPS 2013:8) were assembled for the operation on Lomerok village. The team was later ambushed by Turkana morans during which 105 people were killed among these were 42 police officers. Further 14 police officers were injured and a total of 29 firearms lost to the raiders. In the next section, we apply a processual analysis to the Baragoi massacre to comprehend the progression of incidences of conflict to ‘all-out-violence’.

Figure 6: Map of Samburu County showing the locations of raids that led to the Baragoi Massacre in November 2012

Fig 6 above shows the locations where raiders emerged prior to the Baragoi massacre of November 2012. The bodies of the killed police officers were received at Baragoi Primary School. The massacre led displacements of people and the alteration of livelihoods from

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96 Estimated figure obtained from a local catholic priest in Baragoi
pastoralism to dependency on relief supplies. It further shows the effect of violence in terms of forced movements, fear and insecurity and the uncertainty that comes with irresponsible state policies such as displacements. In summary the map above shows the role of Turkana and Samburu in the production of violence and how the state inadvertently contributes to the establishment of spaces of insecurity that further produces more violence. To understand the Baragoi massacre, we look into past precedents of violence that have occurred between the Samburu and Turkana.

7.2 Interconnectedness of Massacres in Pastoralists Lands of Northern Kenya

Pastoralists communities inhabiting Baringo, Isiolo, Marsabit, Turkana, Samburu and Laikipia counties have at one time or the other been victims or perpetrators of massacres against neighbouring groups. Most of these massacres often involve the raiding of livestock, while others also involve the torching of houses and shooting of livestock in the ensuing cross fire. In this section, I analyse several incidences of massacres among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya as shown in Fig 7 below while also looking into the response of the state to these cases of mass killings of pastoralists by their enemy groups.
Figure 7: Map of Northern Kenya Showing Areas Where Massacres Have Occurred in Recent Years

Contests over pasture, land and water along-side historical claims over specific districts in Northern Kenya have been used as an organizing principle for violence (Galaty 2016:112-117).
In effect, these contests have contributed in a significant way in the reorganization of pastoralists societies in Northern Kenya. Galaty (2016:115) views these conflicts as processual given their long lasting impacts, their critical role in determining grazing and settlement patterns in pastoralists’ borderlands and their interconnectedness with past, present and future incidents of violence. In attempts to apply a processual analysis to the Baragoi massacre of 10\textsuperscript{th} November 2012, it is critical that similar processes and incidences of collective violence that have occurred elsewhere in Northern Kenya be reviewed and contextualized. In this section I will review and contextualize the following massacres: The Lokorkor massacre of 1996, the Murkutwo massacre of March 2001 in Marakwet, the Turbi/Bubisa massacre of 2005 in Marsabit, the Kanampiu massacre of 2009 in Laikipia, the Todonyang’ massacre of 2011 in Turkana, the Kapedo massacre of 2014 along the Turkana-Baringo border and the Nadome massacre of 2015 at the border between Baringo and Turkana Counties in Northern Kenya.

Violence among herders in Baragoi during the drought season of 1996 is noted by (Galaty 2005a; Galaty 2016) to have been informed by past violence while at the same setting a precedent for future violence between the Samburu and Turkana. Galaty situates the conflict that led to a series of cattle raids and massacres in Baragoi in 1996 firstly to “historical claims” by the Turkana over some parts of Baragoi geographical area (Galaty 2016: 112). On the 26\textsuperscript{th} of August 1996, Turkana raiders attacked and killed eighteen Samburu and Ariaal herders. In the process, the Turkana made off with 500 heads of livestock (most of which were later recovered) and set off a chain of violent incidents that continued over the next four months (Galaty 2005a; Galaty 2016). The August 1996 raid by the Turkana of Baragoi on Arial and Samburu herders is vital in understanding the processes of violence in terms of its organisation (300-400 raiders) and its consequences in setting off new cycles of violence. In the month of October 1996, Turkana raiders attacked and killed eighteen Samburu and Ariaal herders. In the process, the Turkana made off with 500 heads of livestock (most of which were later recovered) and set off a chain of violent incidents that continued over the next four months (Galaty 2005a; Galaty 2016). The August 1996 raid by the Turkana of Baragoi on Arial and Samburu herders is vital in understanding the processes of violence in terms of its organisation (300-400 raiders) and its consequences in setting off new cycles of violence. In the month of October 1996, Turkana raided a total of 6300\textsuperscript{97} heads of livestock from the Samburu in three different raids (Galaty 2005a: 117; Mkutu 2005:173). In a revenge raid by a combined team of raiders from Samburu and Pokot communities in December 1996, over 50 Turkana men, women and children were killed at Lokorkor near Marti (Galaty 2005a:117). This shows the potency of revenge as a catalyst in cycles of violence. Secondly, the case of Lokorkor massacre shows that once the

\textsuperscript{97}Mkutu (2005:173) cites a higher figure of 10,000 head of cattle raided
‘season’ of violence starts, it adopts a life of its own. This can be seen in the way the ‘space of violence’ expanded in this case from a pastureland raid in August 1996 near Kawap center in Nyiro Division to targeted violence in which women and children became victims in December 1996 at a manyatta in Lokorkor near Marti center in Baragoi Division. Further, revenge violence in this case was the basic organizing principle through which warrior mobilisation and arming was done.

Another massacre that reset societal relationships in Northern Kenya is the Murkutwo massacre that occurred in March 2001 in Elgeyo Marakwet County following an attack by the 3,000 armed Pokot and Tugen raider “armed with AK47 assault rifles, a few assorted big guns such as rocket launcher and bazookas as well as grenades” on the Marakwet (Cheserek 2012:4; Kagwanja 2001:5). During this raid over 51 people were killed including 17 children and 16 women, bodies set a blaze, 300 houses burnt and thousands of livestock stolen (Cheserek 2012:4). During the massacre 100 cattle and 300 goats were also stolen (Kagwanja 2001:6) Murkutwo massacre was revenge raid by the Pokot following an earlier raid by the Marakwet in July 2000 where over 500 livestock were stolen. To carry out this raid the armed raiders first “encircled and overpowered the 60 Anti-Stock Theft Unit police officers at Chesongoch camp”, thus making it impossible for the police to intervene as they were outnumbered (Cheserek 2012:4; Kagwanja 2001:5). This shows a well laid plan on the part of the raiders and intent to cause maximum damage. It also shows that the process of violence starts with the conception of the idea and a well laid down strategy which is backed up with logistical organisation. The attackers “cut of all escape and supply routes, trapped the hapless villagers in the middle and attacked from the rear and the front” (Kagwanja 2001:6). Some peculiarities of the nature of this violence are well captured by Kagwanja (2001) such as the deaths of Jemutai Kipchemeri a two and a half year old girl whose body was riddled with five bullets and that of 7 year old Jepchumba Kibusa “who raiders threw back in the inferno as she tried to escape” (Kagwanja 2001:6).

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98 Kagwanja (2001:5) mentions 600-1000 raiders
99 Kagwanja (2001:6) mentions 58 killed
100 Kagwanja (2001:6) mentions 600 houses torched
While it has been argued that traditional raiding had sanctioned against the targeting of women, children and the aged, such actions defy the norms of raiding and therefore the Murkutwo massacre when analysed from its targets and victims cannot be classified as a raid in the traditional sense (Hutchinson 2000). As Kagwanja was informed, the aim of the violence was to “teach the Marakwet a lesson” (2001:7). Violence in this case was used as a message to convey a long standing dispute over land, boundaries and incompatibility of political allegiances between the Pokot, Tugen and Marakwet communities. The victims of the violence, those burnt by the raiders served more as examples of the next phase of the politicized dispute between the communities. The Murkutwo massacre further highlights the role of violence as a means through which power and strategic interests are pursued. According to Kagwanja (2001) the attackers were drawn from a combined team of Pokot and Tugen warriors. Further showing that the violence was not meaningless or senseless but was a well-planned action aimed at achieving desired ends.

Further the Murkutwo massacre shows the role of violence in precipitating processes of social change as communities are forced to move out of their lands and their lives transformed from farmers and agro-pastoralists to internally displaced persons reliant on emergency food relief (Opiyo 2010:125; Kagwanja 2001: 8). As a result of the fear of more attacks, many families moved away into forests and caves “in the rugged Lagam escarpment. While others took refuge in the Chesongoch Mission Church compound” (Kagwanja 2001:8), thus altering their modes of survival from agriculture and livestock keeping to dependency on relief supplies. Violence in this case represents a literal “return to the caves” as noted by Kagwanja to metaphorically and practically demonstrate the capacity of violence to negatively and positively transform lives (Kagwanja 2001:8). The culture of cattle raiding is in this case used to anchor violence aimed at executing societal power contests by different interest groups.

On 12th of January 2005, Turbi/Bubisa massacres occurred when Borana raiders targeted Turbi Primary School in Marsabit County and slaughtered 86 people including 12 school children101 from the Gabra community (TJRC 2013: 21; Mwangi 2006:81; Tablino 2006:314-317). The

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101 Mwangi O.G (2006:81) quotes a higher number of school children killed (21)
following day, the Gabra warriors retaliated by ambushing and killing 10 Borana community members who were travelling in a Land Rover on their way to a Catholic church retreat at Bubisa (Tablino 2009:314). A number of structural causes were advanced in attempts to understand and explain the Turbi/Bubisa massacres. According to Hussein and Huka (2011), the massacres occurred due to local political rivalries, border disputes and the incapacity of state security agents to provide security for Gabra community members despite intelligence from the chiefs of an imminent Borana attack. A more historical background to the conflict was provided by Ouko et al (2005) as follows:

“Three key factors underpin the cause of the Turbi conflict; the Borana/Gabra ethnic rivalry for dominance, the unresolved district boundaries and the resource use. Turbi currently falls under Marsabit district but Moyale people and the Boranas by extension believe that Turbi was part and parcel of Moyale district from the colonial times and should remain so. This explains why seemingly simple conflicts around the area often become too complicated to resolve. Moyale community first raised the issue during the Waitate Boundary Commission in Marsabit in 1984. They claimed that Turbi should be part of the Moyale constituency and not of the North Horr. This sentiment continued through the years with varying degree of intensity but became too strong when Moyale became an independent district in 1996 and Turbi remained as part of Marsabit district. The Gabra claim that Turbi belongs to them but Boranas believe that Moyale district boundary is at Lagh Warabessa (approximately 30km beyond Turbi). They justify their claim by the fact that a former Moyale MP constructed the Turbi pan, which is currently the main source of water for the Turbi people. Turbi boundary has remained a contentious political issue and very powerful campaign tool ever since for politicians from both North Horr and Moyale constituencies. The Moyale politician often pledges to bring Turbi back to Moyale while the North Horr one promises to retain the status quo’ Ouko et al (2005:34).

Ouko et al (2005) noted that “the attack on Turbi was construed as an intention to scare away the Gabras from the area so that the Boranas can take the land” (2005:15), thus pointing to the violence as a message on the dispute over land and boundaries between the Gabra and the Borana and the victims as examples of the military might and capacity of the Borana to ‘deal
with the Gabra’. On the other hand, the BBC (2005) looked into the processual nature of violence by placing revenge at the center of the mass killings as part of serial violence that had been ongoing between the Gabra and Borana for over three months. Mwangi (2006:81) recorded that the Borana attackers at Turbi Primary School were over 1000, thus pointing to the existence of a formal organisation, detailed planning and a clear chain of command in the execution of violence. The attack on children in a dormitory at Turbi Primary School and of church goers in Bubisa further shows that these attacks were not necessarily cattle raids but rather informed by primordial classification of the ‘enemy’. This can further be seen in the burning of houses (Mwangi 2006:81). The murdered children at Turbi Primary School were final year students from the Gabra community who would have soon graduated to secondary school, this means that violence was aimed incapacitating the Gabra not only through the torching of huts but also their future prosperity that education of the young would bring to families and the whole community. Ouko et al (2005) made similar observation in the fact finding mission in Marsabit after the massacre as follows:

“The attacks were highly organized. Some students could recognize parents from the school as some of their attackers. It is suspected the school was targeted because it is very core in the society and was seen as the best target to have the greatest impact. The mission was informed that, 3 weeks before the attacks, 10 children belonging to a certain community were removed from the school indicating their parents knew the attack was imminent” (Ouko et al 2005:35).

The trend of attacking symbols of emancipation among rival pastoralists in Northern Kenya has been replicated in Turkana East where bandits attacked a government vehicle, injured a police officer and burnt national examinations that were on transit to Kapedo Secondary School (Lutta and Wanzala 2014; Koskei and N’gasike 2014). This shows high levels of intolerance among rival groups, thus expanding the purposes of violence from its traditional definitions of socio-economic relations to wider societal supremacy battles aimed at not only acquiring power but also preserving hegemonic influence in the future. Even though the raiders stole “about 3,000 cattle, 5,000 sheep and 4,000 camels” (Mwangi 2006:81) in the subsequent attack in Turbi villages, the targeting of children reveals the extent of instrumentality of violent action and its
potency in asserting power over its victims and the ‘victim’ community at large. While guns were used in this massacre as ‘implements’ of violence, the violence act itself is further seen as a weapon aimed at communicating the broader message of ‘psychological defeat’ not only to the victims but to the wider society of the Gabra (Bar On 2002:158).

Further, Mwangi (2006:81) recorded that “an infant had his head smashed on a rock” thus giving a more vivid illustration of deeper meanings of violence as a message of hate and incompatibility between the two groups. While conceding that raiding is a shared practice between the Borana and the Gabra, Tablino (2006:315) asserted that the violence witnessed in Turbi/Bubisa massacre “did not occur in nomadic contexts”. In his view, the violence that occurred during these massacres could only be attributed to “alienation, anomie, uncertainty” (Tablino 2006:317). He blamed cycles of violence to “loss of meaning” of the traditional nomadic life that pastoralists have enjoyed arguing that those who committed the massacres were ‘town people’ for whom being hired for violence was simply a job and thus their actions could not be analysed through the prisms of culture of cattle raiding per se but as a new way in which pastoralists youth were being used as pawns in the commodification of violence for the benefit of power elites..

On 15th September 2009 a raid at dawn by the Pokot on a Samburu manyatta in Kanampiu in Laikipia North district led to the killing of 34 Samburu herders (Wachira 2013). Of interest is the framing of the Kanampiu massacre as an “example” that the Pokot wanted to show their might to the Samburu after disagreements over land claims in Ltungai at the boundary between Samburu and Baringo Counties (Greiner 2013: 227). As a result, Kanampiu was used as a ‘staging’ ground for violence in the contest for political power and resources between the Samburu of Lonyek and Pokot of Amaiya and Churo. Violence as used here was not only communicative rather violence in this sense is the message (Calabrese 2012:109). While the battle between the Samburu and Pokot was on the surface seen as motivated by land claims in Ltungai conservancy, a deeper purpose was the battle for political power among Samburu and Pokot elites. The conflict over Ltungai conservancy gave the political leaders a platform through which they could show their ‘protection credentials’ to their respective voting blocs in readiness for the 2007 General elections (Greiner 2012: 420; Barasa and Kipkoech 2006 quoted in Straight 2009:25).
Another recent massacre occurred in Todonyang’ when the Daasanech from Ethiopia ambushed Turkana women, men and children who were coming back to their villages from a shared market along the Kenya-Ethiopian border on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of May 2011 during which 50 people were killed (Ng’asike 2011; SCCRR 2013:1). Even though the massacre was attributed to scarcity of water and pasture (SCCRR 2013:1) the nature of violence points to a more complicated situation than just scarcity issues as captured below by Ng’asike (2011):

“The youngest victim of the attack was a three-week-old boy whose head had been shattered with a bullet and was found with his intestines protruding from his stomach, that were being devoured by vultures… other 19 bodies were still intact, although the eyes, especially of the women age between 20 and 25 years, had been gouged out (Ng’asike 2011: 1).

Violence incidences in which desecration of dead bodies are carried out show linkages between culture and power (Wood 2007:5). The desecration of victims’ bodies show that power is not only earned by the perpetrator upon killing of the victim but further by carving or ‘injuring’ the deceased as a means of ‘inscribing defeat on the body of the enemy’. Incidences where mutilations of victims’ bodies are carried out have been argued by Broch-Due (2005:21) to fulfill two purposes; first to convey a message of defeat and disempowerment to the larger community from which the victim hails and secondly, to show the victor’s resourcefulness to his own community by coming back home not only with raided cattle for instance but the honour of killing the ‘enemy’ and obtaining a genital trophy. In the case of the Todonyang’ massacre, a local Member of Parliament linked the killings and the collection of genital trophies by the Daasanech as a show of bravery and a step towards upward social mobility that is performed by Daasanech warriors before circumcision every August (Ng’asike 2011:2). CEWARN (2004) in its baseline report of relations among pastoralists in the Kenyan side of the Karamoja Cluster noted that when it comes to violence between the Turkana and the Daasanec “the aggressors tend to kill in line with one of their traditional rites (“ekichum”) whereby, to become a man, a young man has to kill an enemy who in this case is the Turkana” (CEWARN 2004:21). This further shows the linkages between ritual practices and power as the Daasanec young men are
culturally expected to show their bravery by subduing their enemy as a means of gaining societal recognition that ensures promotion from one age-group to the next.

Mutilation of dead bodies therefore not only serve as a resource for the victor’s community but is also stored in the memories of the defeated and is used in future for socialization against the enemy, as a means of mobilisation for violence and as a justification for revenge attacks, thus fueling cycles of violence. The social consequences of Todonyang’ massacre are further captured by SCCRR (2013) as “many people dead; chief’s office and dispensary abandoned; a vandalized school and as a result learning was paralyzed in the area; economic activities suspended and an estimated population of 1200 villagers left homeless” (SCCRR 2013:1). As a result the inter-communal trade between the Turkana and Dasaanech was paralysed and the ensuing insecurity limited movement of people as both communities moved to safe areas away from the common Kenya-Ethiopia international border (SCCRR 2013). Violence therefore plays a critical part in determining movement, trading and settlement choices of pastoralists groups within the Karamoja Cluster. At the same time violence or the threat of it is critical in the creation of spaces of insecurity as people move far away from unsafe areas (Witsenburg and Zaal 2012).

On the 31st of October 2014, Pokot bandits ambushed and killed 24 people including 21 policemen in Kapedo area along the Baringo-Turkana border after “mistaking the police officers to be Turkana’s” (Conflict Barometer 2014:64). The killing of police officers in Kapedo was also part of a past precedent where a senior police officer was shot dead by a Pokot juvenile in the same area while in pursuit of Pokot livestock raiders after a raid on the Samburu (Österle 2007:2013). In the case of the October 2014 police attack, the victims were ambushed while travelling in a police truck along Kapedo-Lokori road (Mabatuk and Koskei 2014:1). The raiders then burned the police truck and the Red Cross personnel who responded to their distress calls were fired upon by the bandits. Although the killing of these police officers was an immediate reminder of the Baragoi massacre of police officers in November 2012, the difference in this case was that these officers were ambushed while traveling, overpowered by group of bandits and executed. There were no cases or allegations of livestock involved. What was telling however is the quote above attributed to Senator John Lonyangapuo (Mabatuk and Koskei
2014:3), a Pokot scholar-turned politician who justified these violence actions along the traditional enmity between the ‘Turkana-Pokot’ as a basis for the killings and therefore something ‘normal’. Justification of pastoralists’ violence as ‘normal’ and ‘cultural’ has played a significant role in the marginalisation of Northern Kenya (Straight 2009:23). This state of neglect has contributed to the ‘ungoverned spaces’ that breed actors in the business of violence (KHRC 2009).

The Kapedo conflict between the Turkana and Pokot is not a new phenomenon as Österle (2007: 203-204) noted several incidents in 2005 where the Pokot and Turkana warriors engaged in revenge attacks. The siege over Kapedo is linked to territorial expansion of Pokot grazing lands since 1980s\footnote{Personal communication with Michael Bollig, August 2016}. The expansion of Pokot grazing areas over the last three decades enabled them to lay claim to Kapedo Center, thus fuelling the violence between the two groups. In some of these incidences the Pokot blocked the road that passes through Kapedo to prevent food supplies from reaching Turkana population in attempts to force the Turkana to flee to ‘safer’ areas away from the contested Kapedo Center. This shows that the ambush and killing of the policemen in October 2014 was part of a long history of violence which is centered on the contest over land around Kapedo Center. Even though cases of cattle raids between the Turkana and Pokot have been ongoing around Kapedo, the actions of actors in violence as captured by Österle (2007) reveal that violence is aimed at evicting the Turkana from Kapedo. This is further corroborated by a Pokot memorandum presented to the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (Greiner 2013: 226) in which the Pokot laid claim to the local Kapedo Primary School.

The last massacre in recent times was the Nadome massacre which occurred on 6\textsuperscript{th} of May 2015 when Turkana raiders attacked Pokot settlements at Nadome village in East Pokot district. During the raid the Turkana allegedly stole 3000 goats while at the same time killed 12 women and children. An immediate revenge attack by Pokot warriors led to the killing of 42 Turkana raiders (Mabatuk 2015). While conflict between the Turkana and Pokot along their common border is not something new, various reasons for this violence has been explored by researchers and journalists. Ruto (2015: 1) linked the Nadome massacre to perennial border disputes between
these two communities. While Lagat (2015:1) agreed that the dispute could be fuelled by disagreements over the boundary, he further observed that scarcity of water and pasture acted as a trigger to the recent massacre. Some peculiarities of violent action however betray these resource scarcity explanations as captured by Mabatuk (2015):

“We come across the body of a woman, her child - a toddler strapped with a shuka\textsuperscript{103} onto her back - also dead. Apparently, after felling the hapless woman, the heartless warriors went for the throat of the baby, slit it open and separated the tiny body from its even tinier head” (Mabatuk 2015:1)

The stench of rotting bodies and desecration of infants led to the description of Nadome village where the massacre occurred as a ‘horror-scape’ (Mabatuk 2015:1) further highlighting the devastation and indiscriminatory nature of the violence. The violence was said to have started when a group of 400 raiders formed a ‘human ring’ around the village and started firing indiscriminately at sleeping mothers and children at 4am in the morning (Mabatuk 2015:1) this further points to the organisation of violence and its intended purpose in this case which was to wipe out members of the Pokot community who resided in this village. This reveals that the conflict aimed at evicting the Pokot residents of Nadome in what was deemed as Turkana land. These acts of devastating violence aimed to permanently inscribe the memories of its victims with the ‘horror’ they experienced in Nadome village (Mabatuk 2015). The Nadome massacre, thus set off the movement of people away from unsafe areas (Mabatuk 2015:2; Kipsang 2015).

While episodes of pastoralists’ violence can be analysed based on structural factors such as boundary disputes and competition over diminishing land or pastures resources. The peculiarities of violent action demand a contextual understanding of violent actions. Can violence that involves the slaughtering of babies be termed ‘cattle raiding’? What could be the aim of such acts? In attempts to answer some of these questions, in the next sections I look into how raiders are psychologically prepared to execute these acts. I aim to show that violence that occurred during the Baragoi massacre was a product of processes which included psychological preparation of warriors to engage in wanton killings. In the next section processual approach to the analysis of violence is expounded upon drawing from cases in East and West Africa.

\textsuperscript{103} Shawl used by pastoralists to wrap on their bodies or to tie babies on their backs
7.3 Pastoralists Violence through the Processual Approach

Conflicts and violence between pastoralists have been explained through structural perspectives. These have focused on resource scarcity (Haro et al 2005; Theisen 2012; Adano et al 2012; Butler and Gates 2012), institutional weakness or failure (Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015, McCabe 1990; Menkhaus 2008), local politics (IRIN News 2014; Sharamo 2014; Greiner 2013; Schilling et al 2012) and colonial history of violent conquest of pastoralists areas (Stigand 1910; Lamphear 1976; Spencer 1965, Kratli and Swift 1999). Moritz (2010) citing cases from Cameroon and Burkina Faso argues that even though the above mentioned structural causes can precipitate conflicts and violence among pastoralists, many at times violence does not break out in other pastoralists’ conflicts despite the above conditions. In Kenya one can cite cases of cooperation between the Samburu and Rendille who live side by side with limited raiding that rarely spirals into massive raids and massacres (Spencer 1973). Citing cases from Ghana (Tonah 2006) also opines that while conflicts between local farmers and Fulbe herdsmen have at times led to inter-communal violence, many other similar conflicts have been solved without escalation.

Basset (1988) argues that conflicts involving herders are complicated with various facets. Moritz (2010) further views conflicts between herders and farmers in West Africa to involve structural and processual causes. He argues that many explanations of violent conflicts involving pastoralists and agro-pastoralists often ignore the role of processes that proceed immediately after a dispute between herders. According to Moritz (2010: 139) structural factors such as state weakness and environmental scarcity can explain the triggers of conflicts “while processual variables explain conflict outcomes”. Sandole (1999) noted the existence of two levels of conflicts: conflicts as start-ups and conflicts as a process. Conflict as a start-up means the underlying challenges that fuel contests between groups. These could be the inability of the state to police its borders thus enabling the easy flow of small arms and light weapons into its territory. Conflicts as a process means the series of events that propel a conflict situation into a massacre. These could be the mobilisation of warriors by a political leader. Or the massive purchase of arms by elites from one community in the guise of ‘protecting their people’. Kratli and Swift (1999) further captured the conflict processes that lead to violence in the following statement:
“As the raided herds need to be restocked, professional raids — well equipped, organized, highly effective — may cause a shower of clan raids — smaller, less equipped, extemporaneous — easily generating a chain reaction of violence” (Krätli and Swift 1999:10).

Processualists view conflicts as a study in complex phases of contests in efforts to establish its patterns and processes (Mortiz 2010). Using Pruitt and Kim (2004) one can analyse the escalation of pastoralists’ violence through five critical transformations: (1) shift from small to large, (2) shift from light to heavy tactics (3) shift from specific to general (4) shift from few to many (5) shift from goals of the conflict. Pruitt and Kim (2004) have further offered three models of understanding the processes of violence escalation in communal conflicts. These include: the contender-model, the conflict spiral model, and the structural change model. This chapter seeks to analyse the Baragoi massacre using the analytical framework of processual analysis of conflicts as espoused by Moritz (2010) and Pruitt and Kim (2004).

Escalation of raids into violence is therefore a process imbued with several factors; according to Spencer (1973) raids escalate when the rules of raiding are not adhered to. Chances of escalation are also determined by the numbers of livestock raided. In the event that a huge number of livestock is raided the possibility of the onset of revenge raids is hire. Escalation also depends on police action. In situations where the police make successful recovery efforts after major raids, conflicts easily dissipates but in situations where recovery efforts of the raided animals are thwarted by heavy gun fire by the raiders, impatience on the part of the raided morans may prompt the victims to ‘take the law into their own hands’ thus adding to the tension and fear that already exists in the area. Kratli and Swift (1999), view escalation of communal violence due to cattle raiding as the result of ethnic organisation and strategic decision making involving actors who are not primarily involved in raiding. They argue that escalation of conflicts stemming from cattle raids may in essence be a guise for pursuit of power by interested groups. Escalation of conflicts in Northern Kenya is therefore viewed as the pursuit of political, economic or socio-cultural power by one group over the other through the use of violence. Kratli and Swift (1999) therefore argue that violence used in raids is itself a resource employed in the pursuit of power at the individual, group or communal levels. In attempts to apply a processual approach to the
analysis of pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi, the next section gives a thick description of the Baragoi massacre of November 2012.

7.3.1 From the Raid to the Massacre- A Processual Analysis of Violence

Using the Baragoi massacre as a case for processual analysis, I draw from Pruitt and Kim (2004) and Moritz (2010) among others to provide the perimeter for violence escalation that led to the massacre as follows:

**Shift from Small to Large**

Pruitt and Kim (2004) argue that conflicts escalate when actors involved increase from those who have primary interest in the dispute to actors who are not directly involved. They argue that the entry of these other actors who are remotely involved in the conflict inhibits negotiation and conciliation efforts that would occur if the dispute was left to the primary group. In the case of the Baragoi massacre, the primary victims were four members of the same family. However, immediately after the raid, one of the primary victims used his position as a political leader to mobilize Samburu morans as active participants in the search for the raided livestock (NPS 2013). The mobilisation of Samburu morans and their involvement in these events brought tension in Baragoi town (NPS 2013). According to the police report, “the Samburus roamed Baragoi town with their firearms” (NPS 2013:7). The tension in Baragoi town was further exacerbated by the mobilisation of police officers from other districts, which signaled an impending paramilitary operation forcing communities especially the Turkana to mobilize defensively to protect their livestock and their villages. The conflict which started as a raid by Turkana warriors on a specific Samburu family herd then became an incident with divergent actors in pursuit of divergent interests.

**Shift from Light to Heavy Tactics**

Immediately after the raid there were efforts at inter-communal negotiations using elders as is custom with many pastoralist societies (Chopra 2008; Pavanello and Scott-Villers 2013; Okumu 2013). The Kenya Police report (NPS 2013) indicates that 36 heads of cattle were returned due to the efforts of the elders. Even as the elders attempted to rescue a dire situation, their efforts were
not helped by a revenge raid by the Samburu morans from El Barta on Lomerok manyatta on the 29th of October 2012. During this raid 12 Samburu raiders were killed while three Turkana warriors were injured while Samburu raiders made away with 205 camels thus further increasing tension in the district. This raid ended the elders’ efforts and solidified the hard-line positions between the two groups. From then on, there was massive mobilisation of Samburu warriors in Baragoi, while the Turkana warriors also mobilized for the defence of their villages, especially Lomerok. Police officers from other parts of the province were also brought into Baragoi in readiness for a paramilitary operation. A final peace meeting on the 5th of November failed due to the unwillingness of both sides to return the stolen animals, thus leading to the launch of the ‘operation rudisha ngombe’.

**Shift from Specifics to General**

In the ensuing days after the raid in Lesirkan by the Turkana, the situation soon spiraled into an inter-communal affair. This was seen in the Kenya police report (NPS 2013) which recorded the mobilisation of up to 600 Samburu morans and KPRs who participated in the 29th October 2012 raid as well as in the ‘operation rudisha ngombe’ of 10th November 2012. The raid of 20th October by the Turkana and the subsequent revenge raid by the Samburu of Turkana camels on the 29th of October were also used by political leaders to galvanise support of their ethnic groups. This was seen in the frequent political meetings that preceded the ‘operation rudisha ngombe’. (NPS 2013) The participation of armed Samburu warriors and their KPRs in a purely police exercise also points to the level of mobilisation and political pressure that was exerted on the police officers (NPS 2013). Violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi has therefore taken a communal angle, where KPRs are used to bolster communal firepower against enemy groups. The Kenyan state is therefore weak in its core duty of protection of citizens’ lives and property and thus the involvement of KPRs in the raids and subsequent massacre reveal the states inability to monopolise its instruments of violence.

**Shift from Few to Many**

At the beginning of the conflict, there are few people involved, escalation takes place if for some reason more people are drawn into the conflict (Pruitt and Kim 2004). In the case of the Baragoi
massacre, the victims of the Turkana raid on the 20th of October 2012 were four Samburu households. The raiders were not specifically identified but in the police record (Baragoi Police Station 2012) it was noted that the Turkana raiders were tracked to Lomirok manyatta. The escalation of this conflict seems to have been propelled by the very fact that one of the victims was a local politician (nominated councilor) who not only put the police under pressure but also mobilized Samburu KPRs in efforts to recover his animals. The role of this politician in escalation of the Baragoi conflict in the following words of the respondent:

“We reached Lomerok and saw a police helicopter overhead, the police helicopter landed nearby and they informed us that they had seen the stolen animals not far away from where we were. It was now approaching 5pm, in our vehicle we carried the councilor whose cattle had been stolen. He was worried and he was pressuring us to get his animals. We were also accompanied by Samburu KPRs”.

The presence of Samburu KPRs in a police operation has been noted (NPS 2013) to have contributed to the massacre. In their submission, the participation of the Samburu KPRs at a time of high tension was deemed to show government support for Samburu warriors (NPS 2013). It further showed the interest of the involved actors to invest further in the ongoing conflict (Pruitt and Kim 2004).

**Shifts in Goals of the Conflict-From Raids to Ethnic Violence**

According to Pruitt and Kim (2004) escalation of conflicts occurs when the goals of the conflict are shifted. To shift the goals of the conflict, Kratli and Swift argue that there must be a huge “ethnic fracture” (1999:11) based on hate, fear and distrust, this closes the door on any form of dialogue and refocuses the communities on preparations for violence. In the Baragoi massacre, the initial goal of the police and the primary victims of the raid from the Samburu side was to recover the raided 501 livestock. The goals started to shift the moment Samburu warriors were openly mobilized and camped at the DC compound where they were fed and addressed by police officers, local politicians and administrators (NPS 2013). The subsequent revenge raid by the mobilized Samburu morans which resulted into their making away with 205 Turkana camels and the death of 12 Samburu morans further entrenched the need by both sides to revenge. The
participation of Samburu warriors and KPRs in the eventual ‘operation rudisha ngombe’ was viewed by Turkana respondents\textsuperscript{104} as an attempt by the police alongside their enemies the Samburu to ‘finish them’. Thus conflict over raided cattle transformed into inter-ethnic violence within a span of 21 days.

7.4 State/Civil Society Response to Massacres among Pastoralists in Northern Kenya

Responses to cases of massacres among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya have taken three distinct key forms: these included paramilitary operations aimed at disarming the entire communities, formation of parliamentary investigation committees to look into the circumstances that led to the violence, arrests of local warriors and local leaders accused of incitement or logistically supporting or organising for the violence or intervention by civil society bodies in to mediate over the conflict. In this section, I seek to review some of these state/civil society interventions.

The Kapedo Massacre

In the aftermath of the Kapedo massacre, the government of Kenya swung into immediate action and the President flew to Kapedo to address an urgent security meeting. In a newspaper report (Kipsang’ 2014), the President was quoted to have “ordered pastoralists on the boundary of Turkana and Baringo counties to name those behind Saturday’s killing of more than 21 police officers ‘by the end of the day’ or face a massive security operation”. The report further indicates that Kenya Defence Forces officers were deployed in the area immediately after to commence a disarmament exercise targeting the Turkana and Pokot communities living in Turkana East and Baringo East areas. Further, the state’s response to the Kapedo massacre can be analysed from the Presidents statements (Kipsang’ 2014) below:

“I’m here today because you took the lives of over 20 officers who were in the line of duty,” he said. “I hereby order that you give us the names of those behind the killings by the end of today. If you can kill officers in such a manner, you are sending a message that there is no government. The government is there and will deal firmly with such

\textsuperscript{104} Interview by Turkana moran who participated in the defence of Keekoridony village, November 2014
lawlessness. The criminals who killed the officers are well-known and we will not rest until they are brought to book. Even if your leaders are claiming that it was a mistaken identity, that does not give you the licence to kill.” (Kipsang’ 2014)

The statement above shows the top-down approach that the Kenyan state embraces when it comes to pertinent issues affecting pastoralists in Northern Kenya, there seems to be no space for dialogue between the central government and community leaders. The government believes that ‘orders’ work best in such situations without looking at the root causes of the conflict. At the same time it is an admission by the state that the Northern part of Kenya does not ‘feel’ the government and thus the need by pastoralists to compete with the state in the ownership and excise of the instruments of violence. One month after the launch of the disarmament exercise in Kapedo, Kipsang’ (2014) reported that little had been achieved by the operation except for the voluntary recovery of 23 guns believed to have been stolen from the slain officers. The manner in which the recovery was made also points at the ineffectiveness of disarmament operations as a strategy as captured in the statements below:

“The recovered guns were dropped by bandits at strategic points at night where Pokot professionals and elders would pick them up and drop them at the sub-county headquarters in Chemolingot” (Kipsang’ 2014)

“Why kill animals? I think this is no longer a normal operation but is aimed at starving the Pokot and ruining their livelihood. Instead of harassing innocent people in shopping centres, why don’t the government which has all the machinery go to the forest where the bandits are hiding?” (Kipsang’ 2014)

The recovery of arms during paramilitary operations do not aim necessarily at arresting perpetrators of violence but more as a show of power and a reminder to the citizens of the existence of a powerful distant state. The surrendered guns are often those that are obsolete and generally meant to appease the state. Thus the cycle of violence is never addressed. At the same time paramilitary operations are fraught with human rights questions as it involves the harassment of citizens and whole communities. It involves the killing of livestock as is captured in the statement above, thus evolving into a new phase of state-led violence.
The state’s response to the Turbi/Bubisa massacre was three fold: the arrest of suspects, deployment of the army to ‘bring peace’ and an inter-agency intervention by government departments and NGOs to support pastoralists’ and agricultural livelihoods as well as the distribution of food and non-food emergency relief to the 6000 people that were directly displaced by the violence (Ouko et al 2005:45). Massacres in Northern Kenya tend to highlight the reactionary nature of state intervention. In the case of the massacres of Marsabit, the high tension and probability of collective violence was rife weeks prior to the Turbi massacre. Ouko et al (2005:35) in their investigative mission in Marsabit were informed that the guns used in Turbi Primary School had been kept within the school compound. In reaction to the massacre, they noted that “thirty suspects had already been arrested, among whom were KPRs” (Ouko et al 2005:35). It is not clear whether any of these suspects were ever charged. Thereafter the government deployed military personnel in Marsabit. The Military Spokesman at the time was quoted as follows (Reliefweb 2005):

“We have deployed a combined team of officers from the military, regular and administrative police to the region where the killings took place. The team is carrying out an intensive operation with a view of tracking down the attackers and restore security,”

Further, the government established operational bases for paramilitary police “in Forole, Maikona and Hurri Hills” (Ouko et al 2005:31). The policy of establishing paramilitary bases to keep inter-communal peace has not been evaluated in terms of its successes, in my own observation from Baragoi; it does not in any way affect the planning and execution of raids or other forms of collective violence.

The third approach was aimed at alleviating the suffering of the displaced people of Marsabit. It was spearheaded by the Government of Kenya and agencies such as Food for the Hungry International (FHI) and the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS). They were involved in distributing food to IDPs as well as other utilities such as “blankets, mosquito nets, kitchen sets, clothes, jerricans, chlorine tabs, water treatment kits, tents and educational kits” (Ouko et al 2005:25). In their recommendations, Ouko et al (2005) noted the structural base of the conflict
between the Gabra and the Borana as being disputes over land and administrative boundaries. It recommended state intervention and community participation in resolving this historical dispute.

**The Baragoi Massacre**

In the case of the Baragoi Massacre, the state/civil society response took several forms. First there was a parliamentary investigation committee (KNA 2012:17) which visited Baragoi and met community leaders and security officers from the district. It made the following recommendations:

- a) The Government should urgently establish specialized units in the hot spot areas of the District, e.g. the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) of the Administration Police.
- b) Urgently improve on resource allocation e.g. communication gadgets, vehicles, fuel and improved budgetary allocation to the security agencies.
- c) Ensure optimum staffing of all security departments e.g. Regular Police, Administration Police, NIS etc.
- d) Urgent disarmament to be done within the Turkana Community.
- e) Urgent financing of peace and reconciliation activities before the General Elections.

In essence the Parliamentary investigation committee recommended the militarisation of these communities further as a means of stemming the violence. During my time in the field, I observed for instance that a part from Nachola GSU camp which was in place before the Baragoi massacre, new camps were established in Kampi ya Nyoka, Tuum and Marti. Residents and police officers talked to the new *kifaru*\(^{105}\) that had been deployed by the government to track cattle raiders in the vast Baragoi district. This has however not stemmed violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi.

The next level of state response was the arrest and detention of six Turkana leaders from Baragoi, these included four chiefs, a councilor and a KPR on the 13\(^{th}\) of November 2012 as narrated by Sam\(^{106}\) one of the arrested chiefs in the excerpt below:

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\(^{105}\) Local Swahili term used to refer to Armoured Personnel Carriers used by the military

\(^{106}\) Interview at Baragoi, February 2015
“On the 12th of November 2012 in the evening, I received a phone call from the D.O of Baragoi that the D.C wanted to meet all the Turkana chiefs in Maralal. I was told to inform all the chiefs and assistant chiefs from Marti, Parkati, Baragoi Town, Nachola and Kawap locations. We were asked by the D.O to wear uniforms. In the morning of the 13th of November 2012, the D.O sent his driver to pick the chiefs of Nachola, while the rest of us who were in Baragoi town walked to the D.O’s office. When we arrived he informed us that the following chiefs would proceed to Maralal; two chiefs from Kawap location, one chief from Parkati location, two chiefs from Marti location and one chief from Nachola location. We arrived at the County Commissioner’s office in Maralal where the meeting was chaired by a security team from the provincial headquarters in Nakuru headed by the Provincial Criminal Investigation Officer (PCIO). Once the PCIO entered the room, there was no introduction or formalities, he said “you chiefs and the councilor refused to return the livestock and that’s why the police were killed”. We were ordered to remove our hats and uniforms and to sit on the floor. After a while he ordered the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers to take us away. We were taken to the office of the District Criminal Investigation Officer (DCIO) where we were again asked to sit on the floor and write the names of Turkana elders and KPRs who had mobilized or participated in the killing of police officers. After that we were asked to write statements on the massacre and our efforts as chiefs in returning the raided Samburu livestock. After writing statements we were taken to Maralal Police Station where we were charged with robbery with violence and locked in the cell. The same night at about 10pm the councilor who was on his way to Nakuru was arrested and brought to our cell in Maralal. On the 16th of November the councilor was also arraigned in court and charged with murder. On the 22nd of November our chargesheet was also changed from that of robbery with violence to murder. The same night we were driven to Nakuru Police Station, we arrived at 1am on the 23rd of November 2012 where we were again collectively charged with murder at the High Court and remanded at Nakuru GoK Prison until 6th of December 2012”.

The states response in charging the Turkana chiefs, KPR and councilor with murder over the Baragoi massacre has been analysed by Holtzman (2016:182). He noted that the government in
effect blamed itself for the massacre since all those arrested by the state were serving in various
government positions as chiefs, councilor or KPR. Holtzman (2016:186) argued that in making
these arrests the state was not in any way seeking justice for the victims but apportioning
responsibility to those who it felt bore the overall responsibility over the geographical area
within which the massacre occurred. In effect the chiefs were arrested because the massacre
occurred within the areas of jurisdiction even though they were not the raiders who killed the
police. The state response was therefore more of a show of power than a step towards justice for
the victims as is well noted below by Holtzman (2016):

“Perhaps most importantly, however, the reason for arresting Christopher and those like
him is that he was available to be arrested. Those who actually took the cattle remained
heavily armed in the inhospitable Suguta Valley. Efforts to arrest and recover the cattle
had already born a concrete result: forty-two police officers had been killed. The
government needed to demonstrate that it was doing its job” (Holtzman 2016:187).

The third form of response was by an Inter-Agency team comprising of government departments
of health, water, education, agriculture, livestock and fisheries supported by Non Governmental
Organizations such as the Kenya Red Cross Society, World Vision and Caritas which conducted
a needs assement following the Baragoi massacre and subsequent conflicts between the
Samburu and Turkana in 2013 (KIRA 2013:3). The needs assessment established the following
key problems:

“190 households had been displaced to Barsaloi following a new attack in Suiyan, further
it noted that more households from Marti, Ngilai, Maskita, Suiyan and Kawop abandoned
their settlements due to fear of attacks and insecurity and moved to Morijo, Kadokoi,
Lenkima, Lesirkan and Barsaloi. Four primary schools and three pre-schools and one out
of school program were completely closed (Kawop, Wuaso Rongai, Suyan and Maskita
Simiti)” (KIRA 2013:3-4).

In its recommendations, KIRA (2013:13) emphasized on the need to boost humanitarian support
towards health and nutrition of displaced families especially children under the age of five and
pregnant or lactating mothers. It further recommended for the provision of food items to
displaced school children in various parts of Baragoi. In my own observation the KIRA report
(2013) exemplifies the cosmetic nature of inter-agency interventions since they do not seek to
address the key underlying issues that create new cycles of violence. The report for instance did not address the role of politics and unequal distribution of County resources in the cycles of violence between the two communities. The inter-agency intervention can therefore be viewed as donor-driven and therefore not designed to address the root causes of violence and in itself not sustainable in the long run.

7.5 Conclusion

From the stand point of processual analysis, escalation of conflict into violence is viewed as subject to specific processes that occur to enlarge the number of parties in the conflict from the primary disputants. Escalation of conflict incidences into violence and massacres can also be seen as subject to the inaction of the state through its security apparatus which prompts citizens to ‘take the law into their own hands’. To understand why some conflicts become massacres while others do not. We have looked at the events prior to the Baragoi massacre and established the participation of politicians and security personnel in a very biased way contributed to the violence. The Baragoi massacre draws parallels with the Lokorkor massacre of 1996 which was a strategic plan based on the mobilisation and arming of warriors by Samburu and Pokot politicians. Mobilisation for war requires ‘war ideology’ that creates a clear boundary between the warring groups. Among the Samburu and Turkana, mobilisation is carried out through ethno-nationalist ideology that is used to entrench the perceived incompatibility of the two groups and the inevitability of attacking the ‘enemy’ for the great benefit of the community. In the case of the Baragoi massacre, it was established that over 600 Samburu warriors were mobilized for violence (NPS 2013). The local catholic priest recalled the tension that engulfed Baragoi town on the eve of 10th November 2012. He narrated how the presence of armed Samburu morans led to self-imposed curfews in Baragoi town. To him, the politicians on both sides of the ethnic divide are in the business of violence for political gain.

The death of the 42 police officers even though officially blamed on Turkana warriors of Lomerok has also been blamed on the police strategy of involving Samburu morans in a police operation. In an interview with a police officer107 who participated in the botched operation, I

107 Interview July 2014 at Baragoi town
was informed that many of the dead police officers were actually killed by Samburu morans who panicked at the sound of gunfire and started shooting aimlessly. Similar sentiments were corroborated by Samburu morans who took part in the operation. This brings into question the interests of the police in arming locals and partnering with them in security operations. It points to the lack of independence among the local police and gives credence to accusations by locals that political leaders influence the security agencies to arm locals and promote violence based on ethnic identities.

Pastoralists violence as was witnessed in the Baragoi massacre are therefore products of structural causes such as historical marginalisation and insecurity that prevails in Northern Kenya coupled with processes that take place after inter-communal raids occur. In the case of Baragoi massacre, there were great efforts at mobilisation of Samburu and Turkana warriors for attack and defence purposes respectively. In the eve of the massacre, I was informed that ammunition became very cheap; meaning supply exceeded demand. The lack of unity of purpose among the security agencies further gave an ample opportunity for politicians to play a significant role in influencing the arming of warriors. These processes led to the abandonment of ‘soft’ approaches towards peacebuilding and the adoption of ‘hard’ solutions of planning war. Extensive pastoralists’ violence as seen in massacres are therefore products of processes in situations where state institutional infrastructure are weak or easily manipulable to the whims of local elites. Processual analysis of violence enables our understanding of two key elements of collective violence; mobilisation and retaliation. Acts of revenge are used firstly to mobilise warrior-age group based on their cultural duty to defend the community but also as part of the patron-client relationships between the warriors and the political leaders. Revenge in the Baragoi massacre case was therefore not only aimed at getting back the livestock raided earlier by the Turkana but also aimed at communicating a political message of power in terms of the skewed relationship between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. Processual analysis of violence therefore sheds more light on the progression of conflicts and the convergence of culture and power as key variables in comprehending socio-cultural strife among distinct groups.
State and civil society interventions in violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya have not only contributed to further violence but have further led to the militarization of these societies. Looking at the Turbi/Bubisa massacres of 2005 and the Baragoi massacre of 2012, one can observe similar response by two different governments. The interventions which follow the script of arrests of some suspects, deployment of the military/paramilitary units to show the ‘might or power’ of the government and later the distribution of relief supplies does not do enough to address the key issues that catalyse conflicts among pastoralists such as political incitements and disputes over administrative and resource boundaries. Further, the ineffectiveness of the judicial system has ensured that those arrested are never brought to book because the state does not go after the perpetrator but often after those responsible over geographical areas (chiefs) within which the violence occurred as we observed in the Baragoi case, thus making it difficult for the prosecution to prove its case against suspects.
Ungoverned Spaces and Informalisation of Violence in Baragoi- the Case of Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs)

8.0 Introduction

Violent conflict in Northern Kenya that stems from cattle raids and highway banditries can be argued to exemplify the inability of the Kenyan state to govern these marginal pastoralists’ dry lands (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010). Most of arid Northern Kenya can be categorized as ungoverned spaces due to the limited presence of state authority in these areas. According to Clunan and Trikunas (2010:17) ungoverned spaces are “social, economic or political arenas where states do not exercise effective authority”. The lack of ‘effective state authority’ in ungoverned spaces gives rise to alternative authority either as proxies of the state or independent from the state (Clunan and Trikunas 2010). In Northern Kenya, the alternative to direct state authority in terms of day to day policing and provision of security services is the Kenya Police Reserve (KHRC 2010; Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015). However other sources of alternative authority exist in Northern Kenya in the form of cattle warlords and gun runners (Analo 2014, The Standard 2012, Osamba 2000).

In this chapter, I analyse the linkages between ungoverned spaces in Northern Kenya and violent entrepreneurship (Abbink 2009) aimed at accomplishing socio-cultural, economic and political goals of individuals and groups. The institution of KPRs among pastoralist groups in Northern Kenya therefore adds to this layer of actors engaged informal violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. The idea of KPRs as alternative to direct state policing was initially seen as viable option aimed at meeting the security needs of locals at minimum cost (Mkutu 2003). The deployment of KPRs as the key policing unit in Northern Kenya has been described as “security on the cheap” owing to the voluntary nature of the job (Mkutu 2003:14). KPRs were to be at the forefront of fighting crime and stemming of raids due to their knowledge of the arid pastoralists’ terrain (Mkutu 2015). In my analysis of the linkages between ungoverned spaces and informalization of violence in Northern Kenya, this chapter therefore explores the role of KPRs along two key arguments; first we analyse the vital role of KPRs as the defender of pastoralists’ villages during incidences of violence. Secondly we analyse the role of KPRs in the informalisation of violence in Baragoi. KPRs are seen as a state actor (by virtue of provision of
arms and ammunition) through which the inability/disinterest of the government facilitates the informalisation of violence through the arming of locals to provide for their own security. This further enables their illegal participation in ammunition trade, cattle raids and highway bandities against targeted communities or individuals. The next section explores a brief history of KPRs.

8.1 Kenya Police Reservists of Baragoi

Kenya Police Reserve was established in 1948 as a volunteer unit. Initially reservists were mostly colonial settlers who were armed by the state and called upon from time to time to help the police with policing duties (Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015). At the height of Mau Mau rebellion the Kenya Police Reserves Airwing was used by the colonial government to reinforce its offensive effort against the Mau Mau (Mkutu 2015). According to Aridi (2013) KPRs are mostly found in areas where police presence is limited and are charged with the responsibility of protecting cattle kraals as well as accompanying herders to ward-off cattle rustlers. The Kenya Police Act section 53 subsection 2 provides that “The reserve may be employed in Kenya for assisting the force in maintenance of law and order, the preservation of peace, the protection of life and property, the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, and the enforcement of all laws and regulations with which the force is charged” (GoK 2010). Another unit which is thought to have evolved into what is known today as KPRs was the “tribal police”, however, this assumption is erroneous as the tribal police later became what we know today as Administration Police (Mkutu 2003:14).

In Northern Kenya, KPRs emerged at the beginning of the Moi presidency in early 1980s. In an interview with a retired paramount chief108 in Samburu North he stated:

“I am the one who started KPRs in this area. We wanted to address the issue of Ngoroko. We all had bows and arrows. I was the operation officer against Ngoroko incursion in this area. I recruited Turkana morans to be trained as KPRs in 1980. Personally I was issued with a gun by the state in 1980 due to frequent Ngoroko attacks in my location of Kawap. The training of KPRs was done in Maralal. At Kawap we had 20 KPRs all were issued

108 Interview at Natiti Village, February 2015
with guns by the government. In Marti we also had 20 KPRs. At that time KPRs used to follow orders. Their job was to prevent raids, they had authority more than Administration Police, they could arrest any offender” (Interview February 2015, Natiti Village)

In an interview with the retired Paramount Chief of the Turkana of Baragoi, he stated that his first recruits into the KPR were “morans, ex-police, tribal police and those who knew how to handle guns”\textsuperscript{109}. In another interview with a serving Assistant Chief\textsuperscript{110} from the Samburu community, I was informed that for one to be selected as a KPR, the person must “be a moran of good character who owns livestock, disciplined, must not be a thief and must be a person who obeys law and order”. A Samburu Sergeant\textsuperscript{111} of the KPR recalled how he was recruited into the service in the early 1990s:

“I was recruited into KPR when I was still a moran. I was recruited by Chief Lomedero of Baragoi town. During that time there were too many wars and many people were acquiring guns. I was issued with a MKIV rifle. During that time KPRs mostly had MK1 and MKIV rifles. In my first war, Rendille cattle were raided by Turkana in Soito el Kokoyo when Rendille herders moved to the area for grazing during the drought. Those days we used to be given 50 bullets and we would finish them in two days. There were too many wars” (Interview January 2015, Baragoi town).

In Samburu North, KPRs (from among the serving moran age-set) are recruited by their chiefs. Once a chief has recommended the appointment or replacement of a KPR, the letter to such effect is forwarded to the district administrative officials. The district administrative officials then forward the same to the head of police within the district (OCPD). The OCPD then instructs the head of police within the division (OCS) from where the chief and the KPRs originates to issue the appointed KPR with a firearm and specific numbers of ammunition. In some cases the district security team also issues the KPR with an identity card that recognizes his designation

\textsuperscript{109} Interview in Natiti village, February 2015
\textsuperscript{110} Interview at Baragoi AP Camp in October 2014
\textsuperscript{111} Interview at Bendera Village (September 2014), Baragoi town (December 2014) Baragoi town (January 2015)
and area of operation (location or sub-location). In my focus group discussions\textsuperscript{112} with KPRs from the Samburu and Turkana communities, I noted that while some had served as KPRs since 1996, others had served for 13 years while the majority were young men in their 20s and therefore among the current warriors age-sets of the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. On issuance with the agreed firearm and ammunition the KPR then signs (puts his thumb print) on the Occurrence Book to acknowledge receipt of those items. KPRs do not receive appointment letters or a contract detailing their job description. For instance on 16\textsuperscript{th} April 2009, a rifle MKIV of serial number 106055 loaded with two rounds of ammunition was handed over to a newly appointed KPR from Nachola location (Baragoi Police Station 2009). Below is an entry in the Occurrence Book of Baragoi Police Station showing the handing over of a firearm to a newly recruited KPR officer in 2007.

There seems to be no clear policy on the standard number of ammunition to be issued to KPRs on recruitment. This is shown on 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2009 when Baragoi Police Post handed over one AK47 rifle of serial number 794131 loaded with 15 rounds of ammunition to a newly recruited KPR from Kawap location (Baragoi Police Station 2009). The issuance of the firearms though four days apart to KPRs from the same community (Turkana) can be seen to vary in terms of the

\textsuperscript{112} Focused Group Discussions conducted in Bendera village (Samburu KPRs) and Nachola (Turkana KPRs) in October 2014 and February 2015 respectively
firearm issued (MKIV versus AK47 and 2 rounds of ammunition vis-à-vis 15 rounds). These disparities raise questions of standard and accountability. My inquiries from KPRs through focused group discussions\textsuperscript{113} indicated that the amount of ammunition issued to KPRs at any one given time almost always depended on the good relations between the area chief and the local head of police or the officer in charge of the armoury. These allegations lend credence to issues of collusion between police officers, chiefs, KPRs and morans in the trade of government ammunition or as Abbink (2009) called it ‘violent entrepreneurship’. Bevan (2008) in his research of illegal ammunition trade in Turkana North also noted the flourishing trade in Government of Kenya issued ammunition.

Table 6: Data on KPRs and their Firearms in Samburu North sub-County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Area (Location)</th>
<th>Inhabitant Community</th>
<th>Number of KPRs</th>
<th>Guns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Horr</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuum</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndoto</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waso Rongai</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsim</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suiyan</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Barta</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latakweny</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baragoi</td>
<td>Samburu and Turkana</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawap</td>
<td>Turkana (now displaced and living at Lenkima village)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkati</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nachola</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marti</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of KPRs</td>
<td></td>
<td>413</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Police Service: Breakdown of KPRs within Samburu North sub-County (NPS 2013)

\textsuperscript{113} FGD with Samburu KPRs at Bendera, September 2014
The above table shows the total number of KPRs per location in Samburu North sub-County. It is notable that the total number of KPRs differs from the total number of guns issued. In my interviews with police officers and senior KPRs I was informed that the extra 7 guns were issued to chiefs and assistant chiefs in the respective administrative areas and recorded as KPRs. The discrepancy in number indicate lack of clear policy in issuance of state arms and the flexibility and power that police officers enjoy in the issuance of arms. This indicates a system of limited accountability that is susceptible to abuse. The consequences of which are the many forms of insecurity faced by communities in the district.

![Identity card issued to a Samburu KPR from Bendera village in Baragoi (Source: Author 2014)](image)

8.2 The Institutional Structure of Kenya Police Reservists

Kenya Police Reservists as it operates today originates from Kenyan law (GoK 2010). Even though this law recognizes the role of KPRs, it does not provide the operational structure of this institution. In my own observation, I noted that the institution of KPR is anchored within the National Police Service Act of 2010 (GoK). This parliamentary act is implemented by the executive arm of the state (the presidency) under which the Ministry of Interior and the Coordination of National Government falls. At the same time, the National Police Service Act (GoK 2010) provides for the office of the Inspector General of Police as the officer responsible for the coordination of police services in Kenya. The Inspector General of Police is therefore answerable both to the executive and legislative arms of the state. In its role of coordination of national government, the Ministry of Interior retained the Provincial Administration and placed officers at the regional (Regional Commissioners), county (County Commissioners), sub-county
(sub-County Commissioners) and divisional levels (Assistant County Commissioners) as administrators in charge of law and order at their various levels. Coordination of the work of Kenya Police Reservists is therefore carried out through two arms of the executive: the office of the Inspector General of Police and the offices of the Regional Commissioner of the North Rift region. This culminates into the coordination in the selection of KPRs (by chiefs as the lowest tier of executive arm of government based at the village/locational level) and their issuance of arms and ammunition by the Police Sergeant in Charge of Armoury at Baragoi Police Station. This structure is captured in the figure below:
Figure 8: The current institutional structure of Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs)

Source: Author
From the structure in Fig. 8 above, we can observe that the current structure is a top-down communication model between officers of various ranks. The interests and concerns of the KPRs can only be articulated by the chiefs even though they are part of the national security set-up. Their link to the National Police Service through the Police Sergeant in Charge of the Armory is purely for the distribution of arms and ammunition, the institution of KPRs is an informal security arrangement with little checks and balances that enables the informalization of violence in Baragoi.

**Figure 9: Proposed institutional structure of National Police Reservists**

Source: GoK (2013:7)

The National Police Reserve Policy Framework (GoK 2013) provides for the formation of the National Police Reserve Unit, the successor to the Kenya Police Reserve, “the Unit must be headed by an officer not below the rank of Assistant Inspector-General who is the Director; a
Deputy Director and such other staff as the management of the Reserve may require. The Unit should be located in the Office of the Inspector General” (GoK 2013:6). The policy guideline proposes the creation of the position of Director of National Police Reserves to report to the Inspector General of Police and mandated to undertake general administration, “training and efficiency of the Reserve personnel in liaison with the respective County Formations” (GoK 2013:7). It further proposes the appointment of a Reserve Officer in every County to be in charge of National Police Reserves within that County. These officers would then report to the Director of Police Reserves who subsequently reports to the Inspector General of Police. The proposed policy further envisages the positioning of reserve officers at Divisional Headquarters alongside officers from the Administration and Kenya Police Services. My own observation of this policy vis-à-vis the situation and role of KRPs in Northern Kenya is that this policy in essence doesn’t address the role of reserve officers at the village level and it presumes that police reserves are police officers in ‘waiting’. Further it doesn’t address teething problems related to salaries that have long bedeviled the KPRs in Northern Kenya. In regards to salaries it proposes the following:

“A Reserve police officer must serve voluntarily and should not be entitled to claim any remuneration for his/her services but while undergoing and performing duties should be paid such allowances as may be prescribed for a police officer of corresponding rank and seniority in such rank” (GoK 2013: 9).

This does not address the plight of KPRs who have worked as reservists since the 1980s and many who have lost lives and livestock in pursuit of raiders. Further this policy does not take into account the daily duty of intelligence gathering that KPRs do to enable police action in places like Baragoi.

8.3 Historical Marginalisation and the Informalisation of Violence in Northern Kenya

Kenya Human Rights Commission (2010) linked the culture of raiding and increased violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya to the historical socio-economic and political marginalization of pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. The existence of KPRs as a policing unit in Northern Kenya represents an aspect of that historical marginalisation as well as the states
contribution to the Informalisation of violence through the recruitment and arming of volunteer villagers to provide security for themselves on behalf of the state. Schilling et al (2012) associated the recruitment of warriors for commercialised raiding among pastoralists in Northern Kenya to lack of opportunities occasioned by very low literacy levels among warriors in Northern Kenya. They further argued that the limited presence of the state in Northern Kenya encourages the presence of other non-state actors such as gun merchants who sell weapons to pastoralists. The insecurity occasioned by the absence of state security forces pastoralists to provide or guarantee their own security through the acquisition of weapons for defensive and aggressive purposes. Enlisting as KPRs therefore provides an avenue through which locals can access guns and ammunition legitimately as state security officers which they can equally use for illegitimate purposes such as cattle raids and highway banditries. Being a KPR therefore provides a window through which an individual can gain power as an owner of a gun thus enabling him to defend his family and livestock as well as to contribute to communal effort in aggression and defence duties.

Bernt and Colini (2013) view marginalisation as the exclusion of groups of people from access to basic human services such as education, health and state protection. Marginalisation in their view is associated with being in the periphery of the state in terms of developmental priorities. They further link marginalisation to unfair allocation and distribution of state resources. Their description of exclusion is derived from Levitas (2007:9) who associates it with “denial of resources, rights, goods and services and the inability to participate in the normal relationships and activities available to the majority of people in a society”. Kerrow (2015) views marginalisation as ‘socio-economic’ exclusion from societal resources. Pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya have been historically marginalised since the onset of colonial administration in Kenya. State development policy viewed pastoralists groups as ‘uncivilised’ due to their nomadic lifestyle and their location in semi-arid environment. Investing in basic infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and state security was seen as an expensive venture with no ‘immediate returns’ as these areas were not viable for agriculture due to limited rainfall.
After Kenya’s independence in 1963, a development policy document prepared to chart the way forward was passed in Parliament in 1965. The policy paper outlined the development priorities of independent Kenya. It stated that “...its approach clearly favours the development of areas having abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities and people receptive to and active in development” (GoK 1965:46). This policy paper clearly laid the basis for developmental exclusion of pastoralists’ lands of Northern Kenya since these are areas with limited rainfall and land suitable for pastoralism as opposed to agricultural production. The policy paper further viewed the people of Northern Kenya as ‘unreceptive’ to development owing to their nomadic lifestyle. In essence marginalisation of pastoralists in Northern Kenya stems from historical state neglect and underdevelopment which is seen in the absence of the state in all forms of socio-economic life of this region. Leff (2009) argued that Eastern Africa states’ neglect of pastoralists in the Karamoja Cluster is evident in its policies of coercion and repression “a function of comparatively deeply-rooted repressive attitudes toward non-sedentary populations” (2009:190). Historical marginalisation of pastoralists groups is therefore at the very foundation of increased violence among pastoralists as groups compete over scarce and diminishing resources in an environment with limited state security. The absence of the state has also contributed to the huge demand of personal and communal security as a public good giving room for non-state actors to profit from provision of illegal arms to meet the high demand created by absence of state security.

State neglect of Northern Kenya can be seen in its incapacity to allocate resources in education, health and security sectors in the arid areas occupied by pastoralists. The limited presence of the state and the history of past wars in Northern Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan have been blamed for inflow of illegal small arms and light weapons in Northern Kenya (Osamba 2000; Leff 2009; Mkutu 2007) and the subsequent violence among herders that results from illegal flow of arms and ammunition through Kenya’s porous borders. Limited state security has also been linked to the rise of non-state actors who trade in illegal firearms (Mkutu 2008; Mkutu 2007). Proximity to war torn countries in Eastern Africa contributes to trade in illegal arms in Northern Kenya (Wairagu and Ndung’u 2003). Illegal gun markets have been documented in Isiolo and Northern parts of Uganda (Mkutu 2007; HRW 2002), with the Isiolo route being
linked with the inflow of M-16 rifles among the Samburu of Baragoi. The inability of the Kenyan state to provide adequate security for its pastoralists citizens in the North has therefore created a huge demand for illegal arms to meet the huge demand for personal and communal security. Non-state actors such as elites from this region and others who have an interest either in the sale of arms, the trade in raided livestock or political offices are therefore part of a network of ‘violent entrepreneurs’ who profit from violent cattle raids thus using culture to promote violence among pastoralists for personal gain (Abbink 2009).

Straight (2009:23) has linked violence among pastoralists in northern Kenya with decades of marginalisation of communities in this area. Straight further argues that the chronic violence that affects the marginalised pastoralists of Northern Kenya stems from the classification of pastoralists violence as ‘cultural’ and therefore something not worthy of national attention of the political leadership in Kenya (2009:24). Linkages between marginalisation and insecurity among pastoralists in Eastern Africa has also been pursued by Mkutu (2007) who noted that incidences of violence that stemmed from illegally acquired weapons occurred in these areas due to the limited presence of state security personnel. According to Mkutu “pastoral areas have historically been the victims of marginalization (political, economic and social isolation), with the absence of effective governance or, in some places, with the total absence of government and judicial systems” (Mkutu 2007:62). Locals therefore have been forced to fend for themselves in terms of provision of these services including security. Schepet-Hughes (2006:13) has described structural violence as those conditions that “naturalises” or normalizes poverty, hunger, sickness or premature death erasing their social and political origins so that they are taken for granted and no one is held accountable except the poor themselves”. The KPRs are at the base of structural violence in Northern Kenya as it is an embodiment the historic and systemic alienation of citizens to their rights for protection by state security apparatus. The institution of KPRs can be seen as an avenue for informalisation violence as it offers pastoralists groups a form of ‘indirect rule’ making them liable for their own insecurity while at the same time saving the state revenue that would otherwise be required to police these vast arid lands (Mkutu 2015:202; Straight 2009:26). In the next section, my analysis focuses on the linkages between ungoverned spaces and Informalisation of violence through KPRs in pastoralist’s lands.
8.4 Ungoverned Spaces and Violent Entrepreneurship in Pastoralists Lands

The minimal presence of state structure within pastoralists rangelands of Eastern Africa has been a subject of great discussion (Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008; Matthysen et al 2010; Bevan 2008; Powel 2010). These studies have linked limited state presence evident in the incapacity or absence of adequate security personnel and the frequency of violent raids. They argue that this indicates the inability of the state to protect life and property of its citizens as indications of the state weakness in pastoralists’ borderlands. Others (Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015) have described pastoralists lands such as Northern Kenya as ‘ungoverned spaces’ due to the limited outreach of the state security apparatus. They have argued that the ineffectiveness of the state in these areas play a significant role in violent conflicts that prevail. Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005:4) and Mburu (n.d) have further classified Northern Kenya as a “periphery” due to “limited government presence”, “inability of the government to maintain basic levels of security and historic economic and political marginalisation including lack of investment”. Ungoverned spaces are therefore associated with marginalization. They are also seen as arenas for production of violence as the absence of the state provides an ample opportunity for non-state actors to engage in ‘violent entrepreneurship’ (Abbink 2009).

Drawing examples from Ethiopia, Kurimoto and Simonse (1998) termed the neglect of pastoralists groups by states in Eastern Africa as state retreat. Sharamo (2014: 4) described Northern Kenya as “bandit kingdom” due to the high levels of insecurity and lawlessness that pervade its geographical space and people. Northern part of Kenya has also been described as ‘Kenya’s Other Frontier’ (Menkhaus 2008). In his discussion of external conflicts among the Suri and its neighbours Abbink (2009:41) has described the Suri settlement area as a “remote lowland region” far from the Ethiopian government. This further points to the idea of pastoralists spaces being ungoverned, in the periphery of the state. Abbink (2009) attributes the inability of the Ethiopian state to monopolise the use of violence among the Suri to its distance from the Suri people. Distance here is not only geographical but also in terms of resource allocation priority. He associated state neglect of the Suri people with their indifference and ambivalence towards state directives from the security forces that from time to time were sent to quell violence within their neighbourhood (Abbink 2009).
Linking ungoverned spaces, lawlessness and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, Masuda (2009:72) has argued that “guns are a violent device for social control, exploitation and oppression, and that they are found in marginal areas, where they are used in interethnic conflicts and in resistance to the state”. Writing about the Nyangatom’s perception of the Ethiopian state, Tornay (2009:86) was informed that it was viewed as a “foreign predatory agency” far from the marginal lands of the Nyangatom; indifferent and unhelpful to their day to day struggles. Discussing the linkages between state neglect and violence in ungoverned pastoralists spaces Sagawa (2010) stated:

“There was no capacity or will to protect pastoral citizens in the border regions and these communities were forced to defend their own lives and property for many years” (Sagawa 2010:103)

Ungoverned spaces have been described as ‘brown areas’ where citizens experience ‘low intensity citizenship’ (O’Donnell 1993). ‘Brown areas’ in most world maps indicate places with little state interest, lacking data on state intervention programs on key issues such as health, security, education, infrastructure and trade. This is the approach of many states with ungoverned spaces. Lastly, ungoverned spaces have also been identified as arenas in which ‘shadow economies’ grow to fulfill the demand for public goods deprived from citizens through retreat of the state (Idler and Forest 2015). The shadow economy that thrives in ungoverned spaces can be in the form of trade on illegal goods. The idea of arming locals in ungoverned spaces was adopted by the Ethiopian government in the 1990s (Sagawa 2010). Sagawa (2010) was informed of cases where government arms issued to the EPRs were used in mounting attacks against ‘favourite enemies’ of the Daasanach. In Northern Kenya, the ungoverned space left by the disinterested state has created a huge demand for security (personal and communal). This space has been partly filled by the Kenya Police Reservists. Given its own weak institutional framework, KPRs have adopted a ‘quasi state-quasi non-state actor’ position to exploit the opportunities available in ungoverned spaces of Northern Kenya through violent entrepreneurship.

The presence of KPRs as the only means of effective state authority in the arid lands of Northern Kenya indicate the incapacity of the Kenyan state to demonstrate effective state authority in this
region. In effect Northern Kenya is ungoverned space. Ken Menkhaus (2007:3) defined ungoverned spaces as geographical areas with “weak or non-existent state authority”. Whelan (2005) stated that physical ungoverned spaces exist in remote borderland areas of the state. Menkhaus (2007:3) further categorises Northern Kenya and Uganda’s Karamoja region as ungoverned spaces owing to the “nominal” presence of effective state authority in these regions. Menkhaus further expounds that ungoverned spaces are associated with high levels of insecurity, the presence of quasi-state security apparatus and the existence of non-state actors who fill the vacuum vacated by the state in terms of security provision. Further, ungoverned spaces are marked by huge presence of humanitarian agencies and the provision of relief food to locals (Menkhaus 2007).

Rabasa et al (2007) have provided a framework for understanding and characterizing ungoverned spaces. They argue that ungoverned spaces must be understood in four dimensions: first is the extent of state presence in the society. By this they imply that if state presence in society is limited for instance to the urban and well infrastructured areas and non-existent in the remote and distant borderlands then those unpenetrated areas become the ungoverned spaces within the state. Secondly ungoverned spaces can be seen in the extent to which the state enjoys monopoly of the instruments of violence in its territory. The existence of non-state actors who use or trade in instruments of violence in defiance of the state and the level of circulation of illegal small arms within particular regions show the existence of ungoverned spaces within the state. Third, the extent to which effective state authority can be put into use at international borders. Ineffective state authority at the borders creates room for the activity of non-state actors. These areas can thus be termed as ungoverned spaces. Fourth, ungoverned spaces arise when governance of some parts or regions of the state are subject to intervention by another state.

Mkutu and Wandera (2013:14) classified Northern Kenya as ungoverned spaces owing to “little physical or communication infrastructure, low levels of state presence, and an under-provision of state security”. They further link ungoverned spaces with un-ending communal conflicts within the state which may at times spill over the international borders due to the remoteness of these regions. They further view the neglect of the neighbouring states in securing their frontlines as
leading to the definition of these areas as ungoverned spaces e.g. the Karamoja cluster. They argue that ungoverned spaces are arenas of illicit enterprise where arms trade and trade in other contraband form part of the money-flow. They characterize ungoverned spaces as undeveloped and marginalised areas with minimal road and communication infrastructure.

According to Menkhaus (2007) ungoverned spaces in the arid lands of Northern Kenya and the Horn of Africa suffer from population pressure, scarcity of resources, constant paramilitary operations to ‘maintain peace’, cattle raiding and ethnic mobilisation for violence. Herbst (2000) another proponent of ungoverned space argument contends that the size of the state determines its capacity to protect citizens within it. He argues that smaller states have the capacity to effect state authority throughout its territory unlike large states. In his argument, geographically larger states with scattered populations in its remote areas are more susceptible to violence due to the challenges the state faces in effectively providing security in these distant and desolate borderlands. Clapham (1986) argues that states decide to avail governance goods depending on its economic interests. The existence of ungoverned spaces within states therefore implies the lack of economic incentives on that part of the state. This is in line with the Sir Geoffrey Archer’s (a colonial administrator in of Samburu areas) view and policy in Northern Kenya:

“There is only one way to treat these northern territories … to give them whatever protection one can under the British Flag and otherwise to leave them to their own customs as far as possible, under their own chiefs. Anything else is uneconomical” (Barber 1968: 415–16).

Clapham’s (1986) argument on provision of governance goods such as security and other forms of development based on economic viability of an area therefore justifies the deployment of KPRs as the sole effective means of securing pastoralists livelihoods. In colonial and independent Kenya governments’ calculations, Northern Kenya did not have immediate economic benefits that warranted investment on state security and thus the option of KPRs; a volunteer unit with no remuneration and limited logistical support. According to Clapham (1986) Northern Kenya therefore is ungoverned space due to rational calculation by the state based on immediate economic returns. Boone (2003) further argues that governed spaces (blue areas) exist
where the state is extractive, while ungoverned spaces (brown areas) can be found in areas where the state is non-extractive. From the above discussion, one can observe the linkages between economic interests of the state and its willingness to invest in particular regions within it. The deployment of KPRs to work closely with the chiefs and other administrators therefore served the minimum administrative and security needs and enabled the Kenyan state to invest its resources in those geographical areas with maximum revenue returns. The disinterest of the state as seen in the weak institutional framework of the KPRs has however enabled KPRs to use their position of authority not only to protect their villages and to aid the safe passage of livestock in these ungoverned spaces but also to engage in violent entrepreneurship through the sale of ammunition and engagement in raids.

8.5 KPRs as Heroes on the Vanguard of Security Issues in Baragoi

Available data indicate that due to the limited presence of state security personnel in this region, KPRs play the policing role. This they do by gathering intelligence on impending attacks, tracking and recovery of raided animals, providing security to cattle kraals, providing security to herders and livestock in grazing lands, night patrol in the manyattas, engaging raiders on shoot-outs, monitoring the movement of raiders and reporting to the police conflict incidences that occur within their localities. A case in point is captured below:

“It was reported by a Kenya Police Reservist within Nachola Location in Baragoi that today at about 0300 hours 800 armed cattle rustlers believed to be of Samburu origin raided Lomirok manyatta situated in Nachola area of Baragoi Division and made away with 205 camels belonging to Kelea Lokadongoi. During the incident, the Turkana morans shot dead 12 Samburu raiders. In the heavy exchange of fire the following Turkana were injured: a Turkana female adult aged 47 years was shot on the right pelvis, a Turkana female adult aged 46 years was shot on the scapula whil a Turkana male adult aged 43 years was shot on the chest. During the attack KPRs responded and expended 600 assorted types of ammunition” (Baragoi Police Station Signal 30th October 2012).

Similarly given their knowledge of the terrain, KPRs are critical in the recovery efforts of stolen animals. This they do through tracing of livestock footmarks and leading police officers (mostly
unfamiliar with the terrain) in grazing lands and bushes where morans hide raided livestock. For instance on Monday the 28th of April 2008, there was a shoot-out at a grazing field near Baragoi Secondary School. Armed Turkana raiders allegedly attacked Samburu herders and made away with 70 heads of cattle. The Samburu KPRs from Bendera village responded to the sounds of gunfire and caught up with the raiders at Naagis Grazing reserve where a further exchange of fire led to the recovery of all the raided livestock by the Samburu KPRs (Baragoi Police Station 2008).

KPRs also play a critical peacebuilding role among the Samburu and Turkana. In some cases, KPRs pass information on raided livestock brought to their manyattas. In such cases, KPRs ensure that such raided livestock are handed back to the owners through the involvement of the police. These actions of returning raided livestock reduces tension between morans from rival communities and averts possibilities of revenge raids. This also indicates that some KPRs work beyond the ethnic divide of the Samburu and Turkana by sharing critical information among themselves and also with the police officers to aid recovery of stolen livestock, as illustrated below:

“To the post are two KPRs from Lonyangaten sub-location, they bring one cow belonging to a Samburu of Bendera village. The cow is one of the 16 heads of cattle stolen at Ngorishe hills grazing field on 24.4.2008. The cow was left behind by rushing raiders who raided Bendera village. It is now handed over to the owner” (Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book 1st May 2008).

In their role of gathering intelligence on the movement of raiders, KPRs work very closely with chiefs from their own administrative areas. Given that raiders often group in pasturelands or in nearby thickets before launching raids. KPRs play a significant role in passing information on the sighting of raiders and thus preventing loss of lives and livestock. The Occurrence Book of Baragoi Police Station recorded various instances of this role by KPRs:

“Now to the post is the senior Chief of Elbarta who reports that he had communicated with his KPRs from Loruko who informed him that a group of Turkana cattle rustlers
attempted to raid the cattle grazing at Loruko but the KPRs were ready and overpowered them” (Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book, 7th September 2008).

“One Samburu KPR from Tuum made a report that today the 28th of December 2013; four suspected Turkana raiders were spotted by the advance party of KPRs heading to Simale village. An exchange of fire ensued between the suspected raiders and the KPRs forcing the suspects to run away” (Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book 27th December 2013).

KPRs are vital for the protection of pastoralists’ villages and many times they are the first causalities during raids. In my focused group discussions114 with KPRs from both communities, every KPR had a bullet scar. From Bendera village alone, seven115 KPRs were killed during the Baragoi massacre in November 2012. On the 12th of February 2011, Pokot raiders killed a Samburu KPR at Suiyan. On 23rd April 2011, Turkana raiders attacked Samburu herders at Lbaaoibor grazing field and killed a Samburu KPR. On 8th June 2011, Pokot raiders attacked Samburu herders in Ndonyo nkere and killed a Samburu KPR. Lastly, on the 18th October 2013, Turkana raiders attacked Samburu herders in Waso Rongai, killed two KPRs and made a way with their G3 rifles (Baragoi Police Station 2013). Further cases of KPRs being killed during raids in Northern Kenya in recent times have been reported in Turkana and Baringo Counties (Leting 2015; Kipsang 2015).

Lastly in my interviews I was informed of cases where Turkana and Samburu herders locally trade in arms and ammunition which are later used in raids and other forms of violent actions. Cases of trade in weapons and ammunition were reported and recorded by the police as captured below:

“To the post is the Assistant chief of Bendera sub-location accompanied by a KPR who make a report that they received information that one Lperis Lombeu bought an AK47

114 Focused Group Discussions with Samburu and Turkana KPRs in 2014
115 Focused group discussions with Bendera KPRs in September 2014
KPRs with their local knowledge of illegal weapons trade can thus be vital in stemming the proliferation of small arms and light weapons as they are familiar with the terrain and their operations in grazing lands and watering places locate them at the venues of illegal arms sale.

8.6 KPRs and Violent Raids in Northern Kenya

KPRs have been accused of using their government issued firearms and ammunition to join raiding parties, engaging in ammunition trade, loaning their firearms to raiders, taking part in highway bandities and using their guns to seek employment as private security guards (Weiss 2004; Mkutu and Wandera 2013; Mkutu 2015). Cases of KPRs being killed during raids have raised the questions of ill-discipline among the KPR ranks, lack of loyalty to the state (but rather to the ethnic group or moran-age group), and the use of government issued firearms to commit crime for personal gain. For instance on the 21st of October 2011, a Rendille KPR was among the injured raiders who were arrested by police in a failed raid attempt at Kawap village of Samburu North sub-County. The said KPR participated in the Kawap raid while armed with a state-issued MKIV rifle of serial number T33913 loaded with 17 rounds of ammunition (Baragoi Police Station 2011). This shows the institutional weakness that exists in the management of KPRs as they are not monitored on how and where they use their firearms and ammunition, thus many join raiding parties for self-gain.

My argument here is that the ungoverned space that is Samburu North enables KPRs to play a significant role in the ‘violent entrepreneurship’ value chain (Abbink 2009) that prevails between security personnel, chiefs, KPRs and morans from both the Samburu and Turkana communities. In focused group’s discussions with KPRs, I was informed that the 303 ammunition that is used in MKIV and MKI rifles is often purchased from corrupt police officers for Kenya Shillings 300 per bullet. Another source of ammunition for the AK47 rifles are political leaders and gun runners who obtain their supplies from Isiolo and Lodwar towns. Leilei town on the Turkana side of Baragoi town is a hub for illegal firearms and ammunitions sale. It is notable that Samburu
and Turkana do trade in arms and ammunition with each other. Their transactions contribute to the production of violence between the two groups in grazing lands and within cattle kraals.

Incidents of cattle raids in Samburu North have been alleged to promote the selling of police ammunition through chiefs and KPRs. In police records from Samburu North instances of huge amounts of ammunition issued to chiefs have been recorded (Baragoi Police Station 2009). On the 24th June 2009 7.62mm 100 rounds of ammunition was handed over to the Chief of Uaso Rongai to be supplied to KPRs in his location. Similarly on the 25th June 2009 another 100 of 7.62mm special ammunition was handed over to the chief of South Horr to be distributed to KPRs within his location (Baragoi Police Station 2009). Further cases of handing over large numbers of ammunition to chiefs occurred on 1st July 2009 (ammunition handed to chief South Horr). It is worthy of note that above mentioned cases of arming of KPRs through chiefs do not correspond with any dates when raids occurred. A curious case of massive distribution of ammunition to KPRs occurred on 26th December 2012. On that day a Senior Sergeant of the Kenya Police was recorded in the Occurrence Book to have taken 2400 ammunition of 7.62mm and 960 of 7.65 mm special ammunition to KPRs based in Masikita village (Baragoi Police Station 2012). This is in contradiction to clear policy which requires the issuing of ammunition to KPRs to be done through the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) in liaison with the Officer Commanding Police District (OCPD). Incidences of irregular arms transfer from the police to the KPRs and chiefs validate the argument and evidence by Bevan (2008) on trade by security officers on government arms and ammunition.

Evidence from police reports indicates the complicity of KPRs in raids. In many of these cases, killed raiders have turned out to be KPRs who joined raiding parties using state firearms. In the Baragoi massacre that occurred on the 10th of November 2012 (NPS 2013) official police reports indicated that 7 Samburu KPRs who took part in the botched operation were killed. There are cases where police investigations have revealed the use of KPR issued guns in cattle raids among the Samburu and Turkana. Cases of misuse of arms are further captured in police records as indicated below:
“The Officer Commanding Police Post (OCPP) now detains the rifle of one KPR from Marti location. Rifle serial number MKIV 14244 with 10 rounds of ammunition. It is detained pending ongoing investigations against the KPR” (Baragoi Police Post Occurrence Book 6th October 2008).

Other incidences where KPRs have been found to have misused their government issued firearms by engaging in raiding can also be found in police records (KHRC 2010). On 12th April 2010 a Samburu KPR was arrested and his MKIV rifle of serial number A65301 with 5 rounds of 303mm ammunition detained after he was found to have taken part in a raid against the Turkana (Baragoi Police Station 2010). Similar incidences of KPRs using their arms to engage in cattle raids were captured in police records:

“To the Post are two Turkana KPRs who hand over a MKIV rifle serial number 360574 loaded with 3 rounds of ammunition which belongs to one Echomo Lokolonyei, a KPR who is under arrest at the post for the offence of stealing stock” (Baragoi Police Post Occurrence Book 9th June 2008).

There have been cases where KPRs have colluded with morans from their ethnic groups to plan and execute raids against their enemy communities (KHRC 2010). While some chiefs also covertly support these raids, at times chiefs who disagree with these raiding plans are threatened by the same KPRs. Given the lack of an institutionalised code of conduct and proper training, KPRs can therefore be a security threat not only to their ‘traditional’ enemies but also internally to those who challenge their raiding plans. A case in point was the report by the then Senior Chief (now retired) of Elbarta who was threatened by his own KPRs for naming raiders from the Samburu community. His report is captured in police records as follows:

“The Senior Chief of Elbarta reports that yesterday the 18th of January 2013 at about 1900 hrs he had a baraza with members of the public from Bendera sub-location. This was over the issue of stolen goats and sheep belonging to the Turkana community by Samburu morans. The goats/sheep had been raided by Samburu morans on the 16th January 2013 and brought to Bendera. At the meeting he asked the community to return the stolen animals or else return the guns issued to KPRs. This is when some members turned against him when he mentioned the following suspects: Elmetaba Lelekalabu,
Antony Leakono and Kamshina Lelet. They then threatened to kill the chief and started firing in the air. The named suspects were however not at the meeting as they were said to have driven the animals towards Ndoto in Loikumkum sub-location. Other members shielded the chief and escorted him to his home. But those who threatened to shoot him told him that they will never return the stolen animals. They included: a Samburu KPR (a guard at Kenya Power Station, Baragoi), L. Leakono who holds an illegal AK47 and Kamuri Letilipa, a KPR” (Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book 19th January 2013).

The illustration above shows the power that KPRs derive from ownership of arms as it emboldens them to challenge the authority. Chiefs are key in the appointment of KPRs (Mkutu 2007; Mkutu and Wandera 2015) but as can be seen above, the power of guns bestows upon KPRs their own ability to choose to respect or undermine institutionalised authority. Cases of KPRs participating in pastoralists’ violence are common owing to the lack of supervision, training and remuneration. It points back to Mkutu’s (2007) assertion that KPRs as an institution is indeed ‘security on the cheap’.

8.7 KPRs, Arms and the Politics of Violence in Samburu North

Since the upsurge of violent raids in 1996, acquiring arms has been vital to the survival of pastoralists’ households among the Samburu and Turkana. While illegal arms have found their way into Samburu North through gun traders and politicians; the battle for the balance of power has also been reflected in the manner in which different communities lobby and influence the local police to attain more KPRs. Having more KPRs means having more ‘legal’ firepower directed against the common enemy. In Samburu North, the Samburu administrative areas tend to have more KPRs than the Turkana areas. The issue of imbalance in the arming of KPR is seen by the Turkana as a deliberate measure aimed at entrenching the ability of the Samburu to militarily prevail in conflict situations against their Turkana neighbours. The disparity of KPR guns allocated to KPRs among the Samburu and Turkana was noted by KNCHR (2008) as one of the key complaints in their fact finding mission on Samburu and Turkana violence in Baragoi. In their assessment they noted that three quarters of KPR guns (especially G3s) were allocated to Samburu KPRs, while Turkana KPRs constituted 25 per cent of KPRs in Baragoi. Similarly, in a memorandum to the Minister of Internal Security during a leaders meeting in Baragoi in 2009,
the Turkana informed the minister of the imbalance in the distribution of walkie talkies to KPRs in Baragoi with the Turkana KPRs receiving 20 per cent while the Samburu received 80 per cent (Ekiru 2009). The politics of arming of KPRs is another facet of the role of violence in power politics between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi, in a recent petition to the President of Kenya, the Samburu North MP (a Samburu) asked for the replacement of Samburu KPR guns from MKIV to more automatic versions such as AK47 and G3. In his request, the MP specifically mentioned the administrative areas (Samburu areas) in which KPRs guns needed to be replaced and left out Turkana administrative areas of Baragoi. This further reinforces my argument that to the local Samburu and Turkana and their leaders, KPRs and their arms represent symbols of communal firepower against common ‘enemy’ communities. Reinforcing communal firepower therefore provides the needed edge against one’s enemies in contests over land, votes and pastures in the absence of the state. To the politicians, the ability to provide better firepower to morans and KPRs entrenches the patron-client relationship that enables their preservation of political power through re-elections (Lentoimaga n.d).

There have been incidences where KPRs have been disarmed owing to what police describe as illegal use of state firearms. In other cases, political meddling by rival group have led to pressure forcing the police to disarm KPRs in certain administrative areas while leaving other areas fully armed with their rifles (Baragoi Police Station 2012). This precipitates imbalance of power and encourages raiders to attack areas perceived to be vulnerable. Following the Baragoi massacre there was political pressure from politicians for the disarming of Turkana KPRs whom they accused of loaning their guns to aid Turkana warriors who killed the police, Samburu warriors and Samburu KPRs in the botched Lomerok raid of 10th November 2012. The order to disarm the Turkana KPRs was however carried out in Parkati village some 80 kilometers away from the scene of the Baragoi massacre. Parkati village is often attacked by the Pokot from Baringo County and Turkana clans from Lokori in Turkana South. The disarming Parkati KPRs due to political pressure from Samburu political leaders who argued that Turkana KPRs were part of the warriors who participated in the killing of police officers in the Baragoi massacre. This led to the vulnerability of the village. The following KPRs from Parkati (including the chief) were disarmed (Baragoi Police Station Occurrence Book November 25th 2012):
- G3 serial number 005624 with ammunition belonging to Assistant Chief Parkati
- MKIV serial number N24652A with 9 rounds of ammunition from the head of KPR in Parkati
- MKIV serial number PF 401881 with 5 rounds of ammunition from a KPR officer
- G3 serial number 97496391 with 81 rounds from a KPR officer
- MKIV serial number U37347 with 8 rounds of ammunition
- MKIV serial number AA22028 with two rounds of ammunition
- MKIV serial number 18545 with 3 rounds of ammunition
- MKIV serial number 13144 with 5 rounds of ammunition
- MKIV serial number F2487 with 2 rounds of ammunition
- MKIV serial number B17345 with 5 rounds of ammunition

Cases of temporary disarmaments of KPRs based on local political dynamics not only endanger the whole community who are exposed to more attacks but also drives the need to acquire illegal arms that further increases the levels of insecurity among the Samburu and the Turkana.

8.8 Privatisation of KPRs in Samburu North

High insecurity levels in Northern Kenya occasioned by limited presence of police personnel has increased the demand for KPRs as an alternative policing option. In studies of KPRs and their welfare in Turkana County (Mkutu and Wandera; Mkutu 2015) have established a trend where KPRs are increasingly being hired by NGOs, oil exploring companies, community banks, politicians, businessmen and even churches as paid private security. Hiring of KPRs as private security for organisations and individuals further reinforces my argument of pastoralists Northern Kenya as ungoverned spaces where the demand for personal and property security as a public good is in short supply. The privatisation of KPRs raises the question of the sources of ammunition that are utilised by KPRs in these private engagements. In essence it forces KPRs to acquire illegal ammunition to be ‘suitable’ for the job. It creates a ready market for ammunition trade and places KPRs as key actors in this trade. Further the hiring of KPRs as private security guards deprives herders of the security back-up they need to traverse pasturelands during the dry season. It exposes herders to vulnerability to attacks especially during the dry period when livestock have to trek long distances in search of pasture and water.
Cases of KPRs abandoning their core responsibility of providing security to pursue other interests can be blamed on the volunteer and non-remunerational nature of the task. In focused group discussions I was informed that KPRs do not earn any salary or allowances for the security services they provide. Cases of drop-outs by KPR recruits have therefore become common as young men seek more productive opportunities. A case in point is captured in the following excerpt:

“Firearms from the following KPRs have been detained. N. N holder of firearm serial number 17325 with 3 rounds ammunition and E. E holder of firearm serial number F2487 with 3 rounds of ammunition. The above KPRs are all from Parkati location. The chief of Parkati and the area councilor complained to the DC’s office that the said KPRs are no longer living in Parkati and there is need to recruit new KPRs to ease the security burden. In Parkati currently there are only 2 KPRs deployed at Parkati Primary School guarding the children against bandit attacks” (Baragoi Police Post Occurrence Book 21st May 2008).

KPRs are also increasingly being hired as bodyguards by politicians, thus shifting their loyalty and main responsibility from the protection of whole communities to that of the individual. Cases of privatisation of KPRs have been found to expose their villages to possibilities of attacks from rival communities and to deny the villages a channel through which information on insecurity incidences can be relayed, especially those that take place in the grazing fields. Since the coming of County governments, Samburu County has created another layer of armed guards. These are pastoralists’ youth who have in the past three years been employed as game rangers in the County. While the ‘traditional’ KPR is a volunteer officer with no uniform and remuneration. The County Ranger is an ‘upgraded’ KPR with uniforms, better weapons (mostly G3 rifles) a patrol vehicle and a salary (about KES 10,000 per month). The creation of this new group of arms holders (from warrior age-sets) also adds another layer of actors armed by the state but poorly supervised. Recruitment of rangers is also a matter of political contestation, in a meeting
of Samburu elders that I attended at Baragoi laga, the reformed moran\textsuperscript{117} that was chosen to be employed as a ranger was rejected by the local MP in favour of another who was a known rustler. Recruitment of KPRs also comes with political undertones of marginalisation. The Turkana have complained of the skewed manner of recruitment of both the traditional KPRs and the County Rangers, they argue that Turkana areas have fewer KPRs who are often disarmed during periods of tension between the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi to limit the military power of the Turkana and to make them vulnerable to Samburu attacks. Militarization of communities through KPRs, rangers and chiefs within a system of limited supervision and checks largely contributes to the informalization of violence in Baragoi.

\textbf{Photo 11:} KPR officer armed with a MKIV rifle employed as a security guard at a Community Savings Bank in Baragoi town, September 2014 (source: Author)

8.9 KPRs and their Loyalties: Tribe or State?

The conduct of KPRs in Samburu North also brings forth a critical issue of loyalty when dealing with security matters. Turkana and Samburu KPRs are firstly loyal to their ethnic groups, their

\textsuperscript{117} Reformed morans among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi are members of the Serian-Ekthil group, \textit{serian} is a Samburu word for peace, \textit{ekthil} also means peace in Ng’irutukana
chiefs and political leaders. As much as they receive arms and ammunition from the state, the firearm is viewed by the community members as a communal asset. Further there have been cases where KPRs have given out their guns to their brothers or other kin to use in the grazing fields. In my interview with a KPR Sergeant\textsuperscript{118} he affirmed that many pastoralists’ boys are trained on shooting skills using KPR guns given to their elder siblings or fathers. This raises questions of the net effect of having KPRs as a local force. Is it beneficial to the communities or does it in a big way contributes to the militarization of ethnicities between the Samburu and Turkana? Cases of KPRs being supplied with ammunition by political leaders\textsuperscript{119} in Samburu County were prevalent during my time in the field, this further raise the critical question of where their loyalties lie. Is it with the state or with the politicians? The arming of KPRs by political leaders contributes in a big way to well organised raids that lead to massive losses by the Samburu and Turkana as they trigger cycles of revenge raids. The increased role of political leaders especially within the Samburu County Government further shows the distance between the Kenyan state and the people of Samburu North. The ethnicisation of arming of KPRs promotes ammunition trade and encourages raiding and other forms of violent entrepreneurship among the Samburu and Turkana.

8.10 Chiefs as KPRs

Police records from Baragoi Police Station reveal that chiefs in all the locations and sublocations are also allocated weapons and ammunition as KPRs. In my study area, I interviewed two Turkana chiefs who previously served as KPRs. In both cases, the KPRs-turned chiefs informed me that they still retained the firearms issued to them in their capacities as KPRs. Further, they continued to receive even a higher allocation of ammunition from the police. The Police Act (GoK 2011) does not foresee this level of abuse when it comes to the appointment of KPRs. The double roles of chiefs as KPRs further contributes to the operational confusion and shows the ease with which one can become a KPR. A former KPR from Kawap location for instance became an Acting Chief when his chief was indicted over allegations of supporting

\textsuperscript{118} Interview at Baragoi town January 2015
\textsuperscript{119} Discussions with security officers in January 2015 in Baragoi town
Turkana raids against the Samburu. The acting chief\textsuperscript{120} of Kawap told me that he was able to obtain a G3 rifle as well as his old MKIV rifle that he was allocated as a KPR. On the issue of ammunition, he informed that he receives ammunition from the police but many times he is forced to go to the illegal gun market in Leilei since the government supply is irregular and very insufficient. The unclear policy surrounding the appointment of KPRs aids the trade in ammunition in Samburu North and contributes in a significant way in the violent raids that Baragoi is synonymous for. In the police records, I noted that the Senior Chief of Baragoi location in his capacity as a KPR was given 80 rounds of ammunition (Baragoi Police Station 2012).

8.11 Conclusion

This chapter sought to link the idea of informalization of violence via KPRs with ungoverned spaces such as pastoralists’ lands of Northern Kenya. I focused on the role of the Kenya Police Reserves a volunteer unit that is deployed by the Kenyan state to provide policing and security services to pastoralists’ villages and grazing fields in Northern Kenya. Focusing on Samburu North district, I have argued that the KPRs as semi-state actors in Baragoi are facilitated by the neglect/disinterest of the Kenyan state in the ungoverned spaces that exists in Northern Kenya (Menkhaus 2007; Idler and Forest 2015). The deployment of KPRs by the Kenyan state can be seen as a stop-gap measure for the security challenges that bedevil the whole of Northern Kenya. However, given the volunteer nature of their job, KPRs owe their loyalties to their communities and their guns are seen as communal assets. KPRs are therefore critical in defending their communities but also very vulnerable in being part of the violent entrepreneurship through the sale of ammunition and participation in cattle raids and highway bandties using state issued arms and ammunition. The recruitment of KPRs also is masked with local power politics where the chiefs are at liberty to propose their kin or friends to these positions. The institutional weaknesses observed in the operations of KPRs can therefore be analysed from the standpoint of divided loyalties that the KPRs owe to chiefs who appoint them, to the police who issue them with the guns and ammunition, to the community that they hail from and to themselves as unpaid and unsupervised officers who have needs and interests to achieve with a loaded gun at their

\textsuperscript{120} Interview March 2015 at Lenkima village
disposal. The institution of KPRs therefore exemplifies the role of the state in the informalization of violence in Northern Kenya. It shows the role of the state in abrogating its core duties of security provision for citizens and sub-contracting (without pay) fellow citizens to provide their own security. For warriors, being a KPR presents one with the opportunity and power to traverse the legality (through ownership of state-issued gun and ammunition) and the illegality (using the state-issued gun and ammunition to commit crime) for individual and communal benefit.

While past studies have blamed pastoralists’ violence on the proliferation of illegal arms and ammunition through non-state actors; I argue in this chapter that the state through KPRs are a critical part of the value chain of actors that exploit the ungoverned space in Samburu North to benefit from violent entrepreneurship and establish a system of informalization of violence among the Samburu and Turkana. In this case study, incidences of massive transfer of ammunition during periods of peace indicate that the police in Samburu North collude with KPRs to sell ammunition. Similar cases were found in Turkana North in a study by Bevan (2008). The existence of KPRs as the only source of security for pastoralists in Northern Kenya demonstrates the distance between the state and the citizens. This resonates with the description of O’Donnell (1993) of ‘low intensity citizenship’ and its links with the ‘shadow economy’ as experienced by citizens in ungoverned spaces.
Women as Targets in Violent Raids: A Consequence of Institutional Change or Part of Traditional Raiding Culture?

9.0 Introduction

Anthropologists have documented the treatment of women during cattle raids by different ethnic groups in the Karamoja Cluster. While others saw women from ‘enemy’ groups as ‘moving assets’ to be abducted and integrated into their ranks as wives, others saw women from ‘enemy’ groups as ‘fair game’ whose killings during raids bestowed socio-cultural pride marked by rituals that ensured upward social mobility. While these two distinct perspectives do not expressly agree on the treatment of women during episodes of pastoralists’ violence, they at least show that the assumption that pastoralists norms of cattle raiding uniformly protected women, children and the aged is not factual. This chapter examines the various forms of violence directed at women among the Samburu and Turkana communities of Baragoi. It seeks to understand whether expanded forms of violence are a consequence of the breakdown of the traditional institutions that ‘protected’ women, children and the aged against violence during raids.

It has been argued that pastoralists’ societies that share the cultural practice of cattle raids had an institutional framework that protected women, children and the aged against any acts of violence (Akabwai and Ateyo 2007; Hutchinson 2000; Schilling et al 2012; Pkalya et al 2004). According to these scholars the killing of women and children was in essence a taboo and an indication of cowardice as opposed to the pride and valor that warriors sought in raids. Other authors have described the many cases where women had special powers and performed certain rituals to protect their households, especially their sons during raids. These scholars have further argued that women could also use their positions of authority in the household to prevent their sons from going to raids (Pkalya et al 2004). Further examples of centrality of women in peacemaking among pastoralists is given by Akabwai and Ateyo (2007:17) who narrated how Didinga women from South Sudan initiated peace talks by accompanying their men to visit the Dodoth in neighbouring Uganda. Akabwai and Ateyo (2007) argue that it’s the presence of Didinga women in their entourage to Dodoth country that protected Didinga elders from attack.
The peace agreement between the Didinga and the Dodoth that ended cattle raids and hostilities that had been ongoing since 1973 was sealed by the presence and lead of Didinga women in 1992. The presence of pastoralists’ women in this case signified a peaceful encounter and served as a basis for inter-communal peacebuilding after two decades of inter-tribal warfare.

While violence against women during cattle raids has been blamed majorly on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in pastoralist areas (Hutchinson 2012; Leff 2009; Triche 2015; Small Arms Survey 2013), this chapter seeks to broaden this argument by looking at the variety of violence incidences that women suffer in pastoralist areas of Baragoi. Drawing from police reports, interviews and event calendars’, this chapter seeks to debunk the notion that the proliferation of arms is the sole source of violence against women (Kratli and Swift 1999). It looks at violence targeting women to be a broad spectrum of incidences including rape during raids, killing or stealing of milking stock, destruction of women’s economic initiatives, domestic water points and threats of violence towards ‘enemy’ women seeking alternative livelihood options such as burning of charcoal or looking for firewood for sale in the grazing lands.

This chapter further looks at the changing status of pastoralists women from a position of protectors to that of targets. Drawing from primary and secondary data, this chapter seeks to contrast the social positioning of women pastoralists. In so doing, I analyse how women were central to arbitration and peacemaking during episodes of traditional cattle raids vis-a-vis the current positioning of women pastoralists as ‘fair game’ and as major victims of pastoralists’ violence. Drawing from cases in the Karamoja cluster, this chapter further illustrates the changing structure and modus operandi of today’s cattle raiding incidents as compared to raids as they were conducted in the earlier and mid-1900s. It seeks to highlight and contrast the treatment of women as assets during raids in traditional raiding and their targeting in modern day cattle raids. This chapter embeds its theoretical basis on performative vis-à-vis primordial ethnicity. I argue that in traditional cattle raids that occurred before 1960s, women were seen in different light: as assets (women could be abducted alongside the raided cattle to increase the population of the raiders and be integrated in the raiders community), women were also seen as custodians of peacemaking instruments such as pregnancy belts (Pkalya et al 2004), these could be used to
deter conflicts or to prevent young men from going to raid (Bianco 1991:770). Further women were seen as protectors and could give special charms to protect their sons from enemy attacks.

This chapter therefore argues the alteration of the position of women from protectors to targets can be explained through the changing interpretations of ethnicity (Hutchinson 2000). In her argument, Hutchinson states that in traditional raids among the Dinka and Nuer, women were treated as assets owing to the fact that a woman could get married across ethnic lines. Increased violent raids among many pastoralists in Eastern Africa has ‘solidified’ interpretations of ethnic identity and in many ways inhibited cross-ethnic marriages. This has led to more stringent interpretations of ethnicity based on common ancestry and shared cultural values. Hutchinson (2000) has described the increased targeting of women as a ‘fair game’ in violence situations using ethnic lenses as the ‘militarisation of ethnicity’. Women whose ethnicity was judged depending on those of their progeny no longer enjoy this privilege. As a result, Hutchinson argues that violence that targets women can be explained through stringent interpretation of ethnicity (through primordialist lenses). Thus women perceived to be from other ethnic groups are no longer seen as assets to be abducted to swell up the productive front of the raiders communities but as fair targets whose humiliation or killings bestows sense of ‘justice’ and honor to the enemy community thus escalating violent raids. In the next section I analyse the social positioning of women and children in traditional cattle raids.

9.1 Women in Traditional Raids

Several authors have highlighted the significant roles that women either played in encouraging raids or those they played to prevent warriors from raiding (Pakalya et al 2004; Schilling et al 2012; HSBA 2012). In his study of pastoralists groups within the Ilemi Triangle, Nene Mburu (2001) was informed of the social sanctions that would befall raiders who dared attack women, children and the aged. Pakalya et al (2004) have elaborated the prominent roles that women played as peace makers and arbiters in intra-communal and inter-communal conflicts among the Pokot, Samburu and Turkana. In their study, they outlined several ways in which pastoralists women were regarded as custodians of special rituals and blessings that enabled men’s success or failure in raids. For instance Pakalya et al (2004) mentioned the Pokot birth belt called
Leketio\textsuperscript{121} worn by women after giving birth to the first child. Among the Pokot, Leketio is believed to protect a woman’s children from harm (Bianco 1991:776). “To tie on a lökötyö is to make a kind of prayer…a lökötyö can be worn for a grown child who is sick, or raiding cows” as a prayer, a protection by the mother to the child against risks and misfortune (Bianco 1991:779). In their study in Northern Kenya, Pkalya et al (2004) were informed of the use of Leketio by Pokot women to prevent harm or injury to their progeny in a number of ways:

“Before warriors set out for a raid, each of them informs his mother so that she can wear the belt while he is away. To prevent conflicts, women refuse to wear the belts prompting the warrior to abandon the mission. Women could also lay their belts in front of warriors who are about to go for a raid. Crossing a leketio is considered a curse. For instance, when fighting is raging, a woman may remove her leketio and lay it between the fighting men. The fight ceases immediately. The concept of using pregnancy belt to halt or prevent conflicts is the same in all the 18 Kalenjin sub tribes” (Pkalya et al 2004:39).

Other examples of the exalted social position of women during conflict can further be drawn from Hutchinson (2000). In her study of inter-ethnic violence and cattle raids among the Dinka and Nuer people of South Sudan, she noted that at the beginning of the war in early 1980s women were treated as “illegitimate targets” (2000:11). She further noted that women were seen as “points of safe refuge” (2000:11) meaning that taking refuge in a woman’s hut, or hiding behind a woman could prevent a man from imminent attack. She further argues that these rules were maintained and adhered to because breach or attack on women was believed to precipitate escalation of violence. Houtteman (2010) also gives the example from the Daasanach that yelling in grief by a mother of a dead raider or a woman whose livestock had been taken by raiders was believed to be a curse that followed the killer and required several steps of purification rituals to re-integrate into society.

On the other hand, Gulliver (1951) described the Turkana raids as a free for all kind of attack in which the killing of men and married women occurred. However, he states that Turkana warriors often abducted boys and girls during their raids. Abduction of boys and girls was aimed at

\textsuperscript{121}Spelled as ‘lökötyö’ by Bianco (1991:770)
swelling the raiders’ ranks with future raiders and wives. The girls were not mistreated but adopted by the raiding families and married off to their sons or their kin at a later stage. Krätli and Swift (1999) makes the argument that the abduction of young girls and young boys was justified by the notion that children were not classified into the age-set systems that many of the pastoralists follow and were therefore classified alongside animals thus part of the raids. Hutchinson (2000) further argues that even though Nuer and Dinka women were ‘protected’ through an institutional framework that sanctioned violence against women during raids; women were expected to advance the war effort by having more babies to swell the numbers of future warriors and women who would be a source of bride-wealth.

Evidence of socio-cultural honours bestowed upon warriors for the killing of women is seen in the scarification marks on the bodies of the Turkana and Karimojong (Gulliver 1951; Knighton 2007). Based on data from cases of deaths during raids among the Karimojong, Knighton argued that for every three men that were killed in raids, a woman was killed. This implies that men were at the fore front of defensive and offensive acts of violence during raids. Women suffered violent actions during ambush, retaliatory attacks or in an all-out war between distinct ethnic identities. Houtteman (2010:140) also indicates that in Daasanech raids women were not spared either. However, the socio-cultural value of killing women was differentiated by that placed on a raider who killed a male enemy. A warrior who killed a male enemy was required to spear an ox as part of the cleansing ceremony while the killer of a woman was required to spear a goat in similar ceremony. Abbink (2009:33) argues that in the earlier periods (mid 1990s), Suri culture protected women and children from ‘enemy’ community. They were spared during raids. As late as 1999, Hutchinson (2009) recorded the raiding of Nuer cattle camps by Dinka raiders during the grass-roots inter-ethnic peacebuilding meetings in Bahr el-Ghazal. During this raid, several women and children from the Nuer community were abducted along with the 2000 cattle stolen. Houtteman (2010) in his study of killings, identity and ethnicity among the Daasanech in Ethiopia was informed through interviews of the existence of Turkana women who were abducted as girls by the Daasanech raiders and later raised and married to Daasanech. According to Houtteman (2010) Daasanech traditional raiding allowed the killing of married or older women but aimed at the capture of young boys and girls. The next section gives an analysis of
the changing social positions of women during cattle raids and plausible causes of increased targeting of women.

While many scholars have argued that traditional raiding had rules that ensured the protection of women, children and the aged (HSBA 2012; Schilling et al 2012 Hutchinson 2000), older literature points out that many pastoralists cultures never had specific distinctions when it comes to targeting of raid victims. In many cases women from other ethnic groups were viewed as fair game (Gulliver 1951; Almagor 1979; Fukui 1979). Archival records also disagree with the notion of overall protection of ‘enemy’ women during raids. Four Merille raids against the Turkana in 1957 over a period of 30 days led to the killings of 47 men, 72 women, 35 boys and 27 girls (KNA DC/ISO/2/1/15 122). Along the Kenya-Uganda border, raids between the Turkana and the Matheniko resulted in the killing of an eight-month pregnant woman from the Turkana community in February 1960 (Uganda Protectorate, 1960). Knighton (2007: 472) dismisses the argument that pastoralists’ norms prohibited violence against women and children as “colonially induced imagination of Victorian morality”. Drawing from the Karimojong, he argued that women were seen and are still seen as part of the collective war effort. Therefore attacking women was well accepted and did not draw any negative sanctions on the warrior. Abbink (2009:45) further pointed at the ‘modern’ indiscriminate killings which occur during Suri raids against their neighbours. He mentions “the gunning down of young girls in Adikyaz in 1993” to show the minimal value to which Suri people attached to women from enemy groups.

Modern raids are marked by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and its substitution of the spear. The use of guns has been blamed for the targeting of women during raids (Gray et al 2003; Mirzerler and Young 2000; Mkutu 2007). It is argued that while spears required raiders to get close to their target in order to be accurate and have maximum impact, the use of guns has depersonalized combat during raids. Raiders no longer have to get closer to the target (HSBA 2012; Kratli and Swift 1999). Guns therefore made women and children legitimate targets since it gave raiders an opportunity to target those far, or those inside a house. This has psychologically dehumanized targets. Incidences where women have been killed or injured

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during raids are well captured in police reports and event calendar interviews by women in Samburu North. Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005) have pointed out the differential impacts of modern-day raiding among the Turkana of Northwestern Kenya. In their study, modern day raiding was seen to be the genesis of female-headed households among the Turkana. Describing the raids during the period of south-south war between the Dinka and the Nuer in the late 1990s, Hutchinson (2009:50) noted that in the ensuing militarization of ethnic relations “everyone became vulnerable to attack, even new born children, pregnant women and the elderly”. This study therefore attempts to put into perspective the reasons behind modern-day targeting of women by analysing the changing value-system through which women were perceived among the Turkana and Samburu. In this analysis I follow Hutchinson (2000) in arguing that increased targeting of ‘enemy’ women in raids, through rape in the grazing fields and shootings in Baragoi town exemplifies a more stringent perception of the ‘enemy’ woman. A woman from the ‘other’ community is no longer seen as ‘passage’ through which any man, whether Samburu or Turkana can receive progeny and add to the numbers of his clan or community. Rather a woman from the ‘other’ community is increasingly seen as an enemy just like their warrior brothers and therefore an easy target for violent action since in many cases women do not carry arms. In the next section, I advance conceptual explanations for increased targeting of women during raids. My analysis is focused on the concept of primordialism and how its use and interpretation in situations of heightened tension among the Samburu and Turkana increases the possibilities of women being viewed as ‘enemies’ based on their ethnic identities unlike in the past when women were viewed to ‘belong to everyone’.

9.2 Primordialism and Treatment of the ‘Other’ as a Basis for Targeting of Woman in Violence among the Samburu and Turkana

Primordialism means the classification or categorisation based on the society/community within which one is born. Rex (2002:91-92) further adds that primordial relations and identification is based on “shared kinship, neighborhood, language, religion, shared, customs, shared code of division of labour and shared history”. The essence of primordialism as an identity marker in society is further explained by Geertz (1963:109) as one based on the “givens of existence” as a ‘natural occurrence’. The notion of primordiality being a ‘given’ is however contestable given
our awareness of construction and reconstruction of social relations from time to time throughout human history (Eisenstadt 2002; Horowitz 1998).

Drawing from Barth (1969), Rex (2002) argues that ethnic identity may sometimes not necessarily be defined by cultural attributes, language or common neighbourhood but rather by the immediate needs of the community. In other words, ethnic identity may be ‘conferred’ upon certain people within the same neighbourhood when it serves the interests of a collective for instance through marriage or cooption of abducted women during raids. This is what Rex (2002) has described as instrumentalist approach to ethnicity. He argues that ethnic identity is not based only on language, culture and religion but also driven by “rational and purposive association” (2002:95). Further, Rex (2002) argues that socio-cultural relations between groups may be redefined from time to time depending on the situational interests of those groups. Eisenstadt (2002:37) has argued that primordiality can be used by collectivities in their struggles for resources and distribution of power. Primordiality is therefore used as a socio-economic or even political boundary for excluding others within the same neighbourhood. It sets a criterion on who is a friend and who is an enemy. In war situations, primordialism becomes the basis for identity and enables the differentiation between enemy and friend. In violence situations primordialism prescribes and legitimizes violence against ‘soft’ targets in the enemy camps. During periods of tension in Baragoi town when armed warriors roam the night, Samburu and Turkana warriors use specific forms of identity like asking a stranger in either Samburu or Turkana language the names of the clan which the ‘stranger’ belongs. Failure to grasp and answer the question portends danger as it means that the ‘stranger’ is an ‘enemy’.

Horowitz (1998) has also pointed out at the two approaches of primordiality; the view of it as a basis for exclusion of others based on ‘nature’ or ‘givens’ while other view it as a social construct manipulated by elites to further individual interests during periods of war. Primordialism is also used by ethnic groups to define the ‘stranger’ and the code of conduct towards him or her. Melotti (1986) has argued that conflicts between groups arise from coded interactions. There are codes of amity between one’s own group and codes of enmity towards the ‘other’. Coding of inter-group relations is further argued to be strategic and rational. In situations where the survival of the group is not under any threat by its neighbours, then the code of amity
is engaged while the code of enmity is used when there is competition over resources that threaten the livelihoods of the group. Primordialism can therefore be used as a strategy of war, a means of excluding others, target and justify violence against others during periods of insecurity (Harvey 2000). To comprehend the phenomenon of increased targeting of women in pastoralists violence, in the next section I analyse two contrasting forms of ethnicity: performative and primordial to explain the shift in interpretations of women’s identities as a key explanation for increased violence against women among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi.

9.2.1 Performative vis-à-vis Primordial Ethnicity

Comparative analysis of performative forms of ethnicity vis-à-vis primordial forms of ethnicity can help to comprehend the reasons why women were treated as ‘protected assets’ during traditional raids (Hutchinson 2000). Similar analysis can also help us understand the reasons why pastoralists’ women are increasingly being targeted in violent raids (Hutchinson 2000). This analysis goes beyond the usual understanding of increased violence among pastoralists to be driven by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Understanding social change and categorisation from performative to primordial ethnicity may help to explain cases of rape against women caught by raiders while looking for firewood in the grazing lands or the killing of goats by raiders among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. According to Houtteman (2010) pastoralists groups in the Karamoja cluster are patrilineal in societal organisation. Women married across ethnic divide conferred ethnic identity of their husbands to their children. For instance a Turkana woman married to a Samburu conferred Samburu ethnic identity to her children. Women were therefore viewed to belong to everyone (Hutchinson 2000; Houtteman 2010). Incorporation of single girls through abduction during raids was therefore seen as a positive thing and aimed at swelling the numbers of the community for future reproductive purposes. Drawing on examples among the Daasanech, Houtteman explains:

“When caught in a raid, a girl might be given to a father’s brother of the raider. The father’s brother will consider her as his own child and she will become Daasanech when circumcised together with other girls of the family. Later on, her new father will give her away as a bride and will get bridewealth for her” (Houtteman 2010:135).
This shows that girls were considered to belong to everyone; their ‘ethnicity’ was transferable before they got married from one community to another. Ethnic identity of women only was solidified after getting married and having children with their husbands. Among the Daasanach protection of girls during raids is linked with their being considered assets to be raided together with the livestock and brought up among the raider community as part of them.

9.3 Primordialism as a Basis for Targeting of Women among the Samburu and Turkana

Samburu and Turkana groups are patrilineal in societal organisation. Women leave their homes after dowry is paid and join their husbands’ compounds. The husbands have control over resources and each married woman is allocated her herd for the substance of her household. Offspring’s of women bestow ethnic identity of their husbands to their children. Inter-communal marriages have occurred for a long time in history. In public meetings that I attended, there was always the discourse among the elderly members of the two groups that ‘we are all Samburu’. This implied that even though the two communities identified themselves as separate and distinct units, they were interrelated and of ‘mixed blood’ due to numerous cases of inter-marriage over a long period of time. This is the essence of performative ethnicity (Hutchinson 2000); a woman’s ethnicity was seen as the ethnicity of her husband. A Samburu woman marrying a Turkana man became a Turkana woman and vice versa. Women were therefore accorded the ethnicity of their husbands. Girls were seen to belong to all thus explaining the many occasions when girls were abducted.

However, there are no recent cases of Samburu women getting married to Turkana. Cases of Turkana women marrying Samburu men have also reduced with a few notable ones being the marriage of elite Turkana to a few elite Samburu. In Baragoi, Samburu men married to Turkana men were all living in Baragoi town. I was informed by a prominent Samburu politician that living with a Turkana woman in the Samburu manyatta was not ‘safe’. In essence one can argue that intermarriages between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi have dwindled over time as primordial forms of identification have taken over from more performative criterion of identity that was the prism for viewing women and girls in former times. Women are no longer seen as

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123 Discussions in November 2014
‘belonging to everyone’ (Hutchinson 2000) but more strictly as belonging to Turkana or Samburu men. The Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights (2008:10) in its fact finding mission of the Samburu-Turkana conflict in Baragoi described the situation as “tribal and shoot-on site” violence. This in essence shows the solidification of identities between the two groups, and its role in targeting of the ‘other’. This case can further be illustrated by the killing of a high school student on the 28th of March 2015 at Baragoi town (Baragoi Police Station 2015). The said student was of mixed parentage, the father being a Samburu married to a Turkana woman and living on the Turkana side of the road that divides the two ethnic territories. In the height of tension that had swelled after revenge attacks since October 2014, the high school student was shot twice in the chest and killed as he entered his father’s compound in Naling’ang’or village by suspected Samburu marksmen. He was in essence a Samburu but was seen more as a Turkana given his physical location (his father’s home on the Turkana side) and the company he kept of fellow Turkana high school boys (Baragoi Police Station 2015). In discussions with a Turkana assistant chief who was the first person on the scene, I was informed that the killing of the student was part of the targeted killing of Turkana elites that had been proposed by a Samburu Member of Parliament who promised morans to pay certain amounts of money for every elite killed. The killing of a high school student was to be rewarded with Kenya Shillings 20,000 while killing of university students was to be rewarded with Kenya Shillings 50,000 and the killing of those educated and employed was to be rewarded with Kenya Shillings 100,000. In further discussions with the police, I was informed that the footprints of the killer was traced to the Samburu side of the road, next to Kenya Power Station, however, they were unable to arrest any suspects. In the next section, I look into specific cases and forms of violence that women of Baragoi continually face due to the ethnic rivalry and recurrent strife that is common among these pastoralists.

9.3.1 Pastoralists Violence and Its Effects on Women in Baragoi

“During a raid by the Turkana I lost all my goats, they also killed my son Loshuku, he was killed by the Turkana at Mt. kosikosi” (Interview February 2015 in Ngilai village)

124 Discussions at Naling’ang’or village, 28th March 2015
The conflict between the Turkana and Samburu has been experienced differently by men and women. While men have been the major combatants fighting and dying in raids; women’s roles have oscillated between encouragors of raids, victims, survivors and heads of female-led households due to the death of their husbands and sons in raids. In women’s stories of ‘war’ the Turkana and Samburu narrate how the conflict has contributed to constant movement due to insecurity. As one Samburu lady\textsuperscript{125} told me: “I lost my cattle twice while leaving in Tuum, then we migrated to South Horr, the Ngoroko again attacked South Horr and we moved to the top of Mount Ng’iro. While there the Ngoroko attacked us again at Koskosi (the top most part of Mt Ng’iro), they killed Loshami my brother after that my husband decided that we go to Ngilai”. In this case modern day raiding is associated with helplessness and unpredictability of day to day life. Movement from place to place that is the basis with of nomadic pastoralism is seen not only as a means of seeking greener pastures in Baragoi but as a safety measure given the rampant nature of violence that started with Ngoroko attacks.

Turkana-Samburu violence can also be seen in its effects on women relationships across the two ethnic groups. An 82\textsuperscript{126} year old Samburu woman told me that many years ago (probably in the early 80s) the Samburu and Turkana lived together in Nachola (now a Turkana domain). This old lady had a Turkana friend whom she gave her sae (Samburu necklace beads). Her friend’s name was Losike. Even though she blamed the Turkana for ‘starting the war’ her story puts into perspective the common past of the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi and how women were viewed by society at that time and how they viewed each other. Increased violence led to the movement of the Samburu out of Nachola. It contributed in a big way to loss of friendships between Turkana and Samburu women and the nurturing of enmity. This further shows the replacement of performative ethnicity with a more primordialists’ view of pastoralists’ women.

A Turkana respondent\textsuperscript{127} from Nachola recounted how she had experienced the Samburu-Turkana violent conflict. To her the raids that became more violent in the early 1990s have brought pain, suffering and fear. Apart from having lost 400 livestock due to Samburu and Pokot

\textsuperscript{125} Interview Uaso Rongai village February 2015
\textsuperscript{126} Interview Ngilai village February 2015
\textsuperscript{127} Interview Nachola village February 2015
attacks, she described the fear of going to the ‘bush’ to cut trees for burning charcoal. She noted that the conflict between these communities has in many ways limited women’s livelihood options as safety is not guaranteed at home or in the bush.

9.3.2 Forms of Violence Targeting Women Livelihood Bases among the Samburu and Turkana

Women tend to suffer four major forms of violence during raids among the Samburu and Turkana: They lose their husbands or sons who would offer protection and leadership at home. Losing husbands force them to mostly be inherited where they lose status and are then treated as second class wives. Secondly women are directly targeted by raiders or killed in cross fire especially when the attacks are within the manyatta. Third, violence during raids in the manyattas leads to killings of milking stock and the loss of goats or milking camels directly affects nutrition balance of the household. Fourth, the case of Kawap demonstrates how violent raids impact on collective women’s effort. In this case, a poultry project ran by Turkana women was destroyed and burnt in a raid by the Samburu of Uaso Rongai in 2013. This section will give illustrations on each of these forms of violence as drawn from my experience from Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi.

Loss of male relatives in raids

Death of male relatives during raids deprives households of security and labour required for the mobility of livestock during the dry periods. Men in pastoralists’ societies are in charge of security in the grazing fields and in the manyatta. Loss of male relatives during raids almost always coincided with the loss of cattle since men are the defenders of livestock. Deaths of husbands, brothers or sons during raids portend a life of despair for pastoralists’ women given the patriarchal nature of their societal set-up. Decision making on the welfare of the animals and sale are mostly made by men. In Samburu North, women who have lost their husbands during raids are forced to move out of pastoralism and settle in Baragoi town. Where they seek alternative means of survival such as sale of charcoal or employment as domestic workers to civil servants working within the sub-County headquarters. According to Salome Leparie, an 88 year old Samburu woman, the conflict between the Samburu and Turkana made her ‘poor’. Her
only son Koona Leparie was killed by Turkana raiders at Lbaibor plains. In the same raid she lost five expectant camels. She associates the death of her son with poverty. She argued that as a widow, her hope was on her son and losing him led to the loss of her camels. Loss of male relatives symbolizes the loss of power by the victims’ family since males in these pastoralists groups are socialized to be aggressive protectors of the household. The death of male relatives further shows the power of violence to transform social relationships as women have to step in and provide security for the household through acquisition of arms and learning how to use them.

Women as Direct targets in raids

Cases of where women have borne injuries or died in raids are increasingly common among the Samburu and Turkana. In run up to the Baragoi massacre, the Samburu attacked Lomirok (in a revenge raid) on the 29th of October 2012. On the Turkana side a 47 year old woman was shot on the right pelvis while a 46 year old woman was shot on the scapula. This perhaps shows that the revenge raid targeted a manyatta (Lomirok). Rape during raids can also be argued to signify the solidification of ethnic identity and the legitimization of any form of violence against the ‘other’ irrespective of gender. A case in point is captured in a police signal below:

“On 30th June 2011 a 17 year old Samburu girl from Seren location was herding her father’s camels in Lemalong area when suspected Turkana raiders armed with rifles attacked and gang raped her, the attackers later tied her beside a tree along the road. The raiders made a way with 5 camels and headed towards Kawap area” (Baragoi Police Station Signal June 30th 2011)

Incidences of rape during raids can be seen as the projection of ethno-nationalistic violence that prevails between the Samburu and Turkana onto the bodies of women. Rape in this case not only serves to humiliate and violate the woman and her family but the woman’s body becomes part of the battle field in which ethnic enmities are squared out (Das 1996:68). Forms of violent action such as rape can be viewed as tools of enhancing primordial identity in the sense that in ‘normal’ raid situations rape or the possibility of gang rape as is recorded above is not part of the mission. The mission being to acquire livestock and escape as soon as possible. But in situations of enhanced tensions, targeting of women from the ‘enemy’ group enables the flourish of these
forms of violence as women are perceived as soft targets. Raping of ‘enemy’ women during raids imply the changing of raiders’ perceptions of women. They are no longer seen as belonging to everyone but strictly as enemies. Rape during raids is therefore a front within which primordial identity and humiliation of the ‘enemy’ is executed. In another illustration, a 72 year old Samburu woman\textsuperscript{128} narrated how her daughter who was in primary school was killed by Turkana raiders in Lbaiboor. According to her, the girl saw the raiders and started running away out of fear but she was still shot on the back despite the fact that she posed no threat as a young woman. She wondered how raiding had changed overtime as during her time such girls would have been abducted and taken with the cattle. She blamed the coming of guns and the ‘disrespect’ of the Turkana warriors for the killing of her daughter. In essence blaming the rifles has been part of anthropological literature. But as Sagawa (2010:87) argued interpreting social change in through the prism of technology exclusively does ignores other factors that contribute towards socio-cultural change in any society. In the case of the Samburu and Turkana, the killing of women in raids, or rape during raids can also be seen as part of the wider contest over power and hegemony among pastoralists in Baragoi. Raping a woman from the ‘enemy’ community fulfills ‘victory’ at least psychologically to the perpetrator. While at the same time handing ‘defeat’ to the victim, her family, clan and community at large.

\textbf{Killing of milking stock during raids}

“I lost 70 goats in Loriu in 1997; I was only left with one male goat. Furthermore my eldest son who was just a boy Kinipat Loputh was killed by the Samburu who took my goats; I had no milk for my children” (Interview February 2015, Logetei village).

Violent raids have a direct impact on household food supply, while raiders have been noted to target the bodies of women through rape and killings. Targeting livestock under the direct control of women can also be seen as a form of violence against the household. Since pastoralists highly depend on milk and milk products, the raiding of all milking goats alters the ability of the household to sustain itself. As this respondent indicated, the raiding of her goats forced her to take up charcoal burning as an alternative means of survival.

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotetext[128]{Interview Ngilai village February 2015}
\end{footnotesize}
Similar cases of killings of livestock were also noted down by chiefs from the Samburu and Turkana communities. In the case of the Tiyale massacre of September 2011, a Turkana chief recorded the killing of 200 camels and 600 shoats through government gunfire during a communal punishment operation aimed at rounding up Turkana livestock for the compensation of Rendille herders.

**Destruction of women-led initiatives and household services**

On the 20th of October 2013, following a series of revenge raids between the Turkana of Kawap and the Samburu of Uaso Rongai, the Samburu raiders attacked Kawap village. The attack involved massive destruction of Kawap Primary School, the newly built Kawap Dispensary, Kawap Administration Police post, Kawap village, the Catholic Church and the teachers’ quarters. To the women of Kawap the vandalism of the newly built dispensary was a great loss. A part from the fact that the Turkana of Kawap were then forced to flee and seek residence among their kin in Lenkima as internally displaced persons (IDPs). The women of Kawap in an
interview\textsuperscript{129} were distraught over the loss over the newly constructed dispensary and their inability to renovate it (having been displaced due to insecurity). To them, the new dispensary was in a big way a relief to many women who had in the past given birth at home with some facing child delivery complications that resulted in deaths. They informed me that the dispensary was built with the contribution of women and its loss was painful.

In the Kawap raid, Naletae women group’s poultry farm was destroyed by Samburu raiders who carried off 78 layers and six bags of chicken feed (culturally the Samburu don’t eat chicken). This project was a part of the now famous ‘table banking’ initiatives in which pastoralists women form groups and initiate joint projects to increase their financial independence. In the Kawap raid, the water pump through which women got their water for household use was also vandalized and the generator stolen. In my interviews with Kawap women, the destruction of \textit{tinga}\textsuperscript{130} as they called it was a source of pain. Access to water for domestic use normally takes a backseat in many pastoralists’ societies as the men have enormous control over water sources and their priority is watering their animals. Women therefore are forced to compete with animals in accessing water. In the case of Kawap women, the water pump was within Kawap Primary School just a few meters away from their manyatta therefore easily accessible and convenient unlike in places such as Kadokoyo manyatta in Marti where women have to walk for 2 kilometers to access water for domestic use. The destruction of these key facilities during raids points to the increased violence on facilities that promote the wellbeing of the household, thus affecting women directly. Raiding between the Samburu and Turkana from a primordialist view does not aim just to acquire livestock but to destroy the livelihood of the other as is the case with the Turkana of Kawap.

\textsuperscript{129} Interview at Lenkima village February 2015
\textsuperscript{130} Swahili word used variously to mean ‘machine’ but can also mean ‘tractor’ in this case used to mean diesel engine water pump
9. 4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have focused on the targeting of women during violent raids among the Turkana and Samburu. While the proliferation of arms has often been blamed as the key basis upon which targeting of women during raids was based; I have argued that targeting of women has to do with a more stringent differentiation of friend and enemy. While women were in the past seen in some communities as ‘moving assets’ to be abducted to swell the numbers of the ‘enemy’ communities. This is no longer the case between the Turkana and Samburu as more primordialist definition of the ‘enemy’ has taken root. I have argued that whether by spear or by the gun, the definition of the ‘enemy’ from a primordialist perspective could be key to understanding the justifications for increased targeting of women in violent raids.

This chapter has further expanded the range or forms of violent actions that target women and women’s’ livelihood bases through a primordialist perspective. I argue that once the definition of the ‘enemy’ is arrived at women from the ‘enemy’ groups are seen as soft targets and therefore suffer many other forms of violence besides killings or gun-shot wounds. Acts of violence such as the killing or raiding of milking stock are symbolic in meaning as milking stock and calves
represent a means through which pastoral societies renew their reproductive capacities of survival and thus killing of these symbols of renewal not only imply the destruction of household and communal fertility but also the destruction of household wealth stored in the reproductive capacity of female animals (Blystad 2005:113).

Violence aimed at the destruction of domestic water points, the damage of women investments such as joint poultry projects and the creation of an atmosphere of fear that prevents women from fetching firewood or burning charcoal in the grazing lands for sale communicates the transformation of the pastoralists household as an arena of war and shows the dynamic nature of violence and its translocation from the grazing fields to the households. Targeting of women in raids points to the role of violence in expanding cultural parameters of behavior among groups, the expanding meanings and purposes of violence among pastoralists that target pastoralist’s women, further points to the role of primordiality in sustaining identity conflicts among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. Targeting of women in pastoralists lands can be argued to bring forth episodes of structural, political, economic and sexual violence (Broch-Due 2005:28). In the case of Baragoi, the body of the woman seems to be entangled in these modalities of violence which inevitably reproduce each other.
Recommendations and Conclusion

10.0 Introduction

Pastoralists’ violence in Eastern Africa has been a subject of different methods of analysis. While the phenomenon of violence has been diagnosed as a factor of environmental change, others have looked at it as a product of advancement in war technology; still some scholars have seen violence as a consequence of the ineffective of local and state conflict resolution institutions. Pastoralists violence has further been attributed to disputes over land and boundaries a well as local political competition. These studies have mostly viewed violence as a negative by-product of disorder in society. In this thesis, violence is seen in two key perspectives; (1) Violence as catalyst of social processes of change (2) Violence as a resource through which the navigation of day to day life is carried out. In looking at violence as an agent of societal change, I explored the production of violence and its impact on the socio-political relations among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi in the long term. Secondly, in analysing violence as a resource, I focused on the day to day uses of violence in the interactions between the Samburu and Turkana. Violence is seen as a means through which certain individual, collective and communal goals can be achieved or preserved through cattle raids, highway banditries, collective violence or even in relations with the state. In so doing, this study argues that violence among the Samburu and Turkana is not new; it is a historical phenomenon which has adopted various meanings and purposes overtime depending on the immediate circumstances of individual and group needs. Its long term impacts are however seen in terms of people’s choices and the leverage that they have in making their everyday socio-political decisions.

10.1 Recommendations

This study sought to comprehend the meanings and purposes of socio-cultural practices that constitute pastoralists violence from the anthropological perspective. The analysis of the data presented here has drawn on different conceptual perspectives. Understanding violence among pastoralists as an evolving phenomenon aimed at meeting new challenges is vital in prescribing peacebuilding and conflict resolution mechanisms that draw on these new situations. Through the study of violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi and its situatedness in pre-
colonial and colonial history, it is vital that violence be analysed not only from its proximate causes but a deeper historic comprehension is required for effective intervention programmes. Actors in pastoralists’ violence have always been portrayed as ‘outsiders’ or ‘illicit businessmen’ the case of Baragoi runs in contrast to this view. Pastoralists are themselves the major actors in violence, they use violence as an agency through which they negotiate day today socio-economic and political relationships based on their ethnic and groups identities as Turkana and Samburu. Therefore understanding pastoralists as key actors in violence and not just as victims is a vital step in comprehending the failure of many intervention programmes who have previously approached peacebuilding among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya through tokenism and other livelihood support strategies such as loaning or replacement of stolen livestock as these serve as motivation for new cycles of pastoralists’ violence.

Another key point is the role of power in violence, analysis of pastoralists violence has focused on external issues such as climate change, commercialisation and even proliferation of arms without giving a critical look at how socialization of pastoralists warriors inculcates warrior ethos that entrenches contests for power even at the lower villages’ levels between the two ethnic groups (Wasamba 2009). Random shootings in the grazing lands may not be necessarily cases of attempted cattle raids but a show of power to the perpetrators community and an avenue to gain social leverage among one’s peers for killing the ‘enemy’. Power therefore plays a significant role not only when viewed from the political angle but when ‘isolated’ violent incidents occur. Incidental power contests between warriors are the sparks that create chains of violence that engulfs whole communities in ‘all out wars’.

The key role of revenge in the reproduction of violent action especially in cases of massacres has not been a subject of inquiry by scholars who have worked with pastoralists in Eastern Africa. In all cases that I have reviewed, massacres were the result of revenge raids. The Turkana and Samburu concept of revenge is based on the need to even for past acts or raids or violence against their kin. While revenge can be undertaken by a group of warriors in support of one of their own, major incidences of large scale violence as was observed in the case of the Baragoi massacre also show the ability of the whoel community to come together and organize revenge. Revenge is enmeshed in pastoralists’ cultures and their local politics of power and hegemonic
control. As noted by Galaty (2016) revenge denotes the characterization of violence as a process. One case of revenge leads to another even if it takes one year. Revenge is therefore a debt that must be paid on behalf of those killed in previous attacks or animals lost. Understanding acts of revenge is vital in formulating effective peacebuilding programmes. In many cases revenge raids leads to massacres and displacement of people. Recovery from revenge raids take longer due to its organisation and massive impacts on pastoralists livelihoods in terms of deaths, destruction, fear, insecurity that inhibits other aspects of pastoralists livelihoods such as mobility of livestock and trade. Effective programmes must therefore be designed to understand the key roles that culture and power plays in pursuit of revenge violence.

The role of the state in pastoralists’ violence through the KPRs exposes the weak policing system that has bedeviled Northern Kenya since the colonial period. With more resources coming into places like Baragoi, through the devolved system of government, it is vital that police operations be upgraded and professionalized for effective and responsible service to the people of Northern Kenya as a whole. The unprofessionalism and lack of proper supervisory structure within the KPR is partly responsible for sale or misuse of state arms and ammunition by KPRs. National and County governments therefore have a responsibility to put in place an effective policing system that is responsive to the nomadic needs of the people of Northern Kenya.

While effects of violence on pastoralists households have been studied and documented in terms of migration, nutrition and responsibility changes. Targeting of women by warriors during violence has not gained much attention probably due to the assumption that women were traditionally protected during raids. This study shows that this is not the case. It further shows that violent actions directed towards women have increased to include the targeting of milking stock and rape of women from ‘enemy’ groups. While this study sought to understand the conceptual justification of these new forms of violence targeted at women it is vital that further research be done to establish the psychological and social impacts of these acts on women and women led households in pastoralists’ communities for effective programmatic interventions.
10.2 Conclusions

Violence among pastoralists in Baragoi can be seen to be rooted in the historical nature of the contest over its social and physical spaces. Even though the meanings and purposes of violence have changed overtime, the use of violence to achieve various ends has remained a constant. Except for the colonial period, in this thesis I have argued that violence among the Turkana and Samburu have been part and parcel of the history of Baragoi. Violence among the pastoralists of Baragoi has been used as a message in itself especially in retaliatory cases such as the Lokorkor massacre of 1996. At other times, violence has been used to convey messages of strife and incompatibility of resource sharing institutions. In such cases, the place and the identity of the violence victim have played a significant role in their chances of experiencing violence.

Even though previous studies on pastoralists conflicts have discounted the role of culture and focused more on the ‘commercialisation’ debate. This study shows that as much as pastoralists’ warfare is getting modernized through the use of automatic weapons, organisation of raids, highway banditries and collective violence, culture plays a critical role in the organisation and mobilisation of warriors especially in revenge situations. As was shown in the case of the Baragoi massacre, organisation for violence calls for the participation of warrior age-sets and is organised within the wider goal of ‘protecting’ the community. Violence could be aimed at displacing opponent ethnic groups but its mobilisation is based on group identities such as those belonging to certain warrior-age-sets. Culture however has a significant influence on the nature of violence, as was shown in chapter three. Culture designates the areas where violence is practiced before it is eventually carried out on perceived enemies. In the case of Baragoi, socialization on violent behavior is carried out in the grazing fields and most of the eventual violence also occurs in the grazing fields. Culture therefore designates the areas for the practice of violence. As is seen this thesis, shepherds or *lchekuuti* are socialized into violence from an early age as they are the ones who do the actual herding of livestock under the supervision of warriors. Within these spaces (grazing lands) they are also trained to shoot, thus the socialization into violence takes place under the cultural context of mentorship with the goal of providing protection to ones livestock and community. Grazing fields are therefore arena for the production and reproduction of violence among pastoralists groups.
Actors in the practice of violence have changed depending on the purpose of violent action. In cases of more traditional raids, warriors are still the key actors whenever there is need to replenish stock for survival purposes. However, pastoralists’ violence in Baragoi can be argued to have taken a political angle since the mid-1990s. Competition for power marked with the growing population of the Turkana threatens the Samburu political hegemony within Samburu North constituency and this has led to increased violence in election years as was witnessed in August to December 1996 and again in October and November 2012. The need to push the Turkana ‘beyond the Suguta Valley’ that was started in the 1960s by Samburu leaders after losing an election to a Turkana candidate to represent Samburu district in the Legislative Assembly seems to find relevance every time there is a political contest in the offing in Baragoi.

Violence as a means of getting or preserving political power can further be seen in the role of the new political class at the Samburu County Assembly. As documented in chapter four, local politicians are at the forefront in the distribution of arms and ammunition as part of ‘protection’ politics. Distribution of arms and ammunition leads to militarisation of communities and increases the probability of violence especially when political leaders incite warriors. The meanings of violence are changing especially under the new political dispensation as violence is increasingly used in pursuit of political power under the guise of ‘protection politics’. Whereas the devolved governance system was expected to bring equity in development, it has inadvertently brought forth new divisions along ethnic lines between the Samburu and Turkana and also clan divisions among the Samburu as groups compete for resources and job opportunities within the new political structures. Political leaders have not hesitated to exploit their new powers to incite people into violence along ethnic lines as a means of maintaining their patron-client relationships and preserving power.

Progression of pastoralists’ conflicts into episodes of collective violence shows that secondary actors play a significant role in undermining inter-communal avenues of peacemaking. As was seen in the Baragoi massacre, efforts at recovery of stolen livestock normally kicks in once the facts of a raid have been lodged with the authorities. Political leaders play a significant role in pursuing ‘paramilitary operations’ especially when it is directed against their opponents. Given the political power and influence held by politicians and their control of resources at the
constituency and ward levels. This gives them the leverage to mobilise for violence despite the best efforts of the police as was seen in the case of the Baragoi massacre. Preventing episodes of collective violence is therefore linked with minimizing the efforts of political leaders to influence the mobilisation of warriors.

The role of state in pastoralists’ violence can be seen in its creation of an enabling environment for the practice and production of violence. The ungoverned spaces that exist in much of Northern Kenya is an indictment of the culpability of the state in protection of its citizens and their properties in the pastoralists borderlands. Institutional weakness and lack of supervision of the KPRs further compounds the problem of violence among pastoralists in Northern Kenya. As documented from police reports from Baragoi Police station, cases of misuse of state firearms and ammunition by KPRs show that government arms and ammunition play a significant role in pastoralists’ violence among the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi. The role of KPRs as actors in pastoralists’ violence needs to be emphasized here. KPRs in Baragoi by virtue of the legal arms and ammunition are the only actors that seem to transcend the ‘legality and illegality pendulum’ of violence. The power of a legal firearm from the state gives the KPR the power not only to defend themselves and their communities but also the illegal leverage to use the government issued gun and ammunition to conduct raids and highway banditries for personal benefit. Cases of KPRs loaning their guns to peers and kinsmen show the institutional weaknesses that bedevil the very idea of volunteer police and highlight the role of KPRs and the state as key actors in violence among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi.

Targeting of women during raids through violent actions such as rape, killing of milking stock and destruction of women-groups initiatives shows the evolution of violent behavior among pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya. Acts of violence are increasingly seen as justified as long as the victim comes from the ‘enemy’ community. These primordial justifications play a critical role in the organisation and mobilisation of collective violence. The use of primordialism as a mobilisation tool is critical in understanding cycles of violence and the role of political leaders in these massacres.

In conclusion, the changing meanings and purposes of pastoralists’ violence has in effect been a driver for societal change among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi from the pre-colonial
times to date. Violence in effect is a means through which groups continually negotiate and renegotiate their socio-cultural spaces and re-assert their distinct identities, these actions however, reinforce their diversities and produces more violence (Broch-Due 2005:1-2). Violence is thus a significant determinant of people’s patterns of behavior in terms of choice of residence areas, trading routes, fencing patterns, access to water sources and grazing lands, and even marriage partners. Understanding violence among groups therefore requires comprehension of the repertoire of cultural practices that inform its projection into socio-economic, environmental and political contests of every day realities. As Straight (2009:27) stated, analysis of pastoralists violence through the prism of culture and tradition must also take into account how these ‘cultural’ small wars are continually used to compete for resources and political power at the local and national levels. In the case of Baragoi there is a strong linkage between cultural small wars and decades of socio-economic and political marginalisation, thus making it inevitable for violence and local politics of marginalisation to continually reproduce each other (Straight 2009:27). Violence has thus become an agency through which societal change is carried out among the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi.
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Appendix I: Interview Guide-Event Calendars to Women

**History of Cattle Raids**

i. How many cattle raids have you experienced in your life time? Can you name 5 most devastating cattle raids you have experienced in your lifetime? Why were these devastating?

ii. When did you experience the last raid? Who were the raiders? How many livestock did you lose?

iii. Is there a difference in the way cattle raids are conducted now and before 1980s? What has changed? And why do you think cattle raiding has changed?

iv. Did elders sanction cattle raids that you participated in? Do elders still have a role of blessing raiders before cattle raiders?

v. Have you lost livestock during cattle raids before? How many livestock have you lost?

vi. Did you conduct revenge cattle raids to regain your stolen livestock after suffering a raid? How many times did you embark on revenge cattle raids? How did you organize these raids? Did you need blessing of elders to embark on cattle raids?

vii. Have you participated in cattle raiding in cattle raids before? How many cattle raids did you participate in? How many livestock did you gain from cattle raids? Which cattle raid was most memorable for you?

**Consequences of Cattle raids**

i. Have you lost family members due to cattle raids? How many? And when did you lose them?

ii. How many of your family members have been maimed due to violent cattle raids? When were they maimed? Were they maimed while taking part in a raid of while defending family/clan livestock?

iii. How many times have you been forced to relocate to new homes/settlements due to insecurity occasioned by cattle raids? Have you lost land due to violent cattle raids? How many acres/hectares? Who lives in your land now?
iv. Have you ever been forced to depend on relief supplies after being impoverished by violent cattle raids? How many times have you had to depend on relief foods?

v. Has violent commercialised cattle raids prevented you from accessing some cattle markets? How many markets have been closed due to insecurity occasioned by violent cattle raids?

vi. Do you own a gun? When did you acquire the gun? Why did you acquire it? Did you buy the gun or did you inherit it? How do you use your gun? For defence or aggression?

vii. Do your relatives borrow your gun to conduct raids on neighbouring communities? How often? Do you benefit from the proceeds of raided livestock in this case?

Appendix II: Focus Group Discussion Guide

i. What is livestock raiding?
ii. Does your community practice cattle raiding? Why?

iii. Are there different types of cattle raiding practiced in your community?

iv. Has the practice of cattle raiding changed in your community over the last century?

v. Are the incidences of cattle raiding increased or decreased in your community and why?

vi. Have you ever participated in cattle raids? What are/were your motivations?

vii. Does your community derive any benefits from cattle raids? What are these benefits?

viii. How does cattle raids affect inter-communal relations between your community and your neighbours?

ix. How often does warriors from your community conduct cattle raids against your neighbours?

x. Does cattle raids escalate inter-communal violence between your community and neighbouring groups?

xi. What rules or norms must be obeyed during cattle raids? Who monitors and sanctions the rules of cattle raiding?

xii. Are there compensation mechanisms between your community and their neighbours whenever a breach of norms occurs during raids?

xiii. Are the benefits of cattle raiding distributed to community/clan members or are the proceeds for personal gain?

xiv. Has the proliferation of guns changed the conduct of cattle raiding?

xv. How have guns impacted on the levels of violence accompanying cattle raids?

xvi. Is there a link between violent cattle raids and land conflicts in your community?

xvii. Is there a link between violent cattle raids and local representation politics?

xviii. How does cattle raids over land tenure/security affect pastoralism as a livelihood system?
xix. Are violent cattle raids linked to sedenterisation policies of the government of Kenya? How?

xx. Are there inter-communal peacebuilding mechanism between your community and the neighbouring pastoralists groups?

xxi. Which actors are involved in mediating conflicts to prevent escalation after violent cattle raids?

xxii. How does violent cattle raids impact on security (individual security, community/local, national and regional security)?

xxiii. How can violent commercialised cattle raids be resolved and what modes of cooperation exist and how can this cooperation be sustained? (Discuss how the groups deal with conflicts, national policies towards resolving the problem, their role in resolving the conflict, new mechanisms and how cooperation can be promoted).

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION

Appendix III: Participant Observation Guide

*What to observe?*

i. Group differentiation within the community, how do elders dress and carry out themselves in comparison to elders?

iii. Weapons. What kind of weapons do adult male respondents walk around with? Are they clubs, sticks, spears, bows and arrows or guns (types)/legal or illegal?

iv. Herds. The size of herds, how big are herds? How are herds managed? Do herders have guns? At what age are boys allowed to openly carry guns? How far is the pastureland from pastoralists’ settlements?

v. Social organization. How does the community organize itself? Is there a marked differentiation between the organization of elders and that of warriors?

vi. Leadership. Are there distinct leaders among the elders? Warriors? What roles do elders play? What roles do warriors play?

vii. Settlements. Where do warriors live? Where does the rest of the community/clan live?

viii. Rituals. What kinds of rituals take place in pastoralists’ societies? Who are the participants in these rituals? What are the meanings of these rituals? And what are the impacts of these rituals on communal and inter-communal relations among pastoralists groups?


tax. Roles. What roles do warriors play in pastoralists’ societies? What roles do elders play in society? What roles do women play in society?
xi. Social Relationships that exist in the community (who is related to who, what are the types of relationships, how are these relationships built and how are these relationships influencing each other in terms of cooperation or conflict)

xii. Atmosphere. What is the prevailing atmosphere in the environment (are there tensions, how are people interacting, talking and perceiving each other)

xiii. Features. What are physical features seen in the community (droughts, water scarcity, desertification, land degradation, bush building, pasture land, organisation of farming and herding activities)


xv. Relief food distribution centres. Who comes for relief food? General members of pastoralists groups? Displaced pastoralists? How far is the relief distribution centres from pastoralists settlements?

xvi. Inter-communal peace meetings. When and where are inter-communal peace treaties/negotiations conducted? What rituals are performed? Who is present at these ceremonies? Are women present? Are warriors present? Are elders present?

xvii. Office of the chief/Police station. Who comes to report incidences of cattle raids to the chief/police? How often does this occur? How many police officers are there at the station? How far is the police station from the incidence of cattle raids? How equipped are the police to tackle livestock raids? How many cars?

xviii. Traiders. Who are traiders? Are they identifiable? Do they belong to pastoralists groups? Are they known to members of pastoralists groups? Who else do they work with? Do
they command any influence among warriors or within the community? Are they respected? Are they feared?

xix. Elites and pastoralists violence in Baragoi, what is their role. How has the new devolved system stemmed or abbeted livestock raids between the Turkana and Samburu of Baragoi? How do political leaders and other elite relate to warriors from the Sambur and Turkana communities?
## Appendix IV: Chronology of Violent Incidences between the Turkana and Samburu Communities Reported At Baragoi Police Station 2008-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Action by Government of Kenya/Police</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22/1/2008</td>
<td>It was reported by A. E from Parkati that his 34 camels were stolen by raiders suspected to be Samburu and driven towards Waso Rongai</td>
<td>Patrol team pursued the same and headed towards Waso Rongai</td>
<td>Stolen stock recovered and handed over to owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/4/2008</td>
<td>It was reported by one Turkana male adult that on the 15/4/2008 at around 8.00pm raiders suspected to be Samburus raided his manyatta, shot his son namely N. L on his right leg and made away with 100 heads of cattle and headed towards Ngoriche hills</td>
<td>Patrol team comprising GSU, regular and administration police dispatched to the scene</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/1/2010</td>
<td>Lena Kira, Lepi Lemaye and Ntonge Andrea all of Samburu do report that at about 0900hrs unknown goats belonging to Lemasen Ntali of Ndoto location were stolen by people believed to be Turkana</td>
<td>Patrol under Sgt. Mark , visited scene footmarks headed towards Lomirok</td>
<td>Matter pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/2/10</td>
<td>Jackson Lelek a Samburu male adult from Masikita location do submit a report that on 20/2/2010 at about 18.00hrs his 15 donkeys were stolen while grazing in a nearby field. Footmarks headed towards Lomirok</td>
<td>Patrol dispatched</td>
<td>All goats recovered on 29.2.2010 and handed over to owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>28/2/2010</td>
<td>Adrian Lolmi Samburu male adult do submit a report that he lost his unknown number of shoats at Baragoi lager at about 4.00pm by raiders believed to be Turkana</td>
<td>Patrol dispatched</td>
<td>All goats recovered on 29/2/2010 and handed over to the owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/4/2010</td>
<td>Assistant chief Suiyan-Barsaloi area a Samburu male adult do report that on the 23rd April 2010 at about 4.30pm his 132 cattle were stolen by people known to him as: 1 Mache Leade, 2. Yama Leadu</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1/2011</td>
<td>At Nachola area, groups of Pokot raiders attacked herds and drove away unknown number of goats and killed one boy namely Uma Loka aged 18 years vide signal CR1/1/3</td>
<td>Area patrolled</td>
<td>Case under pending investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1/11</td>
<td>Suiyan location a group of bandits believed to be Turkana raiders attacked Samburu herders and shot the following herders dead: Lechuka Lenaiguro aged 70 years and Loiti Lenegwe aged 65 years. No animals were stolen as the KPRs intervened and restored order vide signal CR1/1/1/4</td>
<td>Areas patrolled</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/2/2011</td>
<td>At Elbarta location in Lbaaibor grazing field a group of raiders attempted to raid cattle during day time and were overpowered by KPR who killed one raider nothing was stolen</td>
<td>Area patrolled</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location/Details</td>
<td>Area patrolled</td>
<td>Case status</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/2/11</td>
<td>Marti location a group of suspected Pokot raiders attacked Samburu herders and stole 35 cattle which later were intercepted by KPR and returned to owners. At the same time a KPR namely Tupa Lepe was killed by bandits. On the 18/2/2011 at Lowangenethin in Nachola location, unknown number of Pokot attempted to attack Turkana residents to raid 300 cows but were overpowered by the KPRs who killed one raider at the scene and also one resident was injured slightly by a bullet but nothing was stolen.</td>
<td>Area patrolled</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/3/11</td>
<td>Nachola location suspected Pokot raided Turkana herders and killed one Naspan Eregae aged 65 years and stole 91 cattle, 53 camels and 1400 goats/sheep which were later recovered</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/4/11</td>
<td>Lbaaibor grazing field. A group of Turkana raiders attacked Samburu herders and killed one KPR James Lepar aged 23 years, Lteje Leparo aged 12 years and stole 381 cattle</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/5/11</td>
<td>Waso Rongai. A group of Turkana raiders attacked the manyatta and stole 541 goats and sheep which were intercepted by the combined security forces and overpowered the raiders and returned the animals to the owners and one AK 47 Serial No.</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Action Taken</td>
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<tr>
<td>20/5/11</td>
<td>Tuum-Larerok area</td>
<td>A group of Turkana attacked Samburu herders and drove away 67 cattle, 13 sheep which were later intercepted and all returned to owners by a combined security forces. Two raiders were shot dead during the incident.</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/6/11</td>
<td>At Ngike Ndonyo Nkuroto</td>
<td>A group of Turkana attempted to raid Samburu livestock but were overpowered by KPRs and one was killed.</td>
<td>Area patrolled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/6/11</td>
<td>Kawap village</td>
<td>Unknown bandits attacked Kawap but noting was stolen as the KPRs overpowered them.</td>
<td>Area patrolled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/6/11</td>
<td>At Parkati area</td>
<td>Pokot raiders attacked the area and stole 2756 goats/sheep and two people killed: Emu Loda, 20 years of age and Loka Lokolo 25 years. No recoveries made.</td>
<td>Area patrolled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/7/11</td>
<td>Seren within Ndoto location</td>
<td>A group of Turkana raiders attacked Seren herders and stole 5 camels that were being escorted by one young girl whom they raped and released unhurt. No recoveries were made.</td>
<td>Area patrolled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Police Officers</td>
<td>Recovery Efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/11/12</td>
<td>Operation mounted by ASTU, GSU, GD and Aps under command of an Assistant Commissioner of Police to recover 501 heads of cattle stolen from Lesirkan</td>
<td>Police officers drawn from Central, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Western provinces other than GSU and ASTU deployed to intensify patrols within Baragoi and its environs</td>
<td>Efforts to recover the firearms are ongoing. Seven suspects were arrested in connection with the death of police officers and arraigned before court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/11/12</td>
<td>20 heads of donkeys stolen from Masikita. Reports made by the Assistant Chief</td>
<td>Scene visited, no recovery or arrest made</td>
<td>Case pending under inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/11/12</td>
<td>Murder report made by one Somali male adult Abdi J. The deceased Ali M whose body was found at Ilaut location. Remains ferried to Kor in Marsabit for burial</td>
<td>OCS visited the scene. Case file opened and several suspects arraigned before Nakuru High Court</td>
<td>Case pending before High Court in Nakuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/11/2012</td>
<td>John Lobu, a Samburu male adult reports the theft of his donkeys valued at Kshs.15000-the raiders are believed to be from Turkana community</td>
<td>Scene visited. No arrest made or recovery made</td>
<td>Case pending under inquiry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>20/12/2012</td>
<td>Somi Lechu a Samburu male adult from Waso Rongai reported that raiders believed to be of Turkana origin invaded Waso Rongai with the intention to steal livestock but their mission was thwarted after exchange of fire with Samburu KPRs</td>
<td>KPRs resupplied with enough ammunition</td>
<td>Patrols mainly by KPRs intensified within volatile village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/20/2012</td>
<td>Kia Lona a Samburu male adult reports the theft of his 16 donkeys by unknown number of raiders. KPRs followed the footprints which led towards Lomerok</td>
<td>Patrol team led by OCPD visited the scene</td>
<td>No arrest or recovery made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/12/2012</td>
<td>Chief Elbarta reports the theft of cows within Ngilai village. Five animals were stolen but two were recovered. Complainant is Ltumesen Ltangwas</td>
<td>Patrols intensified</td>
<td>No arrests made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/1/2013</td>
<td>Two KPRs Ekale Kotal and Lokwamor report the recovery of seven camels within Baragoi. They managed to recover six of them belonging to former MP Peter Lengees</td>
<td>Camels handed over to Joseph L. from Ngilai for safe custody waiting collection to Loyangalani</td>
<td>Case closed with no other police action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/1/2013</td>
<td>Loka Kalo a Turkana male adult reports that bandits believed to be from Samburu community attacked him within slaughter house and made away with 200 sheep and goats. Attackers are said to have headed towards Bendera</td>
<td>Scene visited. No arrest or recovery made. Investigations continue</td>
<td>Patrols intensified within Bendera and Ngilai villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>14/2/2012</td>
<td>Boni Lokwa a Turkana male adult from Huruma reports the loss of one sheep. He found his fence broken by thieves</td>
<td>Scene visited, footmarks traced to Nalingangor</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/2/2013</td>
<td>Attempted robbery: sub-chief of Bendera reported that raiders suspected to be of Turkana origin attacked Bendera village. They used G3 and AK47 rifles. 10 cartridges were recovered. No cattle stolen no injuries inflicted</td>
<td>OCS and team patrolled the said area. No arrest made and area left calm</td>
<td>Case pending under inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/2/2013</td>
<td>Ltosi Lepe a Samburu male adult reports theft of livestock at Lesirkan. He claims that four of his cattle were grazing and failed to return in the evening. Efforts to follow their footmarks bore no fruits</td>
<td>Investigations commenced. Complainant recorded statements</td>
<td>Case pending under inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/2/2013</td>
<td>Ako Lesa a KPR and watchman at Samburu Traders Sacco report the loss of his goat during the night. He followed the footmarks and managed to find where the goat was slaughtered</td>
<td>Scene visited and action taken</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/2/2013</td>
<td>South Horr Chief reports the theft of 2200 goats by unknown bandits from Loonjorin sub-location within South Horr. He alleges that the bandits were from Turkana community and headed towards Parkati after the incident</td>
<td>Patrols intensified</td>
<td>No recovery or arrest made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/3/2013</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Loonjorin reports that raiders suspected to be of Turkana origin attacked Loonjorin center and made away with 300</td>
<td>Patrols intensified</td>
<td>No recovery or arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Action Taken</td>
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<tr>
<td>16/3/13</td>
<td>Samburu herdsmen while grazing their cattle near Baragoi Boys were attacked by raiders believed to be Turkana origin. Fierce exchange of fire ensued. One cow belonging to a Mr. Leti was shot, no casualty reported, no cattle stolen</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/3/13</td>
<td>Mr. Loba, a Turkana male adult was grazing his livestock of 200 sheep within Leilei when he was attacked by three armed Samburu morans. They took away his sheep and followed a laga towards DC’s office</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/3/13</td>
<td>Highway bandits attacked ACTED employees at Mbukoi area. They stole laptops, mobile phones, cash and other personal items of unknown value. They were on official duties travelling towards Maralal aboard a motor vehicle registration number KBS 012N Toyota.</td>
<td>Scene visited by police officers from Marti assisted by KPRs. Two laptops recovered and as well as assorted clothing. No arrests made</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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131 A French humanitarian NGO working supporting emergency relief and other alternative livelihood programmes among pastoralists in Northern Kenya
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Action Taken</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/4/13</td>
<td>Unknown number of raiders attacked Loketei village and stole 12 camel calves. Footmarks followed and headed towards Bendera village</td>
<td>Patrols intensified with a view to collect intelligence</td>
<td>Reliable information indicates that the animals were driven towards Masikita.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/4/13</td>
<td>Leako Ltaba reported that his children were looking after 14 calves within Bendera village when armed raiders attacked them and took away the animals. No injuries reported</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
<td>No recovery made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/4/13</td>
<td>Ngima Lemar 32 years old reported that a young herds boy looking after his father’s 202 goats at Ndiku grazing field in Masikita’s Simiti village when three armed rustlers believed to be Turkanas ambushed the youngster and took away all the animals. The raiders murdered the young man by cutting his neck with a sword. Local KPRs responded and fierce exchange of fire ensued. 100 animals were recovered.</td>
<td>A combined patrol of Aps, regular police and RDU visited the scene</td>
<td>Case file opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/4/13</td>
<td>Police received information through telephone that a body of unknown adult male was lying dead within Soito area.</td>
<td>Scene visited, body recovered and ferried to Maralal District Hospital for identification and post mortem</td>
<td>No report made so far to police over missing person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>Action Taken</td>
<td>Case Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>19/4/13</td>
<td>Steven Lekupe, a resident of Munanda village reports that at unknown time, unknown people believed to be of Turkana origin invaded his compound and stole a he-goat. He had earlier relocated his livestock from Lesirkan area. Footmarks were tracked and led the police towards Leilei.</td>
<td>Scene visited and necessary action taken</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/4/13</td>
<td>Shooting incident report by one Lpari Lonng a KPR at Waso Rongai on the 20th April 2013 at unknown time. Unknown number of raiders invaded Waso Rongai in a bid to steal stock. Their mission was thwarted by local KPRs who engaged them in a fierce exchange of fire. They spent 103 rounds of ammunition. No injuries reported. The raiders did not steal anything</td>
<td>Scene visited. Victims escorted to Maralal</td>
<td>Unconfirmed report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/4/13</td>
<td>Armed robbers attacked KWFT personnel travelling to Maralal aboard motor vehicle registration number KAW 837Y belonging to the said company a few kilometres from Barsaloi market and stole mobile phones, documents and cash, Kshs. 47000. No arrest or recovery made.</td>
<td>Scene visited. Victims escorted to Maralal</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/2/5/13</td>
<td>It was reported by a Turkana male adult by the name Niku Loko that on 1st May 2013 at about 2200hrs four raiders made away</td>
<td>Scene visited by police but no arrests made</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>23/6/2013</td>
<td>It was reported by one Turkana male adult namely Echag Locho a resident of Loketei village that raiders suspected to be Samburu raided the village and stole 3 donkeys which headed towards Mnanda</td>
<td>Patrols intensified</td>
<td>No recoveries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/6/2013</td>
<td>It was reported by one Eri Losi that on the 23rd June 2013 raiders suspected to be Samburu herdsmen raided a manyatta and stole 23 donkeys and the same headed towards Ngilai village</td>
<td>Patrols intensified</td>
<td>No recoveries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/7/2013</td>
<td>It was reported by one the Assistant Chief Logetei sub-location that on 2/7/2013 at about 0200 hours unknown people took away his six donkeys and the footmarks headed towards Mnanda</td>
<td>Patrol intensified</td>
<td>No recoveries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/7/2013</td>
<td>It was reported by one Nathi a Turkana female adult from Nalingangor village that on the 4th July 2013 at about 1620hrs her sheep were grazing at Natiti area whereby a group of Samburu morans attacked the herders and made away with 152 goats/sheep</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
<td>No recoveries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/07/2013</td>
<td>On the July 7th 2013 at about 1730hrs three raiders believed to be of Turkana origin were spotted by Samburu KPRs/herdsmen whereby an exchange of fire ensued and one of the raiders was shot dead. The body was later identified by relatives and local of</td>
<td>Scene visited and necessary action taken</td>
<td>Case under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/7/13</td>
<td>Leilei village</td>
<td>Leilei village to be one of a Turkana male adult aged 29 years who was allegedly mentally retarded and had been missing from 17th June 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/7/13</td>
<td>Sarima village</td>
<td>It was reported by the Assistant Chief Lkayo sub-location that he received a phone call from Sarima village that about 70 armed raiders attacked Sarima manyatta and stole 11 camels after a fierce exchange of fire. During the incident one Turkana male adult was shot dead</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/2013</td>
<td>Waso Rongai village</td>
<td>It was reported by one assistant chief of Waso Rongai village that he received a call informing him that raiders suspected to be of Turkana origin made away with 40 goats and footmarks headed towards Natiti village</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/7/2013</td>
<td>Loketei village</td>
<td>It was reported by one Joseph N. a Turkana male adult from Loketei village that on 21st July 2013 at about 0300hrs, unknown people took away two camels from his home and the footmarks headed towards Natiti area. However the camels were later recovered at Bendera sub location but no arrests were made. They were handed over to the owner</td>
<td>Scene visited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>24/8/13</td>
<td>On the 24&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; August 2013, it was reported by one Ekwa Losa that while he was grazing goats/sheep at Polytechnic grazing fields two raiders one armed with AK47 rifle and believed to be of Samburu origin attacked him and made away with about 200 goats/sheep.</td>
<td>28 sheep/goats have been recovered.</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/7/2013</td>
<td>It was reported by GSU officers from Nachola GSU camp that on the 28&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; July at about 1730hrs, raiders believed to be of Pokot origin attacked three herds boys at Naturkan are of Nachola location and opened fire and shot one boy namely Thita Lume injuring slightly on the back. They took away 100 goats/sheep</td>
<td>Patrols intensified</td>
<td>No recoveries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/8/2013</td>
<td>It was reported by Peter Lekei a Samburu male adult from Bendera location that his three cows were grazing near Baragoi Boys Secondary School when unknown people drove them away towards Nalingangor village. However the area chief was informed accordingly and with the assistance of the local KPRs the three cows were recovered at Nachola area and handed over to the owner.</td>
<td>Patrols intensified</td>
<td>Animals handed over to owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/9/2013</td>
<td>Loko Losi reported that four Turkana raiders attacked his son who was grazing their animals and went away with 20 camels of</td>
<td>Scene visited but no recoveries made</td>
<td>Case pending under investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Incident Description</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Result</td>
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<tr>
<td>18/9/2013</td>
<td>A number of Turkana tribesmen attacked Samburu herdsmen at Soito area and made away with 49 herds of cattle</td>
<td>A security team was dispatched and recovered all the stolen stock</td>
<td>No arrests made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/9/13</td>
<td>Lemo Loat of Tuum and reports that on the 20&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; September 2013 at about 6,30pm their 15 calves were stolen from the grazing field by people believed to be Turkana</td>
<td>Scene visited and footmarks headed towards Lomerok area</td>
<td>No arrests made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/9/13</td>
<td>On the 26&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; September 2013, Nichol Lepe and Sanya Lenimaga were shot and injured by people suspected to be of Turkana origin at Ngorishe area while riding a motorcycle</td>
<td>Scene visited and area combed but no arrests made</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/9/2013</td>
<td>It was reported by assistant chief of Baragoi township that armed Samburu raiders attacked herders at Nalingangor area and made away with unknown number of goats and sheep and shot dead one David L aged 18 years and a standard eight pupil at Nalingangor Primary School</td>
<td>Scene visited and body removed to Baragoi mortuary. Footmarks headed towards Bendera location</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/10/2013</td>
<td>One Lelki Lesna reports to his area chief that unknown people stole four of his goats and escaped to unknown destination. The incident happened at Waso Rongai village</td>
<td>Scene visited and police took all the necessary action. The complainant did not volunteer to record</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>18/10/13</td>
<td>It was reported by the Assistant Chief Baragoi township location that he received a phone call that unknown number of raiders attacked Waso Rongai village and made away with unknown number of livestock</td>
<td>A patrol team was dispatched to the scene and it was established that raiders believed to be of Turkana origin raided at most eight manyattas and made away with 280 cows and 440 goats. Two KPRs were shot dead and their rifles G3 S/No.299859 and G3 S/No 97-96917 were lost</td>
<td>An inquest file has been opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/10/13</td>
<td>One Samburu male adult namely Njeku Leima reported that while grazing within Baragoi boys areas, he was accosted by Turkana bandits who stole from him 64 goats and drove the animals towards Lomirok</td>
<td>A quick action by the security personnel thwarted any efforts by raiders as the animals were recovered and handed over to the owner</td>
<td>No arrests made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Incident Description</td>
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<td>Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>20/10/2013</td>
<td>Emu Loasa a Turkana herdsman from Leilei village reported that raiders believed to be Samburu invaded his manyatta and took away 80 goats</td>
<td>Scene visited and footmarks headed towards Bendera-Ngilai area</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/10/2013</td>
<td>It was reported by Chief Kawap location that raiders believed to be of Samburu origin invaded Kawop location and caused a massive destruction of school dispensary and the manyattas and the total value of the destruction is estimated to be 550,000 Kenyan shillings which include learning materials, solar panel and solar battery.</td>
<td>Scene was visited and necessary action taken. Exhibits were recovered from the scene</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20/10/2013</td>
<td>The chairlady of Naletae women group a Turkana female adult Ms. Chitine Koe reported that they had fled their manyattas amid fears in the area. During their absence people believed to be Samburu morans invaded their homes and took away 78 chicken which was part of the wealth of the women group</td>
<td>Scene visited by police and the necessary action taken</td>
<td>Investigation continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/11/2013</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Baragoi township reported that at unknown time raiders believed to be of Turkana origin raided Suiyan location and made away with unknown number of camels</td>
<td>Scene visited by police and the footmarks followed towards Lomirok area</td>
<td>Investigation continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/10/2013</td>
<td>chief of Parkati location reported that on 25th November 2013 raiders believed to be of Samburu origin attacked the said village</td>
<td>Patrols intensified</td>
<td>Investigation continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/10/13</td>
<td>Loki Lonyei reported that at about 1000hrs his goats were being grazed at Baragoi Secondary and were stolen by three armed Samburu morans and the herdsman went missing</td>
<td>A patrol was dispatched to the scene to pursue the raiders. The missing person was found dead at the scene.</td>
<td>Case pending before court. No recoveries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/11/13</td>
<td>The Assistant Chief Nalingangor sub-location within Baragoi reported that he received a message that unknown raiders attacked Morilim village Nachola location and made away with unknown number of animals</td>
<td>A patrol team was dispatched to the scene and it was established that three manyattas at Nakuprat village were attacked by about 100 Pokot and made away with almost 500 cattle.</td>
<td>No recovery made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/11/2013</td>
<td>Kultirenti Lesita reported that on the 2nd November 2013 raiders believed to be of Turkana origin raided Masikita village and made away with 50 donkeys</td>
<td>A patrol team was dispatched to area and patrols intensified.</td>
<td>No recoveries made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/11/2013</td>
<td>A high profile security meeting held at Lakira Guest house within Baragoi drawing elders from Turkana and Samburu communities</td>
<td>The launching of operation to mop up illegal arms.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and attended by the local DC, SOOPS GSU, OCPD, D/ACP, SP, Senior Police and KDF officers, members of the public and peace committee members. The meeting touched on issues of conflict resolution and peaceful co-existence and reforming local police reservists, mopping up of illegal firearms. Both communities failed to reach amicable solution which forced the Deputy County Commissioner to allow Operations Commander to give ultimatums leading to the launching of operation okota silaha haramu. The meeting ended peacefully later on dubbed ‘operation okota silaha’.

13/11/2013
Ekar Kue (4) and Mako Abraham reported that they were attacked by a group of raiders believed to be of Samburu origin who stole 20 goats from their manyatta. They recovered one bullet cartridge of AK47 rifle within the compound. The raiders drove away the animals towards Baragoi Secondary School Scene visited and necessary action taken. No recovery or arrest made. Investigation continues Patrol intensified within Bendera and Ngilai villages

13/11/13
Nailu Leparn (37) a Samburu male adult reported the theft of his two heads of cattle valued at Kshs. 60,000
Police officers visited the scene and took necessary action, however no arrests nor recovery made Case pending under investigation

132 Operation to mop up illegal firearms
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident Description</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15/11/13</td>
<td>Lesle Rian and Lebara Lmana both reported that their 7 cattle were stolen by unknown cattle rustlers. The hoofmarks headed towards Lomirok area</td>
<td>Scene visited and no arrests nor recovery made</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/11/13</td>
<td>Highway Banditry: SeTe Nyagah a Kikuyu male adult, Lowan Loiko and Francis Nawer both Turkana male adults reported that while driving from Ngurunit in a motor vehicle registration number KVG 518, they were stopped by a group of Samburu morans 9 in number who were armed with assorted rifles who stole 5 litres of oil from the vehicle and also damaged the drivers safety belt using their swords. They shot at the motor vehicle on the left side forcing the driver to stop. They further robbed them of mobile phones and other property of unknown value</td>
<td>Scene visited and no recovery or arrest made</td>
<td>Investigations commenced on the incident as joint patrols intensified within the border trading center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/11/2013</td>
<td>Muia Lenau a Kenya Police Reservist from Tuum location reported that while driving a motor vehicle registration number KAJ 397C Land rover he was accosted by three armed bandits who fired at his vehicle but he defied their orders and sped away. Nobody was injured and the vehicle was not damaged</td>
<td>Police visited the scene and intensified patrols within Tuum and environs</td>
<td>Case pending under investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Incident Description</td>
<td>Police Action</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/12/13</td>
<td>Senior Chief Baragoi Location, reports to the police that on the previous day at about 11pm people suspected to be of Turkana origin attacked Bendera village and shot one moran namely Satuna Lepareiya on the chest. The victim was rushed to Baragoi sub-district hospital where he died while undergoing treatment.</td>
<td>More patrols intensified within the affected area despite escalating tension. Police at the scene of crime recovered three rounds of 7.62mm special ammunition. Case pending under inquiry.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/12/13</td>
<td>At about 7.30pm at Natiti village within Kawap location one Turkana male adult namely Lokot Loike was inside his manyatta when he heard five gunshots towards his hut. Luckily neither he nor his family was injured. The suspects did not steal anything.</td>
<td>Scene visited and five spent cartridges of AK47 recovered. No arrests made. Case pending under inquiry.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/12/13</td>
<td>It was reported by one Alfred Wame a Kikuyu male adult that while in Kawap trading center loading a water tank to his lorry with the help of four other persons a sudden shoot out ensued from suspected thugs almost five in number. During the incident nobody was injured but the thugs robbed the reportee of property of unknown value.</td>
<td>Area patrolled and photographs taken. Case taken over by DCIO.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Action Taken</td>
<td>Case Status</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/12/13</td>
<td>Shooting incident report was made by Petro Loe and Kelvin Lesei both from Bendera village that they were attacked by two Turkana morans who were armed with AK47 rifles who shot them but luckily missed. Their mission was to steal the stock but were unsuccessful</td>
<td>Scene visited and action taken. No arrest made</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12/13</td>
<td>Joseph Lempa a Samburu male adult reported the theft of 33 goats at unknown time. They are valued at Kshs. 33,000</td>
<td>A joint patrol comprising of KPRs, Aps and regular police dispatched within the area</td>
<td>3 goats recovered within the thickets after intensified patrol, Investigation in progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/12/13</td>
<td>Lemoe Leono and one KPR Mr. Leson Heno reported that one cow and its calf went missing</td>
<td>Scene visited by a patrol team within Leilei village</td>
<td>The area assistant chief have been informed for further follow up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/12/13</td>
<td>Lkitar Lekit a Samburu peasant from Bendera village reports that at around 0200 hours, raiders believed to be of Turkana origin raided his manyatta and stole 20 goats</td>
<td>Patrols intensified within the affected area</td>
<td>Case pending under inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/12/13</td>
<td>It was reported by Chief Inspector of the GSU camp at about 0800hrs that one KPR made a report at their camp that about 4</td>
<td>The patrol team comprising of operation personnel</td>
<td>Joint patrols intensified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Action</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/12/13</td>
<td>Attempted robbery with violence report. It was reported by one Samuel a Kikuyu male adult that two robbers who were armed with AK47 rifles entered into his house and shot two bullets but nobody was injured. The thugs hurriedly escaped without stealing anything</td>
<td>Scene visited. No arrests made. Case pending under inquiry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/01/14</td>
<td>Robbery with violence report. It was reported by one Lillian of South Horr through phone that on 13th January 2014 at about 2100hrs she was attacked by robbers armed with assorted rifles. They robbed her of cash Kshs. 54,000 and other shop goods</td>
<td>Scene visited and necessary action taken. Patrols intensified. Investigations in progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/2/14</td>
<td>It was reported by a group of Turkana men that on 9th February 2014 at around 16.30hrs raiders believed to be of Samburu origin raided their manyatta and made away with seven camels</td>
<td>Police visited the scene and took necessary action. More patrols intensified in the area. A pending investigation file opened to this effect</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/2/14</td>
<td>It was reported by one Steph Lekapi of Lesirkan that on 16/2/2014 at around 1500hrs while grazing in the field, 20 calves went</td>
<td>A combined patrol team of Aps, GSU, Regular police, Recovery made</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Details</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/2/14</td>
<td>It was reported by Mrs. Rael Letoi accompanied by Josep Eboi and other members of the public that unknown person shot one Francis E. aged 25 years who died instantly</td>
<td>The body was released to the family for burial arrangements. Scene was visited and necessary action taken</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASTU and local KPRs traced footmarks which led them towards Kawap direction</td>
<td>Inquest file opened and investigations commenced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/3/14</td>
<td>It was reported by one John Luk that he was attacked by robbers who were armed with M16 and AK47 rifles. They shot several bullets at his motor vehicle until the driver stopped. The robbers were six in number, they robbed him of KES 124,000</td>
<td>Investigation underway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4/14</td>
<td>It was reported by one KPR that on the 26th March 2014 at 1505hrs raiders believed to be from Turkana community attacked four Samburu herdsmen. The raiders were 15 in number and drove the cows towards Parkati area</td>
<td>A patrol team left to Tuum operation camp and pursued the raiders but no recoveries or arrests made</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrons intensified in the area.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**4/4/14**

Patrol back/Prisoners in/Firearms recovered: a patrol team which left new site operation camp at 0900hrs reports back to the station with the following information. The patrol teams were drawn from KDF, ASTU, GSU, AP and Regular Police. They spotted several armed bandits travelling towards Bendera village from Lomirok village. The officers confronted the bandits to surrender after which some of them started to run away. The officers chased them and managed to arrest three suspects namely Ekut Apoo aged 21 years, Ekri Elka 19 years and Ibas Eso 16 years. The officers recovered 7 rifles and ammunition.

**Investigation continues**

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**7/4/14**

Further stoke theft vide OB11/27/4/14. It was reported that three Samburu male adults namely Githinji lost 82 cows, Ntele lost 40 cows and Mathenge lost 40 cows in a Turkana raid of Samburu herders at Tuum airstrip.

A patrol team dispatched to the area but no recovery made.

Case pending under inquiry.

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**7/4/14**

It was reported by Loi Loo and Lokwa Lokon both residents of Natiti village that one 7th April 2014 at around 1600hrs raiders believed to be of Samburu origin attacked one herds boy namely Lobenyei and made away with unknown number of goats and sheep.

A patrol team comprising of GSU, AP and regular police dispatched to the area and all animals were recovered.

The team recovered 59 goats.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/4/14</td>
<td>It was reported by one the assistant chief of Lonyangaten sub-location and the chairman of Kawap primary School that they received intelligence report that some items were being stolen from Kawap dispensary and Kawap Administration Police Camp</td>
<td>The County Commander Samburu County Mr. Wambani SSP, AP, SSP accompanied by DCIO Samburu Central, SP, DAPC Samburu North visited the scene to investigate the report</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/4/14</td>
<td>Further report made to OB11/27/3/2014. It was reported by one Loi Lenom who hails from Tuum village that he too lost 16 cows to the raiders who stole Samburu cattle on the 24th March 2013 at 1500hrs. the footmarks headed towards Suguta valley</td>
<td>Area visited and no recovery made</td>
<td>Case pending under inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/5/14</td>
<td>Senior security officers led by the County Commissioner, County Commander and County Intelligence Officer, Samburu County all arrive in Baragoi for a security meeting within Tuum location</td>
<td>The meeting resolved to send a team to approach their Turkana County security team to help solve the Tuum crisis which arose through a raid by Turkana who moved the livestock to Turkana</td>
<td>Local chief of Parkati sent under escort to Lokori in Turkana County to initiate dialogue aimed at recovery of cattle with elders and local administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/6/14</td>
<td>A team of Police officers who escorted the chief of Parkati location to Lokori area of Turkana county returned to Baragoi after conducting dialogue with the authorities in Lokori conclusively, the issue was left with the security team in Lokori. However it was believed that the stolen cattle from Tuum are hidden within Lokori area</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>Case pending under inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/6/14</td>
<td>Loio Koi a Turkana male adult reported that while looking after his 60 shoats he was accosted by seven Samburu morans who drove away the whole of his herd</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>All animals were recovered and handed over to the owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16/6/14</td>
<td>AP Sergeant of South Horr Post reported that two raiders suspected to be of Turkana origin raided the area with intention of stealing livestock and in the process shot one herdsman Siligwa aged 19 years</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>No arrests made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/6/14</td>
<td>Leleruk reported that she received a report from her herder that her stock got lost. The animals were 20 in number</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>Case pending under inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Incident Description</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19/7/14</td>
<td>Rojo Loteg reported that his 40 goats were stolen by raiders believed to be of Samburu origin while grazing within Kenya Power area who were armed with G3 rifles and threatened to shoot him.</td>
<td>Police officers visited the scene and recovery made but no arrest</td>
<td>All animals recovered and handed over to owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/7/14</td>
<td>Kapi Leiro reported that his seven goats went astray while grazing along the Laga.</td>
<td>He was advised to trace the footmarks with the help of KPRs and report back to police.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/9/14</td>
<td>KPRs reported that on Friday the 5th September 2014 during evening hours 15 donkeys went astray and they tried to trace the footmarks which disappeared within Baragoi Boys Secondary School.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 donkeys recovered and handed over to owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/9/14</td>
<td>Chief Parkati reported that cattle rustlers believed to be from Pokot community raided Lkayo sub-location and stole unknown number of animals.</td>
<td>Patrol dispatched to the area</td>
<td>Pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/9/14</td>
<td>Mobile report: a report received from members of the public indicates that there was a shooting incident between herders and raiders from the Samburu and Turkana communities and two herders were allegedly severely wounded.</td>
<td>The police visited the scene and the injured were taken to Baragoi sub-district hospital for treatment.</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Police Action</td>
<td>Case Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18/11/14</td>
<td>It was reported from AP camp Morijo that a group of about 50 raiders believed to be from Pokot community raided Mbukoi area and managed to take away 300 herds of cattle from the Samburu. They engaged in a fire fight with Samburu KPRs where most of the cattle were recovered and 30 of cattle went missing. Two Samburu morans were injured and two Pokot raiders shot dead.</td>
<td>Scene visited by police and patrols intensified afterwards in view to stop such occurrences</td>
<td>No arrests made and case under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/11/14</td>
<td>It was reported by Assistant Chief of Nalingangor sub location that at Lowararik grazing field the Turkana and Samburu were grazing about 100m apart before a gun fight ensued and a male Turkana adult was shot dead. No livestock stolen</td>
<td>Scene visited by patrol team</td>
<td>Case pending under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/12/14</td>
<td>It was reported by one Samburu herdsman and a KPR that on the night of 2\textsuperscript{nd} December 2014 at about 2300hrs unknown people broke into his house and stole 7 goats</td>
<td>Scene visited and patrol team dispatched to follow the footmarks of the animals. No recoveries made.</td>
<td>Case pending under investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/12/14</td>
<td>It was reported by Assistant Chief of Bendera sub location that a Samburu male adult aged 30 years was shot while riding a motor cycle carrying one 36 years old male adult. They sustained gunshot wounds on their thighs, buttocks and legs but nothing was stolen from them. They were admitted at Baragoi District Hospital</td>
<td>Area visited and the police patrol team combed the area. No arrests made.</td>
<td>Case pending under investigations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and later transferred to Maralal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident Description</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15/12/14</td>
<td>It was reported by Assistant Chief Loonjorin sub location that in Ijuuk village of Tuum location, three armed raiders from the Turkana community attacked a KPR and took away his G3 rifle. The KPR sustained injuries.</td>
<td>Patrol team comprising of police officers and KPRs dispatched immediately. No arrest made but rifle found abandoned within Loonjorin area</td>
<td>Case under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/12/14</td>
<td>It was reported by a Samburu male adult from Oldoinyo Narok in Suiyan location that unknown people believed to be Turkana raided his home and stole 50 goats and 4 donkeys</td>
<td>KPRs engaged the raiders in a gun fight and overpowered them. Scene visited</td>
<td>Recovery of the 50 goats made and 4 donkeys went missing. Case under investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/12/14</td>
<td>It was reported by a Samburu of 60 years from Bendera village that raiders believed to be from Turkana community raided Ngoriche grazing field and made away with 60 goats.</td>
<td>Contingent of police officers followed the footmarks which headed to Suguta valley</td>
<td>No recovery made. Case under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/15</td>
<td>It was reported by Assistant Chief Ngilai sub location that Samburu and Turkana herdsmen met at Loworariak grazing field and a fierce fire exchange ensued. Two herdsmen from Turkana</td>
<td>Patrol team comprising of officers from Baragoi and Kambi ya Nyoka Operation</td>
<td>No arrest made. Case under investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community were shot dead while two Samburu morans were seriously injured.</td>
<td>Camp dispatched to the area. No livestock stolen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix V: Ammunition and Firearms Issued to KPRs in Baragoi from 2007-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Firearm Issued</th>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Ammunition Issued</th>
<th>Chief/ KPR</th>
<th>Administrative Area</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Reason for issuing firearm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21.01.2007</td>
<td>G3</td>
<td>97-96370</td>
<td>4 rounds</td>
<td>KPR</td>
<td>Waso Rongai</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>Issued to new KPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.11.2007</td>
<td>MKIV</td>
<td>402182</td>
<td>10 rounds of .303mm ammunition</td>
<td>KPR</td>
<td>Tuum</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>Issued to new KPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.07.2008</td>
<td>G3</td>
<td>F96563</td>
<td>40 rounds</td>
<td>KPR</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>Issued to new KPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.04.2009</td>
<td>MKIV</td>
<td>PF106055</td>
<td>2 rounds of .303ammunition</td>
<td>KPR Assistant Chief</td>
<td>Nachola</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>Issued to new KPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.04.2009</td>
<td>AK47</td>
<td>79431</td>
<td>15 rounds</td>
<td>KPR Chief</td>
<td>Losurkoi</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>Issue to new KPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.06.2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100 rounds of 7.62mm</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Waso Rongai</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>Distribution to KPRs in Waso Rongai location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.06.2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100 rounds of 7.62mm</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>South Horr</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>Distribution to KPRs in South Horr location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Issue Type</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.07.2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100 rounds of 7.62mm</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>South Horr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>Distribution to KPRs in South Horr location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.07.2009</td>
<td>MKIV</td>
<td>630038</td>
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<td>Rifle handed back to KPR after case against him finalised</td>
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<td>Samburu Distribution to KPRs in El Barta Location</td>
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<td>Latakweny</td>
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<td>Masikita</td>
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<td>Samburu</td>
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<td>22.09.2014</td>
<td>G3</td>
<td>97-06906</td>
<td>19 rounds of 7.62mm</td>
<td>KPR</td>
<td>Bendera sub location</td>
<td>Samburu The rifle had been detained while the KPR was under investigation</td>
<td></td>
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