

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING UNORIGINAL:
JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG
AND HIS *QUAESTIONES*

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General Introduction

John Picard of Lichtenberg is regarded as a leading figure in the Dominican reception and defense of Thomas Aquinas' philosophy and theology at the *studium generale* of Cologne. Here, he composed his *Quaestiones*, in which he addressed some of the most debated problems concerning Thomas' controversial theories. Despite the fact that discussions on Thomas' texts and ideas were already taking place at the universities of Paris and Oxford in the years following his death, Picard's *Quaestiones* represents the first example of such debates in the German context. Moreover, it is known that other German Dominican masters, such as Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart, were frequently polemical in their opposition to Thomas Aquinas' theses. For all of the foregoing reasons, Picard's *Quaestiones* represent a unique point of reference for the study of the German engagement and defense with Thomas' legacy. Indeed, unlike the Parisian and Oxfordian contexts, the German reception has not yet been the subject of scholarly inquiry. Furthermore, with respect to the *studium generale* itself, Picard's upholding of Thomas' theses can be seen as occupying an antithetical position with regard to the philosophical tradition, which has its origins in Albert the Great's legacy and often criticized Aquinas' one. Thus, to gain a deeper understanding of the pioneering nature of Picard's *Quaestiones*, this doctoral study will examine Picard's life and work in four main chapters.

The first chapter will present a biographical account of John Picard of Lichtenberg. In his lifetime, John Picard firstly held the position of *lector* at the Dominican *studium generale* of Cologne; subsequently, he commented on and taught Peter Lombard's *Sentences* in Paris, initially as a bachelor and later as a master of theology. During his teaching period in Cologne, Picard is believed to have debated his *Quaestiones*, although the precise years in which he should have been written remain uncertain. By providing a comprehensive overview of the educational system of the time, the objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the social and intellectual significance of a German *lector* becoming *magister theologiae* in Paris, such as John Picard. Moreover, by placing him within its educational landscape, it will also become evident that Picard's *Quaestiones* could have been composed at an earlier point in time than is currently assumed by the scientific community.

The second chapter will instead undertake an examination of the surviving manuscripts that transmit Picard's *Quaestiones*. The entirety of Picard's *Quaestiones* is transmitted solely by one manuscript (Citta del Vaticano, Vat. Lat. 859), while two other manuscripts (Erfurt, Cod. Ampl. Fol. 321 and Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, MS. 748) transmit it only in part. This

study will concentrate on a number of textual issues that have emerged from a detailed analysis of the those codices. Indeed, through an analysis of the Vatican and Erfurt manuscripts, this doctoral thesis will inquire into the structure and style of the text, revealing an avant-garde aspect of Picard's *Quaestiones*: it is not a mere quodlibetal or ordinary disputed questions, and cannot be confined to a single, clearly defined literary genre. This distinctive feature reflects the innovative and evolving character of teaching practices in the German province. Additionally, Picard's survived text cannot be circumscribed into a fixed category also according to its editorial status. The surviving manuscript versions of Picard's *Quaestiones* are incomplete, and they represent an intermediary stage between an initial drafts and an authoritative and definitive master text ready for publication.

In contrast to these unique material aspects, the theoretical content of Picard's *Quaestiones* shows close and literal connections with the texts of other authors of his time, most notably Thomas and his philosophical solutions. In virtue of his various defenses and analyses of Thomas' theses, as previously stated, Picard is regarded as the spearhead of the so-called "German Thomism". The third chapter will present two case studies which are representative of Picard's interpretation of Thomas' texts. The first case study will examine question 3 (*Utrum Deus potuerit sumere humanam naturam sine supposito*), and the second will focus on question 19 (*Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia*). In these instances, although Picard entirely accepts Thomas' solutions, he also emphasizes that Thomas' views on the subjects underwent modifications from one work to another. This phenomenon of highlighting discrepancies and, at times, contradictory positions within Thomas' various works demonstrates Picard's profound erudition and his nuanced understanding of the philosophical complexities inherent in Thomas' writings. In both instances, Picard identifies critical issues and demonstrates an awareness of the diachronic development of Thomas' thought. This is evident in Picard's presentation of Aquinas' texts, which displays a precise knowledge of their chronology. Picard's accurate interpretation of Thomas' theories, approached from a "historical" perspective, is not concerned with establishing a supposed coherence of a doctrinal system. Rather, Picard seeks to take into account Thomas' views in their controversial nature, attempting to demonstrate that they are the most accurate when compared to the opinions of other authors nevertheless. The two case studies presented in the third chapter illustrate that Picard mostly aligns with Thomas' views and rarely presents novel, original insights. However, Picard's direct and *verbatim* reference to Thomas' texts provides insights into how his philosophy and theology were received, debated, and defended during the period preceding his canonization, which are

known as the “early Thomism”. In light of Picard’s example, the fourth chapter will discuss and revalue the historiographical label of “early Thomism”, shifting the paradigm of studying the early reception of Thomas’ legacy from a doctrinal perspective to a textual and philological one. Indeed, the last decades of study on the “early Thomism” attempted in vain to identify a set of doctrines that all those who defended Thomas’ theses in those years were required to accept. Conversely, this doctoral thesis proposes that this label should be primarily associated with the manner in which Thomas’ texts and name were utilized, quoted, and paraphrased in the writings of scholars during the first fifty years following his passing. In this sense, the term “early Thomism” can be understood as an attitude of defending individual philosophical and theological theses that can be traced back to Thomas’ texts, rather than a set of doctrines considered to be distinctive of a supposed Thomas’ system of thought. Furthermore, this attitude is always relative to specific questions. Consequently, what is identified as “early Thomistic” is never an author, but rather a single opinion.

Following this philological paradigm, the fourth chapter offers also a study of the sources of Picard’s *Quaestiones*. This search of the sources has showed that Picard’s work is textually intertwined not only with that of Thomas Aquinas, but also with several Parisian master of theology’s writings and an Oxonian master of Art’s Commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. In this respects, the “unoriginality” of Picard’s *Quaestiones* allows to discover the relations between his work and those of scholars of other cultural center, revealing that the philosophical and theological debates in the *studium generale* of Cologne were open to outside influences and had Thomas’ ideas at their core. The term “unoriginality” is used in this context to describe transmitted knowledge that does not undergo further developments or substantial changes when it is transferred from one author to another, including textual correspondences, *verbatim*, explicit and implicit quotations. This doctoral thesis ultimately aims to highlight the importance of this textual “unoriginality” of medieval Scholastic authors and works, which sheds light on the intricate network of relationships among different authors and cultural hubs, such as Paris, Oxford and Cologne. The philological research into figures like John Picard of Lichtenberg and their underlying sources and references actually serves as one of the best methods for interpreting the development of this scholarly dialogue within its own historical context.

All of this will be evident in the in its different nuances within the edition of the first nineteen questions of Picard’s work, which will be present at the end of this doctoral thesis. This edition was already settled as a part of the *Corpus philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi*. The *Corpus philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi* (CPTMA) is an editorial project founded by Kurt Flasch and Loris Sturlese in 1977. The CPTMA publishes critical editions of theological

and philosophical works written in the Teutonian province during the late Middle Ages (from about 1250 to 1350). The main aim of CPTMA is to shed a new light on the significance of the German medieval philosophy, showing the close link between the Teutonic area, which has always been considered as an independent philosophical center, and the other universities or *studia* of the time.

Currently the progress of the CPTMA is almost complete; only the third section of this editorial project is still totally unpublished, namely, the section devoted to John Picard of Lichtenberg and his *Quaestiones*. This thesis actually aims to fill part of this editorial gap.

1. BIOGRAPHY

A. LIFE

In 1922, Artur Landgraf wrote the reference study on John Picard's life and work: *Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. P. und seine Quaestiones disputatae*. Here he defines John Picard as one of the most faithful German Dominican upholder of Thomas Aquinas' theology during the early 14th century.¹ There is very little information on John Picard's life and works.² He was a Dominican theologian who studied at the *studium generale* of Cologne and, although it is not known when he actually started his teaching period (that is, the office of *lector*) in the German province, it is certain that he was *lector* there already in 1303.³

¹ A. LANDGRAF, "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. P. und seine Quaestiones disputatae," in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 46 (1922), pp. 510-511: "Das gewaltige Ringen um die Lehre des hl. Thomas v. Aquin war nicht auf die Hauptzentren des Kampfes, Paris und Oxford beschränkt; auch Deutschland und vor allem das Studium von Köln nahm an ihm regen Anteil. Albert der Große machte sich noch 1277, also in seinen letzten Lebensjahren, trotz Abratens seiner Mitbrüder auf den Weg, um im Pariser Generalstudium die Schriften seines heiligen Schülers, "der Blüte und Zierde der Welt", zu verteidigen. Dieser Geist der Ehrfurcht vor dem großen Meister ging auch auf die mittelbaren Schüler Alberts über, namentlich Dietrich v. Freiburg und Hugo v. Straßburg. Nicht zuletzt wäre unter diesen Getreuen Johannes Picardi v. Lichtenberg zu nennen. Es ist nicht einseitige Begeisterung, sondern treue und biedere Sachlichkeit, mit der er einmal Albert den Großen und den hl. Thomas "viri optimi" nennt." Here Landgraf mistook in reading the Latin text, the manuscript *V* an *E* actually transmits "optime" rather than "optimi". In light of this mistake, the opinion of Landgraf becomes slightly misleading. John Picard does not state his opinion on the personalities of Albert or Thomas, but he says that they rightly interpret the opinion of the Commentator on Aristotle's doctrine of relative nouns and the relationship between the understanding and what is understood. See JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 9, resp.; *V*, 158vb; *E*, 103rb: "Unde cum isti viri optime viderint Commentatorem, quando praedictum passum exposuerunt, nec tamen illam expositionem acceptaverunt, quod patet ex hoc, quod cum sit notabilis valde, quod tamen nullus eorum eius mentionem facit, unde verisimile est, quod dictum eius non habeat veritatem ibi de intellectu respectu intelligentis, secundum quod isti eum intelligunt."

² On Picard's life and his name see L. STURLESE, "Johannes Picardi von Lichtenberg," in K. RUH (ed.), *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon*, Bd. 4, Berlin-New York 1983, pp. 706-710; and "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg (de Lucidomonte)" in T. KAEPPELL, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, II: G-I, Rome 1975, pp. 527-528; also A. LANDGRAF, "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. P. und seine Quaestiones disputatae," cit., pp. 511-520. See also J. N. PAQUOT, *Mémoires Pour Servir À L'histoire Littéraire Des Dix-sept Provinces Des Pays-bas, De La Principauté De Liège, Et De Quelques Contrées Voisines*, vol. 2, I, Louvain 1768, pp. 282-283, where Paquot claims that John Picard may have been born around the 1270, but this information has no historical evidence. His date of birth is actually unknown.

³ G. LÖHR, *Die Kölner Dominikanerschule vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert. Mit einer Übersicht über die Gesamtentwicklung*, Freiburg (Schweiz) 1946, pp. 35-36 esp. p. 35: "«Nos frater Antonius (de Confluentia), prior provincialis Teuthonie, magister Theodericus (de Freiberg), fr. H. prior Herbipolensis, fr. Johannes de Lichtenberch lector Coloniensis et fr. Wolframus lector Moguntinus O. P., diffinitores provincialis capituli in Confluentia a. d. 1303 celebrati, habita matura deliberacione diffinivimus et diffinientes pronunciamus, terminos quos karissimus in Xo pater fr. Egno, prior Argentinensis, tunc vicarius Austrie, conventui Cremensi amputans ad conservandam benevolentiam nobilium comitis et comitisse de Hardeck, fundatorum conventus Recensis, dicto conventui [*scripsi*: cen- Löhr] assignaverit, propter grave dispendium, quod ex ablacione dictorum terminorum conventus Cremensis [*scripsi*: -nsus Löhr] sustinet, post mortem dicte comitisse de Hardeck redire debent ad conv. Cremensem integraliter et ad plenum, nisi fratres Cremenses de speciali gracia fratribus Recensibus aliquam partem relinquere voluerint de terminis memoratis, non obstante confirmacione qualibet sub quavis forma et modo verborum data vel concessa, quam post decessum sepe dicte comitisse omnino carere viribus decernimus per presentes. In cuius rei testimonium presentes nostrorum sigillorum munimine volumus roborari. Datum in Confluentia quinta feria (ohne Monatsangabe!) in nostro capitulo provinciali.» Original, Pergament." In his sketch of Picard's life, Landgraf quotes the same text from I. LAMATSCH, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Dominikaner- oder Prediger-Ordens in allen Ordens-Provinzen*, Znaim 1854, p. 17.

During his studies in Cologne,⁴ he probably wrote his only work that survived, the so-called *Quaestiones disputatae*⁵. Indeed, the Codex Vaticanus Latinus 859, which transmits this text in its entirety from fol. 151ra to fol. 182vb, has a valuable note at the top right of fol. 151r that confirms this thesis: *Frater Johannes de Lechtinberg,⁶ lector Coloniae, postea bachillarius Parisiensis. 38 quaestiones scriptas determinavit Coloniae.*⁷ Thus, following these data, John Picard composed and discussed his questions when he was teaching in Cologne before his Parisian baccalaureate.

This lead must be taken very seriously. Indeed, the records of the Dominican general chapter, which was held in Padua in 1308, state that John Picard became a provincial prior in the Northwest of Germany after his Parisian baccalaureate.⁸ Following this line, he must have left Cologne between 1305 and 1307, commenting on the *Sentences* presumably for one or two years⁹ and concluding his theological studies before 1308, that is, before Dominican Order entrusted him with the direction of the Teutonic province. John Picard held this position until 1310, when the Dominican general chapter in Piacenza named him *magister theologiae* in Paris

⁴ Cf. K. EMERY, JR., “The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Cognition according to Henry of Ghent,” in J. A. A. ERTSEN – K. EMERY, JR. – A. SPEER (eds.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, Berlin 2001, pp. 59-124, esp. pp. 63-64: “More intriguingly, I think, Henry’s quodlibetal question was attacked directly by a Dominican follower of Thomas Aquinas across the Rhine. Sometime between 1303 and 1305 at the Dominican *Studium* in Cologne, John Picardi of Lichtenberg disputed the question „Utrum imago Trinitatis sit in anima vel secundum actus vel secundum potentiam“.”

⁵ See A. LANDGRAF, “Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. Praed. und seine Quaestiones disputatae,” cit., p. 523. Although Landgraf suggests Picard’s work to be *Quaestiones disputatae*, Grabmann takes the view that Picard’s questions are more similar to *Quodlibeta* than to disputed questions. See M. GRABMANN, *Neu aufgefundene lateinische Werke deutscher Mystiker*, München 1922, p. 15; ID., *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, vol. I, München 1926, p. 414, n. 27. For a wider consideration on this topic see *infra* the paragraph. “c. THE LITERARY GENRE OF THE QUAESTIONES”, pp. 11-16.

⁶ Landgraf wrongly reads here “Lechtenberg” instead of “Lechtinberg”, see A. LANDGRAF, “Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. Praed. und seine Quaestiones disputatae,” cit., p. 523. Landgraf also takes into account the various versions of John Picard’s name that circulated during the Middle Ages and identifies his birthplace as the small village of Lichtenberg, now a commune in the Bas-Rhin department in the Grand Est in north-eastern France. See A. LANDGRAF, “Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. Praed. und seine Quaestiones disputatae,” cit., pp. 511-514.

⁷ Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg, *Quaestiones* (= V, 151r).

⁸ B. M. REICHERT, *Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. II: *ab anno 1304 usque ad annum 1378*, in *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica*, vol. IV, Roma 1899, p. 37 [1308], lin. 23-27: “Ponimus vicarios in provinciis infrascriptis, quousque provinciales in eisdem provinciis electi, confirmati fuerint et presentes: in provincia Theutonie fr. Iohanem Lucemberch bacalareum Parisiensem; in provincia Ungarie fr. Paulum priorem Pestensem; in provincia Tholosana fr. Guillelmum de Anhanis priorem Tholosanum.”

⁹ W. J. COURTENAY, “Durand in His Educational and Intellectual Context”, in A. SPEER – F. RETUCCI – T. JESCHKE – G. GULDENTOPS (eds.), *Durand of Saint-Pourçain and His Sentences Commentary: Historical, Philosophical, and Theological Issues (Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales - Bibliotheca 9)*, Leuven 2014, pp. 21-22 and p. 21, n. 12; C. SCHABEL, “James of Metz’s *Lectura* on the *Sentences*,” in R. HOFMEISTER PICH – A. SPEER (eds.), *Contemplation and Philosophy: Scholastic and Mystical Modes of Medieval Philosophical Thought*, Leiden 2018, pp. 342-426, esp. 355-356; cf. also W. DUBA – C. SCHABEL, “Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the Myth of the Two-Year Sentences Lecture at Paris,” in: *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 84 (2017), pp. 143-179.

on 3rd of November 1310.¹⁰ After this date, he taught the *Sentences* there for only one year, until 1311.¹¹

Indeed, for the period between 1311 and 1313, he was appointed councilor and nuncio to Henry VII¹² and, on April 4, 1313, pope Clement V appointed John Picard as bishop of Regensburg.¹³ However, on March 21, 1313, the cathedral chapter of Regensburg had already

¹⁰ B. M. REICHERT, *Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. II, *ab anno 1304 usque ad annum 1378*, cit., p. 48 [1310], lin. 33-34: “Absolvimus priorem provincialem Theutonie, quia mittimus eum Parisius ad recipiendum magisterium in sacra theologia”; P. H. DENIFLE – F. EHRLE, *Archiv für Litteratur- und Kirchen Geschichte des Mittelalters II*, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung: Berlin (1886), p. 213: “(60.) frater Johannes Picardi de Lucemberc, Theutonicus, fuit licenciatus MCCCX tercia die mensis novembris.”; J. QUÉTIF – J. ÉCHARD, *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum recensiti, notisque historicis et criticis illustrati*, vol. I, Paris 1719, pp. 522-523, esp. p. 522: “Hoc revera obtinuit eodem anno, ut habet Bernardus Guidonis in indice n. 57: F. Joannes Picardi de Lucemberc Teutonicus fuit licentiatus anno Domini MCCCX tertia die mensis novembris. Annos duo sequentes in gymnasio Sanjacobeo sententias de more publice interpretatum esse certum [...]”; cf. also P. H. DENIFLE – E. CHATELAIN, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 2: Sectio prior 1286-1350, Paris (1891), pp. 143-144 [1310, 682]: “Abolvimus priorem provincialem Theutonie, quia mittimus eum Parisius ad recipiendum in sacra theologia.”

¹¹ W. J. COURTENAY, “The Educational and Intellectual Framework of German Dominicans in the Late 13th and Early 14th Centuries,” in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), pp. 245-259, esp. p. 257: “Johannes Picardi was regent master at Paris in 1310-1311, precisely the time of Herveus’ first attack on the views of Durand of St. Pourçain, all three of whom were resident at St. Jacques.”

¹² See *Monumenta Germaniae historica: Legum sectio 4: Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum* Tomi IV. Pars I, Hannoverae et Lipsiae 1906, pp. 580,14-29 and-581,2-15: “Noverit universitas vestra, quod nos de fide et legalitate venerabilium Girardi Basiliensis et Hugutionis Novariensis episcoporum ac religiosi viri fratris Iohannis de Lucidomonte ordinis Predicatorum magistri in theologia, consiliariorum, secretariorum ac nunciorum nostrorum ad sedem apostolicam, plenius confidentes, damus eis plenam et liberam potestatem nominandi et eligendi tres personas nomine nostro et pro nobis, que simul cum aliis tribus personis eligendis pro parte magnifici principis Philippi regis Francorum illustris habeant potestatem inquirendi, ordinandi, decernendi et terminandi omnes interprisias, controversias et questiones secundum formam tractatus conventionum et promissionum habiti factarum et iuratarum per nobilem virum Iohannem de Flandria comitem Namurcensem consanguineum et fidelem nostrum et honorabilem virum magistrum Symonem de Marvilla thesaurarium Methensis ecclesie, consiliarios, familiares, procuratores et nuncios nostros. ex parte nostra et nobiles viros Ludovicum de Claromonte et magistrum Petrum de Latilly, procuratores et nuncios eiusdem regis Francie, ex parte sua, nec non ad omnes interprisias, questiones et controversias, que in posterum quod absit inter nos et ipsum regem contingeret suboriri, secundum formam tractatus conventionum et promissionum immediate predictarum.”; “Noverint universi presentes litteras seu instrumentum publicum inspecturi, quod in presentia reverendi patris et domini Arnaldi Dei gratia Sancte in Porticu dyaconi cardinalis venerabiles patres Dei gratia domini Gerardus Basiliensis et Hugutio Novariensis episcopi et religiosus vir frater Iohannes de Lucidomonte ordinis Predicatorum magister in theologia, consiliarii, secretarii, procuratores ac nuncii serenissimi principis domini Henrici Dei gratia Romanorum regis semper augusti ad infrascriptam nominationem specialiter constituti, prout in litteris seu procuratione regie maiestati sigillo cereo pendenti cum filis cericis ipsius attentico munitis tenoris et continentie infrascripte plenius continetur, auctoritate et potestate eis ex predictis litteris seu procuratione concessa nominaverunt concorditer ad negotium in dictis litteris et procuratione contentum venerabilem patrem dominum Henricum Dei gratia Coloniensem archiepiscopum ac spectabilem virum dominum Guidonem de Flandria et nobilem virum dominum Ottonem de Grandisono militem ac faciendum et exequendum omnia et singula, que in prefatis litteris seu procuratione regia continentur.”; *Monumenta Germaniae historica: Legum sectio 4: Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum* Tomi IV. Pars II, Hannoverae et Lipsiae 1909-1911, p. 811,16-17: “In verso leguntur: Transcriptum littere imperatori per fratrem Iohannem eius nuncium misse.”

¹³ *Regestum Clementis papae V annus octavus* (vol. 60), ed. MONACHORUM ORDINIS S. BENEDICTI, Roma 1888, esp. pp. 174, n. 9262; 304-305, n. 9698: “Avenione, 4 apr. 1313. Defuncto Conrado episcopo Ratisbonen, et ecclesia eadem dispositioni sedis apostolicae reservata Clemens Pp. V Iohannem ordinem fratrum Praedicatorum professum et in sacerdotio constitutum praeficit eidem Ratisbonen. ecclesiae in episcopum. (cap. 301, f. 105a) Dilecto filio Iohanni electo Ratisponen. Apostolatus officium quamquam.... Dat. Avinione, II nonas aprilis, anno octavo.”; “In prioratu de Grauselto, 9 oct. 1313. Ratificat et approbat confirmationem per Wichardum archiepiscopum Salzeburgen, factam de Nicolao electo Ratisbonen. (cap. 6.45, f. 2066). Dilecto filio Nicolao

elected Nicholas von Stachowitz as bishop. This election was immediately confirmed by archbishop Wichard of Salzburg and ratified by pope Clement V in October 1313. Therefore, John Picard never received the bishopric.¹⁴ Unfortunately, after this year, there is no other information about him.

This chronology of John Picard's life seems to be reliable and respects the standard period of training that a Dominican theologian had to spend in order to become bachelor and master of theology in that decade. Besides, the type of education, which a Dominican theologian received, usually outlined his political and philosophical weight within the Dominican Order itself. It seems that a brief look at the Dominican educational programme can help to understand the role of the figure of John Picard within the Order.

B. EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT

The second half of 13th-century and the first decades of the 14th-century were a turning point for the Dominican institutions and their educational programmes. In fact, the Dominican Order founded the *studia generalia* of Cologne, Oxford, Montpellier, and Bologna in 1248 because of the excessive number of students attending the convent of St. Jacques in Paris.¹⁵

electo Ratisponen. Dudum ecclesia Ratisponen, per obitum bone memorie Conradi episcopi Ratisponen, pastore vacante dilecti filii capitulum ipsius ecclesie te tunc eiusdem ecclesie canonicum in Ratisponen. episcopum concorditer elegerunt et, licet nos elapsis decem diebus post electionem huiusmodi provisionem ea vice de pastore ipsi ecclesie faciendam duxissemus dispositioni apostolice reservandam ac demum de dilecto filio Iohanne de Lucidomonte ordinis Predicatorum eidem ecclesie providendum preficiendo eum ipsi ecclesie in episcopum et pastorem, tamen venerabilis frater noster Wichardus archiepiscopus Salzeburgen., cui ecclesia ipsa Ratisponen. metropolitico iure subesse dinoscitur, reservationis et provisionis huiusmodi, de quibus adhuc nulla in illis partibus mentio habebatur, ignarus omnino huiusmodi electionem tuam, quam ab eo eiusdem sibi presentato decreto confirmari cum instantia postularas, quia ipsam huiusmodi decreto ac persona tua examinatis sollicitate invenit de te persona idonea canonicamente celebratam, servatis iuris solemnitatibus, que consueverunt in talibus observari, auctoritate metropolitana confirmavit; tuque postmodum administrans in ecclesia supradicta regalia recepisti et sponte ac libere cessisti quibusdam beneficiis ecclesiasticis, que tunc tenebas obtinebas. Postmodum vero, cum ad tuam fama referente de reservatione ac provisione huiusmodi notitiam pervenisset, tu habens super premissis ad apostolicam sedem recursum per procuratorem tuum, quem cum decreto predicto ad nostram destinasti presentiam, tibi super hoc per sedis eiusdem subveniri providentiam supplicasti. Nos vero, qui sumus omnibus in iustitia debitores, iuri tuo in hac parte derogare nolentes dilecto filio nostro Francisco sancte Marie in Cosmedin diacono cardinali ad eiusdem tui procuratoris instantiam cominisimus oraculo vive. vocis, ut inquisita per eum, utrum electio supradicta reservationem, ut predicatur, precessisset eandem, diligentius veritate, quod super hoc per inquisitionem huiusmodi reperiret, nobis referre curaret. Facta igitur deinde nobis super premissis per cardinalem eundem relatione fidei, quia nobis constat per relationem huiusmodi prefatam electionem reservationem eandem per decem dies, ut premititur, precessisse, predictam confirmationem per eundem archiepiscopum de prefata electione tua factam, ut predicatur, auctoritate apostolica ex certa scientia ratificamus et etiam approbamus illamque reservationem ac provisionem non obstantibus supradictis plenam et perfectam roboris firmitatem obtinere decernimus dictumque archiepiscopum posse et debere circa consecrationem tuam sui officii debitum exercere. Nulli ergo etc. nostre ratificationis, approbationis et constitutionis etc. Dat. in prioratu de Grausello prope Malausanam Vasionen. diocesis, VII idus octobris, anno octavo.”

¹⁴ *O.c.*, pp. 304-305, n. 9698.

¹⁵ W. J. COURTENAY, “The educational and intellectual framework of German Dominicans in the late 13th and early 14th centuries,” cit., pp. 246-247: “To set the context for these questions, we need to review the Dominican educational program as it existed in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, beginning with the place of

Although Dominicans usually provided the same teachings for all *studia*, some foreign students could often be sent to Paris to become lector, bachelor, or *magister Parisiensis*. On this issue, William Courtenay claims that the Dominican Order established two different educational programs for foreign students at the convent of St. Jacques:¹⁶

(1) After some years of training in theological and philosophical disciplines, the most skilled Dominicans coming from the various provinces of the Order would have attended the lectorate program in theology at the Parisian convent. Since the lectorate program had the purpose of improving the intellectual leadership of each Dominican province, these latter chose the candidates that could complete their education in Paris. In so doing, the various Dominican provinces aimed to develop their faculty to ensure the best teaching possible in their own *studia*. At the end of the lectorate program, the new lecturers should indeed come back and taught at the convents of their home province.¹⁷

(2) Besides the lectorate program, Dominican students could get their university degrees (baccalaureate or *magisterium*) in theology either through the bachelor or the doctoral program. To obtain his baccalaureate, a Dominican student had to comment and take lectures on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* for one or two years. Similarly, when a Dominican master was licensed and incepted in teaching at the Parisian convent, he usually held his office for one or two years. The candidates for this second university program was appointed by the general *minister* or, more often, by the general chapter of the Order instead of being chosen by the leadership of the provinces. From this latter information, it is clear that the appointment of students for the baccalaureate or the doctoral program did not directly concern the intellectual development of the individual provinces, but that of the entire Order.¹⁸

Paris within the *studia generalia* of the Dominican Order. As is well known, St. Jacques was initially the sole *studium generale* for the study of theology and remained the principal one even after the establishment in 1248 of other *studia generalia* at Cologne, Oxford, Montpellier and Bologna (for Germany, England, southern France, and Italy, respectively). To that group were added Naples and Barcelona, and in 1282, with the exception of Greece and the Holy Land, every province was required to have a *studium generale*. The expansion in the number of *studia generalia* resulted from the need for more centers for training in theology and the inability of the Paris convent to accommodate such large numbers of students." See also M. M. MULCHAHEY, 'First the Bow Is Bent in Study'. *Dominican Education before 1350*, Toronto 1998, esp. pp. 337-340, 351-384.

¹⁶ W. J. COURTENAY, "The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century," in P. BILLER – R. B. DOBSON (eds.), *The Medieval Church: Universities, Heresy, and the Religious Life* (Studies in Church History Subsidia 11), Woodbridge 1999, pp. 81-83.

¹⁷ IBIDEM; see also P. H. DENIFLE - E. CHATELAIN, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*. vol. 2, cit., p. 57 [1292,580]: "Item mittendi Parisius ad studium generale primo exerceantur tribus vel duobus annis post novitiatum in aliquo studio provincie sue vel vicine, nisi adeo litterati fuerint quod post novitiatum continuo possint mitti. Non mittantur tamen nisi de auctoritate ministri cum consilio et assensu Capituli provincialis."

¹⁸ W. J. COURTENAY, "The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century," cit., pp. 81-83; see also P. H. DENIFLE - E. CHATELAIN, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*. vol. 2, cit., p. 56 [1292,580]: "De fratribus lecturis Sententias et ad magisterium presentandis Parisius minister provideat generalis."

Because of the founding of many new *studia generalia*, being appointed to the baccalaureate and doctoral program in Paris became increasingly selective and competitive and only few students could be sent to St. Jacques to become bachelor or *magister Parisiensis*. In the late 13th-century, Dominicans held only two chairs for each program, one reserved for theologians coming from the province of France and the other for those from other provinces. Furthermore, Dominicans were allowed to appoint only one new bachelor or master per year and each chair was available every two years. Thus, every year there was one bachelor in his first year of reading the *Sentences* and the other in his second year: each coming from different provinces of the Order. An “external” bachelor was usually appointed in the odd-numbered years. There was instead more flexibility concerning the election of an “external” regent master.¹⁹

Coming back to John Picard, he was lector at the *studium generale* of Cologne already in 1303. Therefore, before beginning his truly university-connected path, he would also have taken part – as student – in a distinct lectorate program in some province of the Order.²⁰ After an unknown number of years of teaching in Cologne, it is very likely that, as Chris Schabel states, John Picard could have read the *Sentences* during the year 1305-1306²¹ and there is no doubt that John Picard was *magister theologiae* between 1310 and 1311/1312.²²

¹⁹ W. J. COURTENAY, “The educational and intellectual framework of German Dominicans in the late 13th and early 14th centuries,” cit., pp. 247-248; ID., “The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century,” cit., p. 83 and esp. n. 15: “The Dominicans had two chairs of theology, one reserved for candidates from the province of France and one for candidates from the other provinces. Since they were not allowed to put forward more than one candidate each year for the baccalaureate, the selection alternated between the two chairs.”

²⁰ A list of names of Dominican students who did not support king Philippe le Bel’s campaign against Boniface VIII shows that there were German Dominicans studying at were at the convent of Montpellier in 1303. Then, the Dominican *studia generalia* accepted foreign students to attend their lectorate programs in theology. See A. DONDAINE, *Documents pour servir à l’histoire de la province de France. L’appel au concile (1303)*, in: *Archivium Fratrum Predicatorum* 22 (1952), pp. 381-439, esp. pp. 430-432. On this list appears the name *Johannes de Colonia*, but it could probably correspond to the German Dominican John of Sterngassen. Cf. W. J. COURTENAY, “The educational and intellectual framework of German Dominicans in the late 13th and early 14th centuries,” cit., pp. 255-256.

²¹ Although Courtenay uncertainly suggests that John Picard read the *Sentences* in the two-year period 1305-1307, Schabel reconstructs the catalogue of Dominican *sententiarum* at Paris between the early 1290’s and the early 1300’s in C. SCHABEL, “James of Metz’s *Lectura* on the *Sentences*,” cit. pp. 355-356, and, according to his list, the probable date would be rather the 1305-1306.

²² To understand better John Picard in his own context, one must think that during his bachelor program, he probably lived at St. Jacques together with Laurence of Nantes, Yves of Caen, and, perhaps, James of Metz, Romeus of Bruguera, Berengar of Landorre and Durand of Saint-Pourçain; whereas, when he was regent master in Paris, the Dominican bachelor students might be John of Naples, Peter of Palude and Theodor of Saxony. Cf. *o.c.*, “James of Metz’s *Lectura* on the *Sentences*,” cit. p. 355 and W. J. COURTENAY, “The educational and intellectual framework of German Dominicans in the late 13th and early 14th centuries,” cit., p. 256-257, who also lists the names of theologians belonging to other Orders: “The Augustinian Hermit, Johannes Pagnota, would have been lecturing on the *Sentences* in 1306-1308, overlapping with Picardi’s second year as *sententarius*, and among theologians in residence in 1307-1308 were the Franciscans Bertrand de la Tour and Nicholas of Lyra, the Carmelite Guy of Terrena, the Cistercian Jacques de Thérines, and the secular bachelors Jean de Pouilly and Henry of Harclay. During Picardi’s second documented time at Paris, which began four months after the burning of

In this respect, it should be recalled that obtaining the chair reserved for the bachelor student coming outside France became a complex goal in those years. Indeed, the German province of Teutonia should compete every two years against Saxony and all the other non-French provinces to incept one of its candidates.²³ But, despite this highly competitive field, John Picard was chosen by the Dominican Order to become both bachelor and master of theology at St. Jacques.²⁴ This evidence shows how this German theologian may have been relevant for the Dominican Order over that decade.

From this perspective, Picard's *Quaestiones* would be one of the reasons why John Picard of Lichtenberg filled both the chair of bachelor and master of theology in Paris.²⁵

C. SUPPOSITIONS AND REMARKS

Many scholars relied on Landgraf's biography of John Picard²⁶ and based their own hypotheses on it, assuming that Picard had begun his teaching period in 1303 – the same year in which he is actually mentioned as *lector Coloniae* – and wrote his *Quaestiones* between 1303 and 1305.²⁷

Marguerite Porete, [...] Thomas de Bailly, Gerard of St. Victor, Gerard of Bologna, Jean de Pouilly, and Nicholas of Lyra were probably still active in the faculty of theology.”

²³ As Courtenay underlines, during the first half of the 14th-century, only two masters of theology came from the province of Teutonia: John Picard of Lichtenberg (1305-1306/1307) and Bartholomeus de Bolsenheim (1351-1352). See *o.c.*, cit., p. 249, n. 12.

²⁴ Being incepted as *magister Parisiensis* was less competitive and easier than taking part in baccalaureate. Indeed, differently from the chosen bachelor students, the *magister theologiae* had not to compete with all the other students of the provinces, but only with those who read the *Sentences* in the previous years. See ID., “The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century,” cit., p. 83.

²⁵ Indeed, besides the intellectual productions of theologians, Courtenay stressed the essential role the institutional and diplomatic skills played in the formation and selection process of the new mendicant masters of theology in *o.c.*, p. 80, 87-88 and 90: “[...] the selection of candidates for the baccalaureate and doctorate at Paris was not based solely or perhaps even primarily on academic achievement as evaluated by those under whom they had studied, but rather on a mixture of qualifications within which political and social considerations played an important part. [...] And because those chosen to proceed to the baccalaureate and doctorate were being groomed as much for administration as for learning, I also suspect that social background, diplomatic skills, and contacts within a defined network were important criteria in the selection process. [...] As suggested above, the Dominicans and Franciscans may have been choosing to send to Paris for the baccalaureate and doctorate those who were being groomed and had been groomed for an administrative career in the Order and the Church.”

²⁶ Cf. for example M. GRABMANN, *Die theologische Erkenntnis- und Einleitungslehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin auf Grund seiner Schrift “In Boethium de Trinitate”*, Freiburg 1948, pp. 362-365, esp. pp. 362-363: “Eine ausführliche Untersuchung über Leben, Schriften und Lehrrichtung dieses Theologen verdanken wir Weihbischof A. Landgraf”; ID., *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, vol. I, cit., pp. 410-420.

²⁷ See P. PORRO, “Essere e essenza in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg: note sulla prima ricezione del tomismo a Colonia,” in M. PICKAVÉ (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag*, Berlin 2003, pp. 226-245; esp. p. 226: “Giovanni fu lettore a Colonia a partire dal 1303, prima di terminare la sua formazione teologica a Parigi, dove commentò le „Sentenze“ tra il 1305 e il 1308; è quindi segnalato come provinciale tra il 1308 e il 1310, e come consigliere e nunzio (anche in Italia) di Enrico VII tra il 1311 e il 1313, anno in cui sarebbe stato nominato da Clemente V vescovo di Regensburg, ma a partire dal quale non si hanno più notizie. Le „Quaestiones disputatae“ risalgono appunto al periodo in cui Giovanni era *lector* a Colonia”; M. LEONE, “La libertà del volere in Giovanni di Lichtenberg,” in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), pp. 303-334, esp. p. 303: “Giovanni Picardi compone a Colonia questi testi (1303-1305)”; and n. 1:

A chronological list of Cologne lectors, made by Gabriel Löhr²⁸ and quoted by Walter Senner,²⁹ corroborates this common opinion, suggesting that there was only one lector at a time in the *studium generale* and excluding the possibility that many lectors taught simultaneously. Following this reconstruction, Picard was the successor of some other lectors (for instance, Henricus de Lovanio and Magister Gerardus) and must have written his work after 1303. Indeed, it would have been unlikely that he became *lector* already before his predecessors and appointed again after them.

However, contrary to what most of the scholars think, it is uncertain that Picard began his teaching period in 1303. Indeed, it must be recalled that Picard was *lector* already in 1303, but it is not known when he actually started teaching in Cologne. As William Courtenay emphasizes, the students who were chosen for the Parisian bachelor program, such as Picard around 1305, had “usually many years of post-lectorate experience in teaching or administration at provincial level” before taking part in the doctoral program.³⁰ Moreover,

“Le Quaestiones sono state per la prima volta esaminate e numerate da A. LANDGRAF, “Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O Praed. und seine *Quaestiones disputatae*,” in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 46 (1922) 510-555.”; moreover, based on Landgraf’s information about Picard’s biography, Alessandra Beccarisi suggests that Dietrich of Freiberg’s *De tribus difficilibus quaestionibus* was composed after 1303 (precisely after Picard’s *Quaestiones*), because Picard does not take Dietrich’s doctrine of *abditum mentis* into account, and Dietrich himself seems to refer to Picard implicitly when he speaks about the *communiter loquentes* in his *De tribus difficilibus quaestionibus*: see A. BECCARISI, “Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg: un exemple de thomisme dans l’horizon culturel allemand,” in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), pp. 286-302, esp. pp. 286-295; EAD., “Johannes Picardi von Lichtenberg, Dietrich von Frieberg und Meister Eckhart: Eine Debatte in Deutschland um 1308,” in A. SPEER – D. WIRMER (eds.), *1308. Eine Topographie historischer Gleichzeitigkeit*, Berlin 2010, pp. 516-538. However, Mojsisch already stressed the relationship between Picard and Dietrich: see B. MOJSISCH, *Meister Eckhart. Analogie, Univozität und Einheit*, Hamburg 1983, p. 75, n. 52. Mojsisch highlighted that Picard explicitly quotes Dietrich, Albert the Great, and Henry of Ghent in his question 5 (“Utrum lux sit qualitas realis vel intentionalis”) and that this might help establish a *terminus ante quem* of two works written by Dietrich, namely *De luce et eius origine* and *De coloribus*. Indeed, the precise date of these two treatises is not known, but Wallace and Rehn believe that Dietrich wrote *De luce* before 1304 and, more certainly, *De coloribus* between 1304-1310. See W. A. WALLACE, *The Scientific Methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg*, Fribourg 1959, p. 17, and DIETRICH VON FREIBERG, *Tractatus de luce et eius origine*, in: *Opera omnia. Tomus IV. Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft. Briefe*, eds. M. R. PAGNONI-STURLESE – R. REHN – L. STURLESE – W. A. WALLACE, Hamburg 1985, p. 5. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, since the two theologians knew each other personally (cf. *supra*, n. 3) and taught in the same *studium generale* of Cologne, it is likely that Picard does not refer to either of Dietrich’s works, but simply gave credit to him as a valid authority regarding the nature of light and color, together with Albert the Great and Henry of Ghent. For further literature on Picard, see Z. RADEVA, “Ein averroistischer Missklang im Werk des Thomas von Aquin: Die dimensiones interminatae und ihre fortuna in thomistischen Konkordanzversuchen des ausgehenden Mittelalters,” in M. MELIADÒ – S. NEGRI (eds.), *Widersprüche und Konkordanz. Peter von Bergamo und der Thomismus im Spätmittelalter*, Leiden 2020, pp. 190-250, esp. pp. 236-239; M. BENEDETTO, “Materia, corpi ed estensione in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg,” in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), pp. 335-368; and S. ROUDAUT, *La mesure de l’être. Le problème de la quantification des formes au Moyen Âge (ca. 1250-1370)*, Leiden 2022, pp. 57 and 92-93.

²⁸ G. LÖHR, “Zur Geschichte der Kölner Dominikanerschule im 14. Jahrhundert,” in *Divus Thomas* 23 (1945), pp. 57-84.

²⁹ W. SENNER, *Johannes von Sterngassen OP. Teil I: Studie*, Berlin 1995, pp. 128-130.

³⁰ W. J. COURTENAY, “The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century,” cit., pp. 77-92, esp. p. 84. Here, Courtenay uses the term “lectorate” to refer to the period of theological study the student had to do before becoming a lector; see *o.c.*, pp. 90-91: “Several observations emerge from the

there is no precise rule concerning the period in between the beginning of the teaching period and the bachelor program. This interim “period might actually range anywhere from five to twenty years,” and bachelor students and regent masters were “probably on the average in their early-to-mid forties.”³¹ Hence, it cannot be excluded that John Picard wrote his questions even before 1303.

However, this hypothesis seems to speak against the interpretation of Löhr’s list, which suggests that no multiple lectors taught simultaneously in Cologne. Upon closer examination, this interpretation of Löhr’s list does not correspond to what the Dominican Order actually stated in its *Acta capitulorum* of those years. It was not until 1305 that the Dominican Order stated that each convent should have only one *lector principalis* and that only when it was common for a convent to have two lectors, one would be *lector principalis* and the other a *cursor Sententiarium*.³² This statement reveals two things: first, that the Dominican Order felt the need to reform the structure of its educational system and, second, that it was not unusual to have two lectors teaching at a single convent before the 1305. Hence, this statement of the *Acta* invalidates the traditional interpretation according to which John Picard could not have been a lector before 1303. Since it was possible to have more than one lector teaching simultaneously at a single *studium generale* before 1305, it also seems likely that Picard had taught as a *lector* in Cologne at the same time as other lectors mentioned by Löhr’s list. Also, in accordance with Courtenay’s thesis, Picard’s teaching period might have begun much earlier than the year in which he was actually called *lector Coloniae*.

2. WORKS

2.1. QUAESTIONES

foregoing analysis. The first is the importance of viewing the teaching programme of the Parisian convents as two related but essentially separate programmes. The residence list for the Franciscan convent at Paris in 1303 allows us to go behind the educational legislation of the order to see how the quota system actually worked in reality. It reveals a large lectorate programme, which, given university restrictions, could not be part of one theological programme leading to the baccalaureate and doctorate. In fact, a closer look at the candidates chosen for the doctorate reveals that they were almost invariably chosen from a more senior group of those who had, subsequent to the lectorate, established themselves through teaching and administrative activities in their home province. And this, in turn, means that commentaries on the *Sentences* were not the products of those who had just completed their years of study for the lectorate, but rather of those who had had several years, perhaps many years, of teaching and administrative duties in their home provinces or provincial *studia*.”

³¹ *O.c.*, pp. 84-85.

³² B. M. REICHERT, *Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. II: *ab anno 1304 usque ad annum 1378*, p. 13 [1305], lin. 23-25: “Volumus autem et ordinamus, quod in uno conventu non sit nisi unus lector principalis, et in locis, ubi duo lectores consueverunt poni, cursor sententiarum loco alterius assignetur.”

As stated above, the *Quaestiones* are the only survived work of John Picard's intellectual production. Nowadays, only one manuscript entirely transmits Picard's *Quaestiones*: the codex Vaticanus Latinus 859 (Ms. Vat. Lat. 859, fols. 151ra-182vb = *V*).³³ In his study, Landgraf points out many omissions and *lacunae* in the Vatican manuscript, which he believes are probably due to the scribe's lack of skill.³⁴ For this reason, Landgraf states that the Vatican manuscript can only be an incomplete copy and expresses his own disappointment and complains about the absence of other manuscripts.³⁵ Besides *V*, which features Picard's text in its entirety, the other known manuscript that contains a part of this work is Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, MS. 748 (= *K*):³⁶ it transmits only one question *Utrum esse et essentia differant realiter vel sint idem* (fols. 56ra-58ra). However, thanks to Maxime Mauriège, a further witness of John Picard's *Quaestiones* has been found. It is a 13th- or 14th-century manuscript from the Bibliotheca Amploniana of Erfurt (Cod. Ampl. Fol. 321, fols. 99rb-108vb = *E*) which transmits only eleven questions of Picard's work.³⁷

This useful finding reveals more about John Picard's *Quaestiones*. For example, although the topics of the questions in *E* coincide with those in *V*, the Erfurt manuscript contains fewer

³³ For the description of the *V*, see A. PELZER, *Codices Vaticani Latini*, t. 2, pars prior, Roma 1931, pp. 229-233 and R. MACKEN, *Bibliotheca manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo. II: Catalogue Q-Z, Répertoire*, Leuven 1979, pp. 806-811; see also A. LANDGRAF, "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. Praed. und seine Quaestiones disputatae," cit., pp. 523-526.

³⁴ See for example *V*, 152va lin. 24, 154va lin. 57, 155ra lin. 27, 174rb lin. 19, 174va lin. 10, 175vb lin. 22-23vb, 177va lin. 24, 181va lin. 43. Cf. *o.c.*, pp. 523-524.

³⁵ *O.c.*, pp. 523: "Leider ließ sich bis jetzt keine andere Handschrift gleichen Inhaltes feststellen, was besonders deshalb zu bedauern ist, weil die vorliegende, ohne Zweifel eine Abschrift, teilweise empfindliche Mängel aufweist. So ließ der Schreiber, wohl weil er die Vorlage nicht entziffern konnte, Lücken im Text, um sie vielleicht später einmal auszufüllen. Einmal ist auf diese Weise fast eine volle Zeile ausgeschaltet. Auch die Korrektur geht höchstens bis f. 168."

³⁶ The manuscript is not available to me, but a description of the manuscript *K* is to be found in Z. WŁODEK, "Hermann de Augsburg et ses Quaestiones de quodlibet dans le BJ MS 748", in *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 6 (1961), pp. 11-27 and in W. SENKO, "Joannis Picardi de Lichtenberg quaestio disputata de esse et essentia ex cod. 748 Bibl. Jagellonicae," in *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 8 (1961), pp. 3-28, where Senko transcribes Picard's question "Utrum esse et essentia differant realiter vel sint idem."; see also ID., *Tomasza z Akwinu Opusikulum „De ente et essentia“* [...], Warszawa 1978, pp. 146-165 and P. PORRO, "Essere e essenza in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg: note sulla prima ricezione del tomismo a Colonia," cit., pp. 226-245. Four other Picard's questions have been transcribed separately during time: (1) "Utrum voluntas moveat se ipsam vel ab alio moveatur" in R. MARTIN, "Mag. Joh. de Lichtenberg O.P. († ca. 1313) Doctrina de motivo humanae voluntatis," in *Divus Thomas* 2 (1924), pp. 149-157; (2) "Utrum imago Trinitatis sit in anima vel secundum actus vel secundum potentiam" in B. MOJSISCH, *Meister Eckhart. Analogie, Univozität und Einheit*, cit., pp. 147-161; (3) "Utrum Deus potuerit sumere humanam naturam sine supposito" in W. SENNER, "Christ in the Writings of the Rhineland Dominicans," in K. EMERY, JR. – J. WAWRYKOW (eds.), *Christ among the Medieval Dominicans. Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of the Order of Preachers*, Notre Dame 1998, pp. 393-413; "Utrum relatio in divinis distinguat personas, in quantum est [coni.: sunt] essentia vel in quantum differunt ab ea" in M. SCHMAUS, *Der Liber Proprius des Thomas Anglicus audn die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, Münster i.W. 1930, pp. 412-417, n. 67.

³⁷ For the description of this manuscript *E* see MEISTER ECKHART, *Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke. Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft: Die lateinischen Werke*, eds. A. ZIMMERMANN – L. STURLESE, vol. V, Stuttgart 2006, pp. 3-5; W. SCHUM, *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt*, Berlin 1887, pp. 222-223.

of them (*V* contains 39 quaestiones, whereas *E* has only 11 quaestiones). Taking the single question of *K* into consideration as well, this leads to the assumption that John Picard's questions could have circulated independently from each other. Besides this little general information, a closer look to Vatican and Erfurt manuscripts raises other problems and speculations about Picard's work.

2.1.1. TEXTUAL PROBLEMS

A. HEADLINE AND ATTRIBUTION OF THE *QUAESTIONES* IN MS. VAT. LAT. 859

Neither the Vatican manuscript nor the Erfurt manuscript has both *incipit* and *explicit* for Picard's work. Furthermore, the headline in Ms. Vat. Lat. 859 (fols. 151ra) – written by a hand other than the one writing the main text – identifies Picard as the author of the following questions, and mentions him only as a Parisian baccalaureate: *Frater Johannes de Lechtinberg, lector Coloniae, postea bachillarius Parisiensis. 38 quaestiones scriptas determinavit Coloniae*. However, this annotation does not make no reference to his later *magisterium* in Paris. This evidence arouses a question: Why not refer to Picard by his most prestigious title when ascribing a work to him? An hypothetical answer is to consider that either the manuscript was written before 1310, i.e. before Picard received the title of *magister*, or depended on another manuscript written before 1310. Furthermore, the annotation would date back to the period between the end of the baccalaureate and before the beginning of the *magisterium*.

B. QUESTIONS' NUMBERING

The same aforementioned annotation is not unproblematic. It states that the manuscript contains a total of 38 questions. Landgraf comes up with a list of only 36 questions, and he supposed that the manuscript could be corrupted or lacking parts.³⁸ He actually merges four separate questions due to their brevity and content similarity (177ra-rb: *Utrum sit maior unio per intellectum vel voluntatem*; 177rb: *Item quaeritur, utrum laus patriae sit magis voluntatis quam intellectus*; 177rb-177va: *Item utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae*; 177va: *Utrum intellectus agens habeat operationem circa quiditatem*).³⁹ Auguste Pelzer rejects Landgraf's choice and, instead, lists an *index quaestionum* of 38 questions. By splitting the questions that Landgraf merges, Pelzer apparently solves the problem brought up by the annotation. However,

³⁸ A. LANDGRAF, "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. P. und seine Quaestiones disputatae," cit., p. 523: "Allein ent gegen dem Versprechen des Titels lassen sich nur 36 Fragen in der Handschrift finden. Vielleicht ist das ursprüngliche Manuskript nicht vollständig erhalten."

³⁹ *O.c.*, p. 555.

Pelzer himself omits one question from his list, namely 177va: *Utrum intellectus agens habeat operationem circa quiditatem*, which is exactly one of the merged questions at issue.⁴⁰ Therefore in my opinion, to follow Pelzer's criteria coherently, the full list should consist of 39 questions and, again, the annotation of the Vatican manuscript would be unreliable.⁴¹

C. THE LITERARY GENRE OF THE *QUAESTIONES*

Another problem is also to precisely determine the literary genre of Picard's work. Indeed, Landgraf attempts to answer this question paleographically by suggesting that the two calligraphic letters "Q^o" and "Dⁱ" written by the rubricator in the upper margin of pages 151ra-182vb of the Vatican manuscript stand for the words "Quaestio" and "Disputata" respectively.⁴² Following Landgraf's opinion, the "Q^o" would be an abbreviation by contraction of the word "Quaestio", because it contains only the first and the last letters of this word; meanwhile the "Dⁱ" would be an abbreviation by suspension or truncation of the word "Disputata", since it uses the first few letters of that word. Thus, Landgraf's thesis is paleographically valid. However, other rubric letters of the same kind of "Q^o" and "Dⁱ" are present in the upper margin throughout the Vatican manuscript.⁴³ The purpose of these rubrics is to name the texts they decorate, as well as in the case of Picard's *Quaestiones*, but they do not always seem to be very clear or accurate in defining the literary genre of these works. One case is idiomatic. From page 15ra to 89rb there are several Hervaeus Natalis' treaties: *De variis materiis contra Henricum de Gandavo*, in which Hervaeus discusses some quodlibetal questions written by Henry of Genth (*De intellectu et specie(bus)*, *De ente et essentia*, *De intellectu et voluntate*) and the treaty *Materia de Christo*. In the upper margin of these pages there are the calligraphic letters "Q^ol" and "H_j", which paleographically would stand for the words "Quodlibet" and "Haervei" or "Henrici" respectively. However, the reading of both "Hervaei" and "Henrici" is problematic. If the abbreviation "H_j" would mean "Henrici", then the rubrics would be entirely

⁴⁰ A. PELZER, *Codices Vaticani Latini* t. 2, pars prior, cit., pp. 232-233.

⁴¹ See M. BENEDETTO, "Materia, corpi ed estensione in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg," cit., pp. 335-368, esp. p. 335 and n. 1.

⁴² A. LANDGRAF, "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. P. und seine Quaestiones disputatae," cit., p. 523: "Am oberen Rande steht in jeder Seitenmitte verso ein großes kalligraphisches Q^o, recto ein gleiches Dⁱ, was jedenfalls Quaestio disputata bedeuten soll, zumal da auch im vorhergehenden Teil der Handschrift durchgehend der Inhalt in einer ähnlichen Titelabkürzung verzeichnet ist. Wenn auch die Zusammenstellung der Quaestionen, wie sie aus dem Verzeichnis hervortritt, eher an Quodlibeta erinnert, so hält doch die getrennte Diskussion der verschiedenen Teile in manchen Quaestionen das Schema der „disputatae“ oder „ordinariae“ fest und M. Grabmann sieht (Neu aufgefundene Werke 15) in unseren Quaestiones Quodlibeta."

⁴³ In the treaty *De voto religiosorum* (fols. 1ra-14vb) and part of the *Materia de Christo* (fols. 89va-97vb), the rubrics in the upper margin of the manuscript are missing. Furthermore, the rubrics of the capital letters in the *folios* 1ra-14vb are different from the others in the manuscript. It is reasonable to assume that two different rubricators worked on the Vatican manuscript.

incorrect, as the text is actually Hervaeus' responses to some Henry's quodlibetal questions. If the abbreviation "H" were to stand for "Hervaei" instead, then the rubrics would not be correct, because Hervaeus' *De variis materiis* do not actually meet any criteria of the literary genre of the quodlibetal questions. "Rather it is an account compiled by the magister of his own critical discussions of controversial quodlibetal questions and their solutions as advanced by a colleague of an entirely different genius, each of which winds up with a *determinatio magistralis*."⁴⁴ In light of this example, the rubrics of the Vatican manuscripts does not represent a sufficient evidence to define the literary genre of Picard's *Quaestiones*, but it is best to analyze their content and structure in order to solve this issue. This will help determine if they fit the literary criteria of the *quaestiones disputatae* or another genre.⁴⁵

Maricken Teeuwen underlines that *disputationes* or *quaestiones disputatae* were always present in the context of medieval university "as a method of teaching a given subject, but also as a means of training the dialectical skills of the students, doing research, or putting students to the test."⁴⁶ Furthermore, disputed questions can be classified in two different kind: private (*disputationes in scholis*) and public disputations (*disputationes sollemnes, disputationes magistrorum* or *disputationes ordinariae*). The main difference between these two groups of questions is that the former were disputed within the school only between the master and his own students. The latter were instead open to all masters and students of the university faculties and also to the general public. One defining characteristic of ordinary disputed questions is their focus on a single topic. In this regard, ordinary disputations differ from the so-called quodlibetal questions (*quodlibeta* or *quaestiones de quolibet*), which cover a wide range of unrelated themes. They are a specific type of disputation, conducted orally and held exclusively by faculty masters. Furthermore, quodlibetal questions were not held throughout the academic

⁴⁴ L. M. DE RIJK, *General Introduction*, in HERVAEUS NATALIS, *De quattuor materiis sive Determinationes contra magistrum Henricum de Gandavo*, vol. I: *De formis*, ed. L. M. DE RIJK, Turnhout 2011, pp. XXVIII.

⁴⁵ The criteria for defining and distinguishing one literary genre from another should not be regarded as absolutely rigid. In fact, the characteristics of a genre may change over time and there may easily be some overlap between one genre and another: see B. C. BAZÀN – G. FRANSEN – D. JACQUART – J. W. WIPPEL, *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, Turnhout-Belgium 1985, pp. 165-175.

⁴⁶ B. M. TEEUWEN, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages*, Turnhout 2003, pp. 256-259, esp. pp. 256-257. For some literature on the "disputatio" and the disputed questions, see O. WEIJERS, *La "disputatio" à la Faculté des Arts de Paris: (1200 - 1350 environ) ; esquisse d'une typologie* (Studia artistarum 2), Turnhout 1995, esp. pp. 41-117; EAD., "La Disputatio à la Faculté des arts le Midi de la France," in *Eglise et culture en France méridionale* (Cahiers de Fanjeaux 35), Toulouse 2000, pp. 245-259; EAD., *Queritur utrum: Recherches sur la 'disputatio' dans les universités médiévales* (Studia artistarum 20), Turnhout 2009, esp. pp. 13-102; EAD., "Quelques observations sur les divers emplois du terme disputatio," in O. WEIJERS (ed.), *Études sur la Faculté des Arts dans les universitaires médiévales: recueils d'articles* (Studia artistarum 28), Turnhout 2011, pp. 77-92; B. C. BAZÀN – G. FRANSEN – D. JACQUART – J. W. WIPPEL, *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, cit.

year like ordinary disputed questions. Rather, they were held only during certain periods, a few days in Advent and Lent. As a result, the introductory section of quodlibetal questions usually refers to the days on which they were held.⁴⁷

Considering these general subdivisions, Picard's *Quaestiones* present a problematic nature as they do not fit entirely into either the genre of ordinary or quodlibetal disputations. This is due to the fact that Picard's *Quaestiones* address various themes rather than just one, making it difficult to define them as ordinary disputations.⁴⁸ Due to this reason, Martin Grabmann claims that Picard's questions are more similar to *quaestiones quodlibetales*.⁴⁹ However, it should be noted that, unlike Paris where only masters were able to lead university debates, in Cologne there was no university institution at all and teachers (*lectores*)⁵⁰ organized the whole educational system in the German Province.⁵¹ Following this line, Palémon Glorieux argues that Picard's *Quaestiones* cannot be considered quodlibetal questions and must have been

⁴⁷ For this information and others on the literary genre of quodlibetal questions see P. GLORIEUX, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, vol. I (Bibliothèque Thomiste 5), Kain, 1925; ID. *La littérature quodlibétique*, vol. II (Bibliothèque Thomiste 21), Paris 1935, esp. pp. 321-322; B. C. BAZAN – G. FRANSEN – D. JACQUART – J. W. WIPPEL, *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, cit., esp. pp. 157-222; M. TEEUWEN, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages*, cit., pp. 256-259 and 326-328; C. SCHABEL (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: the fourteenth Century*, Leiden-Boston 2007, esp. R. L. FRIEDMAN, "Dominican Quodlibetal literature, ca. 1260-1330," pp. 401-492.

⁴⁸ For example, there are questions: (1) on the scientific character of theology (fols. 151r-152r: *Utrum theologia sit scientia*, fols. 159r-160r: *Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia*, fols. 162r-162v: *Utrum theologia sit scientia practica vel speculativa*); (2) on matter (fols. 160r-161r: *Utrum in materia generabilium et corruptibilium sit aliqua inchoatio formae*, 161r-161v: *Utrum in materia sit aliqua forma diminuta, quae postea fiat forma supposito, quod non sit principium activum*, fol. 161v: *Quaeritur utrum materia prima sit una omnium*, fols. 161v-162r: *Utrum materia proxima aliquid reale addat super materiam primam*, fols. 166v-168r: *Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia*, fols. 175v-176r: *Quaestio utrum materia extensa per quantitatem differat realiter a se non extensa*, fols. 177v-178v: *Quaerebatur utrum materia posset esse sine forma ex potentia divina*); (3) on will (fol. 177v: *Utrum voluntatis libertas sit a se vel ab alio*, fols. 180v-181v: *Utrum voluntas moveat se ipsam vel ab alio moveatur*); (4) and on the eternity of the world (fols. 178v-179v: *Utrum mundus potuerit esse ab aeterno*).

⁴⁹ See M. GRABMANN, *Neu aufgefundene lateinische Werke deutscher Mystiker*, cit., p. 15: "Dieser Pycardus ist niemand anderer als der Dominikaner Johannes Picardi von Lichtenberg (de Lucemburg), der 1308 Provinzial der deutschen Provinz, 1310 in Paris Magister der Theologie wurde und 1312 in Italien starb. Von ihm sind im Cod. Vat. lat. 859 thomistisch gerichtete Quodlibeta erhalten."; ID, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, vol. I, cit., p. 414, n. 27: "Ein Verzeichnis der Quaestiones gibt Landgraf 554-555. Derselbe hat auch eine eingehende Beschreibung und Inhaltsangabe des Cod. Vat. lat. 859 gegeben 523-526. Er bezeichnet diese Quaestiones als Quaestiones disputatae, wozu ihm auch die Handschrift selbst den Anhaltspunkt gibt. Doch haben diese Quaestiones mehr das Gepräge der: Quodlibeta an sich." Also Alfred Otto, who is the editor of John of Dacia's works, defines John Picard's *Quaestiones* as *Quodlibeta* in his introduction to IOHANNES DACUS, *Opera*, vol. 1, pars 1, ed. A. OTTO (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi 1), Havniae 1955, pp. IX-X: "Le théologien dominicain Jean Picardi de Lichtenberg mentionne vers 1305, dans ses Quodlibeta, qu'Avicebron et «Jean le Danois de Saint Germain-des-Prés, à Paris», ont été les principaux représentants de l'école philosophique qui professait la pluralité des formes."

⁵⁰ For a description of what the lector was during the 13th century, see M. TEEUWEN, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages*, cit., pp. 85-87; O. WEIJERS, *Terminologie des universités au XIIIe siècle*, Roma 1987, pp. 160-166; and M. M. MULCHAHEY, 'First the Bow Is Bent in Study'. *Dominican Education before 1350*, cit., esp. pp. 167-175, 608-609.

⁵¹ L. STURLESE, "Albert der Grosse und die deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters," in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 28 (1981), pp. 133-147, esp. p. 147.

ordinary disputations because Picard was not a *magister theologiae* when he disputed his questions.⁵² In addition to Picard's case, the only examples of *Quodlibeta* debated in the German province are those written by Henry of Lubeck. In this instance, Glorieux seems to implicitly assume that, since Henry disputed quodlibetal questions,⁵³ he had to be a master in theology. However, Glorieux assumes that Henry debated his questions in Cologne holding the title of *magister theologiae*, because his name was not present in any list of masters who taught in Paris. Contrary to Glorieux's opinion, Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli, one of the editors of Henry of Lubeck's *Quodlibeta*, argues that Henry actually led his quodlibetal questions at Cologne when he was only a lector there.⁵⁴ This claim is supported by the Dominican General Chapter of

⁵² P. GLORIEUX, *La littérature quodlibétique*, vol. II, cit., pp. 321-322: "Les 38 questions que contient le Vatic. lat. 859 (f. 151-182^v) et qui lui sont attribuées par la note marginales de fol. 151: "«frater Johannes de Lichtenberg Lector Coloniensis postea bachilarius parisiensis. 38 quaestiones scriptas determinavit Colonie», ont été reproduites par A. LANDGRAF (*Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg und seine Quaestiones disputatae*, dans *Zeitschrift f. kath. Theol.* 1922, pp. 510-555) et par A. PELZER, *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae ... Codices Vaticani latini*, t. II, pars prior, 1932), pp. 232 ss. Mgr. GRABBMANN (*Forschung zur ältesten Deutscher Thomistenschule des Dominikanerordens*, dans *Xenia Thomistica*, III, pp. 209-220) y voudrait voir un Quodlibet. Ni le genre des questions, ni le titre de simple bachelier que portait alors Jean (il ne fut licencié à Paris que le 3 novembre 1310, et n'enseigna plus ensuite à Cologne) n'autorisent à voir là autre chose que des Questions Disputées."

⁵³ Henry of Lubeck makes it clear that his work is a "disputationes de quolibet" within the introductory section: "Quaestiones Quaesitae in disputatione de quolibet possunt hoc modo habere ordinem secundum scientias, ad quas pertinent, quia quaedam erant de philosophia naturali, quaedam de medicina, quaedam de astronomia, quaedam de metaphysica, quaedam de theologia."; furthermore, since Henry writes an introduction to its *Quodlibeta* where he clarifies the content of his works and the themes of the following questions, his *Quodlibeta* could be classified as a Quodlibet *ordinaire*, see B. C. BAZAN – G. FRANSEN – D. JACQUART – J. W. WIPPEL, *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, cit., pp. 167-168. Here Wippel refers to the division made by Glorieux in P. GLORIEUX, "Le Quodlibet et ses procédés rédactionnels," in *Divus Thomas* 42, Piacenza 1939, pp. 61-93. If John Picard's *Quaestiones* could be classified as a *Quodlibet*, they would be considered a *Quodlibet ex abrupto*, since they have any explicit organizing plan of the questions before the text of the questions.

⁵⁴ UBALDO VILLANI-LUBELLI, "Il quodlibet II di Enrico di Lubecca (1320 ca.): uno studio dottrinale," in F. A. MESCHINI - F. PUCCINI (eds.), *Le opere dei filosofo e degli scienziati. Filosofia e scienza tra testo, libro e biblioteche*, Firenze 2010, pp. 106-126, esp. p. 107: "Della sua produzione scientifica sono sopravvissuti tre Quodlibeta che Enrico ha elaborato ed esposto, molto probabilmente, presso lo *Studium generale* a Colonia. Anche se le quaestiones quodlibetales nacquero come genere letterario specificamente universitario, col tempo trovarono spazio anche negli studia degli ordini religiosi. È questo il caso dei Quodlibeta di Enrico di Lubecca. Per discutere *quaestiones quodlibetales* negli studia degli ordini religiosi non era necessario essere *Magister*, si poteva anche essere lettore, come era molto probabilmente Enrico, che svolse le funzioni di *lector regens* intorno agli anni venti del XIV secolo presso lo *studium generale* di Colonia."; for the teaching activities within the *studia generalia* see A. MAIERÙ, "Formazione culturale e tecniche d'insegnamento degli Ordini mendicanti", in *Studio e Studia: Le scuole degli ordini mendicanti tra XIII e XIV secolo. Atti del XXIX Convegno internazionale, Assisi 11-13 ottobre 2001*, Spoleto 2002, pp. 5-31, esp. pp. 17-26: "Gli *studia generalia ordinis*, a loro volta, accolgono studenti provenienti da tutte le province e preparano al lettorato. [...] Nei conventi importanti i frati impiegano più lettori (un lettore principale e un baccelliere o sublettore che legge le Sentenze), i quali hanno l'obbligo di tenere le lezioni; il lettore principale tiene anche le dispute. [...] Accanto alla lezione, l'attività didattica prevede lo svolgimento di dispute, nel corso delle quali gli studenti sono avviati a prendere parte sempre più attiva a mano a mano che progrediscono negli studi. Le più celebri e meglio documentate sono quelle solenni, che si distinguono in dispute ordinarie e de quolibet." and also ID., *University Training in Medieval Europe*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1994, pp. 1-35; furthermore, concerning educational programs and intellectual productions of the *studia generalia*, especially those of the Dominican Order during the 13th- and 14th-century see M. M. MULCHAHEY, "The Dominican *Studium* system and the universities of Europe in the thirteenth century. A relationship redefined," in J. HAMESSE (ed.), *Manuels, Programmes de Cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universités médiévales*.

Oxford in 1280, which explicitly states that it was forbidden for lectors to dispute *de quolibet* unless they were masters of theology, or except in places where *studia generalia* flourished.⁵⁵ Thanks to this information it is clear that, although Glorieux's opinion is formally correct and valid for the university context and productions, his position on John Picard's *Quaestiones* does not entirely fit the actual historical situation of the Dominican Order educational system of those years. The mendicant *studia generalia* represented a unique phenomenon within the educational system of the time, where the current rules applied to universities were not entirely binding and subject to radical change.

To sum up: John Picard's *Quaestiones* have a literary character as exceptional as that of the educational system of the *studium generale* in Cologne. On one hand, they do not quite fit into the standard model of the ordinary disputed questions held in Paris, because they deal with different subjects, often unrelated to each other. On the other hand, they cannot be considered as quodlibetal questions, since they do not have an *incipit* or *explicit* that explicitly expresses the quodlibetal nature of the work or that states the period of the year in which they were to be discussed. Furthermore, as Picard's *Quaestiones* are the oldest known example of disputations in the history of the Teutonic province,⁵⁶ it is not possible to make a comparison with similar works to provide a better understanding of the intellectual production in Cologne.

The undefined status of Picard's questions seems to have been evident also to readers at the time. Indeed, the headline of the Vatican manuscript refers to Picard's work as *quaestiones*

Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve (9-11 septembre 1993), Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, pp. 277-324; EAD., 'First the Bow Is Bent in Study'. *Dominican Education before 1350*, cit.; EAD., "The Role of the Conventual *Schola* in Early Dominican Education", in *Studio e Studia: Le scuole degli ordini mendicanti tra XIII e XIV secolo. Atti del XXIX Convegno internazionale, Assisi 11-13 ottobre 2001*, cit., pp. 117-150, esp. pp. 117-126; W. J. COURTENAY, "Programs of study and genres of scholastic theological production in the fourteenth century," in J. HAMESSE (ed.), *Manuels, Programmes de Cours et techniques d'enseignement dans les universités médiévales. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve (9-11 septembre 1993)*, cit., pp. 325-350; ID., "The Instructional Programme of the Mendicant Convents at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century," cit., pp. 77-92; ID., "Academic Formation and Careers of Mendicant Friars. A regional Approach", in *Studio e Studia: Le scuole degli ordini mendicanti tra XIII e XIV secolo. Atti del XXIX Convegno internazionale, Assisi 11-13 ottobre 2001*, cit., pp. 197-218; ID., "The educational and intellectual framework of German Dominicans in the late 13th and early 14th centuries," cit., pp. 245-259; ID., "From Studia to University. Cologne in the Fourteenth Century," in A. SPEER - A. BERGER (eds.), *Wissenschaft mit Zukunft: Die 'alte' Kölner Universität im Kontext der europäischen Universitätsgeschichte*, Wien 2016, pp. 33-50; W. SENNER, "Gli *studia generalia* nell'ordine dei predicatori nel duecento," in *Archivium Franciscanum Historicum* 98, 2005, pp. 151-175.

⁵⁵ B. M. REICHERT, *Acta capitulorum generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum*, vol. I: *ab anno 1220 usque ad annum 1303*, Rome 1898, p. 208-209 [1280], lin. 34-2: "Item. Inhibemus. ne lectores disputent de quolibet. nisi sint magistri in theologia. nisi in locis. in quibus secundum ordinem generalia studia videntur. nisi forte ex causa aliqua in locis aliquibus specialibus aliud sit consuetum. aut nisi prioribus provincialibus in suis provinciis aliud videatur."; see also A. MAIERÙ, *University Training in Medieval Europe*, cit., p. 28.

⁵⁶ L. STURLESE, "Idea di un „Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi“," in *Studi medievali* 25 (1984), pp. 459-465.

scriptae.⁵⁷ This means that Picard's work does indeed have the literary characteristics of a written text,⁵⁸ which is clear from the constant cross-references between the various questions throughout Picard's work.⁵⁹ Thus, although it is not clear to what precise literary genre Picard's *Quaestiones* belong, it is at least possible to determine that the text present in the Erfurt and

⁵⁷ The headline of the Erfurt manuscript, which makes a lists of the following questions in the manuscript, does not give any clarifications to understand the literary genre of John Picard's work: *In isti quaterni continentur istae quaestiones*.

⁵⁸ See Friedrich Uberwegs *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie: Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie*, vol. II, ed. B. GEYER, Tübingen 1951, p. 541: "In der Kölner Lehrzeit entstanden 36 Quaestiones. Grabmann sieht in ihnen Quodlibeta, Landgraf Quaestiones disputatae. Da aber Vat. Lat. 859 ausdrücklich sagt „quaestiones scriptas determinavit“ und der Verfasser seine Arbeit gelegentlich tractatus nennt, so handelt es sich wahrscheinlich um eine in dem üblichen Schema der Determinatio abgefaßte Abhandlung. Der aus der Pariser Lehrzeit stammende Sentenzenkommentar ist noch nicht wieder aufgefunden. Wie Landgraf und Grabmann gezeigt haben, ist Johannes bei aller Selbständigkeit ein treuer Schüler des hl. Thomas; für sein hohes Ansehen in der damaligen Zeit spricht, daß er im Katalog der Provinziale der Teutonia „ein hoher Meister gotlicher Kunst“ genannt wird."; John Picard calls his work a *tractatus* in q. 20; *V*, fol. 168va lin. 56-59: "Aliud est esse substantiale, sicut quo substantialiter est aliquid in rerum natura. Et de tali esse quaerit quaestio praesentis tractatus: "utrum esse et essentia differant", ut per 'esse' intelligamus ipsum existere in rerum natura, per 'essentiam' vero ipsum quod est, sive quod existit." This doctoral study contends that Picard uses the term *tractatus* exactly to underline the written nature of his work. Furthermore, the question Picard is referring to in last passage is "Utrum in omni creatura esse et essentia differant vel habent illud, quod sint idem." (JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 20; *V*, fols. 168rb-171ra and *K*, fols. 56ra-58ra).

⁵⁹ For example the internal (very precise references): 1) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 6, sect. 11; *V*, 155va; *E*, 101rb: "Una dicit, quod non solum intentionales, sed etiam reales duae formae possunt esse in eodem subiecto eiusdem speciei, differentes solo numero etiam naturaliter. Et ista probatur et improbat supra quaestione illa: "utrum Deus posset facere duo accidentia eiusdem speciei in eodem subiecto", et ante similiter probatur et improbat in eadem."; 2) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 6, sect. 22; *V*, 155va; *E*, 101va: "Unde est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod nec duae reales nec duae intentionales possunt esse simul, sicut probatur supra in eadem"; 3) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 8, sect. 7 et 8; *V*, 157vb: "Considerandum ergo, quod omnibus decem praedicamentis et cetera, sicut supra in quaestione de relationibus "utrum addant aliquid et cetera"; et sic patet primum. Circa secundum considerandum, quod solum in his, quae dicuntur 'ad aliquid', et cetera, sicut supra eadem quaestione."; 4) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 9, sect. 9; *V*, 158va; *E*, 103ra: "et illa etiam tribus modis se habent: quaedam enim dicuntur relativa secundum esse, alia secundum dici; secunda distinctio est, quod quaedam dicuntur secundum rem, alia vero secundum rationem, et de his in praecedentibus quaestionibus satis dictum est."; 5) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones scripta*, q. 15, sect. 8 et 39; *V*, 162ra et 162va: "Secundum non valet, quia nulla scientia recipit unitatem ex fine extra, sed ex unitate rationis sui subiecti. Nec potest dici plures propter plura considerata, quia unam induunt rationem subiecti, scilicet revelabilitatis, sicut in alia quaestione dictum est de subiecto." and "Item hoc est necessarium ex praedictis, quia dictum est, quod Deus tantum proprie est subiectum huius scientiae, sed illa cadit sub speculativa." referring respectively to 1) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 38; *V*, 181vb-182ra: "Utrum Deus possit facere duo accidentia eiusdem rationis in eodem subiecto."; 2) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 38; *V*, 182ra: "Et ideo est tertia opinio, quod nullo modo neque intentionalia neque realia diversa numero possunt simul esse et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo ex parte formae: [...]. Item hoc patet ex natura subiecti [...]."; 3) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 39; *V*, 182ra-182vb: "Utrum relatio addat aliquid reale supra [an super scrib.?] suum fundamentum."; 4) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 8, sect. 8; *V*, 157va: "Circa secundum considerandum, quod solum in his, quae dicuntur 'ad aliquid' et cetera, sicut supra eadem quaestione; ubi addendum est, quod ex his patet, quod non est idem dicere relationem secundum esse et secundum dici et dicere relationem secundum rem et secundum rationem, sicut patet, quod in scientia est relatio secundum rem, cum in scibili sit solum secundum rationem, et tamen in scientia non est relatio nisi secundum dici et non secundum esse, sed quandoque e converso est relatio secundum rationem et non secundum rem, et tamen est secundum esse, sicut relatio generis ad speciem et e converso." and JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 39; *V*, 182ra-182vb: "Utrum relatio addat aliquid reale supra [an super scrib.?] suum fundamentum."; 5) JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 10; *V*, 159ra-160ra: "Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia".

Vatican manuscripts is not a mere *reportatio* of some oral disputation sessions, but a written version of them prepared by the author for publication.

To conclude, the uncircumscribability of Picard's *Quaestiones* in any classical literary genre of disputations reflects the dynamic and experimental character of teaching activities in the *studium generale* of Cologne. Therefore, the general term *Quaestiones* appears to be the most suitable to express the undefined character of Picard's questions. Although this definition may be too broad, it does not reduce Picard's work to an abstract literary category, which would rather disqualify its avant-garde character in relation to the German context of the time.

D. EDITORIAL STATUS OF THE TEXT AND MANUSCRIPTS DIFFERENCES

Having clarified the written nature of Picard's questions, the task at hand is to establish the relationship between the oral sessions of the disputations and the written form as transmitted by the surviving manuscripts.⁶⁰ On this point, William Courtenay, in one of his studies on the literary genres of theological production, notes that creating a definitive and authoritative text in the Middle Ages was a multi-stage process. In addition, this process sometimes stopped before the author's official publication, and incomplete works were circulated for reading.⁶¹ Thus, the purpose of this paragraph is to determine whether Picard's work found in the Erfurt and Vatican manuscripts is the final version of the text ready for publication or an intermediate step that would have required further revision by the author. To define the editorial status of Picard's written questions, it is necessary to closely analyze the two versions of the text available in extant manuscripts, comparing them and highlighting differences and commonalities. Indeed, the recent discovery of eleven questions in the Erfurt manuscript has actually helped to fill some gaps in the Vatican manuscript and raised new considerations on the transmission of Picard's text.

If one compares the two manuscripts, it is clear that the Erfurt codex shortens some redundant parts of Picard's work. For instance, quotations from authoritative sources such as

⁶⁰ See W. J. COURTENAY, "Programs of study and genres of scholastic theological production in the fourteenth century," cit., pp. 338-339: "One issue that will pervade this discussion of the genres of theological production is the relationship between oral lectures and their written form as well as between lectures and disputations that never resulted in a written equivalent, and writings that never had an oral equivalent. Written texts reveal only part of what went on at medieval universities. Their written form rarely reflects oral performance even though their style purports to do so, and the amount of production both in terms of works circulated as well as the number of manuscript copies tells us more about the avenues for and control of academic book production than about classroom teaching. This is not only true of *reportationes*; it is true for all written forms of scholastic exercises. And this discrepancy applies to the length of the oral and written forms, their structure, and specific wording and citations."

⁶¹ *O.c.*, p. 342.

Dionysius or Hilary of Poitiers present in the Vatican manuscript, whose aim in Picard's discourse is only to supplement previous reasonings, are omitted in the Erfurt one:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 1, arg. and ad arg. 5-11; *V*, 151vb-152rb:

Ad quintum. Nihil unum et idem est creditum et scitum; sed conclusio manet credita; ergo non est scita.

Dicendum, quod, licet multa in hac scientia probantur, quae etiam a philosophis sunt scita, sicut quod est unus Deus et quod est purus actus, tamen istae non sunt propriae conclusiones scilicet huius scientiae, quae ex principiis propriis, scilicet articulis et auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae, procedit; et ideo conclusiones eius in particulari sunt semper ignotae quantum ad scientiam stricte sumptam, sed postea in generali ratione credibilis fiunt nota. Unde Dionysius 1 cap. *De divinis nominibus* circa principium: "Esto autem et nunc a nobis lex praedefinita eloquiorum de Deo veritatem dictorum nos asservare non in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae verbis, sed in demonstratione a spiritu motae theologorum virtutum, secundum quam virtutem ineffabilibus et ignotis ineffabiliter et ignote coniunguntur".

Ad sextum. Omne, quod scitur, impossibile est aliter se habere; sed sic non est de his, quae sunt fidei.

Dicendum, quod fidelis de articulis existimat impossibile aliter se habere et propter eorum veritatem omne genus tormentorum deridet, et similiter de conclusionibus theologus, sicut quod est una operatio trium Personarum naturalis sicut et una natura.

Ad septimum. Subalterna scientia et subalternans simul se compatiuntur in eodem, sicut unus et idem potest esse naturalis et medicus et idem potest esse naturalis et geometer et astrologus vel arithmeticus vel musicus; sed beatorum et ista scientia non possunt esse simul; ergo una non recipit sua principia ab alia.

Dicendum, quod hoc contingit in humanis scientiis propter hoc, quod eodem lumini innituntur; sed nostra scientia et beatorum habent diversa lumina, scilicet gratiae et gloriae, quae

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 1, arg. and ad arg. 5-11; *E*, 99vb:

Ad quintum. Nihil unum et idem est scitum et creditum; sed conclusio manet credita; ergo non scita.

Dicendum, quod, licet in hac multa probentur, quae etiam a philosophis sunt scita, sicut quod Deus est simplex et caetera, istae tamen non sunt propriae conclusiones istius scientiae, quae habet sua propria principia, scilicet articulos et auctoritates sacrae Scripturae; unde conclusiones eius in particulari semper sunt ignotae, sed posita in generali ratione credibilis fiunt scitae.

Ad sextum. Omne, quod scitur, impossibile est alter se habere.

Dicendum, quod fidelis hic existimat de articulis et propter hoc tormentis se exponit.

Ad septimum. Subalterna et subalternans simul se compatiuntur in eodem, sicut unus et idem potest esse naturalis et medicus sed hoc non est hic, ergo et caetera.

Dicendum, quod hoc contingit per diversa lumina hic et ibi, quibus innituntur, sed non sit in humanis ubi est unum lumen naturale omnium scientiarum.

simul se non compatiuntur, nec hoc tamen praeiudicat subalternationi.

Ad octavum. I *Posteriorum*: “Omne scibile est demonstrabile”; ergo a destructione consequentis, quod non est demonstrabile, non est scibile; sed conclusiones huius scientiae non possunt demonstrari, ergo nec sciri.

Dicendum, quod, sicut demonstrantur, sic et sciuntur; sed demonstrantur non stricte accipiendo demonstrationem sicut et in multis aliis scientiis, et sic etiam sciuntur. Unde dicit Philosophus I *Ethicorum*, quod astrologia sive formalis demonstratio non est in omnibus expectanda. Unde secundum exigentiam materiae in qualibet scientia proceditur.

Ad nonum. Si propter hoc est scientia, quia adeo fortiter adhaeret, ut etiam ignibus et aliis tormentis se exponat, dicendum, quod certitudo adhaesionis non solum humanae fidei, sed etiam aliis habitibus, scilicet sapientiae, scientiae, et intellectu, et etiam ex proprio argumento potest aliquis consensum suum firmare in aliquod verum vel falsum: sicut enim opinio est vera vel falsa, ita et fides vera in fideli et falsa in haeretico; non minus firmiter adhaeret aliquis veritati quam falsitati, sicut dicitur VII *Ethicorum*. Et ideo in haeretico sicut est falsa fides, ita et falsa scientia, in fideli autem theologo sicut est vera fides, sic etiam vera scientia. De hoc autem petere probationem vanum est, cum fides sit per gratuitam infusionem.

Ad decimum. Omne, quod est in aliqua scientia, est principium vel conclusum ex principiis; sed corpus Christi esse sub illis speciebus non est articulus nec ex articulis probatur; ergo de theologis non est scientia.

Dicendum, quod, sicut in aliis quaedam sunt principia generalia, quaedam particularia, ita et hic articuli sunt principia generalia, auctoritates autem canonis sunt specialia. Sic ergo corpus Christi ibi esse accipitur non ut conclusum, sed ut fide acceptum, quia hoc dicit Evangelium, ubi dicitur: “Hoc est enim corpus meum”. Possibilitas autem huius principii particularis probatur per id generale, quod omnipotens. Unde Dionysius 2 cap. *De divinis nominibus*:

Ad octavum. I *Posteriorum*: “Omne scibile est demonstrabile”; ergo a destructione consequentis.

Dicendum, quod, sicut demonstrantur, sic et sciuntur; scilicet non stricte sicut et in multis aliis scientiis.

Unde secundum exigentiam materiae proceditur in qualibet scientia.

Ad nonum. Sicut se exponit tormentis Christianus, sic et haeticus.

Dicendum, quod sicut in haeretico est fides falsa, sic et scientia falsa, econverso in Christiano, sed de hoc petere probationem vanum est, cum fides sit per gratuitam infusionem.

Ad decimum. Omne, quod est in scientia, est conclusum ex principiis vel principium; sed corpus Christi esse sub speciebus illis neutro modo est, ergo non est contrarium istius scientiae.

Dicendum, quod, sicut in aliis scientiis, ita et haec quaedam sunt principia generalia ut articuli, quaedam specialia ut auctoritates canonis et inter his accipitur istud.

Possibilitas autem probatur per hoc, quia Deus omnipotens.

“Sequentes ipsam” theologiam “secundum veritatem convenit ad divinos splendores” aspicere. “Et inde divinas” maiestates “assumentes, sicut quendam canonem”, id est “regulam veritatis optimum, positum custodire in” verbis “ipsis non multiplicata et minorata et non perversa studemus”.

Ad undecimum. In omni scientia dicunt principia esse distincta a conclusionibus; sed sicut rationes ducuntur ad conclusiones, ita etiam ad principia.

Dicendum, quod aliter adducuntur hic et ibi, quia rationes, quae adducuntur ad ea, quae fide tenentur, sunt tantum persuasiones ostendentes, quod ea, quae ponuntur, non sunt impossibilia. Unde tales rationes possunt fieri etiam infidelibus, licet dici possint demonstrationes fidelibus. Unde Hilarius X *De Trinitate*: “Eorum enim dictorum, quae secundum falsiloquiis sui artem ex Evangelio haeretici praesumunt, ita denotata veritas est, ut iam in contradictione ignorantiam excusare non liceat, sed irreligiositatem confiteri necesse sit”; sed rationes, quae ex auctoritatibus et principiis sacrae Scripturae procedunt, probant sufficienter suas conclusiones apud fideles tantum; unde Hilarius X *De Trinitate*: “Infirmitatem corporeae naturae non fuisse” “et passionem illam, licet corpori illata sit, non tamen naturam dolenti corpori intulisse; quia, licet forma corporis nostri esset in Domino, non tamen vitiosae infirmitatis nostrae” forma erat in “corpore”, quia “ex” conceptione “Spiritus Sancti Virgo progenuit”. Ubi Hilarius ex huius principio, qui conceptus est de Spiritu Sancto natus ex Maria Virgine, concludit, quod corpus Christi non habuit in se, unde pateretur.

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 6, arg. and ad arg. 1-12; *V*, 156ra-b:

Ad primum. Secundum Philosophum, Avicennam et alios, species conservantur in memoria et particulares et sic in intellectu possibili post apprehensionem earum in sensu exteriorum.

Dicendum secundum Avicennam, quod in illis potentiis sunt in habitu tantum, et ideo Avicenna

Ad undecimum. In omni scientia debent principia distincta esse a conclusionibus; sed sicut hae rationes ducuntur ad conclusiones, sic ad principia.

Dicendum, quod aliter adducuntur hic et ibi, quia ad principia adducuntur persuasiones ostendentes, non esse impossibile. Sed conclusiones sufficienter probantur apud fideles per auctoritates et principia sacrae scripturae.

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 6, arg. and ad arg. 1-12; *E*, 101vb-102ra:

distinguit illas species, ubi species sunt ut in quodam thesauro, ab aliis apprehensivis.

Ad secundum. Species diversorum sensibilium sunt in eodem puncto aeris, ubi se intersecant, de adversarios videntes diriguntur.

Dicendum, quod ibi sunt sicut per modum dispositionis et non per modum ultimae perfectionis, quia ibi sunt in quodam fluxu sicut quodam deferente.

Ad tertium. In eodem subiecto, licet non possint esse disparata, species autem una non est alteri contraria secundum Philosophum II *De anima*.

Dicendum, quod non prohibentur simul esse propter contrarietatem, sed ideo, quia sunt eiusdem rationis in perficiendo in esse unius rationis. Unde species intentionales non habent se sicut figura et color, sed sicut figura et figura.

(39) Nec etiam bene dicitur ab adversariis, quod species duorum hominum sint eiusdem speciei differentes numero, licet ipsae res numero tantum differant; sed melius dicitur, quod similitudo unius - scilicet a recepta nunc et per oblivionem vel quocumque modo illa deleta - <est> iterum eiusdem hominis - scilicet a recepta alia -, quod istae duae sint eiusdem speciei. Et tunc nec ipsi concedent, quod duae solo numero differentes simul sunt in eodem, duorum autem hominum species in oculo recepte quandoque et minus conveniunt ad invicem quam unius hominis et simiae, vel ut evidentius videatur quam statuae sculptae vel depictae. Unde ad compatiendum secum aliam speciem vel non compatiendum non est curandum, utrum res, quarum sunt, sint eiusdem speciei vel diversarum.

† Ad quartum ... †

Ad quintum. Secundum Commentatorem eodem modo sunt species in medio et in organo et simili in speculo; sed in illa parte speculi, ubi recipitur nunc imago, non potest esse alia species, sicut experientia docet; ergo nec species diversorum in eadem parte medii accipiuntur.

Dicendum, quod speculum et medium partim conveniunt et partim differunt. Conveniunt in hoc, quod utrobique forma habet esse intentionale. Unde et Auctor VI *Principiorum* dicit, quod convenientius dicitur, quod “non vere sit forma in speculo”, si secundum esse naturae

Ad rationes. Species diversorum sensibilium sunt in eodem puncto, ubi se intersecant, et ad diversos videntes diriguntur.

Dicendum, quod ibi sunt sicut per modum dispositionis et non per modum ultimae perfectionis, quia sunt ibi in quodam fluxu sicut quodam deferente.

Ad aliud. Secundum Commentatorem eodem modo sunt species in medio in organo et in speculo; sed in illa parte speculi, ubi recipitur nunc imago, non potest simul esse alia species, sicut experientia docet; ergo nec species diversorum in eadem parte medii accipiuntur.

Dicendum, quod speculum et medium partim conveniunt et partim differunt. Conveniunt in hoc, quod utrobique forma habet esse intentionale. Unde et Auctor VI *Principiorum* dicit, quod convenientius dicitur, quod “non vere est forma in speculo”, scilicet secundum esse

sit in subiecto, “licet vulgo error incredibilis putetur”. Secundo, in hoc, quod utrobique forma recipitur in puncto, et similiter in oculo et non situ aliter; si enim situ aliter, tunc tantum corpus occuparet tantum et maius corpus adhuc maius, et similiter propter proportionem ad magnum montem, immo ad mediam circumferentiam caeli non possemus eam vincere. Sed etiam differunt in duobus, primo, quod species in medio recipitur in omni parte medii, sicut et lumen; alias idem visibile non posset videri ab omnibus circumquaque sedentibus, quod tamen fieri videmus; sed in speculo recipitur in determinata parte, et in illa non potest simul eodem modo recipi alia. Hoc autem convenit, quia secundum certam et rectam proportionem recipitur ita, quod, sicut impossibile est, quod aliud corpus in eodem loco vel situ sit cum illo, cuius imago apparet in speculo, ita impossibile alterius similitudinem simul in eodem puncto inesse. In aere autem omnium, quae praesentia sunt speciem, simul sunt, licet indistincte, sicut dictum est. Secunda differentia est, quod imago in speculo videtur et non solum est id, quo res videtur, sed similitudo in aere non videtur. Huius autem ratio est, quod propter transparentiam aeris deferuntur, sed in speculo propter plumbum speculo appositum vel vitro, quod terminat speciem, quasi colligitur et permanet, et simile est in oculo, quod est secundum perspectivos speculum animatum.

Ad sextum. »Ponatur unus oculus versus orientem et respiciat versus occidentem et vocetur A, alium e converso in occidente respiciens versus orientem et vocetur B; et sit obiectum ipsius B in oriente et vocetur C, quod sit album, et obiectum ipsi A in occidente et vocetur D et sit nigrum. Ergo si C immutat B et D immutat A, oportet, quod species eorum in medio concurrant. Aut ergo in illo puncto sunt unum, et tunc nullum secundum propriam rationem perveniet ad suum sensum et sic erunt duo opposita in eodem, aut erunt duae distinctae species ibidem, et tunc habetur propositum.

Dicendum, quod erunt indistinctae realiter, sed tamen ab illa una erunt secundum diversam

naturae sicut in subiecto, “licet vulgo error incredibilis putetur”. Secundo, in hoc, quod utrobique forma recipitur in puncto, et similiter in oculo et non situ aliter; si enim situ aliter, tunc tantum corpus occuparet tantum et maius corpus adhuc maius, et propter proportionem ad magnum montem, immo ad mediam circumferentiam caeli non possemus eam videre. Sed etiam differunt in duobus, primo, quod species in medio recipitur in omni parte medii, sicut etiam lumen; alias idem visibile non posset videri ab omnibus circumquaque sedentibus, quod tamen fieri videmus; sed in speculo recipitur in determinata parte, et in illa non potest simul eodem modo recipi alia. Hoc autem convenit, quia secundum certam et rectam proportionem recipitur ita, quod, sicut impossibile est, quod aliud corpus in eodem situ sit cum illo, cuius imago apparet in speculo, ita impossibile est alterius similitudinem simul in eodem puncto inesse. In aere autem omnium, quae praesentia sunt, simul sunt, licet indistincte, sicut dictum est supra. Secunda differentia est, quod imago in speculo videtur et non solum est id, quo videtur res, sed similitudo in aere non videtur. Huius autem ratio est, quia propter transparentiam aeris deferuntur, sed in speculo propter plumbum speculo appositum vel vitro, quod terminat speciem, quasi colligitur et permanet, et similiter in oculo, quod est secundum perspectivos speculum animatum.

Ad aliud. Ponatur unus oculus versus orientem et respiciat visus versus occidentem et vocetur A, alium e converso qui respiciat versus orientem et vocetur B; et sit obiectum ipsius B in oriente et vocetur C, quod sit album, et obiectum ipsius A in occidente et vocetur D et sit nigrum. Ergo si C immutat B et D immutat A, oportet, quod species eorum in medio concurrant. Aut ergo in illo sunt unum, et sic neutrum secundum propriam rationem perveniet ad suum sensum et sic erunt duo obiecta in eodem, aut erunt duae distinctae species ibidem, et tunc habetur propositum.

Dicendum, quod erunt indistinctae realiter, sed tamen ab illa una secundum diversam virtutem

virtutem obiectorum distinctorum erunt diversae immutationes oculorum illorum.

Ad septimum. Licet motus circuli, qui est circulatio, non habeat contrarium secundum Philosophum VIII *Physicorum*, tantum motus, qui est super circulum, potest habere contrarium. Ponatur ergo circulus et dividatur diametraliter per medium, et unum punctum diametri sive incisionis circuli vocetur A, aliud vocetur B et moveatur C per unam partem versus B et D per aliam partem sive per alium semicirculum, tunc in B unum sistet motum alterius, ne procedat. Si autem hoc contingit in motu circulari, et in recto continget. Ergo nec secundum praecedens argumentum nec C permittet transire D ad oculum A nec D permittet transire C ad oculum B, dum conveniunt in medio puncto, et sic neuter oculorum aliquid videbit.

Dicendum, quod color visibilis est, secundum quod immutat diaphanum secundum actum lucidum, et quia species in medius non impediunt diaphanatum nec lucidatum, ideo nulla impedit aliam, sicut nec in intellectu multitudo specierum se impedit mutuo, sed magis vivat, licet in corporibus hoc impedimentum contingat et in aliis formis corporalibus.

Ad octavum. Secundum Philosophum V *De anima* color est immutativus diaphani; diaphanum autem mutatum mutat visum; ergo oportet, illud agens esse reale, quod est contra respondentem. Dicendum, quod immutat non physica immutatione, sed intentionali sive spirituali, et ideo non nominat aerem, sicut lux, quae immutat physice calefaciendo et alia faciendo.

Ad nonum. Nos videmus manifeste, quod in oculo apparent diversorum imagines distinctae et sic in speculo. Unde si speculum videret, videret illum per diversas species eiusdem speciei solo numero distinctas. Dicendum †.

Ad decimum. Nos videmus, quod diversae virtutes sunt in eadem potentia simul et simul actu potest aliquis diversis virtutibus uti; ergo et hoc contingere potest in virtutibus agentis, ut simul sint plures species etiam in ultimo actu. Dicendum †.

obiectorum distinctorum erunt diversae immutationes oculorum illorum.

Praeterea videtur, quod istae duae species concurrentes in medio sistant motum suum mutuo et sic neutrum perveniet ad suum oculum et sic non erit visio.

Dicendum, quod color visibilis est, secundum quod immutat diaphanum secundum actum lucidi, et quia species in medio non impediunt diaphanitatem nec luciditatem, ideo nulla impedit aliam, sicut nec in intellectu multitudo specierum se impedit mutuo, sed magis vivat, licet in corporibus huiusmodi impedimentum contingat et in aliis formis corporalibus.

Ad undecimum. Videmus, quod essentialiter distincti habitus diversarum scientiarum sunt simul in intellectu et suo modo in memoria, sicut habitus medicinae et geometriae et huiusmodi; si ergo omnes species intelligibiles sunt eiusdem rationis, ita poterit homo habere habitum diversorum solo numero distinctorum, sicut habitum diversarum scientiarum, quod nullus dicit, quia nec duas gratias habituales nec duas caritates, et simile de speculativis habere possumus. Dicendum †.

Ad duodecimum. Relata simul intelliguntur, quae sunt opposita, ergo distincta; aut ergo per duas species - tunc habetur propositum - aut per unam; si sic, contra: Movens et motum, agens et patiens dicuntur correlata; ergo cum angelus se ipsum intelligat per essentiam suam, patiens vel motum ab eo etiam intelligeret simul per essentiam propriam, quod falsum est; ergo per duas simul. Dicendum †.

Before going deeper into the textual analysis, it is useful to make a few remarks about the structure of Picard's questions. John Picard usually lists the *argumenta* and the *responsiones ad argumenta* all together at the end of his questions, with each *argumentum* always preceded by expressions like *ad primum*, *ad secundum*, *ad tertium*, etc. and each *responsio* by the term *dicendum*. Once this has been clarified, it is even more evident that Erfurt codex shortens Picard's text, since in the *quaestio* 6 it not only cuts out the unnecessary parts, but also changes the listing of the *argumenta* from the usual *ad primum*, *ad secundum* etc. to more generic terms like *ad rationes*, *ad aliud* and *praeterea*, thus preserving a coherent order of the discourse. Besides shedding light on the relationship between the texts transmitted by the two codices, *quaestio* 6 reveals additional puzzling aspects of the Vatican manuscript. Here, the ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth *argumenta* get only the term *dicendum* and lack their respective *responsiones*. In the same way, in *quaestio* 8, not only does the ninth argument lack its answer, but the thirteenth and fourteenth *argumenta* and *responsiones* are missing entirely. Furthermore, in *quaestio* 10, in the middle of his *solutio* to the question, Picard states that there are four reasons why theology incompletely knows God as its proper subject. However, the actual text must be lacking part of Picard's discourse, as it only provides three of the four reasons previously stated:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 8, arg. and ad arg. 9 et 12-15; V, 158ra-b:

Ad nonum. Si Pater differt ab essentia vel etiam relatio sola ratione, aut hoc est per comparisonem ad extra, scilicet creaturas, aut intra. Non primo modo, quia personae sunt secundum se non ratione creaturarum, et tunc, quidquid competit alicui secundum se, competit ei non propter aliud; intelligere autem et verbum dicere per se convenit Deo. Si per comparisonem ad intra, contra: Unius simplicissimi non est nisi unus conceptus, ergo una ratio; non ergo erit alia ratio personae, alia essentiae. Dicendum †.

[...]

Ad duodecesimum. Si relatio distinguit personas in quantum divina, ergo in quantum est idem cum essentia, ergo in quantum differunt ratione. Dicendum, quod, sicut homini secundum se convenit ridere, non tamen ridet secundum se consideratus, sed ille vel iste, ita et relationi in quantum huiusmodi convenit distinguere; cum talem distinctionem qualis est in divinis, scilicet quod distincta subsistant in eadem natura, hoc convenit, in quantum est differentia realiter, sed tamen differens ratione.

† Ad tertiusdecimum ... †

† Ad quartusdecimum ... †

Ad quintusdecimum. Actus notionales sunt permixti; ergo et personae et essentiae; probatio primi, quia, sicut se habet persona ad actum personalem, ita et essentia ad actum essentialem; ergo commutata proportione sicut se habet persona ad actum essentialem, ita se habet essentia ad actum personalem; sed personae competit actus essentiae, sicut Pater creat, ergo et essentiae actus personae, ut dicatur: Essentia generat. Dicendum, quod prima propositio est vera, sed mutatio est falsa, quia, sicut patet in numeris, in quibus primo invenitur proportio, tunc est commutatio vera, quando in commutando primum sumitur cum tertio et secundum cum quarto et tunc remanet eadem distantia terminorum, sicut patet in hoc exemplo, sicut se habent duo ad quattuor, ita tria ad sex; ergo commutata proportione, sicut se habent duo ad tria, ita quattuor ad sex; in illa autem commutatione accepit primum cum quarto et secundum cum tertio, et in talibus semper fit crux, et ubicumque crux, ibi falsa commutatio; si autem quaeris, quare ista commutatio sit vera et non illa, ubi crux est, dicendum, quod, sicut in logicalibus si convertens est vera, et eius conversa, non tamen oportet, quod quocumque modo liceat convertere, et sicut sic positis propositionibus, scilicet tali figura fit syllogismus, non autem quocumque alio modo, ita et in proportionibus servatur, et sunt quasi maxime et semper ad aliquam proportionem pervenitur qualemcumque, quando recte fit commutatio, non autem, quando non recte.

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 10, resp.; *V*, 159va-b:

Ad secundum dicendum, quod nullius scientiae intentio est scire de subiecto rationem universalem vel particularem, sicut isti imaginantur de subiecto universali scire passiones, quae ipsi subiecto sub tali ratione sumpto conveniunt. Unde nulla scientia probat rationem sui subiecti sicut nec subiectum, nisi esset dubium, et hoc iam non esset scientiae finis, sed ad eam praeambulum; et tamen si concedatur ipsis argumentum, tunc et ipsa ratio specialis est in principio cognita imperfecte; et sic est subiectum istius scientiae. Et hoc patet *quattuor* rationibus.

Primo, quia Deus secundum Damascenum dicit “quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum” [...]

Secundo, quia, si in sua infinitate vel universalitate est subiectum, omnia erunt pertinentia ad istam scientiam, ad quae se extendere potest subiectum [...]

Tertio, quia oportet dicere, quod ista scientia differat a scientia Dei et beatorum [...]

† Quarto ... †

Circa sextum nota, quod de hoc dicunt quidam, quod de Deo consideratur hic, in quantum restaurator vel reparator. Sed contra hoc obicitur, quod ista scientia <non> fuisset, si etiam homo non peccasset.

This scenario strongly suggests that the scribe of the Vatican manuscript slavishly copied a text that may have been incomplete.⁶² Yet, the question remains: How is it possible for a text to be incomplete in this way? Could it be because the text transmitted by the Vatican manuscript is a *reportatio* of the oral disputation held in Cologne by Picard?

To answer this question, it is helpful to consider John Wippel's criteria for distinguishing between a *reportatio*⁶³ and a final edited text with regards to written versions of quodlibets. Wippel identifies three types of written versions of quodlibetal questions, which reflect the typical structure of oral discussions. The first type is a written version of the first day of oral disputation, which would have been recorded by someone other than the master (i.e. a *reportator*). It is rare to find this type of report in manuscripts, and they usually lack an organized plan of the questions. The second type of written record accounts for the second day of oral disputation when the master presents their own determination, but it is still noted down by a *reportator*. The third and final version of the text is where the master writes their own *determinatio*⁶⁴ and he is the proper author of the work. The second and third types of written versions of quodlibetal questions can be distinguished by identifying the actual author of the text. If the author refers to the master in the third person, the text is most probable to be a *reportatio*, rather than a master's own *determinatio*.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Wippel claims that "there is sometimes a sense of being unfinished, a certain lack of tidiness, in mere *reportationes*. For example, one may find replies to objections without the objections themselves appearing where they should, or perhaps, even without their being present in the quodlibetal question at all as it

⁶² This scribe's attitude to accurately reproducing the text is further evident in the numerous *lacunae* found in the same Vatican manuscripts, which suggest that the scribe left a space when he was unable to transcribe a word he had in front of him while reading. Cf. *supra* p. 10, n. 34.

⁶³ B. M. TEEUWEN, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages*, cit., pp. 333-335, esp. p. 333: "In the context of schools and universities, especially from the thirteenth century onwards, *reportare*, *reportatio* and *reportator* were terms relating to the transmission from oral text to written record. It was common practice to take notes of courses, lectures, disputations or the conclusions of disputations, for example because the purchase of books was often beyond the budget of ordinary scholars or students."; O. WEIJERS, *Terminologie des universités au XIIIe siècle*, cit., pp. 361-365.

⁶⁴ *O.c.*, pp. 250-252, esp. p. 252: "In medieval Latin *determinare* and *determinatio* were used in all their classical senses, including to determine or settle a question or case (doctrinal, legal, administrative or scientific of nature). From there the terms were used for the academic exercise of determining a question, and to qualify, by so doing, for a baccalaureate"; see also O. WEIJERS, *Terminologie des universités au XIIIe siècle*, cit., pp. 348-353, 354-355, 404-407.

⁶⁵ B. C. BAZÀN - G. FRANSEN - D. JACQUART - J. W. WIPPEL, *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, cit., pp. 187-192.

now survives”.⁶⁶ Although Wippel is talking about *quodlibeta* here, also Picard’s questions meet some of the criteria listed earlier.⁶⁷

However, it is important to note that medieval masters often used student records to write their own authoritative texts. This means that, although the *reportationes* and final master’s written work are two different kind of written products, they are part of the same editorial process and manuscripts can also transmit a text that represents an intermediate version between a mere *reportatio* and a work ready for publication.⁶⁸ Indeed, medieval textual production was a multi-phase process, which could stop at any time before the final version of a text was achieved, and which could lead to the circulation of works in any kind of intermediate form, as William Courtenay had already suggested. Such an intermediate version of a text should then show characteristics of both earlier and later stages of this editorial process.⁶⁹ It is furthermore crucial to note that the *reportatio* does not represent a proper stage

⁶⁶ *O.c.*, p. 190.

⁶⁷ Moreover, this division of three types of written versions of quodlibetal questions, which reflect the typical structure of oral discussions, can be applied also to ordinary disputations, see O. WEIJERS, *Terminologie des universités au XIIIe siècle*, cit., pp. 361-362: “Le phénomène de la *reportatio* des disputes de la faculté de théologie au XIIIe siècle était assez complexe. D’abord, il y avait le reportage de la première séance, c’est-à-dire de la discussion elle-même. Le professeur utilisait ces notes pour mettre au point sa *determinatio*. Ensuite, on faisait un compte-rendu de cette seconde séance de la « détermination » magistrale, rapport dont le maître pouvait alors se servir pour préparer la version revue et corrigée qu’il allait éditer. En principe, il peut donc y avoir trois versions reflétant une même dispute. En réalité, cette situation est rare, notamment du fait que les notes de la première séance étaient rendues superflues par celles de la seconde. La principale différence entre la *reportatio* de la première séance et celle de la seconde est le degré d’organisation du matériel: le professeur avait mis de l’ordre dans les arguments avancés pour et contre la thèse proposée avant de donner sa *determinatio*.”

⁶⁸ On the process that brought from a *reportatio* to the definitive scholastic text in Middle Ages see B. M. TEEUWEN, *The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages*, cit., pp. 333-335; J.-G. BOUGEROL, “De la Reportatio à la Redactio (Saint-Bonaventure, Qu. disp. De perfectione evangelica, q.2, a.2 dans les états successifs du texte),” in R. BULTOT (ed.), *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1982, pp. 51-65; O. WEIJERS, *Terminologie des universités au XIIIe siècle*, cit., pp. 361-365; J. HAMESSE, “Collatio et reportatio: deux vocables spécifiques de la vie intellectuelle au Moyen Âge,” in O. WEIJERS (ed.), *Terminologie de la vie intellectuelle au Moyen Âge*, Turnhout 1988, pp. 78-87, esp. pp. 83-87; EAD., “La technique de la reportation” in O. WEIJERS – L. HOLTZ (eds.), *L’enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts*, Turnhout 1997, pp. 405-421, esp. pp. 405-406: “Cette technique ne concerne pas directement le fond, mais la forme des textes fixés par écrit, encore que nous aurons vu que la manière de prendre des notes pouvait également avoir une incidence indirecte ou même directe importante, non seulement sur le contenu d’un exercice oral destiné à être diffusé, mais également sur le processus rédactionnel de nombreux cours et exercices dont le texte définitif devait être rédigé ultérieurement soit par le professeur, soit par l’élève lui-même. En effet, la plupart des reportateurs étaient bien plus intéressés par les idées exposées pendant les cours que par la littéralité de l’expression utilisée par le professeur. La manière de prendre des notes va avoir une influence profonde tant sur la rédaction ultérieure du texte qui sera conservée et diffusée que sur la qualité même des doctrines enseignées. La reportation va donc, dans la plupart des cas, conditionner la qualité de la version définitive d’un texte, faite après coup.”

⁶⁹ See O. WEIJERS, *Terminologie des universités au XIIIe siècle*, cit., pp. 362: “Bien entendu, tous ceux qui étaient présents pouvaient prendre des notes, mais celles qui étaient destinées à l’usage du maître étaient faites par son assistant ou secrétaire, normalement un bachelier. Lorsque le professeur voulait éditer le résultat de ses disputes, il préparait un texte définitif sur la base du matériel des *reportationes*. Parfois, il faisait même plusieurs rédactions successives, si la première ne le satisfaisait pas. Bien qu’elles fussent des textes rédigés par l’auteur, ces rédactions n’en contiennent pas moins des réminiscences de la dispute réelle.”

of the editorial process but one of the initial tools that the master has at his disposal to create his final text.⁷⁰

Coming back to Picard and Wippel's general distinction, the text transmitted by the Erfurt and Vatican manuscripts actually shows three distinctive features which may suggest that Picard's *Quaestiones* should be regarded as a final master's written work rather than a mere *reportatio*. Firstly, as previously mentioned,⁷¹ Picard's written questions contain multiple cross-references between each other, implying the hypothetical existence of an organized plan of the questions. However, a written display of this plan is missing at both the beginning and end of the transmitted versions of Picard's work. Secondly, the author himself refers to Picard's work as to a written text (*tractatus*),⁷² showing an editorial awareness that would not be suitable for the style of a mere record of an oral discussion. Finally, it can be confirmed that Picard

⁷⁰ W. J. COURTENAY, "Programs of study and genres of scholastic theological production in the fourteenth century," cit., pp. 342 -343: "The standard developmental line leading from an author's notes or initial draft, through a *reportatio* or *reportationes*, to an *ordinatio*, oversimplifies the process and, at least for the production of commentaries or questions on the Sentences, accords too central a position to *reportationes*. A *reportatio* is not a stage in the production of a scholastic text, but one of several aids or means through which an author created his final text. Other aids included the author's notes or initial handwritten copy; the copy prepared by his assistant (*socius*), who also tracked down citations, filled in arguments, and moved text blocks at the direction of the author; the *additiones* or *annotationes* developed by the author and incorporated by his assistant; and the text of the scribe (*scriptor*) who prepared a fresh, and eventually a final draft from the author's or *socius*'s revised or annotated copy. In this process a *reportatio* was one of three texts that the author and *socius* used to transform the oral lecture (*lectura lecta*) into a *lectura annotata* and eventually into a *lectura recollecta* or *ordinatio*, sometimes denoted by the term «*edita*». Since the goal of the process was not to remain faithful to the oral performance but to prepare a definitive text, approved by the author and university or religious authority, on which the author's reputation as theologian would rest, a *reportatio* was no more privileged a source than the author's working, draft or his afterthoughts."; J. HAMESSE, "La technique de la *reportatio*," cit., pp. 418 and 420: "On sait, en effet, qu'après une discussion, le maître préparait sa propre position ou *determinatio* en ordonnant l'ensemble des arguments avancés pendant la *disputatio*. Le texte était donc cohérent et réorganisé logiquement. Lors de cette séance de *determinatio*, des objections pouvaient peut-être encore surgir et donner lieu à une autre *reportatio* plus élaborée, et ce n'est que dans un troisième temps que le maître rédigeait le texte définitif destiné à la diffusion. On voit donc ici très clairement que la *reportatio* n'est qu'un support qui permettra au maître d'écrire après coup son propre texte pour la *determinatio* et ensuite de le revoir définitivement pour la rédaction ultime et la diffusion."; "D'autre part, en tant qu'aide-mémoire, elles ont joué un rôle non-négligeable dans l'élaboration définitive du texte du maître, comme nous l'avons vu. Elles sont donc d'excellents témoins, non seulement du contenu d'un cours, mais également de la méthode d'enseignement. En effet, comment pourrions-nous imaginer l'atmosphère des discussions, si nous ne disposions pas des *reportationes*? Elles seules peuvent nous donner une idée de la manière dont ces débats avaient lieu : intervenants parlant en même temps, opposants coupant la parole à celui qui parlait, interventions du maître pour rétablir l'ordre ou souligner des points importants. Le texte rédigé après coup ne rend plus compte de ces aspects vivants, puisque le rédacteur essaie d'ordonner l'ensemble du débat suivant l'ordre logique de la discussion, en extrayant des interventions des uns et des autres les arguments utiles au développement des divers points débattus. Par rapport aux textes définitifs, les *reportationes* sont un peu comparables à nos radios ou télévisions modernes transmettant le vif d'un échange de vues par opposition aux articles de journaux qui livrent le compte rendu plus ordonné d'un débat. D'autre part, à l'origine, elles n'étaient pas conçues pour devenir un état du texte. Elles ne constituaient de manière générale qu'un support ou un aide-mémoire. Mais malheureusement, l'étape ultérieure de rédaction qui aurait dû suivre sur la base de ces notes, n'a pas toujours eu lieu ou du moins, même s'il a eu lieu, nous n'en avons pas conservé de trace et dans ce cas la *reportatio* est le seul reflet de l'état oral d'un enseignement."

⁷¹ See *supra* paragraph. "c. THE LITERARY GENRE OF THE QUAESTIONES", pp. 15-16, n. 59.

⁷² *IBIDEM*.

himself is the author of the text and is writing his own *determinatio* based on the fact that the author writes in the first person in his answers.⁷³ Indeed, as mentioned before, if the author of

⁷³ JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 2; *V*, 152va: “Item is ergo modus videtur imponendus, quod imaginatur quoddam suppositum absolutum unum existens, cum tamen non sint nisi tres Personae vel tria supposita, sicut cum dico ‘Deus generans’ constat, quod est Persona Patris, quod intelligitur.”; JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 5; *V*, 155ra: “Lumen autem, prout est in aliis receptum, dicit esse in tertia specie qualitatis; et licet hoc non sit improbabiliter dictum, tamen secundum communiorem opinionem dico, quod est in tertia specie qualitatis, quia ad illam pertinet passibilis qualitas, qualis est lux, ubicumque ponatur.”; JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 6; *V*, 155vb-156ra; *E*, 101vb: “Sed contra hoc est, quod, quodcumque sunt duo principia formalia distincta essentialiter, oportet esse actus duos, etsi agens sit unum. Si ergo istae species manent actu distinctae essentialiter, oportet dicere, quod sint duae visiones simul et non una, dum video per duas species. Et ideo etiam dicimus, quod in patria sunt duae visiones, scilicet per essentiam et propriam rerum speciem, etiam quando idem per duo principia videt.”; “Et ideo concludendo dico, quod una et eadem species essentialiter ex parte subiecti potest recipere numerum non rei, sed rationis, ut scilicet dicatur multa per relationem et per comparisonem ad diversa obiecta, sicut et in Deo dicimus multas ideas, licet sint una essentia per comparisonem ad ideata, sicut et nos per unam speciem diversa videmus vel intelligimus, quae relata ad diversa, quae per eam repraesentantur, potest dici multa.”; JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 7; *V*, 157ra-b; *E*, 102va-b: “Secundo, quia, sicut se habet esse essentiae ad essentiam, ita esse existentiae ad existentiam. Sed ego video, quod ex inhaerentia accidentis ad substantiam non recipit essentia accidentis essentiam subiecti nec ipsa formaliter est. Ergo nec existentia accidentis erit existentia subiecti.”; “Album autem non est in genere <accidentis> secundum Philosophum in *Topicis*, sed albedo, et idem dico de aliis concretis et abstractis.”; JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 9; *V*, 158vb; *E*, 103va: “Imaginetur igitur, quod ego videam te in speculo materiali et quod ego possem esse causa formativa tui idoli in speculo, sicut nunc verbum vel phantasma cuiuscumque apud me formo; tunc manifeste videres, quod ego per speciem in oculo meo existentem, sine qua non est visio, viderem idolum tuum et per idolum tuum te una et eadem visione, et tunc idolum in una et eadem visione est quasi terminus respectu mei et quasi principium respectu tui; sic etiam est de verbo respectu intelligibilium et phantasmatum respectu imaginabilium.”; JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 10; *V*, 159vb-160ra: “Dico autem, quod quaereretur, quia articuli fidei dicunt vitam aeternam, sed non “in quo”. Unde multi posuerunt in substantiis separatis. Istud autem subiectum sub ratione contracta dico, non quod sit ratio particularis simpliciter, sed quia non in tanta universalitate sicut in scientia beatorum, qui etiam vident in eo effectus gloriae et plura quam nos. Est tamen haec ratio, scilicet credibilis, universalissima omnium rationum huius mundi, in quantum, quidquid in quacumque scientia tractatur, possit revelari vel credi; loquimur autem de hac scientia, non in quantum est practica, quia sic est de actibus humanis ordinabilibus in finem ultimum, sed in quantum est speculativa.”; “Item Prima Parte, quaestione 1, articulo 3, in responsione dicit, quod omnia, quae sunt in hac scientia, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti, quod est revelabile, et idem in solutione 3 argumenti. Item in Scripto de 1 argumento, quod ens divinum, quod principaliter est Deus, cognoscibile per inspirationem; omnia autem haec, scilicet revelabile – non apparens, cognoscibile per inspirationem – comprehenduntur per hoc, quod dico credibile; nec potest dici subiectum huius scientiae, nisi prout est creditum; sed tolle hoc solum, totus processus scientiae erit vanus.”; JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 15; *V*, 162ra-162va: “Sed ista opinio non potest stare. Primo, quia non est dare scientiam, quae neque sit speculativa neque practica, sicut isti volunt, quia scientia est habitus intellectus. Omne autem, quod cadit sub consideratione intellectus, vel est tale, quod intellectus est eius tantum considerativus, vel operativus, non est dare medium; respectu primi est speculativus, respectu secundi est operativus sive practicus. Nec dico, quod omnis intellectus vel est causatus a re vel causat res propter intellectum angelicum, sed prima divisio est vera in omni intellectu.”; JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 16; *V*, 163vb-164ra: “Licet etiam anima non sit proprie suppositum, sed pars suppositi, tamen, quia est hoc aliquid sive singulare, ipsa dico separata. Ideo cum ei aliqua accidunt, scilicet gratia et virtutes, ideo nec in ea sunt idem hoc aliquid et natura.”; “Ipsa autem essentia angeli non comprehendit omnia, cum sit determinata ad certam speciem, sicut dictum est. Et ideo oportet, quod aliud superveniat ad perfectionem eius. Et idem dico de gratia perficiente essentiam, non potentiam, sine qua ad bonum infinitum non elevatur.”; JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 17; *V*, 164rb-va: “Secundo videndum est, quomodo aliqui hanc positionem nituntur defendere tamquam possibilem, etsi non teneant eam. Dicunt enim, quod aequae potens est voluntas ad eliciendum actum dilectionis sicut intellectus actum visionis. Sed ego video, quod in patria intellectus elicit actum visionis non mediante forma creata informantem intellectum – secundum illos, qui ponunt, quod non videtur per similitudinem creatam –, sed elicitur actus vel mediante ipsamet essentia divina vel ex sola praesentia obiecti, quod est Deus; <ergo> formatur visio in ipso intellectu sine habitu medio. Ergo et hic Spiritus Sanctus potest movere voluntatem ad actum dilectionis sine habitu medio creato, qui dicitur caritas.”; JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19; *V*, 166vb et 167va-b; *E*, 104va et 105ra-b: “Sed hoc non videtur esse intentio quaerentium nec

the text were a *reportator*, the latter would refer to the master in the third person.⁷⁴ However, also in this case, defining the editorial status of Picard's work is not totally straightforward, as with the literary genre. Although the text of the Erfurt and Vatican manuscript has some features typical of a final master's written work, it is unclear why Picard's work has missing parts, such as objections without answers or sets of *argumenta* and *responsiones* entirely missing. When reading Picard's *Quaestiones*, one can observe what Wippel refers to as "a sense of being unfinished, a certain lack of tidiness", which is instead characteristic of a *reportatio*.⁷⁵ This is possible if one assumes that Picard revised the text of his *Quaestiones* multiple times, probably starting from some draft version of them, and that the scribes of Erfurt and Vatican manuscripts copied a version of the text that was still in progress, incomplete. As a result, Picard may have left some arguments unanswered because he was still considering what to write and proceeding in finishing his work.

The questions 6, 8, 9, and 11 further suggest the potential existence of an ongoing version of Picard's *Quaestiones* as the model of the surviving copies. In questions 6, 8 and 9 there are some inner references to previous questions of Picard's work. Though, the questions at issue are not found beforehand in the Vatican manuscript – as it should be, if one subsequently literally the references of the text – but it figures in the following part of the work:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 6, resp.; *V*, 155va; *E*, 101rb-101va:

Unde quantum ad secundum pertinet, tunc leguntur hae quattuor opiniones.

Una dicit, quod non solum intentionales, sed etiam reales duae formae possunt esse in eodem subiecto eiusdem speciei, differentes solo numero etiam naturaliter. Et ista probatur et improbatur supra quaestione illa: "utrum deus posset facere duo accidentia eiusdem speciei in

Commentatoris, qui fuit auctor huius positionis. Ista enim praecessio pertinet ad formam secundum illum aspectum, quo est adventicia sive introducenda in materiam, et dico "adventicia", quia, licet forma essentialem respectum habeat ad materiam, tamen quoad hoc advenit."; "Dimensiones autem istae possunt considerari dupliciter: aut secundum eorum terminationem, et dico 'terminari' secundum determinatam mensuram corporis et figuram, et sic ponuntur ut perfecta in genere quantitatis, et sic non possunt esse principia individuationis, quia talis terminatio frequenter variatur circa individuum idem, et sic non remanet idem numero."

⁷⁴ B. C. BAZÀN – G. FRANSEN – D. JACQUART – J. W. WIPPEL, *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, cit., pp. 189: "Secondly, granted that *reportationes* of the second session as well as a Master's final written determination will incorporate some such organizing plan, there are often clear textual indications which show that one is dealing only with a *reportatio*. For instance, there may be references to the Master in the third person, which one would not expect to find in a Master's final written version of his own *Quodlibet*. Or there may be introductory remarks or marginal notations in the manuscript tradition to indicate that one is dealing only with a *reportatio*."

⁷⁵ *O.c.*, p. 190. Cf. also J. HAMESSE, "La technique de la reportation" cit., pp. 416 and 417-418: "En effet, comme on l'a déjà vu, étant incapables de noter l'entière du discours prononcé par le maître ou tous les arguments développés par les divers intervenants lors d'une discussion, le reportateur va à l'essentiel et essaie de consigner par écrit l'ensemble des idées développées."; "À propos d'un passage lors d'une disputation, par exemple, les arguments des opposantes et des respondentes auraient dû être notés au fur et à mesure de la discussion. Certains étaient omis parce que le reportateur ne pouvait pas tout consigner par écrit. Lors de la rédaction finale du texte, le professeur pouvait choisir un ordre plus logique dans la succession des arguments avancés. Nous en avons le témoignage pour un *Quodlibet* de Pierre de Tarentaise."

eodem subiecto” [subiecto *add.* infra quaestione, <columna> 125, <linea> 13 *i.m. ex alia manu V*; *cf. infra V, 181vb*: JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 35, *V, 181vb-182ra*: “Utrum Deus possit facere duo accidentia eiusdem rationis in eodem subiecto”], et ante similiter probatur et improbat in eadem.

† Secunda dicit, ... †

Unde est tertia opinio, quae dicit, quod duae naturales formae non possunt simul esse, sed duae intentionales indistinctae ex parte subiecti, licet essentialiter distinctae ex parte obiectorum.

[...]

Unde est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod nec duae reales nec duae intentionales possunt esse simul, sicut probatur supra in eadem.

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 8, resp.; *V, 157va*:

[...] Unde quod non possunt propter debilitatem entitatis, statim faciunt saepius pertractata et dubitanda inquisita. Considerandum ergo, quod omnibus decem praedicamentis et cetera, sicut supra [*Cf. infra* JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 36; *V, 182ra-182va*: “Utrum relatio addat aliquid reale supra [*an super scrib.?*] suum fundamentum”] in quaestione de relationibus “utrum addant aliquid et cetera”; et sic patet primum.

Circa secundum considerandum, quod solum in his, quae dicuntur ‘ad aliquid’, et cetera, sicut supra eadem quaestione [*Cf. infra* JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 36; *V, 182ra-182va*: “Utrum relatio addat aliquid reale supra [*an super scrib.?*] suum fundamentum”]; [...]

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 9, resp.; *V, 158rb*; *E, 103ra*:

Circa secundum intelligendum, quod, cum quaestio sit de accidente, scilicet actione intellectus et sensus, distinguendum videtur inter accidentia. Sunt enim quaedam accidentia absoluta, sicut qualitas et quantitas, ut album, calidum et huiusmodi, quaedam sunt accidentia respectiva sicut relativa; et illa etiam tribus modis se habent: quaedam enim dicuntur relativa secundum esse, alia secundum dici; secunda distinctio est, quod quaedam dicuntur secundum rem, alia vero secundum rationem, et de his in praecedentibus quaestionibus [*Cf. supra* JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 8; *V, 157va-158rb*: “Utrum relatio in divinis distinguat personas in quantum sunt [*coni.*: est] idem essentia vel in quantum differunt ab ea” *et cf. etiam infra* JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 36; *V, 182ra-182va*: “Utrum relatio addat aliquid reale supra [*an super scrib.?*] suum fundamentum”] satis dictum est; tertia distinctio est secundum Philosophum V *Metaphysicae* in fine capituli de ‘ad aliquid’, quod quaedam sunt relativa per se, quia scilicet ipsa sunt relativa secundum se, alia autem <per accidens>, quia aliquo modo habent se ad relativa, quae secundum se dicuntur, et hoc tripliciter, sicut ibidem ponit.

In the specific case of *quaestio* 6, this inconsistency is so evident that it is also highlighted by a reader of the time who wrote in the margin the exact place, at the end of the Vatican manuscript, where the question was to be found: “infra quaestione, <columna> 125, <linea> 13”. This evidence suggests that, in the codex from which the scribe copied the Vatican manuscript, even the order of the questions might not have been definitively established. This

hypothesis can find further support in the different order of Picard's questions found in the Erfurt manuscript.⁷⁶

Finally, as stated earlier, the *quaestio* 11 gives the last evidence to understand better the editorial status of surviving copies of Picard's work:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 11, resp.; *V*, 160ra-161rb:

Dicenda sunt hic quattuor.

Primo ponam aliquorum opiniones cum ipsarum reprobatione.

Secundo meam cum eius probatione.

Tertio declarabo eam cum quadam imaginatione.

Quarto tangentur argumenta cum ipsorum solutione.

Circa primum notandum, quod de formis inuenio novem opiniones.

[...]

De secundo principali sciendum, quid sit formam educi de potentia materiae. De hoc sunt tres opiniones.

[...]

† De tertio principali sciendum ... †

† De quarto principali sciendum ... †

Here, Picard initially mentions that he will develop four different sections of the question, but despite his statement, only the first two appear actually in the text, the others are completely missing. This significant absence of entire sections of text strongly leads to the hypothesis that what is survived of Picard's text is a copy of an unfinished version of the *Quaestiones* which needed to be reworked in several respects. In conclusion, it is evident that Picard's *Quaestiones* surviving texts are incomplete. This may be due to revisions made over time, and the scribes of the Erfurt and Vatican manuscripts copied a version that cannot be considered neither a initial *reportatio* of oral sessions nor an authoritative and definitive master's text ready for publication, but an intermediate version of the text that circulated in various forms.

2.2 LOST WORKS

Besides the *Quaestiones*, not much is known about other Picard's intellectual production.⁷⁷ As said above, the *Quaestiones* are the sole surviving complete work of Picard. However, John Picard seems to have written some other works during his life.

⁷⁶ See *infra* paragraph "APPENDIX", pp. 31-32

⁷⁷ T. KAEPPELI, *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum Medii Aevi*, II: G-I, cit., pp. 527-528; O. WEIJERS, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500)*, J (à partir de Johannes D), vol. 5 (Studia artistarum. Études sur la Faculté des arts dans les Universités médiévales II), Turnhout 2003, 114-116; see also A. LANDGRAF, "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. P. und seine Quaestiones disputatae," cit., pp. 520-522. and P. PORRO, "Essere e essenza in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg: note sulla prima ricezione del tomismo a Colonia," cit., pp. 226-245.

Heinrich Denifle and Franz Ehrle report that John Picard wrote a *Commentary on the Sentences* – that is clear since he completed the baccalaureate around the 1306.⁷⁸ Albert Fries actually attempts to ascribe to Picard the first two books of an anonymous *Commentary on the Sentences* transmitted by the Codex Vaticanus Latinus n. 1114. He grounds his attribution on a theoretical coherence between the theses shown in these two books and those present in Picard’s *Quaestiones*, but has not been widely accepted.⁷⁹ According to what Martin Grabmann says in his *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, parts of the first book could also be present in the Codex latinus n. 2165 from Wiener Hofbibliothek.⁸⁰ Moreover, Zofia Siemiątkowska discovered some fragments (dd. 1–18) of the fourth book within the codex n. 1583 (ff. 118–142) from Biblioteka Jagiellońska in Kraków.⁸¹ However, till today, no critical edition of these texts is available.

Besides his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Jacques Quéatif and Jacques Échard report that John Picard is credited a *Summa theologica* and three collections of sermons: *sermones quadragesimales*, *sermones dominicales* and *sermones de sanctis per annum*. But, also in this case, there is no evidence about the current existence of these works, which seem to be lost indeed.⁸²

⁷⁸ P. H. DENIFLE – F. EHRLE, *Archiv für Litteratur- und Kirchen Geschichte des Mittelalters* II, cit., p. 228: “(18.) fr. Johannes de Lichtenberg, theutonicus, mag. in theol., scripsit lecturam super sententias.”; G. MEERSSEMAN, “Laurentii Pignon Catalogi et Chronica; accedunt Catalogi Stamensis ut Upsalensis Scriptorum O. P.,” in *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Predicatorum Historica* vol. XVII, pp. 28; 63; 74: “(47) Fr. [Iohannes de Lichtenberg] Theutonicus, magister in theologia, scripsit lecturam super sententias.; (46) Fr. Iohannes de Li[c]htenberg Theutonicus, magister in theologia, scripsit lecturam super sententias.; (35) Iohannes, Theutonicus, magister in theologia, scripsit super omnes quattuor libros sententiarum.”

⁷⁹ A. FRIES, “Cod. Vat. lat. 1114 und der Sentenzenkommentar des Johannes von Lichtenberg O.P.,” in *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 7 (1937), pp. 305-319. For the description of the codex see A. PELZER, *Codices Vaticani Latini* t. 2, pars prior, cit., pp.736-737. Cf. also W. SENNER, *Johannes von Sterngassen OP, Teil. I: Studie*, cit., pp. 65-69. also F. STEGMÜLLER, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* 1, Herbipoli (Würzburg) Schöning, 1947, pp. 232-233 and R. L. FRIEDMAN, *The Sentences Commentary, 1250-1320. General Trends, The Impact of Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination*, in G. R. EVANS (ed.), *Mediaeval Commentaries on the «Sentences» of Peter Lombard. Current Research*, Leiden-Boston, MA-Köln (2002) pp. 59-60 n. 48.

⁸⁰ M. GRABMANN, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, vol. I, cit., pp. 410-420.

⁸¹ Z. K. SIEMIĄTKOWSKA, “Deux decouvertes au sujet de Jacques de Metz et de Jean Picardi,” in *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 8 (1961), pp. 29-32.

⁸² J. QUÉATIF – J. ÉCHARD, *Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum recensiti, notisque historicis et criticis illustrati* (vol. I), cit., p. 523: “*Sermones quadragesimales, Dominicales et Sanctorum per annum*. Ex quibus Turrecremata et Bandellus laudant sermonem de nativitate B. Virginis hoc themate: *Fons parvus crevit in fluvium. Summa theologica*, inquit Lusitanus.”; on the hitherto unproven relationship between a John Picard’s *Summa theologica* and the anonymous *Summa de bono* which is preserved in Cod. Vat. lat. 4305; see also J. N. PAQUOT, *Mémoires Pour Servir À L’histoire Littéraire Des Dix-sept Provinces Des Pays-bas, De La Principauté De Liège, Et De Quelques Contrées Voisines*, cit., pp. 282-283 and M. GRABMANN, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, vol. I, cit., p. 414.

3. JOHN PICARD AS INTERPRETER OF THOMAS AQUINAS

After an in-depth look at Picard's life and work, the following part of the study will focus on presenting two case studies of John Picard's approach to Thomas' texts: *quaestiones 3 (Utrum Deus potuerit sumere humanam naturam sine supposito)* and *19 (Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia)*. By analyzing the ways in which Picard explicitly quotes, uses, and comments on the various works and opinions of Thomas in these two questions, his personal style and method in interpreting the legacy of Aquinas' philosophy and theology will become more clear.

Before examining these two cases in detail, however, a brief historical introduction to the early reception of Thomas' legacy would provide the perfect opportunity to place John Picard's *Quaestiones* in their proper intellectual context.

3.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Shortly after Thomas Aquinas' death in 1274, much controversy arose over his doctrines and works. Tempier's condemnation of 1277 is the clearest example of these theological disagreements. Although the specific effects of Tempier's condemnation of Aquinas' legacy are unclear, it is at least reasonable to assume that Aquinas himself was one of its implicit targets.¹ Two events characterized the years immediately following Thomas' death: on the one hand, further condemnations and polemical writings against Thomas were drafted (for instance, the *Correctorium* of William de la Mare); on the other, members of the Dominican Order attempted to defend Thomas' positions.² The first results of these attempts were the so-called

¹ Cf. J. F. WIPPEL, "Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277," in *The Modern Schoolman* 72 (1995), pp. 233-272; R. HISSETTE, "L'implication de Thomas d'Aquin dans les censures parisiennes de 1277," in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 64 (1997), pp. 3-31; ID., "Philosophie et théologie en conflit: Saint Thomas a-t-il été condamné par les maîtres parisiens en 1277?," in *Revue Théologique de Louvain* 28 (1997), pp. 216-226; J. M. M. H. THIJSSSEN, "1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome," in *Vivarium* 35 (1997), pp. 72-101; J. F. WIPPEL, "Bishop Stephen Tempier and Thomas Aquinas: A Separate Process against Aquinas?," in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 44 (1997), pp. 117-136; R. HISSETTE, "Thomas d'Aquin compromis avec Gilles de Rome en mars 1277?," in *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 93 (1998), pp. 5-26; ID., "Thomas d'Aquin directement visé par la censure du 7 mars 1277? Réponse à John F. Wippel," in J. HAMESSE (ed.), *Roma Magistra Mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis*, vol. I, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, pp. 425-437; R. WIELOCKX, "A Separate Process against Aquinas. A Response to John F. Wippel," in J. HAMESSE (ed.), *Roma Magistra Mundi*, vol. II, pp. 1009-1030; J. M. M. H. THIJSSSEN, *Censures and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400*, Philadelphia 1998; R. WIELOCKX, "Procédures contre Gilles de Rome et Thomas d'Aquin. Réponse à J. M. M. H. Thijssen," in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 83 (1999), pp. 293-313; P. PORRO, *Tommaso d'Aquino. Un profilo storicofilosofico*, Roma 2019, pp. 464-480.

² For the historiographical discussion on the existence of the so-called Early Thomistic School, see F. J. ROENSCH, *Early Thomistic School*, Dubuque 1964; A. A. ROBIGLIO, "Tommaso d'Aquino tra morte e canonizzazione (1274-1323)," in A. GHISALBERTI ET AL. (eds.), *Lecture e interpretazioni di Tommaso d'Aquino oggi. Cantieri aperti*, Torino 2006, pp. 197-216; ID., *La sopravvivenza e la gloria. Appunti sulla formazione della prima scuola tomista*

Correctoria corruptorii fratris Thomae, which were the earliest and most extensive reactions to William's *Correctorium*.³ The *Correctoria* initiated a flourishing period of theological debates with Thomas Aquinas' theology at its core, also showing a sort of coalescence of Dominican scholars.

These debates did not only involve the main centers of theological discourse, such as Paris and Oxford, but also the so-called "peripheral areas",⁴ like the new *studia generalia* established from 1248 on. An example of this intense theological discussion on Aquinas' theories, which took place during the very first years of the 14th-century between universities and *studia generalia*, is John Picard of Lichtenberg's set of questions. This is evident not only from the topics that Picard addresses in his *Quaestiones*, which were indeed hot topics in the intellectual context of that period,⁵ but also from the implicit and explicit sources that Picard refers to in his work when discussing these same questions. In addition to simple sources, the text of the *Quaestiones* shows indeed *verbatim* correspondences between Picard's work and those of other contemporary masters.⁶ In these cases, due to the extreme similarity of the textual passages, it is not possible to establish the precise relationship between Picard's text and those of the other masters.⁷ Nevertheless, together with the sources, these *verbatim* correspondences provide the evidence that the *studium generale* of Cologne cannot be viewed as a close and isolated context. Rather, the *studium* had close links with other cultural hubs of its time. By shedding light on

(*sec. XIV*), Bologna 2008; see *infra* chapter "4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: B. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING UNORIGINAL"

³ Four main *Correctoria* were written between 1282 and 1287: the *Correctorium* "Quare", written by Richard Knapwell, the *Correctorium* "Circa", composed by John of Paris, the *Correctorium* "Sciendum", ascribed to Robert of Oxford, and the *Correctorium* "Quaestione", attributed to William of Macclesfield. On these works, see P. GLORIEUX, "Les premières polémiques thomistes I: Le *Correctorium Corruptorii* 'Quare'," in: *Bibliothèque thomiste* 9 (1927); ID., "Les premières polémiques thomistes II: Le *Correctorium Corruptorii* 'Sciendum'," in *Bibliothèque thomiste* 31 (1956); J.-P. MULLER, *Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Circa" de Jean Quidort de Paris*, Roma 1941; ID., *Le Correctorium Corruptorii "Quaestione." Texte anonyme du ms. Merton 267*, Roma 1954; cf. also M. J. F. M. HOENEN, "Being and Thinking in the „Correctorium fratris Thomae“ and the „Correctorium corruptorii Quare“. Schools of Thought and Philosophical Methodology," in J. A. AERTSEN – K. EMERY, JR. – A. SPEER (eds.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, Berlin 2001, pp. 417-435.

⁴ Cf. N. BRAY – D. DI SEGNI – F. RETUCCI – E. RUBINO (eds.), *Centres and Peripheries in the History of Philosophical Thought. Essays in Honour of Loris Sturlese*, Turnhout 2021, esp. pp. VII-XVI.

⁵ See for example: q. 5, *V*, 153va-155rb: *Utrum lux sit qualitas realis vel intentionalis*; q. 11, *V*, 160ra-161rb: *Utrum in materia generabilium et corruptibilium sit aliqua inchoatio formae*; q. 16, *V*, 162va-164rb: *Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma*; q. 18, *V*, 165rb-166va: *Utrum in homine sit tantum una forma substantialis*; q. 19, *V*, 166va-168rb; *E*, 104rb-105vb: *Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia*; q. 20, *V*, 168rb-171ra: *Utrum in omni creatura esse et essentia differant vel habeant illud, quod sint idem*; q. 35, *V*, 178va-179va: *Utrum mundus potuerit esse ab aeterno*.

⁶ The places where Picard quotes works of contemporary masters of his time are listed *infra* chapter "4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: B. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING UNORIGINAL" of this thesis.

⁷ For a first attempt on this direction and on studying the historical relevance of textual correspondences present in John Picard's *Quaestiones* see G. LASORELLA, "John Picard of Lichtenberg's *Quaestiones Disputatae* as a source of William of Peter of Godin's *Lectura Thomasina*," in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 90,1 (2023), pp. 75-110, esp. pp. 85-107.

the textual mosaic of Picard's different types of references, the *Quaestiones* provide a valuable example of both how Thomas' theories were reinterpreted and which authors and works, in addition to Thomas, were discussed in the *studium generale* of Cologne between the 13th- and 14th centuries.

However, the significant number of implicit and explicit references to Aquinas' texts shows that John Picard is far more familiar with the works of Thomas than with those of anyone else.⁸ Picard is in fact so well acquainted with them that he makes a point of highlighting how Thomas' views sometimes differ from one work to another, showing contradictions and discrepancies.

3.2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN *NATURA* AND *SUPPOSITUM*

3.2.1. JOHN PICARD ON THOMAS' INCONSISTENCY

This phenomenon of highlighting contradictory positions within Thomas' various works is evident at the conclusion of *quaestio 3 (Utrum Deus potuerit sumere humanam naturam sine supposito)*, where, after answering to the question at issue, Picard explains that Thomas speaks doubtfully regarding the distinction between *natura* and *suppositum* in creatures throughout his *corpus* of texts. According to Picard, Thomas' inconsistency is evident since he maintains different opinions on this subject matter in the first and third part of his *Summa theologiae*, in the second book of his *Summa contra Gentiles*, and in his *Quodlibet II*.⁹

⁸ For example, Picard explicitly quotes Thomas many times throughout his *Quaestiones*, see A. LANDGRAF, "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg O. Praed. und seine Quaestiones disputatae," cit., p. 540; see also ms. V, q. 3, fol. 153ra; q. 7, fol. 157rb; q. 9, fol. 158vb; q. 10, fols. 159vb, 160ra; q. 17, fol. 164va; q. 19, fols. 167va, 167vb, 168ra; q. 24, fol. 175va; q. 26, fols. 176rb, 176va; q. 27, fol. 177ra; q. 28, fols. 177rb, 177va.

⁹ On the difference between nature and supposit in Thomas' works see R. CROSS, "Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation," in: *The Thomist* 60,2 (April 1996), pp. 171-202, esp. pp. 174-180; G. GALLUZZO, "Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals," in *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 71,1 (2004), pp. 131-171; M. GORMAN, "Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction in Thomas's Christology," in *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 67,1 (2000), pp. 58-79, esp. pp. 59-62; ID., *Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union*, Washington DC, 2017, pp. 14-34; E. POLSKY, "The Real Distinction between Supposit and Nature in Angels in Thomas Aquinas," in *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (forthcoming, but a draft version dated 01.06.2024 is available on Academia.edu by the link: https://www.academia.edu/105892230/The_Real_Distinction_Between_Supposit_and_Nature_in_Angels_in_Thomas_Aquinas_Forthcoming_Revised_01_06_2024_); E. ROUSSEAU, "Essence and Supposit in the Angels according to St. Thomas," in *The Modern Schoolman* 33 (1956), pp. 241-56; O. SCHWEIZER, *Person und Hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin*, Freiburg, Schweiz 1957, esp. pp. 85-89; ID., "Person und Hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin," in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 6, 1959, pp. 303-311; J. L. A. WEST, "The real distinction between supposit and nature," in P. A. KWASNIEWSKI (ed.), *Wisdom's apprentice: Thomistic essays in honor of Lawrence Dewan, O. P.*, Washington, DC (2007), pp. 85-106; J. WINANDY, "Le Quodlibet II, art. 4 de saint Thomas et la notion de suppot," in *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses* 11 (1934), pp. 5 -29; J. F. WIPPEL, *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, Washington DC 1981, pp. 225-257, esp. pp. 229-232; ID., *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, Washington DC 2000, pp. 238-253; cf. also S. EDWARDS, "Aquinas on Individuals and Their Essences," in *Philosophical Topics* 13,2. *The Proceedings of the Forty-Third and Forty-Fourth: Annual meetings of the Southwestern Philosophical*

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 3: “Utrum Deus potuerit sumere humanam naturam sine supposito”; V, 152va-153ra:

Notandum tamen, quod Thomas videtur dubie loqui de ista differentia, quia in *Prima Parte*, quaestione 29, articulo 2, solutione tertii argumenti, dicit, quod in simplicibus non differant, et etiam *Contra gentiles*, sed in *Quolibet*, quod differunt in omni creatura, sed tamen in fine dicit, quod differunt in modo significandi, et dicit ibidem, quod esse non est de ratione suppositi; sed in *Tertia Parte*, quaestione 2, articulo 2, vult, quod realiter in rebus materialibus differant, et ibi videtur dicere, quod esse requiritur ad suppositum, cum non sufficiant individuantia, sicut patet de natura humana, quae in Christo est una numero.

Upon reading this passage, Picard’s thorough understanding of Aquinas’ ideas is clear. As exemplified by his emphasis on Thomas’ shifting views on the difference between *suppositum* and *natura*, he underlines critical issues and is aware of the historical development of Thomas’ thought. This is also evident in Picard’s division of Aquinas’ writings, which displays his accuracy in knowing the chronology of Thomas’ works. Indeed, according to Picard’s view, in his early works, such as the first part of the *Summa theologiae* and the *Summa contra Gentiles*, dating from 1259 to 1268, Thomas argues that nature and supposit do not differ in simple substances. However, in later works, such as the *Quodlibet II* and the third part of the *Summa theologiae*, written between 1269-1273, Thomas contends that nature and supposit are different in every creature.¹⁰ This precise division reveals the great awareness that scholars of the 13th- and 14th centuries had of both the philosophical complexity of Aquinas’ writings and the historical dynamism of his thought.

To fully understand Picard’s critique, it is essential to closely examine the works he mentions. Firstly, according to Picard, Thomas argues for the identity of supposit and nature in simple beings in his response to the third argument of *quaestio* 29, article 2 of the first part of his *Summa theologiae* (1265–1268).¹¹

3.2.2. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: PRIMA PARS

In this trinitarian question *Utrum persona sit idem quod hypostasis, subsistentia et essentia*, Thomas compares the meaning of the term person with that of hypostasis, subsistence and

Society, Spring 1985, pp. 155-163; G. GALLUZZO, “Averroes and Aquinas on Aristotle’s Criterion of Substantiality,” in *Arabic sciences and philosophy* 19 (2009), pp. 157-187, esp. pp. 179-187; ID., “Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Z,” in *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 74 (2007), pp. 423-481.

¹⁰ For a catalogue of Thomas’ work and their chronology see J.-P. TORRELL, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre* (2^e édition 2002 revue et augmentée d’une mise à jour critique et bibliographie), Paris 2002, esp. pp. 483-525.

¹¹ *O. c.*, p. 289: “Mise en train durant la période de Rome (après qu’il eut renoncé à poursuivre le projet d’un second Commentaire des Sentences?), la Prima Pars était achevée en septembre 1268.”

essence to understand whether they actually mean the same thing or not.¹² Thomas solves this problem by claiming that the term essence differs from the other three, because they refer to the term “substance” in two different ways respectively:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 29, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 330a:
Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in V Metaphys., substantia dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio significat substantiam rei, quam quidem substantiam Graeci usiam vocant, quod nos essentiam dicere possumus. Alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. Et hoc quidem, communiter accipiendo, nominari potest et nomine significante intentionem, et sic dicitur suppositum.

As Aristotle says in Book V of his *Metaphysics*,¹³ substance can be understood in a twofold way, namely as *quidditas rei* and *subiectum* or *suppositum*. The *quidditas rei* means the *definitio*, which, in turn, conveys the substance of a thing or, in other words, the *essentia* of a thing. According to this first meaning, for a substance like “human being” (*homo*), the *quidditas rei*, namely “humanity”, stands for the definition “rational animal” (*animal rationale*) or “rational animality”. This very definition is what the term essence properly means. On the other hand, a substance can be referred to as a *suppositum* or *subiectum* when it stands for something that exists in itself as belonging to the category of substance (*subsistit in genere substantiae*).

Thomas argues that the term “suppositum” expresses the *intentio* of a substance of this kind in its general sense (*communiter*). Moreover, this same substance can also be considered as a specific thing (*res*) through three other terms:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 29, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 330a-b:
Nominatur etiam tribus nominibus significantibus rem, quae quidem sunt res naturae, subsistentia et hypostasis, secundum triplicem considerationem substantiae sic dictae. Secundum enim quod per se existit et non in alio, vocatur subsistentia, illa enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, sed in se existunt. Secundum vero quod supponitur alicui naturae communi, sic dicitur res naturae; sicut hic homo est res naturae humanae. Secundum vero quod supponitur accidentibus, dicitur hypostasis vel substantia. Quod autem haec tria nomina

¹² For a similar text in Aquinas see THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, I, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 553-557.

¹³ ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, IV 8, 1017b10-26; translatio media: Vuillemin-Diem 95,14-96,2: “Substantia dicitur et simplicia corpora, ut terra et ignis et aqua et quaecumque talia, et uniuersaliter corpora et ex hiis consistentia, animalia et horum partes et demonia; ea enim omnia dicuntur substantia, quia non de subiecto dicuntur sed de hiis alia. Alio uero modo quod est causa existendi, existens in talibus que non dicuntur de subiecto, ut anima in animali. Amplius quaecumque particule existentes sunt in talibus et terminantes et hoc aliquid significantes, quibus destructis destruitur totum, tamquam superficie corpus, ut dicunt quidam, superficies linea; et totaliter numerus uidetur esse quibusdam talis (nam destructo nichil esse, et terminare omnia); amplius quid erat esse, cuius ratio est diffinitio, et hoc substantia dicitur uniuscuiusque. Accidit autem secundum duos modos substantiam dici, subiectum ultimum, quod non de alio dicitur, et quod est hoc aliquid ens et separabile; tale uero singuli forma et species.”

significant communiter in toto genere substantiarum, hoc nomen persona significat in genere rationalium substantiarum.

A substance can be referred to as *subsistentia*, *res naturae*, and *hypostasis*. A substance that exists in itself and, thus, does not exist in something else is considered as a *subsistentia*. This kind of substance is furthermore a thing that underlies a common nature, and it is therefore called a *res naturae*. For example, an individual human being like Socrates is a thing that underlies the human nature. Likewise, a substance is a thing that does not only underlie the common nature, but also the accidents. This is why its third name is *hypostasis*. Finally, it has to be noted that those three names universally denote things that belong to the whole genre of substances, meanwhile if one speaks of things that only belong to the category of the rational substances, then the proper name for a substance of this kind is *persona*. This latter is then a term to mean an individual rational substance that exist in itself.

After this terminological clarification, Thomas addresses the specific difference between essence and person in his response to the third argument of the *quaestio*. It is clear that this specific difference actually mirrors the more general distinction between nature and supposit. Indeed, as said, the term *suppositum* signifies the concept (*intentio*) of “something existing in itself and belonging to the category of substance” understood in a general sense, while the term *persona* refers to a specific individual being (*res*) “existing in itself and belonging to the genre of rational substances”:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 29, a. 2, ad arg. 3; Leon. 330b:

Ad tertium dicendum quod essentia proprie est id quod significatur per definitionem. Definitio autem complectitur principia speciei, non autem principia individualia. Unde in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, essentia significat non solum formam, nec solum materiam, sed compositum ex materia et forma communi, prout sunt principia speciei. Sed compositum ex hac materia et ex hac forma, habet rationem hypostasis et personae, anima enim et caro et os sunt de ratione hominis, sed haec anima et haec caro et hoc os sunt de ratione huius hominis. Et ideo hypostasis et persona addunt supra rationem essentiae principia individualia; neque sunt idem cum essentia in compositis ex materia et forma, ut supra dictum est,¹⁴ cum de simplicitate divina ageretur.

¹⁴ See THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 3, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 39b-40b; see also THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 17, ad arg. 10; Bazán 112,249-262: “Sicut enim substantiae separatae alterius modi esse habent quam substantiae materiales, ita Deus alterius modi esse habet quam omnes substantiae separatae. In rebus enim materialibus tria est considerare, quorum nullum est aliud: scilicet individuum, naturam speciei et esse. Non enim possumus dicere quod hic homo sit sua humanitas, quia humanitas consistit tantum in speciei principiis; sed hic homo supra principia speciei addit principia individuantia, secundum quod natura speciei in hac materia recipitur et individuatur. Similiter etiam nec humanitas est ipsum esse hominis. In substantiis autem separatis, quia immateriales sunt, natura speciei non recipitur in aliqua materia individuante, sed est ipsa natura per se subsistens. Unde non est in eis aliud habens quidditatem, et aliud quidditas ipsa. Sed tamen aliud est in eis esse, et aliud quidditas. Deus autem est ipsum suum esse subsistens.”

This text brings out the central difference between essence and person, and clarifies in which creatures there exist this kind of difference. Thomas emphasizes that an essence corresponds to what is meant by the definition and includes the principles of the species, rather than the principles of the individual being. This precisely means that the definition of a material being must include both the form and the matter understood in their general sense (*ex materia et forma communi*), as these are the principles of its species. For example, the essence of the “human being”, namely “humanity”, is said by the definition “rational animal”, which can also be expressed as “a body animated by a rational soul”. This definition includes the terms “body” and “rational soul”, which respectively are the matter and form of the composite substance “human being” in their universal sense.¹⁵ Instead, if one speaks of an individual being, rather than its essence, then this being must be described as a composite of matter and form understood in their particular sense (*ex hac materia et ex hac forma*). Therefore, these two principles does not strictly belong to the notion of the species, but to the notion of the individual being. Referring to the same example abovementioned, if one refers to a particular human being, such as Socrates, then the two principles proper to Socrates are “this body” and “this soul”. They do not belong to the notion of the “human being” generally understood (*de ratione*

¹⁵ See also THOMAS AQUINAS, *De ente et essentia*, c. 2; Leon. 370,1-377,66: “In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur. Quod enim materia sola non sit essentia rei planum est, quia res per essentiam suam et cognoscibilis est et in specie ordinatur vel genere. Sed materia neque cognitionis principium est, neque secundum eam aliquid ad genus vel speciem determinatur, sed secundum id quod aliquid actu est. Neque etiam forma tantum essentia substantiae compositae dici potest, quamvis hoc quidam asserere conentur. Ex his enim quae dicta sunt patet quod essentia est illud, quod per diffinitionem rei significatur. Diffinitio autem substantiarum naturalium non tantum formam continet, sed etiam materiam; aliter enim diffinitiones naturales et mathematicae non differrent. Nec potest dici quod materia in diffinitione substantiae naturalis ponatur sicut additum essentiae eius vel ens extra essentiam eius, quia hic modus diffinitionis proprius est accidentibus, quae perfectam essentiam non habent. Unde oportet quod in diffinitione sua subiectum recipiant, quod est extra genus eorum. Patet ergo quod essentia comprehendit materiam et formam. Non autem potest dici quod essentia significet relationem, quae est inter materiam et formam vel aliquid superadditum ipsis, quia hoc de necessitate esset accidens et extraneum a re nec per eam res cognosceretur, quae omnia essentiae conveniunt. Per formam enim, quae est actus materiae, materia efficitur ens actu et hoc aliquid. Unde illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu simpliciter materiae, sed esse actu tale, sicut etiam accidentia faciunt, ut albedo facit actu album. Unde et quando talis forma acquiritur, non dicitur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Relinquitur ergo quod nomen essentiae in substantiis compositis significat id quod ex materia et forma compositum est. Et huic consonat verbum Boethii in commento praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod usia significat compositum. Usia enim apud Graecos idem est quod essentia apud nos, ut ipsemet dicit in libro de duabus naturis. Avicenna etiam dicit quod quiditas substantiarum compositarum est ipsa compositio formae et materiae. Commentator etiam dicit super VII Metaphysicae: natura quam habent species in rebus generabilibus est aliquod medium, id est compositum ex materia et forma. Huic etiam ratio concordat, quia esse substantiae compositae non est tantum formae nec tantum materiae, sed ipsius compositi. Essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur. Unde oportet quod essentia, qua res denominatur ens, non tantum sit forma neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamvis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola forma sit causa. Sic enim in aliis videmus, quae ex pluribus principiis constituuntur, quod res non denominatur ex altero illorum principiorum tantum, sed ab eo, quod utrumque complectitur, ut patet in saporibus, quia ex actione calidi digerentis humidum causatur dulcedo, et quamvis hoc modo calor sit causa dulcedinis, non tamen denominatur corpus dulce a calore, sed a sapore qui calidum et humidum complectitur.”

hominis), but to the notion of Socrates, who is a particular human being (*de ratione huius hominis*). In other words, the particular matter and form of Socrates are the particular body and soul of Socrates, and together they correspond to the individual principles of Socrates.¹⁶ Thus, the terms “hypostasis” and “person” refer to an individual being, and add the individual principles to the universal essence of that being. For all of these reasons, Thomas concludes that the essence and hypostasis or person are not identical in beings that are composed of matter and form, and exist individually in themselves. Accordingly, since nature is to essence as supposit is to person, nature and supposit are not identical in material beings.

To conclude the analysis of this text, it should be noted that, contrary to Picard’s remark, in this specific response, Thomas does not explicitly argue for the identity of *suppositum* and *natura* in all simple substances. Rather, he only states that in material beings, *suppositum* and *natura* are different, and this is in contrast to divine simplicity, where they are identical.

However, in his *quaestio* 3, article 3 of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, where Aquinas asks whether God is identical with his essence or not, he states that *suppositum* and *natura* does not differ both in God and in every being that is not composed of matter and form – implicitly including divine persons and angels. Furthermore, he clarifies that the individual matter is the metaphysical element which, through the individuation of the principles of the species, causes the distinction of the essence from the supposit in material things:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 3, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 44a-b:

Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est, quod in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et suppositum. Quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei, sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis, his enim homo est homo, et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei, non enim cadunt in definitione hominis haec carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde haec carnes et haec ossa, et accidentia designantia hanc materiam, non concluduntur in humanitate. Et tamen in eo quod est homo, includuntur, unde id quod est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas, sed humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definitiva habent se formaliter, respectu materiae individuantis. In his igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus individuation non est per materiam individuaalem, id est per hanc materiam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae formae sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt suppositum et natura. Et sic, cum Deus non sit

¹⁶ On this point Gabriele Galluzzo rightly states that: “However, Aquinas seems to think that individual matter adds something ontologically relevant to common matter, at least in the sense that what individual matter adds to common matter concerns the real structure of an individual substance and is accordingly mind-independent. [...] Aquinas explicitly talks of individual matter as the principle of individuation. This means that he conceives of an individual substance as analysable into two parts, an essence, which is common to all the members of a certain species, and the principle of individuation, which accounts for the individuality of the different individuals belonging to the same species. Essence, therefore, contains form and common matter, but not individual matter.” (G. GALLUZZO, “Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals,” cit., p. 135)

compositus ex materia et forma, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua deitas, sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.

According to Thomas, the definition of the species “human being” does not include the individual matter (*materia individualis*) or any of the accidents that affect it. However, the individual matter and accidents do belong to the existing individual human being, who therefore possesses something more than the only essence “humanity”.¹⁷ This essence can be considered, Thomas says, as the formal part of the particular human being, as well as the

¹⁷ See also THOMAS AQUINAS, *De ente et essentia*, c. 2; Leon. 371,67-89: “Sed quia individuationis principium materia est, ex hoc forte videtur sequi quod essentia, quae materiam in se complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum particularis et non universalis. Ex quo sequeretur quod universalia diffinitionem non haberent, si essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur. Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata. Et dico materiam signatam, quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. Haec autem materia in diffinitione hominis, in quantum est homo, non ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione Socratis, si Socrates diffinitionem haberet. In diffinitione autem hominis ponitur materia non signata; non enim in diffinitione hominis ponitur hoc os et haec caro, sed os et caro absolute, quae sunt materia hominis non signata. Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia Socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum. Unde Commentator dicit super VII Metaphysicae: Socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae sunt quidditas eius.”; THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 40, resp.; Leon. 139a-b: “Adhuc. In his solum quae sunt ex materia et forma composita, differre invenitur singulare et quidditas eius: ex eo quod singulare est individuatum per materiam designatam, quae in quidditate et natura speciei non includitur; in signatione enim Socratis includitur haec materia, non autem in ratione humanae naturae. Omnis igitur hypostasis in natura humana subsistens est constituta per materiam signatam. Quod de divina hypostasi dici non potest. Non est igitur possibile, ut videtur, quod hypostasis verbi Dei subsistat in humana natura. [...] Praeterea. Sicut ex anima et corpore constituitur humana natura in communi, ita ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore constituitur hic homo, quod est hypostasis hominis.”; the doctrine of material individuation is also consistent with one of Thomas’ last commentaries on Aristotle: THOMAS AQUINAS, *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, VII, lect. 11, nn. 1535-1536; Cathala - Spiazzi 370b: “Definitio autem non assignatur individuis, sed speciebus; et ideo materia individualis, quae est individuationis principium est praeter id quod est quod quid erat esse. Impossibile est autem in rerum natura esse speciem nisi in hoc individuo. Unde oportet quod quaelibet res naturae, si habeat materiam quae est pars speciei, quae est pertinens ad quod quid est, quod etiam habeat materiam individuaem, quae non pertinet ad quod quid est. Unde nulla res naturae si materiam habeat, est ipsum quod quid est, sed est habens illud. Sicut Socrates non est humanitas, sed est humanitatem habens. Si autem esset possibile esse hominem compositum ex corpore et anima, qui non esset hic homo ex hoc corpore et ex hac anima compositus, nihilominus esset suum quod quid erat esse, quamvis haberet materiam. Licet autem homo praeter singularia non sit in rerum natura, est tamen in ratione quae pertinet ad logicam considerationem. Et ideo superius ubi logice consideravit de quod quid erat esse, non exclusit substantias materiales, quin in illis etiam esset idem quod quid est, cum eo cuius est. Homo enim communis est idem cum suo quod quid est, logice loquendo. Nunc autem postquam iam descendit ad principia naturalia quae sunt materia et forma, et ostendit quomodo diversimode comparantur ad universale et particulare quod subsistit in natura, excipit hic ab eo quod supra dixerat idem esse quod quid est cum unoquoque, substantias materiales in rerum natura existentes. Relinquitur autem quod illae substantiae quae sunt formae tantum subsistentes, non habent aliquid per quod individuentur, quod sit extra rationem rei vel speciei significantem quod quid est. Et ideo in illis simpliciter verum est, quod quaelibet illarum est suum quod quid erat esse.”; for the date of writing of Thomas’ *Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics*, see J.-P. TORRELL, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre (2^e édition 2002 revue et augmentée d’une mise à jour critique et bibliographique)*, cit., p. 502: “La date et le lieu du Commentaire sur la *Métaphysique* d’Aristote posent de nombreux problèmes. La désignation du Livre *Lambda* comme Livre XII, appellation que Thomas a adoptée vers le milieu de l’année 1271, invite à dater le Commentaire des Livres VII – XII après cette date; le début du Commentaire pourrait dater de l’année universitaire 1270-71; le Commentaire des Livres II et III enfin pourrait être le fruit d’une auto-correction ou d’une rédaction postérieure. Commencée à Paris, la composition de cet ouvrage peut avoir été achevée à Naples; la seule chose certaine dans l’état actuel de la recherche est qu’il est antérieur au *De celo et mundo*, rédigé probablement à Naples en 1272-73.”

essential principles of the definition “rational animal” are the form of the individuating matter (*materia individuans*).

Moreover, as mentioned above, Thomas stresses here that, unlike material beings, essence and supposit are identical in all simple forms that exist in themselves as belonging to the category of substance.¹⁸ This is because they do not require individual matter to exist independently, as their own form is the cause of their individuation.

¹⁸ Thomas writes that essence and supposit are identical in all the simple forms also in disputed questions *De potentia Dei* (“Utrum quomodo se habeat persona ad essentiam, subsistentiam et hypostasim”) and *De spiritualibus creaturis* (“Utrum aliqua substantia spiritualis creata sit non unita corpori”), and in his *Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima*: THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 9, a. 1, resp.; Pession 226a: “Respondeo. Dicendum quod philosophus ponit substantiam dupliciter dici: dicitur enim uno modo substantia ipsum subiectum ultimum, quod non praedicatur de alio: et hoc est particulare in genere substantiae; alio modo dicitur substantia forma vel natura subiecti. Huius autem distinctionis ratio est, quia inveniuntur plura subiecta in una natura convenire, sicut plures homines in una natura hominis. Unde oportuit distinguere quod est unum, ab eo quod multiplicatur: natura enim communis est quam significat definitio indicans quid est res; unde ipsa natura communis, essentia vel quidditas dicitur. Quidquid ergo est in re ad naturam communem pertinens, sub significatione essentiae continetur, non autem quidquid est in substantia particulari, est huiusmodi. Si enim quidquid est in substantia particulari ad naturam communem pertineret, non posset esse distinctio inter substantias particulares eiusdem naturae. Hoc autem quod est in substantia particulari praeter naturam communem, est materia individualis quae est singularitatis principium, et per consequens accidentia individualia quae materiam praedictam determinant. Comparatur ergo essentia ad substantiam particularem ut pars formalis ipsius, ut humanitas ad Socratem. Et ideo in rebus, ex materia et forma compositis, essentia non est omnino idem quod subiectum; unde non praedicatur de subiecto: non enim dicitur quod Socrates sit una humanitas. In substantiis vero simplicibus, nulla est differentia essentiae et subiecti, cum non sit in eis materia individualis naturam communem individuans, sed ipsa essentia in eis est subsistentia. Et hoc patet per philosophum et per Avicennam, qui dicit, in sua metaphysica, quod quidditas simplicis est ipsum simplex.” THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones de spiritualibus creaturis*, q. un., a. 5, arg. 9 et ad arg. 9; Cos 58,68-79 and 64,325-334: “Preterea. Cum spiritus creati sint substantie finite, necesse est quod sint in determinato genere et specie: est igitur in eis invenire naturam uniuersalem speciei. Ex ipsa autem natura uniuersali non habent quod indiuidentur; ergo oportet esse aliquid additum per quod indiuidentur. Hoc autem non potest esse aliquid materiale quod intret compositionem angeli, cum angeli sint immateriales substantie, ut supra dictum est; necesse est ergo quod addatur eis aliqua materia corporalis, per quam indiuidantur. Et sic idem quod prius. [...] Ad nonum dicendum quod in compositis ex materia et forma, indiuiduum addit supra naturam speciei designationem materiae et accidentia individualia. Sed in formis abstractis non addit indiuiduum supra naturam speciei aliquid secundum rem, quia in talibus essentia eius est ipsummet indiuiduum subsistens, ut patet per philosophum in VII Metaph. Addit tamen aliquid secundum rationem, scilicet hoc quod est non posse existere in pluribus.” THOMAS AQUINAS, *Sententia libri De anima*, III, c. 2; Leon. 209,75-91 and 211,134-139: “Hoc autem contingit in omnibus habentibus formam in materia, quia in eis est aliquid praeter principia speciei. Nam natura speciei indiuidatur per materiam: unde principia indiuiduantia et accidentia indiuidui sunt praeter essentiam speciei. Et ideo contingit sub una specie inveniri plura indiuidua: quae licet non differant in natura speciei, differunt tamen secundum principia indiuiduantia. Et propter hoc in omnibus habentibus formam in materia, non est omnino idem, et res et quod quid est eius. Socrates enim non est sua humanitas. In his vero quae non habent formam in materia, sicut sunt formae simplices, nihil potest esse praeter essentiam speciei; quia ipsa forma est tota essentia. Et ideo in talibus non possunt esse plura indiuidua unius speciei, nec potest in eis differre res et quod quid est eius. [...] Nam in his, quae omnino sunt separata a materia idem est res et quod quid est eius. Et quia substantiae separatae ignotae sunt nobis, non potuit eas nominare propriis nominibus, sicut mathematica et naturalia, sed nominavit ea sub exemplo rerum naturalium.” Thomas wrote these works between 1265-1268, namely after the redaction of his *Summa contra Gentiles* and meanwhile he was finishing writing the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, see J.-P. TORRELL, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre (2^e édition 2002 revue et augmentée d’une mise à jour critique et bibliographie)*, cit., pp. 489–490 and 498: “Les Questions disputées *De potentia* datent du séjour de Thomas à Rome, très probablement de la première année de cette période (1265-66), avant la rédaction de la Prima pars de la *Somme de théologie*.”; “Cette Question disputée [*De spiritualibus creaturis*] date du séjour romain de Thomas; on peut la situer autour des années 1267-68, vraisemblablement entre novembre 1267 et septembre 1268.”; “Le Commentaire sur les trois livres du *De anima* inaugure la série des Commentaires d’Aristote auxquels Thomas

3.2.3. *SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES*

Picard states in his *Quaestiones* that Thomas upholds the thesis of the identity of essence and supposit in all simple beings also throughout his *Summa contra Gentiles* (1259-1265).¹⁹ Indeed, Thomas further specifies here that nature and supposit are identical in angels, as they are immaterial beings:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, c. 21; Leon. 63a-64b:

In omni enim eo quod non est sua essentia sive quidditas, oportet aliquam esse compositionem. Cum enim in unoquoque sit sua essentia, si nihil in aliquo esset praeter eius essentiam, totum quod res est esset eius essentia: et sic ipsum esset sua essentia. Si igitur aliquid non esset sua essentia, oportet aliquid in eo esse praeter eius essentiam. Et sic oportet in eo esse compositionem. Unde etiam essentia in compositis significatur per modum partis, ut humanitas in homine. Ostensum est autem in Deo nullam esse compositionem. Deus igitur est sua essentia. [...] Amplius. Formae quae de rebus subsistentibus non praedicantur, sive in universali sive in singulari acceptis, sunt formae quae non per se singulariter subsistunt in seipsis individuatae. Non enim dicitur quod Socrates aut homo aut animal sit albedo, quia albedo non est per se singulariter subsistens, sed individuatur per subiectum subsistens. Similiter etiam formae naturales non subsistunt per se singulariter, sed individuantur in propriis materiis: unde non dicimus quod hic ignis, aut ignis, sit sua forma. Ipsae etiam essentiae vel quidditates generum vel specierum individuantur per materiam signatam huius vel illius individui, licet etiam quidditas generis vel speciei formam includat et materiam in communi: unde non dicitur quod Socrates, vel homo, sit humanitas. Sed divina essentia est per se singulariter existens et in seipsa individuata: cum non sit in aliqua materia, ut ostensum est. Divina igitur essentia praedicatur de Deo, ut dicatur: Deus est sua essentia.

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 45; Leon. 392b:

In substantiis autem intellectualibus, quae non sunt ex materia et forma compositae, ut ostensum est, sed in eis ipsa forma est substantia subsistens, forma est quod est, ipsum autem esse est actus et quo est.

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 55; Leon. 178b

Convenientius igitur assumpta est hominis natura quam angelica: quia in homine aliud est natura et persona, cum sit ex materia et forma compositus; non autem in Angelo, qui immaterialis est.

In these passages, Thomas repeats that pure intellectual substances like angels are simple forms which do not need any individual matter in order to exist in themselves. Therefore, speaking of intellectual substances, person and nature does not differ.²⁰ However, Thomas adds

travailla dès la fin de la période romaine. L'ouvrage peut être daté avec précision entre la fin de 1267 et l'été 1268, avant que l'auteur ne quitte Rome pour Paris. Ce Commentaire est contemporain des QQ. 75 à 89 de la Prima pars consacrées à l'étude de l'âme humaine."

¹⁹ *O.c.*, cit., pp. 288: "La rédaction primitive des 53 premiers chapitres du Livre I revient à la dernière année du premier enseignement parisien (avant l'été 1259). En Italie, à partir de 1260, Thomas a révisé ces 53 premiers chapitres et rédigé le reste de l'ouvrage, achevé avec la rédaction du Livre IV en 1264-65, très probablement avant son départ pour Rome (1265)."

²⁰ On this topic and on the incommunicability of the essence of separated beings see THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 13, a. 9, resp.; Leon. 158a-159a: "Respondeo dicendum quod aliquod nomen potest esse

here that, although angels are pure forms and are not composite of matter and form, they are a composite of simple form (*quod est*) and *esse* (*actus essendi et quo est*).

Based on this first group of texts, Picard's comment seems to be accurate: in his *Summa theologiae* and *Summa contra Gentiles*, Thomas actually suggests that in all the separated substances – God, divine persons and angels –, nature and suppositum do not differ from each other, but are identical.

3.2.4. *SCRIPTUM SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM*

Although Picard does not mention any other early work of Aquinas besides the two *Summae*, Thomas actually analyses the difference between nature and supposit already in the *responsio* to distinction 5, question 1, article 3 of his *Commentary on the Sentences* (1252-1256).²¹ Here, Thomas discusses whether Christ is one person or not and explores three different features of the relationship between nature and supposit that he does not deal with in his *Summae*: 1) the relationship between nature and supposit is a type of part-whole relationship; 2) both the nature

communicabile dupliciter, uno modo, proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen impositum ad significandum aliquid singulare, est incommunicabile et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquid individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles, inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet fortitudinem. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquid suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis, non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde, quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde, cum hoc nomen Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est; natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est, sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos soles.”

²¹ See J.-P. TORRELL, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre (2^e édition 2002 revue et augmentée d'une mise à jour critique et bibliographie)*, cit., p. 485: “Le Commentaire des quatre Livres des *Sentences* de Pierre Lombard constitue la première œuvre majeure de Thomas. Fruit de son enseignement comme bachelier sententiaire au début de son premier séjour parisien (1252/53-1254/55), sa rédaction a été contemporaine de l'enseignement oral ; la rédaction du Livre IV, deux fois plus gros que les précédents, n'était pas encore tout à fait achevée lorsqu'il commença son activité de maître (1256).”

and supposit can be signified in a certain way by the term “human being”; 3) the nature and supposit differ *secundum rem* in material beings, while they are identical but differ only *secundum rationem* in intellectual ones. This additional information is crucial to understand the reasons behind the inconsistencies that Picard highlights:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, III, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos. 196-197:

Sciendum est ergo quod in quibusdam different natura et persona secundum rem, in quibusdam vero secundum rationem tantum. Natura enim, secundum quod hic loquimur, est quidditas rei quam significat sua definitio. Persona autem est hoc aliquid quod subsistit in natura illa. In simplicibus autem que carent materia, ut dicit Avicenna, ipsum simplex est sua quidditas. Quidditas vero compositi non est ipsum compositum: humanitas enim non est homo.

Cujus ratio est, quia in significatione humanitatis, seu quidditatis, sive naturae, continentur tantum essentialia principia hominis, secundum quod est homo; non autem ea quae pertinent ad determinationem materiae, per quam natura individuatur, quae tantum continentur in significatione Socratis, quia per ea Socrates est hic, et divisus ab aliis.

Et ideo, quia humanitas non includit in sua significatione totum quod est in re subsistente in natura, cum sit quasi pars, non praedicatur; et quia non subsistit nisi quod est compositum, et pars a suo toto habetur, ideo humanitas non subsistit, sed Socrates, et ipse est habens humanitatem.

Homo autem significat utrumque, et essentialia et individuantia, sed diversimode; quia essentialia significat determinate, individuantia vero indeterminate, vel haec vel illa. Et ideo homo, cum sit totum, potest praedicari de Socrate et dicitur habens humanitatem; sed quia esse indistinctum est incompletum, quasi ens in potentia, ideo homo non subsistit, sed hic homo cui convenit ratio personae.

Est ergo ratio personae quod sit subsistens distinctum et omnia comprehendens quae in re sunt; natura autem essentialia tantum comprehendit.

In simplicibus autem non differt esse re natura et persona; quia natura non recipitur in aliqua materia per quam individuatur, sed est per se subsistens. Tamen in quantum considerantur essentialia rei, sic dicimus ibi naturam. In quantum autem invenitur ibi aliquid subsistens, sic dicimus ibi personam.²²

In this passage, 1) Thomas explains that the essence “humanity” only exists in the individual substance “Socrates” and “Socrates” exists as a human being through the essence “humanity”. For this reason, the essence “humanity” is considered as a kind of part (*quasi pars*) of the individual substance “Socrates”, while the *suppositum* “Socrates” is understood as a whole (*ut totum*), which includes both the essence “humanity”, the individual matter and all the other accidents.²³

²² See also THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, c. 21; Leon. 63a-64a: “In omni enim eo quod non est sua essentia sive quidditas, oportet aliquam esse compositionem. Cum enim in unoquoque sit sua essentia, si nihil in aliquo esset praeter eius essentiam, totum quod res est esset eius essentia: et sic ipsum esset sua essentia. Si igitur aliquid non esset sua essentia, oportet aliquid in eo esse praeter eius essentiam. Et sic oportet in eo esse compositionem. Unde etiam essentia in compositis significatur per modum partis, ut humanitas in homine. Ostensum est autem in Deo nullam esse compositionem. Deus igitur est sua essentia.”

²³ On the role of the part-whole relationship in Thomas’ understanding of the difference between *suppositum* and *natura* see also G. GALLUZZO, “Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals,” cit., pp. 146-154 and M. GORMAN, “Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction in Thomas’s Christology,” cit., p. 59: “It is important to emphasize that, for Thomas, a supposit is a whole. It is not, in other words, a bearer of properties which are themselves not parts

In addition to this part-whole relationship, 2) Thomas argues that the expression “human being” refers to both the principles of the species (*principia essentialia*) and the individual principles (*principia individualia*), but in different ways. The term “human being” signifies the essential principles – i.e. the principles of the species – in a defined manner (*determinate*), as it properly identifies with the definition, i.e. the composite of the form “rational soul” and matter “body”, both universally understood. On the other hand, these same terms “human being” also signify the individual principles – the principles of the supposit – in a undefined way (*indeterminate*), as it generally refers to “someone who possesses the essence humanity” (*habens humanitatem*) rather than a specific individual substance like “Socrates” or “Plato”. In this sense, when the terms “human being” are attributed to “Socrates”, they only partially signify him, as if he were a being in potency (*quasi ens in potentia*) that does not exist in itself but requires something else to individually exist, namely, the existing individual matter.²⁴

of it, as a human being wears a coat that is not a part of him. A supposit bears its properties in the sense that it contains them as parts of itself. Whiteness is not something external to Socrates that he possesses or bears; Socrates’s whiteness is a part of the supposit that he is.”

²⁴ Similarly, in his work *De ente et essentia*, Thomas Aquinas states that the terms “humanity” and “human being” refer to the essence of a human being in two different ways: the term “humanity” refers to the form and matter of a human being in their general sense, namely the “body” and the “rational soul”, but excluding the individual matter. For this reason, “humanity” is considered as part of a human being. The term “human being” instead refers to human form and matter in their particular sense, i.e. not excluding individual matter and the respective accidents. Thus, the term “human being” refers to the entirety of a human being in an undefined manner, since the matter that the term “human being” does not exclude is not the individual matter proper to any other individual human being, such as Socrates or Plato. In a way, the term “human being” refers to the individual principles of a human being without specifying which individual human being is being referring to: “Et quia, ut dictum est, natura speciei est indeterminata respectu individui sicut natura generis respectu speciei, inde est quod sicut id quod est genus, prout praedicabatur de specie, implicabat in sua significatione, quamvis indistincte, totum quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et id quod est species, secundum quod praedicatur de individuo, oportet quod significet totum id quod est essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte. Et hoc modo essentia speciei significatur nomine hominis, unde homo de Socrate praedicatur. Si autem significetur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, quae est principium individuationis, sic se habebit per modum partis. Et hoc modo significatur nomine humanitatis; humanitas enim significat id unde homo est homo. Materia autem designata non est id unde homo est homo; et ita nullo modo continetur inter illa, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo. Cum ergo humanitas in suo intellectu includat tantum ea, ex quibus homo habet quod sit homo, patet quod a significatione eius excluditur vel praeciditur materia designata. Et quia pars non praedicatur de toto, inde est quod humanitas nec de homine nec de Socrate praedicatur. Unde dicit Avicenna quod quiditas compositi non est ipsum compositum, cuius est quiditas, quamvis etiam ipsa quiditas sit composita, sicut humanitas, licet sit composita, non est homo, immo oportet quod sit recepta in aliquo quod est materia designata. Sed quia, ut dictum est, designatio speciei respectu generis est per formam, designatio autem individui respectu speciei est per materiam, ideo oportet ut nomen significans id, unde natura generis sumitur, cum praecisione formae determinatae perficientis speciem significet partem materialem totius, sicut corpus est pars materialis hominis. Nomen autem significans id, unde sumitur natura speciei cum praecisione materiae designatae, significat partem formalem. Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, quae est totum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, per quae nata est materia designari. Sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum est, quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit designationem materiae, sed implicite, continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam; et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo de individuis. Sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id, quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et praecidit omnem designationem. Unde de individuis hominis non

In light of this, 3) Thomas explains that essence and supposit are not identical and differ *secundum rem* in material beings because the supposit includes additional real properties to the

praedicatur. Et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae quandoque invenitur praedicatum in re, dicimus enim Socratem esse essentiam quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut dicimus quod essentia Socratis non est Socrates.” (THOMAS AQUINAS, *De ente et essentia*, c. 2; Leon. 373,243-308) Thomas speaks about this topic also in his early *Quodlibet IX* and late *Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics*: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex unione anime et corporis constituitur et homo et humanitas, que quidem duo hoc modo differant quod humanitas significatur per modum partis, eo quod humanitas dicitur qua homo est homo, et sic precise significat essentialia principia speciei per que hoc individuum in tali specie collocatur, unde se habet per modum partis, cum preter huiusmodi principia multa alia in rebus nature inueniantur; set homo significatur per modum totius: homo enim dicitur habens humanitatem uel subsistens in humanitate, sine precisione quorumcunque aliorum superuenientium essentialibus principiis speciei, quia per hoc quod dico: ‘habens humanitatem’, non preciditur quin habeat colorem et quantitatem et alia huius modi.” (THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; Gauthier 92,140-155; on the date of writing of *Quodlibet IX* see J.-P. TORRELL, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre (2^e édition 2002 revue et augmentée d’une mise à jour critique et bibliographie)*, cit., pp. 492: “Les Quodlibets de Thomas se répartissent en deux groupes, suivant les deux périodes d’enseignement à Paris: les Quodlibets VII-XI appartiennent à la première époque (1256-59), [...]”); “Humanitas autem pro tanto non est omnino idem cum homine, quia importat tantum principia essentialia hominis, et exclusionem omnium accidentium. Est enim humanitas, qua homo est homo: nullum autem accidentium hominis est, quo homo sit homo, unde omnia accidentia hominis excluduntur a significatione humanitatis. Hoc autem ipsum quod est homo, est quod habet principia essentialia, et cui possunt accidentia in esse. Unde, licet in significatione hominis non includantur accidentia eius, non tamen homo significat aliquid separatum ab accidentibus; et ideo homo significat ut totum, humanitas significat ut pars.” (THOMAS AQUINAS, *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, VII, lect. 5, n. 1379; Cathala – Spiazzi 339b) By analysing this passage of Thomas’ *Commentary*, J. West rightly points out that: “He [Thomas] notes that the *quod quid est esse* is what the definition signifies. This entails that when a definition is predicated of the relevant thing, the *quod quid est esse* is as well. Humanity, however, is not the proper definition of man; rather, man is defined as a rational mortal animal. The role of “humanity” is different: “Humanity is taken as the formal principle of [man], which is the *quod quid erat esse*; just as animality is taken as the principle of the genus, and not the genus; rationality, the principle of difference and not as the difference.” This difference between the principle of something and thing of which it is a principle leads Aquinas to distinguish different senses of nature in light of the various modes in which a nature can be related to things. [...] In this text, the fact that the term ‘humanity’ excludes accidents from its signification, which was the very same fact that led Aquinas to posit a real distinction between supposit and nature, is also seen as the underlying difference between the abstract and concrete senses of nature.” (J. L. A. WEST, “The real distinction between supposit and nature,” cit., p. 100. On the relationship between the terms “humanity” and “human being” see *o.c.*, pp. 94-100, esp. pp. 94-96); also M. GORMAN, “Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction in Thomas’s Christology,” cit., p. 60: “If the concept «a human being» explicitly included any trait beyond humanity (for example, being a certain size), then having this trait would be necessary for being human; if the concept «a human being» explicitly excluded every trait beyond humanity, then having any such trait would be sufficient for not being human. *Humanitas* is rational animality but nothing more; a *homo* is that which possesses rational animality, and may include much more. Thus, although we have here two ways of thinking about human nature, the result in the first case is a conception of human nature as such, while the result in the second case is not in fact a conception of human nature but is instead a conception of that which possesses human nature, i.e., a conception of a human supposit.” For the same explanation see THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 81; Leon. 257a: “Dicunt autem quidam quod forma partis eadem est et forma totius: sed dicitur forma partis secundum quod facit materiam esse in actu; forma vero totius dicitur secundum quod complet speciei rationem. Et secundum hoc, humanitas non est aliud realiter quam anima rationalis. Unde patet quod, corrupto corpore, non cedit in nihilum. Sed quia humanitas est essentia hominis; essentia autem rei est quam significat definitio; definitio autem rei naturalis non significat tantum formam, sed formam et materiam: necessarium est quod humanitas aliquid significet compositum ex materia et forma, sicut et homo. Differenter tamen. Nam humanitas significat principia essentialia speciei, tam formalia quam materialia, cum praecisione principiorum individualium, dicitur enim humanitas secundum quam aliquis est homo; homo autem non est aliquis ex hoc quod habet principia individualia, sed ex hoc solum quod habet principia essentialia speciei. Humanitas igitur significat sola principia essentialia speciei. Unde significatur per modum partis. Homo autem significat quidem principia essentialia speciei, sed non excludit principia individuantia a sui significatione: nam homo dicitur qui habet humanitatem, ex quo non excluditur quin alia habere possit. Et propter hoc homo significatur per modum totius: significat enim principia speciei essentialia in actu, individuantia vero in potentia. Socrates vero significat utraque in actu, sicut et differentiam genus habet potestate, species vero actu.”

nature, namely the individual matter and accidents. In the case of simple beings – in the latter passage, Thomas is speaking specifically of the divine person in Christ²⁵ –, their essence and supposit are instead identical, since they are pure forms and do not require any individual matter to exist as individual substances. However, the terms “nature” and “supposit” are used to consider distinct aspects of those pure formal beings. The term “nature” refers to the essential principles of these intellectual substances, while “supposit” addresses the fact that these pure forms exist in themselves and not in something else (*aliquid subsistens*).

In summary, all Thomas’ texts share a common point: the *suppositum* signifies something more than the nature of an individual existing thing. This is evident in the case of material beings, where nature refers only to the essence of the material composite and, by its meaning, it is then to be regarded as the formal part (*pars formalis*) of an individual material being. The supposit, instead, includes both the essence, the accidents and the individual matter, and means the individual material being in its entirety (*ut totum*). To make an example, the *suppositum* “Socrates” refers to Socrates’ individual matter and accidents in addition to nature “humanity” that is proper to him. This is why Thomas says that, in the case of material being, *suppositum* and essence differ *secundum rem* and are not *idem*. However, besides this difference, *suppositum* and *natura* are substantially connected, since the supposit “Socrates” cannot be considered without the nature “humanity” that is proper to Socrates and, in turn, Socrates’ “humanity” cannot exist but in the *suppositum* “Socrates”.

On the other hand, supposit and nature are identical and differ only *secundum rationem* in separated beings. Indeed, in this specific case, the supposit does not add any real properties to the nature, since separated beings are pure forms and completely lack individual matter. Yet *suppositum* means something more than mere *natura* also in respect of such beings, for it adds the meaning of “existing in itself as an individual belonging to the category of substance”.

3.2.5. QUODLIBET II

Upon close analysis of the first part of Picard’s passage in relation to Aquinas’ various texts, it appears that Thomas’ theory on the distinction between nature and supposit is consistent in both the *Summa theologiae* and the *Summa contra Gentiles*. However, as Picard also suggests,

²⁵ See J. F. WIPPEL, *The metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas*, cit., p. 242: “In brief, in this discussion Thomas holds that nature and person (and therefore supposit) differ really in material beings, and that they do not in simple substances. While he does not explicitly speak of created simple entities, the context makes it clear that he also has these in mind, and not merely God.”

in *quaestio* 2, article 2 of his *Quodlibet II* (1269)²⁶, Thomas seems to modify his earlier positions on the topic and added some new ideas to his teaching. In this article, Thomas explicitly claims that 1) supposit and nature differ in all creatures, both material and intellectual ones; 2) the existence of a being (*esse*) does not belong to the notion of the *suppositum*; and 3) nature constitutes²⁷ supposit in material beings because they differ in their *modus significandi*.

Before directly addressing these three theses of Thomas, it is better to clarify the context in which they are found. In the article at issue, Aquinas directly addresses and tries to answer to the problem whether in angels supposit differs from nature:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 216,24-38:

Respondeo. Dicendum, quod ad huius quaestionis intelligentiam oportet considerare quid sit suppositum et quid natura. Natura autem quamvis multipliciter dicatur, tamen uno modo dicitur natura ipsa substantia rei, ut dicitur in V *Metaph.*, secundum quod substantia significat essentiam vel quidditatem rei, vel quid est. Illud ergo significatur nomine naturae, prout hic loquimur de natura, quod significat definitio: unde Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis, quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia: differentia enim specifica est completiva definitionis. Suppositum autem est singulare in genere substantiae, quod dicitur hypostasis vel substantia prima.

At the beginning of the *solutio* to the question, Thomas clarifies again the basic meanings of the terms *natura* and *suppositum*: nature is what signifies the definition, while supposit is an individual being belonging to the category of substance. After this standard terminological explanation, Thomas talks about how nature and suppositum relate to each other within substances that are composed of matter and form:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 217,69-97:

Restat ergo considerandum, cum suppositum vel individuum naturale sit compositum ex materia et forma, utrum sit idem essentiae vel naturae. Et hanc quaestionem movet philosophus in libro VII *Metaph.* ubi inquit, utrum sit idem unumquodque, et quod quid est eius: et determinat, quod in his quae dicuntur per se, idem est res et quod quid est rei; in his autem quae dicuntur per accidens, non est idem. Homo enim nihil est aliud quam quod quid est hominis: nihil enim aliud significat homo quam animal gressibile bipes; sed res alba non est idem omnino ei quod quid est album, quod scilicet significatur nomine albi: nam album nihil significat nisi qualitatem, ut dicitur in praedicamentis: res autem alba est substantia habens qualitatem.

²⁶ J.-P. TORRELL, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre (2^e édition 2002 revue et augmentée d'une mise à jour critique et bibliographie)*, cit., pp. 301-310, esp. p. 306, and 492; on the crucial role of *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 2 in Aquinas' thought about the relationship and difference between nature and supposit in creatures see J. F. WIPPEL, *The metaphysical thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, cit., pp. 225-257, esp. pp. 229-232; ID., *The metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas*, cit., pp. 238-253; J. WINANDY, "Le Quodlibet II, art. 4 de saint Thomas et la notion de suppot," cit., pp. 5 -29; O. SCHWEIZER, *Person und Hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin*, cit., esp. pp. 85-89; ID., "Person und Hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin," cit., pp. 303-311; E. ROUSSEAU, "Essence and Supposit in the Angels according to St. Thomas," cit., pp. 241-56.

²⁷ On the term *constituere* used in this context by Aquinas see M. GORMAN, *Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union*, cit., p. 24: "Aquinas uses the word "constitute" (*constituere*) in the following manner: to say that X constitutes Y as F is to say that Y is F in virtue of having X. So, for example, Socrates's human nature "constitutes him as human" because Socrates is human in virtue of having that nature."

Secundum hoc ergo, cuicumque potest aliquid accidere quod non sit de ratione suae naturae, in eo differt res et quod quid est, sive suppositum et natura. Nam in significatione naturae includitur solum id quod est de ratione speciei; suppositum autem non solum habet haec quae ad rationem speciei pertinent, sed etiam alia quae ei accidunt; et ideo suppositum signatur per totum, natura autem, sive quidditas, ut pars formalis. In solo autem Deo non invenitur aliquid accidens praeter eius essentiam, quia suum esse est sua essentia, ut dictum est; et ideo in Deo est omnino idem suppositum et natura.

Thomas focuses his attention here to the way in which an accident-like property adds something more to the essence of a substance when the former happens (*accidere*) to the latter. The purpose of this passage is to demonstrate that the addition of certain accidental property to the nature of a substance results in a distinction between *natura* and *suppositum* within that substance. In order to do so, Thomas first needs to show the relationship between essences and things with respect to substantial and accidental beings (*res per se et per accidens*), and then explains the distinction between supposit and nature in material substances in virtue of this relationship.

Quoting Aristotle, Thomas says that a “thing” (*res*) and “what this thing is” (*quod quid est rei*) – i.e. the nature – are identical in the case of substances that exist in themselves and not in something else (*per se et non in alio*). In this way, a substance like “human being” is identical to “what a human being is”, namely a “walking, bipedal animal”. Contrary to the *res per se* case, a “thing” and “what that thing is” are not identical when considering an accidental being (*per accidens*). For example, a “white thing” is not entirely identical to “what white is”, since “white” signifies a mere quality that always exists in something else, whereas “a white thing” is a substance that exists in itself and has the accidental quality of “being white”.

Thus, Thomas argues that if something happens (*accidere*) to a substance so that this something does not belong to the notion of the nature of that substance – i.e. to its definition – , the supposit and the nature will differ in such a substance. In simpler terms, if an accident-like property is added to the nature of a substance, there is a distinction between the *suppositum* and the *natura*. This is clear in material beings because the *suppositum* adds to the nature of those beings the individual matters, by which they underlie to accidents. Thus, Thomas repeats again, the *suppositum* is understood as the whole of an individual being, while the nature only as the formal part.

To summarize, Thomas’ entire reasoning clearly revolves around the idea that nature and essence are different in every being in which something is added to its essence. To the essences of material substances individual matter and accidents are added. But what about pure intellectual substances? 1) As mentioned above, in the subsequent part of the question, Thomas

revises the position on the identity of nature and supposit in angels, which he had previously upheld in his two *Summae*:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 217,97-102

In Angelo autem non est omnino idem: quia aliquid accidit ei praeter id quod est de ratione suae speciei: quia et ipsum esse Angeli est praeter eius essentiam seu naturam; et alia quaedam ei accidunt quae omnino pertinent ad suppositum, non autem ad naturam.

Hence, Thomas explicitly declares here that *suppositum* and *natura* differ even in pure intellectual creatures like angels. In those substances, something is added to the notion of their essence, that is, their own existence (*ipsum esse*) and other kind of accident-like properties. Thomas delves into this consideration in his response to the first argument of the question:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 1; Gauthier 217,103-218,149:

“Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non solum in compositis ex materia et forma invenitur aliquod accidens praeter essentiam ipsius speciei, sed etiam in substantiis spiritualibus quae non componuntur ex materia et forma; et ideo in utrisque suppositum non est omnino idem quod ipsa natura. Hoc tamen est aliter et aliter in utrisque. Dupliciter autem aliquid accipitur ut accidens praeter rationem rei. Uno modo quia non cadit in definitione significante essentiam rei, sed tamen est designativum vel determinativum alicuius essentialium principiorum; sicut rationale accidit animali, utpote praeter definitionem eius existens, et tamen est determinativum essentialiter animalis; unde est essentialiter homini, et de ratione eius existens. Alio modo accidit aliquid alicui, quia nec est in eius definitione, nec est determinativum alicuius essentialium principiorum; sicut albedo accidit homini. His ergo quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, accidit aliquid praeter rationem speciei existens utroque modo. Cum enim de ratione speciei humanae sit quod componatur ex anima et corpore, determinatio corporis et animae est praeter rationem speciei, et accidit homini in quantum est homo, quod sit ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore; sed convenit per se huic homini, de cuius ratione esset, si definiretur, quod esset ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore; sicut de ratione hominis communis est quod sit ex anima et corpore. Accidunt etiam compositis ex materia et forma praeter rationem speciei multa alia quae non sunt determinativa essentialium principiorum. Substantiis vero immaterialibus creatis accidunt quidem aliqua praeter rationem speciei quae non sunt determinativa essentialium principiorum, ut dictum est; non tamen accidunt eis aliqua quae sunt determinativa essentiae speciei: quia ipsa natura speciei non individuatur per materiam, sed per seipsam, ex hoc quod talis forma non est nata recipi in aliqua materia; unde per se ipsam non est multiplicabilis, neque praedicabilis de pluribus. Sed quia non est suum esse, accidit ei aliquid praeter rationem speciei, scilicet ipsum esse, et alia quaedam quae attribuuntur supposito, et non naturae; propter quod suppositum in eis non est omnino idem cum natura.”

To understand why Thomas says that there is a distinction between the nature and the supposit even in intellectual substances it is better to clarify beforehand how something can generally be added as an accident-like property to the essence of something else.

Something is added as an accident-like property to the essence of something else in two ways. The first is the case of something that is added to the definition of the nature of a thing and further determines the essential principles of this same definition. According to this first kind of addition, the added element becomes part of the notion of the essence to which is added,

and causes the passage from the definition of something to the definition of something else. For instance, the attribute “rational” functions as an accident that affects the notion of “animal”. Since it is added to the definition of “animal”, the attribute “rational” essentially determines the same notion of “animal” (*determinativum essentialiter animalis*). As a result, the attribute “rational” becomes essential part of the definition of “animal”, leading to a further determination of its essential principles. This further determination of “animal” then leads to the definition of “human being”, where “rational” is no longer an accident, but the specific difference of this latter definition. Thus, in this case, the addition of the attribute “rational” to the definition of “animal” causes the essential change from the definition of a genus to the definition of a species.

The second way to add something as an accident-like property to the essence of something else is exactly that of the mere accidents. Contrary to the first case, an accident adds something to the definition of the nature of a thing without further determines its essential principles. Indeed, the quality of “being white” (*albedo*) affects the notion of “human being”, but this quality does not lead to any kind of essential change of this notion.

Before speaking about pure intellectual creatures, Thomas exemplifies the case of material things. Thomas states that something is added as an accident-like property to the essence of material things in both ways. In the first way, Thomas exemplifies, the notion of species “human being” is essentially determined in its essential principles by the material individuation of them. This kind of individuation actually leads to an essential change from the principles of the species “human being” to the individual principles that define “Socrates”. In other words, if the principles of the species “human being” are the matter “body” and the form “rational soul” understood in their universal sense, then when the existing individual matter is added to notion of the species, the principles of the species are further determined in the particular “body” and “soul” which essentially defines the individual “Socrates”. Thus, in this latter case, the addition of the existing individual matter to the essence of “human being” causes the change from the definition of a species to the definition of an individual being.

Moreover, the essence of material things receives also some mere accidents. Indeed, “Socrates” is affected by some features that do not further determine him, like the qualities of “being ugly”, “being bald”, or “being small”. The addition of this accidents does not actually lead to any essential change of the definition of Socrates.

Differently from the material things, nothing is added as an accident-like property to the essence of separated substances in the first way. In fact, since they are pure form existing in themselves, there is nothing that has to be added to their essences in order to have a change

from the principles of their species to their individual principles, because they does not need any individual matters to be individual beings. Indeed, according to Thomas, the essence of the species and the individual principles of them mean the same thing in the case of angels.

However, Thomas asserts that some accident-like property is added to the essence of created separated beings in the second way. As forementioned, what is added in this way is their existence (*ipsum esse*) and all the other accidents, which are indeed included to their supposit. For these reasons, Thomas ultimately says, supposit and nature are not identical in intellectual creatures. This thesis is further developed in Thomas' response to the second argument of the question:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Gauthier 218,150-158:

Ad secundum dicendum, quod non omne quod accidit alicui praeter rationem speciei, est determinativum essentiae ipsius, ut oporteat illud poni in ratione eius, sicut dictum est. Et ideo, licet ipsum esse non sit de ratione suppositi, quia tamen pertinet ad suppositum, et non est de ratione naturae, manifestum est quod suppositum et natura non sunt omnino idem in quibuscumque res non est suum esse.

Upon reading this passage of Thomas' text, a question arises: if the term *suppositum* means "an individual being existing in itself in the category of substance" and includes everything that is added to the nature, how can the *suppositum* not have the existence (*esse*) as part of its own notion? In his comment, Picard specifically refers to this latter passage of Thomas' *Quodlibet II* and highlights Thomas' problematic thesis that 2) *esse* does not belong to the notion of the supposit (*non de ratione suppositi*), but it still pertains to it (*esse pertinet ad suppositum*).²⁸ Thus, the main philosophical issue which seems to be posed by this passage of Thomas' *Quodlibet II*, and which Picard himself notices in his *Quaestiones*, is indeed the difference between the supposit (*suppositum*), which includes all kinds of accidents, and the notion of a supposit (*ratio suppositi*), which does not.

²⁸ Also Giles of Rome noticed this essential philosophical distinction between *suppositum* and *ratio suppositi* in his *De compositione angelorum*, question 5: see P. D. TRAPP, "Aegidii Romani De doctrina modorum," in *Angelicum* 12,4 (Oct.-Dec. 1935), pp. 449-501: "Alteram opinionem S. Thomae, quam priori annectit, desumit Aegidius ex Angelici *Quodlibeto* II, articulo 4. «Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi de hoc quod isti idem ponunt dicentes, quod in omni creatura differunt suppositum et natura. Eius autem rationem assignant ex eo, quod in omni creatura est dare aliqua praeter naturam, realiter differentia a natura, sicut esse et aliqua accidentia. Haec autem quae sunt praeter naturam, pertinent quidem ad suppositum quasi constituenta suppositum, non autem ad naturam. Quare suppositum secundum hoc differt realiter a natura. Addunt autem, quod esse non pertinet ad suppositum, quod sit de ratione suppositi; immo si suppositum definirent, in definitione eius non caderet esse. Et multo magis hoc dicendum videtur de accidentibus consequentibus esse». Ad hoc Aegidius animadvertit: «Sed haec positio quamvis sit conveniens, modus tamen ponendi non videtur rationalis circa hoc praecipue quantum ad hoc quod ponit, esse et accidentia consequentia facere et constituere suppositum». Immo secundum ipsum esse non solum ad constitutionem suppositi, sed etiam ad definitionem concurrere debet.»; cf. also O. SCHWEIZER, "Person und Hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin," cit., pp. 303-311.

Although Thomas does not explore deeply this last specific difference, this dissertation contends that the expression “ratio suppositi” refers to the individual principles of a subsisting *individuum*, while the term “suppositum” refers to what includes everything that is added to the nature of the subsisting individual being. To make an example for material beings, the notion of the *suppositum* “Socrates” is composed only of its individual principles that are proper to Socrates – i.e. the sum of “this body” and “this soul” existing in itself –, which are, in turn, the result of the addition of the individual matter to the essence “humanity”.²⁹ These principles essentially constitute the being “Socrates” as individual being existing in itself in the category of substance. Therefore, any accidents added to the individual principles of Socrates and even the actual existence (*esse*) of this individual principles do not essentially belong to

²⁹ The individual principles of Socrates seems to constitute the proper essence of the particular being “Socrates”. On the possibility of having a particular essence of individual beings in Aquinas, Galluzzo underlines: “As can be noted, Aquinas’s wording leaves open the possibility of there being in fact particular or individual essences alongside universal ones. And, as a matter of fact, further on Aquinas talks of the relationship between «the essence of Socrates» and «the essence of human being» as if they were in fact two distinct types of essence. On the other hand, when pursuing his explanation of the distinction between individual and common nature, he clearly denies that individuals have definitions and hence essences of their own (i.e. independently of the definition and essence of the species they belong to). [...] However, I hope that the rest of this paper will make it clear that the solution lies in a sort of disambiguation of the notion of ‘particular essence’. From the point of view of a theory of individuation like Aquinas’s, there is nothing wrong with talking of ‘particular essences,’ provided that all that is meant by this expression is ‘particularised essences’, i. e. essences made particular by the individuating principles existing in the individual substance. After all, in the external world there exist only particular instances of essences and species, i.e. particularised essences. What, on the contrary, Aquinas strongly denies is the idea that essences are particular by themselves, i.e. quite independently of the individual matter they exist in. In this sense, he also refuses to grant individuals essences of their own, namely essences distinct from the essence of the species individuals belong to.” (G. Galluzzo, “Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals,” cit., p. 136) From this perspectives the individual principles of Socrates can actually be considered the principles of the essence of “Socrates”. The principles “this body” and “this soul” of Socrates are indeed particular instances of the general matter “body” and form “rational soul” of the essence “humanity”. They are and can be considered particular instances because of the individualization of the essence “humanity” through the individual matter of Socrates. Thomas seems to refer to essences of individual beings also in THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 11, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 111a: “Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest, sed id unde est hic homo, non potest communicari nisi uni tantum. Si ergo Socrates per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est.”; see furthermore the analysis made in S. EDWARDS, “Aquinas on Individuals and Their Essences”, cit., esp. pp. 161-162: “Whatever we finally make of the notion of material composition, it should be evident that Aquinas did believe that individuals qua individuals do have essences. In the first place he himself refers to such essences at many points in his works. In the second place, such essences enter into both his treatment of individuation and his account of identity of an individual through time. Veatch is not wrong in holding that no accidental characteristics like particular colors or sizes are essential to individuals (and that is just why Aquinas calls them “accidental”), and he is not wrong when he says that a thing must always retain its substantial form and exhibit spatio-temporal continuity in its existence in order to retain its identity. But this is not enough for it does not capture what it is for its essence to retain its identity. Aquinas is very emphatic that in some way the matter of a thing is essential to that thing as an individual. Socrates does not just have to be human throughout the time he exists in order to be Socrates. He has to be and remain this human and that means he has to be and remain a human soul individuated by this body. Aquinas has unfortunately fallen short in his explanation of what being this body or this designated matter entails. But he nonetheless has the belief that matter is part of an individual essence and that this individual essence can in some cases survive even the destruction of the spatio-temporal continuity of the body.”

the notion of the *suppositum*. Thus, the property of “existing in itself” (*subsistentia*), which is the essential property of a *suppositum*, is not a property associated with the actual existence (*esse*) of an individual being, but a property that strictly belongs to the same essence³⁰ of it. In this sense, a supposit can be considered to exist in itself mainly by virtue of its own individual principles.³¹

On the other hand, the subsisting *suppositum* “Socrates” refers, as a whole, to everything that is outside the essence “humanity” that is proper to “Socrates”, i.e. the individual matter, and also to what is not included in its individual principles, namely the various accidents (such as “being white”, “short” or “ugly”, and even the *esse*).

³⁰ The strict relationship between the property of “existing in itself” and the essence of an individual thing see G. GALLUZZO, “Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals,” cit., p. 140: “In the actual world, a thing is non identical with its essence if and only if it is material. This is so because material essences do not subsist *per se* and hence need individuating principles to do so. However, if it were possible (which is not so) for an essence to be material and to subsist *per se*, then a material substance would be identical with its essence. This appeal to counter possible considerations is meant to show that, strictly speaking, the identity between *suppositum* and essence depends on the self-subsisting character of an essence and not on its immateriality.”; also M. GORMAN, “Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction in Thomas’s Christology,” cit., p. 59: “A nature (essence) is one very important kind of non-supposit. A nature is an intrinsic principle of its supposit, and it does two things for it. First, it is a principle by virtue of which the supposit possesses its essential features or belongs to its species. Socrates is human by virtue of his humanity. Second, a nature is a principle by virtue of which the supposit has its simple existence as a supposit. By virtue of his humanity, Socrates exists as a supposit — without his humanity, Socrates would not exist at all.”; ID., *Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union*, cit., pp. 24-25: “Substantial natures are thus principles that constitute the “substantial existence” of their substances, and by this, Aquinas clearly means *subsistence*. So Socrates’s humanity, which is his essence or nature, is for Aquinas a principle in virtue of which Socrates exists as a supposit. In short, Aquinas believes that substances have accidental existence in virtue of their accidents and subsistence in virtue of their natures or essences. [...] We have seen that for Aquinas, natures are principles in virtue of which their supposits subsist. But we should also note that for him, subsistence is always subsistence as a thing of a certain kind. The principle of Socrates’s subsistence is also the principle of his being human. Understood in this way, natures can be said to perform two functions: that of making something exist as a thing of a certain kind, and that of making something subsist. While distinguishable, these two functions belong together. A substantial nature makes something exist as a thing of a certain kind, and that kind is a kind such that something subsists precisely in virtue of being a thing of that kind.”; Gorman especially refers here to THOMAS AQUINAS, *De principiis naturae ad fratrem Sylvestrum*, 1; Dondaine 39,4-46: “Sed duplex est esse: scilicet esse essenziale rei, sive substantiale ut hominem esse, et hoc est esse simpliciter. Est autem aliud esse accidentale, ut hominem esse album, et hoc est esse aliquid. [...] Et secundum hoc differt materia a subiecto: quia subiectum est quod non habet esse ex eo quod advenit, sed per se habet esse completum, sicut homo non habet esse ab albedine. [...] Et quia forma facit esse in actu, ideo forma dicitur esse actus; quod autem facit actu esse substantiale est forma substantialis, et quod facit actu esse accidentale dicitur forma accidentalis.” On difference between substantial and accidental *esse* see J. F. WIPPEL, *The metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas*, cit., pp. 253–265.

³¹ See also THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 9, a. 5, arg. et ad arg. 13; Pession 234b and 237b: “Praeterea, in omni natura quae non differt a suo supposito, impossibile est multiplicari supposita illius naturae: propter hoc enim possibile est esse plures homines in una natura humana, quia hic homo non est sua humanitas; et ideo multiplicatio individuorum in una natura humana, consequitur diversitatem principiorum individualium, quae non sunt de ratione naturae communis. In substantiis autem immaterialibus in quibus ipsa natura speciei est suppositum subsistens, non est possibile esse plura individua unius speciei. [...] Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod in rebus creatis principia individuantia duo habent: quorum unum est quod sunt principium subsistendi (natura enim communis de se non subsistit nisi in singularibus); aliud est quod per principia individuantia supposita naturae communis ab invicem distinguuntur.”

The notion of separated substances must also be approached in the same way. These substances lack individual matter but exist in themselves through their own essential form, which is nothing but their own essence and individual principles. According to Thomas, the existence (*esse*) of separated substances is indeed an accident-like property added to their essence as well as all the other accidents that pertain to them.

However, Thomas rarely speaks about the particular essence of individual beings and Picard's critical comment on the statement that *esse non est de ratione suppositi* rightly highlights a grey area of Thomas' metaphysics of individual beings. In addition to this, Picard precisely points out that, contrary to all other occasions, in his *Quodlibet II* Thomas claims that nature and supposit differ in material beings not because they are two different things, but according to their way of signifying (*secundum modum significandi*):

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 3; Gauthier 218,159-169:

Ad illud vero quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum, quod natura dicitur constituere suppositum etiam in compositis ex materia et forma, non quia natura sit una res et suppositum alia res (hoc enim est secundum opinionem dicentium quod natura speciei sit forma tantum, quae constituit suppositum sicut totum); sed quia secundum modum significandi natura significatur ut pars, ratione supradicta, suppositum vero ut totum; natura significatur ut constituens, et suppositum ut constitutum.

Indeed, as frequently said, Thomas insists on the thesis that *natura* and *suppositum* are not identical in material beings and differs *secundum rem*. Why does he seem to support the opposite thesis in his *Quodlibet II*? Thomas actually argues here that nature constitutes the supposit in both the intellectual beings and in material beings, not because nature is a thing (*una res*) and the supposit is a different thing from it (*alia res*), but because nature and supposit are considered as part and whole according to their way of signifying.

To clarify his point, Thomas quotes an opinion he discussed at the beginning of the question according to which the substantial form of the subsisting individual being "Socrates" and the form of the species "human being" are identical.³² This means that the rational soul would be identical with the nature "humanity" because it is both the form that actualizes the matter "body" of Socrates and the form that totally constitutes the species "human being". From this perspective, the "rational soul", which completely constitutes the species "human being", would be only a part of the *suppositum* "Socrates". Indeed, the latter would result from the sum

³² THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 216,43-54: "Dicunt autem quidam, quod forma partis est idem cum forma totius, quae dicitur essentia vel natura, secundum rem, sed differt sola ratione: nam forma partis dicitur in quantum facit materiam esse in actu; forma autem totius in quantum constituit speciem: sicut anima dicitur forma partis, in quantum facit corpus esse in actu; et similiter dicitur anima forma totius in quantum constituit speciem humanam, et sic dicitur humanitas. Et secundum hoc, in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, natura est pars suppositi: nam suppositum est individuum compositum ex materia et forma, ut dictum est."

of two distinct and separate things: the body and the rational soul. This means that the nature “humanity” and the supposit “Socrates” are to each other as the part is to the whole.³³

According to Aquinas, this latter opinion is rather false, because the essence “humanity” is not identical only with the “rational soul”, but it includes both the essential principles of the definition of the species, that is, the form “rational soul” and the matter “body” in their universal sense.³⁴ For this reason, it is also false to say that the nature constitutes the supposit as they were two different things.

Ultimately, the nature “humanity” that is proper to Socrates and the supposit “Socrates” do not exist as two different separated things (*res*), but they only exist as one subsisting individual being, namely “Socrates”. Despite this, the nature “humanity” can still be said to constitute the *suppositum* Socrates as a “human being”, because according to the way of signifying (*secundum modum significandi*) nature is understood as the formal part of the subsisting individual being “Socrates”; while, in turn, the supposit is said to include the individual matter and all the accidents proper to “Socrates” because it is understood as the whole subsisting individual being “Socrates. In this precise way, Thomas can coherently argue that nature and

³³ See also THOMAS AQUINAS, *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, VII, lect. 9, n. 1467; Cathala - Spiazzi 358b: “Ad evidentiam autem horum, quae in hoc capitulo dicuntur, sciendum est, quod circa definitiones rerum, et earum essentias duplex est opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod tota essentia speciei est ipsa forma, sicut quod tota essentia hominis est anima. Et propter hoc dicunt, quod eadem secundum rem est forma totius quae significatur nomine humanitatis, et forma partis, quae significatur nomine animae, sed differunt solum secundum rationem: nam forma partis dicitur secundum quod perficit materiam, et facit eam esse in actu: forma autem totius, secundum quod totum compositum per eam in specie collocatur. Et ex hoc volunt, quod nullae partes materiae ponantur in definitione indicante speciem, sed solum principia formalia speciei. Et haec opinio videtur Averrois et quorundam sequentium eum.”

³⁴ THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet II*, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 216,55-217,68: “Sed praedicta positio non videtur esse vera, quia, ut dictum est, natura vel essentia dicitur id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non solum significat formam, sed etiam materiam, ut dicitur in Lib. VI Metaphysic. Nec potest dici quod materia ponatur in definitione rei naturalis sicut non existens de essentia eius: hoc enim est proprium accidentis ut definiatur per aliquod quod non est essentia eius, scilicet per subiectum; et ideo habet essentiam incomplete, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys. Relinquitur ergo quod in rebus compositis ex materia et forma, essentia vel natura non sit sola forma, sed compositum ex materia et forma.” See also THOMAS AQUINAS, *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, VII, lect. 9, nn. 1468-1469; Cathala – Spiazzi 358a-359a: “Sed videtur esse contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim superius in sexto, quod res naturales habent in sui definitione materiam sensibilem, et in hoc differunt a mathematicis. Non autem potest dici, quod substantiae naturales definiantur per id quod non sit de essentia earum. Substantiae enim non habent definitionem ex additione, sed sola accidentia, ut supra est habitum. Unde relinquitur quod materia sensibilis sit pars essentiae substantiarum naturalium, non solum quantum ad individua, sed etiam quantum ad species ipsas. Definitiones enim non dantur de individuis, sed de speciebus. Unde est alia opinio, quam sequitur Avicenna; et secundum hanc forma totius, quae est ipsa quidditas speciei, differt a forma partis, sicut totum a parte: nam quidditas speciei, est composita ex materia et forma, non tamen ex hac forma et ex hac materia individua. Ex his enim componitur individuum, ut Socrates et Callias. Et haec est sententia Aristotelis in hoc capitulo, quam introducit ad excludendum opinionem Platonis de ideis. Dicebat enim species rerum naturalium esse per se existentes sine materia sensibili, quasi materia sensibilis non esset aliquo modo pars speciei. Ostenso ergo, quod materia sensibilis sit pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, ostenditur quod impossibile est esse species rerum naturalium sine materia sensibili, sicut hominem sine carnibus et ossibus, et sic de aliis.”

supposit are not two different things but still differ each other in material being according to their way of signifying, as one includes individual matter and accidents more than the other.

3.2.6. *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: TERTIA PARS*

Although it has been explained how nature constitutes supposit *secundum modum significandi* even though they are not two different things, a problem persists: How is it possible that the supposit and the nature are not two different things but they differ *secundum rem*? This same discrepancy is underlined by Picard's final remark, who notes that, unlike in *Quodlibet II*, where Aquinas stresses the role of the *modus significandi*, in his third part of his *Summa theologiae* Thomas again asserts that supposit and nature differ *secundum rem*. To answer to this problem, it is necessary to analyze the last text of Thomas that Picard quotes at the end of his *quaestio* 3, namely the question 2, article 2 of the third part of the *Summa theologiae* (1272-1273).

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 25a-b:

Natura enim significat *essentiam speciei, quam significat definitio*. Et si quidem his quae ad rationem speciei pertinent nihil aliud adiunctum inveniri posset, nulla necessitas esset distinguendi naturam a supposito naturae, quod est individuum subsistens in natura illa, quia unumquodque individuum subsistens in natura aliqua esset omnino idem cum sua natura. Contingit autem in quibusdam rebus subsistentibus inveniri aliquid quod non pertinet ad rationem speciei, scilicet accidentia et principia individuante, sicut maxime apparet in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita.³⁵ Et ideo in talibus etiam secundum rem differt natura et suppositum, non quasi omnino aliqua separata, sed quia in supposito includitur ipsa natura speciei, et superadduntur quaedam alia quae sunt praeter rationem speciei. Unde suppositum significatur ut totum, habens naturam sicut partem formalem et perfectivam sui. Et propter hoc in compositis ex materia et forma natura non praedicatur de supposito, non enim dicimus quod hic homo sit sua humanitas. Si qua vero res est in qua omnino nihil est aliud praeter rationem speciei vel naturae suae, sicut est in Deo, ibi non est aliud secundum rem suppositum et natura, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, quia natura dicitur secundum quod est essentia quaedam; eadem vero dicitur suppositum secundum quod est subsistens. Et quod est dictum de supposito, intelligendum est de persona in creatura rationali vel intellectuali, quia nihil aliud

³⁵ Thomas expresses the same opinion also in one of his late disputed questions, see THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de unione Verbi incarnati*, a. 1, resp.; Calcaterra – Centi 422: “Ad intelligendum autem quid sit persona, considerandum est quod si aliqua res est in qua non sit aliud quam essentia speciei, ipsa essentia speciei erit per se individualiter subsistens. Et sic in huiusmodi re idem esset realiter suppositum et natura, sola ratione differens; in quantum scilicet natura dicitur prout est essentia speciei, suppositum vero in quantum per se subsistit. Si vero aliqua res sit intra quam praeter essentiam speciei, quam significat definitio, sit aliquid aliud, vel accidens vel materia individualis; tunc suppositum non erit omnino idem quod natura, sed habebit se per additionem ad naturam. Sicut apparet praecipue in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Et quod dictum est de supposito, intelligendum est de persona in rationali natura: cum persona nihil aliud sit quam suppositum rationalis naturae, secundum quod Boetius dicit in libro De Duabus Naturis, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia.” J.-P. TORRELL, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre (2^e édition 2002 revue et augmentée d’une mise à jour critique et bibliographique)*, cit., p. 492: “La Question disputée *De unione Verbi incarnati* doit être située très probablement vers la fin du second enseignement parisien, avant Pâques, tôt en avril, au plus tard en mai 1272; en raison de l’enjeu doctrinal du propos de l’a. 4 par rapport à *IIIa* q.17 a.2, concernant l’unité d’esse dans le Christ, on notera que les deux écrits sont quasiment contemporains.”

est persona quam *rationalis naturae individua substantia*, secundum Boetium. Omne igitur quod inest alicui personae, sive pertineat ad naturam eius sive non, unitur ei in persona.

In his *solutio* to the question, Thomas precisely states that nature and supposit differ *secundum rem* in material entities but they are not different things (*aliqua separata*). This is possible, as said before, because nature and supposit only exist as one subsisting individual being: The supposit cannot exist without the nature that is proper to a subsisting individual being and, in turn, this same nature cannot exist but in the supposit which precisely is that subsisting individual being. However, although they do not exist apart from each other, in the case of material being, the supposit includes certain real properties that are not inherent to its nature, but rather allow the composed being to exist in itself.³⁶ These real properties correspond

³⁶ See THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, III, d. 2, q. 2, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 85: “Respondeo dicendum, quod nulla natura habet esse nisi in supposito suo. Non enim humanitas potest esse nisi in homine. Unde quidquid est in genere substantiae per se existens, rationem hypostasis vel suppositi habet.” On this point, it is also helpful what Thomas states about the difference between nature and supposit in material and immaterial being in his disputed question *De potentia Dei*: “Substantia vero quae est subiectum, duo habet propria: quorum primum est quod non indiget extrinseco fundamento in quo sustentetur, sed sustentatur in seipso; et ideo dicitur subsistere, quasi per se et non in alio existens. Aliud vero est quod est fundamentum accidentibus sustentans ipsa; et pro tanto dicitur substare. Sic ergo substantia quae est subiectum, in quantum subsistit, dicitur ousiosis vel subsistentia; in quantum vero substat, dicitur hypostasis secundum Graecos, vel substantia prima secundum Latinos. Patet ergo quod hypostasis et substantia differunt ratione, sed sunt idem re. Essentia vero in substantiis quidem materialibus non est idem cum eis secundum rem, neque penitus diversum, cum se habeat ut pars formalis; in substantiis vero immaterialibus est omnino idem secundum rem, sed differens ratione. Persona vero addit supra hypostasim determinatam naturam: nihil enim est aliud quam hypostasis rationalis naturae.” (THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 9, a. 1, resp.; Pession 226a-b) Here, Thomas claims that nature and supposit are different *secundum rem* and are not identical in material beings, but they are not different nevertheless (*neque potius diversum*). This is because they exist as one individual being, but the *suppositum* includes in its notion some real properties that the notion of the essence does not, i.e. the individual matter and accidents. See also G. GALLUZZO, “Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals,” cit., pp. 150-154, esp. p. 153: “For what the Dominican Master wants to emphasise is that the relation of individual matter to essence is more complicated than that of matter to form. Predictably, the explanation for that, as Aquinas carefully reminds us, is that essence contains besides form common matter, of which individual matter is nothing but a further determination. Therefore, individual matter is not so distinct from common matter as matter is from form. This explains why, though individual matter is outside essence, we should qualify the part/whole model by introducing the idea that essence is signified as a part and suppositum is signified as a whole. Talking about signification is supposed to capture the thought that what individual matter adds to essence is merely the ontological principles which enable the essence to subsist. Suppositum, therefore, ‘says’ more than essence: it ‘says’ that a certain essence subsists as an individual and hence something has been added to it. This kind of addition, however, although ontologically relevant and hence real, should not be confused with the addition of a completely disjoint component.” and J. L. A. WEST, “The real distinction between supposit and nature,” cit., pp. 93-94: “Rather, he [Thomas] holds that being and essence are really distinct aspects of one and the same res or thing. [...] For Aquinas, however, the claim that being and essence, or supposit and nature, are really distinct in no way implies that the two could ever exist apart from one another: “no nature has being (esse) except in its supposit: for humanity can only be in a man. Hence, whatever is existing per se in the genus of substance has the character of a hypostasis, or supposit.” A supposit exists at all only insofar as it subsists in some nature or other; likewise, natures exist in reality only insofar as they inform particulars. [...] Likewise, to claim that the supposit and nature of a material thing are really distinct does not mean that they are separate, or even that they could be separate. Aquinas simply intends to deny that they are merely different terms or concepts for something that is in reality the same.” Cf. also M. GORMAN, “Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction in Thomas’s Christology,” cit., p. 78: “Now person (or supposit) is that which has properties, while nature is that in virtue of which a person (or supposit) has properties.” A similar description of the relationship between essence and supposit can be found in Thomas’ early *Quodlibet IX* and, later, in the third book of his *Summa theologiae* where Thomas shows how *esse*

to what is added to the essence of a material being, namely the individual matter and accidents.³⁷ For this precise reason, the *suppositum* is understood as the whole subsisting individual being, while the *natura* as the formal part of it. To conclude, the distinction *secundum rem* between the supposit and nature within one and the same individual material being respectively gives forth to a difference between the supposit and nature also in their way of signifying this same being.

3.2.7. CONCLUSION

To summarize Picard's comment: Thomas seems to hold different views on the difference between the *suppositum* and *natura* in creatures. In some of his works (such as the first part of the *Summa theologiae* or in the *Summa contra Gentiles*) Thomas states that nature and supposit are different *secundum rem* in material beings and are identical in immaterial ones. However, in his *Quodlibet II*, Thomas states that nature and supposit differ both in material creatures – but only in their way of signifying – and in intellectual ones. Moreover, in intellectual creatures, the distinction between nature and supposit occurs because their *suppositum* also includes the *esse*, which is added to the nature as an accident-like property. However, Thomas never mentions this reason for distinguishing between nature and supposit in angels before writing his *Quodlibet II*.³⁸

differently pertains to the supposit and nature: “Set hoc esse attribuitur alicui rei dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ei quod proprie et uere habet esse uel est; et sic attribuitur soli substantie per se subsistenti, unde quod uere est dicitur substantia so in I Phisicorum. Omnibus uero que non per se subsistent set in alio et cum alio, siue sint accidentia siue forme substantiales aut quelibet partes, non habent esse ita quod ipsa uere sint, set attribuitur eis esse alio modo, id est ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo dicitur esse, non quia ipsa in esse subsistat, set quia ea aliquid habet esse album. Esse ergo proprie et uere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti.” (THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quodlibet IX*, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 94,47-59) “Esse autem pertinet ad hypostasim et ad naturam, ad hypostasim quidem sicut ad id quod habet esse; ad naturam autem sicut ad id quo aliquid habet esse; natura enim significatur per modum formae, quae dicitur ens ex eo quod ea aliquid est, sicut albedine est aliquid album, et humanitate est aliquis homo.” (THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 17, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 222a). Regarding this latter passage of the *Summa*, Richard Cross rightly points out that: “The point of this distinction is that only *supposita* may be said to exist. A nature exists just in so far as some *suppositum* instantiates it. Hence the nature is that in virtue of which the suppositum is of a particular kind. (This is another way, of course, of claiming that a nature is a formal part of a *suppositum*.)” (R. CROSS, “Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the Incarnation,” cit., p. 181.)

³⁷ Based on Aquinas' *Quodlibet II*, Picard believes that Thomas here is referring to *esse* when he uses the term “accidentia”. Therefore, *esse* is necessary for the supposit to exist properly as a *suppositum*, since only individual principles are not sufficient to explain what a *suppositum* includes (*esse requiritur ad suppositum, cum non sufficientiant individuantia*). However, Thomas argues that in cases where something is added to the nature of a thing, there must be both individual principles – such as individual matter and essence – and various types of accidents, like individual accidents, accidents of the species, or *esse*. To conclude, Thomas is just saying that, speaking about composed beings, the *suppositum* actually includes individual matter and accidents.

³⁸ This is evident in some of Thomas' early work when he speaks about the simplicity of God: THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, I, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet - Moos 788-789, esp. p. 788: “Respondeo dicendum, quod persona et essentia omnino re in diuinis non distinguuntur. In illis enim in quibus aliud est essentia quam hypostasis vel suppositum, oportet quod sit aliquid materiale, per quod

However, whether Thomas' thought can actually be shown to be philosophically consistent or not is not the purpose of this study. A lot of words have been spent on this issue to date,³⁹

natura communis individuetur et determinetur ad hoc singulare. Unde illam determinationem materiae vel alicujus quod loco materiae se habet, addit in creaturis hypostasis supra essentiam et naturam; unde non omnino ista in creaturis idem sunt. In Deo autem non est natura ipsius subsistens per aliquod ad quod determinatur sicut per materiam; sed per seipsam est subsistens, et ipsum suum esse subsistens est; unde natura est ipsum quod subsistit, et esse in quo subsistit : et propter hoc in Deo omnino idem est quo est et quod est.” THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 7, a. 4, resp.; Pession 195b-196a: “Respondeo. Dicendum quod, absque omni dubitatione, tenendum est quod in Deo nullum sit accidens; quod quidem ad praesens potest ostendi tribus rationibus. Prima ratio est, quia nulli naturae vel essentiae vel formae aliquid extraneum adiungitur, licet id quod habet naturam vel formam vel essentiam, possit aliquid extraneum in se habere; humanitas enim non recipit in se nisi quod est de ratione humanitatis. Quod ex hoc patet, quia in definitionibus quae essentiam rerum significant quodlibet additum vel subtractum variat speciem, sicut etiam in numeris, ut dicit philosophus. Homo autem qui habet humanitatem, potest aliquid aliud habere quod non sit de ratione humanitatis, sicut albedinem et huiusmodi, quae non insunt humanitati, sed homini. In qualibet autem creatura invenitur differentia habentis et habiti. In creaturis namque compositis invenitur duplex differentia, quia ipsum suppositum sive individuum habet naturam speciei, sicut homo humanitatem, et habet ulterius esse: homo enim nec est humanitas nec esse suum; unde homini potest inesse aliquod accidens, non autem ipsi humanitati vel eius esse. In substantiis vero simplicibus est una tantum differentia, scilicet essentiae et esse. In Angelis enim quodlibet suppositum est sua natura: quidditas enim simplicis est ipsum simplex, ut dicit Avicenna; non est autem suum esse; unde ipsa quidditas est in suo esse subsistens. Unde in huiusmodi substantiis potest inveniri aliquod accidens intelligibile, non autem materiale. [...] Sic enim causatur accidens in aliquo subiecto ab extrinseco in quantum exterius agens agit in subiectum in quo causatur accidens. Similiter etiam non potest esse ex causa intrinseca, sicut est per se in accidentibus, quae habent causam in subiecto. Subiectum enim non potest esse causa accidentis ex eodem ex quo suscipit accidens, quia nulla potentia movet se ad actum. Unde oportet quod ex alio sit susceptivum accidentis, et ex alio sit causa accidentis, et sic est compositum; sicut ista quae recipiunt accidens per naturam materiae, et causant accidens per naturam formae.” In his *Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences*, Thomas uncertainly states that in creatures can be generally established a difference between the nature and supposit because there exists in them either the determination of matter or “anything that holds the place of matter”. What Thomas means by “that something which takes the place of matter” in this passage is unclear. Thomas could be referring to both the general concept of accident and *esse*, which add to the essence of creatures. This would suggest that Thomas in his *Commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences* already had in mind in draft form what he would explicitly state later in his *Quodlibet II*. But, Thomas does not delve deeply enough into the problem, so it is not possible to give a certain answer to this question. On the other hand, the text in *De Potentia* clearly contradicts what Thomas says in his *Quodlibet II*. In this text, Thomas explains that every creature has a distinction between what it possesses and what is possessed. When it comes to material beings, there are two differences: the difference between essence and supposit, and the difference between essence and existence. Therefore, it can be said that the supposit of a material being possesses both its own essence and existence, such as a human being possessing its humanity and existence. Differently from material beings, according to Thomas, in simple substances like angels, there is only the one difference: in angels, each supposit is its own nature, but their essence differs from their existence. Thus, angels do not possess material accidents, but only intelligible ones. It is reasonable to assume that these intelligible accidents correspond to the proper accidents of the angels' species and their own *esse*. However, it is essential to emphasize that although Thomas explicitly says that essence and existence differ in angels, the fact that angels possess an accident such as *esse* – which comes from an external cause that is God – seems in no way to affect the identity between their suppositum and natura. In this passage, Thomas does not consider the difference between the essence and existence of angels as playing a crucial role in the difference between their nature and supposit. This *solutio* to the article 4 of question 7 of the *De potentia* seems to contradict Thomas' answer offered in *Quodlibet II* to the difference between supposit and nature in angels. Upon analyzing these two texts, it becomes even more evident that Thomas' position on this specific issue is unclear.

³⁹ For example, in his study *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, John Wippel has also noticed the discrepancies in Thomas' views on the difference between supposit and nature in intellectual creatures, emphasizing the different positions that Thomas took on this problem throughout his life: “On a number of occasions, however, Thomas does treat of the topic with which Godfrey is here concerned, that is, the relationship and distinction between nature and supposit. Usually he maintains that in corporeal entities nature and supposit really differ as part and whole. In spiritual beings, including angels and God, they are identical. But in certain contexts, especially in *Quodlibet 2*, q. 4, Thomas seems to defend a different position. There he is attempting to determine whether nature and supposit differ in angels. [...] Therefore, only in God are nature and supposit

identical. As Thomas goes on to indicate, it will follow from this that even in angels nature and supposit differ, since an angel includes not only its essence but existence and certain accidents as well. As we have remarked above, in other contexts Thomas seems to restrict distinction between nature and supposit to material entities. One might conclude that his opinion on this point has undergone some change. Or one might attempt to remove the apparent discrepancy by suggesting that he defines supposit differently in *Quodlibet 2*, q. 4 and in the other texts. Any effort here to resolve this controverted point in Thomistic interpretation would carry us too far afield.” (J. F. WIPPEL, *The Metaphysical thought of Godfrey of Fontaines*, cit., pp. 225-257, esp. pp. 232-234) Furthermore, in his *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, Wippel himself analyses the different contemporary interpretations on Thomas’ change of view with respect to the difference between nature and supposit in angels. Some contemporary scholars have indeed attempted to resolve this apparent inconsistency in the teaching of Thomas. One of the contemporary interpretation that Wippel analyses is that of Othmar Schweizer. In his book *Person und Hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin*, Schweizer tried to show that in *Quodlibet II* Thomas gave two different meanings to the term *suppositum* during his career. According to Schweizer, in his earlier works Thomas used the term “*suppositum*” to signify only the sum of essence, individual matter, and accidents; whereas in *Quodlibet II* Thomas uses the word “*suppositum*” including in its meaning, the existence (*esse*). (See O. SCHWEIZER, *Person und Hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin*, cit., esp. pp. 85-89; ID., “Person und Hypostatische Union bei Thomas von Aquin,” cit., pp. 303-311) According to this specific understanding of Thomas’ texts, Thomas approached the same problem in two different ways, using two different meanings of the same term. If we understand the term *suppositum* in his restricted meaning, the supposit and the nature will be identical in immaterial beings; on the other hand, if the term *suppositum* is used in his boarder meaning, the supposit will be different from the nature. After describing Schweizer’s position, Wippel tries to demonstrate the validity of this latter. He shows that Thomas actually understands the term supposit in two different ways, outlining a simile with Thomas’ distinction between “that which is” (*quod est*) and *esse*. In this way, Wippel does not claim that there was a substantial change of doctrine in Thomas’ writings, but only a change in the use of the term *suppositum*: “Another way of approaching this is recall that frequently enough Thomas to uses Boethian language in referring to the distinction or composition of essence and act of being in created beings. This is to say, he often describes it as a distinction or composition of “that which is” (*quod est*) and of *esse*. When Thomas speaks this way, we should understand him to be emphasizing not the “is” (*est*) but the “that which” (*quod*) in this expression. It is because of this emphasis on the quidditative aspect of a concrete entity that Thomas can say that such a concrete being (“that which is”) is other than and enters into composition with its act of being (*esse*). Even in a created spiritual entity, its “that which is” when so understood will not include its act of being. [...] *Mutatis mutandis*, we might say much the same of Thomas’s understanding of supposit in his more frequent comparisons of this with nature. Just as the expression “that which is” may be taken as signifying a concrete subject which exists, but with an emphasis on its quidditative aspect, so the term “supposit” may be taken as signifying this same subject with this same quidditative emphasis along with the additional implication that the subject is ontologically complete and incommunicable. In this usage the individuated nature or essence is viewed as related to the subject or supposit as a formal part to a concrete whole. Since in material entities the concrete whole or subject includes individuating characteristics in addition to the specific essence, Thomas always defends real distinction between nature and supposit in such beings. And since such added individuating characteristics are unnecessary in created subsisting forms or angels, Thomas can identify nature and supposit in such beings when he understands supposit in this way, that is, when he concentrates on its quidditative aspect. On the other hand, we might emphasize the “is” (*est*) in the expression “that which is.” We could then argue that the concrete existing entity, which we may still identify as a supposit, includes its act of being (*esse*) in addition to its nature or essence. So understood, the subject or supposit will differ really from its nature or essence even in created spirits, not merely in material beings. This will follow because in each case the existing supposit includes the act of being in addition to its essence or nature. In fact it is in this way that Thomas understands the supposit in *Quodlibet 2*, q. 2, a. 2. Without necessarily implying a substantive change in doctrine, this text surely does point to a change in usage.” (ID., *The metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas*, cit., pp. 249-251) Besides Wippel’s explanation, Elliot Polsky’s paper, “The Real Distinction between Supposit and Nature in Angels in Thomas Aquinas”, presents the most recent attempt to coherently describe Aquinas’ discussion about the distinction between nature and supposit in angels. Here, the author of the paper identifies three arguments used by Aquinas to address this distinction in God and, by extension, in angels. Polsky calls these three arguments: the “accidental argument”, “the individuation argument” and “the act-potency argument”. According to the first argument, Thomas demonstrates that only God completely lacks accidents, whereas all the other creatures does have them. Thus, supposit and nature are totally identical only in God. According to the second argument, Thomas proves that only in material things supposit and nature differ, because essence is individuated by signed matter and exists in something else; whereas, since the essence of all immaterial substances exist in itself, then their essence does not differ from their suppositum. Similarly to the first argument, according to the third one, Thomas shows that only God is completely without potency, whereas all creatures have it; therefore, supposit and nature are totally identical only in God. (see E.

POLSKY, “The Real Distinction between Supposit and Nature in Angels in Thomas Aquinas”, p. 15) However, despite the commendable effort to achieve a consistent and organized picture of Thomas’ philosophical account on the topic, Polsky himself admits that Thomas is unclear (or inconsistent?) in at least one of his texts: “There isn’t space to discuss this text [Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 9, a. 1, resp.; Pession 226a-b] at length, but unless Aquinas flatly contradicts his consistent teaching that (a) angels have accidents and (b) only in what lacks accidents are supposit and nature *omnino idem*, we must take what he says here as an imprecise way of speaking ordered towards a question that has nothing to do with angels. He speaks of “immaterial substances” in the plural, but what he is intent on addressing is the identity of supposit and essence in God, not angels. Moreover, he says “omnino idem,” but what he has actually been discussing in the corpus, is not total identity (*omnino idem*), but essential identity (*idem per se*). What is most likely is that he is using the expression “omnino” broadly for total identity, not in every respect, but in definition or essence. Thus, whereas in most texts, total identity and per se identity are contrasted, here the expression “total identity” (*omnino idem*) is intended to signify only per se identity—total identity in essence, not in every respect. It is true that angelic supposita are not diverse from their essences per se secundum rem, but only by reason (*ratione*). This is perfectly consistent with the claim that they are not altogether the same (*omnino idem*)—in the strict sense—as their essences *secundum rem*.” (E. POLSKY, “The Real Distinction between Supposit and Nature in Angels in Thomas Aquinas,” cit., pp. 2-3, n. 6) Polsky is commenting on Thomas’ solution to article 1 of question 9 of his *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia Dei*, and he observes that here, in contrast to what Thomas does on other occasions, he writes that essence and supposit are totally identical (*omnino idem*) in all simple forms. Polsky is speaking only of the *De potentia Dei*, but, as seen above (cf. n. 15 and 31), Thomas also claims that essence and supposit are *omnino idem* in his *Commentary on the third book of Aristotle’s De anima*. Polsky is actually aware that this statement of Thomas raises at least a problem of theoretical consistency: How is it possible that nature and supposit are *omnino idem* for all intellectual substances, if it is known that angels have accidents? To answer this question, Polsky says that Thomas used “an imprecise way of speaking” because the subject of the question in question “Utrum quomodo se habeat persona ad essentiam, subsistentiam et hypostasim” does not directly concern angels, therefore Thomas is actually referring to the divine persons with the terms “spiritual substances”. Moreover, Polsky needs to specify that Thomas does not use here the expression “omnino idem” as he usually does. According to him, Thomas uses the terms “omnino idem” in this passage to mean the identity in essence (*idem per se*), rather than the identity in every respect (*omnino idem*). So Polsky needs to suppose that Thomas uses a “strict” and a “broad” sense of the expression “omnino idem” when he speaks about nature and supposit in intellectual substances. Polsky’s justification leaks a sort of rigid interpretative standardization of Thomas’ philosophical language that, it seems, neither Thomas does respect. In addition to that, Polsky never quotes in his paper Thomas’ problematic *solutio* to the article 4 of question 7 of the *De potentia* that it was analyzed in the previous footnote. Besides these little details, it is true, as Polsky says, that angels have some accidents added to their essence, beyond the mere *esse*. Thomas speaks about angels’ accidents within the first part of his *Summa theologiae*: THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 54, a. 3, arg. 2 et ad arg. 2; Leon. 47a-b: “Praeterea, si potentia intellectiva in Angelo est aliquid praeter eius essentiam, oportet quod sit accidens, hoc enim dicimus esse accidens alicuius, quod est praeter eius essentiam. Sed forma simplex subiectum esse non potest, ut Boetius dicit, in libro *De Trin.* Ergo Angelus non esset forma simplex, quod est contra praemissa. [...] Ad secundum dicendum quod forma simplex quae est actus purus, nullius accidentis potest esse subiectum, quia subiectum comparatur ad accidens ut potentia ad actum. Et huiusmodi est solus Deus. Et de tali forma loquitur ibi Boetius. Forma autem simplex quae non est suum esse, sed comparatur ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum, potest esse subiectum accidentis, et praecipue eius quod consequitur speciem, huiusmodi enim accidens pertinet ad formam (accidens vero quod est individui, non consequens totam speciem, consequitur materiam, quae est individuationis principium). Et talis forma simplex est angelus.” Here, Thomas explicitly states that angels do have accidents, and since species and individual being coincide in angels, angels’ accidents must be accidents proper of their species. Angels’ accidents are proper accidents (*accidentia propria*), which are caused by the essential principles of the angels’ species and cannot be separated from it to which they pertain. They are not essential properties nevertheless. To draw a comparison, the accidents of angels are to their species as the ability to laugh is to the human species. As the ability to laugh is an accident only proper to human species, so angels’ accidents will be only proper to angels’ species. Thomas actually speaks about proper accidents also slightly before in the first part of the *Summa* when he deals with the problem whether essence and existence are identical in God: THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 3, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 42a: “Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius, oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria consequentia speciei, ut risibile consequitur hominem et causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis essentialibus eiusdem rei.” (on the general topic of proper accidents or “necessary accidents” cf. also M. GORMAN, *Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union*, cit., pp. 14-34). By combining these last two texts, it is clear that Thomas Aquinas understood angels as having accidents beyond their

but all those intellectual efforts just highlights much more what John Picard of Lichtenberg already stated centuries ago: Thomas speaks doubtfully and unclearly on the difference between *suppositum* and *natura* in pure intellectual substances.

By highlighting the critical points that Aquinas' philosophical and theological theses, Picard shows indeed a deep knowledge of Thomas' works, but also a critical awareness of the complexity of his thought. Rather than attempting to reconcile Aquinas' apparent contradictory positions, Picard chooses in this case only to show Thomas' different opinions on the topic at issue. Picard behaves like a rigorous historian: He is only willing to point out unclear passages, reporting what Thomas' wrote, without attempting to solve any theoretical discrepancy through new concepts or interpretations that Thomas himself did never provide and probably would not even have accepted. Picard's "historical" approach demonstrates that, for his contemporaries, Thomas' thought was not an unchanging and consistent set of doctrines to be dogmatically accepted and defended, but rather an intellectual enterprise subject to problems of various kinds and worthy of careful critical analysis.

own essence already in the first part of the *Summa theologiae*. Thus, a further question arises: Why Thomas Aquinas never discussed the difference between nature and supposit in angels as he did in his *Quodlibet II*, since he was aware that angels had accidents beyond their own essence even in his earlier work? This question may appear speculative, but it seems to rise further doubt about whether Thomas had the same clear understanding of the distinction between nature and the supposit in angels throughout his career.

3.3. THE PRECEDENCE OF THE *DIMENSIONES INTERMINATAE* IN MATTER OVER THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM

Similarly to question 3, Picard offers a critical interpretation of a Thomas' change of idea also within his question 19.¹ Here, Picard faces the problem whether dimensions or some other kind of accidental dispositions precede in matter over the substantial form (*Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia*). The concept of dimensions and its connection with the category of quantity played a central role in the history of the reception and interpretation of Aristotelian philosophical thought, especially concerning the relationship between substantial form and prime matter, or with regard to the continuous change of substantial forms within the process of generation and corruption. In her series of papers on the various interpretations of the dimensions in the Late Middle Ages, Silvia Donati² provides a precise account of the historical development of this concept, explaining how the explicit discussion of the precedence of dimensions in matter over the substantial form originated in the Arab debates between Avicenna and Averroes' philosophical models and subsequently influenced the Latin world. The same conclusion was recently drawn by Margarete Neuhaus,³ who, together with the University of Cologne, has published a comprehensive work on the *dimensiones interminatae*, in which she analyzes the development and diffusion of this concept in the history of medieval philosophy.

3.3.1. AVERROES' DOCTRINE OF *DIMENSIONES INTERMINATAE* IN THE *SERMO DE SUBSTANTIA ORBIS*

¹ On Picard's question 19 see A. BECCARISI, "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg: un exemple de thomisme dans l'horizon culturel allemand," cit., pp. 296-298; M. BENEDETTO, "Materia, corpi ed estensione in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg," cit., pp. 348-358; Z. RADEVA, "Ein averroistischer Missklang im Werk des Thomas von Aquin: Die dimensiones interminatae und ihre fortuna in thomistischen Konkordanzversuchen des ausgehenden Mittelalters," cit., pp. 236-239.

² S. DONATI, "La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano," in *Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale* 14 (1988), pp. 149-233; EAD., "La discussione sulle dimensioni indeterminate in un commento alla Metafisica della fine del XIII secolo," in *Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale* 25 (1999/2000), pp. 235-312; EAD., "The notion of "Dimensiones indeterminate" in the commentary tradition of the "Physics" in the thirteenth and in the early fourteenth century," in C. H. LEIJENHORST – C. H. LÜTHY – J. M. M. H. THIJSSSEN (eds.), *The dynamics of Aristotelian natural philosophy from antiquity to the seventeenth century*, Leiden 2002, pp. 189-223; EAD., "Il dibattito sulle dimensioni indeterminate tra XIII e XIV secolo: Thomas Wylton e Walter Burley," in *Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale* 29 (2004), pp. 177-232; EAD., "Materia e dimensioni tra XIII e XIV secolo: la dottrina delle dimensiones indeterminate," in *Quaestio* 7 (2007), pp. 361-393.

³ M. NEUHAUS, *Der Begriff der dimensiones interminatae im lateinischen Hoch- und Spätmittelalter* (Dissertation), Universität zu Köln, Bonn 2020.

In light of these studies, it can be argued that, although the debate on the *dimensiones interminatae* has a “prehistory” in the Late Antiquity, Averroes’ doctrine, exposed in the first chapter of his *De Substantia Orbis*, was the most influential text on the subject.⁴ Here, Averroes’ discussion on dimensions begin with the definition of the prime matter, which is understood as the subject (*subiectum*) of two different kind of dimensions:

AVERROES, *Sermo de Substantia Orbis*, c. 1; Venetiis 3vL-4rC

Unde natura huius subiecti recipientis substantiales formas, videlicet primae materiae, necesse est ut sit natura potentiae, scilicet quod potentia sit eius differentia substantialis. Et ideo nullam habet formam propriam, et naturam existentem in actu; sed eius substantia est in posse, et ex hoc materia recipit omnes formas. [...] Et, quando invenit substantiales formas dividi secundum divisionem huius subiecti, divisio autem non est huic subiecto nisi in quantum habet quantitatem, scivit [Aristoteles] quod primum eorum, quae existunt in hoc, sunt tres dimensiones, quae sunt corpus. Et, cum invenit in eis dimensionibus communicari formas omnes, quarum quelibet habet quantitatem terminatam propriam, scivit dimensiones terminatas ultimo actu non posse esse, nisi postquam forma substantialis est in eo, sicut est dispositio de aliis accidentibus in actu. [...] Et, quia invenit omnes formas communicari in dimensionibus non terminatis, scivit [Aristoteles] quod prima materia nunquam denudatur a dimensionibus non terminatis, quia, si denudaretur, tunc corpus esset ex non corpore et dimensio ex non dimensione: et tunc formae corporales essent contrariae, et succedentes sibi in hoc subiecto, sicut est dispositio de formis substantialibus.

In the view of Averroes, prime matter is the subject that receives the substantial forms and is defined by its potentiality. In other words, potentiality is the specific difference (*differentia substantialis*) that distinguishes prime matter from other entities. Indeed, differently from all the other beings, prime matter is absolutely potential and it does not possess any actual existing form or nature. Its pure potentiality makes prime matter able to receive any kind of form and, as Donati clarifies in her articles,⁵ this is the metaphysical premise that underpins the entire Averroes’ doctrine of unterminated dimensions.

At this point in his exposition, Averroes notes that substantial forms are inherent in their subject, namely, prime matter, and must therefore be divided according to the division of this same subject. However, as mentioned above, prime matter is purely potential and has no formal

⁴ *O.c.*, pp. 102-103: “Averroes bildet damit sowohl den Schlusspunkt der Vorgeschichte der *dimensiones interminatae*, als auch – in Übersetzung – den Anfangspunkt ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte im lateinischen Hoch und Spätmittelalter.”; S. DONATI, “Il dibattito sulle dimensioni indeterminate tra XIII e XIV secolo: Thomas Wylton e Walter Burley,” cit., p. 366: “Se il dibattito tardo-antico rimane in gran parte ignoto al medioevo latino, la dottrina avicenniana della *forma corporeitatis* e la dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate di Averroè esercitano su di esso un’ampia influenza.”

⁵ For the study Donati and Neuhaus made on Avveroes’ doctrine of unterminated dimensions in his *De Substantia Orbis* see *supra* n. 1; Z. RADEVA, “Ein averroistischer Missklang im Werk des Thomas von Aquin: Die *dimensiones interminatae* und ihre fortuna in thomistischen Konkordanzversuchen des ausgehenden Mittelalters,” cit., pp. 192-199; cf. also P. PORRO, *Introduzione*, in TOMMASO D’AQUINO, *L’ente e l’essenza*, P. PORRO (introd., transl., and notes), Milano 2017, pp. 5-43, esp. pp. 13-14.

properties, including division, so this division must be conferred by some kind of form. Indeed, every division, Averroes asserts, results from having quantity, and thus it follows that the first properties that must be given to prime matter are the three dimensions, which are kinds of quantities that divide matter itself and make forms, in turn, capable of being divided. It is important to notice that, for Averroes, the three dimensions coincide with the body; they are the properties without which matter cannot be a body. Averroes goes further in his conclusions by saying that, since the three dimensions cause prime matter to be a body and the various substantial forms to be divided according to their matter, these dimensions must be shared in a certain way by each of these forms and their individual limits and figures. The sign of this is that each of the forms, which shapes prime matter, has its own terminated quantity (*quantitatem terminatam propriam*). This terminated quantity corresponds to the terminated dimensions, which are the specific limits and figures of individual body and belong to matter only in its ultimate actuality, when this matter is shaped by substantial forms. However, as previously stated, every substantial form is said to share the three dimensions in order to be a body, regardless of the terminated limits and figures this body may possess. For this reason, these three dimensions must be considered as dimensions that are inherent in the potentiality of the prime matter before the actuality of the substantial forms comes upon it, and which Averroes calls “unterminated dimensions”. Furthermore, given that any corporeal substantial form shares the three dimensions, it is impossible for these dimensions to be removed from prime matter in order for a corporeal substantial form to cause prime matter to become a certain body with a certain terminated quantity. Otherwise, the substantial form would produce a certain body with terminated dimensions from a subject that is completely potential and that is neither a body nor has dimensions at all, as it is prime matter. All this shows the metaphysical necessity for the existence of the three dimensions in the division of prime matter and its intermediary role in the union between prime matter and substantial forms. Indeed, unlike the terminated dimensions, they must exist in matter prior to the inherence of any corporeal substantial form:

AVERROES, *Sermo de Substantia Orbis*, c. 1; Venetiis 4rD-4vI

Dimensiones igitur simpliciter, quae appellantur corpus simpliciter, non denudantur a prima materia, sicut nec alia accidentia communia omnibus corporibus contrariis, aut duobus eorum, aut pluribus, v.g. diaphaneitas, in qua communicant ignis, et aqua. Et, quia illa forma, scilicet dimensionis non terminate existit in prima materia primitus, [...]. Declaratum est igitur quod causa corruptionis entium, et factionis eorum est contrarietas existens in sui formis, et commune subiectum, quod nullam habet propriam formam: sed est potentia recipiens numerum secundum formas diversas in specie, et numerum secundum formas diversas in numero, et que sit secundum maius et minus. Et causa huius totius est, quod hoc subiectum recipit primitus dimensiones interminatas, et quia est multum in potentia. Quoniam, si non haberet dimensionem, non reciperet insimul formas diversas numero, neque formas diversas specie

nisi in temporibus diversis sed in eodem tempore non inveniretur nisi una forma. [...] Si [istud subiectum] recipieret [quantitatem primo, ante receptionem formarum], esset divisibile secundum formam, et forma divisibilis secundum eius dimensiones, scilicet per subiecti divisionem, et finiti essent actus secundum finitatem illius quantitatis, et esset possibile in ea formam recipere maius et minus, partem et totum.

In this passage, Averroes states again the crucial coincidence between the three dimensions with the body. He asserts that the unterminated dimensions are dimensions taken in their absolute sense (*dimensiones simpliciter*) and, in turn, correspond to the body taken as such (*corpus simpliciter*). Moreover, in accordance with Averroes' view, the three dimensions, in addition to causing the division of prime matter, assure the substantial change during the process of generation and corruption. Indeed, for Averroes, the causes of the corruption and generation of forms are both the oppositeness (*contrarietas*) of forms themselves and prime matter. However, prime matter has no form of its own, but it has the potentiality to receive different forms, both according to the number and species, insofar as it can be divided in different ways. This distinction of the prime matter is caused by the unterminated dimensions, which must inhere in it before any other corporeal substantial form. Therefore, since they are the cause of the division of prime matter according to different substantial forms, unterminated dimensions are also the precondition for the oppositeness of forms and process of generation and corruption of those forms.

To sum up, Averroes' theory argues that the unterminated dimensions are a kind of quantity that guarantee prime matter division according to different substantial forms and, for this reason, are inherent in prime matter before every other form. They coincide with the three dimensions or *dimensiones simpliciter* and are identical with the body in its absolute sense, which is in potentiality all the corporeal substances, but that acquires different terminated determinations through the different substantial forms. Furthermore, they are the unchanging precondition for the substantial change of forms within matter during the process of generation and corruption.

Although Averroes' doctrine of the unterminated dimensions provides a solution to some theoretical problems of Aristotle's metaphysics, such as explaining how the undefined prime matter can receive simple forms in different ways and in different parts, it also raises further questions. If, as Aristotle said, accidents are inherent only in constituted substance, how can an accidental property, such as the three dimensions, be inherent in prime matter prior to its substantial form? Given their precedence over the substantial form, what is the appropriate metaphysical status to be ascribed to dimensions?

3.3.2. JOHN PICARD'S INTRODUCTION TO QUESTION 19

In addition to aforementioned questions, the issue of the precedence of accidental properties in matter over the substantial form is closely related to the question of the presence of one or more substantial forms in matter.⁶ However, in the introduction to his question 19, Picard notes that the same difficulty about the precedence of accidental properties with respect to the substantial forms arises regardless of whether one considers the unicity or plurality of the substantial form in matter:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: "Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia"; *V* 166va, *E* 104rb: Intelligendum est hic, quod, sive ponatur una forma in re sive plures, eadem difficultas contingit, quia, si ponantur plures realiter differentes, tunc habent videre, utrum primam, quae recipitur in materia, praecedant dimensiones.

Indeed, departing from the common Aristotelian assumption that an accident only inheres an already existing substance, it is problematic for both of those who argue for either the plurality or the unicity of the substantial form to demonstrate whether and how an accidental property can exist in matter before a form actually causes matter to be an individual substance.

Departing from this theoretical awareness, Picard shows that, in order to resolve the question of whether an accidental form can precede a substantial one in matter, the first necessary step is to clarify the various ways in which the relationship between matter and form can be understood. Picard explains that form can relate to matter in three different ways:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: "Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia"; *V* 166va, *E* 104rb: Circa istam igitur quaestionem duo videnda sunt: primo explicabitur quaestio, secundo narrabitur multiplex opinio. Quantum ad primum videndum, quod forma sive anima habet ad materiam triplicem aspectum. Primus est, secundum quod anima sive forma respectu materiae

⁶ For further information on the relationship between the theory of the unicity or plurality of substantial form and the precedence of accidental dispositions in matter over substantial form see S. DONATI, "La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano," cit., pp. 171-173 and n. 74-77: "Già i contemporanei di Tommaso osservavano una dipendenza della tesi secondo la quale le *dispositiones accidentales* non possono precedere la forma sostanziale dalla tesi tomista dell'unicità della forma. Di fatto, il problema della priorità delle *dispositiones* e delle dimensioni indeterminate, il problema della permanenza numerica di certi accidenti nella generazione e nella corruzione, furono costanti temi di discussione nelle successive dispute sull'unicità della forma. I pluralisti, infatti ne facevano uno degli argomenti in loro favore. [...] La posizione tomista e la posizione dei pluralisti appaiono due opposte ma coerenti applicazioni di uno stesso principio, la tesi della priorità della forma sostanziale rispetto agli accidenti e la tesi secondo la quale il sostrato di un accidente non è la materia ma la sostanza composta. L'unico modo per salvare agli accidenti una qualche priorità rimane allora, quello di ammettere l'esistenza di più forme." Moreover, by emphasizing this point, Donati correctly refers to the discussion on this specific topic among William de la Mare's *Correctorium* and the subsequent *Correctoria*: see GUILLELMUS DE LA MARE, *Correctorium fratris Thomae*, in *Le Correctorium Corruptorii 'Quare'*, cit., pp. 143-145; *Le Correctorium Corruptorii 'Quare'*, cit., pp. 145-157; *Le Correctorium Corruptorii 'Circa'*, cit., pp. 185-192; *Le Correctorium Corruptorii 'Sciendum'*, cit., pp. 144-146.

est adventitia, quia advenit et recedit, inquantum materia nunc unam, modo aliam habet, sicut patet in generationibus et corruptionibus. Potest ergo secundum hoc materia considerari, secundum quod est in via ad formam, et sic oportet necessario, quod praecedant dimensiones. Quod patet ex tribus. Primo, quia forma est terminus alterationis; unde et finis generationis dicitur, licet non proprie intentionis, quia causa finalis differt a formali. Oportet autem omnem alterationem recipi in subiecto, quia ens in actu est subiectum alterationis secundum Philosophum I *De generatione*; alteratio autem physica non potest esse nisi in subiecto quanto; quantum autem est per dimensionem. Secundo patet ex parte materiae. Secundum enim quod patet ex VI *Physicorum*, “impartibile non movetur”; oportet ergo, quod mobile sit quantum; materia autem prima sine dimensionibus considerata non est quanta; ergo et cetera. Tertio ex parte agentis. Agens enim assimilare vult sibi patiens, sicut ignis sibi aquam; ergo iam non est similis, sed in qualitatibus contraria. Contrarietas autem non est in materia nuda a quantitate, et ideo, si etiam poneretur virtute divina materia sine forma, secundum quod aliqui fingunt, <quod> agens naturale non possit inducere formam, cum non agat nisi per motum, eius applicatio non posset esse in materiam nudam.

First, form can be understood as something that comes to and goes away from matter (*advenit et recedit*), as it is evident during the process of generation and corruption. For example, when a human being dies and decays into a corpse, matter loses one form and acquires another. From this perspective, just as the dying human being, matter which underlies the generation and corruption processes is understood as being in the way of acquiring a form (*in via ad formam*).⁷ As a consequence of this relationship, Picard argues that accidental

⁷ Picard’s understanding of matter as a being *in via ad formam* directly stems from Thomas’ definition of motions and generations. Indeed, according to Thomas, the latter are processes tending toward substance (*tendunt ad substantiam*), so it will be the same for the matter underlying those kinds of processes. See THOMAS AQUINAS, *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, IV, lect. 1, n. 540-543; Cathala – Spiazzi 152b: “Sciendum tamen quod praedicti modi essendi ad quatuor possunt reduci. Nam unum eorum quod est debilissimum, est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio et privatio, quam dicimus in ratione esse, quia ratio de eis negociatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, dum de eis affirmat vel negat aliquid. Secundum quid autem differant negatio et privatio, infra dicitur. Aliud autem huic proximum in debilitate est, secundum quod generatio et corruptio et motus entia dicuntur. Habent enim aliquid admixtum de privatione et negatione. Nam motus est actus imperfectus, ut dicitur tertio physicorum. Tertium autem dicitur quod nihil habet de non ente admixtum, habet tamen esse debile, quia non per se, sed in alio, sicut sunt qualitates, quantitates et substantiae proprietates. Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per se existens, sicut sunt substantiae. Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia alia referuntur. Nam qualitates et quantitates dicuntur esse, inquantum insunt substantiae; motus et generationes, inquantum tendunt ad substantiam vel ad aliquid praedictorum; privationes autem et negationes, inquantum remouent aliquid trium praedictorum.”; THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, I, c. 26; Leon. 82a: “Generatio per se loquendo est via in esse, et corruptio via in non esse: non enim generationis terminus est forma et corruptionis privatio, nisi quia forma facit esse et privatio non esse; [...]”; THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 90, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 386a-b: “[...] cum fieri sit via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod composita subsistentia fiunt.”; THOMAS AQUINAS, *In primum librum Aristotelis de generatione et corruptione*, I, c. 3., lect. 9; Leon. 296a-b: “Illa ergo quae non significant substantiam, sed qualitatem aut aliquid aliorum, non dicuntur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid: quae vero significant substantiam, dicuntur generari simpliciter. Cuius ratio est, quia generatio est via de non esse ad esse: et ideo illud simpliciter generatur, quod acquirit esse cui non praesupponitur aliud esse. Non enim fit quod est: unde quod iam est, non potest generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et ideo ista quorum esse praesupponit aliud esse, non dicuntur generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Esse autem accidentium

dispositions, specifically dimensions, must precede the form in three respects. a) Firstly, it must be claimed that form is the conclusion of any alteration process and the end of any generation (*terminus alterationis et finis generationis*). In addition to this, any alteration process occurs to an existing being belonging to the category of substance (*ens in actu est subiectum alterationis*), as stated in Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione*.⁸ This implies that when an existing substance undergoes any process of alteration or generation, it receives a certain form at the end of these processes. Moreover, Picard states, any physical alteration only occurs to existing substance that already possesses quantity (*in subiecto quanto*), and a substance possesses quantity only when it is shaped by dimensions. This entails that a substance must already possess the accidental properties of dimensions in order to undergo physical alteration, which, as previously stated, provides a form to matter as its end. b) Secondly, according to the definition of the form as "something that comes to and goes away from matter within the process of generation and corruption", Picard argues that dimensions precede in matter over substantial form also *ex parte materiae*. This is because, according to the Aristotelian premise that "what is undividable cannot move", prime matter, since it is indivisible, cannot move or undergo any kind of mutations. The division of prime matter is only possible when it has quantity, which it acquires when it is shaped by dimensions. Consequently, these dimensions must precede and be a necessary condition for the matter to receive forms within any mutation process. c) Finally, Picard argues that the precedence of dimensions is clear also *ex parte agentis* when discussing mutation processes. Indeed, Picard contends that a natural agent induces forms in matter only through some kind of motion. However, a kind of motion, such as the change from one quality to its opposite, cannot occur in prime matter, since the oppositeness (*contrarietas*) is a property that belongs only to matter that has quantity. Consequently, a natural agent cannot bestow any kind of form upon prime matter until dimensions, which cause matter to acquire quantity, are not present in it. Therefore,

praesupponit aliud esse, scilicet esse subiecti: esse autem substantiae non praesupponit aliud esse, quia subiectum formae substantialis non est ens actu, sed potentia. Et ideo ex hoc quod aliquid accipit formam substantialem, dicitur generari simpliciter: ex hoc autem quod accipit formam accidentalem, dicitur generari secundum quid."

⁸ ARISTOTELES, *De generatione et corruptione*, I 4, 319b31–320a2; Judycka 25,1-5: "Quando quidem igitur secundum quantum est transmutatio contrarietatis, augmentum et diminutio; quando autem secundum locum, allatio; quando autem secundum passionem et quale, alteratio; quando autem nichil manet, cuius alterum passio et accidens universaliter, generatio, hoc autem corruptio."; also THOMAS AQUINAS, *In primum librum Aristotelis de generatione et corruptione*, I, c. 4, lect. 10; Leon. 300b: "Deinde cum dicit: quando quidem igitur etc., ostendit differentiam generationis ad alterationem et ad alias transmutationes, ex parte subiecti. Et primo ostendit qualiter se habeant ad subiectum quod est ens in actu; secundo qualiter se habeant ad subiectum quod est ens in potentia, ibi: est autem hyle etc. Dicit ergo primo quod dictum est quod alteratio est secundum passiones alicuius permanentis: et hoc idem accidit in aliis transmutationibus, quae fiunt secundum accidentia quae adveniunt subiecto existenti in actu."

dimensions can be regarded once again as the necessary conditions for matter to receive forms during motions.⁹

After describing the first way in which the relationship between matter and form can be understood, Picard further describes that form and matter can relate to each other in the same way as the soul can relate to the body, namely, as “what moves” relates to “what is moved”.

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: “Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia”; V 166va-b, E 104rb: Secundus aspectus animae est ad corpus, inquantum est motor sui perfectibilis, quod convenit in omnibus animatis, quae movent se ipsa secundum Philosophum VIII *Physicorum*; omnis autem operatio animae est per potentiam, quae, sicut in alia quaestione dictum est, differt a substantia, cuius est, sive a forma. Talis autem inter talem formam et suum perfectibile cadit etiam medium in movendo, quia, si movet per intellectum, media est potentia, si per potentiam sensitivam vel vegetativam potentia vel organum simul; motus autem cordis est motus non ab anima inquantum anima, sed inquantum naturalis forma, cum in se includat omnium formarum perfectiones. Et ideo dicit Philosophus II *De anima*, quod anima est ut natura quaedam talis corporis. Sicut ergo ignis movetur sursum non per potentiam motivam neque per hoc, quod una pars moveat aliam, neque per hoc, quod forma ignis moveat materiam suam, sed est in eo formale principium, quare sic naturaliter movetur, sic etiam motus cordis est naturalis et sanguis similiter naturaliter currit ad certa loca.

According to Aristotle,¹⁰ the soul moves by itself and is the mover of “what is perfected by it”, namely, the body. However, any actions of the soul occur through its powers. Thus, these powers are some kind of intermediates between the actions of the soul and the body, which is perfected by the soul itself. For instance, if the body moves through the intellect, then

⁹ A study of Thomas’ works on the precedence of the untermiated dimensions over substantial form according to the processes of generation and corruption is present in G. G. LENOTRE, “Determinate and Indeterminate Dimensions: Does Thomas Aquinas Change His Mind on Individuation?,” in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 94, 4, Charlottesville 2020, pp. 503-546, esp. p. 514: “[...] the existence of indeterminate dimensions is, so to speak, in development or in-process. Indeterminate dimensions do not have that complete and perfected existence because those dimensions predispose (or are preunderstood in) the matter prior to its union with the substantial form; indeterminate dimensions prior to the matter-form union are not-yet-existing. Thomas analyzes in order of generation the individual’s indeterminate dimensions, not as though they mind-independently existed prior in time, but in the sense that indeterminate dimensions are in-the-process or on-the-move (*in movendo*) toward determination. Indeterminate dimensions only “exist” as building-a-house exist, that is, in a dynamic and inchoate state of imperfect actuality.” In contrast to Lenotre, Picard does not focus here on the existential status of untermiated dimensions in matter within the process of generation and corruption. Instead, he states that, dimensions must precede in matter over the substantial form because only matter that has quantity can undergo motions, and dimensions cause matter to be divided and to acquire quantity. Consequently, dimensions represent the necessary precondition for matter to undergo any kind of motion, including the processes of generation and corruption.

¹⁰ Cf. ARISTOTELES, *Physica*, VIII 2, 252b12–24; translatio vetus: Bossier – Brams 284,10–21: “Amplius videmus quoniam [in]possibile est moveri neque quod movetur neque habens in se ipso neque unum motum, ut in inanimatis, quorum neque pars nulla neque totum movetur, sed quiescens movetur quandoque; convenit autem aut semper moveri aut nequaquam, si quidem non fit cum non sit. Multo autem magis huiusmodi in animatis esse manifestum est; neque una enim in nobis cum sit motus aliquando, sed expergescentes tamen movemur aliquando, et fit in nobis ex nobis ipsis principium motus aliquando, etsi nichil extra moveat. Hoc enim in inanimatis non videmus similiter, sed semper movet aliquid ipsa exteriorum alterum; animal autem ipsum dicimus ipsum movere.”

the intellective power will be the intermediate between the actions of the intellect and the body.¹¹

However, Picard clarifies that the relationship between the soul and the body can be conceived differently from that between “what moves” and “what is moved”, so that there would be no powers or other kind of intermediate between the two of them. This type of relationship is evident when the soul is seen as the nature or formal principle of the body. In such a way, the soul includes the perfections of all the forms that constitute the body and the union between them is considered as an essential one:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: “Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia”; V 166vb, E 104rb:

¹¹ For a detailed examination in the work of Thomas of the relationship between the soul and the body as a relationship between the mover and the moved see: THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 9, resp.; Bazán 81,250-82,298: “Sed considerandum est quod secundum gradum formarum in perfectione essendi est etiam gradus earum in virtute operandi, cum operatio sit existentis in actu. Et ideo quanto aliqua forma est maioris perfectionis in dando esse, tanto etiam est maioris virtutis in operando. Unde formae perfectiores habent plures operationes et magis diversas quam formae minus perfectae. Et inde est quod ad diversitatem operationum in rebus minus perfectis sufficit diversitas accidentium. In rebus autem magis perfectis requiritur ulterius diversitas partium; et tanto magis, quanto forma fuerit perfectior. Videmus enim quod igni conveniunt diversae operationes secundum diversa accidentia; sicut ferri sursum secundum levitatem, calefacere secundum calorem, et sic de aliis. Sed tamen quaelibet harum operationum competit igni secundum quamlibet partem eius. In corporibus vero animatis quae habent nobiliores formas, diversis operationibus deputantur diversae partes; sicut in plantis alia est operatio radicis, alia rami et stipitis. Et quanto corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto propter maiorem perfectionem necesse est inveniri maiorem diversitatem in partibus. Unde cum anima rationalis sit perfectissima formarum naturalium, in homine invenitur maxima distinctio partium propter diversas operationes; et anima singulis earum dat esse substantiale, secundum illum modum qui competit operationi ipsorum. Cuius signum est, quod remota anima, non remanet neque caro neque oculus nisi aequivoce. Sed cum oporteat ordinem instrumentorum esse secundum ordinem operationum, diversarum autem operationum quae sunt ab anima, una naturaliter praecedit alteram, necessarium est quod una pars corporis moveatur per aliam ad suam operationem. Sic ergo inter animam secundum quod est motor et principium operationum et totum corpus, cadit aliquid medium; quia mediante aliqua prima parte primo mota movet alias partes ad suas operationes, sicut mediante corde movet alia membra ad vitales operationes: sed secundum quod dat esse corpori, immediate dat esse substantiale et specificum omnibus partibus corporis. Et hoc est quod a multis dicitur quod anima unitur corpori ut forma sine medio, ut motor autem per medium.”; THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 3, resp.; Cos 38,223-229. “Responsio. Dicendum quod huius quaestiones veritas aliqualiter dependet ex praemissa. Si enim anima rationalis unitur corpori solum per contactum virtualem, ut motor, ut aliqui posuerunt, nihil prohibebat dicere quod sunt multa media inter animam et corpus; et magis inter animam et materiam primam. [...] Secundum vero quod est motor, sic nihil prohibet ponere ibi multa media; manifeste enim anima per cor movet alia membra, et etiam per spiritum movet corpus. Sed tunc dubium restat, quid sit proprium subiectum animae, quod comparetur ad ipsam sicut materia ad formam.”; THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 229a: “Respondeo dicendum quod, si anima uniretur corpori solum ut motor, nihil prohiberet, immo magis necessarium esset esse aliquas dispositiones medias inter animam et corpus, potentiam scilicet ex parte animae, per quam moveret corpus; et aliquam habilitatem ex parte corporis, per quam corpus esset ab anima mobile”; cf. also THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, c. 71, resp.; Leon. 454b: “Potest tamen dici aliquid esse medium inter animam et corpus, etsi non in essendo, tamen in movendo et in via generationis. In movendo quidem, quia in motu quo anima movet corpus, est quidam ordo mobilium et motorum. Anima enim omnes operationes suas efficit per suas potentias: unde mediante potentia movet corpus; et adhuc membra mediante spiritu; et ulterius unum organum mediante alio organo. In via autem generationis dispositiones ad formam praecedunt formam in materia, quamvis sint posteriores in essendo. Unde et dispositiones corporis quibus fit proprium perfectibile talis formae, hoc modo possunt dici mediae inter animam et corpus.”

Tertius aspectus est, secundum quod consideratur, prout attingit ipsam formam in actuali perfectione, secundum quam est mutua dependentia materiae ad formam et e converso, et sic proprie est forma eius non abiciens eam nec considerata secundum unionem, sed unionem, et sic sunt sex opiniones.

The third way in which Picard describes the relationship between the soul and body exactly corresponds with this essential relationship between the formal and material principles of a thing. In this way, soul and body are considered the two fundamental elements of a third composed thing. This relationship makes it possible to understand form in its actual perfection and in its mutual dependence with matter. From this perspective, both form and matter cannot exist outside the union (*unio*) of this relationship, as they exist only in relation to each other and as principles of the third composed thing they constitute. Moreover, according to this third essential relationship, form is not considered to be something that abandons the composed substance. For these reasons, this essential union (*unio*) of matter and form must be distinguished from the union (*unitio*) between matter and form that occurs within the process of generation and corruption, where substantial forms continuously come to and go away from matter.¹² As said above, the *unio* between form and matter therefore corresponds to the shaping of prime matter by a substantial form, which causes matter to exist and endows it with all the perfections that are proper to the lower forms, and that are included within that same substantial form. It is exactly this third kind of relationship that Picard refers to when he discusses the problem of whether and how certain accidental properties, such as dimensions, can precede the union between matter and substantial form.

¹² In his paper, Lenotre identifies a similar difference in Aquinas' thought, highlighting that Thomas considers the union between matter and form in two distinct ways: according to the order of perfection and according to the order of generation and corruption: "So the order of perfection considers the individual as "already made" because the individual is a necessary condition in order to have the nature of the species. In the order of perfection, the metaphysician considers the individual with its substantial principles as finished. [...] The order of generation consists in the way toward being (*via in esse*), from the non-being of prime matter toward the being of a matter-form composite. So the problem of individuation from within the order of generation examines the in-process character of a substance." (G. G. LENOTRE, "Determinate and Indeterminate Dimensions: Does Thomas Aquinas Change His Mind on Individuation?," cit., pp. 516-517 and 534.) The order of perfection is indeed comparable to the essential union of matter and form within a composed substance (*unio*), while the order of generation and corruption to the union that occurs when substantial forms continuously come to and go away from matter (*unitio*). Furthermore, differently from Lenotre, who believes that Thomas only discusses untermimated dimensions in relation to the union that occurs when substantial forms continuously come to and go away from matter, Picard claims that the untermimated dimensions are also involved in the essential union of matter and form within a composed substance. Consequence of these different positions is that Picard believes that Thomas' ideas on the precedence of dimensions in matter over the substantial form have undergone a change. In contrast, Lenotre upholds that Thomas' views on this topic have remained consistent.

Indeed, after this introduction, Picard enumerates six distinct opinions on this issue. The fifth and sixth ones correspond to what Picard interprets as the two distinct positions on the subject Thomas Aquinas mentioned throughout his entire career.¹³

3.3.3. JOHN PICARD ON THOMAS' CHANGE OF VIEW

In his interpretation, Picard claims that Thomas underwent a change of mind regarding the problem of whether dimensions precede or not the substantial form in matter. In contrast to what contemporary scholars assert today, Picard suggests that Thomas initially rejected Averroes' doctrine of the precedence of dimensions and only later began to advocate for it:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: "Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia"; V 167rb-168ra, E 104vb-105va:

Unde est alia opinio, quod nullae dimensiones praecedunt realiter, sed secundum modum intelligibilem tantum. Et hoc primo probant, secundo declarant. [...] Licet ista opinio fuerit Thomae in *Quaestione de anima* articulo 9 et *De spiritualibus creaturis* articulo 3 et in prima parte *Summae* quaestione 76, tamen, quia aliter sensit in fine, sicut patet per *Boethium De*

¹³ For the development of Thomas' view on the *dimensiones interminatae* see S. DONATI, "La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano," cit., pp. 164-173; EAD. "Materia e dimensioni tra XIII e XIV secolo: la dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate," cit., pp. 367-371; M. NEUHAUS, *Der Begriff der dimensiones interminatae im lateinischen Hochund Spätmittelalter* (Dissertation), cit., esp. pp. 140-197; cf. also Z. RADEVA, "Ein averroistischer Missklang im Werk des Thomas von Aquin: Die dimensiones interminatae und ihre fortuna in thomistischen Konkordanzversuchen des ausgehenden Mittelalters," cit., pp. 197-199. A significant number of scholars have highlighted the role of the concepts of terminated and unterminated dimensions in Aquinas' development of a theory of individuation. This topic is also strictly connected to the question of whether Thomas actually changed his idea about the status of unterminated dimensions during his career, since Thomas no longer explicitly mentions the concept of unterminated dimensions concerning the individuation of substantial forms in his later works. Rather, he modifies his terminology, yet seems to ascribe the properties of the unterminated dimensions to a more general notion of dimensionality (*quantitas dimensiva*). The secondary literature on this problematic topic is extensive, and a coherent interpretation of Thomas' theory of individuation remains a topic of ongoing debate. The following alphabetical listing of scholars who have attempted to provide a more or less precise account of the problem in Thomas' various works will be presented: J. BOBIK, "Le doctrine de Saint Thomas sur l'individuation des substances corporelles," in *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 51 (1953), pp. 5-41; ID., "Dimensions in the Individuation of Bodily Substances," in *Philosophical Studies* 4 (1954), pp. 60-79; U. DEGL'INNOCENTI, "Il pensiero di San Tommaso sul principio di individuazione," in *Divus Thomas* 45 (1942), pp. 35-81; A. FITZPATRICK, *Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity*, cit., esp. pp. 80-182; J. KLINGER, *Das Prinzip der Individuation bei Thomas von Aquin*, Münsterschwarzach 1964, esp. pp. 10-15, 44-63; G. G. LENOTRE, "Determinate and Indeterminate Dimensions: Does Thomas Aquinas Change His Mind on Individuation?," cit., pp. 503-546; G. M. MANSER, "Das thomistisches Individuationsprinzip," in *Divus Thomas* 12 (1934), pp. 221-237; J. OWENS, "Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle," in *Medieval Studies* 50 (1988), pp. 279-310; R. PASNAU, *Metaphysical themes 1274-1671*, New York, 2011, pp. 53-71; P. PORRO, *Introduzione*, in TOMMASO D'AQUINO, *Commenti a Boezio*, P. PORRO (introd., transl., and notes), Milano 2017, pp. 5-49, esp. pp. 19-23 and 44-45; ID., *Introduzione*, in TOMMASO D'AQUINO, *L'ente e l'essenza*, P. PORRO (introd., transl., and notes), Milano 2017, pp. 5-43, esp. pp. 12-17 and 48-53; M. D. ROLAND-GOSSELIN, *Le «De ente et essentia» de S. Thomas d'Aquin. Texte établi d'après les manuscrits parisiens. Introduction, Notes et Études historiques*, Bibliothèque thomiste 8, Kain 1926, 1948²; J. F. WIPPEL, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, cit., pp. 351-375. However, the aim of this study is not to demonstrate whether Thomas' view about individuation or unterminated dimensions changed over time. Rather, the study seeks to determine whether and how, according to Picard's interpretation, Thomas actually changed his idea on the precedence of dimensions in matter over substantial forms.

trinitate articulo 14 sive quaestione et in quaestionibus *De veritate* quaestione de providentia divina “utrum disponat corpora inferiora per superiora” solutione 6 argumenti; ideo videtur, <quod> aliter dicendum. Et haec est positio sexta, scilicet quod dimensiones interminatae praecedant, et hoc sic patet ex natura individuationis. [...] Et ista etiam quandoque fuit mens Thomae, sicut patet in IV *Contra gentiles*, ubi loquitur de identitate resurgentis, et in IV *Super Sententias* in eadem materia in solutione 3 argumenti, et quia istae duae ultimae positiones videntur magis verisimiles, licet sint contrariae, ideo respondendum est ad aliquas rationes factas contra eas. Et primo contra primam. [...] Sed quia Thomas ultimo ponit dimensiones, sicut dictum est, ideo ad rationes factas in contrarium potest sic responderi.

According to Picard’s understanding of Thomas’ works chronology, Thomas would have ultimately upheld the doctrine of untermimated dimensions, as proposed by Averroes. Indeed, Picard believes that Thomas wrote his *Commentary on Boethius’ De trinitate* and his disputed questions *De veritate* towards the end of his career, likely after the first part of the *Summa theologiae*. However, nowadays it is commonly accepted that those two works were written during Thomas’ first stay in Paris as *magister theologiae* (1256-1259),¹⁴ before he actually concluded the first part of his *Summa theologiae*. In addition to suggesting that Picard knows

¹⁴ For the commonly accepted date of writing of Thomas’ *Super Boetium De Trinitate* see J.-P. TORRELL, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre (2e édition 2002 revue et augmentée d’une mise à jour critique et bibliographie)*, cit., pp. 99 and 503: “Reprenant l’examen de la datation, P.-M. Gils conclut qu’il faut placer cet ouvrage [*Super Boetium De Trinitate*] «quelque part à mi-chemin entre le milieu du *De veritate* et le début du *Contra Gentiles*, soit dans les années 1257-58 ou début 1259, comme l’avait à peu près deviné P. Mandonnet». La communauté de propos avec les premiers livres du *Contra Gentiles* n’est pas seule à rendre cette date vraisemblable. À la même époque, le conflit entre séculiers et religieux entrait lui aussi dans une phase d’apaisement provisoire. Sans perdre de temps, Thomas se lançait donc dans des travaux intellectuellement plus exigeants. Si l’on excepte le fait qu’il soit du même auteur, aucune raison n’oblige à placer ici le rappel de l’autre Commentaire de Thomas sur Boèce. C’est le seul motif pour lequel les historiens mentionnent habituellement ces deux ouvrages à la suite. Dans la Préface à l’édition léonine, L. J. Bataillon pense au contraire – d’après les données internes qui accusent les différences – que l’*Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus* est probablement postérieure dans le temps au *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, mais faute de données externes qui permettraient de mieux le situer (par l’utilisation de sources datées par ailleurs par exemple) il s’avoue incapable de proposer une date précise.”; “Cet ouvrage [*Super Boetium De Trinitate*], pour lequel on possède l’un des rares autographes de Thomas, fut rédigé lors de son premier séjour d’enseignement parisien, dans les années 1257-58 ou au début de 1259, entre le milieu du *De veritate* et le début du *Contra Gentiles*.”; instead, for the date of writing of Thomas’ *De Veritate*, see ID., *Initiation à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Sa personne et son œuvre (2e édition 2002 revue et augmentée d’une mise à jour critique et bibliographie)*, cit., pp. 92–93 and 488: “Pour en revenir au *De veritate*, la rédaction finale a dû suivre la discussion assez rapidement car son existence est attestée très tôt. Bien avant la déposition au procès de Naples de Barthélemy de Capoue, un catalogue des œuvres de Thomas antérieur à 1293 mentionne déjà les Questions *De veritate* «quas disputavit Parisius». Mais nous avons deux autres témoignages encore antérieurs. Dès 1278, Guillaume de la Mare, l’adversaire franciscain de Thomas, auteur du fameux *Correctorium*, consacre une section de neuf articles à attaquer les thèses fautives à ses yeux *du De veritate*, signe indiscutable de l’authenticité thomiste que reconnaissent évidemment aussi les amis de Thomas qui prennent sa défense. À une époque encore plus ancienne, c’est Vincent de Beauvais qui, avant 1264/65 (date de sa mort), introduit dans la seconde édition de son *Speculum maius*, de larges fragments des Questions 11, 12 et 13 du *De veritate* sous le nom explicite de leur auteur. L’utilisation du livre a donc été pratiquement contemporaine de son achèvement et cela permet de souligner à la fois la rapidité de sa diffusion et la vitalité du milieu universitaire parisien à cette époque.”; “Les Questions disputées *De veritate* datent des trois années du premier enseignement magistral de Thomas à Paris, de 1256 à 1259; nous en possédons encore l’original dicté pour les questions 2-22. Cet ensemble de 253 articles est regroupé en 29 questions; la première a donné son nom à toute la série, mais les autres ne s’y rattachent que de plus ou moins près. On peut y percevoir deux grandes masses: le vrai et la connaissance (qq. 1-20), le bien et l’appétit du bien (q. 21-29). L’intérêt de ces Questions disputées *De veritate* est considérable pour saisir l’évolution de la pensée du jeune maître et son génie qui s’affirme de plus en plus.”

a different dating of these two works than is generally agreed today, this evidence also clearly shows that Picard places great importance on interpreting Thomas' thought with an historical adherence. Like in the case of *quaestio* 3, Picard's focus is not on finding a coherence among Thomas' several doctrines in order to provide an unchanging or irrefutable interpretation of his thought,¹⁵ but rather an accurate historical account of what Thomas held throughout his life. In his chronological interpretation of Thomas' various works, Picard concludes that the latter upheld two opposing views on the precedence of dimensions over substantial form throughout his career.

Hence, Picard contends that Thomas initially asserted that no dimensions precede substantial form in matter *realiter*, but that they do so in an intelligible manner (*secundum modum intelligibilem*). In order to understand why Picard claims that for Aquinas dimensions precede substantial form not *realiter* but in an intelligible way, it is essential to analyze where, according to Picard's interpretation, Thomas deals with the notion of dimensions and the role they play into the union between substantial form and matter. According to Picard, in his article 9 of the *Quaestiones de anima*, article 3 of the *Quaestiones de spiritualibus creaturis*, and question 76 of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, Thomas argues for the mere intelligible precedence of dimensions in matter over the substantial form. The texts just quoted all address the same problem: whether the soul is united with bodily matter through an intermediate (*utrum anima uniatur materiale corporali per medium*). In this context, the dimensions might be indeed a possible candidates to represent intermediary forms within the union between substantial form and matter. Dimensions can be considered as accidental properties that might guarantee the body to receive the rational soul and all the different perfections that are proper to this latter.

¹⁵ Thomas' unclearness on the problem of whether the untermiated dimensions precede or not the substantial form in matter was evident also to his earlier interpreters. Indeed, rightly after Thomas' death, this specific issue shows up in lists that collate passages where Thomas appears to contradict himself, like in the case of the *Articuli in quibus frater Thomas melius in Summa quam in Scriptis*, or *opuscola* attempting to coherently reconcile the various ambiguous positions that Thomas upheld in his various works, such as the *Concordantia Pertransibunt plurimi*. See, respectively, R.-A. GAUTHIER, "Les «Articuli in quibus frater Thomas melius in Summa quam in Scriptis»,” in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 19 (1952), pp. 271-326, esp. p. 297; THOMAS AQUINAS, *De concordantiis in quo concordat seipsum in passibus apparenter contrariis*, in *Opera omnia* 28, Vivès, Parisiis 1871-1882, pp. 560-574, esp. pp. 565-566; cf. also M. GRABMANN, "Hilfsmittel des Thomisstudiums aus alter Zeit. Abbreviationes, Concordantiae, Tabulae,” in M. GRABMANN, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, vol. II, cit., pp. 424-489. For a general overview of the early and late reception and attempts at reconciliation of Thomas' diverse positions on the topic of untermiated dimensions see Z. RADEVA, "Ein averroistischer Missklang im Werk des Thomas von Aquin: Die dimensiones interminatae und ihre fortuna in thomistischen Konkordanzversuchen des ausgehenden Mittelalters,” cit., pp. 190-250, esp. pp. 199-239.

3.3.4. *QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE ANIMA*

As claimed by Picard, Thomas firstly addresses this hypothesis in his response to the article 9 of his *Quaestiones de anima*. However, Thomas' answer to the question clearly shows that dimensions cannot be real intermediates in the union between soul and bodily matter:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 9, resp.; Bazán 79,139-80,154:
Respondeo. Dicendum quod inter omnia, esse est illud quod immediatius et intimius convenit rebus, ut dicitur in lib. *De causis* [prop. 4]; unde oportet, cum materia habeat esse actu per formam, quod forma dans esse materiae, ante omnia intelligatur advenire materiae, et immediatius ceteris sibi inesse. Est autem hoc proprium formae substantialis quod det materiae esse simpliciter; ipsa enim est per quam res est hoc ipsum quod est. Non autem per formas accidentales habet esse simpliciter, sed esse secundum quid: puta esse magnum, vel coloratum, vel aliquid tale. Si qua ergo forma est quae non det materiae esse simpliciter, sed adveniat materiae iam existenti in actu per aliquam formam, non erit forma substantialis.

Thomas begins his response by asserting that the form that causes matter to exist (*forma dans esse materiae*) as an individual substance is to be understood as more inherent in matter than any other form, and comes before any other form. This claim of Thomas is rooted in two general metaphysical premises. First, existence (*esse*) is the most immediate and intimate aspect of anything; second, matter comes to actual existence (*esse actu*) through form. Thus, a thing (*res*) must come into actual existence through the form that causes matter to exist as an individual substance, namely, the substantial form.

Moreover, since the substantial form causes matter to come into existence, and, in turn, is what more immediately and intimately belongs to every thing, the substantial form must be the first form that comes upon prime matter. In addition to providing the fundamental existence (*esse simpliciter*) of an individual thing, the substantial form also makes this same thing what it actually is, namely determines its nature. From this precise perspective, the substantial form is the only form that completely causes matter to be a substance. To make an example, when it comes to speak of human beings, it is the rational soul to cause matter into actual existence and to bestow on matter the nature that is proper to human species.

As a consequence of this, all forms that come after the substantial form and do not give matter neither its existence nor nature are only accidental forms. Indeed, according to the classical Aristotelian definition of accidental properties, they cannot exist by themselves and are not directly inherent in prime matter, but they must come to matter when this latter already exists. Unlike the substantial form, accidental forms does not provide matter its fundamental existence, but only a certain way of being (*esse secundum quid*), such as “being big” or “being colored”. For these reasons, since the accidental forms inhere in already existing substances,

they cannot come to matter before the substantial form. The union between prime matter and substantial form is immediate and no accidental forms can actually lie in-between these two fundamental principles of things. In other words, no accidental forms can be an intermediate between prime matter and the substantial form.

In his account of Aquinas' thought, Picard provides a precise synthesis of the principal philosophical ideas that underpin Thomas's reasoning:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: "Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia"; *V* 167rb, *E* 104vb-105ra:

Primo sic: Id, quod primo omnium intelligitur in materia, est esse; hoc autem est a forma; ergo omne aliud consequitur formam.

Item divisio rei in potentiam et actum est per immediata. Unde secundum Themistium *Super II De anima* circa principium, cum omne esse multipliciter dicatur, scilicet secundum decem genera praedicamentorum, tamen ad hos duos modos reducitur, scilicet potentiam et actum. Cum igitur anima, ut ibidem dicit Philosophus, sit entelechia, id est actus, et idem dico de quacumque forma; materia autem est sicut potentia, ipsa se ipsa perficitur per formam nullo mediante.

Item impossibile est, quod aliquid sit hoc vel hoc vel tale vel tale, nisi sit, quia esse tale includit esse; materia autem sine forma non est; ergo nec quanta est. Nec obstat, si dicatur, quod dimensiones sint imperfecta entia, quia nec imperfectum esse potest, nisi sit; hoc esse autem est per formam.

Item secundum Themistium ubi supra, ab ea, scilicet forma, sicut res habet esse, ita unum esse. Dimensio autem ponitur, ut una pars materiae ab alia distinguatur. Hoc autem dicimus unum, quod in se indivisum et ab alio divisum. Ergo hoc non erit nisi per formam principaliter.

Praeterea secundum Commentatorem *Super III Metaphysicae* perfectio formae accidentalis est aequivoca ad perfectionem formae substantialis, quia forma substantialis dat esse materiae, accidentalis autem recipit esse a subiecto, in quo est. Si igitur dimensiones illae sint accidentia, ut oportet, alias essent materia vel forma vel compositum, quod non dicunt; ergo recipiunt esse ab eo, in quo sunt. Sed materia, in qua dicunt esse dimensiones, ipsamet non est nisi a forma; ergo nec dimensionibus dat esse.

Picard identifies three fundamental principles in Thomas' reasoning: the primacy of existence (*esse*) with respect to all other formal properties; the essential relationship between existence and substantial form; and, the impossibility, by definition, for an accidental form to precede the substantial one in matter.

In his account, Picard underlines that the primacy of *esse* is evident from the fact that what can be primarily thought of in matter is existence (*esse*). Consequently, existence is prior to all other formal properties belonging to substances. Since *esse* is bestowed on matter by the substantial form, then whatever comes to matter after existence will also come after the substantial form.

Secondly, the primacy of *esse* is also clear from its foundational relationship with all the formal properties of a substance, which imply in their way of being the concept of existence itself. Indeed, Picard shows that a certain thing (*aliquid*) cannot be a thing of a certain kind

(*hoc vel hoc*) if it does not primarily exist (*nisi sit*), since a certain kind of existence (*esse tale*) implies the existence as such (*esse*). Thus, since matter can only exist through substantial form, this means that if matter does not receive existence through the substantial form, then matter cannot have also all other kind of properties, such as having quantity (*quanta*). This is true even for accidental properties such as dimensions, which are considered to be imperfect being, since no being can exist imperfectly if it does not exist primarily. This leads to the conclusion that the primacy of *esse* grounds a certain kind of relationship between matter and substantial form. Picard shows this relationship to be immediate in three steps. First, he states that a thing can be divided by its potentiality and actuality as through two immediate principles (*divisio rei per potentiam et actum est per immediata*). Second, since Aristotle says in its *De anima* that the soul is the act of the body,¹⁶ Picard outlines a general proportion according to which soul/form is to actuality as body/matter is to potentiality. Finally, Picard claims that, since potentiality is immediately perfected by actuality, so, in virtue of the proportion just delineated, matter must be perfected by substantial form immediately and through no other intermediate, such as dimensions.

Moreover, as previously stated, through this immediate union with the substantial form, matter receives not only existence but also all other properties that are closely related to it, as a unity. It is form that causes something to exist and be one and, when something is one, it is also undivided in itself and is distinct from everything else. Therefore, although dimensions are thought to be in matter to divide it into parts that are distinct from each other, the different parts of matter can exist as one in themselves only through the perfection that the substantial form gives to matter. This means that matter can have parts that are one in themselves and distinct from each other only when it is perfected by the substantial form.

In conclusion, following Thomas, Picard also highlights that the immediacy of the union between prime matter and substantial form is evident by the same definition of accidental properties. This is because accidents, by their own definition, receive existence from the subject they inhere in. In this regard, Picard asserts that the perfection of accidental and substantial forms is equivocal. The substantial form causes matter to exist, while the accidental form receives existence from the subject that underlies them. Consequently, since dimensions are

¹⁶ ARISTOTELES, *De anima*, II 1, 412a27; transl. vetus: Stroick 66,91: “Unde et anima est actus primus corporis phisici potentia vitam habentis.”; AUCTORITATES ARISTOTELIS, 6, n. 41; Hamesse 177,57: “Anima est actus corporis organici phisici vitam habentis in potential, scilicet ad opera vitae.”; THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 44; Leon. 147b: “Est autem propria materia animae corpus organizatum: est enim anima entelechia corporis organici phisici potentia vitam habentis.”

accidents, they receive existence from the subject they inhere in. However, prime matter exists as a subject only by virtue of the substantial form. This entails that accidental forms such as dimensions require prime matter to be shaped as a subject by substantial form before they can inhere in matter itself.

Picard's emphasis on the priority of the *esse* and the essential relationship between the existence of things and their substantial forms further shows the close connection between Thomas' theory of the precedence of the substantial form in matter and that of its unicity. Indeed, Thomas himself, shortly after in his response to the article 9 at issue, reasonably concludes that the substantial form, which gives matter its existence and specific nature, must be unique. Furthermore, as aforementioned, if the form that endows matter with substantiality is unique, then all other forms that come to a matter that is already existing must be accidental forms. Therefore, Thomas claims that there cannot be any accidental intermediate within the union between matter and substantial form:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 9, resp.; Bazán 80,155-81,205:

Ex quo patet quod inter formam substantialem et materiam non potest cadere aliqua forma substantialis media, sicut quidam voluerunt, ponentes quod secundum ordinem generum, quorum unum sub altero ordinatur, est ordo diversarum formarum in materia; utpote si dicamus, quod materia secundum unam formam habet quod sit substantia in actu, et secundum aliam quod sit corpus, et iterum secundum aliam quod sit animatum corpus, et sic deinceps. Sed hac positione facta, sola prima forma, quae faceret esse substantiam actu, esset substantialis, aliae vero omnes accidentales; quia forma substantialis est quae facit hoc aliquid, ut iam dictum est. Oportet igitur dicere, quod eadem numero forma sit per quam res habet quod sit substantia, et quod sit in ultima specie specialissima, et in omnibus intermediis generibus. Relinquitur ergo dicendum quod cum formae rerum naturalium sint sicut numeri, in quibus est diversitas speciei addita vel subtracta unitate, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys.; oportet intelligere diversitatem formarum naturalium, secundum quas constituitur materia in diversis speciebus, ex hoc quod una addit perfectionem super aliam, ut puta quod una forma constituit in esse corporali tantum (hunc enim oportet esse infimum gradum formarum animalium, eo quod materia non est in potentia nisi ad formas corporales. Quae enim incorporea sunt, immaterialia sunt, ut in praecedentibus ostensum est). Alia autem perfectior forma constituit materiam in esse corporali, et ulterius dat ei esse vitale. Et ulterius alia forma dat ei et esse corporale et esse vitale, et super hoc addit ei esse sensitivum; et sic est in aliis. Oportet ergo intelligere quod forma perfectior secundum quod simul cum materia compositum constituit in perfectione inferioris gradus, intelligatur ut materiale respectu ulterioris perfectionis, et sic ulterius procedendo. Utpote materia prima, secundum quod iam constituta est in esse corporeo, est materia respectu ulterioris perfectionis, quae est vita; et exinde est quod corpus est genus corporis viventis; et animatum, sive vivens, est differentia. Nam genus sumitur a materia et differentia a forma; et sic quodammodo una et eadem forma, secundum quod constituit materiam in actu inferioris gradus, est media inter materiam et seipsam, secundum quod constituit eam in actu superioris gradus.

The theory of plurality of substantial forms posits that multiple substantial forms shape prime matter to produce an individual substance. In this view, the substantial perfections possessed by a single being derive from the multitude of substantial forms that constitute it.

Furthermore, these substantial forms are ordered one below the other according to the order of their genus and their degrees of perfection. For example, in the case of human beings, such a series of forms would cause matter first to actually exist, and consequently to be a body, an animated body, and finally a rational animal. This theory is rejected by Thomas, who argues instead that the substantial form corresponds to what bestows on matter both its existence (*esse*) and its ultimate nature. In other words, for Thomas, the substantial form is the immediate cause of matter becoming an individual substance, existing in its ultimate species and in all the other genera (*in ultima specie specialissima, et in omnibus intermediis generibus*). Thus, in the case of the human being, Aquinas claims that the rational soul immediately unites with matter and adds to this latter all the perfections that less perfect forms would provide – such as the perfection of existence, corporality, and life with vegetative and sensory functions – plus its specific perfection, i.e. rationality. Following Thomas' view, a higher form then encompasses and further completes all the perfections that are proper to lower forms. However, it does so through an ultimate unity of species that is distinct from that of all other forms. This is why Thomas does not propose the addition of one particular form to the others, as the theorists of the plurality of forms do. Instead, as Picard notes in his work, Thomas seems to understand the addition of the perfection of the higher form to the different perfections that are proper to the lower forms as an addition only according to the intelligible way (*secundum modum intelligibilem*). This is because the different perfections that are proper to the lower forms are actually brought to prime matter through the immediate union with a unique higher form. In summary, an higher substantial form constitutes a composed being through its immediate union with prime matter and bestows upon this latter all the lower perfections included in its undivided unity.

Moreover, from this intelligible perspective, an higher perfection can be understood as something material (*intelligatur ut materiale*) in relation to a further, more perfect form. For example, in the case of the living body, the matter that already exists as a corporeal being can be understood as something material in relation to the higher perfections of more perfect forms, such as the living functions proper to the vegetative soul. This is the reason why, following the example of the living body, the genus “body” of the definition “living corporeal being” is regarded as the part of the definition derived from the matter, while the specific difference “living” is the part derived from the form. Thus, “body” and “living” constitute the definition of a living corporeal being, since the perfection of the body is further perfected by the life imparted by the vegetative soul, just like matter is perfected by the form.

Thus, according to this intelligible order, the lower perfection of the body is understood as an intermediate between prime matter and the ultimate perfection of the soul, while, according to the actual union, the highest form immediately confers upon matter all the perfections proper to the lower forms, plus its own perfection through its all-encompassing unicity.

Thomas applies those general principles to the specific case of human being later in the same question:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 9, resp.; Bazán 81,230-245:
Sic igitur cum anima sit forma substantialis, quia constituit hominem in determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantialis media inter animam et materiam primam; sed homo ab ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum diversos gradus perfectionum, ut sit scilicet corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal rationale. Sed oportet quod materia secundum quod intelligitur ut recipiens ab ipsa anima rationali perfectiones inferioris gradus, puta quod sit corpus et animatum corpus et animal, intelligatur, simul cum dispositionibus convenientibus, quod sit materia propria ad animam rationalem, secundum quod dat ultimam perfectionem. Sic igitur anima, secundum quod est forma dans esse, non habet aliquid aliud medium inter se et materiam primam.

Here, Thomas repeats that, just as the substantial form – perfectly and without any intermediate – causes prime matter to exist and to have a specific nature, so the rational soul immediately constitutes the human being in a certain species of substances. Moreover, through its all-encompassing unicity, the rational soul bestows on matter all the lower perfections included in its form, so that a human being is both a body, an animated body, and a rational animal. Together with those perfections, the rational soul provides matter also all the appropriate dispositions and accidents, which make matter suitable for the ultimate perfection of rationality.

Also in this case, Picard accurately displays Thomas' opinion and delves deeply into the most pivotal of Thomas' philosophical principles on the subject, namely, the all-encompassing unicity of a higher form with respect to the perfections of lower ones. Furthermore, Picard provides a clear and concise explanation of this concept through the use of illustrative examples:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: "Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia"; *V* 167va, *E* 105ra:
Secundo declarant sic: Forma perfectior sicut anima in se continet perfectiones inferiorum formarum, sicut tetragonum trigonum et ternarius binarium: primum sumitur ex II *De anima*, ubi Philosophus dicit, quod vegetativum est in sensitivo et sensitivum in intellectivo, sicut trigonum in tetragono et tetragonum in pentagono; secundum sumitur ex VIII *Metaphysicae*, ubi Philosophus formas comparat numeris.
Si ergo anima vel quaecumque forma consideretur secundum essentiam suam, sic ipsa sine omni medio unitur materiae. Sed si consideretur secundum diversum gradum perfectionis, quem dat materiae, sic ipsamet secundum unam perfectionem, quam dat, cadit media inter

materiam et se ipsam secundum aliam perfectionem. Anima igitur, quia dat esse, dat esse substantiam, dat esse vivum corpus, animal et hominem, et sic quidquid est substantialiter in re ipsa, inquantum est forma corporeitatis, immediate secundum istam perfectionem unitur materiae, quia materia ad formam corporeitatis est disposita se ipsa sine omni dispositione media. Sicut ergo anima dat hoc esse corporeum, ita ad eam inquantum huiusmodi consequuntur propria accidentia corporis, et haec sunt dimensiones, ex quibus iam distinguitur ab alia parte materiae et non per dimensiones praecedentes, sicut putabat Commentator, sicut album dicitur calidum a caliditate consequente formam, non praecedente, et secundum quod sic consideratur materia perfecta, est proprium susceptibile vivi, et quia vivere etiam dat anima, ideo ipsa, inquantum dedit esse corporeum, disponit et est media inter se ipsam et materiam, ut perficiat in esse vivo.

Item inquantum materia iam est perfecta sub esse vivo, est proprium susceptivum eiusdem animae, secundum quod dat esse sensitivum; et secundum quod perfecta est in esse sensitivo sive animalis, est proprium susceptivum eiusdem animae inquantum rationalis. Et sic etiam dimensiones et alia accidentia praecedunt animam secundum ordinem perficiendi et intelligendi, et ideo genus sumitur a differentia sensitiva, differentia a rationali, et non a materia et forma simpliciter, sed ab eo, quod se habet materialiter et formaliter.

Huius exemplum manifestum est in rebus corporalibus; secundum consuetudinem coloniensem in una corda secundum diversa signa sunt multae ulnae; et quod in diversis terris mensuratur per ulnas vel baculos, haec una quantitas cordae indivisa totum mensurat quasi includens in se omnes inferiores mensuras, sicut in numeris dictum est et figuris, et cadit corda media quantum ad unam partem signatam inter se ipsam et quantum ad aliquas et pannum, qui mensuratur. Hoc exemplum licet non sit per omnia simile, quia anima non est dimensionata, tamen manuducit quantum ad hoc, quod virtute perfectiva etiam potest dici quanta.

Picard shows that, in accordance with Thomas' principle that a more perfect form encompasses all the perfections that are proper to less perfect forms, a substantial form of a thing can be considered in two different ways: according to its essence or according to the different degrees of perfection that it gives to matter. When a substantial form is considered according to its essence, this form is united with prime matter without any intermediate. Therefore, in the case of the rational soul, when it is considered in its essential unity, then it is united with matter and perfects it immediately, causing the existence of matter and of its perfection into a living body, an animal, and a human being. This means that the rational soul causes prime matter to be a body and gives matter also all the accidents that belong to the body (*accidentia propria corporis*). For Picard, these accidents are precisely the dimensions by which matter can be divided in different parts. Thus, according to its essence, the substantial form must be understood to precede and to be the cause of all the accidents that are proper to the perfections that it gives to matter.

On contrary, when a substantial form of a thing is understood according to its different degrees of perfection, this same form, according to the lower degrees of perfection that it provides to matter, can be considered as an intermediate between prime matter and itself, taken according to its highest perfection. To illustrate, the rational soul bestows both the corporeal perfection on prime matter and the human rationality on the living body. This means that the

same rational soul is both understood as the cause that confers corporeal perfection on prime matter and the cause that confers human perfection on the body. In such a perspective, rational soul's role in conferring corporeal perfection on prime matter can be understood as lying between the pure potential indetermination of matter and the ultimate perfection of human rationality. Consequently, the rational soul, understood as the cause of corporeal being, is considered to be an intermediate between prime matter and itself understood as the cause of the rationality in the living body. This entails that, according to this way, the dimensions precede the perfections of the living, animal, and human being. This is because dimensions are accidents that belong to the perfection of the corporeal being, which precedes, according to the order of understanding, all other modes of being – namely, the modes of living, animal, and human being –.

On this basis, just like Thomas, Picard states that the concepts of genus and specific difference must also be understood in accordance with the order of degrees of perfection conferred by the unique substantial form to the matter. For example, the genus and specific difference of “human being” are not assumed as the matter and the form *simpliciter* (namely, the prime matter and the substantial form “rational soul”), but they corresponds to what materially and formally outlines the definition of “human being”, that is, its being an “animal” or “sensitive body” and its being “rational”. Thus, these material and formal parts of the definition of “human being” represent two different degrees of perfection that the unique rational soul immediately confers to prime matter.

In this regard, Picard offers an interesting example derived from a typical custom of Cologne. According to Picard's words, in the city of Cologne, people were accustomed to measuring things by a rope, on which different marks were inscribed. Those marks signified the numerous ell lengths that a rope encompassed within its undivided length. Indeed, the Cologne rope included in its length many ell or stick lengths. Consequently, what was measured in various lands by those smaller lengths was also measured by the Cologne rope, as if the rope included in itself all the inferior measures. This unique quantity of rope measured things in an undivided way. However, the marked parts of the rope, which signified the many ell lengths, fell between the length of the rope taken in its entirety and the thing that is measured. This is analogous to the case of the unique substantial form and the different degrees of perfection that this bestows on prime matter.

To sum up, Picard successfully identifies two distinct ways in which Thomas outlines the union of matter and form. The first way is to understand the union between prime matter and the unique substantial form in its actuality and immediacy, which causes the actual existence

of a thing in its formal entirety. The second way is to understand this same actual union according to the multiple levels of perfection that the single substantial form immediately and simultaneously bestows on matter. In this latter sense, matter is understood to receive not only the higher perfection that is proper to the unique substantial form, but also all the other lower perfections that this form actually includes in its all-encompassing unicity. Thus, although there is no actual intermediate between prime matter and the higher perfection of the substantial form, which is actually unique and undivided, the lower perfections that the form bestows on matter can be nevertheless understood as intermediate between matter and form itself according to the intelligible way.

However, these two perspectives on the essential union between substantial form and prime matter – one actual, and the other intelligible –, raise the question if the precedence of dimensions over substantial form should be denied entirely. Thomas addresses the relationship between the accidents of a substance and its substantial form later on in this same question:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 9, resp.; Bazán 81,206-229:
Materia autem prout intelligitur constituta in esse substantiali secundum perfectionem inferioris gradus, per consequens intelligi potest ut accidentibus subiecta. Nam substantia secundum illum inferiorem gradum perfectionis necesse est quod habeat quaedam accidentia propria quae necesse est ei inesse. Sicut ex hoc quod materia constituitur in esse corporeo per formas, statim consequitur ut sint in ea dimensiones, per quas intelligitur materia divisibilis per diversas partes, ut sic secundum diversas sui partes possit esse susceptiva diversarum formarum. Et ulterius ex quo materia intelligitur constituta in esse quodam substantiali, intelligi potest ut susceptiva accidentium quibus disponitur ad ulteriorem perfectionem, secundum quam materia fit propria ad ulteriorem perfectionem suscipiendam. Huiusmodi autem dispositiones praeintelliguntur formae ut inductae ab agente in materiam, licet sint quaedam accidentia impropria formae, quae non nisi ex ipsa forma causentur in materia. Unde non praeintelliguntur in materia formae quasi dispositiones, sed magis forma praeintelligitur eis, sicut causa effectibus.

In this passage, Thomas outlines three types of accidents that can occur in matter when the substantial causes it to exist through a specific ultimate nature: those that are proper to lower perfections; those that dispose matter to receive a higher perfection by the action of an outside agent; and, those that are caused by the substantial form but are not proper to it.

As Picard's account showed already before, when a substantial form causes matter to exist, the latter is understood to receive, in addition to all the essential perfections proper to the lower forms, also the accidents proper (*quaedam accidentia propria*) to those lower essential perfections.

In addition to those kind of accidents, matter, when understood as shaped by a substantial form, can receive accidents that prepare and dispose it for achieving a higher level of perfection. These accidents are a kind of dispositions that are presupposed (*praeintelliguntur*)

in matter with respect to this higher form, since they are introduced only when an outside agent acts upon matter and shapes it with the form.

According to Thomas, however, there is also another kind of accident in matter. These are those that do not belong to a particular form (*impropria accidentia*) and are caused solely by the form itself, such as the accidental quality of “being bald” that belongs to human being and is caused by the rational soul.

In his seventeenth *argumentum* and respective *responsio* of this article, Thomas clarifies that dimensions belong to the first of these groups of accidents. In the case of human soul, dimensions are indeed accidents proper to perfections that are lower than rationality. Indeed, since prime matter is shaped as a corporeal being by the rational soul, there are also in matter those accidents that are proper to the corporeal being, such as the dimensions whereby matter can be understood as divisible into different parts and receiving different forms. Thomas uses this description of dimensions in resolving the problem of whether or not dimensions precede substantial form over matter:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 9, arg. 17 et ad arg. 17; Bazán 79,117-121 et 85,513-86,522:

Praeterea, sicut anima naturaliter unitur corpori, ita haec anima unitur huic corpori. Sed hoc corpus est per hoc quod est sub aliquibus dimensionibus terminatis. Ergo anima unitur corpori mediantibus dimensionibus terminatis. [...] Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod dimensiones non possunt intelligi in materia nisi secundum quod materia intelligitur constituta per formam substantialem in esse substantiali corporeo: quod quidem non fit per aliam formam in homine quam per animam, ut dictum est. Unde huiusmodi dimensiones non praeintelliguntur ante animam in materia totaliter, sed quantum ad ultimos gradus perfectionis, ut supra expositum est.

The objection, which Thomas deals with here, claims that the soul naturally (*naturaliter*) unites with the body in a manner comparable to the union of “this soul” with “this body”. However, a body is referred to as “this body” because it has some terminated dimensions (*dimensiones terminatae*) underlying it, namely certain kind of precise boundaries and limits. According to this, it is reasonable to assume that, since “this body” exists before that “this rational soul” comes upon it in order to constitute “this human being”, the terminated dimensions must exist in matter prior to its union with “this rational soul”. These dimensions are indeed accidents that do not directly belong to the essential perfection of the rational soul, but rather are properties of the form of the body that precede the reception of rational soul. Therefore, this objection holds that the terminated dimensions play an intermediary role in the actual union between the body and the soul.

Thomas replies to this objection by saying that dimensions can only be conceived of in matter insofar as matter is conceived of as being constituted in substantial corporeal being through a substantial form (*materia intelligitur constituta per formam substantialem in esse substantiali corporeo*). In simple terms, this means that dimensions are present in matter only when a substantial form provides matter with the perfection of the corporeal being. As previously stated, the perfection of the corporeal being is the ultimate perfection of the form of the body. However, in accordance with the principle that the perfections of a lower substantial form are included in a higher one, the rational soul causes prime matter to exist and bestows upon it all the essential and accidental perfections that are proper to the lower form of the body, such as the terminated dimensions. Consequently, in the case of the perfection of the corporeal being with regard to the human being, it is the substantial form of the rational soul that causes matter to have the dimensions that are the proper accidents of the body, rather than the other way around. This is valid also with the form of the body itself. The substance “body” does have a substantial form, that is, corporeality (*corporeitas*), which does not correspond to the three-dimensional properties, but rather those latter are caused in matter by the form of the body itself.¹⁷ For these reasons, it can be said that there is no real intermediate in the union between prime matter and the form of the rational soul. Indeed, terminated dimensions do not exist at all in matter before that the rational soul comes to it.

Indeed, Thomas specifies that lower perfections, such as the terminated dimensions, are not wholly presupposed (*praeintelliguntur totaliter*) in matter with respect to the rational soul, but only with respect to all the perfections bestowed upon matter by the rational soul itself that are higher than those of the form of the body. In this sense, the terminated dimensions can be understood as an intermediate between prime matter and the ultimate perfection proper to rational soul itself, namely, life or rationality.

After a thorough analysis of the text of this question, it is definitely clear that Thomas believes that dimensions can only precede substantial form over matter in an intelligible way, as Picard precisely identifies in his text.

3.3.5. *QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE SPIRITUALIBUS CREATURIS*

¹⁷ See THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 3, ad arg. 14.; Cos 47,596-603: “Corpus autem quod est in genere substantiae, habet formam substantialem quae dicitur corporeitas, quae non est tres dimensiones, sed quaecumque forma substantialis ex qua sequuntur in materia tres dimensiones; et haec forma in igne est igneitas, in animali anima sensitiva, et in homine anima intellectiva.”

However, besides the *Quaestiones de anima*, Picard also states that Thomas upholds this same opinion in his article 3 of his *Quaestiones de spiritualibus creaturis* and in the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, where he explains again that if the soul is united with the body, then it is necessary to say that this union must be immediate:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 3, resp.; Cos 38,223-39,248:

Responsio. [...] Si vero ponatur anima uniri corpori ut forma, necesse est dicere, quod uniatur ei immediate. Omnis enim forma sive substantialis sive accidentalis, unitur materiae vel subiecto. Unumquodque enim secundum hoc est unum, secundum quod est ens. Est autem unumquodque ens actu per formam, sive secundum esse substantiale, sive secundum esse accidentale: unde omnis forma est actus; et per consequens est ratio unitatis, qua aliquid est unum. Sicut igitur non est dicere quod sit aliquod aliud medium quo materia habeat esse per suam formam, ita non potest dici quod sit aliquod aliud medium uniens formam materiae vel subiecto. Secundum igitur quod anima est forma corporis, non potest esse aliquid medium inter animam et corpus.

Differently from his *Quaestiones de anima*, Thomas here grounds his thesis that the soul is immediately united with the body as its form on the notion of unity and its intimate connection with their existence.

According to Thomas, since every individual thing is one insofar as it is a being, what causes a thing to exist as a being must also cause it to be one. Moreover, an individual thing exists as a being only through the actuality of the form, and thus this form is also the reason for the unity that makes that being one. In a similar manner, it can be argued that what makes the potentiality of matter existing and being one is the actuality of the substantial form. Therefore, since there is no other intermediate by which matter has being but its form, there is also no intermediate in the union between matter and form. Consequently, if the soul is conceived as the form of the body, it follows that there must be no intermediate between body and soul.

Also in this question, Thomas explicitly displays the deep interconnection between the problem of whether the form is immediately united with the matter and the debate surrounding the unicity or plurality of the substantial form. Indeed, Thomas raises the problem of whether the union between the rational soul and the body must be understood as the union between a substantial form and prime matter or between a substantial form and an already existing *subiectum*. In this context, Thomas proceeds here to inquire as to what is the *subiectum* of the soul that can be compared to its matter:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 3, resp.; Cos 39,249-275:

Sed tunc dubium restat, quid sit proprium subiectum animae, quod comparetur ad ipsam sicut materia ad formam. Circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod sunt multae formae substantiales in eodem individuo, quarum una substernitur alteri; et sic materia prima non est immediatum subiectum ultimae formae substantialis, sed subiicitur ei mediantibus formis mediis; ita quod ipsa materia, secundum quod est sub forma prima, est subiectum proximum formae secundae; et sic deinceps usque ad ultimam formam. Sic igitur subiectum animae rationalis proximum, est corpus perfectum anima sensitiva; et huic unitur anima rationalis ut forma. Alia opinio est, quod in uno individuo non est nisi una forma substantialis et secundum hoc oportet dicere quod per formam substantialem, quae est forma humana, habet hoc individuum non solum quod sit homo, sed quod sit animal, et quod sit vivum, et quod sit corpus, et substantia et ens. Et sic nulla alia forma substantialis praecedat in hoc homine animam humanam, et per consequens nec accidentalis; quia tunc oporteret dicere, quod materia prius perficiatur per formam accidentalem quam substantialem, quod est impossibile; oportet enim omne accidens fundari in substantia.

Thomas says that if one adheres to the view that there is a plurality of substantial forms within an individual being, then this must also imply that prime matter is not the immediate *subiectum* of the substantial perfection of the rational soul. Indeed, prime matter is brought into existence as an individual substance only by the first substantial form that comes to it. In accordance with the pluralist theory, the substance that emerges from this first union is the proximate subject (*subiectum proximum*) for a second substantial form, and so on until the advent of the ultimate form. Therefore, in line with this theory, the prime matter must undergo a series of intermediary substantial forms before being perfected by the last and most perfect one. This leads to the conclusion that, in the case of the human being, the proximate subject of the rational soul must be the body animated by the sensitive soul.

However, if someone were to argue for the unicity of the substantial form within an individual being, it would be necessary to claim that the only rational soul causes prime matter to be a human being, an animal, a living being, a body, substance, and, most fundamentally, a being. According to this theory, it is also impossible to posit any kind of accidental form perfecting prime matter before the substantial form, given that the latter is the cause of matter existence in its entirety. Actually, by their own definition, accidental properties cannot be inherent to prime matter, but they can only do so in an already existing substance.

After rejecting the plurality of the substantial form and explaining why this theory goes against the principles of Aristotle's philosophy, Thomas further describes how it is possible for a single substantial form to cause over matter a multitude of perfections:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 3, resp.; Cos 44,393-444:

Sic ergo dicimus quod in hoc homine non est alia forma substantialis quam anima rationalis; et quod per eam homo non solum est homo, sed animal et vivum et corpus et substantia et ens. Quod quidem sic considerari potest. Forma enim est similitudo agentis in materia. [...] Perfectioris autem agentis est inducere perfectiorem formam. Unde perfectior forma facit per

unum omnia quae inferiores faciunt per diversa, et adhuc amplius: puta, si forma corporis inanimati dat materiae esse et esse corpus, forma plantae dabit ei et hoc et insuper vivere; anima vero sensitiva et hoc, insuper et sensibile esse; anima vero rationalis et hoc, et insuper rationale esse. Sic enim inveniuntur differre formae rerum naturalium secundum perfectum et magis perfectum, ut patet intuenti. Propter quod species comparantur numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaph.: quorum species per additionem et subtractionem unitatis variantur. Unde etiam Aristoteles in II de anima dicit, quod vegetativum est in sensitivo, et sensitivum in intellectivo, sicut trigonum in tetragono, et tetragonum in pentagono; pentagonum enim virtute continet tetragonum: habet enim hoc et adhuc amplius; non autem quod seorsum in pentagono sit id quod est tetragoni, et id quod est pentagoni proprium, tanquam duae figurae. Sic etiam anima intellectiva virtute continet sensitivam, quia habet hoc et adhuc amplius; non tamen ita quod sint duae animae. Si autem diceretur quod anima intellectiva differret per essentiam a sensitiva in homine, non posset assignari ratio unionis animae intellectivae ad corpus, cum nulla operatio propria animae intellectivae sit per organum corporale.

The theory of the unicity of the substantial form claims that the first form to come to matter is the substantial form, while those that come later are merely accidental.¹⁸ However, this opens the discussion to the problem of what differentiates a substantial form such as that of the body from that of the rational soul, and how they relate to each other and to the prime matter. Thomas delineates, here, the distinction between two different substantial forms based on the principle that a form represents a likeness of the agent in the matter. This implies that a more perfect agent must induce (*est inducere*) a more perfect form in matter based on this likeness. By combining this last principle with the theory of the unicity of the substantial form, it can be deduced that a more perfect substantial form can cause a multitude of perfections through its unicity, whereas less perfect forms can only cause these perfections separately. For example, the less perfect form of the body is the cause of matter existence and its being corporeal. In turn, the more perfect form of the vegetative soul is the cause of matter existence as much as of its corporeal and living being. The same reasoning can be applied to the sensitive soul and rational soul. Therefore, the form of the body and the various souls differ from each other in the same way that a less perfect form differs from a more perfect one.

In this text, Thomas employs a geometrical simile to illustrate the relationship between the vegetative, sensitive, and rational soul.¹⁹ He states that the vegetative soul is analogous to a

¹⁸ Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 3, resp.; Cos 43,353-358: “Manifestum est autem quod quaelibet forma substantialis, quaecumque sit, facit ens actu et constituit; unde sequitur quod sola prima forma quae advenit materiae sit substantialis, omnes vero subsequenter advenientes sint accidentales.”

¹⁹ Picard uses the same simile in his account, see JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: “Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia”; V 167rb, E 105ra: “Secundo declarant sic: Forma perfectior, sicut anima, in se continet perfectiones inferiorum formarum, sicut tetragonum trigonum et ternarius binarium: primum sumitur ex II *De anima* ubi Philosophus dicit quod vegetativum est in sensitivo et sensitivum in intellectivo, sicut trigonum in tetragono et tetragonum in pentagono; secundum sumitur ex VIII *Metaphysicae*, ubi Philosophus formas comparat numeris.”

triangle, the sensitive soul to a quadrilateral, and the rational soul to a pentagon. As the rational soul encompasses the formal perfections proper to the body, the vegetative and sensitive souls, so too does the pentagon virtually (*virtute*) include the perfections of the triangle and quadrilateral, and adds its specific and higher perfection. However, it is important to underline that the essence (*id quod est*) that is proper to the quadrilateral and the essence that is proper to the pentagon are not present in the pentagon as they were two distinct figures. Rather, they are just two perfections that are included in the essential unity of the substantial form of the pentagon. The distinction between the perfection of the quadrilateral and that of the pentagon within the pentagon is not an actual one. It is not as if one figure exists in addition to the other as two distinct forms, which are then combined within a third figure. Rather, this distinction between the perfection of the quadrilateral and that of the pentagon within the pentagon is merely virtual, existing according to the intelligible way. The distinction between the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls within the unity of the rational soul itself must be conceived in a similar manner. The essence that is proper to vegetative and sensitive soul are not included in the rational one as if they were two distinct forms, which are then combined within a third soul. But, those two souls stand to the rational one as lower forms stand to higher one. This latter includes in itself all the perfections that are proper to the lower ones, and adds to them its specific perfection that those do not possess.

Besides that, it is crucial to stress that the rational soul is not essentially different from the vegetative and sensitive ones. If it were, the rational soul would not be able to be united with the body, since no activity that is proper to the rational soul can be operated via a bodily organ. Nevertheless, it is evident that the rational soul is in union with the body. This is exactly because the rational soul is not essentially different from the vegetative and sensitive ones.

In a manner analogous to the sensitive and vegetative souls, the form of the rational soul encompasses also the perfection of the body and dimensions. Thomas deals with this problem in the seventeenth and eighteenth objections and their respective responses:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 3, arg. et ad arg. 17-18; Cos 36,131-146 et 48,612-627:

Praeterea, Commentator dicit, quod materia prima prius recipit formas universales quam particulares, utpote prius formam corporis quam formam animati corporis; et sic deinceps. Cum ergo anima humana, sit ultima forma et maxime specifica, videtur quod praesupponat alias formas universales in materia. Praeterea, Commentator dicit in libro de substantia orbis, quod dimensiones praeexistunt in materia ante formas elementares. Sed dimensiones sunt accidentia, et praesupponunt aliquam formam substantialem in materia; alioquin esse accidentale praecederet esse substantiale. Ergo ante formam simplicis elementi praeexistit in materia aliqua alia forma substantialis; multo igitur fortius ante animam rationalem. [...] Ad decimumseptimum dicendum quod ordo ille quem Commentator tangit, est secundum rationem

intelligibilem tantum; quia prius intelligitur materia perfici secundum rationem formae universalis quam specialis; sicut prius intelligitur aliquid ens quam vivum, et vivum quam animal, et animal quam homo. Ad decimumoctavum dicendum quod quodlibet esse generis vel speciei consequuntur propria accidentia illius generis vel speciei. Unde quando iam materia intelligitur perfecta secundum rationem huius generis quod est corpus, possunt in ea intelligi dimensiones, quae sunt propria accidentia huius generis: et sic consequuntur ordinem intelligibilem in materia, secundum diversas eius partes, diversae formae elementares.

These objections holds that, in accordance with Averroes' teachings, prime matter receives universal forms before particular ones. In this way, matter receives the form of body before the form of life, and so forth until the form of rational soul. Furthermore, as expounded by Averroes in the opening chapter of his treatise *Sermo de Substantia Orbis*,²⁰ the dimensions exist in matter before the elementary forms. This entails that the accidental *esse* of the dimensions precedes the substantial *esse* of the elements, and, as a consequence, the accidental form of dimensions must precede the substantial form of the elements. Accordingly, they must also precede the form of the rational soul in the substantial composite "human being". This shows that there are many substantial forms in individual things and that dimensions serve as an intermediate between the various substantial forms.

In response to these objections, Thomas asserts that when Averroes discusses universal and particular forms, he is referring exclusively to the intelligible order (*ordinem intelligibilem*). Dimensions come over matter before the rational soul only according to this same order. The actual precedence of the dimensions has to be rejected also because accidents that are proper to a genus or species come after the existence of the genus or species itself (*esse generis vel speciei*). Therefore, dimensions, which are accidents inherent to the genus "body", are thought to exist in matter only when matter is understood as perfected (*perfecta*) in accordance with the notion of the genus "body". Thus, just as the genus precedes its accidents, the form of the body actually precede spatial dimensions.

So, also in his *Quaestiones de spiritualibus creaturis*, Thomas definitively concludes that dimensions precede the substantial forms in matter only according to the intelligible way.

3.3.6. *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: PRIMA PARS*

Following Picard's account, Thomas finally denies the theory of the precedence of the dimensions to the substantial form in matter in question 76 of the first part of his *Summa theologiae*. In the article 6 of this question, besides claiming that it is not possible for any accidental dispositions to be intermediate between the body and the soul, or, more accurately,

²⁰ AVERROES, *Sermo de Substantia Orbis*, c. 1; Venetiis 3vL-4vI.

between matter and the substantial form, Thomas clarifies better than anywhere else that there is a certain correspondence between the order of acts that perfect matter and the intelligible order of the properties that inhere matter:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 229a-b:

Respondeo dicendum quod, [...] si anima intellectiva unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut iam supra dictum est, impossibile est quod aliqua dispositio accidentalis cadat media inter corpus et animam, vel inter quamcumque formam substantialem et materiam suam. Et huius ratio est quia, cum materia sit in potentia ad omnes actus ordine quodam, oportet quod id quod est primum simpliciter in actibus, primo in materia intelligatur. Primum autem inter omnes actus est esse. Impossibile est ergo intelligere materiam prius esse calidam vel quantam, quam esse in actu. Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit esse simpliciter, ut iam dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praeexistent in materia ante formam substantialem; et per consequens neque ante animam.

Since matter has potentiality to any acts, what is fundamentally first according to the order of acts must be thought of as first in matter according to the intelligible order. What is first in the order of acts is existence (*esse*), so it is impossible, as Thomas asserts, to think matter perfected by some properties, such as “being hot” or “having quantity,” before being perfected by the act of existence. It is necessary to deduce that those properties must be thought to perfect matter subsequent to the act of *esse*, which is the fundamental cause of matter’s existence. Since the act of *esse* is brought to matter by the substantial form, the coincidence between the intelligible order and that of acts allows Thomas to say that the union of the substantial form and the matter is immediate and that it is impossible that some accidental dispositions exist in matter before the substantial form, because, before the latter, matter does not exist at all and cannot receive properties of any kind. Also in such a case, this view rises the questions of how and whether dimensions can precede the substantial form in matter. Thomas directly addresses this issue in the initial two objections and answers of the article:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 76, arg. et ad arg. 2; Leon. 229a-b:

Videtur quod anima intellectiva uniatur corpori mediantibus aliquibus dispositionibus accidentalibus. Omnis enim forma est in materia sibi propria et disposita. Sed dispositiones ad formam sunt accidentia quaedam. Ergo oportet praeintelligi accidentia aliqua in materia ante formam substantialem, et ita ante animam, cum anima sit quaedam substantialis forma. Praeterea, diversae formae unius speciei requirunt diversas materiae partes. Partes autem materiae diversae non possunt intelligi nisi secundum divisionem dimensionum quantitatum. Ergo oportet intelligere dimensiones in materia ante formas substantiales, quae sunt multae unius speciei.

[...]

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, forma perfectior virtute continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum. Et ideo una et eadem existens, perficit materiam secundum diversos perfectionis gradus. Una enim et eadem forma est per essentiam, per quam homo est ens actu, et per quam est corpus, et per quam est vivum, et per quam est animal, et per quam est homo. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque genus consequuntur propria accidentia.

Sicut ergo materia praeintelligitur perfecta secundum esse ante intellectum corporeitatis, et sic de aliis; ita praeintelliguntur accidentia quae sunt propria entis, ante corporeitatem. Et sic praeintelliguntur dispositiones in materia ante formam, non quantum ad omnem eius effectum, sed quantum ad posteriorem.

Ad secundum dicendum quod dimensiones quantitativae sunt accidentia consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit. Unde materia iam intellecta sub corporeitate et dimensionibus, potest intelligi ut distincta in diversas partes, ut sic accipiat diversas formas secundum ultiores perfectionis gradus. Quamvis enim eadem forma sit secundum essentiam quae diversos perfectionis gradus materiae attribuit, ut dictum est; tamen secundum considerationem rationis differt.

The first objection claims that matter can receive a form only if the matter is properly disposed to it. These dispositions are accidents that inhere in matter and are presupposed in it (*praeintelligi in materia*) with respect to the substantial form. Consequently, these accidental dispositions must also precede the substantial form in matter. Indeed, if one argue for the coincidence between the intelligible order and that of acts, it seems that, in the case of human beings, the act of dimensions is understood to be in matter before the act of the rational soul because they belongs to the act of the body.

However, in response to this objection, Thomas upholds his usual view based on principle that a more perfect form contains all the perfections that belong to less perfect forms. This implies that, although substantial forms are unique and undivided, a higher substantial form, such as the rational soul, bestows upon matter all the perfection and acts of the lower forms, including those of the sensitive and vegetative soul, and of the body. Furthermore, since accidents that are proper to a genus are thought to come after this genus, it can be claimed that the accidents proper to the body precede the genus of the soul because the genus of the body is prior to and logically presupposed by the genus of the soul. In this sense, the accidents of the body precede the genus of the soul. However, this is possible only by considering the virtual order that exists among the degrees of perfection within the undivided substantial form. Only according to this order, the corporeal accidents that dispose matter to receive the soul can be considered prior to it. Moreover, according to the priority of the *esse* over all the other acts, the substantial form of the soul immediately unites with prime matter and does not need prime matter to be already perfected by the form of the body in order to become a human being.

The second objection states instead that different forms of the same species require different diverse parts of matter in order to perfect matter in different ways. Indeed, different colors can shape matter with their own different perfection, only if matter possesses different parts which can be colored. Matter can have different parts, and they can be thought to exist in matter only through the division made by the dimensional quantities. Consequently, it is essential to posit

the existence of these dimensions within matter before the different forms of the same species can perfect matter.

However, Thomas responds that quantitative dimensions are the accidents proper to the corporeity, which belongs to the whole matter (*toti materiae*). Therefore, the matter can be thought of as divided into different parts when it is already thought of as perfected by the substantial form “corporeity” and, therefore, by the accidental forms of dimensions that follow it. Furthermore, Thomas repeats that, although the substantial form is unique in constituting the individual being, the perfections, that this form gives to matter, can nevertheless be considered separately according to the way of understanding (*secundum considerationem rationis*).

A thorough examination of Thomas’ text as cited by Picard in his *Quaestiones* reveals a consistent rejection by Thomas of the real precedence of any kind of dimensions in matter over substantial form for a specific phase of his career. It is noteworthy to highlight that, in the texts that have been examined, Thomas does not deny the precedence of terminated or unterminated dimensions, but of all kinds of dimensions, regardless of whether they are terminated or unterminated. This complete rejection is inextricably linked with Thomas’s advocacy of the unicity of substantial form, which also allows to understand dimensions as prior to the substantial form only according to the intelligible way.

3.3.7. *SUPER BOETHIUM DE TRINITATE*

However, Picard explains that Thomas undergoes a change of opinion on this subject. According to the chronology of Aquinas’ text that Picard has in mind, Thomas begins to advocate the precedence of dimensions over substantial form after writing the first part of his *Summa theologiae*, that is, in his *Commentary on Boethius’ De trinitate* and in article 9, quaestio 5 of his *De veritate*:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: “Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia”; *V* 167va, *E* 105ra: [...] tamen, quia aliter sensit in fine, sicut patet per *Boethium De trinitate* articulo 14 sive quaestione et in quaestionibus *De veritate* quaestione de providentia divina “utrum disponat corpora inferiora per superiora” solutione 6 argumenti, ideo videtur, <quod> aliter dicendum. Et haec est positio sexta, scilicet quod dimensiones interminatae praecedant, et hoc sic patet ex natura individuationis.

Picard states that in contrast to Thomas’s earlier opinion that no dimensions could have preceded the substantial form in matter, in these other two cases Thomas explicitly accepts

Averroes' doctrine of untermimated²¹ dimensions. Furthermore, the precedence of dimensions with respect to the substantial form is no longer linked here to the question of whether the union between the soul and the body is immediate or not. Instead, it concerns the way things are individuated (*ex natura individuationis*). Thomas' focus is in these cases on the metaphysical relationship among dimensions, the individual matter and the process of individuation. In emphasizing this shift in perspective, Picard again demonstrates his historical accuracy in understanding and interpreting the complexity of Thomas' texts, placing Thomas' thesis in their appropriate theoretical context.

In his general overview of Thomas' new approach to Averroes' doctrine of the untermimated dimensions, Picard first quoted Thomas' article 2, question 4 of his *Commentary on Boethius' De trinitate*. The topic of the question at issue already highlights the shift of perspective in Thomas' speculation. The question at issue indeed regards the relationship between the variety of accidents and diversity according to number (*Utrum uarietas accidentium faciat diuersitatem secundum numerum*). In his comprehensive response to this query, Thomas addresses the concept of difference (*diuersitas*) and the possibility of individual composed substances being distinct from one another:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Gils 123,80-102:
 Cum autem in individuo composito in genere substantiae non sint nisi tria, scilicet materia, forma et compositum, oportet ex aliquo horum cuiuslibet harum diuersitatum causas inuenire. Sciendum est ergo quod diuersitas secundum genus reducitur in diuersitatem materiae, diuersitas uero secundum speciem in diuersitatem formae, sed diuersitas secundum numerum partim in diuersitatem materiae, partim in diuersitatem accidentis.
 Cum autem genus sit principium cognoscendi, utpote prima diffinitionis pars, materia autem secundum se sit ignota, non potest secundum se ex ea accipi diuersitas generis, sed solum illo modo, quo cognoscibilis est.
 Est autem cognoscibilis [...] per formam, per quam habet esse in actu. Unumquodque enim cognoscitur, secundum quod est in actu, et non secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX *Metaphysicae*.

Thomas asserts that substances can be distinguished from one another in three ways: according to the genus; according to the species; and, according to the number (*secundum numerum*) or according to their individual being. First, they differ according to the genus when

²¹ The Latin words "terminatae/interminatae" are translated in this study into English as "terminated/untermimated." Moreover, it is unnecessary to differentiate between the couple of terms "terminatae/interminatae" and "determinatae/indeterminatae" in this study, as well as their hypothetical difference in Thomas' works, since neither Picard nor Thomas' works cited by Picard outline such a distinction. Instead, they present only one terminological variant, namely the couple "terminatae/interminatae," which in turn are the original terms used by Averroes in his *De Substantia Orbis*. For a discussion on the hypothetical difference in meaning between the two couples of terms "terminatae/interminatae" and "determinatae/indeterminatae" see for example J. F. WIPPEL, *The metaphysical thought of Thomas Aquinas*, cit., pp. 356-358 and M. NEUHAUS, *Der Begriff der dimensiones interminatae im lateinischen Hochund Spätmittelalter* (Dissertation), cit., pp. 141-146.

matters of those substances are different. Second, they differ according to the species when their forms are different. Third, they differ from each other in a third way, i.e. according to their individual being, because both their individual matters and accidents are different. To provide some examples, substances such as chairs and human beings differ according to their genus because their matters are “unanimated body” and “animated body,” respectively. In contrast, tigers and humans are identical in matter, which is “animated body,” but their forms differ. Indeed, tigers are “irrational animals,” while humans are “rational animals.” Finally, individuals belonging to the same species, such as Plato and Socrates, are distinct from each other due to their individual matter (*materia signata*) and peculiar accidents.

When Thomas speaks of the difference between substances according to their genus and species, he generally speaks of matter (*materia*) and form (*forma*) as the causes of this difference. However, through this terms, he does not directly refers to prime matter and the essences that compose the diverse beings. Rather, Thomas identifies the origin of the species and genus differences with the material and formal principles of the definition of substances.

Indeed, knowing that two things are different according to their different matter or from presupposes that the matter or form of these things are somehow knowable. Furthermore, the intellect knows things to the extent that they have actuality, and they have actuality through form. Thus, as Thomas says, matter in itself (*materia secundum se*) cannot be known by the intellect because it lacks any form, it is pure potency. Prime matter can only be known when it is formed and perfected by a form. For these reasons, the matter Thomas is referring to when he speaks of genus difference is not the unknowable prime matter, but some knowable material principle that underlies to formal properties of substances. This material principle of substances is exactly the genus, that is, the first part of the definition of a composed substance. In fact, the genus is considered to be the material principle of a substance, insofar as it, like prime matter, is the underlying intelligible foundation for further perfections, namely, specific differences. Since it is the foundation of a substance’s intelligibility, the genus is also to be referring to, according to Thomas, as the principle by which something is known. From this perspective, matter is the cause of the genus difference between substances only when it has already been perfected by a form. In fact, this enables intellect to know the prime matter as the material principle of the definition of a substance.

From the same perspective, it is necessary to claim that form is the cause of the species difference between substances, because it further perfects knowable matter and it is regarded as the formal principle of a substance’s definition, namely as the specific difference.

However, if prime matter is the cause of the genus difference between substances only in virtue of the perfection of the form that makes it knowable, then it is necessary to explain how the various forms actually perfect matter so that there are different substances:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Gils 124,116-143

[...] Materiam sumitur diversitas generis, secundum quod materia est perfecta per formam. Cum enim materia sit potentia pura et Deus actus purus, nihil est aliud materiam perfici in actum qui est forma, nisi quatenus participat aliquam similitudinem actus primi, licet imperfecte, ut sic illud, quod est iam compositum ex materia et forma, sit medium inter potentiam puram et actum purum.

Non autem materia ex omni parte recipit aequaliter similitudinem primi actus, sed a quibusdam imperfecte, a quibusdam vero perfectius, utpote quaedam participant divinam similitudinem secundum hoc tantum quod subsistunt, quaedam vero secundum quod vivunt, quaedam vero secundum quod cognoscunt, quaedam secundum quod intelligunt. Ipsa igitur similitudo primi actus in quacumque materia existens est forma eius. Sed forma talis in quibusdam facit esse tantum, in quibusdam esse et vivere, et sic de aliis una et eadem. Similitudo enim perfectior habet omne illud quod habet similitudo minus perfecta, et adhuc amplius. Aliquid ergo invenitur commune in utraque similitudine, quod in una substernitur imperfectioni et in alia perfectioni, sicut materia substernebatur actui et privationi; et ideo materia simul accepta cum hoc communi est adhuc materialis respectu perfectionis et imperfectionis praedictae.

Et ex hoc materiali sumitur genus, differentiae vero ex perfectione et imperfectione praedicta. Sicut ex hoc communi materiali, quod est habere vitam, sumitur hoc genus animatum corpus; ex perfectione vero superaddita haec differentia sensibile; ex imperfectione vero haec differentia insensibile. Et sic diversitas talium materialium inducit diversitatem generis, sicut animal a planta. Et propter hoc dicitur materia esse principium diversitatis secundum genus. Et eadem ratione forma est principium diversitatis secundum speciem, quia a praedictis formalibus, quae habent ad dicta materialia, unde genera sumuntur, comparisonem formae ad materiam, sumuntur differentiae quae constituunt species [...] Sic ergo patet, quomodo materia facit diversitatem in genere et forma diversitatem in specie.

Created substances have some actuality only because they imperfectly participate in a certain resemblance to the first grounding actuality, namely God, who is actuality *per suam essentiam*. This imperfect resemblance is the form that perfects prime matter in various degrees. According to the different ways forms can perfect prime matter, substances enjoy different degrees of perfection, such as the simple existence, the corporeal being, living or rationality. Besides, since a form is simple, it is necessary that a more perfect form includes all the perfections possessed by those forms which are less perfect, otherwise there would be a plurality of forms in one substance. In this way, the higher and lower forms have different degrees of perfection, but they also have in common all the perfections proper to lower form, because the higher one includes all of them adding the further its own perfection. The common perfections between a lower and higher form are to be considered the material principle of the further perfection added by the higher one, which, in turn, is regarded as the formal principle. To sum up, the perfections that the lower and higher forms have in common are what the genus stands for in the definition of the higher form, while the further added perfection is the specific

difference that constitutes a precise species. To make an example, the perfections of the sensitive soul, that is, “animated body with vegetative e sensory functions”, stand for the genus of the substance perfected by the rational soul, namely, the human being. Accordingly, Thomas says, it is possible to claim that the matter of a substance is the cause (*principium*) of the difference according to the genus, while the form is the cause of the difference according to the species. However, form and matter, which for Thomas are the causes (*principia*) of the differences between substances according to genus and species, do not correspond to the prime matter and the substantial form, but rather to the material and formal parts of the definitions of substances. These parts of the definitions differentiate substances according to their diverse perfections and correspond to the means through which intellect understands substances in their universal aspects. Individual substances seem to be, in fact, composed *realiter* of prime matter and simple substantial form, while the distinction between the various degrees of perfection that a simple form gives to prime matter is made by the intellect itself. Then, the differences between substances according to genus and species are not real, but they exist according to substances’ intelligible aspects.

If genus and species differences are distinctions based on the several perfections that a simple form bestow upon the prime matter, then what about the difference according to the number (*secundum numerum*)? Does also this difference concern the intelligible aspects of substances, or does this one consider some real element of individual substances? Thomas’ response to these issues is directly conveyed by Picard in his question, and represents what Picard considers to be Thomas’ definitive view on the precedence of untermiated dimensions in matter over substantial form. This suggests that the correct understanding of the relationship between individuation and untermiated dimensions are closely related to the notion of number difference (*diversitas secundum numerum*):

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: “Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia”; *V* 167va, *E* 105ra: [...] tamen, quia aliter sensit in fine, sicut patet per *Boethium De trinitate* articulo 14 sive quaestione et in quaestionibus *De veritate* quaestione de providentia divina “utrum disponat corpora inferiora per superiora” solutione 6 argumenti, ideo videtur, <quod> aliter dicendum- Et haec est positio sexta, scilicet quod dimensiones interminatae praecedant, et hoc sic patet ex natura individuationis.

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Gils 124,186-125,213:

Generationes enim et corruptiones non sunt universalium, sed singularium. Unde generatur hic aer et corrumpitur hic ignis. Forma autem individua non recipitur nisi in materia individuata sive signata. Et hoc sic patet *secundum Philosophum VII Metaphysicae, sicut partes generis et speciei sunt materia et forma, ita partes individui sunt haec materia et haec forma.*

Forma autem in quantum huiusmodi non fit haec, nisi in quantum recipitur in hac materia.

Materia autem, cum in se considerata sit indivisibilis, non distinguitur nisi per quantitatem.

Unde I Physicorum dicit Philosophus, quod subtracta quantitate remanet substantia indivisibilis, et ideo materia efficitur signata, secundum quod est sub dimensionibus.

Unlike genus and species differences, the number difference does not concern some intelligible aspect of substances. This third kind of difference shows instead that two substances belonging to the same species can differ from each other due to their diverse metaphysical constitution. This shift from the universal and intelligible aspects of beings to their individual constituents is highlighted by Picard, who introduces Thomas' text by stating that the process of generation and corruption does not concern universals (*universalium*), such as genus and species, but rather individuals (*singularium*), like Socrates and Plato. This implies that when something is produced or corrupted in something else, what underlies to this process is always "this thing" (*haec res*). After this brief introduction, it is evident that number difference no longer concerns the material and formal principles of substances' definition, but rather the

Inter individua vero unius speciei hoc modo consideranda est diversitas. *Secundum Philosophum enim in VII Metaphysicae sicut partes generis et speciei sunt materia et forma, ita partes individui sunt haec materia et haec forma.*

Unde sicut diversitatem in genere vel specie facit diversitas materiae vel formae absolute, ita diversitatem in numero facit haec forma et haec materia. Nulla autem forma in quantum huiusmodi est haec ex se ipsa. Dico autem in quantum huiusmodi propter animam rationalem, quae quodammodo ex se ipsa est hoc aliquid, sed non in quantum forma. Intellectus enim quamlibet formam, quam possibile est recipi in aliquo sicut in materia vel in subiecto, natus est attribuere pluribus, quod est contra rationem eius quod est hoc aliquid. Unde forma fit haec per hoc quod recipitur in materia. Sed cum materia in se sit indistincta, non potest esse quod formam receptam individuet, nisi secundum quod est distinguibilis.

Non enim *forma* individuatur per *hoc* quod recipitur in materia, *nisi* quatenus *recipitur in hac materia* distincta et determinata ad hic et nunc. *Materia autem non est divisibilis nisi per quantitatem.*

Unde Philosophus dicit in I Physicorum quod subtracta quantitate remanebit substantia indivisibilis. Et ideo materia efficitur haec et signata, secundum quod subest dimensionibus.

matter and form which constitute composed individual substances. Thomas' text explicitly shows this change of perspective, claiming that if the constituent parts of the genus and species are matter and form taken in their universal sense, then the constituent parts of individual beings are matter and form taken in their individual sense. For example, if the constituent parts of the species "human being" are "body" and "rational soul" taken in the universal sense, so that they are common to every individual beings belonging to the human species, then the constituent parts of the individual being "Socrates" are "this body" and "this rational soul" that are instead proper only to Socrates. Accordingly, if genus and species differences concerns the universal matter and form of substances' definition (*diversitas materiae vel formae absolute*), the number difference pertains to "this form" and "this matter" of "this individual being" (*haec forma et haec materia*). However, Thomas underlines that no form, as such, can be "this form" by itself. This is because forms as such are always universal and simple. For this reason, a form can be "this form" only when it is received in matter. However, matter in itself (*secundum se*) is undetermined and indistinct (*indistincta*). It is therefore impossible for something that is indistinct to make something else individual and distinct from all the others belonging to the same species. Consequently, the matter that makes form individual must be already distinguishable (*distinguibilis*) before receiving the simple form, in order to instantiate that universal form in a particular one. In other words, the simple form must be received in "this matter" in order to be individuated, namely in a matter that is already distinct and determined in space and time (*distincta et determinata ad hic et nunc*).

The issue at hand is twofold. First, there is the question of how the matter can be made distinct and distinguishable before receiving the simple form. Indeed, only the individuation of the simple form through distinct and determinate matter causes a species to be divided into several individual beings, which have their own identity and are distinct from each other. Second, there is the other fundamental metaphysical problem of how to guarantee individual substance to be itself over changes. Indeed, the individuation of a form must cause a substance to have certain individual properties that are only its own, so that an individual being can remain itself and identical in number throughout time and space. Therefore, the principle of individuation (*principium individuationis*) can be regarded as both the cause of the number difference between substances belonging to the same species and the guarantee of the space and time identity of each individual substance.

In his text, Picard anticipates Thomas' answer to the problem of matter divisibility and claims that an individual form (*forma individua*) can be received only in a matter that has been individuated or signed (*recipitur nisi in materia individuata sive signata*). The signed matter is

that matter which has acquired the property of being divisible (*divisibilis*) through the category of quantity (*per quantitatem*). Indeed, as Aristotle said,²² a substance lacking quantity becomes indivisible. Therefore, something that is divisible must possess some sort of quantity. Consequently, the matter must underlie (*subest*) some quantity in order to be “this matter” and individuate the form. Thomas asserts that this quantity must correspond to dimensions (*dimensionibus*):

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: “Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia”; V 167va-b, E 105ra-b: *Dimensiones autem istae possunt considerari dupliciter: aut secundum earum terminationem, et dico ‘terminari’ secundum determinatam mensuram corporis et figuram, et sic ponuntur ut perfecta in genere quantitatis, et sic non possunt esse principia individuationis, quia talis terminatio frequenter variatur circa individuum idem, et sic non remanet idem numero.*

Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura distinctionis sive dimensionis tantum, quamvis numquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint, sicut nec natura coloris sine determinatione albi vel nigri, et sic collocantur in genere quantitatis ut imperfectum.

Et ex his efficitur haec materia signata et individuat formam et istae dimensiones praecintelliguntur in materia, sine quibus non potest intelligi individuum, sicut nec sine forma, et intelligo de his individuis, quae sunt diversa in eadem specie, [...].

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Gils 125,213-231:

Dimensiones autem istae possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum earum terminationem; et dico eas terminari secundum determinatam mensuram et figuram, et sic ut entia perfecta collocantur in genere quantitatis. Et sic non possunt esse principium individuationis; quia cum talis terminatio dimensionum varietur frequenter circa individuum, sequeretur quod individuum non remaneret semper idem numero.

Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura dimensionis tantum, quamvis numquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint, sicut nec natura coloris sine determinatione albi et nigri; et sic collocantur in genere quantitatis ut imperfectum.

Et ex his dimensionibus interminatis materia efficitur haec materia signata, et sic individuat formam,

et sic ex materia causatur diversitas secundum numerum in eadem specie.

However, dimensions can be distinguished in two different type: the terminated and unterminated dimensions. For Thomas, the term “terminated dimensions” refers to dimensions that possess a precise boundary or limit (*terminationem*), namely, a determined measure and figure (*determinatam mensuram et figuram*). For this reason, they are well-defined dimensions that can be placed into the category of quantity as complete and perfect properties.

However, although the terminated dimensions divide matter in a well-defined way, so that Thomas claims that they cannot be considered as the causes of the individuation that can

²² ARISTOTELES, *Physica*, I 2, 185b16; translatio vetus: Bossier – Brams : “At vero si est sicut indivisibile, nullum erit quantum neque quale, neque iam infinitum quod est.”

guarantee an individual being to be identical in number over space and time. As an illustration, consider a 10-year-old child named Socrates, who stands approximately 140 cm in height and weighs approximately 30 kg. His body has precise measures and figures that differ from those of other children. The height, weight, measures and figures of Socrates are his own boundaries, and they perfectly describe him as the 10-year-old Socrates. Although the height, weight, and other measures and figures that Socrates possesses at the age of 10 distinguish him from the rest of the children, as he grows, Socrates will increase in height and weight, and he will change in measures and figures over time and space, becoming a fully grown up human being. In such a way, the height, weight, and other measures and figures that Socrates possesses at the age of 10 cannot be considered the characteristics that guarantee Socrates to remain himself and identical in number across time and space.

The term “unterminated dimensions” is used instead by Thomas to describe the same terminated dimensions but considered in the nature of dimension (*natura dimensionis*), without taking into account any precise and particular boundary or determination (*sine determinatione*). From this perspective, the terminated dimensions must be considered in themselves, taken in their nature, namely as what underlies and is common to all the various terminated dimensions. In this sense, the unterminated dimensions are to terminated dimensions as the nature of the color is to red, green, yellow and all the other individuals belonging to the species of the color. This means that, like any other nature considered in itself, unterminated dimensions never exist as such, but always exist through the various particular instantiations of them; in the same way that the nature of color (*natura coloris*) never exists as such, but always exists in the determinations of white and black (*coloris sine determinatione albi et nigri*). For these reasons, the unterminated dimensions can be placed into the category of quantity as imperfect properties (*ut imperfectum*)²³ that need to be completed by the several particular boundaries and limits

²³ In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Thomas defines the unterminated dimensions as imperfect, comparing them to prime matter. In fact, prime matter is an incomplete substance belonging to the category of quantity, and the dimensions are similarly incomplete beings in the category of quantity. See THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, IV, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, ad arg. 4; Mandonnet – Moos 439: “Ad quartum dicendum, quod dimensio quae praecognoscitur ante formam substantialem in materia, non habet esse completum, quia non est dimensio terminata; terminatio enim dimensionis est per formam. Sed dimensiones quae manent post consecrationem, sunt dimensiones terminatae, quia habent certam mensuram et figuram.”; THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 4, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 513: “Sicut enim Commentator dicit in 1 Physica, et in Lib. de Substantia orbis, in materia generabilium et corruptibilium oportet intelligere dimensiones interminatas ante adventum formae substantialis; alias non posset intelligi divisio materiae, ut in diversis partibus materiae diversae formae substantiales essent. Hujusmodi autem dimensiones post adventum formae substantialis accipiunt esse terminatum et completum. Quidquid autem intelligitur in materia ante adventum formae substantialis, hoc manet idem numero in generato et in eo ex quo generat; quia remoto posteriori oportet remanere prius; dimensiones autem illae interminatae se habent ad genus quantitatis sicut materia ad genus substantiae. Unde sicut in quolibet completo in genere

(*terminationibus*), just as the color taken as such is placed into the category of quality as imperfect property that needs to be completed by further determinations.

However, as they are the common metaphysical ground of all terminated dimensions and lack particular boundaries or determinations, the unterminated dimensions are the condition for changes in space and time without ever changing in themselves. Indeed, since they do not exist by themselves, but are the essential precondition for the perfect division of the terminated dimensions, they can be considered the cause of the division of the matter; while since they do never change, they can guarantee every individual being to be identical to itself over time and space. Therefore, Thomas states that they are the unchanging quantities that coincide with the cause of the individuation of the forms. These quantities, which he refers to as “unterminated dimensions,” are what make matter “this matter.” Also, since the unterminated dimensions are the causes of the individuation of the forms, they are the reason why one species divided into many diverse individual beings, that is, the causes of the number difference.

To sum up, the unterminated dimensions correspond to the dimensional nature of quantity that allows prime matter to be divisible, thus enabling it to receive and individuate all the simple substantial forms proper to composed substances. Like this, individual matter can instantiate natures in different individual beings, who will in turn belong to the same universal species. Then, according to the way things are individuated (*natura individuationis*), the unterminated dimensions must actually precede any other substantial or accidental forms in prime matter.

At this point of the text, Picard diverges from Thomas’ text attaching Thomas’ own response to the fifth objection to the *solutio* at issue:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: “Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia”; *V* 167vb, *E* 105rb:
Alio modo possunt considerari sine ista determinatione in natura distinctionis sive dimensionis tantum, quamvis numquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint, sicut nec natura coloris sine determinatione albi vel nigri, et sic collocantur in genere quantitatis ut imperfectum. Et ex his efficitur haec materia signata et individuat formam et *istae dimensiones praeintelliguntur in materia, sine quibus non potest intelligi individuum, sicut nec sine forma, et intelligo de his individuis, quae sunt diversa in eadem specie, [...]*.

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2, ad arg. 5; Gils 126,287-292:

Ad quintum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de accidentibus completis, quae sequuntur esse formae in materia, non autem de *dimensionibus* interminatis, quae *praeintelliguntur* ante ipsam formam *in materia*. *Sine his enim non potest intelligi individuum, sicut nec sine forma.*

substantiae est accipere materiam, quae est ens incompletum in genere illo; ita in dimensionibus completis, quae sunt in hoc sacramento, est accipere dimensiones incompletas; [...].”

The text, that Picard adds, claims that the unterminated dimensions are presupposed (*praeintelliguntur*) in matter, because, just as the substantial form, it is not possible to think (*non potest intelligi*) of any individual beings without thinking of those dimensions as the precondition of substances individuation. This collage of Thomas' texts in Picard's *Quaestiones* raises some interpretive issues, depending on how one reads it.

Indeed, Picard indicated in his account that Thomas held two distinct views regarding the precedence of dimensions over substantial form. As Picard reports, in his first part of the *Summa theologiae* and in his disputed questions *De anima* and *De spiritualibus creaturis*, Thomas claims that no dimensions precede the substantial form *realiter*, but only according to the intelligible way (*secundum modum intelligibilem tantum*). However, Picard highlights that Thomas changes his view in the *Commentary on Boethius' De trinitate*. Here, Picard claims that, for Thomas, the unterminated dimensions precede the substantial form in matter. Although Picard does not state it explicitly, the opposition he presents between these two different opinions suggests that, Thomas in the *Commentary on Boethius' De trinitate* is arguing for a real (*realiter*) precedence of the unterminated dimensions over the substantial form. Nevertheless, this interpretation, which argue for a real precedence of the unterminated dimensions, seems to conflict with what Picard himself underlines of in Thomas' text from *Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate*.

Thus, Picard's text addition can be interpreted in two different ways: 1) it may suggest that, since the unterminated dimensions are presupposed (*praeintelliguntur*) in matter, there is no real precedence of the unterminated dimensions, but rather that they precede the substantial form only according to the intelligible way. Then, following this reading, the two different positions that Picard identifies in Thomas' works would seem ultimately to converge in their theoretical implications, raising some interpretive issues.

On the other hand, 2) Picard's collage can be read as a further systematization of Thomas' argument, in which it is specified that the real precedence of the unterminated dimensions in matter is actually reflected in presupposing these dimensions on the intelligible level (*praeintelligere*) when one thinks of individual beings. In such a way, according to Thomas, the unterminated dimensions are properties that do not really exist in themselves, like prime matter, but nevertheless they must really precede the individuated substantial forms as metaphysical cause of their individuation. Indeed, only the individual composed beings with their terminated dimensions and instantiated substantial forms really exists. However, since

any forms must be individuated by signed matter in order to really exist and untermiated dimensions are the causes of this individuation of the forms, thus these dimensions, together with prime matter, are metaphysical preconditions without which the simple substantial forms would not really exist as individuals. In this sense, the untermiated dimensions actually affect the material metaphysical component of individual beings, namely the prime matter. Therefore, although Thomas never openly states this in his text, it can be claimed that the untermiated dimensions are a certain kind of metaphysical intermediates in the union between prime matter and substantial forms. Furthermore, with regard to the individuation of simple forms in material substances, these dimensions can be said to precede the substantial forms in matter *realiter* – if with *realiter* one means metaphysically –. Following this line, it would be correct in claiming that, since the untermiated dimensions precede the substantial form in matter *realiter*, they must also be presupposed on the intelligible level.²⁴

However, in which sense, for Picard, the untermiated dimensions precede the substantial form in matter is a question that he will answer only later in his question, when he shows his own interpretation of Thomas’ texts.

After this divergent moment, Picard starts again to *verbatim* follow Thomas’ text by restating that prime matter cannot be the principle of individuation of forms, but only the signed matter is:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: “Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia”; V 167vb, E 105rb: [...] et ideo quandoque dicitur materia individuationis principium, quandoque accidens, quia *materia non secundum se, sed prout substat*

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Gils 125,231-246:

Unde patet quod *materia secundum se* accepta nec est principium diversitatis secundum speciem nec secundum numerum, sed sicut est principium diversitatis secundum genus, prout

²⁴ This interpretation is further validated by the fact that in this question of the *Commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate*, Thomas uses terms that always point to the intelligible presupposition of the untermiated dimensions. However, he simultaneously upholds the metaphysical function of these dimensions; see THOMAS AQUINAS, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 2, ad arg. 3-4; Gils 125,258-126,277: “Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione individui est quod sit in se indivisum et ab aliis ultima divisione divisum. Nullum autem accidens habet ex se propriam rationem divisionis nisi quantitas. Unde dimensiones ex se ipsis habent quandam rationem individuationis secundum determinatum situm, prout situs est differentia quantitatis. Et sic dimensio habet duplicem rationem individuationis: unam ex subiecto, sicut et quodlibet aliud accidens, et aliam ex se ipsa, in quantum habet situm, ratione cuius etiam abstrahendo a materia sensibili imaginamur hanc lineam et hunc circulum. Et ideo recte materiae convenit individuate omnes alias formas ex hoc, quod subditur illi formae, quae ex se ipsa habet individuationis rationem, ita quod etiam ipsae dimensiones terminatae, quae fundantur in subiecto iam completo, individuantur quodammodo ex materia individuata per dimensiones interminatas praeintellectas in materia. Ad quartum dicendum quod illa, quae differunt numero in genere substantiae, non solum differunt accidentibus, sed etiam forma et materia. Sed si quaeratur, quare differens est eorum forma, non erit alia ratio, nisi quia est in alia materia signata. Nec invenitur alia ratio, quare haec materia sit divisa ab illa, nisi propter quantitatem. Et ideo materia subiecta dimensionibus intelligitur esse principium huius diversitatis.”

praedictis *dimensionibus*, est principium individuationis.

Alia autem *accidentia* magis sunt signa individuationis quam principia, et ista videtur fuisse intentio Commentatoris. Et ideo in corporibus supercaelestibus, ubi non ponit materiam, vel si aliquis poneret, non sunt plura eiusdem speciei, ibi non ponuntur dimensiones praeintelligi.

subest formae communi, ita est principium diversitatis secundum numerum, *prout subest dimensionibus interminatis*. Et ideo cum hae dimensiones sint de genere accidentium, quandoque diversitas secundum numerum reducitur in diversitatem materiae, quandoque in diversitatem accidentis, et hoc ratione dimensionum praedictarum. *Alia* vero *accidentia* non sunt principium individuationis, sed sunt principium cognoscendi distinctionem individuorum. Et per hunc modum etiam aliis accidentibus individuatio attribuitur.

Thomas claims that matter and unterminated dimensions can only be together principles of individuation of substantial forms, and causes of the number difference between the diverse individual beings belonging to the same universal species. Indeed, what causes matter to be divisible, simple forms to be individuated and individual beings to remain themselves over time and space is the union of the prime matter with the quantitative accidents of the unterminated dimensions.²⁵ If the distinction between individuals of the same species can be traced back to these accidents belonging to the category of quantity, the accidents belonging to the other categories are instead only signs of the individuation of forms. Or rather, as Thomas says, they are the causes of knowing the distinction between individuals of the same species.

At this point, Thomas' response concludes, and Picard claims that this position aligns with the *intentio* of Averroes and his doctrine of unterminated dimensions. This is clear, according to Picard, when Averroes asserts that celestial bodies lack matter, and if such entities existed in that state, there would be no more individual entities belonging to the same species. For these two reasons, it is impossible to presuppose dimensions in the case of heavenly body, since dimensions are only presupposed in the matter of individual substances.²⁶

²⁵ Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, ad arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 503: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod de ratione individui duo sunt: scilicet quod sit ens actu vel in se vel in alio; et quod sit divisum ab aliis quae sunt vel possunt esse in eadem specie, in se indivisum existens; et ideo primum individuationis principium est materia, qua acquiritur esse in actu cuilibet tali formae sive substantiali sive accidentali; et secundarium principium individuationis est dimensio, quia ex ipsa habet materia quod dividatur; unde in carentibus dimensione impossibile est aliam esse divisionem nisi per formam, quae facit diversitatem speciei; et propter hoc in angelis sunt tot species quot individua; quia cum sint formae sive quidditates subsistentes ex seipsis, habent esse in actu et distinctionem; et ideo non indigent ad sui individuationem neque materia neque dimensione.”

²⁶ AVERROES, *Sermo de Substantia Orbis*, c. 1; Venetiis 4vM-5rE: “[...] et fuit declaratum de corporibus coelestibus ipsa esse neque generabilia neque corruptibilia, negavit [Aristoteles] ea habere subiectum recipiens numerum, et divisionem per existentiam simplicium dimensionum in eo primo ante existentiam formae, et ipsa esse in potentia multa, et unum numero. Et negavit formas corporum celestium dividi per divisionem subiecti sui, et esse finitarum actionum propter finitatem eorum corporum, quam potentia totius in formis divisibilibus per

However, claiming that Thomas' conclusions perfectly mirror Averroes' position, as Picard does, is misleading. According to Averroes, the unterminated dimensions actually exist in the potentiality of the prime matter before the existence of form. In this context, prime matter receives forms through these dimensions that exist in potentiality and alongside the form of that matter, and are shared by each form. In contrast with Averroes, for Thomas, the unterminated dimensions, precisely like prime matter, never exist as such, and, for this reason, they can only be presupposed (*intelliguntur*) in matter. They receive existence only once the substantial form comes upon them. According to Thomas, unterminated dimensions are indeed the same terminated dimensions but understood in the nature of dimension (*natura dimensionis tantum*). They are the metaphysical precondition for the terminated dimensions as much as the prime matter is for the composed thing. In this sense, Thomas' notion of unterminated dimensions can be said to be similar to that of Averroes, but they differ in terms of their existential status.

3.3.8. *DE VERITATE*

Picard compares the solution that Thomas shows in his *Commentary on Boethius' De trinitate* with the article 9, *quaestio 5* of Thomas' *De veritate*:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 9, ad arg. 6; Dondaine 165,357-166,371:

Praeterea, quod non convenit priori, non convenit etiam posteriori. Sed, sicut dicit Commentator in Lib. de substantia orbis, formae corporales praesupponunt dimensiones interminatas in materia; dimensiones autem non agunt, quia quantitas nullius actionis principium est. Ergo nec corporales formae sunt principia actionum; et sic nullum corpus aliquid agit nisi per virtutem incorporalem in eo existentem; et sic idem ut prius.

[...]

Ad sextum dicendum, quod dimensiones praeintelliguntur in materia, non in actu completo ante formas naturales, sed in actu incompleto; et ideo sunt prius in via materiae et generationis; sed forma est prior in via complementi. Secundum hoc autem aliquid agit quod completum est et

divisionem sui subiecti est maior potentia partis. Quando ergo invenit eorum actiones esse infinitas, concludit formas eorum non esse in subiecto mediantibus dimensionibus, sed eas non esse potentias in corporibus. [...] Amplius quod motus corporum coelestium non habent contraria: conclusit hec corpora esse ingenerabilia, et incorruptibilia, et ipsa non habere subiectum recipiens dimensiones prima receptione, ita quod formae suae dividantur per divisionem sui subiecti. [...] Et, quia manifestum est sensui, quod corpora coelestia recipiunt dimensiones terminatas secundum suas formas, neque possunt recipere formas mediantibus dimensionibus interminatis, sicut est dispositio de formis generabilibus, et corruptibilibus, necesse est ea recipere dimensiones tali modo, ex quo non contingit formas et generabiles et corruptibiles: quod est, quia materia eorum recipit dimensiones prima receptione mediantibus illis formis suis, et non recipit formas mediantibus dimensionibus existentibus in eis in potentia, scilicet non terminatis, sicut est dispositio in dimensionibus, quae sunt in prima materia cum forma istius materiae, sed dimensiones, quae sunt in materia coelesti, sunt proprium priorum eius. Et, cum fuerit declaratum ei de corporibus coelestibus eorum formas existere in suis subiectis, videlicet existentia quod non dividuntur per divisionem sui subiecti, et quod causa in hoc est, quia non existunt in subiectis, secundum quod sunt divisibilia, fuit ei declaratum, quod istae formae non constituuntur per subiectum, immo sunt abstractae in esse, quoniam, cum existunt in toto subiecto, et non dividuntur per eius divisionem, contingit quod non consituuntur per subiectum [...].”

ens actu, non secundum quod est in potentia; secundum hoc enim patitur; et ideo non sequitur, si materia vel dimensiones in materia praeexistentes non agunt, quod forma non agat; sed e converso. Sequeretur autem quod si non patiuntur, quod forma non patiatur; et tamen forma corporis caelestis non inest ei mediantibus huiusmodi dimensionibus, ut Commentator dicit ibidem.

Here, the matter at issue is whether divine providence disposes sublunar bodies through the celestial bodies. In the sixth objection, it is argued that sublunar bodies are not ruled through the instrumentality of celestial bodies. The objection departs from two general premises. The first premise follows Averroes' doctrine of unterminated dimensions, which states that corporeal forms presuppose (*preasupponunt*) the unterminated dimensions to be in matter before coming upon it. The second premise is that what does not belong to what is prior also does not belong to what is posterior. Consequently, since the unterminated dimensions are prior to the corporeal forms and they are not active – because quantity is not a principle of action – the corporeal forms that are posterior to dimensions in matter must not be principles of action either. Therefore, it can be concluded that corporeal things can be active only through an immaterial power (*per virtutem incorporalem*) existing within it. Then, it is not possible that the divine providence disposes sublunar bodies through the celestial bodies.

In his response to this objection, Thomas clarifies why the precedence of unterminated dimensions in matter over corporeal forms does not make it necessary for corporeal forms not to be principles of action. According to Thomas, this is because the unterminated dimensions and the corporeal forms concern two different metaphysical level of the composed beings. The unterminated dimensions belong to the level of matter potentiality, while the corporeal forms to the level of form actuality. Indeed, as such, dimensions are in matter not in a state of complete actuality; rather, they are in a state of incomplete actuality. They only regard the potential existence of a composed things, rather than the actual one. The unterminated dimensions never exist in themselves, but always exist through the various particular instantiations of them, namely as terminated dimensions. Unterminated dimensions precede forms only according the level of matter potentiality, not to that of the actuality that shapes the composed being, and for this reason, they are presupposed (*praeintelliguntur*) in matter and are present there before natural forms. On the contrary, when one takes into account the actual existence of things, the natural forms are understood to be prior because their actuality causes unterminated dimensions to exist as terminated dimensions, just as prime matter comes to existence as a composed substance through the actuality of the form. From such a prospective, the priority or posteriority between unterminated dimensions and forms depends on which level one refers to. Thomas says that the unterminated dimensions precede forms only according to

the manner of the matter and of the process of generation (*via materiae et generationis*), namely the level of matter potentiality; while the natural form precede dimensions from the manner of completion (*via complementi*), that is, the level of form actuality.²⁷

In light of this, it can be concluded that a being is active only in so far as it is completed and has actuality, not in so far as it is in potency. Differently, something that is in potency is passive. Taking into account all this information, Thomas says that it is incorrect to say that the unterminated dimensions do precede the natural forms according to the actuality of a being; rather they precede those forms only according to its potentiality.²⁸ Furthermore, it is also incorrect to state that, since the unterminated dimensions that exist in matter before the natural forms are not active, then the forms themselves must be in the same way. This because

²⁷ Thomas speaks of these two different metaphysical levels especially in *De principiis naturae*. Here Thomas states that matter and form are said to be related to each other (*relative ad invicem*) as mutual causes. In fact, matter is said to be the cause of form because form can exist only in matter and, on the other hand, form is said to be the cause of matter because matter can exist only through form. In this regard, Thomas states that what is the cause of something is always prior to what is caused by it. Thus, depending on how one views the mutual causality of matter and form, there are two different ways of understanding something as prior or posterior to something else. In the first way, according to the mode of generation and time, what is imperfect, material and potential must be considered as prior to what is perfect, actual and formal. In a second way, according to the mode of substance and perfection, the former will be posterior to the latter. With regard to the specific case of unterminated dimensions, if one understands the matter to be the cause of form, then unterminated dimensions will be understood to be prior to the substantial form. Conversely, if one understands form to be the cause of matter, then they will be considered as posterior, as Thomas points out in his *De veritate*. See THOMAS AQUINAS, *De principiis naturae ad fratrem Sylvestrum*, 4; Dondaine 44,37-58: “Materia enim dicitur causa formae, inquantum forma non est nisi in materia; et similiter forma est causa materiae, inquantum materia non habet esse in actu nisi per formam. Materia enim et forma dicuntur relative ad invicem, ut dicitur in secundo physicorum. Dicuntur enim ad compositum sicut partes ad totum, et simplex ad compositum. Sed quia omnis causa, inquantum est causa, naturaliter prior est causato, sciendum quod prius dicitur duobus modis, ut dicit Aristoteles in decimosexto De Animal.; per quorum diversitatem potest aliquid dici prius et posterius respectu eiusdem, et causa et causatum. Dicitur enim aliquid prius altero generatione et tempore, et iterum in substantia et complemento. Cum ergo naturae operatio procedat ab imperfecto ad perfectum, et ab incompleto ad completum, imperfectum est prius perfecto, secundum generationem et tempus, sed perfectum est prius in complemento: sicut potest dici quod vir est ante puerum in substantia et complemento, sed puer est ante virum generatione et tempore. Sed licet in rebus generabilibus imperfectum sit prius perfecto, et potentia prior actu, considerando in aliquo eodem quod prius est imperfectum quam perfectum, et in potentia quam in actu, simpliciter tamen loquendo, oportet actum et perfectum prius esse: quia quod reducit potentiam ad actum, actu est, et quod perficit imperfectum, perfectum est. Materia quidem est prior forma generatione et tempore: prius enim est cui advenit, quam quod advenit. Forma vero est prior materia perfectione, quia materia non habet esse completum nisi per formam. Similiter efficiens prior est fine generatione et tempore, cum ab efficiente fiat motus ad finem; sed finis est prior efficiente inquantum est efficiens, in substantia et complemento, cum actio efficientis non compleatur nisi per finem. Igitur istae duae causae, scilicet materia et efficiens, sunt prius per viam generationis; sed forma et finis sunt prius per viam perfectionis.” Cf. also G. G. LENOTRE, “Determinate and Indeterminate Dimensions: Does Thomas Aquinas Change His Mind on Individuation?,” cit., pp. 503-546.

²⁸ Another evidence of the link between the potentiality of matter and unterminated dimensions is found in THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 5, ad arg. 3; Vivès 307: “Ad tertium dicendum, quod in materia generabilium et corruptibilium dimensiones interminatas oportet intelligere ante receptionem formae substantialis: et ideo divisio quae est secundum hujusmodi dimensiones, proprie pertinet ad materiam; sed quantitas completa et terminata advenit materiae post formam substantialem; unde divisio quae fit secundum dimensiones terminatas, respicit speciem, praecipue quando ad resurrectionem speciei pertinet determinatus situs partium, sicut est in corpore humano.”

dimensions and forms do not precede each other univocally, since the former are principles of passivity, while the latter are principles of activity. Due to their different levels, the form of heavenly bodies is not in them through the mediation of unterminated dimensions. Thus, it can be concluded that the entire reasoning of the sixth objection is grounded on an erroneous understanding of the precedence of the unterminated dimensions over the forms.

3.3.9. *SCRIPTUM SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM AND SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES*

Immediately following his description of Thomas' position in the *Commentary on Boethius' De trinitate* and *De veritate*, Picard further highlights Thomas' change of view on the precedence of unterminated dimensions, citing the fourth book of his *Summa contra Gentiles* and the fourth book of his *Commentary on the Sentences*. Both of these two texts, as cited by Picard, concern the problem of number identity of those who will rise during the day of the judgment. Also in this case, Thomas presents two conflicting positions. In his *Commentary on the Sentences*, he strongly upholds Averroes' notion of unterminated dimensions as the necessary intermediate between the soul and the body that guarantees the number identity of each resurrected human body. However, in his *Summa contra Gentiles*, he denies that any kind of dimensions can precede the substantial form in matter. He claims therefore that it is the substantial form that allows the human body to identically resurrect after its death.

A. *SCRIPTUM SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM*

In distinction 44, question 1, article 1, questioncula 1 of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Thomas answers to the third objection of the questioncula by stating that the number identity of the resurrected body is preserved within the process of generation and corruption thanks to the permanence of the unterminated dimensions in matter:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiunc. 1, ad arg. 3; Vivès 295 et 297:

Praeterea, corpus humanum usque ad elementa post mortem resolvitur, ut supra dictum est. Sed illae partes elementorum in quas corpus humanum resolutum est, non conveniunt cum corpore humano quod in ea resolutum est, nisi in materia prima, quomodo quaelibet aliae elementorum partes cum praedicto corpore conveniunt. Si autem ex aliis partibus elementorum corpus formaretur, non diceretur idem numero. Ergo nec si ex illis partibus reparatur, corpus erit numero idem.

[...]

Ad tertium dicendum, quod illud quod intelligitur in materia ante formam, remanet in materia post corruptionem: quia remoto posteriori, remanere adhuc potest prius. Oportet autem, ut Commentator dicit in 1 physic., et in lib. de substantia orbis, in materia generabilium et corruptibilium ante formam substantialem intelligere dimensiones non terminatas, secundum

quas attendatur divisio materiae, ut diversas formas in diversis partibus recipere possit; unde et post separationem formae substantialis a materia adhuc dimensiones illae manent eadem; et sic materia sub illis dimensionibus existens, quamcumque formam accipiat, habet majorem identitatem ad illud quod ex ea generatum fuerat, quam aliqua pars alia materiae sub quacumque forma existens; et sic eadem materia ad corpus humanum reparandum reducetur quae prius ejus materia fuit.

The objection asserts that, following death, the human body decays (*resolvitur*) until reaching the elements. However, the components of the elements in which the human body is decayed have nothing in common with the human body that underwent the decay process, except for the prime matter. In a way, prime matter shares something in common both with the components of the elements derived from the decay of the human body and all the other components of the other elements. This means that the components of the elements derived from the decay of the human body, after this decay, lose their belonging to the human body and become similar to those components of the other elements. As a consequence, if the resurrected human body is formed from components other than those of the elements from which it was decayed, this resurrected human body will be not identical in number with that who died back then. Indeed, since prime matter is common to all elements, it is not possible that it can guarantee the number identity of such a thing as the human body, which undergoes to the continuous process of generation and corruption. Actually, within this process, the components of elements derived from the decayed human body can readily mix with other homologous parts derived from other decayed bodies. Therefore, it appears that the number identity of each dead human body must be guaranteed by something other than prime matter.

Thomas solves this problem in his response to the objection at issue. The answer's premises is clear: Since when what is posterior is removed, what is prior remains, then what it is thought to be in matter before a form, it will remain after this form is corrupted. As aforementioned, according to Averroes' *De substantia orbis*, the unterminated dimensions (*dimensiones non terminatae*) are thought to be present in the matter of substances, which undergo the process of generation and corruption, before the advent of the substantial form. Furthermore, these dimensions causes matter to be divided and to receive different forms in different parts. Accordingly, since the unterminated dimensions are thought to be present before the generation of a substantial form, when this substantial form is corrupted and separated from the matter, what remains after this corruption is the matter together with the unterminated dimensions. Moreover, since those unterminated dimensions are what remains when the various determinations of a substantial form are corrupted, then they must remain identical to themselves during the process of generation and corruption of substantial forms. To illustrate,

consider the following scenario: One draws a cat in a certain position on a sheet of paper, then deletes it with a rubber. In this process, although the figure of the cat was erased, the part of the sheet and position where it was drawn remain identical in number and provide that figure of the cat a number identity that did not vanish with the vanishings of the determinations of the figure itself. From a counterfactual perspective, had there been no positional relationship between the sheet of paper and the cat depicted on it, once it was erased, there would be no way to identify with precision where the cat was originally drawn, as it would be impossible to determine whether it was drawn in a particular part or on another one of the sheet. Indeed, without positional indications, the cat could have been drawn on any part of the sheet. Just as the sheet of paper and the position where to draw, the matter and the untermiated dimensions never change during the continuous process of generation and corruption of different substances.²⁹ In this way, Thomas states that the matter existing under the untermiated

²⁹ The relationship between the untermiated dimensions and the notion of position (*situm*) is evident in article 3, question 4 of Thomas' *Commentary on Boethius' De trinitate*. Here, Thomas highlights that the form of corporeity can be divided only according to the division of the matter. This division of the matter is due to the untermiated dimensions, whose essential notion (*ratio*) is position. Indeed, Thomas asserts that it is impossible to distinguish "this matter" from "that matter" without reference to their respective and different positions. From this perspective, the untermiated dimensions can divide prime matter because they provide positional coordinates to matter, allowing for the numerical distinction of matter in several parts. See THOMAS AQUINAS, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 3, resp.; Gils 129,192-206: "Et ideo ex natura materiae subiectae dimensionibus prohibentur corpora esse in eodem loco plura. Oportet enim esse plura corpora, in quibus forma corporeitatis invenitur divisa, quae quidem non dividitur nisi secundum divisionem materiae, cuius divisio cum sit solum per dimensiones, de quarum ratione est situs, impossibile est esse hanc materiam distinctam ab illa, nisi quando est distincta secundum situm, quod non est quando duo corpora ponuntur esse in eodem loco. Unde sequitur illa duo corpora esse unum corpus, quod est impossibile. Cum ergo materia dimensionibus subiecta inveniatur in quibuslibet corporibus, oportet quaelibet duo corpora prohiberi ex ipsa natura corporeitatis, ne sint in eodem loco." The pivotal role of position as an essential notion at the core of the distinction that untermiated dimensions establish in matter is evident also in Thomas' *Commentary on the Sentences*. Thomas states that one part of a thing differs from another in number according to the order that is found in the position of the parts themselves. This means that prime matter can be numerically distinguished by the untermiated dimensions only since those dimensions establish a certain positional order of parts among each other. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi*, IV, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, ad arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 503: "Si ergo quantitas sine materia haberet esse actu, per se haberet individuationem, quia per se habet divisionem illam secundum quam dividitur materia; et sic una pars differret ab alia non specie, sed numero, secundum ordinem qui attenditur in situ partium; et similiter una linea ab alia differret numero, dummodo acciperetur in diverso situ. Quia ergo in hoc sacramento ponimus dimensiones per se subsistere, constat quod ex seipsis individuatur, et per ea alia accidentia quae in eis fundantur." As previously stated throughout this study, Thomas did modify his perspective on untermiated dimensions over the course of his life. He no longer explicitly employs the concept of untermiated dimensions in his later works. However, in these latter contexts, he ascribes the same fundamental notion of position - that was the essential condition for the distinction of the matter provided by untermiated dimensions - to the more general notion of dimensionality (*quantitas dimensiva*). For instance, in his *Summa contra Gentiles*, Thomas posits that the dimensional quantity encompasses the concept of position in its notion. Thus, since the concept of position is defined as the order that parts have in the whole, (dimensional) quantity can be defined in turn as that which has a position. As in the case of untermiated dimensions, prime matter is divided in several parts because the dimensive quantity precisely bestows upon matter the positional coordinates that those parts have among each other. See THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 65; resp.; Leon. 209b: "Habet autem et hoc proprium quantitas dimensiva inter accidentia reliqua, quod ipsa secundum se individuatur. Quod ideo est, quia positio, quae est ordo partium in toto, in eius ratione includitur: est enim quantitas positionem habens. Ubi cumque autem intelligitur diversitas partium eiusdem speciei, necesse est intelligi individuationem:

nam quae sunt unius speciei, non multiplicantur nisi secundum individuum; et inde est quod non possunt apprehendi multae albedines nisi secundum quod sunt in diversis subiectis; possunt autem apprehendi multae lineae, etiam si secundum se considerentur: diversus enim situs, qui per se lineae inest, ad pluralitatem linearum sufficiens est. Et quia sola quantitas dimensiva de sui ratione habet unde multiplicatio individuorum in eadem specie possit accidere, prima radix huiusmodi multiplicationis ex dimensione esse videtur: quia et in genere substantiae multiplicatio fit secundum divisionem materiae; quae nec intelligi posset nisi secundum quod materia sub dimensionibus consideratur; nam, remota quantitate, substantia omnis indivisibilis est, ut patet per philosophum in I Physicorum.” Thomas repeats the same idea at the end of his career, in the third part of his *Summa theologiae*. In article 2, question 77, Thomas indeed states that both matter and dimensional quantity are the principles of the individuation of forms in matter. Furthermore, he claims that the notion of position is essentially related to that of dimensional quantity (*cadit in ratione quantitatis huius*), such that this kind of quantity can be defined as a “quantity that has position”: THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 77, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 196a-197a: “Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere accidentia alia quae remanent in hoc sacramento, esse sicut in subiecto in quantitate dimensiva panis vel vini remanente. Primo quidem, per hoc quod ad sensum apparet aliquod quantum esse ibi coloratum et aliis accidentibus affectum, nec in talibus sensus decipitur. Secundo, quia prima dispositio materiae est quantitas dimensiva, unde et Plato posuit primas differentias materiae magnum et parvum. Et quia primum subiectum est materia, consequens est quod omnia alia accidentia referantur ad subiectum mediante quantitate dimensiva, sicut et primum subiectum coloris dicitur superficies esse, ratione cuius quidam posuerunt dimensiones esse substantias corporum, ut dicitur in III Metaphys. Et quia, subtracto subiecto, remanent accidentia secundum esse quod prius habebant, consequens est quod omnia accidentia remanent fundata super quantitatem dimensionem. Tertio quia, cum subiectum sit principium individuationis accidentium, oportet id quod ponitur aliquorum accidentium subiectum esse, aliquo modo esse individuationis principium. Est enim de ratione individui quod non possit in pluribus esse. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quia non est natum in aliquo esse, et hoc modo formae immateriales separatae, per se subsistentes, sunt etiam per seipsas individuae. Alio modo, ex eo quod forma substantialis vel accidentalis est quidem nata in aliquo esse, non tamen in pluribus, sicut haec albedo, quae est in hoc corpore. Quantum igitur ad primum, materia est individuationis principium omnibus formis inhaerentibus, quia, cum huiusmodi formae, quantum est de se, sint natae in aliquo esse sicut in subiecto, ex quo aliqua earum recipitur in materia, quae non est in alio, iam nec ipsa forma sic existens potest in alio esse. Quantum autem ad secundum, dicendum est quod individuationis principium est quantitas dimensiva. Ex hoc enim aliquid est natum esse in uno solo, quod illud est in se indivisum et divisum ab omnibus aliis. Divisio autem accidit substantiae ratione quantitatis, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et ideo ipsa quantitas dimensiva est quoddam individuationis principium huiusmodi formis, inquantum scilicet diversae formae numero sunt in diversis partibus materiae. Unde ipsa quantitas dimensiva secundum se habet quandam individuationem, ita quod possumus imaginari plures lineas eiusdem speciei differentes positione, quae cadit in ratione quantitatis huius; convenit enim dimensionem quod sit quantitas positionem habens. Et ideo potius quantitas dimensiva potest esse subiectum aliorum accidentium quam e converso.”; cf. also THOMAS AQUINAS, *In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio*, VII, lect. 2, n. 1283; Cathala – Spiazzi 322a-b: “Et post omnia ista inveniuntur in corporibus sensibilibus dimensiones, scilicet longitudo, latitudo et profunditas, quae sunt quantitates quaedam, et non substantiae. Quantitas enim manifestum est quod non est substantia; sed illud cui praedictae dimensiones insunt, ut primum subiectum earum, est substantia. Sed remotis istis dimensionibus nihil videtur remanere nisi subiectum earum, quod est determinatum et distinctum per huiusmodi dimensiones. Haec autem est materia. Quantitas enim dimensiva videtur inesse materiae immediate, cum materia non dividatur ad recipiendum diversas formas in diversis suis partibus, nisi per huiusmodi quantitatem. Et ideo per huiusmodi considerationem videtur necessarium esse non solum quod materia sit substantia, sed quod ipsa sola sit substantia.”; Neuhaus posits that the concept of *quantitas dimensiva*, present throughout Thomas’ intellectual production, seems to encompass both the properties of terminated and unterminated dimensions and become the preferred solution to many philosophical and theological issues in Thomas’ later works: “Was ist nun quantitas dimensiva? Dies beantwortet Thomas schon im Frühwerk, nämlich in De veritate: „Unter dimensionaler Quantität wird Länge, Breite und Tiefe, und Zahl der Möglichkeit nach zusammengefasst.“ Länge, Breite und Tiefe gehören offenbar zu den bestimmten Dimensionen aus De trinitate (es sei denn, man bezieht, in potentia‘ auf alles Vorhergehende). Die ‚Zahl der Möglichkeit nach‘ ist jedoch etwas anderes. Auch die dimensiones interminatae haben – wie gesehen – potentiellen Charakter, sie haben kein vollkommenes Sein; und sie bewirken, dass ein Individuum als ein der Zahl nach eines, geteilt von allen anderen Dingen der Welt, verstanden werden kann. Eine sehr ähnliche Überlegung zum numerischen Charakter, also derteilenden und damit vereinzeln Eigenschaft der dimensiones interminatae, fand sich im übrigen schon bei Averroes. Die Annahme liegt daher nahe, dass Thomas bestimmte und unbestimmte Dimensionen stärker unter einen Oberbegriff, nämlich den der quantitas dimensiva, subsumiert, ohne aber die den dimensiones interminatae zugrundeliegende Theorie ganz aufzugeben. Er kreiert dabei keinen neuen Fachbegriff, sondern reduziert lediglich das aus dem Sentenzenkommentar schon vorhandene Vokabular. Diese Interpretation wird durch den direkten Vergleich mit der Summa theologiae sogar gestützt. [...] Andererseits hat

dimensions, regardless of its form, possesses a greater identity with what is generated from itself than with any other part of matter existing under any form. In a manner analogous to the identity relationship between the sheet of paper and a figure of a cat, which is guaranteed by the precise position where the figure of the cat was drawn on the sheet, the untermiated dimensions guarantee the identity relationship between a specific part of matter and what is generated from it. This entails that the matter that will be employed to restore the human body will be identical to that which the human body had before.

It is noteworthy that, in this passage, Thomas focuses his attention on the manner in which a substance, such as a human body, can maintain its identity over the processes of generation and corruption. In contrast to the preceding texts, the issue here is no longer to justify the individuation of a universal species in different individuals through its union with matter. Rather, the focus is on the preservation of a composed substance identity once an individual substantial form is separated from its own matter.

B. *SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES*

z.B. die *quantitas dimensiva* nicht von der Hand zuweisende Vorteile: Sie löst die Probleme, um die es Thomas eigentlich geht, ohne ein neues Konzept einzuführen, also ohne eine Vielzahl Folgefragen zu provozieren, die vom eigentlichen Thema weg und in die Niederungen unbestimmter Dimensionalität führen. Es muss betont werden, dass es Thomas nie um die *dimensiones interminatae* selbst geht, sondern immer um die Lösung gänzlich anderer Probleme. Insofern ist auch die hier verwendete Formulierung der ‚Lehre der *dimensiones interminatae*‘ problematisch: Thomas entwirft gerade keine solche Lehre.“ (M. NEUHAUS, *Der Begriff der dimensiones interminatae im lateinischen Hoch- und Spätmittelalter* (Dissertation), cit., pp. 174-197, esp. p. 184 and 194); on the role of extension in Thomas’ later works see also P. PORRO, *Introduzione*, cit., p. 17: “Quella che può essere considerata forse come l’ultima parola su Tommaso sul principio di individuazione – nella terza parte della *Summa* – non fa comunque che ribadire il concorso di materia e estensione: è infatti la materia ad assicurare alla forma il fatto di non poter essere ricevuta in altro, ma è poi l’estensione ad assicurare alla forma così ricevuta di non poter sussistere in più soggetti, facendo sì che più individui appartenenti ad una stessa specie possano distinguersi tra loro a livello numerico.”; S. DONATI, “La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano,” cit., p. 166: “Nella prospettiva tomista, la distinzione tra dimensioni determinate e dimensioni indeterminate si giustifica sulla base della natura propria della *quantitas dimensiva*, cioè l’estensione. L’estensione sembra essere concepita come una forma che, rimanendo essenzialmente identica, può diventare più grande o più piccola così come può assumere figure differenti.”; EAD., “Materia e dimensioni tra XIII e XIV secolo: la dottrina delle *dimensiones interminatae*,” cit., p. 369: “Come la diversa intensità è in un certo senso una determinazione accidentale rispetto alla qualità, per esempio alla carità, allo stesso modo le misure sono accidentali rispetto alla quantità estesa; di conseguenza, così come per la carità la variazione di intensità è compatibile con la permanenza della forma qualitativa, allo stesso modo, per l’estensione, una variazione delle misure è compatibile con la permanenza della forma quantitativa. La forma quantitativa che permane al variare delle sue misure è esplicitamente identificata da Tommaso con le dimensioni indeterminate.”; on the similar characteristics between untermiated dimensions and *quantitas dimensiva* see also G. LENOTRE, “Determinate and Indeterminate Dimensions: Does Thomas Aquinas Change His Mind on Individuation?,” cit., pp. 545-546: “We can infer that these text imply indeterminate dimensions because they rely upon identical characteristics that indeterminate dimensions have in contrast to determinate dimensions [...] Whether he writes in terms of the essence or nature of dimensions (*natura tantum*), dimensions that do not vary, or dimensions that are understood (*intelligitur*) before the substantial form, Thomas signifies the same type of dimensions later in his career as he does earlier in his career, namely, indeterminate dimensions.” On the concept of dimensive quantity and its role in Thomas’ theory of individuation see A. FITZPATRICK, *Thomas Aquinas on Bodily Identity*, cit., pp. 98-103; J. OWENS, “Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle,” cit., pp. 279-310.

In contrast to his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Thomas asserts in chapter 81 of his *Summa contra Gentiles* that the substantial form itself is what preserves the number identity of a substance within the process of generation and corruption. This position evidently represents a change of mind on the topic:

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 81; Leon. 252b-253a:

Nullum enim principiorum essentialium hominis per mortem omnino cedit in nihilum: nam anima rationalis, quae est hominis forma, manet post mortem, ut superius est ostensum; materia etiam manet, quae tali formae fuit subiecta, sub dimensionibus eisdem ex quibus habebat ut esset individualis materia. Ex coniunctione igitur eiusdem animae numero ad eandem materiam numero, homo reparabitur.

Corporeitas autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est forma substantialis corporis, prout in genere substantiae collocatur. Et sic corporeitas cuiuscumque corporis nihil est aliud quam forma substantialis eius, secundum quam in genere et specie collocatur, ex qua debetur rei corporali quod habeat tres dimensiones. Non enim sunt diversae formae substantiales in uno et eodem, per quarum unam collocatur in genere supremo, puta substantiae; et per aliam in genere proximo, puta in genere corporis vel animalis; et per aliam in specie puta hominis aut equi. Quia si prima forma faceret esse substantiam, sequentes formae iam advenirent ei quod est hoc aliquid in actu et subsistens in natura: et sic posteriores formae non facerent hoc aliquid, sed essent in subiecto quod est hoc aliquid sicut formae accidentales. Oportet igitur, quod corporeitas, prout est forma substantialis in homine, non sit aliud quam anima rationalis, quae in sua materia hoc requirit, quod habeat tres dimensiones: est enim actus corporis alicuius. Alio modo accipitur corporeitas prout est forma accidentalis, secundum quam dicitur corpus quod est in genere quantitatis. Et sic corporeitas nihil aliud est quam tres dimensiones, quae corporis rationem constituunt. Etsi igitur haec corporeitas in nihilum cedit, corpore humano corrupto, tamen impedire non potest quin idem numero resurgat: eo quod corporeitas primo modo dicta non in nihilum cedit, sed eadem manet.

According to what Thomas says here, the form of the body (*corporeitas*) can be understood in two different ways. Firstly, this form can be considered as the substantial form of a body in so far as this form belongs to the category of the substance. In such a way, the form of the body causes something to belong to the category of the bodily substances, and, in virtue of this belonging, also to have a three-dimensional existence (*habeat tres dimensiones*). After saying that, Thomas clarifies that it is not possible to have more than one substantial form within one individual being; otherwise, it would contravene the Aristotelian criteria according to which only the first form coming upon matter has to be the substantial form, since it causes matter to exist, while all the other forms, which come later, are instead only accidental because they inhere an already existing substance (*subiectum*). By agreeing with this principle, in the case of human being, the form of the body (*corporeitas*) that causes matter to belong to the category of the substance must correspond to the form of the rational soul. Indeed, since a human being is a corporeal being but his substantial form is the rational soul, the form of the rational soul must include in its actuality also all the perfections that are proper to the form of the body – for this reason, the rational soul is called the act of a body (*actus corporis alicuius*). This also

implies that, as the human being receives all the perfections of the corporeal being through the rational soul, it also gets a three-dimensional existence through this same substantial form. However, the form of the body can be understood in another way, namely as an accidental form. In this secondary fashion, being a body does mean no longer to be a substance that has the three dimensions as its essential properties, but only to be a substance which takes part in the accidental category of quantity. From this perspective, it implies that a substance, like the human body, receives three dimensions – which corresponds to the notion of being a body (*ratio corporis*) – as accidental properties that will disappear into nothingness when the substance they were inhering will be corrupted. Therefore, this second way of understanding the form of the body cannot guarantee the body of a human being to be identical in number when it will be restored. On the contrary, if the form of the body is understood as a substantial form that causes matter to exist with certain specific dimensions, this can guarantee the human body to be resurrected in its own number identity after that is corrupted. Indeed, when the rational soul reunites with prime matter during the resurrection, it will provide matter with the same dimensions proper of that individual human being who were corrupted. This is because, according to the principle of unicity of the substantial form, the rational soul includes in itself all the perfections of the substantial form of the body. For instance, although the body of Socrates decays after death and the separation from Socrates' soul, its corporeal number identity will be restored when his soul joins matter again because the dimensions that are proper to Socrates are preserved by his own rational soul, which includes them as its own perfections.

In the same manner, says Thomas, one can understand the form of a compound (*forma mixti*):

THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 81; Leon. 253a:

Similiter etiam forma mixti dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo ut per formam mixti intelligatur forma substantialis corporis mixti. Et sic, cum in homine non sit alia forma substantialis quam anima rationalis, ut ostensum est: non poterit dici quod forma mixti, prout est forma substantialis, homine moriente cedat in nihilum. Alio modo dicitur forma mixti qualitas quaedam composita et contemperata ex mixtione simplicium qualitatum, quae ita se habet ad formam substantialem corporis mixti sicut se habet qualitas simplex ad formam substantialem corporis simplicis. Unde etsi forma mixtionis sic dicta in nihilum cedat, non praeiudicat unitati corporis resurgentis.

The form of a compound can be understood both as the substantial form of a composite body and as an accidental quality. In the first way, taking the case of human being, as the rational soul includes the perfections that are proper of the form of the composite body, those latter will not disappear into nothingness when a human body decays, but they will be identically restored during resurrection. On the contrary, the form of a composite body can also

be considered as a certain quality derived by the compound of simpler qualities. However, regarded as accidental quality, the form of compound disappears into nothingness once the composite substance, which it inheres, decays into simpler substances. Thus, also in this case, the number identity of the form of the compound will be preserved by the substantial form of the rational soul.

To summarize, differently from what Thomas states in the fourth book of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, the number identity of a human body is not guaranteed by the untermimated dimensions which precede the substantial form in matter, but from the rational soul of the individual human being itself. Moreover, in contrast to his *Commentary on Boethius' De trinitate* and questions *De veritate*, dimensions are not presupposed (*praeintelliguntur*) in prime matter and preserved in its potentiality. Rather, they are perfections that belong to the substantial form, which, in turn, provides matter with all the perfection of the case, including the substantial perfection of the form of the body and its related accidents, such as the dimensions. Thus, if on the one hand, dimensions are actually accidental features that inhere in the individual substance and that are corrupted when this individual being is corrupted, on the other hand, they essentially belong to the substantial perfection of the body which, in the case of the human being, is contained in the rational soul even after the corruption of the individual human body. Consequently, since dimensions essentially belongs to the rational soul, they do not disappear into nothingness but they are preserved in the unicity of the rational soul, which, in turn, will provide matter with the same accidental properties once the individual human being is resurrected during the day of judgment.

3.3.9. JOHN PICARD'S OWN INTERPRETATION OF THOMAS' THOUGHT ON UNTERMINATED DIMENSIONS

Upon concluding his description of Thomas' opinions, Picard ultimately upholds that, despite their apparent contradiction, the two positions Thomas espouses throughout his life provides the two most plausible explanations for resolving the issue of the precedence of dimensions in matter over the substantial form. First, Thomas' positing of an all-encompassing higher substantial form outlines the best explanation for an immediate union of prime matter with substantial form. In this way, Thomas not only provides further support for the theory of the unicity of the substantial form in matter, but also avoids contravening any of Aristotle's metaphysical principles. These include the priority of existence in matter with respect to all other formal properties and the correlated necessary inherence of accidental properties in an already constituted *subiectum*. Second, Thomas' perspective on untermimated dimensions is

identified with the most accurate interpretation of Averroes' doctrine and represents, in Picard's eyes, the best application of this concept to solve the problem of prime matter division and the individuation of universal species.³⁰

At the conclusion of his inquiry, Picard highlighted once again Thomas' change of ideas, reiterating that Thomas upheld the precedence of untermiated dimensions in matter. For this reason, Picard responds himself to Thomas' arguments listed before in favor of the precedence of substantial form, rejecting their premises and explicitly showing that Thomas' precedence of untermiated dimensions must be interpreted as a metaphysical one:

JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 19: "Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia"; V 168ra-b, E 105va-b:

Sed quia Thomas ultimo ponit dimensiones, sicut dictum est, ideo ad rationes factas in contrarium potest sic responderi.

Ad primum dicendum, quod esse est primum quantum ad actualitatem rei; dimensiones autem praeintelliguntur in materia, sicut et ipsa praeintelligitur, licet sine forma non sit in actu.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod materia se ipsa perficitur per formam nec aliquod medium inter ea pertinet essentialiter ad rem, sed haec materia, quae perficitur, non est haec nisi per dimensiones interminatas.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut intelligo hanc materiam in ordine ad formam, non quod sit sine forma, ita intelligo hanc materiam per dimensiones signatas, sine quibus non est haec, non tamen quod sit quanta eis sine forma. Nec obstat, si dicatur, quod haec materia singularis non intelligitur, quia solum universale intelligitur. Loquimur enim nunc de individuo, secundum quod cadit in consideratione, non de hoc certo individuo singulari, sed de his, quae competunt individuo in quantum huiusmodi.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod unitas in actu competit sibi per formam, sic et per eam est actu, nec dimensiones distinguunt materiam sine forma.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod materia non dat dimensionibus esse nec e converso, sed, quod sint, est a forma, sed quod forma haec sit, est e converso ab eis. Unde ut ita dicam, actualitas est a forma, haecitas est ab eis praeintellectis, non praexistentibus, sicut repletio vasis est a vino, sed quadrata repletio est a vase quadrato.

[...]

Ad septimum dicendum, quod istae dimensiones non sunt puncta vel huiusmodi principia aliqua individua, nec etiam sunt nuda materia, quia sic non intelligeretur distinguere, sed nec sunt dimensiones terminatae in quantum huiusmodi, quae sunt perfectae species quantitatis, sed sunt ipsae quantitates determinatae, intellectae tamen sine determinatione, sicut hanc quantitatem huius folii intelligo sine eius quadratura, sed solum in quantum distinguit ab alio folio materiam, quod facit etiam circumscripta quadratura vel quacumque terminatione. Et hoc modo accipitur quantitas naturalis quaedam, sed non naturaliter, sed quasi metaphysice, in ratione tantum distinguendi considerata. Sed utrum distinguat materiam in quantum aeris vel aquae materia haec non ad interminatas, sed ad terminatas, secundum quod aliter terminatur quantitas aquae, aliter aeris; sed distinctio essentialiter <et> praecipue pertinet ad interminatas,

³⁰ M. J. F. M. HOENEN – R. IMBACH – C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, "Thomistes allemands du XIV^e siècle: lectures, stratégies d'appropriation, divergences," in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), pp. 227-244, esp. p. 239, n. 49: "Par exemple, le thomiste réputé le plus fidèle à Thomas de la constellation allemande du XIV^e siècle, Jean Picardi, souligne tantôt cette divergence interne à l'œuvre, reconnaît une dualité contradictoire de positions au sujet de la question des dimensions indéterminées, s'abstient de les réconcilier, mais les défend toutes deux contre les objections adverses."

sicut in eodem vase vinum quantum mutaretur in acetum, licet essent aliae dimensiones terminatae, tamen eadem consideratae in natura dimensionis, scilicet in quantum distinguunt, et non esset materia de novo partita nec vas nova repletionem repletum. Ergo dimensiones in quantum huiusmodi, non in quantum huius vel illius, habent distinguere materiam et replere.

The initial argument that Picard addresses and attempts to refute is the general metaphysical premise of the priority of existence. To do so, Picard grounds his reasoning on the aforementioned distinction between the level of matter potentiality and that of form actuality when understanding the metaphysical status of a substance. According to the level of matter potentiality, untermiinated dimensions must precede both the substantial form and the existence that this latter provides to prime matter. This is because these dimensions are presupposed in prime matter, which, in turn, is presupposed to the actuality of the form and is understood as preceding it. Thus, metaphysically speaking, the matter that is actualized by the form in the constitution of the individual substance correspond to the individual matter that is the necessary condition for the individuation of the substantial form itself. However, the consequence of this metaphysical presupposition is that both untermiinated dimensions and prime matter never exist in themselves or have any kind of actuality without the actuality of the form.

Picard delves more into this topic, positing that there are different ways in which the union between matter and form can be conceived. First, Picard asserts that matter itself (*materia se ipsa*), namely matter understood in its universal sense, is immediately perfected by the form, and that there is no intermediary entity between them, such that this intermediary entity essentially pertains to the composed thing. Such way is then the immediate union between matter and form, both universally understood. As with the term “humanity”, which refers to the form and matter of a human being in their universal sense (namely the “body” and the “rational soul”), both individual matter and the respective accidents are explicitly excluded, and the matter “body” is immediately united and shaped by the form “soul”. However, Picard claims that the matter that belongs to individual substances is not matter itself; but, it is the individual matter, namely, “this matter” (*haec materia*), which is “this matter” through the untermiinated dimensions. This is the reason why Picard speaks of a second mediate union, namely, that of “this matter” with form. It is noteworthy to underline that, here, Picard is not speaking of the union between matter and form as it occurs in specific individual beings (*de hoc certo individuo*), such as Socrates or Plato, but it is union of matter and form in the individual being as it is understood by the intellect (*secundum quod cadit in consideratione*), that is, the individual being as such (*individuum in quantum huiusmodi*). The individual being taken as such corresponds to the individual being understood in its universal meaning of

“something that exist in itself in the category of substance”. According to this way, the *individuum inquantum huiusmodi* encompasses a certain nature, not excluding individual matter, namely “this matter”, and its respective accidents. This perspective can be illustrated by the more specific term “human being”, which encompasses human essential components – matter and form in their universal sense –, not excluding individual matter and its respective accidents. The term “human being” signifies “someone who possesses the essence humanity” (*habens humanitatem*), the individual human being as such, rather than a specific individual human being, like Socrates or Plato. In this context, “this matter” that the terms “human being” or “individual being” do not exclude does not correspond to the individual matter proper to any existing individual substances, such as Socrates or Plato, but the individual matter understood in its universal sense, namely the prime matter shaped by the unterminated dimensions. Consequently, it is neither problematic to say that “this matter” of individual substances is thought or presupposed (*praeintelligitur*), because “this matter” is not the specific individual matter of a certain existing individual being or another, but rather the metaphysical universal principle concerning the individual being taken as such, and since it is universal, it can be also thought by the intellect. From this metaphysical perspective, “this matter” can be conceived to be without any form, although it never exists without it. In the same manner, Picard state that “this matter” can be conceived under signed dimensions – without which matter cannot be individuated – even though matter does not have any kind of quantity before the form shaping it. Indeed, shortly after, Picard carefully repeats that dimensions do not actually distinguish matter without the form shaping it. This is because, in its actuality, unity – that is, the condition for having any division – belongs to a thing in virtue of the form, which in turn, also gives actuality to that thing itself. In this same sense, what actually exists and divides matter into unities is only the actuality of determinate dimensions which pertain to matter through the substantial form, while the unterminated dimensions can be said to be metaphysically presupposed in the prime matter, since they precede in and are not excluded by the concept of the individual being taken as such.

Picard employs the metaphor of the wine vase being filled to illustrate this metaphysical precedence of unterminated dimensions. According to him, the filling of a vase is a result of the poured wine, but the fact that this filling is with a squared shape comes from the fact that the vase is squared. In this manner, the vase does not cause its squared shape to be filled with wine, nor vice versa. Rather, the filling of the vase is only in virtue of the wine. Similarly, matter does not cause the unterminated dimensions to exist, nor vice versa. The actuality of a thing is only due to the form. Moreover, the fact that the filling of the vase is with a wine of

squared shape is a consequence of the squared shape of the vase; in the same way, the being “this thing” (*haeccitas*) comes from the unterminated dimensions that are presupposed (*ab eis praeintellectis*) in matter, but that never actually pre-exist (*praexistentibus*) in it. This is because what actually exists in itself is always the substance with its formal properties and boundaries, while prime matter and unterminated dimensions never do. However, when understanding the individual being as such through the metaphysical analysis of the various individual substances existing in itself, prime matter and unterminated dimensions must be presupposed at the intelligible level. Indeed, from this metaphysical analysis, the intellect presupposes within the individual being as such, on the one hand, an unknowable prime matter, which never exists without form, which serves as the subject for the substantial form; on the other hand, the unterminated dimensions that divide such matter into various parts so that it receives different forms in different parts.

To sum up all these conclusions, Picard reiterates his definition of unterminated dimensions in accordance with Thomas’ thought and clarifies his point of view with some examples. Unterminated dimensions are the determinate quantities themselves (*ipsae quantitates determinatae*), which are conceived without any kind of determination or boundary.³¹ Picard illustrates this specific way of understanding the unterminated dimensions through the example of the sheet of paper. The quantity that corresponds to the unterminated dimensions is “this quantity” of “this sheet of paper”, understood without its squared shape. In this way, “this quantity” can be conceived only insofar as it distinguishes the matter of “this sheet of paper” from that of another sheet of paper. In the same way, the terminated quantity of an existing substance is considered with all boundaries and determinations removed. This allows for the understanding of the quantity solely insofar as it differentiates the matter of a thing from that of another.

In another example, Picard states that the quantity that differentiates matter, insofar as “this matter” of the air is distinct from that of the water, does not correspond to dimensions that are

³¹ Regarding this specific point, the definition of Thomas’ unterminated dimensions presented by Picard recalls an essential observation present in S. DONATI, “La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano,” cit., p. 166: “Un’osservazione ci sembra opportuna a proposito dell’interpretazione data da Tommaso alla distinzione tra dimensioni determinate e dimensioni indeterminate. A fondamento della distinzione sta un’unica e medesima forma che può essere considerata sotto due punti di vista differenti, in se stessa e nelle sue *terminaciones*.”; see also G. G. LENOTRE, “Determinate and Indeterminate Dimensions: Does Thomas Aquinas Change His Mind on Individuation?,” cit., p. 504: “In general, determinate (defined, terminated, or designed) dimensions are those accidental forms of quantity with position that are perfectly actual and fixed dispositions of matter such as *this* Labrador’s length, breadth, and width; in contrast, indeterminate (undefined, unterminated, or non-designed) dimensions are those same forms of quantity with position that are predispositions of matter, neither perfectly actual nor fixed to the here-and-now.”

understood as unterminated, but rather to dimensions that are understood as terminated. This is because the quantity that describes “this matter” of the air and water distinguishes those two parts of the matter only according to their different formal determinations. That is, it distinguishes them according to how the quantity of water is differently determined from that of air. On the other hand, the fundamental distinction of one part of the matter from another is essentially and specifically related to dimensions understood without any formal determinations, namely as unterminated.

Repeating the same concept, Picard illustrates once again the distinction between quantity related to terminated and unterminated dimensions with the example of the wine vase. He states that when wine changes into vinegar inside a vase, although the terminated dimensions change together with the formal change from the wine to vinegar, the unterminated dimensions do not. This is because when wine changes into vinegar, the three-dimensional position of the matter of the wine does not change with respect to that of the matter of the vinegar. Indeed, as Picard claims, although there exist different terminated dimensions, the latter remain identical when they are considered in their nature of dimension, namely according to their way of distinguishing one part of the matter from the others. Accordingly, Picard concludes that when wine transforms into vinegar, matter is not divided anew (*de novo partita*) or the vase filled anew (*nova repletione*), just as the dimensions taken as such remain identical despite the change in their formal determinations.

It follows from this analysis that, for Picard, unterminated dimensions correspond to the quantity understood only according to the way in which it distinguishes one part of the matter from another (*in ratione tantum distinguendi*). In this view, a certain natural quantity (*quantitas naturalis quaedam*) is not considered in the way it exists in natural things (*naturaliter*), but rather in a quasi-metaphysical way (*quasi metaphysice*), according to the nature of dimension and distinction (*eadem consideratae in natura dimensionis [et distinctionis]*). This quasi-metaphysical way precisely coincide with universality of the individual being taken as such. Indeed, although both individual being as such and these dimensions, just like prime matter, are imperfect entities within the category of substance and quantity, respectively, they are the universal underlying ground of individual existing beings. Hence, the unterminated dimensions are only presupposed (*praeintelliguntur*) in prime matter and does not exist in themselves because they refer to the universality of the individual matter and accidents which are not excluded in the definition of the individual being as such.

3.3.10. CONCLUSION

Picard never expresses any doubt regarding Thomas' shift in opinion and final alignment with Averroes' perspective. This is noteworthy because Picard might have found Thomas' final choice to be somewhat ambiguous, in light of Thomas' strong adherence to Aristotelian metaphysics and the fundamental role the unique substantial form plays in bringing an individual substance into existence. Instead, he never questions Thomas' thought development. Moreover, in contrast to what Alessandra Beccarisi states,³² Picard approaches the inner contradictions present in Thomas' texts without any concordist intent. His objective is not to justify textual discordances or purify his texts from all the inconsistencies in order to achieve an harmonic and coherent view of them. He does not attempt to identify the true *mens Thomae* when confronted with his contradictory positions. Instead, his aim is to delineate the manner in which Thomas' thought evolved over time. This is precisely possible through the evidence that substantiates this evolution, which often emerges from discrepancies and changes of opinions present in Thoms' works. Indeed, both in the cases of questions 3 and 19, Picard employs an "historical" approach to analyze Thomas' *corpus* of texts. He describes Thomas' contradictions in order to highlight the critical complexity of the texts and clearly point at the chronological and dynamic development of Thomas' thought.

From this perspective, it can be argued that an accurate understanding of an author's doctrine, such as Thomas' notion of the precedence of the untermiated dimensions over the substantial form, requires a keen awareness of its historical development. This kind of mastered knowledge, which Picard effectively illustrates, becomes exactly evident when contradictions within the author's various texts are highlighted, rather than when doubts or ambiguities are denied and solved through a further interpretation.³³

³² A. BECCARISI, "Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg: un exemple de thomisme dans l'horizon culturel allemand," cit., pp. 296-298: "La question 19 de Johannes Picardi pourrait appartenir au genre littéraire des concordances: entre autres tâches, elle projette d'aplanir les contradictions présentes dans l'œuvre de Thomas. [...] Ainsi, nous rencontrons le nom de Thomas aussi bien parmi les partisans que parmi les exemples d'opposition à la thèse de l'antériorité des *dimensiones interminatae* par rapport à l'avènement de la forme substantielle. L'intérêt principal de Picardi est dès lors de mettre en évidence la vraie mens Thomae, même lorsque des contradictions manifestes se font jour dans sa pensée [...]. Dans tous les cas, la tentative de Picardi pour justifier les passages discordants des enseignements thomasiens relatifs aux *dimensiones interminatae* me paraît intéressante. Dans l'horizon du thomisme allemand, cette tentative est unique, au vu de ce que nous savons aujourd'hui. On pourrait parler d'un thomisme qui se développe alors en doctrine et qui devait ainsi se purifier de toutes contradictions internes possibles. Une doctrine maîtrisée est une doctrine qui n'admet ni doute ni ambiguïté. Le thomisme devait devenir et était en train de devenir la doctrine dominante au sein de l'ordre dominicain tout entier, en Allemagne aussi."

³³ Zornitsa Radeva underlines Picard "historical" approach on this specific topic too: "Zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts treffen wir mit Johannes Picardi einen thomistischen Autor, der eine zeitliche Entwicklung in Thomas' Reflexionen über die *dimensiones interminatae* sieht, ohne sich klar für die frühere oder spätere *opinio* des Meisters auszusprechen. Diese 'historisierende' Perspektive scheint immerhin der (nach Picardis ungewöhnlicher Chronologie) späteren Auffassung des Thomas einen leichten Vorzug zu gewähren und sie als die definitive zu betrachten, Überraschenderweise wird ausgerechnet diese letzte *opinio* als identisch mit der

Finally, Picard's accurate interpretation of Thomas' doctrines through an "historical" approach to his texts exemplifies the first known instance of a "early Thomistic" attitude within the *studium generale* of Cologne. This "early Thomistic" attitude is not focused on the personality of Thomas Aquinas or on defending the consistency of his doctrinal system. On the contrary, Picard aims to analyze Thomas' numerous writings in order to demonstrate that, despite the controversial nature of Thomas' texts, his position is the truest when compared to those of other authors.

Ansicht des Kommentators verstanden, der zufolge die unbestimmten Dimensionen der substantiellen Form *realiter* vorausgehen. Averroes' *dimensiones interminatae* erhalten in Picardis thomistisch inspirierter Doktrin voll Bürgerrechte: ein Ereignis, das sich bei keinem der hier untersuchten Autoren wiederholt hat." (Z RADEVA, "Ein averroistischer Missklang im Werk des Thomas von Aquin: Die *dimensiones interminatae* und ihre fortuna in thomistischen Konkordanzversuchen des ausgehenden Mittelalters," cit., pp. 236-239, esp. pp. 238-239); see also M. J. F. M. HOENEN – R. IMBACH – C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, "Thomistes allemands du XIV^e siècle: lectures, stratégies d'appropriation, divergences," cit., pp. 239-240: "Inscrit dans ces fresques historiques, le thomisme ne signifie plus un corps doctrinal dont on pourrait décrire le contenu a priori - à partir du présent de l'historien - pour en sonder la présence ou l'absence dans les textes du passé. Le propos est autre: se demander comment les acteurs intellectuels lisaient Thomas d'Aquin, comment ils intégraient ses textes et ses doctrines à leur politique du savoir, comment enfin ils concevaient leur propre rapport à Thomas. Dans les discussions et défenses de ses thèses par les théologiens dominicains allemands, Thomas apparaît protéiforme et hétérogène: il revêt des figures différentes d'un auteur à l'autre. Sous la plume d'un même auteur, la divergence des thèses défendues par Thomas à différents moments de sa carrière et dans différentes œuvres, leur incompatibilité, sont parfois soulignées. [...] Jean Picardi n'est pas en reste. Dans sa question disputée 19 consacrée aux dimensions indéterminées, il considère conjointement et quasi sur le même plan les autorités (les «mentes») de Thomas et d'Averroès."

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS

A. IS JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG A THOMIST?

In opening his article *Essere e essenza in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg: note sulla prima ricezione del tomismo a Colonia*, Pasquale Porro defines the German Dominican theologian John Picard of Lichtenberg as “the moment of greatest continuity with the legacy of Thomas Aquinas within the framework of the *studium generale* of Cologne”.¹ This continuity is evident in all of its shades upon analysis of Picard’s questions 3 and 19 above analyzed. He accepts and agrees with Thomas’ positions, which he deems to be the most correct one on the subjects of those questions. Furthermore, by highlighting inconsistencies within Thomas’ various works and accounting also for their chronological order, Picard shows his “historical” and accurate knowledge of Thomas’ texts. Indeed, Picard never yields to any concordist interpretation that would have aimed to resolve any theoretical discrepancies of the case. Instead, he keeps evident what he sees as the historical development and the inner complexity of Thomas’ thought.

But, a question arises. As Frederick Roensch would have stated, should John Picard’s agreement with Thomas Aquinas’ thesis be considered a representative example of the so-called “early Thomistic school”?² The existence of an “early Thomistic school” in the years between the end of the 13th- and the beginning of the 14th-century is definitively a controversial topic.³

¹ P. PORRO, “Essere e essenza in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg: note sulla prima ricezione del tomismo a Colonia,” cit., p. 226: “Nell’ambito della cosiddetta „scuola domenicana tedesca“ - con tutte le cautele che una simile espressione richiede -, Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg rappresenta forse il momento di maggiore continuità con l’eredità di Tommaso d’Aquino: una caratteristica che differenzia significativamente la sua figura tanto da Teodorico di Freiberg quanto da Meister Eckhart, per non citare che due dei nomi più celebri.”

² F. J. ROENSCH, *Early Thomistic School*, cit.

³ A. A. ROBIGLIO, *La sopravvivenza e la gloria, Appunti sulla formazione della prima scuola tomista (sec. XIV)*, cit., esp. pp. 11-53, see for example pp. 23 and 53: “Gli argomenti a favore di un più o meno strutturato e condiviso «sistema tomistico» trovano scarsi e, quel che è peggio, ambivalenti appigli nelle discussioni anteriori alla seconda decade del Trecento. Solo di lì in avanti e, particolarmente, in seguito alla canonizzazione, codesta pista di indagine può sperare di dare buoni frutti: a quel punto, infatti, l’anti-tomismo sarà costretto ad assumere un’identità ecclesiasticamente precisa, vale a dire quella di costituire un’eresia almeno virtuale. [...] La cosa da sottolineare in conclusione è che, per il «tomismo» e per la conseguente scuola di pensiero eponima, i giochi restarono aperti fino alla canonizzazione. Solo dopo di allora, infatti, l’Aquinata poté contare su di un’ autorità e una visibilità che nessun’altro dei moderni scolastici poteva vantare.”; ID., “Tommaso d’Aquino tra morte e canonizzazione (1274-1323),” cit., pp. 197-216; M. J. F. M. HOENEN, “Thomas von Aquin und der Dominikanerorden: Lehrtraditionen bei den Mendikanten des späten Mittelalters”, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), pp. 260-285, esp. p. 261, n. 3; I. IRIBARREN, “‘Responsio secundum Thomam’ and the search for an Early Thomistic school,” in *Vivarium* 39 (2001), pp. 255-296, esp. pp. 263-265. In these pages, Isabel Iribarren underlines that the so-called “early Thomistic school” cannot be understood as a “school of thought”, as Roensch has intended, since the term “school” in the 13th century was used to identify cultural places and their *curricula studiorum*: “Thus, the adherence to a school [of thought] should presuppose a “speculative awareness” of the doctrine which the school represents, in the sense that the members of the school should understand the full implications of the doctrine and according to that choose to adhere to that particular view. By the end of the thirteenth century, however, the term “school” was never understood in this sense as a “school of thought” attached to an abstract ideological current, but it was always personified in the doctrine of a leading figure in a way still too individualistic. Just like Peter Abelard in the twelfth century, Aquinas attracted both followers and critics. It was the way in which these individual figures exercised reason within a theological

In her paper *‘Responsio secundum Thomam’ and the search for an Early Thomistic school*, Isabel Iribarren makes a significant observation regarding the unquestioned equation, that Roensch and other scholars do, between “Thomism” and a “Thomistic school”.⁴ Accepting this equation, the term “Thomistic school” would coincide with the acceptance and defense of a certain number of doctrines that are understood to belong to Aquinas’ teachings. However, upholding some of Thomas’ theses does not imply what could be considered the main condition for speaking of a “school of thought”, namely, members’ self-consciousness of belonging to the school that these doctrines represent. From this perspective, the fundamental characteristic to identify a “school of thought” is a well-defined set of theories that all the members of that school must explicitly and consciously accept and defend in order to be part of it. The foundation of a self-aware group identity on a collective commitment to a set of shared doctrines, beliefs and approaches to them differentiates a “school of thought” from a series of individual attempts to defend a nonuniform collection of theories. In such a sense, the philosophical and theological debates that occurred between the late 13th- and early 14th- century, which were centered on diverse single theses attributed to Thomas, cannot be defined as a clash between two distinct “schools of thought”, namely “early Thomists” and “early Anti-Thomists”. Rather, attacks and defenses of Thomas’ teachings by scholars of that time must be considered as politically driven conflicts of individual wills and clashes of intellectual textual productions, the consequence of which was one of the most lively moments of debate in those centuries.⁵ The early reception of Thomas’s theses was indeed a transnational phenomenon,

question, which aroused either censure or adherence. What the late thirteenth-century scholar associated with the term “school” was a place of study and its standard curriculum of teaching, rather than a specific philosophical commitment. Thus, a “Dominican school” did not necessarily imply a particular doctrinal credo, but more immediately referred to the masters that belonged to the Order. In this sense, Kilwardby was no less a member of the Dominican school than enthusiastic defenders of Aquinas such as Knapwell and John of Paris.”

⁴ *O.c.*, cit., p. 255, n. 2.

⁵ *O.c.*, cit., p. 296: “Aquinas’ theses therefore certainly spurred some cohesion among Dominicans, but this seems to have been more circumstantial and “nominal”, as it were, than a profound intellectual movement – at least not at the end of the thirteenth century. Aquinas had left a mark in his Order – and indeed in the learned world – as a profound and original theologian. It was then understandable that the blemish of his name could have been seen as having a direct negative impact in that of his Order’s.” For similar conclusions: F. BONINI, “The *Lectura Thomasina*: an Early Thomistic *Sentences* Commentary” in A. SPEER – A. COLLI – F. BONINI (eds.), *The Lectura Thomasina in its Context, Philosophical and Theological Issues*, Leuven-Paris- Bristol, CT (2020), pp. 15-34, esp. pp. 20-23. Furthermore, it is important to note that, following Tempier’s condemnation in 1277 and the *Correctorium* written by William de la Mare, the Dominican Order gradually established a certain control in order to promulgate a solid image of the Order through Thomas’ *doctrina*: “I provvedimenti più drastici (censura di testi “pubblicati” ed esame preventivo di quelli non ancora “pubblicati”, roghi di libri, delazione) vennero sempre adottati nei periodi in cui, dinanzi ai contrasti e ai dissensi che laceravano l’Ordine *al suo interno*, si faceva più necessario proiettare all’*esterno* un’immagine di concordia e compattezza dottrinale.” (L. BIANCHI, “Ordini mendicanti e controllo ‘ideologico’: il caso delle provincie domenicane,” in *Studio e studia: le scuole degli ordini mendicanti tra XIII e XIV secolo. Atti del XXIX Convegno internazionale. Assisi, 11-13 ottobre 2001*, Spoleto 2002, pp. 303-338, esp pp. 326-338). See also P. PORRO, “Un’autorità dirompente e controversa. Condanne,

driven by the active debates among lectors, bachelors, and masters.⁶ A multi-centered discussion on Thomas' philosophical and theological legacy actually emerged and subsequently developed into what appeared to be a conflict between personalities of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders and between Dominicans themselves.⁷ This resulted in the Dominican Order stiffening around the thought of Thomas Aquinas himself as the most representative example of the Order's doctrine, ultimately leading to his canonization.⁸

It is the contention of this study that the grounding condition to speak of an "early Thomism" and "Anti-Thomism" is to understand it as those fifty years after Thomas' death in which Thomas' *textual legacy* was received, defended, criticized and, consequently, revised and reinterpreted by the numerous scholars of that time.⁹ In such a sense, the historiographical

polemiche e la nascita del tomismo," in S.-T. BONINO - L.F. TUNINETTI (eds.), *Vetera novis augere. Le risorse della tradizione tomista nel contesto attuale*, Roma 2023 (*Doctor Communis* 6), pp. 41-59.

⁶ See W. J. COURTENAY, "The Educational and Intellectual Framework of German Dominicans in the Late 13th and Early 14th Centuries," cit., pp. 257-259.

⁷ Cf. P. PORRO, "Un' autorità dirompente e controversa. Condanne, polemiche e la nascita del tomismo," cit., pp. 41-59.

⁸ See A. A. ROBIGLIO, "Se un 'savio omo' diventa santo. Un aspetto della reputazione di Tommaso d'Aquino per gli studenti del Trecento," in *Studia, studenti, religione* (2009), pp. 159-173; ID., "Wenn ein 'weiser Meister' ein Heiliger wird. Die Figur des Thomas von Aquin und das Lehren und Studieren im 14. Jahrhundert," in: A. SPEER - T. JESCHKE (eds.), *Schüler und Meister*, Berlin 2016, pp. 243-254; M. J. F. M. HOENEN, "Thomas von Aquin und der Dominikanerorden: Lehrtraditionen bei den Mendikanten des späten Mittelalters," cit., pp. 260-285. For an analysis of the contrastive nature of Dominican attitudes in defense of Thomistic theses, see P. PORRO, "Un' autorità dirompente e controversa. Condanne, polemiche e la nascita del tomismo," cit., esp. p. 59: "Mi sembra, in conclusione, che da quanto visto si possa affermare che la prima stagione di formazione di una tendenza "tomista" (adoperando questo termine con tutte le cautele del caso) sia stata caratterizzata da una strategia essenzialmente difensiva, ovvero che paradossalmente gli avversari di Tommaso, e in particolare i francescani, abbiano giocato un ruolo decisivo, in senso antagonistico e contrastivo, nella costituzione di una prima identità "tomista". [...] Se non proprio un "tomismo", abbiamo qui un "tomatismo" (per altro in linea con l'uso di queste espressioni nel latino scolastico) che si costruisce quasi per via negativa, come difesa di Tommaso nei confronti delle accuse, più o meno violente, che gli erano state mosse."; and also L. BIANCHI, "Ordini mendicanti e controllo 'ideologico': il caso delle provincie domenicane," cit., esp. p. 337: "È comunque eloquente il fatto che le più rigide limitazioni della libertà intellettuale risalgano al secondo e terzo decennio del XIV secolo, quando la sfida lanciata da Durando di san Porziano manifestò in modo eclatante l'esistenza di una corrente antitomista, che dalla Francia era destinata a diffondersi in Italia (con Uberto Guidi e più tardi con Tommaso di Napoli) e in Germania (con Teodorico di Freiberg e Meister Eckhart). Non c'è bisogno di sottolineare quanto fosse urgente estirpare un simile movimento di dissenso e imporre una poco spontanea uniformitas doctrinae negli anni in cui si svolgeva il processo di santificazione dell'Aquinate e il vescovo di Parigi Stefano di Bourret finalmente si convinceva a revocare gli articoli proibiti dal suo predecessore Tempier «in quanto coinvolgono o si dice coinvolgono la dottrina di san Tommaso»."

⁹ The concept of grounding the historiographical label "early Thomism/Anti-Thomism" on how Thomas' textual legacy was utilized by the authors during the fifty years following his death, rather than on a presumed shared set of doctrines, comes from M. J. F. M. HOENEN – R. IMBACH – C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, "Thomistes allemands du XIVe siècle: lectures, stratégies d'appropriation, divergences," cit., pp. 227-244, esp. pp. 243-244: "Le «thomisme» se dissout dans ce qui s'est passé, c'est-à-dire dans l'histoire des réceptions des textes de Thomas d'Aquin, réceptions diverses et parfois inconciliables, dans l'histoire des usages des textes de Thomas, mais aussi de son nom et de ses supposées doctrines, souvent médiatisées et produites par des montages composites." Moreover, Pasquale Porro shares the same idea when he generally defines the concept of a "philosophical tradition": "D'altra parte, è evidente che non si può neppure cadere nell'estremo opposto: quello cioè di immaginare che la filosofia medievale non abbia assolutamente nulla in comune con ciò che intendiamo oggi con 'filosofia', ovvero che l'incommensurabilità si sostituisca del tutto all'idea della continuità (o addirittura di una persistenza atemporale della filosofia). Un denominatore comune può tuttavia senz'altro essere ritrovato – o almeno questa è la mia

labels of “early Thomism” and “Anti-Thomism” would be linked no more to a supposed doctrinal core to which all those who discussed Thomas’ thought in those years has to accept unconditionally. Consequently, those labels would not represent a dichotomy of complete acceptance or rejection of a supposed Thomas’ philosophical system of thought, but they would be better aligned with two distinct attitudes towards Thomas’ *textual legacy*, which was discussed in its own single critical points. Indeed, the attitude to defend and criticize Aquinas’ texts concerned always single controversial questions and notions, which represented for a long time the main focuses of the philosophical and theological discussions. Furthermore, those labels would be primarily linked to the manner in which Thomas’ *texts* were used, quoted and paraphrased in the works of scholars.¹⁰

This perspective leads to the assertion that it is inadequate to characterize an *author* as either “Thomistic” or “Anti-Thomistic”. Instead, it is more accurate to describe the author’s *positions* as either “Thomistic” or “Anti-Thomistic”, based on the way in which the author quotes and interprets Thomas’ works.

convinzione, e insieme il mio presupposto – nel fatto che il fare filosofia non può prescindere dal riferimento a una tradizione e a un *corpus* di testi elaborati principalmente in greco (dall’età classica alla tarda antichità), tradotti poi in arabo (talvolta attraverso una mediazione in siriano), e poi resi accessibili – a partire dagli originali greci o dalle traduzioni arabe – anche in latino. Il riferimento a questa dinamica fin troppo generale di trasmissione testuale configura un livello di univocità minimale per evitare che, nell’uso del termine ‘filosofia’, si possa cadere in una *fallacia aequivocationis*. [...] Una volta ammesso che nella storia della filosofia, e in quella della filosofia medievale in particolare, la ricognizione delle differenze è un compito fondamentale, occorre poi evitare che esplodano disordinatamente, per mera giustapposizione, restando così incontrollabili e improduttive. Come già detto, questo rischio può essere evitato facendo riferimento alle specifiche tradizioni testuali che connettono la produzione filosofica e scientifica greca con quella araba e quella latina.” (P. PORRO, “La filosofia dei medievali e la filosofia dei medievisti,” in *Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana* (Serie 7 vol. 19), Firenze 2023, pp. 413-437, esp. pp. 413-414 and 427). According to Porro, the transmission, discussion, and commentary on a shared *corpus* of texts serve as the foundation for textual traditions, which in turn guarantee a certain continuity in philosophical reflections. This same principle can be applied to the continuity of the philosophical reflection of “early Thomism”, which can be based on the transmission, discussion, and commentary of Thomas’ *corpus* of texts. Cf. also ID., “Un’alterità accessibile. Qualche considerazione sulla funzione della storia della filosofia (e della storia della filosofia medievale in particolare),” in A. CAPUTO – L. ILLETTERATI (eds.), *Tra passato e presente. Studi in onore di Ferruccio De Natale*, (Percorsi di confine 30), Milano-Udine 2021, pp. 83-99.

¹⁰ In a similar vein, Andrea Colli says that: “Rather than by defining the level of >Thomism< in general terms, this is possible by elaborately analyzing the massive number of quotations from Thomas’ writings included in these particular works. The different strategies of quoting, summarizing, and paraphrasing are indeed not a merely technical aspect, but rather a very useful tool for mapping the reception of Aquinas’ thought. [...] Investigating the reasons for these and other dissimilar uses of the quotations is presumably the first step in delineating the understanding and transmission of Thomas Aquinas’ thought in the Dominican theological schools during the period between his death and his canonization.” (A. COLLI, “Transcriptions, paraphrases and abbreviations. Rewriting Thomas Aquinas in the *Lectura Thomasina*,” in M. MELIADÒ – S. NEGRI, *Praxis des Philosophierens, Praktiken der Historiographie: Perspektiven von der Spätantike bis zur Moderne* (Geist und Geisteswissenschaft 2), Freiburg 2018, pp. 21-42, esp. pp. 23 and 42). See also ID., “Tommaso prima del Tomismo. Annotazioni per un’edizione critica della *Lectura Thomasina* (II libro),” in *Divus Thomas* 120/2 (2017), pp. 163-194.

In this way, the term “early Thomism” would lose its strong doctrinal connotation,¹¹ thereby negating also a supposed radical “early Anti-Thomism”.¹² The term “early Anti-Thomism”,

¹¹ See M. J. F. M. HOENEN, “Thomas von Aquin und der Dominikanerorden: Lehrtraditionen bei den Mendikanten des späten Mittelalters,” cit., pp. 260-285, esp. pp. 282-285, for example: “Offensichtlich ist also das Beharren auf einzelnen Thesen nicht repräsentativ für die Art und Weise, wie die vom Generalkapitel vorgeschriebene Ordensdisziplin verstanden werden sollte. Die Affäre um Durandus gibt folglich kein brauchbares Modell ab, insbesondere angesichts der beträchtlichen Lehrunterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Dominikanern. Einige moderne Forscher sind deshalb zu Recht zurückhaltend wenn es um die Frage der thomistischen Orthodoxie geht. Manche gehen sogar so weit daraus die Konsequenz zu ziehen, dass die Frage nach einer doktrinären Einheit innerhalb des Ordens, wenn sie allgemein gestellt werde, nicht sinnvoll sei, da es Perioden gab, in denen sich keine einheitliche Tradition ausmachen lasse. Schulbildung sei erst ein Produkt des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts. Aber hier gilt zu bedenken, dass man dann in Erklärungsnot gerät, wie die immer wiederholten Vorschriften gerade aus der frühen Zeit zu verstehen sind und wieso es trotz der angeblichen doktrinären Einheit im fünfzehnten Jahrhundert weiterhin verschiedene Richtungen innerhalb des Thomismus gab. Vielleicht ist es deshalb erfolgreicher, die auferlegte Nachfolge des Thomas von Aquin wie hier vorgeschlagen anders zu deuten, nämlich als die Vorschrift, nicht von der allgemeinen Lehre abzuweichen, wie sie in der Tradition gelehrt und in einer beispielhaften Weise von Thomas vertreten wurde. Denn auf diese Weise lassen sich die beiden historischen Gegebenheiten problemlos miteinander verbinden: zwingende Vorschriften einerseits und Vielfalt in der Lehre andererseits. [...] Versucht man diese Vorschrift, von der allgemeinen Lehre nicht abzuweichen, trotz der Vielfalt in der Lehre inhaltlich zu bestimmen, so könnte diese in der Überzeugung bestehen, dass der Glaube mit Hilfe der Philosophie, insbesondere der aristotelischen Philosophie, verteidigt werden könne. Es ist nämlich auffällig, dass das Argument der Vereinbarkeit von (aristotelischer) Philosophie und Theologie gegen Ende des Mittelalters immer mehr ins Zentrum der Auseinandersetzungen rückte und die Thomisten (und Albertisten) im sogenannten, ‚Wegestreit‘ den Nominalisten vorwarfen, mit ihrer Deutung des Aristoteles den Glauben zu gefährden und in Widerspruch zur Tradition der Kirche zu treten.”; M. J. F. M. HOENEN – R. IMBACH – C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, “Thomistes allemands du XIVe siècle: lectures, stratégies d’appropriation, divergences,” cit., pp. 227-244, esp. p. 239: “Inscrit dans ces fresques historiques, le thomisme ne signifie plus un corps doctrinal dont on pourrait décrire le contenu a priori - à partir du présent de l’historien - pour en sonder la présence ou l’absence dans les textes du passé. Le propos est autre: se demander comment les acteurs intellectuels lisaient Thomas d’Aquin, comment ils intégraient ses textes et ses doctrines à leur politique du savoir, comment enfin ils concevaient leur propre rapport à Thomas. Dans les discussions et défenses de ses thèses par les théologiens dominicains allemands, Thomas apparaît protéiforme et hétérogène: il revêt des figures différentes d’un auteur à l’autre. Sous la plume d’un même auteur, la divergence des thèses défendues par Thomas à différents moments de sa carrière et dans différentes œuvres, leur incompatibilité, sont parfois soulignées.”

¹² This doctrinal connotation as the main factor to determine whether a medieval author can be considered as an “early Thomist” or not is evident in the conclusion of Roensch’s book, which provides an noteworthy definition of what should be understood a “Thomist”: “The critical editions of some of the writings of his defenders, when analyzed against the background of the conflicts of their time, reveal that these men understood and accepted the teachings of the Angelic Doctor as he himself understood them. This means that they were Thomist in the true sense of the word, at least in the fundamental methodology and doctrines which, at that time, characterized the personal theological system of Aquinas. [...] The principal teaching under dispute was the unicity of the substantial form. By implication the controversy included discussions of the pure potentiality of the matter, matter as the principle of the individuation in material beings, the spirituality of angels and the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures. [...] This is not to say that these defenders of Aquinas never deviated from the Angelic Doctor. The spirit of independent thinking which St. Thomas himself had so effectively defended at Paris, and which he encouraged among his student, is evident in these early Thomists. Nevertheless, with regard to the doctrine of the unicity of the substantial form and its implications they consistently and confidently upheld the letter and the spirit of the Thomistic synthesis. [...] If an answer to the question “What is a Thomist?” is to be forthcoming, it may well be that the historian, in studies similar to the one above, will have to determine it within the context of a particular age and only in terms of the stage of development which Thomism had reached at that time. In any age, those to whom the name “Thomist” may be given adopted the method of Aristotle in their philosophical and theological reasoning, which St. Thomas had used, and adhered firmly to those propositions which in their time were seen to belong necessarily to St. Thomas’ system. [...] For Thomism, after all, is a living system and its principles develop step by step in such a way that each new stage is organically linked with the past. [...] New editions of the writings of the defenders of St. Thomas’ thought, and editions of hitherto unedited works will bring about a better understanding and a more profound judgment of Thomism, and will help to identify the personalities and worth of other early Thomists.” In his conclusions, Roensch identifies three main points.

First, he asserts that the doctrinal core of the “early Thomistic School” is the theory of the unicity of the substantial form and its associated philosophical consequences. Second, he notes that the concept of “Thomism” has evolved over time, with different stages that are interconnected and collectively form a tradition based on Thomas’ teachings and propositions. (for an overview of the various stages of “Thomism” see I. IRIBARREN, “Thomism,” in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500* [2^a ed.], ed. H. LAGERLUND, Dordrecht 2020, pp. 1919b-1927b). In this way, a precise outline of what a “Thomist” is supposed to become clearer with the passage of time. Ultimately, Roensch emphasizes the importance of a new critical editions of medieval authors’ works in order to better understand the category of “Thomism” more profoundly. (Besides Roensch study, see also M. J. F. M. HOENEN, “Being and Thinking in the „Correctorium fratris Thomae“ and the „Correctorium corruptorii Quare“,” in J. A. AERTSEN – K. EMERY – A. SPEER (eds.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 / After the Condemnation of 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte / Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century. Studies and Texts*, Berlin-New York, pp. 417-435). Although Roensch’s insights have had a significant impact on the scientific community’s debates on the first reception of Thomas’ legacy, this doctoral study aims to offer a different perspective on these three key points. Firstly, the adherence of the theory of the unicity of the substantial form as the doctrinal core of an “early Thomistic School” presents a challenge in defining controversial authors like Durandus of Saint-Pourçain. Indeed, Durandus himself accepts the thesis of the unicity of the substantial form (on this see T. JESCHKE, *Die Lehre von den Seelenpotenzen bei Durandus von Saint-Pourçain. Eine philosophische Psychologie im Übergang vom Hoc- zum Spätmittelalter (Studien und Texte 131)*, Leiden-Boston 2022, pp. 226-256). In accordance with Roensch’s first point, this would indicate that Durandus should be considered a member of the “early Thomistic School”, a conclusion that is at odds with the prevailing opinion among scholars who view Durandus as an “early Anti-Thomist”, since Durandus strongly upheld in his career some theological and philosophical positions contrary to those of Thomas. (On the problematic issue to define the figure of Durandus as an “Anti-Thomist” see I. IRIBARREN, “L’antithomisme de Durand de Saint-Pourçain et ses précédents,” in *Revue thomiste* 108/1 (2008), pp. 39-56). Consequently, the establishment by Roensch of the existence of an “early Thomistic School” as a collective of authors who adhere to a common doctrine results in the ambiguous conclusion that an author who strongly criticizes several Thomas’ theses may be designated as a “Thomist” only on the grounds that he agrees with Aquinas on the unicity of substantial form. In order to avoid this problematic, this doctoral study proposes to focus the attention on analyzing, case by case, the various positions present within a single author’s work, rather than on defining authors as “Thomists” based on a presumed doctrinal core inherent to Thomas’ teachings. In this context, the extent to which an author’s opinion employs and reinterprets Thomas’ texts can be used to determine the degree of adherence to Thomas’ teachings. (See for example A. FITZPATRICK, “The unicity of substantial form in the *Correctoria corruptorii fratris Thomae* of Richard Knapwell, Robert Orford and John of Paris,” in A. FITZPATRICK – J. SABAPATHY, *Individuals and Institutions in Medieval Scholasticism*, London 2020, pp. 71-88). Accordingly, only the position of the author can be classified as “Thomistic” or “Anti-Thomistic”. In this manner, the various authors are able to retain their distinctive characteristics and individuality, while simultaneously maintaining a connection to Thomas’ textual legacy. This connection is evidenced by the (literal or paraphrased) presence of Thomas’ work within the writings of the different authors under consideration. From this textual perspective, Roensch’s second and third point become definitively more incisive. Indeed, the development of a more structured “Thomism” after Thomas’ death were grounded in the practice of commenting on and finding the most correct interpretation of Thomas’ texts, especially the *Summa theologiae*. (L. LANZA – M. TOSTE (eds.), *Summistae. The commentary tradition on Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae from the 15th to the 17th centuries*, Leuven 2021). Finally, the search for explicit and implicit sources behind medieval authors’ works, which were produced during the first fifty years after Aquinas’ death, can provide, through new critical editions, insight into how Thomas’ texts were used and reworked. (On the importance on critical edition and search for textual sources concerning the understanding of how Thomas’ works were reworked and interpreted in his early reception see also M. J. F. M. HOENEN – R. IMBACH – C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, “Thomistes allemands du XIV^e siècle: lectures, stratégies d’appropriation, divergences,” cit., pp. 227-244; R. L. FRIEDMAN, “Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260-1330,” in: C. SCHABEL (ed.), *Theological quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. 2. The fourteenth century*, Leiden 2007, pp. 401-492, esp. pp. 474-476: “In this way, Dominican quodlibetal literature mirrors Dominican philosophical and theological literature of the period more generally: it is Thomist, but open to other influences, and it does not stand still but is constantly reacting and adapting to its changing intellectual environment, in the process renewing itself. This is part of what makes the Dominican literature of this period exciting and interesting. What it means, however, is that in order to come to a genuine understanding of the nature of the period’s Dominican thought, we are required to investigate not only the texts themselves, but also their sources and their contexts. And this in turn will require critical editions of far more of the texts discussed here than have been made to date. Indeed, the vast majority of the quodlibetal questions discussed here have never been printed. This in itself

just like “early Thomism”, would be better understood as a *spectrum* of attitudes, encompassing a range of positions who have either implicitly or explicitly defended or critiqued¹³ Thomas’ various *texts* and different *positions*.¹⁴ This early interpretation and problematic reception of Thomas’ writings by both the Dominican and Franciscan Order established Thomas’ works as some of the main intellectual productions which the scholars of the following years should engage with in order to discuss the most up-to-date theological and philosophical theories.¹⁵

should show that, despite the immense progress we have made over the last century in our study of Dominican quodlibetal literature, we still have a very long way to go.”).

¹³ By using the terms “defending” and “criticizing”, this study refers to the attitude of authors to consider Thomas’ opinions to be correct or incorrect, respectively.

¹⁴ On this see A.-S. ROBIN-FABRE, “Antithomisme – antithomiste,” in I. ATUCHA – D. CALMA – C. KÖNIG-PRALONG – I. ZAVATTERO (eds.), in *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, , Porto, 2011, pp. 87-97, esp. pp. 96-97: “Parler d’antithomisme pour la période médiévale en faisant référence à un esprit plus qu’à une doctrine ne paraît donc pas totalement illégitime. Ceci paraît d’autant plus intéressant que c’est en effet la seule période où le terme d’antithomisme peut avoir deux sens, comme le montre l’existence de deux adjectifs tirés de ce substantifs (« antithomiste » et « antithomasien »). Alors qu’en effet à la période classique où l’emploi du terme devient plus courant, il sert à désigner un critère d’orthodoxie au sein d’un thomisme se revendiquant comme unitaire, pour la période médiévale, le terme d’antithomisme peut désigner une opposition à Thomas d’Aquin ou à samé moire, c’est-à-dire retrouver le sens véritable de ses constituants («anti-Thomas» ou «anti-thomistes»). Le propre de l’antithomisme médiéval pourrait en effet être des attaquer directement à la lettre de Thomas, ce qui par la suite cédera la place à une opposition à l’interprétation majoritaire des écrits de Thomas. Ceci est en effet clair chez un Roger Marston qui dénonce l’incorrection des positions thomasiennes excitant de longs passages de la *Somme Théologique*. Les termes d’antithomisme et d’antithomiste sont donc relativement complexes, en raison en partie de leur polymorphisme. Leur statut évolue avec l’histoire et leur contexte d’emploi. Leur difficulté est aussi liée à celle de leur opposé (thomisme et thomiste) dont ils sont tributaires. Surgit alors en effet la question récurrente de l’historiographie: l’antithomisme naît-il du thomisme ou le thomisme de l’antithomisme? Terme historiographique et donc reconstruction intellectuelle, il est à la fois un outil de catégorisation, et une étiquette trop large, qui ne doivent cependant pas être refusés mais utilisés avec mesure, en particulier pour la période médiévale afin de saisir véritablement les différents centres d’impulsion du paysage intellectuel.” Cf. also EAD., ‘*Contra Thomam*’: un aperçu de l’antithomisme . la fin du XIIIe siècle et au début du XIVe, PhD dissertation, Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne 2013; M. J. F. M. HOENEN – R. IMBACH – C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, “Thomistes allemands du XIVe siècle: lectures, stratégies d’appropriation, divergences,” cit., pp. 227-244, esp. pp. 231-234.

¹⁵ As has been said in the introduction of the second chapter, the literary genre of the *Correctoria* is an example of the early Dominican tendency to support and enrich Thomas Aquinas’s theses against the *Correctorium* written by William de la Mare. However, for a more complete overview of the scholastic context of those years, focusing only on the *Correctoria* would be too narrow. They neither comprehensively represent the ideas of the Dominicans nor fully exemplify the entirety of the Dominican effort to defend Aquinas’s doctrines. In this respect, additionally to the *Correctoria*, another of the most influential literary genre of those years is the *Commentary on the Sentences*. One example of this phenomenon is William Peter of Godin’s *Lectura Thomasina*: “There is a second point of view for interpreting the close connection between the *Correctorium* literature and the *Lectura Thomasina*. Even if both the *Correctorium fratris Thomae* and the different versions of the *correctorium corruptorii* form the basis of Godin’s approach to the most discussed problem of Thomistic thought, this does not necessarily imply that the work of the French Dominican theologian is only to produce a mosaic of quotations from the *Correctorium* literature. In many cases, he actually combines the arguments from these texts with opinions or solutions advanced by other of his contemporaries (although without mentioning them by name). Thereby, he provides the Dominican scholars with a sort of updated version of the dispute “Thomism-anti-Thomism.” Thus, Godin does not only aim at rewriting the counterarguments included in William de la Mare’s *Correctorium* and the corresponding replies written by the authors of the different *correctoria corruptorii*. Quite the contrary, in many cases, one gets the impression that he intended to incorporate the *Correctorium* literature into a wider-ranging discussion that involves also other sources. [...] If the primary objective of Godin’s commentary on the *Sentences* is to offer a first overview of Aquinas’ principal theses to the Dominican students, the second and consequent objective is certainly to warn them of the most frequent criticisms against Thomas Aquinas in the Parisian theological landscape. In this sense, when Godin quotes William de la Mare’s *Correctorium*, Richard of Mediavilla’s *Commentary on the Sentences*, or other 13th-century theologians involved

In conclusion, four principal criteria would serve to ground the historiographical labels of “early Thomism” and “Anti-Thomism”. 1) The terms “early Thomism” and “Anti-Thomism” refer to all theological and philosophical discussions that occurred prior to Thomas’ canonization among scholars with regard to Thomas’ works. 2) These labels primarily concern the reception, use, and interpretation of Thomas’ texts and name. 3) “Early Thomism” and “Anti-Thomism” represent two distinct attitudes held by scholars of the period towards Thomas’ positions on specific topics. These attitudes pertain to the defense or critique of individual philosophical and theological theses that can be traced back to Thomas’ texts. Accordingly, the terms “early Thomism” and “Anti-Thomism” do not correspond to the upholding and rejecting of a set of doctrines considered to be distinctive of a supposed Thomas’ system of thought. Reversely, some doctrine can be considered “early Thomistic” or “Anti-Thomistic” only insofar as they are linked to the manner in which Thomas exposed them in his textual productions and subsequently reported or revised by later authors. 4) These two attitudes toward Thomas’ texts are always relative to specific questions and never to Thomas’ thought in its entirety or to a system of thought comprising a precise set of doctrines. Thus, what is regarded as “early Thomistic” and “Anti-Thomistic” is never an author in and of itself, but rather a single defending or criticizing position about Thomas’ theses, as they are present in his works.

Once the aforementioned criteria have been enumerated, it becomes evident that the terms “early Thomism” and “Anti-Thomism,” when understood as the scientific use of and attitude towards Thomas’ texts and name, cease to possess their meaningful connotation of identifying the clash between two constituted and well-defined groups of scholars. Rather, as said, they begin to describe the tendency of authors, active between Aquinas’ death and canonization, to

in the debate between “Thomism” and “anti-Thomism,” he actually does not aim at contrasting these authors, but rather at improving his exposition of Aquinas’ theses by referring to hypothetical objections and to the corresponding counterarguments.” (A. COLLI, “From Condemnations to the Schools, The *Correctorium* Literature in the *Lectura Thomasina*,” in A. SPEER – A. COLLI – F. BONINI (eds.), *The Lectura Thomasina in its Context, Philosophical and Theological Issues*, cit., pp. 35-66, esp. pp. 59 and 65-66) For a systematic study on Peter of Godin’s *Lectura Thomasina* see M. GRABMANN, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik*, vol. II, München 1936, pp. 559-576; ID., *Die theologische Erkenntnis- und Einleitungslehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin auf Grund seiner Schrift “In Boethium de Trinitate”*, cit., pp. 359-362; B. DECKER, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 42/1), Münster 1967; W. GORIS – M. PICKAVÉ, “Die *Lectura Thomasina* des Guillelmus Petri de Godino (ca. 1260-1336). Ein Beitrag zur Text- und Überlieferungsgeschichte,” in J. HAMESSE (ed.), *Roma magistra mundi. Itineraria culturae medievalis. Parvi flores. Mélanges offerts au Père L.E. Boyle à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1998, pp. 83-109; F. BONINI, *Introduzione*, in GUILLELMUS PETRI DE GODINO, *Lectura Thomasina*, ed. F. BONINI, Peeters, Leuven-Paris-Bristol 2020, pp. 15-60; A. SPEER – A. COLLI – F. BONINI, *The Lectura Thomasina in its Context, Philosophical and Theological Issues*, cit.

engage with his writings and the various defenses, refutations, and interpretations produced on those writings.

This raises a final question: if the labels of “early Thomism” and “Anti-Thomism” have lost their original meaning, in accordance with the described four criteria, is it still historiographically useful to employ them?

Although these labels have been stripped of their original meaning, this study maintains that they may still serve a purpose in assisting modern scholars to stress the epistemic importance of the presence of Thomas’ *name* and *texts* in the works of subsequent authors of that time. Indeed, the intellectual practice of continuously quoting, reworking and commenting on Thomas’ works contributed Thomas’ name to become a *textual authority* cited alongside those of Aristotle, Averroes, and Augustine. Additionally, his works were regarded as a significant and authoritative step in the development of theological and philosophical theory at that time and in subsequent periods.¹⁶ In this sense, the uses and quotations of Thomas’ name and texts, as well as the defending attitude of some of his contemporary scholars, shows the epistemic value of the label of “early Thomism/Anti-Thomism”, more than its mere ideological one – which is nevertheless clear from the political acts and rules promulgated by the Dominican Order before and after his canonization. This study therefore proposes that the most significant role that the historiographical labels of “early Thomism” and “Anti-Thomism” can still play is to denote the scientific process that shaped Thomas’ “epistemic authority” through authors’ multifaceted works over the course of the first fifty years after his death.¹⁷

So, in light of these considerations, John Picard of Lichtenberg and his *Quaestiones* exemplify one of the ways in which the Dominican theologians (and not only them) interpreted and reworked Thomas Aquinas’ textual legacy. John Picard does not approach Aquinas’ thought as a consistent and monolithic system that must be defended in its entirety. On the contrary, by using Thomas’ various texts, Picard discusses single questions that have been considered controversial and require further clarification. Moreover, Picard’s *Quaestiones* demonstrates

¹⁶ M. BRÎNZEI – C. SCHABEL, “Thomas Aquinas as Authority and the ‘Summa Theologiae’ as Auctoritas in the Late Middle Ages,” in L. LANZA – M. TOSTE (eds.), *Summistae. The commentary tradition on Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae from the 15th to the 17th centuries*, cit., pp. 95-126.

¹⁷ As a result of the debates surrounding his most controversial theses, Thomas’ name and works began to be regarded as an “epistemic authority” within the scientific community of that period. For further insight into the nature of an “epistemic authority” and the ways in which it can be shaped, please refer to the following papers: J. OPSOMER – A. ULACCO, “Epistemic Authority in Textual Traditions: A Model and Some Examples from Ancient Philosophy,” in S. BOODTS – J. LEEMANS – B. MEIJNS (eds.), *Shaping Authority: How Did a Person Become an Authority in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance?*, Leiden 2016, pp. 21-46; A. ULACCO, “Autorità epistemica e storia della filosofia: un caso dalla filosofia antica,” in *Archivio di Storia della Cultura* 33 (2020), pp. 34-48.

that Thomas' theses were explicitly discussed in Cologne at the beginning of the 14th century and enriched, commented upon, and understood in dialogue with the opinions of the early interpreters of the time.¹⁸

B. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING UNORIGINAL

In the two case-studies presented in the third chapter of this doctoral thesis, Picard accepts Thomas views and hardly shows groundbreaking and original ideas himself. Yet, this study contends that the richness of this author precisely lies in his “unoriginality”. By the term “unoriginality”, this thesis refers to transmitted knowledges that do not undergo further developments or substantial changes when it moves from one author to another, such as textual correspondences, *verbatim* and implicit sources. They represent, in fact, the most evident way to establish connections between different authors and cultural milieus and to reconstruct the intellectual life of a certain cultural context during time.

Furthermore, a more general consideration can be done. In his article *The genre of Commentaries in the Middle Ages and its Relation to the Nature and Originality of Medieval Thought*, Francesco del Punta distinguishes the several meanings of the term “originality” and explains how medieval commentaries on Aristotle could be considered as original philosophical productions. In his opinion, the “originality” of medieval commentaries lies exactly in their “intellectual disposition towards independence from a received text or doctrine”.¹⁹ The emphasis on the “originality” of medieval writers and productions has become a widespread trend among contemporary scholars. However, focusing exclusively on the notion of “originality” can lead to disregarding an important aspect that also makes the late scholastic

¹⁸ M. J. F. M. HOENEN – R. IMBACH – C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, “Thomistes allemands du XIVe siècle: lectures, stratégies d’appropriation, divergences,” cit., pp. 227-244, esp. pp. 229 and 231 n. 12: “Au final, si la capacité descriptive de l’étiquette «thomisme» est presque réduite à néant, étant donné l’absence d’un corps doctrinal stable qui puisse lui fournir un contenu objectif identifiable, certains dominicains de la constellation allemande se singularisent bien par un rapport privilégié à Thomas d’Aquin. D’un point de vue *quantitatif* d’abord, la présence de Thomas d’Aquin, explicite ou muette, est plus importante chez eux que chez leurs contemporains. *Qualitativement*, leurs lectures et usages des textes thomasiens témoignent d’un rapport privilégié à Thomas, qui est regardé comme une autorité et un maître à penser. [...] Pour des raisons de commodité et pour donner un premier cadre historiographique à nos recherches, nous avons usé du terme «thomisme allemand». La prudence et la circonspection sont pourtant de mise dans l’usage de notions qui pourraient suggérer une quelconque connexion entre une nation (un peuple, une ethnie) et une pensée. Il vaut donc la peine de le répéter: ici cette étiquette circonscrit un espace géographique dans lequel ont circulé des documents; elle désigne donc aussi, au niveau de l’histoire institutionnelle, un réseau de diffusion du savoir dans les formes et la politique culturelle programmées par les institutions ecclésiastiques et académiques installées sur ce territoire. Pour éviter tout malentendu, il faudrait donc parler de la diffusion et de la réception des textes de Thomas d’Aquin dans les milieux dominicains allemands des provinces de Teutonia et de Saxonnia à la fin du XIIIe et au début du XIVe siècle.”

¹⁹ F. DEL PUNTA, “The Genre of Commentaries in the Middle Ages and its Relation to the Nature and Originality of Medieval Thought,” cit., pp. 150-151.

Middle Ages such an interesting period for the history of philosophy. This is exactly the notion of “unoriginality”, as intended above.

During the late Middle Ages, Scholastic philosophers and theologians used to quote and copy their colleagues’ works and doctrine without explicitly mentioning their name. This intellectual practice, whose result is *verbatim* correspondences between different authors, is an example of “unoriginality”. In one of his paper, Zénon Kaluza proposed the word “plagiarism” as a possible way of defining this specific phenomenon.²⁰ However, a question arises: Is it historically accurate to describe a medieval phenomenon using a term that originated after that specific period? Does the word “plagiarism” bring with itself a background of values that do not belong to the medieval production of scientific texts? The medieval practice of *verbatim* copying another author’s work actually challenges our modern understanding of concepts such as “intellectual property”, “creativity”, and “originality”.²¹ Indeed, an analysis of a medieval text that focuses on the modern notion of “originality” may result in the neglect of one of the primary methods through which scientific knowledge was spread and shared among individuals in late medieval Scholasticism: the intellectual practice of quoting and coping one another’s works.

Moreover, a closer examination of what has traditionally been referred to as “plagiarism” may give also the chance to distance oneself from the contemporary perspective and explore a new historiographical approach to the medieval Scholastic “authorship”. This approach should consider the intellectual practice of quoting *verbatim* or by paraphrase, no longer from the modern value of “creativity”, but rather from that of “truth”, and the argumentative and authoritative quality of a scientific text. In this respect, Courtenay observes: “[...] the redelivery or reworking of earlier scholastic material was not specifically a result of laziness or lack of creativity on the part of the second or secondary author. It could be a compliment to the original author, an expression of the respect and academic *pietas*. We should not, I would urge, apply our modern notion of authorship and the corresponding sin of plagiarism. The truth

²⁰ Z. KALUZA, “Auteur et plagiaire: quelques remarques,” in J. A. AERTSEN – A. SPEER (eds.) *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (1998), pp. 312-320, esp. p. 318: “Mon opinion au sujet du plagiat médiéval est que, les faits étant ce qu’ils sont, nous ne les changerons point, et que, puisque nous avons aujourd’hui un mot pour les appeler, il faut s’en servir.”

²¹ See G. L. BRUNS, “The Originality of Texts in a Manuscript Culture,” in *Comparative Literature* 32 (1980), pp. 113-129; A. J. MINNIS, *Medieval theory of authorship: scholastic literary attitudes in the later Middle Ages*, London 1988; ID., “Nolens auctor sed compilator reputari: the late-medieval discourse of compilation,” in M. CHAZAN – G. DAHAN (eds.), *La méthode critique au Moyen Âge* (2006), pp. 47-63; N. HATHAWAY, “Compilatio: From Plagiarism to Compiling,” in *Viator* (1989), pp. 19-44; M. B. CALMA, “Plagium,” in *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, cit., pp. 559-568; C. SCHABEL, “Haec ille: Citation, Quotation, and Plagiarism in 14th Century Scholasticism. The Origins of European Scholarship,” in I. TAIFACOS (ed.), *The Cyprus Millenium Conference*, Stuttgart 2006, pp. 163-175.

and quality of argumentation was often more highly valued than individual authorship throughout the medieval period, and medieval scholars felt that good work should get repeated exposure”.²² In this sense, a shift in perspective from an approach to medieval Scholastic “authorship” based on the value of “originality” to that of the “truth” and “scientific updating” may be considered a perspective for understanding the intellectual practice of copying as a primary instrument in the process of establishing an “epistemic authority” within the scientific community of the time, as seems to be the case with Thomas Aquinas.²³

In light of these general consideration, the huge number of implicit sources and textual correspondences in Picard’s *Quaestiones* provide the perfect opportunity to understand better what the theological and philosophical discussions might have been like in the *studium generale* of Cologne during those years. Moreover, they precisely exemplify the typical manner in which Aquinas’ legacy was received and further developed, in dialogue with the opinions and interpretations of other contemporary authors:

<i>Quaestiones</i>	Correspondences
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 1	- <i>Verbatim</i> : GUILLELMUS PETRI DE GODINO, <i>Lectura Thomasina</i> , I, proL., q. 1: “Utrum sacra theologia sit scientia”
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 3	- <i>Verbatim</i> : GUILLELMUS PETRI DE GODINO, <i>Lectura Thomasina</i> , I, d. 34, q. 1: “Utrum in divinis sit idem essentia et persona” - GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, <i>Quodlibet</i> VII, q. 5 et <i>Quodlibet</i> VIII, q. 1: “Utrum suppositum addat aliquam rem supra essentiam vel naturam”; <u>via the same paraphrases present in</u> GUILLELMUS PETRI DE GODINO, <i>Lectura Thomasina</i> , I, d. 34, q. 1: “Utrum in divinis sit idem essentia et persona”
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 4	- <i>Verbatim</i> : JACOBUS DE VITERBO, <i>Disputatio secunda de Quolibet</i> , q. 12: “Utrum in conversione substantiae panis in corpus Christi, convertatur materia in materiam et forma in formam” - AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, <i>Theoremata de corpore Christi</i> , prop. 26 <u>via the paraphrases made by</u> JACOBUS DE VITERBO, <i>Disputatio secunda de Quodlibet</i> , q. 12: “Utrum in conversione substantiae panis in corpus Christi, convertatur materia in materiam et forma in formam”
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 5	- <i>Verbatim</i> : IOHANNES PARISIENSIS, <i>Super Sententias</i> , II, d. 13, q. 1 et 2: “Utrum lumen in medio sit corpus”; “Utrum lumen in medio habeat esse reale vel intentionale” = <u>also called <i>Adversarius</i></u>
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 6	- <u>Quoted as an <i>aliqua opinio</i></u> : AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, <i>Quodlibet</i> IV, q. 1: “Utrum Deus posset facere duo accidentia eiusdem speciei existere simul in eodem subiecto”;

²² W. J. COURTENAY, “Programs of Study and Genres of Scholastic Theological Production in the Fourteenth Century,” cit., pp. 325-350, esp. p. 348.

²³ On this see also F. BONINI, “The *Lectura Thomasina*: an Early Thomistic Sentences Commentary,” cit., pp. 32-34; A. COLLI, “Transcriptions, paraphrases and abbreviations. Rewriting Thomas Aquinas in the *Lectura Thomasina*,” cit., pp. 40-42.

	- Quoted as <i>Adversarius</i> : IOHANNES PARISENSIS, <i>Super Sententias</i> , I, d. 27, q. 3: “Utrum species intelligibilis expressa in acie cogitantis sit idem cum actu intelligendi”
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 9	- GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, <i>Quodlibet</i> XII, q. 1: “Utrum Deus possit potentias animae passivas reducere in actus suos absque suis obiectis faciendo visionem sine visibili et sic de aliis”
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 10	- <i>Verbatim</i> : IOHANNES PARISENSIS, <i>Super Sententias</i> , I, q. 1: “Utrum in theologia Deus sit subiectum”; - Quoted as an <i>aliqua opinio</i> : AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, <i>Quodlibet</i> III, q. 2: “Utrum Deus sub speciali ratione sit subiectum in Sacra pagina” - AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, <i>Super Sententias</i> , I, prolat., q. 1, a. 3: “Quod sit subiectum in Sacra pagina”
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 11	- Quoted as an <i>aliqua opinio</i> : AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, <i>Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis</i> I, lect. 18 <u>via the paraphrases made by</u> JACOBUS DE VITERBO, <i>Disputatio secunda de Quolibet</i> , q. 5: “Utrum in materia sint rationes seminales” - Quoted as an <i>aliqua opinio</i> : JACOBUS DE VITERBO, <i>Disputatio secunda de Quolibet</i> , q. 5: “Utrum in materia sint rationes seminales” - <i>Verbatim</i> : HAERVEUS NATALIS, <i>In Sententias</i> , II, d. 18, q. 1 : “Utrum sint aliquae inchoationes formarum in materia, quae sint rationes seminales”
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 12	- <i>The same question appears almost verbatim in the Commentarius Super Metaphysicam Aristotelis Ioannis Tytysdalensis</i> : Ms. Durham, Cathedral, MS C IV.20, ff. 127rb–128rb et Ms. Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, Section Médecine, H 293, ff. 92ra-92vb; cf. C. J. ERMATINGER, “The Fourteenth Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies: abstracts of papers”, in <i>Manuscripta</i> 32,1, Saint Louis 1988, pp. 8-10.
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 13	<i>The same question appears almost verbatim in the Commentarius Super Metaphysicam Aristotelis Ioannis Tytysdalensis</i> : Ms. Durham, Cathedral, MS C IV.20, ff. 152rb-153rb et Ms. Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, Section Médecine, H 293, ff. 107rb-vb sed ibi pars conclusiva textus deest et omittitur; cf. C. J. ERMATINGER, “The Fourteenth Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies: abstracts of papers,” cit., pp. 8-10.
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 14	<i>The same question appears almost verbatim in the Commentarius Super Metaphysicam Aristotelis Ioannis Tytysdalensis</i> : Ms. Durham, Cathedral, MS C IV.20, ff. 153rb-153vb et Ms. Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, Section Médecine, H 293, ff. 107vb-108ra sed ibi pars initialis textus deest et omittitur.; cf. C. J. ERMATINGER, “The Fourteenth Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies: abstracts of papers,” cit., pp. 8-10.
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 15	- AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, <i>Super Sententias</i> , I, prolat., q. 3, a. 4: “Utrum theologia sit scientia practica vel speculativa” - GODEFRIDUS DE FONTIBUS, <i>Quodlibet</i> XIII, q. 1: “Utrum scientia theologiae sit scientia speculativa”
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 17	- <i>Almost verbatim</i> : IOHANNES PARISENSIS, <i>Super Sententias</i> , I, d. 17, q. 1: “Utrum caritas sit aliquid creatum in anima”

	- Quoted as an <i>aliqua opinio</i> : AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, <i>Super Sententias</i> , I, d. 17, p. 1, princ. 1, q. 1 et 2: “Utrum actus dilectionis eliciatur in nobis a deo absque aliquo alio habitu medio”; “Utrum sit necesse dare habitum charitatis in anima ad hoc quod deum diligamus meritorie”; <u>via the paraphrases made by IOHANNES PARISENSIS, <i>Super Sententias</i>, I, d. 17, q. 1: “Utrum caritas sit aliquid creatum in anima”</u>
Johannes Picardi, <i>Quaestiones</i> , Q. 19	- Quoted as an <i>aliqua opinio</i> : AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, <i>Reportatio</i> , II, q. 44: “Utrum dimensiones interminate precedant formam substantialem in materia”. <u>Picard’s paraphrase of Giles is also similar to IOHANNES PARISENSIS, <i>Super Sententias</i>, II, d. 18, q. 4: “Quia dictum est quod materia habet quantitatem, ideo quaeratur utrum dimensiones interminatae praecedant formam substantialem in materia”</u>

Even though almost of them are *verbatim* references – so there is not a true reworking of the sources Picard uses –, these textual correspondences possess their own heuristic value. Indeed, these additional findings demonstrate that the *studium generale* of Cologne was far from being isolated. Instead, the diverse mosaic of references found in Picard’s work vividly brought to light its being intertwined with other cultural hubs of its time, as shown in the case of textual correspondences not only with Thomas and Albert,²⁴ but also with Henry of Ghent,²⁵ Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, John of Paris, John of Dymdale, James of Viterbo, William Peter of Godin, and Hervaeus Natalis.

All these textual correspondences underline once again the essential role of the search for sources in Picard’s *Quaestiones* in order to uncover a part of the history of German theology and philosophy that has not yet been studied and that is not strictly linked to the neo-Platonic legacy of Albert the Great. By new textual findings, it should be possible to reconstruct and provide a richer picture of the intellectual life in Cologne, thus bringing the knowledge of it one step further. In this way, Picard’s *Quaestiones* actually confirm the idea that Cologne was

²⁴ See JOHN PICARD OF LICHTENBERG, *Quaestiones*, q. 9, resp.; *V*, 158vb; *E*, 103rb: “Unde cum isti viri optime viderint Commentatorem, quando praedictum passum exposuerunt, nec tamen illam expositionem acceptaverunt, quod patet ex hoc, quod, cum sit notabilis valde, quod tamen nullus eorum eius mentionem facit, unde verisimile est, quod dictum eius non habeat veritatem ibi de intellectu respectu intelligentis, secundum quod isti eum intelligunt.” In addition to Thomas, Picard also shows a deep respect for Albert the Great and quotes some of his works *verbatim*, like the *De homine* while he speaks of the nature of the light and whether light is an intentional or real quality (see ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *De homine*, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1; Anzulewicz – Söder 153,34-163,13).

²⁵ The great importance of Henry of Ghent as one of the main sources present in John Picard’s *Quaestiones* is clear in P. PORRO, “Essere e essenza in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg: note sulla prima ricezione del tomismo a Colonia,” cit., pp. 226-245; A. BECCARISI, “Johannes Picardi de Lichtenberg: un exemple de thomisme dans l’horizon culturel allemand,” cit., pp. 286-302; EAD., “Johannes Picardi von Lichtenberg, Dietrich von Frieberg und Meister Eckhart: Eine Debatte in Deutschland um 1308,” cit., pp. 516-538; M. BENEDETTO, “Materia, corpi ed estensione in Giovanni Picardi di Lichtenberg,” cit., pp. 335-368; M. J. F. M. HOENEN – R. IMBACH – C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, “Thomistes allemands du XIVe siècle: lectures, stratégies d’appropriation, divergences,” cit., pp. 227-244; M. LEONE, “La libertà del volere in Giovanni di Lichtenberg,” cit., pp. 303-334.

involved in cross-border dialogues with other universities and cultural centers of the time, such as Paris and Oxford.

The influence of Parisian masters is evident from the abundant presence of Giles of Rome and Godfrey of Fontaines' quotations in Picard's work. In 2010, Gianfranco Pellegrino already underlined the key influence of Giles of Rome on Nicholas of Strasburg and on the so-called "German Thomism".²⁶ Differently from Nicholas, Picard mainly refutes Giles's and Godfrey's theories in his various questions. Additionally, upon closer look, things reveal themselves to be more complex than they first appear. Picard paraphrases the opinion of Giles or Godfrey by borrowing the same words from other authors, such as John of Paris (in questions 17 and 19), James of Viterbo (in questions 4 and 11) and William Peter of Godin (in question 3). This means that Picard is not only interested in quoting theories that go back to some of the most famous masters of his time, but also in being updated to the current interpretations of these theories.

Indeed, Picard's text also shows *verbatim* correspondences with other Parisian masters of his time. An example of those latter is John of Paris, whom Picard calls *adversarius*. Moreover, he often criticizes his opinion when it comes to interpret Thomas' works. This is the further proof that Picard's text can be considered part of the dynamic discussion on the early reception of Thomas' theses.

In addition to quotes from the Parisian masters, Picard's *Quaestiones* also include *verbatim* references from a master of Arts from Oxford, namely John of Dymdale.²⁷ This last case is actually remarkable. In 1988, Charles Ermatinger briefly suggested that three of Picard's *quaestiones* were condensed versions of three questions on the *Metaphysics* written by John of Dymdale, apparently around 1283.²⁸ Dymdale's work is preserved in two manuscripts, one located in Montpellier and the other in Durham.²⁹ Upon consulting these manuscripts, it is actually evident that Picard copies almost entirely Dymdale's text. Borrowing these three

²⁶ G. PELLEGRINO, "Un contributo al dibattito storiografico sul tomismo tedesco: le dimensioni indeterminate nella "Summa" di Nicola di Strasburgo" in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 57 (2010), pp. 393-409.

²⁷ On John of Dymdale's life and Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* see L. J. THRO – C. J. ERMATINGER, "Questions on Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X and XII, by Master John Dymdale: Part I," in *Manuscripta* 36,2 (1992), pp. 71-124; EAD., "Questions on Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X and XII, by Master John Dymdale: Part II," in: *Manuscripta* 37,2 (1993), pp. 107-167; L. J. THRO, "John Dymdale's *Quaestiones super Libros Metaphysicorum* (I-III)," in *Manuscripta* 42,1-3 (1998), pp. 3-29, 71-108 and 158-192.

²⁸ C. J. ERMATINGER, "The Fourteenth Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies: abstracts of papers," in *Manuscripta* 32,1, Saint Louis 1988, pp. 8-10.

²⁹ Ms. Durham, Cathedral, MS C IV.20 (available online on the website <https://iiif.biblissima.fr/collections/manifest/e4355a227657cb78730d3e9e29540369687cff53>) and Ms. Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, Section Médecine, H 293 (available online on the website: https://ged.scdi-montpellier.fr/florabium45/jsp/bium/num/view_diaporama_report.jsp?recordId=documents:BIU_DOCUMENT S:147&volumeIndex=1).

questions, namely the questions 12, 13 and 14, Picard merely adds further elaborations to the problem that he examined before in the *quaestio* 11, that is *Utrum in materia generabilium et corruptibilium sit aliqua inchoatio forme*. This correspondence leads to two main conclusions. First, there existed at that time in Cologne a manuscript containing the metaphysical questions of an Oxford master of Arts; second, the German theologians were actively using such questions to discuss metaphysical issues. These textual source further corroborates the thesis proposed by Fiorella Retucci,³⁰ namely that Oxford exerted a specific influence on the German Dominican thinkers and the intellectual context of Cologne.

Therefore, considering only the exclusive connections between single *studia* and universities, such as that between Cologne and Paris, would be too reductive and fail to capture the rich diversity of data that can be found in the manuscripts and works of that period.

In addition to that, another case of textual correspondence reveals Picard's *Quaestiones* to be a representative example of how scientific knowledge spread in the later Middle Ages: To date, it is known that Peter of Godin completed his *Lectura Thomasina* around 1300 and Hervaeus Natalis read his *Commentary on the Sentences* in 1303.³¹ Both these works share some passages with Picard's *Quaestiones*, whose *terminus ante quem* is 1305. The short time span between these Parisian and German writings clearly shows how quickly manuscripts could travel in the later Middle Ages and how the exchanges of knowledge from the centers to the peripheries, and vice versa, was much more intense and decisive than expected.

To sum up, within the Dominican *studium generale* in Cologne there were philosophical discussions which were almost unknown until now, and which could only have been revealed through the textual analysis of John Picard's work. With regard to this matter, the edition and the study of the sources of John Picard's *Quaestiones* demonstrates the necessity for a slight modification to the paradigm proposed by Kurt Flasch and Loris Sturlese regarding the "deutscher Sonderweg". Indeed, in the light of Picard's text and sources, it is evident that the intellectual productions of the *studium generale* of Cologne cannot be confined to that independent and alternative philosophy, which is based on Albert the Great's legacy. John Picard's *Quaestiones* clearly represent the earliest example of a proper German scholastic discourse on Thomas' legacy, similar to those of Paris and Oxford. This new philosophical attempt can be legitimately seen as a counterpart to what has until now been considered to be

³⁰ Retucci demonstrated the key role of the Oxford theologian Thomas of York on the German Dominican Berthold of Moosburg, see for example F. RETUCCI, "Between Cologne and Oxford: Berthold of Moosburg and Thomas of York's *Sapientiale*," in D. CALMA – E. KING (eds.), *The renewal of medieval metaphysics. Berthold of Moosburg's "Expositio" on Proclus' "Elements of theology"*, Leiden - Boston (2021), pp. 84-121.

³¹ C. SCHABEL, "James of Metz's *Lectura* on the *Sentences*," cit., pp. 355-356.

the most relevant philosophical movement in Cologne, namely the neo-Platonic trend that came from the Albert's philosophy and the so-called "deutsche Mystik".³²

Ultimately, as has been shown, the "unoriginality" of medieval Scholastic authors' works allows a specific understanding of the real network of relationships that there existed between thinkers who were active in the same period. The dialogue between scholars from different regions, faculties and universities is nowadays an established historical truth. However, one of the most effective tools for a more accurate interpretation of this dialogue is further research into authors, such as John Picard of Lichtenberg, and the implicit sources and references that lie behind them. Those authors and texts indeed represent one of the preferred gateways to understanding how that philosophical thought actually developed in its historical and material context.

³² L. STURLESE, *Die deutsche Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Bonifatius bis zu Albert dem Großen (784-1280)*, München 1993, p. 388: "Mit Albert entwickelte sich das philosophische Denken Deutschlands von einer Randerscheinung im europäischen geistesgeschichtlichen Panorama zu einer eigenständigen und alternativen Philosophie. Ein «deutscher Sonderweg» in der Philosophie des Mittelalters nahm Konturen an. Entlang diesem Weg wurde einer der gewagtesten Versuche in der Geschichte des Denkens entwickelt und erprobt: Er ist unter dem Namen «Deutsche Mystik» bekannt." Cf. also ID., *Idea di un „Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi“*, cit., 459-465.

5. PROLEGOMENA

A. MANUSCRIPTS OVERVIEW

- V Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ms. Vat. Lat. 859, qq. 1-39 = fols. 151ra, column 1, l. 26 -182vb, column 129, l. 59 [edited text in this volume: qq. 1-19 = fols. 151ra, column 1, l. 26 – 168, column 70, l. 19]

Headline and attribution of the work: f. 151r *ex alia manu: Frater Johannes de Lechtinberg, lector Coloniae, postea bachillarius Parisiensis. 38 quaestiones scriptas determinavit Coloniae.*

Beginning (q. 1 = fol. 151ra, column 1, ll. 26-28): *Utrum theologia sit scientia. Circa istam quaestionem duo in genere sunt consideranda. Primo, quid secundum aliquos sit dicendum.*

Ending (q. 39 = fol. 182vb, column 129, ll. 57-59): *Cum ergo bonum sit in rebus, verum autem et falsum in intellectu, ut, dicitur sexto metaphysice, constat, quod relatio est aliquid reale distinctum a rebus absolutis.*

CONTENT: The manuscript contains six works by Hervaeus Natalis presented in a disorderly manner (fols. 1ra-98ra: fols. 1ra-14vb: *De voto religiosorum*; fols. 15ra-82vb: *De variis materiis contra Henricum de Gandavo*, that is, the so-called *Hervaeus de quattuor materiis* and other two treaties = fols. 15ra-35rb: *De intellectu et specie(bus)*; fols. 35rb-48vb: *De ente et essentia*; fols. 48vb-82vb: *De intellectu et voluntate*; fols. 82vb-98rb: a mix between the *Materia de Christo* and the tract *De formis*; fols. 98rb-118ra: *De unitate formae substantialis in eodem supposito*),¹ a *Correctorium Corruptorii* attributed to John of Paris (fols. 118ra-151ra) and, finally, John Picard's *Quaestiones* (fols. 151ra-182vb).

- E Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana, Cod. Amplon. Fol. 321, qq. 1-11, fols. 99rb-108vb [edited text in this volume: qq. 1,7-8,10 = fols. 99rb-vb, 101rb-103va, 104rb-105vb]

Headline: *In isto quaternione continentur istae quaestiones: Utrum theologia sit scientia; Utrum esse rei sit immediate a deo uel ab aliis causis; Utrum materia extensa per quantitatem differat realiter a se non extensa; Utrum in angelo movente orbis vel aliquid aliud sit aliqua alia potentia praeter intellectum et voluntatem; Utrum intellectus agens sit*

¹ The meticulous description of this part of the manuscript and the edition of the *De formis* can be found in L. M. DE RIJK, *General Introduction*, cit., pp. XVIII-XXI; for the edition of the and *De esse et essentia* see HERVAEUS NATALIS, *De quattuor materiis sive Determinationes contra magistrum Henricum de Gandavo*, vol. I: *De esse et essentia*, ed. L. M. DE RIJK, Turnhout 2013. As for Picard's *Quaestiones*, also the text of the *De quattuor materiis* present in the Vatican manuscript is corrupted, so that De Rijk states: "Returning now to the first portion of the manuscript, the text concerning the diverse tracts of *De quattuor materiis* is neatly written by an apparently inaccurate copyist, unless the many textual omissions are the result of *homoioteleuta* errors of the scribe's exemplar", see L. M. DE RIJK, *General Introduction*, cit., p. XX.

aliquid animae; Utrum species intentionales recipiant numerum ab obiecto vel subiecto; Utrum sit unum esse omnium quae sunt in homine vel in alio quocumque, scilicet accidentium et substantiarum; Utrum Deus possit potentiam passivam reducere in actum absque obiecto; Utrum intellectus agens intelligat; Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia; Utrum elementa sint actu in mixto; Utrum materia sit principium individuationis vel aliquid aliud; Quid sit principium individuationis; Quomodo dimensiones interminatae et aliae dispositiones formam praecedant etc. utque.

Beginning (q. 1, fol. 99rb): *Utrum theologia sit scientia. Circa istam quaestionem duo in genere sunt consideranda. Primo, quid secundum aliquos sit dicendum.*

Ending (q. 15, fol. 108vb): *Pro tanto enim ista materia est essentialiter alia ab illa, quia ista materia essentialiter et totaliter.*

CONTENT: The codex is composed by two distinct parts, which are bound together: the first part contains Thomas Aquinas's *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* almost in its entirety (fols. 1ra-62va), whereas the second part comprises an *Abbreviatio* of the first two *Quodlibeta* of James of Viterbo written by Bernard of Auvergne (Bernardus de Gannato) (fols. 63ra-92rb), five *Collationes in libros Sententiarum* (fols. 92va-96vb; fols. 97va-98vb) and other miscellaneous questions (fols. 99rb-108vb). Eleven of these *Quaestiones philosophicae* can be attributed to John Picard and three are taken from Nicholas of Strasbourg's *Summa philosophiae*. This mix of authors should not be considered so unusual. Indeed, Loris Sturlese has already shown that Picard had a great impact on Nicholas's *Summa*, and it seems plausible that a 14th-century scribe put their questions together.²

APPENDIX

Index of the *Quaestiones* from Ms. Vat. Lat. 859, fols. 151ra-182vb (= V), with a comparison with Cod. Amplon. Fol. 321, fols. 99rb-108vb (= E):

E, fol. 98vb: In isto quaternione continentur istae quaestiones:

V, fol 151r: Frater Johannes de Lecthinberg lector Coloniae, postea bachillarius Parisiensis 38 quaestiones scriptas determinavit Coloniae.

V, Q. 1, fols. 151ra-152rb = E, Q. 1, fol. 99rb-vb: Utrum theologia sit scientia.

² L. STURLESE, "Eckhart, Teodorico e Picardi nella Summa philosophiae di Nicola di Strasburgo. Documenti per una storia della filosofia medievale tedesca," in *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana* V^a serie, 61 [63] (1982), pp. 183-206.

V, Q. 2, fol. 152rb-152va: Utrum tres personae divinae possint assumere eandem numero humanam naturam.

V, Q. 3, fols. 152va-153ra: Utrum Deus potuerit sumere humanam naturam sine supposito.

V, Q. 4, fol. 153ra-153va: Utrum in transsubstantiatione sic facta conversio fuisset, quod materia in materiam et forma panis in formam Christi, si aliquis apostolorum in triduo celebrasset.

V, Q. 5, fol. 153va-155rb: Utrum lux sit qualitas realis vel intentionalis.

V, Q. 6, fols. 155rb-156rb = *E*, Q. 6, fols. 101rb-102ra: Utrum species intentionales recipiant numerum ab obiecto vel subiecto.

V, Q. 7, fols. 156rb-157va = *E*, Q. 7, fol. 102ra-102vb: Utrum sit unum esse omnium quae sunt in homine vel in alio quocumque, scilicet accidentium et substantiarum.

V, Q. 8, fols. 157va-158rb: Utrum relatio in divinis distinguat personas inquantum sunt [*coni.*: est] idem essentia vel inquantum differunt ab ea.

V, Q. 9, fols. 158rb-159ra = *E*, Q. 8, fols. 102vb-103va: Utrum Deus possit potentiam passivam reducere in actum absque obiecto.

V, Q. 10, fols. 159ra-160ra: Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia.

V, Q. 11, fol. 160ra-161rb: Utrum in materia generabilium et corruptibilium sit aliqua inchoatio formae.

V, Q. 12, fol. 161rb-161va: Utrum in materia sit aliqua forma diminuta, que postea fiat forma supposito.

V, Q. 13, fol. 161va-161vb: Quaeritur utrum materia prima sit una omnium.

V, Q. 14, fols. 161vb-162ra: Utrum materia proxima aliquid reale addat super materiam primam.

V, Q. 15, fol. 162ra-162va: Utrum theologia sit scientia practica vel speculativa.

V, Q. 16, fols. 162va-164rb: Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma.

V, Q. 17, fols. 164rb-165rb: Utrum caritas, qua diligimus Deum, sit aliquod creatum in anima.

V, Q. 18, fols. 165rb-166va: Utrum in homine sit tantum una forma substantialis.

V, Q. 19, fols. 166va-168rb = *E*, Q. 10, fols. 104rb-105vb: Utrum dimensiones vel aliquae dispositiones accidentales praecedant formam substantialem in materia.

V, Q. 20, fols. 168rb-171ra = Utrum in omni creatura esse et essentia differant vel habeant illud, quod sint idem.

V, Q. 21, fols. 171ra-172ra = *E*, Q. 11, fol. 105vb-*Incomplete, one sheet cut out*: Utrum elementa sint actu in mixto.

V, Q. 22, fols. 172ra-173va: Utrum imago trinitatis sit in anima vel secundum actum [*coni.*: actus] vel secundum potentiam.

V, Q. 23, fols. 173va-174vb: Utrum in Deo sit ponere pluralitatem attributorum realem.

V, Q. 24, fols. 174vb-175va: Utrum Deus sit simplex.

V, Q. 25, fols. 175va-176rb = E, Q. 3, fol. 100rb-100va: Utrum materia extensa per quantitatem differat realiter a se non extensa.

V, Q. 26, fol. 176rb-176va = E, Q. 2, fols. 99vb-100rb: Utrum esse rei sit immediate a deo uel ab aliis causis.

V, Q. 27, fols. 176va-177ra = E, Q. 4, fols. 100va-101ra: Utrum in angelo movente orbem vel aliquid aliud sit aliqua alia potentia praeter intellectum et voluntatem.

V, Q. 28, fol. 177ra-177rb: Utrum sit maior unio per intellectum vel voluntatem.

V, Q. 29, fol. 177rb: Iterum quaeritur utrum laus patriae sit magis voluntatis quam intellectus.

V, Q. 30, fol. 177rb-177va = E, Q. 5, fol. 101ra-101rb: Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae.

V, Q. 31 (4), fol. 177va: Utrum intellectus agens habeat operationem circa quidditatem. *Additional information on V, Q. 28, fol. 177ra-177va (?) = E, Q. 9, fols. 103vb-104ra – Rest of the column empty*: Utrum intellectus agens intelligat.

V, Q. 32, fol. 177va: Utrum voluntatis libertas sit a se vel ab alio.

V, Q. 33, fol. 177va-177vb: Utrum species expressa intelligibilis in acie cogitantis sit idem cum actu intelligendi.

V, Q. 34, fols. 177vb-178va: Quaerebatur utrum materia posset esse sine forma ex potentia divina.

V, Q. 35, fols. 178va-179va: Utrum mundus potuerit esse ab aeterno.

V, Q. 36, fols. 179va-180vb: Utrum gravia et levia moveant se ipsa vel moveantur ab alio.

V, Q. 37, fols. 180vb-181vb: Utrum voluntas moveat se ipsam vel ab alio moveatur.

V, Q. 38, fols. 181vb-182ra: Utrum Deus possit facere duo accidentia eiusdem rationis in eodem subiecto.

V, Q. 39, fols. 182ra-182vb: Utrum relatio addat aliquid reale supra [*an super scrib.?*] suum fundamentum.

In addition to these common questions, Cod. E adds four more questions:

Q. 12: fol. 106ra-106vb = NICOLAUS DE ARGENTINA, *Summa*, Lib. II, tract. 1,

Q. 12, ed. T. Suarez-Nani, Leipzig 1990, pp. 48-53: Utrum materia sit principium individuationis vel aliquid aliud.

Q. 13: fols. 106vb-107rb = ?: Consequenter quaeritur quid sit principium individuationis.

Q. 14: fol. 107rb-107vb: *In the middle of the text, the writer jumps to the text of another question* = NICOLAUS DE ARGENTINA, *Summa*, Lib. II, tract. 1, q. 12, ed. T. SUAREZ-NANI, Leipzig 1990, pp. 54-56 (up to l. 107): Quomodo dimensiones interminatae et alie dispositiones praecedant formam substantialem in materia.

Q. 15: fols. 107vb-108vb = *probably* NICOLAUS DE ARGENTINA: Utrum materia inferiorum et superiorum sit eadem.—*The rubricator notes in the lower margin of 107v: Quod sequitur post istud signum # pertinet ad quaestionem: Utrum materia inferiorum et superiorum sit eadem, et est factum per errorem scriptoris.—The last question lacks not only the beginning, but also the end. Folio 108vb is unfinished. The list of questions in fol. 98vb, which may still belong to the 14th century, gives only questions 1-14. The questions have been copied by two different scribes; the second begins on fol. 104rb.*³

B. APPARATUS OF VARIANTS

The apparatus of variants is negative: Only deviations, deletions, additions, etc. are reported, but not text versions of manuscripts that agree with the edited text. Variants are cited with reference to the line in the text whose number is given in the apparatus. If a variant spans several words in the edited text, the first and last are referred to as lemmas; if it spans several lines, the last word is preceded by the corresponding line number in parentheses. If there are two identical words in a line of text, a lemma refers to the first of the two without any special reference. In order not to burden the apparatus, misspellings, clear scribal errors, pictographs or transpositions that do not affect the text are not reported. Deviations that cannot be decided (e.g. *ergo: igitur, ille: iste, neque: nec, sive: seu*) are also disregarded in the apparatus.

C. ABBREVIATIONS

- V Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Ms. Vat. Lat. 859
E Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt, Bibliotheca Amploniana, Cod. Amplon. Fol. 321

- a.m. alia manu
add. addidit (-erunt etc.)
and. adnotavit
c. capitulum
cf. conferatur
coni. conieci
d. distinctio
del. delevit

³ MEISTER ECKHART, *Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke. Herausgegeben im Auftrag der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft: Die lateinischen Werke*, cit., p. 5.

e. g.	exempli gratia
exp.	expunxit
i. m.	in margine
i. v.	infra versum
illeg.	illegibilis (-le)
inv.	invertit
lac.	lac
n.	nota
om.	omisit
q.	quaestio
q. un.	quaestio unica
quaestiun.	quaestiuncula
s. v.	supra versum
resp.	responsio
sect.	sectio
spec.	specialiter
tit.	titulo
tract.	tractatus
transl.	translatio

D. CHARACTERS

- |...| Beginning of a new column or page of the manuscript, which is cited in the margin.
- <...> Addition of text deemed necessary by the editors.
- † Missing part of the text can neither be corrected by another manuscript nor by another author's text, nor it can be conjectured.

6. EDITION

JOHANNES PICARDI DE LICHTENBERG

QUAESTIONES I-XIX

Frater Johannes de Lechtinberg, lector Coloniae, postea bachillarius Parisiensis. 38 quaestiones scriptas determinavit Coloniae

QUAESTIO I

[V 151ra – E 99ra] UTRUM THEOLOGIA SIT SCIENTIA

- (1) Circa istam quaestionem duo in genere sunt consideranda.
- (2) Primo, quid secundum aliquos sit dicendum. Secundo, quid secundum veritatem sit tenendum, ut illud Philosophi⁴ observemus⁵, quod dicit in XII *Metaphysicae*⁶: “Amare quidem utrosque”, scilicet et dicentes non scientiam et dicentes scientiam⁷, “persuaderi⁸ a⁹ certioribus”.
- (3) Quantum ad primum nunc¹⁰ est quadruplex opinio.
- (4) Quidam¹¹) dicunt, quod est verissima scientia et omnibus aliis evidentior propter sua principia, quae magis sunt certa in lumine fidei quam aliarum scientiarum principia, sicut et lumen fidei est altius lumine naturali, cui aliae scientiae innituntur.
- (5) Sed illud statim apparet falsum. Constat enim, quod ratio fidei non patitur evidentiam. Unde dicit Apostolus *Ad Hebraeos* 12¹²), quod “fides” est¹³ “argumentum non apparentium”, et

⁴ Philosophi: phi *E*

⁵ observemus: servemus *sed add. s. v. ob E*

⁶ Arist., *Metaph.* XII 8, 1073b11–16; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 217,1–2.

⁷ et ... scientiam: et dicentes scientiam et non dicentes non scientiam *sed non exp. E*

⁸ persuaderi: persuadere *V*

⁹ a *add. vero E*

¹⁰ nunc: tuc *E*

¹¹) Cf. Alb., In I Sent., d. 1, a. 3; Burger 14,41–47; etiam Alb., S. th., prol.; Siedler 2,16–29; Alb., S. th., prol.; Siedler 3,54–59; Alb., S. th., I, q. 1; Siedler 6,43–53; Alb., S. th., I, q. 1; Siedler 7,34–42; Alb., S. th., I, q. 1; Siedler 7,76–81; Alb., S. th., I, q. 4; Siedler 15,1–9; et etiam Thom., S. th. I, q. 1, a. 5, resp.; Leon. 6b.

¹²) *Hebr.* 11,1.

¹³ est: est *sed del. E*

Augustinus¹⁴) dicit, quod “fides est credere, quod non vides”, et Gregorius in *Homiliis*¹⁵): “Apparentia non habent fidem, sed agnitionem^{16,17}).

(6) »Nec valet, quod imaginatur¹⁸ de lumine, quod lumen fidei sit quid manifestans evidenter credibilia sicut lumen solis colores. Dicitur enim fides ipsa lumen quoddam, in quantum per ipsam mens hominis inclinatur ad assentiendum his, quae sunt fidei, sicut¹⁹ et per alios²⁰ habitus virtutum homo videt, quod sibi secundum illum²¹ vel illum habitum est conveniens, et ad hoc inclinatur²²). Dicitur tamen magis proprie videre per fidem, quia fides est habitus intellectus, qui est oculus animae²³).

(7) Unde alii²⁴) dicunt, quod est verissima scientia non propter lumen fidei, quod est in omnibus fidelibus communiter, sed propter aliud lumen, quod infunditur theologis, secundum quod theologi multa concludentes²⁵ et scientes differunt ab aliis; et illud lumen non est in aliis, et ideo illi credunt, quod isti sciunt. Et hoc confirmant per hoc, quod dicit Augustinus²⁶) <quod> aliud lumen requiritur ad credendum et aliud ad intelligendum”.

(8) »Sed hoc etiam est²⁷ fictitium, quia non est altius lumen in hac vita quam lumen fidei, ita ut etiam cognitio, quae habetur in raptu, vel quaecumque alia cuiuscumque doni sub²⁸ lumine fidei concluduntur²⁹, ut dicit Dionysius 1 cap. *Caelestis*³⁰ *hierarchiae*³¹): “Non est possibile nobis aliter superlucere divinum radium nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum³² anagogice^{33,34} et his, quae³⁵ secundum nos sunt, providentia paterna connaturaliter et proprie praeparatum”.

¹⁴) Aug., Serm. de vet. test. 43, 1; Lambot 508,6–7; Aug., In Iohan., 40, 9; Willems 355,7–9; cf. etiam Petrus Lomb., Sent., II, d. 27, c. 8, s. 3–5; Grottaferrata 486,19; 486,25; 487,4–5; etiam Petrus Lomb., Sent., III, d. 23, c. 7, s. 3; Grottaferrata 146,15–18.

¹⁵) Greg., In Ev. Hom., n. 26, 8; Étaix 224,180–181; cf. etiam Thom., S. th., I, q. 12, a. 13, arg. 3; Leon. 137a; Thom., S. th., II–II, q. 1, a. 5 sed contra; Leon. 16a; Petrus Lomb., Sent., III, d. 23, c. 7, s. 1; Grottaferrata 145,16–17.

¹⁶ agnitionem: cognitionem V

¹⁷) Cf. Thom., S. th., II–II, q. 4, a. 1 resp.; Leon. 43a–44b; cf. etiam Thom., De ver., q. 14, a. 2; Dondaine 439,1–444,441.

¹⁸ imaginatur: immaginantur E

¹⁹ sicut: sic V

²⁰ alios: aliquos E

²¹ illum: illud V

²²) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, prolog., 1; Bonini 14,218–222; cf. etiam Thom., In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiu. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 727; Thom., Super Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1, ad arg. 4; Gils 109a–b.

²³) Cf. Aug., In Iohan., 35, 3; Willems 319,27–30; Aug., De Gen. ad litt., XII, 7; Zycha 389,15–17.

²⁴) Cf. Henr. de Gand., Summa, a. 6, q. 1; a. 13, q. 2; q. 4; q. 6; q. 7; q. 8; Badius 42vB–vD; 91rT–rV, 92vM–93rO; 94rA–95vM; 95O–97X; 97A; etiam Henricus de Gand., *Quodl. XII*, q. 2; Decorte 14,1–27,101.

²⁵ concludentes: concludunt V

²⁶) Aug., In Iohan., 2, 6; Willems 14,3–15,18; cf. Aug., De Trin. XIII, 1, 2; Mountain-Glorie 381,26–382,41; etiam Henr. de Gand., *Quodl. XII*, q. 2, ad arg. 1; Decorte 17,82–18,88; 20,28–37.

²⁷ etiam est inv. E

²⁸ sub: sub *sed del.* E

²⁹ concluduntur: occluduntur V

³⁰ Caelestis: angelicae EV acte *sed corr.* V

³¹) Dion., De cael. hier. 1, 2; PG 3,121B–C; Dionysiaca 733A–C; Heil 8,10–13; cf. etiam Alb., S. th., I, q. 5, c. 1; Siedler 17,1–5.

³² circumvelatum om. *sed suppl. i. m.* V

³³ circumvelatum anagogice inv. E

- (9) Constat autem, quod beatus Dionysius theologus magnus fuit et tamen sine velamine³⁶, quod ad aenigma spectat³⁷, non intellexit³⁸).
- (10) Praeterea constat, quod, si simplex fidelis se exercitaret in theologia, fieret theologus et tamen de illo lumine nihil experiretur.
- (11) »Praeterea alii magistri in theologia aeque magni contradicunt isti³⁹ opinioni vel maiores nihil de isto⁴⁰ lumine sentientes, quod tamen inconueniens esset, si |V 151rb| lateret eos tam nobilis habitus, per quem alia manifestantur, sicut arguit Philosophus libro *Posteriorum*⁴¹)⁴²).
- (12) Nec valet, quod dicitur de Augustino, quia intelligit, quod aliud lumen requiritur⁴³ ad credendum, quod est in hac vita, aliud ad intelligendum, quod est in alia vita, et habetur ibi, non hic.
- (13) Unde dicunt alii⁴⁴), quod est scientia consequentiae, non consequentis, quia suppositis quibusdam, scilicet articulis, scilicet⁴⁵ ut principiis, tunc concludit quaedam, quae necessario consequuntur, non quod scientia consequens sit necessaria, sed necessitas consequentis et consequentia⁴⁶.
- (14) Sed hoc etiam minus bene dicitur. Mirum⁴⁷ est⁴⁸ enim, quod totus labor sanctorum doctorum, Augustini, Dionysii, Gregorii⁴⁹ et aliorum, qui multiplicaverunt libros, ad hoc tantum⁵⁰ venerit, quod solum scirent consequentias et his, quae sequuntur, non ut in se intellectis inhaerent.
- (15) Praeterea tunc plus de ratione scientiae haberent haeretici quam fideles, cum illi etiam cum his, quae concludunt, et illatis non illatione tantum parati sint se tantum exponere tormentis.
- (16) Praeterea ponamus, quod magister in theologia sit hodie fidelis, cras⁵¹ infidelis; constat, quod hic novit theologiam, quod ex hoc patet⁵², quod⁵³ docere potest Parisius vel alibi sicut⁵⁴ prius; oportet ergo illum differre a fideli magistro; sed non est aliquid, in quo differat, quantum ad

³⁴ anagogice *add.* communicabant V

³⁵ quae: quod *sed del.* E

³⁶ velamine *coni.*: velaminibus EV

³⁷ spectat: pertinet *sed exp. et corr. s. v.* E

³⁸) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, prol., 1; Bonini 8,124–133.

³⁹ isti: illi V

⁴⁰ isto: illo V

⁴¹) Arist., Anal. post., II 19, 99b20–35; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 104,16–105,8.

⁴²) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, prol., 1; Bonini 8,133–9,137.

⁴³ requiritur *om.* V

⁴⁴) *non inveni sed cf.* God. de Font., Quodl. IX, q. 20, resp.; Hoffmans 285.

⁴⁵ scilicet *an sicut scrib.?*

⁴⁶ *An consequentiae scrib.?*

⁴⁷ mirum: stultum E

⁴⁸ est *an esset scrib.?*

⁴⁹ Dionysii, Gregorii: Gregorii et Dionysii E

⁵⁰ tantum: tamen E

⁵¹ cras: *add.* sit E

⁵² ex hoc patet: patet ex hoc E

⁵³ quod: quia V

⁵⁴ sicut: ut E

scientiam spectat, nisi quod illis articulis, quibus ipse prius, cum esset fidelis, utabatur⁵⁵ ut dignitatibus, nunc utitur ut suppositionibus tantum, sicut prior ista utitur “A”, “B”, “C” et aliis transcendentibus; habet ergo fidelis magister plus quam infidelis, infidelis autem habet scientiam consequentiae; ergo et caetera.⁵⁶

(17) Unde alii⁵⁷) dicunt, quod nullo modo est scientia. Omnis enim scientia, si non est subalternata, praesupponit sua principia et scit *quid et propter quid*; si vero sit subalterna debet sibi saltem notum esse⁵⁸, quia sicut chirurgicus⁵⁹ scit *quia* vulnera circularia difficile sanantur, quia hoc videt et experitur, sed geometra scit *propter quid*⁶⁰), quia scit, quod circulus est figura⁶¹ rotunda sine angulo, |E 99rb| unde partes non appropinquant sibi, sicut dicitur I Posteriorum⁶²) ante illud⁶³ capitulum “Figurarum autem”. Sed theologus nec scit *quid* vel *quia* nec *propter quid* de suis articulis.

(18) Sed illud⁶⁴ etiam non concludit. Potest enim aliquis esse chirurgicus⁶⁵, cui numquam occurrat⁶⁶ experientia, utrum vulnera circularia de facili vel difficili sanentur, et in diversis scientiis sunt multa principia, quae supponuntur⁶⁷ tamquam a superiori nota, quorum nec experientiam nec causam⁶⁸ habent, qui tamen habent scientiam, et multi medicorum ex librorum scientia agunt et puerile est dicere, quod⁶⁹ non habeant scientiam nisi post omnium primorum principiorum suorum experientiam, sed sufficit alteri credere experto. Sic enim auditus credit disciplinae, ut habetur libro *De sensu et sensato*⁷⁰), et accipitur scientia per doctrinam. Et sic patet primum principale.

(19) Circa secundum consideranda sunt quattuor.

(20) Primo, quae sint huius scientiae principia, cum non sit scientia sine principiiis.

(21) Secundo, quae sit evidentia principiorum.

(22) Tertio, quae conclusionum.

(23) Quarto concludetur propositum.

(24) Circa primum intelligendum⁷¹, quod circa hoc est triplex opinio.

⁵⁵ utabatur: utabatur V

⁵⁶ ergo et caetera om. V

⁵⁷) Cf. God. de Font., Quodl. IV, q. 10; De Wulf – Pelzer 260-264; God. de Font., Quodl. XIV, q. 5; Hoffmans 401; etiam God. de Font., Quodl. IX, q. 20; Hoffmans 285; et etiam Rich. Fish., In Sent., prol.; Long 90.

⁵⁸ si ... nota: sed tum sibi dicunt esse nota V

⁵⁹ chirurgicus: cerulicus E chirurgicus V

⁶⁰) Cf. Auct. Arist., 35, n. 65, n. 31; Hamesse 316,85–317,87 ex Arist., Anal. post., I 13, 79a11–12; 79a13–16.

⁶¹ circulus ... figura: figura circulus est E

⁶²) Arist., Anal. post., I 13, 79a14–17; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 32,15–18; cf. etiam Thom., Exp. Post., I 25, 79a13; I 41, 87a31; Gauthier 92,161–182; 151,15–30.

⁶³ sicut ... illud lac. E

⁶⁴ illud om. V

⁶⁵ chirurgicus: cerulicus E

⁶⁶ occurrat: occurrit E

⁶⁷ supponuntur: a superiori praem. sed del. V

⁶⁸ nec... causam: experientiam non causam V

⁶⁹ quod: et praem. E

⁷⁰) Alb., *De sens.*, I, tract. 1, c. 2; Donati 22,13–18.

⁷¹ intelligendum: considerandum sed exp. et corr. s. v. E

- (25) Quidam⁷²⁾ dicunt, quod communes animi conceptiones sunt huius scientiae principia, et hoc propter tria.
- (26) Primo, quia virtute harum ex articulis fidei conclusiones deducuntur; hoc autem est principium, in quo virtute est conclusio⁷³⁾.
- (27) Secundo, quia plus sciens de philosophia⁷⁴⁾, quae innititur eis, etiam plus scit⁷⁵⁾ hoc, quando se confert⁷⁶⁾ ad istam scientiam.
- (28) Tertio, quia ista principia sunt priora et universaliora quam articuli, quia sicut subiectum de⁷⁷⁾ subiecto, sic scientia sub scientia et principia sub principiis; subiectum autem huius scientiae, quod est Deus, est sub subiecto metaphysicae⁷⁸⁾, quod est ens communiter acceptum⁷⁹⁾.
- (29) Alii⁸⁰⁾ dicunt, quod est duplex principium, scilicet in genere – et sic sunt articuli, quibus ista sola doctrina utitur –, aliud extra genus – et sic sunt communes conceptiones, quibus innituntur omnes scientiae.
- (30) Sed nulla harum opinionum est vera. Ista enim scientia est de hiis⁸¹⁾, quae naturali ratione non attinguntur; sed quidquid probatur per communes animi conceptiones, naturale est⁸²⁾ animi, et ipsa principia sint⁸³⁾ nota naturali lumine.
- (31) Praeterea articuli fidei spectant ad istam scientiam, sed nec resolvuntur in communes animi conceptiones, nec etiam⁸⁴⁾ per eas possunt⁸⁵⁾ probari.
- (32) Item nec secunda positio est vera, quia principia in genere reducuntur ad principia extra genus et ab eodem⁸⁶⁾ habent probari. Hoc autem de articulis non convenit.
- (33) Nec rationes primae opinionis valent, quia ista scientia utitur communibus conceptionibus quasi quibusdam instrumentis, sicut et gratia utitur natura, sicut et caecus per gratiam illuminatus videt naturali organo⁸⁷⁾, non⁸⁸⁾ autem utitur communibus conceptionibus ut primis fundamentis⁸⁹⁾.

⁷²⁾ *non inveni*

⁷³⁾ Cf. Thom., Exp. Post., I 3, 71a29; Gauthier 15,54–60; etiam Thom., S. th., II–II, q. 44, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 332a–b.

⁷⁴⁾ *philosophia: prophetia V*

⁷⁵⁾ *scit om. V*

⁷⁶⁾ *se confert inv. E*

⁷⁷⁾ *de an sub scrib.?*

⁷⁸⁾ Cf. Henr. de Gand., Summa, a. 7, q. 6, ad arg. 2; Badius 56rS.

⁷⁹⁾ Cf. Henr. de Gand., Summa, a. 19, q. 1, ad arg. 4; a. 21, q. 3; Badius 115vL; 126rD.

⁸⁰⁾ Cf. Pecham, Super Sent., prol. q. 2, a. 2, p. 1, ad arg.5; de Benedittis [forthcoming] (F, 4vb; N, 4vb); etiam Rich. de Mediavill., In Sent., prol., q. 2, resp.; Brixiae 1591 5a–b.

⁸¹⁾ *hiis: illis V*

⁸²⁾ *naturale est inv. E*

⁸³⁾ *sint: an sunt scrib.?*

⁸⁴⁾ *etiam om. E*

⁸⁵⁾ *per ... possunt: possunt per eas E*

⁸⁶⁾ *ab eodem: ex eisdem sed del. et corr. s. v. E*

⁸⁷⁾ *naturali organo inv. E*

⁸⁸⁾ *non: nunc V*

⁸⁹⁾ *fundamentis: fundatis V*

(34) Nec secunda valet, quia hoc est, quia melius utitur instrumentis naturalibus et scientiis mundanis, quas ista scientia⁹⁰ sumit⁹¹ in obsequium, non ad necessitatem, unde dicuntur huiusmodi scientiae ancillae, *Prov.* 9⁹²).

(35) Ad tertiam dicendum, |V 151va| quod causata est huius communitas sicut illius, quia huius per attributionem⁹³, illius per praedicationem, et tamen super omnem conceptionem, quam metaphysicus potest concipere sive de ente creato sive etiam de⁹⁴ ipso Deo, adhuc Deus, qui est huius scientiae subiectum, excedit, cum sit “super omnem visionem et cognitionem”, sicut dicitur 5 cap. *Mysticae theologiae*⁹⁵).

(36) Unde est tertia opinio, quod huius scientiae principia sunt articuli fidei. Sicut enim in aliis scientiis omnis scientia utitur suis principiis, ut Alanus dicit in *Maximis theologiae*⁹⁶), sic et ista. Et quia ista scientia innititur lumini speciali⁹⁷, ideo et sua principia habet specialia, quae dicuntur articuli fidei. Et sicut in aliis scientiis quaedam sunt principia generalia, quaedam autem sunt⁹⁸ magis specialia, ita et hi sunt articuli quasi generalia, sed aliae auctoritates Bibliae quasi specialia.

(37) Unde circa secundum⁹⁹ considerandum de evidentia horum principiorum, quod aliquid¹⁰⁰ dicitur evidens dupliciter. Uno modo ex se, sicut quod per se obiectum intellectui se ipso repraesentatur¹⁰¹, et sic sunt prima principia, quae notis terminis noscuntur – et sic non sunt evidentes¹⁰² articuli. Alio modo aliquid est notum ex alio, et hoc dupliciter: vel ex quo sicut principio, sicut contingit in scientiis subalternis, vel ex alio sicut ex effectu. Primum non habet locum in nobis, quia scientia beatorum, in qua nota sunt principia haec, transcendit nostram scientiam et est nobis ignota. Sed de effectu etiam est impossibile, quia per effectum naturalem non innotescunt haec principia sive articuli, quia sic¹⁰³ philosophi attigissent eos, nec per effectus gratiae, quia¹⁰⁴ illi transcendunt non solum cognitionem hominum, sed etiam naturalem

⁹⁰ scientia: scientiant *sed corr. V; om. E*

⁹¹ sumit *om. sed accipit add i. m. V*

⁹² *Prov.* 9,3 *ex Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 5, sed contra; Leon. 16a.*

⁹³ attributionem *add. et E*

⁹⁴ *de om. V*

⁹⁵ Dion., *De myst. theol.*, 2, 1; PG 3,1025A; Ritter 145,1–3; transl. Sarraceni: *Dionysiaca 579D, apud Thom. Gall., Extract. de Lib. Beat. Dion., in: J. McEvoy (ed.), Mystical Theology, The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia, Paris–Leuven–Dudley 2003, 1–51, spec. 32.*

⁹⁶ Alan. *de Ins., Regul. cael. iur.*, prolog., 1; Häring 121.

⁹⁷ speciali: spirituali *sed corr. V*

⁹⁸ sunt *om. V*

⁹⁹ circa secundum *om. V*

¹⁰⁰ aliquid: alio *V*

¹⁰¹ repraesentatur: repraesentat *V*

¹⁰² evidentes: evidenter *V*

¹⁰³ sic: similiter *V*

¹⁰⁴ quia: qui *V*

cognitionem angelorum, et multo magis operationes intraneae, secundum quas distinguuntur Personae, quarum Trinitas cadit sub fide, cum¹⁰⁵ sit unum principium.

(38) Circa tertium, videlicet evidentiā¹⁰⁶ conclusionum, sciendum, quod circa hoc est triplex opinio.

(39) Una, quod conclusiones sint¹⁰⁷ evidētiore principii, scilicet articulis, quia articuli solum creduntur, sed conclusiones virtute primorum principiorum sciuntur.

(40) Sed hoc non valet, quia, secundum quod¹⁰⁸ dicitur I *Posteriorum*¹⁰⁹), oportet non solum credere |E 99va| principiis, sed plus quam conclusionibus.

(41) Praeterea quando attribuitur duobus¹¹⁰, uni ut principali, alteri ut instrumento¹¹¹, magis debet iudicari secundum principale quam secundum instrumentum; articuli autem sunt principales, communes autem conceptiones animi ut¹¹² instrumenta.

(42) Praeterea, omnis conclusio explicat, quod est implicite in principiis, unde non potest plus habere evidētia, quam sit in principiis.

(43) Secunda positio est, quod aequae notae sunt conclusiones principii per quoddam lumen desuper infusum, scilicet lumen fidei, per quod et articuli et conclusiones sunt manifeste et evidenter. Sed hoc improbatum est¹¹³.

(44) Unde est tertia opinio, quod¹¹⁴ sicut principia, sic¹¹⁵ etiam conclusiones sunt inevidentes. Loquimur enim nunc de conclusionibus huius scientiae. Conclusiones autem huiusmodi sunt, quaecumque ex principiis huius scientiae concluduntur; sed, sicut dicit Philosophus I *Posteriorum*¹¹⁶), “propter quod unumquodque.¹¹⁷ et illud magis”; cum ergo evidētia conclusionum sit propter¹¹⁸ evidētia principiorum, si principia non sunt evidētia, nec conclusiones.

(45) Ex his possumus concludere propositum dicentes, quod »scientia¹¹⁹ dupliciter potest¹²⁰ considerari. Uno modo stricte et in suo potissimo esse, sicut accipitur a Commentatore II

¹⁰⁵ cum: tamen *add. sed exp. E om. V*

¹⁰⁶ videlicet evidentiā: scilicet evidētia V

¹⁰⁷ sint: sit E

¹⁰⁸ secundum quod: ut E

¹⁰⁹) Arist., Anal. post., I 3, 72a30–32; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluella – Dod 9,15–16.

¹¹⁰ principiis ... duobus *illeg. E*

¹¹¹ principali, alteri ut instrumento: instrumento, et alteri ut principali E

¹¹² ut: uti V

¹¹³ improbatum est: improbant V

¹¹⁴ quod: quia V

¹¹⁵ sic: ita V

¹¹⁶) Arist., Anal. post., I 3, 72a29–30; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluella – Dod 9,13–16.

¹¹⁷ unumquodque *add. tale V*

¹¹⁸ propter: per V

¹¹⁹ scientia: principia *sed exp. et corr. i. m. E principia V*

¹²⁰ potest: possunt *sed exp. et corr. s. v. E possunt V*

*Physicorum*¹²¹), ubi dicit, quod scientia est habitus veridicus conclusionum deductarum ex principiis necessariis et manifestis ipsi deducendi. Et hoc modo sumendo scientiam, secundum quod etiam dicit Philosophus I *Posteriorum*¹²²) de principiis, quod non convenit ea ignorare, et de conclusione, quod impossibile est¹²³ eam aliter¹²⁴ se habere, et de deductione ex principiis, quod non solum causam scit in se, sed quod causa est illi, scilicet conclusioni, sic igitur accipiendo scientiam, non est scientia nec aliae multae scientiae sic sunt, ut puta naturalis, moralis et multae aliae, cum loquatur ibi¹²⁵ de scientia secundum suum potissimum esse, quale habet solum in scientiis primis, scilicet mathematicis, ubi principia lumine naturali¹²⁶ sunt magis nota conclusionibus.

(46) Alio modo potest accipi scientia, prout ipsum nomen sonat a “scire”, quod descendit “a discere¹²⁷”, sicut¹²⁸ dicit Isidorus in principio libri¹²⁹ *Etymologiarum*¹³⁰), et sic de ratione scientiae sunt duo: unum ex parte conclusionum, scilicet quod ex aliquibus principiis deducantur; secundum ex parte principiorum, scilicet quod sint certitudinaliter accepta, vel in se, sicut contingit in scientiis primis, vel in superiorum¹³¹ certificatis, sicut contingit in scientiis subalternis. Et hoc modo theologia est scientia, et sic accipitur¹³² VI *Ethicorum*¹³³), ubi dicit Philosophus, quod scientia “est ex praecognitis” et creditis, quia huius scientiae principia sunt¹³⁴ praecognita cognitione fidei, cum fides determinet intellectum ad aliquod intelligibile, quod est cognoscere, et etiam sunt credita«¹³⁵¹³⁶).

(47) Vel potest intelligi, quod sint praecognita in alia scientia et hic credita, et sic accipiendo scientiam stricte secundum suum |V 151vb| esse potissimum¹³⁷ non est scientia¹³⁸, sicut nec

¹²¹) *potius* Averr., In Moral. Nic. Exp., VI, 6; Venetiis 1562 85rE–F; Averr., In lib. post., II, 19, comm. 107; Venetiis 1562, vol. I/IIb, 35 I–L; etiam Venetiis 1562, vol. I/IIa, 567D–568D; cf. Arist., Anal. post., II 19, 100a5–17; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 106,16–107,7; Arist., Eth. Nic., VI 6, 1140b31–1141a8; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 258,26–259,7; et etiam Thom., In I Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 3, qc. 2, ad arg. 3; Oliva 324,91–95; Thom., Exp. Post., II 20, 100a16–100b13; Gauthier 246,288–247,322.

¹²²) Cf. Arist., Anal. post., I 1, 71a1–2; I 2, 71b9–19; I 4, 73a21–25; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 5,3–4; 7,4–16; 12,8–12; cf. Auct. Ar., 35, n. 1et 8–9; Hamesse 311,67–68; 311,86–88.

¹²³ impossibile est: non contingit *sed exp. et corr. i. m. E*

¹²⁴ aliter *scr.:* *sed corr. in alter E alter V*

¹²⁵ ibi: illic *E*

¹²⁶ lumine naturali: luminis naturalis *V*

¹²⁷ discere: disce *V*

¹²⁸ sicut: ut *E*

¹²⁹ principio libri: I libro *E*

¹³⁰) Isidor., Etym., I, 1, 2–3; Lindsay 25.

¹³¹ superiorum: superiori *E*

¹³² accipitur: in *add. E*

¹³³) Arist., Eth. Nic., VI 3, 1139b26–27; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 255,25–26.

¹³⁴ sunt: *ex corr. E. non praem V*

¹³⁵) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 3,32–35; 12,185–13,205.

¹³⁶) Thom., S. th., I, q. 12, a. 13, ad arg. 3; Leon. 138b.

¹³⁷ esse potissimum *inv. E*

¹³⁸ scientia *add. cum* secundum Philosophum I Metaphysicae signum scientis sit posse docere *sed. del. E add. cum* signum scientis sit posse docere *V*

dialectica nec naturalis nec rhetorica, in quibus¹³⁹ non salvantur omnes condiciones posite¹⁴⁰ in libro *Posteriorum*¹⁴¹).

(48) »Si autem accipiatur scientia communiter et proprie¹⁴² et vere, sic est scientia, cum secundum Philosophum I *Metaphysicae*¹⁴³) “signum scientis sit posse docere”, docere autem est per causam¹⁴⁴), quod tamen spectat ad scientiam. Unde Apostolus¹⁴⁵): “In quo sum ego positus doctorum, et praedicator gentium¹⁴⁶”. Sed quia deficit in evidentia suorum principiorum¹⁴⁷ non propter defectum ipsorum, sed nostrum, ideo est imperfecta scientia, sicut et fides, per quam cognoscimus principia, est imperfecta¹⁴⁸). Unde dicit Apostolus¹⁴⁹): “Ex parte cognoscimus et ex parte prophetamus”; et item¹⁵⁰): “Cum venerit, quod perfectum est, evacuabitur, quod ex parte est”, id est, cum venerit visio, evacuabitur¹⁵¹ imperfectum, et hoc attestatur magis eius dignitati, cum sit ex nostrae, quam indignitati, sicut hoc est dignitas priorum principiorum¹⁵², quod de eis non est scientia, sed intellectus. »Et sic etiam metaphysica propter excessum sui subiecti minus evidentibus innititur demonstrationibus quam scientiae quadrivales, et tamen multo dignior est illis scientiis, et non solum est¹⁵³ scientia, sed etiam caput aliarum¹⁵⁴, unde et dicitur sapientia¹⁵⁵¹⁵⁶). Unde sicut aliae scientiae sunt verae scientiae¹⁵⁷, quae innituntur lumini naturali apud omnes utentes lumine naturali, ita et ista apud omnes utentes lumine fidei¹⁵⁸).

(49) Nec obstat, quod aliqui infideles¹⁵⁹ eam accipiant¹⁶⁰, quia sic etiam esset, si Deus alium mundum faceret, qui istis principiis naturalibus non uteretur¹⁶¹, et nihilominus istae, quae nunc sunt scientiae, essent scientiae¹⁶².

¹³⁹ in quibus: in quantum V

¹⁴⁰ posite om. V

¹⁴¹) Cf. Arist., Anal. post., I 1, 71a1–2; I 2, 71b20–22; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 5,3–4; 7,16–19; cf. Auct. Arist., 35, n. 12; Hamesse 312,92–93.

¹⁴² proprie: improprie sed corr. E

¹⁴³) Arist., Metaph., I 1, 981b7–8; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 8,23–24.

¹⁴⁴) Arist., Metaph., I 1, 982a28–30; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 10,4–5; cf. Auct. Arist., 1, n. 14; Hamesse 116,105.

¹⁴⁵) *Ad I Timoth.* 2,7.

¹⁴⁶ gentium: gentia V

¹⁴⁷ suorum principiorum inv. E

¹⁴⁸) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 13,205–210.

¹⁴⁹) *Ad I Cor.* 13,9.

¹⁵⁰) *Ad I Cor.* 13,10.

¹⁵¹ evacuabitur: eva V

¹⁵² principiorum om. V

¹⁵³ est om. V

¹⁵⁴ aliarum: aliorum V

¹⁵⁵ dicitur add. s. v. V

¹⁵⁶) Arist., Eth. Nic., VI 7, 1041a16–20; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 484,1–5; cf. Thom., Exp. Post., II 20, 100b5; Gauthier 246,305–247,311; etiam Thom., In III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiu. 2, sed contra 2; Mandonnet – Moos 1192; Thom., In III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 3, quaestiu. 1, arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 1201.

¹⁵⁷ scientiae om. V

¹⁵⁸) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 13,211–14,217.

¹⁵⁹ infideles: fideles sed corr. s. v. E

¹⁶⁰ accipiant: accipiunt E

¹⁶¹ uteretur: utatur V

(50) Unde Dionysius II cap. *De divinis nominibus*¹⁶³): “Si enim aliquis est, qui” omnino et “totaliter eloquiis resistat, longe omnino erit et a nostra philosophia. Et si non ipsi cura¹⁶⁴ est Dei venerationis ex eloquiis, conclusionum nobis cura¹⁶⁵ sit illius manuductionis ad theologiam scientiam”. Ecce, quomodo theologiam docet¹⁶⁶, et philosophiam et etiam scientiam!

(51) Unde Apostolus I *Ad Corinthios*¹⁶⁷ 8¹⁶⁸): “De his, quae idolis immolantur, scimus, quoniam omnem scientiam habemus”. Sic ergo patet, quod scientia vere et proprie dicta, sed non perfecta.

(52) Ad rationes dicendum. I *Posteriorum*¹⁶⁹¹⁷⁰) dicitur, quod non solum oportet principia magis cognoscere et magis eis¹⁷¹ credere quam ei, quod demonstratur, sed nec aliquid¹⁷² ipso credibilius esse; sed principia huius scientiae non¹⁷³ sunt talia. Dicendum, quod istis principiis magis creditur et magis cognoscuntur certitudine adhaesionis et immobilitatis, licet non evidentiae¹⁷⁴). Unde et Apostolus dicit *Ad Hebraeos* 12¹⁷⁵) fidem fundamentum propter immobilitatem, et hoc est, quod¹⁷⁶ dicit Dionysius 8 cap. *De divinis nominibus*¹⁷⁷), quod “fides est” “manens credentium collocatio, quae istos collocat”, scilicet fideles, “in veritate et in ipsis veritatem |E 99vb| intransmutabili¹⁷⁸ identitate”.

(53) »Ad secundum dicendum¹⁷⁹, quod scientia est eorum, quae sunt ubique; sed fides non est ubique, quia “non omnium est fides”, sicut dicitur *Ad Romanos*¹⁸⁰)«¹⁸¹). »Dicendum, quod hoc est propter defectum non fidei, sed hominum, quia fides, quantum est de se, omnibus proponitur secundum illud “Praedicate Evangelium omni creaturae”¹⁸²), sicut, etiamsi aliqui abicerent¹⁸³ alias scientias, haec non derogaret ipsis«¹⁸⁴).

¹⁶² essent scientiae om. V

¹⁶³) Dion., De div. nom., II, 2; PG 3,640A; Suchla 124,18–125,3; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 68B–D ex Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 2, 18; Simon 55,65–67.

¹⁶⁴ cura: causa a V

¹⁶⁵ cura: causa V

¹⁶⁶ docet: dicet E

¹⁶⁷ Ad Corinthios: Corinthiorum V

¹⁶⁸) *Ad I Cor.* 8,1.

¹⁶⁹ Posteriorum: de tre V

¹⁷⁰) Arist., Anal. post., I 3, 72a30–32; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 9,15–16.

¹⁷¹ eis om. V

¹⁷² aliquid: quid V

¹⁷³ non: nec V

¹⁷⁴) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, porem., q. 6, resp.; Muller 19,118–20,123.

¹⁷⁵) *Hebr.* 11,1; cf. Petrus Lomb., *Collect. in Ep. d. Pauli*, Hebr. 11,1 (448A).

¹⁷⁶ quod add. etiam E

¹⁷⁷) Dion., De div. nom., VII, 4; PG 3,872C; Suchla 199,5–7; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 409D–410B ex Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 7, 34; Simon 362,57–58.

¹⁷⁸ intransmutabili *illeg.* E

¹⁷⁹ dicendum om. E

¹⁸⁰) *rectius Ad II Thess.* 3,2

¹⁸¹) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 3,48–50.

¹⁸²) *Marc.* 16,15.

¹⁸³ abicerent: obicerent contra E

¹⁸⁴) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 19,314–318.

(54) Ad tertium dicitur I *Posteriorum*¹⁸⁵): “Si non est illa, scilicet prima principia, scire nec ea, quae sunt ex his, est scire simpliciter et proprie, sed ex condicione, scilicet si illa sunt”, ergo videtur, quod ista scientia non est simpliciter scientia, sed condicionalis. Dicendum, quod ibi scire non accipitur proprie a Philosopho, prout est¹⁸⁶ principiorum, quia eorum non est scientia, sed intellectus, sed ibi vult, quod principia sint certa et cognita, non tantum supposita, sicut ex suppositione quandoque proceditur¹⁸⁷ in libro *Priorum*¹⁸⁸), quando¹⁸⁹ concluditur; quod “C”, sic “A”, et talis scientia est condicionalis; sed theologia habet de suis principiis certam cognitionem intellectualem; unde est proprie scientia, licet quoad nos imperfecta.

(55) »Ad quartum. Si theologia sit scientia, ergo conclusum in ea est scitum¹⁹⁰; sed theologus hoc non diceret, quia ita per fidem adhaeret¹⁹¹ conclusioni¹⁹² sicut principiis. Praeterea si esset¹⁹³ scitum¹⁹⁴, esset notius principiis, scilicet articulis, quod non est possibile secundum Philosophum I *Posteriorum*¹⁹⁵), qui dicit, quod “oportet principia esse notiora”¹⁹⁶). »Dicendum, quod theologus habens hanc scientiam conclusionem¹⁹⁷ et scit et credit¹⁹⁸, quia, si crederetur conclusio sub ratione particulari¹⁹⁹ et propria, scilicet terminorum significatione, sic credit, quod ex hoc, quod in Christo sunt duae naturae, concludit duas operationes in uno supposito, scilicet unam aeternam et aliam temporalem sive unam increatam et aliam creatam²⁰⁰. Si autem consideretur sub communi ratione credibilitatis²⁰¹, tunc est scita²⁰². Et in hoc differt theologus a simplici fidei, quia, si conclusio theologica proponatur in sermone vel alicui fidei, credit sicut et articulos et non scit; sed theologus ex articulis per se concludit nulli super hoc credens sicut simplex fidelis, sed concludit certissime, quod etiam hoc scilicet sit credibile et credendum, sicut et dialectica docens scit, quod conclusio sua est probabilis²⁰³).

¹⁸⁵) Arist., Anal. post., I 3, 72b13–15; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 10,7–9.

¹⁸⁶ est *om. E*

¹⁸⁷ proceditur *om. V*

¹⁸⁸) Arist., Anal. post., I 1, 24a28–24b10; transl. Boethii (recensiones duae): Minio-Paluello 5,21–6,3; 143,19–21.

¹⁸⁹ quando *om. V*

¹⁹⁰ scitum: sa[...] *lac. V*

¹⁹¹ adhaeret *om. V*

¹⁹² conclusionem: cognosci *V*

¹⁹³ esset *dub. E*

¹⁹⁴ scitum: satis *V*

¹⁹⁵) Arist., Anal. post., I 2, 71b29–30; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 8,2–3; cf. Auct. Arist., 35, n. 12; Hamesse 312,92–93.

¹⁹⁶) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 3,39–43.

¹⁹⁷ conclusionem *om E*

¹⁹⁸ credit *add. conclusionem E*

¹⁹⁹ particulari: particularum *V*

²⁰⁰ quod ... creatam *om. E*

²⁰¹ credibilitatis: credibilis *V*

²⁰² scita *om. sed suppl. s. v. E*

²⁰³) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 19,302–310.

(56) Ad quintum. Nihil unum et idem est creditum et scitum²⁰⁴; sed conclusio manet credita; ergo non est²⁰⁵ scita. Dicendum, quod, licet multa in hac²⁰⁶ scientia²⁰⁷ probentur²⁰⁸, quae etiam a philosophis sunt scita, |V 152ra| sicut quod est unus Deus²⁰⁹ et quod est purus actus²¹⁰, istae tamen²¹¹ non sunt propriae conclusiones istius scientiae²¹², quae ex principiis propriis, scilicet articulis et auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae²¹³, procedit; et ideo²¹⁴ conclusiones eius in particulari semper sunt²¹⁵ ignotae quantum ad scientiam stricte sumptam²¹⁶, sed postea²¹⁷ in generali ratione credibilis fiunt scitae²¹⁸. Unde Dionysius 1 cap. De divinis nominibus²¹⁹) circa principium: “Esto autem et nunc a nobis lex praedefinita eloquiorum de Deo veritatem dictorum nos asservare non in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae verbis, sed in demonstratione a spiritu motae theologorum virtutum, secundum quam virtutem ineffabilibus et ignotis ineffabiliter et ignotae coniunguntur”²²⁰.

(57) Ad sextum. Omne, quod scitur, impossibile est aliter²²¹ se habere; sed sic non est de his, quae sunt fidei²²². Dicendum, quod fidelis²²³ existimat de articulis²²⁴ impossibile aliter se habere et propter eorum veritatem omne genus tormentorum deridet, et similiter de conclusionibus theologus, sicut quod est una operatio trium Personarum naturalis sicut et una natura²²⁵.

(58) »Ad septimum. Subalterna scientia²²⁶ et subalternans simul se compatiuntur in eodem, sicut unus et idem potest esse naturalis et medicus et idem potest esse naturalis et geometer et astrologus vel arithmeticus vel musicus; sed beatorum et ista scientia non possunt esse simul; ergo una non recipit sua principia ab alia²²⁷ «²²⁸). »Dicendum, quod hoc contingit in humanis scientiis propter hoc,

²⁰⁴ creditum ... scitum: scitum et creditum E

²⁰⁵ est om. E

²⁰⁶ multa ... hac: in hac multa E

²⁰⁷ scientia om. E

²⁰⁸ probentur: probantur V

²⁰⁹ est unus Deus: Deus est simplex E

²¹⁰ et quod est purus actus: et caetera E

²¹¹ istae tamen inv. V

²¹² istius scientiae: scilicet huius scientiae V

²¹³ ex ... auctoritatibus: habet sua propria principia, scilicet articulos et auctoritates E

²¹⁴ et ideo: unde E

²¹⁵ semper sunt inv. V

²¹⁶ quantum ad scientiam stricte sumptam om. E

²¹⁷ postea: posita E

²¹⁸ scitae: nota V

²¹⁹) Dion., De div. nom., I, 1; PG 3,585B–588A; Suchla 107,4–108,4; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 5C–6D ex Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 1, 9; Simon 4,84–86.

²²⁰ unde ... coniunguntur om. E

²²¹ aliter: alter E

²²² sed ... fidei om. E

²²³ fidelis add. hic E

²²⁴ existimat de articulis: de articulis extimat V

²²⁵ impossibile ... natura: et propter hoc tormentis se exponit E

²²⁶ scientia om. E

²²⁷ et ... alia: sed hoc non est hic ergo et caetera. E

²²⁸) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 4,51–56.

quod eidem²²⁹ lumini innituntur; sed nostra scientia et beatorum habent diversa lumina, scilicet gratiae et gloriae, quae simul se non compatiuntur, nec hoc tamen praeiudicat subalternationi²³⁰«²³¹).

(59) »Ad octavum. I *Posteriorum*²³²): “Omne scibile est demonstrabile”; ergo a destructione consequentis, quod non est demonstrabile, non est scibile; sed conclusiones huius scientiae non possunt demonstrari, ergo nec sciri²³³«²³⁴). »Dicendum, quod, sicut demonstrantur, sic et sciuntur; sed demonstrantur²³⁵ non stricte accipiendo demonstrationem²³⁶ sicut et in multis aliis scientiis, et sic etiam sciuntur«²³⁷). Unde dicit Philosophus I *Ethicorum*²³⁸), quod astrologia²³⁹ sive formalis demonstratio non est in omnibus expectanda²⁴⁰. Unde secundum exigentiam materiae proceditur in qualibet scientia²⁴¹.

(60) Ad nonum. Si propter hoc est scientia, quia adeo fortiter adhaeret, ut etiam ignibus et aliis tormentis se exponat, dicendum, quod »certitudo adhaesionis non <est> solum humanae fidei, sed etiam aliis habitibus, scilicet sapientiae, scientiae et intellectu, et etiam ex proprio argumento potest aliquis consensum suum firmare in aliquod verum vel falsum (sicut enim opinio est vera vel falsa, ita et fides vera in fideli et falsa in haeretico), non minus firmiter adhaeret aliquis veritati quam falsitati, sicut dicitur VII *Ethicorum*²⁴²«²⁴³). Et ideo in haeretico sicut est falsa fides, ita et falsa scientia, in fideli autem theologo sicut est vera fides, sic etiam vera scientia. De hoc autem petere probationem vanum est, cum fides sit per gratuitam infusionem²⁴⁴.

(61) Ad decimum. Omne, quod est in aliqua²⁴⁵ scientia, est principium vel conclusum ex principiis²⁴⁶; sed corpus Christi esse sub illis speciebus²⁴⁷ non est articulus nec ex articulis probatur;

²²⁹ eidem: eodem V

²³⁰ in ... subalternationi: per diversa lumina hic et ibi, quibus innituntur, sed non sit in humanis ubi est unum lumen naturale omnium scientiarum E

²³¹) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 20,319–323.

²³²) Arist., Anal. post., I 4, 73a21–25; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 12,8–12; Arist., Eth. Nic., VI 6, 1140b30–1141a3; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 483,7–13; cf. Auct. Arist., 35, n. 14; Hamesse 312,96.

²³³ quod ... sciri om. E

²³⁴) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 3,44–47.

²³⁵ sed demonstrantur: scilicet E

²³⁶ accipiendo demonstrationem om. E

²³⁷) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 19,311–313.

²³⁸) Arist., Eth. Nic., I 3, 1094b11–27; II 2, 1103b34–1104a3; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 142,28–143,11; 165,5–8; cf. Auct. Arist., 12, n. 7; Hamesse 233,17.

²³⁹ astrologia dub. EV

²⁴⁰ et sic ... expectanda om. E

²⁴¹ proceditur ... scientia: in qualibet scientia proceditur V

²⁴²) Arist., Eth. Nic., VII 3, 1146b29–30; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 276,4–5.

²⁴³) Thom., Quodl. VI, q. 4 resp.; Gauthier 301,46–58.

²⁴⁴ si ... infusionem: sicut se exponit tormentis Christianus, sic et haereticus. Dicendum, quod sicut in haeretico est fides falsa, sic et scientia falsa, e converso in Christiano, sed de hoc petere probationem vanum est, cum fides sit per gratuitam infusionem E

²⁴⁵ aliqua om. E

²⁴⁶ principium ... principiis: conclusum ex principiis vel principium E

²⁴⁷ illis speciebus inv. E

ergo de theologicis non est scientia²⁴⁸. Dicendum, quod, sicut in aliis scientiis²⁴⁹ quaedam sunt principia generalia, quaedam particularia, ita et hic articuli sunt principia generalia, auctoritates autem canonis sunt specialia. Sic ergo corpus Christi ibi esse accipitur non ut conclusum, sed ut fide acceptum, quia hoc dicit Evangelium²⁵⁰), ubi dicitur: “Hoc est enim corpus meum”²⁵¹. Possibilitas autem huius principii particularis²⁵² probatur per id generale²⁵³, quod²⁵⁴ Deus²⁵⁵ omnipotens. Unde Dionysius 2 cap. De divinis nominibus²⁵⁶): “Sequentes ipsam” theologiam “secundum veritatem convenit ad divinos splendores²⁵⁷” aspicere. “Et inde divinas” maiestates “assumentes, sicut quendam canonem”, id est “regulam veritatis optimum²⁵⁸, positum custodire in” verbis²⁵⁹ “ipsis non multiplicata et minorata et non perversa studemus”²⁶⁰.

(62) Ad undecimum. In omni scientia debent²⁶¹ principia esse distincta²⁶² a conclusionibus; sed sicut hae²⁶³ rationes ducuntur ad conclusiones, ita etiam²⁶⁴ ad principia. Dicendum, quod aliter adducuntur hic et ibi, quia rationes, quae²⁶⁵ adducuntur²⁶⁶ ad principia²⁶⁷, quae fide tenentur, sunt tantum²⁶⁸ persuasiones ostendentes, quod ea, quae ponuntur²⁶⁹, non sunt impossibilia²⁷⁰. Unde tales rationes possunt fieri etiam infidelibus, licet dici possint demonstrationes fidelibus; unde Hilarius X De Trinitate²⁷¹): “Eorum enim dictorum, quae secundum falsiloquii²⁷² sui artem ex Evangelio haeretici praesumunt, ita denotata veritas est, ut iam in contradictione ignorantiam excusare non liceat, sed irreligiositatem confiteri²⁷³ necesse sit”. Sed rationes, quae ex auctoritatibus et principiis

²⁴⁸ non ... scientia: neutro modo est, ergo non est contrarium istius scientiae *E*

²⁴⁹ scientiis *om. V*

²⁵⁰) *Matth.* 26,26; *Marc.* 14,22; *Luc.* 22,19; *Ad I Cor.* 11,24.

²⁵¹ quaedam ... meum: ita et haec quaedam sunt principia generalia ut articuli, quaedam specialia ut auctoritates canonis et inter his accipitur istud *E*

²⁵² huius ... particularis *om. E*

²⁵³ id generale: hoc *E*

²⁵⁴ quod: quia *E*

²⁵⁵ Deus *om. V*

²⁵⁶) *Dion.*, *De div. nom.*, II, 2; PG 3,640A–B; *Suchla* 125,7–11; transl. *Sarraceni*: *Dionysiaca* 70A–D *ex Alb.*, *Super Dion. De div. nom.*, c. 2, 18; *Simon* 55,69–72.

²⁵⁷ splendores *scr.*: splendorum *V*

²⁵⁸ optimum *add. lac. V*

²⁵⁹ verbis: *an nobis scr.?*

²⁶⁰ unde ... studemus *om. E*

²⁶¹ debent: dicunt *V*

²⁶² esse distincta *inv. E*

²⁶³ hae *om. V*

²⁶⁴ ita etiam: sic *E*

²⁶⁵ rationes, quae *om. E*

²⁶⁶ adducuntur *add. principia E*

²⁶⁷ principia: ea *V*

²⁶⁸ quae ... tantum *om. E*

²⁶⁹ quod ... ponuntur *om. E*

²⁷⁰ sunt impossibilia: esse impossibile *E*

²⁷¹) *Hilar.*, *De Trin.*, X, 5; *Smulders* 462,7–11.

²⁷² falsiloquii *scr.*: falsiloquis *V*

²⁷³ unde ... confiteri *om. E*

sacrae Scripturae procedunt, probant sufficienter suas conclusiones apud fideles tantum²⁷⁴; unde Hilarius X De Trinitate²⁷⁵): “Infirmitatem corporeae naturae non fuisse” “et passionem illam, licet corpori illata sit, non tamen naturam dolenti |V 152rb| corpori intulisse; quia, licet forma corporis nostri esset in Domino, non tamen vitiosae infirmitatis nostrae” forma erat in “corpore”, quia “ex” conceptione “Spiritus Sancti Virgo progenuit”, ubi Hilarius²⁷⁶) ex huius principio, qui conceptus est de Spiritu Sancto natus ex Maria Virgine, concludit, quod corpus Christi non habuit in se, unde pateretur²⁷⁷.

²⁷⁴ sed ... tantum: sed conclusiones sufficiter probantur apud fideles per auctoritates et principia sacrae scripturae *E*

²⁷⁵) Hilar., De Trin., X, 35; Smulders 488,3–9.

²⁷⁶) Hilar., De Trin., X 35; Smulders 488,3–9.

²⁷⁷ unde ... pateretur *om. E*

QUAESTIO II

UTRUM TRES PERSONAE DIVINAE POSSINT ASSUMERE EANDEM NUMERO HUMANAM NATURAM

- (1) Quod non, quia assumens et assumptum communicant sibi idiomata. Si ergo Pater et Filius assumerent eandem humanitatem, essent idem homo numero, et sic Pater esset Filius et e converso²⁷⁸).
- (2) Contra. Non minus potuit Pater post incarnationem quam ante; sed ante potuit assumere; ergo post. Simile est de Spiritu Sancto²⁷⁹).
- (3) Dicendum, quod hic sunt duo videnda: primo, quid intelligatur nomine assumptionis; secundo, quid sit veritas quaestionis.
- (4) Quantum ad primum sciendum, quod assumptio importat duo, scilicet principium actionis, scilicet assumptionis, et terminum assumptionis. Unde dicitur assumptio quasi ad aliquid sumptio²⁸⁰).
- (5) Si ergo loquamur de principio, tunc non solum potest, immo ita fuit, quod tota Trinitas assumpsit humanam naturam, quia virtute divinitatis, quae eadem est omnibus²⁸¹), pariter factum est. Et in hoc differt assumptio ab unione, quia unio dicit solam relationem unitorum, et ideo aequè bene dicitur, quod natura divina est unita humanae, sicut quod humana est unita divinae, sed divina natura non dicitur assumpta, sed assumens, humana autem assumpta²⁸²).
- (6) Si autem attendamus ad terminum, tunc assumere dicitur tripliciter. Large, et sic assumere dicitur quasi ad aliquid sumere, et sic tota Trinitas assumpsit columbam ad aliquid, scilicet ostensionem Spiritus sancti.
- (7) Secundo dicitur magis proprie assumere quasi ad sui societatem sumere, et sic divina natura vel tota Trinitas ad societatem divinae naturae humanam assumpsit, unde et Leo papa²⁸³) dicit, quod homo per incarnationem factus est consors divinae naturae.
- (8) Tertio dicitur propriissime quasi ad se et in se sumere, et sic Filius assumpsit humanam naturam, in quantum in persona Filii subsistit²⁸⁴).

²⁷⁸) Thom., In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 39 *ex* Ioann. Damasc., *De fide orth.*, 48, III, 4; Kotter 117,24–38; Buytaert 182,30–183,46.

²⁷⁹) Cf. Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 7, sed contra; Leon. 68a.

²⁸⁰) Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 53a; Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 2 resp.; Leon. 56a.

²⁸¹) Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 56a; Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 62a.

²⁸²) Thom., S. th., III, q. 2, a. 8, resp.; Leon. 42a–43a; Thom., In III Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, resp. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 189.

²⁸³) Leo Magn., Epist., CXXIV, c. 7; PL 54 1066D; cf. etiam Aug., Serm. Supp. CXXVIII, c. 3; PL 39 1998; et etiam Thom., In III Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 362; Thom., S. th., III, q. 16, a. 8, arg. 1; Leon. 211a; Thom., S. th., III, q. 16, a. 5, resp.; Leon. 205b.

(9) Quaestio ergo quaerit, utrum plures Personae ad unitatem Personarum suarum possint eandem naturam numero assumere.

(10) Et circa hoc est triplex opinio.

(11) Prima dicit, quod est impossibile, et hoc propter duo. Primo, quia, ut dicit, per hoc ostenditur divina natura infinita et illimitata, quod una numero existens est in pluribus suppositis; natura autem humana vel quaecumque alia creata est finita; et ideo non potest esse eadem numero in pluribus²⁸⁵). Secundo, quia natura non habet unitatem naturalem nisi ex eo, ex quo personatur et substantificatur. Licet ergo quaelibet Persona divina possit unam assumere, tamen postquam una est ab una Persona assumpta, non potest ab aliis sumi. Iam enim plurificaretur, quod est contra hoc, quod quaeritur, utrum scilicet una et caetera²⁸⁶).

(12) Sed haec ratio non videtur cogere. Posito enim, quod non essent tres personae in divinis, sicut ponebant philosophi, adhuc divina natura esset infinita, sicut Philosophus probat VIII *Physicorum* et XII *Metaphysicae*²⁸⁷). Nec secunda valet, quia natura non multiplicatur secundum numerum ex suppositis, nisi in quantum ipsorum suppositorum non est idem esse et in quantum ipsa natura de se non habet unitatem²⁸⁸); sed Personae divinae habent idem esse numero²⁸⁹). Item natura habet unitatem de se, quia singularis est, in quantum est ibi haec anima, hoc corpus; quam non habet ex Persona, cum sit infinita, sed corpus et anima sunt hic et nunc, quod competit ipsi naturae²⁹⁰).

(13) Unde est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod posset eandem sumere, sed tunc illae tres Personae essent tres homines et non unus, non quod natura multiplicaretur, sed quod multipliciter diceretur. Quod ostendunt sic: Omnia illa, quae adiective dicuntur de Personis, pluraliter proferuntur, sicut et Personae, quod sunt tres entes vel coaeterni vel huiusmodi²⁹¹); sed humana natura accidentaliter advenit divinae Personae quodammodo; ergo pluraliter praedicatur de Personis.

(14) Item Personae divinae dicuntur unus Deus non propter unitatem divinae naturae in tribus, sed ex hoc, quod Deus in concrezione importat quoddam suppositum absolutum, quod indivisim²⁹² Iudaei vel pagani ponunt, cum divina natura sit intellectualis subsistens, tale autem est Persona²⁹³).

²⁸⁴) Thom., In III Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 201.

²⁸⁵) Henr. de Gand., Quodl. VI, q. 7, sed contra; Wilson 73,10–12.

²⁸⁶) Thom., S. th. III, q. 3, a. 6, arg. 2; Leon. 64a; cf. etiam Thom., In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 41.

²⁸⁷) Arist., Metaph., XII 7, 1073a3–11; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 215,5–12; Arist., Phys., VIII 10, 266a10–266b20; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 334,8–337,9; Arist., Phys., VIII 10, 267b17–26; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 340,11–21.

²⁸⁸) Thom., In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, arg. 5; Mandonnet – Moos 40.

²⁸⁹) Thom., In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, ad arg. 5; Mandonnet – Moos 42.

²⁹⁰) Thom., In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 41.

²⁹¹) Thom., S. th., I, q. 39, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 400a–b.

²⁹² indivisim an indivisum scrib.?

²⁹³) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 90, resp.; Muller 251,60–252,77 et 253,108–122; cf. etiam Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 9, a. 4, arg. 8–9 et resp; Pession 231a–b et 233a; Thom., S. th., I, q. 28, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 324b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 29, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 333b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 30, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 336a; Thom., S. th., I, q. 39, a. 3, arg. 2, 4 et ad ag. 2, 4;

Et ideo propter huius suppositi unitatem tres Personae sunt unus Deus²⁹⁴). Sed homo significat in concrezione naturam humanam ad suppositum quodcumque, quod habet humanam naturam²⁹⁵), sive id sit absolutum sive relatum. Unde quot sunt habentes naturam humanam, tot sunt homines.

(15) Sed ista non sufficiunt. Licet enim ex tempore sit homo vel esset illae personae propter assumptionem, tamen non propter hoc pluraliter dicerentur tres homines, sicut et ex tempore dicitur creator propter creaturae creationem et tamen non sunt tres creatores nec domini. Item, licet accidentaliter adveniat, tamen est substantia absoluta et numero una²⁹⁶).

(16) Ad secundum dicendum, quod in hoc videtur esse error similis imaginationi abbatis Iaochimi²⁹⁷, sicut ponitur in principio *Decretalium*²⁹⁸). Ille enim dicebat, quod magister Petrus Lombardus [V 152va] errasset in hoc, quod posuit divinam essentiam esse “quandam rem, quae nec esset generans nec genita nec procedens”²⁹⁹), quasi in hoc pone<re>t quaternitatem³⁰⁰). Item is ergo modus videtur imponendus³⁰¹, quod imaginatur quoddam suppositum absolutum unum existens, cum tamen non sint nisi tres Personae vel tria supposita, sicut cum dico “Deus generans” constat, quod est Persona Patris, quod intelligitur. Praeterea numquam unum suppositum praedicatur de alio. Illud ergo paganicum suppositum, si non est unum de tribus vel tria indistincte accepta, numquam praedicatur de Personis³⁰²).

(17) Unde est tertia opinio³⁰³), quod, sicut Filius, ita et Pater et Spiritus sanctus eandem humanitatem possent assumere, quod faciendo non essent nisi unus homo per assumptionem, ubi³⁰⁴ nunc sunt unus Deus per naturam. Ad hoc intelligendum accipiendum est, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus³⁰⁵), in mysterio incarnationis “tota ratio facti est potentia facientis”. Quia ergo hoc non fuit in potentia creaturae, sed creatoris, ideo iudicandum est secundum condicionem personae assumentis. Est autem haec condicio Personarum, quia nulla excludit aliam a communionem vel communicationem eiusdem naturae, sed solum a communicatione eiusdem Personae³⁰⁶). Cum igitur

Leon. 399b–400b; Thom., In I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 560–565; Thom., In I Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 621–625.

²⁹⁴) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 27, resp.; Muller 94,41–54; cf. etiam Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I prol., 1; Bonini 70,64–72,111; Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, q. 89, resp.; Muller 247,31–41; Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 90, resp.; Muller 280,90–94; cf. God. de Font., Quodl. V, q. 11; De Wulf – Hoffmans 43.

²⁹⁵) Thom., S. th., III, q. 4, a. 3, ad arg. 2; Leon. 81b.

²⁹⁶) Thom., S. th., I, q. 39, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 400a–b.

²⁹⁷ *Ioachimi conii*: Pacheri V

²⁹⁸) Concil. Oecum. Decr., Concilium Lateranense IV 1215, c. 2; Alberigo et al. 207,7–17.

²⁹⁹) Petrus Lomb., Sent. I, d. 5, c. 1, s. 6; Grottaferrata 82,16–22.

³⁰⁰) Cf. Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 89, resp.; Muller 248,47–49.

³⁰¹ *imponendus an imponere scrib.?*

³⁰²) Thom., S. th. I, q. 39, a. 5, resp.; Leon. 405a.

³⁰³) Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 6, resp. et ad arg. 1; Leon. 64a–b.

³⁰⁴ *ubi add. s. v. V*

³⁰⁵) Aug., *Epist.* CXXXVII, 8; Daur 263,173–174.

³⁰⁶) Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 64a–b.

natura creata non sit ipsa Persona nec aliquid personae proprium, inquantum³⁰⁷ est ab alia Persona distincta, <naturae> assumptae unius Personae non³⁰⁸ prohibet, quin alia etiam Persona possit idem assumere.

(18) Ad primum dicendum, quod, sicut nunc Pater et Filius communicant, sic ea, quae sunt naturae, in qua conveniunt, et tamen propter hoc Pater non est Filius nec e converso, ita et tres Personae haberent communia ea, quae essent humanae naturae, et tamen assumentia non essent idem. Unde sicut non sequitur “Deus est Filius; Pater est Deus; ergo Pater est Filius”³⁰⁹), sed est fallacia accidentis³¹⁰) vel figurae dictionis³¹¹)³¹²) (nota tamen, quod Thomas³¹³) dicit, quod, si una Persona assumeret duas humanas naturas, tamen esset unus homo, sicut unus dicitur vestitus, licet aliquis plures habeat vestes), ita et plures vestimenti posse de homine, si tres unam assumerent <naturam>. Si tres una veste tecti essent, dicerentur tres vestiti, licet una veste. Humana autem natura secundum Augustinum³¹⁴) vestimento comparatur. Hoc tamen non determino, sed primum, ut dictum est.

³⁰⁷ inquantum *coni.*: inquam *V*

³⁰⁸ non *an nihil scrib.*?

³⁰⁹) Cf. Bonav., In Sent. I, d. 4, dub. 4; Quaracchi 1882 105b.

³¹⁰) Arist., De Soph. El., I 5, 166b28–30; transl. Boethii: Dod 11,8–10.

³¹¹) Arist., De Soph. El., I 4, 166b10–14; transl. Boethii: Dod 10,12–16.

³¹²) Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 6, ad arg. 3; Leon. 64b–65b.

³¹³) Thom., S. th., III, q. 2, a. 6, ad arg. 1; Leon. 37ab; Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 7, ad arg. 2; Leon. 68a–b; cf. etiam Thom., S. th., III, q. 3, a. 6, ad arg. 1; Leon. 64b.

³¹⁴) Aug., De div. quaest. ad Simpl. 73, 1; Mutznebecher 210,28–34 et 211,55–67.

QUAESTIO III³¹⁵⁾

UTRUM DEUS POTUERIT SUMERE HUMANA NATURAM SINE SUPPOSITO

- (1) Dicenda sunt hic duo: primo, quod differunt, scilicet suppositum et essentia; secundo, quod unum praeter alterum sumi potest.
- (2) Ad primum sciendum, quod sunt tres opiniones.
- (3) »Prima, quod differunt realiter, et hoc attenditur³¹⁶ penes triplicem modum.
- (4) Patet, quod differunt in modo praedicandi, quia unum non praedicatur de altero. Hoc autem non esset, nisi in modo includeretur differentia realis, quia, quae sunt idem re, differentia ratione vel modo significandi, praedicantur de se non praedicatione formali, sed ea, quae est per identitatem, sicut “deus est divinitas”³¹⁷⁾, non autem dicitur “homo est humanitas”³¹⁸⁾«³¹⁹⁾.
- (5) »Secundo differunt in modo agendi, quia suppositum agit, non autem natura. Unde humanitas non currit³²⁰, sed homo³²¹⁾«³²²⁾.
- (6) »Tertio quantum ad modum essendi, quia natura subsistit in aliquo, non autem suppositum.
- (7) Item natura dicitur esse in supposito, non autem e converso proprie³²³⁾.
- (8) Item natura dicitur ut habita, suppositum autem ut habens; et multa talia, sicut quod natura humana est assumpta, non autem suppositum³²⁴⁾. Hoc autem dicunt propter differentiam realem esse. Sed modus ponendi est duplex: unus, quod ita dicendum differentia, non³²⁵ est per aliquam rem additam, sed per quendam modum, <qui> communicatur in re unius praedicamenti ex coniunctione ad rem alterius praedicamenti, sicut materia extensa differt a se ipsa non extensa non³²⁶ per rem additam, sed per modum, inquantum materia est extensa affecta accidentibus³²⁷⁾«³²⁸⁾.

³¹⁵⁾ Transcriptio istae quaestionis adest integraliter in W. Senner, *Christ in the writings of the Rhineland Dominicans*, in: *Christ among the medieval Dominicans*, University of Notre Dame Press 1988, S. 409–413.

³¹⁶⁾ attenditur *dub. V*

³¹⁷⁾ Thom., Contr. error. Graec., c. 4; Dondaine 75a.

³¹⁸⁾ God. de Font., Quodl., VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 301.

³¹⁹⁾ Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 45,22–29 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20va).

³²⁰⁾ currit *coni.:* cur *V*

³²¹⁾ God. de Font., Quodl., VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 301.

³²²⁾ Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 45,30–31 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20va).

³²³⁾ God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 302.

³²⁴⁾ God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 301–302.

³²⁵⁾ non *coni.:* nisi *V*

³²⁶⁾ non *coni.:* nisi *V*

³²⁷⁾ God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 302–303.

³²⁸⁾ Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 45,30–46,42 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20va).

(9) Alii dicunt, quod <secundum> istum modum sortitur substantia vel natura³²⁹ ab agente, inquantum natura habet esse in alio, sicut natura humana assumpta in Deo habet esse; suppositum autem non habet esse in alio, sed per se, quod esse sibi tribuitur ab agente³³⁰).

(10) »Sed ista positio non valet penes³³¹ modos.

(11) Primo: Sicut impossibile est, quod aliqua differant ratione, nisi vel sint diversae rationes, vel nisi habeant vel includant diversas res, ambo vel alterum. Materia ergo extensa non differt realiter a materia non extensa, nisi addat aliquam rem³³²)«³³³). Extensa ergo dicit totum, quia materiam quantam, et differt a materia non extensa sicut totum a parte.

(12) Item illa, quae distinguuntur sola ratione, dicuntur entia rationis. Item illa, quae distinguuntur solis relationibus, dicuntur relativa. Illa, quae distinguuntur rebus, sunt entia realia. Ergo si aliqua distinguuntur solum modo, erunt modalia. Supposita igitur omnia sola erunt modalia³³⁴).

(13) »Item humana natura in Christo, cum sit affecta accidentibus et quantitate, erit suppositum«³³⁵).

(14) »Unde est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod suppositum et natura differunt non realiter, sed solum in modo significandi, et sic est in omni abstracto et concreto, quia sic se habent suppositum et natura sicut abstractum et concretum³³⁶), et hoc primo probant dupliciter.

(15) Primo sic, quia illa sunt eadem³³⁷ re, |V 152vb| quae habent eandem definitionem; sed si definiatur homo et humanitas, eadem ponentur in definitione utriusque, sicut patet in VII *Metaphysicae*³³⁸), <ubi> Philosophus quaerens, utrum differat unumquodque et quod quid est eius, dicit, quod in his, quae sunt per se, non differt³³⁹; in his autem, quae sunt per accidens, differt³⁴⁰). Commentator autem li “per se” exponit de substantia³⁴¹)«³⁴²). »Unde idem est homo et quod quid est hominis, non autem album et quod quid est albi, quia quod quid est albi est natura albi, quae est qualitas, quia album puram qualitatem significat, sicut dicitur in *Praedicamentis*³⁴³)«³⁴⁴), sed habens album, quod est suppositum eius, est aliud sicut lignum vel lapis³⁴⁵).

³²⁹ natura *coni.*: nec V

³³⁰) Cf. God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 307.

³³¹ penes *coni.*: ponens V

³³²) God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 305-306.

³³³) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 46,42–48 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20vb).

³³⁴) Cf. God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 306.

³³⁵) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 47,55–56 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20vb).

³³⁶) Cf. God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 308.

³³⁷ eadem *coni.*: idem V

³³⁸) Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 5–6, 1031a11–16; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 130,19–23.

³³⁹ differt *coni.*: differunt V

³⁴⁰) Thom., Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 217,69–77.

³⁴¹) Averb., *Metaph.*, VII, comm. 2; Venetiis 1562 153rF–153vG.

³⁴²) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 48,77–85 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20vb).

³⁴³) Arist., *Cat.*, c. 5, 3b19; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 11,7–10.

³⁴⁴) Thom., Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 217,77–84.

³⁴⁵) God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 308.

(16) »Secundo declarant et dicunt, quod differunt solum in modo significandi, non autem in re significata, quia idem significat utrumque; modus autem naturae est, quod significat rem in abstracto excludendo accidentia; sed suppositum, quod est concretum, significat idem alio modo, quia vel includendo accidentia vel saltem non excludendo; et ideo ex hoc sequitur, quod concretum se habet per modum totius, quia includit vel non excludit accidentia, natura autem cum praecisione accidentium sive omnis extranei, et ideo per modum partis significat³⁴⁶)«³⁴⁷).

(17) »Ex hoc etiam sequitur, quod unum de altero non praedicatur, licet sint idem et significant idem, quia ex modo significandi unum includit vel saltem non excludit extraneum, scilicet accidentia³⁴⁸), sed secundo bene unum de altero praedicatur, quia etiam ex modo significandi nullum accidens ibi includitur. Item semper est formalis praedicatio impropria abstracti de concreto, sed vera in Deo propter identitatem rei significatae per utrumque³⁴⁹)«³⁵⁰).

(18) »Ex hoc etiam patet, quod natura est non habens, sed quod habetur vel quod in alio, quia habet se per modum partis, cuiuslibet sunt conditiones, et ideo nulli parti convenit modus concretivus, quamdiu pars est, quia ad concretum pertinent³⁵¹ accidentia, quod subsistunt«³⁵²).

(19) Sed ista positio etiam non valet quantum ad nostrum intellectum. Nos enim quaerimus non de homine simpliciter vel specificiter, quia sane intelligendo non est inconveniens concedere, quod homo et humanitas habeant se sicut concretum et abstractum et quod non differant re, licet in modo significandi, sed nos hic per suppositum intelligimus individuum in genere substantiae, ut Sortes, qui subsistit, per naturam autem quiditatem sive essentiam; et quod sic differant re, patet ex duobus, quae pro alia positione formata sunt.

(20) Primo sic: Quorum est alia definitio, differunt realiter; sed in definitione suppositi, si definitio notetur ut Sortes praeter illa, quae sunt naturae vel speciei, ponuntur individua principia vel secundum alios individuata³⁵³) ut haec caro, haec anima grata.

(21) »Praeterea in his, quae sunt per se, idem sunt <natura et suppositum>, non autem in his, quae sunt per accidens; sed in omni supposito materiali, de quo loquimur, sunt quaedam, quae accidunt supposito, non autem naturae, quorum accidentium quaedam sunt determinativa alicuius essentialium principiorum, sicut determinatur essentia speciei per hanc formam et hanc materiam, quae determinatio accidit speciei, sicut rationale animali accidit et tamen est essentielle Sorti sive

³⁴⁶) God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 308–309; cf. etiam Thom., Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Gauthier 218,159–169.

³⁴⁷) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 48,85–90 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20vb).

³⁴⁸) God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 309.

³⁴⁹) God. de Font., Quodl. VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 309.

³⁵⁰) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 48,93–108 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20vb) et Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 48,87–89 [forthcoming edition] (f. 20vb).

³⁵¹) *pertinent coni.*: pertinet V

³⁵²) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 48,90–49,93 (forthcoming edition) (f. 20vb).

³⁵³) cf. Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 17, ad arg. 10; Bazán 112,249–257.

supposito, sicut rationale animali accidit et tamen est essenziale homini. Aliqua autem sunt, quae non sunt determinativa vel designativa alicuius essentialium principiorum ut pertinentia ad constitutionem individui, sed tamen pertinent ad suppositum et non ad naturam, sicut esse et alia accidentia, utrumque in substantiis corporalibus, sed immaterialibus, quae per se individuuntur, est alterum tantum, scilicet accidentia non determinata³⁵⁴ vel constitutiva«³⁵⁵). Cum igitur in omni ente praeter primum aliquid accidat, oportet dicere, quod in omni re differant, sed realius in materialibus, non quod natura sit una res et suppositum alia, quia hoc esset secundum illos, qui dicunt naturam esse formam tantum, quae est altera pars suppositi, vel secundum Platonicos³⁵⁶), qui ponebant quidditates rerum separatas, sed hoc intelligendum, quod unum includit aliud et aliquid addit, scilicet suppositum super materiam.

(22) Et per hoc patet ad rationes, quia non habet eandem definitionem et etiam non sunt per se, non quod unum sit accidens unum de novem, sed quia addit aliquid, quod accidit speciei, in quantum non est de ratione eius.

(23) Et ideo sunt alii, qui dicunt differre suppositum et naturam realiter propter rationes iam dictas. Praeterea si non differrent realiter, sed solum in modo significandi, cum humana natura fuerit a Verbo sumpta, eorum suppositum falsum est, sicut statim patebit.

(24) »Adhuc quidam dicunt, quod Christus³⁵⁷ est unum suppositum actu, plura vero potentia³⁵⁸)«³⁵⁹).

(25) Sed contra: Actus et potentia differunt. Cum igitur natura humana sit actu in Christo, potentia et suppositum non erunt idem.

(26) »Sed dicunt, quod vadit in actum non per additum³⁶⁰, sed sola dimissione, si dimitteretur, sicut una pars aquae ab alia differt formaliter a se ipsa et fierent diversa |V 153ra| supposita divisione facta ab agente, nullo autem reali additamento. Quod autem natura in Christo existens modo non habet rationem suppositi, hoc est, quia ei non convenit talis modus significandi in concreto, scilicet nec aquae pars dicitur suppositum, quamdiu est pars, sed in alio, sed nec naturae, cum sit in alio³⁶¹)«³⁶²).

³⁵⁴ *determinata an determinativa scrib.?*

³⁵⁵) Thom., Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 1; Gauthier 217,109–218,121; cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 3, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 39b–40b; Thom., De ente, c. 2–5, *spec.* c. 4 et 5; Leon 370,1–379,140, *spec.* 376,54–89 et 379,72–84.

³⁵⁶) Boeth., In Isag. Porph., I, c. 11; Brandt 167,8–15; cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 29, a. 2, ad arg. 4; Leon. 330b.

³⁵⁷ *Christus coni.: Christo V*

³⁵⁸) Cf. God. de Font., Quodl. VIII, q. 1; Hoffmans 16–17.

³⁵⁹) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 47,67 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20vb).

³⁶⁰ *additum an additamentum scrib.?*

³⁶¹) Cf. *infra* sect. 38

³⁶²) Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., I, d. 34, q. 1; Bonini 47,68–48,77 [forthcoming edition] (G, f. 20vb).

(27) Sed contra: Si natura humana sibi relinqueretur, aliquid reale haberet illud novum suppositum, quod esset aliud a primo, quia creatum, et illud additum esset esse creatum. Nec³⁶³ autem habet aliud esse, quia increatum; † vel ideo natura humana, licet sit individuum in genere substantiae, tamen, quia plus ad suppositum exigitur, scilicet quod habeat esse per se, ideo non est persona³⁶⁴). Est enim persona rationalis naturae substantia individua³⁶⁵), sed natura vel pars non est substantia completa, sed pars substantiae.

(28) Circa secundum sciendum ex hoc, quod, quantumcumque aliqua differunt, unum potest sumi sine reliquo. Cum igitur, ut ostensum est, natura humana differt a supposito, potuit unum sine altero sumi. Sed quod suppositum etiam non potuit sumi, sic patet. Id enim, quod assumitur, etsi non sit prius tempore, tamen praecintelligitur³⁶⁶ assumptioni. Illud ergo suppositum aut remaneret aut non. Si non, ergo non esset assumptum, sed magis destructum. Si remaneret, ergo essent duo supposita in Christo³⁶⁷). Sed ex hoc sequerentur tria inconvenientia. Unum, quod Deus non esset homo nec³⁶⁸ e converso, quia numquam unum suppositum distinctum ab alio de alio³⁶⁹ praedicatur. Unde etiam in divinis, ubi est maxima unitas, Pater non est Filius. Secundo, quod non esset unio in una persona, nec etiam in una natura, cum non possunt esse una natura divina et humana. Tertio, quod Deus non esset Filius Virginis, sed homo ille sive persona illa³⁷⁰.

(29) Ad rationem. Si differunt, aut per aliquid substantiale aut accidentale. Non substantiale, quia quidquid est substantiale vel essenziale, in natura continetur. Si accidentale, ergo suppositum est unum per accidens. Dicendum, quod addit substantiale individuo, accidentale speciei, sicut supra dictum est³⁷¹). Posset tamen hic dici secundum aliquos³⁷²), quod natura dicit essentialia, cum praecisione accidentium <accidentia> nec includit nec excludit, Sortes vel suppositum etiam includit individuantia.

(30) Notandum tamen, quod Thomas videtur dubie loqui de ista differentia, quia in Prima Parte quaestione 29 articulo 2 solutione tertii argumenti dicit, quod in simplicibus non differant³⁷³), et etiam *Contra gentiles*³⁷⁴), sed in *Quolibet*, quod differunt in omni creatura³⁷⁵), sed tamen in fine

³⁶³ Nec *coni.* nunc V

³⁶⁴) Cf. Thom., S. th., III, q. 2, a. 2 ad arg. 3; Leon. 25b.

³⁶⁵) Cf. Boeth., Contr. Eutychn. et Nestor., 3; Stewart – Rand 84,4–5.

³⁶⁶ a suppositio *add. sed exp.* V

³⁶⁷) Cf. Thom., S. th., III, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 74a–b.

³⁶⁸ nec: ut *sed corr.* V

³⁶⁹ de alio *add. s. v.* V

³⁷⁰ illa: ille *sed del. et corr.* V

³⁷¹) Cf. *supra* sect. 21

³⁷²) Cf. *supra* sect. 16

³⁷³) Thom., S. th., I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3; Leon. 330b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 3, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 44a–b; cf. etiam Thom., In III Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 196–197; Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 17, ad arg. 10; Bazán 112,249–262.

³⁷⁴) Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 45; Leon. 392b.

³⁷⁵) Thom., Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 1; Gauthier 217,103–109.

dicit, quod differunt in modo significandi³⁷⁶), et dicit ibidem³⁷⁷, quod esse non est de ratione suppositi³⁷⁸); sed in Tertia Parte quaestione 2 articulo 2 vult, quod realiter in rebus materialibus differant, et ibi videtur dicere, quod esse requiritur ad suppositum, cum non sufficiant individuata, sicut patet de natura humana, quae in Christo est una numero³⁷⁹).

³⁷⁶) Thom., Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 217,85–102; cf. etiam Thom., Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1; Gauthier 92,140–93,168.

³⁷⁷) *ibidem coni.*: idem V

³⁷⁸) Thom., Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 2 et resp. ad sed contra; Gauthier 218,150–169.

³⁷⁹) Thom., S. th., III, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 25a–b.

QUAESTIO IV

UTRUM IN TRANSUBSTANTIATIONE SIC FACTA CONVERSIO FUISSET, QUOD MATERIA IN MATERIAM ET
FORMA PANIS IN FORMAM CHRISTI, SI ALIQUIS APOSTOLORUM IN TRIDUO CELEBRASSET

- (1) Hic sunt duo videnda: primo, quid alii ponant; secundo, quid mihi videatur.
- (2) Quantum ad primum pertinet, tunc sunt quattuor opiniones.
- (3) Una, quae dicit, quod forma in illo triduo fuit suspensa, et istam ponit Ioannes Teutonicus in apparatu super *Decretum* distinctione 9³⁸⁰), et secundum hoc si aliquis dixisset verba consecrationis, panis non fuisset conversus; ideo potuit hoc eos movere, quia, ut videtur, defectus fuit materiae non ex qua, sed in qua, quia non fuit corpus Christi, sicut fuit, quando forma in cena fuit instituta.
- (4) Sed ista positio vana est, tum quia nulla auctoritate roboratur³⁸¹), tum quia ratio nulla, quia illud corpus, quod de cruce fuit portatum ad sepulchrum, constat, quod aliquid fuit et deitati unitum; alias non adorassent, quod negare est haeticum.
- (5) Item illi, qui tunc circa corpus fuerunt, scilicet Joseph et Maria³⁸², manducaverunt ipsum corpus spiritualiter, et ideo etiam potuit manducari sacramentum.
- (6) »Unde est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod in homine est alia forma praeter animam, scilicet corporeitatis³⁸³), et illa manet recedente anima, et sic in Christo fuit simpliciter idem corpus mortuum et vivum; et sicut prius ipso vivente conversio fiebat in corpus Christi, ita et tunc in triduo fuisset.
- (7) Sed ista positio plura inconvenientia ponit, quam vitare possit, sed tamen, quantum pertinet ad praesens, stare non potest. Primo, quia ipsa veritas dicit *Ioannes* 6³⁸⁴): “Caro mea vere est cibus, et sanguis meus vere est potus”. Hoc autem dici non posset, nisi ab eadem forma esset caro et corpus. Sic enim se habet unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut ad entitatem³⁸⁵), sicut patet ex II *Metaphysicae*, quia eadem est dispositio rei in entitate et veritate. Sed caro non est caro per formam corporeitatis post animam, ita et ante infusionem animae, quia non fuit nihil nec materia prima, et si sic, tunc non

³⁸⁰) *non inveni* in Decretum Gratiani cum apparatu Iohannis Teutonici *rectius* Thom., In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 3, a. 4, quaestiu. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 488; etiam Alb., Sent., IV, d. 12, a. 14, ad arg. 4; Borgnet 320b–321a.

³⁸¹) Thom., In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 3, a. 4, quaestiu. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 488.

³⁸² *Maria coni*: Mariae V

³⁸³) Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 12; Ypma 143,28–31; 144,51–54; cf. etiam Avenc., Fons vitae, III, 48; IV, 3; V, 34; Baeumker 187,24–188,3; 216,1–6; 320,8–12; et etiam Pecham, Quodl. IV, q. 11, resp.; q. 25, resp. et ad arg. 1; Etkorn – Delorme 198–199; 230–231.

³⁸⁴) *Ioh.* 6,56.

³⁸⁵) Auct. Arist., I, n. 42; Hamesse 118,58–59 *ex* Arist., *Metaph.* II 1, 993b30–31; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 37,9–10.

fuisset |V 153rb| corpus Christi “formatum de purissimis sanguinibus Virginis”³⁸⁶), quod est haereticum, ubi dicit Damascenus. Non enim fit corpus aliud nisi per aliam formam dantem esse corporis.

(8) »Et ideo est alia positio³⁸⁷), quae dicit, quod conversio fiat in materiam. Et hoc sic declarant. Dicunt, quod corpus sumitur tripliciter: uno modo dicit trinam dimensionem, et sic est in genere quantitatis; alio modo dicit quiddam compositum ex materia et forma, et sic est directe in genere substantiae et est species immediate sub substantia et prima essentialiter, quia nec genus de homine; tertio modo dicitur corpus, quod dividitur contra animam et habet rationem partis et praedicatur de homine denominative, sicut cum dicitur “homo corporeus”, et sic est in genere substantiae per reductionem, et sic ponitur in definitione animae, et istud corpus dicit materiam, sed materiam omnino reali quantitate, et meretur dici corpus propter hoc, quod talem modum acquirit coniuncta quantitati, et talis materia vel corpus non est compositum ex his, sed huic; et habet aliquas partes a partibus quantitatis, licet habeat a quantitate, et dicuntur partes materia, et in materiam sic acceptam fit conversio et modo et tunc fuisset facta«³⁸⁸).

(9) Sed ista positio videtur inconueniens. Primo, quia Christo subiunxit, quod pro nobis traderetur, et in forma consecrationis sanguinis ponitur, quod pro nobis et pro multis effundetur. Sed constat, quod pati vel effundi vel alia huiusmodi non competunt materiae, sed coniuncto. Nec valet, si dicatur, quod competunt ei non secundum se, sed prout est coniuncta, quia Philosophus non est³⁸⁹ contentus in *De anima* secundum se, sed totius coniuncti³⁹⁰). Unde erravit Plato³⁹¹) volens, quod anima sentiat, licet per corpus faciat. Et istorum error est irrationabiliter³⁹² attribuere aliquid materiae, quod habeat rationem actionis vel passionis.

(10) Praeterea vanum est ponere novos modos, cum philosophi novem praedicamenta non dixerint esse aliud nisi quosdam modos substantiae.

(11) Praeterea sicut non dicimus aliquid album nisi habens albedinem et formaliter ipsa albedine, ita nec corpus aliquid dicitur nisi habens formam corporeitatis vel ipsam trinam dimensionem, non quod ab eo, sed quod ipsa formaliter. Non ergo per aliquem modum fieret homo, erit ubi †.

³⁸⁶) Ioann. Damasc., *De fide orthod.*, 46, III, 2; Kotter 109,1–110,42; Buytaert 170,1–173,45.

³⁸⁷) Aeg. Rom., *Theorem. corp. Christ.*, prop. 26; Romae 1554/55 16rb–16va; cf. etiam Aeg. Rom., *De grad. form.*, II, c. 1; Venetiis 1500 98rb–98vb.

³⁸⁸) Jacob. de Vit., *Quodl.* II, q. 12; Ypma 145,77–146,110.

³⁸⁹ est *add. s. v. V*

³⁹⁰) Auct. Arist., 6, n. 10; Hamesse 174,90–93; Cf. Arist., *De an.* I 1, 403a7–12; transl. vetus: Stroick 11,67–70; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 8a.

³⁹¹) Cf. Plato, *Theatetus*, 184c–d; Plato, *Timaeus*, 43b–c; Waszink 38–39; etiam Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 75, a. 3; Leon. 199b; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 75, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 201a.

³⁹² *irrationabiliter coni.*: *irrationabilior V*

(12) »Unde est alia positio³⁹³), quae dicit, quod corpus non dicit solum materiam <nec> cum materia quantitatem, sed ipsam materiam quantam. Dicunt enim, quod nomen corporis primo fuit impositum ad significandum trinam dimensionem, et quia quantitas est commune accidens omnibus corporibus, ideo forma rerum corporalium vocata est forma corporeitatis, sicut aliquando etiam formae aliquae substantiales nominantur nominibus accidentium magis notorum, et huiusmodi corpus sic dicens materiam cum forma corporeitatis est genus; sed materia ipsa cum quantitate dicitur corpus, sicut et materia subiecta albedini dicitur alba, et sic corpus dicitur denominative, licet habeat modum substantivi. Nomen enim denominativum secundum Commentatorem V *Metaphysicae*³⁹⁴) significat substantiam et accidens, licet accidens principalius, et sic panis convertitur in corpus, quod significat materiam cum quantitate et non formam substantialem«³⁹⁵).

(13) Sed ista positio grossiorem continet errorem. Primo, quia impossibile est, quod materia sit quanta, ex quo habet rationem corporis secundum eos, nisi sit; sed non est nisi per formam substantialem; unde quod non est nisi potentia, non est quantum vel corpus nisi in potentia, sed in tale non fit conversio.

(14) »Praeterea corpus ponitur in definitione animae, sed nullum accidens ponitur in definitione substantiae *metaphysicae*³⁹⁶ consideratae, sed bene ponitur in definitione substantiae naturalis«³⁹⁷), quae est substantia materialis, scilicet sensibilis.

(15) »Unde etiam dicitur, quod <anima> est forma corporis organici physici et *actus*³⁹⁸³⁹⁹), quae non possunt intelligi nisi quanta, quia organa sunt figuris distincta«⁴⁰⁰).

(16) Sed hoc nihil valet, quia nihil organa dici possunt nec physica, nisi habeant formam substantialem. Ponuntur ergo ista, non quod praecedant formam substantialem simpliciter, sed prout est definita. Definitur autem, in quantum est anima. Et sic praesupponit se ipsam, in quantum est forma corporeitatis, et per consequens accidentia *consequentia*⁴⁰¹ formam corporis.

(17) Praeterea si corpus dicit materiam quantam, tunc fit conversio in quantitatem. Ad hoc dicunt⁴⁰²), quod verum est per accidens, quia in id, quod est quantum, non tamen in quantitatem.

(18) Sed hoc non valet, quia terminus conversionis est id, quod intelligimus nomine corporis. Si ergo materia non est corpus, sed quanta, ergo prout est quanta, sic est terminus, quia oportet in

³⁹³) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 18, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 226a–b; Thom., De ente, c. 2; Leon. 371,109–372,150.

³⁹⁴) Averr., Metaph. V, comm. 14; Ponzalli 130,83–131,89.

³⁹⁵) Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 12; Ypma 146,118–137.

³⁹⁶ *metaphysicae coni. ex Jacobi: mathematicae V*

³⁹⁷) Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 12; Ypma 147,149–153.

³⁹⁸ *actus coni.: nullus V*

³⁹⁹) Arist., De an., II 1, 412a19–20, 412a27–28 et 412b5–6; Stroick 64,55–66,88; 66,91; 67,65–66; cf. Auct. Arist. 6, n. 41; Hamesse 177,57–58.

⁴⁰⁰) Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 12; Ypma 147,163–168.

⁴⁰¹ *consequentia coni.: communia V*

⁴⁰²) Cf. Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 12; Ypma 148,191–149,210.

corpore secundum eos intelligi vel quantitatem secundum modum contractum vel⁴⁰³ quantitatem secundum praecedentem positionem, et sic, quocumque modo dicatur conversio, erit in modum vel in quantitatem.

(19) Unde est alia positio⁴⁰⁴), quae dicit, quod id, in quod fit conversio, non dicit materiam tantum nec formam tantum, sed dicit compositum ex materia et forma, quod est substantia, et quia terminus ad quem in isto sacramento non mutatur ex vi consecrationis, sed solum terminus a quo, scilicet panis, ideo, sicut se habet corpus Christi, ita et in ipsum fit conversio. |V 153va| Ante ergo parasceven fiebat conversio in corpus eius paschale, post resurrectionem et modo in corpus glorificatum; sed in triduo fuisset facta conversio in corpus, sicut tunc erat; erat autem exanime; ideo etiam fuisset consecratio terminata in corpus mortuum sive sine anima.

(20) Sed contra hoc obicitur primo sic: Corpus, quod est substantia, est genus ad hominem et ad animalia, sed in tale commune non fuit consecratio. Dicendum, quod corpus potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, prout dicit mihi quandam regulam ex materia et forma tali, ad quam sequuntur tres dimensiones cum praecisione ulterioris perfectionis, et sic acceptum est propria materia animati, nisi quod realiter seorsum sit corpus, seorsum anima, ut ipsi imaginantur (hoc enim esset abicere animam); unde corpus mortuum non est proprie materia animati, sed prout est habens animam. Unde ab eadem forma habet naturam corporis et per eandem est materia propria ad animatum. Et sic non est genus hominis, sed perfectus, quia sic anima non includitur in eo, quod significaretur nomine corporis, sicut nec alia, quaecumque ponatur, perfectio addita corpori. Alio modo potest intelligi nomine corporis res quaedam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua possunt in ea designari tres dimensiones, quaecumque sit illa forma, sive sequatur ulterior aliqua perfectio sive non; et hoc modo corpus est genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere, quod non contineatur implicite in nomine corporis, cum in animali ipsa⁴⁰⁵ anima sit illa forma et non alia, per quam est corpus. Non ergo conversio fit in aliquid commune, sed in corpus Christi singulare.

(21) Secundo sic: Anima est in sacramento ex vi concomitante. Hoc autem non esset, si⁴⁰⁶ ex vi consecrationis, si corpus diceret materiam et formam, in quod est conversio, cum non sit alia forma quam anima. Dicendum, quod ipsa essentia animae in corpore vivo Christi est ibi ex vi consecrationis, sed hoc non in quantum anima, sed in quantum forma corporeitatis; in triduo neutro modo ibi fuisset, sicut nec sanguis in sacramento corporis.

(22) Tertio: Si in triduo alia forma fuit introducta, tunc, sicut prius in anima, sic in triduo in illam fuisset consecratio facta, cum per eam fuerit corpus. Dicendum, quod nec Christo vivente nec

⁴⁰³ *vel coni.*: ex V

⁴⁰⁴) Cf. Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 12; Ypma 144,61–65.

⁴⁰⁵ *ipsa add. forma sed exp. V*

⁴⁰⁶ *si coni.*: sed V

mortuo debet dici, quod materia in materiam et forma in formam conversa fuisset. Et hoc propter tria. Primo, quia conversio fit in corpus, secundum quod exprimit forma consecrationis; sed corpus neque dicit materiam neque formam nec ista collecta, sed unam rem simpliciter. Secundo, quia, quando aliquid competit alicui per partes, non competit sibi per se nec primo, sicut in animatis, quae movent se ipsa, in qua pars movet partem. Si ergo conversio esset in corpus, †. Tertio, quia in naturalibus non dicimus, quando cibus convertitur in corpus, quod pars in partem, sed totum in totum. In triduo ergo nulla occurrit difficultas, sive fuerit idem corpus simpliciter, sive non quod prius, dummodo fuerit Christi sive suppositi; fuit autem suum, quia unitur sibi, nec sunt verba consecrationis animae sive formae corporis, sed suppositi, cum dixit “hoc est corpus meum”⁴⁰⁷). Cum ergo ad oculum appareat, quod in triduo fuit corpus quoddam, quod Ioseph tulit de cruce, et fuerit suum, quod nullus, nisi haereticus sit, negat, quia, etsi lapis fuisset sic vintus, suus fuisset, ideo in corpus illud mortuum, quodcumque, quod tunc habebat, consecratio terminata fuisset, inquantum corpus fuit et inquantum suum.

⁴⁰⁷) *Matt.* 26,26; *Marc.* 14,22; *Luc.* 22,19; *I Corinth.* 11,24.

QUAESTIO V

UTRUM⁴⁰⁸ LUX SIT QUALITAS REALIS VEL INTENTIONALIS

- (1) Circa hanc quaestionem tria oportet videre.
- (2) Primo declarabo quaestionem.
- (3) Secundo⁴⁰⁹ quaedam narratim notificabo.
- (4) Tertio⁴¹⁰ tangam multiplicem opinionem ipsam reprobando.
- (5) De primo duo declarantur: primo quantum ad vocem, secundo quantum ad rem.
- (6) Circa primum intelligendum, quod haec septem ab invicem distinguuntur, scilicet luminare, lux, lucidum, lumen, radius, radiosum, splendor⁴¹¹).
- (7) Dicitur enim luminare secundum Damascenum⁴¹²) ipsum receptaculum luminis, scilicet ipsum vas contentivum et emissivum luminis, sicut sol et luna et huiusmodi secundum illud *Gen.*⁴¹³): “Fecit” “Deus duo magna luminaria”, scilicet solem et lunam⁴¹⁴).
- (8) Lux autem dicitur ipsa perfectio luminaris, a qua ipsum corpus solis vel alterius⁴¹⁵ dicitur luminare, ut lumen praesenter in ipso luminari dicitur lux.
- (9) Lucidum autem dicitur ipsum medium, in quo ipsa lux a luminari recipitur, sicut aer, aqua vel huiusmodi quodcumque diaphanum.
- (10) Lumen autem dicitur ipsa lux in tali diaphano recepta, et est eius perfectio, secundum quam dicitur actu lucidum, sicut per lucem proprie sumptam⁴¹⁶ dicitur luminare lucens.
- (11) »Radius autem dicitur illuminatio, prout secundum rectam lineam procedit a lucente ad lucidum. Unde ubi radius, ibi lumen, sed non convertitur, sicut |V 153vb| patet in domo, quando sol lucet per fenestram⁴¹⁷), ubi in tota domo est lumen, non tantum radii, qui manifeste secundum determinatam lineam procedant. Unde imaginare⁴¹⁸ possumus, quod, sicut fons parvulus facit

⁴⁰⁸ Utrum *add. i.m.* de hac materia supra est 53 V

⁴⁰⁹ Secundo *add. s. v. ex a. m.* V

⁴¹⁰ Tertio *coni.:* Secundo V

⁴¹¹) Cf. Alb., De homine, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1; Anzulewicz – Söder 159,57–58; 162,75–163,13; etiam Avic., De an., III, c. 1; Van Riet 170,7–171,24; Alb., Sent I, d. 9, a. 8, arg. 1 et resp.; Borgnet 284b; 285a–b; Alb., De an., II, tract. 3, c. 8 et 12; Stroick 110,63–69; 117,54–58; etiam Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 332; Thom., In De an. II, c 14; Leon. 129,318–323.

⁴¹²) Ioann. Damasc., De fide orthod. 21, II, 7; Kotter 55,35–36; Buytaert 86,38–39.

⁴¹³) *Gen.* 1,16.

⁴¹⁴) Pap., Element. doctrin. rudiment.; Venetiis 1496 94r.

⁴¹⁵ alterius *coni.:* altⁱ/alt^m V

⁴¹⁶ sumptam *coni.:* suptam V

⁴¹⁷) Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 332.

⁴¹⁸ imaginare *coni.:* imaginari V

lacum, dum aqua reflectitur repercussa ex obstaculo facto vel invento, et ubi rivulus, ibi⁴¹⁹ aqua, non tamen convertitur, sicut patet in toto lacu, ita et lux per radium procedens causat lumen in medio, dum repercutitur a solido corpore et undique diffunditur.

(12) Radiosum autem dicitur corpus aliquod politum in se non habens lumen, reflectens tamen⁴²⁰ radios, sicut est videre in clipeis deauratis, secundum illud “refulsit sol in clipeis”⁴²¹) et caetera.

(13) Splendor est reflexio luminis procedens a reflexione radiorum. Unde splendor proprie est illud, quod emicat a re fulgida et tersa sive polita, quae dicitur radiosa. Unde et radiosum accepta luce dicitur fulgidum sive splendidum. Fulgor autem vel splendor dicitur lumen a fulgido vel splendido procedens. Unde et Filius secundum Apostolum⁴²²) dicitur “splendor gloriae”, quia est verbum procedens et manifestans splendidam Patris sapientiam, sicut etiam in verbo cordis relucet scientia hominis.

(14) De secundo sciendum, quod accipiendo ens⁴²³ generaliter, tunc accipitur duplex ens, unum reale et aliud intentionale. Reale autem appello ens naturae, secundum quod natura non solum dicitur in naturalibus, quae distinguuntur contra metaphysicalia, sed secundum quod dicitur natura de omni eo, quod in rerum natura ratiudinem habet, sicut sunt substantiae tam immateriales quam materiales et accidentia tam propria quam communia et breviter omne id, quod in certo genere entis invenitur, secundum quod praedicamenta sunt distincta, quae sunt secundum Boethium decem rerum genera⁴²⁴).

(15) Alio modo accipitur ens intentionale, et istud subdividitur, quia uno modo accipitur ens intentionale pro ente, quod solum est in anima et vocatur ens rationis, sicut dicimus intentiones primas vel secundas, sicut dicitur intentio generis vel speciei et huiusmodi, de quibus proprie est scientia rationalis, non propter ratiocinationem tantum, sed propter hoc, quod non sunt entia, nisi inquantum ratio ea facit⁴²⁵). Unde secundum Commentatorem⁴²⁶ Super III⁴²⁷ De anima⁴²⁸) “intellectus⁴²⁹ solum facit universalitatem in rebus”. Et hoc modo nullus sanae mentis intelligit quaestionem, ut scilicet quaerat, “utrum lux sit ens rationis”, quia lux fuit et causabat diem et noctem, antequam homo vel ratio talis causans existeret, et si nullus homo esset, adhuc sol

⁴¹⁹ ibi: in *sed exp. et corr. V*

⁴²⁰ tamen *coni.*: tantum *V*

⁴²¹) *I Mach.* 6,39.

⁴²²) *Ad Hebr.* 1,3.

⁴²³ ens: *sed sed exp. V*

⁴²⁴) Boeth., In cat. Arist., I; PL 64, 163A–B; cf. etiam Henr. de Gand., Quodl. VII, q. 1 et 2, arg. 2; Wilson 4,13–18; Henr. de Gand., Quodl. IX, q. 3, resp.; Macken 47,36–41; Henr. de Gand., Quodl. IX, q. 3, ad arg.; Macken 76,45–57; cf. etiam Thom., De ente, c. 1; Leon. 369,20–370,67.

⁴²⁵) Cf. Thom., In Metaph., IV, lect. 4, n. 574; Cathala – Spiazzi 160b.

⁴²⁶ Commentatorem: mentatorem *sed corr. s. v. ex a. m. V*

⁴²⁷ Super III: semper tantum *sed del. et corr. s. v. ex a. m. V*

⁴²⁸) *potius* Averb., De an., I, comm. 8; Crawford 12,25–26; Auct. Arist., 6, n. 27; Hamesse 176,27.

⁴²⁹ intellectus: intellectum *sed corr. ex a. m. V*

illuminaret aerem sicut nunc. Alii autem intellectus, quorum non est abstrahere, non habent universalia causare, et si haberent, etiam ipsis destructis adhuc lumen esset in aere.

(16) Secundo modo dicitur ens intentionale ens imperfectum⁴³⁰ sive diminutum, sicut virtus principalis agentis dicitur esse in instrumento⁴³¹), et sic peccatum originale dicitur esse in semine et virtus sacramentorum in sacramentis et quodcumque ens tale, quod est quasi in viam et quasi in deferente et quasi res transiens, et hoc modo hic quaeritur: Utrum et caetera.

(17) Per hoc patet primum principale.

(18) Circa⁴³² secundum sciendum, quod circa hoc inveniuntur quattuor opiniones.

(19) Una est antiquorum et est magis rudis, quam tangit Philosophus II *De anima*⁴³³), quod lumen sit corpus, et dicunt quidam⁴³⁴), quod materia eius continue creatur, forma autem eius continue a sole influitur.

(20) Sed contra⁴³⁵ hoc dicit Philosophus *ibidem*⁴³⁶), quod posset nos latere in parvo spatio, sed extra omnem rationem est, quod lateat nos in tanto spatio, sicut est ab oriente in occidentem⁴³⁷).

(21) Secunda ratio est, quod⁴³⁸ impossibile est duo corpora esse in eodem loco simul⁴³⁹). Hoc autem esset, cum aer sit corpus, si etiam lumen existens in aere sit⁴⁴⁰ corpus. Sed hoc quidam concedit, quod duo corpora possint esse simul. Hoc autem non posset esse nisi inventis aliis philosophiae principiis⁴⁴¹).

(22) Tertia⁴⁴² ratio est Themistii *Super II De anima*⁴⁴³), qui dicit, quod, si lumen esset corpus, tunc aer esset grossior de die quam de nocte propter praesentiam corporis alterius, scilicet luminis. Huius autem oppositum videmus, quod⁴⁴⁴ aer grossior est de nocte, subtilior est de die.

(23) Quarta⁴⁴⁵ ratio est Avicennae *VI Naturalium*⁴⁴⁶) et in sua *Metaphysica*⁴⁴⁷) et idem Algazel⁴⁴⁸), quia »unum corpus lucidum eclipsat aliud post se, sicut patet de duabus stellis, quarum una occultat

⁴³⁰ imperfectum: perfectum *sed s. v. add. in V*

⁴³¹) Thom., In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quaest. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 34–35.

⁴³² Circa *adn. Prima principale opinio i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴³³) Arist., *De an.*, II 7, 418b20–23; transl. vetus: Stroick 117,82–83.

⁴³⁴) Cf. Arist., *De an.*, II 7, 418b11–13; transl. vetus: Stroick 110,88–89; etiam Alb., *Super Dion. De div. nom.*, c. 2, 31; Simon 63,29–41; et etiam Rich. Fish., *De luc.*, 24–25; Long – Noone 535.

⁴³⁵ Sed contra *adn. Contra i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴³⁶) Arist., *De an.*, II 7, 418b23–26; transl. vetus: Stroick 117,83–84.

⁴³⁷) Thom., In II Sent. d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 332–333.

⁴³⁸ quod: quia *sed corr. ex a. m. V*

⁴³⁹) Auct. Arist., 6, n. 69; Hamesse 180,14 *ex Arist.*, *De an.*, II 7, 418b17; transl. vetus: Stroick 117, 88–89; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 102.

⁴⁴⁰ sit an esset scrib.?

⁴⁴¹) Thom., In II Sent. d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 333; cf. Rich. Fish., *De luc.*, 23; Long – Noone 534.

⁴⁴² Tertia *adn. Tertia i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁴³) *potius* Themist., *De anim.*, VI, 18rb; Verbeke 138,56–139,64.

⁴⁴⁴ quod *add. si sed exp. V*

⁴⁴⁵ Quarta *adn. Quarta i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁴⁶) Avic., *De an.*, III, c. 1–2; Van Riet 172,33–43; 177,6–186,37.

lumen alterius, sed unum lumen non eclipsat lumen alterius, sicut patet. Item⁴⁴⁹, si esset corpus, tunc clausa fenestra remaneret lumen in domo. Ridiculum enim esset dicere, quod corrumpetur in instanti et esset ponere vacuum, cum aliud non succedat⁴⁵⁰451).

(24) Unde⁴⁵² est alia opinio, quae dicit, quod lumen in aere est accidens⁴⁵³), sed lux in sole vel alio naturaliter lucido est forma substantialis⁴⁵⁴).

(25) Sed⁴⁵⁵ hoc est falsum. Primo, quia nulla forma substantialis est sensibilis, sed solum intelligibilis. Unde quidam antiqui formam substantialem negabant, |V 154ra| alii autem accidens ponebant formas substantiales⁴⁵⁶). Lux autem est maxime sensibilis et causa sentiendi aliis⁴⁵⁷). »Sed dicunt quidam, quod illa lux, quae sentitur vel videtur, non est illa forma substantialis, sed alia lux. Sed hoc nihil est, quia simili modo possem dicere, quod lux esset pes asini, non ille, qui videtur, sed quidam alius⁴⁵⁸).

(26) Secundo⁴⁵⁹, quia Commentator⁴⁶⁰) probat calorem non esse formam substantialem ignis contra Avicennam⁴⁶¹) propter hoc, quod calor in aliis est⁴⁶² accidens; unde quod in uno est accidens, in alio non potest esse substantia⁴⁶³).

(27) Tertio⁴⁶⁴, quia lucere est accidens; unde oportet, quod suum immediatum⁴⁶⁵ principium sit forma accidentalis, cum unumquodque agat sibi simile⁴⁶⁶467).

⁴⁴⁷) an cf. Avic., Metaph. II, c. 4; Van Riet 99,61–66 *sed rectius* Avic., De an., III, c. 1–2; Van Riet 172,33–43; 177,6–186,37.

⁴⁴⁸) Algaz., Metaph. II, tract. 2; Muckle 147,10–148,25; cf. etiam Algaz., Metaph. II, tract. 4; Muckle 182,19–25.

⁴⁴⁹) *Item adn. Quinta i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁵⁰) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., II, d. 13, q. 1; Muller 115,6–116,21.

⁴⁵¹) Cf. Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 333.

⁴⁵²) *Unde adn. Opinio secunda i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁵³) Bonav., In Sent. II, d. 13, a. 3, q. 2, resp.; Quaracchi 1885 328b; cf. Alb., De homine, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1; Anzulewicz – Söder 156,17–35; etiam Dav. De Dinan., Quaternul. Fragment., De visu; Kurdzialek 39,25–27.

⁴⁵⁴) Bonav., In Sent. II, d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, resp.; Quaracchi 1885 320b–321a; Cf. Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 333; Thom., S. th., I, q. 67, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 165a; et etiam Thom., In De an., II, c. 14; Leon. 128,291–304.

⁴⁵⁵) *Sed adn. Contra i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁵⁶) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 44, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 457b; etiam Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 3, a. 6; Pession 19a; Thom., De sub. sep., c. 9; Leon. D57,75–101; Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 37; Leon. 353a; Thom., In Phys., VIII, lect. 2, n. 975; Maggiolo 506b.

⁴⁵⁷) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 67, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 165a.

⁴⁵⁸) Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 2, 31; Simon 63,42–53; cf. etiam Alb., De an., II, tract. 3, c. 11; Stroick 115,4–14; etiam Alb., De homine, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1; Anzulewicz – Söder 155,70–156,17.

⁴⁵⁹) *Secundo adn. Secunda i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁶⁰) Averr., In Metaph., VIII, 5; Venetiis 1562 213rF–vG; Thom., In II Sent. d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 333; Thom., In Metaph., XI, lect. 12, n. 2380; Cathala – Spiazzi 560b; Thom., S. th. I, q. 3, a. 6, arg. 1; Leon. 45a.

⁴⁶¹) Avic., Metaph. II, c. 1; Van Riet 66,30–37.

⁴⁶²) *est: esse sed corr. V*

⁴⁶³) Thom. Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 11, a. 11; Bazán 96,80–97,83; Hugo de Sanct. Char., Quaest. de an.; Lottin 473,43.

⁴⁶⁴) *Tertio adn. Tertia i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁶⁵) *immediatum: mediatum sed add. in s. v. V*

⁴⁶⁶) Cf. Thom., S. th., I q. 4, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 54a; Thom., S. th., I q. 6, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 66a; Thom., S. th., I, q. 19, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 237b; Thom., In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quaest. 4, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 36–37.

⁴⁶⁷) Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 333–334.

(28) Unde⁴⁶⁸ est tertia opinio, quae dicit, quod lux vel lumen nihil aliud est nisi evidentia colorum, id est color evidens.⁴⁶⁹) Unde candorem vel intensum album⁴⁷⁰ dicimus quandoque lucem, et Philosophus dicit caelum album in *De caelo et mundo*⁴⁷¹). »Et⁴⁷² hoc probant primo auctoritate, quia dicit Philosophus in quodam capitulo *De coloribus*⁴⁷³): “Dico autem lucem esse hypostasim colorum”. Hypostasim autem dicit substantiam eius, cuius est. Item⁴⁷⁴ Alpharabius⁴⁷⁵⁴⁷⁶): “Colores fiunt ex admixtione ignis cum corporibus, et lux non est causa in inductione coloris ad visum tantum, sed in esse eius”.

(29) Item⁴⁷⁷ hoc probant per duo experimenta. Primum est, quod, quando sol eclipsatur, illa, quae fuerunt alba, apparent pallida et post iterum apparent alba⁴⁷⁸).

(30) Secundum est, quod, si valde parum de rubeo vino ponatur in vitro et ponatur contra solem, ut transluceat, apparet vinum album, si autem plus, apparet rubeum, si autem adhuc plus esset, apparet quasi nigrum, et variatur color, secundum quod lux solis magis vel minus potest penetrare vinum⁴⁷⁹)«⁴⁸⁰).

(31) Sed⁴⁸¹ ista positio stare non potest, quia est contra experimentum. Videtur enim, quod ea, quae de nocte videntur lucentia, non videntur secundum proprium colorem, qui de die apparet. Tunc autem evidentius deberet apparere color, si lux esset coloris evidentia⁴⁸²).

(32) Ad solutionem autem auctoritatum et experimentorum intelligendum est, quod Avicenna dicit, quod lux dat⁴⁸³ esse formale coloribus⁴⁸⁴), materiale autem habet ex qualitatibus activis et passivis, scilicet calido, frigido, humido, sicco, et quod habet in sua materia sive subiecto⁴⁸⁵), quod est corpus determinatum, id est non pervium⁴⁸⁶). Formale autem est, secundum quod actu habet immutare visum. Voluit igitur Avicenna, quod lux sit necessaria ad hoc, ut videatur color non solum ex parte

⁴⁶⁸ Unde *adn.* Opinio tertia *i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁶⁹ Avic., *De an.*, III, c. 2; Van Riet 178,12-13; cf. Averr., *De an.*, II, comm. 67; Crawford 231,21-37; etiam Alb., *De homine*, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, sed contra 7; Anzulewicz – Söder 156,72-74; Alb., *De an.*, II, tract. 3, c. 11; Stroick 115,85-90”; et etiam Thom., *In II Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 334.

⁴⁷⁰ album: albedinem *sed corr. V*

⁴⁷¹) non *inveni*

⁴⁷² Et *adn.* Primus *i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁷³) *potius* Nic. *Perip.*, Quaest. c. 7; Wielgus 136,28; etiam Alb., *De sens.*, I, tract. 2, c. 1; Donati 58,61-69.

⁴⁷⁴ Item *adn.* Secundus *i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁷⁵ Apharabius: Alpherabius *V*

⁴⁷⁶) *potius* Averr., *De sens.*; Shields – Blumberg 18,8-11.

⁴⁷⁷ Item *adn.* Tertius *i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁴⁷⁸) Nic. *Perip.*, Quaest. c. 7; Wielgus 137,1-5.

⁴⁷⁹) Nic. *Perip.*, Quaest. c. 7; Wielgus 137,9-17.

⁴⁸⁰) Alb., *De homine*, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, sed cont. 12; Anzulewicz – Söder 158,65-159,3.

⁴⁸¹ Sed *adn.* Contra *i.m. V*

⁴⁸²) Thom., *In II Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 334.

⁴⁸³ dat: datet *sed corr. V*

⁴⁸⁴) Cf. Avic., *De an.*, III, c. 1; Van Riet 173,46-7; Avic., *De an.* III, c. 3; Van Riet 192,26-32; Avic., *De an.* III, c. 3; Van Riet 194,50-59.

⁴⁸⁵) Cf. Avic., *De act. et pass.*, II, c. 2; Verbeke 90,11-17.

⁴⁸⁶) Alb., *De an.*, II, tract. 3, c. 7; Stroick 109,46-55; 109,59-63; Alb., *Met.*, III, tract. 4, c. 9; Hossfeld 185,54-64.

medii, per quod videtur, sed etiam ex parte ipsius, quod videtur, scilicet ipsius coloris, cui dat esse visibile⁴⁸⁷); cuius experimentum est, quod corpus positum in lumine videtur ab eo, qui est in tenebris, non autem e converso positus in luce videt id, quod est in tenebris.

(33) Sed hoc est contra Philosophum III *De anima*,⁴⁸⁸) qui dicit: “Visibile autem est⁴⁸⁹ color. Hoc autem est in eo, quod secundum se visibile”; et exponens, quid intendat per li “secundum se”, dicit, quod “secundum se autem non ratione, sed quoniam in se ipso habet causam essendi visibile”, hoc est, quod visibile non ponitur in ratione coloris, sed quia in se ipso habet causam visibilitatis, sicut subiectum habet causam propriae passionis⁴⁹⁰). Et hoc exponens Commentator⁴⁹¹) dicit, quod lux non largitur colori aliquam formam vel habitum vel aliquod esse ad hoc, ut sit visibilis.

(34) Unde melius dicitur, quod lux sit necessaria solum ex parte medii, et hoc vult communis modus loquendi, quia non dicimus, quod “color est motivus visus secundum actum lucidus”, sed “secundum actum lucidi”, scilicet medii sive diaphani, secundum quod Philosophus⁴⁹²) ibidem dicit.

(35) Quod autem aliquis in tenebris existens videt positum in luce, hoc est, quia non est totaliter in tenebris, sed medium usque ad eum tantum est immutatum, quod sufficere potest ad immutationem visus. Sed quando e converso⁴⁹³ est, tunc non sic videt⁴⁹⁴), quia, licet color sit secundum se immutativum medii, ut imprimat suam formam, non tamen tamquam imperfectam virtutem habens potest hoc efficere medio quocumque modo disposito, et ideo, quia medium debet esse lucidum, ideo ex illa parte, qua est obiectum sive coloratum, debet esse magis lucidum, ut sic immutatio veniat ad oculum, sicut etiam dicere possumus, quod sigillum secundum se est impressivum formae suae in ceram, sed tamen non nisi in mollem. Ignis ergo vel aliquid mollificans sic se habet ad sigilli impressionem sicut lux ad coloris immutationem, et tamen ignis nihil confert sigillo; et item oportet in contactu sigilli ceram esse molliorem. Si autem sigillum esset ignitum, simul ceram disponderet mollificando et figuram imprimeret. Et sic est de corpore lucido sive ignito⁴⁹⁵, cuius proprius [V 154rb] color lux est, secundum quod Philosophus dicit circa principium libri *De coloribus*⁴⁹⁶), non autem de colorato tantum, quia »color est lux quaedam quodammodo obscurata ex admixtione

⁴⁸⁷) Cf. Avic., *De act. et pass.* II, c. 1; Verbeke 80,8–12.

⁴⁸⁸) Arist., *De an.*, II 7, 418a29–31; transl. vetus: Stroick 108,79–80; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 123a; cf. Auct. Arist., 6, n. 67; Hamesse 180,10–11.

⁴⁸⁹ est *coni.*: et V

⁴⁹⁰) Thom., *In De an.*, II, c. 14; Leon. 124,58–64.

⁴⁹¹) Averr., *De an.*, II, comm. 67; Crawford 233,79–84.

⁴⁹²) Arist., *De an.*, II 7, 418a31–418b2; transl. vetus: Stroick 108,80–81; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 123a; cf. Auct. Arist., 6, n. 67; Hamesse 180,10–11.

⁴⁹³ e converso: aequo *sed corr.* V

⁴⁹⁴) Cf. Alb., *De an.*, II, tract. 3, c. 7; . Stroick 109,17–21.

⁴⁹⁵ ignito: igno *sed corr.* i. v. V

⁴⁹⁶) Ps.-Arist., *De color.*, 791b11–14; transl. Bartholomei: Beullens 187,32–34.

corporis opaci. Unde non habet tantam virtutem, ut faciat medium in illa dispositione, qua fit susceptivum coloris, quod tamen potest facere pura lux⁴⁹⁷).

(36) Dicendum ergo ad auctoritates, quod lux dicitur “hypostasis colorum”⁴⁹⁸) vel, quia et ipse color est quaedam lux defectiva, vel aliter et melius, quia dat sibi, scilicet colori, ut sit “actu immutativus visus”⁴⁹⁹), quod est esse visibile actu et esse formale, cuius nihil tamen ex parte coloris tribuendo, sed ex parte medii.

(37) Ad experimenta dicendum, quod colores in re non mutantur, sed lumen facit, sine quo non movent, ut aliter et aliter moveant visum, sicut et nunc videnti per blavium vel rubeum vitrum alba apparent blavia vel rubea nulla facta mutatione in colore, et similiter corpora caelestia secundum diversam mutationem nubium aliter et aliter apparent.

(38) Quod autem Philosophus⁵⁰⁰) dicit solem album, intelligit lucidum, quia albedo ceteris coloribus plus participat de luce.

(39) Unde⁵⁰¹ est alia opinio⁵⁰²), quae dicit, quod lumen sit ens intentionale, et isti ad hoc tria faciunt: primo se declarant, secundo probant per rationes, tertio per signa.

(40) »Primo⁵⁰³ sic dicunt, quod non differunt⁵⁰⁴ lux et lumen sicut calor in igne et calor in alio, sive aere sive aqua, sed differunt lux et lumen sicut color in obiecto et color in medio; color autem in obiecto sive subiecto habet esse reale, sicut albedo in pariete, sed in medio, scilicet aere vel diaphano, habet esse intentionale; sic et lux, prout est in corpore lucido, scilicet sole vel stella, habet esse reale, sed prout est in aere, ubi vocatur lumen, est ens intentionale.

(41) Secundo⁵⁰⁵ probant. Primo sic: Lumen dat colori esse intentionale; ergo multo magis ipsum lumen erit ens intentionale.

⁴⁹⁷) Thom., In De an., II, c. 14; Leon. 130,375–380; cf. etiam Alb., De an. II, tract. 3, c. 7; . Stroick 109,75–76.

⁴⁹⁸) Nic. Perip., Quaest. c. 7; Wielgus 136,28.

⁴⁹⁹) Arist., De an., II 7, 418a31–418b2; transl. vetus: Stroick 108,80–81; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 123a; cf. Auct. Arist. 6, n. 67; Hamesse 180,10–11.

⁵⁰⁰) Ps.-Arist., S. tot. log. Arist., tract. 5, c. 1; Parmensis 1864 77a–b; cf. Arist., De sen., c. 3, 439b6–18; transl. vetus: Donati 55,43–48; etiam Alb., De an., II, tract. 3, c. 16; Strocik 123,11–14; Alb., De homine, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, sed cont. 8; Anzulewicz – Söder 156,75–80; Alb., De sens., I, tract. 2, c. 1; Donati 58,49–70; Alb., Met., III, tract. 4, c. 9; Hoßfeld 185,62–64; Alb., Phys., II, tract. 1, c. 7; Hoßfeld 87,80–85.

⁵⁰¹ Unde *adn.* Opinio quarta *i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁰²) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. II, d. 13, q. 2; Muller 117,21–119,70; cf. Aeg. Rom., In II Super Sent., d. 13, q. 2, a. 2; Venetiis 1521 575A–577B; Aeg. Rom., Report., II, d. 13, q. 46–47; Luna 288,1–290,48; Aeg. Rom., In De an., II, c. 7; Venetiis 1500 40va–41ra; Aeg. Rom., Hexaem., II, c. 12; Romae 1555 33vb–34vb; Bonav., In Sent., II, d. 13, a. 3, q. 2, resp.; Quaracchi 1885 329a; Averr., De an. II, comm. 70; Crawford 237,17–25; et etiam Alb., De an., II, tract. 3, c. 12; Stroick 116,73–80; Thom., S. th., I, q. 67, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 165a; Thom., In De an., II, c. 14; Leon. 128,291–293; Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 334.

⁵⁰³ *Primo adn.* Primus *i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁰⁴ differunt *coni.*: differt *V*

⁵⁰⁵ *Secundo adn.* Secundus *i.m. ex a. m. V*

(42) Secundo⁵⁰⁶: Nulla qualitas realis posita supra sensum facit sensum, sed intentionalis facit; lumen autem positum supra sensum videtur; ergo est intentionalis. Item⁵⁰⁷ hoc manifeste dicit Commentator *Super II De anima*⁵⁰⁸), quod lumen est ens intentionale.

(43) Tertio⁵⁰⁹⁵¹⁰ ponunt signa ostendendo differentiam realis ab intentionali et dixerunt⁵¹¹ primo ex natura sui multiplicationis, quia nulla forma realis multiplicatur in instanti, sed intentionalis bene. Talis autem est differentia inter lucem et lumen. Prima differentia est ex natura suae dependentiae, quia qualitas realis tantum quantum “ad fieri” dependet a sua causa, sed intentionalis quantum “ad fieri” et quantum “ad esse” et quantum “ad conservari”, quia talia non remanent nisi in praesentia suae causae, ut patet.

(44) Secunda⁵¹² differentia est ex natura suae numerationis, quia duae qualitates reales solo numero differentes non possunt simul esse in eodem subiecto, sed duae intentionales bene sunt simul in eodem, sicut probat Perspectivus⁵¹³) dupliciter, primo per duas umbras, quia duabus candelis accensis et interposito corpore opaco in medio causat duas umbras, quod non posset esse, nisi lumen utriusque candela esset in medio; quaelibet enim umbra est privatio⁵¹⁴ sui luminis.

Secundo⁵¹⁵ hoc probant per foramen in tabula, per quod transeunt duo radii se intersecantes et apparent duae refulgentiae in pariete; quaelibet autem refulgentia est a suo proprio radio⁵¹⁶).

(45) Sed⁵¹⁷ isti tripliciter deficiunt.

(46) Primo in declaratione. Non enim habent se lux et lumen sicut color in pariete vel alio obiecto et lumen in aere, sed lumen in aere habet se non ut color in aere, sed sicut color in obiecto sive corpore terminato, ubi habet esse reale. Et hoc patet per Commentatorem *Super II De anima*⁵¹⁸), <ubi> exponens illud Philosophi⁵¹⁹) “lumen autem ut color est diaphani” dicit, quod lumen ita est actus diaphani, sicut color⁵²⁰ est actus perspicui terminati⁵²¹). Et eodem modo exponit Albertus⁵²²) et

⁵⁰⁶ *Secundo adn. Tertius i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁰⁷ *Item adn. Quartus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁰⁸) Averr., *De an.*, II, comm. 70; Crawford 237,17–25; cf. etiam Bonav., *In Sent.*, II, d. 13, a. 3, q. 2; Quaracchi 1885 328a et 329a.

⁵⁰⁹ *Tertio coni.: Secundo V*

⁵¹⁰ *Tertio adn. Quintus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵¹¹ *dixerunt: dicunt sed corr. V*

⁵¹² *Secunda adn. Sextus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵¹³) Alhazen, *De aspect.* III, 2.25–2.46; Smith 263,174–269,44; cf. Ioh. Par., *Super Sent.* I, d. 27, q. 3; Muller 298,198–299,224.

⁵¹⁴ *privatio coni.: privativum sed corr. privum V*

⁵¹⁵ *Secundo adn. Septimus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵¹⁶) Ioh. Par., *Super Sent.* II, d. 13, q. 2; Muller 117,21–118,46.

⁵¹⁷ *Sed adn. Contra i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵¹⁸) Averr., *De an.*, II, comm. 69; Crawford 236,21–25.

⁵¹⁹) Arist., *De an.*, II 7 418b11–13; transl. vetus: Stroick 110,88–89; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 123; cf. Auct. Arist., 6, n. 67; Hamesse 180,10–11.

⁵²⁰ *color: calor sed corr. V*

⁵²¹) Arist., *De sen.*, c. 3, 439b6–18; transl. vetus: Donati 55,43–48; cf. Auct. Arist., 7, n. 14; Hamesse 196,57.

Theodoricus⁵²³) et Henricus⁵²⁴). Themistius⁵²⁵) idem exponens dicit: “Dixi autem ‘velut’” secundum antiquam translationem, “vel ut” secundum novam, “quia non colorat aerem lumen sicut albedo”. Constat autem, quod albedo, secundum quod est in medio, non⁵²⁶ colorat ipsum, sed colorat corpus terminatum. Et ideo lumen in aere assimilatur colori non in medio, ubi habet esse intentionale, sed colori in obiecto.

(47) Similiter⁵²⁷ rationes⁵²⁸ non concludunt⁵²⁹. Quod primo dicunt: “Lumen dat esse intentionale colori” ergo et caetera, non sequitur, quia et intellectus agens dat esse universale et esse rationis, licet ipse sit ens naturae.

(48) Praeterea »lux etiam non dat esse spirituale speciebus in organo completum, sed hoc habet ex natura subiecti, quia omne, quod recipitur, secundum modum recipientis et non recepti recipitur. Sensus autem recipiens dicitur spiritualis ab anima, cuius est potentia. |V 154va| Et secundum hoc etiam lux potest dici spiritualis in medio, sicut et humidum aeris dicitur a Philosopho⁵³⁰) spirituale, quia propter sui subtilitatem non est incorporabile⁵³¹).

(49) Ad secundum dicendum, quod nec species sentitur, quae est in sensu, sed est principium sentiendi id, cuius est species. Dicendum tamen ad argumentum, quod, sicut Deus propter hoc immediate per suam essentiam videtur, quia est ipsa veritas et ratio veritatis, inquantum esse verum est verum participative primae veritatis secundum Augustinum 83⁵³² *Quaestionibus*⁵³³) – alia autem non per suas essentias⁵³⁴ videntur, sed per medium –, ita et lux habet se ad sensum visus. Omnia enim videntur, inquantum aliquid lucis participant, et ideo ipsa lux per se habet videri.

(50) Quidam⁵³⁵) autem dicunt, quod lux coniuncta oculo non videtur, sed lux separata. Sed hoc nihil est, quia etiam clausis oculis diem sentimus sentiendo lucem pervenientem per palpebras ad organum, de nocte autem apparet nigrum clausis oculis. Et praeterea, cum oculos proicimus ad radium solis, continuatur clara lux oculo, quam videmus.

⁵²²) Alb., De an. II, tract. 3, c. 7 et 8; Stroick 108,62–66; 110,70–80; Alb., De sens., I, tract. 2, c. 1; Donati 58,49–70; Alb., Phys., II, tract. 1, c. 7; Hoßfeld 87,80–85.

⁵²³) Theod. de Vrib., De luce, 8; Rehn 15,33–16,38; Theod. de Vrib., De ir., II, 4; Sturlese 153,41–46; Theod. de Vrib., De color., I, 2; Rehn 278,34–38

⁵²⁴) Henr. de Gand., Quodl. IV, q. 15, resp.; Wilson-Etz Korn 278,793–279,809.

⁵²⁵) Themist., De anim., VI, 18ra; Verbeke 138,39–43.

⁵²⁶ non *add. s. v. V*

⁵²⁷ *Similiter adn.* Ergo responsio *i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵²⁸ *rationes: rationem sed corr. rationes ex a. m. V*

⁵²⁹ *concludunt coni.: concludit V*

⁵³⁰) Arist., Meteor., IV 3, 380a28–30; transl. Henrici Aristippi: Steel 12,112–115; Cf. Alb., Met., IV, tract. 1, c. 18; Hossfeld 232,3–5.

⁵³¹) Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 2, n. 33; Simon 65,23–33.

⁵³² *83 coni.: 93 V*

⁵³³) Aug., De div. quaest. LXXXIII, 1; Mutzenbecher 11,3–9.

⁵³⁴ *suas essentias coni.: suam essentiam V*

⁵³⁵) *non inveni*

(51) Ad illud autem dicendum, quod non est multum curandum de hoc, qualiter entia nominet, quia nomine intentionis etiam realia quandoque nominat sicut scientiam et aliquos habitus. Unde etiam ibidem ante et post dicit⁵³⁶) lumen esse habitum lucidi inquantum lucidi et formam et perfectionem, quae sunt nomina entium realium. Nullus autem dicit similitudinem coloris in aere esse formam eius vel perfectionem vel habitum.

(52) »Ad differentiam autem dicendum ad primum, quod, sicut materia, quando facta est necessaria ad recipiendum formam substantialem per praecedentem alterationem, tunc recipit in instanti – unde et generatio est in instanti –, ita et⁵³⁷ aer, cum sit in ultima dispositione ad lumen, non indiget nisi praesentia illuminantis. Et ideo dicit Commentator VI *Physicorum*⁵³⁸), quod, sicut generatio est terminus alterationis, ita et illuminatio est terminus motus localis, quo illuminans sit praesens.

(53) Ad secundum dicendum, quod lumen in diversis diversimode accipitur secundum Dionysium 4 cap. *De divinis nominibus*⁵³⁹). Quaedam enim recipiunt in superficie tantum, sicut corpora opaca, quaedam in profundo, ut diaphana, quae tamen lucem non retinent, quia imperfecte lumen recipiunt, licet ipsum sit reale, et ideo cessat lumen absente illuminante; alia vero sunt, quae perfectius recipiunt lumen et tenent, sicut carbunculus et huiusmodi⁵⁴⁰).

(54) Ad tertium dicendum, quod est unum lumen in medio duorum luminarium, et si simul ponantur, ambo simul causant illud, si autem unum post aliud, tunc secundum auget primum, et si tertium, similiter auget praecedens, et quodlibet secundum virtutem suam secundum plus vel minus, et quia illud lumen in medio habet virtutem amborum luminarium, ideo per obstaculum respectu utriusque luminaris causabit duas umbras, quae sunt privationes unius luminis realiter, quae tamen duo dici possunt per comparisonem ad luminaria; nec tamen totum lumen privatum est, quod est in medio, licet sit unum, quia privatio fit luminis secundum certum situm et rectum aspectum, sicut et illa illuminatio fuit, quae est privata.

(55) Et similiter dicendum est ad aliud, quia in foramine est unum lumen habens virtutem duorum luminarium. Et ideo causat duas refulgentias. Considerandum⁵⁴¹ tamen, quod nihil prohibet <philosophum> naturalem aliquid dicere aliud vel duo, quod tamen mathematicus dicit idem vel unum et tamen utrique vere secundum sua principia, sicut si detur piscis unus habens longitudinem pedalem et statim moriatur, dicit naturalis, quod sit alia quantitas illius rei, cum omnia accidentia priora sint destructa destructo subiecto, sed tamen mathematicus diceret eandem quantitatem sive

⁵³⁶) *non inveni*

⁵³⁷ Et: quasi *sed corr. V*

⁵³⁸) Averr., *Phys.*, VI, comm. 59; Venetiis 1562, 285rC.

⁵³⁹) Dion., *De div. nom.*, IV, 4; PG 3,700B–C; Suchla 148,19–149,4; transl. Sarraceni: *Dionysiaca* 169D–171A.

⁵⁴⁰) Thom., *In II Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, ad 9; Mandonnet – Moos 336–337.

⁵⁴¹ Considerandum *adn.* matemthicus et <philosophus> naturalis differunt *i.m. ex a. m. V*

longitudinem. Cuius ratio est, quia mathematicus non considerat motum et materiam⁵⁴²), et ideo, dummodo ipsa quantitas proportionata, scilicet piscis vel alterius, non sit divisa nec additionem receperit, sed stat eadem distantia terminorum quantitatis, dicet eam eandem non curans, utrum aliud vel idem sit subiectum. Sed <philosophus> naturalis considerans accidentis esse, cuius est inesse subiecto, aliud dicet esse nunc quam prius. Ita etiam nihil prohibet in proposito perspectivum dicere duo lumina vel duos radios considerando tantum lumen secundum exitum sui a lucente, quae sunt duo, quae tamen etiam vere dicit <philosophus> naturalis unum propter identitatem subiecti.

(56) Considerandum etiam, quod differentiae illae non sunt verae differentiae. Non enim differt realis qualitas ab intentionali per hoc, quod omnis intentionalis forma acquiratur in instanti sicut⁵⁴³ et quaelibet forma substantialis, nec per hoc, quod intentionalis secundum esse dependeat a sua causa, cum totum universum, quod est valde reale, dependeat a Deo et inferiora etiam conserventur in esse a corporibus caelestibus⁵⁴⁴ †, et adhuc concedimus, quod in caelestibus formae solo numero differentes simul insunt eodem⁵⁴⁵ <subiecto>.

(57) Considerandum etiam, quod in illis differentiis etiam videtur concludi ex puris affirmativis in secunda figura. |V 154vb| Non enim sequitur, si lumen in illis tribus, scilicet⁵⁴⁶ multiplicitate, dependentia et numeratione, convenit cum speciebus intentionalibus⁵⁴⁷, quod ideo lumen sit intentio, sicut nec asinus est homo propter hoc, quod in pluribus convenit cum eo, sed alia sunt in lumine, quae ei conveniunt, ita quod non materialiter, sicut statim patebit.

(58) Et ideo est alia opinio⁵⁴⁸), quae dicit, quod lumen est qualitas realis, non intentionalis. Et circa hoc duo sunt videnda: Primo modus positionis narratur, secundo probatur.

(59) De primo intelligendum, quod, sicut calor dupliciter consideratur, uno modo, prout est in igne, cuius primo et principaliter est propria virtus naturalis consequens formam naturalem vel substantialem eius, in aliis autem est calor ab igne receptus, et propter hoc ignis dicitur per se calefacere, alia autem per accidens, in quantum habent ab eo, cui primo convenit, licet aliqua participant calorem naturaliter, sicut in animalibus est calor naturalis et in pluribus aliis; ita et lux, prout in sole est, est eius virtus et qualitas naturalis consequens eius formam substantialem et⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴²) Cf. Thom., In Metaph., proem.; Cathala – Spiazzi 1b; Thom., In Metaph., VI, lect. I, 1159–1163; Cathala – Spiazzi 297a–b; etiam Thom., In Metaph., XI, lect. VII, 2256–2264; Cathala – Spiazzi 535b–536b; Thom., Super Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, resp.; Gils 138,141–154.

⁵⁴³ sicut *add. s. v. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁴⁴ caelestibus *add. lac. V*

⁵⁴⁵ eodem *coni.: eidem V*

⁵⁴⁶ scilicet: secundum *sed corr. V*

⁵⁴⁷ intentionalibus: intentionalem *sed corr. V*

⁵⁴⁸) Cf. Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 331–337; Thom., S. th., I, q. 67, a. 3; Leon. 164a–165b; Thom., In De an., II, c. 14; Leon. 123,1–130,387.

⁵⁴⁹ et *add. s. v. ex a. m. V*

cuiuscumque alterius corporis a se lucentis, si aliud aliquod tale est, cuius signum corporum. In aliis autem est lux recepta ab eo, cui per se convenit, et in talibus dicitur proprie lumen⁵⁵⁰).

(60) »Considerandum etiam ex his, quod, cum lux sit prima qualitas primi corporis⁵⁵¹, quod est maxime perfectum et formale in corporalibus. Illa corpora, quae sunt maxime formalia et nobilia, sunt lucida semper actu; quae autem sunt propinqua his, sunt receptiva luminis, sicut diaphanum; quae autem sunt maxime materialia, non habent lumen in sui natura neque sunt luminis receptiva, sed sunt opaca. Huius exemplum patet ex ipsis elementis. Nam ignis habet lucem in sui natura, licet eius lux non appareat nobis nisi in natura aliena propter densitatem. Aer autem et aqua, quae sunt minus formalia, sunt diaphana. Terra⁵⁵² autem, quae⁵⁵³ est maxime materialis, est opaca«⁵⁵⁴).

(61) »Considerandum etiam, quod, sicut calor ignis habet unam communem actionem, scilicet calefacere, et tamen, secundum quod in diversis accipitur, determinatur sua actio ad diversos et determinatos effectus, sicut calor in homine ad conversionem cibi in carnem humanam, in planta ad plantam, in ipso igne ad formam ignis, ita et lux primi alterantis determinatur, secundum quod in diversis accipitur, secundum diversitatem naturarum recipientium. Unde alium effectum habet radius Saturni, alium Iovis, alium Solis, secundum quod est determinata species ab aliis distincta, secundum quam etiam determinationem pertinet ad opus ornatus et dicitur quarta die facta. Sicut ergo calor est accidens reale, ubicumque ponatur, sive in igne sive in aliis, ita et lumen, sive in sole sive in medio«⁵⁵⁵).

(62) Secundo illud probatur, et hoc tripliciter.

(63) Primo sic: Illud, quod facit realem transmutationem et causat realem effectum, oportet, quod sit res. Sed sol causat in istis inferioribus generationem et alterationem vel transmutat omnia⁵⁵⁶), ut Dionysius dicit 4 cap. *De divinis nominibus*⁵⁵⁷), quod lumen solare “corporum visibilibus generationem confert et ad vitam ipsa movet”. Ergo et caetera.

(64) Sed ad hoc dicunt adversarii⁵⁵⁸), quod hoc facit sol per accidens, quia sol est corpus densius ceteris corporibus supercaelestibus et ideo est in eo maior virtus unita, et quia corpus densius plus habet et retinet de luce, ideo plus sol habet de luce; accidit ergo luci, quod agat istas actiones, inquantum est in tali corpore, quod habet lucem.

⁵⁵⁰) Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 334–335; Thom., S. th., I, q. 67, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 165a–b; Thom., In De an., II, c. 14; Leon. 128,305–129,308.

⁵⁵¹ corporis *add. s. v. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁵² Terra *add. i. m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁵³ quae *add. non s. v. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁵⁴) Thom., In De an., II, c. 14; Leon. 129,327–340.

⁵⁵⁵) Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 338.

⁵⁵⁶) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., II, d. 13, q. 2, arg. 2; Muller 116,4–5; etiam Thom., In De an., II, c. 14; Leon. 128,301–304; Thom., S. th. I, q. 67, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 165a; Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, resp. et ad arg. 7; Mandonnet – Moos 334, 336.

⁵⁵⁷) Dion., De div. nom., IV, 4; PG 3,700A; Suchla 148,3–4; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 166A–B.

⁵⁵⁸) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., II, d. 13, q. 2, ad arg. 2; Muller 118,58–119,70.

(65) Sed hoc non videtur bene dictum, quia tantae densitatis⁵⁵⁹ est sol in hieme sicut in aestate et insuper nobis vicinior est in hieme quam in aestate.

(66) Sed dicunt, quod in aestate nobis perpendiculariter opponitur et ideo magis calefacit.

(67) Sed hoc est nobiscum dicere, quia perpendicularitas non videtur ad aliud facere nisi, quod radius eius directius nos respicit; radius autem lumen est.

(68) Secundo probatur sic: Nulla qualitas intentionalis⁵⁶⁰ denominat suum subiectum; sed lumen denominat aerem, et dicitur lucidus⁵⁶¹).

(69) Sed et ad hoc dicunt, quod hoc est ideo, quia nomina non sunt imposita aliquibus intentionibus sicut lumini et ideo non denominant nisi per circumlocutionem⁵⁶²).

(70) Sed hoc etiam non bene dicitur, quia, licet obiectum visus non sit nominatum secundum Philosophum II *De anima*⁵⁶³), tamen obiecta aliorum sensuum sunt nominata, sicut sonus, sapor, odor et huiusmodi, quae sunt entia realia; et tamen intentiones obiectorum in medio nec una est nominata, nec fuit a principio mundi, nec etiam per circumlocutionem aer denominatur, licet intentiones dicamus esse in aere, nec bene diceretur aer intentionatus, quare aer ex his secundum suam speciem perficitur.

(71) Tertia ratio est, quod duorum, quorum est una operatio realis, si unum est reale, et |V 155ra| alterum. Sed ego video, quod, sicut lux solis habet illuminare diaphanum et ignire, ita et lumen receptum in alio, et ideo, si accipiatur speculum concavum, per lumen receptum in medio et in se accendit ignem et illuminabit diaphanum, et ideo concludo, quod lux sit qualitas realis.

(72) Ad⁵⁶⁴ rationes dicendum. Dionysius 2 cap. *De divinis nominibus*⁵⁶⁵): “Lumina luminarium” “diligentem habent discretionem proprie subsistentem”, ergo subsistunt et sunt substantiae. Dicendum⁵⁶⁶, quod loquitur secundum antiquorum opinionem, apud quos erat famosa⁵⁶⁷, sicut saepe ponimus exempla secundum aliorum opiniones, quando de eis per intentionem non loquimur. Unde quantum ad intentionem Dionysii ibidem⁵⁶⁸) non est, videtur utrum lux sit substantia vel accidens, vel dicendum, quod dicitur “subsistere” respectu luminarium, secundum quae sunt vel non sunt.

⁵⁵⁹ densitatis: diversitatis *sed corr. V*

⁵⁶⁰ intentionalis: essentialis *sed corr. V*

⁵⁶¹) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., II, d. 13, q. 2, arg. 1; Muller 116,1–3; Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, ad. arg. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 335.

⁵⁶²) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. II, d. 13, q. 2, ad arg. 1; Muller 118,47–57.

⁵⁶³) Arist., De an., II 7, 418a 26–28; transl. vetus: Stroick 108,78–79.

⁵⁶⁴ *Ad adn. Solutio argomentorum i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁶⁵) Dion., De div. nom. II, 4; PG 3,641A–B; Suchla 127,4–7; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 78C et 79B.

⁵⁶⁶ *Dicendum adn. Primus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁶⁷ famosa *coni.*: famosum *V*

⁵⁶⁸) Dion., De div. nom., II, 4; PG 3,641A–B; Suchla 127,4–7; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 78C et 79B.

(73) Ad⁵⁶⁹ secundum. Dicit ibidem⁵⁷⁰), quod unum lumen deportetur, simul “egreditur proprium universum lumen”. Egredi autem est corporis. Dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum⁵⁷¹⁵⁷²) egredi, intersecari, reflecti, reperi – »omnia attribuuntur lumini metaphysice, quia, sicut nomen distantiae derivatum est a loco ad omnia⁵⁷³ <contraria>, ut dicitur X *Metaphysicae*⁵⁷⁴), ita etiam⁵⁷⁵ istis utimur in alteratione secundum quandam similitudinem sumptam a motu locali propter eius simplicitatem⁵⁷⁶). Unde sicut dicere possumus, quod calor egreditur, quando aliud aliquid ab igne⁵⁷⁷ calefit et sic processus a causa ad effectum, ita et hic sumitur.

(74) Ad⁵⁷⁸ tertium. Dicit ibidem⁵⁷⁹), quod “lumina tota sunt in se invicem totis” “non confusa”. Dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de luminaribus secundum comparisonem ad illuminantia, et hoc exponi bene sibi ibidem⁵⁸⁰) competit, quod, sicut⁵⁸¹ in re est lumen, sed distinguitur secundum extrinsecum lucens, ita et personae divinae per relationes oppositas.

(75) Ad⁵⁸² quartum. Sicut forma substantialis non introducit nisi per praecedentem generationem, sic nec accidentalis nisi praecedente alteratione, si est realis; hoc autem non est in illuminatione. Dicendum, quod generatio praecedens formam substantialem tempore non est aliud nisi alteratio et ita sic se habet ad formam substantialem sicut motus localis ad illuminationem, quo praesens fit illuminans. Iam⁵⁸³ † autem alterationibus alteratione ad duas formas, scilicet accidentalem, qua fit materia disposita, ad substantialem. Si autem generatio accipiatur pro ipsa inductione formae substantialis, sic est in instanti, et sic simul fit et est forma, sed secundum modum intelligendi, licet simul sit illuminatio et illuminatum esse.

(76) Ad⁵⁸⁴ quintum. Si est qualitas, ergo in aliqua specie; sed non videtur esse nisi tertia specie; hoc autem non potest esse, quia, quae sunt in tertia specie, habent contrarium; luci autem nihil est contrarium, licet tenebra opponitur non tamen contrarie, sed privative⁵⁸⁵). Dicendum, quod

⁵⁶⁹ *Ad adn. Secundus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁷⁰ Dion., De div. nom., II, 4; PG 3,641B; Suchla 127,14; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 80C–81A.

⁵⁷¹ *Augustinum conl.: Augustinus V*

⁵⁷² *potius Thom., S. th., I, q. 67, a. 2, arg. 3; Leon. 163b–164a.*

⁵⁷³ *omnia add. ita sed exp. V*

⁵⁷⁴ Arist., *Metaph. X 4*, 1055a4–10; transl. media: Vuillemin – Diem: 192,3–7.

⁵⁷⁵ *etiam add. in sed exp. V*

⁵⁷⁶ Thom., S. th., I, q. 67, a. 2, ad arg. 3; Leon. 164b.

⁵⁷⁷ *igne add. non sed del. V*

⁵⁷⁸ *Ad adn. Tertius i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁷⁹ Dion., De div. nom., II, 4; PG 3,641A–B et 641C; Suchla 127,4–5 et 128,1; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 79A et 81C.

⁵⁸⁰ Dion., De div. nom., II, 4; PG 3,640D–641C; Suchla 126,3–128,2; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 74A–83B.

⁵⁸¹ *sicut add. est sed exp. V*

⁵⁸² *Ad adn. Quartus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁸³ *Iam add. lac. V*

⁵⁸⁴ *Ad adn. Quintus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁸⁵ Thom., In II Sent. d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 8; Mandonnet – Moos 331–332; Thom., S. th., I, q. 67, a. 3, arg. 2; Leon. 164a–b; cf. etiam Thom., In De an., II, c. 14; Leon. 129,309–312.

quibusdam videtur, quod sit in prima specie, quia Averroes *Super II De anima*⁵⁸⁶) dicit lumen esse habitum. Albertus autem super 2 cap. *De divinis nominibus*⁵⁸⁷) dicit lucem, prout est in corpore solari, esse in secunda specie qualitatis, quae est naturalis potentia vel impotentia, et hoc contingit ex victoria formae solis super materiam eius, quia est maxime formalis. Lumen autem, prout est in aliis receptum, dicit esse in tertia specie qualitatis; et licet hoc non sit improbabiliter dictum, tamen secundum communiorem opinionem⁵⁸⁸) dico, quod est in tertia specie qualitatis, quia ad illam pertinet passibilis qualitas, qualis est lux, ubicumque ponatur. Sed contrarium non habet, tum propter hoc, quod⁵⁸⁹ est qualitas proprie⁵⁹⁰ vel⁵⁹¹ corporis, quod est remotum ab omni contrarietate⁵⁹²), tum quia movet ad omnes formas; si autem haberet contrarium, non moveret ad illud secundum Albertum⁵⁹³) in eodem.

(77) Ad⁵⁹⁴ sextum. Forma, quae non habet contrarium, satiat appetitum materiae⁵⁹⁵; talis autem est incorporalis; ergo lux erit incorporalis. Dicendum, quod satiare appetitum materiae convenit formis substantialibus, non accidentalibus, cuius est lux.

(78) Ad⁵⁹⁶ septimum. Sicut sol est causa operationum naturalium, ita et intentiones, sicut videmus, quod aliqui moventur ex apprehensione terribilium intentionum; non enim potest dici lux propter hoc realis. Dicendum, quod non est simile, quia lux est effectiva⁵⁹⁷ talium effectuum et causa per se. Unde si esset particeps culpae vel gratiae, ex effectibus mereretur vel demereretur, sed quando unus concipit terribile, ipsa res apprehensa habet se per modum obiecti vel finis, non efficientis, nec in aliquo posset culpari. Intellectus autem sic apprehendens vel aestimatio movet appetitum, et appetitus, qui est potentia realis, movet ad operationes aliquas reales.

(79) Ad⁵⁹⁸ octavum. “Lux” secundum Ambrosium⁵⁹⁹) “non est creata in mensura, numero et pondere”; ergo non videtur esse accidens aliquod creatum, cum omne creatum sit factum “in numero, pondere et mensura”, *Sap.* 11⁶⁰⁰). Dicendum, quod hoc dicitur non simpliciter, sed per comparisonem ad corporalia, quia virtus lucis ad omnia corporalia se extendit, in quantum est qualitas activa primi |V 155rb| corporis, scilicet caeli alterantis.

⁵⁸⁶) Averr., *De an.*, II, comm. 70; Crawford 237,11–25.

⁵⁸⁷) Alb., *Super Dion. De div. nom.*, c. 2, n. 32; Simon 64,43–54 et 65,2–5.

⁵⁸⁸) Thom., *In II Sent. d.* 13, q. 1, a. 3, ad arg. 8; Mandonnet – Moos 336; cf. etiam Thom., *In De an.* II, c. 14; Leon. 128,305–129,308.

⁵⁸⁹) quod *add. s. v. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁹⁰) proprie *add. potest sed exp. V*

⁵⁹¹) vel *add. s. v. ex a. m. V; an illius scirb.?*

⁵⁹²) Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 67, a. 3, ad arg. 2; Leon. 165b.

⁵⁹³) Alb., *Super Dion. De div. nom.*, c. 2, n. 32; Simon 65,15–19.

⁵⁹⁴) *Ad adn. Sextus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁹⁵) materiae: modo *sed corr. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁹⁶) *Ad adn. Septimus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁹⁷) effectiva: effectativa *sed corr. V*

⁵⁹⁸) *Ad adn. Octavus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁵⁹⁹) Ambros., *Hexaem.*, I, 9, 34; Schenkl 37,2–3.

⁶⁰⁰) *Sap.* 11,21.

(80) Ad⁶⁰¹ nonum. Dicitur contra ponentes, quod sit corpus, quod ridiculum est ponere, quod subito tandem corpus corrumpitur ad absentiam lucentis; ergo etiam videtur nunc non corruptum, sed non migrat in aliud subiectum; ergo recedit cum corpore lucente; hoc autem non est nisi substantiae; ergo substantia est. Dicendum, quod ridiculum est dicere de corpore creato, quod corrumpitur, quia tale non corrumpitur nisi in materiam et alio generato, cum unius corruptio sit generatio alterius ex eo, quod materia non relinquitur sine forma; tamen non est ridiculum hoc dicere, quod accidens desinat esse, quale est lux.

(81) Ad⁶⁰² decimum. Si corpora caelestia non agunt nisi per lucem, ergo, quando luna eclipsatur vel quando non est accensa, nullum habebit effectum super mare; item nec sol habebit effectum aliquem in visceribus terrae, ubi lux non potest attingere. Dicendum, quod luna et si qua alia sunt, quae quandoque carent luce, habent aliquam virtutem ex sua specie, qua operantur etiam sine luce, licet mediante luce efficacius operentur, sicut patet de luna in plenilunio, sicut etiam medicinae agentes ex sua specie efficacius operentur calefactae, immo etiam quae sunt frigidae virtutis ad suum effectum calefacta melius attingunt, sic et “noctes in plenilunio sunt calidiores” secundum Philosophum⁶⁰³) propter lucem lunae, et tum lux eius vel motus eius habet humectare vel infrigidare, secundum quod habet ad hoc vel illud virtutem determinatam ex sua specie, sive sit luna sive stella.⁶⁰⁴) Ad illud de visceribus terrae dici potest, quod sol etiam ibi operatur, si est necesse ad bonum universi, et licet ibi non attingat immediate, tamen mediante terra attingit, quae etiam quandam recipit alterationem suo modo, sicut Commentator ponit exemplum in VIII *Physicorum*⁶⁰⁵) de pisce in reti, qui stupefacit manum per rete, et tum rete, licet non stupefiat, quia non est susceptivum stupefactionis, aliquam alterationem recipit⁶⁰⁶).

(82) Ad⁶⁰⁷ undecimum. Spiritualius est “medium sub quo” quam “medium quo”, sicut patet de intellectu, quod lumen intellectus agentis est spiritualius quam species intelligibilis; ergo et in sensu lumen extra est spiritualius quam species in medio. Dicendum, quod, etsi concedatur, quod lux sit spiritualior, non tamen ex hoc habetur, quod sit intentionalior. Item in hoc deficit, quod in intellectu “medium quo” et “sub quo” pertinent ad eandem naturam intellectus, licet hoc medium est in diversis naturis, ex quibus etiam surgit maior vel minor spiritualitas, sicut unum medium est species in oculo, aliud species in aere, vel aliter, quia lumen intellectus agentis non habet operationes nisi pertinentes ad operationem intellectus, sed lumen solis vel alterius lucentis non solum habet

⁶⁰¹ *Ad adn. Nonus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁶⁰² *Ad adn. Decimus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁶⁰³) Arist., *De part. animal.*, IV 5, 680a32; transl. Scoti: van Oppenraaij 163.

⁶⁰⁴) Thom., *In II Sent.*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, ad arg. 5; Mandonnet – Moos 373.

⁶⁰⁵) Averr., *Phys.*, VIII, n. 37; Venetiis 1562 376vH.

⁶⁰⁶) Cf. Thom., *In II Sent.* d. 15, q. 1, a. 2, ad arg. 6; Mandonnet – Moos 373.

⁶⁰⁷ *Ad adn. Undecimus i.m. ex a. m. V*

operationes ad sensationem, sed etiam habet operationes naturales, ex quo habet maiorem realitatem.

(83) Ad⁶⁰⁸ duodecimum. »De Rabbi Mose⁶⁰⁹), qui dicit in libro *De lumine*, quod sol non calefacit per se, sed tantum per accidens, inquantum radii sui transeunt sphaera ignis«⁶¹⁰); ergo lux non est qualitas per se primi alterantis. Dicendum, quod hoc dicitur, quia lux non est substantia vel corpus, sed accidens; tamen hoc non prohibet, quin per se insit soli.

⁶⁰⁸ *Ad adn. Duodecimus i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁶⁰⁹) Mos. Maimon., *Dux neutror.*, II, 11; *Di Segni* 44,23–27.

⁶¹⁰) *Ioh. Par.*, *Super Sent.*, II, d. 13, q. 2, ad arg. 2; *Muller* 119,66–70.

QUAESTIO VI

[E 101rb] UTRUM SPECIES INTENTIONALES RECIPIANT NUMERUM AB OBIECTO VEL SUBIECTO

- (1) Ad huius quaestionis intelligentiam tria sunt advertenda.
- (2) Primo dabo quaestionis intellectum.
- (3) Secundo ponam opiniones aliorum.
- (4) Tertio concludam meam intentionem.
- (5) »De primo considerandum, quod »nomen intentionis sumitur ab eo, quod est intendere. Intendere autem⁶¹¹ est tendere in aliquid, et hoc competit duobus, scilicet mobili, quod tendit in terminum, et moventi, inquantum terminus motus⁶¹² est a movente⁶¹³ intentus. Unde, quia motus mobilis in aliquid tendit ab actione moventis, ideo intentio primo et principaliter pertinet ad id, quod movet alia, et quia hoc in nobis est voluntas, ideo⁶¹⁴ hoc modo sumpta intentio, prout sumitur frequenter⁶¹⁵ in moralibus, sic est actus voluntatis⁶¹⁶).
- (6) »Unde Augustinus XI⁶¹⁷ *De Trinitate*⁶¹⁸) dicit, quod “voluntatis intentio copulat corpus⁶¹⁹ visum visui⁶²⁰ et similiter speciem in memoria existentem ad aciem animi interioris cogitantis⁶²¹”⁶²²).
- (7) Sed quia in tali copulatione obiecti ad potentiam fit quaedam conceptio intellectus de re, ideo apud philosophos etiam in pure speculabilibus ipsa conceptio nominatur⁶²³ intentio. Unde si est conceptio de ipsa natura rei, dicitur intentio prima⁶²⁴ apud logicum, sicut conceptio hominis vel lapidis⁶²⁵; quando autem ipsa natura concepta consideratur ut praedicabilis de multis, sicut lapis de multis lapidibus, homo de multis hominibus, tunc super primum⁶²⁶ conceptum formatur alius conceptus, et ille dicitur intentio secunda, sicut conceptus speciei vel generis vel aliquid⁶²⁷

⁶¹¹ autem: vero *E*

⁶¹² motus *add.* etiam *V*

⁶¹³ a movente: ab eo *E*

⁶¹⁴ ideo: et *V*

⁶¹⁵ sumitur frequenter *inv.* *E*

⁶¹⁶) Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 12, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 94a–b.

⁶¹⁷ XI: X *V*

⁶¹⁸) Aug., De Trin., XI, c. 4; Mountain – Glorie 342,39–343,51.

⁶¹⁹ corpus *add.* ad *sed exp.* *E*

⁶²⁰ visui: ad visum *E*

⁶²¹ ad ... cogitantis: acie cogitationis animi interioris *E*

⁶²²) Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 12, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 94a.

⁶²³ nominatur *sed* vocatur *exp.* et *corr.* *E*

⁶²⁴ intentio prima *inv.* *E*

⁶²⁵ hominis ... lapidis: lapis vel hominis *E*

⁶²⁶ primum: prius *E*

⁶²⁷ aliquid *om.* *V*

huiusmodi⁶²⁸, de quibus tractat Porphyrius, sicut dicitur <in> I libro |V 155va| *Praedicamentorum*⁶²⁹).

(8) Et simili modo grammaticus distinguit nominum impositionem. Et illa nomina sunt primae impositionis, quae significant ipsam rem, ut lignum, lapis vel colorem⁶³⁰⁶³¹, sed prout concipitur per modum subsistentis vel transeuntis⁶³², sic accipiuntur nomina secundae impositionis, ut “nomen”, “pronomen”, “verbum”, “participium” et caetera apud eosdem⁶³³ grammaticos⁶³⁴).

(9) Ulterius⁶³⁵ considerandum, quod, quia isti conceptus sive intentiones, quae dicuntur entia rationis, habent esse debile, quia solum in anima sunt et non sunt nisi⁶³⁶ ad praesentiam vel absentiam intellectus⁶³⁷ actualis intellectionis; ideo ista⁶³⁸ entia, quae in rerum natura parum vel fere⁶³⁹ nihil habent ratitudinis⁶⁴⁰⁶⁴¹, sicut est virtus principalis agentis⁶⁴² in instrumento et species coloris in aere, quae nec aerem colorat nec⁶⁴³ substantiam⁶⁴⁴, illa etiam propter quandam similitudinem illorum entium dicuntur entia intentionalia, inquantum habent esse per modum intentionum, et sunt⁶⁴⁵ entia media inter entia habentia ratitudinem in natura et inter entia rationis, quia entia sunt naturae sive realia⁶⁴⁶, sed tamen⁶⁴⁷ habent modum entium intentionalium⁶⁴⁸, et de istis quaerit quaestio.

(10) Unde quantum ad secundum pertinet, tunc leguntur hae⁶⁴⁹ quattuor⁶⁵⁰ opiniones.

(11) Una⁶⁵¹ dicit, quod non solum intentionales, sed etiam reales duae formae possunt esse in eodem subiecto eiusdem speciei, differentes solo numero⁶⁵² etiam naturaliter⁶⁵³). Et⁶⁵⁴ ista probatur

⁶²⁸ huiusmodi *add. sic sed exp. E*

⁶²⁹) Porphyr., Isag.; Busse 1,3–13,36, *spec.* 1,3–16; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello – Dod 5,2–20,15, *spec.* 5,2–17.

⁶³⁰ colorem *coni.*: currere *V*

⁶³¹ lignum ... colorem: lapis vel lignum *E*

⁶³² subsistentis ... transeuntis: transeuntis vel subsistentis *E*

⁶³³ eosdem *om. V*

⁶³⁴) Cf. Boeth., In Cat. Arist., I; PL 64 159A–C; etiam Abelard., Gloss. Super Praed. Arist.; Geyer 112,8–28; Anonymous, Gloss. De interpretatione; Del Pra 393–394; Walter Burley, In Perih., 1.018; Brown 51–52.

⁶³⁵ Ulterius *adn.* Nota bene *i. m. ex a. m. E*

⁶³⁶ nisi *om. E*

⁶³⁷ intellectus *om. E an intellectui scrib.?*

⁶³⁸ ista: illa *V*

⁶³⁹ fere *om. E*

⁶⁴⁰ ratitudinis: entitatis *E rati^{tis} sed corr. i. m. ex a. m. V*

⁶⁴¹ habent ratitudinis: entitatis habent *E*

⁶⁴² agentis: prout est *add. V*

⁶⁴³ nec: et *V*

⁶⁴⁴ substantiam: substantia *V*

⁶⁴⁵ sunt: sicut *sed exp. et corr. similiter i. m. ex a. m. V*

⁶⁴⁶ sive realia *om. E*

⁶⁴⁷ tamen: tantum *V*

⁶⁴⁸ entium intentionalium: intentionum *E*

⁶⁴⁹ hae *om. V*

⁶⁵⁰ quattuor: novem *V*

⁶⁵¹ Una *adn.* Prima *i. m. ex a. m. E*

⁶⁵² differentes ... numero: solo numero differentes *E*

⁶⁵³) Aeg. Rom., Quodl. IV, q. 1, resp.; Coninck 202a.

et improbatur supra quaestione illa: “utrum Deus possit⁶⁵⁵ facere duo accidentia eiusdem speciei⁶⁵⁶ in eodem subiecto”^{657,658}), et ante⁶⁵⁹ similiter probatur et improbatur in eadem.

(12) †

(13) Unde⁶⁶⁰ est tertia opinio⁶⁶¹), quae dicit, quod duae naturales formae non possunt simul esse⁶⁶², sed solum⁶⁶³ duae intentionales indistinctae ex parte subiecti, licet⁶⁶⁴ essentialiter in subiecto⁶⁶⁵ distinctae⁶⁶⁶ ex parte obiectorum.

(14) Et hoc probant quattuor modis: primo, quia Philosophus dicit II *De anima*⁶⁶⁷ de sensu communi loquens, quod “impossibile est album et nigrum simul esse”⁶⁶⁸) [E 101va], tamen idem potest haberi sub specie utriusque; sed huiusmodi est – inquit⁶⁶⁹ – sensus et intelligentia; propter⁶⁷⁰ hoc videtur omnino, quod in sensu vel intellectu simul⁶⁷¹ sunt⁶⁷² duae species intentionales eiusdem speciei, ex quo duae species etiam contrariorum simul esse possunt⁶⁷³.

(15) Secundo sic: Ego imaginor duo quaedam eiusdem speciei, scilicet⁶⁷⁴ duas fenestras in domo; ergo tunc simul sunt duae species⁶⁷⁵ duorum alborum vel duarum fenestrarum in phantasia mea.

(16) Item unum agens non facit simul⁶⁷⁶ in eodem susceptibili nisi unam impressionem⁶⁷⁷ eiusdem speciei. Si ergo duae species duorum alborum visorum efficerentur⁶⁷⁸ una in puncto concurso⁶⁷⁹ duorum nervorum⁶⁸⁰ opticorum⁶⁸¹, sicut dicunt adversarii⁶⁸²), ergo illa una facta non nisi unicam⁶⁸³

⁶⁵⁴ Et *adn.* Secunda *i. m. ex a. m. E*

⁶⁵⁵ *possit: posset V*

⁶⁵⁶ *eiusdem speciei om. V*

⁶⁵⁷ *subiecto adn. infra quaestio, <columna> 125, <linea> 13 i.m. ex a. m. V*

⁶⁵⁸) *Cf. infra V, 181vb*

⁶⁵⁹ *ante: hoc V*

⁶⁶⁰ *Unde adn. Tertia i. m. ex a. m. E*

⁶⁶¹) *non inveni*

⁶⁶² *simul esse inv. E*

⁶⁶³ *solum om. V*

⁶⁶⁴ *licet add. in subiecto V*

⁶⁶⁵ *in subiecto om. E*

⁶⁶⁶ *distinctae add. in subiecto scilicet E*

⁶⁶⁷ *anima add. scilicet E*

⁶⁶⁸) *Arist., De an., III 2, 427a6–9; transl. vetus: Stroick 163,86–88; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 182b.*

⁶⁶⁹ *tamen ... inquit illeg. E*

⁶⁷⁰ *propter: per V*

⁶⁷¹ *simul om. E*

⁶⁷² *sunt coni: sint EV*

⁶⁷³ *simul ... possunt: possunt simul esse E*

⁶⁷⁴ *scilicet: sicut V*

⁶⁷⁵ *simul ... species: sunt duae species simul E*

⁶⁷⁶ *simul om. E*

⁶⁷⁷ *impressionem add. simul E*

⁶⁷⁸ *efficerentur: efficerent E*

⁶⁷⁹ *concurso coni.: concursus EV*

⁶⁸⁰ *nervorum: numerorum V*

⁶⁸¹ *opticorum: optidorum V*

⁶⁸²) *non inveni*

⁶⁸³ *unicam: unam sed exp. et corr. E*

impressionem faciet in phantasia, et sic “abeuntibus sensibilibus non relinquitur nisi una species in phantasia”⁶⁸⁴), quae est contra experientiam in nobis.

(17) Quarto secundum perspectivum speculo posito directe in radiis⁶⁸⁵ solis non apparent species coloris, quia maius⁶⁸⁶ lumen tollit apparentiam minoris; tamen secundum adversarios⁶⁸⁷), qui dicunt, quod duo radii efficiuntur unus in medio, oportet dicere, quod radius unus efficitur efficacior⁶⁸⁸ alio superveniente in medio; ergo a simili si duae species efficiuntur una in subiecto⁶⁸⁹, oportet dicere, quod melius et evidentius videatur una res⁶⁹⁰ per illam speciem⁶⁹¹ communem quam per speciem illam⁶⁹² rei specialem⁶⁹³, quod est falsum, quia sic⁶⁹⁴ etiam certius viderentur duo⁶⁹⁵ quam unum, et⁶⁹⁶ melius etiam videmus rem per suam⁶⁹⁷ propriam speciem⁶⁹⁸ proprie eam repraesentantem⁶⁹⁹ quam per communem.

(18) Sed istae rationes non concludunt. Quod primo dicunt de Philosopho, dicendum est⁷⁰⁰, quod hoc pro tanto dicit, quia, licet album secundum esse reale impediatur, ne simul sit in eodem subiecto⁷⁰¹ nigrum, tamen species albi in medio vel in oculo⁷⁰² non impedit speciem nigri, quia species intentionales non opponuntur; licet res, quarum sunt species⁷⁰³, aliquando opponantur, sicut patet in praedicto exemplo albi et nigri⁷⁰⁴), non tamen per hoc habetur, quod Philosophus velit, quod ista simul sint essentialiter distincta in subiecto.

(19) Ad secundum dicendum, quod non per duas, sed per unam actualem speciem ambas fenestras imaginor.

(20) Nec tertia concludit, quia illa species unum effectum imprimit in virtute amborum; duos, scilicet⁷⁰⁵ habitualement⁷⁰⁶ et unum⁷⁰⁷ vero⁷⁰⁸ actualem, sicut videbitur statim.

⁶⁸⁴) Auct. Arist., 6, n. 105, n. 31; Hamesse 182,70; cf. Arist., De an., III 2, 425a24–25; transl. vetus: Stroick 158,78.

⁶⁸⁵ radiis: radio E

⁶⁸⁶ maius: magis *sed exp. et corr. E*

⁶⁸⁷) non inveni

⁶⁸⁸ efficacior *om. E*

⁶⁸⁹ subiecto: medi *sed del. et corr. E*

⁶⁹⁰ videatur ... res: una res videatur E

⁶⁹¹ illam speciem *inv. E*

⁶⁹² illam *om. V*

⁶⁹³ specialem coni.: simplam EV

⁶⁹⁴ sic: tunc *sed exp. et corr. E*

⁶⁹⁵ duo: due res E

⁶⁹⁶ et: cum E

⁶⁹⁷ suam *om. E*

⁶⁹⁸ propriam speciem *inv. E*

⁶⁹⁹ proprie eam repraesentantem *om. V*

⁷⁰⁰ est *om. E*

⁷⁰¹ subiecto *om. V*

⁷⁰² in oculo: sensu V

⁷⁰³ species *om. V*

⁷⁰⁴) Cf. *supra* sect. (14)

⁷⁰⁵ scilicet *om. V*

⁷⁰⁶ habitualement: habituales E

⁷⁰⁷ et unum: unam V

(21) Ad quartum dicendum, quod ideo evidentius videtur unum quam duo, quia virtus visiva sive alius quicumque sensus magis est unita⁷⁰⁹, quando⁷¹⁰ per intentionem circa unum accipitur⁷¹¹ quam quando⁷¹² circa plura, sive illa species sit communis sive propria.

(22) Unde⁷¹³ est alia opinio⁷¹⁴), quae dicit, quod nec duae reales nec duae intentionales possunt esse simul, sicut probatur supra in eadem⁷¹⁵(⁷¹⁶).

(23) Sed licet modus iste sustineri possit, tamen videtur⁷¹⁷ adhuc clarius⁷¹⁸ esse dicendum. Et per hoc itur ad tertium principale, ubi considerandum, quod subiectum habens speciem potest tripliciter⁷¹⁹ considerari: uno modo, prout |V 155vb| est in nuda⁷²⁰ potentia respectu earum, sicut est homo ante addiscere, sicut dicitur in⁷²¹ II *De anima*⁷²²); alio modo consideratur, prout est in ultimo actu, sicut quando homo actu per speciem⁷²³ considerat; tertio, quando habet se⁷²⁴ medio modo inter puram potentiam et purum actum quasi in habitu, sicut quando habet aliquis⁷²⁵ habitum scientiae⁷²⁶, non tamen considerat actu⁷²⁷(⁷²⁸).

(24) Si ergo loquamur primo modo, tunc non solum formae intentionales possunt esse simul⁷²⁹), sed etiam naturales, sicut idem subiectum sive eadem materia⁷³⁰ simul⁷³¹ est potentia aer et⁷³² aqua et ignis et idem subiectum potentia album et nigrum. »Et possunt etiam dispositiones esse simul ad utrumque in eodem⁷³³, sicut si aer ex una parte inspissetur et ex alia calefiat, quae sunt dispositiones ad oppositas formas«⁷³⁴).

⁷⁰⁸ vero *om.* E

⁷⁰⁹ unita: unitus V

⁷¹⁰ quando *om.* E

⁷¹¹ accipitur: accipiatur V

⁷¹² quando *om.* E

⁷¹³ Unde *adn.* Quarta *i. m. ex a. m.* E

⁷¹⁴) non *inveni*

⁷¹⁵ eadem *coni.*: eodem EV

⁷¹⁶) Cf. *infra* V, 182ra.

⁷¹⁷ videtur *om.* V

⁷¹⁸ clarius *om.* V

⁷¹⁹ tripliciter potest *inv.* E

⁷²⁰ nuda: pura E

⁷²¹ in *om. sed add. s. v.* E

⁷²²) Arist., *De an.*, III 4, 429b9–10; transl. vetus: Stroick 198,83–85; cf. etiam Arist., *De an.*, II 5, 417a21–417b2; transl. vetus: Stroick 98,77–83; Arist., *Phys.*, VIII 4, 255a33–255b5; transl. vetus: Bossier–Brams 294,9–16.

⁷²³ speciem *add. actu sed exp.* V

⁷²⁴ habet se *inv.* E

⁷²⁵ habet aliquis *inv.* E

⁷²⁶ scientiae: scientia e *sed corr.* E

⁷²⁷ non ... actu: et actu non considerat E

⁷²⁸) Cf. Thom., *De ver.*, q. 8, a. 14, resp.; Dondaine 264,163–177.

⁷²⁹) Cf. Thom., *De ver.*, q. 8, a. 14, resp.; Dondaine 265,179–184.

⁷³⁰ materia *add. potentia sed exp.* E

⁷³¹ materia simul *inv.* E

⁷³² et *om.* E

⁷³³ eodem *add. simul* E

⁷³⁴) Thom., *Quodl.* VII, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 10,71–79.

(25) Si autem consideremus⁷³⁵ tertio modo, qui est⁷³⁶ medio modo se habere quasi in habitu, quod habet locum in perfectionibus animae, ubi sunt formae rerum intentionaliter, tunc adhuc formae intentionales, sive sint rerum contrariarum sive rerum eiusdem speciei, possunt simul inesse eidem⁷³⁷).

(26) Si autem consideremus secundo modo, scilicet prout sunt in actu completo, tunc impossibile est simul esse plures species⁷³⁸ actu, sive sint contrariae sive non sive sint⁷³⁹ eiusdem speciei sive non. Et hoc ostenditur tribus rationibus⁷⁴⁰).

(27) »Una⁷⁴¹ est secundum Philosophum III⁷⁴² *De anima* “intellectum in actu et intelligens sunt omnino idem”⁷⁴³), et idem est de sensu in actu et sensibili⁷⁴⁴ in actu, quod non est intelligendum, quod essentia intellectus fiat essentia intelligibilis, sicut nec essentia materiae fit essentia formae, licet materia et forma sint⁷⁴⁵ idem actu. Unde sicut impossibile est, quod una res naturalis⁷⁴⁶ sit actu plura, ita impossibile est, quod duae formae⁷⁴⁷ intentionales sint simul actu in eodem⁷⁴⁸).

(28) Secundo sic: Secundum Algazelem⁷⁴⁹⁷⁵⁰) impossibile est unum corpus simul figurari pluribus figuris, licet diversae⁷⁵¹ sint figurae et specie differentes; hoc tamen ideo contingit, quia idem est modus et eadem ratio omnium specierum vel⁷⁵² figurarum⁷⁵³ informandi, sicut et omnium corporum⁷⁵⁴ locorum, quantumcumque diversae speciei⁷⁵⁵ vel specierum⁷⁵⁶, est eadem ratio locationum. Cum igitur species intelligibiles sint perfectiones intellectus et sensibiles ipsius sensus⁷⁵⁷ et omnes sint eiusdem rationis in perficiendo⁷⁵⁸ ipsam potentiam, licet res, quarum sunt

⁷³⁵ consideremus: consideratur *E*

⁷³⁶ qui est: scilicet *E*

⁷³⁷) Cf. Thom., De ver., q. 8, a. 14, resp.; Dondaine 265,184–188.

⁷³⁸ species *om. E*

⁷³⁹ sint *om. V*

⁷⁴⁰) Thom., De ver., q. 8, a. 14, resp.; Dondaine 265,188–188; cf. Thom., Quodl. VII, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 11,95–104.

⁷⁴¹ Una *adn. nota bene i. m. ex a. m. E*

⁷⁴² III: II *V*

⁷⁴³) Arist., De an., III 7, 431b16–17; transl. vetus: Stroick 215,91–92; cf. etiam Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 59; Leon. 415b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 87, a. 1, ad arg. 3, Leon. 356b; Thom., In I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 812.

⁷⁴⁴ sensibili *add. intellectuali sed exp. et corr. V*

⁷⁴⁵ sint: sit *E*

⁷⁴⁶ naturalis: in naturalibus *V*

⁷⁴⁷ formae: species *E*

⁷⁴⁸) Thom., Quodl. VII, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 10,61–75.

⁷⁴⁹) Secundum Algazalem: Secundum sic secundum Algazalem *add. sed del. E*

⁷⁵⁰) Algaz., Metaph. I, tract. 3; Muckle 68,14–20.

⁷⁵¹ diversae *add. sed exp. E*

⁷⁵² vel *coni: vel om. EV*

⁷⁵³ specierum ... figurarum: figurarum speicerum *sed inv. et corr. E*

⁷⁵⁴ coprorum *om. E*

⁷⁵⁵ diversae speciei: diversorum specie *V*

⁷⁵⁶ vel specierum *om. V*

⁷⁵⁷ ipsius sensus *inv. sed corr. E*

⁷⁵⁸ perficiendo: perficiende *sed corr. E*

species⁷⁵⁹, sint diversarum rationum vel contrariae vel unius speciei, species autem non, sed ita parum secundum se contrariatur⁷⁶⁰⁷⁶¹ species albi speciei nigri sicut speciei alterius rei, et⁷⁶² ideo non solum species diversorum numero convenientium in specie non⁷⁶³ possunt esse simul in eodem, sed nec quaecumque⁷⁶⁴ |E 101vb| species quarumcumque⁷⁶⁵).

(29) Tertio sic⁷⁶⁶: Si duae species simul sint in eodem distinctae actu, tunc, secundum quod probat perspectivus, una res videntur duae res. Hoc autem modo non convenit secundum eum, quia duae species duorum oculorum concurrentes ad unum punctum duorum nervorum efficiuntur una in illo modo communi. Unde omne, quod videtur, videtur sub pyramide, cuius basis est in re visa et angulus pyramidis in nervo illo, ubi coniunguntur duae lineae a base descendente. Et ideo quando aliquis elevat alterum oculum, tunc, quia duae lineae in basi pyramidis protractae⁷⁶⁷ versus illum punctum non possunt convenire in nervo illo, una res apparet⁷⁶⁸ duae.⁷⁶⁹)

(30) Sed ad hoc dicunt adversarii⁷⁷⁰), quod perspectivus vult, quod sint unum subiecto sive situationaliter, quia non est eas distinguere ex parte subiecti, tamen sunt duae essentialiter distinctae ex parte obiectorum.

(31) Sed contra hoc est, quod, quandocumque sunt duo principia formalia distincta essentialiter, oportet esse actus duos⁷⁷¹, etsi⁷⁷² agens sit unum. Si ergo istae species manent actu distinctae essentialiter, oportet dicere, quod sint duae visiones simul et non una, dum video per duas species. Et ideo etiam dicimus, quod in patria sunt duae visiones, scilicet per essentiam et propriam rerum speciem⁷⁷³, etiam quando idem per duo principia videt.

(32) Sed ad hoc dicunt, quod una est⁷⁷⁴ visio, quia uniuntur non essentialiter⁷⁷⁵ in uno puncto communi⁷⁷⁶⁷⁷⁷).

⁷⁵⁹ species *om. E*

⁷⁶⁰ secundum se contrariantur: contrariantur secundum se *E*

⁷⁶¹ contrariatur: contrariantur *V*

⁷⁶² et *om. V*

⁷⁶³ non *om. E*

⁷⁶⁴ quaecumque *add.* Item diversae species non possunt simul actu informare idem subiectum sive sint intentionales sive rationales sive eiusdem speciei sive diversarum, sed in habitu vel in pura potentia possunt inesse eidem ut patet superius *i.m. ex a. m. E*

⁷⁶⁵) Thom., Quodl. VII, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 11,104–121.

⁷⁶⁶ sic: sicie *sed corr. V*

⁷⁶⁷ protractae: pertractae *V*

⁷⁶⁸ apparet: apparent *V*

⁷⁶⁹) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 101, resp.; Muller 299.

⁷⁷⁰) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 101, resp.; Muller 298,198–202; Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 101, resp.; Muller 299,234–236.

⁷⁷¹ actus duos: actiones duas *V*

⁷⁷² etsi: etiam si *E*

⁷⁷³ propriam ... speciem: pro proprias rerum species *E*

⁷⁷⁴ una est *inv. E*

⁷⁷⁵ non essentialiter *om. E*

⁷⁷⁶ communi: commune *E*

⁷⁷⁷) Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 101, resp.; Muller 299,234–236.

(33) Sed hoc non sufficit, sicut, quantumcumque lux et calor in igne uniantur, quod, ubicumque est unum, est et⁷⁷⁸ aliud, et similiter color⁷⁷⁹ et sapor in pomo, tamen sunt ipsorum duae operationes.

(34) Nec obstat, si dicas⁷⁸⁰, quod ista differunt genere vel specie⁷⁸¹, scilicet color et sapor, lux et calor⁷⁸², non autem sic⁷⁸³ duae species duorum oculorum, quia, sicut adhuc sequitur, quod sint⁷⁸⁴ diversae operationes illorum⁷⁸⁵ specie vel genere non obstante, quod sunt in uno subiecto indistinctae, ita et hic erunt duae operationes vel⁷⁸⁶ duae visiones⁷⁸⁷ numero distinctae, quod tamen falsum est⁷⁸⁸.

(35) Et⁷⁸⁹ ideo concludendo dico, quod una et eadem species essentialiter ex parte subiecti potest recipere numerum non rei, sed rationis, ut scilicet dicatur multa per relationem et per comparisonem ad diversa obiecta, sicut et in Deo dicimus multas ideas, licet sint una essentia per comparisonem ad ideata, sicut et nos per unam⁷⁹⁰ speciem diversa videmus vel intelligimus, quae relata |V 156ra| ad diversa, quae per eam repraesentantur, potest dici multa.

(36) Ad rationes⁷⁹¹. Ad primum. Secundum Philosophum⁷⁹², Avicennam⁷⁹³) et alios, species conservantur in memoria et particulares et sic in intellectu possibili post apprehensionem earum in sensu exteriorum. Dicendum secundum Avicennam⁷⁹⁴, quod in illis potentiis sunt in habitu tantum, et ideo Avicenna⁷⁹⁵ distinguit illas species, ubi species sunt ut in quodam thesauro, ab aliis apprehensivis.⁷⁹⁶)

(37) »Ad secundum⁷⁹⁷. Species diversorum sensibilium sunt in eodem puncto aeris⁷⁹⁸, ubi se intersecant, et ad diversos⁷⁹⁹ videntes diriguntur. Dicendum, quod ibi sunt sicut per modum

⁷⁷⁸ et om. E

⁷⁷⁹ color: calor V

⁷⁸⁰ dicas: dicitur E

⁷⁸¹ genere ... specie: specie vel genere V

⁷⁸² color ... sapor: calor et lux, color et sapor E

⁷⁸³ sic om. V

⁷⁸⁴ sint om. V

⁷⁸⁵ diversae ... illorum: illorum sunt diversae actiones V

⁷⁸⁶ vel: sive V

⁷⁸⁷ duae visiones inv. E

⁷⁸⁸ tamen ... est: falsum est tamen E

⁷⁸⁹ Et adn. Responsio i. m. ex a. m. E

⁷⁹⁰ per unam: per unam sed corr. s. v. E

⁷⁹¹ Ad rationes om. V

⁷⁹²) Cf. Arist., De memor. et remiscet., c. 1, 449b1–451a17; transl. Iacobi: Donati 115,31–120,25.

⁷⁹³) Avic., De an., I, 5; Van Riet 89,53–90,60; Avic., De an., IV, 1; Van Riet 8,95–11,50, spec. 9,8–17; Avic., De an., V, 6; Van Riet 144,66–148,39; cf. etiam Thom., De ver., q. 10, a. 2, resp.; Dondaine 301,127–153.

⁷⁹⁴) Avic., De an., V, 6; Van Riet 144,74–145,82.

⁷⁹⁵) Avic., De an., V, 6; Van Riet 140,17–20; 147,25–148,30.

⁷⁹⁶) Cf. Thom., Quodl. VII, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 10,85–11,95.

⁷⁹⁷ Ad ... secundum om. E

⁷⁹⁸ aereis om. E

⁷⁹⁹ et ad diversos: de adversarios V

dispositionis et non per modum ultimae perfectionis, quia sunt ibi⁸⁰⁰ in quodam fluxu sicut quodam deferente«⁸⁰¹).

(38) Ad tertium. In eodem subiecto, licet non possint esse disparata, species autem una non est alteri contraria secundum Philosophum II *De anima*⁸⁰². Dicendum, quod non prohibentur simul esse propter contrarietatem, sed ideo, quia sunt eiusdem rationis in perficiendo in esse unius rationis. Unde species intentionales non habent se sicut figura et color, sed sicut figura et figura⁸⁰³).

(39) Nec etiam bene dicitur ab adversariis⁸⁰⁴, quod species duorum hominum sint eiusdem speciei differentes numero, licet ipsae res numero tantum differant; sed melius dicitur, quod⁸⁰⁵ similitudo unius - scilicet a recepta nunc et per oblivionem vel quocumque modo illa deleta - <est> iterum eiusdem hominis - scilicet a recepta alia -, quod istae duae sint eiusdem speciei. Et tunc nec ipsi concedent, quod duae solo numero differentes simul sunt in eodem, duorum autem hominum species in oculo repente quandoque et minus conveniunt ad invicem quam unius hominis et simiae⁸⁰⁶, vel ut evidentius videatur quam statuae sculptae vel depictae. Unde ad compatiendum secum aliam speciem vel non compatiendum non est curandum, utrum res, quarum sunt, sint eiusdem speciei vel diversarum⁸⁰⁷.

(40) Ad quintum.⁸⁰⁸ Secundum Commentatorem⁸⁰⁹) eodem modo sunt species in medio et⁸¹⁰ in organo et simili⁸¹¹ in speculo; sed in illa parte speculi, ubi recipitur nunc imago, non potest simul⁸¹² esse alia species, sicut experientia docet; ergo nec species diversorum in eadem parte medii accipiuntur. Dicendum, quod⁸¹³ speculum et medium partim conveniunt et partim differunt. Conveniunt in hoc, quod utrobique forma habet esse intentionale. Unde et Auctor VI *Principiorum*⁸¹⁴) dicit, quod convenientius dicitur, quod “non vere est⁸¹⁵ forma in speculo”,

⁸⁰⁰ sunt ibi *inv. V*

⁸⁰¹) Thom., Quodl. VII, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 5 et ad arg. 5; Gauthier 9,26–10,36; 12,161–165; Thomas, De ver., q. 8, a. 14, arg. 8 et ad 8; Dondaine 263,43–53; 266,286–288.

⁸⁰²) Cf. Arist., De an., III 4, 429a19–24; transl. vetus: Stroick 178,90–93; etiam Alb., De an., III, tract. 2, c. 2; Stroick 178,85–179,5.

⁸⁰³) Thom., Quodl. VII, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 4 et ad. 4; Gauthier 9,20–22; 12,155–160.

⁸⁰⁴) *non inveni*

⁸⁰⁵ quod *an* quia *scirb.* ?

⁸⁰⁶ simiae *coni*: symee *V*

⁸⁰⁷ Ad ... diversarum *om. E*

⁸⁰⁸ Ad quintum: Ad aliud *E*

⁸⁰⁹) Averr., De an., II, comm. 97; Crawford 277,28–33; cf. Alb., De homine, I,1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 5; Anzulewicz – Söder 181,58–66; 182,22–24.

⁸¹⁰ et *om. E*

⁸¹¹ simili *om. E*

⁸¹² simul *om. V*

⁸¹³ quod *add.* species *sed exp. V*

⁸¹⁴) Lib. de sex princ., c.2, n. 19; Minio-Paluello – Dod 39,4–8; cf. Alb., De homin., I,1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3; Anzulewicz – Söder 177,39–43; etiam Alb., De forma resultante in speculo; Anzulewicz 184,41–44.

⁸¹⁵ est: sit *V*

scilicet⁸¹⁶ secundum esse naturae sicut⁸¹⁷ in subiecto, “licet vulgo error incredibilis putetur”. Secundo, in hoc, quod utrobique forma recipitur in puncto, et similiter in oculo et non situalter; si enim situalter, tunc tantum corpus occuparet tantum et maius corpus⁸¹⁸ adhuc maius, et similiter⁸¹⁹ propter proportionem ad magnum montem, immo ad mediam circumferentiam caeli non possemus eam videre⁸²⁰. Sed etiam differunt in duobus, primo, quod species in medio recipitur in omni parte medii, sicut etiam⁸²¹ lumen; alias idem visibile non posset videri ab omnibus circumquaque sedentibus, quod tamen fieri videmus; sed in speculo recipitur in determinata parte, et in illa non potest simul eodem modo recipi alia. Hoc autem convenit, quia secundum certam et rectam proportionem recipitur ita, quod, sicut impossibile est, quod aliud corpus in eodem loco vel⁸²² situ sit cum illo, cuius imago apparet in speculo, ita impossibile est⁸²³ alterius similitudinem simul in eodem puncto inesse. In aere autem omnium⁸²⁴ species⁸²⁵, quae praesentia sunt⁸²⁶, simul sunt, licet indistincte, sicut dictum est supra⁸²⁷⁸²⁸). Secunda differentia est, quod imago in speculo videtur et non solum est id, quo res videtur⁸²⁹, sed similitudo in aere non videtur. Huius autem ratio est, quod⁸³⁰ propter transparentiam aeris deferuntur, sed in speculo propter plumbum speculo appositum vel vitro, quod terminat speciem, quasi colligitur et permanet, et similiter⁸³¹ est⁸³² in oculo, quod est secundum perspectivos⁸³³) speculum animatum.

(41) Ad sextum⁸³⁴. »Ponatur unus oculus versus orientem et respiciat visus⁸³⁵ versus occidentem et vocetur A, alius⁸³⁶ e converso in occidente respiciens⁸³⁷ versus orientem et vocetur B; et sit obiectum ipsius B in oriente et vocetur C, quod sit album, et obiectum ipsius⁸³⁸ A in occidente et

⁸¹⁶ scilicet: si V

⁸¹⁷ sicut: sit V

⁸¹⁸ corpus *add. et sed exp. E*

⁸¹⁹ similiter *om. E*

⁸²⁰ videre: vincere V

⁸²¹ etiam: et V

⁸²² loco vel *om. E*

⁸²³ est *om. V*

⁸²⁴ omnium: omni E

⁸²⁵ species *om. V*

⁸²⁶ sunt *add. speciem V*

⁸²⁷ supra *om. V*

⁸²⁸) Cf. *supra* sect. (8)

⁸²⁹ res videtur *inv. E*

⁸³⁰ quod: quia E

⁸³¹ similiter: simile V

⁸³² est *om. E*

⁸³³) Algazel, *Metaph.*, II, tract. 4 c. 3; Muckle 166,31–34; Cf. Alb., *De homine*, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3; I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2; Anzulewicz – Söder 175,68–72; 315,55–61; Alb., *De an.*, II, tract. 3, c. 14; Stroick 120,35–38; Alb., *De forma resultante in speculo*; Anzulewicz 187,97–100; 263,29–31; et etiam Dav. *De Dinan.*, *Quaternul. Fragment. c. De visu*; Kurdzialek 40,9–10; 66,2.

⁸³⁴ sextum: aliud E


⁸³⁵ visus *om. V*

⁸³⁶ alius: alium V

⁸³⁷ in occidente respiciens: qui respiciat E

⁸³⁸ ipsius: ipsi V

vocetur D et sit nigrum. Ergo si C immutat B et D immutat A, oportet, quod species eorum in medio concurrant. Aut ergo in illo puncto⁸³⁹ sunt unum, et sic neutrum⁸⁴⁰ secundum propriam rationem perveniet ad suum sensum et sic erunt duo obiecta⁸⁴¹ opposita⁸⁴² in eodem, aut erunt duae distinctae |E 102ra| species ibidem, et tunc habetur propositum«⁸⁴³).



Dicendum, quod erunt indistinctae realiter, sed tamen ab illa una⁸⁴⁴ secundum diversam virtutem obiectorum distinctorum erunt diversae immutationes oculorum illorum.

(42) Ad septimum. »Licet motus circuli, qui est circulatio, non habeat contrarium secundum Philosophum VIII *Physicorum*⁸⁴⁵, |V 156rb| tamen⁸⁴⁶ motus, qui est super circum, potest habere contrarium. Ponatur ergo circulus et dividatur diametraliter per medium, et unum punctum diametri sive incisionis circuli vocetur A, aliud vocetur B et moveatur C per unam partem versus B et D per aliam partem sive per alium semicirculum, tunc in B unum sistet motum alterius, ne procedat. Si autem hoc contingit in motu circulari, et in recto continget. Ergo nec secundum praecedens argumentum nec C permittet transire D ad oculum A nec D permittet transire C ad oculum B, dum conveniunt in medio puncto, et sic neuter oculorum aliquid videbit⁸⁴⁷«⁸⁴⁸).

⁸³⁹ puncto *om. E*

⁸⁴⁰ sic neutrum: tunc nullum *V*

⁸⁴¹ obiecta *om. V*

⁸⁴² opposita *om. E*

⁸⁴³) Alb., *De homine*, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 5; Anzulewicz – Söder 181,21–41.


⁸⁴⁴ una *add. erunt V*

⁸⁴⁵) Arist., *Phys.*, VIII 8, 261b27–262a17; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 318,6–320,1.

⁸⁴⁶ tamen *coni: tantum V*

⁸⁴⁷ Ad ... aliquid videbit: Praeterea videtur, quod istae duae species concurrentes in medio sistant motum suum mutuo et sic neutrum perveniet ad suum oculum et sic non erit visio. *E*

⁸⁴⁸) Alb., *De homine*, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 5; Anzulewicz – Söder 183,1–17.



Dicendum, quod color visibilis est, secundum quod immutat diaphanum secundum actum lucidi⁸⁴⁹⁸⁵⁰), et quia species in medio⁸⁵¹ non impediunt diaphanitatem⁸⁵² nec luciditatem⁸⁵³, ideo nulla impedit aliam, sicut nec in intellectu multitudo specierum se impedit mutuo⁸⁵⁴, sed magis vivat, licet in corporibus huiusmodi⁸⁵⁵ impedimentum contingat et in aliis formis corporalibus.

(43) Ad octavum. Secundum Philosophum II⁸⁵⁶ De anima color est immutativus diaphani⁸⁵⁷; diaphanum autem mutatum mutat visum; ergo oportet, illud agens esse reale, quod est contra respondentem. Dicendum, quod immutat non physica immutatione, sed intentionali sive spirituali, et ideo non nominat aerem, sicut lux, quae immutat physice calefaciendo et alia faciendo.

(44) Ad nonum. Nos videmus manifeste, quod in oculo apparent diversorum imagines distinctae et sic in speculo. Unde si speculum videret, videret illum per diversas species eiusdem speciei solo numero distinctas. Dicendum †.

(45) Ad decimum. Nos videmus, quod diversae virtutes sunt in eadem potentia simul et simul actu potest aliquis diversis virtutibus uti; ergo et hoc contingere potest in virtutibus agentis, ut simul sint plures species etiam in ultimo actu. Dicendum †.

⁸⁴⁹ lucidi: lucidum V

⁸⁵⁰ Arist., De an. II, 7, 418a31–418b2; transl. vetus: Stroick 108,80–8; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 123a; cf. Auct. Arist. 6, n. 67; Hamesse 180,10–11.

⁸⁵¹ medio: medius V

⁸⁵² diaphanitatem: diaphanatum V

⁸⁵³ luciditatem: lucidatum V

⁸⁵⁴ mutuo: mu^utuo E

⁸⁵⁵ huiusmodi: hoc V

⁸⁵⁶ II *coni.*: V V

⁸⁵⁷) Arist., De an. II, 7, 418a31–418b2; transl. vetus: Stroick 108,80–81; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 123a; cf. Auct. Arist. 6, n. 67; Hamesse 180,10–11.

(46) Ad undecimum. Videmus, quod essentialiter distincti habitus diversarum scientiarum sunt simul in intellectu et suo modo in memoria, sicut habitus medicinae et geometriae et huiusmodi; si ergo omnes species intelligibiles sunt eiusdem rationis, ita poterit homo habere habitum diversorum solo numero distinctorum, sicut habitum diversarum scientiarum, quod nullus dicit, quia nec duas gratias habituales nec duas caritates, et simile de speculativis habere possumus. Dicendum †.

(47) Ad duodecimum. Relata⁸⁵⁸ simul intelliguntur, quae sunt opposita, ergo distincta; aut ergo per duas species - tunc habetur propositum - aut per unam; si sic, contra: Movens et motum, agens et patiens dicuntur correlata; ergo cum angelus se ipsum intelligat per essentiam suam⁸⁵⁹, patiens vel motum ab eo etiam intelligeret simul per essentiam propriam, quod falsum est; ergo per duas simul. Dicendum †⁸⁶⁰.

⁸⁵⁸ *relata an relativa scrib.?*

⁸⁵⁹ *suam coni.: suum V*

⁸⁶⁰ *Ad octavum ... Dicendum: om. E*

QUAESTIO VII

UTRUM SIT UNUM ESSE OMNIUM, QUAE SUNT IN HOMINE VEL ETIAM⁸⁶¹ ALIO QUOCUMQUE, SCILICET
ACCIDENTIUM ET SUBSTANTIARUM

- (1) Ad huius quaestionis intellectum tria sunt consideranda.
- (2) Primo ponetur quaedam distinctio ipsius esse.
- (3) Secundo ostendetur, quod substantiae et accidentis eius non est idem esse.
- (4) Tertio concludetur⁸⁶², quod substantialium in eadem re est idem esse.
- (5) »Circa primum considerandum, quod secundum Philosophum V *Metaphysicae*⁸⁶³) esse dupliciter accipitur: uno modo, prout est copula verbalis significans compositionem⁸⁶⁴ cuiuscumque enuntiationis⁸⁶⁵, quam facit anima; et hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, sed tantum⁸⁶⁶ in actu animae componentis et dividens, et tale esse attribuitur omni ei, de quo potest formari propositio, sive sit ens sive privatio⁸⁶⁷ entis inquantum⁸⁶⁸ ens; secundo modo⁸⁶⁹, quo⁸⁷⁰ denominatur aliquid esse in rerum natura, et sic esse non attribuitur nisi ipsis rebus⁸⁷¹, quae in decem generibus continentur«⁸⁷²).
- (6) Considerandum ulterius, quod in ipsis decem generibus aliquid invenitur ut perfectum in suo genere⁸⁷³, et tali convenit⁸⁷⁴ nomen essentiae, quae etiam quidditas rei dicitur et explicatur per definitionem et secundum quam unumquodque est in genere secundum Avicennam in sua *Metaphysica*⁸⁷⁵). Aliquid autem invenitur ut imperfectum⁸⁷⁶, sicut sunt partes et principia essentiae⁸⁷⁷; talia sunt entia⁸⁷⁸ quodammodo, inquantum ipsis est aliquid⁸⁷⁹, non tamen proprie

⁸⁶¹ etiam *om. E*

⁸⁶² concluderetur: ostenderetur *E*

⁸⁶³) Arist., *Metaph.*, V 7, 1017a23–35; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 94,21–95,5; cf. Averr., *Metaph.* V, text. 14 et comm. 14; Ponzalli 128,44–129,58; 130,66–134,142.

⁸⁶⁴ compositionem: composita *V*

⁸⁶⁵ enuntiationis: compositionis *sed corr. E*

⁸⁶⁶ tantum: tamen *E*

⁸⁶⁷ privatio *coni. ex Thoma*: proprietas *E* proportio *V*

⁸⁶⁸ inquantum *add. est V*

⁸⁶⁹ modo *om. E*

⁸⁷⁰ quo *om. V*

⁸⁷¹ rebus *om. V*

⁸⁷²) Thom., *Quodl.* IX, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 94,31–46; cf. etiam Thom., *De ente*, c. 1; Leon. 369,1–13.

⁸⁷³ genere *add. ut Avicenna dicit in sua Metaphysica E*

⁸⁷⁴ convenit: competit *V*

⁸⁷⁵) Avic., *Metaph.*, I, 5; Van Riet 34,55–35,57; 35,63–64; cf. Thom., *De ente*, c. 1; Leon. 369,27–36.

⁸⁷⁶ imperfectum *add. in suo genere et tali competit nomen essentiae quae etiam sed del. cum va-cat V*

⁸⁷⁷ essentiae *add. vel sed del. V*

⁸⁷⁸ entia: essentia *sed corr. V*

⁸⁷⁹ est aliquid *inv. V*

dicuntur essentiae. Unde male tractum est in usum, quod materia dicitur essentia vel forma⁸⁸⁰ vel⁸⁸¹ huiusmodi, sed secundum Philosophum⁸⁸²) dicuntur⁸⁸³ principia essentialia⁸⁸⁴, non essentiae. Rursus, quia nomen essentiae includit solum⁸⁸⁵ principia essentialia⁸⁸⁶ cum praecisione omnium <aliorum accidentium>, quae ad essentiam non pertinent, sed solum adveniunt ei; suppositum autem⁸⁸⁷ dicit aliquid⁸⁸⁸ habens essentiam non excludendo alia, quae ipsi |V 156va| accidunt⁸⁸⁹, ideo suppositum est id, quod in essentia vel⁸⁹⁰ per essentiam in natura rerum subsistit non solum ipsi essentiae, sed etiam aliis. Unde comparatur suppositum ad essentiam non sicut alia res ad aliam, sed sicut idem sumptum per modum totius ad se ipsum⁸⁹¹ sumptum per modum partis, et sic se habent homo et humanitas. Si enim humanitas esset alia res ab homine, cum in homine etiam includatur humanitas, essent duae humanitates in homine, quod est absurdum⁸⁹²).

(7) Rursus, quia ipsi supposito insunt accidentia, quae non habent esse nisi in supposito, ideo secundum haec tria, essentiam, suppositum et⁸⁹³ accidentia, distinguitur triplex esse, scilicet esse essentiae, esse subsistentiae, quod est suppositi, et esse existentiae, quod est accidentium et eorum, quae non per se subsistunt, licet in rei veritate primum esse, scilicet esse⁸⁹⁴ essentiae, non sit aliis connumerandum, quia non dicit⁸⁹⁵ actum essendi⁸⁹⁶ per se, cum essentia non sit nisi in supposito.⁸⁹⁷) Unde esse humanitatis, prout dicit actum essendi, non est nisi esse hominis. Unde esse essentiae secundum se nihil aliud dicit nisi⁸⁹⁸ ipsamet essentiam, sed differunt sicut abstractum et concretum et sicut currere et cursus⁸⁹⁹); et sic appellatur a Philosopho in⁹⁰⁰ VI *Topicorum*⁹⁰¹), cum dicit⁹⁰²,

⁸⁸⁰ forma: forme vel puncti *E*

⁸⁸¹ vel: et *V*

⁸⁸²) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, V 7, 1017b21–22; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 95,24–25; cf. etiam Thom., *In Metaph.*, V, lect. 10, n. 902; Cathala–Spiazzi 242a; Thom., *S. contr. Gent.*, IV, c. 30; Leon. 113a; Thom., *Quaest. disp. de pot.*, q. 9, a. 1, resp. ad sed contra; Pession 227a.

⁸⁸³ dicuntur: appellantur *V*

⁸⁸⁴ essentialia *om. V*

⁸⁸⁵ includit solum *inv. E*

⁸⁸⁶ essentialia: essentiae *E*

⁸⁸⁷ autem *om. E*

⁸⁸⁸ aliquid *om. V*

⁸⁸⁹ alia ... accidunt: si sit illa aliquod aliud accidens *E*

⁸⁹⁰ vel: sive *V*

⁸⁹¹ se ipsum: suppositum *V*

⁸⁹²) Cf. God. de Font., *Quodl.* VII, q. 5; De Wulf – Hoffmans 308–309; cf. etiam Thom., *Quodl.* II, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; Gauthier 218,159–169; Thom., *Compend. th.*, I, c. 154; Leon. 140,64–141,78.

⁸⁹³ et *om. V*

⁸⁹⁴ esse *om. V*

⁸⁹⁵ quia non dicit: cum non dicat *E*

⁸⁹⁶ essendi: essentiae *E*

⁸⁹⁷) Cf. God. de Font., *Quodl.* III, q. 4; De Wulf – Pelzer 190.

⁸⁹⁸ nisi: quod sic *E*

⁸⁹⁹) Cf. Aeg. Rom., *Quaest. de esse et essent.*, q. IX, resp.; Venetiis 1503 18ra–19ra.

⁹⁰⁰ in: cum dicit *V*

⁹⁰¹) *potius* Arist., *Topic.*, I 5, 101b39, transl. Boethii: Minio–Paluello 9,6–8; transl. anonyma: Minio–Paluello 194,1–3.

⁹⁰² cum dicit *om. V*

quod “definitio est oratio indicans, quid est esse rei”⁹⁰³, id est quiditatem vel essentiam rei; et in III *De anima*⁹⁰⁴) dicit, quod potentia intellectiva “carnis”⁹⁰⁵ esse discernit”, id est essentiam; et sic patet, quod non est nisi duplex esse proprie accipiendo in rerum natura, scilicet subsistentiae et existentiae. Et ideo quaestio nostra quaerit “utrum idem sit”⁹⁰⁶ esse substantiarum et accidentium” sive quorumcumque in re, prout esse dicit actum essendi.

(8) Circa secundum considerandum, quod circa hoc est triplex opinio.

(9) Quidam⁹⁰⁷) dicunt, quod accidentia non dicunt⁹⁰⁸ aliquam naturam vel⁹⁰⁹ quiditatem nec est alia quiditas in natura nisi quiditas substantiae.

(10) Concedunt tamen aliqui, quod accidentia, licet non sint entia, tamen non⁹¹⁰ sunt nihil, quia sunt aliquid et quasi quidam⁹¹¹ modus substantiae, non tamen sunt⁹¹² secundum hos⁹¹³ entia.

(11) Hoc autem probant tripliciter.

(12) Primo per Philosophum in⁹¹⁴ IV *Metaphysicae*⁹¹⁵), qui dicit, quod accidentia dicuntur entia, inquantum⁹¹⁶ sunt passiones vel accidentia vel viae vel huiusmodi aliquid⁹¹⁷ ad substantiam⁹¹⁸), sicut et sanitas attribuitur animali⁹¹⁹, sed aliis competit⁹²⁰ secundum analogiam ad sanitatem, quae est in animali⁹²¹; sed constat, quod sanitas, prout est in aliquo⁹²² alio quam in animali, sive in herba

⁹⁰³ rei om. V

⁹⁰⁴) Arist., De an., III 4, 429b16–18; transl. vetus: Stroick 199,87–88; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 208.

⁹⁰⁵ carnis: quamvis V

⁹⁰⁶ idem sit inv. E

⁹⁰⁷) Theod. de Vrib., De acciden., 10, 1–2 et 4; Pagnoni-Sturlese 66,51–65; 67,86–92; cf. L. Sturlese, *Eckhart, Teodorico e Picardi nella Summa Philosophiae di Nicola di Strasburgo*, pp. 183–206; R. Imbach, *Metaphysik, Theologie und Politik*, 384–393; A. Beccarisi, *Johannes Picardi von Lichtenberg, Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart*, 526–536; cf. etiam Siger., Quaest. in Metaph. V, q. 23, resp.; Mauerer 237,16–238,29; Siger., Quaest. in Metaph., VII, q. 1; Mauerer 328,13–14.

⁹⁰⁸ dicunt: dicant V

⁹⁰⁹ vel: nec V

⁹¹⁰ tamen non inv. E

⁹¹¹ et ... quidam: scilicet E

⁹¹² sunt om. E

⁹¹³ secundum hos om. V

⁹¹⁴ in om. V

⁹¹⁵) Arist., Metaph., IV 1, 1003b6–10; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 60,22–61,4; cf. etiam Thom., In Metaph., IV, lect. 1, n. 539; Cathala – Spiazzi 152a–b.

⁹¹⁶ inquantum: quia E

⁹¹⁷ aliquid om. V

⁹¹⁸) Theod. de Vrib., De acciden., 10, 3; Pagnoni-Sturlese 66,67–6,77; cf. etiam Anonym., Quaest. super Metaph., IV, q. 3, Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 192, III, f. 19ra, in S. Donati, *La discussione sull'unita del concetto di ente nella tradizione di commento della "Fisica": commenti parigini degli anni 1270-1315 ca*, in M. Pickave' (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 30), Berlin-New York 2003, 60–139, spec. 107, n. 95.

⁹¹⁹ animalis: uni V

⁹²⁰ competit om. E

⁹²¹ sanitatem ... animalis: animal E

⁹²² aliquo om. E

sive in urina, non dicit aliquid formaliter in eis nec competit eis ratio sanitatis propria, quae est debita commensuratio humorum⁹²³); ergo a simili nec accidentibus est⁹²⁴ ratio entis⁹²⁵).

(13) Secundo: Illud⁹²⁶, cui non competit ratio entis vel entitas⁹²⁷ in recto, sed solum in obliquo, id de se nihil est;⁹²⁸) sed secundum Philosophum VII *Metaphysicae*⁹²⁹) accidentia non dicuntur entia, nisi inquantum⁹³⁰ sunt entis⁹³¹).

(14) Tertio, quia hoc expresse dicit Commentator *Super IV Metaphysicae*⁹³²), ubi sic dicit⁹³³, quod “universaliter non dicuntur entia, nisi quia sunt dispositiones entis; et multi homines negant esse ea^{934.935}) Albedo enim non est”. Ex quo patet, quod non sunt entia. |E 102rb|

(15) Sed ista positio absurda est propter quattuor.

(16) Primo, quia destruit omnem scientiam.

(17) Secundo⁹³⁶ negat sensum.

(18) Tertio negat experientiam.

(19) Quarto est contra philosophorum doctrinam.

(20) Primum patet, quia secundum⁹³⁷ Philosophum I⁹³⁸ libro⁹³⁹ *Posteriorum*⁹⁴⁰): “Scientia est habitus conclusionum”. Scientiae autem demonstrative⁹⁴¹ probant passiones proprias⁹⁴² de subiecto^{943.944}). Unde quod quid est secundum eum in eodem non demonstratur, sed definitur⁹⁴⁵).

⁹²³) Arist., *Metaph.*, IV 1, 1003a33–b4; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 60,14–21.

⁹²⁴ est *om. E*

⁹²⁵) Cf. Anonym., *Quaest. super Metaph.*, IV, q. 4, Ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse, 192, III, f. 20rb, in: S. Donati, *La discussione sull'unita del concetto di ente nella tradizione di commento della "Fisica": commenti parigini degli anni 1270-1315 ca.*, in: M. Pickave' (ed.), *Die Logik des Transzendentalen. Festschrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburtstag* (Miscellanea Mediaevalia 30), Berlin-New York 2003, 60–139, *spec.* 107, n. 95.

⁹²⁶ Illud: sic *E*

⁹²⁷ ratio entis vel entitas: entitas *V*

⁹²⁸) Magist. Echard., *In Exod.*, c. 15, v. 18, n. 54; Fischer – Koch – Weiss, 58,3–59,9.

⁹²⁹) Arist., *Metaph.*, VII I, 1028a18–19; transl. media: Vuillemin – Diem 123,10–12; cf. Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,76.

⁹³⁰ inquantum: quia *E*

⁹³¹) Theod. de Vrib., *De acciden.*, 10, 3; Pagnoni–Sturlese 66,66–67.

⁹³²) Averr., *Metaph.*, IV, comm. 2; Venetiis 1562, 65vI–K.

⁹³³ sic dicit *inv. E*

⁹³⁴ esse ea *inv. E*

⁹³⁵) Theod. de Vrib., *De acciden.*, 10, 3; Pagnoni–Sturlese 66,77–85.

⁹³⁶ absurda ... Secundo *illeg. E*

⁹³⁷ quia secundum: per *V*

⁹³⁸ *I om. V*

⁹³⁹ libro *om. E*

⁹⁴⁰) Cf. Arist., *Anal. post.*, II 19, 100a5–17; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 106,16–107,7; cf. etiam Averr., *In lib. post.*, II, 19, comm. 107; Venetiis 1562, vol. I/Ib, 35 I–L; etiam Venetiis 1562, vol. I/IIa, 567D–568D; et etiam Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, VI 6, 1140b31–1141a8; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 258,26–259,7; Averr., *In Moral. Nic. Exp.*, VI, 6; Venetiis 1562 85rE–F; et etiam Thom., *In I Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, qc. 2, ad arg. 3; Oliva 324,91–95; Thom., *Exp. Post.*, II, 20, 100a16–100b13; Gauthier 246,288–247,322.

⁹⁴¹ demonstrative *om. E*

⁹⁴² passiones proprias *inv. E*

⁹⁴³ subiecto: suis subiectis *E*

⁹⁴⁴) Cf. Arist., *Anal. post.*, I 28, 87a38; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 60,21–61,1; Arist., *Anal. poster.*, I 1, 71a1–2; I 2, 71b9–19; I 4, 73a21–25; transl. Iacobi, Minio-Paluello – Dod 5,3–4; 7,4–16; 12,8–12; etiam Alb., *In I Sent.*, d. 1,

Dicere ergo⁹⁴⁶ passiones nihil esse, quae sunt de genere accidentium, est destruere scientias; et sicut per hoc invenimus formam esse aliud principium a materia, quia eadem materia perdit unam formam et accipit aliam, ita et color est aliud a subiecto, in quo est, cum contingat unum perdere colorem⁹⁴⁷ et alium accipere; ergo et alia quantitas⁹⁴⁸ a subiecto.

(21) Secundum patet, quia substantia non sentitur, sed solum intelligitur⁹⁴⁹). Sentitur autem per accidens, quia alba, colorata vel huiusmodi⁹⁵⁰. Sensus autem per se est qualitatum sensibilium, circa quas⁹⁵¹ etiam non decipitur secundum Philosophum II *De anima*⁹⁵²). Unde negare accidentia esse⁹⁵³ est negare sensum, cum oporteat eum esse alicuius, sicut obiecti <ad> potentiam^{954/955}).

(22) Tertio: Convenit eis, sicut convenit negantibus principia, scilicet, quod negando, ea ponunt⁹⁵⁶, sicut etiam ille⁹⁵⁷, qui negat veritatem, ponit eam, quia vult, quod dictum suum, quo negat veritatem⁹⁵⁸, habeat veritatem^{959/960}). Sic et isti, dum negant⁹⁶¹ accidentia, dicendo ponunt vocem, quae aliquid est, et concipiendo accidentia non esse ponunt conceptionem, quae est accidens⁹⁶². Ergo propriam positionem non possunt etiam⁹⁶³ intelligere.

(23) Quarto patet, quia dicit Commentator *Super VII Metaphysicae*⁹⁶⁴) quod Philosophus ibi⁹⁶⁵ circa principium intendit determinare⁹⁶⁶, quod “quiditas individui substantiae est prior⁹⁶⁷ in⁹⁶⁸ esse

c. 1, a. 2; Burger 12,66–69; Alb., S. th., tract. 1, q. 3, c. 2; Siedler 11,93–12,1; Alb., Anal. Post. I, tract. 5, c. 6; Borgnet 140a; Thom., Exp. Post., I, 42; Gauthier 157,8–12; Thom., S. th. I, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 1; Leon. 11a; Thom., S. th. III, q. 11, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 164b; Thom., In Metaph., proem.; Cathala – Spiazzi 2a–b.

⁹⁴⁵ Arist., Anal. post., I 7, 75a40–75b1; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 19,20–24; Auct. Arist. 35, n. 50–52; Hamesse 315,58–62.

⁹⁴⁶ ergo: autem E

⁹⁴⁷ in quo est ... colorem: quod contingit eum perdere E

⁹⁴⁸ quantitas: quiditas E

⁹⁴⁹ Cf. etiam Thom., S. contr. Gent. III, c. 56; Leon. 155b; cf. Arist., De an., III 4, 429b16–18; transl. vetus: Stroick 199,87–88; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 208.

⁹⁵⁰ quia ... huiusmodi: inquantum coloratum vel sonans vel calidum vel frigidum V

⁹⁵¹ quas: quae V

⁹⁵² Arist., De an., II 6, 418a7–25; III 1, 425a24–27; transl. vetus: Stroick 102,73–82; 154,86–155,77; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 108; 172; Aristotele, *De Anima*, III, 8, 426b8–12; transl. vetus: Stroick 161,79–80; transl. Guillelmi: Gauthier 182; cf. etiam Thom., Super Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, resp.; Gils 138,113–123; Thom., Quaest. de carit., q. un., art. 4, resp.; Odetto 763b.

⁹⁵³ esse om. V

⁹⁵⁴ cum ... potentiam: cum sensum oporteat esse alicuius V

⁹⁵⁵ Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, art. 3 resp.; Leon. 12a; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, art. 7, resp.; Leon. 19a–b; Thom., S. th., I q. 77, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 253b–254a; Thom., In De an., II, 6; Leon. 93,118–94,190, spec. 93,122–94,172.

⁹⁵⁶ ea ponunt: ponant ea E

⁹⁵⁷ ille om. E

⁹⁵⁸ veritatem: ea E

⁹⁵⁹ habeat veritatem: sit verum E

⁹⁶⁰ Thom., In II Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 4; Mandonnet – Moos 871; Aug., Soliloq., II, c. 2, 2; Hörmann 48,12–24; Anselm., De ver., c. 1; Schmitt 176,4–177,3.

⁹⁶¹ negant: negat E

⁹⁶² est accidens inv. E

⁹⁶³ non ... etiam: etiam non possunt E

⁹⁶⁴ Averr., Metaph., VII, comm. 2; Venetiis 1562 153vI.

⁹⁶⁵ Metaphysicae ... ibi om. V

⁹⁶⁶ Metaphysicae ... determinare: circa principium in hoc capitulo intendit Aristoteles declarare V

⁹⁶⁷ est prior inv. E

quiditate accidentium”. Item parum post dicit: “Manifestum est igitur, quod substantiae sunt causae⁹⁶⁹ essentiae accidentium”⁹⁷⁰), et iterum parum post: “Quiditates accidentium posteriorantur⁹⁷¹ |V 156vb| quiditatibus substantiarum, secundum quod causata posteriorantur causis”⁹⁷²). Cum igitur causatum semper differat a causa, constat, quod alia est quiditas⁹⁷³ sive essentia⁹⁷⁴ accidentis, alia⁹⁷⁵ substantiae.

(24) Rationes non concludunt⁹⁷⁶. Unde⁹⁷⁷⁹⁷⁸ dicendum ad primum dupliciter: Primo quod⁹⁷⁹ Philosophus non intendit ibi⁹⁸⁰⁹⁸¹), “utrum accidentia sint entia vel non”, sed vult concludere, quod, sicut una est⁹⁸² scientia omnium sanorum et una omnium vocum, ita et una est scientia substantiae et suorum⁹⁸³ accidentium, quia, quae habent attributionem ad aliquod unum, illa sunt unius scientiae, vel quia non solum accidentia, verum etiam non entia vel negationes entium quodammodo referuntur ad principale ens, quod est substantia, ideo sunt unius scientiae⁹⁸⁴)⁹⁸⁵).

(25) Secundo dicitur, quod nec argumentum concludit, quia bene concedo⁹⁸⁶, quod sanitas⁹⁸⁷, quae est in urina vel herba, non habet proprie⁹⁸⁸ rationem sanitatis eius⁹⁸⁹, quae est in animali; ita entia, quae sunt accidentia⁹⁹⁰, non habent⁹⁹¹ rationem illius⁹⁹² entis principalis, scilicet substantiae, ad quam⁹⁹³ referuntur accidentia, sicut omnia sana ad sanitatem animalis⁹⁹⁴.

(26) Ad secundum dicendum, quod ens bene⁹⁹⁵ convenit eis in recto, sed ratio entitatis est ex obliquo. Unde sensus est, quod non dicuntur entia, scilicet accidentia, secundum se, sed in quantum sunt entis, scilicet substantiae dispositiones, secundum Commentatorem⁹⁹⁶).

⁹⁶⁸ in: vel *sed exp. et corr. s. v. E*

⁹⁶⁹ causae: esse *E*

⁹⁷⁰) Averr., Metaph., VII, comm. 3; Venetiis 1562 154rE.

⁹⁷¹ posteriorantur: posteriores *E*

⁹⁷²) Averr., Metaph., VII, comm. 4; Venetiis 1562 154vI.

⁹⁷³ quiditas: quantitas *V*

⁹⁷⁴ sive essentia *om. E*

⁹⁷⁵ alia: quam *E*

⁹⁷⁶ concludunt: concludit *V*

⁹⁷⁷ Unde: Et ideo *E*

⁹⁷⁸ Unde *adn. Solutiones i.m. ex a. m. E*

⁹⁷⁹ quod *om. V*

⁹⁸⁰ ibi *om. E*

⁹⁸¹) Cf. Arist., Metaph. IV 1, 1003a33–b10; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 60,14–61,4.

⁹⁸² una est *inv. V*

⁹⁸³ suorum *om. V*

⁹⁸⁴) Cf. Thom., De prin. nat., c. 6; Dondaine 46,42–47,62.

⁹⁸⁵) Cf. Arist., Metaph. IV 2, 1003b5–11; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 60,22–61,5.

⁹⁸⁶ concedo: conceditur *E*

⁹⁸⁷ concedo *add. quod sanitas i. m. V*

⁹⁸⁸ proprie: vere *E*

⁹⁸⁹ eius: verae *V*

⁹⁹⁰ ita ... accidentia: similiter accidentium quodlibet *E*

⁹⁹¹ habent: habet *E*

⁹⁹² illius *om. E*

⁹⁹³ quam: quod *E*

⁹⁹⁴ sanitatem animalis *inv. E*

⁹⁹⁵ bene: bene *sed corr. non V*

(27) Ad tertium dicendum, quod, quia accidentia non sunt nisi in subiecto, albedo autem significat⁹⁹⁷ in abstracto non concernendo⁹⁹⁸ subiectum, ideo multi dixerunt, quod albedo et alia accidentia in abstracto⁹⁹⁹ non essent entia. Unde dicitur ibidem¹⁰⁰⁰): “Albedo autem non est, sed album”. Constat autem, quod album meram qualitatem significat secundum Philosophum in *Praedicamentis*¹⁰⁰¹).

(28) Unde notandum¹⁰⁰², quod ea, quae in re sunt coniuncta, intellectus potest ea¹⁰⁰³ separatim intelligere, et quia voces non¹⁰⁰⁴ significant res nisi¹⁰⁰⁵ mediante conceptu intellectus¹⁰⁰⁶), ideo albedo significat albedinem in subiecto existentem et non aliud nec nihil, licet non significet ens ut inexistens¹⁰⁰⁷, quod facit album.

(29) Nec hoc etiam bene dicitur a quibusdam¹⁰⁰⁸), quia, licet accidens dicat quid, nec sit nihil, tamen non¹⁰⁰⁹ est ens secundum eos¹⁰¹⁰. Sed quod nomen entis sibi competat¹⁰¹¹, patet ex tribus: primo per hoc, quod nullum vocabulum est ita tenue in sui significatione. Dicitur enim de entibus rationis, de entibus intentionalibus¹⁰¹², sicut supra dictum est¹⁰¹³), quod etiam non ens dicitur ens aliquo modo, sicut patet de privationibus¹⁰¹⁴); secundo patet per Philosophum II *Metaphysicae*¹⁰¹⁵), quod ens dicitur de decem praedicamentis; tertio per Commentatorem *Super VII Metaphysicae*¹⁰¹⁶) qui dicit¹⁰¹⁷, quod “Philosophus declaravit, quod quiditates substantiarum sunt priores aliis entibus”, id est accidentibus¹⁰¹⁸.

(30) Et¹⁰¹⁹ ideo est alia opinio¹⁰²⁰), quae dicit, quod accidentia habent quiditatem quandam, non¹⁰²² tamen habent aliquod esse, sed eorum natura est in subiecto¹⁰²³, secundum quam substantia

⁹⁹⁶) Cf. Averr., *Metaph.*, IV, comm. 2; Venetiis 1562 65vI–K.

⁹⁹⁷ significat: significatur *E*

⁹⁹⁸ concernendo: consignificando *V*

⁹⁹⁹ accidentia ... abstracto: abstracta *V*

¹⁰⁰⁰) Averr., *Metaph.*, IV comm. 2; Venetiis 1562 65vK.

¹⁰⁰¹) Cf. Arist., *Cat.*, c. 5, 3b19; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 11,8–9.

¹⁰⁰² notandum: considerandum *V*

¹⁰⁰³ ea *om. E*

¹⁰⁰⁴ non *om. E*

¹⁰⁰⁵ nisi *om. E add. i. m. V*

¹⁰⁰⁶) Cf. Thom., *Exp. Perym.*, I, 10; Leon. 50,42–48; Thom., *In Metaph. VII*, lect. 1, n. 1254; Cathala – Spiazzi 317a.

¹⁰⁰⁷ ens ... inexistens: eam ut in-existentem *V*

¹⁰⁰⁸) *non inveni*

¹⁰⁰⁹ tamen non *inv. E*

¹⁰¹⁰ secundum eos *om. V*

¹⁰¹¹ sibi competat *inv. E*

¹⁰¹² rationis ... intentionalibus: intentionalibus et rationis *E*

¹⁰¹³) Cf. *supra* sect. (24)

¹⁰¹⁴) Cf. Arist., *Metaph. IV* 2, 1003b5–11; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 60,22–61,5.

¹⁰¹⁵) *potius* Arist., *Metaph. IV* 2, 1003b5–11; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 60,22–61,5; Arist., *Metaph. V* 7, 1017a22–27; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 94,23–26; cf. etiam Averr., *Metaph.*, V, comm. 14; Ponzalli 131,95.

¹⁰¹⁶) Averr., *Metaph.*, VII, comm. 5; Venetiis 1552 155vM.

¹⁰¹⁷ Super ... dicit: qui dicit Super VII *Metaphysicae V*

¹⁰¹⁸ substantiarum ... accidentibus: accidentium sunt posteriores aliis entibus hoc est substantiis et e-converso *E*

¹⁰¹⁹ Et *om. E*

¹⁰²⁰ opinio *add. Secunda opinio i. m. E*

denominatur, non tamen habent aliquod proprium esse nec eis etiam¹⁰²⁴ competit esse subiecti, quod est substantiale, sicut est¹⁰²⁵ humanitas in Christo, quae est¹⁰²⁶ per modum accidentis, nec habet proprium esse¹⁰²⁷, sicut haberet, si esset a verbo separata; habet tamen esse verbi, quod ei communicabile est, cum sit et¹⁰²⁸ ipsa substantia; non autem sic de accidentibus, quibus non competit esse substantiale.

(31) Sed¹⁰²⁹ hoc etiam non potest stare propter tria.

(32) Primo, quia ponere rem esse aliquid et tamen “non¹⁰³⁰ habere¹⁰³¹ esse” est rem solum ponere¹⁰³² esse in anima, sicut rosa in hoc differt a chimaera, quod chimaera non dicit rem esse habentem¹⁰³³ nec etiam rem¹⁰³⁴ circumscripto esse, sicut essentiae rerum considerantur communiter¹⁰³⁵ sine esse; rosa autem est flos, etiam nulla rosa existente¹⁰³⁶ in actu, et licet sit in potentia, ut sit in actu essendi, tamen non est in potentia, ut sit flos, quia¹⁰³⁷ hoc necesse est esse et non potest non esse flos. Nullus autem ponit accidentia solum esse in anima¹⁰³⁸).

(33) Secundo, quia esse praecedit operari¹⁰³⁹) nec potest intelligi, quod aliquid operetur et non sit. Constat autem, quod accidentia sicut calor¹⁰⁴⁰, frigus, |E 102va| color, sonus et huiusmodi et aliae virtutes naturales agunt et sine eis nulla¹⁰⁴¹ est actio in creatura. Nec obstat, si dicantur esse principia operandi, quia, sicut oportet operans esse, ita et principium esse et esse utrique attribuitur, sicut et operari utrique suo modo attribuitur.

(34) Tertio, quia Philosophus dicit IV *Metaphysicae*¹⁰⁴²), quod hoc, scilicet substantia, est causa¹⁰⁴³ cuiuslibet aliorum, et illa sunt per istud¹⁰⁴⁴, sed quae sunt, habent esse. Item si causa habet esse, et effectus eius¹⁰⁴⁵, qui ponitur, habet esse.

¹⁰²¹) non inveni

¹⁰²² non om. sed corr. s. v. E

¹⁰²³ subiecto: esse add. sed exp. E

¹⁰²⁴ eis etiam inv. E

¹⁰²⁵ est: et V

¹⁰²⁶ quae est: est in supposito V

¹⁰²⁷ nec ... esse: cum sit et ipsa substantia sed exp. et corr. i. m. V

¹⁰²⁸ et: etiam E

¹⁰²⁹ Sed add. Reprobatio i. m. E

¹⁰³⁰ non om. E

¹⁰³¹ habere: habere sed corr. contrarie E

¹⁰³² solum ponere inv. E

¹⁰³³ esse habentem inv. E

¹⁰³⁴ etiam rem inv. E

¹⁰³⁵ communiter om. V

¹⁰³⁶ etiam ... existente: circumscripta rosa etiam E

¹⁰³⁷ quia: quod V

¹⁰³⁸) Cf. God. de Font., Quodl. II, q. 2; De Wulf – Pelzer 65; God. de Font., Quodl. VIII, q. 3; Hoffmans 40; God. de Font., Quodl. VIII; Hoffmans 41.

¹⁰³⁹) Cf. Thom., In III Sent., d. 20, q. 1, a. 1, quaestunum. 2, ad arg. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 614.

¹⁰⁴⁰ calor add. et E

¹⁰⁴¹ color ... nulla illeg. E

¹⁰⁴²) Cf. *potius* Arist., *Metaph.* V 8, 1017b14–16; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 95,19–20.

¹⁰⁴³ causa add. substantiae V

(35) Unde¹⁰⁴⁶ est alia opinio¹⁰⁴⁷¹⁰⁴⁸), quod accidentia habent esse non proprium nec nullum, sed habent esse subiecti ita, quod per esse subiecti, quod est esse substantiale, sunt¹⁰⁴⁹ omnia, quae sunt in subiecto¹⁰⁵⁰ sive sint¹⁰⁵¹ accidentia sive partes substantiales.

(36) Et hoc probant dupliciter: primo, quia esse est actus communissimus, qui solum participatur et nullo alio participat secundum Boethium in *De hebdomadibus*¹⁰⁵²); sed sic esset participans et alius participatus¹⁰⁵³. Hoc autem esset¹⁰⁵⁴ contra rationem ipsius esse; secundo, ego video, quod una est extensio in subiecto, scilicet quantitas, secundum quam omne, quod est in subiecto, dicitur extensum¹⁰⁵⁵, scilicet et¹⁰⁵⁶ ipsa substantia, quae¹⁰⁵⁷ est subiectum quantitatis, et ipsa quantitas, quae est se ipsa extensa, et albedo, |V 157ra| quae est per accidens eadem quantitate extensa, et quidquid dicitur extensum, sive substantia sive accidens¹⁰⁵⁸, eadem quantitate dicitur extensum; ergo a simili omnium, quae sunt in eodem, subiecto, erit idem esse cum subiecto¹⁰⁵⁹.

(37) Sed¹⁰⁶⁰ ista positio non videtur vera, nec rationes concludunt.

(38) Primum patet ex duobus.

(39) Primo, quia, si sic esset, cum esse sit quidam actus formalis, oporteret dicere, quod esse subiecti formaliter perficeret ipsum accidens. Hoc autem est impossibile. Cuius ratio est, quia, quandocumque aliqua duo¹⁰⁶¹ ita se habent, quod unum semper¹⁰⁶² vel tempore vel naturali ordine¹⁰⁶³ praecedat aliud¹⁰⁶⁴, et hoc exigitive, tunc magis oportet dicere, quod id, quod sequitur, perficiat primum quam e converso; nunc autem ita est, quod esse subiecti praexigitur et praetelligitur ipsi accidenti nec potest inesse accidens, nisi ponatur subiectum esse.

(40) Secundo, quia, sicut se habet esse essentiae ad essentiam, ita esse¹⁰⁶⁵ existentiae ad existentiam. Sed ego video, quod ex inhaerentia accidentis ad substantiam non¹⁰⁶⁶ recipit essentia

¹⁰⁴⁴ istud: id *E*

¹⁰⁴⁵ eius *om. E*

¹⁰⁴⁶ Unde *add. Tertia opinio i. m. E*

¹⁰⁴⁷ opinio: positio *V*

¹⁰⁴⁸) *non inveni*

¹⁰⁴⁹ sunt *om. V*

¹⁰⁵⁰ subiecto *add. sunt V*

¹⁰⁵¹ sint *an sunt scrib.?*

¹⁰⁵²) Boeth., Quomodo subst.; Moreschini 187,29–31.

¹⁰⁵³ et ... participatus *om. V*

¹⁰⁵⁴ esset: est *sed corr. s. v. E*

¹⁰⁵⁵ extensum: existens *V*

¹⁰⁵⁶ et *om. E*

¹⁰⁵⁷ quae: inquantum *V*

¹⁰⁵⁸ substantia ... accidens: accidens sive substantia *E*

¹⁰⁵⁹ omnium ... subiecto: unius subiecti cum omnibus, quae in eo sunt, erit idem esse *V*

¹⁰⁶⁰ Sed *add. Reprobatio i.m. E*

¹⁰⁶¹ duo *om. V*

¹⁰⁶² semper *om. E*

¹⁰⁶³ naturali ordine: natura semper *E*

¹⁰⁶⁴ aliud: reliquum *V*

¹⁰⁶⁵ esse *om. V*

accidentis essentiam subiecti nec ipsa formaliter est. Ergo nec existentia¹⁰⁶⁷ accidentis erit existentia¹⁰⁶⁸ subiecti. Item Commentator *Super VII Metaphysicae*¹⁰⁶⁹): “Quiditas¹⁰⁷⁰ individui substantiae est prior in esse quiditate¹⁰⁷¹ accidentium. Individuum enim substantiae esse¹⁰⁷² prius aliis individuis accidentium, manifestum est per se”; idem autem non potest esse prius¹⁰⁷³ et posterius se ipso.

(41) Ad argumenta dicendum, quod verum est, quod esse est actus communissimus, tamen¹⁰⁷⁴ dicitur analogice. Unde esse substantiale est actus¹⁰⁷⁵ communissimum in perfectionibus substantialibus et esse accidentale in perfectionibus¹⁰⁷⁶ accidentalibus. Non¹⁰⁷⁷ oportet, quod alter altero¹⁰⁷⁸ participet, sed uterque a subiecto participatur. Unde dicit Boethius in *De hebdomadibus*¹⁰⁷⁹): “Diversum est esse aliquid¹⁰⁸⁰ et esse aliquid in eo, quod est. Illic enim accidens”, scilicet in ipsa¹⁰⁸¹ participatione, quae habet esse album vel huiusmodi, “hic substantia significatur”. Item¹⁰⁸² in eodem¹⁰⁸³): “Omne, quod est, participat eo, quod est esse, ut sit; alio vero participat, ut aliquid sit”. Ecce, duplex participatio! Et ponit exemplum commentator illius liber¹⁰⁸⁴, Gilbertus¹⁰⁸⁵ Porretanus¹⁰⁸⁶), quod aliter dicimus opus triangulum, aliter opus aereum, quia illic accidens, hic¹⁰⁸⁷ substantia significatur.

(42) Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est simile de quantitate et esse, quia quantitas una numero est in re et non possunt plures inesse eiusdem rationis, esse autem substantiae et accidentis sunt diversarum rationum, inquantum consequuntur¹⁰⁸⁸ diversas naturas, et insuper esse est de transcendentibus et potest diversificari secundum diversitatem formarum, quas consequitur, quod non potest quantitas.

¹⁰⁶⁶ non: nec *E*

¹⁰⁶⁷ existentia: ex natura *sed corr. V*

¹⁰⁶⁸ existentia: ex natura *sed corr. V*

¹⁰⁶⁹) Averr., *Metaph. VII*, comm. 2; Venetiis 1562 153vI–K; cf. Auct. Arist., 1, n. 190; Hamesse 131,17.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Quiditas: Quiditates *sed corr. V*

¹⁰⁷¹ quiditate: quiditati *E*

¹⁰⁷² esse: est *sed exp. et corr. s. v. E est V*

¹⁰⁷³ prius *add. s. v. V*

¹⁰⁷⁴ tamen: cum *V*

¹⁰⁷⁵ actus *om. V*

¹⁰⁷⁶ perfectionibus *om. V*

¹⁰⁷⁷ Non: Nec *E*

¹⁰⁷⁸ alter altero *inv. E*

¹⁰⁷⁹) Boeth., *Quomodo subst.*; Moerschini 188,35–36.

¹⁰⁸⁰ esse aliquid *inv. E*

¹⁰⁸¹ ipsa: prima *V*

¹⁰⁸² Item: vel tunc *V*

¹⁰⁸³) Boeth., *Quomodo subst.*; Moerschini 188,37–38.

¹⁰⁸⁴ liber: hoc *V*

¹⁰⁸⁵ Gilbertus *coni.*: Wilhelmus *E* Guilhelmus *V*

¹⁰⁸⁶) Gilbert. Porretan., *De bon. ebdomad.*, 1,47; Häring 197,59–60.

¹⁰⁸⁷ hic: illic *E*

¹⁰⁸⁸ consequuntur: sequuntur *V*

(43) Et¹⁰⁸⁹ ideo est alia opinio¹⁰⁹⁰), quod aliud est esse accidentium et subiecti; quia¹⁰⁹¹ subiecti et omnium partium substantialium vel essentialium¹⁰⁹² est idem esse actuale, et hoc est¹⁰⁹³ tertium principale¹⁰⁹⁴ intentum.

(44) Ubi¹⁰⁹⁵ considerandum, quod, sicut forma substantialis dat esse subiecto¹⁰⁹⁶ substantiale et idem esse est¹⁰⁹⁷ subiecti et¹⁰⁹⁸ suppositi ut “cuius est” vel “quid¹⁰⁹⁹ est formae”, vero ut “quo” aliquid est substantialiter, et sic est amborum; ita et forma accidentalis dat esse subiecto¹¹⁰⁰ accidentale, et hoc idem non est esse substantiale, sed accidentale, et tamen hoc idem est¹¹⁰¹ amborum, scilicet subiecti et accidentis, sed subiecti ut “cuius est”¹¹⁰², accidentis ut “quo” aliquid¹¹⁰³ est tale, scilicet album vel huiusmodi, et secundum hoc formatur talis ratio: forma dat esse, et nova et alia forma dat aliud esse, nisi trahatur in communicationem alterius esse; sed forma substantialis est alia a forma¹¹⁰⁴ accidentali nec potest ei communicari esse substantiae, sicut supra est probatum; ergo habebit aliud esse.

(45) Secundo sic: Secundum Philosophum in VII <Metaphysicae>¹¹⁰⁵): “ens, quod est principale, non est¹¹⁰⁶ id, quod est aliquid ens, sed quod est ens simpliciter, est substantia”, secundum Commentatorem, qui dicit^{1107/1108}), “quod manifestum est, quod ens, quod est principale,¹¹⁰⁹ quod est prius¹¹¹⁰ et simpliciter ens¹¹¹¹, est substantia, non id, quod est aliquid ens, id est non simpliciter nec principaliter”; ex hoc formatur talis ratio: Ens, sicut dictum¹¹¹²), differt¹¹¹³ ab esse; ubi est¹¹¹⁴ aliud ens et aliud esse, sed substantia est aliud ens quasi principale et simpliciter, accidens

¹⁰⁸⁹ Et *add.* Quarta opinio *i.m.* E

¹⁰⁹⁰ Thom., Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 94,47–95,66.

¹⁰⁹¹ quia: sed V

¹⁰⁹² substantialium ... essentialium: accidentium substantialium V

¹⁰⁹³ est: fuit V

¹⁰⁹⁴ principale: principaliter E

¹⁰⁹⁵ Ubi: Unde E

¹⁰⁹⁶ subiecto: supposito V

¹⁰⁹⁷ esse est *inv.* E

¹⁰⁹⁸ subiecti et *om.* V

¹⁰⁹⁹ quid: quod E

¹¹⁰⁰ subiecto *om.* E

¹¹⁰¹ idem est *inv.* E

¹¹⁰² ut cuius est: quod est *sed del. et add.* ut cuius est *i.m.* V quod est E

¹¹⁰³ aliquid *om.* E

¹¹⁰⁴ a forma: ab V

¹¹⁰⁵ Arist., Metaph., VII 1, 1028a29–31; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 124,19–21; cf. Averr., Metaph., VII, text. 4; Venetiis 1562 154vH.

¹¹⁰⁶ est *om.* V

¹¹⁰⁷ secundum ... dicit: ubi dicit Commentator V

¹¹⁰⁸ Averr., Metaph., VII, comm. 4; Venetiis 1562 154vI–K.

¹¹⁰⁹ principale *add.* non est id quod est aliquid ens, sed E

¹¹¹⁰ prius: primum E

¹¹¹¹ ens *om.* V

¹¹¹² Cf. *supra* sect. (36)

¹¹¹³ differt: dicitur E dicitur *sed exp. et add.* differt *i. m.* V

¹¹¹⁴ est ergo *inv.* E

autem quasi¹¹¹⁵ non principale. Ergo est et¹¹¹⁶ duplex esse, scilicet principale et secundarium, ex quo etiam patet, quod, quando Philosophus dicit accidentia non entia¹¹¹⁷), intendit¹¹¹⁸ non principalia. Unde etiam¹¹¹⁹ dicitur in I *Physicorum*¹¹²⁰), quod id, quod vere est, dicitur substantia.

(46) Secundum probatur sic de substantialibus dupliciter. Primo, si ponantur plures formae in eodem, quia res non dicitur esse quamdiu est in fieri, sed quando habet suum completum esse¹¹²¹, quia dispositiones terminantur ad esse suum completum¹¹²² existentiae; sed si ponantur plures formae, ab una sola dicitur esse; ergo ab una sola erit esse et secundum illam¹¹²³.

(47) Secundo, si ponatur una, idem erit¹¹²⁴; una enim forma non dat nisi unum esse sui generis; una etiam materia non recipit nisi unum esse ab una forma; cum ergo totum corpus cum omnibus partibus suis sit una materia sive unum [E 102vb] perfectibile unius animae, non erit eius nisi unum esse substantiale.

(48) Unde ad rationes¹¹²⁵. Accidentis esse est inesse secundum Philosophum¹¹²⁶); ergo¹¹²⁷ sibi nullum competit esse, sed solum inhaerere. Dicendum, quod in hoc dictio esse non accipitur pro essentia, quasi sit definitio accidentis indicans, quid est esse eius; et si sic acciperetur, tunc corrigitur tamquam insufficientis per Avicennam [V 157rb] in¹¹²⁸ sua *Metaphysica*¹¹²⁹), qui sic definit substantiam, quod “substantia est res, cuius naturae non debetur in alio esse”; accidens autem est “res, cuius naturae debetur in alio esse”¹¹³⁰). Unde actualitas inhaerentiae non est de¹¹³¹ eius essentia. Accipitur ergo hic esse pro actu essendi¹¹³²), qui sibi competit per comparisonem¹¹³³ ad causam subiectivam, ut sit sensus: accidentis esse est in subiecto¹¹³⁴ esse¹¹³⁵), quasi dicat non est

¹¹¹⁵ quasi om. V

¹¹¹⁶ et om. E

¹¹¹⁷) Arist., *Metaph.* VII I, 1028a18–19; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 123,10–12; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,76.

¹¹¹⁸ intendit: intelligit V

¹¹¹⁹ etiam: et E

¹¹²⁰) Cf. Arist., *Phys.*, I 3, 186b4–5; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 15,10–12; etiam Thom., *In Phys.* I, lect. VI, n. 42; Maggiolo 24b–25a.

¹¹²¹ completum esse inv. E

¹¹²² suum completum om. E

¹¹²³ ab ... illam: et unum erit secundum illam esse V

¹¹²⁴ erit: patet V

¹¹²⁵ rationes: positiones E

¹¹²⁶) Arist., *Metaph.*, V 30, 1025a14; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 114,20; cf. Thom., *In Metaph.* V, lect. 9, n. 894; Cathala – Spiazzi 239a; Thom., *Quodl.* IX, q. 3, ad arg. 1.; Gauthier 99,65–69.

¹¹²⁷ secundum Philosophum ergo: unde E

¹¹²⁸ in *add.* Utrum in homine sit tantum esse omnium, quae in ipso sunt *i.m.* V

¹¹²⁹) Cf. Avic., *Metaph.*, VIII, c. 4; Van Riet 402,61–404,101; *sed potius* Bonav., *In Sent.* IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1.1, 1.2 et 1.4; Quaracchi 1889, 271a–b.

¹¹³⁰) Thom., *Quodl.* IX, q. 3, ad. 2.; Gauthier 99,78–90; Thom., *Quaest. disp. de pot.*, q. 7, a. 3, ad arg. 4; Pession 194a.

¹¹³¹ de om. V

¹¹³²) Cf. Thom., *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 195; Thom., *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Mandonnet – Moos 223; Thom., *In Metaph.*, IV, lect. 2, n. 553; Cathala – Spiazzi 155a; Thom., *De ver.*, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Dondaine 5,131–139; Thom., *De ver.*, q. 1, a. 1, resp. ad *sed contra* 3; Dondaine 7,283–286.

¹¹³³ per comparisonem: in comparatione V

¹¹³⁴ subiecto *add.* scilicet V

per se extra subiectum¹¹³⁶ via naturae; non tamen ex hoc intelligitur, quod ipsum¹¹³⁷ inhaerere sit suum esse, quia, cum ipsum¹¹³⁸ solum inhaereat, esse esset suum tantum et non subiecti; nunc autem esse accidentale est subiecti et accidentis simul, sicut esse substantiale est materiae et formae simul.

(49) Ad secundum. Sicut accidens respectivum se habet ad suum oppositum, ita absolutum ad suum subiectum vel suppositum; sed ibi relatorum est idem esse; ergo et hic accidentis et subiecti. Dicendum, quod ibi¹¹³⁹ aliud est esse numero¹¹⁴⁰ unius relativi et¹¹⁴¹ aliud alterius, sicut aliud patris vel paternitatis, aliud filii in quantum huiusmodi et filiationis, licet conveniant in specie, quia ambo relativa. Subiectum autem et accidens non conveniunt in specie nec¹¹⁴² genere¹¹⁴³.

(50) Ad tertium. Ipsum esse relativi est ad aliud se habere et est definitio indicans quiditatem¹¹⁴⁴), sicut¹¹⁴⁵ patet ex libro *Praedicamentorum*¹¹⁴⁶); unde Philosophus¹¹⁴⁷) corrigit primam definitionem, quae fuit: “Ad aliquid vero¹¹⁴⁸ talia dicuntur, quaecumque hoc ipsum, quod sunt, dicuntur aliorum¹¹⁴⁹ vel quomodolibet aliter ad aliud”, quae fuit Platonis secundum Boethium in *Commento*¹¹⁵⁰), et secundum eam substantia etiam¹¹⁵¹ dicebatur¹¹⁵² ad aliquid¹¹⁵³, ut patet in eodem capitulo¹¹⁵⁴) de partibus substantiae; sed sicut ad aliud esse est definitio relativorum, ita et¹¹⁵⁵ definitio indicans quiditatem accidentium amborum est¹¹⁵⁶ in alio esse; ergo eorum substantia est inesse. Dicendum, quod non sic essentialiter dependet accidens¹¹⁵⁷ absolutum a subiecto sicut respectivum ab¹¹⁵⁸ opposito¹¹⁵⁹. Unde Deus non posset unum relativum facere¹¹⁶⁰, cui nullum

¹¹³⁵) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, VII I, 1028a18–19; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 123,10-12; cf. Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,76.

¹¹³⁶ subiectum: substantiam V

¹¹³⁷ ipsum: suum *sed exp. et corr. s. v. E*

¹¹³⁸ ipsum *om. V*

¹¹³⁹ ibi *om. V*

¹¹⁴⁰ numero *om. E*

¹¹⁴¹ et *om. V*

¹¹⁴² nec: vel V

¹¹⁴³ specie ... genere: genere nec specie *sed corr. E*

¹¹⁴⁴) Arist., *Topic.*, I 5, 101b39, transl. Boethii: Minio–Paluello 9,6–8; transl. anonyma: Minio–Paluello 194,1–3.

¹¹⁴⁵ sicut: secundum quod V

¹¹⁴⁶) Arist., *Cat.* 7, 8a37–b1; transl. Boethii: Minio–Paluello 22,26–29; cf. etiam Thom., *In III Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 5, arg. 2; Mandonnet – Moos 291; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 28, a. 2, arg. 3; Leon. 321a; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 40, a. 2, arg. 4; Leon. 413a; Thom., *Quodl. IX*, qu. 2, a. 3, arg. 3; Gauthier 96,17–20.

¹¹⁴⁷) Arist., *Cat.*, c. 7, 6a36–37; transl. Boethii: Minio–Paluello 18,4–5.

¹¹⁴⁸ vero: termino V

¹¹⁴⁹ dicuntur aliorum *inv. E*

¹¹⁵⁰) Boeth., *In cat. Arist. II*; PL 64, 217C.

¹¹⁵¹ substantia etiam: etiam substantiae V

¹¹⁵² dicebatur: dicebantur V

¹¹⁵³ aliquid: aliud E

¹¹⁵⁴) Boeth., *In cat. Arist. II*; PL 64, 233D–238D, *spec.* 235B.

¹¹⁵⁵ et *om. V*

¹¹⁵⁶ est: erit V

¹¹⁵⁷ accidens *om. E*

¹¹⁵⁸ ab *add. obiecto E*

¹¹⁵⁹ opposito: oppō^si^o V

correlativum corresponderet¹¹⁶¹, cum unum sit de intellectu alterius. Accidens autem facere potest sine subiecto.

(51) Ad quartum. Essentia materiae est alia ab essentia formae¹¹⁶²), et tamen hoc non impedit, quin habeant unum esse; ergo nec hoc, quod accidens dicit aliam essentiam quam substantia. Dicendum, quod non est simile, quia tam materia quam forma dicunt substantiam¹¹⁶³) et ideo unum esse substantiale habere possunt, quod non contingit in accidente. Item ex eis fit unum per essentiam, et ideo possunt habere unum esse¹¹⁶⁴; nec¹¹⁶⁵ sic ex¹¹⁶⁶ accidente et subiecto¹¹⁶⁷, sed unum per accidens¹¹⁶⁸.

(52) Ad quintum. Secundum Philosophum IV *Metaphysicae*¹¹⁶⁹): “ens homo et unus homo non significant aliquid diversum”; ergo ubi alia unitas, ibi alia entitas; sed alia est unitas pollicis, quam habet ex unitate totius, secundum quam non differt ab indice, alia propria, secundum quam numero differt ab eo et a¹¹⁷⁰ quocumque alio digito; ergo et alia est entitas. Dicendum, quod essentialis pars in toto non habet esse¹¹⁷¹ actu substantiali, sed¹¹⁷² secundum diversum situm et officium, et tamen utrumque, scilicet¹¹⁷³ situs et officium, magis dicendum est esse totius quam partium.

(53) Ad sextum. Sicut se habet rationale ad hominem, ita et nasus ad simum, quia utrumque est differentia alterius; sed rationalis et hominis est unum esse; ergo et illorum. Dicendum, quod aliter definiuntur substantiae, aliter accidentia, quia substantiae¹¹⁷⁴ per differentiam, quae est intranea essentiae, et ideo eorum est unum esse, accidentia autem definiuntur per id, quod est extra essentiam¹¹⁷⁵); et ideo non est simile. Considerandum tamen, quod definitio proprie est essentiae rei¹¹⁷⁶), secundum quod est in genere. Album autem non est in genere <accidentis> secundum Philosophum in *Topicis*¹¹⁷⁷), sed albedo, et idem dico de aliis concretis et abstractis¹¹⁷⁸). Quando

¹¹⁶⁰ unum ... facere: facere unum correlativum *E*

¹¹⁶¹ corresponderet: responderet *E*

¹¹⁶²) Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 3, 1029a20-26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,29–126,7.

¹¹⁶³) Cf. Thom., In *Metaph.*, VII, lect. 2, n. 1276; Cathala – Spiazzi 321b; Thom., In *Metaph.*, VII, lect. 11, n. 1532; Cathala – Spiazzi 370a; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 29, a. 1, ad arg. 4; Leon. 328b; Thom., *S. th.*, I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Leon. 313a.

¹¹⁶⁴ esse *om. E*

¹¹⁶⁵ nec: non *E*

¹¹⁶⁶ ex: de *sed corr. E*

¹¹⁶⁷ accidente ... subiecto: subiecto et accidente *E*

¹¹⁶⁸ unum ... accidens: ^{per} accidens unum *E*

¹¹⁶⁹) Arist., *Metaph.*, IV 1, 1003b26–29; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 61,19–21.

¹¹⁷⁰ a *om. V*

¹¹⁷¹ essentialis ... esse: essentialiter non habet pars esse in toto *E*

¹¹⁷² sed *om. V*

¹¹⁷³ scilicet: videlicet *E*

¹¹⁷⁴ substantiae: substantia *V*

¹¹⁷⁵) Cf. Thom., In *De an.*, II, 1; Leon. 68,59–73.

¹¹⁷⁶) Cf. Thom., *De ente*, c. 1; Leon. 369,27–34.

¹¹⁷⁷) *potius* cf. Thom., In *Metaph.*, V, lect. 9, n. 894; Cathala – Spiazzi 239a; et etiam Averr., *Metaph.*, V comm. 14; Ponzalli 130,79–131,94.

¹¹⁷⁸) Thom., *De ente*, c. 6; Leon. 381,123–128.

ergo abstractum proprie¹¹⁷⁹ definitur ut simitas, tunc subiectum ponitur in obliquo quasi differentia secundum Commentatorem¹¹⁸⁰) et accidens pro genere, ut “simitas est curvitas nasi”; sed quando concretum, tunc e converso subiectum ponitur quasi pro genere et accidens loco differentiae, ut “simus”¹¹⁸¹, quid est – respondetur – “nasus curvus”¹¹⁸²).

(54) Ad septimum. Oportet secundum Philosophum¹¹⁸³¹¹⁸⁴) “principia manere”; manere autem est in esse durare¹¹⁸⁵; ergo materia et forma cum sint principia et non maneant nisi in supposito, oportet, quod habeant aliud esse praeter esse suppositi, quod est contra mentem¹¹⁸⁶. Dicendum, quod manent universalia principia semper¹¹⁸⁷ quantum ad esse, sed particularia aliter¹¹⁸⁸, quia materia manet secundum suam essentiam, corpus autem secundum aliud et aliud esse secundum Philosophum I *Physicorum*¹¹⁸⁹), cum non habeat esse actuale nisi per formam, quae etiam corrumpitur.

(55) Ad octavum. Natura humana¹¹⁹⁰ habet esse accidentale¹¹⁹¹ in Christo; sed ibi est idem esse humanitatis et divinitatis; ergo et¹¹⁹² idem subiecti et accidentis in aliis, cum plus differant creator et creatura quam substantia et accidens. Dicendum, quod divinitas et humanitas utrumque est substantia et ideo possunt habere idem esse; non sic de substantia et accidente. Considerandum tamen, quod Thomas ponit in *Quaestionibus disputatis*¹¹⁹³¹¹⁹⁴¹¹⁹⁵) quaestione ultima articulo 4 in principali solutione vel responsione¹¹⁹⁶, quod in Christo est duplex esse suppositi, scilicet principale, quod est aeternum, et secundarium, quod est temporale.

(56) Ad nonum. Accidens non est, nisi |V 157va| inquantum subiectum est per ipsum; ergo ipsum non est; ergo nec aliud esse habet a subiecto. Dicendum, quod verum est, quod idem est esse subiecti et accidentis, scilicet <esse> accidentale subiecti, scilicet ut “cuius”, accidentis ut “quo”, sed tamen aliud est esse subiecti¹¹⁹⁷ substantiale, in quo accidens non communicat.

¹¹⁷⁹ proprie: proprium V

¹¹⁸⁰) Cf. Averr., Metaph., VII, comm. 17 et 18; Venetiis 1562, 166vH–167rA; 167rC–167vM.

¹¹⁸¹ simus: nasus *sed del. et corr. s. v. E*

¹¹⁸²) Thom., De ente, c. 6; Leon. 381,140–152; Thom., In Metaph. VII, lect. 4, n. 1353; Cathala–Spiazzi 334a–b.

¹¹⁸³ secundum Philosophum *om. E*

¹¹⁸⁴) Arist., Phys., I 6, 189a19–20; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 26,17–18; Auct. Arist., 2, n. 21; Hamesse 141,29.

¹¹⁸⁵ durare *add. secundum Philosophum E*

¹¹⁸⁶ mentem: respondentem *E*

¹¹⁸⁷ semper *om. E*

¹¹⁸⁸ particularia aliter: particulariter *V*

¹¹⁸⁹) Cf. Arist., Phys., I 7, 189b30–191a23, *spec.* 189b34–190a21; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 29,16–35,12, *spec.* 30,3–31,6.

¹¹⁹⁰ humana *om. V*

¹¹⁹¹ accidentale: actuale *V*

¹¹⁹² et *om. E*

¹¹⁹³ Quaestionibus disputatis: nona disputatione *E*

¹¹⁹⁴ disputatis *add. de virtutibus V*

¹¹⁹⁵) Thom., Quaest. de union., q. un., a. 4, resp.; Calcaterra – Centi 432a–b; cf. etiam Thom., Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 3; Gauthier 95,100–104.

¹¹⁹⁶ solutione vel responsione: ratione *V*

¹¹⁹⁷ esse subiecti *inv. V*

(57) Ad decimum. Creatio¹¹⁹⁸ terminatur ad esse¹¹⁹⁹), sed et¹²⁰⁰ una creatio terminatur ad unum esse; sed tota substantia simul creatur cum accidentibus; ergo omnium erit idem esse. Dicendum, quod creatio est ad hoc, quod res sit suo modo, et ideo totum sic creatur, ut per¹²⁰¹ formam substantialem habeat esse substantiale et per accidentalem accidentale.

¹¹⁹⁸ Creatio *add. non sed del. V*

¹¹⁹⁹) Cf. Thom., In II Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 2; Mandonnet – Moos 326; Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 3, a. 5, arg. 2; Pession 48a.

¹²⁰⁰ et: etiam *E*

¹²⁰¹ per: quod *sed corr. E*

QUAESTIO VIII¹²⁰²⁾

UTRUM RELATIO IN DIVINIS DISTINGUAT PERSONAS, INQUANTUM SUNT¹²⁰³ IDEM ESSENTIA¹²⁰⁴ VEL
INQUANTUM DIFFERUNT¹²⁰⁵ AB EA

- (1) Dicendum, quod hic videnda sunt quinque.
- (2) Primo, quid intelligamus¹²⁰⁶ nomine relationis.
- (3) Secundo, quae relatio possit dici realis.
- (4) Tertio, utrum relationes in divinis sint reales.
- (5) Quarto, utrum distinctio personarum sit per relationes.
- (6) Quinto, utrum <relationes> distinguant personas, inquantum differunt ab essentia vel inquantum idem sunt, quod est principale.
- (7) Circa primum considerandum, quod relatio habet minimum de esse¹²⁰⁷⁾. Talia autem, quae habent modicum de esse, etiam parvam et indurabilem faciunt impressionem in anima, sicut patet etiam de aliis entibus rationis, et ideo Philosophus loquens de relatione in *Praedicamentis*¹²⁰⁸⁾ dicit, quod “fortasse difficile sit aliquid de huiusmodi rebus¹²⁰⁹ confidenter declarare, nisi saepius fuerint pertractata”, et subiungit, quod “dubitare de singulis”, scilicet¹²¹⁰ talibus, “non est inutile”. Unde quod non possunt propter debilitatem entitatis, statim faciunt saepius pertractata et dubitanda¹²¹¹ inquisita. Considerandum ergo, quod omnibus decem praedicamentis et caetera, sicut supra¹²¹²⁾ in quaestione de relationibus “utrum addant aliquid et caetera”; et sic patet primum.
- (8) Circa secundum considerandum, quod solum in his, quae dicuntur “ad aliquid”, et caetera, sicut supra¹²¹³ eadem quaestione¹²¹⁴⁾; ubi addendum est, quod ex his patet, quod non est idem dicere

¹²⁰²⁾ Transcriptio istae quaestionis adest integraliter in M. Schmaus, *Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus Und Die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin Und Duns Scotus* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 29), Aschendorff 1930, 412–417.

¹²⁰³ sunt *coni*: est V

¹²⁰⁴ essentia: essentiae *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁰⁵ differunt: differt *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁰⁶ intelligamus: intelligemus *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁰⁷⁾ Cf. Thom., S. contr. Gent., IV, c. 14; Leon. 57b; Thom., In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Mandonnet – Moos 635; Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 8, a. 1, ad arg. 4; Pession 215b; Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 9, a. 5, ad arg. 2; Pession 236b–237a; cf. Jacob. de Vit., Quaest. de Divin. Praed. XVIII, ad arg. 9; Ypma 93,119–120.

¹²⁰⁸⁾ Arist., Cat., c. 7, 8b21–24; transl. Boethii: Minio–Paluello 23,18–21.

¹²⁰⁹ rebus: relationibus *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²¹⁰ de singulis scilicet *om. transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²¹¹ dubitanda: dubitando *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²¹²⁾ Cf. *infra* V, 182ra–182va

¹²¹³ supra *add.* in *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²¹⁴⁾ Cf. *ibidem*.

relationem secundum esse et secundum dici¹²¹⁵) et dicere relationem secundum rem et secundum rationem¹²¹⁶), sicut patet, quod in scientia est relatio secundum rem, cum in scibili sit solum secundum rationem, et tamen in scientia non est relatio nisi secundum dici et non secundum esse¹²¹⁷), sed¹²¹⁸ quandoque e converso est relatio secundum rationem et non secundum rem, et tamen est¹²¹⁹ secundum esse, sicut relatio generis ad speciem et e converso.

(9) Circa tertium advertendum, quod »relatio realis non potest intelligi nisi consequens quantitatem vel actionem vel passionem«¹²²⁰), sicut patet ex V *Metaphysicae*¹²²¹). Nec obstat, quod similitudo est relatio realis consequens qualitatem, ut puta albedinem vel huiusmodi, quia hoc¹²²² non est, nisi in quantum qualitas habet rationem quantitatis, quod similia dicuntur unum in qualitate et ille est similior, qui magis habet de eadem qualitate¹²²³). Unde¹²²⁴ autem et magis ad quantitatem pertinent. »Cum igitur in Deo consequatur actionem et passionem et cum non sit ibi proprie dicta passio, oportet, quod consequatur actionem, sed non actionem transeuntem ad extra, quia ex tali actione, quae est ad creaturam, non est in Deo¹²²⁵ relatio realis¹²²⁶. Ergo oportet, quod consequatur actionem manentem intra. Sed illa¹²²⁷ non potest esse sensus, quia talis completur per organum corporale. Ergo oportet, quod sit intellectus et voluntatis.

(10) Ubi considerandum, quod intellectus habet ordinem ad quattuor, scilicet ad speciem, per quam intelligit, et ad operationem ipsam, scilicet intellectionem, et <ad> ipsum verbum intellectione conceptum et ad ipsam rem intellectam. Verbum enim ab his tribus differt, primo ab ipsa re intellecta dupliciter: primo, quia ipsa res quandoque est extra intellectum, verbum autem numquam est extra; secundo, quia ipsum verbum ordinatur ad ipsam rem intellectam ut ad finem, quia propter hoc solum concipitur verbum, ut res ipsa intelligatur. Similiter differt¹²²⁸ a specie dupliciter: primo,

¹²¹⁵) Arist., Cat., c. 7, 6a36–37; 8a31–32; 8a39–b1; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 18,4–5; 22,20–21; 22,26–29; etiam Boeth., In cat. Arist., II; PL 64, 235D; cf. etiam Thom., S. th., I, q. 13, a. 7, ad arg. 1; Leon. 153a–b; Thom., De ver., q. 4, a. 5, arg. 2; Dondaine 130,8–18; Thom., In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 763; Thom., Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 3, arg. 2; Gauthier 95,15–96,20; et etiam Alex. Hal., S. th., n. 376, ad arg. 1; Quaracchi 1924 554b; Alb., Sent., I, d. 30, a. 5, arg. 1; Borgnet 94a; Bonav., In Sent. I, d. 34, a. un., q. 2, resp.; Quaracchi 1882 591a–b.

¹²¹⁶) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 28, a. 1, ad arg. 4; Leon. 319b; Thom., In I Sent., d. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Mandonnet – Moos 943–944; Thom., In III Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 1006–1007; Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 12; Leon. 290a–b; Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 3, a. 3, resp.; Pession 43a; Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 7, a. 11, resp.; Pession 212a.

¹²¹⁷) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 7, a. 10, arg. 11 et ad arg. 11; Pession 209b; 211b; Thom., In I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 4 et ad arg. 4; Mandonnet – Moos 707; 709.

¹²¹⁸ sed con: et V

¹²¹⁹ est om. transcriptio Schmausi

¹²²⁰) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 8, a. 1, arg. 11 et resp.; Pession 213b; 214b.

¹²²¹) Arist., Metaph., V 15, 1020b26–30; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 103,15–19.

¹²²² hoc om. transcriptio Schmausi

¹²²³) Arist., Metaph., V 15, 1021a9–14; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 104,7–12.

¹²²⁴ Unde: Unum transcriptio Schmausi

¹²²⁵ Deo add. et con.: nisi transcriptio Schmausi

¹²²⁶ realis con. ex Thoma: rationis V

¹²²⁷ illa: ista transcriptio Schmausi

¹²²⁸ differt con: different V

quia ipsa species non est id, quod intelligitur, sed quo tantum, sicut omne agens agit aliquo formali principio. Verbum autem est etiam intellectum, non quo tantum; secundo, quia verbum est quasi terminus intellectus, species autem sicut principium, ut dictum est. Ab actione etiam differt dupliciter: primo, quia ipsum verbum est quid ipsa actione constitutum; secundo, quia verbum est id, quod exteriori verbo significatur; nullus autem intendit exteriori verbo exprimere ipsam actionem, sed conceptum ipsum; huiusmodi autem verbum oritur ab intellectu et est quasi eius propago, et ab ipso distinguitur sicut a principio principiatum quadam origine unius ab altero; et quia in nobis intelligere est accidens, ideo et verbum nostrum est alterius naturae a nobis; cum igitur in Deo suum intelligere sit sua essentia, oportet, quod verbum ab ipso procedens sit eiusdem naturae cum¹²²⁹ ipso, distinctum sola origine, habens relationem ad suum principium et tamen ordinatur in communicatione eiusdem naturae, scilicet divinae, quae est realissima; ideo oportet dicere, quod relatio Patris ad Filium et e converso sit realis et idem est iudicandum¹²³⁰ de Spiritu sancto respectu amborum, inquantum spirant ipsum, sicut Pater dicit Filium¹²³¹). Et sic patet tertium¹²³².

(11) Circa quartum intelligendum, |V 157vb| quod circa hoc est triplex opinio.

(12) Quidam¹²³³) dicunt, quod se ipsis distinguuntur personae. Sed hoc non bene dicitur, quia constat, quod nihil absolutum in divinis distinguitur, sed solum relatum inquantum huiusmodi. Relata autem inquantum huiusmodi distingui nihil aliud est quam relationibus distingui.

(13) Unde alii dicunt¹²³⁴), quod distinguuntur origine. Sed hoc etiam non sufficienter dicitur, quia nihil distinguitur ab alio formaliter nisi per id, quod formaliter inest alteri et quasi formaliter constituens ipsum. Nec aliquid distinguitur ab alio per id, quod est quasi via ad formam, sed per ipsam formam, sicut homo non nativitate distinguitur a bruto vel Socrates <non> sua generatione distinguitur a Platone, sed homo humanitate, Socrates Socratitate; sic¹²³⁵ autem in his nativitas hominis terminatur ad humanitatem, generatio Socratis¹²³⁶ ad Socratitatem, ita et¹²³⁷ in divinis origo terminatur ad filiationem.

(14) Et ideo est tertia opinio¹²³⁸), quae dicit, quod distinguuntur relationibus, et tenent mediam viam inter duas haereses, quia nullus dicit, quod distinguantur re absoluta, sicut Arriani¹²³⁹) dividentes

¹²²⁹ cum: ab *sed exp. et corr. s. v. V*

¹²³⁰ iudicandum: iudicium *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²³¹) Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 8, a. 1, resp.; Pession 214b–215b.

¹²³² tertium *coni.*: primum *V*

¹²³³) Praepositin., S. th. I, q. 17; Vat. lat. 1174, f. 20vb; Stegmüller 180; cf. etiam Duns Scot., Ordin. I, d. 26, q. un., op. 1; Vaticana 2,13–16; Henr. de Gand., Summa, a. 55, q. 1, ad arg. 3; Wilson – Eitzkorn 369,103–108.

¹²³⁴) Bonav., In Sent. I, d. 26, a. un., q. 3; Quaracchi 1882, 458a; cf. etiam Duns Scot., Ordinatio I, d. 26, q. un., op. 3; Scotist. 23,21–24,10.

¹²³⁵ sic *an sicut scrib.?* sicut *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²³⁶ Socratis: Socrates *sed. corr. V*

¹²³⁷ et: etiam *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²³⁸) Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 8, a. 1, resp.; Pession 215b.

¹²³⁹) Cf. Aug., Contra Sermones Arriani., V, 5; Hombert 191,13–16.

essentiam, nec distinguuntur tantum ratione, sicut Sabelliani¹²⁴⁰) unientes personas, sed distinguuntur re relativa, scilicet relationibus, et ista distinctio maxime convenit divinis, tum quia facit veram distinctionem, ut unum non possit dici aliud sicut illa, quae solum ratione distinguuntur, tum quia ex neutra parte ponit imperfectionem, sicut opposita alia, quorum unum semper dicit aliquid imperfectum respectu alterius sicut nigrum¹²⁴¹ respectu albi et sic in aliis¹²⁴²), nec¹²⁴³ dicit non ens sicut in privativis et contradictoriis, tum quia ponendo distinctionem veram non¹²⁴⁴ dividit essentiam, cum distinguantur tantum ut relata. Manet ergo identitas absoluta.

(15) Circa quintum considerandum, quod li “inquantum” est designativum causae, sicut dicimus, quod stella lucet inquantum lucida, quia lux est sibi causa lucendi. Contingit igitur quandoque, quod aliquid competit alicui non per se, scilicet per suam essentiam, sed per aliud, ut patet in dicto exemplo. Et sicut dicimus, quod ignis calefacit non inquantum ignis, sed inquantum calidus; calor autem calefacit, inquantum calor est, quia hoc sibi competit per suam essentiam; unde, sicut in talibus non bene quaereretur, utrum calor calefaceret inquantum idem subiecto vel differens a subiecto, ita et in proposito, cum relatio eo ipso, quod relatio est, ubicumque ponatur, habeat facere distinctionem, inquantum relationes oppositum habent.

(16) Ideo dicendum est, quod relatio divina consideratur tripliciter: vel inquantum relatio est, <et> sic habet ex se distinguere et non ex differentia vel indifferentia ad essentiam; vel consideratur ut divina, et sic habet per se subsistere, quia, inquantum relatio est, non habet, quod subsistat; tertio consideratur inquantum proprietas, et sic habet constituere relativum. Et quia haec omnia est relatio divina, ideo constituit, inquantum est proprietas, et constitutum eius subsistit, inquantum ipsa relatio divina essentia est et ideo subsistens, distinguit autem, inquantum relatio est.

(17) Ad primum ergo dicendum: relatio non distinguit per comparisonem ad suum oppositum, ut videtur, quia sic habet referre; ergo per comparisonem ad essentiam. Dicendum, quod referendo distinguit et distinguendo refert, et ideo consuevit dici, quod relatio fert secum suam distinctionem.

(18) Ad secundum. In relatione non sunt nisi duo, scilicet res et ratio; si ergo distinguit, secundum quod dicit rem, pareret essentiam; hoc falsum est, quia ab essentia nihil ibi differt realiter; si, secundum quod differt ratione tantum, ergo non causabit distinctionem nisi rationis, quod est error Sabellii¹²⁴⁵). Dicendum, quod relatio non inquantum differens vel idem, sed considerata ut differens ratione ab essentia potest distinguere reali distinctione, sicut et actio et motus secundum

¹²⁴⁰) Cf. Aug., De civ. Dei, X, 10; Dombart – Kalb 330,13–19.

¹²⁴¹ nigrum: niger *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁴²) Cf. Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 33–34, q. 1; Muller 337,124–338,127.

¹²⁴³ nec: nihil *sed corr. V*

¹²⁴⁴ non *coni.*: tum *V* tamen [non] *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁴⁵) Cf. Aug., De civ. Dei, X, 10; Dombart – Kalb 330,13–19.

Philosophum III *Physicorum*¹²⁴⁶) idem sunt secundum rem et tamen ex ea parte, qua differt actio secundum rationem a motu, inquantum scilicet actio dicit motum per comparisonem ad oppositum terminum, inquantum ipsi termini realiter distant, sic etiam homo et animal, licet sint idem re, tamen, inquantum animal differt ratione ab homine, potest etiam alteri attribui, scilicet asino, qui differt ab homine etiam re¹²⁴⁷).

(19) Ad tertium. Sicut paternitas differt sola ratione ab essentia et similiter filiatio, ita et potentia et bonitas ab essentia, sed illa propter hoc inter se non habent distinctionem realem, scilicet potentia et bonitas, et ideo unum de altero praedicatur, quia potentia Dei est sua bonitas; ergo nec paternitas nec filiatio habebit inter se distinctionem. Dicendum, quod non est simile de illis et de istis, quia ista super hoc, quod dictum est de differentia rationis, habent rationem relationum, illarum autem est semper distinguere et oppositionem habere¹²⁴⁸).

(20) Ad quartum. Illa, quae sunt maxime entia, non possunt constitui per ens debilissimum; si ergo personae divinae, quae sunt maxime entia, non constituuntur per quodcumque absolutum in divinis, videtur, quod nec per relationem. Dicendum, quod non constituuntur per absolutum [V 158ra] nec etiam, inquantum sunt subsistentes, per relationes secundum se acceptas, sed per relationes constituuntur, inquantum sunt tales proprietates, quae sunt ipsamet divina essentia, et sic non habent debile esse¹²⁴⁹).

(21) Ad quintum. Omne constituens dat aliquod esse constituto, nec etiam aliqua possunt dici distincta realiter, nisi secundum esse sint distincta; alias esset distinctio solum in anima; si ergo personae sunt distinctae realiter et per relationes constitutae, ergo erit ibi triplex esse personale, quod falsum esse videtur. Dicendum, quod in Deo idem sunt intelligere et esse¹²⁵⁰), et ideo, sicut est unum intelligere in divinis, quia unus intellectus, licet Pater sit intelligens et Filius intelligens, quia non aliud intellectum, ita et esse est unum propter unitatem essentiae, quae, sicut eadem numero communicatur Filio, quae est in Patre, ita et idem esse, et sicut essentia, prout est in Filio, est essentia genita, ita et¹²⁵¹ esse, prout est in Filio, est esse genitum, quia secundum Hilarium *De trinitate*¹²⁵²) “nihil nisi natum habet Filius”; nec tamen, inquantum est in Patre et inquantum est in Filio, realiter distinguitur sicut Pater et Filius, quia esse non dicit relativum, sed absolutum accipiendo pro actu essendi.

¹²⁴⁶) Arist., Phys., III 3, 202b16–22; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 107,13–108,5.

¹²⁴⁷) Cf. Thom., S. th. I, q. 28, a. 3, arg. 1 et ad arg. 1; Leon. 324a–b.

¹²⁴⁸) Cf. Thom., S. th. I, q. 28, a. 3, arg. 2 et ad arg. 2; Leon. 324a–b.

¹²⁴⁹) Cf. Thom., S. th., q. 28, a. 2, arg. 3 et ad arg. 3; Leon. 321a; 322a–b.

¹²⁵⁰) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 14, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 171a–b.

¹²⁵¹ et: etiam *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁵²) Hilar., De Trin., IV, 10; Smulders 111,7–8.

(22) Ad sextum. Alia est ratio essentiae, alia personae; ubi autem alia ratio, ibi et aliud esse, quia ratio definitiva est indicans, quid est esse¹²⁵³). Dicendum, quod nullo modo concedendum est, quod sit aliud esse essentiae et aliud personae, nec definitio dicit esse, sed esse quid, id est, quod aliquid est¹²⁵⁴). Unde duae rationes eiusdem rei non demonstrant duplex esse, sed duo quid, sicut de puncto dicimus, quod est quid ut principium et quid ut finis¹²⁵⁵).

(23) Ad septimum. Nihil indifferens ab aliquo potest aliquid constituere ut differens ab eodem; sed relatio est indifferens ab essentia; ergo nihil constituet, inquantum differens ab eadem. Dicendum, quod est indifferens quantum ad rem, sed differens quantum ad rationem; sed in creaturis¹²⁵⁶ relatio etiam realiter esset differens a suo fundamento; sed hic¹²⁵⁷, quidquid realitatis est in quocumque, quod in Deo ponitur, totum est idem re cum divina essentia.

(24) Ad octavum. Dicendum, ab eodem aliquid habet esse et distingui; sed relatio non dat esse, cum esse in Deo sit ab essentia et sit idem cum ipsa. Dicendum, quod relatio dat esse personae, ut est proprietas, non tamen aliud ab esse divinae essentiae; non tamen ad esse semper sequitur distinctio ab alio, quia¹²⁵⁸ et Adam, etsi habuit esse, non tamen habuit esse distinctum ab aliis hominibus, antequam essent.

(25) Ad nonum. Si Pater differt ab essentia vel etiam relatio sola ratione, aut hoc est per comparisonem ad extra, scilicet creaturas, aut intra. Non primo modo, quia personae sunt secundum se non ratione creaturarum, et tunc, quidquid competit alicui secundum se, competit ei non propter aliud¹²⁵⁹; intelligere autem et verbum dicere per se convenit¹²⁶⁰ Deo. Si per comparisonem ad intra, contra: Unius simplicissimi non est nisi unus conceptus, ergo una ratio; non ergo erit alia ratio personae, alia essentiae. Dicendum †.

(26) Ad decimum. Si persona differt ab essentia ratione et similiter persona a relatione, ergo erunt duae rationes diversae in una <et> eadem persona; hoc autem est inconveniens quantum ad Deum, quia ipse perfectissime se ipsum una conceptione concipit; ergo adhuc¹²⁶¹ ibi non erit distinctio secundum se, sed secundum nos.

(27) Ad undecimum. Esse ad aliud est propria definitio relativorum¹²⁶²); unde esse in eis nihil addit super ipsam, quia habitudo ipsa relativi¹²⁶³ unius ad aliud, hoc est eis esse; cum igitur alia sit

¹²⁵³) Arist., Topic., I 5, 101b39, transl. Boethii: Minio–Paluello 9,6–8; transl. anonyma: Minio–Paluello 194,1–3.

¹²⁵⁴) Arist., Topic., I 5, 101b39, transl. Boethii: Minio–Paluello 9,6–8; transl. anonyma: Minio–Paluello 194,1–3.

¹²⁵⁵) Cf. Arist., Phys., IV 11, 220a10–13; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 177,18–178,3.

¹²⁵⁶ in creaturis: inter creaturas *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁵⁷ hic: hoc *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁵⁸ quia *add. ad sed exp. V*

¹²⁵⁹ aliud *add. s. v. V*

¹²⁶⁰ convenit: competit *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁶¹ adhuc: ad hoc *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁶²) Arist., Cat., c. 7, 8a37–b1; transl. Boethii: Minio–Paluello 22,26–29.

¹²⁶³ relativi *coni.:* relativum *V*

habitus Patris ad Filium, alia e converso, ergo et aliud esse. Dicendum, quod ipsa habitudo unius ad alterum est esse quiditativum relationis, sed habitudo in actu addit actum essendi, qui¹²⁶⁴ non est relatio essentialiter, sed actualitas eius. Unde sicut secundum Avicennam in sua *Metaphysica*¹²⁶⁵) “accidens est res, cuius naturae debetur in alio esse”¹²⁶⁶), quod est commune omnibus accidentibus, ita et contrahendo ad certum genus, scilicet relationis, possumus dicere, quod “relatio est res, cuius naturae debetur ad aliud se habere”¹²⁶⁷) vel, ut melius dicatur¹²⁶⁸, “cuius natura est ad aliud habitudo”¹²⁶⁹) vel respectus, quam tamen naturam potuit intelligere Adam, etiam antequam esset pater.

(28) Ad duodecesimum. Si relatio distinguit personas in quantum divina, ergo in quantum est idem cum essentia, ergo in quantum differunt ratione. Dicendum, quod, sicut homini secundum se convenit¹²⁷⁰ ridere¹²⁷¹), non tamen ridet secundum se consideratus, sed ille vel iste, ita et relationi in quantum huiusmodi convenit¹²⁷² distinguere; cum¹²⁷³ talis distinctio¹²⁷⁴ qualis est in divinis, scilicet quod distincta subsistant in eadem natura, hoc convenit¹²⁷⁵, in quantum est differentia¹²⁷⁶ realiter, sed¹²⁷⁷ tamen differens ratione¹²⁷⁸).

(29) †

(30) †

(31) Ad quintusdecimum¹²⁷⁹. Actus notionales¹²⁸⁰ sunt permixti; ergo et personae et essentiae; probatio primi, quia, sicut se habet persona ad actum personalem, ita et essentia ad actum essentialem; ergo commutata proportione sicut se habet persona ad actum essentialem, ita se habet essentia ad actum personalem; sed personae competit actus essentiae, sicut Pater creat, ergo et

¹²⁶⁴ qui: quia *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁶⁵) Cf. Avic., *Metaph.*, VIII, c. 4; Van Riet 402,61–404,101; *sed potius* Bonav., In Sent. IV, d. 12, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. et ad arg. 1, 2 et 4; Quaracchi 1889 271a–b.

¹²⁶⁶) Cf. Thom., *Quodl.* IX, q. 3, a. un., ad arg. 2.; Gauthier 99,78–90; Thom., *Quaest. disp. de pot.*, q. 7, a. 3, ad. 4; Pession 58a.

¹²⁶⁷) Arist., *Cat.*, c. 7, 8a39-b1; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 22, 26–29; cf. etiam Thom., In III Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 5, arg. 2; Mandonnet – Moos 291; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 28, a. 2, arg. 3; Leon. 321a; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 40, a. 2, arg. 4; Leon. 413a; Thom., *Quodl.* IX, q. 2, a. 3, arg. 3; Gauthier 96,17–20.

¹²⁶⁸ dicatur: dicetur *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁶⁹) Cf. Duns Scot., *Super Praed.*, q. 29, 19; Andrews – Etkorn – Gál – Noone – Wood 468,16–18; Duns Scot., *Notabil. Super Metaph.*, V, 204; Pini 75,945; Duns Scot., *Ordin.*, I, d. 26, q. un., op. 3; Vaticana 27,1–3.

¹²⁷⁰ convenit: competit *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁷¹) Boeth., In *Isag. Porph.*, IV, 15; Brandt 278,1–13.

¹²⁷² convenit: competit *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁷³ cum: tamen *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁷⁴ talis distinctio *coni.*: talem distinctionem V

¹²⁷⁵ convenit: [non] competit *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁷⁶ differentia *an.* differens *scirb.*? differens *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁷⁷ sed *an.* et *scirb.* ex Thome?

¹²⁷⁸) Thom., *S. th.* I, q. 39 a. 1 resp.; Leon. 396a–b.

¹²⁷⁹ quintusdecimum: duodecesimum *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁸⁰ notionales *add.* tredecim V

essentiae¹²⁸¹ actus personae, ut dicatur: *Essentia generat*. Dicendum, quod prima propositio est vera, sed mutatio¹²⁸² est falsa, quia, sicut patet in numeris, in quibus primo invenitur proportio, tunc est |V 158rb| commutatio¹²⁸³ vera, quando in commutando primum sumitur cum tertio et secundum cum quarto et tunc remanet eadem distantia terminorum, sicut patet in hoc exemplo, sicut se habent duo ad quattuor, ita tria ad sex; ergo commutata proportione, sicut se habent duo ad tria, ita quattuor ad sex¹²⁸⁴); in illa autem commutatione accepit primum cum quarto et secundum cum tertio, et in talibus semper fit crux, et ubicumque crux, ibi falsa commutatio; si autem quaeris¹²⁸⁵, quare ista commutatio sit vera et non illa, ubi crux est, dicendum, quod, sicut in logicalibus si convertens est vera, et eius conversa, non tamen oportet, quod quocumque modo liceat convertere, et sicut sic positis propositionibus, scilicet tali figura fit syllogismus, non autem quocumque alio modo, ita et in proportionibus servatur, et sunt quasi maxime et semper ad aliquam proportionem pervenitur qualemcumque, quando recte fit commutatio, non autem, quando non recte.

(32) Ad sextusdecimum¹²⁸⁶. Idem est, quo generans generat vel quo distinguitur a generato; sed Pater non generat paternitate; probatio, quia genitum debet assimilare in eo, quo generat, non autem assimilatur Filius Patri in paternitate; ergo nec distinguitur paternitate. Dicendum, quod Socrates generat et forma speciei, quia humanitate, et etiam forma individui¹²⁸⁷, et quia generare est opus naturae¹²⁸⁸) a persona, ideo assimilatur in substantia, non autem semper in persona; sic et Filius in divinis assimilatur in natura divina, quae etiam est principium omnium operationum tam essentialium quam notionalium, sed essentialium in se, personalium, prout est in persona¹²⁸⁹).

(33) Ad septimusdecimum¹²⁹⁰. In relatione¹²⁹¹ sunt duo, scilicet inesse sicut et aliorum accidentium et propria quiditas, quae nisi differret, Deus non posset quiditatem accidentis conservare in esse sive in esse substantiae. Cum igitur relatio secundum id, quod inest, vertatur in substantiam divinam sicut et alia accidentia, remaneat autem secundum Boethium in libro *De trinitate*¹²⁹²) secundum propriam quiditatem, ergo secundum quiditatem differentem a substantia divina distinguit. Dicendum, quod in Deo nihil est nisi Deus. Unde et relationis etiam quiditas et quidquid dicere potest realitatis, totum vertitur in divinam essentiam, nec aliqua creatura ut creatura est in Deo; sed quia relatio etiam in Deo existens tenet modum praedicandi sive quiditatis, scilicet “ad aliud”, alia

¹²⁸¹ *essentiae*: *essentia sed. corr. V*

¹²⁸² *mutatio an commutatio scirb.? minor transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁸³ *commutatio*: De relationibus divinis et De potentia Dei *add. i.m. V*

¹²⁸⁴) Cf. Thom., Exp. Post., I, 12; Gauthier 46,93–47,115.

¹²⁸⁵ *quaeris*: *quaeras transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁸⁶ *sextusdecimum*: *tertiusdecimum transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁸⁷ *individui*: *individuali transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁸⁸) Cf. Ioann. Damasc., De fide orthod., I, c. 8; Kotter 21,67; Buytaert 32,77–78.

¹²⁸⁹) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 41, a. 5, resp.; Leon. 430a–b.

¹²⁹⁰ *septimusdecimum*: *quartusdecimum transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁹¹ *relatione coni*: Platone *V*

¹²⁹²) Boeth., De trin., 4; Moreschini 175,181–185.

autem accidentia in Deo non, quia nihil dicit ibi inhaerens, sed subsistens, ideo dicit Boethius¹²⁹³), quod “ad aliquid” eius non praedicatur, scilicet substantialiter, quia, licet in Deo dicat substantiam, sicut in veritate dicit accidens, tamen neque per modum subsistentis neque per modum inhaerentis, sed secundum proprium modum, scilicet “ad aliud se habentis”, et vere dicitur ibi: potest ad aliud se habere, licet sapientia vel bonitas non dicatur ibi vere inhaerere, etiam posito, quod praedicient¹²⁹⁴ per modum inhaerentis¹²⁹⁵).

¹²⁹³) Boeth., *Utrum pat. et fil.*; Moreschini 182,1–185,67, *spec. Boeth.*, *Utrum pat. et fil.* 4; Moreschini 184,55–61.

¹²⁹⁴ praedicient: praedicientur *transcriptio Schmausi*

¹²⁹⁵) Cf. Boeth., *Utrum pat. et fil.* 4; Moreschini 184,61–187,64.

QUAESTIO IX

[E 102VB] UTRUM DEUS POSSIT POTENTIAM PASSIVAM REDUCERE IN ACTUM ABSQUE OBIECTO

- (1) Dicendum, quod hic possunt considerari tria.
- (2) Primo declaratur¹²⁹⁶ quaestio.
- (3) Secundo ponitur¹²⁹⁷ quaedam distinctio.
- (4) Tertio investigatur positio.
- (5) De primo intelligendum, quod quaestio ista¹²⁹⁸ potest intelligi tripliciter.
- (6) Primo, “utrum Deus possit et caetera¹²⁹⁹ absque obiecto”, scilicet reducete vel causante. Obiectum enim secundum aliquos¹³⁰⁰) habet totam causalitatem motionis potentiae ad actum. Et hoc modo intelligendo [E 103ra] quaestionem sic:¹³⁰¹ Deus potest reducere potentiam¹³⁰² in actum sine obiecto, quia quidquid potest Deus per causam mediam sive particularem¹³⁰³ in efficiendo¹³⁰⁴; hoc etiam¹³⁰⁵ de se potest sine illa, cum ipse praehabeat in se omnem vim activam, quae quibuscumque agentibus est communicata¹³⁰⁶ secundum Dionysium¹³⁰⁷).
- (7) Secundo modo potest intelligi, “utrum et caetera absque¹³⁰⁸ obiecto”, scilicet in rerum natura coexistente, et sic etiam potest quantum ad interiores sensus et intellectuales, quia etiam re destructa potest haberi eius imago, ut¹³⁰⁹ rosa non existente potest adhuc esse naturae suae¹³¹⁰ in intellectu¹³¹¹, et pro isto et pro primo membro praemisso est, quod Deus angelo dedit¹³¹² cognitionem rerum, antequam fierent secundum opinionem eorum¹³¹³1314), qui ponunt successionem sex dierum.

¹²⁹⁶ declaratur: declarabitur *E*

¹²⁹⁷ ponitur: ponetur *E*

¹²⁹⁸ ista *om. E*

¹²⁹⁹ et caetera *om. E*

¹³⁰⁰) God. de Font., Quodl., XII, q. 1, arg. 1 et resp.; Hoffmans 79.

¹³⁰¹ quaestionem sic *om. E*

¹³⁰² reducere potentiam *inv. E*

¹³⁰³ sive particularem *om. E*

¹³⁰⁴ efficiendo *add. scilicet particularem E*

¹³⁰⁵ hoc etiam *inv. E*

¹³⁰⁶ communicata: continuerta^a *V*

¹³⁰⁷) Dion., De div. nom., c. 5,10; PG 3, 825B–C; Suchla 189,7–190,2; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 364B – 367B ex Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 5; Simon 326,71–78.

¹³⁰⁸ absque *om. E*

¹³⁰⁹ ut: et *E*

¹³¹⁰ suae *add. esse E*

¹³¹¹ in intellectu: intellecto/intellectio *V*

¹³¹² angelo dedit *inv. E*

¹³¹³ eorum: illorum *E*

¹³¹⁴) Aug. De Gen. ad litt., IV, 32; Zycha 130,10–15; cf. etiam Alex. Hal., S. th., II, p. 1, inquisit. 2, tract. 3, sect. 2, q. 1, tit.: 2, m. 1, c. 3, n. 125; Quaracchi 1924 169b.

(8) Tertio potest intelligi, “utrum et caetera¹³¹⁵ absque obiecto” ut obiecto, scilicet non ut re coexistente ita, quod accipiatur¹³¹⁶ obiectum ut terminans actionem et correspondens actioni, et sic videtur velle¹³¹⁷ quaerere quaestio, “utrum” scilicet “possit divina virtute aliquis intellectus¹³¹⁸ intelligere et¹³¹⁹ tamen¹³²⁰ nullum intelligibile intelligat”¹³²¹).

(9) Circa secundum intelligendum, quod, cum quaestio sit de accidente, scilicet actione intellectus et sensus, distinguendum videtur inter accidentia. Sunt enim quaedam accidentia absoluta, sicut¹³²² qualitas et quantitas, ut album, calidum¹³²³ et huiusmodi, quaedam sunt accidentia respectiva sicut relativa¹³²⁴¹³²⁵); et illa etiam tribus modis se habent: quaedam enim dicuntur relativa¹³²⁶ secundum esse, alia secundum dici¹³²⁷); secunda distinctio est, quod quaedam dicuntur secundum rem, alia vero¹³²⁸ secundum rationem¹³²⁹), et de his in praecedentibus quaestionibus¹³³⁰)¹³³¹ satis dictum est; tertia distinctio est secundum Philosophum V *Metaphysicae*¹³³²) in fine capituli de “ad aliquid”, quod quaedam sunt relativa¹³³³ per se, quia scilicet ipsa sunt relativa¹³³⁴ secundum se, alia autem <per accidens>, quia aliquo modo habent se¹³³⁵ ad relativa¹³³⁶, quae secundum se dicuntur, et hoc tripliciter, sicut ibidem ponit.

(10) Primo, quia genera eorum dicuntur “ad aliquid”; ideo et ipsa ratione generum¹³³⁷ dicuntur “ad aliquid”¹³³⁸, sicut¹³³⁹ medicina non dicitur “ad aliquid” secundum se, sed quia scientia dicitur “ad

¹³¹⁵ et caetera *om. E*

¹³¹⁶ accipiatur: recipiatur *V*

¹³¹⁷ velle *om. E*

¹³¹⁸ intellectus *om. V*

¹³¹⁹ et: ita *E*

¹³²⁰ tamen *add. quod E*

¹³²¹) God. de Font., Quodl., XII, q. 1, arg. 1; Hoffmans 79.

¹³²² sicut: scilicet *E*

¹³²³ ut ... calidum: calidum frigidum *E*

¹³²⁴ relativa: relata *V*

¹³²⁵) Cf. Henr. de Gand., Quodl. IX, q. 3, ad arg.; Macken 87,85–88,97; Henr. de Gand., Quodl. XV, q. 5, resp.; Etkorn–Wilson 24,33–25,49.

¹³²⁶ relativa: relata *V*

¹³²⁷) Cf. Thom., S. Th., I, q. 13, a. 7, ad arg. 1; Leon. 153a–b; Thom., De ver., q. 4, a. 5, arg. 2.; Dondaine 130,8–18; Thom., In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 763; etiam Bonav., In Sent. I, d. 34, a. un., q. 2, ad arg. 6.; Quaracchi 1882, 591a–b.

¹³²⁸ vero *om. E*

¹³²⁹) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 7, a. 10, arg. 11 et ad arg. 11; Pession 209b et 211b; Thom., In I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 4 et ad arg. 4; Mandonnet – Moos 707 et 709.

¹³³⁰) Cf. *supra* q. VIII “Utrum relatio in divinis distinguat personas, in quantum sunt idem essentia vel in quantum differunt ab ea”, sect. (8) et cf. etiam *infra* V, 182ra–182va.

¹³³¹ quaestionibus: quibusdam *V*

¹³³²) Arist., Metaph. V, 15, 1021b3–11; transl. media: Geyer 105,6–13.

¹³³³ relativa: relata *V*

¹³³⁴ relativa: relata *V*

¹³³⁵ habent se *inv. E*

¹³³⁶ relativa: relata *V*

¹³³⁷ ratione generum *om. E*

¹³³⁸ ad aliquid *om. V*

¹³³⁹ sicut: ut *E*

aliquid”. Et ideo dicit ibidem Commentator¹³⁴⁰), quod “scientia”, secundum quod dicitur “ad aliquid”, “non est genus [V 158va] medicinae in rei veritate, nisi¹³⁴¹ scientia diceretur relative ad scientem et medicina ad medicum. Tunc enim etiam sciens esset genus medici”.

(11) Secundus modus est, quod abstracta dicuntur relativa¹³⁴² propter hoc, quod eorum concreta dicuntur relativa¹³⁴³, sicut aequalitas, similitudo vel paternitas¹³⁴⁴, quia aequale est tale, scilicet¹³⁴⁵ relativum et simile et Pater. Est enim proprium relativi¹³⁴⁶ dici¹³⁴⁷ non ad subiectum, sed extra ad oppositum. Unde paternitas non dicitur Filii, sed Patris¹³⁴⁸. Unde secundum nomen talia non dicuntur ad aliquid.

(12) Tertio dicitur relativa¹³⁴⁹ per accidens, inquantum aliquid¹³⁵⁰ est¹³⁵¹ subiectum accidentis relativi, sicut hoc dicitur duplum et simile, quia subiectum dupli. Et eodem modo caput dicitur ad aliquid, quia est pars; pars autem dicitur alicuius pars¹³⁵²).

(13) Et sic patet secundum.

(14) Circa tertium sciendum¹³⁵³, quod de quaestione ista est duplex opinio.

(15) Dicunt quidam¹³⁵⁴), quod loquendo de accidentibus absolutis Deus potest facere sine quocumque alio, sicut si faceret solam naturam albedinis vel alterius accidentis¹³⁵⁵ absoluti etiam nulla alia creatura existente sive¹³⁵⁶ subiecto sive obiecto alio, sed loquendo de accidentibus respectivis non potest nec¹³⁵⁷ sine subiecto nec¹³⁵⁸ sine¹³⁵⁹ obiecto, ut sit scientia¹³⁶⁰ sine sciente vel¹³⁶¹ scibili. Et adducunt Simplicium, qui dicit *Super librum¹³⁶² praedicamentorum¹³⁶³*), quod¹³⁶⁴ relationis essentia¹³⁶⁵ et natura characterizatur in duobus extremis, quorum unum est ei pro subiecto

¹³⁴⁰) Averr., Metaph., V, comm. 20; Ponzalli 178,173–176.

¹³⁴¹ nisi *add.* et *E*

¹³⁴² relativa: relata *V*

¹³⁴³ relativa: relative *V*

¹³⁴⁴ paternitas: trinitas *E*

¹³⁴⁵ tale scilicet *om.* *V*

¹³⁴⁶ relativi: relati *V*

¹³⁴⁷ dici *om.* *E*

¹³⁴⁸ Patris: Pater *E*

¹³⁴⁹ relativa *om.* *V*

¹³⁵⁰ aliquid *om.* *V*

¹³⁵¹ est *add.* ad *sed exp.* *V*

¹³⁵²) Thom., In Metaph. V, lect. 17, n. 1030–1032; Cathala – Spiazzi 269b.

¹³⁵³ sciendum: dicendum *E*

¹³⁵⁴) God. de Font., Quodl., XII, q. 1, resp.; Hoffmans 79.

¹³⁵⁵ accidentis *om.* *V*

¹³⁵⁶ sive: sine *V*

¹³⁵⁷ nec: neque *V*

¹³⁵⁸ nec: neque *V*

¹³⁵⁹ sine *om.* *V*

¹³⁶⁰ scientia *add.* vel aliud relativum *V*

¹³⁶¹ vel: et non *V*

¹³⁶² librum: libro *V*

¹³⁶³) Simpl., In Praed., c. 7; Pattin 211,87–281,97, *spec.* 226,28–227.

¹³⁶⁴ quod: quia *E*

¹³⁶⁵ relationis essentia *inv.* *E*

et fundamento, alterum¹³⁶⁶ pro termino vel¹³⁶⁷ obiecto et nullum tale potest esse nisi¹³⁶⁸ pluribus coexistentibus.

(16) Sed ista opinio¹³⁶⁹, licet quoad primam¹³⁷⁰ partem, scilicet de accidentibus absolutis, habeat veritatem, tamen quantum ad aliam non est omnino vera¹³⁷¹, scilicet de relativis quantum ad subiectum. Nec sic characterizatur relativum¹³⁷² ex subiecto sicut ex opposito, a quo dependet inquantum¹³⁷³ relativum¹³⁷⁴; non autem ex subiecto nisi secundum modum naturae accidentis¹³⁷⁵, inquantum ei competit inesse; hoc autem tollitur facta suppositione de potentia Dei.

(17) Et ideo est alia opinio¹³⁷⁶), quae dicit de absolutis sicut prima, sed de respectivis dicit, quod Deus potest accidens aliquod respectivum¹³⁷⁷ facere sine subiecto sicut scientiam vel virtutem aliquam, non tamen individualement sicut scientiam¹³⁷⁸ Platonis vel Aristotelis, quia illae naturaliter non distinguuntur nisi¹³⁷⁹ ex subiectis. Non tamen possit facere accidens respectivum sine obiecto correlativo¹³⁸⁰ sive in subiecto sive sine subiecto; et quia actus potentiarum animae sunt entia, quibus per se et essentialiter¹³⁸¹ est relatio annexa¹³⁸²¹³⁸³, nullo modo poterunt¹³⁸⁴ esse sine obiecto obiective coexistente quantum ad permanentiam sive conservationem, licet possit¹³⁸⁵¹³⁸⁶ incipere esse sive fieri, sicut prius dictum est¹³⁸⁷), aliquo non agente eo modo, quo effici habent factione¹³⁸⁸, scilicet¹³⁸⁹ fundamenti sui. Et hoc primo probat¹³⁹⁰ de¹³⁹¹ exteriori auctoritate, secundo consequenter¹³⁹² de aliis ratione.

¹³⁶⁶ pro ... alterum: subiectum, scilicet et fundamentum aliud *E*

¹³⁶⁷ vel: et *E*

¹³⁶⁸ nisi: sine *E*

¹³⁶⁹ opinio: positio *E*

¹³⁷⁰ primam *add.* sui *E*

¹³⁷¹ est omnino vera: habet veritate *V*

¹³⁷² relativum *coni.*: relatum *V om. sed add.* quantum ad subiectum vel *E*

¹³⁷³ inquantum: quantum *sed corr. s. v. E*

¹³⁷⁴ relativum: relatum *V*

¹³⁷⁵ accidentis *om. V*

¹³⁷⁶) God. de Font., Quodl., XII, q. 1, resp.; Hoffmans 79–80.

¹³⁷⁷ accidens *om. E*

¹³⁷⁸ sicut scientiam: scilicet *E*

¹³⁷⁹ nisi *om. V*

¹³⁸⁰ correlativo: correlato *V*

¹³⁸¹ essentialiter: immediate *E*

¹³⁸² relatio annexa *inv. E*

¹³⁸³ annexa *add.* et essentialiter *E*

¹³⁸⁴ potuerunt: possunt *E*

¹³⁸⁵ possit: possint *V*

¹³⁸⁶ possit *add.* esse sive fieri *sed. del. E*

¹³⁸⁷) Cf. *supra ibidem sect.* (17)

¹³⁸⁸ factione: factionem *V*

¹³⁸⁹ scilicet *om. E*

¹³⁹⁰ probatur: probat *V*

¹³⁹¹ de *add.* sensu *V*

¹³⁹² consequenter: consequens *sed corr. E*

(18) Primo sic, quia dicit Augustinus XI *De trinitate* cap. 2¹³⁹³): “Visio” nihil “aliud” est “quam sensus ex ea re, quae sentitur, informatus”, “qua detracta¹³⁹⁴ nulla omnino visio” esse potest. Item in eodem capitulo 2¹³⁹⁵¹³⁹⁶): “Illa informatio sensus, quae visio dicitur, et a re visibili imprimitur; illa re detracta¹³⁹⁷ nulla¹³⁹⁸ remanet forma, quae inerat sensui, dum esset illud, quod videbatur”¹³⁹⁹).

(19) Secundo patet ratione sic. Et primo de relativis¹⁴⁰⁰ |E 103rb| secundum esse, ubi etiam utrumque ad alterum refertur. Videmus enim, quod, licet Socrates possit¹⁴⁰¹ fieri albus¹⁴⁰² et esse albus¹⁴⁰³, tamen non potest Socrates albus¹⁴⁰⁴ esse similis¹⁴⁰⁵ sine alio albo¹⁴⁰⁶ coexistente nec¹⁴⁰⁷ e converso.¹⁴⁰⁸) Sicut¹⁴⁰⁹ patet de relativis, ubi¹⁴¹⁰ alterum tantum¹⁴¹¹ refertur, ut in sensu et scientia et intellectu et intelligibili, sicut patet in¹⁴¹² V *Metaphysicae*, ubi dicit Philosophus¹⁴¹³¹⁴¹⁴), quod “intellectus refertur ad intellectum et non¹⁴¹⁵ ad intelligentem; bis idem diceretur”, quod exponens Commentator¹⁴¹⁶) dicit¹⁴¹⁷: “Bis idem, id est, intellectus non refertur ad intelligentem, sed ad intellectum, quoniam si ita esset, tunc intelligere constitueretur per intelligentem; sed videtur esse e converso. Ex quo sequeretur, quod id, quod constituitur per aliquid, constituat id, scilicet quia contingit, ut¹⁴¹⁸ causa constitueretur per causatum insimul, et hoc intendebat, cum dixit: ‘Tunc idem diceretur bis’, id est: ‘Tunc idem erit causa et causatum eiusdem’”. Ex quo accipitur, quod actus habet relationem realem ad obiectum ut causatum ad causam, et non causatur actus a subiecto, scilicet intelligere vel velle ab intelligente vel volente; alias non referrentur secundum tertium

¹³⁹³) Aug., De Trin., XI, c. 2; Mountain – Glorie 334,10–335,18.

¹³⁹⁴ detracta *coni. ex Augustino et Godefrido*: destructa *EV*

¹³⁹⁵ capitulo 2: libro *V*

¹³⁹⁶) Aug., De Trin., XI, c. 2; Mountain – Glorie 335,60–64.

¹³⁹⁷ detracta *coni. ex Augustino et Godefrido*: destructa *EV*

¹³⁹⁸ nulla *add. omnino E*

¹³⁹⁹) God. de Font., Quodl., XII, q. 1, contra et resp.; Hoffmans 79 et 80.

¹⁴⁰⁰ relativis: relationibus *V*

¹⁴⁰¹ etiam ... possit *illeg. E*

¹⁴⁰² albus: album *V*

¹⁴⁰³ albus *om. E*

¹⁴⁰⁴ albus: album *E*

¹⁴⁰⁵ esse similis *inv. E*

¹⁴⁰⁶ sine alio albo: alio albo sine illo *E*

¹⁴⁰⁷ nec: et *E*

¹⁴⁰⁸) God. de Font., Quodl., XII, q. 1, resp.; Hoffmans 81.

¹⁴⁰⁹ sicut: sic *E* sed *sed corr. V*

¹⁴¹⁰ ubi: quorum *E*

¹⁴¹¹ tantum: solum *V*

¹⁴¹² in *om. V*

¹⁴¹³ Philosophus: Aristoteles *E*

¹⁴¹⁴) Arist., *Metaph.*, V 15, 1021a31–b1; transl. Guillelmi: Vuillemin-Diem 113,615–618.

¹⁴¹⁵ non: si *E*

¹⁴¹⁶) Averr., In *Metaph.*, V, comm. 20; Ponzalli 177,145–152.

¹⁴¹⁷ Commentator dicit *inv. E*

¹⁴¹⁸ ut: quod *E*

modum relativorum ibi in V *Metaphysicae*¹⁴¹⁹) positorum, in quo modo unum refertur ad alterum tantum¹⁴²⁰ et non e converso, sicut scientia ad scibile, quia in primis duobus modis¹⁴²¹, scilicet secundum quantitatem et secundum potentiam activam vel passivam est relatio etiam e converso. Item¹⁴²² tertius modus etiam differt ab illis, quia id, ad quod aliud refertur, est causa esse alterius, sicut scibile scientiae, et¹⁴²³ ideo obiectum est causa actus potentiae et non potentia; et ideo actus habet realem¹⁴²⁴ relationem ad obiectum vel essentialem¹⁴²⁵, ex quo concluditur, quod actus non potest poni¹⁴²⁶ sine obiecto.¹⁴²⁷)

(20) Sed licet ista¹⁴²⁸ conclusio sit vera¹⁴²⁹, tamen ista ratio¹⁴³⁰ aliud inconueniens includit, scilicet quod actus non causetur a potentia, sed solum ab obiecto, quod supra quaestione tertia¹⁴³¹¹⁴³²) est improbatum¹⁴³³. Manifestum est etiam secundum omnes philosophos, quod habitus [V 158vb] habet rationem causae respectu actus¹⁴³⁴), ut patet in virtutibus et aliis; habens autem habitum operatur, quando vult, licet actio determinetur per obiectum; et possit¹⁴³⁵ haec opinio sapere haeresim, si nos non essemus ex nobis esse¹⁴³⁶ causa nostrarum operationum.

(21) Unde illud Philosophi “bis idem et caetera”¹⁴³⁷) aliter exponitur per Thomam¹⁴³⁸), qui dicit, quod, si referretur¹⁴³⁹ scientia vel intellectus ad scientem vel intelligentem, cum nunc¹⁴⁴⁰ referatur ad scitum sive intellectum, “bis idem”, id est, cum relativi esse sit ad aliud se habere, esset eius duplex esse, quod est inconueniens.

(22) Secundum Albertum¹⁴⁴¹) exponitur sic: “bis idem”, id est, si referretur scientia ad scientem, hoc esset, inquantum esset¹⁴⁴² habens scientiam, et sic “idem bis diceretur”, si scientia referretur ad

¹⁴¹⁹) Arist., *Metaph.*, V 15, 1021a27–b3; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 113,611–114,621.

¹⁴²⁰ tantum *om. E*

¹⁴²¹ modis *om. V*

¹⁴²² Item: Iterum *E*

¹⁴²³ et *add. est sed exp. E*

¹⁴²⁴ realem: essentialem *V*

¹⁴²⁵ vel essentialem *om. V*

¹⁴²⁶ poni: esse *E*

¹⁴²⁷) God. de Font., *Quodl.*, XII, q. 1, resp.; Hoffmans 80–82.

¹⁴²⁸ ista *om. V*

¹⁴²⁹ sit vera *inv. E*

¹⁴³⁰ ista ratio *inv. E*

¹⁴³¹ quaestione tertia *om. E*

¹⁴³²) *non inveni*

¹⁴³³ est improbatum *inv. E*

¹⁴³⁴) Cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, III 10, 1115b; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier. 192,9–10; et etiam Thom., *Quaest. disp. de virt. in comm.*, q. un., a. 12, ad arg. 5; Odetto 745a.

¹⁴³⁵ possit: posset *E*

¹⁴³⁶ ex nobis esse *om. V*

¹⁴³⁷) Arist., *Metaph.*, V 15, 1021a31–b1; transl. Guillelmi: Vuillemin-Diem 113,615–618.

¹⁴³⁸) Thom., *In Metaph.*, V, lect. 17, n. 1028; Cathala – Spiazzi 269b.

¹⁴³⁹ referretur: referre *E*

¹⁴⁴⁰ nunc: etiam *E*

¹⁴⁴¹) Alb., *Metaph.*, V, tract. 3, c. 8; Geyer 270,49–57.

¹⁴⁴² esset: est *V*

habentem scientiam, et similiter illa¹⁴⁴³ scientia, si referretur ad scientem, tunc “bis”¹⁴⁴⁴, id est, in infinitum sibi diceretur¹⁴⁴⁵.

(23) Unde cum isti viri optime viderint Commentatorem, quando praedictum passum exposuerunt, nec tamen illam expositionem acceptaverunt, quod patet ex hoc, quod, cum sit notabilis¹⁴⁴⁶ valde, quod tamen nullus eorum¹⁴⁴⁷ eius mentionem facit. Unde verisimile est, quod dictum eius non habeat veritatem ibi de intellectu respectu intelligentis, secundum quod isti eum intelligunt.

(24) Unde considerandum, quod Philosophus¹⁴⁴⁸) dicit, quod tertius modus est¹⁴⁴⁹, quando aliquid ad aliud dicitur ut mensurabile ad mensuram, non secundum quod mensurat esse, nec dicit Philosophus, quod mensura¹⁴⁵⁰ causet esse. Sic enim imago refertur¹⁴⁵¹ ad id¹⁴⁵², cuius est imago, nec tamen id est causa¹⁴⁵³ efficiens istius¹⁴⁵⁴, sicut isti¹⁴⁵⁵) volunt. Nec etiam verum est, quod scientia causetur a rebus scitis, ad quas¹⁴⁵⁶ tamen refertur, cum aliqua scientia inveniatur a rebus, non causata a rebus¹⁴⁵⁷. Item ab eo, quod res est vel non est, secundum Philosophum¹⁴⁵⁸) dicitur oratio vera vel falsa; unde a quocumque proferatur oratio et¹⁴⁵⁹ ab illo, qui non habet scientiam, scilicet¹⁴⁶⁰ a rebus causatam¹⁴⁶¹, tamen oratio est vera vel falsa ratione rei et per consequens conceptus¹⁴⁶² intellectus, mediante quo rem¹⁴⁶³ significat¹⁴⁶⁴); nec tamen oportet dicere, ut videtur, quod tale intelligere causet rem intellectam.

(25) Unde patet, quod, si referretur¹⁴⁶⁵ non ut mensuratum tantum, sed ut causatum, tunc e converso etiam esset relatio in creaturis et pertineret ad secundum modum et esset relatio secundum esse et non secundum dici tantum.

¹⁴⁴³ illa: ista *E*

¹⁴⁴⁴ bis *om. E*

¹⁴⁴⁵ sibi diceretur: diceretur sic *E*

¹⁴⁴⁶ sit notabilis *inv. E*

¹⁴⁴⁷ eorum *om. V*

¹⁴⁴⁸) Arist., *Metaph.*, V 15, 1021a27–b3; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 113,611–114,621.

¹⁴⁴⁹ est *add. quod V*

¹⁴⁵⁰ mensura *add. esset sed. exp. V*

¹⁴⁵¹ refertur: referretur *E*

¹⁴⁵² id: illud *V*

¹⁴⁵³ est causa *inv. E*

¹⁴⁵⁴ istius: huius *E*

¹⁴⁵⁵) Averr., In *Metaph.*, V, comm. 20; Ponzalli 177,145–152; God. de Font., *Quodl.*, XII, q. 1, resp.; Hoffmans 80–81.

¹⁴⁵⁶ quas *coni.*: quam *EV*

¹⁴⁵⁷ a rebus *om. V*

¹⁴⁵⁸) Boeth., In *Peri hermeneias*, I, c. 9; Meiser 124,17–20; Arist., *Cat.*, c. 5, 4b9–11; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 13,9–11.

¹⁴⁵⁹ et: etiam *V*

¹⁴⁶⁰ scilicet *om. V*

¹⁴⁶¹ causata: acquisita *sed del. et corr. s.v. E*

¹⁴⁶² conceptus: conceptur *sed. corr. E*

¹⁴⁶³ rem: esse *E*

¹⁴⁶⁴) Cf. *Ps.-Arist.*, *S. tot. logic. Arist.*, tract. 6, c. 6; *Parmensis* 87a; *Thom.*, *Quaest. disp. de pot.*, q. 9, a. 5, resp.; *Pession* 236a.

¹⁴⁶⁵ refferetur: referatur *E*

(26) Item nec est inconueniens, quod aliquid constituat aliud¹⁴⁶⁶ formaliter quantum ad esse accidentale et tamen illud¹⁴⁶⁷ e converso constituatur efficienter, sicut etiam¹⁴⁶⁸ multa accidentia propria et naturalia a principiis suis¹⁴⁶⁹ producuntur.

(27) Ad Commentatorem¹⁴⁷⁰) tamen potest dici, quod inconueniens esset dicere¹⁴⁷¹, quod idem esset causa et causatum eiusdem eodem modo et quod potentia est causa actus quantum ad exercitium, non autem quantum ad determinationem actus¹⁴⁷²; hoc enim¹⁴⁷³ habet ab obiecto, sicut calefactio quantum ad substantiam actus est¹⁴⁷⁴ a calefaciente, sed determinatio eius est a calore non calefacientis, cum sol et motus et alia quandoque calefaciant, quae non sunt formaliter calida¹⁴⁷⁵, sed determinatur a calore, ad quem terminatur¹⁴⁷⁶; et sic potest dici de operationibus potentiarum.¹⁴⁷⁷)

(28) Unde potest alia ratio poni ad propositum, quae est talis¹⁴⁷⁸: Videmus¹⁴⁷⁹, quod, licet creatura non sit relatio secundum esse¹⁴⁸⁰, inquantum creatura est¹⁴⁸¹¹⁴⁸², consequitur eam¹⁴⁸³¹⁴⁸⁴ quaedam relatio necessaria¹⁴⁸⁵, nec potest Dei virtute ab ea separari, sicut non¹⁴⁸⁶ potest facere, quod¹⁴⁸⁷ sit aliud ab eo et quod¹⁴⁸⁸ non sit creatura, quia¹⁴⁸⁹ relatio eius est¹⁴⁹⁰ ad Deum, et est relatio realiter¹⁴⁹¹ in creatura et¹⁴⁹² non in Deo nisi secundum rationem. Sic a simili: Licet scientia secundum suam

¹⁴⁶⁶ aliud: aliquid *E*

¹⁴⁶⁷ illud: id *E*

¹⁴⁶⁸ etiam: et *E*

¹⁴⁶⁹ suis *coni.*: sibi *EV*

¹⁴⁷⁰) Averr., In Metaph. V, comm. 20; Ponzalli 177,145–152.

¹⁴⁷¹ dicere *om.* *V*

¹⁴⁷² actus *om.* *V*

¹⁴⁷³ hoc enim: sed hoc *V*

¹⁴⁷⁴ est *om.* *V*

¹⁴⁷⁵ formaliter calida *inv.* *E*

¹⁴⁷⁶ terminatur: determinatur *sed. corr.* *E*

¹⁴⁷⁷) Cf. Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 9, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 74a–b.

¹⁴⁷⁸ est talis *inv.* *E*

¹⁴⁷⁹ Videmus: Videtur *V*

¹⁴⁸⁰ secundum esse *om.* *E*

¹⁴⁸¹ est *om.* *E*

¹⁴⁸² inquantum creatura est *om.* *E*

¹⁴⁸³ eam: ipsam *E*

¹⁴⁸⁴ eam *add.* inquantum creatura *E*

¹⁴⁸⁵ necessaria: necessario *V*

¹⁴⁸⁶ non: nec *E*

¹⁴⁸⁷ quod: ut *V*

¹⁴⁸⁸ quod *om.* *V*

¹⁴⁸⁹ quia: quae *V*

¹⁴⁹⁰ eius est *inv.* *V*

¹⁴⁹¹ realiter: rea^{9r} *E*

¹⁴⁹² et *om.* *E*

quiditatem¹⁴⁹³ sit qualitas¹⁴⁹⁴), tamen consequitur eam quaedam relatio ad scibile, a quo mensuratur; et ideo¹⁴⁹⁵ etiam non potest esse sine obiecto.

(29) Ad¹⁴⁹⁶ rationes. Sicut lucere est actus lucentis¹⁴⁹⁷), |E 103va| ita intelligere intelligentis¹⁴⁹⁸); sed lux potest¹⁴⁹⁹ causari a Deo¹⁵⁰⁰¹⁵⁰¹) et conservari sine alio; ergo¹⁵⁰² et intelligere. Dicendum, quod non est simile: primo, quia lux sive lucere non dicit aliquem respectum¹⁵⁰³, sed simplicem¹⁵⁰⁴ actum absolutum, intelligere autem est aliquid¹⁵⁰⁵ in¹⁵⁰⁶ intellectu capere; secundo, quia lux dependet a sua causa et quantum ad esse et quantum ad¹⁵⁰⁷ conservari propter debilitatem essendi, quam habet a¹⁵⁰⁸ suo subiecto, et¹⁵⁰⁹ ideo requiritur¹⁵¹⁰ praesentia causae ad permanendum¹⁵¹¹; posset autem Deus conservare lumen in aere etiam subtracto corpore luminoso; sed quia actus requirit aliquid etiam¹⁵¹² ut terminum, et Deus non potest esse terminus sensus, licet possit esse intellectus vel voluntatis; et¹⁵¹³ ideo non est simile.

(30) Ad secundum. Quidquid Deus potest¹⁵¹⁴ facere per causam particularem et¹⁵¹⁵ mediam, hoc potest per se et¹⁵¹⁶ immediate; sed obiectum est causa particularis; ergo et caetera. Dicendum, quod propositio non est generaliter vera, quia fallit in causis¹⁵¹⁷ materialibus et formalibus inhaerentibus et¹⁵¹⁸ quia Deus non est corpus nec materialis; ideo non potest esse obiectum vel terminus sensus materialis.

(31) Ad tertium. Id, cuius esse non dependet ab alio, potest esse sine illo; sed relativa¹⁵¹⁹ secundum dici non dependet ab opposito, quia hoc est relativorum¹⁵²⁰ secundum esse; ergo potest esse

¹⁴⁹³ quiditatem: quantitatem V

¹⁴⁹⁴) Arist., Cat., c. 8, 8b25–35; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 23,22–24,6.

¹⁴⁹⁵ ideo: io E

¹⁴⁹⁶ Ad *add.* Solutiones *i.m.* V

¹⁴⁹⁷) Cf. Thom., In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 238.

¹⁴⁹⁸) Cf. Thom., S. contr. Gent., I, c. 45; Leon. 136b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 14, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 171a–b; Thom., De ver., q. 10, a. 8, ad arg. 12; Dondaine 324,403–406.

¹⁴⁹⁹ potest *add.* ad idem *sed exp.* V

¹⁵⁰⁰ ita ... Deo *illeg.* E

¹⁵⁰¹) Cf. *Gen.* 1,3.

¹⁵⁰² alio ergo *illeg.* E

¹⁵⁰³ respectum *an* respectivum *scrib.*?

¹⁵⁰⁴ simplicem *om.* V

¹⁵⁰⁵ aliquid: ad E

¹⁵⁰⁶ in *om.* V

¹⁵⁰⁷ quantum ad *om.* V

¹⁵⁰⁸ a: in V

¹⁵⁰⁹ et *om.* E

¹⁵¹⁰ requiritur: requirit E

¹⁵¹¹ permanendum: permanens V

¹⁵¹² etiam *om.* E

¹⁵¹³ et *om.* E

¹⁵¹⁴ Deus potest *inv.* E

¹⁵¹⁵ et *om.* E

¹⁵¹⁶ et *om.* V

¹⁵¹⁷ fallit in causis: falsum in generis V

¹⁵¹⁸ et *om.* E

¹⁵¹⁹ relativa *coni.*: relata EV

scientia in actu vel intelligere sine obiecto. Dicendum, quod, sicut creatura¹⁵²¹ non solum non potest esse sine creatore, sed nec etiam potest esse¹⁵²² sine illo accidente respectivo, quod consequetur ipsam, ita nec scientia sine scibili etiam posito, quod non sit causata ab ipsa re¹⁵²³ ex natura annexae relationis, quae est ad suam mensuram.

(32) Ad quartum. Intelligere non potest terminari ad rem, secundum quod est extra, quia ipsa¹⁵²⁴ est actio intra manens¹⁵²⁵ totaliter, |V 159ra| ergo ad aliquid intra terminatur¹⁵²⁶; sed intra non est nisi species et¹⁵²⁷ obiectum¹⁵²⁸ ratione speciei¹⁵²⁹ vel verbi; nullum autem horum potest esse terminus: non species, quia est principium intellectionis; non verbum, quia tunc ibi¹⁵³⁰ sisteret in¹⁵³¹ intellectivo et sic solum ipsum esset intellectum et non res extra, ergo oportet intellectionem sequi ipsum verbum, ergo nihil terminat. Dicendum, quod verbum est terminus et etiam quodammodo principium. Ubi intelligendum¹⁵³², quod verbum formatur, ut per ipsum res¹⁵³³ intelligatur, sicut in quodam speculo intelligibili. Imaginetur¹⁵³⁴ igitur¹⁵³⁵, quod ego videam¹⁵³⁶ te in speculo materiali et quod ego possem esse causa formativa tui idoli in speculo¹⁵³⁷, sicut nunc verbum vel phantasma¹⁵³⁸ cuiuscumque apud me formo; tunc manifeste videres, quod ego per speciem in oculo meo existentem, sine qua non est visio, viderem idolum tuum et per idolum tuum¹⁵³⁹ te una et eadem visione, et tunc idolum in una et eadem visione est quasi terminus respectu mei et quasi principium respectu tui; sic etiam est de verbo respectu intelligibilium et phantasmatum respectu¹⁵⁴⁰ imaginabilium.

(33) Ad quintum. Deus potest conservare speciem visibilem in oculo videntis, et tunc videret absque obiecto, sublato obiecto¹⁵⁴¹. Dicendum, quod videret aliquid exteriori visu¹⁵⁴², non solum interiori,

¹⁵²⁰ relativorum: relatorum V

¹⁵²¹ sicut creatura *inv. E*

¹⁵²² sed nec etiam potest esse: ita nec V

¹⁵²³ re *om. V*

¹⁵²⁴ ipsa *om. V*

¹⁵²⁵ actio ... manens: intra manens actio V

¹⁵²⁶ terminatur *om. V*

¹⁵²⁷ nisi species et *add. E*

¹⁵²⁸ obiectum *add. nisi V*

¹⁵²⁹ obiectum ratione speciei: ratione speciei verbum obiectum *sed exp. verbum E*

¹⁵³⁰ ibi *om. V*

¹⁵³¹ in *om. E*

¹⁵³² intelligendum: sciendum E

¹⁵³³ per ... res: res per ipsum E

¹⁵³⁴ Imaginetur: Imaginemur E

¹⁵³⁵ igitur: enim E

¹⁵³⁶ videam: video V

¹⁵³⁷ in speculo *om. E*

¹⁵³⁸ phantasma: phantasiam V

¹⁵³⁹ tuum *om. V*

¹⁵⁴⁰ respectu: et V

¹⁵⁴¹ sublato obiecto: oblato ipso E

¹⁵⁴² exteriori visu *inv. E*

ut quidam¹⁵⁴³) dicunt stante illa positione, quod patet, quia talis color ad aliquid visum¹⁵⁴⁴ referretur¹⁵⁴⁵, sed¹⁵⁴⁶ imaginari possum aliquid¹⁵⁴⁷ ita¹⁵⁴⁸ retro¹⁵⁴⁹ me sicut ante; sed id¹⁵⁵⁰, quod videt et terminat visum, est iudicandum¹⁵⁵¹ secundum speciem¹⁵⁵²; et¹⁵⁵³, si Deus speciem asini¹⁵⁵⁴ in oculo meo conservaret¹⁵⁵⁵ vertendo me ad te, videris mihi asinus. Si autem solum species¹⁵⁵⁶ coloris¹⁵⁵⁷ conservaretur¹⁵⁵⁸ in oculo meo, tunc omnia apparerent¹⁵⁵⁹ esse¹⁵⁶⁰ secundum illum colorem, sicut contingit, quando aliquid¹⁵⁶¹ intente¹⁵⁶² respicit blavium¹⁵⁶³ vel rubeum remanente¹⁵⁶⁴ ad horam specie in oculo, et¹⁵⁶⁵ illa non¹⁵⁶⁶ subito occiditur¹⁵⁶⁷, etiamsi sit alterius coloris, apparet blavium¹⁵⁶⁸ vel rubeum, et tunc decipitur in proprio sensibili et non in sensibili per accidens, quia indicat id¹⁵⁶⁹, quod est, scilicet pannum vel huiusmodi, et sic¹⁵⁷⁰ etiam quandoque contingit, quod uni¹⁵⁷¹ soli apparet in manu sacerdotis caro et non aliis; hoc est¹⁵⁷² in oculo videntis, nec debet dici, quod illa species in oculo videatur, tum quia sensus non reflectitur super se, tum quia manifeste talis vertit se ad¹⁵⁷³ terminatum¹⁵⁷⁴ distans.

(34) Ad sextum. Sicut rotunditas non separatur a circulo¹⁵⁷⁵), ita et videtur, quod, cum de ratione obiecti sit, ut¹⁵⁷⁶ moveat potentiam; non potest ergo¹⁵⁷⁷ poni, quod solum sit terminus et non

¹⁵⁴³) non inveni

¹⁵⁴⁴ visum om. V

¹⁵⁴⁵ referretur om. V

¹⁵⁴⁶ sed: sicut E

¹⁵⁴⁷ aliquid om. V

¹⁵⁴⁸ ita om. E

¹⁵⁴⁹ retro: an sed exp. et corr. E

¹⁵⁵⁰ id: illud V

¹⁵⁵¹ est iudicandum: indicat V

¹⁵⁵² speciem: species E

¹⁵⁵³ et: ut V

¹⁵⁵⁴ asini add. ut sed exp. V

¹⁵⁵⁵ in ... conservaret : conservaret in oculo meo E

¹⁵⁵⁶ species: speciem E speciem sed exp. et corr. V

¹⁵⁵⁷ species coloris: coloris speciem E

¹⁵⁵⁸ conservaretur: reservaret sed exp. et corr. conservaret E

¹⁵⁵⁹ apparerent: apparet E

¹⁵⁶⁰ esse om. V

¹⁵⁶¹ aliquid: aliquis E

¹⁵⁶² intente: aistente E

¹⁵⁶³ blavium: blaveum E

¹⁵⁶⁴ remanente: manente E

¹⁵⁶⁵ et om. V

¹⁵⁶⁶ non om. sed add. s. v. E

¹⁵⁶⁷ occiditur: occidit E

¹⁵⁶⁸ blavium: blaveum E

¹⁵⁶⁹ id: illud V

¹⁵⁷⁰ et sic: sicut E

¹⁵⁷¹ uni: alicui V

¹⁵⁷² est: oportet V

¹⁵⁷³ ad: dicendum sed corr. E

¹⁵⁷⁴ terminatum: determinatum V

¹⁵⁷⁵) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 50, a. 5, resp.; Leon. 11b.

¹⁵⁷⁶ ut: quod E

¹⁵⁷⁷ ergo om. V

movens¹⁵⁷⁸. Dicendum, quod de ratione sui est, ut¹⁵⁷⁹ possit movere, non quod semper actu¹⁵⁸⁰ moveat.

(35) Ad septimum. Posterius non potest poni nisi posito priori; sed movens praecedat terminum; si ergo ponitur obiectum ut terminus, oportet, quod etiam¹⁵⁸¹ ponatur ut movens. Dicendum, quod movens praecedat, sed id stante positione esset terminus, non obiectum.

(36) Ad octavum. Intelligere est per abstractionem a rebus; ergo non erit¹⁵⁸² per conversionem ad res. Dicendum, quod intelligimus per abstractionem a rebus secundum esse earum materiale et tamen per conversionem ad eas secundum esse immateriale.

(37) Ad nonum. Voluntas consideratur tripliciter: vel negative, sicut quando non volo aliquid, sicut dormiens se habet; quandoque positive, sicut quando aliquid vult; quandoque privative, sicut quando stat actus et negatur obiectum, sicut quando volo non hoc, sicut volo non bibere, ibi obiectum negatur et nullum aliud positum¹⁵⁸³). Dicendum, quod voluntas movetur a bono apprehenso¹⁵⁸⁴). Sicut autem intellectus indicat bonum ipsum bibere, ita ex causa etiam aliquando non bibere, et est propositio affirmativa velle non bibere, quia principale verbum est velle, quod affirmatur. Unde velle hoc et velle non hoc non habent se simpliciter ut affirmatio et negatio.

(38) Ad decimum. Si est impossibile intelligere sine obiecto, formetur propositio: Intellectus intelligit sine obiecto; aut haec est impossibilitas ex parte terminorum propositionis aut ratione rei; non ratione propositionis, quia termini sibi non repugnant, nec ex parte rei, quia veritas et possibilitas propositionis est ex possibilitate rei. Dicendum, quod repugnantia terminorum, prout in propositione ponuntur, sicut et hoc esse simum sine naso, ita et hoc, quod est intelligere, esse sine obiecto.

(39) Ad undecimum.¹⁵⁸⁵ Intelligere est quoddam moveri¹⁵⁸⁶); sed posito motu in naturalibus non ponitur terminus eius statim¹⁵⁸⁷; ergo nec in motu intellectionis. Dicendum, quod est duplex terminus, scilicet "terminus¹⁵⁸⁸ ad quem", et ille non statim habetur nec¹⁵⁸⁹ ponitur, quando motus

¹⁵⁷⁸ movens: moveat *sed corr. E*

¹⁵⁷⁹ ut: quod *E*

¹⁵⁸⁰ actu *om. E*

¹⁵⁸¹ quod etiam *inv. E*

¹⁵⁸² erit *om. E*

¹⁵⁸³ Henr. de Gand., Quodl. XII, q. 26, resp.; Decorte 137,16–25.

¹⁵⁸⁴ Cf. Thom., S. contr. Gen., III, c. 73; Leon. 216a; etiam God. de Font., Quodl. X, q. 14, resp.; Hoffmans 381.

¹⁵⁸⁵ Ad ... undecimum: ad aliud *E*

¹⁵⁸⁶ Cf. Arist., De an., III 4, 429a13–14; Stroick 177,74–75; etiam Thom., S. contr. Gen., II, c. 82; Leon. 515a; Thom., S. th., I, q. 14, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Leon. 169a; Thom., De ver., q. 8, a. 15, ad arg. 3; Dondaine 269,158–162; Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 10, a. 1, resp.; Pession 254b.

¹⁵⁸⁷ ponitur terminus eius statim: statim ponitur terminus *E*

¹⁵⁸⁸ terminus *om. E*

¹⁵⁸⁹ habetur nec *om. V*

est in tempore, cuius partes non sunt simul; alius est “terminus”¹⁵⁹⁰ circa quem”, et talis est obiectum, circa quod est actio intellectus¹⁵⁹¹.

¹⁵⁹⁰ est terminus *inv. E*

¹⁵⁹¹ intellectus *add.* Ad aliud. Si impossibile est intelligere sine obiecto, aut hoc est impossibilitas ex parte terminorum propositionis, quae formetur sic: Intellectus in intelligit sine obiecto; aut ex parte rei; non ex parte terminorum, quia termini sibi non repugnant; nec ex parte rei, quia veritas et impossibilitas propositionis est ex possibilitate rei. Dicendum, quod est repugnantia terminorum prout in propositione ponuntur, sic et hoc esse simum sine naso, ita et hoc quod est intelligere sine obiecto, et caetera. *E*

QUAESTIO X

UTRUM DEUS SIT SUBIECTUM IN THEOLOGIA

- (1) Dicenda sunt hic septem.
- (2) Primo, quomodo differt subiectum a materia.
- (3) Secundo, quam habitudinem habet scientia ad subiectum.
- (4) Tertio, quomodo diversi diversimode posuerunt subiectum.
- (5) Quarto ostenditur, quod Deus est subiectum in hac scientia et nihil aliud.
- (6) Quinto¹⁵⁹²¹⁵⁹³ ostenditur, quod Deus <non> est subiectum sub ratione universali, qua Deus.
- (7) Sexto¹⁵⁹⁴, sub qua ratione Deus subiectum sit.
- (8) Septimo¹⁵⁹⁵ ostendetur, |V 159rb| quod¹⁵⁹⁶ istud est de mente Thomae.
- (9) Ad primum notandum, quod subiectum tripliciter differt a materia. Unde ex naturalibus oportet iudicare de his, quae sunt secundum artem¹⁵⁹⁷). Materia autem dicit quid imperfectum, scilicet carens substantiali et subicitur generationi; subiectum autem <dicit> quid imperfectum non simpliciter, sed secundum quid; sic et in arte subiectum dicit quid perfectum, materia imperfectum¹⁵⁹⁸). Secundo materia est quid generalius, sicut etiam imperfecta sunt universaliora ut animal homine; »unde in propositione subiectum et praedicatum utrumque potest dici materia, non tamen subiectum; unde differunt sicut superius et inferius«¹⁵⁹⁹). Tertio subiectum dicit quid habens principalitatem, sed materia dicitur omne, quod requiritur vel exigitur ad id, et sic tantum sequitur ad duo praecedentia, quia imperfecta sunt propter perfecta et universalialia propter particularia, ut animal propter hominem assumitur in definitione.
- (10) Circa secundum nota, quod¹⁶⁰⁰ scientia¹⁶⁰¹ recipit a subiecto sex.
- (11) Primo unitatem. Unde in *Posterioribus*¹⁶⁰²) una est scientia, quae est unius generis subiecti partes et passiones considerans.

¹⁵⁹² ostenditur ... Quinto *add i.m. ex a. m. V*

¹⁵⁹³ Quinto: Quarto V

¹⁵⁹⁴ Sexto: Quinto V

¹⁵⁹⁵ Sexto: Septimo V

¹⁵⁹⁶ De subiecto scientiae theologiae *adn. i. m. ex a. m. V*

¹⁵⁹⁷ Cf. Seneca, Epist., VII, 3, n. 65; Reynolds 176,2–7; cf. also Auct. Arist., 21, n.91; Hamesse 279,72.

¹⁵⁹⁸ Cf. Aeg. Rom., In I Super Sent., prolog., q. 1, a. 3; Corduba 1699 10b; etiam Thom., De prin. Nat., c. 1; Dondaine 41,16–35; Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 1, resp.; Muller 3,1–4,5.

¹⁵⁹⁹ Ioh. Paris., Super Sent., I, q. 1, resp.; Muller 4,6–10.

¹⁶⁰⁰ quod *add. etiam sed exp. V*

¹⁶⁰¹ scientia *add. s. v. V*

¹⁶⁰² Arist., Anal. post., I 28, 87a38; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 60,21–61,23; cf. Alb., In I Sent., d. 1, c. 1, a. 2; Burger 12,66–69; Alb., S. th., tract. 1, ; Siedler 11,93–12,1; Alb., Anal. Post., I, tract. 5, c. 6; Borgnet 140a; etiam

- (12) Secundo ab unitate ulterius recipit ab aliis scientiis distinctionem, quia ab eodem, a quo habet, ut fit¹⁶⁰³, sive a quo habet speciem, ab illo est in se indivisum et ab aliis divisum¹⁶⁰⁴).
- (13) Tertio accipit a subiecto nobilitatem; unde in I *De anima*¹⁶⁰⁵) dicitur, quod una est melior alia, quia nobilior et caetera¹⁶⁰⁶).
- (14) Quarto accipit ordinem, quia, positis aliis condicionibus, quas¹⁶⁰⁷ habet subiectum, sub subiecto est tum sub illa.
- (15) Quinto accipit necessitatem, quia, si subiectum est necessarium et non determinatur in alia scientia, necessarium est haberi scientiam de hoc.
- (16) Sexto accipit perfectionem, quia quocumque alio cognito praeter subiectum non habetur scientia, sed cognito subiecto, sicut debet cognosci, tunc est scientia perfecta¹⁶⁰⁸).
- (17) Circa tertium notandum, quod diversi diversimode subiectum assignaverunt.
- (18) Quidam¹⁶⁰⁹), quod ens divinum cognoscibile per inspirationem; isti active dicunt ad hoc, quod subiectum videtur debere continere omnia, quae sunt in scientia.
- (19) Sed isti multipliciter peccant; primo, quia non audent dare certum subiectum; sed quia scientia non est nisi de ente, denominatur esse subiectum ab ente¹⁶¹⁰), sicut si diceremus, quod non syllogismus¹⁶¹¹), sed ens rationis est subiectum logicae¹⁶¹²).
- (20) Item subiectum non debet continere omnia, quia subiectum debet esse distinctum a passionibus¹⁶¹³ et a principiis et multis aliis, quae sunt in scientia. Isti autem totum includunt, sicut illi, qui dicunt de grammatica, quod subiectum eius est “vox litterata, articulata, debito modo pronuntiata”¹⁶¹⁴), quod vanum est, quia subiectum non debet continere omnia, sed ad ipsum debent omnia attributionem habere sicut ad sanum animalem¹⁶¹⁵ omnia alia, quae sunt in medicina.

Thom., Exp. Post., I, 41, 87a39; I, 42, 87b19; Gauthier 154,231–235; 157,8–12; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 1; Leon. 11a; Thom., S. th., III, q. 11, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 164b; Thom., Quaest. disp. de virt. card., q. un., a. 3, resp.; Odetto 823a.

¹⁶⁰³ fit *an sit scrib.?*

¹⁶⁰⁴ Arist. Anal. post., I, 75a38–b12 et 87a39–b4; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 19,19–20,9; 60,21–61,6; cf. etiam God. de Font., Quodl. VI, q. 16; De Wulf – Hoffmans 256.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Auct. Arist., 6, n. 2; Hamesse 174,75–77; cf. Arist., De an., I 1, 402a1–4; transl. vetus: Stroick 3,57–58; et etiam Avic., Metaph., I, 2; Van Riet 15,89–16,94; God. de Font., Quodl. IX, q. 20; Hoffmans 287–288.

¹⁶⁰⁶ Alb., In I Sent., d. 1, c. 1; Burger 11,49–53.

¹⁶⁰⁷ quas *coni.*: quae V

¹⁶⁰⁸ Cf. Aeg. Rom., In I Super Sent., prol., q. 2, prol.; Corduba 1699 13aD–bA.

¹⁶⁰⁹ Thom., In I Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Oliva 328,31–38; cf. etiam Aegidius Romanus, In I Sent. prol., q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Corduba 1699 12aA–B; et etiam Alb., S. th., tract. 1, q. 1, sed contra; Siedler 6,43–57.

¹⁶¹⁰ Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 2; Leon. 6a.

¹⁶¹¹ Cf. Alb., Anal. Prior., I, tract. 1, c. 1; Borgnet 459a–b; Alb., S. th., tract. 1, q. 3, c. 2, arg. 1; Siedler 12,7–10; etiam Thom., Exp. Post., I, 1; Gauthier 6,80–87; etiam Pecham, Super Sent., prol. q. 1, resp.; de Benedittis [forthcoming] (F, 2va; N, 3rb).

¹⁶¹² Cf. Thom., In Metaph., IV, lect. 4, n. 574; Cathala – Spiazzi 160b.

¹⁶¹³ passionibus *coni.*: passione V

¹⁶¹⁴ Cf. Eber. Bet., Glos. super Graecis. prol., II, 2.1.2; Grondeux 244,142–144; Iohan. Dacus, S. Gramm., A, 4; Otto 71,20–31; et etiam Aden. de Anag., prol., f. 178va; Lètourneau 232,1; Arnv. Prov., Div. Scien.; Lafleur 339,605–607; Nic. Paris., Phil. f. 151ra; Lafleur 460, §31.

¹⁶¹⁵ animale *coni.*: animalis V

(21) Item isti faciunt contra primam particulam, inquantum scientia recipit unitatem ab unitate subiecti, isti autem non dant determinatum subiectum.

(22) Unde alii dicunt, quod res et signa, ut Magister¹⁶¹⁶) et Augustinus¹⁶¹⁷).

(23) Sed sanctorum non fuit intentio magna occupare se cum limitato modo assignandi subiectum, sed dicere, de quibus sit scientia.

(24) Item tenentes¹⁶¹⁸) hanc opinionem attendunt, quod res et signa continent omnia istius scientiae, quia omne, quod est, <est> res vel signa¹⁶¹⁹. Sed hoc est contra secundam particulam, scilicet quod a subiecto distinguitur scientia contra alias scientias; nulla est autem scientia, quae non consideret res vel signa¹⁶²⁰), nisi per signa intelligamus sacramenta, de quibus tamen principaliter ista scientia non determinat.

(25) Unde alii dicunt¹⁶²¹), quod totus Christus, scilicet caput et membra¹⁶²²), quae sunt fideles, et haec est opinio Hugonis *Super Caelestem hierarchiam*¹⁶²³); sed isti attendunt ad totalitatem vitae generalitatis.

(26) Sed hoc non valet proprie loquendo, quia in nulla scientia bene dicitur, quod subiectum constituatur ex suis passionibus et principiis et aliis, quae sunt in scientia.

(27) Item istud est contra tertiam particulam, quia sic ista scientia non esset nobilior alia quacumque, quia Christus inquantum huiusmodi non est melior omni creatura, scilicet inquantum homo.

(28) Et ideo dicunt alii¹⁶²⁴), quod in omni re sunt tria, scilicet substantia sive essentia et virtus et operatio; et quia “Christus” secundum Apostolum¹⁶²⁵) “Dei virtus est et sapientia”, opera autem restorationis sunt eius operatio, ideo dicunt, quod subiectum scientiae huius est Deus quantum ad primum, proximum quantum ad secundum, operans opus restorationis quantum ad tertium.

¹⁶¹⁶) Petr. Lomb., Sent., I, d. 1, c. 1,1; Grottaferrata 55,5–20; cf. etiam Thom., In I Sent., prolog., q. 1, a. 4; arg. 3; Oliva 326,12–15.

¹⁶¹⁷) Aug., De doctr. chr., I, 2, 2; Martin 7,1–2.

¹⁶¹⁸) Aug., De doctr. chr., I, 2, 2; Martin 7,1–2; cf. Petr. Lomb., Sent., I, d. 1, c. 1,1; Grottaferrata 55,5–20; et etiam Alb., In I Sent., d. 1, c. 1; Burger 12,1–19; etiam Pecham, Super Sent., prolog. q. 1, resp.; de Benedittis 18–19 [ed. provv.] (F 2rb; N 2rb).

¹⁶¹⁹ signa *an* signum *scrib.*?

¹⁶²⁰) Cf. Thom., In I Sent. prolog., q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Oliva 326,12–18.

¹⁶²¹) Petr. Lomb., Gloss. in Psalm., praef.; PL 191 59B–C; Hug. de Sanct. Char., Postill. in Psalm., prolog.; Venetiis 1754 2va; Grossatest., Hexaem., I, 1, 1; Dales – Gieben 49,1–6; cf. Thom., In I Sent., prolog., q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Oliva 326,20–23; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 7, resp.; Leon. 19b; et etiam Walfrid. Starb., Gloss. Ord., Liber Psal., Prothemat. in Psalter.; PL 113 844B–C; Cassiodorus, Expos. in Psal., praef., 13; Adriaen 15,1–16,17; Aug., Serm. ad popul., 341, c. 1; PL 39 1493; Gilbert. Porretan., Gloss. in Psalm., n. 2511; Stegmüller 345; Roland. de Crem., S. th., prolog.; Cremascoli 865,170–175; Alex. Hal., S. th., I, n. 3, arg. 3; Quaracchi 1924 6a.

¹⁶²²) Cf. *Eph.* 4,15; 5,23.

¹⁶²³) *potius* Hugon. de Sanct. Victor., De sac. ch. fid., II, 2, c. 1; Berndt 336,9–11; cf. etiam Aug., Contra Faust. Manich., XXII, 94; Zycha 701,2–4.

¹⁶²⁴) Cf. Alex. Hal., S. th., I, n. 3, resp.; Quaracchi 1924 6a; etiam Odo Rigald., Quaest. de scient. th., I, q. 3, resp., n. 80; Sileo, 33,93–35,105; Odo Rigald., Lectura, I, d. 1, p. I, q. 1, resp., n. 11–12; Sileo 98,50–63; et etiam Dion., De cael. hier., c. 11, 2; PG 3,284D–285A; Heil 41,20–42,5; transl. Eriugena: Simon – Kübel 169,71–170,75.

¹⁶²⁵) *Ad I Cor.* 1, 24.

(29) Sed istud etiam non valet, quia, si Deus non esset Christus, adhuc esset ista scientia similiter, si nec restaurasset.

(30) Item nulla scientia assignando subiectum simpliciter dicit cum reductione operationis.

(31) Item de subiecto inquiruntur virtutes et operationes; non ergo cadunt in assignatione subiecti.

(32) Item hic aequivocatur virtus; non enim Christus est virtus Dei proprie loquendo de virtute.

(33) Et ideo alii¹⁶²⁶): Sicut in geometria corpus quantum est subiectum integrale, in quo omnis dimensio continetur, et quantitas continua in numero est subiectum universale et punctum¹⁶²⁷ est subiectum radicale, sicut etiam in grammatica littera est subiectum radicale, ita etiam Deus ratione suae simplicitatis est subiectum radicale.

(34) Sed hoc nihil est, quia, sicut dicitur in ultima particula, scientia habet perfectionem ex suo subiecto; sed constat, quod littera cognita vel punctum non est perfecta scientia grammaticae vel geometriae; sic etiam esset, si solum radicaliter Deus accipiatur. [V 159va]

(35) Circa quartum notandum, quod Deus et nihil aliud proprie loquendo subiectum est in hac scientia. Et hoc patet ex particulis, quae competunt scientiae ex subiecto. Dictum est enim, quod scientia recipit entitatem et unitatem ex unitate subiecti¹⁶²⁸). Theologia autem, ut sonat nomen eius, est scientia dicta a “theos”, quod est Deus¹⁶²⁹), et ab unitate unius Dei¹⁶³⁰ hic considerati est una scientia.

(36) Item ista scientia debet esse ab aliis distincta non lumine tantum, quia “scientiae” proprie “secantur quemadmodum et res”¹⁶³¹), non dicit quemadmodum lumina. Unum est enim lumen omnium scientiarum humanarum. Sed quidquid accipitur praeter Deum, est creatura et pertinet ad aliquam scientiam. Sed de Deo ut¹⁶³² subiecto nulla alia considerat, quia metaphysicus non considerat Deum ut subiectum, sed ens, licet quaedam entia sint aliis nobiliora, tamen illa non sunt hoc subiectum, licet principaliter intendat de illis, ubi ratio entis nobilior invenitur, sicut et logica est de syllogismo simpliciter¹⁶³³), licet de modo <sciendi>¹⁶³⁴) sit nobilior et de eo plus intendat.

¹⁶²⁶) Bonav., In Sent. I proem., q. 1, resp.; Quaracchi 1882 7a–b.

¹⁶²⁷) punctum: punctus V

¹⁶²⁸) Arist., Anal. post., I 28, 87a38; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 60,21–61,23; cf. Alb., In I Sent., d. 1, c. 1, a. 2; Burger 12,66–69; Alb., S. th., tract. 1, ; Siedler 11,93–12,1; Alb., Anal. Post., I, tract. 5, c. 6; Borgnet 140a; etiam Thom., Exp. Post., I, 41, 87a39; I, 42, 87b19; Gauthier 154,231–235; 157,8–12; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 1; Leon. 11a; Thom., S. th., III, q. 11, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 164b; Thom., Quaest. disp. de virt. card., q. un., a. 3, resp.; Odetto 823a.

¹⁶²⁹) Isidor., Etym. VIII, 6, n. 18; Lindsay 318,26–28; cf. Alb., In I Sent., d. 1, c. 1, arg. 3; Burger 11,45–48; Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 12, 7; Simon 430,34–36; Aug. de Dac., Rotol. Pugillar., tract. I; Walz 255; Guill. de Conch., Glos. sup. Boet. Consol., I, pr. 1; Nauta 31,306–307; Henr. de Gand., Summa, prol.; Wilson 3,2–5; Hugon. de Sanct. Victor., Didascal., II; Narvaja 347,18–21; Ioann. Damasc., De fide orthod., I, c. 9, n. 3; Kotter 31,14–15; Buytaert 49,20–23; Odo Rgald., Lectura, I, d. 1, p. I, q. 1, n. 6, arg. 4; Sileo 97,30–33; Thom., In I Sent., q. 1, a. 4, arg. 1; Oliva 325,2–326,3; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 7, sed contra; Leon. 19a.

¹⁶³⁰) Dei: dei *sed corr.* diei V

¹⁶³¹) Auct. Arist. 6, n. 162; Hamesse 188,75; cf. Arist., De an., III 8, 431b24–25; transl. vetus: Stroick 223,72–73; et etiam Thom., In I Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Oliva 327,26–328,30; Thom., In Gen. et Corr., I, proem.; Leon. 261a.

¹⁶³²) ut: non *sed corr.* V

¹⁶³³) Cf. Alb., Anal. Prior., I, c. 1; Borgnet 459a–b.

(37) Item ista scientia debet esse nobilissima; hoc autem non haberet ab alio subiecto, nisi quod esset Deus.

(38) Item ista scientia debet esse altissima huius mundi; unde et Dionysius dicit in *Epistula ad Polycarpum*¹⁶³⁵), quod “ad causam ipsorum existentium et cognitionis ipsorum oportet sursum agi veros philosophos”. Subiectum ergo ipsius non debet esse sub subiecto alio. Hoc autem non esset, nisi subiectum eius Deus esset. Unde licet metaphysica sit altissima inter humanas, tamen non est altior ista, quia illa considerat ens simpliciter et Deum pro causa prima omnis entis naturalis, ista autem omnis entis naturalis et supernaturalis¹⁶³⁶).

(39) Item considerat Deum, in quantum est supersubstantia et superexistens secundum Dionysium in *Mystica theologia*,¹⁶³⁷) metaphysica vero ut causam universi¹⁶³⁸).

(40) Item sicut videmus, quod sensus communis sub una ratione universali considerat una virtus existens, quod quinque sensus distincti cognoscunt, ita et illa, quae in diversis aliis scientiis considerantur, ita una existens considerat sub una ratione universali, in quantum induunt rationem esse divini¹⁶³⁹). Sic ergo omne ens cuiuscumque alterius scientiae potest hic considerari, in quantum participat esse divinum¹⁶⁴⁰); non autem e converso omne ens divinum potest dici ens naturale, quod solum pertinet ad philosophos. Unde et Deus, prout pertinet ad metaphysicum, est ens naturale, quia naturaliter cognoscibile.

(41) Item ista scientia maxime est necessaria, cum sit secundum Augustinum¹⁶⁴¹) de his, quae ad salutem hominis pertinent; istam autem necessitatem non posset habere melius ab alio subiecto quam a Deo. Unde *Ieremia X*¹⁶⁴²) “in hoc gloriatur, qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me” non dicit alia¹⁶⁴³).

(42) Item ista scientia maxime est perfecta perficiens hominem in hac vita; sed quocumque alio noto praeter Deum homo est imperfectus; et ideo Deus verissime est subiectum.

(43) Circa quantum notandum, quod aliqui¹⁶⁴⁴) dicunt, quod Deus est subiectum sub ratione universali non contracto, scilicet in quantum Deus. Sed hoc probant duabus rationibus.

(44) Primo¹⁶⁴⁵, quia ista scientia est quaedam imago scientiae Dei; unde est “quaedam emanatio claritatis Dei”¹⁶⁴⁶).

¹⁶³⁴) Cf. Duns Scot., *Notabil. Super Metaph.*, II, 4; Pini 4,34–36.

¹⁶³⁵) Dion., *Epist. 7*, PG 3,1080B; Ritter 167,1–2; transl. Sarraceni: Simon 503,73–74.

¹⁶³⁶) Cf. Thom., *In I Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Oliva 321,37–44; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 1, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 17b–18a.

¹⁶³⁷) *potius* Dion., *De div. nom.*, V, 8; PG 3,824B; Suchla 187,11–12; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 356B–C *ex Alb.*, *Super Dion. De div. nom.*, c. 5, 18–19; Simon 321,78–79.

¹⁶³⁸) *Aeg. Rom.*, *In I Super Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Corduba 1699 12aC–D.

¹⁶³⁹) Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 1 a. 3 ad arg. 2; Leon. 12b.

¹⁶⁴⁰) Cf. Thom., *S. th.*, q. 1, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Leon. 7a–b.

¹⁶⁴¹) Aug., *De Trin.*, XIV, 1, 3; Mountain – Glorie 423,52–424,67.

¹⁶⁴²) *Ier.* 9,24: “in hoc gloriatur, qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me”

¹⁶⁴³) Cf. Thom., *S. th.*, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 6b.

¹⁶⁴⁴) *Henr. de Gand.*, *Summa*, a. 19, q. 1, resp.; Badius 115rC–D.

(45) Et secunda *Ad Coloss.*¹⁶⁴⁷) “nos” autem “revelata facie gloriam Domini speculamur, in eadem imagine transformamur”; sed illa considerat absolute, ergo et ista¹⁶⁴⁸). Omne enim subiectum in quantum subiectum cognoscitur in universali; sed finis scientiae est, ut cognoscatur in speciali; si ergo sub speciali ratione est subiectum, tunc eodem et subiectum et finis; et ideo a principio haberetur eius scientia¹⁶⁴⁹)¹⁶⁵⁰).

(46) Sed ista non concludunt. Eo enim ipso, quod ista est emanans ab illa, inferiori modo recipitur, sicut et Deus est ens non contractum et tamen omne ens fluens ab eo in alia est modo contracto¹⁶⁵¹ receptum.

(47) Ad secundum dicendum, quod nullius scientiae intentio est scire de subiecto rationem universalem vel particularem, sicut isti imaginantur de subiecto universali scire passiones, quae ipsi subiecto sub tali ratione sumpto conveniunt. Unde nulla scientia probat rationem sui subiecti sicut nec subiectum¹⁶⁵²), nisi esset dubium, et hoc iam non esset scientiae finis, sed ad eam praeambulatum¹⁶⁵³); et tamen si concedatur ipsis argumentum, tunc et ipsa ratio specialis est in principio cognita imperfecte; et sic est subiectum istius scientiae¹⁶⁵⁴). Et hoc patet quattuor¹⁶⁵⁵ rationibus.

(48) Primo, quia Deus secundum Damascenum¹⁶⁵⁶) dicit “quoddam pelagus substantiae¹⁶⁵⁷ infinitum”. Si ergo tale pelagus sub ratione infiniti est subiectum, cum scientia sua recipiat extensionem secundum extensionem subiecti, theologia erit scientia infinita. Scibile enim dicitur, cuius possibilis est scientia¹⁶⁵⁸).

(49) Secundo, quia, si in sua infinitate vel universalitate est subiectum, omnia erunt pertinentia ad istam scientiam, ad quae se extendere potest subiectum. Hoc enim falsum est secundum Augustinum¹⁶⁵⁹) XIV *De trinitate*; aliae enim scientiae plurimum habent vanitatis et noxiae curiositatis, sed huic tantum scientiae illud attribuitur¹⁶⁶⁰, quo fides saluberrima gignitur et caetera.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Primo *an Prima scrib.*?

¹⁶⁴⁶) *Sap.* 7,25.

¹⁶⁴⁷) *rectius Ad II Corinth.* 3,18.

¹⁶⁴⁸) Henr. de Gand., *Summa*, a. 19, q. 2, ad arg 2; Badius 118rF–118vF.

¹⁶⁴⁹) Henr. de Gand., *Summa*, a. 19, q. 1, ad arg 1; Badius 115rE–F.

¹⁶⁵⁰) Cf. Aeg. Rom., *Quodl.* III, q. 2, resp.; Coninck 127b–128a.

¹⁶⁵¹ modo contracto *add. i.m. V*

¹⁶⁵²) Auct. Arist. 1, n. 145; Hamesse 127,44–45; cf. Thom., *In Metaph.*, VI, lect. 1, n. 1151; Cathala – Spiazzi 296.

¹⁶⁵³) Cf. Thom., *Super Boet. de Trin.*, q. 2, a. 3, resp.; Gils 99,148–154.

¹⁶⁵⁴) Cf. Aeg. Rom., *Quodl.* III, q. 2, resp.; Coninck 130b.

¹⁶⁵⁵ quattuor *an tria scrib.*?

¹⁶⁵⁶) Dam., *De fide orth.* I, c. 9, n. 2; Kotter 31,12–13; Buytaert 49,16–17.

¹⁶⁵⁷ substantiae *add. in sed exp. V*

¹⁶⁵⁸) Arist., *Cat.*, c. 7, 6b29–35; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 19,3–8; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., 16, n. 60; Hamesse 267,9; Arist., *Rhet.*, III 8, 1408b27–28; transl. vetus: Schneider 135,3.

¹⁶⁵⁹) Aug., *De Trin.*, XIV, 1, 3; Mountain – Glorie 423,52–424,67.

¹⁶⁶⁰ attribuitur *coni.*: attribuere *corr.* attribuero *V*

(50) Tertio, quia oportet dicere, quod ista scientia differat a scientia Dei et beatorum. Non enim possumus dicere, quod sit una scientia vel unus specie habitus diffusus solum secundum clarum et obscurum, et tunc uno et eodem et idem numero |V 159vb| remaneret habitus, dum de¹⁶⁶¹ remisso vel obscuro iretur ad clarum. Hoc autem in proposito falsum est, quia nostra scientia evacuatur veniente habitu gloriae¹⁶⁶²). Quando autem aliqua scientia differt ab alia, oportet, quod hoc fiat dupliciter, si sunt de eodem subiecto, vel ita, quod una scientia considerat sub ratione absoluta, alia particulari, et sic differt metaphysica, quae est de ente, a qualibet alia scientia inferiori, quae considerat¹⁶⁶³ de ente contracto, aut ita, quod unaquaeque sub ratione particulari, sed alia et alia, sicut terram eandem mathematicus et naturalis. Si dicamus primo modo, tunc, cum scientia beatorum sit perfectior nostra theologia, ratio particularis erit apud nostram scientiam et non apud illam; si autem secundo modo, tunc iterum haberetur propositum, scilicet quod et hic et ibi in patria erit ratio contracta et in solo Deo ratio omnimoda.

(51) †

(52) Circa sextum nota, quod de hoc dicunt quidam¹⁶⁶⁴), quod de Deo consideratur hic, inquantum restaurator vel reparator. Sed contra hoc obicitur, quod ista scientia <non> fuisset, si etiam homo non peccasset¹⁶⁶⁵).

(53) Ad hoc dicunt¹⁶⁶⁶), quod reparator dicitur respectu cuiuslibet repletionis defectus; homo etiam, etsi non peccasset, insufficiens tamen fuisset ad cognoscendum Deum quantum ad istam cognitionem.

(54) Alii autem dicunt¹⁶⁶⁷), quod inquantum glorificans et beatificans; sed sic est subiectum in patria; ad hoc: quod “ibi in re, hic ut in spe”¹⁶⁶⁸)¹⁶⁶⁹).

(55) Alii¹⁶⁷⁰), quod inquantum utrumque; sed glorificatio dicit rationem principalem, reparatio vel liberatio exprimit modum glorificationis, quia liberatio¹⁶⁷¹ ad salutem preduxit¹⁶⁷².

(56) Sed nihil horum convenienter ponitur.

(57) Primo, quia condicio sive ratio debet dicere aliquid ex parte subiecti secundum se; hic dicuntur, scilicet liberator et glorificator, ex parte nostra.

¹⁶⁶¹ de *add. s. v. V*

¹⁶⁶²) *Ad I Cor.* 13,9–10.

¹⁶⁶³) *considerat: considerant sed corr. V*

¹⁶⁶⁴) Hugon. de Sanct. Victor., *De sac. ch. fid.*, prol.; Berndt 31,19–20.

¹⁶⁶⁵) Cf. *Aeg. Rom.*, *Quodl. III*, q. 2, resp.; Coninck 128a.

¹⁶⁶⁶) Cf. *Aeg. Rom.*, *Quodl. III*, q. 2, resp.; Coninck 130b.

¹⁶⁶⁷) *Aeg. Rom.*, *Quodl. III*, q. 2, resp.; Coninck 131a; cf. *Aeg. Rom.*, *In I Super Sent.*, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Corduba 1699 12bA; et etiam Aug., *De Trin.*, XIV, 1, 3; Mountain – Glorie 423,52–424,67; Pecham, *Super Sent.*, prol. q. 1, resp.; de Benedittis [forthcoming] (*F 2va; N 2va.*);

¹⁶⁶⁸) Aug., *Serm. ad popul.*, 256; PL 38 1193a.

¹⁶⁶⁹) Cf. *Aeg. Rom.*, *Quodl. III*, q. 2, resp.; Coninck 131a; 133a.

¹⁶⁷⁰) *Aeg. Rom.*, *In I Super Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Corduba 1699 12aC–D.

¹⁶⁷¹ liberatio *coni.*: liberando *V*

¹⁶⁷² an preducit *scrib.*?

(58) Item haec conveniunt sibi sub ratione boni, sed ista scientia, quae est principaliter speculativa, habet pro obiecto verum.

(59) Item ista scientia magis dicitur proprie fidei quam spei; non ergo spes distinguit nostram rationem a ratione beatorum.

(60) Item licet alius sit habitus principiorum et conclusionis¹⁶⁷³), tamen idem subiectum et eadem ratio. Sed articuli fidei multa alia dicunt quam vitam aeternam vel Deum beatificantem.

(61) Nec valet, si dicas, quod omnia ad hoc ordinantur et quod ista scientia sit organum perveniendi ad beatitudinem¹⁶⁷⁴). Nos enim quaerimus subiectum et non finem.

(62) Item in hac scientia proponitur nobis trinitas personarum et multa alia, quibus non positus adhuc Deus esset glorificator, et tamen ista pertinent principaliter ad hanc scientiam.

(63) Unde dicendum, quod Deus est subiectum istius scientiae sub ratione credibilis, et per haec duo differt ab omnibus aliis, per primum ab omnibus scientiis humanis, quia nulla de Deo est ut de subiecto, neque metaphysica, quae est de ente; per secundum differt a scientia beatorum, qui non credunt eum, sed vident.

(64) Principia enim et scientia sub eadem ratione accipiunt suum subiectum; alias subiectum non esset proprius effectus eorum nec virtute esset in eis¹⁶⁷⁵); sed principium hoc est fides, quae est de Deo sive veritate prima inquantum non apparens, quia est “argumentum non apparentium” secundum Apostolum¹⁶⁷⁶); ergo et haec scientia, quae est scientia fidei, erit de credibilibus¹⁶⁷⁷).

(65) Est autem talis ordo, quod primo suum subiectum est non apparens, deinde revelatur, tertio interius movente sensu¹⁶⁷⁸ intellectus acquiescit credendo, et sic eo accepto ut credito procedit ad inquirendum modo rationis alias conclusiones virtute articulorum fidei, sicut dicit Dionysius 5 cap. *De divinis nominibus*¹⁶⁷⁹), “accedentem autem ad Deum oportet credere, quia est”¹⁶⁸⁰), et hoc exigitur ad subiectum, scilicet “quia est”. Quod autem Deus sit glorificator, non praesupponitur, sed quaereretur in hac scientia, si non esset revelatum. Per hoc ergo “ego merces tua magna” in *Exod.*¹⁶⁸¹) et *Ioann.*¹⁶⁸²): “Haec est autem vita aeterna” et caetera.

¹⁶⁷³) Cf. Arist., Anal. post., II 19, 100b5–17; transl. Iacobi: Minio–Paluello – Dod 106,17–107,7; Arist., Eth. Nic., VI 6, 1140b31–1141a8; transl. Grosseteste: Gauthier 258,26–259,7; et etiam Auct. Arist. 35, n. 123; Hamesse 321,75.

¹⁶⁷⁴) Aeg. Rom., Quodl. III, q. 2, resp.; Coninck 128b–129a.

¹⁶⁷⁵) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 7, resp.; Leon. 19a–b.

¹⁶⁷⁶) *Hebr.* 11,1.

¹⁶⁷⁷) Cf. Alb., In I Sent., d. 1, c. 1, resp.; Burger 12, 19–23; Alex. Hal., S. th., I, n. 1, ad arg. 3; Quaracchi 1924 3b.

¹⁶⁷⁸) *sensu coni.*: senso V

¹⁶⁷⁹) Dion., De div. nom., V, 1; PG 3,816A; Suchla 180,8–13; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 321B–322C ex Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 5, 2; Simon 301,52–55; cf. Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 5, 3; Simon 304,52–65.

¹⁶⁸⁰) *Heb.* 11,6.

¹⁶⁸¹) *rectius Gen.* 15,1.

¹⁶⁸²) *Ioh.* 17,3.

(66) Dico autem, quod quaeretur, quia articuli fidei dicunt vitam aeternam, sed non “in quo”. Unde multi posuerunt in substantiis separatis¹⁶⁸³). Istud autem subiectum sub ratione contracta dico, non quod sit ratio particularis simpliciter, sed quia non in tanta universalitate sicut in scientia beatorum, qui etiam vident in eo effectus gloriae et plura quam nos. Est tamen haec ratio, scilicet credibilis, universalissima omnium rationum huius mundi, inquantum, quidquid in quacumque scientia tractatur, possit revelari vel credi; loquemur autem de hac scientia, non inquantum est practica, quia sic est de actibus humanis ordinabilibus in finem ultimum, sed inquantum est speculativa¹⁶⁸⁴).

(67) Circa septimum nota, quod hoc est¹⁶⁸⁵ mens Thomae, scilicet a parte ipsius Dei sit alia ratio formalis distinguens hanc scientiam ab aliis, unde in *Quaestione de veritate quaestione*¹⁶⁸⁶ XV articulo VIII in solutione III argumenti¹⁶⁸⁷), ubi dicit, quod “obiectum patriae est ut in sua specie apparens”; unde dicit ibidem, quod “formaliter differt hic et ibi obiectum”. Unde et alius hic et ibi habitus et similiter actus, quod concordat Dionysio¹⁶⁸⁸), qui dicit, quod maxime coniungimur ei, quando coniungimur ut ignoto; coniunctionem autem appellat cognitionem, sicut¹⁶⁸⁹ patet in *Mystica theologia* cap. 2¹⁶⁹⁰), ubi dicit: “In hac superlucenti caligine nos fieri precamur per non videre et ignorare videre et cognoscere eum, qui est super omnem visionem et cognitionem, in ipso non videre et non cognoscere”.

(68) Item hoc patet ex modo loquendi |V 160ra| doctorum, qui semper quaerunt, utrum de credibilibus possit esse scientia, ut patet per Thomam *Super Boethium De trinitate*¹⁶⁹¹) et in multis locis¹⁶⁹²), et non quaerunt de glorificatore inquantum huiusmodi.

(69) Item *Prima Parte*, quaestione 1, articulo 3, in responsione¹⁶⁹³) dicit, quod omnia, quae sunt in hac scientia, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti, quod est revelabile, et idem in solutione 3

¹⁶⁸³) Cf. Thom., *Super Boet. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 4, resp.; Gils 154,175–206.

¹⁶⁸⁴) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, II 1, 993b20–21; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 36,21–37,1; Auct. Arist. 1, n. 39; Hamesse 118,52; etiam Thom., *In Metaph.*, II, lect. 2, n. 290; Cathala – Spiazzi 84a–b; Thom., *Super Boet. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1, resp.; Gils 140,256–261.

¹⁶⁸⁵ est *add. s. v. V*

¹⁶⁸⁶ quaestione *coni.*: materia V

¹⁶⁸⁷) Thom., *De ver.*, q. 14, a. 8; ad arg. 3; Dondaine 460,182–187.

¹⁶⁸⁸) Dion., *De myst. theol.*, c. 1, 1; PG 3, 997B; Ritter 1442,8–9; transl. Sarraceni: Simon 457,67–68; I, 3; PG 3, 1001 A; Ritter 144,13–15; transl. Sarraceni: Simon 461,86–87; etiam Dion., *De div. nom.*, c. 1, 1; PG 585B–588A; Suchla 108,3–5; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 6C–7A *ex Alb.*, *Super Dion. De div. nom.*, c. 1, 9; Simon 4,85–86; cf. etiam Thom., *Super Boet. de Trin.* q. 1, a. 2, arg. 2; Gils 83,5–8; Thom., *In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, arg. 3; Vivés 480a.

¹⁶⁸⁹ sicut: sed *sed. corr. V*

¹⁶⁹⁰) Dion., *De myst. theol.*, c. 2; PG 3, 1025A; Ritter 145,1–3; transl. Sarraceni: Simon 464,67–68.

¹⁶⁹¹) Thom., *Super Boet. de Trin.*, q. 2, a. 2, *spec. resp.*; Gils 94,1–97,179, *spec.* 95,54–88.

¹⁶⁹²) *e.g.* Thom., *In I Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, quaestiu. 2, *spec. arg.* 2 et ad arg. 2; Oliva 319,12–23; 322,52–324,95, *spec.* 319,16–18; 322,53–58; Thom., *In I Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, quaestiu. 3, *spec. resp.*; Oliva 320,24–27; 325,97–108, *spec.* 325,97–108; Thom., *In I Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Oliva 327,26–29; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 1 a. 2, resp. et ad arg. 1; Leon. 9a–b Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 1, a. 3, resp., Leon. 12a; Thom., *S. th.*, I q. 1, a. 7, resp.; Leon. 19a–b.

¹⁶⁹³) Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 12a.

argumenti¹⁶⁹⁴). Item in Scripto de 1 argumento¹⁶⁹⁵), quod ens divinum, quod principaliter est Deus, cognoscibile per inspirationem; omnia autem haec, scilicet revelabile – non apparens, cognoscibile per inspirationem¹⁶⁹⁶ – comprehenduntur per hoc, quod dico credibile; nec potest dici subiectum huius scientiae, nisi prout est creditum; sed tolle hoc solum, totus processus scientiae erit vanus.

(70) Ad argumenta dicendum. Ad primum, “de subiecto oportet praescire, quid est”, in *Posterioribus*¹⁶⁹⁷); sed de Deo non scimus¹⁶⁹⁸). Dicendum, quod “oportet praescire, quid est”, quod dicitur. Contra: “Ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio”¹⁶⁹⁹); ergo si¹⁷⁰⁰ scio quid nominativum, sciam quid definitivum. Dicendum, quod imperfecte nominamus et imperfecte definimus sive describimus, vel dicendum, quod scimus quid suppositi, non naturae.

(71) Ad secundum. Deus dicitur a “theos” Graece, quod est “videre”, quod pertinet ad providentiam, quae est de omnibus¹⁷⁰¹); si ergo est de Deo, erit secundum generalem rationem. Dicendum, quod credibile generalius est providentia. Unde praeter providentiam multa alia tractantur in theologia.

(72) Ad tertium. Omnia tractantur hic, inquantum reducuntur in Deum ut in principium vel in finem; ergo vel inquantum creator vel glorificator¹⁷⁰²). Dicendum, quod hic ipsum credimus, quod creavit, postquam non erat, et quod sit glorificator, sicut fides ponit, scilicet cum carnis resurrectione.

(73) Ad quartum. Scientia subalterna debet habere subiectum subalternatum; cum ergo scientia beatorum, quae est subalternans, habeat Deum, ista habebit aliud subiectum inferius. Dicendum, quod subalterna dicitur aliqua scientia non ratione solum subiecti, sed etiam modi; hic autem modus est inferior, scilicet cum aenigmate¹⁷⁰³); posset tamen dici, quod istius scientiae est inferius subiectum non quantum ad subiecti substantiam, scilicet Deum, sed rationem, scilicet credibilis; est

¹⁶⁹⁴) Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 3, ad arg. 2; Leon. 12b.

¹⁶⁹⁵) Thom., In I Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 4, resp. et ad arg. 1; Oliva 327,23–328,41; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 7, resp.; Leon. 19a–b.

¹⁶⁹⁶ omnia ... inspirationem *add. i.m. V*

¹⁶⁹⁷) Thom., Exp. Post., I, 2, 71a11; Gauthier 11,46–49; Thom., In Metaph., XI, lect. 7, n. 2249; Cathala – Spiazzi 535a; cf. etiam Auct. arist. 35, n. 5; Hamesse 311,74–80; et etiam Arist., Anal. post., I 1, 71a11–13; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 5,12–15; Thom., Exp. Post., I, 2, 71a11; Gauthier 12,113–120; Thom., Super Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, arg. 2; Gils 94,5–7; Thom., De ver., q. 11, a. 1, ad arg. 3; Dondaine 352,392–397; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 7, arg. 1; Leon. 19a.

¹⁶⁹⁸) Cf. Ioann. Damasc., De fide orthod., c. 4, 4; Kotter 13,26–27; Buytaert 20,33–21,34; etiam Thom., Super Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, arg. 2; Gils 94,7–9; Thom., S. th., I, a. 7, arg. 1; Leon. 19a.

¹⁶⁹⁹) Auct. Arist. 1, n. 116; Hamesse 124,82; cf. Thom., In Metaph., IV, lect. 7, n. 613; lect. 16, n. 733; Cathala – Spiazzi 171; 202; Thom., In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 66; Thom., De ver. q. 2, a. 1, ad arg. 11; Dondaine 42,334–351; Thom., S. th., III, q. 37, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 377.

¹⁷⁰⁰ si *coni.*: sed *V*

¹⁷⁰¹) Cf. Dam., De fide orthod. c. 9, 3; Kotter 31,14–32,20; Buytaert 49,20–50,28; Dam., *De hymn. trisag.*, 5; PG 95 15B–16B; etiam Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 12, 7; Simon 430,36–40.

¹⁷⁰²) Aeg. Rom., In I Super Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Corduba 1699 12aD et 12bC.

¹⁷⁰³) Cf. Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 3, resp.; Muller 11,12–18 et 12,43–50.

etiam finis inferior, quia finis proximus et proprius hic est scire Deum perfecte fidei cognitione, licet remotus sit visio; sed tunc hic non erit.

(74) Ad quintum. Aut considerat in quantum cognoscibilis aut in quantum actu cognitus; non primo modo, quia est infinitis modis cognoscibilis, non secundo modo, quia sic sibi soli. Dicendum, quod cognoscibilis praefigitur tam sibi modus determinatus, prout ad hanc scientiam pertinet, scilicet per fidem.

(75) Ad sextum. Aut considerat sub ratione communi, tunc non differt a metaphysica, aut speciali, tunc ratio non est generalis, nec scientia ista extendit se ad omnia. Dicendum, quod ratio credibilis est communissima; adhuc tamen differt a metaphysica tripliciter: et ratione formali, quia illa non considerat in quantum credibile; item lumine, quia non supernaturali; item subiecto, quia non de Deo principaliter, sed in quantum est pars entis, sed ista e converso de Deo principaliter, sed de ente, in quantum omne ens est a Deo, qui est secundum Dionysium¹⁷⁰⁴) superexistens et verius, non ens¹⁷⁰⁵).

(76) Ad septimum. Aut considerat sub ratione finiti aut infiniti¹⁷⁰⁶). Dicendum, quod neutrum concedendum, quia nullius subiecti ratio formalis dicitur esse finitum vel infinitum, licet alicui competat, ut sit finitum vel infinitum. Deus ergo, qui est infinitus, est hic subiectum.

(77) Ad octavum. Finis et materia non coincidunt, II¹⁷⁰⁷ *Physicorum*¹⁷⁰⁸); sed Deus est finis, item principium; ergo non subiectum¹⁷⁰⁹). Dicendum, quod in materialibus est verum; subiectum autem hic aequivoce dicitur materia¹⁷¹⁰).

(78) Item dixit respondens, quod, sicut obiectum solet ad potentiam, ita subiectum ad scientiam¹⁷¹¹). Contra: Scientia est habitus complexorum, quia conclusionum¹⁷¹²); obiectum est simplex ut color. Dicendum, quod quantum ad ipsam rem subiectum scientiae est semper incomplexum aliquod, sed quia intellectus noster recipit modo complexo, ideo quantum ad intellectum est quid complexum, sicut etiam obiectum in se est simplex, recipitur tamen color in oculo quasi complexo, quia mediante specie.

¹⁷⁰⁴) Dion., De div. nom., V, 8; PG 3,824B; Suchla 187,11–12; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 356B–C ex Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 5, 18–19; Simon 321,78–79.

¹⁷⁰⁵) Cf. Aeg. Rom., Quodl. III, q. 2, resp.; Coninck 129a.

¹⁷⁰⁶) Cf. Ioh. Par., Super Sent., I, q. 1, ad arg 1; Muller 7,102–103.

¹⁷⁰⁷ II *coni.*: V V

¹⁷⁰⁸) Arist., Phys., II 7, 198a20–26; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 79,7–80,2; cf. Thomas, In Phys., II, lect. 11, n. 242; Maggiolo 117–118; etiam Auct. Arist. 2, n. 86; Hamesse 147,47–48.

¹⁷⁰⁹) Cf. Odo Rigald., Quaest. de scient. th., I, q. 3, sed contra, n. 66; Sileo 30,29–32.

¹⁷¹⁰) Cf. Thom., De prin. nat., c. 1; Dondaine 41,9–35; etiam Odo Rigald., de scient. th., I, q. 3, ad arg. 3; Sileo 38,145–39,158.

¹⁷¹¹) Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 7, resp.; Leon. 12a.

¹⁷¹²) Cf. Alb., Sent., III, d. 35A, a. 4, resp.; Borgnet 649a.

QUAESTIO XI

UTRUM IN MATERIA GENERABILIIUM ET CORRUPTIBILIIUM SIT ALIQUA INCHOATIO

- (1) Dicenda sunt hic quattuor¹⁷¹³.
- (2) Primo ponam aliquorum opiniones cum ipsarum reprobatione.
- (3) Secundo meam cum eius probatione.
- (4) Tertio declarabo eam cum quadam imaginatione.
- (5) Quarto tangentur argumenta cum ipsorum solutione.
- (6) Circa primum notandum, quod de formis invenio novem opiniones.
- (7) Una¹⁷¹⁴), quae dicit, quod forma praeexistit in materia secundum suam essentiam in actu et per generationem educitur de esse latente seu occulto in manifestum, et haec fuit Anaxagorae¹⁷¹⁵, sicut prima positio physicorum et eius sequentium, qui ponunt latitationem formarum. Ratio movens eum fuit, quia omnium, sicut ibidem dicitur¹⁷¹⁶, fuit opinio ex nihilo nihil posse fieri, ne ergo dicerent res sive formas fieri ex non ente; dixerunt fieri ex ente, et quia ens in potentia ignoraverunt, dixerunt res fieri ex ente in actu, et quia ex quolibet videbant aliud fieri, ideo dicebant quodlibet esse in quolibet, sed tamen unumquodque denominari non ab omnibus, sed unumquodque esse id, quod magis apparebat¹⁷¹⁷).
- (8) Sed hoc stare non potest propter duo. Primo, quia, licet [V 160rb] secundum¹⁷¹⁸ aliquos diversae formae possint esse in eodem, tamen contrarie inter se, sicut ignis et aqua non posset eodem modo inesse, quod sequitur secundum eos; nec potest dici, quod sint in diversis partibus materiae, cum ex qualibet parte materiae fiat ignis et aqua, sicut ipsi etiam concedunt; nec obstat, si dicantur ibi esse latentes, quia secundum suas essentias habent quasdam operationes diversae formae¹⁷¹⁹) et non secundum esse manifestum vel occultum.

¹⁷¹³ quattuor: quod *sed. corr. et quattuor add. s. v. V*

¹⁷¹⁴) Arist., Phys., I 4, 187a26–188a18, *spec.* 187a26–187b4; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 18,10–19,13; cf. Alb., Phys., I, tract. 2, c. 11; Hoßfeld 32,29–33,19; Alb., De gen. et corr., I, tract. 1, c. 2; Hoßfeld 113,16–31; etiam Thom., In Phys., I, lect. 9, n. 59–63; Maggiolo 35a–36a; Thom., In Gen. et Corr., I, c. 1, lect. 1; Leon. 265a–b; Thom., In Metaph., VII, lect. 7 et 8, n. 1430 et 1442d; Cathala – Spiazzi 350a; 352b–353a; Thom., In Metaph., XI, lect. 6, n. 2245; Cathala – Spiazzi 532a–b; et etiam Bonav., In Sent. II, d. 7, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, resp.; Quaracchi 1885 197b–198a; Thom., In II Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 3 et ad arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 450; 453–454; Thom., S. th., I, q. 45, a. 8, resp; Leon. 477a; Thom., S. th., I- II, q. 63, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 406a; Corr. Sciendum, 85; Glorieux 300; Corr. Quare, 85; Glorieux 353; Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., II, d. 18, q. 1, resp.; Colli 264,75–77; Aeg. Rom., Quodl. II, q. 12, resp.; Coninck 80a; Aeg. Rom., Quodl. V, q. 10, resp.; Coninck 295a–b.

¹⁷¹⁵ Anaxagorae: Anaxagoriae *sed. corr. V*

¹⁷¹⁶ dicitur *add. s. v. V*

¹⁷¹⁷) Cf. Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 60,32–37.

¹⁷¹⁸ Utrum in materia sit aliqua inchoatio formae *add. i. m. V*

¹⁷¹⁹) Cf. Thom., S. contr. Gent., III, c. 97; Leon. 299b–300a.

(9) Secundo tollit generationem¹⁷²⁰), quia ponit ens actu; unde magis est ibi segregatio, sicut auferens rubiginem de argento¹⁷²¹) dicitur educere formam argenti.

(10) Unde¹⁷²² est alia opinio¹⁷²³), quae dicit, quod est ibi forma non secundum essentiam perfectam, sed secundum partem sui et per generans fit tota; et ratio movens eos est, ne dicant aliquid fieri ex nihilo, quod oporteret, sicut dicunt, si nihil formae praeexisteret; et idem motivum est commune omnibus, qui ponunt incohesiones.

(11) Sed nec hoc stare potest, primo, quia forma substantialis, cum sit indivisibilis secundum Commentatorem V¹⁷²⁴ *Physicorum*¹⁷²⁵), non habet partem et partem¹⁷²⁶).

(12) Secundo, quia nec sic evadunt, quod intendunt. Sit enim forma inducenda A·B·C, quia secundum te est divisibilis; si ergo huius formae aliquid praeexistat, sit illud A; ergo cum residui, scilicet B·C, nihil praeexistat, erit eius creatio vel aliquid sine creatione potest induci, cuius nihil praeexistebat; si autem et huius, scilicet B·C, aliquid praeexistit, scilicet B, et tunc C totum sive aliquid sui inducitur; alias erit in infinitum ire; si autem ponas totum praeexistere C, et tunc erit idem cum prima opinione. Nec oportet aliquid fieri ex nihilo, si nihil eius praeexistat, sicut infra¹⁷²⁷) dicitur.

(13) Tertia¹⁷²⁸ est opinio¹⁷²⁹), quae dicit, quod formam inducendam praecedat quaedam forma communis et generalis sicut forma corporeitatis. Et hoc probat¹⁷³⁰ dupliciter: primo, quia Commentator¹⁷³¹) dicit, quod forma generis est quaedam media forma inter materiam primam et formam speciei; item, quia videmus, quod forma corporeitatis praeinvenitur ante generationem et remanet post rei corruptionem, quia corpus non resolvitur nisi in corpus et fit ex corpore.

(14) Sed hoc stare non potest.

¹⁷²⁰) Cf. Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 60,38–40.

¹⁷²¹) Cf. *Prov.* 25,4.

¹⁷²² Unde *add.* Opinio secunda *i. m. V*

¹⁷²³) Petr. de Tarantas., In Sent., II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Tolosae 1649 152b; cf. Bonav., In Sent. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, resp.; Quaracchi 1885 440b; Guill. de la Mare, Correct., 85; Glorieux 351–353; Corr. Sciendum, 85; Glorieux 300–304; et etiam Corr. Quare, 85; Glorieux 353–355, *spec.* 353; Guill. P. God., Lect. Thom., II, d. 18, q. 1, resp.; Colli 263,50–261,79, *spec.* 263,50–54 et 264,70–74; Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, q. 47, arg. 2 et resp.; Muller 140,10–19; 141,24–36; Thom., In Metaph., VII, lect. 8, n. 1442a; Cathala – Spiazzi 352b; Aeg. Rom., Quodl. II, q. 12, resp.; Coninck 80a; Aeg. Rom., Quodl. V, q. 10, resp.; Coninck 296b.

¹⁷²⁴ V conii: II V

¹⁷²⁵) Averr., Phys., III, comm. 68; Venetiis 1562 117vL; Averr., Phys., V, comm. 21; Venetiis 1562 222vI–K.

¹⁷²⁶) Cf. Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 60,41–45.

¹⁷²⁷) *non inveni*

¹⁷²⁸ Tertia *add.* Opinio tertia *i. m. V*

¹⁷²⁹) Cf. Thom., In II Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 451–452; et etiam Corr. Sciendum, 85; Petr. de Tarantas., In Sent., II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Tolosae 1649 152a–b; Aeg. Rom., In II Super Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Venetiis 1521 80aC–82aC.

¹⁷³⁰ Et hoc probat *add. i. m. V*

¹⁷³¹) Averr., Metaph., I, comm. 17; Venetiis 1562, 14vK.

(15) Primo, quia tollit veram generationem, cuius subiectum secundum Philosophum in *De generatione*¹⁷³²) est hyle; corpus autem per formam corporeitatis est ens in actu et manet actu secundum eos; et ad hanc etiam omnia inconvenientia sequuntur, quae sequuntur eos, qui ponunt plures formas, ut supra patet.

(16) Secundo, quia non habent suum intentum, quia, cum forma particularis sit alia a forma corporeitatis secundum eos, erit eadem dubitatio cum illa, quomodo fiat in materia, cum nihil eius praeexistat¹⁷³³).

(17) Nec valent motiva, quia forma generis non est alia a forma speciei; alias genus diceret aliam naturam a natura speciei, quod falsum est, quia sic genus de specie non praedicaretur in quid; nec vult Commentator¹⁷³⁴), quod sit media secundum rem, sed secundum intellectum, quia ordine intelligendi prius est genus quam species sicut universalibus particularibus¹⁷³⁵).

(18) Nec valet secundum motivum, quia corpus non fit ex corpore manente nec post corruptionem manet idem secundum rem, sed solum secundum conceptionem generis, sicut, etiamsi homo corrumpetur in vermem, diceretur remanere animal, quod est commune utrique.

(19) Unde¹⁷³⁶ est quarta opinio¹⁷³⁷), quae dicit, quod in materia praeexistit quoddam principium activum, sed illud est ita imperfectum, quod non potest agere ad formam, nisi per agens extrinsecum excitetur et iuvetur, et sic per agens extrinsecum et per illud educitur forma¹⁷³⁸). Et moventur ad hoc, ne dicant generationem naturalium esse violentam, quia secundum Philosophum¹⁷³⁹) III *Ethicorum* violentum est, cuius principium est extra nihil conferente vim passo. Naturalium autem est intra secundum eundem II *Physicorum*¹⁷⁴⁰). Item ibidem¹⁷⁴¹) dicit, quod, si ars navifactiva esset in lignis navis, tunc fieret a natura, sicut nunc fit ab arte; ergo videtur, quod in naturalibus requiritur principium intra activum.

(20) Sed istud etiam non valet, quia Philosophus VIII *Physicorum*¹⁷⁴²) distinguit animata ab inanimatis per hoc, quod animata movent se ipsa, non autem inanimata; hoc autem non intelligitur

¹⁷³²) Arist., *De gen. et corr.*, I 4, 320a2–3; *Judycka* 25,5–7.

¹⁷³³) Cf. Jacob. de Vit., *Quodl. II*, q. 5, resp.; *Ypma* 60,46–56.

¹⁷³⁴) Cf. Averr., *Metaph.*, I, comm. 17; *Venetiiis* 1562, 14vK.

¹⁷³⁵) Cf. Thom., *In II Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 452; Petr. de Tarantas., *In Sent.*, II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 2, 3 et ad arg. 2,3; *Tolosae* 1649 152a–b.

¹⁷³⁶ Unde *add.* *Opinio quarta i. m. V*

¹⁷³⁷) Petr. de Tarantas., *In Sent.*, II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; *Tolosae* 1649 152b; cf. Thom., *In II Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 452; Thom., *In Metaph.*, VII, lect. 8, n. 1442; Cathala – Spiazzi 352b; et etiam *Corr. Sciendum*, 85; *Glorieux* 304; Guill. P. God., *Lect. Thom.*, II, d. 18, q. 1, resp.; *Colli* 263,55–264,69; *Aeg. Rom.*, *In Phy.*, II, lect. 1, dub. 9; *Venetiiis* 1502 28ra–b; *Aeg. Rom.*, *Quodl. II*, q. 12, resp.; *Coninck* 80b.

¹⁷³⁸) Cf. Jacob. de Vit., *Quodl. II*, q. 5, resp.; *Ypma* 61,81–62,95.

¹⁷³⁹) Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, III 1, 1110a1–2 et 1110b1–3; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: *Gauthier* 410,9–10 et 411,13–14.

¹⁷⁴⁰) *potius* Thom., *In Phy.*, V, lect. 10, n. 740; *Maggiolo* 365b–366a; cf. etiam Arist., *Phys.*, II 1, 192b8–23; transl. vetus: *Bossier – Brams* 42,1–43,7; Arist., *Phys.*, V 6, 230a30–230b3; transl. vetus: *Bossier – Brams* 213,7–14; et etiam Thom., *In Phy.*, II, lect. 1, n. 145; *Maggiolo* 73b; Thom., *In Phy.*, VIII, lect. 7, n. 1024; *Maggiolo* 536a.

¹⁷⁴¹) Arist., *Phys.*, II 8, 199b28–30; transl. vetus: *Bossier – Brams* 90,10–91,2.

¹⁷⁴²) Cf. Arist., *Phys.*, VIII 2, 252b12–24; transl. vetus: *Bossier – Brams* 284,10–21.

in eis ita, quod in eis anima sit movens et corpus motum, quia in eis movens non est forma tantum, sed coniunctum, quia virtus motiva est virtus in organo.

(21) Et praeterea oportet movens esse distinctum a moto; praeter animam autem secundum ponentes unam formam non est in animato nisi materia prima, quae non movetur sine forma.

(22) Nec est dicendum, quod totum movet totum, sed ab anima est, quod moveat, a corpore, quod moveatur¹⁷⁴³), quia oportet movens a mobili¹⁷⁴⁴) esse distinctum subiecto et ratione, non principium tantum motus¹⁷⁴⁵).

(23) Et praeterea partes homogeneae non movent se ipsas in animatis nec articulus movet se ipsum, licet ibi sit anima et corpus. Unde intelligi oportet, quod, quia in animatis omnibus est diversitas organorum, quae distinguuntur situ et virtute, unde organa similiter et plantarum partes secundum Philosophum II *Physicorum*¹⁷⁴⁶) [V 160va]; ideo convenit in eis, quod una pars movet¹⁷⁴⁷ aliam, sicut brachium movet manum et manus digitum, et quia talis partium diversitas non est in inanimatis¹⁷⁴⁸, ideo non movent se ipsa, quantumcumque etiam habeant in se principium motus, sicut ignis non movet se ipsum sursum, sed generans.

(24) Secundo non valet positio, quia, si in materia est principium activum, tunc idem movet se ipsum et est sibi causa esse et destructionis, quia non potest nova res fieri nisi, quae fuit, destruat, cum unius generatio sit alterius corruptio¹⁷⁴⁹)¹⁷⁵⁰).

(25) Nec valent motiva, quia, si loquamur de motu locali, de quo loquitur in II *Physicorum*¹⁷⁵¹) comparando naturalia ad artificialia, nullum <artificialium> habent in se principium motus in quantum huiusmodi, sed si moventur deorsum, hoc est in quantum lapideus vel huiusmodi, naturalia autem habent, quia gravia vel levia; et sic non est ad propositum argumentum, quia mobile est ens in actu, sed nos loquimur de materia respectu formae, utrum in ea sit principium activum.

(26) Tamen potest dici, quod in naturalibus est principium ad generationem passivum¹⁷⁵²), quod confert non agendo, sed patiendo, et hoc est ipsa materia, quae etiam dicitur natura, II *Physicorum*¹⁷⁵³), et a tali dicuntur generationes etiam naturales.

¹⁷⁴³) Cf. Arist., Phys., VIII 5, 258a25–26; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 304,17–305,1.

¹⁷⁴⁴) Cf. Auct. Arist., 2, n. 172; Hamesse 154,90.

¹⁷⁴⁵) Cf. Thom., In Phy., VIII, lect. 7, n. 1024; Maggiolo 536a.

¹⁷⁴⁶) Cf. Arist., Phys., II 1, 192b8–13; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 42,1–43,7.

¹⁷⁴⁷ movet *add. s. v. V*

¹⁷⁴⁸ inanimatis: animatis *sed in add. s. v. V*

¹⁷⁴⁹) Arist., Metaph., II 1, 994b5–6; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 38,18–19; Arist., De gen. et corr., I 3, 318a23–25; Judycka 19,4–7; cf. Auct. Arist., 1, n. 4; 4, n. 7; Hamesse 118,65; 167,46–47.

¹⁷⁵⁰) Cf. Corr. Sciendum, 85; Glorieux 304.

¹⁷⁵¹) Arist., Phys., II 1, 192b8–23; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 42,1–43,7; cf. Thom., In Phy., II, lect. 1, n. 142; Maggiolo 74b.

¹⁷⁵²) Cf. etiam Thom., In Phy., II, lect. 1, n. 144; Maggiolo 74b.

¹⁷⁵³) Arist., Phys., II 1, 193a29–31; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 47,5–8; cf. Arist., Metaph., VII 7, 1032a16–27; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 133,2–12; etiam Thom., In Phy., II, lect. 1, n. 146; Maggiolo 75b.

(27) Ad secundum de navi dicendum, quod tunc generatio assimilaretur generationi animatorum, non inanimatorum, quia in illis est bene principium activum intra ut semen, quod est activum, non autem in inanimatis. Unde dicit, quod, sicut domus est ab extrinseco agente¹⁷⁵⁴), ita et ignis; tamen ignis naturale habet principium non agens, sed passivum¹⁷⁵⁵).

(28) Unde¹⁷⁵⁶ est alia opinio¹⁷⁵⁷), quae dicit, quod in materia est incohatio formae, quae incohatio non est aliud quam privatio, quam Philosophus I *Physicorum* etiam dicit esse principium¹⁷⁵⁸), et dicunt isti, quod privatio differt a negatione simpliciter, quia illa nihil ponit, sed privatio, quia dicit negationem in subiecto, relinquit tamen dispositionem ad habitum vel formam, et quantum ad hoc est principium praecedens in materia formam.

(29) Sed hoc stare non potest propter duo, primo, quia privatio secundum Philosophum I *Physicorum*¹⁷⁵⁹) est principium per accidens, quia scilicet est in materia, sicut medicus aedificat per accidens, sed in hoc est differentia, quod principium est accidens inseparabile, medicus autem separabile; nihil autem per accidens dicitur principium proprie¹⁷⁶⁰).

(30) Praeterea dispositio semper disponit ad bonum rei¹⁷⁶¹), sed secundum Philosophum in fine I *Physicorum*¹⁷⁶²) privationem imaginatur multoties quis ad maleficium rei, et ideo dicit ibidem¹⁷⁶³) formam esse quid divinum. Item privatio non est secundum eundem¹⁷⁶⁴) nisi principium in fieri¹⁷⁶⁵), quia generationes oportet esse ex oppositis sive contrariis; privationi autem contraria est forma; tale autem non potest dici dispositio, cum dispositio per formam perficiatur.

(31) Nec valet declaratio, quia privatio nullam ponit aptitudinem vel dispositionem, sicut caecitas in oculo nullam ponit dispositionem, sed magis removet; unde caecitas non est in patiendo aliquid animati¹⁷⁶⁶, sed corpus, quod caret dispositione ad visum secundum Philosophum II *De anima*¹⁷⁶⁷).

¹⁷⁵⁴) Cf. Thom., In Phy., II, lect. 1, n. 145; Maggiolo 75a.

¹⁷⁵⁵) Cf. etiam Thom., In Phy., II, lect. 1, n. 144; Maggiolo 74b; Thom., In Metaph., VII, lect. 8, n. 1442; Cathala – Spiazzi 353a.

¹⁷⁵⁶ Unde *add.* Opinio quarta *i. m. V*

¹⁷⁵⁷) Alb., Phys., I, tract. 3, c. 9; Hoßfeld 54,39–89; Alb., Phys., I, tract. 3, c. 10; Hoßfeld 56,40–45; 56,58–74; Alb., Phys., I, tract. 3, c. 15; Hoßfeld 68,63–71; Alb., Phys., I, tract. 3, c. 16; Hoßfeld 72,92–73,6; Alb., Phys., II, tract. 1, c. 3; Hoßfeld 79,51–64; cf. etiam Thom., In Phy., I, lect. 13, n. 112–113; Maggiolo 58a–b; Thom., In Phy., II, lect. 1, n. 143; Maggiolo 74a–b.

¹⁷⁵⁸) Arist., Phys., I 7, 191a8–17; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 34,15–35,6; cf. Auct. Arist. 2, n. 17; Hamesse 141,24; etiam Thom., In Phy., I, lect. 13, n. 110–119, *spec.* n. 118; Maggiolo 57a–59b, *spec.* 59a–b.

¹⁷⁵⁹) *potius* Averr., Phys. I comm. 74; Venetiis 1562, 43rA–D.

¹⁷⁶⁰) Cf. Thom., De prin. nat. 2; Dondaine 40,5–14.

¹⁷⁶¹) Cf. Alb., Phys., I, tract. 3, c. 16; Hoßfeld 72,57–73,27.

¹⁷⁶²) Arist., Phys., I 7, 192a14–16; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 39,9–11; cf. Auct. Arist. 2, n. 33; Hamesse 142,52–53.

¹⁷⁶³) Cf. Auct. Arist. 2, n. 31; Hamesse 141,50; Arist., Phys., I 9, 192a16–17; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 39,11–12; etiam Thom., In Phys., I, lect. 15, n.135; Maggiolo 68a.

¹⁷⁶⁴) Cf. Arist., Phys., I 7, 190a21–30; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 31,6–15; etiam Arist., Phys., I 7, 191a6–15; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 34,10–35,4.

¹⁷⁶⁵) Cf. Thom., De prin. nat. 2; Dondaine 40,44–45.

¹⁷⁶⁶ animati: animatu V

¹⁷⁶⁷) *potius* cf. Arist., Metaph., V 21, 1022b21–31; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 108,11–20; etiam Thom., In Metaph., V, lect. 20, n. 1072; Cathala – Spiazzi 278b; Thom., In Metaph., X, lect. 6, n. 2052; Cathala – Spiazzi 484b.

Differt tamen privatio a negatione simpliciter, non quia aliquid ponit, sed quia privat aliquid determinatum in determinato subiecto, et quia non privat totum, ideo relinquit – non ponit –, quod non privat, sicut caecitas privans visum relinquit auditum vel etiam habilitatem non in oculo¹⁷⁶⁸), sed in materia prima eius, qui habuit oculum, sic, quia privatio non privat nisi sibi oppositam formam; remanent in materia habilitates, quas materia ex se habet et non ex privatione; negatio autem tollit totum.

(32) Unde¹⁷⁶⁹ est sexta opinio¹⁷⁷⁰), quae dicit, quod in materia praecedit potentia ad formam, et illa potentia est aliud a materia, quod probat Commentator I *Physicorum*¹⁷⁷¹) et *De substantia orbis*¹⁷⁷²) primo per hoc, quod materia manet, potentia autem adveniente forma non manet, secundo, quia materia est una, potentiae autem in ea sunt multae, tertio potest dici, quod potentia dicit quid in alio, materia quid absolutum; sed quia idem Commentator dicit in *De substantia orbis*¹⁷⁷³), quod materia substantificatur per posse et quod potentia est eius differentia essentialis, ideo dicunt¹⁷⁷⁴), quod est duplex potentia in materia, una, quae dicitur receptiva, et illa est idem cum materia, alia dicitur passiva, et illa differt et fit ipsamet forma.

(33) Sed ista positio est falsa, et¹⁷⁷⁵ rationes non concludunt¹⁷⁷⁶, et distinctio nulla est.

(34) Primum patet sic, quia illa potentia aut est substantia aut accidens; non est medium. Si substantia, ergo vel materia, et tunc habetur propositum, vel est compositum, quod non est, quia nondum est compositum, vel est forma aut perfecta iam, et tunc non erit generatio, quia iam habetur forma, aut imperfecta, et tunc generatio erit motus de imperfecto ad perfectum et ex hoc sequitur, quod forma recipiat intensionem et remissionem; si autem dicatur, quod illa potentia sit accidens, aut ergo quantitas vel qualitas et caetera; sed secundum Philosophum I *Metaphysicae*¹⁷⁷⁷) materia secundum se sine forma accepta non est quanta |V 160vb| vel qualis nec aliquid aliorum praedicamentorum.

¹⁷⁶⁸) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, IV 2, 1004a10–16; IV 6, 1011b19–23; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 62,9–15; 80,10–14; etiam Auct. Arist., 1, n. 94; Hamesse 122,44–46; Thom., In *Metaph.*, IV, lect. 3, n. 565 et 566; Cathala – Spiazzi 157a–158a; Thom., In *Metaph.*, IV, lect. 15, n. 719; Cathala – Spiazzi 197a–b.

¹⁷⁶⁹ Unde *add.* Opinio sexta *i. m. V*

¹⁷⁷⁰) Aeg. Rom., In *Phy.*, I, lect. 18, dub. 1; Venetiis 1502 24ra; Cf. Jacob. de Vit., *Quodl.* II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 65,208–67,270.

¹⁷⁷¹) Averr., *Phys.* I comm. 70; Venetiis 1562, 41rE–F.

¹⁷⁷²) Averr., *De sub. orb.*, c. 1; Venetiis 1562 3vL–M.

¹⁷⁷³) Averr., *De sub. orb.*, c. 1; Venetiis 1562 3vM.

¹⁷⁷⁴) Aeg. Rom., In *Phy.*, I, lect. 18, resp. ad dub. 1; Venetiis 1502 24ra.

¹⁷⁷⁵ et *add. s. v. V*

¹⁷⁷⁶ *concludunt*: *concluditur sed corr. V*

¹⁷⁷⁷) *potius* Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,77–78; Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 3, 1029a20–26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,28–126,7; cf. etiam Arist., *Metaph.*, I 8, 989a31–989b21; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 26,18–27,13; Thom., In *Metaph.*, I, lect. 12, n. 196, 198; Cathala – Spiazzi 58a–b; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 31 et 32; Hamesse 117,34–39.

(35) Nec valent rationes, quia adveniente forma desinit respectus ad eam, qui non nominatur potentia, sed potentia hoc ipsum, quod est, remanet; unde dicimus rem compositam ex potentia et actu sicut etiam ex materia et forma.

(36) Ad secundum dicendum, quod una est materia, quae dicitur multos habere respectus, quos nominamus aliquando potentias, aliquando habilitates et huiusmodi¹⁷⁷⁸).

(37) Ad tertium, quod potentia non dicitur inesse nisi illa, quae est accidens, sicut visus vel huiusmodi, sed potentia materiae non secundum veritatem, sed secundum modum intelligendi dicitur inesse, sicut etiam dicimus essentiam esse in supposito.

(38) Distinctio etiam non valet, quia eadem materia dicitur potentia receptiva respectu formae, quam recipit, licet tamen non proprie dicatur, quod forma recipiatur, nisi sit totaliter ab extrinseco sicut anima intellectiva¹⁷⁷⁹), et quia forma inducitur ab agente, cui subicitur materia, ideo respectu actionis agentis dicitur passiva potentia, licet etiam respectu agentis possit dici receptiva, cuius actionem recipit¹⁷⁸⁰.

(39) Unde¹⁷⁸¹ est septima opinio¹⁷⁸²), quae dicit, quod, quia forma non inducitur nisi in materia disposita, quae dicitur materia proxima, quia id, quod materia proxima addit super materiam primam, quod id est incohatio formae in materia.

(40) Declarantes se dicunt, quod videmus, quod ex materia prima potest unumquodque fieri et tamen ex semine¹⁷⁸³ plantae¹⁷⁸⁴ secundum Philosophum¹⁷⁸⁵) non fit equus, sed planta, nec quilibet fit ex quolibet secundum Philosophum in *De generatione et corruptione*¹⁷⁸⁶).

(41) Sed ista positio stare non potest, quia secundum Commentatorem¹⁷⁸⁷) prima materia per se est immediate in potentia ad formam elementi et tamen non fit ignis nisi ex aere vel aqua vel alio corpore ad hoc disposito. Et ideo dicendum, quod eadem est¹⁷⁸⁸ materia prima et proxima, sed differt secundum solam considerationem. Unde secundum se considerata sine omni forma dicitur prima et eadem stans sub dispositionibus ad formam dicitur proxima, et istae dispositiones sunt mediae quantum ad inductionem formae, non quantum ad unionem, sicut eadem dicitur materia naturalis, inquantum subicitur qualitatibus activis et passivis, mathematica, inquantum consideratur

¹⁷⁷⁸) Averr., Metaph. XII comm. 11; Venetiis 1562 297rD–E.

¹⁷⁷⁹) Avic., Metaph., IX, c. 5; Van Riet 489,31–490,35 et 492,91–493,97; cf. Thom., De ver., q. 11, a. 1, resp.; Dondaine 349,195–202; cf. etiam Henr. de Gand., Summa, art. 1, q. 4, resp.; Wilson 94,80–96,109.

¹⁷⁸⁰) Cf. Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 68,312–315.

¹⁷⁸¹ Unde *add.* Opinio septima *i. m. V*

¹⁷⁸²) Cf. Alb., De an. I, tract. 1, c. 7; Stroick 15,94–16,15; Alb., De an. I, tract. 2, c. 8; Stroick 38,9–18; Alb., Metaph., XI, tract. 1, c. 5; Geyer 465,20–33; Alb., Metaph., XI, tract. 1, c. 8; Geyer 470,31–41; Alb., De creat., tract. 4, q. 72, a. 1, ad arg. 12; Borgnet 737b; Alb., De V universal., tract. 4, c. 1; Noya 54,37–43.

¹⁷⁸³ semine: scientie *sed corr. V*

¹⁷⁸⁴ plantae: plura *sed corr. V*

¹⁷⁸⁵) *potius* cf. Averr., Metaph. XII comm. 18; Venetiis 1562 303vG–H.

¹⁷⁸⁶) *potius* cf. Arist., Metaph., XII 2, 1069b28–29; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 206,2–4.

¹⁷⁸⁷) Averr., Metaph. XII comm. 11; Venetiis 1562 297rE.

¹⁷⁸⁸ est *add. s. v. V*

sine istis, sed tamen sub quantitate, sed metaphysica, inquantum consideratur sine omni quantitate, propter quod et Philosophus prius de ea tractat, ut patet VII et VIII *Metaphysicae*¹⁷⁸⁹). Hic grossum est exemplum, quod damus, quod clericus simplex communiter loquendo est in potentia remota ad episcopatum, sed praepositus maior in potentia propinqua, non tamen sic, quod ipse manens praepositus induat dignitatem episcopalem, sed simul abiecta praepositura; sic ergo clericus, qui tum dicebatur in remota potentia, fit episcopus; ita et in naturalibus materia prima stat sub forma, licet non accipiat nisi mediantibus dispositionibus; ex quo patet ad declarationem, quia non fit quidlibet ex quolibet immediate; fieri enim est via ad esse sive ad formam¹⁷⁹⁰).

(42) Unde¹⁷⁹¹ est octava opinio¹⁷⁹²), quae dicit, quod inchoatio ista est respectus, qui est in materia respectu formae; nisi enim haberet respectum ad formam, non reciperet eam.

(43) Sed hoc nihil est, quia secundum Philosophum¹⁷⁹³) respectus semper consequitur ad aliquid sive relinquitur ex aliquo¹⁷⁹⁴); unde nulli rei est causa vel principium; unde etiam in divinis paternitas, prout est relatio, non proprietas, non est principium Filii, sed magis consequitur; secundum modum intelligendi generationem est Pater et non paternitate generat¹⁷⁹⁵).

(44) Praeterea: Quod est alicuius principium vel causa, semper aliquid reale ponit; sed relatio nihil reale ponit praeter absolutum, quod est sui fundamentum¹⁷⁹⁶); alias omnis relatio esset realis, si sibi secundum se competeret realitas.

(45) Praeterea aliquid nullo adveniente esset compositius quam prius, cum nulla facta mutatione circa me ego sim modo alicui aequalis vel similis, cui non fui prius.

(46) Utrum autem ille respectus, licet non habeat rationem principii vel causae, sit realiter in materia differens ab ea, de hoc sunt tres¹⁷⁹⁷ opiniones¹⁷⁹⁸).

(47) Quidam¹⁷⁹⁹) dicunt, quod respectus ille sit ens rationis, secundum quod anima considerat materiam in ordine ad formam.

¹⁷⁸⁹) Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 3, 1029a20–26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,28–126,7; Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 10, 1036a9–13; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 142,6–10; Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 11, 1036b35–1037a5; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 144,10–14; Arist., *Metaph.*, VIII 6, 1045a34–36; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 166,15–17; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,77–78; cf. Avenc., *Fons vitae*, IV, 8; Beumke 229; Galter. Burg., In I Sent., d. 8, a. 5, resp.; Longpré 269; Guill. de la Mare, *Super Sent.*, I, d. 8, p. 2, q. 3, resp.; Kraml 129,46–48.

¹⁷⁹⁰) Thom., In *Metaph.*, VII, lect. 7, n. 1419; Cathala – Spiazzi 348a.

¹⁷⁹¹ Unde *add.* *Opinio octava i. m. V*

¹⁷⁹²) Cf. Jacob. de Vit., *Quodl.* II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 67,271–70,369, *spec.* 69,359–70,369; etiam Siger., *Quaest. in Metaph.*, V, q. 32, resp.; Mauerer 262,17–25.

¹⁷⁹³) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, V 15, 1020b25–1021b11; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 103,15–105,13; Arist., *Cat.*, c. 7, 6a36–8b25; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 18,4–23,21.

¹⁷⁹⁴) Cf. Alb., *Metaph.*, V, tract. 3, c. 7; Geyer 267,35–43.

¹⁷⁹⁵) Alex. Hal., *Gloss. in Sent.*, I, d. 34, a. 4, p. b; Quaracchi 1951 344,28–37.

¹⁷⁹⁶) Cf. Thom., *De ver.*, q. 27, a. 4, sed contra 4 et 5; Dondaine 803,181–186; Thom., *S. contr. Gent.*, IV, c. 10; Leon. 30b.

¹⁷⁹⁷ tres *an quattuor scrib.?*

¹⁷⁹⁸) Cf. S. Donati, “*Commenti parigini alla Fisica degli anni 1270–1300 ca.*”, in A. Speer (ed.), *Die Bibliotheca Amploniana, Ihre Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus, Nominalismus und Humanismus*, Berlin/New York 1995, 136–256, *spec.* 204–212.

(48) Sed hoc videtur mirabile, cum materia secundum intelligere et secundum esse dependeat ad formam, quod ens rei¹⁸⁰⁰¹⁸⁰¹ fiat per ens rationis.

(49) Unde alii¹⁸⁰²), quod dicit relationem secundum esse reale et fundatur in materia immediate et consequitur creationem eius, sicut et omnis creatura per se refertur ad creatorem.

(50) Sed alii¹⁸⁰³) dicunt, quod praedicamenta communicant sibi modos suos; unde scientia refertur ad scibile, et tamen non secundum esse, sed secundum id, quod est in praedicamento relationis, licet realiter referatur; unde non est idem realiter referri et secundum esse, nec oportet, quod idem <est id>, quod non secundum esse refertur, <et id>, quod statim relatione rationis referatur¹⁸⁰⁴, sicut patet de scientia; ita et in proposito materia prima non secundum esse, sed secundum dici refertur ad formam et tamen realiter.

(51) Nota tamen, quod istum respectum dicunt aliqui¹⁸⁰⁵) esse non in materia prima secundum se, quae ante omnia praeaccipit formam, sed et in proposito, licet ratione materiae [V 161ra], et ideo materia existens sub una forma actu habet respectum ad aliam, quam habet in potentia.

(52) Unde¹⁸⁰⁶ est nona opinio¹⁸⁰⁷), quae dicit, quod in materia praeexistat forma non in actu nec secundum partem, sed tota secundum esse potentiale ita, quod illa eadem potentia est postea actus, et sicut res composita est ex materia et forma in actu, ita et in materia est compositio materiae et potentiae, quia ipsa potentia nihil aliud est nisi ipsamet forma sub esse potenciali, et talis potentia dicitur inchoatio formae sive seminarium sive exordium quoddam, sicut dicimus habere seminaria scientiarum et virtutum, ita et materia habet formam, et illa potentia non dicit privationem formae simpliciter vel essentiae eius, sed privationem eius secundum tale esse, scilicet actuale, et talis potentia¹⁸⁰⁸ est in secunda specie qualitatis. Istud probatur primo per Simplicium *Super libro Praedicamentorum*¹⁸⁰⁹), qui loquens de hac specie dicit, quod “in toto mundo si qua producatur generatio, non aliter quam per potentiam in substantiam producitur et perficitur, et materia in suscipiendo speciem per potentiam in ipsam provenit ab imperfecto ad perfectum”; “procedit aliquid, nisi¹⁸¹⁰ potentia media adfuerit, addens quidem quod deficit ad perfectum, suscipiens

¹⁷⁹⁹) Siger., Quaest. in Metaph., V, q. 32, resp. et ad arg. 1; Mauerer 262,40–263,66.

¹⁸⁰⁰ ens rei *add. i. m. V*

¹⁸⁰¹ rei: est *sed exp. V*

¹⁸⁰²) Cf. Aeg. Rom., In Phy., I, lect. 18; Venetiis 1502 24ra–b.

¹⁸⁰³) Aeg. Rom., In Phy., I, lect. 18; Venetiis 1502 24rb.

¹⁸⁰⁴ referatur *an* refertur *scrib.?*

¹⁸⁰⁵) *non inveni*

¹⁸⁰⁶ Unde *add. Opinio nona i. m. V*

¹⁸⁰⁷) Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 70,370–72,439; 75,521–534.

¹⁸⁰⁸ potentia *add. dicitur inchoatio formae sed exp. V*

¹⁸⁰⁹) Simpl., In Praed., De qualitate; Pattin 340,73–341,87 et 341,95–98.

¹⁸¹⁰ non *sed corr. nisi V*

autem¹⁸¹¹ completionem a perfectissimo”, et infra: “Opera enim naturae in motu sunt, qui¹⁸¹² ex potentia hac in actum procedit”.

(53) Secundo¹⁸¹³ Commentator VIII *Metaphysicae*¹⁸¹⁴), quod id, quod est in actu, non est aliud ab eo, quod est in potentia; sed “id¹⁸¹⁵ idem, quod fuit in potentia, est in actu, et non sunt haec duo diversa”.

(54) Item idem¹⁸¹⁶) loquens de generatione compositi dicit: “Est igitur aliquid unum, quod primo est in potentia et post transfertur de potentia ad actum. Translatio enim eius largitur ei moltitudinem¹⁸¹⁷, sed perfectio¹⁸¹⁸ in esse”; esset autem multitudo, nisi prius esset duo, scilicet materia et potentia¹⁸¹⁹, sicut post materia et forma. Item medium participat naturam extremorum, sed subiectum differt ab extremis sicut lignum ab albo et negatione albi et materia a forma et privatione formae, cum oportet disponere lignum a potentia albi¹⁸²⁰ et materiam a potentia formae; unde oporteret dicere, quod sit aliud potentia materiae et potentia formae.

(55) »Sed ista positio stare non potest. Sicut se habet pura potentia ad modum actus simpliciter, ita se habet actus purus ad modum potentiae purae; sed pura potentia non potest habere modum actus; ergo nec id, quod est actus simpliciter per essentiam suam, potest habere modum purae potentiae. Id autem, quod non habet modum purae potentiae, semper oportet, quamdiu est in rerum natura, habere modum actus, quia omnia dividuntur in actum et potentiam; ergo et caetera«¹⁸²¹).

(56) »Ex hoc sequuntur inconvenientia.

(57) Primum est, quod essentia formae sit in rerum natura et non habeat modum actus.

(58) Secundum est, quod forma non habeat actus, nisi in quantum est subsistens vel dans tale esse vel tale.

(59) Tertium est, quod omnis motio erit intensio formae praecedentis.

(60) Quartum, quod oportet in eadem parte materiae esse tot essentias formarum diversas numero, quot¹⁸²² differentiae realiter numero possunt fieri de eadem parte materiae.

(61) Sequeretur etiam, quod, si de equo corrupto generaretur herba, de qua menstruum, de quo equus, quod forma secundi equi infinities esset in eadem materia; istae ergo formae diversorum

¹⁸¹¹ autem *coni. ex Simplicii et Jacobi: ante V*

¹⁸¹² qui *coni. ex Simplicii et Jacobi: quae V*

¹⁸¹³ Secundo *coni.: Tertio V*

¹⁸¹⁴) Averr., *Metaph.*, VIII, comm. 16; Venetiis 1562 225rE.

¹⁸¹⁵ id *an illud scrib.?*

¹⁸¹⁶) Averr., *Metaph.*, VIII, comm. 15; Venetiis 1562 224rA.

¹⁸¹⁷ moltitudinem *coni. ex Averroee et Jacobi: multipliciter V*

¹⁸¹⁸ perfectionem *coni. ex Averroee et Jacobi: perfectio V*

¹⁸¹⁹ potentia: ponitur *V*

¹⁸²⁰ albi: albo *V*

¹⁸²¹) *apud etiam* Haerv. Natal., *In Sent.*, II, d. 18, q. 1; Paris 1647 256a; Nicol. de Arg., *Summa*, II, tract. 1, q. 4; Pellegrino 15,176–188;

¹⁸²² quot *coni: quod V*

equorum vel differunt se ipsis vel secundum modum; non primo modo, quia oporteret in eadem materia esse infinitas essentias formarum differentes, quod est inconveniens, nec secundo, quia sequeretur, quod unus essentialis equus esset plures modales, quod est derisio¹⁸²³).

(62) »De secundo principali sciendum, quid sit formam educi de potentia materiae. De hoc sunt tres opiniones.

(63) Una est, quae dicit, quod formam educi de potentia materiae est materiam converti in formam, quod probant sic, quia, antequam forma sit in materia, materia est in potentia ad formam, sed postquam materia adeptam est formam, amplius non est materia in potentia ad formam, quia potentia non manet; cum igitur huiusmodi potentia sit ipsamet essentia materiae, ergo essentia materiae non manet in adventu formae; hoc autem non esset, nisi materia converteretur in formam.

(64) Sed ista opinio ab omnibus reprobatur, quia sequitur, quod in rebus naturalibus non sit realis compositio ex materia et forma; sequitur etiam, quod una forma convertatur in aliam, quia materia semel¹⁸²⁴ conversa non manet amplius.

(65) Ratio eorum etiam non valet, quia, quando dicitur “materia, antequam et caetera”, verum est; sed esse in potentia ad formam ultra naturam potentiae importat carentiam formae; unde materiam esse in potentia ad formam est materiam habere habilitatem ad formam habendam, qua caret; et quando dicitur, quod, quando habet formam, non est potentia ad eam, verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod tollatur potentia, quae est essentia materiae, sed ex potentia et actu fit unum, sed totum hoc esse in potentia non manet, quia principium non manet.

(66) Secunda opinio¹⁸²⁵) est, quod educi de potentia materiae est aliquid fieri per transmutationem materiae a forma contraria in formam contrariam, et ideo dicunt, quod formae non habentes contrarium ut lumen et species intelligibilis non educuntur |V 161rb| de¹⁸²⁶ potentia subiecti.

(67) Sed hoc non valet, quia propter hoc dicitur¹⁸²⁷ formam¹⁸²⁸ educi de potentia materiae, quia forma est aliquo modo in potentia materiae, sed non contrarium formae, ut quod motus ad formam incipiat ab eius contrario; hoc enim non plus ponit formam esse in potentia materiae quam non inesse, immo minus; plus enim videtur contrarium formae excludere formam quam privationem¹⁸²⁹, quia talis privatio¹⁸³⁰ posset accipi, quae non totaliter excluderet formam, sicut in his, quae intenduntur et remittuntur. Item huiusmodi formae non habentes contrarium magis dicuntur venire

¹⁸²³) *apud etiam* Haerv. Natal., In Sent., II, d. 18, q. 1; Paris 1647 256a–257a.

¹⁸²⁴ *semel coni. ex Haervei: simul V*

¹⁸²⁵) Cf. Theod. de Vrib., De vision. beat., 3.2.3; Mojsisch 72,43-73.

¹⁸²⁶ *de add. De materia et inchoatio formae i. m. V*

¹⁸²⁷ *dicitur add. dicitur sed del. V*

¹⁸²⁸ *formam coni.: forma V*

¹⁸²⁹ *privationem coni. ex Haervei: prius V*

¹⁸³⁰ *privatio coni. ex Haervei: principaliter V*

ab intra quam ab extra quam aliae, immo plus, inquantum nullum ponimus in eis repugnans in materia; ergo educi de materia non est sic dicendum.

(68) Et ideo est tertia¹⁸³¹ opinio, quae dicit, quod formam educi de potentia materiae est formam dependere in esse et fieri a materia ita, quod nec esse nec fieri competat formae proprie, sed composito; et dicitur educi de potentia materiae, quia in potentia materiae est passive, quod talis forma vadit ad esse; sicut enim dicimus, quod in sole est illuminare active, quia ab eo active dependet lumen, ita in potentia materiae est forma, quia in potentia eius passiva est, quod talis forma ducatur ad esse et de potentia eius passiva dependet, quod forma pertingat ad esse; et quia etiam fieri est tantum compositi, ideo dicitur educi de potentia¹⁸³²).

(69) Sed notandum, quod tripliciter¹⁸³³ est potentia: obedientialis¹⁸³⁴, ut quando de trunco fit vitulus¹⁸³⁵, et haec potentia nihil aliud est quam subiectum aliquod, quod est aptum reduci in actum ab agente non requirente dispositiones naturales in subiecto, quale est Deus; alia est potentia naturalis, scilicet potentia alicuius subiecti, secundum quod est mobile ab agente requirente dispositiones naturales¹⁸³⁶); alio modo dicitur educi de potentia materiae aliquid active a potentiis activis collatis a rebus corporalibus, non quod taliseductio ponat principium activum in materia, inquantum inducitur forma, et sic educi nihil aliud est quam produci a principio activo collato alicui rei materiali; illae ergo formae educuntur, quae possunt fieri ab aliqua virtute corporali; quae autem non possunt fieri, non educuntur«¹⁸³⁷).

(70) †

(71) †

¹⁸³¹ *tertia coni.: quarta V*

¹⁸³²) Cf. Jacob. de Therin., Quodl. I, q. 2; Glorieux 62.

¹⁸³³ *tripliciter coni.: quadripliciter V*

¹⁸³⁴ *obedientialis coni.: obedinalis V*

¹⁸³⁵ *vitulus: intellectus sed esp et corr. V*

¹⁸³⁶) Cf. Thom., In III Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad arg. 4; Mandonnet – Moos 23; Thom., S. th., III, q. 11, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 157b; etiam Pecham, Quaest. de Euchar., q. 5, ad arg. 9; Etzkorn 72,6–13; Jacob. de Vit., Quodl. II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 62,96–99.

¹⁸³⁷) *apud etiam* Haerv. Natal., In Sent., II, d. 18, q. 1; Paris 1647 257a–258b.

QUAESTIO XII

UTRUM IN MATERIA SIT ALIQUA FORMA DIMINUTA, QUAE FIAT FORMA, SUPPOSITO QUOD NON SIT
PRINCIPIUM ACTIVUM¹⁸³⁸)

- (1) Et videtur, quod sic. “Agens extrahit formam a materia” per Commentatorem in multis locis¹⁸³⁹); sed nihil extrahitur ab alio, nisi prius fuerit in illo, sed non complete; ergo diminute; ergo et caetera.
- (2) Item Commentator in XII¹⁸⁴⁰ <Metaphysicae>¹⁸⁴¹): “Forma fit ex non forma¹⁸⁴²”; ergo ex forma, sed non completa, ergo diminuta.
- (3) Item: Nisi in materia esset forma diminuta, quae postmodum fieret forma rei, esset ab extrinseco; sic essent datores formarum¹⁸⁴³).
- (4) Item forma est in materia aut ex nihilo aut ex aliquo: non ex nihilo, quia inter nihil et aliquid est infinita distantia, quae non potest per agens finitae virtutis pertransiri¹⁸⁴⁴); nec ex aliquo, quod est¹⁸⁴⁵ ex materia, tunc materia esset pars formae, quod falsum est; ergo ex aliquo, quod est pars formae.
- (5) Ad illud dicitur: In materia necesse est praeesse formam rei diminutam, quae postea fiat forma rei; alioquin forma fieret ex nihilo, et formarum esset creatio. Istud non est verum, quia indivisible¹⁸⁴⁶, ubi est, totaliter est; forma substantialis indivisibilis, ergo ubi est, totaliter est. Si igitur in materia praefuit, totaliter praefuit, ex quo sequitur opinio Anaxagorae¹⁸⁴⁷), quod quidlibet actu sit in quolibet.
- (6) Praeterea ista positio incidit¹⁸⁴⁸ in id idem, quod vitare intendit; nam quaestio est: “utrum completa forma addat aliquid super diminutam, aut non”. Si nihil addat, ergo forma completa

¹⁸³⁸) Eadem quaestio in Commentario Super Metaphysicam Aristotelis Ioannis Tytysdalensis praesens est, ut ex Ermatingeri testificatione scimus, cf. C. J. Ermatinger, “The fourteenth Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies: abstract of papers,” in *Manuscripta* 32,1, Saint Louis 1988, 8–10; etiam Ms. Durham, Cathedral, MS C IV.20, ff. 127rb–128rb et Ms. Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, Section Médecine, H 293, ff. 92ra–92vb.

¹⁸³⁹) e.g. Averr., *Metaph.*, VII, comm. 28; VIII, comm. 15; XII, comm. 18; Venetiis 1562 178vH; 224rA; 304vI.

¹⁸⁴⁰ XII *coni.*: XI V

¹⁸⁴¹) Cf. Averr., XII, comm. 18; Venetiis 1562 304rC.

¹⁸⁴² ex non forma *coni.*: extensor V

¹⁸⁴³) Avic., *Metaph.*, IX, c. 5; Van Riet 489,31–490,35 et 492,91–493,97; cf. etiam Averr., *Metaph.*, XII, comm. 18; Venetiis 1562 304rA–B.

¹⁸⁴⁴) Cf. *Auct. Arist.*, 4, n. 34; Hamesse 170,94; etiam Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 45, a. 2, arg. 4; Leon. 465b; Thom., *De ver.*, q. 27, a. 3, arg. 9; Dondaine 796,65–70.

¹⁸⁴⁵ est *add. s. v. V*

¹⁸⁴⁶ indivisible: divisible *sed in add. s. v. V*

¹⁸⁴⁷) Cf. *Arist.*, *Phys.*, I 4, 187a26–188a18, *spec.* 187a26–187b4; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 18,10–19,13.

¹⁸⁴⁸ incidit *add. i. m. V*

praefuit. Si aliquid addat, id additum non praefuit et id additum fieret et per consequens fieret ex nihilo.

(7) Si forte id videtur concedendum, quia Philosophus¹⁸⁴⁹) ostendit, quod forma non fit ex aliquo, sed Philosophus ostendit – diceret scilicet¹⁸⁵⁰ aliquis – formam non fieri ex aliquo sicut ex materia, non tamen negat, quin fiat ex aliquo tamquam ex forma.

(8) Sed contra: Materia est id, ex quo fit aliquid et, cum factum est, inest; sed ista ratio convenit formae¹⁸⁵¹ diminutae, si ex ipsa fieret forma completa; ergo et caetera.

(9) Ad illud forte diceretur, quod aliter est de materia et forma diminuta, quia per generationem materia fit sub forma completa, sed forma diminuta fit¹⁸⁵² ipsa forma completa.

(10) Contra: Quaero, utrum forma diminuta et forma completa sint eiusdem essentiae. Si non, non magis fieret haec forma aeris quam ignis. Si sint eiusdem essentiae, aut ergo tota forma completa praefuit et sic est latitatio formarum¹⁸⁵³), aut forma diminuta est pars formae completae et sic substantia suscipit magis et minus¹⁸⁵⁴). Si dicatur, quod tota forma completa praefuit, sed tantum in potentia, aut ita, quod nihil eius praefuit, sed quod materia fuit in potentia ad ipsam – sic habeo propositum, quod forma <diminuta> non praefuit –, aut ipsa tota praefuit prius in potentia ita, quod nihil per generationem acquiritur – et sic non differunt esse actu et esse in potentia –, aut ita, quod aliquid acquiritur per generationem et id non praefuit – ergo aliquid fit, quod prius non fuit, sive ex nihilo. |V 161va|

(11) Ad quaestionem dicendum est, sicut dicit Commentator in XI¹⁸⁵⁵), quod circa istam quaestionem duae fuerunt opiniones extremae. Una ponit formam semper praeesse in materia sicut Anaxagoras. Alia ponit rem et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam in materia totaliter esse de novo, et haec est opinio Christianorum. Sed inter has sunt tres mediae, quae neque ponunt rem totaliter praefuisse nec totaliter de novo esse, quarum una ponit formam causari in materia ab intelligentia separata, et haec est opinio Avicennae. Alia ponit causari in materia ab agente separato eiusdem speciei, sicut Plato de ideis, sed Aristoteles viam mediam: Nec ponit formam esse totaliter ab intra, sed partim causari ab intra et partim ab extra; ab intra, quia ex potentia materiae, ab extra, quia ab agente extrinseco.

¹⁸⁴⁹) Arist., *Metaph.*, V 8, 1033a31–1033b9; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 135,21–136,4.

¹⁸⁵⁰ *scilicet an enim scrib.?*

¹⁸⁵¹ *formae add. te sed exp. V*

¹⁸⁵² *fit an sit scrib.?*

¹⁸⁵³) Cf. e.g. Thom., In *Metaph.*, VII, lect. 7 et 8, n. 1430 et 1442d; Cathala – Spiazzi 350a; 352b–353a; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 45, a. 8, resp; Leon. 477a; Thom., *S. th.*, I-II, q. 63, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 406a; etiam Corr. *Sciendum*, 85; Glorieux 300; Jacob. de Vit., *Quodl.* II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 65,208–214.

¹⁸⁵⁴) Cf. e.g. Corr. *Quare*, 85; Glorieux 353–355, *spec.* 353; Ioh. Par., *Super Sent.* I, q. 47, arg. 2 et resp.; Muller 140,10–19; 141,24–36; etiam Jacob. de Vit., *Quodl.* II, q. 5, resp.; Ypma 60,41–45.

¹⁸⁵⁵) *rectius* Averr., XII, comm. 18; Venetiis 1562 304rD–304vL.

(12) Sed circa hanc opinionem dupliciter se habent moderni, quia, quod forma educatur de potentia materiae, hoc est dupliciter, aut, quod praesit potentia diminuta in materia, aut non. Quod praesit, multi ponunt¹⁸⁵⁶), ne ponant aliquid fieri ex nihilo. Quod autem in omni generatione hoc sit necessarium, scilicet aliquid esse, quod non praefuit, et non fiat ex aliquo, ostendo sic: Sit aliquod generatum A·B·C, sicut supra¹⁸⁵⁷) in praecedenti quaestione in secunda opinione; dicendum est ergo, quod in materia non est forma diminuta nec tamen creatur, quia creatio est productio entis per se et forma non habet esse per se, sed compositum¹⁸⁵⁸), nec fit ex nihilo, sed ex materia, non tamen ita, quod materia sit pars eius, quia hoc est proprium compositi.

(13) Ad primum dicendum, quod extrahere, producere et huiusmodi improprie accipiuntur in generatione, quia tamen quidam¹⁸⁵⁹) proposuerunt formas extra materiam fieri et postmodum in materia imprimi. Commentator¹⁸⁶⁰), volens innuere, quod hoc non sit de mente Philosophi, dicit, quod agens non extrahit, et caetera. Sed sic dicimus, quod lumen et caliditas transeunt a sole per medium, cum tamen nihil sit in medio, quod prius fuit in sole, sic improprie accipitur hic.

(14) Ad secundum dicendum, quod Commentator¹⁸⁶¹) dicit fieri formam ex non forma pro¹⁸⁶² eo, quod forma <non> fit¹⁸⁶³ extra materiam, immo fit¹⁸⁶⁴ in materia, quae praefuit sub alia.

(15) Ad tertium dicendum, quod, etsi non sit talis forma, non tamen fit¹⁸⁶⁵ per se ab extrinseco nisi pro tanto, quod fit¹⁸⁶⁶ ab actione agentis extrinseci; fit enim ab intra, quia ex materia.

(16) Ad ultimum dicendum, quod non fit ex nihilo, sed ex aliquo, quod est materia, non tamen ita, quod materia sit pars eius, quia hoc debetur eis, quae¹⁸⁶⁷ per se fiunt.

(17) Notandum, quod in generatione artificialium et naturalium est quaedam aptitudo in materia ad formam, quia quaelibet forma non inducitur in quamlibet materiam, ut patet de littera, sed in modo disposita, quae aptitudo non est forma diminuta.

¹⁸⁵⁶) Cf. supra q. 11, sect. (7)–(61)

¹⁸⁵⁷) Cf. supra q. 11, sect. (12)

¹⁸⁵⁸) Cf. Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 18; Leon. 305b.

¹⁸⁵⁹) Cf. Averr., Metaph., VII, comm. 28; Venetiis 1562 178rB–C.

¹⁸⁶⁰) Averr., Metaph., VII, comm. 28; Venetiis 1562 178vH.

¹⁸⁶¹) Cf. Averr., XII, comm. 18; Venetiis 1562 304rC.

¹⁸⁶² pro *coni.*: non *add. s. v. ex a. m. V*

¹⁸⁶³ *fit coni.*: sit *V*

¹⁸⁶⁴ *fit coni.*: sit *V*

¹⁸⁶⁵ *fit coni.*: sit *V*

¹⁸⁶⁶ *fit coni.*: sit *V*

¹⁸⁶⁷ *quae add. s. v. V*

QUAESTIO XIII

QUAERITUR, UTRUM MATERIA PRIMA SIT UNA OMNIUM¹⁸⁶⁸)

- (1) Et videtur, quod sic, quia id, in quo stat resolutio¹⁸⁶⁹ omnium, est unum numero, ut patet per Philosophum II *Metaphysicae*¹⁸⁷⁰), quia in causis est status.
- (2) Praeterea omnis distinctio est ab actu¹⁸⁷¹), sed pura potentialitas, quae est materia, omnem actum excludit¹⁸⁷²).
- (3) Praeterea in I *De generatione*¹⁸⁷³): “Melius est facere materiam in omnibus inseparatam¹⁸⁷⁴ entem numero unam” quam plures.
- (4) Item resolvantur duo corporalia in suas materias; facta resolutione quaeritur, utrum materiae sint distinctae vel non.
- (5) Si sic, contra: Omnis distinctio est ab actu¹⁸⁷⁵).
- (6) Si non, ergo¹⁸⁷⁶ corpus unum.
- (7) Contra: Ista sunt unum numero, quorum materia est una numero¹⁸⁷⁷); sed omnia non sunt huiusmodi.
- (8) Item materia substantificatur per posse¹⁸⁷⁸), sed omnium non est unum posse.
- (9) Item si materia est una, aut secundum esse aut essentiam¹⁸⁷⁹); si secundum esse, ergo erit <tantum> una forma; si secundum essentiam, ergo principiata non erunt diversa essentialiter, quia diversitas compositorum est ex diversitate principiorum.

¹⁸⁶⁸) Eadem quaestio in Commentario Super Metaphysicam Aristotelis Ioannis Tytysdalensis praesens est, ut ex Ermatingeri testificatione scimus, cf. C. J. Ermatinger, “The fourteenth Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies: abstract of papers,” in *Manuscripta* 32, Saint Louis 1988, 8–10. Cf. etiam Ms. Durham, Cathedral, MS C IV.20, ff. 152rb–153rb et Ms. Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, Section Médecine, H 293, ff. 107rb–107vb sed ibi pars conclusiva textus deest et omittitur.

¹⁸⁶⁹ resolutio *coni.*: relatio V

¹⁸⁷⁰) Arist., *Metaph.*, 994a1–994b31; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 37,11–39,16.

¹⁸⁷¹) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 13, 1039a7; VII 17, 1041b8; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 149,5–6; 155,6–7; etiam Thom., In *Metaph.*, VII, lect. 13, n. 1588; lect. 17, n. 1668; Cathala – Spiazzi 381a; 397b.

¹⁸⁷²) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 3, 1029a20–26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,28–126,7; etiam Arist., *Metaph.*, I 8, 989a31–989b21; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 26,18–27,13; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,77–78; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 31 et 32; Hamesse 117,34–39; Thom., In *Metaph.*, I, lect. 12, n. 196, 198; Cathala – Spiazzi 58a–b.

¹⁸⁷³) Arist., *De gen. et corr.*, I 5, 320b12–14; Judycka 27,6–7.

¹⁸⁷⁴ inseparatam *coni.* ex *Aristotele*: separatam V

¹⁸⁷⁵) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 13, 1039a7; VII 17, 1041b8; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 149,5–6; 155,6–7; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 187–189; Hamesse 130,12–14; etiam Thom., In *Metaph.*, VII, lect. 13, n. 1588; lect. 17, n. 1668; Cathala – Spiazzi 381a; 397b.

¹⁸⁷⁶ ergo: genus *sed exp. et corr.* V

¹⁸⁷⁷) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, V 6, 1016b31–32; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 93,26–28; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 129; Hamesse 125,8–9; etiam Thom., *Super Boet. de Trin.*, q. 4, a. 2, arg. 1 et ad arg. 1; Gils 122,1–8 et 125,247–252.

¹⁸⁷⁸) Cf. Averr., *De sub. orb.*, c. 1; Venetiis 1562 3vM.

¹⁸⁷⁹) Cf. Petr. de Tarantas., In *Sent.*, II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 1, resp.; Tolosae 1652/1649 31a.

(10) Item si una esset materia, ex quolibet posset fieri quidlibet.

(11) Dicendum, quod, sicut aliquid est ens, ita est unum, et talis est quaerenda in unoquoque unitas, qualis etiam ei debetur entitas. Sed materia de se est ens in potentia. In ipsa ergo solum quaerenda est unitas in potentia. Dicendum ergo, quod est loqui de materia prima dupliciter: aut, secundum quod est sub forma, aut circumscribendo omnem formam. Si primo modo, sic non¹⁸⁸⁰ est una numero, quia impossibile est unum et idem esse sub diversis formis et moveri diversis motibus, scilicet contrariis, sed ubi est compositum, ibi est et materia per accidens, et sic moto composito movetur materia per accidens; nunc autem ignis et terra et caetera¹⁸⁸¹).

(12) Praeterea materia proxima non est una numero omnium; illa autem non est realiter separata a prima materia¹⁸⁸²).

(13) Si loquamur secundo modo de materia, sic nec adhuc est una numero omnibus, una tamen secundum rationem, quia materia ostenditur negatione sicut et genus per Aristotelem in X *Metaphysicae*¹⁸⁸³), sed qui circumscribit a genere omnem differentiam, nullam in genere percipit distinctionem; sic qui apprehendit materiam per privationem omnium formarum, nullam multitudinem circa ipsam apprehendit nec aliquam unitatem realem. Sic enim una est apud rationem, quia circumscriptio formarum a materia non est extra intellectum in re, cum ipsa materia sit multa¹⁸⁸⁴). Unitas enim in ratione non ponit unitatem in re. Sic enim intelligendo <circa> quaestionem opiniones, licet videantur diversae, in idem referuntur. [V 161vb] Ponentes enim unam materiam in omnibus ponunt ipsam esse unam per privationem et indifferentiam formarum¹⁸⁸⁵). Ponentes ipsam non esse unam ponunt eam non esse unam in re sicut nec formam¹⁸⁸⁶). Unde unitas rationis non repugnat pluralitati in re. Intelligendum tamen, quod materia potest comparari ad diversa simul existentia vel ad diversa ex se invicem successive generata. Si primo modo, sic diversorum diversa est materia prima sicut proxima. Si secundo modo, sic, prout materia eorum est una, quia una et eadem materia est aer et ignis generati¹⁸⁸⁷ ex aere, quia subiectum generationis

¹⁸⁸⁰ non *add. s. v. V*

¹⁸⁸¹) Cf. Rich. de Mediavill., In Sent., II, d. 12, q. 9, a. 1, contra 4; Brixiae 1591 161a; Petr. de Tarantas., In Sent., II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 2, contra 3; Tolosae 1652/1649 31a.

¹⁸⁸²) Cf. *supra* q. 11, sect. (39)–(41) *et infra* q. 14

¹⁸⁸³) Arist., *Metaph.*, X 8, 1058a23; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 201,13–14; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 248; Hamesse 136,35–36; Thom., In *Metaph.*, X, lect. 12, n. 2125; Cathala – Spiazzi 500b.

¹⁸⁸⁴) Cf. Averr., *Metaph.*, XII, comm. 14; Venetiis 1562 300vL–301rB.

¹⁸⁸⁵) Cf. Petr. de Tarantas., In Sent., II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 2, resp.; Tolosae 1652/1649 32a; etiam Aeg. Rom., *Hexaem.*, I, c. 9; Romae 1555 7a.

¹⁸⁸⁶) Cf. Petr. de Tarantas., In Sent., II, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 2, resp.; Tolosae 1652/1649 32a.

¹⁸⁸⁷ aer et ignis generati *an* aeris et ignis generantis *scrib.*?

manet in utroque, et ideo dicitur in *De generatione*¹⁸⁸⁸), quod eadem est materia contrariorum, quod refertur ad generata successive et non aliter¹⁸⁸⁹).

(14) Ad argumenta. Ad primum dicendum, sicut supra¹⁸⁹⁰) ad probationem dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio de fine et efficiente, et materia et forma, quia haec sunt principia intrinseca¹⁸⁹¹), et ideo, quot sunt principiata¹⁸⁹², tot sunt formae et materiae, sed illa sunt separata <a principiatis> et in illis devenitur ad unum.

(15) Ad secundum. Duplex est distinctio, actualis et potentialis; pura potentialitas distinctionem omnem actualem excludit¹⁸⁹³), distinctionem tamen¹⁸⁹⁴ potentialem permittit, et ideo sicut duae formae separatae distinguuntur actualiter, sic duae materiae potentialiter¹⁸⁹⁵).

(16) Ad tertium. Philosophus ostendit ibi¹⁸⁹⁶), quod materia non est separata a magnitudine, et intelligitur sic littera: Melius est circa omnes res ponere materiam separatam a magnitudine – ratione vero non unam, quia alia est ratio materiae et magnitudinis –, quam plures separatim existentes.

(17) Ad ultimum dicendum, quod illae materiae post resolutionem sunt duae et distinguuntur se ipsis.

(18) Ad rationes in oppositum.

(19) Ad primam dicendum, quod Philosophus¹⁸⁹⁷) loquitur de illis, quae sunt unum per materiam individualem.

(20) Ad secundam. Licet non sit una potentia in omnibus, tamen id, in quo sunt illae potentiae, est unum per indifferentias. Unde pluralitas potentiarum non facit diversitatem in materia.

(21) Ad tertiam dicendum, quod est una secundum essentiam, ita tamen, quod haec unitas non est extra rationem, sicut <nec unitas> in genere est etiam <extra rationem>.

(22) Ad quartam. Materia cuiuslibet rei est in potentia ad quidlibet vel mediate vel immediate, nisi impediatur per accidens, sicut ex materia milii non potest fieri leo, et hoc propter defectum quanti eo, quod materia, quae est in milio, non est sufficiens ad formam leonis; si tantum tamen esset de

¹⁸⁸⁸) Arist., *De gen. et corr.*, I 1, 314b29–315a2; *Judycka* 8,1–4; *Auct. Arist.*, 4, n. 1; *Hamesse* 167,36–37.

¹⁸⁸⁹) Cf. *Rich. de Mediavill.*, In *Sent.*, II, d. 12, q. 9, a. 1, arg. 5 et ad arg. 5; *Brixiae* 1591 161a et 162a; etiam *Aeg. Rom.*, *Hexaem.*, I, c. 9; *Romae* 1555 8b.

¹⁸⁹⁰) Cf. *supra* sect. (9)

¹⁸⁹¹) Cf. *Thom.*, *De prin. nat.*, 3; *Dondaine* 42,47–52.

¹⁸⁹² principiata coni.: principia V

¹⁸⁹³) Cf. *Arist.*, *Metaph.*, VII 3, 1029a20–26; transl. media: *Vuillemin-Diem* 125,28–126,7; etiam *Arist.*, *Metaph.*, I 8, 989a31–989b21; transl. media: *Vuillemin-Diem* 26,18–27,13; *Auct. Arist.*, 1, n. 160; *Hamesse* 128,77–78; *Auct. Arist.*, 1, n. 31 et 32; *Hamesse* 117,34–39; *Thom.*, In *Metaph.*, I, lect. 12, n. 196, 198; *Cathala – Spiazzi* 58a–b.

¹⁸⁹⁴ tamen: tantum *sed corr.* V

¹⁸⁹⁵) Cf. *Rich. de Mediavill.*, In *Sent.*, II, d. 12, q. 9, a. 1, resp.; *Brixiae* 1591 161b–162a.

¹⁸⁹⁶) *Arist.*, *De gen. et corr.*, I 5, 320b12–14; *Judycka* 27,6–7.

¹⁸⁹⁷) Cf. *Arist.*, *Metaph.*, V 6, 1016b31–32; transl. media: *Vuillemin-Diem* 93,26–28; *Auct. Arist.*, 1, n. 129; *Hamesse* 125,8–9; etiam *Thom.*, *Super Boet. de Trin.*, q. 4, a. 2, arg. 1 et ad arg. 1; *Gils* 122,1–8 et 125,247–252.

materia in uno sicut in alio, tunc in materia milii posset induci forma leonis per multas tamen transmutationes¹⁸⁹⁸).

¹⁸⁹⁸) Cf. Aeg. Rom., In Gen. et Corr., I; Venetiis 1567 15b–16a.

QUAESTIO XIV

UTRUM MATERIA PROXIMA ALIQUID REALE ADDAT SUPER MATERIAM PRIMAM¹⁸⁹⁹⁾

- (1) Videtur, quod sic, quia carnes et ossa, quae sunt materia hominis, addunt super materiam primam¹⁹⁰⁰⁾.
- (2) Item: Quod est indifferens ad multa, non determinatur ad unum nisi per reale additum; sed materia prima est huiusmodi¹⁹⁰¹⁾.
- (3) Item: Materia prima est una omnium, sed proxima est alia et alia, ut amara et dulcia realiter differunt.
- (4) Ad oppositum: Commune in speciali non est aliud ab eo realiter, et caetera.
- (5) Dicendum, quod dicunt quidam¹⁹⁰²⁾, quod materia proxima aliquid reale addit, quod videtur sic: Forma non inducitur in quacumque materia, sed in disposita; sed intantum dicitur disposita, quia subicitur passionibus realibus. Praeterea corpus est materia animae¹⁹⁰³⁾, sed id non est materia prima, sed aliquid additum.
- (6) Ista non concludunt, quia, licet forma inducatur in materia disposita, dispositiones tamen non manent in inductione formae. Similiter licet anima sit actus corporis, anima tamen immediate perficit materiam, quae est sub forma corporis, nec forma corporis est medium, sed dispositiones ad omnia.
- (7) Unde dicendum est ad quaestionem, quod nihil reale addit, materia tamen proxima alicui reali coniungitur, cui non coniungitur materia prima.
- (8) Declaratio primi est, quia, si materia proxima aliquid reale adderet super materiam primam, aut formam essentialem aut accidentalem; si accidentalem, duo sequuntur inconvenientia: Primum est, quod forma accidentalis praecedet inductionem formae substantialis in materia; secundum est, quod forma accidentalis participabit quiditatem speciei; si addit substantialem, aut ergo formam

¹⁸⁹⁹⁾ Eadem quaestio in Commentario Super Metaphysicam Aristotelis Ioannis Tytysdalensis praesens est, ut ex Ermatingeri testificatione scimus, cf. C. J. Ermatinger, "The fourteenth Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies: abstract of papers," in *Manuscripta* 32, Saint Louis 1988, 8–10. Cf. etiam Ms. Durham, Cathedral, MS C IV.20, ff. 153rb–153vb et Ms. Montpellier, Bibliothèque interuniversitaire, Section Médecine, H 293, ff. 107vb–108ra sed ibi pars initialis textus deest et omittitur.

¹⁹⁰⁰⁾ Cf. Thom., S. contr. Gent., IV, c. 30; Leon. 113a; Thom., In Metaph., VII, lect. 9, n. 1469; Cathala – Spiazzi 359a; etiam Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 92; Leon 558b; Thom., S. th., III, q. 5, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 88b.

¹⁹⁰¹⁾ Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 1003.

¹⁹⁰²⁾ *non inveni sed* Cf. Alb., De an. I, tract. 1, c. 7; Stroick 15,94–16,15; Alb., De an. I, tract. 2, c. 8; Stroick 38,9–18; Alb., Metaph., XI, tract. 1, c. 5; Geyer 465,20–33; Alb., Metaph., XI, tract. 1, c. 8; Geyer 470,31–41; Alb., De creat., tract. 4, q. 72, a. 1, ad arg. 12; Borgnet 737b; Alb., De V universal., tract. 4, c. 1; Noya 54,37–43.

¹⁹⁰³⁾ Thom., De prin. nat., 4; Dondaine 43,14–15.

diminutam, quae postea fiat completa – et hoc improbatum est¹⁹⁰⁴) –, aut erit forma perfecta substantialis, et tunc forma posterius adveniens est accidens, quod est impossibile.

(9) Declaratio secundi est: Materia prima nullam sibi formam determinat¹⁹⁰⁵), sed materia proxima diversorum coniuncta est cum diversis. Unde in IV *Meteororum*¹⁹⁰⁶¹⁹⁰⁷) dicitur, quod alia est materia proxima auri, alia argenti, vini et olei.

(10) Dicendum est igitur, quod materia proxima nihil reale addit super materiam primam, immo differunt secundum rationem solum. Dicitur enim prima, ut indifferens est ad omnem formam et dispositionem¹⁹⁰⁸), proxima, ut subiecta est determinatae dispositioni; sic materia dicitur naturalis, ut subiecta est qualitatibus, et dicitur mathematica, ut subiecta est dimensionibus¹⁹⁰⁹), et dicitur prima¹⁹¹⁰), ut indifferens est ad hoc et hoc; totum una materia est.

(11) Ad primum dicendum, quod carnes et ossa sunt partes, non materia, et id, cuius sunt partes, est materia¹⁹¹¹). Unde carnes et ossa non dicuntur, nisi in quantum sunt totius; ideo plus important quam materiam.

(12) Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud, quod de se est indifferens ad multa [V 162ra], si determinetur, hoc erit per alterum, et ideo materia determinatur per hoc, quod coniungitur passionibus, vel per intellectum; vel dicendum, quod materia in re determinata est, indeterminata autem est per intellectum.

(13) Ad tertium: Licet materia diversa sit in his et materia prima una, non tamen aliquid reale addit, sicut species potest definiri, genus autem non; et tamen species nihil reale addit super genus, nec e converso; sic et in proposito.

¹⁹⁰⁴) Cf. *supra* q. 12

¹⁹⁰⁵) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 3, 1029a20–26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,28–126,7; etiam Arist., *Metaph.*, I 8, 989a31–989b21; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 26,18–27,13; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,77–78; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 31 et 32; Hamesse 117,34–39.

¹⁹⁰⁶ *Meteororum add. dicendum sed. exp. V*

¹⁹⁰⁷) Cf. Arist., *Meteor.*, IV 10, 388a10–389a25; transl. Henrici Aristippi: Rubino 34,591–37,665; etiam Alb., *Metaph.*, V, tract. 1, c. 5; Geyer 220,36–50.

¹⁹⁰⁸) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 1003; etiam Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 3, 1029a20–26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,28–126,7; Arist., *Metaph.*, I 8, 989a31–989b21; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 26,18–27,13; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,77–78; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 31 et 32; Hamesse 117,34–39.

¹⁹⁰⁹) Cf. Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Leon. 331b.

¹⁹¹⁰) Cf. *supra* in eadem sect.

¹⁹¹¹) Cf. Thom., In *Phys.*, II, lect. 5, n. 179; Maggiolo 92b; Thom., In *Phys.*, II, lect. 15, n. 274; Maggiolo 135b; etiam Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Leon. 331b.

QUAESTIO XV

UTRUM THEOLOGIA SIT SCIENTIA PRACTICA VEL SPECULATIVA

(1) Ad intellectum huius quaestionis videnda sunt duo.

(2) Primo, unde practicum et speculativum sit accipiendum.

(3) Secundo, quid de opinionibus quorundam sit sentiendum.

(2) Quantum ad primum pertinet, tunc inveniuntur quattuor modi dicendi.

(3) Quidam¹⁹¹²) dicunt, quod distinguuntur ex tribus aequaliter, scilicet ex parte obiectorum, quia secundum Aristotelem VI *Ethicorum*¹⁹¹³) speculativa est de non operabili, et ex parte modi, quia practicum applicat ad opus, et ex parte finis, quia speculativae finis est verum in I *Metaphysicae*¹⁹¹⁴).

(4) Sed hoc stare non potest. Sicut enim ex his, quae sunt per artem, iudicamus de his, quae sunt per naturam, quando ea, quae sunt artis, sunt necessaria, quod communiter contingit, sicut II *De anima*¹⁹¹⁵) facit Philosophus de dolabra, ita et e converso, quando naturalia sunt nobis magis nota; sed hoc videmus in naturalibus, quod idem est causa essendi et distinguendi, scilicet forma¹⁹¹⁶). Etsi res constituatur ex materia et forma, tamen non est ante formam, et etiam principalius est unumquodque per formam quam per materiam¹⁹¹⁷).

(5) Unde sunt alii¹⁹¹⁸), qui dicunt, quod practica et speculativa differunt solum per obiecta. Hoc enim proprium est actu¹⁹¹⁹ distingui per obiecta, II *De anima*¹⁹²⁰). Item III *De anima*¹⁹²¹)

¹⁹¹²) Cf. Henr. de Gand., Summa a. 36, q. 4, resp.; Wilson 106,24–107,36; etiam Ps.-Aeg. Rom., Sup. Isag. Porph., access.; Luna 285,377–387.

¹⁹¹³) Arist., Eth. Nic. VI, 2, 1138b35–1139a16; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 253,5–23.

¹⁹¹⁴) Arist., Metaph. II, 1, 993b20–21; transl. media: Vuillemin–Diem 36,21–37,22; Auct. Arist. 1, n. 39; Hamesse 118,52; cf. etiam Thom., In Metaph. II, lec. 2, n. 290; Cathala–Spiazzi 84a–b; Thom., De ver. q. 5, a. 1, resp.; Dondaine 137,93–98; Thom., S. th. I, q. 79, a. 11, resp.; Leon. 278a; Thom., Super Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, resp.; Gils 137,93–102.

¹⁹¹⁵) Arist., De an., II 1, 412b10–17; transl. vetus: Stroick 67,68–71; cf. etiam Alb., De an., II, tract. 1, c. 3; Stroick 68,83–69,17; Thom., In De an., II, 2; Leon. 75,43–80.

¹⁹¹⁶) Cf. Arist., Metaph., VII 13, 1039a7; VII 17, 1041b8; transl. media: Vuillemin–Diem 149,5–6; 155,6–7; Auct. Arist. 1, n. 187–189; Hamesse 130,12–14; etiam Thom., In Metaph., VII, lect. 13, n. 1588; lect. 17, n. 1668; Cathala – Spiazzi 381a; 397b.

¹⁹¹⁷) Arist., Metaph., VII 3, 1028b36–1029a7; VIII 1, 1042a25–32; transl. media: Vuillemin–Diem 125,9–17; 158,5–12; Auct. Arist. 1, n. 199–202; Hamesse 131,36–132,42; et etiam Thom., In Metaph., VII, lect. 2, n. 1278–1279; Cathala – Spiazzi 321b–322a.

¹⁹¹⁸) Cf. e. g. Averr., In Moral. Nic. Exp., VI, 2; Venetiis 1562 81vK–82rA; etiam Avic., Metaph., I, c. 1; Van Riet 1,7–2,19; et etiam God. de Font., Quodl. XIII, q. 1, resp.; Hoffmans 169–170; Thom., S. th., I–II, q. 54, a. 2, sed contra; Leon. 342a; et etiam Rob. Cowt., In Sent., prol., q. 7, a. 1; Theissing 311,28–33.

¹⁹¹⁹ actuum: actu non *sed corr.* V

¹⁹²⁰) Arist., De an., II 4, 415a20–22; transl. vetus: Stroick 83,59–61; cf. etiam Thom., In De an., II, 6; Leon. 93,131–94,172; cf. etiam Thom., In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 5, ad arg. 4; Mandonnet – Moos 407; Thom., In II Sent., d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 1124; Thom., De ver., q. 22, a. 14, arg. 4; Dondaine 647,27–30; Thom., De ver., q. 26, a. 4,

“scientiae secantur sicut et res”. Et determinantes se aliqui¹⁹²²) dicunt, quod speculativa est, quae considerat verum, practica autem volitum sive bonum sub ratione boni; et hoc probant, quia, sicut speculativa¹⁹²³ procedit ex principiis ad conclusiones, ita practica ex fine ad ea, quae sunt ad finem, II *Physicorum*¹⁹²⁴); finis autem habet rationem voliti sive boni.

(6) Sed primum horum est insufficiens, secundum vero falsum.

(7) Primum patet, quia constat, quod materialis diversitas obiectorum non diversificat habitus, sed formalis, non autem formalis secundum genus, quia hoc facit diversitatem habituum: secundum speciem¹⁹²⁵). Nos autem non loquimur hic de diversitate horum, ut sunt habitus quidam, cum habitus etiam diversificentur secundum principia activa talium dispositionum et etiam secundum diversitatem naturarum et etiam secundum diversitatem finium¹⁹²⁶), sed loquimur †. Unde talis habitus dicatur practicus vel speculativus.

(8) Secundum non valet, quia bonum sive volitum inquantum huiusmodi pertinet ad aliam potentiam quam verum, scilicet ad voluntatem; sed obiectum practici intellectus est bonum non sub ratione boni, sed veri, sicut e converso verum est obiectum voluntatis non inquantum huiusmodi, sed inquantum bonum.¹⁹²⁷)

(9) Unde dicunt alii¹⁹²⁸), quod distinguuntur in modo, quia speculativus considerat absolute, practicus in relatione ad opus. Sed iste modus non differt a termino¹⁹²⁹ prius dicto, quia hoc est fine differre, inquantum speculativus non intendit nisi verum, practicus autem opus; et praeterea in omnibus videmus, quod diversitas modi sumitur a fine.

(10) Unde melius dicitur, quod speculativus et practicus differunt fine secundum Philosophum II *Metaphysicae*¹⁹³⁰), quia speculativus solum vult scire, practicus operari¹⁹³¹¹⁹³²), et ideo dicit

sed contra 1; Dondaine 760,50–51; Thom., S. th., I, q. 77, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 241a–b; Thom., Super Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, resp.; Gils 138,113–126; Thom., S. contr. Gent., III, c. 56; Leon. 155a; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; I, q. 1, art. 7 resp.; Leon. 12a.

¹⁹²¹) Arist., De an., III 8, 431b24–25; transl. vetus: Stroick 233,73; cf. Thom., In I Sent., q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Oliva 327,26–328,30; etiam Thom., In Gen. et Corr., proem.; Leon. 262a.

¹⁹²²) Cf. Henr. de Gand., Summa, a. 49, q. 5, ad arg. 3; Führer 97,343–98,365.

¹⁹²³ speculativa *coni.*: speculativus V

¹⁹²⁴) Arist., Phys., II 9, 200a19–24; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 93,7–94,1; Auct. Arist., 2, n. 91; Hamesse 147,52–53; Thom., In Phys. II, lect. 15, n. 273; Maggiolo 135a.

¹⁹²⁵) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de virt. in comm., q. 2, art. 4, resp.; Odetto 763a; Thom., In De an., II, 6; Leon. 93,131–94,172; Thom., Exp. Post., I, 41; Gauthier 154,241–251; Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 54, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Leon. 341b–342a.

¹⁹²⁶) Cf. Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 54 a. 2, resp. et ad 1–3; Leon. 342a–343b.

¹⁹²⁷) Thom., S. th., I, q. 79, a. 11, resp. et ad arg. 2; Leon. 278b–279b; cf. etiam Thom., S. th. I-II, q. 8, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 70a–b; Thom., In I Sent., d. 45, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; Mandonnet – Moos 1035.

¹⁹²⁸) Thom., In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 3, quaestiu. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 732; cf. etiam Thom., S. th., I, q. 79, a. 11, resp. et ad arg. 2; Leon. 278b–279b.

¹⁹²⁹ a termino: actio *sed corr.* V

¹⁹³⁰) Auct. Arist., 1, n. 39; Hamesse 118,52; Arist., Metaph., II 1, 993b20–21; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 37,1; cf. Thom., In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 3, quaestiu. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 733.

¹⁹³¹ operari *an* operare *scrib.*?

¹⁹³²) Cf. Themist., De anim., VI; Verbeke 255,23–25; etiam Thom., In De an., III, 6, 431b10; Leon. 233,223–250.

Philosophus III *De anima*¹⁹³³), quod “speculativus extensione”, scilicet ad opus, “fit practicus”, et ex isto fine aliae omnes subdifferentiae accipiuntur, quia et finis obiective consideratur et ex fine ratio facti¹⁹³⁴ accipitur et finis¹⁹³⁵ movet activa principia.

(11) Circa secundum principale invenio quattuor opiniones.

(12) Una est, quae dicit, quod est affectiva¹⁹³⁶), et hoc probant et declarant.

(13) Probant, quia Apostolus dicit I *Tim.* 1¹⁹³⁷): “Finis praecepti caritas”. Item in *Matth.*¹⁹³⁸) dicit dominus, quod “in his duobus”, scilicet diligere Deum et proximum sicut te ipsum, “pendet universa lex et prophetae”; theologia autem continetur in lege et prophetiis. Item in statu viae diligere est melius, finis autem est optimum¹⁹³⁹), ergo diligere est finis; ab hoc ergo est denominanda; ergo est affectiva¹⁹⁴⁰).

(14) Declarant se et dicunt, quod affectio non dicitur hic, prout sequitur actum intellectus, sed prout respicit obiectum, quia in aliis scientiis etiam aliquis delectatur in consideratione veritatis et non in obiecto; sed theologia est affectiva ab affectione obiecti, scilicet Dei.

(15) Sed ista opinio non potest stare. Primo, quia non est dare scientiam, quae neque sit speculativa neque practica, sicut isti volunt, quia scientia est habitus intellectus¹⁹⁴¹). Omne autem, quod cadit sub consideratione intellectus, vel est tale, quod intellectus est eius tantum considerativus, vel operativus, non est dare medium; respectu primi est speculativus, respectu secundi est operativus sive practicus¹⁹⁴²). Nec dico, quod omnis intellectus vel est causatus a re vel causat res propter intellectum angelicum, sed prima divisio est vera in omni intellectu.

(16) Item sapientia, quae ponitur, virtus est intellectualis et est speculativa¹⁹⁴³), VI *Ethicorum*¹⁹⁴⁴).

¹⁹³³) Arist., *De an.*, III 9, 433a1–3; transl. vetus: Stroick 230,89–90; G. Queneau, “Origine de la sentence « Intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus » et date du Commentaire du « De anima » de S. Albert le Grand,” in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 21 (1954), 307–312 et J. E. Naus, *The Nature of the Practical Intellect According to Saint Thomas Aquinas*, (*Analecta Gregoriana* 108), 1959, spec. 23–26; cf. Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 79, a. 11, sed contra; Leon. 278a–b; Thom., *S. th.*, II-II, q. 4, a. 2, ad arg. 3; Leon. 45b; etiam Alb., *De homine*, I, 1, 2, 5, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 3, 3, resp.; Anzulewicz – Söder 295,70–74; etiam Alb., *De homine*, I, 1, 2, 5, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 1, 4, arg. 1 et resp.; Anzulewicz – Söder 484,20–29; 485,1–5; Alb., *Super Dion. De div. nom.*, c. 4, 2; Simon 114,11–14; Alb., *S. th.*, II, tract. 4, q. 14, m. 3, a. 1, quaestiu. 1, arg. 1; Borgnet 172a; Bonav., *In Sent. II*, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, arg. 2; Quaracchi 1885 558a; Bonav., *In Sent. III*, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2, resp.; Quaracchi 1887 475b; Petr. de Tarantas., *In Sent.*, I, prol., a. 4, resp.; Tolosae 1652 5a; et etiam Vincent. Bellovacen., *Specul. natural.*, 27, c. 58; Dauci 1624 1958.

¹⁹³⁴ ratio facti *lac. sed corr. ex a. m. V*

¹⁹³⁵ finis: fine *sed corr. V*

¹⁹³⁶) Aeg. Rom., *In I Super Sent.*, prol., q. 3, a. 4, resp.; Corduba 1699 30bC–31bD, spec. 30bD–31aD; cf. Alb., *In I Sent.*, prol., d. 1, c. 1, a. 3, rep. et ad arg. 2; Burger 14,22–40; 14,56–15,17; etiam Bonav., *In Sent. I*, prol., q. 3, resp.; Quaracchi 1882 13a–b; Rob. De Orf., *Reprob. Egid.*, prol., q. 5, resp.; Vella 45–47.

¹⁹³⁷) *Ad I Tim.* 1,5.

¹⁹³⁸) *Matth.* 22,39–40.

¹⁹³⁹) Cf. Auct. Arist., 1, n. 122; Hamesse 125,96; Arist., *Metaph.*, V 2, 1013b26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 86,10–12.

¹⁹⁴⁰) Cf. God. de Font., *Quodl. XIII*, q. 1, arg. 3; Hoffmans 169.

¹⁹⁴¹) Arist., *Eth. Nic.*, VI 3, 1139b14–16; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 255,13–15.

¹⁹⁴²) Cf. God. de Font., *Quodl. XIII*, q. 1, resp.; Hoffmans 170.

¹⁹⁴³) Cf. Thom., *S. th. I-II*, q. 57, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 365a–b.

(17) Item sapientia, quae est donum, quae nobilior est quam theologia, quae elicitur ex habitu fidei, ponitur etiam habitus speculativus de divinis, per quae de omnibus iudicat [V 162rb] multo rectius; ergo sapientia <est plus speculativa quam> theologia¹⁹⁴⁵).

(18) Item declaratio non valet, quia, si dicitur affectiva ab affectione obiecti, tunc malus theologus, qui non habet affectionem, neque habet scientiam, quod fatuum est dicere.

(19) Item, quod dicunt isti solum scientiae esse proprium, falsum est, »quia Philosophus XI *De animalibus* dicit, quod “amans in parva comprehensione amati magis delectatur quam in magna aliorum comprehensione”¹⁹⁴⁶); et ideo, ut ipse dicit, illud parvum, quod de substantiis separatis cognoscere possumus, plus desideratur et delectat quam quidquid de aliis rebus cognoscimus«¹⁹⁴⁷). Constat autem, quod Philosophus propter istam delectationem vel desiderium non dixit talem scientiam affectivam, quasi non esset speculativa vel practica.

(20) Item effectus communis numquam dividitur contra causam; sed affectio sequitur et intellectum speculativum et practicum.

(21) Item sapientia donum dicitur¹⁹⁴⁸ a sapore¹⁹⁴⁹), affectiva propter affectionem praecedentem, secundum quod aliquis “patiendi divina, didicit¹⁹⁵⁰ divina”, sicut de Ierotheo dicit Dionysius 2 cap. *De divinis nominibus*¹⁹⁵¹), et tamen hoc non dicit differentiam aliquam scientiae, sed dicitur eo modo affectiva sicut et sancta vel salubris et huiusmodi.

(22) Ad rationes dicendum, quod dicit “finis praecepti”, ubi dicit “scientiae”¹⁹⁵²), et ideo concedo, quod theologia, prout est practica, ordinatur ad caritatem in hac vita.

(23) Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsum diligere ordinatur ad opus secundum illud *Ioann.* XIV¹⁹⁵³): “Si quis diligit me, sermonem meum servabit” in opere. Glossa Gregorii in *Homilia*¹⁹⁵⁴): “Probatio dilectionis¹⁹⁵⁵ est exhibitio operis” et idem¹⁹⁵⁶¹⁹⁵⁷) “amor Dei numquam est otiosus, operatur magna, si est”. Unde “caritas meretur augeri, ut aucta¹⁹⁵⁸ mereatur perfici”¹⁹⁵⁹).

¹⁹⁴⁴) Arist., Eth. Nic., VI 3 et 7, 1139b14–16 et 1141a17–20; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 255,13–15 et 259,17–22.

¹⁹⁴⁵) Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 45, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Leon. 340a–b; Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 45, a. 3, resp. et ad arg. 1; Leon. 341b–342b.

¹⁹⁴⁶) Arist., De part. animal., I 5, 644b24–645a1; transl. Scoti: van Oppenraaij 26–27.

¹⁹⁴⁷) Thom., In III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, quaestium. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 1199.

¹⁹⁴⁸ dicitur *coni.*: dicit V

¹⁹⁴⁹) *Eccl.* 6,23; Isidor., Etym. X, 240; Lindsay 420,7–11; Guill. Altiss., S. aur., III, tract. 34, c. 5; Ribaillier 663,11–17; cf. etiam Bonav., In Sent. III, d. 35, a. un., q. 1, ad arg. 1; Quaracchi 1887 773a–b.

¹⁹⁵⁰ didicit *coni ex Dionysio*: discit V

¹⁹⁵¹) Alb., Sent., III, d. 35A, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Borgnet 645a; Dion., De div. nom., c. 2, 9; PG 3,648B; Suchla 134,1–1; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 104C ex Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 2, 69; Simon 87,66–67.

¹⁹⁵²) *Ad I Tim.* 1,5.

¹⁹⁵³) *Ioh.* 14,23.

¹⁹⁵⁴) Greg., In ev. hom. XXX, n. 1; Étaix 256,14–15.

¹⁹⁵⁵ deliectionis: dilectio modo *sed corr. V*

¹⁹⁵⁶ idem: ratio *sed corr. V*

¹⁹⁵⁷) Greg., In ev. hom. XXX, n. 2; Étaix 257,43–44.

¹⁹⁵⁸ aucta *coni*: aut V

(24) Ad tertium dicendum, quod dato, quod caritas esset melius et finis, tamen nulla scientia denominatur a tali, sicut ethica non denominatur a virtutibus intellectualibus neque a beatitudine, sed ab operatione, quam intendit, sicut generalem finem felicitatem considerat, ut alliciat ad operationem, sicut ostenso fine homo allicitur ad ea, per quae disponitur ad finem.

(25) Secunda opinio¹⁹⁶⁰) est, quae dicit, quod aequaliter sit speculativa et practica et quod theologia non sit una scientia simpliciter, sed plures. Haec est quaestio “utrum sit una scientia vel plures”, una autem secundum quid, inquantum scilicet uniuntur in uno fine extra, scilicet beatitudine, et ideo aequaliter intendit de operabili et non operabili¹⁹⁶¹, cum amborum cognitio sit necessaria ad finem extra.

(26) Sed istud non videtur verum pro utraque parte.

(27) Quantum ad primum, quia, sicut videmus, quod unum aliquando ordinatur ad diversa et diversa aliquando ad unum, ita etiam aliquando unum causatur vel procedit a diversis et aliquando diversa ab uno, sed numquam unum procedit a diversis nisi ab uno praesentibus, sicut compositum magis est a forma quam materia¹⁹⁶²), et in causis efficientibus ordinatis eodem modo, immo etiam in divinis Spiritus Sanctus, licet non principaliter a Patre, tamen ordine quodam, propter quod auctoritas est in Patre, a quo habet Filius, ut ab ipso procedat Spiritus sanctus, ita nec unum ordinatur ad diversos fines aequaliter. Dictum est autem supra¹⁹⁶³), quod practicum et speculativum differunt fine. Ergo theologia non aequaliter erit practica et speculativa.

(28) Item sicut nec plura procedunt ab uno nisi ordine principalitatis in creaturis, sicut patet de potentiis animae et quibuscumque aliis, ita etiam si sunt plures scientiae, theologia vel plura in ea considerata non aequaliter se habebunt ad finem. Unde et in diligentibus et in articulis et in sperandis est ordo et principalitas.

(29) Item si non est una nisi ex fine extra, ex quo non habent, ut dicantur speculativa vel practica, sed ex operabili, tunc sunt realiter diversi habitus theologiae¹⁹⁶⁴; et tunc positio nulla, quia unus habitus erit speculativus tantum, alius practicus tantum.

(30) Secundum non valet, quia nulla scientia recipit unitatem¹⁹⁶⁵ ex fine extra, sed ex unitate rationis sui subiecti¹⁹⁶⁶). Nec potest dici plures propter plura considerata, quia unam induunt rationem subiecti, scilicet revelabilitatis, sicut in alia quaestione dictum est de subiecto¹⁹⁶⁷).

¹⁹⁵⁹) Aug., Ep. CLXXXVI, c. 3, 10; PL 33, 819.

¹⁹⁶⁰) God. de Font., Quodl. XIII, q. 1, resp.; Hoffmans 174–176.

¹⁹⁶¹ operabili *coni.*: comparabili V

¹⁹⁶²) Cf. Arist., Metaph., VII 3, 1028b36–1029a7; VII 17, 1041b8; VIII 1, 1042a25–32; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,9–17; 155,6–7; 158,5–12; Auct. Arist. 1, n. n. 187–189; 199–202; Hamesse 130,13–14; 131,36–132,42; etiam Thom., In Metaph., VII, lect. 2, n. 1278–1279; VII, lect. 13, n. 1588; lect. 17, n. 1668; Cathala – Spiazzi 321b–322a; 381a; 397b.

¹⁹⁶³) Cf. *supra* sect. (10)

¹⁹⁶⁴ theologiae *coni.*: theologia V

¹⁹⁶⁵ unitatem *coni.*: virtutem V

(31) Tertia opinio¹⁹⁶⁸) est, quod est practica principaliter, et hoc ostendunt, quia theologia est scientia fidei; “fides autem sine operibus mortua est”, *Iac.*¹⁹⁶⁹); mortuum autem non est, ergo nec theologia dicitur scientia, nisi in quantum est de operibus. Item secundum Augustinum¹⁹⁷⁰) theologia est scientia de his, quae ad salutem hominis pertinent; sed *Marc.* IX¹⁹⁷¹) dicitur: “Si vis ingredi vitam, conserva mandata”.

(32) Sed hoc stare non potest, quia nulla practica scientia dignior est omnibus aliis, nec iudicat de omnibus. Ista autem est caput et domina; aliae autem dicuntur ancillae eius, *Prov.*¹⁹⁷²), et “quidquid alibi invenitur, si noxium est, ibi”, scilicet in theologia secundum Augustinum¹⁹⁷³), “damnatur¹⁹⁷⁴; si utile, ibi invenitur”.

(33) Nec rationes cogunt, quia fides dicitur mortua, quia fides non sit, sed quia caret vita gratiae et gloriae; sic et pravus theologus sine operibus scientiam haberet, sed hac vita careret.

(34) Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus¹⁹⁷⁵) consequenter dicit, quia dicitur *Ioann.*¹⁹⁷⁶) vel “haec autem scripta sunt, ut credatis” et “ut credentes, vitam habeatis” et caetera, sed quando dicimus “si vis ingredi”¹⁹⁷⁷) et caetera [V 162va], concedo, quod nec servare mandata sine cognitione, nec cognoscere¹⁹⁷⁸ sine servare in eo, qui potest sufficere¹⁹⁷⁹ ad vitam gloriae; potest tamen esse theologus et habere scientiam istam sine mandatorum observatione.

(35) Et ideo est quarta opinio, quae dicit, quod est speculativa et practica una simpliciter existens¹⁹⁸⁰, sed magis speculativa quam practica¹⁹⁸¹).

(36) Istud primo probatur, secundo declaratur.

(37) Primo sic, quia dicit Boethius in libro *De Trinitate* cap. 5¹⁹⁸²), quod scientiae speculativae sunt tres, scilicet theologia, mathematica et naturalis. Per theologiam non intelligit ibi nisi nostram, quae

¹⁹⁶⁶) Arist., Anal. post., I 28, 87a38; transl. Iacobi: Minio-Paluello – Dod 60,21–61,23; cf. Alb., In I Sent., d. 1, c. 1, a. 2; Burger 12,66–69; Alb., S. th., tract. 1, ; Siedler 11,93–12,1; Alb., Anal. Post., I, tract. 5, c. 6; Borgnet 140a; Thom., Exp. Post., I, 41, 87a39; I, 42, 87b19; Gauthier 154,231–235; 157,8–12; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 3, arg. 1; Leon. 11a; Thom., S. th., III, q. 11, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 164b; Thom., Quaest. disp. de virt. card., q. un., a. 3, resp.; Odetto 823a.

¹⁹⁶⁷) Cf. *supra* q. 10, resp.: “Utrum Deus sit subiectum in theologia”

¹⁹⁶⁸) Rich. de Mediavill., In Sent., prol., q. 4, resp.; Brixiae 1591 7b; et etiam Pecham, Super Sent., prol. q. 2, a. 2, p. 2, resp.; de Benedittis [forthcoming] (F, 5ra; N, 5ra); cf. Bonav., In Sent. I, prol., q. 3, resp.; Quaracchi 1882 13a–b.

¹⁹⁶⁹) *Iac.*, 2,26.

¹⁹⁷⁰) Aug., De Trin., XIV, 1, 3; Mountain – Glorie 424,59–67; cf. etiam Alb., S. th., I, tract. 1, q. 2, arg. 1; Siedler 8,9–11; Alex. Hal., S. th., I, n. 1, sed contra 2; Quaracchi 1924 2a; Thom., In I Sent., q. 1, a. 3, quaestiu. 1, sed contra; Oliva 319,22–23.

¹⁹⁷¹) *rectius Matth.*, 19,17.

¹⁹⁷²) *Prov.*, 9,1–3.

¹⁹⁷³) Aug., De doctr. chr., II, 42; Martin 76,6–8.

¹⁹⁷⁴ damnatur *coni. ex Augustino*: damnatione V

¹⁹⁷⁵) Aug., De Trin., XIV, 1, 3; Mountain – Glorie 424,59–67.

¹⁹⁷⁶) *Ioh.*, 20,31.

¹⁹⁷⁷) *Matth.* 19,17.

¹⁹⁷⁸ cognoscere *coni.*: congrue V

¹⁹⁷⁹ sufficere *coni.*: sufficiunt V

¹⁹⁸⁰ existens *add.* quae dicit, quod speculativa et practica una existens *sed del. V*

¹⁹⁸¹) Thom., In I Sent., q. 1, a. 3, quaestiu. 1, resp.; Oliva 320,30–36; Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Leon 14a.

est de Deo, non metaphysicam¹⁹⁸³, quae est de ente simpliciter, quia post declarat se et dicit, quod theologia est de his, quae sunt sine motu et materia sicut substantia Dei.

(38) Item hoc concordat cum nomine, quia dicitur theologia quasi sermo de Deo¹⁹⁸⁴).

(39) Item hoc est necessarium ex praedictis, quia dictum est¹⁹⁸⁵), quod Deus tantum proprie est subiectum huius scientiae, sed illa¹⁹⁸⁶ cadit sub speculativa.

(40) Item hoc ostenditur ex principiis, scilicet articulis, qui parum vel nihil dicunt¹⁹⁸⁷ de operabili, sed de scibili.

(41) Et praeterea ipse doctor huiusmodi et auctor scientiae dicit *Ioann.*¹⁹⁸⁸): ad “hoc natus sum et ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati”. Veritas autem est subiectum huiusmodi.

(42) Item Ioannes baptista dicebat propositio¹⁹⁸⁹ “ego veni in aqua baptizans”, *Ioann.* 3¹⁹⁹⁰).

(43) Secundo sic, quia ista scientia est “quaedam emanatio claritatis Dei”, sicut dicitur *Eccli.*¹⁹⁹¹). Unde sicut claritas Dei, quae est sua sapientia eadem existens, est simul speculativa et practica – per eam omnia videt et operatur –, ita et ista propter unitatem luminis infusi, et sicut primo per illam videt se et alia et deinde alia operatur, ita et ista principaliter est considerativa Dei, et quia homo habens istam scientiam ordinatur ad alium finem, ideo ex consequenti oportet operari; et hoc ad nullam aliam pertinet quam ad istam, quae finem ostendit; et ideo est principaliter speculativa, secundo practica¹⁹⁹²).

(44) Notandum tamen ad hunc intellectum, quod scientia est medium¹⁹⁹³ inter subiectum et obiectum¹⁹⁹⁴). Potest ergo dici aliqua scientia speculativa vel practica ex parte subiecti, et sic homo intendens in qualibet scientia verum scire tantum sicut in medicina vel ethica dicitur speculativus; et e converso intendens logicam vel philosophiam propter lucrum, non propter veritatem, dicitur

¹⁹⁸²) Boeth., *De trin.*, II; Moreschini 168,64–171,120, *spec.* 169,76–78.

¹⁹⁸³ metaphysicam: physicam *sed corr. i m. V*

¹⁹⁸⁴) Isidor., *Etym.* VIII, 6, n. 18; Lindsay 318,26–28 “Dicit autem theologi, quoniam in scriptis suis de Deo dixerunt. Quorum varia constat opinio, quid Deus dum quaererent”; cf. *e. g.* Thom., *In I Sent.*, q. 1, a. 4, arg. 1; Oliva 325,2–326,3; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 1, a. 7, *sed contra*; Leon. 19a; Alb., *In I Sent.*, d. 1, c. 1, arg. 3; Burger 11,45–48; Aug. de *Dac.*, *Rotol. Pugillar.*, tract. I; Walz 255; Guill. de Conch., *Glos. sup. Boet. Consol.*, I, pr. 1; Nauta 31,306–307; Henr. de Gand., *Summa*, prol.; Wilson 3,2–5; Hugon. de Sanct. Victor., *Didascal.*, II; Narvaja 347,18–21; Odo Rgald., *Lectura*, I, d. 1, p. I, q. 1, n. 6, arg. 4; Sileo 97,30–33; etiam Alb., *Super Dion. De div. nom.*, c. 12, 7; Simon 430,34–36; Ioann. Damasc., *De fide orthod.*, I, c. 9, n. 3; Kotter 31,14–15; Buytaert 49,20–23; cf. *supra* q. 10: “Utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae”, sect. (35).

¹⁹⁸⁵) Cf. *supra* sect. (37–38) et etiam q. 10 “Utrum Deus sit subiectum theologiae” sect. (35–65); cf. etiam Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 1, a. 7, resp.; Leon. 19a–b.

¹⁹⁸⁶ illa *coni.*: ille *V*

¹⁹⁸⁷ dicunt: dcutum *sed corr. V*

¹⁹⁸⁸) *Ioh.*, 18,37.

¹⁹⁸⁹) *propositio coni.*: propter *V*

¹⁹⁹⁰) *rectius Ioh.*, 1,31.

¹⁹⁹¹) *resctius Sap.*, 7,25.

¹⁹⁹²) Cf. Thom., *In I Sent.*, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiu. 1, resp. et ad arg. 1; Oliva 320,30–36; 322,48–51; et etiam Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 14a.

¹⁹⁹³ medium *an media scrib.*?

¹⁹⁹⁴) Cf. Thom., *De ver.*, q. 2, a. 13, resp.; Dondaine 88,83–84.

practicus; sed hoc est secundum quid; unde hoc magis est dicere intellectum practicum vel speculativum quam scientiam, quia ab actu iudicatur intellectus, ab aptitudine dicitur scientia speculativa vel practica, etiamsi intelligens aliud intendat, sed simpliciter speculativa vel practica sumitur ex natura ipsius rei scibilis¹⁹⁹⁵, et hoc contingit tripliciter. Est enim aliquod scibile, quod de se nullam habet relationem ad opus, sicut scire, quod “triangulus habet” et caetera, et talis est pure speculativa; aliquod est, quod totaliter habet relationem ad opus, sicut actus humani, et talis pure est practica; aliquod autem est, quod et de se magnam habet dignitatem quantum ad considerationem et tamen potest esse regula agendorum, sicut astrologia, in qua aliqua considerantur respectu operis, puta navigandi; talis est principaliter speculativa, quia considerat astra et motus, et secundo practica. Talis est theologia, quae principaliter Deum considerat, quae tamen est regula agendorum.

(45) Est autem duplex opinio: unde sive a quo fine sumatur speculativa esse – quidam¹⁹⁹⁶) dicunt, quod a fine patriae, scilicet beatitudine – sive sit in intellectu sive in affectu, quia ipsa suum obiectum ostendit affectui, et ideo secundum utrosque ab hoc fine speculativa.

(46) Sed hoc non videtur mihi, cuius ratio est duplex, una, quod speculativa est propter scire¹⁹⁹⁷); aut ergo propter scire secundum habitum, scilicet theologiae, aut propter alium habitum; non propter alium, quia nulla scientia perficitur ad alterius habitus scire; sed scire secundum theologiam non est patriae; ergo et caetera.

(47) Praeterea ab eodem scire non potest dupliciter¹⁹⁹⁸ scientia nominari, sed a scire patriae dicitur scientia patriae speculativa; item speculativa dicitur scientia, quia potest speculari; sed habito illo scire patriae non potest speculari secundum theologiam, quia scientia nostra tunc est evacuata¹⁹⁹⁹).

¹⁹⁹⁵ *scibilis coni: stabilis V*

¹⁹⁹⁶) Cf. Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, prol., q. 8, resp.; Muller 25,96-29; etiam Thom., In I Sent., q. 1, a. 3, quaestiu. 1, resp. et ad arg. 1; Oliva 320,30–36; 322,48–51; et etiam Thom., S. th., I, q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 14a.

¹⁹⁹⁷) Cf. Themist., De anim., VI; Verbeke 255,23–25; etiam Thom., In De an., III, 6, 431b10; Leon. 233,223–250.

¹⁹⁹⁸ *dupliciter an duplex scrib.?*

¹⁹⁹⁹) *I Cor.* 13,9–10.

QUAESTIO XVI

UTRUM ANIMA SIT COMPOSITA EX MATERIA ET FORMA

(1) Dicendum est hic, quod apud antiquos fuerunt de anima diversi errores quibusdam dicentibus, quod anima sit quoddam unum elementum, aliis, quod sit composita ex elementis vel ex omnibus, ut omnia cognosceret, et multi tales, quos Philosophus I *De anima*²⁰⁰⁰) reprobat, et quia rudes erant, relinquuntur ad praesens.

(2) Sed quantum ad modernos pertinet, inveniuntur quattuor opiniones.

(3) »Prima²⁰⁰¹) est, quae dicit, quod non solum in anima, sed in omni substantia spirituali est compositio ex materia et forma et quod eius materia est eiusdem rationis cum materia rerum corporalium. Et ista opinio primo fuit cuiusdam Avicbron in libro *Fontis vitae*²⁰⁰²). Ratio autem movens eum fuit, quod dicit: Ubi cumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, ibi est materia; ubi proprietates sunt materiae, ibi sunt esse in potentia, recipere, subici; et quia hoc competit animae et substantiis separatis, ideo et caetera.

(4) Sed hoc frivolum est, quia ex aequivocis nihil potest concludi nisi |V 162vb| aequivocum. Cum ergo ista dicantur aequivoce de materia et de anima, oportet etiam esse aequivoce dictam materiam in anima; hoc autem non quaerimus. Quod autem illud non secundum eandem rationem dicatur in substantia separata et in materia prima, sic patet: Materia prima nihil recipit nisi cum transmutatione et motu, et quia omnis transmutatio et motus reducuntur ad motum localem sicut ad primum et communiorem, ut probatur III *Physicorum*²⁰⁰³), relinquitur, quod materia in illis sit tantum, in quibus est potentia ad ubi. Huiusmodi autem sunt corporalia, quae loco circumscribuntur. Unde materia²⁰⁰⁴ non invenitur nisi in corporalibus, secundum quod physici locuti sunt de materia. Unde Philosophus I *Metaphysicae*²⁰⁰⁵) dicit, quod necesse est imaginari materiam in re mota²⁰⁰⁶²⁰⁰⁷). Anima autem recipit contrario modo, quia sine motu, secundum quod dicitur VII *Physicorum*²⁰⁰⁸), quod anima sedendo et quiescendo fit sciens et prudens, nec in tali receptione transmutatur, sed

²⁰⁰⁰) Arist., *De an.*, I 2–5, 403b24–411b31; Strocik 17,59–61,81.

²⁰⁰¹) Thom., *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 3 et resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 85 et 86.

²⁰⁰²) Avenc., *Fons vitae*, IV, *spec.* c. 7 et 10; Beumker 211–256, *spec.* 226,8–10 et 233,1–11; cf. Thom., *S. th.*, q. 50, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 5b.

²⁰⁰³) *potius* Arist., *Physic.*, VIII 7, 261a27 – 28; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 316,12–13; cf. *Auct. Arist.* 2, n. 219; Hamesse 158,56.

²⁰⁰⁴ unde materia *inv. sed corr.* V

²⁰⁰⁵) Arist., *Metaph.*, II 2, 994b26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 39,11–12.

²⁰⁰⁶ re mota: reota *sed corr.* s. v. V

²⁰⁰⁷) Thom., *In II Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 5; Mandonnet – Moos 301; Thom., *In II Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 416; Thom., *Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat.*, a. 1, arg. 3; Cos 3,16–18.

²⁰⁰⁸) Arist., *Phys.*, VII 3, 247b23–24; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 267,14–16.

perficitur. Unde in III *De anima*²⁰⁰⁹) dicit Philosophus, quod intelligere dicitur pati alio modo, quam fit in rebus corporalibus passio²⁰¹⁰.

(5) Et ideo est alia opinio²⁰¹¹), quae dicit, quod in anima est materia, sed non eiusdem rationis cum materia corporali. Et ad hoc faciunt tria: Primo se ipsos declarant, secundo rationes contra se adducunt et solvunt eas, tertio probant suum intentum.

(6) Dicunt ergo primo, quod materia secundum se considerata dicit potentiam; potentia autem dicitur respectu actus; actus autem est triplex, et secundum hoc erit triplex materia, scilicet una, quae est ad hunc actum, qui est transmutatio, et talis est in generabilibus et corruptibilibus, et talis est ad contraria; alia est ad hunc actum, qui est ubi, et talis est in corporibus caelestibus, quae non sunt in potentia ad transmutationem, sed ad ubi²⁰¹²); dum est in hoc ubi, est in potentia quaelibet pars caeli ad aliud ubi; tertia est potentia, quae dicitur ad formam sive ad esse, non quod aliquando sit separata a formali esse, sed semper est coniuncta sicut et materia in caelo; sed materia animae est spiritualis, non corporalis.

(7) Secundo arguunt contra se ipsos sic: Augustinus, ut dicunt aliqui²⁰¹³), II *Super Genesim ad litteram*²⁰¹⁴) dicit, quod anima non est facta, neque ex spirituali neque ex corporali materia²⁰¹⁵).

(8) Item si anima est forma corporalis, aut tota, et tunc nulla pars eius est materia, aut secundum partem, non illam²⁰¹⁶, quae est materia, cum non sit actus; ergo secundum illam formalem²⁰¹⁷); sed hoc est impossibile, quia tunc illa pars informaret duas materias, scilicet spiritualem et corporalem²⁰¹⁸2019), aut oporteret destrui alteram partem, quod non concedunt, quia sic anima destrueretur; ideo quod recipitur in alio, per modum recipientis recipitur; anima autem intellectiva recipit res absolute sine materia; ergo caret materia²⁰²⁰).

²⁰⁰⁹) Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 6, resp.; Bazán 50,159–161; Cf. Arist., De an., III 4, 429a29–30; transl. vetus: Stroick 198,80–81.

²⁰¹⁰) Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 6, resp.; Bazán 49,128–50,161.

²⁰¹¹) Guill. de la Mare, Super Sent., II, d. 3, q. 1, resp. et d. 17, q. 2, resp.; Kraml 48,28–58 et 218,41–53; Guill. de la Mare, Correct., a. 10 et 28; Glorieux 49–59 et 118–122; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 9 et 27; Muller 51,1–63,56 et 144,1–155,61; Correct. Corrup. Sciendum a. 10 et 28; Glorieux 63–66 et 118–121; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione a. 10 et 28; Muller 55–69 et 134–144; cf. etiam Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, *spec.* n. 203 et 225b; Garcia, 125–146, *spec.* 129 et 145.

²⁰¹²) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 6, ad arg. 2; Cos 70,275–71,286.

²⁰¹³) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 75, a. 5, sed contra; Leon. 202a.

²⁰¹⁴) Aug., De Gen. ad litt., VII, 7–8; Zycha 206,11–207,29.

²⁰¹⁵) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 118; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 144; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 134; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 201a; Garcia, 126.

²⁰¹⁶ *illam: nulla sed corr. V*

²⁰¹⁷) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 118; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 144,6–9; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 134; cf. Guill. de la Mare, Super Sent., II, d. 17, q. 2, arg. 2; Kraml 217,10–12; etiam Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 201b–c; Garcia, 126–127.

²⁰¹⁸ *corporalem coni.: odius V*

²⁰¹⁹) Cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 201c; Garcia, 127.

²⁰²⁰) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 118; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 144,10–15; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 134.

- (9) Quarto si est composita ex materia et forma, recipitur in ea individualitate; sed hoc est proprium sensus²⁰²¹).
- (10) Ad illa dicunt ad primum, quod illa auctoritas nusquam invenitur in Augustini libris²⁰²²).
- (11) Ad secundum dicunt, quod, licet materia in se considerata non possit esse forma, tamen, prout est in actu per suam formam, sic tota anima potest esse forma corporis²⁰²³).
- (12) Ad tertium dicunt, quod ita concludi posset de sensitiva, quod esset immaterialis, quia recipit species sine materia. Item oculus est aqueus, non tamen oportet propter hoc visibile esse aqueum²⁰²⁴). Unde hoc dicunt intelligi secundum perfectionem et imperfectionem, puritatem et impuritatem. Unde organum purius et impurius et perfectius et imperfectius recipit²⁰²⁵).
- (13) Ad quartum dicunt, quod species, prout est in intellectu, est percipere quoddam respectu subiecti, tamen in comparatione ad res extra secundum Avicennam II *Metaphysicae*²⁰²⁶) suae cap. 15²⁰²⁷).
- (14) Ideo probant suum intentum, et hoc per sanctos et philosophos et per rationes. Primo, quia Augustinus IV *Super Genesim*²⁰²⁸) supponit eam habere materiam, sed solum inquit, utrum sua materia praecesserit origine solum, vel scilicet tempore, sicut fuit in aliis, quia materia Adae praecessit tempore, nisi dicatur secundum aliam opinionem omnia simul facta, et hoc tenet, scilicet quod origo²⁰²⁹ solum praecessit²⁰³⁰).
- (15) Item libro VII capitulo 6²⁰³¹): “Si”, inquit, “incommutabilis quidem esset anima, nullo modo quasi materiem quaerere deberemus^{2032,2033}).
- (16) Item parum post²⁰³⁴ potuit anima habere materiam pro suo genere spiritualem²⁰³⁵).
- (17) Item ibidem²⁰³⁶): Quid nisi de materia spirituali convenientius anima credatur²⁰³⁷).

²⁰²¹) Correct. Corrup. Quare a. 28; Glorieux 118; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 144,16–20; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 134–135; cf. Guill. de la Mare, Super Sent., II, d. 17, q. 2, arg. 3; Kraml 217,13–16; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 201e; Garcia, 127.

²⁰²²) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 120; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 145,51–53; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 136; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 225a; Garcia, 145.

²⁰²³) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 120; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 145,54–57; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 136; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 225b; Garcia, 145.

²⁰²⁴) Cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 224b; Garcia, 144.

²⁰²⁵) Guill. de la Mare, Super Sent., II, d. 17, q. 2, ad arg. 3; Kraml 219,70–74; Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 121; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 145,58–146,72; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 136–137; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 225c; Garcia, 146.

²⁰²⁶) Avic., Metaph., V, c. 2; Van Riet 242,29–245,97.

²⁰²⁷) Correct. Corrup. Quare a. 28; Glorieux 121; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 146,73–80; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 137; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 225d–e; Garcia, 146.

²⁰²⁸) Aug., De Gen. ad litt., VII, 5–28; Zycha 204,10–228,21.

²⁰²⁹ origo an origine scrib.?

²⁰³⁰) Cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216a; Garcia, 138.

²⁰³¹) Aug., De Gen. ad litt., VII, 6; Zycha 205,20–21.

²⁰³² materiem quaerere deberemus *coni. ex Augustino: maneat quereremus V*

²⁰³³) Cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216a; Garcia, 138.

²⁰³⁴) Aug., De Gen. ad litt., VII, 6; Zycha 206,1–5.

²⁰³⁵) Cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216a; Garcia, 139.

- (18) Item Boethius libro *De unitate et uno*²⁰³⁸: “Aliud est simplicitate unum ut Deus, aliud coniunctione materiae et formae ut angelus”²⁰³⁹).
- (19) Item Damascenus²⁰⁴⁰: “Angelus est immaterialis et incorporealis quantum ad nos, sed non quantum ad Deum”²⁰⁴¹). Et eodem modo dicunt, quod sic intelligit Dionysius 3 cap. *De divinis nominibus*²⁰⁴²), cum dicit, quod angeli “incorporales et immateriales intelliguntur”, scilicet quoad Deum, sed non simpliciter²⁰⁴³).
- (20) Item probant secundum philosophos. Commentator super illud IX *Metaphysicae*²⁰⁴⁴: “si fuit substantia movens”, Commentator²⁰⁴⁵: “Causa potentiae in rebus, in quibus est potentia, est materia”²⁰⁴⁶). Sed omnes concedunt in anima vel angelo esse potentiam²⁰⁴⁷).
- (21) Item Rabbi Moses in libro *De Deo benedicto*²⁰⁴⁸) dicit, quod omne, quod est in potentia ad aliud, necesse habet materiam, quoniam potentia semper est in materia²⁰⁴⁹).
- (22) Item Commentator *Super III De anima*²⁰⁵⁰): “Quemadmodum”, inquit, “sensibile dividitur in materiam et formam, sic intelligibile in esse oportet dividi in consimilia [V 163ra] his duobus, in aliquod simile formae et in aliquod simile materiae”²⁰⁵¹), et dicit “simile”, quia Philosophus non dicit nisi de materia corporali, sed Augustinus ponit spiritualem, quare Commentator dicit “simile”.
- (23) Item Commentator *Super III Metaphysicae*²⁰⁵²) recitat Themistium²⁰⁵³ dixisse aut sunt formae sine materia aut habent materias et aequivocationem, sicut est dispositio in materia <et> in materia intelligi²⁰⁵⁴).

²⁰³⁶) Aug., De Gen. ad litt., VII, 27; Zycha 225,4–12.

²⁰³⁷) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 119; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 144,21–145,30; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 135; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216a; Garcia, 139.

²⁰³⁸) Dom. Gundisalv., De unit.; Correns 9,14–17.

²⁰³⁹) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 10; Glorieux 50; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 52,27–29; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 56; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216c; Garcia, 139.

²⁰⁴⁰) Ioann. Damasc., De fide orthod., II, c. 17, n. 2; Kotter 45,11–14; Buytaert 69,14–17.

²⁰⁴¹) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 10; Glorieux 51; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 52,37–53,40; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 56; Cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216d; Garcia, 139.

²⁰⁴²) Dion., De div. nom. 4,1; PG 3, 693 C; Suchla 144,10; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 148 C–D *ex Alb.*, Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 4; Simon 119,79–80.

²⁰⁴³) Corr. Corrup. Quare, a. 10; Glorieux 49 et 52; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 9; Muller 52,13–14 et 53,57–58; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 10; Muller 55 et 58; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 200c; Garcia, 126; etiam Thom., S. th., q. 50, a. 1, arg. 1; Leon., 3a.

²⁰⁴⁴) Averr., Metaph., XII, comm. 30; Venetiis 1562, 315B.

²⁰⁴⁵) Commentator: Item Rabi Moses *add. sed. exp. V*

²⁰⁴⁶) Averr., Metaph., XII, comm. 30; Venetiis 1562, 315B–C.

²⁰⁴⁷) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 10; Glorieux 51; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 9; Muller 53,44–47; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 56–57; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216e; Garcia, 139.

²⁰⁴⁸) Mos. Maimon., Dux neutror. II, c. 1, prop. 24; Di Segni 6,86–87; Mos. Maimon., Liber de uno Deo benedict.; Kluxen 175,24–25.

²⁰⁴⁹) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 10; Glorieux 51; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 9; Muller 53,47–50; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 56–57; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216f; Garcia, 139–140.

²⁰⁵⁰) Averr., De an., III, comm. 5; Crawford 409, 657–661.

²⁰⁵¹) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 119; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 145,31–36; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 135; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216b; Garcia, 139.

²⁰⁵²) Averr., Metaph., VIII, comm. 12; Venetiis 1562, 220H.

²⁰⁵³) Themistium *coni.*: terminis tantum V

- (24) Item ostendunt rationibus. Nihil enim recipit, nisi secundum quod est in potentia vel patitur, quia, secundum quod est in actu aliquid, nihil patitur; omnis autem potentia passiva reducitur ad materiam, ut habetur XI *Metaphysicae*²⁰⁵⁵)²⁰⁵⁶).
- (25) Item dicunt, quod sequitur inconueniens contra fidem, quia anima patitur ab igne purgatorio et angelus malus in inferno et bonus recipit beatitudinem et gloriam et huiusmodi; nihil autem horum posset fieri, si non habeat materiam²⁰⁵⁷).
- (26) Sed illa omnia videntur frivola.
- (27) Quod primo dicunt esse triplicem materiam, nihil est. Materia enim proprie accepta distinguitur contra actum et omne, quod est, vel est actu vel potentia²⁰⁵⁸). Materia ergo accipitur illud, quod est carens omni specie vel forma secundum se et est primum fundamentum²⁰⁵⁹ in natura²⁰⁶⁰). Unde dicitur “prope nihil” secundum Augustinum libro *Confessionum*²⁰⁶¹).
- (28) Sed illa, cum dicatur respectu actus, non potest dici nisi respectu huius actus, qui est forma substantialis, quia, quod dicitur materia respectu formae accidentaliter, non caret omni specie, sed magis dicitur subiectum in actu primo²⁰⁶²).
- (29) Item non potest dici respectu huius actus, qui est esse, quia esse competit materiae per formam, quia ad eam consequitur, et praeterea esse non competit nisi formae vel habenti formam²⁰⁶³); sed tale non est materia, ut dictum est.
- (30) Item materia non potest dici potentia respectu transmutationis vel contrarietatis, quia ad ista non ordinatur materia; nec recipit nihil, ut acquirat actum suum, qui est forma, ut patet in generabilibus et corruptibilibus.
- (31) Et ideo melius dicitur secundum sanam philosophiam²⁰⁶⁴, quia materia dicit potentiam ad formam tantum, et cum alia sit ratio formae repraesentans totum appetitum et nullam relinquens

²⁰⁵⁴) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 10; Glorieux 50; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 9; Muller 52,30–32; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 10; Muller 56; cf. Duns Scot., Quaest. disp. de rer. princip., q. 7, a. 2, n. 216b; Garcia, 139.

²⁰⁵⁵) *potius* Averr., Metaph., IX, comm. 2; Venetiis 1562, 227B; cf. Arist., Metaph., IX 1, 1046a12–13; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 168,21–169,1.

²⁰⁵⁶) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 119–120; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 145,42–46; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 135–136.

²⁰⁵⁷) Correct. Corrup. Quare, a. 28; Glorieux 120; Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 145,46–50; Correct. Corrup. Quaestione, a. 28; Muller 136.

²⁰⁵⁸) Cf. e. g. Thom., In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 4; Mandonnet – Moos 85; Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 6, arg. 12; Bazán 48,83–85.

²⁰⁵⁹ fundamentum: sunta *sed corr.* V

²⁰⁶⁰) Cf. Arist., Metaph., VII 3, 1029a20–26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,28–126,7; etiam Arist., Metaph., I 8, 989a31–989b21; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 26,18–27,13; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,77–78; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 31 et 32; Hamesse 117,34–39.

²⁰⁶¹) Aug., Confess. XII, 7; Verheijen 220,13–16.

²⁰⁶²) Cf. Thom., De prin. nat., 1; Dondaine 39,9–46.

²⁰⁶³) Cf. e. g. Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 1, ad arg. 6; Cos 15,477–485; Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 5, ad arg. 10; Cos 64,335–340.

²⁰⁶⁴ philosophiam *coni.*: physicam V

potentialitatem ad privationem vel aliam formam et alia²⁰⁶⁵ sit ratio formae non replentis, ideo etiam non est nisi duplex materia, una superiorum corporum, alia inferiorum, et utraque secundum se accepta caret forma, ad quam est in potentia. Et ideo materia caeli non bene dicitur potentia ad ubi, cum mobile oporteat habere²⁰⁶⁶ actum substantialem, ratione cuius proprie dicitur potentia, sed ad ubi est potentia totum subiectum sive corpus caeli, licet mobilitas, ita quantum ad subiectum motus, possit dici sibi competere non ex parte formae simpliciter, sed materiae, a qua est omnis imperfectio corporalis, licet talis motus, scilicet circa centrum, vel alia, quae sibi competunt, sint a forma, sicut et ignis a materia habet moveri. Unde formas separatas dicimus immobiles, sed quod ignis sic movetur, habet a forma sua, scilicet sursum²⁰⁶⁷), ut quanto plus habet de forma ignis, tanto velocius ascendat.

(32) Secundo patet, quod rationes non solvunt. Quod primo dicunt, quod haec auctoritas non est Augustini, falsum dicunt quantum ad sensum, licet non sint verba omnino, quia eodem libro cap. 11²⁰⁶⁸ et 12 usque ad 16 disputans²⁰⁶⁹), utrum sit ex materia corporali vel spirituali sive vivente sive non vivente, postquam multa inconvenientia probavit, concludit, quod melius est inter dubitationes dicere, quod ex nullo tali dicatur²⁰⁷⁰ facta fuisse, sed dicatur simul creata fuerunt prima die, antequam corpori sexto die infunderetur, nisi sint alia simul creata. Hoc autem dicimus creari, quod nec ex materia spirituali nec corporali forma²⁰⁷¹).

(33) Item nec ad secundum bene dicunt, quod anima secundum Philosophum est actus²⁰⁷²) et omnis forma est actus²⁰⁷³), non habens actum.

(34) Item id, quod est forma, id dicimus animam, habens dicimus animatum²⁰⁷⁴); ergo et adhuc idem erit primo animatum²⁰⁷⁵).

(35) Item nec tertio, quia in libro *De causis*²⁰⁷⁶) ponitur illa propositio, scilicet ibi commentator²⁰⁷⁷ utitur isto sensu et dicit, quod, licet causa prima sit una, tamen diversae res diversimode eam recipiunt, quia quaedam modo corporali, quaedam vero modo spirituali²⁰⁷⁸).

²⁰⁶⁵ alia *coni.*: aliud V

²⁰⁶⁶ habere *add. sed exp. rationem V*

²⁰⁶⁷) Cf. *e. g.* Arist., Phys., III 5, 205b18–22; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 122,8–12; Arist., Phys., IV 8, 214b13–16; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 158,16–19; Arist., Phys., V 6, 230b3–4; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 214,5–7; Arist., Phys., VIII 4, 255a31–33; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 294,7–9; Arist., Top., V 8, 137b37–138a2; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 110,10.

²⁰⁶⁸ 11 *coni.*: 21 V

²⁰⁶⁹) Aug., De Gen. ad litt., VII, 12–28; Zycha 211,7–228,21.

²⁰⁷⁰ dicatur: de causa *sed corr. V*

²⁰⁷¹) Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 147,5–19; 150,6–11.

²⁰⁷²) Arist., De an., II 1, 412a19–20, 412a27–28 et 412b5–6; Stroick 64,55–66,88; 66,91; 67,65–66; cf. Auct. Arist. 6, n. 41; Hamesse 177,57–58.

²⁰⁷³) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 3, resp.; Cos 38,234–245.

²⁰⁷⁴) Cf. Thom., De ente, c. 2; Leon. 372,177–186.

²⁰⁷⁵) Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 151,12–18.

²⁰⁷⁶) Lib. de Caus., prop. XXIII (XXIV), 177; Pattin 97,24–26.

²⁰⁷⁷ commentaror: commentum *sed corr. s. v. V*

- (36) Et eorum exemplum de oculo non videtur, quia, ut quidam²⁰⁷⁹) dicunt, visus nullam speciem recipit, sed organum, quod etiam est materiale.
- (37) Item cum dicitur, quod sensus recipit species sine materia, intelligitur materia, in qua est, sed non sine omni, quia recipitur in organo materiali. Unde Philosophus ponit exemplum II *De anima*²⁰⁸⁰): Sicut cera recipit sigillum sine materia sigilli, est tamen in materia cerae, sicut convenit etiam in aliis formis, quae insunt, sicut imagines sunt²⁰⁸¹).
- (38) Item nec est solutum, quia et adhuc dicunt quidam²⁰⁸²), quod species non recipitur ut forma, sed ut obiectum.
- (39) Contra, quia, si sicut forma, cum talis esset, ut dicunt, singularis, non iudicaret intellectus de rebus universaliter per eam, quod falsum est, sicut visus non iudicat rem magnam vel parvam secundum basim, quae est in re visa, quia basis manet, quocumque modo distet res, sed iudicat modo secundum conum, qui est in oculo, quia, quanto plus res distat, tanto minor est, et ideo res [V 163rb] minor iudicatur. Sic etiam esset, si species, per quam res extra intelligitur, esset sicut forma in intellectu et individua et iudicaret intellectus sicut sensus. Sed hoc nihil est, quia non est distantia consideranda in visione intellectuali sicut in sensu exteriori²⁰⁸³).
- (40) Item bene conceditur, quod, sicut intellectus specie propria vel impropria informatur, ita etiam iudicat de re, et ideo non omnes idem habent iudicium, licet res maneat eadem, sicut etiam visus post fortem impressionem rubei vitri in oculo id, quod statim²⁰⁸⁴) occurrit, iudicat rubeum, etiamsi non sit.
- (41) Unde dicendum, quod non solvunt rationem primam, quia ratio non vult concludere, quod sit singularis, sed quod sit individua ea individuatione, quae est per materiam, et talis individua species habens condiciones materiae non potest repraesentare universale abstractum.
- (42) Quod etiam probant per auctoritates et primo sanctorum, ubi dicunt, quod fuerit opinio Augustini, falsum dicunt, sicut patuit supra.
- (43) Item Augustinus non inquit nisi de qua materia transeunte, ex qua fit res, sicut dicit, quod caro habuerit materiam ex qua, scilicet terram, et sicut vitrum ex silice, sed nos quaerimus materiam, ex qua res est²⁰⁸⁵, quae permanet²⁰⁸⁶).

²⁰⁷⁸) Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 151,24–30.

²⁰⁷⁹) Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 151,32–38.

²⁰⁸⁰) Aristotele, *De anima*, II 12, 424a17–24; transl. vetus: Stroick 149,65–68.

²⁰⁸¹) Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 151,38–152,47.

²⁰⁸²) Cf. Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 1; Muller 5,21–24.

²⁰⁸³) Cf. Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 152,48–67.

²⁰⁸⁴ statim: statit *sed corr.* V

²⁰⁸⁵ est *add. s. v. V*

²⁰⁸⁶) Correct. Corrup. Circa, a. 27; Muller 148,20–29.

- (44) Quod autem nihil cogat, etiamsi dicat, patet, quia loquitur disputative. Unde de hoc libro in libro *Retractionum*²⁰⁸⁷) sic dicit, quod “in illo opere plura sunt quaesita quam inventa et eorum, quae inventa sunt, pauciora sunt firmata, caetera vero ita posita, velut adhuc requirenda sint”²⁰⁸⁸).
- (45) Ad rationes ergo patet Augustini, quod dicit quasi materiam non simpliciter materiam, quia aliquam habet potentiam, sicut diceretur.
- (46) Item dicere potuit disputative.
- (47) Item dicit postea “Quid” et caetera interrogative.
- (48) Ad illud Boethii dicendum, quod liber non fuit suus, cum contrarium dicat in libro *De Trinitate*, scilicet quod forma spiritualis nulli innititur materiae fundamento²⁰⁸⁹²⁰⁹⁰). Item nec illius libri in aliis nec aliorum in illo mentionem facit²⁰⁹¹).
- (49) Item ad illud Damasceni dicendum, quod non concludit, quia medium alteri extremorum comparatum videtur alterum extremum, et ideo si hoc, ratione probari posset, quod angelus esset corporalis, quia dicit, quod solus Deus est immaterialis et incorporeus²⁰⁹²).
- (50) Argumentum autem Dionysii stat; loquitur absolute sine comparatione.
- (51) Ad illud Commentatoris dicendum, quod verum est de potentia ad formam, non quacumque. Unde dicit in rebus, in quibus est tale, si dicimus in anima.
- (52) Ad aliud Commentatoris dicendum, quod consimile dicit potentiam ad esse vel alias formas accidentales vel spirituales, quia talis non est, sed simile, sed esset secundum eos ipsamet materia.
- (53) Ad illud Themistii. Auctoritas solvit se ipsam, quia non est materia sicut nec intellectu²⁰⁹³). Unde ipse Commentator reprobatur eum, si intelligit proprie dictam materiam.
- (54) Ad rationes dicendum, quod omnis potentia passiva proprie dicta fit per transmutationem, quae non est in intellectu, sicut ponit Philosophus III *De anima*²⁰⁹⁴) movens super hoc quaestionem, quomodo patitur intellectus ab intelligibili²⁰⁹⁵, cum non habeant commune, scilicet materiam, quia patitur non abiciendo, sed recipiendo²⁰⁹⁶).
- (55) Ad aliud, quod contra fidem, dicendum, quod non est, quia contra fidem est hoc dicere, quod habeat materiam, quia materia, quia dicta, non quae est in capite specierum, illa non privatur quantitate.

²⁰⁸⁷) Aug., *Retract.*, II, 24, 1; Mutzenbecher 109,7–11.

²⁰⁸⁸) *Correct. Corrup. Circa*, a. 27; Muller 147,99–4.

²⁰⁸⁹ *materie fundamento: modo finite sed corr. V*

²⁰⁹⁰) Boeth., *De trin.*, 2; Moreschini 170,100–106.

²⁰⁹¹) *Correct. Corrup. Circa*, a. 9; Muller 59,58–60,62.

²⁰⁹²) *Correct. Corrup. Circa*, a. 9; Muller 61,98–7.

²⁰⁹³) *Correct. Corrup. Circa*, a. 9; Muller 60,76–79.

²⁰⁹⁴) Aristoteles, *De an.*, III 4, 429b22–430a9; Stroick 201,80–89.

²⁰⁹⁵ *intelligibili coni.: intellectuali V*

²⁰⁹⁶) Cf. *Correct. Corrup. Circa*, a. 27; Muller 149,64–80.

(56) Item secundum Philosophum I *De generatione*²⁰⁹⁷) materia inferiorum non separatur a passionibus; est et morpheis²⁰⁹⁸). Igitur si est in anima, anima erit quanta, quod est contra fidem et scripturam.

(57) Item erit corruptibilis, quod est contra fidem²⁰⁹⁹).

(58) Unde dicendum, quod nec per hoc habeat propositum, quia in spiritum numquam agit agens per qualitatem, sicut est ignis, et ita illa materia ita est abstracta a sensibilibus sicut eius forma.

(59) Et ideo dicendum, nullo modo est composita, et hoc patet his rationibus, primo, quia tales non possunt evadere inconveniens. Averroes ipse enim ponebat, quod intellectus, quia est substantia subsistens in actu, non poterat uniri corpori neque multiplicari²¹⁰⁰ secundum corporum multitudinem²¹⁰¹). Si igitur anima habet partem sui, quae est forma, constat, quod id, quod primo informat, fiat actu, et cum sit forma non accidentalis, erit substantia in actu. Non ergo unietur anima, sed solum copulatur corpori.

(60) Item constat, quod angelus vel anima in forma similior Deo quam forma corporis accidentalis ut albedo. Sed Deus potest talem separatam tenere, et tum erit sine materia parte sui; igitur et angelus magis est talis; maxime tamen in sacramento teneat accidentia sine quantitate, quae tamen non est composita ex materia et forma²¹⁰²).

(61) Item angeli forma aut est separabilis a sua materia aut non; si sic, sequitur, quod sit corporalis²¹⁰³).

(62) Item cum materia non possit esse sine forma, formam accipiet aliam, et sic erit transmutabilis²¹⁰⁴).

(63) Item si illa forma manet, sequitur, quod forma aliqua subsistat non composita. Si autem potest separari, sequitur, quod omnis actio animae communicatur materiae, quia actio est coniuncti²¹⁰⁵).

(64) Item forma non est propter bonum materiae, sed e converso. Unde cum bonum formae sit actio, numquam unietur materiae nisi propter operationem, quam sine corpore vel materia non potest agere. Unde Philosophus²¹⁰⁶) probat intellectum non materialem, quia potest per se habere operationem. Cum igitur angelus habeat operationem |V 163va| intellectualem, quam potest sine

²⁰⁹⁷) Arist., *De gen. et corr.*, I 5, 320b16–17; Judycka 27,9–10.

²⁰⁹⁸) Cf. *Correct. Corrup. Circa*, a. 9; Muller 54,75–77.

²⁰⁹⁹) *Correct. Corrup. Circa*, a. 27; Muller 150,200–5.

²¹⁰⁰ multiplicari *add. in marg. V*

²¹⁰¹) Averr., *De an.* III, comm. 4 et comm. 5; Crawford 385,76–386,90 et 401,424–413,758.

²¹⁰²) Cf. *Corrup. Circa*, a. 9; Muller 54,79–84.

²¹⁰³) Cf. *Corrup. Circa*, a. 9; Muller 54,94–55,100.

²¹⁰⁴) Cf. *Corrup. Circa*, a. 9; Muller 55,5–9.

²¹⁰⁵) Cf. *Corrup. Circa*, a. 9; Muller 55,9–12.

²¹⁰⁶) Arist., *De an.*, III 4, 429a18–29; Stroick 178,90–198,80; cf. Thom., *Quaest. Disp. de an.*, q. 14, resp.; Bazán 126,196–209; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 75, a. 2, resp.; Leon., 196b; Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 84, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 324a.

materia exercere, frustra uniretur materiae; sed in tam nobilibus creaturis nihil ponendum est frustra²¹⁰⁷).

(65) Praeterea cum nobilior sit forma, quae est sine materia, quam cum materia, et Deus possit hoc facere, sicut patet de albedine, frivolum est dicere, quod non fecerit, maxime cum opposita probari non possit²¹⁰⁸.

(66) Item in *De causis*²¹⁰⁹) dicitur, quod “intelligentia est substantia, quae non dividitur”, et hoc pertinet ad perfectionem universi, quia creaturae sunt mediae inter Deum et materiam primam. Ordo ergo hoc habet, ut, sicut sunt quaedam formae, quae semper sunt in materia prope eam, quaedam, quae numquam in materia prope Deum, quaedam quasi limes, scilicet anima rationalis, quae quandoque est in materia, quandoque sine materia²¹¹⁰).

(67) Unde est alia positio²¹¹¹), quod angelus sive quaecumque substantia spiritualis est omnino simplex²¹¹², nec est in aliquo genere, nec alicuius accidentis est subiectum.

(68) Et hoc sic ostendit, primo, quia prima dispositio substantiae est quantitas, postquam ostendit, alia accidentia consequuntur, sicut patet ex ordine posito in libro *Praedicamentorum*²¹¹³). Ubi ergo nulla est quantitas, nec erit aliquod accidens. Angelus autem non est quantus. Secundo oportet omne, quod est in genere, vel esse genus vel differentiam vel habere illa. Sed angelus non est genus vel differentia, sicut patet, nec species habens ista, cum haec sumantur a materia et forma, quae non sunt in eo²¹¹⁴).

(69) Praeterea substantia genus est, cuius prima dispositio est quantitas. Talis substantia non est angelus vel anima. Non potuit etiam poni in praedicamento accidentis, cum subsistat. Item nec est in eo ut²¹¹⁵ substantia sive essentia vel suum esse, quia, cum “vivere” secundum Philosophum II *De anima*²¹¹⁶) “sit in viventibus esse” et esse se habeat ad essentiam sicut vivere ad vitam²¹¹⁷); ipsa vita autem non est aliud quam vivere, ideo nec essentia erit aliud quam esse.

(70) Item ipse est sua virtus vel potentia; eo ipso enim, quod aliqua substantia est immaterialis et subsistens, potest per se agere ex sui natura; sed immaterialitas et subsistentia²¹¹⁸ competunt ei per

²¹⁰⁷) Cf. Corrup. Circa, a. 9; Muller 55,12–20.

²¹⁰⁸) Cf. Corrup. Circa, a. 9; Muller 55,29–56,36.

²¹⁰⁹) Lib. de Caus., prop. VI (VII),64; Pattin 61,65.

²¹¹⁰) Corrup. Circa, a. 9; Muller 54,85–93.

²¹¹¹) *non inveni*

²¹¹² simplex: simpliciter *sed corr. V*

²¹¹³) Arist., Cat., 4b20–6a35; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 13,20–18,3.

²¹¹⁴) Cf. Thom., In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, arg. 4; Mandonnet – Moos 99.

²¹¹⁵ *ut con.*: a¹ V

²¹¹⁶) Arist., De an., II 4, 415b13; Stroick 85,71–72.

²¹¹⁷) Cf. Alex. Hal., S. th., II, p. 1, inquis. 4, tract. 3, q. 1, tit. 2, d. 1, m. 3, c. 1, n. 484; Quaracchi 1924 670a.

²¹¹⁸ *subsistentia con.*: subsistentens V

suam essentiam;²¹¹⁹) ipse est suus habitus, cum intelligat per essentiam suam, et ideo numquam est in habitu, sed semper in actu. Unde Dionysius dicit 7 cap. *De divinis nominibus*²¹²⁰), quod “angeli intelligunt eam in terra²¹²¹ per propriam mentis naturam”, et III *De anima*²¹²²) et XII *Metaphysicae*²¹²³) dicit Philosophus, quod actio intellectus est vita²¹²⁴).

(71) Sed hoc etiam stare non potest. Dicit enim Dionysius cap. *Angelicae hierarchiae*²¹²⁵), quod angeli dividuntur in substantiam et operationem. Quod autem omnino est simplex, non dividitur²¹²⁶).

(72) Item nec rationes concludunt.

(73) Ad primum dicendum, quod in rebus materialibus quantitas est prima dispositio²¹²⁷), quia in una²¹²⁸ et eadem re materia sive potentia praecedit actum²¹²⁹) et ideo quantitas ante alia ordinatur. Subtracta igitur materia a substantia, sicut est in angelo, possunt alia accidentia inesse sine quantitate.

(74) Dicunt tamen quidam²¹³⁰) adhuc, quod est ibi quantitas non est aliud quam qualitas, propter quod non enumeratur inter species quantitatis in libro illo, ut omnis species reducitur ad quantitatem, cuius partes habent copulationem ad unum communem terminum vel ad quantitatem; partes non habent terminum communem vel ad quantitatem continuam vel discretam.

(75) Et praeterea in prima specie qualitatis ponitur scientia vel virtus²¹³¹), et constat, quod illa non insunt mediante quantitate.

(76) Ad secundum dicendum, quod, in quibus est materia, genus recipitur a materia²¹³²), in quibusdam non recipitur, sed a proportionali.

(77) Ubi sciendum, quod genus non recipitur a materia prima; alias, omnia²¹³³ corporalia communicent in genere, scilicet corporali; sed genus sumitur a materia, secundum quod est

²¹¹⁹) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 79, a. 1, arg. 4; Leon., 258a; Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 11, arg. 17; Cos 117,135–140.

²¹²⁰) Dion., De div. nom., 7, 2; PG 3, 869 C; Suchla 197,14–16; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 401C – 402A ex Alb., Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 7; Simon 353,82–83.

²¹²¹ in terra: intram *sed corr. V*

²¹²²) Cf. Arist., De an., III 5, 430a15–26; Stroick 204,88–92.

²¹²³) Arist. Metaph., XI 7, 1072b27; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 214,19–20.

²¹²⁴) Cf. Thomas, S. th., I, q. 54, a. 1; arg. 1 et 2; Leon. 39a; Thom., S. th., q. 55, a. 1, arg. 1 et 2; Leon. 54a.

²¹²⁵) Dion., De cael. hier., c. 11, 2; PG 3, 284D; Heil 41,22–42,2; transl. Eriugena: Simon – Kübel 169,72–73.

²¹²⁶) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 11, sed contra 1; Cos 117,157–161; Thom., S. th., I, q. 54, a. 3, sed contra; Leon. 47a; Thom., S. th., I, q. 77, a. 1, sed contra; Leon. 236b.

²¹²⁷) Cf. Thom., In IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiu. 3, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 502; Thom., S. contr. Gent., IV, c. 63; Leon. 201b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 6, ad arg. 2; Leon. 229b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 78, a. 3, ad arg. 2; Leon. 254b; Thom., S. th., III, q. 77, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 196b; Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 3, ad arg. 18; Cos 48,621–627.

²¹²⁸ una: ea *sed. exp. et corr. s. v. V*

²¹²⁹) Auct. Arist. 1, n. 225; Hamesse 134,94–95.

²¹³⁰) *non inveni*

²¹³¹) Arist., Cat., c. 8, 8b25–35; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 23,22–24,6.

²¹³²) Cf. e. g. Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 3, arg. 4; Leon. 220a–b; Thom., In Metaph., III, lect. 8, n. 442; Cathala – Spiazzi 123b; Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 11, ad arg. 18; Bazán 103,385–104,395.

informata secundum aliquod esse imperfectum²¹³⁴), et sic, secundum quod intelliguntur perfecta in esse corporeitatis, est materia respectu esse vivi; et, secundum quod perficitur in esse vitae, est materia respectu esse sensitivi sensitiva; et, secundum quod accipitur materia, ut perfecta est <in> esse sensitivo²¹³⁵ sive animalis, est materia respectu esse rationalis. Et ideo animal est genus, rationale differentia, licet in una et eadem re ab eodem sit animal et rationale, scilicet ab anima intellectiva, inquantum potest una existens facere formaliter, quod possunt inferiores.

(78) Ad tertium. Substantia, prout est genus, non dicit subiectum quantitatis, quia tale subiectum pertinet ad naturalem philosophum. Substantia, autem praedicamentum, pertinet ad metaphysicum, et ideo quidquid per se subsistit, hoc pertinet ad substantiae praedicamentum²¹³⁶).

(79) Ad quartum dicendum, quod vita non habet se ad vivere sicut essentia ad esse, sed sicut vivens ad vivere se habet, quia idem significatur per vitam in abstracto et vivere in concreto²¹³⁷). Sed essentia dicit id, quod est, quia illam dicimus esse. Nullus autem proprie dicit vitam vivere, sed viventem, et multi in ignorantia huius definitionis²¹³⁸ decipiuntur.

(80) Ad quintum²¹³⁹ dicendum, quod immaterialitas est causa, quare aliquid sit intelligens, hoc est: habeat intellectum. Unde quae sunt totaliter materialia, non intelligunt. Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod sine potentia intelligant, immo magis sequitur ex hoc, quod potentiam habeant, qua materialia carent.

(81) Ad sextum dicendum, quod angelus intelligit per propriam mentis naturam, quia habet potentiam, qua intelligit, quae sibi competunt ex natura sua, sicut dictum est²¹⁴⁰) [V 163vb], ut li “per” non determinet medium, sed principium²¹⁴¹).

(82) Ad septimum dicendum, quod hoc Philosophus non dicit, quasi potentia intellectiva vel sensitiva vertatur in obiectum vel e converso, sed quia in actu intelligendi vel sentiendi ex potentia²¹⁴² et illa similitudine fit unum in actu sicut ex potentia et actu. Hoc autem Philosophus²¹⁴³) pro tanto dicit esse in separatis, quia illa semper sunt actu intelligibilia et intelligentia, quia sunt a materia separata, quae prohibet vel impedit hanc unionem²¹⁴⁴).

²¹³³ omnia *coni*: cuius V

²¹³⁴) Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 1, ad arg. 24; Cos 19,649–656.

²¹³⁵ sensitivo *an* sensitivi *scrib.*?

²¹³⁶) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 1, ad arg. 10; Cos 17,574–18,581.

²¹³⁷) Thom., S. th., I, q. 54, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Leon. 39b.

²¹³⁸ definitionis: discretionis *sed corr.* V

²¹³⁹ quintum *coni*.: quartum V

²¹⁴⁰) Cf. *supra* sect. (70)

²¹⁴¹) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 55, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Leon. 54b.

²¹⁴² potentia: composita *sed exp. et corr.* V

²¹⁴³) Cf. Arist., De an., III 4, 430a3–6; Stroick 201,86–89.

²¹⁴⁴) Cf. Thom., S. th., q. 55, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Leon. 54b.

(83) Ad octavum dicendum, quod hoc²¹⁴⁵ pro tanto dicitur, quia intellectus possibilis non intelligit, nisi prius habeat speciem, quam acquirat, sed agens non indiget, sed statim, postquam irradiat. Unde intelligitur illa identitas per quandam concomitantiam, sicut cum diceremus de aliquo semper devoto, quod est ipsa devotio²¹⁴⁶).

(84) Ad id XII *Metaphysicae*²¹⁴⁷) dicendum, quod vita non accipitur pro esse, sed pro operari, sicut dicimus e converso hominem mortuum, qui nihil facit.

(85) Et ideo est alia positio²¹⁴⁸), quae dicit, quod angelus in sua essentia vel anima est simplex simpliciter, et ideo in eo nihil est nisi unum, non aliud et aliud, et est simplicior omni puncto indivisibili, sed tamen, quia multa sibi accidere possunt, quae non sunt ipse, ideo in eo sunt compositiones multae stante semper essentiae suae simplicitate; et sicut ex albedine superveniente aliquis dicitur albus, ita ex compositione adveniente potest dici²¹⁴⁹ compositus; et ideo utrumque est concedere, scilicet quod est simplex quoad essentiam et quod est compositus, inquantum unum fit per accidens, non simpliciter ex se ipso et his, quae sibi adveniunt, et quia et quod recipit aliquid, dicitur potentia respectu illius; ideo dicimus, quod sit compositus ex potentia et actu. Et quia primus actus est esse²¹⁵⁰), quem oportet praeintelligi aliis perfectionibus, ideo dicimus eum compositum ex essentia et esse, quod idem est “quod quid est” quoad essentiam et “quo est” quoad esse. Unde exclusae compositione materiae et formae et partium quantitativarum aliae sex compositiones supra de Dei simplicitate positae sibi conveniunt, quod sic patet per ordinem. In rebus compositis ex materia et forma est duplex ordo, unus ipsius materiae et formae, alius ipsius compositi et esse, quia compositum. Subtracta igitur materia si ponatur forma subsistere, remanebit compositio secunda, et comparabitur ipsa forma ad esse sicut potentia, et quia angelus est talis et anima, sicut dictum est, in eo ideo est compositio essentiae et esse. Et hoc est, quod dicitur 9 prop. *De causis*²¹⁵¹) in commento, quod angelus habet suum *ylithim*, quoniam est esse et forma; et similiter anima est habens *ylithim* et natura est habens *ylithim*; hoc pro tanto dicit, quod ista compositio est in omni natura, et ideo excipit primam causam, quia ipsa est suum esse.

(86) Secundo est in eo compositio generis et differentiae, quae est magis rationis quam rei, et tamen rationem compositionis habet, quia, licet sumatur ab una simplici essentia angeli, tamen, quia genus

²¹⁴⁵ hoc *add. impedit sed exp. V*

²¹⁴⁶ Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 54, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Leon. 39b.

²¹⁴⁷ Arist. *Metaph.*, XI 7, 1072b27; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 214,19–20.

²¹⁴⁸ Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 229–230; Thom., In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 87–88; Thom., S. th., I, q. 50, a. 2, ad arg. 3; Leon. 6b; Thom., De ente, c. 4; Leon. 376,33–40 et 377,159–166; Thom., Quaes. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 1, resp.; Cos 13,376–14,408; Thom., Quodl., IX, q. 4, a. 1, resp.; Gauthier 102,115–103,132; Thom., Quodl., III, q. 8, a. un., resp.; Gauthier 277,31–48.

²¹⁴⁹ dici *add. de sed exp. V*

²¹⁵⁰ Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 766; etiam Ps.-Thom., De nat. mater. et dimension. interm., c. 4, n. 382; Spiazzi 135b; Ps.-Thom., De quattuor opposit., c. 1, n. 586; Spiazzi 208b.

²¹⁵¹) Lib. de Caus., prop. VIII (IX),90; Pattin 69,98–102.

sumitur ab indeterminato, scilicet a natura communi angeli, inquantum angelus est, quae natura communis est alteri angelo distincto realiter ab isto, scilicet Gabriele. Differentia autem sumitur a proprio gradu Gabrielis, qui non invenitur extra ipsum, ideo dicitur compositio. Talis autem est in angelo. Omne enim illud, cuius natura secundum aliquid convenit cum aliis et secundum aliquid differt ab aliis, illud habet genus et differentiam²¹⁵²). Et ideo Deus est extra genus, quia in nullo convenit cum rebus creatis secundum unam rationem, quae pertinet ad rationem generis, nec differt per aliquam differentiam, quae alii differentiae opponatur, quia tunc oppositae differentiae perfectionem non includeret, cum tamen omnium habeat perfectiones²¹⁵³). Angelus autem aliquid habet commune, scilicet Gabriel cum Michaele, et aliquid distinctum. Ergo ambo sunt in genere. Anima autem non est in genere nisi per reductionem, quia est principium formale alicuius substantiae. Et ideo ista compositio competit sibi imperfecte²¹⁵⁴, sicut et naturam intellectualem habet imperfecte²¹⁵⁵²¹⁵⁶).

(87) Tertia est compositio ex supposito et natura. Natura igitur²¹⁵⁷, sicut prius dictum est, est id, quod significatur per definitionem²¹⁵⁸); suppositum autem hic accipitur singulare in genere substantiae, et quia accidentia²¹⁵⁹ pertinent ad suppositum, non quod includantur in singulari²¹⁶⁰ eius, sed quia ei competunt, non naturae. Unde natura angeli proprie non est nec intelligit, sed suppositum, scilicet angelus; ideo cum angelo aliqua accidant, quae non sunt ipse, et hoc pertineat ad suppositum, non erit omnino idem in angelo suppositum et natura²¹⁶¹).

(88) Licet etiam anima non sit proprie suppositum, sed pars suppositi²¹⁶²), tamen, quia est hoc aliquid²¹⁶³) sive singulare, ipsa dico separata. Ideo cum ei aliqua accidunt, scilicet gratia et virtutes²¹⁶⁴), ideo nec in ea sunt idem hoc aliquid et natura.

²¹⁵²) Cf. Thom., De ente, c. 4 et 5; Leon. 377,167–177 et 379,85–130; Thom., S. th., I, q. 50, a. 2, ad arg. 1; Leon. 6a; Thom., In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 100.

²¹⁵³) Cf. e. g. Thom., De ente, c. 5; Leon. 378,15–43; Thom., S. contr. Gent., I, c. 26; Leon. 82b; Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot. q. 7, a. 3, resp.; Pession 193b.

²¹⁵⁴ imperfecte *illeg. sed corr. V*

²¹⁵⁵ imperfecte *illeg. sed corr. V*

²¹⁵⁶) Cf. Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 1, ad arg. 13; Bazán 12,434–441; Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 2, ad arg. 10; Bazán 20,435–440; Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 14, ad arg. 2; Bazán 127,267–128,280; etiam Thom., S. th., I, q. 90, a. 4, ad arg. 2; Leon. 389b.

²¹⁵⁷ igitur: igni *sed del. et corr. s. v. V*

²¹⁵⁸) Thom., De ente, c. 1; Leon. 370,49–50; Thom., S. contr. Gent., IV, c. 40; Leon. 139a; Thom., S. th., I, q. 29, a. 2, ad arg. 3; Leon. 330b.

²¹⁵⁹ accidentia *coni.*: accidens *V*

²¹⁶⁰ singulari *coni.*: singulare/singularie *V*

²¹⁶¹) Thom., Quodl., II, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 216,24–217,102.

²¹⁶²) Cf. e. g. Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 94; Leon. 566b; Thom., In De an. II, c. 1, 412a6; Leon. 69,78–83; Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 7, ad arg. 16; Bazán 62,464–474; Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 2, ad arg. 16; Cos 32,462–470; Thom., S. th., I, q. 75, a. 4, ad arg. 2; Leon. 201b.

²¹⁶³) Cf. Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 1, resp.; Bazán 9,281–10,341; Thom., In II Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, ad arg. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 418; Thom., In III Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 2, ad arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 207; Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 2, ad arg. 16; Cos 32,462–471.

(89) Quarta²¹⁶⁵ est ibi compositio substantiae et potentiae. Sicut enim substantia est potentia ad esse, sicut dictum est, ita et potentia²¹⁶⁶ ad operationem. Cum igitur nulli rei creatae esse sit eius operatio, nec substantia erit potentia; et sic etiam in angelo non erunt idem²¹⁶⁷).

(90) Praeterea principium immediatum accidentalis operationis oportet esse accidens. Potentia ergo eius angeli non erit eius substantia²¹⁶⁸), cum operatio eius sit accidens, ut patebit²¹⁶⁹).

(91) Quinta compositio est substantiae et habitus, inquantum habitus, per quos |V 164ra| perficitur essentia vel potentia, non sunt idem, quod ipsa. Hoc sic patet: Habitus comparatur ad id, in quo est, sicut forma eius. Ad hoc autem, quod aliquid perfecte perficiatur per habitum, oportet, quod ad omnia, ad quae se extendit potentia, ad eadem se extendat habitus sive forma illa. Potentia autem intellectiva angeli se extendit ad omnia, quia omnibus eis est ens simpliciter. Ipsa autem essentia angeli non comprehendit omnia, cum sit determinata ad certam speciem²¹⁷⁰), sicut dictum est. Et ideo oportet, quod aliud superveniat ad perfectionem eius. Et idem dico de gratia perficiente essentiam, non potentiam, sine qua ad bonum infinitum non elevatur.

(92) Sexta²¹⁷¹ compositio est substantiae et operationis, quia non est sua operatio. Est enim duplex operatio secundum Philosophum IX *Metaphysicae*²¹⁷²), scilicet una, quae transit in aliquid exterius, alia, quae manet in ipso agente et est eius perfectio, sicut intelligere et velle.

(93) Prima constat, quod non est eius essentia, cum sit perfectio rei exterioris²¹⁷³).

(94) De secunda autem sciendum, quod talis habet quandam infinitatem, vel simpliciter quantum ad intelligere et velle, quae se extendit ad totum ens, vel secundum quid, sicut sensus se habet ad omnia sensibilia et visus ad omnia visibilia. Esse autem cuiuslibet creati et eius substantia est determinatum ad unum vel genus vel speciem. Et ideo nec angelus nec anima est sua operatio, sed solum esse est suum intelligere et suum velle secundum Dionysium 5 cap. *De divinis nominibus*²¹⁷⁴)²¹⁷⁵).

²¹⁶⁴) Cf. Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Leon. 313a–b; Thom., De ver., q. 27, a. 6, resp.; Dondaine 814,102–113.

²¹⁶⁵ quarta *coni.*: quarto V

²¹⁶⁶ potentia: potius *sed corr.* V

²¹⁶⁷) Cf. e.g. Thom., S. th., I, q. 54, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 39a–b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 54, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 45a–b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 54, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 47a–b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 79 a. 1, resp.; Leon. 258a–b.

²¹⁶⁸) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 54, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 47a–b.

²¹⁶⁹) Thom., In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 116.

²¹⁷⁰) Thom., S. th. I, q. 55, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 54a–b.

²¹⁷¹ Sexta: Tertia *sed del. et corr.* V

²¹⁷²) Auct. Arist., 1, n. 226; Hamesse 134,96–99; cf. Arist. *Metaph.*, VIII 8, 1050a30–b1; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 178,22–179,4.

²¹⁷³) Thom., In *Metaph.*, IX, lect. 8, n. 1865; Cathala – Spiazzi 448a.

²¹⁷⁴) Cf. Dion., De div. nom., 5, 4–5; PG 3, 817 D – 820 A; Suchla 183,4–17; transl. Sarraceni: Dionysiaca 333D – 336D *ex Alb.*, Super Dion. De div. nom., c. 5; Simon 311,70–77.

²¹⁷⁵) Thom., S. th., I, q. 54, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 45a–b.

(95) Ad argumenta. VIII *Metaphysicae*²¹⁷⁶) in his, quae sunt sine materia, unumquodque est statim nec habet causam sui esse; sed anima et angelus habent causam sui esse²¹⁷⁷). Dicendum, quod talia non habent causam formalem sui esse, quia sunt formae, habent tamen effective. Dicuntur autem statim esse, quia non educuntur per motum sive in tempore, quod est proprium eorum, quae fiunt ex materia²¹⁷⁸).

(96) Ad secundum. Augustinus VII *Super Genesim ad litteram*²¹⁷⁹): Sicut caro habuit materiam suam, scilicet terram, ita et illa natura, scilicet anima, potuit suo modo habere materiam spiritualem²¹⁸⁰). Dicendum, quod loquitur inquisitio, si tendit de materia transeunte, sicut patet de terra.

(97) Praeterea. Philosophus ponit IX *Metaphysicae*²¹⁸¹) duplicem materiam dicens, quod separata sunt existentia per materiam sensibilem vel intelligibilem; ergo videtur in eis esse materia spiritualis. Dicendum secundum Commentatorem ibidem²¹⁸²), quod per illas intelligit naturalem et mathematicam²¹⁸³, quia mathematicus²¹⁸⁴ abstrahit a materia²¹⁸⁵ sensibili, quia considerat quantitatem, quae praecedit qualitatem, ex qua substantia dicitur sensibilis, non tamen abstrahit a substantia simpliciter, ut videtur.

(98) Ad quartum. Non videtur inconueniens animam componi ex materia, nisi quia est forma corporis materialis; sed hoc non obstat, ut videtur, quia materia animae est spiritualis, sicut et anima; ergo potest esse forma. Dicendum, quod, quantumcumque poneretur spiritualis, tamen, quia id, quod est potentia, non potest esse alterius actus, ideo et caetera.

(99) Ad quintum. Ego video, quod unum subiectum informatur pluribus, scilicet superficie et albedine, et eadem forma, scilicet albedo, informat duo ordine quodam, scilicet superficiem et lignum; ergo videtur, quod forma animae possit propriam materiam et corpus informare. Dicendum, quod non est simile, quia esse substantiale non est communicabile, sed unius est unum. Accidentale autem non.

(100) Ad sextum. Si anima solum componitur ex essentia et esse, quod est aliud ab essentia, componitur²¹⁸⁶ ex se et ex alio, quod est inconueniens²¹⁸⁷). Dicendum, quod non est inconueniens in

²¹⁷⁶) Arist., *Metaph.*, VIII, 1045a36–b5; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 166,15–23.

²¹⁷⁷) Cf. Thom., *Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat.*, a. 1, arg. 5; Cos 4,27–33.

²¹⁷⁸) Thom., *Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat.*, a. 1, ad arg. 5; Cos 15,466–477.

²¹⁷⁹) Aug., *De Gen. ad litt.*, VII, 6; Zycha 205,26–206,5.

²¹⁸⁰) Cf. Thom., *Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat.*, a. 1, arg. 13; Cos 5,111–6,118.

²¹⁸¹) Cf. *potius* Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 10, 1036a9–12; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 142,6–10; VII 11, 1037a4–b7; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 144,14–145,20; VIII 6, 1045a34–b6; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 166,15–20.

²¹⁸²) Cf. *potius* Averr., *Metaph.*, VII, comm. 39, Venetiis 1562, 191vG–H.

²¹⁸³ *mathematica coni.*: metaphysicam V

²¹⁸⁴ *mathematicus coni.*: metaphysicus V

²¹⁸⁵ *materia add. naturali sed exp.* V

²¹⁸⁶ *essentia componitur: esse componere sed corr.* V

²¹⁸⁷) Cf. Thom., *Quodl.* II, q. 2, a. 1, arg. 1; Gauthier 214,10–18.

compositione quasi accidentali, non integrali, sicut Sortes albus componitur ex se et alio. Unde non fit unum simpliciter, sed quaedam ratio composita²¹⁸⁸).

(101) Ad septimum. Sicut actus dicitur ad potentiam²¹⁸⁹), sic forma ad materiam²¹⁹⁰); sed omnis actus habet rationem formae²¹⁹¹); ergo omnis potentia habet rationem materiae; si ergo in angelo est compositio ex potentia, erit ex materia. Dicendum, quod nomen actus et formae competit etiam accidentibus, sed nomen materiae non competit proprie nisi potentiae substantiali²¹⁹²), sicut dictum est.

(102) Ad octavum. Si eadem est compositio animae et angeli, erunt eiusdem speciei, sed alia tunc, cum minus conveniat compositio animae cum supremo angelorum quam medii angeli cum supremo; minor autem compositio non est sub potentia et actu quam materiae et formae; ergo anima erit composita ex materia et forma. Dicendum, quod, sicut non sequitur, si²¹⁹³ illud est minus calidum quam illud, quod ideo statim sit frigidum, ita non sequitur, si minor est simplicitas in angelo quam Deo vel anima quam angelo, quod statim intret compositionem, quae opponitur simplicitati. Tamen anima ita deficit a simplicitate primi propter minus²¹⁹⁴ distare, quod efficitur pars compositi, et etiam in compositis ex materia et forma, licet eadem sit compositio, non sunt eiusdem speciei²¹⁹⁵).

(103) Ad nonum. Agere vel pati non competit alicui secundum idem²¹⁹⁶); cum igitur in anima sit intellectus agens et possibilis, videtur, quod unum habeat ex parte materiae, scilicet pati, aliud ex parte formae²¹⁹⁷). Dicendum, quod unum est, quod non competit secundum idem. Et ideo Deus, cum sit idem cum sua potentia, nihil patitur, sed tantum agit. In anima autem contingit propter diversas potentias, quas qui negat, non vere solvit istud argumentum. Unde sicut in eodem oculo catti est potentia, qua recipit colores et qua facit eas in actu, cum de nocte videt, non propter materiam vel formam, sed propter eiusdem naturae [V 164rb] diversas potentias²¹⁹⁸), ita et in angelo hoc contingit.

²¹⁸⁸) Cf. Thom., Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Gauthier 215,77–87.

²¹⁸⁹) Cf. Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 12, resp.; Bazán 110,220.

²¹⁹⁰) Cf. Thom., In De cael. et mund., I, c. 2, lect. 4, n. 18; Leon. 18b.

²¹⁹¹) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Mandonnet – Moss 983.

²¹⁹²) Cf. Thom., De prin. nat., 1; Dondaine 39,9–46; etiam Thom., S. th., I, q. 77, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Leon. 237a.

²¹⁹³ si *add. s. v. V*

²¹⁹⁴ minus *an magis scrib.?*

²¹⁹⁵) Cf. Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 7, resp.; Bazán 60,293–321.

²¹⁹⁶) Cf. Arist., Physic., III 1, 201a20–21; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 99,10–11; Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 59, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 23a; Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 117, a. 4, ad arg. 3; Leon. 452b; cf. etiam Arist., De gen. et corr., II 9, 335b29–31; Judycka 73,12–13; Auct. Arist., 4, n. 39; Hamesse 170,100.

²¹⁹⁷) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 1, arg. 16; Cos 6,132–139; Thom., Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 6, arg. 5; Bazán 47,37–47.

²¹⁹⁸) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creat., a. 10, ad arg. 4; Cos 109,412–110,437

(104) Ad decimum. Diversa individua non distinguuntur numero ex corpore, sicut quilibet actus ex proprio susceptibili; contra ergo²¹⁹⁹ animae separatae non distinguerentur. Dicendum, quod retinent distinctionem, quam receperunt ex corporibus.

(105) Contra: Anima potest creari extra corpus, sicut multi, scilicet Origenes et alii²²⁰⁰), posuerunt²²⁰¹). Dicendum, quod illa distingueretur ab ista, quae est in corpore, eo ipso, quod est separata, sicut albedo, si esset separata, distingueretur ab eo, quae est in subiecto²²⁰²).

(106) Contra: Deus posset plures creare sine corporibus; quomodo ergo illae distinguerentur inter se²²⁰³). Dicendum, quod cursus naturae non habet, quod fiant extra corpus; tamen si faceret, tunc eo ipso, quod respectu diversorum corporum crearentur, sic differrent, sicut etiam dicimus de potentiis animae respectu obiectorum.

(107) Ad undecimum. Deus posset lapidem convertere in spiritum; ergo esset ibi materia lapidis. Dicendum secundum quosdam²²⁰⁴), quod Deus non potest rem corporalem transmutare in intelligentiam vel spiritum, quia non sunt convertibilia, nisi quae habent rationem communem. Sed hoc nihil valet, quia tunc non attribueremus ei, nisi quod agens naturale potest. Unde dicendum, quod, sicut id, quod cum actu secundum partem tantum, scilicet formam, non potest super materiam, sed super formam, ita et Deus, qui est purus actus et totum esse, potest quodlibet ens in quodlibet convertere removendo ea, per quae essentia ab invicem distinguuntur, nec remaneret materia, quia totum esset transubstantiatum, sicut in sacramento contingit, ubi etiam in animam rationalem, quae est spiritus, fit transmutatio corporalis rei, scilicet panis, cuius essentia est ibi ex vi consecrationis, licet non in quantum rationalis, sed in quantum forma corporis; et forte posset totum ens in se ipsum convertere et tamen sine sui mutatione, quia in talibus mutatur “terminus a quo”, non “ad quem”, sicut corpus Christi in caelo, in quod fit conversio, non mutatur ex frequenti consecratione. Unde Augustinus *Super Ioannem XVIII*²²⁰⁵) “Clarifica me” dicit, quod, si humanitas in Deum converteretur, creatura periret in Deo, scilicet quantum ad “terminum a quo”, non “ad quem”, in quo magis salvaretur²²⁰⁶). Nota Thomam de hoc in quaestione de quolibet de forma panis in conversione sacramenti²²⁰⁷).

²¹⁹⁹ ergo: genus *sed corr. V*

²²⁰⁰) Cf. *e. g.* Origen., *De princip.*, I, c. 6 et c. 8 et II, c. 9; Crouzel – Simonetti 194,1–206,187, 220,1–232,178, 352,1–372,300; Aug., *De Gen. ad litt.*, VII, 24 et 28; Zycha 222,20–222,9 et 225,12–228,21.

²²⁰¹) Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 90, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 388a–b.

²²⁰²) Cf. Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 90, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 388b–389a.

²²⁰³) Cf. Henr. de Gand., *Quodl.* II, q. 8, resp.; Wielockx 53,36–44.

²²⁰⁴) Cf. God. de Font., *Quodl.*, V, q. 1, resp.; De Wulf – Hoffmans 2; Aeg. Rom., *De mater. cel.*, q. 2, resp.; Venetiis 1500 88ra.

²²⁰⁵) Cf. Aug., *In Iohan.*, tract. 105,6; Willems 606,5–607,13; etiam Thom., *Quodl.*, V, q. 6, a. 1, arg. 2; Gauthier 376,21–26.

²²⁰⁶) Thom., *Quodl.*, V, q. 6, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Gauthier 377,54–58.

²²⁰⁷) Thom., *Quodl.*, V, q. 6, a. 1; Gauthier 376,1–377,58; cf. etiam Thom., *Quodl.*, VII, q. 4, a.1, resp.; Gauthier 19,32–20,69; Thom., *Quodl.* IX, q. 3, a. un., ad 3; Gauthier 99,96–100,132.

QUAESTIO XVII

UTRUM CARITAS, QUA DILIGIMUS DEUM, SIT ALIQUOD CREATUM IN ANIMA

- (1) Circa istam quaestionem est duplex opinio. Una est Magistri distinctione²²⁰⁸ XVII²²⁰⁹) hic praesentis; aliam communiter dat intentio Magistri.
- (2) Secundo ponetur defensio quorundum pro Magistro.
- (3) Primo ergo sciendum, quod ex fide et spe oportet nos procedere ad Magistri intensionem de caritate sicut ex magis notis. Nihil autem homini notius est sua fide secundum Augustinum²²¹⁰). In fide autem tria oportet considerare: ipsum actum fidei, qui est credere²²¹¹), secundo ipsum habitum, qui est ipsa fides, quae est virtus theologica²²¹²), tertio ipsam potentiam, quae est subiectum fidei, scilicet intellectum²²¹³) vel quaecumque alia potentia sustineri poneretur²²¹⁴; nihil refert ad propositum²²¹⁵).
- (4) Quarto oportet considerare ipsum Spiritum, scilicet qui omnia movet ad fines suos, et praecipue ea, quae directe ad finem ultimum pertinent. Nunc autem ita est, quia Spiritus Sanctus movet animam sive intellectum ad actum fidei mediante habitu fidei et similiter ad actum spei, quia est sperare mediante habitu spei²²¹⁶. Sed in tertio significato videtur defecisse in hoc, quod ponit, quod Spiritus Sanctus movet voluntatem, cuius est diligere ad actum dilectionis non mediante habitu creato aliquo, sicut facit in primis duobus actibus, scilicet fidei et spei, et ideo secundum eum²²¹⁷) caritas in nobis non dicit nisi vel actum caritatis, quod non diceret increatum, vel Spiritum Sanctum, cum Augustinus III *De doctrina Christiana*²²¹⁸) dicat: “Caritatem autem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter se ipsum” vel ipsum Spiritum Sanctum moventem voluntatem ad hunc actum. Et sic caritas dicit quid increatum, et sic secundum eum²²¹⁹) caritas non dicit aliquem habitum vel virtutem mediam inter Spiritum Sanctum moventem et ipsum actum.

²²⁰⁸ distinctione: de *sed corr.* V

²²⁰⁹) Petr. Lomb., Sent., I, d. 17, c. 6; Grottaferrata 148,23–149,4.

²²¹⁰) Aug., De Trin., XIII, c. 1, 3; Mountain – Glorie 383,74–75.

²²¹¹) Cf. Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 27a–b; Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 2, a. 9, resp.; Leon. 37b.

²²¹²) Cf. Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 62, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 403a–b; Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 4, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 47a–b.

²²¹³) Cf. Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 45a–b.

²²¹⁴ poneretur *fan* posset *scrib.*?

²²¹⁵) Cf. Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 4, a. 1 resp.; Leon. 43a–44b.

²²¹⁶ spei *add.* et similiter ad actum spei *sed exp.* V

²²¹⁷) Cf. Petr. Lomb., Sent., I, d. 17, c. 6; Grottaferrata 149,22–150,16.

²²¹⁸) Aug., De doct. chr., III, c. 10, 16; Martin 87,32–33.

²²¹⁹) Cf. Petr. Lomb., Sent., I, d. 17, c. 6; Grottaferrata 151,20–152,3.

(5) Motus²²²⁰ autem fuit Magister²²²¹) praecipue ex duobus, primo ex ipsa excellentia actus dilectionis, quem aestimabat non posse procedere nisi a principio increato, secundo ex auctoritatibus quibusdam Augustini in *De Trinitate* libro VIII²²²²), ubi dicit, quod, “qui diligit proximum, consequens est, ut magis ipsam dilectionem diligat”, quia Deus est dilectio, et plures aliae sunt multum expressae secundum litteram, sicut ipse Magister XXII distinctione²²²³ introducit²²²⁴).

(6) Secundo videndum est, quomodo aliqui²²²⁵) hanc positionem nituntur defendere tamquam possibilem, etsi non teneant eam. Dicunt enim, quod aequae potens est voluntas ad eliciendum actum dilectionis sicut intellectus actum visionis. Sed ego video, quod in patria intellectus elicit actum visionis non mediante forma creata informante intellectum – secundum illos, qui ponunt, quod non videtur per similitudinem creatam –, sed elicitur actus vel mediante ipsamet essentia divina vel ex sola praesentia obiecti, quod est Deus; <ergo> formatur visio in ipso intellectu sine habitu medio. Ergo et hic Spiritus Sanctus potest movere voluntatem ad actum dilectionis sine habitu medio creato [V 164va], qui dicitur caritas²²²⁶).

(7) Secundo addunt, quod, quia Deus numquam est novo modo in creatura praeter illos generales modos, scilicet essentia, praesentia et potentia, nisi per gratiam vel gratiae aliquem effectum, ideo Spiritus Sanctus numquam movet ad actum dilectionis nisi mediante habitu gratiae, quae non est in potentia vel voluntate, sed essentia animae, et quia per talem habitum essentia animae elevatur, ideo per consequens ponuntur ab essentia fluentes per talem habitum elevando, et ita per talem formam essentiae animae inhaerentem est actus dilectionis delectabilis et meritorius et non ab extra²²²⁷).

(8) Sed nec positio stare potest nec rationes et auctoritates cogunt nec declaratio valet.

(9) Primum sic patet. Actus perfectus non elicitur nisi a potentia perfecta. Unde licet²²²⁸ irasci, quod est actus imperfectus, elici possit a potentia imperfecta, tamen irasci secundum rationem non elicitur nisi a potentia perfecta per habitum virtutis, et sic in omnibus. Et ideo quanto actus est perfectior, tanto oportet potentiam magis esse perfectam. Cum igitur dilectio sit actio perfectior quam actus fidei vel spei, oportet dicere, quod procedat a potentia maxime perfecta. Perfectio autem

²²²⁰ Motus *dub. V*

²²²¹) Cf. Petr. Lomb., Sent., I, d. 17, c. 1; Grottaferrata 142,4–19.

²²²²) Aug., De Trin., VIII, c. 7, 10; Mountain – Glorie 285,31–32.

²²²³ distinctione: de *sed corr. V*

²²²⁴) Petr. Lomb., Sent., I, d. 22, c. 1–5; Grottaferrata 178,3–180,36.

²²²⁵) Aeg. Rom., In I Super Sent., I, d. 17, p. 1, princ. 1, q. 1 et 2, *spec. q. 1., resp.*; Venetiis 1521 89rC–91rC, *spec. 89rG*.

²²²⁶) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 195,59–70.

²²²⁷) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 195,80–196,91.

²²²⁸ licet *add. s. v. V*

potentiae est habitus²²²⁹), quod Spiritui Sancto non convenit nec Magister diceret. Et ideo secundum eos tantum defertur caritatis²²³⁰ dignitati, quod derogatur eius entitati.

(10) »Item nec auctoritates Augustini²²³¹) cogunt, quantumcumque expresse videantur, quia, sicut dicimur sapientes sapientia, quae Dei est, non quod ipsa formaliter, sed eius participatione, sic etiam diligimus dilectione, qua Deus, in quem²²³² nostra dilectio est quaedam participatio dilectionis suae. Et illo modo loquendi utuntur Platonici²²³³, quorum doctrina Augustinus imbutus fuit«²²³⁴).

(11) Similiter nec defensio valet, quia aliud est iudicium de intellectu, aliud de voluntate. Hoc autem quidam²²³⁵) sic ostendunt. Dicunt, quod secundum Aristotelem III *De anima*²²³⁶) intelligere²²³⁷ sit motus a rebus ad animam, amare autem e converso motus ab anima ad res. Unde intelligere est pati²²³⁸), amare autem agere²²³⁹). Ad hoc autem, quod aliquid patitur, non oportet, quod habeat aliquam formam inhaerentem, sed patitur ex hoc, quod in passo recipitur forma ab agente, sicut calefactibile recipit calorem a calefaciente. In voluntate autem, cum²²⁴⁰ eius actio magis sit actio quam passio, oportet, quod per aliquam formam inhaerentem perficiatur, ut agere possit.

(12) Addunt²²⁴¹) etiam, quod species non est necessaria in intellectu, ut per eam intellectus²²⁴² perficiatur ita, quod per eam intellectionem eliciat, sed propter hoc, quod quandoque res intelligibilis non est praesens intellectui, sed si alia fit praesens per speciem sive similitudinem suam, et quia divina essentia offert se intellectui beato praesentialiter²²⁴³, ideo non indiget intellectus specie, sed ipsa divina essentia se ipsa imprimit visionem in intellectum, non quod sit media vel principium, quo intellectus videat.

(13) Et hoc probant sic²²⁴⁴). Quotiescumque aliquid agit mediante aliquo, si utrique illorum competit agere, eadem numero erit actio utriusque sicut fabri et martelli et ignis et caloris. Si igitur voluntas mediante Spiritu Sancto elicit actum dilectionis, erit eadem numero actio, qua debent diligere proximum et ego ipsum proximum, cum secundum eos ipsum proximum diligam Spiritu

²²²⁹) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, ad arg. 3; Muller 199,185–192.

²²³⁰ caritatis: caritas *sed corr. V*

²²³¹) Cf. Aug., De Trin., VIII, c. 7, 10; Mountain – Glorie 285,31–34”; Aug., De Trin., XV, c. 17, 27; Mountain – Glorie 502,22–23; etiam Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 23, a. 2, arg. 1; Leon. 164a.

²²³² in quem *an in quantum scirb.?*

²²³³ Platonici: philosophia *sed. del et corr. i. m. V*

²²³⁴ Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 23, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Leon. 165b.

²²³⁵) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, ad arg. 3; Muller 196,92–103.

²²³⁶) *potius* Arist., De an., I 4, 408b1–18; transl. vetus: Stroick 41,76–84; cf. etiam Bonav., In Sent. I, d. 32, a. 2, q. 1, ad arg. 1–3; Quaracchi 1882, 562b.

²²³⁷ intelligere: intellectio *sed corr. V*

²²³⁸) Arist., De an., III 4, 429a10–14; transl. vetus: Stroick 178,73–75; cf. Auct. Arist., 6, n. 136; Hamesse 185,30.

²²³⁹) Cf. etiam Matt. de Aquaspart., Quaest. disput. de grat., q. 2, ad arg. 13; Doucet 57.

²²⁴⁰ cum: est *sed corr. V*

²²⁴¹) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, ad arg. 3; Muller 196,103–113.

²²⁴² intellectus: intelligentiae *V*

²²⁴³ praesentialiter: praesente *sed. corr. V*

²²⁴⁴) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 197,125–143.

Sancto; ita dicunt, quod similiter sequeretur in intellectu, si mediante divina essentia intellectus intelligeret, scilicet quod eadem esset numero intellectio Dei et beati. Hoc argumentum falsum est, immo dicunt, quod in beata visione Deus habet se in ratione obiecti praesentis et imprimis intellectionem in intellectu.

(14) Sed ista impugnatio non videtur vera²²⁴⁵. Quod enim primo dicunt, quod intelligere est motus ad animam, velle e converso, et quod ideo non est simile de intellectu et voluntate, verum est quidem, sed nihil ad propositum valet. Est enim intellectus motus a rebus ad eum, velle autem dicitur esse motus ab anima ad rem, quia anima per speciem apprehensam videns rem ut convenientem inclinatur ad eam.

(15) Quod secundo dicunt, quod intelligere sit pati, amare agere, falsum dicunt pro utraque parte. Intelligere enim est quaedam operatio. Nulla autem operatio in quantum huiusmodi passio est, sed potest habere passionem coniunctam vel praecedentem, sicut in sensu praecedit receptio speciei et sic in intellectu, vel potest habere passionem consequentem, sicut ex apprehensione sensitiva sequitur quandoque passio. Hoc dicit Thomas super quartum distinctione 49 quaestio De delectatione in solutione secundi argumenti²²⁴⁶). Et ideo in *Prima parte*, ubi quaeritur, utrum intelligere sit pati²²⁴⁷), concedit, quod sic, licet improprie, et tamen hoc non concedit nisi de nostro intellectu, cuius est recipere speciem, qui quandoque est in potentia. Quantum autem ad intellectionem ipsam idem est de omni intelligente. Si autem alterum debet esse passio, scilicet intelligere vel amare, magis [V 164vb] erit amare; cum est amor sensitivus, ponatur passio convenientius quam cognitio sensitiva.

(16) Item nec hoc valet, quod dicunt de specie, quod non sit nisi in loco intelligibilis, quia per essentiam non est praesens. Si enim vicem eius impleret, oporteret, quod ipsa species esset quid in intellectu, non quo sicut idolum alicuius naturae, quando id, cuius est idolum, non est praesens. Hoc autem non apparet in specie, cum non intelligatur nisi resolutione.

(17) Item quod dicunt, quod esset eadem intellectio numero Dei et beati, si essentia divina est, quo intelligit, non sequitur, quia essentia divina, prout ipsa est intelligens, sic non est, quo intelligit intellectus, et prout est, quo intelligit intellectus, sic non est intelligens sicut nec alia species intellectus. Unde non habet se ut instrumentum²²⁴⁸ hoc modo, quia instrumentum motum movet²²⁴⁹). Unde est hic fallacia accidentis, quia variatur modus eo, quod aliter et aliter accipitur divina essentia, prout est intelligens et prout est media, quo non differens ab obiecto re, sed ratione. Sed melius videretur, sequi, quod idem esset intelligere duorum beatorum vel est unum numero,

²²⁴⁵ vera: falsa *sed corr.* V

²²⁴⁶) Thom., In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunc. 1, ad arg. 2; Vivés 507a.

²²⁴⁷) Thom., S. th., I, q. 79, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 259a–260a.

²²⁴⁸ instrumentum: in speciem *sed del. et corr. i. m.* V

²²⁴⁹) Cf. Thom., In Phys., VIII, lect. 9, n. 1044; Maggiolo 547b.

quia eodem modo divina essentia in eis accipitur, scilicet ut principium. Sed nec hoc sequitur, quia, cum essentia divina sit infinita, potest esse in quolibet intellectu ut principium et tamen diversificantur operationes secundum potentias agentes.

(18) Et ideo videtur dicendum aliter, quod, sicut in via est habitus perficiens voluntatem, scilicet caritas, sicut ostenditur, ita et habitus perficiens intellectum, scilicet lumen fidei, et sic etiam proportionaliter in patria in voluntate erit caritas consummata, in intellectu autem lumen gloriae, quod lumen dicimus. Quod autem in via post talem habitum in intellectu ponitur species, non autem in voluntate; hoc est, quia²²⁵⁰ intellectui oportet rem praesentari, non autem oportet hoc in voluntate, in qua non ponitur species. Et quia in patria divina essentia non potest per creaturam repraesentari, sicut est, ideo ammota omni specie creata per se ipsam intelligitur manente habitu gloriae in intellectu sicut caritate in voluntate. Et ideo sine omni medio videtur vel sine omni specie media.

(19) Similiter nec secunda declaratio²²⁵¹) valet, quia, cum essentia animae et potentia sint diversa perfectibilia, oportet, quod secundum diversas perfectiones eis inhaerentes perficiantur. Non ergo sufficit perfectio animae per gratiam.

(20) Et ideo est alia opinio²²⁵²), quae ponit, quod caritas, qua diligimus Deum et proximum, est quaedam virtus creata infusa sicut et fides et²²⁵³ spes et non est Spiritus Sanctus.

(21) Et hoc probatur multipliciter. Primo sic: Sicut actio vel motus rei naturalis procedit ab intrinsic²²⁵⁴ principio – et ab hoc dicitur naturalis –, sic et in voluntariis actio non potest dici voluntaria²²⁵⁵, nisi sit a principio intrinsic. Sicut enim inclinatio naturalis nihil aliud est quam appetitus naturalis, ita voluntas nihil aliud est in rationalibus nisi appetitus rationalis. Licet ergo Deus aliqua virtute posset lapidem movere sursum, sicut et homo aliquo impulsu, tamen, quod ille motus sit ei naturalis, stante natura lapidis est impossibile; ita est impossibile²²⁵⁶, quod motus hominis interior vel exterior sit voluntarius, si sit a principio extrinsec. Actus igitur excedens totam virtutem naturae non potest esse homini voluntarius, nisi aliquid intrinsicum superveniat perficiens formaliter voluntatem. Hoc autem non potest esse Spiritus Sanctus, cum nullius sit forma, quantumcumque assistens vel praesens²²⁵⁷).

²²⁵⁰ quia *add. s. v. V*

²²⁵¹) Cf. Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 197,145–198,161.

²²⁵²) Thom., In I Sent., d. 17, a. 1, a. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 391–397; Thom., Lect. rom. in Sent. d. 17, a. 17.2.1; Boyle – Boyle, 191,1–192; Thom. Quaest. Disp. de carit. q. un., a. 1, resp.; Odetto 755a–757a; Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 23, a. 2; resp.; Leon. .164a–165b.

²²⁵³ et: vel *sed corr. V*

²²⁵⁴ intrinsic *coni. ex Thomae*: extrinsec

²²⁵⁵ voluntaria: voluntas *sed corr. V*

²²⁵⁶ ita est impossibile *add. i. m. V*

²²⁵⁷) Thom. Quaest. Disp. de carit., q. un., a. 1, resp.; Odetto 755a–b.

(22) Item Magister non ponit, quod voluntas eliciat actum dilectionis mediante Spiritu Sancto, sicut nos ponimus, quod mediante caritate creata, sed ponit, quod Spiritus Sanctus movet ipsam voluntatem ad actum dilectionis sine medio.

(23) Tunc arguitur sic: Omne agens, quod non agit secundum propriam formam, sed solum, secundum quod est motum ab altero, est instrumentum movens, sicut securis ab artifice. In tali autem non est agere vel non agere et per consequens nec mereri. Si ergo voluntas tantum est mota a Spiritu Sancto, tolleretur meritum hominis, cum tamen caritas sit radix merendi²²⁵⁸).

(24) Item omnis promptitudo et delectabilitas in actu est ex habitu, unde etiam in malis ut in fortitudine, quanto aliquis habet habitum quasi magis radicatum, tanto promptior est et delectabilior operatio. Unde et in II *Ethicorum*²²⁵⁹) dicitur, quod signum generati habitus est firma²²⁶⁰ in opere delectatio. Unde etiam in modum naturae inclinatur et operatur. Naturalia autem delectabilia magis. Si igitur sine habitu voluntas diligeret, dilectio delectabilis non esset, cum tamen delectabilia omnia faciat amor et nihil sit delectabilius²²⁶¹).

(25) Nec id potest facere Spiritus Sanctus, quia, etiamsi moveret manum alicuius ad scribendum non habentis artem scribendi, non ita delectabiliter operaretur sicut |V 165ra| scriptor bonus.

(26) Item sicut corpus non dicitur album per albedinem separatam, sed formaliter perficientem ut homo per animam, etiamsi ponatur in corpore a Deo per motum, quo angelus est in corpore assumpto, ubi sit in corpore formaliter perficiens, ita nec anima diceretur Deo grata vel voluntas creata nisi gratia vel caritate informata. Hoc autem non convenit Spiritui Sancto²²⁶²).

(27) Item nobilius et perfectius est principium, quo elicitur actus virtutis theoretice, quam principium, quo elicitur actus virtutis politice. Sed istud, scilicet politice, non solum facit actum bonum, sed etiam habentem perficit. Ergo et caetera. Et cum hoc non possit facere Spiritus Sanctus, qui est Deus, ideo oportet, quod hoc sit per habitum creatum, quem dicimus caritate²²⁶³).

(28) »Ad²²⁶⁴ primum. Commentator dicit *Super XII Metaphysicae*²²⁶⁵): “Quandocumque aliqua duo²²⁶⁶ se habent vel concurrunt ad eundem actum, unum habet se in ratione formae, aliud in ratione

²²⁵⁸) Thom. Quaest. Disp. de carit., q. un., a. 1, resp.; Odetto 755b.

²²⁵⁹) Arist., Ethic., II 2, 1104b4–5; transl. Roberti Grosseteste: Gauthier 399,1–2; cf. Thom., In Ethic., II 3, 1104b3; Leon. 83,17–21.

²²⁶⁰ firma: finitum *sed exp. et corr. i. m. V*

²²⁶¹) Thom. Quaest. Disp. de carit., q. un., a. 1, resp.; Odetto 755b; Cf. Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 195,55–57.

²²⁶²) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 393; Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 194,38–41.

²²⁶³) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 393; Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 194,42–47.

²²⁶⁴ Ad *add. solutio argumentorum i. m. V*

²²⁶⁵) *rectius* Averr., De an., III, comm. 18; Crawford 438,34–439,71 *apud* Aeg. Rom., In I Super Sent., I, d. 17, par. 1, prin., 1, q. 1, resp.; Venetiis 1521 89vI.

²²⁶⁶ duo *add. sic sed exp. V*

materiae sicut lux et color ad actum videndi”. Licet ad actum dilectionis concurrunt Spiritus Sanctus et voluntas, quia sine Spiritu Sancto nihil diligimus. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus erit ut forma²²⁶⁷).

(29) Ad hoc dicendum secundum quosdam²²⁶⁸), quod non est simile de luce et colore et Spiritu Sancto et voluntate, qui ibi ambo habent se in ratione obiecti vel alterum, scilicet lux, in ratione medii, sed hic Spiritus Sanctus habet se in ratione obiecti, non voluntas.

(30) Sed hoc nihil est, nec sic dicens²²⁶⁹ videtur intelligere positionem Magistri, quia Spiritus Sanctus non accipitur in ratione obiecti, sed et ipse cum Patre et Filio diligit, sed recipitur a Magistro in ratione principii moventis ad dilectionem obiecti.

(31) Unde dicendum est aliter, quod non est simile de colore et luce, quia apta nata sunt inesse²²⁷⁰ ambo alteri, non sic autem Spiritus Sanctus²²⁷¹). Sed melius dicitur, quod etiam in ipsa dilectione formalior est actio Spiritus Sancti moventis quam voluntatis, licet non oporteat, quod propter hoc sit forma excludens habitum caritatis. Sic non contingit in omni actione causae primariae respectu secundariae.

(32) Ad secundum. Augustinus²²⁷²): “Sicut anima est vita corporis, ita Deus est vita animae”. Sed anima vivificat formaliter; ergo et Deus sive Spiritus Sanctus²²⁷³). Dicendum, quod corpus per animam vivit, non in anima proprie loquendo; sed “nos in Deo vivimus, movemur et sumus”²²⁷⁴, ut dicit Augustinus²²⁷⁵). Et ideo dicendum, quod Deus est aliter vita animae quam anima corporis, quia effective secundum se, sed formaliter per gratiam²²⁷⁶).

(33) Ad tertium. Augustinus in XV *De Trinitate*²²⁷⁷) dicit, quod hoc “Deus caritas est”²²⁷⁸) non est dictum per causam, sicut dicimus “Deus patientia²²⁷⁹ mea²²⁸⁰) vel spes mea”²²⁸¹), sed absolute et per

²²⁶⁷) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 193,8–13.

²²⁶⁸) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 198,171–178.

²²⁶⁹ dicens: decens *sed corr. V*

²²⁷⁰ esse *add. eidem sed exp. V*

²²⁷¹) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 198,169–171.

²²⁷²) *e. g.* Aug., De civ. Dei, , XIII, c. 2; Dombart – Kalb 385,37–39; Aug., De civ. Dei, XIX c. 26; Dombart – Kalb 696,1–2; Aug., Sermon., 65, c. 4, 5; Conick – Coppieters’t Wallant – Demeulenaere 379,92–93; Aug., Sermon. 161, c. 6; S. Boodts 129,148; Aug., Sermon., 180, c. 7, S. Boodts 673,200–201; Aug., Enarr. in Ps., 70, s. 2, 3; Dekkers – Fraipont 962,58–59.

²²⁷³) Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 23, a. 2, arg. 2; Leon. 164a–b; cf. Thom. Quaest. Disp. de carit., q. un., a. 1, arg. 1; Odetto 753a; etiam Thom., De ver., q. 27, a. 1, arg. 1; Dondaine 789,3–9.

²²⁷⁴) *Act.* 17,28.

²²⁷⁵) *e. g.* Aug., Ep., 140, 32; Goldbacher 182,14–18; Aug., In Iohan., tract. 48, 10; Willems 418,6–8; Aug., Enarr. in Ps., 137, 2; Dekkers – Fraipont 1980,41–42; Aug., Sermon. 49 auct., c. 2, 6; De Conick – Coppieters’t Wallant – Demeulenaere 443,181–182.

²²⁷⁶) Thom., S. th., II-II, q. 23, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Leon. 165b; cf. Thom., De ver., q. 27, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Dondaine 791,167–171.

²²⁷⁷) Aug., De Trin., XV, c. 17, 27; Mountain – Glorie 502,17–23.

²²⁷⁸) *Ioh.* 4, 24.

²²⁷⁹ *patientia coni. ex Augustini: portio V*

²²⁸⁰) *Ps.*, 61, 6.

²²⁸¹) *Ps.*, 90, 9.

essentiam. Unde infra idem subiungit, quod ita dictum est “Deus caritas est²²⁸²), sicut dictum est de Spiritu Sancto²²⁸³)”²²⁸⁴). Dicendum est, quod intentio Augustini est, quod, quia animae virtutes, scilicet patientia, spes et huiusmodi, aliquid imperfectionis in habente important, quod ideo non sunt essentialiter in Deo, sed causaliter, caritas autem non²²⁸⁵). Et ideo non est intentio Augustini, quod eadem numero caritas sit Spiritus Sanctus et caritas creata, sed quod nostra non solum causaliter, sed exemplariter est ab illa.

(34) Ad quartum. Intellectus in patria videt mediante divina essentia; ergo et voluntas hic potest diligere mediante Spiritu Sancto.²²⁸⁶) Dicendum, quod in patria est iste ordo: intelligitur²²⁸⁷ divina essentia ut principium “quo” et ipsamet ut obiectum. Sed hoc secundum Magistrum²²⁸⁸) non est simile, si ipse recte intelligatur, quia primo Spiritus Sanctus movens, secundo voluntas mota ad actum, tertio Deus sive obiectum dilectum, et ideo ex illa visione non potest concludi istud secundum Magistri opinionem.

(35) Ad quintum. Si oportet adesse habitum, ut sit nostra dilectio et delectabilis, ergo et in patria oportet adesse speciem “per quam”, quod falsum est, cum tum illud intelligere sit nostrum et summa delectatio sit in eo. Dicendum, quod necessarium est intelligere in patria non propter hoc, quod sit nostra passio a divina essentia secundum quosdam²²⁸⁹), sed quia nostra operatio, quia intellectus nostri perfecte per habitum luminis gloriae, sicut hic est credere nostrum per habitum luminis fidei, etiamsi sine specie crederemus secundum illos²²⁹⁰), qui negant speciem.

(36) Ad sextum. Aut indiget habitu ad determinationem actus aut ad determinationem, quocumque modo dicatur, hoc potest facere Spiritus Sanctus. Dicendum, quod non potest, quia determinantum actuum determinata sunt principia proxima, quibus agentia perficiuntur ad hoc, quod sint naturales vel voluntarii.

(37) Ad septimum. Id, quod est activum, non indiget alio ad hoc, quod fiat activum; sed voluntas est activa potentia; ergo non indiget habitu aliquo. Dicendum, quod voluntas est potentia activa et passiva²²⁹¹), quia movet mota secundum Philosophum III *De anima*²²⁹²), unde passiva respectu obiecti, sed activa respectu aliquarum potentiarum, quas movet suo imperio, quia amare, quod dicit

²²⁸²) *I Ioh.* 4, 8.

²²⁸³) *Ioh.* 4, 24.

²²⁸⁴) Thom. Quaest. Disp. de carit., q. un., a. 1, arg. 6; Odetto 753b–754a.

²²⁸⁵) Thom. Quaest. Disp. de carit., q. un., a. 1, ad arg. 5–6; Odetto 756a.

²²⁸⁶) Cf. Aeg. Rom., In I Super Sent., I, d. 17, p. 1, princ. 1, q.1; Venetiis 1521 89rH–vI ; etiam Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 195,71–75.

²²⁸⁷ intelligitur *coni.*: intelligit V

²²⁸⁸) Cf. Petr. Lomb., Sent., I, d. 17, c. 7; Grottaferrata 151,8–19.

²²⁸⁹) Cf. Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 195,71–75; Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 197,125–130.

²²⁹⁰) Cf. Aeg. Rom., In I Super Sent., I, d. 17, p. 1, princ. 1, q.1; Venetiis 1521 90vL–M.

²²⁹¹) Cf. Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 77, a. 1, arg. 1; Leon. 61a; Thom., De ver., q. 22, a. 12, arg. 3 et 4; Dondaine 641,19–26.

²²⁹²) Arist., De an., III 10, 433b14–19; transl. vetus: Stroick 236,88–89; Auct. Arist., 6, n. 172; Hamesse 188,90–92.

actum respectu obiecti, magis est passio quam actio, [V 165rb] licet alii aliter dicant²²⁹³). Licet ergo sit potentia activa, tamen, ut agat actum supernaturalem vel imperet ad eum, indiget habitu perficiente, sicut et in politicis potentia indiget habitu virtutis, non ut agat simpliciter, sed ut actus sit laudabilis vel bonus vel perfectus.

(38) Ad octavum. Instrumentum habet actionem specialem praeter actionem principalis agentis; alias non magis istud quam illud quam aliud assumeretur pro instrumento; si ergo voluntas solum sit mota a Spiritu Sancto, tum sibi attribuetur agere et vere poterit mereri. Dicendum, quod non est alia actio numero principalis agentis et instrumenti, si proprie sit instrumentum, scilicet tantum motum, ut est securis, non sicut quae moventia movent sicut animata et omnes creaturae movent in virtute primi, sed tamen in effectum est aliquid, quod redditur ad instrumentum sicut divisio ligni ad serram, non, quod non etiam divisio sit ab artifice; aliquid autem non ad serram, sed ad artificem sicut forma scamni, et talia instrumenta nihil merentur, quae tamen mota movent eodem, non alio motu. Sic autem esset de voluntate secundum opinionem Magistri.

(39) Item ipsum velle elicitur sine habitu a voluntate; ergo et alia. Dicendum, quod velle est generale sicut et intelligere. Numquam autem est in natura nisi respectu alicuius determinati obiecti, sicut nec intelligere contingit, nisi aliquid intelligat. Et ideo si id est beatitudo simpliciter, sic vult naturaliter quasi ut natura, non ut voluntas, sicut et naturaliter prima principia intelligimus²²⁹⁴), sed velle beatitudinem in hoc, scilicet Deo, in quo solo ponimus, non potest esse nisi per caritatem.

(40) Ad decimum. Humanitas in Christo fuit instrumentum divinitatis²²⁹⁵), et opera Filii non solum fuerunt sua, sed etiam humanitatis, et delectabilia humanitati sive homini illi; ergo et opera Spiritus Sancti moventis sunt etiam voluntatis. Dicendum, quod non est simile secundum quosdam²²⁹⁶), quia humanitas et Filius unita fuerunt in esse, non sic Spiritus Sanctus vel voluntas.

(41) Sed contra: Maior est illa unio secundum esse quam secundum operationem²²⁹⁷); unde in patria in actu intellectionis unitur divina essentia intellectui non in esse; ergo si Filius unitur humanitati in esse, et Spiritus Sanctus poterit voluntati secundum operationem. Dicendum aliter, quod Filius per humanitatem operabatur repletam tamen habitibus omnium gratiarum. Unde “requievit super eum spiritus sapientiae, scientiae et intellectus”²²⁹⁸) et caetera.

²²⁹³) Cf. Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 17, q. 1, resp.; Muller 196,99–100.

²²⁹⁴) Cf. Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 75; Leon. 475a; Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 83; Leon. 523a; Thom., Super Boet. de Trin., q. 6, a. 4, resp.; Gils 170,96–127; Thom., Quodl. VIII, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gauthier 58,65–59,78.

²²⁹⁵) Cf. Ioann. Damasc., De fide orthod., c. 59; Kotter 150,171; Buytaert 239,199.

²²⁹⁶) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 394–395; Thom., In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Mandonnet – Moos 240.

²²⁹⁷) Cf. Thom., S. th., III, q. 4, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Leon. 72a–b.

²²⁹⁸) Is. 11, 2.

(42) Ad undecimum. “Spiritus postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarratibus”²²⁹⁹); sed homo non potest competere sibi ut agenti, cuius non est gemere, ergo ut principio. Dicendum, quod postulat, inquantum postulare nos²³⁰⁰ facit²³⁰¹).

²²⁹⁹) *Rom.*, 8, 26.

²³⁰⁰ nos: non *sed del. et corr. V*

²³⁰¹) Thom., In IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 6, quaestiu. 1, arg. 3 et ad arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 754 et 755.

QUAESTIO XVIII

UTRUM IN HOMINE SIT TANTUM UNA FORMA SUBSTANTIALIS

- (1) Circa istam quaestionem primo videndum est, quid sit dicendum secundum aliorum opiniones, secundo, quid secundum veritatem.
- (2) Quoad primum sciendum, quod ponentes plures formas sex modis diversificantur.
- (3) Quidam dicunt, quod secundum diversitatem essentialium praedicamentorum in quolibet diversitas formarum secundum aliam formam est substantia, secundum aliam corpus, secundum aliam vivum et secundum aliam animal et secundum aliam homo. Et hanc opinionem tenuit Avicbron²³⁰²) et Ioannes Dacus²³⁰³) in campo sancti Germani Parisius. Ratio horum est, quia intentiones logicales sumuntur a principiis essentialibus, unde oportet, quod intellectualibus intentionibus²³⁰⁴ correspondeat multitudo formarum.
- (4) Sed hoc stare non potest propter duo: Primo, quia falsum praesupponunt. Forma enim substantialis solidius fundamentum parat intentionibus logicalibus quam accidentibus, sed ab eadem forma accidentali sumuntur omnes intentiones, ut ab eadem albedine, quae est una simpliciter forma, tu es qualificatus, coloratus et dealbatus. Multo ergo magis ab eadem forma substantiali possunt sumi. Secundo, quia secundum Commentatorem²³⁰⁵) et etiam Philosophum²³⁰⁶) materia prima est de se in potentia immediata ad formam essentialem, quae est forma corporeitatis²³⁰⁷). Unde forma corporeitatis est prima forma, quae advenit materiae primae. Ista autem imaginatur formam aliam priorem, per quam est aliquid substantia, quod falsum est, quia sic est: substantia, quod <non> est corpus, est forma tantum ut angelus²³⁰⁸. Unde haec opinio est magis rudis et puerilis inter omnes, quia facit nimis bonum † forum de formis²³⁰⁹ †.
- (5) Secunda opinio²³¹⁰) est, quae dicit, quod homo habet formam corporeitatis et habet etiam tres animas distinctas actu in corpore secundum diversa organa, quarum una est in hepate, scilicet

²³⁰²) Cf. Avenc., Fons vitae, III, 48; IV, 3; V, 34; Beumker 187,24–188,3; 216,1–6; 320,8–12; etiam Thom., In Gen. et Corr., I, c. 4, lect. 10; Leon. 300b–301a.

²³⁰³) Iohan. Dacus, De grad. form.; Otto 515–570, *spec.* Iohan. Dacus, De grad. form. I; Otto 521 et 530.

²³⁰⁴ intellectualibus intentionibus *coni.*: intellectualium intentionum V

²³⁰⁵) Cf. Averr., Phys. I comm. 63; Venetiis 1562, 38rD; Averr., De sub. orb., c. 1; Venetiis 1562 3vM–4vL.

²³⁰⁶) Cf. Arist., Metaph. VII, 3, 1029a14–20; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,22–28; Arist., Phys. I, 2, 185b3–5; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 11,11–14.

²³⁰⁷) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 228–229; etiam Thom., In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 86–87.

²³⁰⁸ sic ... angelus *an* sic substantia, quae est corpus, est forma tantum ut angelus *scrib.*?

²³⁰⁹ forum ... formis *dub.* V

²³¹⁰) Cf. Averr., De an., I, comm. 90; Crawford. 121,8–17; etiam Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 220b.

nutritiva sive vegetativa, alia, scilicet concupisciva, in corde, alia, cognoscitiva, in cerebro. Motivum horum erat, quia operationes horum magis in his apparent.

(6) Sed hoc stare non potest propter duo, secundum quod Philosophus probat contra eum I *De anima*²³¹¹), primo, quia in eadem parte decisa apparent diversae operationes, scilicet sensus et appetitus. Hoc autem non esset, si in diversis partibus essent, sed quaelibet in sua parte tantum et non in alia operationem haberet. Secundo quaerit Philosophus²³¹²), quid illas animas contineat, aut [V 165va] corpus aut anima. Non corpus, quia corpus magis contineretur ab anima; unde recedente anima corpus macrescit et dissolvitur. Ergo anima est continens illa²³¹³²³¹⁴). Tunc quaero, utrum illa anima continens sit una vel plures. Non plures, quia continet illas et sic in infinitum. Si una, quaeritur ergo a principio non dixit esse unam. Nec valet ratio, quia, licet in his magis appareant operationes, tamen etiam in aliis pertinentibus inveniuntur, ut dictum est²³¹⁵).

(7) Tertia opinio²³¹⁶), quae dicit, quod in homine est alia forma, per quam est corpus, alia, per quam est vivum, scilicet vegetabilis, alia, per quam est animal, scilicet sensitiva, alia, per quam est homo, scilicet intellectiva, et sunt ab invicem distinctae, et una aliam tempore via generationis praecedit.

(8) Ratio ipsorum est duplex, una, quia ista in aliis sunt formae substantiales; non ergo minus, sed magis in homine; secundo, quia secundum Commentatorem²³¹⁷) formae universaliores praecedunt particulares, ut forma corporis alias²³¹⁸²³¹⁹).

(9) Sed hoc stare non potest propter duo: primo, quia secundum Philosophum II *De anima*²³²⁰) vegetativum est in sensitivo et sensitivum in intellectivo sicut trigonum in tetragono. Hoc autem est potentia tantum, quia idem non potest simul esse actu trigonum et tetragonum; ergo et ibi forma corporis vivi et sensitivi; sunt autem in homine, inquantum sunt potentia in anima rationali²³²¹). Secundo: Quando aliquae formae distinctae una non impedit aliam, sicut albedo non impedit calorem in calefaciendo, nec calor albedinem in disgregando visum²³²²), et multo minus impedit una aliam, quando una ad aliam ordinatur, sicut ibi est secundum eos, sed magis promovet. Videmus

²³¹¹) Arist., De an. I, 411b19–30; transl. vetus: Stroick 61,75–81; etiam Arist., De an., II 2, 413b13–24; Stroick 74,72–75,87.

²³¹²) Arist., De an. I, 5, 411b5–31; transl. vetus: Stroick 56,78–81 et 61,73–81.

²³¹³ illa an illas scrib.?

²³¹⁴) Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 58; Leon 410b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 3, resp; Leon. 220b–221a.

²³¹⁵) Cf. *supra* idem sect.

²³¹⁶) Cf. e.g. Guill. de Alvern., De an., c. 4, p. 1; Parisiis 1674 105; etiam Rich. de Mediavill., De grad. form., resp.; Zavalloni 71,18–22; Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creatur., a. 3, ad arg. 12 et 13; Cos 46,537–578; Thom., Quodl., I, q. 4, a. 1; Gauthier 183,15–185,156.

²³¹⁷) Cf. Averr., Metaph., I, comm. 17; Venetiis 1562, 14vK.

²³¹⁸ alias: aliis V

²³¹⁹) Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creatur., a. 3, arg. 17; Cos 36,131–137.

²³²⁰) Arist., De an. II, 414b19–31; transl. vetus: Stroick 80,69–75.

²³²¹) Cf. Thom., Quodl., I, q. 4, a. 1, resp.; Gauthier 183,58–184,69; Thom. Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 8, arg. 8; Bazán 65,85–92.

²³²²) Cf. e.g. Guill. Altiss., S. aur., I, append. 48, tract. 13, c. 5, p. 257; Ribailier 367,21–26; Alb., De praed., tract. 4, c. 4; Santos-Noya – Steel – Donati 87,58–88,2.

autem, quod, quando sensitiva intenditur, vegetativa remittitur, ut in die; quando autem remittitur ut in quiete noctis, tunc vegetativa intenditur; et similiter est de intellectiva. Hoc autem non esset, nisi idem principium primum harum operationum esset.

(10) Nec valent rationes. Ex perfectione animae rationalis est in homine, quod ipsa sola possit, quia aliae alia possunt, sicut et tetragonus²³²³ maius potest, quod potest trigonus, et adhuc potest plus²³²⁴).

(11) Secundum non valet, quia formae generales, quae praecedunt tempore, dispositive sunt et adveniente ultima corrumpuntur; quae autem praecedunt ordine naturae non realiter, sed secundum modum intelligendi, eadem sunt cum ultimo, sed differunt ratione, ut eadem anima rationalis, prout est forma corporis, praecedit se ipsam, inquantum est vegetativa, et inquantum vegetativa²³²⁵ <praecedit> se ipsam, inquantum est sensitiva, et sic de aliis. Et similiter accidentia, quae consequuntur corpus inquantum corpus, praecedunt ordine naturae accidentia vivi, et similiter se habent accidentia vivi respectu sensitivi et sensitivi respectu intellectivi²³²⁶).

(12) Quarta opinio²³²⁷) est, quae dicit, quod plures in homine sunt formae, ut tertia opinio, sed addit, quod forma prior non corrumpitur adveniente alia, sed perficitur per sequentem, et sic de aliis usque ad ultimam.

(13) Rationes sunt ad hoc duae, prima, quia natura nihil facit frustra²³²⁸); cum ergo prior forma, scilicet incompleta, disponat ad aliam advenientem²³²⁹, completa non destruit, sed perficiet; secunda, quia nihil destruitur nisi per destructionem sui subiecti, scilicet per accidens, vel per suum contrarium, scilicet per se²³³⁰); sed forma incompleta prior non destruitur per accidens, quia subiectum manet, nec est per se, quia sequens forma non est priori contraria, cum ambae sint substantiae.

(14) Sed hoc stare non potest, quia aut illa forma incompleta, quae prius inest, sic perficitur, quod sit ipsamet forma completa, aut ex omnibus formis illis fit una completa quasi ex illis commixta, aut illae remanebunt distinctae ordinem quandam habentes. Sed nullum horum est possibile. Primum non, quia tunc forma veniret de esse non completo sive remisso ad esse intensum, et similiter cum

²³²³ tetragonus *coni.*: tetragonis *V*

²³²⁴) Cf. Thom., Quaest. de spirit. creatur., a. 3, resp.; Cos 44,416–435.

²³²⁵ vegetativa *coni.*: vegetur *V*

²³²⁶) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creatur., a. 3, ad arg. 17; Cos 48,612–618; etiam Rich. de Mediavill., De grad. form., resp.; Zavalloni 70,83–87.

²³²⁷) Cf. e.g. Rich. de Mediavill., De grad. form., resp.; Zavalloni 68,57–69,82; Pecham, Quaest. de an., q. 1, ad arg. 7 et ad 13; Spettmann 326,26–30 et 328,4–13; Pecham, Quodl. IV, q. 25, ad arg. 1; Etzkorn – Delorme 231,47–49; Guill. de la Mare, Correct., a. 31, ad arg. 1; Glorieux 132; cf. etiam Thom., Quaest. de spirit. creatur., a. 3, resp.; Cos 39,249–263.

²³²⁸) Cf. Arist., De cael., I 4, 271a33; Hoßfeld 26,69–70; Arist., De an., III 9, 432b21–23; Stroick 229,83–84; Auct. Arist. 3, n. 18; Hamesse 161,16; Auct. Arist. 6, n. 168; Hamesse 188,83–84.

²³²⁹ advenientem *coni.*: adveniente *V*

²³³⁰) Cf. Arist., De iuvent. et senect., c. 5, 469b21–470a19; etiam Thom., Quaest. disp. de an., q. 19, resp.; Bazán 164,160–170.

destrueretur completa et remaneret incompleta, veniret ex intenso ad remissum, et sic susciperet magis et minus, quod non convenit formae substantiali²³³¹).

(15) Secundum etiam non constat, quia forma substantialis est simplex²³³²). Unde non potest esse commixta. Unde si cadunt in unam essentiam formae unius, tunc non potest aliquid eius corrumpi et aliud remanere.

(16) Tertium etiam stare non potest, quia, cum quaelibet sit forma in eis, ipsum totum, scilicet homo vel equus, erit unum sicut et ipsae formae. Hoc autem est unum ordine, quae est minima unionum, et sic minor mundus, scilicet homo²³³³), non erit unus²³³⁴ simpliciter, sed erit unus sicut maior mundus, quod est absurdum.

(17) Rationes non valent, quia natura nihil facit frustra²³³⁵). Inducit enim formam incompletam, ut per eam res disponatur ad completam, sine qua non complete²³³⁶ posset haberi, sicut et primo natura in digestionem inducit formam sanguinis, ut postea possit haberi forma carnis, et tamen, quando est caro, non est sanguis, [V 165vb] nec tamen frustra fiet sanguis. Unde sicut non manet sanguis, sic nec forma sanguinis.

(18) Ad secundum dicendum, quod corrumpitur non²³³⁷ ratione contrarietatis formae alterius, sed ratione non simul totalium²³³⁸ sicut in omnibus successivis, sicut mane corrumpitur per meridiem. Potest etiam dici, quod corrumpitur per accidens, in quantum subiectum corrumpitur, quod corrumpitur, in quantum ex eo aliud per sequentem formam generatur, sicut et sanguis et sua accidentia per generationem carnis.

(19) Quinta opinio²³³⁹) est, quae dicit, quod in omnibus est una forma praeterquam in homine, in quo sunt duae, scilicet anima sensitiva, quae virtute continet omnes inferiores, et anima intellectiva. Ratio ipsorum est, quia impossibile est duarum diversarum actionum et diversorum agentium esse unum terminum, sicut nec duorum motuum. Iam enim esset unus motus, sed agens supernaturale, scilicet Deus, agit per intentionem ad hunc terminum, scilicet animam rationalem²³⁴⁰. Ergo oportet, quod agentis naturalis, scilicet patris generantis, sit aliquis alius terminus, qui teneret suam

²³³¹) Cf. Arist., Cat., c. 5, 3b33; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 11,21; Thom., S. th., III, q. 75, a. 7, resp.; Leon 175a; Thom., Compend. th., I, c. 92; Leon. 114,106–121; Thom., Quaest. disp. de an., q. 9, ad arg. 10; Bazán 85,457–461.

²³³²) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 77, a. 1, arg. 3; Leon. 236a.

²³³³) Cf. e.g. Arist., Physic., VIII 2, 252b26–27; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 285,3–5; Mar. Victorin., Lib. de defin., 28; Pronay 78,6–7; Auct. Arist. 2, n. 205; Hamesse 156,35; Thom., In Phys., VIII, lect. 4, n. 999; Maggiolo 519b; Alb., Sent., III, d. 2A, a. 1, ad arg. 3; Borgnet 23a.

²³³⁴ unus coni.: unum V

²³³⁵) Cf. Arist., De cael., I 4, 271a33; Hoßfeld 26,69–70; Arist., De an., III 9, 432b21–23; Stroick 229,83–84; Auct. Arist. 3, n. 18; Hamesse 161,16; Auct. Arist. 6, n. 168; Hamesse 188,83–84.

²³³⁶ complete coni.: comple^{te} V

²³³⁷ corrumpitur non: corrumpitur natura *sed corr.* V

²³³⁸ totalium coni.: rationalia/communi alia V

²³³⁹) Henr. de Gand., Quodl. IV, q. 13, resp.; Wilson – Etzkorn 143,753–144,803; etiam. etiam God. de Font., Quodl. II, q. 7, resp.; De Wulf – Pelzer 112 et 122–123.

²³⁴⁰ scilicet animam rationalem *add. i. m.* V

actionem. Hoc autem, cum non sit anima intellectiva, oportet esse aliam, quae immediate est disposita ad animam rationalem. Sed nulla est ei proximior quam sensitiva. Quare istae duae sunt in homine.

(20) Sed istud stare non potest, quia, quando aliquid praedicatur de aliquo, propter diversas formas est praedicatio: per accidens, sed illae formae non sunt ad invicem ordinatae, ut superficies et color; erit praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi²³⁴¹ per se, ut superficiei est color, et tunc subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati²³⁴²). Cum igitur dico “homo est animal”, si ab alia forma est “homo” – est homo homo –, si²³⁴³ intellectiva, ab alia “animal”, scilicet sensitiva, sicut tu dicis, tunc ista praedicatio “homo est animal” erit per accidens. Sed istae formae non sunt ordinatae. Si autem ordinatae, est praedicatio non essentialis, sed in secundo modo dicendi per se. Et tunc hoc ponitur in definitione animalis et non equi et erit homo aliter animal quam alia animalia et quasi aequivoce, quod est absurdum²³⁴⁴).

(21) Secundo, quia, si anima intellectiva est alia, tunc ipsa recedente remanebit sensitiva et sic animal et viva caro, maxime cum maneat corpus, et secundum eos per sensitivam animam est corpus, et quidquid est praeterquam homo.

(22) Ratio non valet, quia duo possunt terminari ad unum diversimode, scilicet unum principaliter ut in creatione Deus, aliud instrumentaliter ut homo, qui ad eam disponit, sicut etiam ad eandem gratiam homo disponit, ad quam creatio gratiae sive infusio Dei terminatur. Et hoc est, quod Augustinus expresse dicit in libro *De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus*²³⁴⁵): “Neque dicimus duas animas esse in uno homine, sicut Iacobus et alii Syrorum dicunt”. Si non in homine, multo minus nec in aliis animatis, ut ex eorum ratione patet, cum ibi nulla anima creetur²³⁴⁶.

(23) Unde est sexta opinio²³⁴⁷), quae dicit, quod in omni animato est alia forma ipsa anima, per quam vivit, alia forma corporis; in inanimatis autem est una tantum. Et ad hoc moventur primo et principali, quia recedente anima remanet adhuc idem corpus. Non est autem idem nisi per eandem formam. Cum igitur non sit idem per formam vivi, quia illa non est, cum mortuum sit animal, ergo est alia, quae sit forma corporeitatis.

(24) Secundo, quia cuilibet corruptioni correspondet sua compositio²³⁴⁸). In vivente autem est duplex corruptio, una, quae dicitur vitae, alia, quae dicitur incineratio, quae est corporis etiam post

²³⁴¹ dicendi: dicendo *sed corr. V*

²³⁴²) Cf. Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 58; Leon. 409b; Thom., In Metaph., V, lect. 19, n. 1054–1057, *spec.* 1055; Cathala – Spiazzi 274b–275b, *spec.* 274b–275a; Thom., In Anal. Post., I 35, 84a12; Leon. 130,46–53.

²³⁴³ si *an* scilicet *scrib.*?

²³⁴⁴) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 221a; etiam Correct. Corrupt. Quare, a. 31; Glorieux 141–142.

²³⁴⁵) Ps.-Gennad. Massilien., Lib. ecclesiastic. dogmat., c. 15; PL 58 1021A–B.

²³⁴⁶ creetur: tenetur *sed corr. V*

²³⁴⁷) *non inveni*

²³⁴⁸) Cf. Arist., Metaph., II 2, 994b5–6; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 38,18–19 .

mortem²³⁴⁹). Ergo est duplex compositio, una, per quam est corpus, alia, per quam vivum est. Quaelibet autem compositio est ex forma et materia²³⁵⁰). Ergo duae formae.

(25) Isti habent et alia motiva, quae inferius solventur.

(26) Sed hoc stare non potest propter duo, primo, quia, sicut dictum est²³⁵¹), si homo per aliam esset homo, per aliam animal, per aliam corpus, sicut dicunt, tunc, cum dico “hominem” corpus vel “animal est corpus” est praedicatio non generis nec essentialis, sed per accidens, quod falsum est.

(27) Secundo, quia, cum illa forma corporis sit forma substantialis, faciens ens actu. Quod autem advenit enti in actu, est accidentale²³⁵²). Quare sequeretur, quod forma vivi sive anima esset forma accidentalis, quod est erroneum et contra Philosophum, qui in II *De anima*²³⁵³) dicit animam esse substantiam.

(28) Praeterea quaerendum est ab istis, quomodo intelligant suam positionem, aut sic, quod est forma eadem numero corporis, quam materia numquam perdit nec privatur ea, sicut voluit Avicenna²³⁵⁴), et quod generationes et corruptiones sunt circa alias formas advenientes; aut sic, quod etiam materia potest formam corporis perdere.

(29) Neutrum potest stare. Primum non, quia secundum Philosophum in *De generatione et corruptione*²³⁵⁵) “hyle est immediatum subiectum generationis et corruptionis”. Ergo est immediate in potentia ad formam elementorum²³⁵⁶), in quibus principaliter et prius est generatio et corruptio, non ergo mediante forma corporis. Secundo, quia tunc nulla esset generatio simpliciter, sed tantum alteratio, quia alteratio est, quando sub actu manente circa formas fit variatio²³⁵⁷).

(30) Tertio, quia tunc ignis et aqua erunt unum et idem corpus numero tantum, [V 166ra] eadem potentia maneat corporis, quando ex uno fit aliud, sicut coclear et manubium sunt idem lignum, quando ex uno fieret aliud, cum maneat forma ligni.

(31) Secundum etiam non potest stare, scilicet quod materia separabiliter habeat illam formam corporis, quia, si perdit eam, aut hoc fit cum corruptione formae specificaе aut seorsum sine ea. Primum non, quia recedente forma vivi, adhuc remanet forma corporis secundum eos. Si seorsum, ergo sicut, quod perdit formam ignis, fit non ignis, ita et, quod perderet formam corporis, fieret non

²³⁴⁹) Cf. Thom., In III Sent., d. 21, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 5; Mandonnet – Moos 638.

²³⁵⁰) Cf. Auct. Arist., 4, n. 23; Hamesse 169,73–74.

²³⁵¹) Cf. *supra* sect. (20)

²³⁵²) Cf. Auct. Arist. 6, n. 114; Hamesse 183,85; etiam Averr., De an., II, comm. 4 et 7; Crawford 133,32–134,39 et 139,42–45.

²³⁵³) Arist., De an., II 1, 412a19–20; Stroick 64,55–56; cf. Auct. Arist. 6, n. 41; Hamesse 177,59.

²³⁵⁴) Avic., Suffic., tract. I, c. 2; Van Riet 20,50–62.

²³⁵⁵) Arist., De gen. et corr., I 4, 320a2–3; Judycka 25,5–7; cf. Auct. Arist. 4, n. 9; Hamesse 168,49–51.

²³⁵⁶) Cf. e.g. Thom., Quaest. disp. de an., q. 9, arg. 9; Bazán 77,73–78; Thom., S. contr. Gent., III, c. 22; Leon. 52b et 53b.

²³⁵⁷) Cf. Thom., In Gen. et Corr., I, lect. 2, n. 2; Leon. 268b.

corpus. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia ex corpore non fit non corpus²³⁵⁸) sicut nec ex non corpore corpus. Nec valet, si dicas, quod corrumpitur in non hoc corpus, sed in aliud numero, quia generatio et corruptio sunt semper in oppositas formas²³⁵⁹). Una autem forma corporis inquantum corporis non opponitur alteri inquantum corpus. Potest et hoc videri in pluribus corporibus et in inanimatis, ubi non tantum est, quod est generis, sed etiam, quod est speciei, ut ignis est corpus et est ignis. Si ergo hoc est per eandem formam, ergo et in animalibus. Sed hoc nihil valet, quia perfectibilibus respondent suae perfectiones²³⁶⁰). Si ergo forma ignis dat esse ignem et corpus, ergo et anima, quae est nobilior perfectio, dabit suo nobili perfectibili esse animal et corpus.

(32) Unde alii dicunt, quod est tantum una forma in re. Sed isti variantur tripliciter.

(33) Quidam²³⁶¹) dicunt, quod in qualibet re est una forma, per quam est totum quod est, sicut per eandem formam homo est corpus, animal, homo et quidquid est, sed in habentibus partes eius genericas sive diversarum specierum ibi praeter illam formam totius unam singulae partes habent suas partiales actu formas. Unde secundum eos alia est forma oculi, alia carnis, alia ossis, et sic de aliis. Unde una est forma totius, multae vero partium.

(34) Moventur autem adhuc propter tria:

(35) Primo, quia ista differunt plus quam numero ab invicem, quia unum os ab alio osse differt numero, a carne vero plus, et hoc est specie, quod patet, quia diversas habent operationes et virtutes sicut etiam patet de visu et auditu; sed diversitas speciei non est ab una forma. Cum igitur forma totius sit una, oportet, quod hoc sit a diversis formis partium.

(36) Secundo Commentator dicit *Super II De anima*²³⁶²), quod visus est forma substantialis oculi. Visus autem non est anima, cum anima sit in toto corpore²³⁶³), non autem visus. Et sic praeter animam, quae est forma totius, est alia forma in oculo, et sic de aliis partibus.

(37) Tertio, quia ibidem dicit Philosophus²³⁶⁴), quod, si oculus esset animal, visus esset anima. Hoc autem non esset verum, nisi visus esset forma substantialis sicut anima animalis.

(38) Sed ista opinio non valet.

(39) Primo, quia volens fugere formarum pluralitatem maiorem, <sed> ponit²³⁶⁵ minoritatem formarum propter magnam multitudinem partium in animali.

²³⁵⁸) Cf. Arist., De cael., III 6, 305a14–33; Hoßfeld 231,79–232,90.

²³⁵⁹) Cf. Thom., In Phys., V, lect. 3, n. 671; Maggiolo 331a.

²³⁶⁰) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, sed contra 3; Mandonnet – Moos 115.

²³⁶¹) Cf. Aeg. Rom., De grad. form., II, c. 8; Venetiis 1500 102va–b, *spec.* 102va.

²³⁶²) Averr., De an., II, comm. 9; Crawford 144,32–33.

²³⁶³) Cf. *e.g.* Thom., In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 232–236; Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 72; Leon. 456a–457b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 8; Leon. 232a–233b; Thom., Quaest. disp. de an., q. 10; Bazán 87,1–94,427; Thom., De spiritual. creat., q. un., a. 4; Leon. 48,1–55,399.

²³⁶⁴) Arist., De an. II 1, 412b18–19; transl. vetus: Stroick 67,73; cf. Auct. Arist., 6, n. 44; Hamesse 177,62.

²³⁶⁵ ponit: poterit *sed corr.* V

(40) Secundo, quia eadem inconvenientia sequentur ad istam positionem, quae ad alias; primo, quia, sicut homo non esset unum quid numero, si plures haberet formas totius, ita et hic oculus non esset quid unum, si haberet duas formas; sed sicut ibi altera formarum esset accidentalis, quia adveniret completo, ita et hic anima vel visus – quod est contra eos –; sed sicut et ibi “homo est corpus” esset praedicatio accidentalis, ita et hic “oculus est corpus”, cum per aliam formam, scilicet totius, sit corpus, per aliam oculus; et simile est de ossibus et aliis partibus. Nec erit dare, quid sit per animam²³⁶⁶, cum anima sit corporis forma secundum Philosophum²³⁶⁷) et corpus non sit aliquid seorsum a partibus.

(41) Praeterea Philosophus²³⁶⁸) dicit, quod anima non tenet aliquem determinatum locum in corpore ita, quod sit in certa parte, sicut voluit Plato²³⁶⁹). Ergo est in qualibet parte. Si ergo non dat oculo, quod sit oculus, vel ossi, quod sit os, quid ergo dat? Sed dicunt ita, quod dat oculo, quod sit pars, et in quantum pars non est distinctus a ceteris partibus²³⁷⁰), sed quod sit oculus, hoc habet a visu, qui est forma partis, per quam distinguitur ab aliis partibus.

(42) Contra: Philosophus²³⁷¹) dicit, quod “anima est actus corporis physici organici”. Oculus autem in quantum oculus est organum. Unde sublatis organis sicut in animalibus densis²³⁷², anima recedit vel corrumpitur, quod non est forma organici corporis.

(43) Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non differunt specie substantiali, sed accidentali, sicut, si in eodem ligno esset forma coclearis et in alia parte ligni esset forma manubrii, idem lignum habens unam formam substantialem haberet diversas artificiales, quae sunt accidentales, et tamen secundum illas ordinarentur ad diversas species artis operationes. Si hoc fit ab arte, ita in animali una est forma substantialis, a qua propter sui perfectionem fluunt diversae potentiae perficientes diversa organa accidentali perfectione, et ex hoc ibi inveniuntur diversae operationes²³⁷³).

(44) Ad dictum Commentatoris dicendum, quod per visum intelligit animam visivam, quae est ipsamet anima vel †²³⁷⁴ |V 166rb| substantialis, id est essentialis, quia ponit ipsum in specie originali, quasi sicut dicere possumus, quod forma coclearis est forma non substantialis, sed essentialis, prout artificialia dicuntur habere essentiam.

²³⁶⁶ animam *add.* quae absurda sunt V

²³⁶⁷) Arist., De an., II 1, 412a19–20; Stroick 64,55–56; cf. Auct. Arist. 6, n. 42; Hamesse 177,59.

²³⁶⁸) Arist., De an. I, 411b19–30; transl. vetus: Stroick 61,75–81; Arist., De an., II 2, 413b13–24; Stroick 74,72–75,87; cf. etiam Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 220b–221a.

²³⁶⁹) Cf. Averb., De an., I, comm. 90; Crawford. 121,8–17; Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 220b; Thom., S. contr. Gent., II, c. 58; Leon. 410b.

²³⁷⁰) Cf. Bonav., In Sent. IV, d. 10, par. 1, a. un., q. 5, sed contra 1; Quaracchi 1889 224b.

²³⁷¹) Arist., De an., II 1, 412a19–20, 412a27–28 et 412b5–6; Stroick 64,55–66,88; 66,91; 67,65–66; cf. Auct. Arist. 6, n. 41; Hamesse 177,57–58.

²³⁷² densis *dub.* V

²³⁷³) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, sed contra 3; Mandonnet – Moos 115–116.

²³⁷⁴ †: glo^d V

(45) Ad illud Philosophi dicendum, quod consequentia bona est. Posito enim, quod visus non sit forma substantialis, sicut ibidem²³⁷⁵) dicitur, quod, si dolabra esset animal, forma dolabrae²³⁷⁶ esset anima, et tamen nunc forma dolabrae²³⁷⁷ est accidentalis.

(46) Unde est alia opinio²³⁷⁸), quae dicit cum praecedenti, quod est una forma tantum, per quam est homo, quidquid est; sed tamen sunt aliae formae partium non actu, sicut dicit opinio praecedens, sed quasi habitu. Unde dicit, quod forma totius, sicut anima in homine, dat esse et toti et omnibus partibus, et partes non habent aliud esse a toto, quia, licet habeant formas suas partiales, tamen ab illis non habent esse, sed participant esse totius, quamdiu sunt in toto. Et quia habitus procedit in actum remoto prohibente, ideo remota forma totius quaelibet pars habet esse per formam suam, et non habet esse, quod prius, quia illud participatur a toto; nunc autem per se a forma propria, sicut corpus, quod prius fuit corpus per formam totius, in organo animalis est corpus per formam propriam, quo iterum resolutio partes eius habent esse proprium²³⁷⁹, et sicut eadem est forma, quae modo est in potentia, postea est in actu, ita et idem corpus, quod modo est animalis, postea est per se. Et quod dicitur, quod non sic idem intelligitur, quod non est eodem modo in genere, quo prius, quia per reductionem, id est per formam totius, postea autem per se, id est per formam propriam. Hoc autem totum intelligitur de his, quae componuntur ex diversis naturis, non autem de simplicibus, quia pars ignis habet eandem formam cum toto igne, cuius est pars.

(47) Ad hoc inducunt verbum Commentatoris *Super II Metaphysicae*²³⁸⁰), qui dicit, quod partes sunt in toto vel in potentia vel proprie²³⁸¹. Potentiam proprie²³⁸² dicit, quia non est nuda potentia, sed habitualis.

(48) Ad hoc adducunt duo exempla, unum, quod est sic: Species intelligibiles sunt in intellectu possibili non in nuda potentia, sicut antequam eas intellectus reciperet, nec in actu simpliciter, sicut quando actu intelligit; aliud est, quod anima Christi non dabat aliud esse in Christo, sed participabat esse divinum; sed dedisset, si sibi²³⁸³ fuisset relicta et a divinitate separata.

(49) Sed haec positio, licet sit subtilis, tamen non potest stare, primo, quia natura habitus non habet locum nisi in accidentalibus²³⁸⁴. Unde etiam est in prima specie qualitatis²³⁸⁵). Una ergo et eadem

²³⁷⁵) Arist., De an., II 1, 412b10–18; Stroick 67,69–72.

²³⁷⁶ dolabrae *coni.*: dolabrae V

²³⁷⁷ dolabrae *coni.*: dolabrae V

²³⁷⁸) Cf. Correct. Corrup. Sciendum, a. 31 et 52; Glorieux 142 et 202–203.

²³⁷⁹ proprium *coni.*: propria V

²³⁸⁰) *potius* Averr., Metaph. V, comm. 31; Ponzalli 215,42–46; cf. Thom., In Metaph., V, lect. 21, n. 1102; Cathala – Spiazzi 285.

²³⁸¹ proprie *an* prope *scirb. ex Averro?*

²³⁸² proprie *an* prope *scirb. ex Averro?*

²³⁸³ si sibi: sic *sed corr.* V

²³⁸⁴ accidentalibus: *accidentibus sed. corr. s. v.* V

²³⁸⁵) Arist., Cat., c. 8, 8b25–35; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 23,22–24,6.

forma accidentalis ut scientia primo est in nuda potentia intellectus²³⁸⁶ possibilis ante addiscere, postea fit singularis, ut dicitur III *De anima*²³⁸⁷), id est, quando habet species singularum rerum, tunc est aliquo modo in potentia, quia non pura, sed permixta cum actu, quia ideo habetur actu scientia, licet non actu consideret secundum eam; et respectu huius actus secundi, qui est considerare, dicitur in potentia, et talis forma, quae est in potentia respectu huius actus secundi et actu respectu primi, dicitur habitus. Hoc autem totum non habet locum in formis substantialibus. Si tamen concedatur eis natura habitus in substantialibus propter hoc, quod Philosophus dicit II *De anima*²³⁸⁸), quod anima est forma ut habitus, habitum ibidem²³⁸⁹) dicit ipsam essentiam animae completam essentialiter et informantem corpus, qui habitus nihil habet, vel dicit de potentia ad essentiam formae, sed solum ad actum suum sive ad operationem eius. Sic autem ponere formas partium est²³⁹⁰ esse idem ponere, quod praecedens opinio dicit; ponit videlicet, quod in partibus sint plures²³⁹¹ formae actu substantiales, quod improbatum est.

(50) Praeterea secundum Philosophum VIII *Metaphysicae*²³⁹²) vivum corrumpitur²³⁹³ in corpus mortuum sicut vinum in acetum. Sed nullus dicit formam aceti esse habitualiter in vino. Ergo nec forma corporis, quod relinquitur per mortem, fuit habitualiter in vivo²³⁹⁴ animali.

(51) Praeterea si per formam partis oculus est oculus et caro caro, tunc remota forma totius per mortem et praecedentibus formis substantialibus in actus suos, quod prius non potuerunt propter formam totius, cuius esse participabant, tunc maxime dabant partibus esse. Hoc autem falsum est, immo mortuus oculus non est oculus nec mortua caro est caro. †²³⁹⁵ et tamen primo prius deberet unumquodque maxime esse, quod est.

(52) Ad dictum Commentatoris dicendum, quod potentiam dicit, quia non est tantus transitus a toto ad partes sicut in aliis rebus, quando ex una fit alia.

(53) Exempla non valent, quia species intelligibiles sunt formae accidentales²³⁹⁶); nec etiam secundum, quia, licet non dederit esse, tamen dedit esse homini et dedit operationes et passiones

²³⁸⁶ intellectus *coni.*: intelligit V

²³⁸⁷) Arist., De an. III 4, 429b5; transl. vetus: Stroick 198,83–85; cf. etiam Thom., S. th., I, q. 79, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 270b.

²³⁸⁸) Arist., De an. II 4, 412a21–27; transl. vetus: Stroick 66,88–91; cf. etiam Alb., De an., II, tract. 1, c. 2; Stroick 66,60–65; Thom., In De an., II, c. 1, 412a22; Leon. 71,289–300.

²³⁸⁹) Arist., De an. II 4, 412a21–27; transl. vetus: Stroick 66,88–91; cf. Alb., De an., II, tract. 1, c. 2; Stroick 66,60–65; Thom., In De an., II, c. 1, 412a22; Leon. 71,289–300.

²³⁹⁰ est: esse *sed corr. V et add. esse V*

²³⁹¹ plures *coni.*: plure V

²³⁹²) Arist., Metaph., VIII 5, 1044b34–1045a7; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 165,10–18; cf. etiam Thom., In I Sent., d. 11, q. 2, a. 3, quaestiu. 2, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 473.

²³⁹³ corrumpitur: corruptu *sed corr. V*

²³⁹⁴ vivo *coni.*: vivuo V

²³⁹⁵ †: H' t'no te V

²³⁹⁶) Cf. Avic., Metaph., III, c. 8; Van Riet 157,42–163,43, *spec.* 163,38–43; etiam Thom., De ver., q. 10, a. 6, arg. 7; Dondaine 311,59–62; Thom., S. contr. Gent., I, c. 46; Leon. 137a.

humanas, quas divinitas non²³⁹⁷ habebat, et etiam fuit ibi in perfecta essentia, non habituali, et fuit²³⁹⁸ in genere substantiae per eam, quae prius in nullo genere fuit, quia ista negant de suis partibus et habitualibus formis.

(54) Unde dicendum est aliter sermone absoluto et sine omni distinctione et exceptione, quod in omni re composita ex materia et forma non est nisi una forma tantum [V 166va] substantialis, qua corrupta vel recedente succedit alia, quae etiam est una, nisi illud compositum primum corrumpatur in diversa²³⁹⁹). Et hoc ostenditur ex quattuor, primo ex parte ipsius esse formae. De intellectu enim formae est, quod dat esse nec ab ea separari potest. Forma igitur praecedens dat aliquod esse substantiale; sequens ergo aut totum idem esse aut aliud; non idem, quia datum est; ergo aliud. Igitur res habebit duo esse. Sed esse est actus entis²⁴⁰⁰), et non multiplicatur nisi multiplicatione eorum, quorum est. Ergo erunt duo entia, cum esse sit actus entis. Sed ens et res convertuntur et unum secundum Avicennam²⁴⁰¹). Ergo habens duas vel plures formas non erit ens, sed entia, nec una res, sed plures, nec unum, sed plura²⁴⁰²).

(55) Secundo hoc²⁴⁰³ patet ex parte formae. Constat enim, quod anima est ipsius corporis forma; autem ergo²⁴⁰⁴ accidentalis aut substantialis; non accidentalis, quia anima est substantia secundum Philosophum II *De anima*²⁴⁰⁵); ergo substantialis. Non autem sic – quam se existens substantia adveniat certe – accipitur sicut vestes vestito, quia sic etiam homo esset unum per accidens et in genere accidentis, sicut vestitum²⁴⁰⁶). Ergo est substantialiter informans corpus. Hoc autem non posset esse, nisi sit de substantia corporis. Ergo corpus non est nec intelligitur esse sine anima. Quare non est alia forma. Unde secundum Philosophum II *De anima*²⁴⁰⁷): “Vivere viventibus est esse”. Cum igitur secundum eum *ibidem*²⁴⁰⁸) anima sit principium, quo vivimus; et vivere sit esse, si habet esse ab anima corpus, qui est primus omnium actus²⁴⁰⁹) et alios habebit.

(56) Tertio hoc patet ex natura generationis et corruptionis. In omni enim transmutatione hoc est, quod “terminus a quo” numquam stat cum “termino ad quem”, cum propter hoc sit

²³⁹⁷ non *add. s. v. V*

²³⁹⁸ fuit *add. in genere sed del. V*

²³⁹⁹) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 3, resp.; Leon. 221a.

²⁴⁰⁰) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 195; Thom., In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad arg. 2; Mandonnet – Moos 223; Thom., In Metaph., IV, lect. 2, n. 553; Cathala – Spiazzi 155a; Thom., De ver., q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Dondaine 5,131–139; Thom., De ver., q. 1, a. 1, resp. ad sed contra 3; Dondaine 7,283–286.

²⁴⁰¹) Avic., Metaph., I, c. 5 et II, c. 2; Van Riet 31,2–32,5; 33,25–28 et 114,17–20.

²⁴⁰²) Cf. Thom., In III Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, ad arg. 3; Mandonnet – Moos 556; etiam Ps.-Thom., De nat. mater. et dimension. interm., c. 8, n. 408; Spiazzi 142a.

²⁴⁰³ hoc: huius *sed corr. V*

²⁴⁰⁴ ergo: genus *sed corr. V*

²⁴⁰⁵) Arist., De an., II 1, 412a19–20; Stroick 64,55–56; cf. etiam Auct. Arist. 6, n. 42; Hamesse 177,59.

²⁴⁰⁶) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 5, a. 10, resp.; Pession 156a.

²⁴⁰⁷) Arist., De an., II 4, 415b13; Stroick 85,71–72.

²⁴⁰⁸) Arist., De an., II 4, 415b13; Stroick 85,71–72.

²⁴⁰⁹) Cf. Thom., In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad arg. 1; Mandonnet – Moos 766; etiam Ps.-Thom., De nat. mater. et dimension. interm., c. 4, n. 382; Spiazzi 135b; Ps.-Thom., De quattuor opposit., c. 1, n. 586; Spiazzi 208b.

transmutatio²⁴¹⁰), quod “terminus a quo” reiciatur et “terminus ad quem” habeatur. Sed forma praecedens est “terminus a quo”, forma adveniens “terminus ad quem”. Ergo ex natura transmutationis numquam istae formae stant simul.

(57) Quarto ex natura privationis. Forma enim adveniente aut stat eius privatio, quae prius erat modo, aut²⁴¹¹ non. Si stat, hoc non potest esse, quia tunc privatio non esset carentia formae²⁴¹²), si staret, quando forma iam haberetur. Si non stat, ergo et forma corrumpitur, quae praecedit, per quam stabit sub privatione, cum materia nuda non sit subiectum privationis, quia, si materia nuda sive prima esset subiectum proprium privationis, cum illa de se sit una et indifferens²⁴¹³), omnia essent aequaliter privata, quae sunt privata.

(58) Praeterea cum materia non possit esse sine forma²⁴¹⁴), ex hoc est materia privata una forma, quia habet aliam. Et ideo privatio numquam aufertur nisi sublata forma, quam habet.

(59) Et sic concluditur sine haesitatione, quod in omni re est tantum una forma substantialis.

²⁴¹⁰) Cf. God. de Font., Quodl. XIV, q. 5, resp.; Hoffmans 415.

²⁴¹¹ aut *coni.*: autem V

²⁴¹²) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 66, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 157a.

²⁴¹³) Cf. Thom., De sub. sep., c. 5; Leon. D 48,74–77.

²⁴¹⁴) Cf. Thom., Quaest. disp. de spirit. creatur., a. 5, ad arg. 10; Cos 64,335–340.

QUAESTIO XIX

[E 104rb] UTRUM DIMENSIONES VEL ALIQUAE DISPOSITIONES ACCIDENTALES PRAECEDANT FORMAM
SUBSTANTIALEM²⁴¹⁵ IN MATERIA

(1) Intelligendum est hic, quod, sive ponatur una forma in re sive plures, eadem difficultas contingit, quia, si ponantur plures realiter differentes, tunc habent videre, utrum primam, quae recipitur in materia, praecedant dimensiones.

(2) Circa istam igitur quaestionem²⁴¹⁶ duo videnda sunt²⁴¹⁷, primo explicabitur quaestio, secundo narrabitur multiplex opinio.

(3) Quantum ad primum videndum, quod forma sive anima habet ad materiam triplicem aspectum. Primus est, secundum quod anima sive forma respectu materiae est adventicia, quia advenit et recedit, in quantum materia nunc unam, modo aliam habet, sicut patet in generationibus et²⁴¹⁸ corruptionibus. Potest ergo secundum hoc materia considerari, secundum quod est in via ad formam, et sic oportet necessario, quod praecedant dimensiones, quod patet ex tribus, primo, quia forma est terminus alterationis; unde et finis generationis²⁴¹⁹) dicitur²⁴²⁰, licet non proprie intentionis, quia causa finalis differt a formali. Oportet autem omnem²⁴²¹ alterationem recipi in subiecto, quia ens²⁴²² in actu est subiectum alterationis secundum Philosophum I *De generatione*²⁴²³); alteratio autem physica non potest esse nisi in subiecto quanto; quantum autem est per dimensionem. Secundo patet ex parte materiae, secundum enim quod patet ex VI *Physicorum*²⁴²⁴): “impartibile non movetur”; oportet ergo, quod mobile sit quantum, materia autem prima sine dimensionibus considerata non est quanta²⁴²⁵), ergo et caetera. Tertio ex parte agentis; agens enim assimilare vult sibi patiens²⁴²⁶), sicut ignis sibi aquam; ergo iam non est similis, sed in

²⁴¹⁵ vel ... formam *illeg. E*

²⁴¹⁶ quaestionem: quaestio *E*

²⁴¹⁷ videnda sunt *inv. E*

²⁴¹⁸ et *om. V*

²⁴¹⁹) Cf. Arist., Phys., II 7, 198a21–26; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 79,7–80,2; etiam Thom., In Phys., II, lect. 11, n. 242; Maggiolo 117b.

²⁴²⁰ dicitur: dici *E*

²⁴²¹ omem: causam *sed corr. V*

²⁴²² ens: omne *sed corr. esse V*

²⁴²³) Thom., In Gen. et Corr., I, c. 4, lect. 10; Leon. 300b; cf. Arist., De gen. et corr., I 4, 319b31–320a2; Judycka 25,1–5.

²⁴²⁴) Arist., Phys., VI 10, 240b8–9; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 250,5–6; etiam Auct. Arist., 2, n. 176; Hamesse 154,96.

²⁴²⁵) Cf. Arist., Metaph., VII 3, 1029a20–26; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 125,28–126,7; etiam Arist., Metaph., I 8, 989a31–989b21; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 26,18–27,13; etiam Auct. Arist., 1, n. 160; Hamesse 128,77–78; Auct. Arist., 1, n. 31 et 32; Hamesse 117,34–39.

²⁴²⁶) Arist., De gen. et corr., I 7, 324a10–14; Judycka 37,12–17.

qualitatibus contraria. Contrarietas autem non est in materia nuda a quantitate, et ideo, si etiam poneretur virtute divina materia sine forma, secundum quod aliqui fingunt, agens naturale²⁴²⁷ non possit inducere formam, cum non agat nisi per motum²⁴²⁸), eius²⁴²⁹ applicatio non posset esse²⁴³⁰ in materiam nudam.

(4) Secundus aspectus animae est ad corpus, inquantum est motor sui perfectibilis, quod convenit in omnibus animatis, quae movent se ipsa secundum Philosophum VIII *Physicorum*²⁴³¹); omnis autem operatio animae est per potentiam²⁴³²), quae, sicut in alia quaestione dictum est²⁴³³), differt a substantia [V 166vb], cuius est, sive a forma. Talis autem inter talem formam et suum perfectibile cadit etiam medium in movendo, quia, si movet per intellectum, media est potentia, si per potentiam sensitivam vel vegetativam potentia vel organum simul; motus autem cordis est motus non ab anima inquantum anima, sed inquantum naturalis forma, cum in se includat omnium formarum perfectiones²⁴³⁴). Et ideo dicit Philosophus II *De anima*²⁴³⁵), quod anima est ut natura quaedam talis corporis. Sicut ergo²⁴³⁶ ignis movetur sursum non per potentiam motivam neque per hoc, quod una pars moveat aliam, neque per hoc, quod forma ignis moveat materiam suam, sed est in eo formale principium, quare sic naturaliter movetur, sic etiam²⁴³⁷ motus cordis est naturalis et sanguis similiter naturaliter currit²⁴³⁸ ad certa loca²⁴³⁹²⁴⁴⁰).

(5) Tertius aspectus est, secundum quem²⁴⁴¹ consideratur, prout attingit ipsam formam in actuali perfectione, secundum quam est mutua dependentia materiae ad formam et e converso, et sic proprie est forma eius non abiciens eam nec considerata secundum unionem, sed unionem, et sic sunt sex opiniones²⁴⁴².

(6) Prima Avicennae in sua *Metaphysica*²⁴⁴³), qui dicit, quod²⁴⁴⁴ materia²⁴⁴⁵ numquam spoliatur forma corporeitatis, sed fit generatio et corruptio secundum formas specificas²⁴⁴⁶), sicut quando ex

²⁴²⁷ naturale: materiale V

²⁴²⁸) Cf. Thom., In Metaph., VII, lect. 17, n. 1661; Cathala – Spiazzi 396b.

²⁴²⁹ cuius: eius V

²⁴³⁰ esse om. V

²⁴³¹) Cf. Arist., Phys., VIII 2, 252b12–24; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 284,10–21.

²⁴³²) Cf. Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 50, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 318b; Thom., S. th., I-II, q. 56, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 355a–b.

²⁴³³) non inveni

²⁴³⁴) Cf. Thom., De motu cord.; Leon. 128,148–129,185.

²⁴³⁵) Arist., De an., II 1, 412a19–20; transl. vetus: Stroick 64,55–66,88; cf. Auct. Arist., 6, n. 41–42; Hamesse 177,57–59; etiam Alb., De homine I 1 1 3; Anzulewicz – Söder 8,17–18.

²⁴³⁶ ergo: igitur V

²⁴³⁷ etiam: et E

²⁴³⁸ similiter naturaliter currit: currit similiter V

²⁴³⁹ loca add. naturaliter V

²⁴⁴⁰) Thom. Quaest. Disp. de an., q. 9, ad arg. 6; Bazán 83,365–84,432.

²⁴⁴¹ quem: quod E

²⁴⁴² opiniones: operationes sed corr. V

²⁴⁴³) Avic., Metaph., II, c. 3; Van Riet 92,22–25; etiam Avic., Metaph., II, c. 2; Van Riet 71,35–72,48; Avic., Metaph., II, c. 2; Van Riet 78,77–79,84; Avic., Metaph., II, c. 2; Van Riet 82,34–38.

²⁴⁴⁴ quod add. s. v. V

igne fit aer vel e converso, et quia quantitas²⁴⁴⁷ est proprietas consequens formam corporis, inde est, quod in omni introductione oportet praecedere dimensiones.

(7) Sed ista positio stare non potest propter tria. Primo, quia, quando aliqua duo attribuuntur uni secundum diversas formas, unum numquam praedicatur de altero nisi secundum accidens, sicut, si substantiae sit idem album vel musicum, quorum unum est secundum albedinem, aliud secundum scientiam musicae, illa <praedicatio> – ergo “album est musicum” – est per accidens, non per se, nec essentialis, sed cum dico “ignis vel homo est corpus”, est praedicatio essentialis, quod non esset, si ab alio esset corpus et ab alio homo vel ignis, quantumcumque essent formae ad invicem ordinatae, quia unitas ordinis minima est.

(8) Secundo, quia, cum quaelibet forma substantialis faciat ens actu²⁴⁴⁸), forma specifica adveniens formae corporeitatis esset forma accidentalis, et sic homo esset unum per accidens.

(9) Tertio, quia una et eadem forma accidentalis, scilicet albedo, facit, quod eadem res est alba colorata; qualis ergo et substantialis totum dat, quod aliae formae. Huius signum est, quod antiqui²⁴⁴⁹), ponentes primum principium materiale ens actu, generari statuerunt alterari. Sic ergo dimensiones non possunt praecedere per hunc²⁴⁵⁰ modum.

(10) Unde²⁴⁵¹ est alia opinio²⁴⁵²), quae dicit, quod dimensiones rei corruptendae dicuntur terminate, prout spectant ad formam praesentem, sed dicuntur interminatae quantum ad formam inducendam. Sic igitur praecedunt²⁴⁵³ dimensiones, quae dicuntur interminatae illa terminatione, quae eis competere potest per formam inducendam, licet actu terminum habeat, sicut indeterminate calidum potest dici, quod habet caliditatem in²⁴⁵⁴ actu, sed potentia est ad alium gradum caliditatis, et hoc est²⁴⁵⁵ in omnibus generabilibus [E 104va] et corruptibilibus. In caelo autem tales dimensiones²⁴⁵⁶ non ponuntur secundum Commentatorem in *De substantia orbis*²⁴⁵⁷), quia est

²⁴⁴⁵ materia om. V

²⁴⁴⁶) Avic, Suffic., I, c. 2; Van Riet 21,50–54; cf. etiam Thom., In II Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 4, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 313.

²⁴⁴⁷ quantitas: quantitatis V

²⁴⁴⁸) Cf. Thom., De prin. nat., par. 1; Dondaine 40,42–46; Thom., Quodl., I, q. 4, a. 1, sed contra; Gauthier 182,19–29; Thom., Quaest. de spirit. creatur., a. 3, resp.; Cos 43,353–358.

²⁴⁴⁹) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 44, a. 2, resp.; Leon. 457b; Thom., Quaest. disp. de pot., q. 3, a. 5, resp.; Pession 49a; Thom., De spirital. creatur., a. 3, resp.; Cos 43,369–44,392.

²⁴⁵⁰ istum: hunc V

²⁴⁵¹ Unde add. secunda opinio i. m. E

²⁴⁵²) non inveni sed cf. Averr., De sub. orb., c. 1; Venetiis 1562 3vM–4vL; etiam Auct. Arist., 10, n. 11; Hamesse 230,50–51.

²⁴⁵³ praecedunt: peccant V

²⁴⁵⁴ in om. V

²⁴⁵⁵ est om. V

²⁴⁵⁶ et corruptibilibus ... dimensiones illeg. E

²⁴⁵⁷) Averr., De sub. orb., c. 1; Venetiis 1562 4vL–5rE.

ingenerabile et incorruptibile²⁴⁵⁸, et dimensiones et quidquid accidentale²⁴⁵⁹ in eo, consequitur formam et non praecedit.

(11) Sed hoc non videtur esse intentio quaerentium nec Commentatoris, qui fuit auctor huius positionis. Ista enim praecessio pertinet ad formam secundum illum aspectum, quo²⁴⁶⁰ est adventicia sive introducenda in materiam, et dico “adventicia”, quia, licet forma essentialem respectum habeat ad materiam, tamen quoad²⁴⁶¹ hoc advenit.

(12) Praeterea Commentator, qui hanc positionem solus²⁴⁶² posuit, non dubitavit, quin alii philosophi etiam scirent, quod forma inducenda praeveniret formam corrumpendam cum dimensionibus subiecti sui.

(13) Praeterea, cum praecedant etiam alia accidentia et qualitates, si hoc fuisset, Averroes²⁴⁶³ ita posuisset²⁴⁶⁴ interminatas qualitates sicut dimensiones, quod non fecit.

(14) Praeterea ponentes dimensiones interminatas volunt, quod postea terminentur, sed²⁴⁶⁵ dimensiones formae corrumpendae secundum istos etiam corrumpuntur.

(15) Unde²⁴⁶⁶ est alia opinio²⁴⁶⁷), quae dicit, quod necessario praecedunt et appellant isti dimensiones interminatas multum et paucum, secundum quod inveniuntur in raro et denso²⁴⁶⁸, et ad hoc duo faciunt, primo probant, secundo declarant.

(16) Primo sic²⁴⁶⁹ dupliciter, quia illud, quod potest super aliquam formam, potest super omne illud²⁴⁷⁰, quod consequitur per se ad eam, sicut quod potest super formam terrae et aquae, potest super omne²⁴⁷¹ siccum et humidum, sed agens naturale potest inducere formam, non potest autem facere de multo paucum nec e converso. Ergo multum et paucum non consequuntur formam; praecedunt ergo eam in materia, cum non subsistant per se²⁴⁷²). Probatio minoris est, quia non posset |V 167ra| facere²⁴⁷³ de ramo²⁴⁷⁴ arborem, nec de lapide montem sine additione materiae. Non posset ergo facere de paucis lapidis multum montis vel de paucis rami²⁴⁷⁵ multum arborem.

²⁴⁵⁸ incorruptibile *coni*: corruptibile V *om. E*

²⁴⁵⁹ accidentale *add. est E*

²⁴⁶⁰ quo: qui V

²⁴⁶¹ quoad: quod hoc E

²⁴⁶² solus *om. V*

²⁴⁶³ Averroes: intentio aut tempore V

²⁴⁶⁴ posuisset: potuisset V

²⁴⁶⁵ sed: secundum V

²⁴⁶⁶ Unde *add. tertia alia opinio i. m. E*

²⁴⁶⁷) Aeg. Rom., Report., II, q. 44, resp.; Luna 279,3–14; Ioh. Par., Super Sent. II, d. 18, q. 4; Muller 149,11–20; cf. etiam Aeg. Rom., Theorem. corp. Christ., prop. 44; Romae 1555 30vb–32rb; Aeg. Rom., In Phy., IV, lect. 17; Venetiis 1502 96va Aeg. Rom., Quaest. Metaphysic., VIII, q. 4 et 5, ; Venetiis 1501 34va–35va.

²⁴⁶⁸ denso: dense E

²⁴⁶⁹ sic *om. V*

²⁴⁷⁰ omne illud: id V

²⁴⁷¹ super omne: supra V

²⁴⁷²) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. II, d. 18, q. 4; Muller 149,21–150,33; Aeg. Rom., Theorem. corp. Christ., prop. 44; Romae 1555 31vb; Aeg. Rom., Quaest. Metaphysic., VIII, q. 5; Venetiis 1501 35ra.

²⁴⁷³ facere *add. De dimensionibus interminatis i. m. V*

(17) Praeterea cum ex uno pugillo terrae fiunt decem aquae, centem aeris, millem ignis. Tantum est de materia in aqua quantum fuit in terra nec plus nec minus, nec plus vel minus²⁴⁷⁶ facere possunt. Quantum autem dicit quantitatem; cum ergo non dicat extensionem, quae est in aqua, quia illa maior est quam in²⁴⁷⁷ terra fuerit, cum plus occupet. Ergo illa tantalitas dicit aliam²⁴⁷⁸ quantitatem, scilicet interminatam²⁴⁷⁹).

(18) Secundo declarant et²⁴⁸⁰ dicunt, quod istae dimensiones differunt a materia et forma et dimensionibus terminatis. Primum patet, quia materia de se nec est multa nec pauca, sed per quantitatem.²⁴⁸¹) Item a forma, quia illa est substantia, non dimensiones. Item a dimensionibus terminatis, quia ille maiores sunt in raro quam in denso, sunt ergo proprietates consequentes materiam. Unde illa quattuor habens se per ordinem, scilicet materia prima, dimensiones interminate²⁴⁸², forma substantialis, dimensiones terminatae, et ideo ad dimensiones interminatas actio naturae non se²⁴⁸³ extendit, sicut nec ad materiam.²⁴⁸⁴)

(19) Sed²⁴⁸⁵ ista positio nec est vera nec aliquid valet. Primum patet, quia male utuntur multo et pauco, quia ista non dicunt quantitatem, sicut dicit Philosophus libro *Praedicamentorum*²⁴⁸⁶) capitulo de quantitate, sed sunt ad aliquid, quia, sicut ibi dicit, multi homines dicuntur in domo, pauci vero in theatro, licet sint multiplices, id est plures. Item multi in vico, licet²⁴⁸⁷ pauci in civitate. Item rarum et densum etiam²⁴⁸⁸ non sunt quantitates, sed principaliter sunt positiones, licet etiam consequenter dicant²⁴⁸⁹ qualitates secundum Averroem²⁴⁹⁰ *Super librum*²⁴⁹¹ *Praedicamentorum*²⁴⁹²), sed stricte loquendo non sunt qualitates secundum Philosophum libro *Praedicamentorum*²⁴⁹³) capitulo de qualitate post quartam speciem, quantitates²⁴⁹⁴ autem²⁴⁹⁵

²⁴⁷⁴ ramo *add.* facere V

²⁴⁷⁵ rami: causa V ramis *sed corr.* E

²⁴⁷⁶ nec plus vel minus *om.* V

²⁴⁷⁷ in *om.* V

²⁴⁷⁸ aliam: autem V

²⁴⁷⁹) Aeg. Rom., Report., II, q. 44, resp.; Luna 279,16–22 et 281,70–78; Ioh. Par., Super Sent. II, d. 18, q. 4; Muller 150,34–43.

²⁴⁸⁰ et: quod V

²⁴⁸¹) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. I, d. 8, q. 6; Muller 142,71–98.

²⁴⁸² quia ... interminate *om.* V

²⁴⁸³ non se *inv.* V

²⁴⁸⁴) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. II, d. 18, q. 4; Muller 150,34–43.

²⁴⁸⁵ Sed *add.* reprobatio positione *i. m.* E

²⁴⁸⁶) Arist., Cat. c. 6, 5b10–29; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 16,1–18.

²⁴⁸⁷ licet: sed V

²⁴⁸⁸ etiam *om.* V

²⁴⁸⁹ dicant *an* dicantur *scrib.*?

²⁴⁹⁰ Averroem: Augustinus E

²⁴⁹¹ librum: libro E

²⁴⁹²) Aerr., Super Praed., II, 75–77; Hissette 89,131–91,150.

²⁴⁹³) Arist., Cat., c. 8, 10a16–25; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 27,9–16.

²⁴⁹⁴ quantitates: quantitatis V

²⁴⁹⁵ autem: quoniam V

nunquam. Rationes²⁴⁹⁶ de phantasmate²⁴⁹⁷ sunt, quia, licet agens naturale possit inducere formam, non tamen quocumque modo, sed determinato. Unde non potest in granum frumenti inducere formam asini nisi per materiae additionem, sic²⁴⁹⁸ etiam non potest facere quocumque modo²⁴⁹⁹ de multo paucum, vel e converso, sed determinate, scilicet per subtractionem vel additionem materiae vel quando inducit formam aquae in materiam terrae, facit de multo paucum, quia secundum Philosophum in *De generatione*²⁵⁰⁰) densum est, ubi multum de materia in parva distentione, rarum e converso; licet ergo eadem sit proportio materiae in aqua, quae prius fuit in terra, tamen, quod prius dicebatur multum respectu quantitatis terrae, nunc dicitur paucum respectu quantitatis aquae.

(20) Ad secundum “tanta est materia”²⁵⁰¹) et caetera, dicendum, quod ista tantalitas non dicit quantitatem aliquam mensurabilem, sed sensus est, quod tantum potest fieri ex materia, quae stat²⁵⁰² sub decem pugillis aquae, quantum ex materia, quae stat sub uno terrae, quia, si tantalitas, quam tu intelligis²⁵⁰³ “multum et paucum”, accipiantur²⁵⁰⁴ proprie vel secundum quod sunt ad aliquid, tunc non est tantum in aqua quantum in terra prius²⁵⁰⁵, sicut dictum est.

(21) Item si aliquis prius sanus postea infirmus et iterum sanus, potest de eo dici, quod tanta sanitas est in eo nunc, quanta prius, et similiter de sciente, qui prius habet scientiam et post²⁵⁰⁶ erravit, tamen ista tantalitas non est mensurabilis, sed virtualis in formis, potentialis²⁵⁰⁷ in materia, et hoc importatur per li “ex”. Sicut ergo dicitur iste tantum sciens vel sanus, quia potest in tot scibilia vel tam intensive, vel sanus potest in tot operationes non impeditae, sicut si esset infirmus; ita dico, quod tantalitas illa intelligitur, quod materia, prout est ista portio, potest ex ea tantum fieri, quantum est in decem aquae quantum quando in uno terrae. Quod autem ibi decem, hic unum, |E 104vb| hoc est ex forma aquae vel terrae.

(22) Declaratio etiam²⁵⁰⁸ nulla est, quia multum et paucum consequuntur formas, non materiam, quia multum in terra non est multum in aqua.

(23) Item non²⁵⁰⁹ dicunt aliquid quantum²⁵¹⁰, sed dicunt materiam quantum quantitate terminata sive manifesta²⁵¹¹ cum respectu, qui sibi debetur ex forma. Unde tanta est materia in uno pugillo terrae,

²⁴⁹⁶ Rationes *add.* rerpobatio responsione *i. m.* E

²⁴⁹⁷ phantasmate *dub.* EV

²⁴⁹⁸ sicut: sic V

²⁴⁹⁹ facere ... modo: quocumque modo facere E

²⁵⁰⁰) *potius* cf. Arist., Phys., IV 9, 217b8–19; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 169,8–18; etiam Aeg. Rom., In Phy., Iv, lect. 17; Venetiis 1502 96va; Thom., S. th., III, q. 77, a. 2, arg. 3; Leon. 196a; Thom., In II Sent., d. 30, q. 2, a. 1, resp.; Mandonnet – Moos 778.

²⁵⁰¹) Ioh. Par., Super Sent. II, d. 18, q. 4; Muller 150,47–48.

²⁵⁰² stat: constat V

²⁵⁰³ intelligis: accipit *add.* V

²⁵⁰⁴ accipiantur: accipiatur V

²⁵⁰⁵ prius: primum V

²⁵⁰⁶ scientiam ... post: post scientiam E

²⁵⁰⁷ potentialis *add.* vero E

²⁵⁰⁸ etiam: non *sed corr.* E

quanta in decem aquae, quia tantum potest fieri ex tali quanto terrae, quantum ex tali²⁵¹² quanto aquae, quia tantum ex materia dimensionata dimensione unius pugillo terrae quantum ex materia dimensionata dimensionibus decem aquae. Hoc autem pertinet ad dimensionem manifestam, ut patet ex ipso numero, scilicet decem et unum, et non ad involutam vel latentem.

(24) Ideo²⁵¹³ est alia opinio²⁵¹⁴), quae dicit, quod dimensiones interminatae praecedunt, quae quidem dicuntur interminatae²⁵¹⁵, inquantum nullum terminum habent actu sed potentia et dicuntur in potentia ad dimensiones terminatas, sicut materia dicitur in²⁵¹⁶ potentia ad formas²⁵¹⁷. Ratio eorum, quia actus et potentia dividunt quodcumque ens et potentia est in eodem genere, in quo est actus. Sicut ergo²⁵¹⁸ potentia ad formam substantialem, scilicet materia est quoddam²⁵¹⁹ imperfectum |V 167rb| in genere substantiae, ita et dimensiones interminatae in genere quantitatis.

(25) Item cum²⁵²⁰ quantitas praecedens corrumpatur et non sit alia quantitas in re generata nisi illa, quae cum forma illa²⁵²¹ introducit in instanti. Cum illa forma introducatur in instanti²⁵²², ipsa quantitas introducetur in instanti. Cum igitur dilatatio partium illius quantitatis sit quidam motus localis, quia occupat maiorem locum quam prius²⁵²³, sicut quando ex aqua fit²⁵²⁴ aer, ergo motus localis erit in instanti, quod est impossibile.

(26) Sed²⁵²⁵ ista positio stare non potest²⁵²⁶ nec est de mente Commentatoris. Tota enim ratio positionis dimensionum²⁵²⁷ est, ut materia in diversas partes distinguatur, in quibus diversae formae possint recipi²⁵²⁸. Si igitur istae dimensiones nullam habent distentionem partium, sed solum sunt potentia quantae²⁵²⁹, tunc non potuerunt distinguere.

²⁵⁰⁹ non: nec V

²⁵¹⁰ aliquid quantum: ad quartum V

²⁵¹¹ manifesta: mai^{ta} E

²⁵¹² ex tali *add.* ex tali *sed exp.* E

²⁵¹³ Ideo *add.* quarta *i. m.* E

²⁵¹⁴) non *inveni*

²⁵¹⁵ interminatae: terminatae V

²⁵¹⁶ in *om.* E

²⁵¹⁷ formas: formam E

²⁵¹⁸ ergo *om.* E

²⁵¹⁹ materia est quoddam: materiam quid V

²⁵²⁰ cum *om.* V

²⁵²¹ illa *add.* s. v. V *om.* E

²⁵²² Cum ... instanti *om.* V

²⁵²³ prius: primum V

²⁵²⁴ fit: fiet V

²⁵²⁵ Sed *add.* reprobatio *i. m.* E

²⁵²⁶ stare non potest: potest non stare E

²⁵²⁷ dimensionum *om.* E

²⁵²⁸ possint recipi: possunt accipi V

²⁵²⁹ quantae: quanta V

(27) Item omnis distinctio est a forma, quia actus distinguunt²⁵³⁰). Sicut ergo forma non distinguit²⁵³¹ actu, nisi sit actu, ita nec dimensio partem materiae a parte, nisi sit dimensionata actu.

(28) Praeterea licet aliqua portio²⁵³² materiae sit pars²⁵³³ distincta vel partita et sic dicatur partialis quantum ad proprias partes, sicut est in toto, tamen ista sive quaecumque data ab alia portione materiae est distincta. Hoc autem non est nisi per actualem quantitatem, nisi tu intelligas materiam²⁵³⁴ puram ab omni forma denudatam. Sed in illa non recipitur aliqua forma generabilis²⁵³⁵, quia, sicut dictum est²⁵³⁶), generatio non est per hoc, quod forma simpliciter recipiatur in materia simpliciter, sed haec in hac, sicut aeris in materiam aquae vel huiusmodi. Et hoc a simili in specie, quod etiam habet partem materiae.

(29) Nec rationes concludunt, quia a simili posset dici, quod in materia esset potentia coloris et aliorum omnium accidentium, et ille²⁵³⁷ diceretur color²⁵³⁸ indeterminatus et esset in praedicamento eodem cum determinato. Et ideo dicendum, quod materia primo et principaliter per suam essentiam est in potentia ad esse substantiale²⁵³⁹) et per illud ad omnia alia accidentia, et²⁵⁴⁰ ratio huius est, quia secundum Philosophum in *De somno*²⁵⁴¹) *et vigilia* cuius est actus per se, illius est potentia. Quantitas autem actualis et omnia alia accidentia sunt in composito, sicut dicit Averroes capitulo primo *De substantia orbis*²⁵⁴²), quod “subiecta²⁵⁴³ omnium accidentium sunt individua, quae sunt in actu”; ergo²⁵⁴⁴ nihil est in materia praeter se ipsam considerare.

(30) Secunda²⁵⁴⁵ ratio non concludit, quia quantitas introducta non dilatatur, sed consideratur ut in fine transmutationis, in quo est dilatata, sicut si Deus causaret hic unum asinum, sua quantitas non dilatando²⁵⁴⁶ partes repleret locum, sed totum simul esset creatum et repleret²⁵⁴⁷ sine motu locali.

²⁵³⁰) Cf. Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 13, 1039a7; VII 17, 1041b8; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 149,5–6; 155,6–7; Auct. Arist. 1, n. 187–189; Hamesse 130,12–14; etiam Thom., In *Metaph.*, VII, lect. 13, n. 1588; lect. 17, n. 1668; Cathala – Spiazzi 381a; 397b.

²⁵³¹ distinguit: distingut *E*

²⁵³² portio: partio *V*

²⁵³³ pars: potentia *E*

²⁵³⁴ materiam *om.* *V*

²⁵³⁵ generabilis: generalis *V*

²⁵³⁶) Cf. *supra* sect (26–27)

²⁵³⁷ ille: illa *E*

²⁵³⁸ color: calor *E*

²⁵³⁹) Cf. Thom. *Quaest. Disp. de an.*, q. 9, ad arg. 5; Bazán 83,350–354.

²⁵⁴⁰ et *om. sed add. s. v.* *E*

²⁵⁴¹) Airst., *De somp. et vigil.*, c. 1, 454a8; transl. vetus: Lulofs 1,35–2,2; cf. Auct. Arist., 7, n. 70; Hamesse 201,58.

²⁵⁴²) Averr., *De sub. orb.*, c. 1; Venetiis 1562 4rA–B.

²⁵⁴³ subiecta *coni. ex Averroee*: substantia *EV*

²⁵⁴⁴ ergo: igitur *V*

²⁵⁴⁵ Secunda: Ad secundum *E*

²⁵⁴⁶ dilatando: dilatata *V*

²⁵⁴⁷ repleret: replet *V*

Sed tamen nota, quod oportet cedere aerem, qui prius occupabat, et hoc fieret per motum, ut videtur²⁵⁴⁸). Exitus ergo eius esset in instanti, sed hoc dubium nihil ad eos.

(31) Item per simile arguitur contra eos, quia, si dimensiones interminatae crescunt indeterminatas et istae²⁵⁴⁹ fiunt ab istis²⁵⁵⁰, cum non sint terminatae nisi in ultimo instanti, quando forma est inducta, tunc etiam secundum tuam imaginationem erit dilatatio partium et motus localis in instanti, et sic argumentum, ita est contra te, sicut est contra me.

(32) Unde²⁵⁵¹ est alia opinio²⁵⁵²), quod nullae dimensiones praecedunt realiter, sed secundum modum intelligibilem tantum. Et hoc primo probant²⁵⁵³, secundo declarant.

(33) Primo²⁵⁵⁴ sic: Id, quod primo omnium intelligitur in materia, est esse; hoc autem est a forma; ergo omne aliud consequitur formam.

(34) Item²⁵⁵⁵ divisio rei per²⁵⁵⁶ potentiam et actum est per immediata. Unde secundum Themistium *Super II De anima*²⁵⁵⁷) circa principium, cum omne esse multipliciter dicatur, scilicet²⁵⁵⁸ secundum decem genera praedicamentorum, tamen ad hos duos modos reducitur, scilicet potentiam et actum. Cum igitur anima, ut ibidem^{2559,2560}) dicit Philosophus, sit entelechia, id est²⁵⁶¹ actus, et idem dico²⁵⁶² de quacumque forma; materia autem est sicut²⁵⁶³ potentia, ipsa se ipsa perficitur per formam nullo mediante.

(35) Item²⁵⁶⁴ impossibile est, quod aliquid sit hoc vel hoc vel tale vel tale²⁵⁶⁵, nisi sit, quia esse tale includit esse; materia autem sine forma non est; ergo nec quanta est. Nec obstat, si dicatur, quod dimensiones sint imperfecta entia²⁵⁶⁶, quia nec imperfectum esse potest, nisi sit; hoc²⁵⁶⁷ esse autem est²⁵⁶⁸ per formam.

²⁵⁴⁸) Cf. *supra* sect. (25)

²⁵⁴⁹ istae: illae *E*

²⁵⁵⁰ istis: illis *E*

²⁵⁵¹ Unde *add.* quinta opinio *i. m. E add.* opinio *i. m. V*

²⁵⁵²) Cf. *infra* sect. (43)

²⁵⁵³ primo probant *inv. V*

²⁵⁵⁴ Primo *add.* arguitur *i. m. E*

²⁵⁵⁵ Item *add.* secundo *i. m. E*

²⁵⁵⁶ per: in *E*

²⁵⁵⁷) Themist., *De anim.*, III, 412b6; Verbeke 99,82–87; Cf. etiam Thom., *In De an.*, II, c. 1,412b6; Leon. 73,380–383.

²⁵⁵⁸ scilicet *om. V*

²⁵⁵⁹ ibidem: ibi *V*

²⁵⁶⁰) Arist., *De an.*, II 1, 412a27; transl. vetus: Stroick 66,91; Auct. Arist., 6, n. 41; Hamesse 177,57; etiam Thom., *S. contr. Gent.*, IV, c. 44; Leon. 147b.

²⁵⁶¹ id est: scilicet *E*

²⁵⁶² idem dico: dividitur *V*

²⁵⁶³ est sicut: sit *E*

²⁵⁶⁴ Item *add.* tertio *i. m. E*

²⁵⁶⁵ vel tale *om. V*

²⁵⁶⁶ imperfecta entia: imperfectum ens *EV*

²⁵⁶⁷ hoc: homo *V*

²⁵⁶⁸ est *om. V*

(36) Item²⁵⁶⁹ secundum Themistium ubi supra²⁵⁷⁰²⁵⁷¹), ab ea, scilicet forma, sicut res habet esse, ita unum esse. Dimensio autem ponitur, ut una pars materiae [E 105ra] ab alia distinguatur. Hoc autem dicimus unum, quod in se indivisum et ab alio divisum²⁵⁷²). Ergo hoc non erit nisi per formam principaliter²⁵⁷³).

(37) Praeterea secundum Commentatorem *Super III*²⁵⁷⁴ *Metaphysicae*²⁵⁷⁵) perfectio formae accidentalis est aequivoca ad perfectionem formae substantialis, quia forma substantialis dat esse materiae, accidentalis autem recipit esse a subiecto, in quo est. Si igitur dimensiones illae sint accidentia, ut oportet, alias essent²⁵⁷⁶ materia vel²⁵⁷⁷ forma vel compositum, quod non dicunt; ergo recipiunt esse ab eo, in quo sunt. Sed materia, in qua dicunt esse dimensiones, ipsamet non est nisi a forma; ergo nec dimensionibus dat esse. [V 167va]

(38) Praeterea dimensiones secundum eos magis directe se habent²⁵⁷⁸ ad formam sive esse quam privatio, quae est principium per accidens. Sed illa ponitur principium, ergo magis dimensio. Sic ergo erunt quattuor principia, quod est contra Philosophum I *Physicorum*²⁵⁷⁹), qui ponit duo per se, scilicet materiam et formam, tertio per accidens, scilicet privationem.

(39) Item omnis quantitas aut est per se quantitas aut habet se in ratione principii vel²⁵⁸⁰ termini. Sed dimensiones illae non sunt per se quantitates, quia nec linea nec superficies vel huiusmodi; ergo principium, scilicet punctum²⁵⁸¹). Sed hoc non potest dici interminatum, cum sit ipse terminus, nec ex punctis fit linea vel quantitas, ut dicitur VI²⁵⁸² *Physicorum*²⁵⁸³). Sed ipsi dicunt ex interminatis fieri terminatas.

(40) Secundo declarant sic: Forma perfectior sicut²⁵⁸⁴ anima in se continet perfectiones inferiorum formarum, sicut tetragonum trigonum²⁵⁸⁵ et ternarius binarium²⁵⁸⁶: primum sumitur ex II De

²⁵⁶⁹ Item *add. quarto i. m. E*

²⁵⁷⁰ supra: prius *E*

²⁵⁷¹) Themist., *De anim.*, III, 412b6; Verbeke 99,82–87; cf. etiam Thom., *S. contr. Gent.*, II, c. 58; Leon. 409b.

²⁵⁷²) Cf. *e. g.* Thom., *De ver.*, q. 2, a. 15, resp.; Dondaine 94,43–49; Thom. *Quaest. Disp. de an.*, q. 3, resp.; Bazán 28,316–318; Thom., *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 4, a. 1, ad arg. 2; Mandonnet – Moos 481; Thom., *In Phys.*, VII, lect. 9, n. 960; Maggiolo 494a.

²⁵⁷³) Cf. *Auct. Arist.*, 1, n. 113; Hamesse 124,75–76.

²⁵⁷⁴ III *om. E*

²⁵⁷⁵) *potius* Averr., *De anim.*, II, comm. 4; Crawford 133,28–134,39; etiam *Auct. Arist.*, 6, n. 114; Hamesse 183,85–91; cf. etiam Averr., *Phys.*, I, comm. 63; Venetiis 37vM–38rC, *spec.* 37vM; *Auct. Arist.*, 2, n. 45; Hamesse 144,87–90; et etiam Thom., *S. th.*, I, q. 76, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 224a.

²⁵⁷⁶ essent *add. a sed exp. V*

²⁵⁷⁷ vel *om. V*

²⁵⁷⁸ se habent *inv. V*

²⁵⁷⁹) Cf. *Arist.*, *Phys.*, I 7, 191a8–17; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 34,15–35,6; Thom., *In Phy.*, I, lect. 13, n. 110–119; Maggiolo 57a–59b; etiam *Auct. Arist.* 2, n. 17; Hamesse 141,24.

²⁵⁸⁰ vel: aut *V*

²⁵⁸¹) Cf. Thom., *In Phys.*, I, lect. 1, n. 5; Maggiolo 4a–b.

²⁵⁸² VI: VII *V*

²⁵⁸³) *Arist.*, *Physic.*, VI 1, 231a21–26 et VI 10, 241a2–6; 216,3–8 et 253,7–11; cf. etiam *Auct. Arist.*, 2, n. 166; Hamesse 153,81–82.

²⁵⁸⁴ sicut *add. est V*

*anima*²⁵⁸⁷), ubi Philosophus dicit quod vegetativum est in sensitivo et sensitivum in intellectivo, sicut trigonum²⁵⁸⁸ in tetragono et tetragonum in pentagono²⁵⁸⁹); secundum sumitur²⁵⁹⁰ ex²⁵⁹¹ VIII *Metaphysicae*²⁵⁹²), ubi Philosophus formas comparat numeris. Si ergo²⁵⁹³ anima vel quaecumque forma consideretur²⁵⁹⁴ secundum essentiam suam, sic ipsa sine omni medio unitur materiae. Sed si consideretur secundum diversum gradum perfectionis, quem dat materiae, sic ipsamet secundum unam perfectionem, quam dat, cadit media inter materiam et se ipsam secundum aliam perfectionem. Anima igitur, quia dat esse, dat esse substantiam, dat esse vivum²⁵⁹⁵ corpus, animal et²⁵⁹⁶ hominem, et sic quidquid est substantialiter in re ipsa, inquantum est forma corporeitatis, immediate secundum istam perfectionem unitur materiae, quia materia ad formam corporeitatis est disposita se ipsa sine omni dispositione media. Sicut²⁵⁹⁷ ergo²⁵⁹⁸ anima dat hoc esse corporeum, ita ad eam inquantum huiusmodi consequuntur propria accidentia corporis, et haec sunt dimensiones, ex quibus iam distinguitur ab alia²⁵⁹⁹ parte²⁶⁰⁰ materiae et non per dimensiones praecedentes, sicut putabat Commentator²⁶⁰¹), sicut album dicitur calidum a caliditate consequente formam, non praecedente, et secundum quod sic consideratur materia perfecta, est proprium susceptibile vivi, et quia vivere etiam dat anima, ideo ipsa, inquantum dedit esse corporeum, disponit et est media inter se ipsam et materiam, ut perficiat in esse vivo.

(41) Item inquantum materia iam est perfecta sub esse vivo, est proprium susceptivum eiusdem animae, secundum quod dat esse sensitivum; et secundum quod perfecta est in esse sensitivo sive animalis, est proprium susceptivum eiusdem animae inquantum rationalis. Et sic etiam²⁶⁰² dimensiones et alia accidentia praecedunt animam secundum ordinem perficiendi et intelligendi, et

²⁵⁸⁵ tetragonum trigonum: trigonum in tetragono V

²⁵⁸⁶ ternarius binarius: binarius in ternario V

²⁵⁸⁷) Arist., De an., II 5, 414b29–31; Stroick 80,73–75.

²⁵⁸⁸ trigonum coni: triganum E

²⁵⁸⁹) Thom., Quaest. de spirit. creatur., a. 3, resp.; Cos 44,406–427

²⁵⁹⁰ Primum ... sumitur om. V

²⁵⁹¹ ex: in V

²⁵⁹²) Cf. Arist., Metaph., VIII 3, 1043b34–1044a10; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 162,16–163,8; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., 1, n. 204 et 205; Hamesse 132,45–50.

²⁵⁹³ Ergo: igitur E

²⁵⁹⁴ Consideretur: considerata V

²⁵⁹⁵ vivum: unum E

²⁵⁹⁶ et om. V

²⁵⁹⁷ Sicut: Sic V

²⁵⁹⁸ ergo om. E

²⁵⁹⁹ alia: aliis sed corr. V

²⁶⁰⁰ parte: partibus sed corr. V

²⁶⁰¹) Cf. Averr., De sub. Orb., c. 1; Venetiis 1562 3vM–5vL; etiam Auct. Arist., 10, n. 11; Hamesse 230,50–51.

²⁶⁰² Etiam: et E

ideo genus sumitur a differentia sensitiva, differentia a rationali, et non a materia et²⁶⁰³ forma simpliciter, sed ab eo, quod se habet²⁶⁰⁴ materialiter et formaliter.

(42) Huius exemplum manifestum est in rebus corporalibus; secundum consuetudinem coloniensem²⁶⁰⁵ in una corda secundum diversa signa sunt multae ulnae; et quod in diversis terris mensuratur per ulnas vel²⁶⁰⁶ baculos, haec una²⁶⁰⁷ quantitas cordae indivisa totum mensurat quasi includens in se omnes inferiores mensuras²⁶⁰⁸, sicut in numeris dictum est et figuris²⁶⁰⁹, et cadit corda media quantum ad unam partem signatam inter se ipsam et quantum ad aliquas et pannum, qui mensuratur. Hoc exemplum licet non sit per omnia simile, quia anima non est dimensionata, tamen manuducit quantum ad hoc, quod virtute perfectiva etiam potest dici quanta.

(43) Licet ista²⁶¹⁰ opinio fuerit Thomae in *Quaestione de anima* articulo 9²⁶¹¹) et *De spiritualibus creaturis*²⁶¹² articulo 3 et in prima parte *Summae* quaestione 76²⁶¹⁴), tamen, quia aliter sensit in fine, sicut patet per *Boethium De trinitate*²⁶¹⁵) articulo 14 sive quaestione et in quaestionibus De veritate²⁶¹⁶) quaestione de providentia divina “utrum disponat corpora inferiora per superiora” solutione 6 argumenti²⁶¹⁷, ideo videtur, <quod> aliter dicendum. Et haec est positio sexta²⁶¹⁸, scilicet quod dimensiones interminatae praecedant, et hoc sic patet ex natura individuationis²⁶¹⁹. Generationes enim et corruptiones non sunt universalium, sed singularium. Unde generatur hic aer et corrumpitur hic ignis. »Forma autem individua non recipitur nisi in materia individuata sive signata. Et hoc sic patet secundum Philosophum VII *Metaphysicae*²⁶²⁰), sicut partes generis et speciei sunt materia et forma, ita partes individui²⁶²¹ sunt haec materia et haec forma. Forma autem in quantum huiusmodi non fit haec, nisi in quantum recipitur in hac materia. Materia autem, cum in se considerata sit indivisibilis non, distinguitur nisi per quantitatem. Unde I *Physicorum*²⁶²²) dicit

²⁶⁰³ et: vel V

²⁶⁰⁴ se habet *inv. E*

²⁶⁰⁵ coloniensem: colonum *sed corr. i. m. V*

²⁶⁰⁶ vel *om. E*

²⁶⁰⁷ una: ulna V

²⁶⁰⁸ mensuras *om. E*

²⁶⁰⁹ et figuris *om. V*

²⁶¹⁰ ista: illa V

²⁶¹¹ Thom. Quaest. Disp. De an., q. 9, *spec. arg.* 17 et ad arg. 17; Bazán 79,117–121 et 85,513–86,522.

²⁶¹² Creaturis *om. E*

²⁶¹³ Thom., Quaest. De spirit. creatur., a. 3, arg. 17–18 et ad arg. 17–18; Cos 36,131–146 et 48,612–627.

²⁶¹⁴ Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 6, *spec. resp.*; Leon. 229a–230b, *spec.* 229a–b.

²⁶¹⁵ Thom., Super Boet. De Trin., q. 4, a. 2, *resp.*; Gils 123,77–125,246.

²⁶¹⁶ Thom., De ver., q. 5, a. 9, ad arg. 6; Dondaine 165,357–166,371.

²⁶¹⁷ Et in ... 6 argumenti *om. E*

²⁶¹⁸ sexta: octava V

²⁶¹⁹ individuationis: individua V

²⁶²⁰ Arist., *Metaph.*, VII 10, 1035b27–31; transl. media: Vuillemin-Diem 141,17–20.

²⁶²¹ individui: individue *sed corr. V*

²⁶²² Arist., *Phys.*, I 2, 185b16; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams.

Philosophus, quod subtracta²⁶²³ quantitate remanet substantia indivisibilis, et ideo materia efficitur signata, secundum quod est sub dimensionibus.

(44) Dimensiones autem istae possunt considerari dupliciter: aut secundum eorum²⁶²⁴ terminationem, et dico “terminari” secundum determinatam mensuram corporis et figuram, et sic ponuntur ut perfecta in genere quantitatis |E 105rb|, et sic non possunt esse principia individuationis, quia talis terminatio frequenter variatur²⁶²⁵ circa individuum idem²⁶²⁶ |V 167vb|, et sic non remanet²⁶²⁷ idem numero.

(45) Alio modo possunt considerari²⁶²⁸ sine ista determinatione²⁶²⁹ in natura distinctionis sive dimensionis tantum, quamvis numquam sine aliqua determinatione esse possint²⁶³⁰, sicut nec natura coloris sine determinatione albi vel nigri, et sic collocantur²⁶³¹ in genere quantitatis ut imperfectum. Et ex his efficitur haec materia signata²⁶³² et individuat formam et istae dimensiones praeintelliguntur in materia, sine quibus non potest intelligi individuum, sicut nec sine forma, et intelligo de his individuis, quae sunt diversa in eadem specie, et ideo quandoque dicitur materia²⁶³³ individuationis principium, quandoque²⁶³⁴ accidens²⁶³⁵, quia materia non secundum se, sed²⁶³⁶ prout substat praedictis dimensionibus, est principium individuationis. Alia autem accidentia magis sunt signa individuationis quam principia²⁶³⁷), et ista videtur fuisse intentio Commentatoris. Et ideo in corporibus supercaelestibus, ubi non ponit materiam, vel si aliquis poneret, non sunt plura eiusdem speciei, ibi non ponuntur dimensiones praeintelligi.

(46) Et ista etiam quandoque fuit mens Thomae, sicut patet in IV Contra²⁶³⁸ gentiles²⁶³⁹), ubi loquitur de identitate resurgentis, et in IV Super Sententias²⁶⁴⁰) in eadem materia in solutione 3²⁶⁴¹ argumenti, et quia istae duae ultimae positiones videntur magis verisimiles, licet sint contrariae, ideo respondendum est ad aliquas rationes factas contra eas. Et primo contra primam.

²⁶²³ subtracta *coni. ex Thoma: sub mota EV*

²⁶²⁴ earum *coni.: eorum EV*

²⁶²⁵ principia ... variatur *illeg. E*

²⁶²⁶ individuum idem *inv. E*

²⁶²⁷ remanet: remanent *E*

²⁶²⁸ alio ... considerari *illeg. E*

²⁶²⁹ determinatione: terminatione *E*

²⁶³⁰ possint: possint *V*

²⁶³¹ collocantur: collocatur *V*

²⁶³² signata: signate *V*

²⁶³³ dicitur materia *inv. E*

²⁶³⁴ quandoque *add. scilicet V*

²⁶³⁵ accidens: agens *sed corr. s. v. V*

²⁶³⁶ sed *om. E*

²⁶³⁷) Thom., Super Boet. de Trin., q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Gils 124,186–125,246.

²⁶³⁸ Contra: Super *E*

²⁶³⁹) Thom., S. contr. Gent., IV, c. 81; Leon. 252b–253a.

²⁶⁴⁰) Thom., In IV Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, quaestiunc. 1, ad arg. 3; Vivés 297a–b.

²⁶⁴¹ 3: 2 *V*

(47) Ad²⁶⁴² primum. In his, quae habent symbolum, facilius est transmutatio secundum Philosophum I *De generatione*²⁶⁴³), quia remanet qualitas symboli²⁶⁴⁴, sed qualitas non remanet, nisi etiam²⁶⁴⁵ quantitas remaneat, nec esset facilius, si corrumpetur. Dicendum, quod non²⁶⁴⁶ remanet eadem numero, sed specie, sicut quando ex aqua fit aer, remanet eadem diaphaneitas specie²⁶⁴⁷). Contra: Ita est eadem, ubicumque sit; non ergo magis diceretur de ista quam de alia. Dicendum, quod hoc est propter hoc, quod ista generata est ex illa prima vel consequitur eam, non autem alia, quae est in alio subiecto, sicut dicimus de patre, quod remanet in filio suo, licet differat numero ab eo, sicut alius homo. Facilius autem dicitur transitus, quia contraria qualitas per se et directe corrumpitur, symbolica autem non nisi per accidens, quia mutatur subiectum, quo mutato²⁶⁴⁸ mutatur accidens, sicut etiam difficilius est²⁶⁴⁹ duos inimicos vincere, qui sunt inimici ex contrariis causis diversis quam duos, quorum unus tantum resistit et alius per accidens cadit.

(48) Ad secundum. Si tertia pars potti impleatur de pisa²⁶⁵⁰, nullo addito pisae²⁶⁵¹ vel subtracto impletur totus pottus per decoctionem, licet e converso fit de herbis. Tantum ergo de materia est in toto quantum in parte tertia, nec plus nec minus. Hoc non est per dimensiones manifestas, quia est hic e converso. Dicendum ad hoc sicut de pugillis.

(49) Item in medietate²⁶⁵² potti est minus de materia quam in tertia parte, quia in tertia et toto fuit aequalis. Hoc etiam non est secundum manifestam, quia plus occupat medietas quam tertia pars. Dicendum, quod hoc est pro me, quia removendo medietatem non removes nisi dividendo subiectum pisae, quod fit per dimensiones²⁶⁵³ manifestas et per ablationem partis materiae per consequens et nihil ibi ad multum vel paucum, prout importat dimensiones in voluntas.

(50) Ad quartum. Circa principium II *De anima*²⁶⁵⁴) non oportet quaerere, quomodo sit unum materia et forma, sicut neque quomodo²⁶⁵⁵ cera et figura. Sed figura²⁶⁵⁶ recipitur mediante superficie, quae est quantitas. Ergo si est bona similitudo, forma substantialis recipietur²⁶⁵⁷

²⁶⁴² Ad *add.* reprobatio ad primum *E*

²⁶⁴³) Arist., *De gen. et corr.*, II 4, 331a24–331b5.; Judycka 59,14–60,7; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., 4, n. 31; Hamesse 169,90–91.

²⁶⁴⁴ symboli: symbola *E*

²⁶⁴⁵ etiam *om. sed add. s. v. E*

²⁶⁴⁶ non *om. E*

²⁶⁴⁷) Cf. Arist., *De gen. et corr.*, II 11, 338b14–19; Judycka 81,9–14; etiam Auct. Arist., 4, n. 51; Hamesse 171,17–18; Thom., *In Gen. et Corr.*, I, c. 4, lect. 10; Leon. 300a.

²⁶⁴⁸ mutato *om. V*

²⁶⁴⁹ etiam ... est: difficilius etiam est *E*

²⁶⁵⁰ pisa: ipsa *sed exp. et add. i. m. V*

²⁶⁵¹ pisae: pisa *V*

²⁶⁵² medietate: medio *V*

²⁶⁵³ Manifestam ... dimensiones *om. V*

²⁶⁵⁴) Arist., *De an.*, II 1, 412b6–8; transl. vetus: Stroick 67,66–67.

²⁶⁵⁵ quomodo *om. V*

²⁶⁵⁶ figura: figa^f *E*

²⁶⁵⁷ recipietur: recipitur *V*

mediante quantitate. Dicendum ergo, quod aliqui²⁶⁵⁸) dicunt, quod figura est ipsa quantitas terminata. Unde non recipitur mediante alia.

(51) Sed contra hoc est, quod est quattuor species qualitatis²⁶⁵⁹). Qualitas autem corporalis accipitur²⁶⁶⁰ mediante quantitate. Dicendum ergo, quod cera, ut est quanta, sic est potentia ad figuram sigilli vel alterius, et sic etiam non cadit medium.

(52) Ad quintum. Ex minimo ignis non potest fieri terra, quia iam esset aliquid minus minimo, quia minor est quantitas terrae quam ignis, sive comparando totum ad totum sive minimum ad minimum, quod ex²⁶⁶¹ igne fit. Ergo oportet, quod ex dimensionibus ignis, in quas²⁶⁶² dividitur minimus²⁶⁶³ ignis, fiat terra. Dicendum, quod minimum ignis non est dare separatum actu²⁶⁶⁴ a toto, quia aut esset in regione sua, scilicet ignis, et tunc non esset separatum, aut extra, et tunc etiam non esset dare ad nullum momentum. Mixtum autem ut minima caro posset dari separata a toto, ut videtur, et illa, si divideretur, resolveretur²⁶⁶⁵ in continens, scilicet elementum, quod esset simplicius et tamen si esset dare minimum ignem nihil ex eo generaretur, quia materia, prout stat sub tam parva quantitate, non potest recipere formam inferioris elementi, cum ex decem minimis ignis habeat fieri unum minimum aeris, centem aque millem ignis²⁶⁶⁶. Et praeterea alterabile oportet habere partes alterabiles, quod non habet²⁶⁶⁷ minimum, quia |E 105va| pars minimi non est eiusdem speciei. Quando ergo dicitur ex minimo fit²⁶⁶⁸ minimum vel in nutritione²⁶⁶⁹, ubi fit alteratio secundum minima, intelligitur minima in composito vel toto.

(53) Ad sextum. Ex non corpore non fit corpus nec ex non dimensionibus dimensiones²⁶⁷⁰). Unde VI *Physicorum*²⁶⁷¹) ostendit, quod divisibile non fit ex indivisibilibus. |V 168ra| Ergo oportet quantitates esse in materia, cum totum sit quantum. Dicendum, quod, sicut materia est in potentia ad esse compositi²⁶⁷²), ita ad omnia alia mediante illo. Sicut ergo asinus non²⁶⁷³ fit ex non asino, sed ex

²⁶⁵⁸) Alb., Super Euclid., I, def. 11; Tummies 6,54; Alb., De praed., tract. 5, c. 8; Santos-Noya – Steel – Donati 119,1–11; Alb., Phys., I, tract. 1, c. 1; Hofffeld 2,8–11; Alb., S. th., I, tract. 6, q. 26, a. 3, p. 2; Siedler 187,91–187,12 *ex* Eucl., Elem., I, diff. 14; Heiberg – Stamatis 5,8; Busard 31,24.

²⁶⁵⁹) Cf. Arist., Cat., c. 8, 8b25–11b1, *spec.* 8b25–10a26; transl. Boethii: Minio-Paluello 23,22–30,11, *spec.* 23,22–27,18.

²⁶⁶⁰ accipitur: recipitur *E*

²⁶⁶¹ ex *om.* *E*

²⁶⁶² quas: quos *V*

²⁶⁶³ minimus: minor *V*

²⁶⁶⁴ separatum actu *inv.* *V*

²⁶⁶⁵ resolveretur *om.* *E*

²⁶⁶⁶ 100 aque, 1000 ignis *om.* *E*

²⁶⁶⁷ quod non habet *an* quae non habent *scirb.*?

²⁶⁶⁸ pars ... fit *illeg.* *E*

²⁶⁶⁹ in nutritione *dub.* *V illeg.* *E*

²⁶⁷⁰) Averr., De sub. orb., c. 1; Venetiis 1562 4rB.

²⁶⁷¹) Arist., Phys., VI 1, 231a21–26; VI 2, 232b25–7; VI 10, 241a2–6; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 216,3–8; 222,14–16; 253,7–11; cf. etiam Auct. Arist., 2, n. 166 et 171; Hamesse 153,81–82 et 154,89.

²⁶⁷²) Cf. Thom., De prin. nat., par. 1; Dondaine 40,12–35.

²⁶⁷³ non *om.* *E*

potentia asino, ita et corpus et dimensiones ex potentia corpore²⁶⁷⁴ et dimensionibus^{2675,2676}. Talem autem potentiam non habet punctum, sed materia.

(54) Praeterea secundum Themistium²⁶⁷⁷) forma intensa et remissa²⁶⁷⁸ est eadem per essentiam, ergo et dimensio terminata et interminata. Dicendum secundum Philosophum I *De generatione*²⁶⁷⁹), quod, quando ex aqua fit aer quod, quamvis generatus sit maior, minor, scilicet dimensiones, non tamen est augmentatio, quia augmentatio est, quando idem manens subiectum variatur secundum quantitatem maiorem. Nihil autem idem est hoc²⁶⁸⁰, quod sit²⁶⁸¹ subiectum, quia aqua est destructa. Ex quo patet, quod materia secundum se non est subiectum horum, sed compositum. Unde horum²⁶⁸² intensio et remissio, quae²⁶⁸³ competunt ex diversis rebus specie, non sunt eiusdem formae.

(55) Ad septimum. Forma²⁶⁸⁴ non unitur materiae indivisibili, ergo quantae – non quantae per quantitatem in unicam²⁶⁸⁵, quia illa corrumpitur, ergo per aliam –. Et hoc videtur dimensio. Dicendum, quod unitur quantae in unicum²⁶⁸⁶ esse non per aliquam quantitatem, quam²⁶⁸⁷ fecit forma adducta²⁶⁸⁸, inquantum est forma corporeitatis, sicut etiam dicimus, quod angelus est in loco per operationem et corpus per quantitatem²⁶⁸⁹), cum tamen videatur prius esse in loco quam operari²⁶⁹⁰ in loco²⁶⁹¹).

(56) Ad octavum. Nihil abicitur, quando summe est necessarium. Sed dispositio est summe necessaria, quando ultima²⁶⁹² dispositione disponit. Ergo tunc non abicitur, quia, si abiceretur, introductio impediretur. Et praeterea non potest simul aliquid esse et corrumpi in eodem instanti; sed in eodem instanti, quo aliquid est ultimo dispositum, introducitur forma; non ergo tunc corrumpitur. Dicendum, quod ultima dispositio ad eam, scilicet formam, corrumpitur per accidens nec tamen frustra fuit, quia aliter non potuit introduci forma; sicut nec in materiam cibi, nisi prius

²⁶⁷⁴ corpore *coni.*: corpus *V*

²⁶⁷⁵ dimensionibus *coni.*: dimensiones *V*

²⁶⁷⁶ ex ... dimensionibus *om. E*

²⁶⁷⁷) Cf. Themist., *De anim.*, I, 412b6; Verbeke 99,82–87; Themist., *De anim.*, III, 430a23–24; Verbeke 228,74–79.

²⁶⁷⁸ remissa: remissi *V*

²⁶⁷⁹) Arist., *De gen. et corr.*, I 5, 320b30–32; Judycka 27,23–28,1; I 5, 321a10–17; Judycka 28,14–22; Thom., *In Gen. et Corr.*, I, c. 5, lect. 14; Leon. 312a–b.

²⁶⁸⁰ idem est hoc: hoc idem est *V*

²⁶⁸¹ sit: fit *V*

²⁶⁸² horum *om. E*

²⁶⁸³ quae: qui *V*

²⁶⁸⁴ Forma *om. V*

²⁶⁸⁵ in unicam *dub. coni.*: iūñtā *V* in unum tam *E*

²⁶⁸⁶ unicum *dub. EV*

²⁶⁸⁷ quam *add. nisi E*

²⁶⁸⁸ adducta: adducit *E*

²⁶⁸⁹) Thom., *Quodl.*, I, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; Gauthier 181,23–39.

²⁶⁹⁰ operari: comparari *V*

²⁶⁹¹) Thom., *Quodl.*, I, q. 3, a. 1, arg. 1 et ad arg. 1; Gauthier 181,11–14 et 181,40–47.

²⁶⁹² ultima: ultimata *E*

habeat formam sanguinis. Cum tamen sanguis non maneat, si debeat²⁶⁹³ fieri caro vel os, sed ultima dispositio sub forma illa non corrumpitur, sed commanet formae.

(57) Ad nonum. Si omnes formae et dispositiones praecedentes corrumpuntur et aliae sint in re, ergo illae vel sunt creatae vel in instanti generatae, quod falsum est. Dicendum, quod isti imaginantur quoddam intervallum inter corruptionem et generationem²⁶⁹⁴. Unde sciendum, quod generatio unius est corruptio alterius, non quod ad unum sequatur aliud quasi actio generationis ad actionem corruptionis, sed quia idem sunt et differunt terminis. Unde sicut in motu locali nihil aliud est²⁶⁹⁵ egressus ab uno loco nisi ingressus ad alium locum et non alio motu²⁶⁹⁶ hic intrat et inde exit, ita et²⁶⁹⁷ ipsa actio corruptionis²⁶⁹⁸ et²⁶⁹⁹ ipsa generatio formae. Nec imaginemur formam ab extrinseco post corruptionem, sed, quia corrumpens procedit a termino “a quo” et tendit ad terminum “ad quem”, cum non vadat in infinitum, et illae terminus est forma et perfectae²⁷⁰⁰ qualitates, quantitates et quidquid est, quod pertinet ad formam generatam; totum est²⁷⁰¹ terminus alterationis praecedentis et correspondet forma formae, quantitas quantitati, qualitas qualitati, et quantitas introducta non est nisi terminatio extensionis in generando²⁷⁰², quando ex aqua fiat aer, et idem est de qualitate.

(58) Sed quia Thomas ultimo ponit dimensiones, sicut dictum est²⁷⁰³), ideo ad rationes factas in contrarium potest sic responderi.

(58) Ad²⁷⁰⁴ primum dicendum, quod esse est primum quantum ad actualitatem rei²⁷⁰⁵); dimensiones autem praecintelliguntur in materia, sicut et ipsa praecintelligitur, licet sine forma non sit in²⁷⁰⁶ actu.

(60) Ad secundum dicendum, quod materia se ipsa perficitur per formam nec aliquod²⁷⁰⁷ medium inter ea²⁷⁰⁸ pertinet²⁷⁰⁹ essentialiter²⁷¹⁰ ad rem, sed haec materia²⁷¹¹, quae perficitur, non est haec²⁷¹² nisi per dimensiones interminatas.

²⁶⁹³ debeat: debeant V

²⁶⁹⁴ corruptionem et generationem: generationem et corruptionem E

²⁶⁹⁵ est om. E

²⁶⁹⁶ alio motu: alium motum V

²⁶⁹⁷ et: quod V

²⁶⁹⁸ corruptionis om. E

²⁶⁹⁹ et: est V

²⁷⁰⁰ perfectae: perfectio V

²⁷⁰¹ sunt *sed corr.* est V

²⁷⁰² generando: generando *sed corr.* quanto V

²⁷⁰³) Cf. *supra* sect. (43–46)

²⁷⁰⁴ Ad add. solutiones *i. m. E*

²⁷⁰⁵) Cf. Thom., S. th., I, q. 3, a. 4, resp.; Leon. 42b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 4, a. 1, ad arg. 3; Leon. 50b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 5, a. 1, resp. et ad arg. 1; Leon. 56a–b; Thom., S. th., I, q. 54, a. 1, resp.; Leon. 39a; Thom., S. th., I, q. 76, a. 6, resp.; Leon. 229b.

²⁷⁰⁶ in om. V

²⁷⁰⁷ aliquod: ad V

²⁷⁰⁸ inter ea om. V

²⁷⁰⁹ pertinet *add.* inter ea V

²⁷¹⁰ essentialiter: accidentaliter V

(61) Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut intelligo hanc materiam in ordine ad formam, non quod sit sine forma, ita intelligo hanc materiam per dimensiones²⁷¹³ signates, sine quibus non est haec²⁷¹⁴, non tamen quod sit quanta eis sine forma. Nec obstat, si dicatur, quod haec materia singularis non intelligitur, quia²⁷¹⁵ solum universale intelligitur. Loquimur enim nunc²⁷¹⁶ de individuo, secundum quod cadit in consideratione non de hoc certo individuo singulari, sed de his, quae competunt individuo inquantum huiusmodi.

(62) Ad quartum²⁷¹⁷ dicendum, quod unitas in actu competit sibi per formam, sic²⁷¹⁸ et per eam est actu, nec dimensiones [E 105vb] distinguunt materiam sine forma.

(63) Ad quintum dicendum, quod materia non dat dimensionibus esse nec e converso, sed, quod sint²⁷¹⁹, est²⁷²⁰ a forma, sed quod forma haec sit, est e converso²⁷²¹ ab eis. Unde ut²⁷²² ita dicam, actualitas est a forma, haeccitas²⁷²³ est ab eis praeintellectis, non praeexistentibus, sicut repletio vasis est a vino, sed quadrata²⁷²⁴ repletio est a vase quadrato.

(64) Ad sextum <dicendum, quod> Philosophus²⁷²⁵) ponit materiam et formam principia <rerum>, quia intrans essentialiter rem, non sicut dimensiones illas²⁷²⁶, individuum esset unum per accidens. Privatio est²⁷²⁷ principium non intrans et ideo per accidens. [V 168rb] Unde ista requiruntur necessario in omni generatione. Nisi²⁷²⁸ enim esset privatio in materia, non esset materia in potentia ad formam, unde nec ad formam²⁷²⁹, quam actu habet materia, nec ad formam, qua non est privata, est in potentia, sicut stellae materia ad formam ignis. Dimensiones autem ponuntur, ut distinguatur materia ad recipiendum diversas formas.

(65) Ad septimum dicendum, quod istae dimensiones non sunt puncta²⁷³⁰ vel huiusmodi principia aliqua individua, nec etiam sunt nuda materia, quia sic non intelligeretur²⁷³¹ distinguere, sed nec

²⁷¹¹ haec materia: hoc modo V

²⁷¹² haec: hic V

²⁷¹³ interminatas ... dimensiones om. sed add. i. m. E

²⁷¹⁴ haec: hic V

²⁷¹⁵ quia add. si E

²⁷¹⁶ nunc: sicut V

²⁷¹⁷ quartum: decimum V

²⁷¹⁸ sic: sicut V

²⁷¹⁹ sint an sunt scrib.?

²⁷²⁰ est om. V

²⁷²¹ e converso: aequo V

²⁷²² ut: ubi V

²⁷²³ haeccitas: hiccitas V an haecceitas scrib.?

²⁷²⁴ quadrata: quaedam V

²⁷²⁵) Cf. Arist., Phys., I 7, 191a8–17; transl. vetus: Bossier – Brams 34,15–35,6; Thom., In Phy., I, lect. 13, n. 110–119; Maggiolo 57a–59b; etiam Auct. Arist. 2, n. 17; Hamesse 141,24.

²⁷²⁶ illas: alias E

²⁷²⁷ Privatio est: privationem V

²⁷²⁸ Nisi: non sed corr. V

²⁷²⁹ unde ... formam om. sed an add. i. m. sed illeg. E

²⁷³⁰ puncta: punctum E

²⁷³¹ intelligeretur: intelligerentur V

sunt dimensiones terminatae²⁷³² inquantum huiusmodi, quae sunt perfectae species quantitatis, sed sunt ipsae quantitates²⁷³³ determinatae, intellectae tamen sine determinatione, sicut hanc quantitatem huius folii intelligo sine eius quadratura, sed solum inquantum distinguit ab alio folio materiam, quod facit etiam circumscripta quadratura vel quacumque terminatione. Et hoc modo accipitur quantitas naturalis quaedam²⁷³⁴, sed non naturaliter, sed quasi metaphysice, in ratione tantum²⁷³⁵ distinguendi considerata. Sed utrum distinguat materiam inquantum aeris vel aquae materia haec non ad interminatas²⁷³⁶, sed ad terminatas²⁷³⁷, secundum quod aliter terminatur quantitas aquae, aliter aeris; sed distinctio essentialiter <et> praecipue pertinet ad interminatas, sicut in eodem vase vinum quantum mutaretur in acetum²⁷³⁸, licet essent aliae dimensiones terminatae, tamen eadem consideratae in natura dimensionis, scilicet inquantum distinguunt²⁷³⁹, et non esset materia de novo partita²⁷⁴⁰ nec vas nova repletionem repletum²⁷⁴¹. Ergo dimensiones inquantum huiusmodi, non inquantum huius vel illius, habent distinguere materiam et replere.

²⁷³² terminate: interminate V

²⁷³³ quantitates: quantitatis V

²⁷³⁴ quaedam: quidem V

²⁷³⁵ tantum: in ratione tamen V

²⁷³⁶ interminatas: terminatas *sed corr. s. v. E*

²⁷³⁷ terminatas: determinatas V

²⁷³⁸ acetum: acet^r E

²⁷³⁹ distinguunt: distinguit V

²⁷⁴⁰ partita *om. E*

²⁷⁴¹ repletum: repletet V

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