

**The Sedimented Unconscious:  
from Husserlian Phenomenology to Phenomenological Psychopathology**

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## Part I – Phenomenology of the Unconscious

### Chapter One: Introduction - The Problematic and Scope of this Work

#### 1.1 The Unconscious as a Philosophical Problem and Its Historical Origin

The beginning of the philosophical use of the word “unconscious” is usually traced back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). In his *New Essays on Human Understanding*, completed in 1704 and first published in 1765 after his death, Leibniz introduced the idea of *petites perceptions*, or “small perceptions”, which lie below the threshold of conscious awareness and are therefore characterized as unconscious. Small perceptions refer to the sensory weaves continuously given to the mind, such as little noises of the sea or constant feelings of coldness - even during sleep. They flow incessantly into the mind and constitute the indistinct background of perception in general, yet without reaching the region of one’s awareness due to their low level of intensity. Echoing the Cartesian principle that “the mind always thinks”, Leibniz’s idea of small perceptions explains the way in which the soul does not cease to be affected by minute sensory data, though in an unconscious way that Descartes never thought of (See Aloisi, 2021). Unconscious though they are, these infinite small perceptions are nevertheless the very condition for conscious perception, which Leibniz refers to in *Monadology* (1714) as apperception, or the perception of perceiving. Apperception is perception accompanied by conscious awareness, but it is essentially the perception of the unconscious small perceptions and is unrealizable without the latter serving as its foundation. In other words, rather than being the ontological rivalry of consciousness, the unconscious is constitutively inherent to what is conscious (the apperceptions) in the form of small perceptions.

While Kant seldom speaks thematically of the unconscious, his distinction between phenomenon and noumenon ends up being influential for the German Idealists’ further conceptualization of the notion. For Kant, the noumenon bespeaks the unknowable, viz. that which goes beyond and imposes a limit for human cognition. Inspired indirectly by Kant, Fichte and Schelling develop the idea of the unconscious processing of the ego. For Fichte, the ego (*das Ich*) is not completely transparent to itself in that it is constantly carrying out activities that are not initiated or accompanied by conscious awareness. Among others, the activity of positing (*Setzung*) itself and the world, despite being the most foundational act of the ego, remains for the most part below the threshold of reflective consciousness, viz. it remains mostly unconscious. Nonetheless, just as, for Leibniz, small perceptions are condition for the possibility of apperception, the unconscious positing of the ego is for Fichte also the necessary condition for the ego’s conscious experience. The idea of the unconscious becomes even more prominent in Schelling’s philosophy. While he conceptualizes the notion from different aspects and in different theoretical contexts within his idealism, two of his insights should be mentioned here. In his early thoughts on philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*), Schelling identifies – in opposition to the traditional dichotomy between nature and spirit - the nature

as an unconscious spirit. Rather than being the sum of soulless materials, nature is a living and dynamic spirit that strives continuously for self-manifestation, which eventually is the manifestation of the absolute. Its unconscious and dynamic evolution is marked particularly by tensions between opposites, the polar forces “between centripetal and centrifugal drives, gravity and light, no and yes” (McGrath, 2020, 75). It is only out of these conflicts that life develops itself and culminates in human consciousness. In his later engagement with the philosophy of freedom, Schelling focuses on the metaphysical dimension of the unconscious. While God has within himself the ground of his existence, human existence (*Existenz*), by contrast, has an unconscious ground (*Grund*) that cannot be made fully transparent to consciousness. However, this dark, concealed ground is, again, the necessary condition for human freedom, namely, the freedom of consciously bringing forth the realization of being. It is also this very tension between the unconscious and consciousness that gives rise to artistic creativity and human volition.

Standing between German idealism and so-called existence philosophy (*Existenzphilosophie*), Arthur Schopenhauer establishes his metaphysics of will in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818). Borrowing Kant’s notion of *Ding-an-sich*, Schopenhauer identifies the will (*der Wille*) as the thing-in-itself, viz. the inner essence of everything. The will is, in turn, an unconscious, blind, irrational and chaotic force that dominates life and drives all human behaviours. As a drive that hardly coincides with rationality, the unconscious will is for Schopenhauer the very root of human conflicts and suffering. Most human beings are submitted to the force of the will until aesthetic experiences manage to liberate one temporarily from such servitude. Adopting a less pessimistic and negative view of the unconscious, Nietzsche also conceives of it as the fundamental drives and instincts that underlie human beings, as discussed in such works as *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (1886) and *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (1887). Rejecting the primacy of rationality and the existence of any ahistorical truth and morality, Nietzsche attributes to the unconscious drives and instincts of human being an ontologically significant role. As irrational and chaotic as these are, the unconscious is what shapes and underlies the various historical formations of culture, morality, and values. Sharing apparent similarities with Schopenhauer’s idea of the will to live (*der Wille zum Leben*), Nietzsche’s famous doctrine of the will to power (*der Wille zur Macht*) is also, in certain sense, of unconscious nature. The will to power is the unconscious driving force that underlies not only human but also all kinds of life, a force that enables the incessant evolution, destructions, and self-overcoming of all living beings.

Of utmost importance to our current interdisciplinary study between phenomenology, psychology, psychoanalysis, and psychopathology is Eduard von Hartmann’s all-encompassing work on the unconscious, *Die Philosophie des Unbewussten* (1869). Starting from Descartes, Locke, and most importantly Leibniz, von Hartmann undertakes a historical and systematic approach to the problematic of the unconscious. Siding with Schelling and Schopenhauer, on the one hand, von Hartmann regards the unconscious as a universal force lying beneath all existence. From this he

develops a metaphysics of the unconscious in both human and non-human beings. On the other hand, he is driven solely by a philosophical-metaphysical concern but also ventures to put forward a psychological study of various psychical phenomena that belong exclusively to the human. The latter includes themes such as sexual love, the origin of language and thoughts, character and morality, etc., and above all their respective relationship to the unconscious human mind. Despite both his methodology and conceptualization differing significantly from that adopted by the school of Freudian psychoanalysis, von Hartmann's philosophical and psychological contemplation unquestionably opened up the room for an interdisciplinary study of the unconscious in the following decades.

## 1.2 Sedimentation as a Philosophical Notion and its Conceptual Origin

Unlike many other phenomenological terms, "sedimentation" was never a philosophical invention, nor was it originally designated to enter the discourse of human sciences. Even nowadays, it does not even occupy a single entry in any historical dictionary of philosophy. Sedimentation, and its verb form, to sediment, have an etymological origin in ordinary Latin as *sedimentum* (noun) and *sedere* (verb). *Sedere* has the original meaning of "to settle", "to take a seat", or "to come to rest". From the French *sédiment* (16<sup>th</sup> century), "to sedimen" describes the "matter which settles by gravity to the bottom of water or other liquid," (Online Etymology Dictionary). Correspondingly, sedimentation as the noun form of the action bespeaks the process and the end products of the residue of such settling and sinking down of particles, which eventually come to rest at the lowest layer of a certain liquid. It was not until the 16<sup>th</sup> century that sedimentation entered English and made its appearance in the academic world as a specific notion, in particular in geology (and biology). As a study of the earth and its formational materials and processes, geology first made use of the word sedimentation to describe the natural process by which the particles in air or water settle, sink down and come to rest due to gravity, forming, over a long period of time, different layers that make up rocks and stones and eventually the core material components of the earth. Since then, sedimentation has served as a foundational notion for the study of earth history and stratigraphy, which is concerned with the description of the layers (strata) and layering (stratification) of rocks over an extensive time scale. Thanks to its significance to the geological study as such, the notion also developed a metaphorical meaning that depicts the temporal-accumulative formational process by which something with a historical depth comes into existence. The metaphorical meaning is twofold: on the one hand, things that fade out or disappear over time do always leave a trace that contributes to the birth of something else discernible in or even essential for the present and the future, just as the disappearance of wind and air leaves particles that form the rocks and stones of our earth; on the other hand, just as rocks and stones do not come into existence all of a sudden and out of pure nothingness, things in general always have undergone a historical process of formation that invites a retrospective gaze.

Sedimentation first emerged as a technical notion in the human sciences and became a philosophical problem when Husserl metaphorically adopted it in his later (less studied) works, which will be investigated throughout the current study in relation to such problematics as human subjectivity and the unconscious. Apart from that, in the more well-known work, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* (1936), the notion of *Sedimentierung* plays a crucial role in Husserl's discussion of life-world (*Lebenswelt*) and the sense-formation (*Sinnbildung*) of historical traditions. The pre-scientific life-world as a cultural world of specific meaningfulness is not any a priori givenness but rather a historical product of sedimented acts and experiences accumulated in the past generations. The sedimented past leaves its traces; it is preserved, taken over, and appropriated (*aneignen*) in the current life-world as customs and traditions that emboss our daily lives and shape the way in which things are pre-reflectively given to us with particular cultural meaning. The problem of sedimentation is hence a problem of the historical constitution of sense (See Husserl, 2019, section 9-12, 34). In addition, the crisis of modern natural science consists, according to Husserl, precisely in the forgetting of the sedimented origin of their theories and concepts. The presumed ideal objectivities of geometry and mathematics have lost their relevancy to the life-world and are oblivious of their own historical origin. To save humanity from this crisis, Husserl argues, we are urged to investigate – retrospectively – the rootedness of modern natural science in the historical life-world and, in particular, the way in which its sedimented layers give rise to widespread scientific ideas. Sedimentation as addressed in *die Krisis* amounts to what will be characterized in the next chapter as the generative sense of sedimentation, which will emerge from time to time throughout our current work despite the fact that it is not the main focus of our investigation.

Developing Husserl's idea of sedimentation, Merleau-Ponty, mainly in his work *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945), studies the notion even more thematically within the context of perception, embodiment, and pathology. Above all, sedimentation is essential to the study of human actions and perception since human beings are embodied subjects in whose body (and consciousness) experiences are sedimented in the form of habits. Chapter 5 will touch upon such notions as body-memory and the body-schema, which for Merleau-Ponty are nothing but the bodily manifestations of sedimented experiences. Besides phenomenology, sedimentation as a philosophical notion is also foregrounded by Derrida. Rather than attributing positive significance to the concept, however, Derrida carries out a critique of it due to its function of stabilizing meaning. Resisting the stabilization of meaning – which falls prey to the concealment of the potentiality of reinterpretation - Derrida calls instead for a reactivation or reawakening of the sedimented past, a deconstruction or *de-sedimentation*. His idea lies outside of the scope of the current investigation, but it is definitely worth mentioning for the sake of an extended study of the problematic from a perspective beyond phenomenology.

### 1.3 Contemporary Discourse on the Phenomenology of the Sedimented Unconscious

Restricting ourselves to the phenomenological tradition, we are pleased to see that the problem of sedimentation and the unconscious, as well as their interrelationship and theoretical relevancy to other disciplines, have received increased attention in contemporary discourses. Here I will mention some of the most important works that approach the issue in various manners and from various perspectives. Whereas static phenomenology is dedicated to unravelling the eidetic structures of acts of pure consciousness that constitutes its intentional correlates, genetic phenomenology questions the “wherefrom”, viz. the temporal genesis, of such constitutive performance of pure consciousness embodied in a concrete subjectivity. Shedding light on the significance of genetic phenomenology, Dieter Lohmar underlines the historicity of experiential consciousness and is concerned with the way in which past experiences contribute to the formation of intentional acts of various kinds, especially to the acts of perception and the formation of perceptual types (*Typus*). In this regard, the notion of sedimentation comes into view as he identifies pre-predicative experience and “the sedimentation of our perceptual experiences in the form of types” as the “two central forms of our experiential life” (Lohmar, 2011, 268). Indeed Lohmar has been carrying out insightful studies on the notion of types for more than 20 years (See Lohmar, 1998, 2003). His major work, *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken*, offers a detailed account of the historical and conceptual development of categorial thinking and schematization of experience, which started from Hume and Locke and reached its peak in Kant and Husserl. Of particular interest for him are the similarities and contrasts between Kant’s schematism and Husserl’s typifying of experiences. As will be discussed in chapter 3.1, Lohmar recognizes that the idea of types in Husserl, in contrast to the Kantian categories, foregrounds the experiential and personal origin of schematization of pre-predicative experience. Throughout his investigations, the notion of sedimentation operates for the most part in the background and is addressed merely occasionally. Building on his insights, I venture to carry out a more thematic exploration of the relationship of types to sedimentation in chapter 3 and 8.

Besides her concerns with such notions as types, the life-world (*Lebenswelt*), and (transcendental) personal subjectivity, Jagna Brudzinska (2014, 2015) contributes significantly to the interdisciplinary dialogue between phenomenology and psychoanalysis in her monograph, *Bi-Valenz der Erfahrung* (2019). This work juxtaposes the Husserlian phenomenological investigation of consciousness and Freud’s psychoanalytic discovery of the unconscious and explores their dynamics both in the constitution of our experiences and of human subjectivity in its concreteness. In particular, Husserl’s phenomenological engagement with themes such as drives, affection, and instincts, etc., which drew less attention than his other themes during the past decades, is brought into light. Their theoretical significance is revealed in relation to Freud’s psychoanalytic insights about autonomy of the unconscious and its constant intrusion upon the conscious present. Central to Brudzinska’s work is her discovery of two orders of experiences interwoven with each other: namely, perceptual experience



guided by sensuous impressional givenness and phantasy guided and motivated by the subject's own repressed wishes, desires, and forgotten childhood experiences, etc. While her works serves as valuable conceptual resources for the current study, the latter initiates a shift of perspective by focusing on the sedimented unconscious mainly within the Husserlian-phenomenological framework and exploring its implications for understanding psychopathological experiences.

Already more than 20 years ago, an intense dialogue between Husserl and Freud was initiated by Rudolf Bernet (1997, 2002), who speaks of “unconscious consciousness” in both figures. Bernet identifies Freud's main concern as the appearing of the unconscious, which leads to a direct confrontation of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology with the task of clarifying how consciousness brings something that is foreign to it (viz. the unconscious) to present appearance. Husserl's theory of intuitive presentification (*anschauliche Vergegenwärtigung*), in particular phantasy, serves, according to Bernet, as the key to the solution of this seemingly impossible task (Bernet, 2002, 329). It is also within this context that the unconscious is denied its ontological independence and is determined to be nothing more than a dimension of consciousness. Later in his research, Bernet (2006, 2020) dedicates himself to such themes as desires, drives, and impulses, together with the idea of the lived-body (*Leib*) conceptualized by Husserl. All those so-called libido forces are considered to be of an unconscious nature and at the same time inseparable from ego-consciousness, which inevitably leads to the idea of a “drive-based subject” complemented by Freud's meta-psychological theory of the subject in his first and second topography. This is thus another insightful work that deepens the conceptual exchange between phenomenology and psychoanalysis.

On the other side, drawing much less from Freudian psychoanalysis, Dermot Moran concentrates more on Husserlian phenomenology itself when he delves into the problem of personal self and personal ego. He is convinced that there is a Husserlian breakthrough from the modern conception of self established by Descartes, Hume, Kant, and so on. Liberated from the Cartesian and Kantian conception of self as a thoroughly free and rational agent (and the Humean one as a mere bundle of perceptions), Husserl develops a layered concept of self (person) (See Moran, 2016, 2017) consisting of both conscious and unconscious substratum. The phenomenological subject is composed of both freedom/rationality and sensuality/irrationality. Above all, Moran (2014) is concerned with the ego as a substrate of habits, which I will discuss extensively in chapters 5 and 10. While Moran is fully aware of the unconscious layer of the person and the formation of habits through the sedimentation of experiences, the very relations between them deserve a more thematic elaboration together with the other forms of manifestation of the sedimented unconscious.

In recent years, besides the phenomenology of horizon, imagination, and pain, Saulius Geniusas (2020) initiated – starting with the idea of absorption (*Versunkenheit*) - a revival of the thematic exploration of the problem of sedimentation and the unconscious within Husserlian

phenomenology and beyond. Of utmost importance, for the relevant studies in general and the current investigation in particular, is his taxonomy of the different meaning of the unconscious in Husserl (Geniusas, 2024c), including the unconscious as horizontal, time-constituting, repressed, absorbed, sedimented, and so on. Closely related to this is also Geniusas' reconstruction of the conceptual and textual origin of Husserl's idea of sedimentation and the three different senses of it, which will be addressed in the upcoming sections (Geniusas, 2024a, 2024b). His recent studies offer an important framework for situating our present study within the whole contemporary discourse on the subject matter: among others, the following investigation will focus on the sedimented unconscious, which is differentiated from other meanings of the unconscious despite not being completely isolated from them. Likewise, while the genetic sense of sedimentation is much more prominent than the static and generative sense of it throughout the work, the latter does also play a role - discussed in such chapters as 3.3 and 5.3 - as far as problems involving intersubjectivity are concerned. Last but not least, Geniusas' investigation even goes beyond Husserl and explores the various dimensions of sedimentation in Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur. The latter sheds light on the innovative aspect of sedimentation, which will be discussed in the last chapter<sup>1</sup>.

#### 1.4 An Overview of the Following Investigation

Developing from the previous efforts made by other scholars, the current investigation adopts a somewhat different approach and perspective towards the problematic. While also drawing occasionally from Freudian psychoanalysis, Blankenburg's phenomenological psychiatry, as well as Binswanger's Daseinanalysis, this work proceeds first and foremost in the Husserlian-phenomenological approach towards a thematic investigation of sedimentation and the unconscious – or, more precisely, of the unconscious understood mainly as sedimentation (hence: the sedimented unconscious). It aims not only to unravel a less prominent theme in (Husserlian) phenomenology, viz. the unconscious, but also to explore its theoretical significance for other scientific disciplines such as psychology and psychopathology. In light of the fertile study of consciousness and intentionality in Husserl, the leading question of the following research is *how* the sedimented unconscious manifests and affects the intentional activities of consciousness in such a way that the former is even shown to be indispensable for the constitutive performance of the latter. Put otherwise, following the metaphorical meaning of sedimentation employed in geology, it explores the very *traces* left by sedimented past experiences in the person and their formation of the layers of conscious life. Just as particles of air and wind form the stones and rocks of our earth, past experiences also take part in the

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<sup>1</sup> Of course, there are much more references in the contemporary discourse than I could address here. Two illuminating companions (Lohmar & Brudzinska, 2012; Legrand & Trigg, 2017) are, for instance, all-encompassing phenomenological and psychoanalytic expositions of the unconscious. This shows the significant growth of interest in the subject matter.

genesis of one's life consciousness as a whole. A phenomenological and systematic exposition of the conscious manifestations of the unconscious will contribute to the understanding of such genesis.

Before an overview of the themes discussed in the subsequent chapters, a few conceptual and methodological remarks should be made in advance. First, while part I focuses on so-called "normal" consciousness and the unconscious' (re-)emergence in it, part II turns towards "pathological" consciousness and explores the way in which the unconscious is effective in atypical lived-experiences. The crude division made here between "normal" and "pathological" consciousness requires cautious attention. Instead of drawing a strict line between the normal and abnormal, the division is based on Husserl's distinction between *normality* (*Normalität*) and *anomaly* (*Anomalität*) in the 5<sup>th</sup> Cartesian meditation. "Pathological", of which the second part speaks frequently, does not mean *abnormal*, which seems to be a complete negation or privation of the normal, but rather *anormal* in the sense that it has deviated from the normal majority. Husserl's own examples of anomaly includes the blind or deaf person, the animal, and even the human child (See Husserl, 2012a, 125). Anomaly as such is in no case cut off from the normal but rather consists in "anomalous 'alterations of my humanity (*anomale ‚Abwandlungen‘ meiner Menschlichkeit*)", an "intentional modification" that constitutes itself first and only on the basis of a normality preceding itself ("*die Anomalität muss sich als solche selbst erst konstituieren, und kann es nur auf dem Grund einer an sich vorangehenden Normalität*") (ibid., my translation). Based on this idea, while part I (chapter 2-6) remains within the classical Husserlian framework and puts forward a schematic interpretation of the (re-)emergence of the sedimented unconscious in different spheres of consciousness, the phenomenological psychopathology in part II (chapter 7-11) conceives pathological consciousness mainly as anomalous consciousness in Husserl's (and Binswanger's) sense. The pathological does not bespeak the simple deficit, absence, or deprivation of certain structures of the normal, but rather a modification of and on the basis of the normal (see chapter 7). Therefore, as will be demonstrated throughout the entire work, whereas the sedimented unconscious manifests as *types*, *mood*, and *habits*, in normal consciousness, these structural moments undergo a pathological (anomalous) modification as *derivatives*, *bad mood*, and *hyperreflexivity* in anomaly, which in this thesis refers particularly to various pathologies.

The second remark concerns the idea of phenomenology understood as *transcendental* phenomenology. In the very first place, transcendental phenomenology restricts itself to the pure realm that stays intact after the implementation of the epoché and reduction. At the core of its investigation are the eidetic structures of transcendental consciousness, which render experiences as such possible but which themselves are not empirically derived – otherwise the universality and the rigour of phenomenology would seem to be threatened. Now, the idea of sedimentation, inevitably as sedimentation of subjective and intersubjective *experiences*, poses a pressing problem as to whether it is purely an empirical matter – an object of study of empirical sciences such as psychology -, or in

what sense it bears transcendental significance in phenomenology. A brief response to this challenge is that sedimentation is *both empirical and transcendental*. As far as sedimentation is the sedimentation of experience (*Erfahrung*) and lived-experience (*Erlebnis*) of any concrete subject(s), it is inevitably empirical in its nature and its origin. Indeed, it is admittedly the experiential origin of all pure concepts and ideal objectivities in logic and natural sciences, which are ontologically rooted in the pre-predicative experiences in the life-world. Nonetheless, sedimentation, understood in this study in particular as the sedimented unconscious, is destined to constitute an indispensable dimension or layer (*Schicht*) of a concrete subjectivity, and consequently also that of the life of consciousness in its entirety. Husserl, especially in his later writings, keeps coming back to the parallel between the transcendental-constituting ego and the psychological-empirical ego, which make up the two sides of one and the same ego and which determine each other constitutively. While sedimentation cannot help but originate in the experiences of the empirical ego, it constantly enters the transcendental realm and affects and colours its ongoing intentional activities. Sedimentation is hence also transcendental in the sense that it does not cease to co-constitute a subject's experience by manifesting in transcendental consciousness as various structural moments essential to the latter's intentional performances. The current work is dedicated to systematically unfolding how sedimentation manifests itself in transcendental consciousness. At the same time, this task also implies an attempt to *broaden the realm of the transcendental*. The transcendental consists no longer merely of static structures universally shared by all subjectivities and untouched by any empirical contingency. Rather, under the light of the idea of sedimentation, transcendental-constituting consciousness is shown to be a concrete subjectivity determined extensively by its own historicity, social-cultural contingencies, personal style and dispositions, habitualities and even certain concealed wishes and desire. Despite having an empirical origin, so to speak, all of these contribute co-effectively to the constitution of experience of an individual, rendering themselves as distinctively transcendental in nature. Transcendental consciousness is eventually shown to be a sedimented transcendental subjectivity imbued with historical depth and personal peculiarities.

The last remark concerns methodology, which will be further clarified at the beginning of chapter two. At this point, it suffices to mention that sedimentation is never an unequivocal notion clearly defined by Husserl himself. Instead, like most of the notions in phenomenology, including that of the unconscious (See Geniusas, 2024c), sedimentation has different meanings when situated within different theoretical frameworks in phenomenology. However, while it is almost inevitable to focus on one or two of them, it is conceptually and practically impossible to completely isolate one meaning of sedimentation from the others. As far as sedimentation is concerned, three main senses of the notion can be discerned, namely, the *static*, *genetic*, and *generative*. The meaning of each of them will be elaborated in greater detail in the next chapter and throughout the work. It should, however, be stated clearly that while the primary focus of the following study lies in the *genetic* sense of sedimentation,

the *static*, and more importantly, the *generative* sense of it will come onto the scene as well, for the experience of a personal subjectivity is fundamentally inseparable from the intersubjectively and intergenerationally constituted world and its traditions.

Beginning with this methodological clarification, chapter two is a preparatory work that establishes the theoretical foundation on which the subsequent investigations will proceed. This chapter offers a phenomenological clarification of the two core concepts of the work, sedimentation and the unconscious, as well as Husserl's unconventional identification of them. The problem of the unconscious then leads to an unavoidable confrontation with the Freudian-psychoanalytic theory of the id and repression, which drastically contrast with the Husserlian-phenomenological account. While the latter is significantly differentiated from the former in terms of its ontological nature, it should not be reduced to the Freudian pre-consciousness as famously contended by Ricoeur. There is no doubt that phenomenological unconscious keeps resurfacing and manifesting in the conscious sphere. However, the different mechanisms of such manifestation require a more systematic treatment, which will also be carried out in the last section of the chapter.

Having laid the theoretical groundwork in the previous chapter, the subsequent three chapters delve into the ways in which the sedimented unconscious manifests as three essential structural moments constitutive of three kinds of intentionality respectively. In the sphere of understanding, as discussed in chapter three, sedimented experiences manifest as the *types* of perceptions. For a pre-predicative perceptual experience to be possible, a corresponding typifying-anticipatory horizon that goes beyond the impressional givenness must be projected by the subject itself. At the core of each of such horizon in which the constitution of the being of objects takes place is precisely the type formed by similar experiences from the past. Furthermore and intrinsic to this process, two problematics arise and deserve closer examination. The first concerns the "objective" and "subjective" associative connection between the impressional givenness and the types formed in and through the unconscious past, while the second exhibits the "irrational" and "subjective" factors that take part in the formation of types themselves.

Chapter four turns to the sphere of affect and identifies *mood* as the affective manifestation of sedimentation. A more profound sense of mood than that referring simply to the "lingering" of a previous emotion is brought into light. Despite the fact that manifold life-feelings lived through in the past are sedimented, they continue to colour one's future experiences by forming a subtle yet pervasive feeling-background of a subjectivity. Everything appears to the subject under a specific emotive light that belongs exclusively to their own self. Furthermore, different from the associative awakening of the types, moods are characterized by a certain degree of violence in that they recklessly pervade or even intrude upon the subject regardless of the latter's current encounters. In the face of such affective intrusion, the subject is always required to take a stance and decides to what degree it

will allow itself to be immersed in its own mood. In relation to this, the last section of the chapter addresses the problem of affective position-taking and surrender in Husserl's *Studien*.

Chapter five sheds light on the sphere of volition, where sedimentation is preserved and continues to be effective as *habits* of different kinds. Through the preservation of previous experiences, a subject is acquainted with their own competence, limitations, and dispositions, in such a way that one is equipped with the practical habits that allow an unhindered and mostly unproblematic coping with daily affairs. As far as the manifesting mechanism of habits is concerned, it is shown to be a special awakening "between" the intrusive and spontaneous coming-forth of moods and the passive being-awakened of types. The dynamic between the external encounter and a subject's own habitual tendency to act comes onto the scene. In addition, the problem of habits is simultaneously the problem of common sense, which in typical cases ensures the smoothness of one's practical life and the loss of which results in massive disturbances of volitional acts.

At the end of part one, chapter six attempts to exhibit the synthetic unity and reciprocal determination of the three structural moments elucidated in the foregoing chapters. To achieve the task, the horizontal structure of types, moods, and habits, as well as their constitution of the horizon-consciousness, conceived of particularly as the horizon of transcendental subjectivity in its concreteness, are first laid bare. Subsequently, the very dynamic and intertwinement between the three moments is demonstrated more concretely through the associative awakening of types, which I argue is inevitably navigated by individual moods and habits.

Part two goes beyond classical Husserlian phenomenology and turns towards phenomenological psychopathology. It starts with the theoretical necessity of devising an anomalous counterpart of sedimentation, which I term pathological sedimentation in chapter seven. It will be argued that as a piece of experience encompasses various dimensions other than its temporality, the sedimentation of experience results in a stratification that accounts for the different depths and intensity of sedimented contents. Only an emotionally stratified concept of sedimentation is able to explain the pathological phenomena whereby mere fragments of the past reappear in certain unpredictable ways and under apparently incomprehensible circumstances.

On the ground of the idea of pathological sedimentation, chapter eight introduces the Freudian notion of *derivatives* as the pathological correlate of Husserlian types. Whereas the awakening of types is motivated by the perceptual interest to apprehend the givenness as such, the derivatives, as nothing but substitute-representatives of one's original, repressed representations of drive and desires, strive to gain access to the conscious sphere whenever contingent environmental clues are given. They do not truly aim at the apprehension of objects but rather the fulfilment of the subject's concealed wishes by means of distorted perceptions. From a psychoanalytic standpoint, this

phenomenon is deeply rooted in the human nature of repetition-compulsion, namely, the hidden tendency to constantly repeat one's past even when it is traumatic.

In the sphere of affect, mood is modified into sort of *bad mood* in pathologies such as depression and schizophrenia. Arguing against the English translation, chapter nine attempts to unravel the essence of *Verstimmung*, which differentiates itself from typical *Stimmung*. It will be argued that the common criteria for the differentiation in both colloquial and psychiatric uses of the term do not suffice to capture the essential feature of *Verstimmung*. Instead, the Husserlian ideas of affective position-taking and surrender offer a more convincing way to conceptualize the pathological nature of *Verstimmung* as the loss of the capability to voluntarily take a stance towards one's current mood. Eventually, this results in an immediate and unfree surrender to a mood, as is commonly discernible in such cases as the inescapable and persistent entrapment in a depressive *Verstimmung*.

Chapter ten returns to the problem of common sense and takes a closer look at the loss of it in pathologies such as schizophrenia. The core question arises as to what exactly is lost when Blankenburg and Fuchs speak of the loss of common sense. A careful examination of their position will reveal that it is phenomenologically untenable to attribute to schizophrenic patients a complete loss of the world or the worldliness of world. The world is still preserved to a certain extent, and what is truly lost is instead the trust and familiarity towards one's own (practical) habitualities and one's common sense about the world and others. As one no longer feels secure in and familiar with the surrounding world, one is susceptible to endless reflections and incessant attempts to decipher the imagined threats "behind" every encounter. In this sense, habits are replaced by *habitual hyperreflexivity* that severely obstructs one's daily life.

Chapter eleven concludes the study by throwing light on the potential reversed influence of the present consciousness upon the unconscious sedimented past. Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic account of the constitution of narrative self-identity is introduced in this respect. Ricoeur's emphasis on the potential innovativeness of sedimentation through retrospective (re-)interpretation in terms of its meaningfulness is placed in contrast with Husserl's phenomenological focus on the reawakening and reactivation of the sedimented past. Whereas the latter foregrounds the continual "forward" effects of the sedimented past upon present intentionality, the former indicates the possibility of a retrospective "backward" re-determination of the meaning of the past from the present standpoint. Taken together, they make up the constant dynamic and reciprocity between the unconscious and consciousness. The study concludes with the hope of opening up a new horizon for further investigation into the problem of the unconscious.

## Chapter Two: Towards a Phenomenology of the Unconscious and the Husserlian Concept of Sedimentation

### 2.1 The Phenomenological Concept of Sedimentation and the Tripartition of the Sphere of Consciousness

While its exact meaning, its ontological status and its essential nature are constantly disputable themes throughout the philosophical, psychological and psychoanalytical traditions ever since the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the unconscious should be conceptualized phenomenologically within the Husserlian framework first and foremost as *sedimentation* (*die Sedimentierung*). The conceptual identification of the unconscious with sedimentation in this research serves two purposes: first, it limits the scope of our research such that unnecessary theoretical clumsiness is avoided; second, it allows a thematic investigation of the problem of the unconscious exclusively *from the phenomenological perspective*, an investigation that is so far not so prominent as it deserves to be. In this chapter, a phenomenological exploration and reconstruction of the notion of sedimentation, as well as its theoretical significance with respect to the problem of the unconscious in Husserl's phenomenology, will be carried out. After that, the conceptual tripartition of the sphere of consciousness will be brought into light as the foundation for further studies.

The notion of sedimentation makes its scattered appearance mainly (but not solely) in texts such as *Analysen zur passive Synthesis* (henceforth *APS*), *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie* (henceforth *GZ*), *Erfahrung und Urteil* (henceforth *EU*), and *der Ursprung der Geometrie* (henceforth *UG*). A thematic and clear analysis of the notion is basically absent in these texts. However, the scattered reflections offered by Husserl suffice for a reconstruction of a relatively systematic understanding of it. As a remark, I mention here the three senses of sedimentation suggested by contemporary scholars such as Anthony Steinbock and Saulius Geniusas. According to them, sedimentation could be understood in the *static*, *genetic* and *generative* senses (See Geniusas, 2024a). The *static* sense refers to the immediate retentional past of time-consciousness, such as a melody just heard and past, yet which is still retained in consciousness and synthetically integrated with the melodies heard in the subsequent moments (present and future). The *genetic* sense centres upon the concrete, individual and historical subjectivity and refers to sedimentation in terms of the whole past life-experiences (*Erlebnisse*) of it. Under this understanding, sedimentation designates, more precisely, the concrete events which one once experienced and which sunk into the distant past, while shaping the historicity and individuality of subjectivity. Finally, the *generative* sense of the notion extends itself to refer to the intersubjectively and intergenerationally constituted and inherited traditions and customs within a particular community. While the static sense revolves mainly around the constitution of a *single* experience, the genetic sense is concerned emphatically with the historicity of an individual subject and the generative sense of the traditionality of an intersubjective community.



Methodologically speaking, this work focuses, according to this schema, primarily – yet not exclusively - on the *genetic* sense of sedimentation, while the static and generative sense of it is also play a crucial role at different places, such as in the formation of social-cultural habits and even in the shaping of perceptual schemata. In other words, without dismissing entirely the static and generative sense of sedimentation and their inseparability from the genetic senses of the notion, this study is dedicated mainly to the exploration of the sedimented experiences of a concrete individual subject and how they interact with the upcoming conscious activities. That being said, in what follows, I distinguish two fundamental and interrelated senses of the notion, namely, a) sedimentation (*die Sedimentierung/Sedimentation*) conceived as an *eidetic process* that characterizes *all* experiences of temporal consciousness, and b) sedimentation conceived as a *region* or *field* (*Gebiet*) of consciousness and the “contents” (*die Sedimentierten/Sedimentations*) preserved there.

#### a) Sedimentation as an Eidetic Process

Sedimentation understood as an eidetic process could be defined as the diminution of the “graduality of liveliness (*Gradualität der Lebendigkeit*)” (Husserl, 1966, 167) of experiential contents until they reach the level of affective nullity. The meaning of this process is made intelligible only in relation with and analogy to the more often discussed concept of retention. As Husserl expounds in *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* and elsewhere, temporal consciousness is characterized by the essential structure of “retention-impression-protention” (See Husserl, 1971), which is presupposed by all possible experiences. Briefly put, all givenness in the impressional living present is co-formed by the passive expectation (protention) of the upcoming contents and the contents just past but still retained in the conscious sphere (retention). The latter, which are those “still-retained-in-consciousness (*Noch-im-Bewusstsein-Behalten*)”, despite fading away slowly, continues to exercise affective force upon the ongoing constitution of experience. For instance, a melody just heard is not immediately forgotten but rather retained in the conscious sphere and synthesized with the melodies heard in the following moments, leading to the constitution of the unity of the composition as a whole.

Conceived as such, the retentional process is meant to be an eidetic process – a kind of intentional modification – which *all* impressional contents are subject to. The latter is once experienced first with utmost affective force and then sinks gradually into the past while still remaining temporarily in consciousness, but with reduced allure. Retention is thus a necessary process undergone by the primal impressions, as Husserl describes: “Retention links up to the primordial impression. The retentional process is... the process of a peculiar, continuous modification of the primordial impression.” (Husserl, 2001, 217)<sup>2</sup> However, what is modified in this process is not the *content* of the primal impressions, but rather their *way of givenness* (*Gegebenheitsweise*) in terms of

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<sup>2</sup> „An die Urimpression schließt sich Retention an. Der retentionale Prozess ist...ein Prozess eigentümlicher stetiger Modifikation der Urimpression.“ (Husserl, 1966, 168)

their internal differentiations and affective force. The originally intuitively given contents become less differentiable and affective in a process that could be described as “obfuscation (*Verneblung*)”.

Correspondingly, sedimentation is the eidetic process which designates the inevitable “continuation” as well as the “end result” of the retentive modification of experiential contents. As Husserl states clearly in *GZ*: “And what can ‘sedimentation of the constitution’ bespeak other than the continuation of the ‘passive’ retention into obscurity?” (Husserl, 2013, 64, my translation)<sup>3</sup>. Even more strikingly, sedimentation understood as an eidetic structure that characterizes *all* lived-experiences (*Erlebnisse*) is described as the “destiny of consciousness”<sup>4</sup>.

Despite necessarily being understood in relation to and analogously with retention, sedimentation as a process is not merely retentive modification of experiential contents in terms of their affective force, but moreover the ultimate “becoming-zero (*Null-werden*)” of intuitiveness, liveliness and differentiation. It designates one of the two poles of the graduality of liveliness of experiences that range between the contents of the impressional present and the sedimented contents. According to Husserl, the former possesses the highest degree of affection, liveness, intuitiveness and inner differentiations of the contents. Here, it is worth mentioning that “affection” or “affective force” refers to nothing but the way of givenness of things, namely, the allure (*Reiz*) exercised by specific experiential contents such as certain pre-given sensuous data or pieces of constituted past experience, etc. When the allure reaches certain degree of intensity, the things that give rise to such allure become an affective prominence (*Abgehobenheit*) that more or less draws the attention of the subject who then either turns toward or away from (*sich zu- oder abwenden*) it. For Husserl, things given and experienced *here and now*, viz. in the living impressional present, usually exercise the highest intensity of allure and hence contain the most affective force. Correspondingly, on the other end of the scale lies the unconscious, which is defined by the “zero of such liveliness of consciousness (*das Null dieser Bewusstseinslebendigkeit*)” (Husserl, 1966, 167, my translation).

The eidetic process that transforms the impressional liveliness of experiential contents into the so-called unconscious is precisely the process of sedimentation. Several other expressions are employed to describe this process, such as “sinking (*versinken*)” (Husserl, 1966, 167), “debilitation (*Entkräftung*)”, and “darkening (*Verdunklung*)” (Husserl, 2013, 36). The once consciously experienced contents gradually fade out from subject’s sphere of awareness and become less and less thematic contents for the present consciousness. Having undergone this process, the contents are eventually sedimented and land in what Husserl calls the “affective zero-region (*affektives Nullgebiet*)” of the conscious life, which leads us to the second meaning of sedimentation to be

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<sup>3</sup> „Und was kann ‚Sedimentierung der Konstitution‘ anders besagen als Fortgehen der ‚passiven‘ Retention im Dunkel?“

<sup>4</sup> „Es wird uns hier wie überall sichtlich und immer besser noch sichtlich werden, dass sozusagen das Schicksal des Bewusstseins, all das, was es an Wendungen und Wandlungen erfährt, in ihm selbst nach der Wandlung als seine ‚Geschichte‘ niedergeschlagen bleibt.“ (Husserl, 1966, 38)

explored. Importantly, this “zero” or *Null* is nonetheless never a complete and simple nothing (*Nichts*). The contents of this zero-region do not disappear from the conscious life all at once. Rather, they continue to affect the forthcoming intentional activities in some ways or other. *How* such indirect effects (*Auswirkungen*) are to be conceptualized is precisely the theme of this study.

#### b) Sedimentation as a Field or Region (*Gebiet*) of Consciousness

Sedimentation in its second sense designates the very unconscious field or region of consciousness and the affectless contents therein. The contents residing there are characterized by “complete differentiationless out of complete affective forcelessness (*völlige Unterschiedslosigkeit aus völliger affektiver Kraftlosigkeit*)” (Husserl, 1966, 170, my translation). No internal differentiations and liveliness are discernible. Nonetheless, it is a field that belongs essentially to consciousness, yet distinctively in the mode of the unconscious. This field lies so to speak at the boundary of consciousness yet is never ontologically or metaphysically separated from it. In *GZ*, this very “terminal” of the retentional modification of experiential contents is characterized, again, as the “zero”: „the retentional modification cannot proceed endlessly, it comes into a zero...into the reservoir of all the zeros, into the zero-horizon, that of the sedimented” (Husserl, 2013, 62, my translation)<sup>5</sup>. Either termed the affective zero-region, the zero-sphere, or the zero-horizon, sedimentation depicted with all these spatial metaphors serves as the “abiding reservoir (*beständiger Reservoir*)” (Husserl, 1967, 177; 2013, 63) in which all sedimented past contents are “stored”. These “stored” yet momentarily unconscious contents are referred to sedimentations in the second sense and make up the background horizon as well as the concrete historicity of an individual subjectivity. Moreover, despite being unconscious, the sedimented essentially makes up “part of” the conscious life and always has the potentiality of being brought back to the conscious sphere. As Husserl emphasizes, „In it [the constant reservoir of objects], they [the sedimented] are tucked away from the ego, but quite at its disposal” (Husserl, 2001, 227)<sup>6</sup>. While the sedimented contents do not exercise direct affective force upon the ego-subject, they are nonetheless “available” for reawakening (*Weckung*) in some ways or others. Through being reawakened, they prove themselves to be transcendently constitutive for further conscious activities.

Throughout this study, the notion of sedimentation in the second sense will be in focus. Astonishingly or not, for Husserl, the sedimented is identified for the most part with the much disputed notion of the unconscious. His phenomenological conceptualization of the unconscious means basically nothing but *affectless*, viz. neither reflectively nor pre-reflectively conscious or co-conscious of. That which the subject is pre-reflectively conscious of, such as their body (*Leib*), can be

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<sup>5</sup> „die retentionalen Abwandlungen können nicht ins Unendliche gehen, sie kommen an ein Null...in das Reservoir aller Null, in den Nullhorizont, den des Sedimentierten“

<sup>6</sup> „Für das Ich sind sie [die Sedimentierten] darin verschlossen, aber sehr wohl zu seiner Verfügung.“ (Husserl, 1966, 177)

thematized as the object of conscious reflection anytime without much “effort”, as in the case where our subject-body is reflected upon as an *object* of theoretical examination. Similarly, that which the subject is co-conscious of, such as their environmental surroundings in the present, can be transformed into a thematic object of observation through a voluntary shift of attention. The unconscious is essentially distinguished from these cases in terms of its resistance to simple and voluntary accessibility and sometimes to objective intelligibility, as neither a direct allure upon the subject nor a strictly logical relationship to present experience is discernible - even when the unconscious manifests consciously.

Sedimentations and the unconscious share, phenomenologically speaking, the essential characteristics of “forcelessness (*Kraftlosigkeit*)” and “unawakenedness (*Unwachheit*)” (Husserl, 2013, 36). Thus, within the Husserlian framework, we might assert that the sedimented *is* unconscious, whereas the unconscious encompasses probably *more than* the sedimented. For the sake of theoretical clearness and with regard to the scope of this study, I restrict the use of the unconscious mainly to refer to the sedimented and its relationship to consciousness. This conceptual restriction (of the unconscious to sedimentation) is not without textual support. In *GZ*, for instance, Husserl writes, “...the supplement concerns the secret of the unconscious or else that of the sedimentation...” (ibid., my translation)<sup>7</sup>. This conceptualization is based extensively on the idea that the loss of affective force of something means nothing but its becoming unconscious for the subject. As Husserl states clearly, „And when there is no affection coming from the diverse objects, then these diverse objects have slipped into sheer nightfall, in a special sense, they have slipped into the unconscious” (Husserl, 2001, 221, emphasis added)<sup>8</sup>. Conceived as such, the Husserlian conception of the unconscious is further determined by its being nothing more than a *mode* or *dimension* of consciousness, rather than its being *independent* of the latter, as Freud would argue (see the next section).<sup>9</sup> In *formale und transzendente Logik*, the unconscious is described as the “inconspicuous substratum” of consciousness (Husserl, 1929, 279). In *EU*, when speaking of predicative judgment, this issue is brought up with more detailed discussion. Every actively constituted judgment, like all other experiences, is subject to retention, i.e., the first intentional modification understood as retaining-in-grasp (*im-Griff-Behalten*). As time progresses further, the judgment is then “*abandoned* in its retentional reverberation. It then sinks (*versinken*) ever further into the...passive background, into the ‘unconscious’...” (Husserl, 1973a, 279) What is meant by “sink” here is precisely the process of sedimentation, and what sinks into the unconscious becomes nothing but the sedimented. More significantly, this passive background of the unconscious is, according to Husserl, “not a dead nothingness but a *limiting mode (Grenzmodi)* of consciousness” (ibid.). The unconscious as a specific mode of consciousness thus finds its explicit

<sup>7</sup> „...die Ergänzung betrifft das Geheimnis des Unbewussten bzw. der Sedimentierung...” (Husserl, 2013, 63)

<sup>8</sup> “Und wenn von verschiedenen Gegenständen nichts affektiv wird, so sind diese verschiedenen in eine einzige Nacht untergetaucht, im besonderen Sinn *unbewusst* geworden.” (Husserl, 1966, 172, emphasis added)

<sup>9</sup> This claim is supported by such scholars as Saulius Geniusas (2024a) and Rudolf Bernet (2002, 2012).

affirmation here. Furthermore, the continuous effects of the unconscious upon one's upcoming experience is indicated here as well: "...[the unconscious] accordingly can affect us anew like another passivity in the form of whims, free-floating ideas, and so on" (ibid.). *How* exactly such "affecting anew" is to be understood, *in what manners* the unconscious relates itself to consciousness, *what* the former manifests or re-appears as for the latter - these are all problematics that require an in-depth exposition. Before that, the tripartition of the sphere of consciousness that serves as the theoretical foundation for such exposition should first be laid bare. The hypothesis that guides the whole study is that the unconscious (the sedimented) never manifests homogenously or simply as it "originally" was experienced in the past, but rather, *formally* enunciated, *as* three different structural moments in the three different dimensions of consciousness. That is, sedimentations *manifest as* something other than "themselves" as the former empirical elements and lived-experiences have undergone certain unconscious changes and dynamics. They "reappear" *as* transcendently constitutive moments essential to further intentional accomplishments. Such *manifesting-as* could be schematically and systematically explicated only on the ground of the threefold division of the conscious sphere.

There are three types of fundamental intentional relationships (*intentionale Bezüge*) of consciousness to the world, and the sedimented plays a particular role in each. The four volumes of *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins* identify them as: the representing-thinking (*vorstellend-denkend*), the feeling-valuing (*fühlend-wertend*), and willing-acting (*wollend-handelnd*) intentionality (See Breyer, 2017). They are intellectual, affective, and practical by nature respectively and are "located" in the sphere of understanding (*Verstandessphäre*), the sphere of affect (*Gemütssphäre*) and the sphere of will (*Willenssphäre*). Whereas the proper intentional objects of the intellectual sphere are meant to be being (*Sein*) and knowledge, those of the affective sphere are feelings and values and those of the practical sphere volitions and actions. In light of this division, sedimentations manifest in each of these spheres respectively as *type* (*Typus*), *mood* (*Stimmung*), and *habit* (*Habitus*). Enriched by individually concrete contents, these structural moments are not brought back to the conscious sphere as empirical contingencies, but rather, to put it in Kantian language, as the transcendental conditions of the possibility for the meaningful constitution of experiences.

## 2.2 A Comparative Analysis of the Husserlian-Phenomenological and Freudian-Psychoanalytic Conception of the Unconscious

For the sake of a clearer demarcation of the scope and the overall focus of our study, a rough comparative analysis of the commonalities and differences between the classical phenomenological and the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious is worth carrying out. In what follows, first, the very nature of the unconscious as conceptualized by Husserl and Freud will be examined. Second, the core concept related to the unconscious in each account, sedimentation and repression (*Verdrängung*),

will be considered in terms of their different operational principles. Lastly, viewing the whole issue from a reversed direction, I will inquire into the far less conspicuous Husserlian conception of repression and the Freudian conception of sedimentation, revealing certain nuances in the two traditions.

#### a) The Ontological Nature of the Unconscious

As far as the ontological nature of the unconscious is concerned, two sets of considerations should be taken into account. The first concerns the ontological independence of the unconscious. For Freud, it is metaphysically unquestionable that the unconscious exists as a substantial psychical region independent from consciousness. This assertion is made most forcefully with his systematic (topographical) concept of the unconscious. In 1915 he developed the so-called *erste Topik* consisting of consciousness (*das Bewusstsein*), the pre-conscious (*das Vorbewusste*), and the unconscious (*das Unbewusste*). Such psychical topology, as Freud explicitly states, has nothing to do with anatomy but it instead indicates the segregation of the different “regions of the psychical apparatus” in terms of their fundamentally distinctive nature and function (Freud, 2020, 17). The mechanism that separates consciousness/the pre-conscious from the unconscious is referred to as the censorship mechanism of repression. Those drive-representations (*Triebvorstellungen*) that are not granted the access to the conscious/pre-conscious sphere does not disappear but are pushed back and “stored” in the unconscious and imbued with a special nature. The radical separateness between the conscious/pre-conscious and unconscious contents is demonstrated by Freud with clinical experiences. In a therapeutic setting, certain repressed drive-representations and unconscious memories of the patient might be made conscious through in-depth communication with the therapist. However, despite being made conscious and even while possessing same semantic contents, the formerly unconscious representations are never identical with the present conscious representations or report of them. According to Freud, the “being-heard (*Gehörhaben*)” and „being-lived-through (*Erlebhaben*)” are two completely different things according to their psychological nature, even though they have similar contents (Freud, 2020, 18). This is because the contents, despite being similar or even the same, are registered in two topologically separated “records (*Niederschriften*)”, which are located in two different regions of the psyche and never unified with each other<sup>10</sup>. In other words, the unconscious is, for Freud, ontologically independent from consciousness and is ruled by its own principles. Whereas consciousness follows the reality-principle (*Realitätsprinzip*) and such logical law as that of non-contradiction, the unconscious is ruled by the pleasure-principle (*Lustprinzip*) and allows the simultaneous existence of *A* and  $\sim A$ . Such radical separateness of the unconscious from consciousness

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<sup>10</sup> “Damit schiene ja für oberflächliche Erwägung erwiesen, dass bewusste und unbewusste Vorstellungen verschiedene und topisch gesonderte Niederschriften des nämlichen Inhaltes sind. Aber die nächste Überlegung zeigt, dass die Identität der Mitteilung ...“ (Freud, 2020, 18)

is fundamentally irreconcilable with the Husserlian conceptualization of the unconscious as nothing more than a mode or dimension of the conscious life.

The Freudian position is further reified with the so-called *zweite Topik* developed in 1923, which divides the psychical life into the three structures of *superego* (*das Über-ich*), *ego* (*das Ich*), and *id* (*das Es*). Despite there being a certain theoretical overlapping with the three regions suggested in the *erste Topik*, no direct correspondence between the two topologies should be asserted. This is, however, an issue that cannot be dealt with here. For the present discussion, it is only important to point out that the *id*, viz. the unconscious, is conceived not only as something separate from the conscious ego, but even as that which reigns over it. Composed mainly of repressed drive-representations (*Triebvorstellungen*) and different instincts, the *id* never ceases exercising impregnable motivational forces (*treibende Kräfte*) upon the ego without the latter being aware of it. As the superficial region of the psyche, the ego has direct contact with the external world and plays the mediating role between one's inner instincts, desires and wishes on the one hand, and the practical and ethical constraints of reality on the other. According to Freud, despite its being conscious through and through, the ego always lives in the *illusion* of autonomy and freedom in its decision-making *since it is, ultimately, more like a slave for the id*. The relationship between the ego and the *id* is depicted by the relationship between the horseman and his horse (Freud, 2018, 23). The horseman conceives himself as the one who has full control over the horse, and during the whole ride; he thinks he has the freedom of determining the very direction of the ride. The fact is, however, the rider cannot help but follow the reckless dynamics and unpredictable rhythm of the untameable animal, as Freud describes: "Just like with the horseman...there is often nothing else remaining other than being to where the horse wants to go..." (ibid., my translation)<sup>11</sup>. Analogously, the ego always acts *as if it was its own will* ("*als ob es der eigene [Wille] wäre*"), while it is, in fact, acting merely to transcribe the will, viz. the unconscious wishes and desires, of the *id* into practice. In this sense, the unconscious *id* functions almost as an "external" force that rules over consciousness.

By contrast, the Husserlian-phenomenological conception of the unconscious does not possess such radical topological independence and unsurpassable, yet somewhat mystical, forces. Despite being characterized as a "region", the unconscious – understood first and foremost as sedimentation – is not a region beyond or isolated from consciousness, but rather, as mentioned, a mode of the latter. While *EU* explicitly identifies the unconscious as a "limiting-mode (*Grenzmodi*)" of consciousness (Husserl, 1973a, 279), in *formale und transzendente Logik* it is described as an "inconspicuous substratum" (Husserl, 1929, 279). This position is made visible by contemporary scholars such as Saulius Geniusas (2024) and Rudolf Bernet (2002). They state clearly that in

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<sup>11</sup> „Wie dem Reiter...oft nichts anderes übrig bleibt, als es dahin zu führen, wohin es gehen will..." (Freud, 2018, 23).

Husserlian phenomenology, “the unconscious is a dimension of consciousness” (Geniusas, 2024a, 5). As a dimension of consciousness, the unconscious encompasses contents that do not belong to the present conscious sphere, yet those which can *in principle* be brought back into the light of consciousness through the subject’s change in attitude or shift of attention (See Husserl, 1966, 172-8). Furthermore, since the unconscious and consciousness are not ontologically separate, the question of *whether or not* it is possible for them to interact with each other need not be raised. Rather, the problems of *how* the dynamic interaction between the two are to be conceptualized and *what* the transcendental significance of the unconscious has for consciousness should occupy our main interest in this study.

Another set of considerations that distinguish the Husserlian from the Freudian conception of the unconscious concerns its genetic and personalistic nature on the one hand, and its naturalistic character on the other. Freud develops an economic concept of the unconscious, which conceives it as sort of quantitatively measurable psychical energy or libido. In light of such a conception, the problem of meaning (of the unconscious) is to a great extent reduced to the problem of energy dynamics, which leads to a naturalistic conception of meaning in general. This creates a theoretical bewilderment within Freud’s theory. He contends that what distinguishes his psychoanalytic theory from psychiatry is the former’s attempt to unveil the very “meaning” of everyday Freudian slips, dreams, pathological behaviours and thoughts of various kinds. He claims that, for instance, “...psychoanalysis steps in and shows that the symptom carries a meaning and is connected with the experience of the patient” (Freud, 2012, 217), and that “...every dream will reveal itself as a psychological structure, full of significance...” (Freud, 1995, 151). Even ordinary experiences of “healthy” persons such as occasional forgetting of names and words, slips of the tongue, and so on, are not merely contingent event, but rather something that carries certain meaning and can always be traced back to unconscious desires, memories, or thoughts. However, at the same time, the meaning to be unveiled is conceptualized *naturalistically* in terms of psychical force or energy, which eventually contributes hardly anything to the understanding of the existential state of the individual in question. As Binswanger recognizes, Freud endeavours to unpack the meaning (*Sinn or Sinnhaftigkeit*) of different psychical acts and understands meaning in terms of “meaning, intention, tendency, and position in a series of psychical interrelations (*Bedeutung, Absicht, Tendenz und Stellung in einer Reihe psychischer Zusammenhänge*)” (Binswanger, 1994, 19, my translation). Nonetheless, as a result of Freud’s (tendency to) naturalism, the “meaning“ of such meaning - consisting of one’s intention, tendency, position, and so on -, is subsequently translated into the notion of energy, as Binswanger continues to write: “Such that Freud’s naturalism is brought into the proper light, namely, his derivation as well as the derivation of the spiritual life from instinctuality (*Damit war Freuds Naturalismus ins rechte Licht gestellt, seine Herleitung also auch des geistigen Lebens aus der Triebhaftigkeit*)” (Binswanger, 1994, 27, my translation). The *Sinnhaftigkeit* of psychical acts is



reduced by Freud into *Triebhaftigkeit*. That is, the former is understood exclusively as the energies either attached to original representations, displaced to substitute-representations, or contracted in a dream, when the original representations of an instinctual force are repressed. The naturalistic conceptualization of meaning (of the unconscious) as such is also asserted by Ricoeur in his well-known interpretation of Freud. Ricoeur writes, for instance, “the most difficult notion of all is the idea of an ‘energy that is transformed into meaning’” (Ricoeur, 1970, 395). It turns out that, with such a naturalistic tendency and quantitative approach, Freud could hardly distinguish his own scientific engagement from that of clinical psychiatry, as both share the fundamental idea of “reducing” the human being to the schema or system of natural science (Binswanger, 1994, 26).

While Freud devises a naturalistic account of the unconscious as well as of human subjects, Husserl sheds extensive light on the genetic dimension of the unconscious in terms of its conceptual interlacement with the notion of sedimentation. The genetic concept of sedimentation enriches the static notion of the ego focused by early Husserl, who attributes to the ego an “empty” and ahistorical structure. Sedimentation highlights the concrete, individual past experiences that make up the very peculiarity and historicity of a constitutive subjectivity. Such historical sedimentations are never reducible to any quantitatively measurable instinctual energy as conceived by Freud, nor are they part of the nature or subject to any universal natural laws. Instead, they make up the unique intellectual, affective and practical tendencies of an individual subjectivity, which are not explicable by means of natural science, as will be elucidated in the rest of this study. Sedimented experience is essentially unrepeatable and irreversible. As Husserl states, what one experienced as phrases and transformations (*Wendungen und Wandlungen*) of life experienced is necessarily preserved and “precipitated as one’s history (*als seine ‚Geschichte‘ niedergeschlagen bleibt*)” (Husserl, 1966, 38). By introducing the dimension of sedimentation of the human subject, Husserl manages to provide a more solid ground for the distinction, foregrounded in *Cartesianischen Meditationen*, between the empty “I am” and the concrete ego. The ego is no longer (merely) an empty identity of “I am” (“*die leere Identität des ‘ich bin’*”), the absolutely indubitable ground for everything else in the external world. Rather, it is also a “concrete *ich*”, filled with “an individual content of lived-experiences, capabilities, and dispositions” (Husserl, 1987, 29, my translation)<sup>12</sup>. The individual differences in question are a matter of qualitative, instead of quantitative, differences, making up the irreducible idiosyncrasy of each concrete ego. Again, a brief reference to Binswanger might be illuminating here. In his essay “*Lebensfunktion und innere Lebensgeschichte*” (See Binswanger, 1994, 71-94), Binswanger conceives the human being as a synthesis of the “functions of psychical-physical organism (*Funktionsweise des seelisch-körperlichen Organismus*)” and the “spiritual life-histories (*geistige*

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<sup>12</sup> „Mit ihr hängt es zusammen und zu ihr selbst gehört es auch mit, dass das Ich für sich selbst apodiktisch vorgezeichnet ist als konkretes, mit einem individuellen Gehalt an Erlebnissen, Vermögen, Dispositionen seiendes...“

*Lebensgeschichte*)". Whereas the former designates the natural dimension shared universally by all human beings, the latter, viz. the personal histories consisting of one's life-decisions and life-transformations, is what marks the individuality of each human being. In Husserl's term, they are nothing but the sedimented experiential contents of one's conscious life.

Another way to understand the difference between the naturalistic and genetic conception of the unconscious (as well as human being as a whole) is in terms of the two kinds of causality explicated by Husserl, namely, natural and motivational causality (See Husserl, 1989, 223-247). "Motivation is the lawfulness (*Gesetzlichkeit*) of the life of the spirit (*Geist*)", asserts Husserl. That which distinguishes motivational from natural causality is that the latter is characterized by universality necessity and applicability while the former is not. Natural causality governs physical, "real" objects in the nature. If all external conditions of A and B are identical, the causal relationship between the also remains identical. No room to maneuver for freedom is allowed, and historicity does not matter. For example, an apple drops and will drop onto the floor each and every time when you do release it from your hand, no matter if it is the first or thousandth time carrying out this activity. Analogically, by reducing human spiritual life to the dynamics and intensity of energy, Freud is forced to draw the conclusion that the human psyche is governed by natural causality and is hardly distinguishable from other natural objects in the world. By contrast, things subject to motivational causality are granted a measure of freedom and essential unpredictability. As Husserl writes, "[when objects are governed by motivation] objects experienced in the surrounding world are *at one time* attended to, *at another time* not...they 'arouse' an interest [in the subject] and, in virtue of this interest, a *tendency* to turn towards them" (Husserl, 1989, 227, emphasis added). What is at issue is not any kind of *necessity*, but rather "interest" and "tendency", which imply the very freedom of consciousness to decide its reaction, position-taking and so on. Husserl's notion of sedimentation underlines the unique nexus of motivation (*Motivationszusammenhang*) of an individual. The network of motivation is made up by one's habits, interests, tendencies, and so on, which are all shaped by one's sedimented past experiences. However, this network merely *motivates*, but never *determines*, the subject's particular ways of reacting. Furthermore, each and every new decision the motivated subject makes is again sedimented, shaping the network of motivation of the individual anew. In the course of life, therefore, the individual motivating network is never fixed, but it is rather constantly "renewed" as more experiences sediment.

#### b) Sedimentation vs. Repression (*Verdrängung*) and Suppression (*Unterdrückung*)

The exposition above shows that whereas the Husserlian conception of the unconscious is *almost* identified with sedimentation, the Freudian one is closely related to repression (and suppression). While the Husserlian unconscious is composed *mainly* of sedimented experiential contents, the Freudian unconscious is *mainly* made up of repressed drive-representations

(*Triebvorstellungen*). In his work, “Towards a Phenomenology of Repression”, Nicholas Smith (2010) juxtaposes the two notions and carries out a comparative analysis between them. This approach is justified by the fact that each of the two notions, sedimentation and repression, represent a specific conceptualization of the general and disputable notion of the unconscious. In this section, a comparison between the two conceptualizations in light of these two specific notions will be carried out. Subsequently, a switch of perspective leads us to question whether there is an account of repression in Husserl’s phenomenology - and, conversely, one of sedimentation in Freud’s psychoanalysis -, and how each is to be understood within our context. Through this analysis, the meaning and nature of the Husserlian unconscious will be further illuminated.

Firstly, sedimentation differentiates itself from repression by virtue of its eidetic nature. While sedimentation is a *passivity* that constitutes an eidetic structure of all temporal experiences, repression (and suppression) is an *activity* executed by the ego-subject, whether consciously or subconsciously. Sedimentation belongs to the very passivity of consciousness in the sense that no thematic attention, “turning-towards (*Zuwendung*)”, or any sort of voluntary activity of the ego-subject is required for experiences to sediment. Similar to the retentional structure of temporal consciousness, the eideticity of sedimentation determines that all experiences are destined to sediment as time progresses, independent of the subject’s awareness or *unawareness* of the content in question. In other words, not only the *result* (the sedimented contents) of sedimentation is unconscious, but also the very *process* itself. By contrast, repression, especially in the form of suppression, is not completely independent of the interference of the ego-subject and is never *entirely* or *necessarily* passive by nature. The *act* of repression *can* take place without the subject being aware of it, yet in most cases it is more or less deliberately initiated by the conscious ego-subject. This happens especially in view of constraints the subject perceives in their external reality, or the ethical rules taken over and stipulated by the super-ego. The act of repression is rarely completely unintentional or unconscious, as Freud describes in his clinical experience. During therapy, resistance (*Widerstand*) from the side of the patient is often encountered, as he or she “knows” that something (especially a memory) unbearably shameful, painful, or traumatic, is to be brought to light. Those memories are thus “intentionally” repressed (suppressed) by the patient, as Freud describes: “...it concerns the things that the patient *wanted* to forget, which he consequently repressed, blocked, and suppressed *purposely* from his conscious thinking” (Breuer and Freud, 2011, 89, my translation)<sup>13</sup>. Due to the limit of scope of this study, it is hard to make a sophisticated distinction between repression and suppression. Yet it is commonly agreed that suppression, as a form of repression, is a conscious mechanism, an active psychological operation that “halts” *particular* psychical contents (ideas, thoughts, affects, etc.) from entering into the conscious sphere. As *empirical* operation of the psyche, repression and suppression are concerned

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<sup>13</sup> „...es (handelt) sich um Dinge, die der Kranke vergessen *wollte*, die er darum *absichtlich* aus seinem bewussten Denken verdrängte, hemmte und unterdrückte“.

only with *particular* contents that fail to pass through the censorship mechanism of the ego and super-ego. Those contents are censored, repressed into the unconscious, due to their inappropriateness with regard to their ethical or existential significance when confronted with the external world. In contrast to this, sedimentation - as an *eidetic* and *a priori*, instead of empirical, feature of consciousness - is an essential lawfulness which *all* experiential contents are subject to, regardless of their existential, ethical, or affective significance for the subject.

Secondly, the respective *objects* of sedimentation and repression are also different. As exposed above, sedimentation as a process is the diminution of the affective force of experience, and as a region it is the field where those *no-longer-affective* contents are preserved. Therefore, per definition, only those contents which *were* once consciously experienced and affectively effective can truly sediment. As Steinbock puts it, “a completely undifferentiated field of affective force is possible, only after they were once ‘present’ in the living present” (Steinbock, 2002, 249, My translation). While sedimentation is directed to the contents that were once “present”, actually realized in actions or experienced consciously, repression is basically repression of something that has never been granted access to consciousness. Instead of the drives (*Triebe*) themselves, what are repressed are drive-representations (*Treibvorstellungen*), which are forbidden from ever being realized. What is repressed, therefore, is precisely what has never actually been experienced in the past but rather what was merely *phantasized*. Since realization of particular drives or wishes is not allowed, phantasized representations of objects of fulfilment, such as unresolved infantile sexual phantasies, are devised and then mostly repressed. Repression of such kind, according to Freud, might result in neurotic symptoms, which “were not related directly to actual events but to wishful fantasies” (Storr, 2001, 26). Instead of material reality or any actual events, repression is concerned mainly with psychical reality, as Freud terms it. However, his exclusive focus on the (phantasized) sexual dimension of human psychical life draws widespread criticism. For instance, Anthony Storr (2001, 79) writes, “Freud’s insistence upon the persistence or recrudescence of infantile sexual phantasies as the casual agents of neurosis had sometimes encouraged psychoanalysts to neglect the real events and circumstances which influence people’s lives”. In light of what has been said above, we might add that the “real events” and their “after-effects” upon the ongoing life of consciousness are precisely illuminated by Husserl’s concept of sedimentation.

### c) Husserl’s Concept of Repression/Suppression

After a brief comparative analysis between the concept of sedimentation and repression in Husserl and Freud respectively, it is now worth undertaking a shift of perspective and inquiring how Husserl understands the notion of repression within his phenomenological framework and, conversely, how Freud understands sedimentation in his psychoanalytic theory. Put briefly, in Husserl’s phenomenology, there *is* unquestionably a concept of repression (or suppression) which takes part in

the formation of the unconscious; however, it is significantly differentiated from the concept of sedimentation and plays a less decisive role in the phenomenological unconscious.

The notion of repression (designated by various expressions) is elucidated thematically in *GZ. Beilage XIV* discusses the problem of “*eingeklemmte Affekte*” (Husserl, 2013, 112-3), which could be conceived as the problem of repressed affects as in Freudian psychoanalysis. Here, repression is described as a kind of refraining epoché, analogous to the epoché central to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This practical, empirical epoché is described as “a kind of negation, a cancellation of performance (*eine Art der Negation, eine Durchstreichung des Folgeleistens*” (Husserl, 2013, 112, my translation). It means that, different from the Freudian conceptualization, repression is understood by Husserl as an *actively* performed position-taking (*Stellungnahme*) of the ego-subject with respect to specific affects, wishes, or intentions of fulfilment of desires and instincts. Similar to the Freudian conceptualization, such a refraining epoché is a kind of repression whereby the repressed is always “still there” and still effective: “But with that the affect is only ‘covered’, suppressed, and still there, effectively... (*Aber damit ist der Affekt nur ‚verdeckt‘, heruntergedrückt und doch da, wirksam...*)” (ibid., my translation). This process shares an apparent similarity with Freudian repression, in which the repressed contents never cease attempting to make their appearances in consciousness and to intrude upon (*sich aufdrängen*) the conscious subject. In another section, repression is, again, expressed in different ways such as “*Hemmung*”, “*Sich-Enthalten*”, “*Zurückdrängen*”, or even directly as “*Verdrängen*” (Husserl, 2013, 128). Regardless of the different expressions, repression is again characterized by Husserl as something *actively* performed by the subject, rather than an unconscious mechanism in the absence of any participation of the conscious subject. As he writes, repression is not “a passive letting-oneself-be-distracted, but rather an *active* abstaining-from in the cancellation of the fulfilling process of the craving affection as such” (Husserl, 2013, 128, my translation and emphasis)<sup>14</sup>.

In order to examine more closely Husserl’s concept of repression as such and its differences from the notion of sedimentation, as well as its role in the formation of the unconscious, it should be mentioned that there are two fundamental modes of drives, instincts, needs, etc.: the repressed or inhibited, and the fulfilled or realized (Husserl, 2013, 125)<sup>15</sup>. Each of them stands in a different relationship to the problem of sedimentation and the unconscious. First, repression is essentially distinguished from sedimentation, yet it does make up part of the unconscious in its own way. As discussed above, while repression, as a kind of position-taking, is an active and empirical performance of the ego-subject, sedimentation constitutes an eidetic and passive structure of all temporal

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<sup>14</sup> „ein passives Sich-ablenken-lassen, sondern ein *aktives* Sich-Enthalten (als ein Tun) in Durchstreichung des Erfüllungsprozesses der begehrenden Affektion als solcher.“

<sup>15</sup> „Trieb, Bedürfnis im Modus der Befriedigung. Trieb im Modus der Hemmung...Aber da ist schon an Begehren und Erfüllung des Begehrens gedacht.“

experiences regardless of one's subjective will. It also follows that repression is exercised in view of the external, empirical situation, one's primary interest at the moment, etc., where an active switch of attention is required<sup>16</sup>. In contrast to that, sedimentation is not conditioned by any actual existential situation or ethical concern but rather prescribes the gradual diminution of affective force for all experiential contents. Despite being significantly differentiated from sedimentation, Husserl admits that repressed contents nonetheless take part in the formation of the unconscious. As he writes, explicitly, the drive in the mode of repression is "the drive in the mode of the 'unconsciousness', of the unconscious being for me (*der Trieb im Modus des 'Unbewusstseins', des mir unbewusst Seins*)" (Husserl, 2013, 126, my translation). The repressed drive is unconscious and preserved in the mode of the unconscious, so to speak. However, this description sometimes draws criticism such as Steinbock's. Steinbock argues that the repressed contents should not be characterized by the mode of the unconscious, since they do not cease to be affective and could have even more affective force than the present givenness. Put otherwise, the intensity of affection does not necessarily depend on the "presentness" of the contents. He boldly supposes that Husserl *would not* attribute unconsciousness to repressed contents: "Husserl would say that with such 'repression' the affective power is not zero, and therefore does not deserve the attribute of 'unconscious'" (Steinbock, 2002, 249, my translation)<sup>17</sup>. Steinbock's assumption speaks only part of the truth. For Husserl, the repressed does indeed retain a certain degree of affective force. However, it does not follow that it is not in the mode of the unconscious, for unconsciousness in Husserl's phenomenology means nothing but not being a thematic object within the present awareness of the subject. Echoing Freud, unintentionally though, Husserl clearly identifies that an affection that is not "followed" by the subject, viz. a desire or instinct that is not truly realized, "continues to be an affection"<sup>18</sup>. The repressed contents are not completely deprived of affective force *and at the same time* are preserved in the "background" of the subject, in the unconscious: "Likewise a purpose of will is not to be simply pushed back, while it continues to be valid and the will continues to live in the mode of the ego's background, in the 'unconscious'..." (Husserl, 2013, 128, my translation)<sup>19</sup>. Hence, just like sedimented contents, repressed desires and drives also make up part of the unconscious, yet in their own way significantly different from that of sedimentations. However, it does not follow that repression and sedimentation are completely unrelated. The drives in the other mode, viz. the mode of fulfilment, *are* also part of the unconscious

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<sup>16</sup> „Ich bin in einer Handlung durch diese Affektion abgelenkt, das heißt hier: Der Richtungsstrahl meiner ichlichen Intentionalität hat nicht mehr die primäre Gestalt...es ist in seiner Auswirkung geschwächt, gehemmt, obschon im Willen. Indem ich mich des Begehrens enthalte, es zurückschiebe, will ich dem Zweck der primären Fortführung meines Handelns folgen.“ (Husserl, 2013, 128)

<sup>17</sup> „Husserl würde also sagen, dass bei einer solchen ‚Verdrängung‘ die affektive Kraft nicht null ist und daher nicht das Attribut ‚unbewusst‘ verdient“.

<sup>18</sup> „Jedenfalls, das zurückgedrängte Begehren ist noch mein Begehren in einem anderen Modus; eine Affektion, der ich nicht folge, ist weiter noch Affektion.“ (Husserl, 2013, 128)

<sup>19</sup> „Ebenso ein Willensziel nicht bloß zurückstellen, während es noch fortgilt, während der Wille in dem Modus des ichlichen Hintergrundes, im ‚Unbewussten‘, noch fortlebt...“

precisely since they are subject to the process of sedimentation. In this regard, Husserl writes, "...in a quite different manner from ‚completion‘, satiation enters life with the element of well-being in the modification of retention (which bespeaks here a passivity, viz. the passivity of sedimentation)" (Husserl, 2013, 126, my translation)<sup>20</sup>. The drive-complex that is fulfilled is that which is actually realized in experience through practical actions of the subject. Therefore, fulfilled drives are by definition those which *were* once consciously constituted and experienced, just as any other experiential contents, and which *then* necessarily became sedimented. As sedimented contents, fulfilled drives make up part of the unconscious.

Despite his thematic (though brief) exploration of the problem of repression, Husserl's phenomenological account of the unconscious is related most primarily to the notion of sedimentation. The latter constitutes the core of the unconscious, so to speak. This has to do with the fundamental commitment of Husserl's phenomenology. To be sure, in his later period, Husserl distances himself, to some extent, from those strictly defined concepts of eideticity and absolute evidence, and turns to such apparently empirical and psychological phenomena as instincts, habits, and individual peculiarities. However, his phenomenological commitment to the study of the eidetic structures of consciousness and conscious experiences is never given up. Thus, sedimentation, as an eidetic feature of all temporal experiences, is unquestionably more central to his study, constituting an a priori essential dimension of consciousness. This is precisely what differentiates his notion of sedimentation from the empirical concept of repression.

#### d) Freud's Concept of "Sedimentation"

On the other side, it is even more often overlooked that there is a subtle concept of sedimentation in Freud's psychoanalysis. Despite the absence of the direct employment of the word as a core term, it is indubitable that in his psychoanalytic approach, problems from or related to one's past experiences in general - such as infantile desires and experiences that have been forgotten, as well as personal histories, etc. - are central to the understanding of psychopathological phenomena. The latter includes not only conspicuous mental disorders but also everyday phenomena such as slips of tongue, the forgetting of words, dreams, etc. Although, unlike Husserl, Freud does not explicitly identify sedimentations as the very core of the unconscious, the former constitutes nonetheless an essential part of the latter. Sedimented past experiences, whether they are forgotten or unconsciously repressed, are the "source" or "whence (*woher*)" of the *meaning* of different "abnormal" phenomena and neurotic symptoms. The task of Freudian psychoanalysis is precisely to render the unintelligible phenomena intelligible by bringing into light relevant unconscious instincts, desires and past experiences that underlie those phenomena. In a number of occasions, the significance of a past that

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<sup>20</sup> „...ganz anders geht Sättigung ins Leben ein als ‚Erledigung‘, mit der ein Element des Wohlgefühls in der Verwandlung des Behaltens (das hier eine Passivität besagt, also der ‚Sedimentierung‘).“

has sunken into the unconscious is thematically laid bare. For instance, Freud writes, “we have combined two things as the meaning of a symptom, its ‘whence’, on the one hand, and its ‘whither’ or ‘why’, on the other...the ‘whence’ of a symptom is traced back to impressions which have come from without, which have therefore necessarily been conscious at some time, but which may have sunk into the unconscious – that is, have been forgotten.” (Freud, 2012, 241). The “origin” of symptoms is located in the experiences that *were* once in the impressional present and that are sedimented in the unconscious, to use Husserl’s terms. One of the main differences is nonetheless that in Freud’s psychoanalysis, sedimentations are conceived in a restricted manner as the source of neurotic symptoms and so-called pathological phenomena. As Freud further explains, the very motivation as well as the task of psychoanalysis is nothing but to “step in and show that the symptom carries a *meaning* and is connected with the *experience* of the patient” (Freud, 2012, 217, Emphasis added). It is crucial to note that the “experience” of the patient in question consists not only in *actual* events which are sedimented, but also those infantile *phantasies* driven by unrealized impulses. In his interpretation of Freud, Ricoeur terms the former “real history” and the history (sedimentation) that encompasses the latter “figurative history” (Ricoeur, 1970, 369). Figurative history has a hermeneutic dimension in that it sheds light on the *meaning* of one’s personal histories as understood by the subject itself. The subject then obtains a kind of unconscious self-understanding which is responsible for one’s neurotic symptoms. In a word, actual experiences, phantasized representations, and one’s subjective interpretation of them, make up the sphere of sedimentation in the Freudian sense, if he were to employ this terminology. Despite the absence of the terminology, there is one specific notion deployed by Freud designating the relationship between the neurotic subject and its sedimented past, namely, fixation (*Fixierung*). In certain cases, Freud suggests, subjects are “fixated upon some very definite part of their past; they are unable to free themselves therefore, and have therefore come to be completely estranged both from the present and the future” (Freud, 2012, 231). Certain neurotic symptoms arise since people are fixated upon specific forms, objects, and types of satisfaction learnt in the past. They are unable to let the past truly sediment, viz. to let the past truly be *as the past*, such that they are stuck in the past and closed off from all other possibilities offered by the present and future. This leads to what Freud terms repetition compulsion (*Wiederholungszwang*) (See Freud, 2000), to which we will return in the second part of this study.

The problem of unconscious (sedimented) past experience is now shown to be essential to Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Nonetheless, its significant differences from the Husserlian concept of sedimentation should not be overlooked. Firstly, Freud advances an empirical-psychological understanding of sedimentation. He focuses exclusively on *particular* infantile and past experiences, especially those which are sexually connoted or traumatically effective. That is, for Freud the sedimentation in question is nothing more than that which potentially leads to “abnormal” thoughts and behaviours, and which serves as the source of meaning of them. By contrast, Husserl develops a



transcendental-phenomenological account of sedimentation, which constitutes an eidetic structure of consciousness that characterizes *all* sorts of experience as a result of their essential temporality. Secondly, for Freud, sedimented experiences - though play a significant role in the formation and understanding of pathological phenomena -, nonetheless do *not* constitute the core of the unconscious. Instead, among other things, the Freudian unconscious consists of the repressed drive-representations (*Triebrepräsenz*), as elaborated above. In his “erste Topik”, for instance, Freud states explicitly that “the core of the unconscious consists in drive-representatives that intend to discharge their cathexis... (*das Kern des Unbewussten besteht aus Triebrepräsenzen, die ihre Besetzung abführen wollen...*)” (Freud, 2020, 29, my translation). What is repressed is pushed back into the unconscious, yet the very objects of repression are not drives themselves, but rather their representations. In a word, whereas the Freudian unconscious is intertwined with the problem of repression, the Husserlian one is unconceivable without the notion of sedimentation.

One of the most well-known objections against the conceptualization of the Husserlian unconscious as truly unconscious is raised by Ricoeur, who asserts that “the unconscious of phenomenology is the preconscious of psychoanalysis” (Ricoeur, 1970, 392). Ricoeur continues his argument by distinguishing the two senses in which phenomenology speaks of the unconscious. First, mainly in the phenomenology of perception, the co-intended (*das Mitgemeinte*) is characterized as unconscious. More precisely, the inner- and outerhorizon (*der Innen- und Außenhorizont*) are not thematically and explicitly intended by the subject, but merely implicitly co-intended. The former designates the not-presently-given attributes of the intentional object, while the latter designates the other objects that surround it, which are not (yet) objects of the present thematic consciousness. Both horizons belong to the field of consciousness in the mode of being co-intended. They *are* not the objects of thematic consciousness in the present, yet they *can* be such once the subject shifts its attentive gaze. Before that, however, they remain unconscious, so to speak. The second sense in which phenomenology speaks of unconscious, according to Ricoeur, is the “invincible unawareness of self” in its intentional acts (Ricoeur, 1970, 379). Consciousness, characterized essentially by intentionality, always intends objects, *yet without always knowing itself intending*. There is a distinction between knowing the object and knowing itself knowing that object. The lack of the latter is unreflected consciousness (unawareness of self), which is prior to reflected consciousness (thematically intending an object). Such unreflected self-awareness marks a new step towards the Freudian unconscious, so argues Ricoeur. Having exposed these two senses of the unconscious in Husserl, he is then able to draw the conclusion that the phenomenological unconscious is nothing more than the pre-conscious in psychoanalysis, for both can be made conscious via a voluntary act of the ego-subject, viz. via a change of attitude and shift of attention.

One way to rebut Ricoeur’s thesis is to point out that his interpretative account of Husserl does not take the notion of sedimentation and its relationship to the unconscious into consideration.

Failing to do so, his interpretation does not manage to exhaust the full meaning of the unconscious in phenomenology. Two things should be mentioned here. Firstly, the alleged two meanings of the unconscious as identified by Ricoeur are limited to the framework of static phenomenology. Both the co-intended horizon and the unawareness of self are explicated mainly as structural components of the act of perception that takes place in the impressional present. From a static standpoint, the structure of perceptual consciousness is explicated without temporality and historicity. Closely examined, however, perceptual consciousness (and its unconscious moments) also includes its sedimented structure. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, perceptual – and other intentional - acts are impossible without sedimentation. The latter brings into fore the essential temporal-historical dimension of consciousness as well as of its intentional acts. The genetic constitution of the co-intended inner- and outerhorizon, for instance, is explicable only through the notion of sedimentation, which makes up, as enunciated above, the core of the unconscious in Husserl's phenomenology. Moreover, unlike co-intended objects or unreflected self-awareness, the sphere of sedimentations is not only something that does not belong to the present sphere of thematic consciousness, but rather something that *cannot* be made entirely accessible to consciousness. While the co-intended can be intended once the subject actively shifts its attention and the unreflected self-awareness can be reflected upon through the phenomenological epoché and reduction, one's whole stream of sedimented past experiences refuses to be fully illuminated merely by means of a voluntary act of the subject. Although Husserl affirms the possibility of the reawakening or reactivation of sedimented experiences, they are never brought back into the light of consciousness "in one stroke" and in their full transparency and totality. More often, they are made "partly" conscious in a form that is completely different from how they were originally constituted in the past. In the next section, the three different "mechanisms" involved in this process are sketched out.

## 2.3 The Three Manifesting Mechanisms of Sedimentations in Consciousness

Phenomenology is dedicated to the study of the phenomena that appear in consciousness. Without their conscious manifestations, sedimentations can hardly come into the light of phenomenological investigation. As contents of the life of consciousness that are preserved in the mode of unconsciousness, sedimented experiences make their appearance in the conscious sphere, thus rendering themselves phenomenologically accessible, through different mechanisms. From an empirical-psychological perspective, unconscious desires and experiences manifest predominantly as empirical phenomena such as flashbacks, nightmares, daydreams, body memories, neurotic symptoms, and limit-experiences in psychopathologies, etc. Admittedly, these are significant ways in and through which the unconscious show itself. However, before moving to a phenomenological study of such empirical phenomena in part II of this work, a transcendental framework should be first

unfolded systematically, which will serve as the basis for further investigations. From a transcendental-phenomenological standpoint, the following chapters will explicate the three structural, constitutive moments of intentionality, which are genetically (and generatively) rooted in and shaped by sedimentation. Instead of flashbacks or nightmares, sedimented experiences manifest transcendently as *Typus*, *Stimmung*, and *Habitus*, each located respectively in the sphere of understanding, affect/mind, and volition, as briefly mentioned above. While it is well acknowledged in contemporary scholarship that Husserl's concept of sedimentation is coupled with that of reactivation (*Reaktivierung*) (See Geniusas, 2024b), the various *ways* in which sedimented contents are reactivated – or reawakened – are mostly overlooked. In this section, as preparatory work for the upcoming study, the different mechanisms of the manifestation of sedimentation in consciousness will be brought to light.

First of all, different forms of association discernible in the classical studies of Husserl (See Holenstein, 1972; Lohmar, 1998; Biceaga, 2010) should be laid bare, since the problem of association is closely related to, and easily confused with, that of reactivation and reawakening. Normally speaking, there are three forms of association essential to Husserl's genetic description of the passive constitution of experience. Primal association (*Urassoziation*) precedes all constitution of objects. It does not function as the associative connection between already-constituted objects in the past, present or future. Instead, it is responsible for the structuration of the present (*Strukturierung der Gegenwart*) (Holenstein, 1972, 36), without which the subsequent constitution of object is impossible. Primal-association structures the present by “melting (*verschmelzen*)” together the pre-constituted hyletic data of shapes, colour, sound, etc., according to their similarity and their temporal (principle of succession) and spatial (principle of co-existence) affinity. The co-existing flakes with a similar white colour, for example, are “melted” with each other and associatively “constituted” as the unity of a colour-surface. The perceptual background is never a sheer chaos but rather pre-reflectively structured in virtue of such primal association. Such structured background, against which a certain prominent givenness stands out (*abgehoben*), serves as the presupposition for any object-constitution possible. The second classical form of association is known as reproductive association, which designates the associative awakening of the once constituted, yet now sedimented, past experiences in connection with what is given in the present. Past experiences fade out from the present conscious sphere, yet a projection of an empty representation (*Leervorstellung*) of a specific memory can be awakened by the present in virtue of an association understood as identity- or sameness synthesis (*Identität- oder Gleichheitsdeckung*). The empty representation strives, subsequently, for intuitive fulfilment by means of a presentification (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of the desired piece of past experience. The reproduction in question is precisely what makes the sedimented and affectless contents “affective again” - either those from the “close sphere” of still-alive retention or from the “distant sphere” of affectless sedimentation. While the former can be integrated immediately into the impressional present (like

how a melody just past is immediately synthesized with the melody heard presently), the latter has no direct connection with the present and is hence characterized by kind of volatility (*Sprunghaftigkeit*). Regardless of their temporal distance from the present, both types of awakening are possible in virtue of reproductive association alone and are closely related to the problem of sedimentations and their manifestation, as will be discussed shortly. The third form of association is termed anticipatory association, which is transcendently indispensable to the meaningful apprehension of objects. Whereas primal association is directed towards the present and reproductive association towards the past, anticipatory association is oriented towards the future, despite also being triggered by specific present givennesses. In the impressional present, adumbrated profiles of an object are given to the perceiving subject. They then associatively awaken similar “types (*Typus*)” of objects learnt in the past, such that the originally unorganized sheer givenness is apprehended – in accordance with that type – as a synthetic unity charged with objective significance. This form of association is also described as “inductive association”, since it is nothing but an induction of “something reminding one of something (*etwas erinnert an etwas*)” according to the objective similarities between the awakening and the awakened terms. This form of association requires much closer examination in the upcoming chapters. At this stage, it is only important to note two things. First, anticipatory association is a *passive* accomplishment of consciousness - that is, the passive *Unterstufe* of the inductive logical reasoning actively carried out by the ego-subject. Second, both reproductive and anticipatory association are possible only on the basis of sedimentation, as Holenstein explicitly stated. Reproductive association is possible, according to Holenstein (1972, 34, my translation), “only because the awakened is implicated in the so-called background-consciousness”. Likewise, anticipatory association projects a horizon of “unity- and sense-making (*Einheits- und Sinnbildungen*)”, yet according solely to the “exemplar (*Vorbild*)” of context of appearances (ibid.). In what follows, an attempt will be made to schematize the different “mechanisms” of the “coming-back” of sedimentations.

Depending on the framework of analysis one adopts, we are concerned with different contents of sedimentation from different theoretical standpoint. As some scholars acknowledge, the problem of sedimentation can be located in the analysis of time, in the genetic phenomenology of types and habits, or even in the philosophy of science and geometry (See Geniusas, 2024b). To this I would add that the very manifesting mechanism of sedimentations as they relate to different contents also varies and requires a systematic exposition. In what follows, three such mechanisms will be laid bare, corresponding to three sets of theoretical concern. There is a transcendental-philosophical concern regarding the foundation of scientific practices, where the eidetic insights of science and geometry are in focus. Also, there is an empirical-psychological problem with regard to the episodic recollection of past experiences. Finally, there is the genetic-phenomenological task of exploring the manifestations of sedimentation as transcendently constitutive moments of intentionality. This last concern involves

concerns the threefold problematics of types, moods, and habits, as mentioned above, and will be the focus of the upcoming chapters in part I of this work,

In *der Ursprung der Geometrie* (henceforth *UG*), Husserl searches for the original evidence of the eidetic insights obtained in geometry and natural science. Within this framework of analysis, the *active reactivation* (*aktive Reaktivierung*) of sedimentations occupies the focus of the study. Modern natural sciences, above all geometry, are engaged with the uses and the investigation of so-called “ideal objectivities”, which are nothing but abstractions from concrete, vague and unreflected lived-experiences. Scientific and technological advances proceed on the basis of those abstractions without ever tracing back the very origin and evidence of them. One of the tasks of phenomenology, urges Husserl, is the “questioning back of the most original sense (*Rückfrage nach dem ursprünglichsten Sinn*)” (Husserl, 1987, 205) and of the original evidence of the abstracted eidetic insights of modern natural sciences. It turns out that they are to be found nowhere else than in the pre-reflective lived-experiences of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*), which are sedimented throughout numerous generations as particular social-cultural traditions. To regain the epistemological and ontological ground for those abstract ideal objectivities, therefore, one must *actively reactivate* the original insights *lived through* by others in the past. Lived-experience as such is sedimented, passed on and taken over by subsequent generations. Eventually forgotten, it awaits the eidetic recollection that will bring it to light again as the original and evidential ground of modern sciences. Essential to our discussion is that the eidetic recollection of the eidetic insights as such is an *act* carried out voluntarily by the intentional ego-subject. It is an active and deliberate spontaneity motivated by a determinate purpose, namely, the philosophical interrogation of the original sense of natural sciences, the “making-evident (*Evidentmachen*)” of idealities whose origin has been completely forgotten.

In contrast to the active reactivation of the sedimented lived-experiences of past generations, within the framework of genetic phenomenology, the *passive reawakening* (*passive Weckung*) of individual experiences as *types* and *habits* is foregrounded. The passive awakening of individual sedimentations underlies the passive accomplishment of consciousness, which is by necessity presupposed by active, predicative judgments as well as the active reactivation of eidetic insights. This is emphasized most prominently in *EU*, as will be further elaborated in the upcoming chapters. Despite the fact that Husserl does not clearly distinguish between reactivation (characterized by activity) and reawakening (characterized by passivity), this distinction is crucial with respect to the different intentional accomplishments involved in the manifestations of sedimentations in consciousness. In fact, the distinction is hinted in *UG* and made visible through a comparative reading of *UG* and *APS* as well as *EU*. In *UG*, Husserl discusses the problem of the mutual understanding of language (Husserl, 1987, 212-3), to which the passivity of reawakening of meaning essentially belongs. Linguistic signs that are documented and written associatively awaken (*wecken*) the familiar meaning (“*vertraute Bedeutung*”) attached to them. Such awakening does not require any deliberate,

reflective act of the subject. Rather, it is an immediate passivity through which the meaning is simply *given* to the subject, making understanding possible. As Husserl writes, explicitly, "...but as linguistic signs, they awaken, just like linguistic sounds, their entrusted meaning. The awakening is a passivity, such that the thus awakened meaning is *passively given*...associatively awakened" (Husserl, 1987, 212, my translation and emphasis)<sup>21</sup>. This passivity can be transformed into a kind of activity, Husserl continues, which is precisely the capacity of reactivation discussed above, namely, the reactivation of the original "creation" of meaning in the lived-experiences of others in the past. A crucial distinction is thus made between the passive-associative (re-)awakening of meaning-understanding and the active-reflective reactivation of meaning-formation. This distinction is not elaborated by Husserl thematically, yet it is clearly addressed in passing: "There is thus a differentiation between the passive understanding of the expression and the making-evident that reactivates its meaning (*Es scheidet sich also das passive Verstehen des Ausdrucks und sein den Sinn reaktivierendes Evidentmachen*)" (Husserl, 1987, 213, my translation). In *APS*, association in the form of passive awakening is foregrounded as central to the passive synthesis of intentionality. It is characterized as the immediate associative connection between two objects of experience – the awakening and the awakened - in virtue of their similarity: "...we will then find the similarity of something awakened with something that is immediately awakening as proper to immediate association, as proper to immediate awakening" (Husserl, 2001, 167)<sup>22</sup>. As a special synthesis through similarity, the immediate associative awakening operates „*unbemerkt*", that is, without the voluntary participation of the ego-subject. This is a significant mechanism of the *passive* constitution of experience in the pre-predicative and pre-reflective sphere, which precedes the active constitution of predicative judgment as well as that of active reactivation. Within the genetic-phenomenological framework, sedimented experiences are passively reawakened as the structural moments of types and habits, to which we will come back later.

As an interlude it is worth considering an empirical-psychological problem regarding the recollection (*Wiedererinnerung*) of episodic memory. Whereas the *active reactivation* of sedimented past lived-experiences of others plays a key role in the search for the philosophical foundation of modern sciences, the *passive reawakening* of one's individual sedimentations is what underlies the passive constitution of further experiences. As far as the empirical-psychological recollection of memories is concerned, we may assert that it is an act of association of *either* of them or a combination of both. Recollection of memories is for the most part a passivity of the intentional implication (*intentionale Verweisung*) that accompanies each and every constituted experience. All lived-experiences of a subject are intertwined with each other in the stream of intentional life of

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<sup>21</sup> „...aber als Sprachzeichen wecken sie ebenso wie Sprachlaute ihre vertrauten Bedeutungen. Die Weckung ist eine *Passivität*, die geweckte Bedeutung also *passive gegeben*...assoziativ geweckt.“

<sup>22</sup> „so finden wir als zu unmittelbarer Assoziation, als zu unmittelbarer Weckung gehörig Ähnlichkeit des Geweckten mit dem unmittelbar Weckenden" (Husserl, 1966, 122).

consciousness. As intertwined, they constitute a nexus of reference (*Verweisungszusammenhang*), such that “each *Erlebnis* relates to all other *Erlebnisse*” (Geniusas, 2012, 123) and each single *Erlebnis* refers *passively* to the entire history of the subject. For instance, trip to Canada now reminds me of the last trip to this country together with other events related to it. This act of remembering does not involve any interference of any spontaneous act of “my” will. However, according to Husserl, the passive reawakening in such a case is often “incomplete”, for it does not directly acquire any intuitive fulfilment for the empty representation (*Leervorstellung*) awakened by the association. The empty representation is directed towards a particular piece of past experience and even implies the entire past life of the subject. As Husserl writes in *APS*, „wir finden allerdings, dass die Weckung oft nicht zu anschaulicher Erinnerung führt, aber dann zu einer Leervorstellung, die bestimmt gerichtet ist...“ (Husserl, 1966, 122). In order to obtain an intuitive fulfilment for the empty representation, then, a spontaneous presentification (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of the sedimented past experience is required. This is precisely the active recollection of memory that follows the passive awakening of the empty representation directed towards this memory. In this sense, the empirical-psychological recollection of memory is possible in virtue of the cooperation of passivity and activity in the sense explored above. As a quick remark, there is unquestionably also a form of episodic recollection that is spontaneously enacted by the ego-subject without any (direct) givenness in the present that serves as the stimulating “awakening” item. Driven by specific interest or practical purpose (instead of any perceptual givenness), the intentional subject does sometimes voluntarily direct its attention towards the active search of a piece of past experience. For instance, one is requested by the philosophy department to write a report on a conference took place two weeks ago. In the present perceptual field, there is nothing that contingently reminds one of the event in question. However, motivated by the practical purpose (the request), one deliberately recalls and presentifies the details of the event, which are not passively awakened by any present encounter.

The two kinds of mechanisms explored above, active reactivation and passive reawakening, are more widely acknowledged in comparison to a third one, namely, the “passive tendential bringing-forth (*passiv-tendenziöses Hervortreten*)” of what is already sedimented. Like the passive reawakening of the past, the “passive tendential bringing-forth” also takes place in the sphere of passivity. Yet, unlike the former, the latter is not triggered by any stimulus in the present. Rather, that which is “brought forth” simply “comes forth” regardless of the present environment, violently intruding oneself upon (*sich aufdrängen auf*) the conscious subject. While the former two mechanisms take their departure from the present and are directed towards the past, the latter one departs from the past and heads toward the present. It is described in the less examined D-manuscript as follows: “here the peculiar reproduction, the special ‘awakening’ enters newly into the scene...which is namely the passive tendential bringing-forth and affecting, and it is also without the (ego’s) turning-towards a passively-effecting-of-itself ...(*hier tritt neu ein eben die eigentliche*

*Reproduktion, die besondere ,Weckung’ ...die ein passiv tendenziöses Hervortreten, Affizieren ist und auch ohne Zuwendung ein Sich-passiv-auswirken...*“ (Husserl, D-14/53, my translation) We will return to this special mechanism in the chapter on mood. Mood, as an affective background of consciousness, is a prominent example of such passive bringing-forth of itself. Unlike any intentional object, the mood simply permeates the whole conscious sphere and spreads over its surroundings, disregarding what is given in the present. De Warren characterizes the mood of grief as in terms of “spectrality”. Similar to a spectre, the mood “haunts” one incessantly at any time and any place, granting all the surrounding things and the entire perceptual field a melancholic colour-tone. So pervaded, the subject can hardly get rid of it simply by means of a conscious change of attitude or shift of attention.

To summarize, I identify three associative mechanisms underlying the threefold manifestations of sedimentations in the conscious sphere. In the search for the original evidence of ideal objectivities of modern natural sciences, the *active reactivation* of the eidetic insights lived through by others in the past plays a central role. For the passive constitution of pre-reflective and pre-predicative experience, the *passive reawakening* of types and habits is transcendently indispensable. As for the empirical-psychological episodic recollection of past experiences, a combination of both passive intentional implication and active presentification often comes into play. Finally, there is *the passive tendential bringing-forth* of the sedimented past, which forcefully invades and pervades the present conscious life regardless of what is presently given, such as in the case of affective sedimentation or mood.



## Chapter Three: The Sphere of Understanding – Sedimentation and *Type (Typus)*

### 3.1 A General Characterization of Type and its Origin in Sedimentation

In the sphere of understanding, sedimented experiences manifest as *type*, which is one of the transcendental conditions of apprehension (*Auffassung*) of object in the pre-predicative sphere of experience. Belonging to the sphere of passivity, pre-predicative experience is where things are constituted *prereflectively* as meaningful objects of perception without the active performance of the intentional subject. The latter is required by all predicative judgments, which reflectively articulate that which is pre-predicatively experienced in advance - and which constitute the so-called “objectivities of understanding”. This chapter will focus primarily on the pre-predicative sphere of experience, where the transcendental significance of sedimentation is best demonstrated through its manifestation as type.

The notion of type arises against a specific theoretical background in the philosophical tradition. Plato’s “Meno’s paradox” could be deemed an illuminative starting point of the problematic. After several rounds of interrogation by Socrates, who was in search of a genuine definition for certain core concepts (such as justice, beauty, etc.), Meno is brought in front of an epistemological impasse. The paradox is thus: if one already knows something, then there is no need for one to inquire about it, since one already knows the answer; however, if one does not know something and is completely ignorant of what one is looking for, then it is impossible for one to learn anything about it, since one would not recognize the thing even if one comes across it. In response to this, Plato himself introduced his theory of knowledge as recollection (*anamnesis*), whereas philosophers of modernity offered different proposals. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger - dedicated to the question of the meaning of Being (*die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein*) - articulates the fundamental difficulty of his inquiry by referring implicitly to Meno’s paradox. He asks, rhetorically, “if we must define an entity *in this Being*, and if we want to formulate the question of Being only on this basis, what is this but going in a circle?” (Heidegger, 2008, 27) If we already possess an understanding of Being, then there is no need to launch such an inquiry; yet, if we do not have any knowledge of Being, then it is impossible to engage in an investigation that necessarily involves an understanding of the Being of entities (*Seiende*). In view of this impasse, which is also regarded as a hermeneutic circle, Heidegger devises and delves into the notion of what he calls the “average vague understanding of Being (*das durchschnittliche und vage Seinsverständnis*)” (Heidegger, 2008, 25). In order to “determine the nature of entities in their Being” and to kick start the inquiry, one need not already possess “the explicit concept of the meaning of Being” (Heidegger, 2008, 27). Rather, Dasein’s pre-reflective, pre-scientific and pre-conceptual vague understanding of Being already suffices for such a task. More precisely, such pre-understanding is not a sufficient condition for understanding but rather its necessary presupposition. In the later sections (31-33) of his work, the “fore-structure (*Vor-Struktur*)”

of understanding is unfolded into *Vor-habe*, *-sicht* and *-griff*, demonstrating the necessity of a certain degree of pre-understanding and pre-acquaintance with the subject matter in every attempt at understanding (*Verstehen*). Slightly later, the ontological impossibility of an entirely presuppositionless, “neutral” understanding was strictly refuted by Gadamer, who transformed Heidegger’s existential ontology into hermeneutic ontology. In *Wahrheit und Methode*, Gadamer rigorously challenges the Enlightenment’s prejudice against prejudice (*Vorurteil*), that is, the naïve striving for understanding and knowledge that are entirely free of prejudices. This striving is itself a prejudice stemming from modern natural sciences, which, for the sake of an alleged neutrality and objectivity of knowledge, forcefully discredit anything deemed “subjective” – such as the historicity of human consciousness (See Gadamer, 1990, 276-81). The Enlightenment’s conception of knowledge overlooks the ontological and hermeneutical facticity of human beings, whose fundamental finitude implies that every understanding presupposes a certain pre-understanding. Likewise, every judgment (*Urteil*) is possible only by virtue of a pre-judgment (*Vor-urteil*), as suggested etymologically in the German terms. Put more concretely, pre-understanding and pre-judgment includes above all that which make up our own hermeneutic situation, such as personal histories, culture and traditions in which one is raised. Without these constituting for the subject a certain degree of theoretical and practical familiarity in the surrounding world, understanding would simply be impossible.

This brief sketch of the historical background of the problematic offers us a starting point for delving into Husserl’s notion of type in his genetic phenomenology. Type could be conceived of as Husserl’s answer to Meno’s paradox. Briefly put, it explains the very possibility of the objective apperception of things by serving as the pre-reflective acquaintance presupposed by every experience, understanding as well as judgment. In what follows, the general nature and function of type, its constitutive and synthesizing function in different dimensions of pre-predicative experiences, and its genetic origin in sedimentations will be explored.

#### a) The General Nature and Function of Type

The nature of types is essentially differentiated from what we ordinarily know as empirical or abstract “concepts”. From the genetic point of view, types are the very foundation of concepts, which presuppose the typifying apperception of objects in the pre-reflective sphere. Whereas concepts are obtained via a spontaneous act of abstraction that “extracts” a universal core separable from all situational contingencies, types are passively pre-constituted in a sequence of perceptual experiences (Lohmar, 2003, 109) and retain most of the empirical variations of the latter. At the same time, the retaining of empirical elements implies the plasticity of types, which are constantly changed and shaped differently as perceptual experiences accumulate. Hence, distinguishing types from pure generalities (concepts), Husserl emphasizes that the former “are known although not yet apprehended” (Husserl, 1973a, 319), namely, not apprehended by any reflective spontaneity of the

ego. By contrast, generalities which are “freely constructed in spontaneity” based on what was already typically apperceived, eventually lead to pure or essential generalities, viz. concepts (ibid.). The “spontaneity” in question refers to a voluntary act of the ego that turns consciously towards a group of apprehended objects. Subsequently, by means of abstraction, the ego discerns a “core” that remains ideally and absolutely identical throughout all experiences of that object, whereby pure concepts are constructed. On the other hand, prior to any spontaneity and reflectivity, the formation of types - as will be discussed in more detail later - is primarily a process of passive “grouping (*Gruppierung*)”, viz. without the active interference of the ego, of objects of experience that resemble each other. This process operates according to the principle of similarity (*Ähnlichkeitsprinzip*) on which the building of types (*Typusbildung*) is based.

As far as their “function” is concerned, a comparison between types and the Kantian a priori categories is worth carrying out. The latter, by definition prior to and independent of all experiences, could be deemed the purest form of concepts. However, despite their unbridgeable distinction, both types and the Kantian categories share the essential function known as the schematization of an experientially given manifold (*Mannigfaltigkeit*). Kant famously asserts that, in response to the modern rationalism and empiricism of his time, “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”. Knowledge in its truest sense must be acquired through both sensuous intuition and concepts of understanding, as he sophisticatedly argues in the *Erste Kritik*. Through intuition (*Anschauung*), the chaos of manifold sensory data is given to the knowing subject without any stabilizing pattern and meaning. In order to “make sense of” them, the sensory manifold must be properly “organized” by the pure concepts of the understanding (*Verstand*). Pure concepts, or categories, such as causality, quality, quantity, etc. are a priori by nature and yet necessary for the acquisition of the objects’ synthetic unity as objects of cognition (See Kant, 2012). For Kant, pure concepts, being unscathed by contingent changes from experiential encounters, serve as the transcendental condition for the possibility of any experience whatsoever. Being aware of the “gap” between the sensuous givenness of intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding, Kant brings forth the notion of *Einbildungskraft* and *schemata*, which serve as the “bridge” between the two. The schemata are the “(sensuous) images” of concepts and hence provide the “rules” for the synthesizing function of pure concepts as they are applied to sensuous givenness. However, Kant’s main concern remains the very justification of the pure concepts rather than any genetic question with regard to (the origin of) schemata and schematization. Despite the fact that he does also engage with the problem of empirical schemata, which are conceived of as products of the faculty of imagination (*Einbildungskraft*), these are explored mainly in order to tackle the “bridging problem” between sensory intuition and pure concepts. The problem of origin, whether of pure or empirical schemata, is considered as something a posteriori and therefore purely a “matter of psychology” that does not belong to Kant’s own transcendental enterprise (See Lohmar, 2020). By contrast, differentiating types

from concepts, Husserl incorporates such genetic problems into his transcendental phenomenology. For Husserl, types are formed and shaped empirically, individually, culturally and historically *on the ground of sedimentation*. Nonetheless, they are simultaneously the essential condition for the schematization and constitution of pre-predicative experiences, on which, in turn, other acts of consciousness of higher levels, which constitute predicative judgments as well as empirical and pure concepts, are based. The indispensable rootedness of types in sedimentation, which distinguishes Husserlian types from the Kantian categories, plays a main role here and will be explored later.

Before moving to an overview of the manner in which types are constitutive of the different dimensions of perceptual experiences in the pre-predicative sphere, some remarks on the nature and focuses of my exposition should be made. The following discussions are dedicated less to the notion of type alone than to a demonstration of the *transcendental significance* of sedimentation *via* its manifestation as type in the constitutive process of perceptual experience. This will be illustrated through an examination of types in terms of i) its associative awakening in and through the impressional present and ii) its formation in the unconscious (non-impressional) sphere. Both are genetically rooted in sedimentation – or the unconscious –, which has, however, scarcely been a thematic object of study among Husserlian scholars. Admittedly, there are already literatures focusing on such topics as genetic phenomenology, passivity and the problematic of type. Dieter Lohmar and Jagna Brudzinska, for instance, have carried out insightful and comprehensive studies of type from the standpoint of genetic phenomenology (See Lohmar, 1998, 2003, 2011; Brudzinska, 2014, 2019). However, the concept of sedimentation does not occupy their main focus. In Lohmar's main work, *Erfahrung und kategoriales Denken*, the historical and conceptual development of the problematic of pre-predicative experience is studied in great detail. Starting from Hume, who fell prey to extreme scepticism as a result of his empiricism, the work offers a historical reconstruction of Kant and Husserl's response to Humean scepticism. Husserl's notion of type is studied mainly against the backdrop of the epistemological concern of finding the condition for possibility for pre-predicative experience. Brudzinska's *Bi-Valenz der Erfahrung* presents a valuable dialogue between Husserlian phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis, arguing for two “orders (*Ordnungen*)” of experience that are intertwined with each other, as well as for the concreteness of an ego-subject. The experience of an ego-subject consists not only of what phenomenology considers as its main object of study – namely, the “apperceptive-impressional order of perception (*apperzeptiv-impressionale Wahrnehmungsordnung*)”, which is concerned with sensuous feelings (*sinnliche Empfindungen*) given to us “objectively” from the outside. Rather, there is also another layer of experience that is confronted by psychoanalysis, namely, the “phantasmatic-imaginary order (*phantasmatisch-imaginäre Ordnung*)”, which is involuntary and composed of “subjective” dreams, wishes, instincts, anxieties and phantasies (Brudzinska, 2019, 16). Despite also referring to Kant and Freud occasionally, my exploration will focus on the conceptual relationship between types and sedimentation, which is

addressed in the works mentioned above merely in passing. In what follows, it will be demonstrated that sedimentation is “located” right *between* the unconscious and consciousness, moving between them in an unceasing and dynamic manner. Sedimented experiences have already faded away from consciousness and sunken into the unconscious sphere, yet they do not cease reappearing in consciousness in a constitutive manner without the least voluntary intervention by the ego<sup>23</sup>.

## b) Types in Simple Apprehension and Explicative Contemplation

This section elucidates more concretely how empirically shaped types are constitutive of three levels and aspects of synthesis of pre-predicative experience. At the most primordial level lies the simple apprehension (*schlichte Erfassung*) of objects - that is, the sheer external perception or simple “grasping (*Erfassen*)” of objects. Subsequently, the apprehended objects, can become the object of explicative contemplation (*explizierendes Betrachten*), the second level of apprehension. Guided by the subject’s specific perceptual interest, the act of explication is an activity of the ego yet is still not a predicative act. It brings about nothing “new” but leads rather to “more precise determination (*Bestimmung*) and correction of anticipations” (Husserl, 1973a, 113). The explicative determination is divided, furthermore, into two forms: the internal determination with reference to the internal horizon (*Innenhorizont*) and the external determination with reference to the external horizon (*Außenhorizont*). From a genetic standpoint, all three levels or aspects of the pre-predicative experience of objects are closely related to one’s past sedimented experiences (See Lohmar, 2011).

*External perception* bespeaks the simple apprehension of an object as a meaningful synthetic unity. In this regard, the most classical phenomenological description of perceptual experience takes its departure from the perspectival givenness of spatial objects: “Let us begin by noting that the aspect, the perspectival adumbration through which every spatial object invariably appears, only manifests the spatial object from one side” (Husserl, 2001, 39). In order to grasp (*erfassen*) the incomplete, “one-sided” givenness truly as an object, the perceiving subject is required to intend something “more than” what are actually given at the moment, such that that which is intended is the “the intending-beyond of something (*etwas über sie [die wirklich gesehene Seiten] Hinausweisen*)”, the “unintuitive indicative (*unanschauliche Indizieren*)” (Husserl, 1966, 4-5, my translation). What is intended and opened up is an “empty” intentional horizon that strives for intuitive fulfilment. It is empty in the sense of lacking intuitive givenness; yet at the same time, it is not empty in terms of its content. Rather, the horizon is a leeway (*Spielraum*) of possibilities that surrounds and is circumscribed by a specific “core”, which alone offers possible ways of apprehending the scattered and partial givennesses as a unitary object. Such a “core” is precisely what Husserl terms the *Typus*, as

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<sup>23</sup> By highlighting its “betweenness”, I do not mean that sedimentation is to be identified with the Freudian preconsciousness (*das Vorbewusste*). The latter is practically accessible to consciousness, as long as the ego-subject actively directs its attention towards it. I addressed this problem in slightly more detail in another article of mine (See Wun, 2024a).

elucidated most extensively in *Erfahrung und Urteil*. In section 8 of the work, the horizon-structure of experience is disclosed in relation to type, conceived of as a *typifying-anticipatory horizon* (*typisierend-antizipierender Horizont*) essential to pre-reflective experience. Meno's paradox, and the modern responses to it sketched above, show that the understanding of things always presupposes a certain pre-understanding and "familiarity" with the things in question. The latter is not something actually given to the subject "from without", but rather possessed and projected by the subject who intends beyond what is presently given. Husserl refers to this projection as typical precognition (*typische Vorbekanntheit*) and preknowledge (*Vorwissen*) (Husserl, 1973a, 32). Together, they are revealed as the anticipatory horizon of experience, an empty intentional horizon, as mentioned above. When something is given to the subject in the present, certain past experiences that resemble this givenness are associatively awakened, providing the subject with a vague, indeterminate yet reasonably delineated ranges of possible ways of apprehension. Thus, experience is never free-floating but is always given *within* a horizon of familiarity - more precisely, an empty horizon of familiar unfamiliarity (Husserl, 1973a, 38), wherein the givenness is to be grasped in particular, non-arbitrary ways. This horizon, also referred to as the horizon of determinable indeterminability, is delineated by a particular type awakened, that is, a "core" surrounded by a number of different possible presentations of it, such as the same kind of object with different appearances, ways of moving, shapes, etc. In other words, type, as a horizon-structure of experience, involves "an element of familiarity", "typical generality in the form of determinate 'possibilities'" (Husserl, 1973a, 36), by virtue of which alone the sheer sensory data is apprehended (*aufgefasst*) meaningfully. Apprehension is, therefore, always typifying apprehension (See Lohmar, 2016).

However, apprehension/apperception at this level is nothing more than a sheer grasping of something *as* something, namely, *as* a meaningful and unified object of perception *as a whole*. The internal and external attributes are left undiscernible until the act of explication comes into force, which, again, is also an act based on type.

The act of explication (*Explication*), or explicative contemplation, is motivated by specific perceptual interest *after* the object is roughly grasped according to its type. Motivated by either theoretical or practical interest, the ego-subject seeks to "penetrate" the object by "unfolding" it from different aspects and in terms of its various properties. As mentioned above, explicative contemplation can aim at either internal or external (relative) determinations of an object. Whereas internal determination lays bare the attributes that belong "internally" to the object itself, external (relative) determination unveils the attributes that are displayed when the object is placed in relation to *other* objects within a context. Crucial to our discussion is the fact that both necessarily take place within the typifying horizon stemming from the subject's sedimented experiences, and their accomplishment enriches, in turn, the types on which they were once based.

The explication of *internal determination* is guided by the interest to “know more” about the object in question through closer scrutiny. More precisely, explication does not bring anything “new” into sight but merely unveils what was already implicitly included in the typical, internal horizon of familiarity in which it takes place. The typifying horizon indicates not only what the object possibly *is* as a whole but also implies an “expectation” of the attributes that *typically* belong to the object, given that it is apprehended as such. Such “expectation” is based for the most part on one’s previous experiences of the same type of objects and one’s knowledge about them, which are then (partly) transferred to the anticipatory horizon of the present experience. Therefore, Husserl (1973a, 113) characterizes explication as nothing but “the more precise determination and correction of anticipations”. The process of internal determination can be described and conceptually broken down as follows. First, having grasped the object S in its wholeness, the subject shifts its attention away from the object S as a whole *to* its internal moments, such as  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , etc. However, while the particularities of  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , etc. are now thematic objects for the subject, the original object S does not completely vanish from the conscious sphere. Rather, the object S is intentionally retained in grasp (*im-Griff-Behalten*) as the very theme of the explication. As Husserl writes (1973a, 117), “we have apprehended it [the object S] and hold fast to it as a thematic substrate...while we apprehend the singularities in particular...”. The second structural moment that follows is the partial apprehension (*Partialerfassung*) that connects the object S and its internal determinations  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , etc. In the act of explication, a twofold constitution of sense (*Sinngebung*) is realized, namely, “object [S] as substrate” and “determination  $\alpha$ ...” (Husserl, 1973a, 114). By virtue of the retaining-in-grasp of S, the intention of  $\alpha$  even includes the intention of S as simultaneously implied. Subsequently, the two intentions constitute a unity of coincidence (*Deckungseinheit*) or overlapping (*Überschiebung*). Nonetheless, the overlapping is merely a *partial* one since  $\alpha$  is not completely identical with S and vice-versa. Rather,  $\alpha$  is apprehended as a particular moment *of* S and “S is present *in* one of its particularities” (Husserl, 1973a, 116, emphasis added). In a word,  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , etc. are apprehended as belonging to S and S is apprehended as the substrate of  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , etc. The explicative process eventually leads to the modification of the total grasp of the object S as a whole in terms of its content, which is now enriched, transformed, corrected, or eliminated in light of the present accomplishment. Here, an interplay between what was acquired in the past and sedimented, on the one hand, and the present accomplishment and experience, on the other, comes into view. While the explication of the object is based on the typifying-anticipatory horizon of precognition and preliminary familiarity (the type), this horizon of the experienceable is in turn constantly updated, modified and enriched by new typical determinations and familiarities acquired in each new present. The type, now enriched in terms of its contents and meaning (*Inhalt-/Sinnesbereicherung*), will serve as the “new” horizon of apprehension in ongoing experiences.

Whereas internal determinations refer to the attributes contained “in” the object itself, *external* or *relative determinations* are those which “display what the object is in its relation to other objects” (Husserl, 1973a, 105), for instance, the pencil is *beside* the computer, or this book is *larger than* that one next to it. Relative determinations are not intrinsic to the object itself, but rather dependent upon the co-givenness of other objects in the *external horizon* of the original object of thematic interest. There are two forms of external horizon, both of which are conceived within what Husserl calls the “totality of typification (*Totalitätstypik*)”, which encompasses types for all things belonging essentially to external perception and internal explication (Husserl, 1973a, 35-6). One of the two forms of external horizon is the horizon of what is co-given *originaliter* as perceptible in the objective background (of the object of thematic interest) in the present. This horizon, of which the subject is co-conscious (*mitbewusst*) as the perceptual background, consists of other objects co-given at the same place and the same impressional present, surrounding the intuitively and thematically given object. However, there is another form of external horizon that goes beyond what is co-present here and now - namely, the horizon of typical preacquaintance, which is also at work in simple apprehension and the explication of internal determinations elucidated above. This horizon encompasses objects that are not co-present but rather are from the past, (i.e., sedimented experiences) and which are associatively connected with the present object in question, forming a “network” of associations. Such associations are based merely on the likeness and similarities between objects. Way more crucial are the “other objects” that *were* affectively co-experienced in the past together with the object in question, for instance the surrounding environment, the heat, the special people involved, etc., when the building *was* visited in the past *and* revisited again here and now. The present experience of the same building now takes place within the horizon that contains those “other objects” as the “habitual precipitate (*Niederschlag*) of determinations” (Husserl, 1973a, 151) acquired from the sedimented past. For both forms of explication of external determinations, the structural moments of retaining-in-grasp and synthetic overlapping - explained above - are constitutively indispensable, though in a different manner. What is at stake is the fundamental relationship among the various independent objects given as a plurality in the perceptual background, or external horizon, and which consist either in objects co-given in the present or in those recalled from the sedimented past. In the first case, based on the simple apprehension of one of the objects, a specific interest is further directed towards this object as the “principal theme” of explication against the whole impressional background. The subject’s attention then wanders from it to other surrounding objects, while still intentionally retaining it in grasp. The surrounding objects *themselves* are not examined as *the* thematic objects, but rather as “a theme in relation to” the principal theme, viz. the original object of thematic interest. Subsequently, by virtue of a “synthetic overlapping of the two apprehensions” - namely, “the principal theme which is retained in grasp” and “the theme related to it” (Husserl, 1973a, 153), the principal object obtains new determinations. Though still not yet in predicative form, these determinations enrich the sense of the external horizon itself. The same applies to the external horizon



of the second form, except that here the “themes” related to and surrounding the principal theme are not co-present but recalled from the past and presentified (*vergegenwärtigt*).

The above elucidations demonstrated more concretely the transcendental significance of type, often manifesting as a typifying-anticipatory horizon, to the different levels and aspects of the constitution of pre-predicative experience. In the next section, the genetic origin of type in sedimentation will be further explored.

### c) Sedimentation as the “Origin” of Type

For Kant, the pure concepts (categories) of understanding are responsible for the schematization of a manifold givenness to intuition. The former is, as mentioned, by nature prior to and independent from all experiences, yet is simultaneously that which renders experience possible and hence in this sense is transcendental. The Husserlian types are likewise transcendental as they serve as the enabling condition for the possibility of pre-predicative experience at the lowest level of constitution in the passive sphere of consciousness. Unlike pure concepts, however, types are not a priori but rooted in and stem from the sedimented historical experiences of the concrete subjectivity of each individual. They are, therefore, formed and constantly modified in the course of the ongoing experience of the individual in which more experiences are sedimented, preserved, and reorganized “unconsciously”, viz. without the reflective interference of the subject. As Husserl affirms, “the fact that all objects of experience are from the first experienced as known according to their type has its basis in the sedimentation of all apperceptions...” (Husserl, 1973a, 321). Necessarily subject to retentional reverberation, all temporal lived-experiences in their mode of original emergence are destined to sink gradually into the corresponding non-original mode. As time progresses, the retentional reverberation of the experiences leads finally to “submersion into the totally empty, dead past” (Husserl, 1973a, 122), that is, to sedimentation in the unconscious sphere. The sunken experiences as such, however, do not simply disappear as a “nothing (*Nichts*)” without any traces. Rather, they have become a latent “possession (*Besitz*)”, which continues to enter and take part in ongoing intentional activities - for instance, as types in simple perception. Both the transformation of the original emergence of experiences into its non-original mode in the dead past and its continuous latent preservation are not initiated or controlled by the ego-subject. Rather, they are but the results of consciousness’ eidetic lawfulness designated as the structure of sedimentation, whose contents are nonetheless subject to incessant changes, corrections and enrichment as lived-experiences increase. Here, a reciprocal and dynamic determination between the present constitution of lived-experiences on the one hand, and their sedimentation and manifestation as a typifying horizon, on the other, is again visible. As elaborated above, the constitution of pre-predicative experience is transcendently impossible without the arousal of types and their anticipatory horizon. Each object encountered is “always already saturated with anticipation” with an anticipatory horizon of recognizance and familiarity, in

and through which alone apprehension and further explication are possible. On the other hand, each new apprehension and explication of objects enriches the sedimented possessions belonging to the subjectivity in question and contributes to the modification and extensions of types and the typifying horizons. The latter, reshaped by new sedimented experiences, in turn conditions future constitutive activities and experiences, which again renew the pre-existing types involved. In a word, the type is “an ever-to-be-corrected concept [concept in the broadest sense] which...is founded on the progress of actual experience” (Husserl, 1973a, 333). Sedimentation is the empirical origin of type, and type is, conversely, one of the conscious manifestations of sedimentation.

### 3.2 The “Passive-Associative Awakening (*Weckung*)” of Type

Association is the fundamental principle of passive synthesis, as Husserl clearly states in *CM*. Accordingly, typifying apperception, as a main intentional accomplishment of passivity, is inevitably subject to one of the forms of association - namely, passive-associative awakening. The latter enables not only the reawakening of the sedimented in consciousness, but also the synthetic unification of the present and non-present. In this regard, Husserl asserts that lived-experiences and knowledge preserved in the form of latent possessions are “ready at anytime to be awakened anew by an active association” (Husserl, 1973a, 122). This assertion requires further clarification. Here, “active” does not refer to an “act” of association carried out by the voluntary spontaneity of the ego-subject. Rather, it simply describes association as that which takes place in and is triggered by something in the impressional present. The very passivity and the absence of the ego’s spontaneous intervention is essential here, for it implies both the “untamed” nature of this form of association and the room it leaves for individual variations and even pathological modifications. This is emphasized by Husserl (1973a, 179) when he writes that “all these occurrences of associative awakening and linkage take place in the domain of passivity without any participation by the ego”. In the next chapter of this work, another form of association is placed in contrast with the passive-associative awakening of type. Briefly put, the latter is characterized by its “departure” from the present and directedness toward the past: it “radiates out from the present and [is] directed toward the vivifying of the past” (ibid.). By contrast, the form of association pertaining to moods takes another direction: it radiates from the past and is directed toward the present. Before we undertake a comparison between the different forms of association, this section aims to take a closer look at the *objective* as well as *subjective* basis of the passive-associative awakening of type, preparing, at the same time, for the theoretical possibility of a pathological modification of type and association to be explored in part two of this study.

Husserl’s emphasis on the objective (*gegenständlich*) basis of the associative awakening of type is undeniable. Regarding the associative relation between the present givenness and the

awakened type - under which a group of objects of experience in the past is assembled - the *objective likeness and similarity* between the two termini serve almost exclusively as their bridging elements. Instead of any contingent and subjective projection of horizon of apprehension, the data given in the present awaken nothing but what *resembles* them and what offers a “reasonable” possibility for an objective apprehension. In *APS*, the affective force stemming from the objective givenness and exercised upon the perceiving subject is described as such: “And it *calls out* to us (*ruft es uns zu*), as it were, in these referential implications: ‘there is still more to see here...’” (Husserl, 2001, 41, my emphasis). The “zurufen” indicates that the perceiving subject is passively reminded of something other than what is present, and such “reminding” is based to a large extent on what is now objectively given, that is, on the similarity between the awakened (*das Geweckte*) and the awakening (*das Weckende*). Classically, it is conceived the experience of “something reminding (me) of something (*etwas erinnert an etwas*)”, that is “the like here recalls what is like there, the similar recalls the similar” (Husserl, 1973a, 177). Accordingly, such associative awakening is termed the “*Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung*” and the synthesis between the two termini a “special synthesis through similarity (*spezielle Synthese durch Ähnlichkeit*)” (Husserl, 1966, 123). A simple example of this is when something *like* a flower makes its appearance to us it awakens in us the *type* of flower that shares certain objective traits with it in terms of its shape, colour, fragrance, etc., while what is presumably particular and contingent between the two, such as the number of thorns, is simply set aside (Husserl, 1973a, 328-9).

The classical account above fails to consider the *subjective* elements that equally effective in the awakening process. The objective similarity between the awakening and the awakened should not be considered the *sole* “bridge” between the two termini. In many cases, the awakened type in us “surprises” us, as it has objectively nothing resembling what is presently given, even leading to perceptions that are not shared intersubjectively but intelligible only to oneself. For instance, a leaf dropped suddenly from the tree in front of me is perceived “by me” as a cicada that startles “me” for seconds, since I was frightened by some other insects some moments ago. Subjective moments as such in the awakening of the typifying horizon of perception deserve more phenomenological descriptions. Indeed, these are hinted at yet not sufficiently elaborated by Husserl. In *APS*, he raises the example of a *Talschluss*, a valley end. A valley end “we” perceive now during a hike reminds “us” of another particular valley end we saw in the past. Despite the fact that both, objectively speaking, are simply valley end, *that* one is recalled instead of another random one could only be explained by something other than their objective similarity. As Husserl notices, the reproduction of the recalled valley end is “not only a reproduced similar object at all (*nicht nur überhaupt ein reproduzierter ähnlicher Gegenstand*)”. Rather, the awakening of it goes “beyond the sheer likeness-relationship (*über die bloße Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung hinaus*)” and involves a “certain relationship between both [the valley end perceived at present and the one from the past that is recalled]” (Husserl, 1966, 121, my

translation). This seems to imply that beyond the objective likeness, there are also subjective or individual variables that (unconsciously) bring forth *one* particular valley end within the present consciousness, instead of another.

What I refer to as the “subjective variables” that are in play in associative relationship will be further elaborated in chapter 5. At this point, it suffices to bring to light, under this notion, such elements as an individual’s idiosyncratic dispositions, interests, drives, desires, and so on, which largely condition the associative processes in different forms. Husserl briefly addresses these elements, which include “privileged sensible feelings like a passionate desire founded by a prominence in its unity”, as well as “originally instinctive, drive related preferences” (Husserl, 2001, 198)<sup>24</sup>. These are something beyond the affection that is dependent upon the *objective* similarities and contrasts among the relevant objects. Acknowledging the subjective dimension of association and affection, Dermot Moran foregrounds the differentiation between universally shared instincts and individually varied dispositions in terms of their *objects* of the fulfilment. Following Husserl, he admits that the allure (*Reiz*) of an object (a sudden noise, a pattern of colour, etc.) exercises certain affective force (*affektive Kraft*) upon the ego-subject. Generally, the ego-subject is either attracted to or repelled by those sensory prominences depending on their intensity in contrast with the background experiential field. However, not each and every individual subject is *equally* attracted to or repelled by the *same* sensory prominences with the *same* degree of intensity. This is because, as Moran explains, there is “a high degree of idiosyncrasy in the make-up of the individual ego” (Moran, 2017, 15). Admittedly, there are a number of fundamental and instinctual needs shared universally by all human beings, such as preservation of life, hunger, sexual desire, etc. Nonetheless, at the same time, such tendencies or “originary instincts (*Urtriebe, Urinstinkte*)” are developed and shaped *individually* in the course of one’s experiences and acculturation. Hunger and the craving for food, for instance, are instincts shared universally by everyone; yet *what* kinds of dish will arouse more or less appetite is exclusively an individual matter. As a result of sedimented experiences and acculturations, which make up one’s character-style and disposition, each and every individual subject has its own peculiarity (*Eigenart*), such that it is attracted to or repelled by *particular* stimuli and its attention is directed more or less towards *particular* aspects of an object. It follows that, in the case of association, what is awakened in a subject via certain external stimuli also varies, as one might be moved more by *this* attribute of the object and another by *that*. The best illustration with regard to the individuality and apparent contingency of associative awakening is offered by Freud in his account of dreams and association. Freud distinguishes between two kinds of association: association guided by directing ideas from the unconscious *and* superficial association that connects ideas simply through assonance, verbal ambiguity, temporal coincidences, etc. (Freud, 1995, 451). While the former is

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<sup>24</sup> „...bevorzugenden sinnlichen Gefühle, wie einer durch das Abgehobene in seiner Einheit fundierten Wollust...[und] ursprünglich instinktive, triebmäßige Bevorzugungen.“ (Husserl, 1966, 150)

rooted in one's "subjective" unconscious desires, moods, feelings, and so on, the latter has simply to do with properties that are intersubjectively and superficially discernible. In daily "pathological" phenomena (such as slip of tongue, forgetting of names, etc.) and especially in dreams, the subjective unconscious is usually replaced or concealed by superficial ("objective") misconstructions as a result of the censorship mechanism. However, it is in effect nothing but the unconscious ideas that serve as the genuine motivations and the origin of meaning for the associations in both thoughts and dreams. Certain ideas are repressed into the unconscious, censored and forbidden to emerge in conscious life and to be realized in the practical world. As repressed, however, they do not stop attempting to intrude upon the perceivable sphere of consciousness by disguising themselves with ordinary representations. In dreams, above all, the repressed ideas are associated with harmless ideas founded on certain superficial relationships in order to attain access to consciousness under the mask of the latter. The original object of sexual desire, one's mother or one's unattainable beloved, for instance, is represented in dreams by a balloon or something else ordinary. The "energy" of the desire, represented originally by a particular object, is now transferred (*übertragen*) to harmless representations, which are "superficially" associated with the original representation and bring it into conscious light. In other words, "the psychic intensity of the elements in dream-thoughts", viz. the association of thoughts motivated by one's deepest desires and wishes, is "replaced by the sensory intensity of the elements in dream-content", viz. elements that are associated with each other on the basis of their objective and superficial resemblances, temporal and spatial contiguity, etc. (Freud, 1995, 474). An associative network of derivatives (*Abkömmlinge*) is also formed in this process, which explains and underlies specific pathological experiences. This will be further discussed in part II of this work. At this point, it is important to note that, as Freud argues, only through penetrating into the "subjective" and unconscious motivation-context (*Motivationszusammenhang*) consisting of peculiar wishes, feelings, and desires, can the genuine meaning of the dream-contents and other pathological phenomena be made intelligible. Dream-contents disguised by superficiality always await a psychoanalytic deciphering to unveil their true meaning rooted in the subjective unconscious. In this regard, Brudzinska further highlights the "creative character of association (*schöperischen Charakter der Assiziationstätigkeit*)", namely, the form of association motivated by subjective phantasies, desires and habits. This form is significantly distinguished from the association of impressional-empirical contents that follow the mundane laws of contiguity, similarity and causality (See Brudzinska, 2019, 39-41). In chapter five, the essential intertwinement of type, mood and habits in the process of association will be laid bare, underlining again the subjective elements at play in the associative awakening of types.

### 3.3 The Problem of Type-formation (*Typusbildung*) in the Unconscious

The final section of this chapter is concerned with the associative relationship between the *present* givenness to the consciousness and the *past* constituted contents (types). In this section, the problem

of the formation of the type itself *in the unconscious* (the region of sedimentation) will be thematized. As shown above, a type is a *group* of (similar) objects of experience constituted in the past, sedimented in the unconscious and associatively connected with each other. The problem of the formation of type is therefore the problem concerning the *process* as well as the *principles* of such “grouping”. How are particular objects grouped together? According to what principles are they associated with each other? What elements are in play in this process? These are the leading questions of the current section.

The classical response by Husserl is, unsurprisingly, that the basis for the grouping of objects under a type is simply the synthesis of likeness and the coincidence of similarity. Just as a sensory manifold given to the conscious sphere is schematized by types, the sedimented experiences in the unconscious also constantly undergo the process of typification. The latter refers to the process whereby sedimented experiences are associatively joined with each another on the basis of their objective likeness. Things “like” a dog are grouped together, such that the type “dog” is established in order to capture all those similar objects of experience. The type “dog” contains not only individual dogs but also a set of relevant “information” and its variations of which we are seldomly aware, such as a dog’s possible ways of moving, its facial expressions, its different sizes and noise, and so on. These attributes and determinations, which even include, as Lohmar argues (2016, 52), the value and functional qualities of a dog, are then anticipated and explicated when an individual dog is perceived and focused on in the present. Husserl describes this perceptual experience as follows: “when we see a dog, we immediately *anticipate* its additional modes of behavior: its *typical* way of eating, playing, running, jumping and so on. We do not actually see its teeth; but although we have never yet seen this dog, we know in advance how its teeth will look – not in their individual determination but according to *type*, inasmuch as we have already had previous and frequent experience of ‘similar’ animals, of ‘dogs’” (Husserl, 1973a, 331, my emphasis). Similar objects with their similar objective features are assembled and represented by a particular type. Unlike pure concepts, however, such typification is not a reflective abstraction of a universal core shared by the same group of objects. Rather, the abstraction of a universal core is based on the unreflective grouping of objects, viz. the typification of empirical objects, which takes place “in” the subject yet without its active intervention. Lohmar (1998, 238, my translation and emphasis) defines type and its process of formation as follows: “The type can hence be understood as the connection – residing in the respective subject – of a multiplicity of similar objects or as a group of representations of the same object (group of similarity), which are transferable in their transformations of similarity”<sup>25</sup>. To sum up: on the one hand, the formation of type as that which contains a group of objects that resemble each other through “family resemblance

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<sup>25</sup> „So lässt sich ein Typus auch als – *im jeweiligen Subjekt gelegene* – Verbindung einer Vielheit voneinander *ähnlichen* Gegenständen oder als eine Gruppe ineinander in *Ähnlichkeitstransformationen* überführbaren Darstellungen desselben Gegenstandes (*Ähnlichkeitsgruppe*) verstehen.“

(*Familienähnlichkeit*)”, is based on an coincidence of likeness. On the other hand, however, the fact that the assembling of objects as types takes place “in the subject” seems to imply a subjective dimension of the associative linkage.

The understanding of the associative formation of types remains incomplete until the subjective dimension is brought into light. Despite the lack of thematic exposition in Husserl’s text, there are indeed various textual traces that point to subjective, or even “irrational”, factors that condition the associative process. Brudzinska (2015, 17) concisely describes the typifying of experiences in the formation of types as a dynamic and potentially ‘irrational’ process of “condensation (*Verdichtung*) and expansion (*Ausbreitung*) of subjective life in which sensible experiences interfere or dewarp”, as well as a process characterized by “contradiction, inhibition and disappointment”. This means that the formation of types is not necessarily a logical and uninterrupted process guided exclusively by the “objective” features of the objects of experience, not to mention the universality and necessity attributed to concepts of natural science and Kantian categories. To borrow some ideas from Freud, it is not even unreasonable to assert that the laws of association *of the unconscious* (what Freud terms the primary process) sometimes reign over the passive synthesis of the ego-subject. The former is the alleged free association driven by subjective (ideas of) drives and instincts in the unconscious, whose contents are not subject to logical rules such as the law of contradiction. Furthermore, they are atemporal (*zeitlos*), not temporally organized, and deprived of any negation, doubt and degree of certainty (See Freud, 2016, 29-30). The region where types are formed, namely, the unconscious, is hence penetrated by various kinds and degrees of “irrationality” deeply rooted in the subject itself. In what follows, I attempt to sketch out three sorts of subjective, so-called “irrational”, factors co-determining the formation of type: a) personal histories (sedimentations) including interests, dispositions, desires, etc.; b) the social-cultural community in which the personal subject lives; c) the freedom of the spontaneous activity of the ego.

#### a) The Personal Dimension

An episode of experience sedimented into the past is in no way a single, isolated entity “stored” in the stream of consciousness with a fixed temporal and spatial position. Rather, it is ontologically made up of and intertwined with different experiential and psychological contents in the conscious life of the subject, including semantic, emotional and existential elements. A past event is registered in memory by “a cluster of descriptive propositions”, which are composed not only of concepts that describe the factual information of the event, but also of emotive notions (“emotional nodes”) shared by and connected to other aspects of the emotions and other events. In psychology, this is referred to as the associative network theory of memory and emotion (See Bower, 1981; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Lewis & Critchley, 2003). An experience that aroused and was accompanied by a particular emotion is connected with another experience that involves a similar emotion. An associative network of

memory is thus formed and constantly changed. A simple example would be a simple event: “Mary kissed me (and I felt happy)” (See Bower, 1981, 134-5). Firstly, each concept describing the event, “Mary”, “kiss”, “me”, is associatively linked with other events described with the same or similar concepts, whereas those events usually have nothing to do with the original event itself. Moreover, the emotional node - in this case, “happy” - is likewise surrounded and linked with other aspects of an emotion such as its expressive behaviours, verbal labels, evoking appraisals, etc., as well as with other events that share the same emotional property. The warmth and joy “I” felt when my teacher hugged me, for instance, may be associated with or even recall the memory of “Mary kissed me” by virtue of the emotional node of “joy”. Two “originally” or “objectively” unrelated events are connected on such an exclusively subjective basis<sup>26</sup>.

I argue that this memorial organization of empirical events applies analogically to the unconscious formation of types. The type of a dog, sticking with our example above, contains more “information” than what dogs in general and “objectively” are, such as how they move and eat and what they look like. Rather, “my” type of dog encompasses also “my” personal, affective experiences with dogs. For instance, “I” once had a dog as a pet, which passed away a few years ago. Since then, the notion “dog” is, for “me”, loaded with such emotive properties as sadness, nostalgia, tenderness, and so on. Since then, “my” type of dog is accordingly filled with peculiar existential and affective significance that goes beyond any objective features of this animal. Furthermore, all semantic notions and emotive vocabularies describing my personal experiences with dogs are associated with other events described by similar concepts, forming a complex network of association that enables an associative recalling of memories related to dogs through a seemingly contingent provocation. This has significant implications for pathological experiences to be discussed in part II. In a word, sedimented experiences are typified and associated with each other and grouped under a specific type not only on the basis of the resemblance of their objective features. Rather, the personal emotional meaning one attaches unconsciously to experiences might also serve as the allegedly subjective and irrational bridging member between them, such that the same type might contain (radically) different meaning for different individual subjects.

#### b) The Intersubjective Dimension

Not only personal history plays a role in the dynamic process of typification of sedimented experiences. Rather, the cultural-historical community in which one grows up and lives, constituted intersubjectively and intergenerationally, also affects the way in which one “categorizes (typifies)” part of one’s experiences. In this regard, Husserl’s distinction between homeworld (*Heimwelt*) and

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<sup>26</sup> This will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 8, where the (pathological) formation of derivatives (*Abkömmlinge*) is studied in relation to one’s subjective peculiarities. Also, chapter 6 will highlight the affective or emotional conditioning of the associative awakening of types.



alienworld (*Fremdwelt*), despite not being thematically explored by him in relation to the problem of the formation of type, is worth bringing to light (See Husserl, 2008, 157-174). Man is neither an absolute and empty ego nor an atemporal and detached observer of the world. Man is, instead, a man of culture (*Kulturmensch*) who apperceives surrounding objects first and foremost as cultural objects (*Kulturgegenstände*) with specific cultural, social and historical connotations. Correspondingly, one's typifying horizon of perception is more or less a cultural horizon essentially shaped by the personal surrounding world (*personale Umwelt*) with which one is most familiar. This world of familiarity is called by Husserl one's *Heimwelt*, which is always pregiven with and predetermined by its unique tradition and system of meaning. Thrown into and living in the *Heimwelt*, one has one's typifying horizon unconsciously shaped into a homeworld-horizon (*Heimwelthorizont*), which *can be* significantly different from horizons stemming from other worlds, viz. the *Fremdwelt*. Put more concretely, as Husserl does, type is not only a sedimented product of an individual, but also a sedimented cultural product generated and modified in the history of a culture, intergenerational (indirect) communication and contemporary interactions between the subjects within the same community. Some types cannot be "learnt" independently from one's social-cultural context, since they are essentially embedded in the pre-established system of goals and meanings. As Husserl writes (2008, 159), "*Die Typik ist nicht eine im äußeren Hantieren allein gelegene, die ich schnell auffassen mag, sondern (sie liegt auch) in dem Zwecksinn, dem typischen Vorhaben der Leute, und den Weisen, sie im Verkehr zu verwirklichen*". A type in a specific world experienced as a *Fremdwelt* cannot be grasped immediately and "once and for all". This is because its concrete meaning is left incomplete if the subject is not already familiarized with its whole cultural and historical significance in relation to the world – the intersubjectively and intergenerationally constituted community. Each peculiar world takes part in the shaping of the peculiar world-horizon (*Welthorizont*) of the individual subjects living in it.

The world in which "I" live is "my" *Heimwelt*, the generative ground of "my" types. It is a world always familiar for me (*mir vertraut*) and has for me "an apperceptive sense in advance (*im Voraus einen apperzeptiven Sinn*)", which indicates a *telos* of possible experience and knowledge (Husserl, 2008, 160). Cultural objects have their meaning as the representation or fulfilment of particular meaning of purpose (*Zwecksinn*) shared by the whole tradition, which is basically a system of purposes (*Zwecksystem*) constituted by past generations and inherited by future ones. This system might be a complex of sedimented beliefs, habits, values, and so on, which remain at least partly unintelligible for people from the *Fremdwelt*. When one comes into touch with a *Fremdwelt*, what one has to learn is not merely the individual types but, more importantly, the whole cultural world understood as such a complex system. As Husserl writes, "I have to reach the point of appropriating for myself, like a Chinese person, the Chinese concrete life-world with its living past, and later, of course, also with the living future horizon that flows along with it inherently" (Husserl, 2008, 162-3,

my translation)<sup>27</sup>. In a word, an individual subject's typifying horizon is formed on the ground of one's world-horizon within a *Heimwelt*, and the former can be best understood with reference to the latter.

To be sure, complete intelligibility and familiarity of a tradition is impossible, even if it is the tradition of one's *Heimwelt*. At the same time, this partial familiarity implies the room for changes and enrichments of a tradition: "through all of the unintelligibility there runs nonetheless a unity of the traditionality – a unity of the surrounding world with its type that is partly already familiar and partly to be further developed through appropriation" (Husserl, 2008, 161, my translation)<sup>28</sup>. Some types, for example those related to the educational system, are more familiar to "me" since "I" personally take part in it by working in academia<sup>29</sup>. One's *Heimwelt* encompasses numerous layers of horizon (one's family, educational background, circle of friends, career, etc.) that significantly condition the typification of one's experiences. The endless dispute between Asians and Germans about whether or not "toast" is a kind of "bread" (whether it can be grouped under the type of toast) is an interesting and simple example of culture's on the formation of type, which could not be explained purely in terms of the "objective" differences and similarities between toast and bread. The individuality, historicity and plasticity of types eventually imply the potentiality of their pathological modification for persons who, for instance, are raised in an unfavourable environment of discouraging parents and fellows. This will be the theme of chapter 7.

### c) The "Egoic" Dimension

The two dimensions discussed above are located in the sphere of *passivity* and foreground *subpersonal* factors in the formation of types, without the ego's spontaneous involvement. In this section, we will move to the sphere of *activity* where the "freedom" intrinsic to the spontaneous acts of the ego is brought into light. Briefly put, egoic freedom enables the construction of "new" types corresponding to the subject's personal interest.

The general distinction, which is emphasized above all in *EU*, between pre-predicative experience as originary passivity and predicative judgement as spontaneous activity of the ego should be addressed in advance. According to Husserl, in pre-predicative experience, the connection between objects is always that of a "material community" grounded in the unity of sensuous intuition that is

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<sup>27</sup> "Ich müsste dahin kommen, wie ein Chinese die chinesische konkrete Lebensumwelt mit ihrer darin beschlossenen lebendigen Vergangenheit mir zuzueignen, und danach natürlich auch den lebendigen Zukunftshorizont, der ihr strömend mitzugehört."

<sup>28</sup> „durch alle Unverständlichkeiten geht doch hindurch eine Einheit der Traditionalität- eine Einheit der Umwelt mit ihrer teils schon vertrauten, teils in Aneignung fortzubildenden Typik.“

<sup>29</sup> It also follows that the personal engagement presupposes, on the one hand, a general pre-understanding of the field in its surrounding world, and implies, on the other hand, one's potentiality to contribute to its enrichment. The reciprocal determination of the individual subject and the intersubjective community is another issue I cannot delve into within the scope of the current work.

“only a question of similarity or likeness” (Husserl, 1973a, 249). That is to say, in the sphere of passivity, only similar contents in actual temporal-spatial positions are connected, forming a homogeneity of materials. The connection of contents adheres exclusively to the principle of objective likeness and similarity, such that the possibility of “free construction” is ruled out here. In contrast, predicative acts initiated by the spontaneity of the ego are capable of going beyond the relation of likeness and similarity and thus of connecting different non-sensuous objectivities together “freely”. Describing the syntactical form of connection, Husserl writes (1973a, 248): “...and since we can colligate everything and anything we please, this implies that this form of connection is completely independent of the conditions of homogeneity – at least of the relations of being like and unlike”. Specifically, the act of judgement can be characterized simply as a “putting-in-relation” - guided by the subject’s own “interest” - of two or more independent objects. The following three forms of modification of judgment illustrate the “freedom” of egoic acts in this specific sense.

The first form is the *substantivation* that transforms a “is-judgment” into a “has-judgment” (See Husserl, 1973a, 220-3). In the sphere of passivity, the explication of the attributes of an object results in the partial apprehension of *p* (an attribute) as belonging to *S* (the substrate), or that *S* is (present) in one of its particularities *p*. Here, no form of predicative judgment is involved. However, based on the sense apprehended passively in the pre-predicative explication, the ego is then able to constitute a thematic judgement *S is p*, such as “*S is red*”. As the next step, the predicate *p* or *red* can be substantivated and the whole judgement transformed into “*S has redness*”. Through this modification, the attribute *p*, originally a dependent moment of *S*, is now substantivated as an independent objectivity. The possible result is, eventually, the substantivated independent moment of *redness* being grasped as an individual type, which can be further connected with other types in the network of association in either farther or closer relationships. We could imagine that something else (like *N*) with the same property *redness* might not only draw the subject’s attention but also awaken in it the object *S* by virtue of the bridging member of *redness*, which was constituted as a component of the network of types. Substantivation “creates”, in this way, new types that were formerly facets of objects which were barely thematized.

Another form of modification of judgement is *contraction* of its propositional form into attributive form (See Husserl, 1973a, 227-9). The simplest form of propositional judgement is composed of independent clauses of determinations that are of equal interest for the judging subject: “*S is p, q, r, etc.*” Depending on the cognitive interest of the subject thereafter, the proposition can be divided into main and subordinate clauses, for instance, “*S is q*” as the main clause and “*S is p*” as the subordinate. This division can then be formulated by means of a relative clause sentence, “*S, which is p, is q*”, where the ego is directed toward the synthesis of identification in a double ray. The relative clause can, however, further be modified (contracted) into an attributive form: *Sp*, such that the whole statement is now expressed as “*Sp is q*”. Put otherwise, *predication* is transformed into *attribution*.

The subject, *S*, which was formerly the subject of a predicate, *p*, becomes the subject of an attributive determination, *Sp*. That is, the “original predicative position *S is p* is here contracted still further”, such that *S* and *p* are no longer parts of a spontaneously constituted synthesis, but instead are contracted, such that “*S* is taken immediately as *p*” (Husserl, 1973a, 230). *Sp* is henceforth immediately and passively given whenever *S* is thought of. *S*, then, as a type, is enriched by *p* through the modification of judgement as such. The contraction and enrichment of the type *S* can proceed further by constituting “*Spqr*” as a unity, one which was originally nothing but a spontaneous synthesis. Crucially, such contraction is not necessarily – or in most cases not - a rational decision, but instead arises from the ego’s “contingent” (unconsciously motivated by one’s personal experiences, culturalization, etc.) putting-into-relation of objects. For instance, a rope (*S*) can be perceived immediately as either an ordinary tool (*p*) of a repair shop or as something related to torture and punishment (*qrs*), depending on the subject’s personal experiences and, correspondingly, which determinations are contracted with the subject-type. It follows that in the associative awakening of type, not only the presently given *S*’ is able to awaken the type *S* given their objective likeness. Rather, an attribute *p*’ (belonging to *V*, for example), might likewise awaken the attributive determination *p* that is “accidentally” contracted with *S*, such that, eventually, the type of *S*, instead of *V*, is awakened as a result of the former constitution of *S* as the unity *Sp*. Given the possibility of contracting different subject-types with “contingent” determinations, the potentiality of the pathological modification of types into so-called derivatives (*Abkömmlinge*) is provided with a theoretical and phenomenological basis (See chapter 7).

Finally, there is also the constitution of *set* (*Menge*) by virtue of the productive spontaneity of the ego-subject (See Husserl, 1973a, 244-8). In the domain of passivity, there is unquestionably already the possibility of plural contemplation that takes multiple things together. However, the “unity of taking-together, of collection (of plural objects)” brought about by this act does *not* constitute the multiple objects as *one*. They are still regarded as two independent objects toward which the subject turns consecutively, one after another. The subject turns toward to one of them *and then* to another, while retaining the previous one in grasp, leading to an apprehension of objects in the complex form *A, B, C*, etc. Such a complex form of *A, B, C* is not grasped immediately as a unity until an active and spontaneous constitution comes into force. Here, the ego-subject actively initiates a retrospective apprehension (*rückgreifendes Erfassen*) by thematizing the pre-constituted plurality - the collective synthesis “*A, B, C*” - itself. Only when the latter is thematically apprehended by a synthetically unified consciousness, it is constituted as a “new” object, namely, a *unity* [*A, B, C*]. The three objects are henceforth given as a genuine “set” or unity rather than as three consecutively apprehended objects. Similar to the contraction of substratum and determinations above, the constitution of set also implies the possibility of grouping “contingent” objects together under a type, a grouping that might remain unintelligible for other subjects.

The three forms of modification of judgement elucidated above do not only demonstrate the numerous and subjectively motivated variations in the formation of types, but they also lay bare the phenomenological foundation for the pathological modification of types. The latter goes beyond Husserl's studies and points rather to such Freudian ideas as contraction (*Verdichtung*) and displacement (*Verschiebung*), especially when phenomena such as dreams and neurosis are concerned. Briefly defined, contraction means "a disposition to form new unities from the elements that we, upon reflection, would have definitely set apart (*eine Neigung, neue Einheiten zu bilden aus Elementen, die wir im Nachgedanken gewiss auseinandergehalten hätten*)" (Freud, 1953, 26, my translation). There are elements or objects which are supposed to be separated from each other. However, thanks to the creative character of human phantasies, wishes, desires, as well as unconscious past experiences, certain elements are combined together in an apparently "contingent" manner. This process realizes the practical possibility that, as mentioned above, one element is accidentally entwined with another, and associatively awakens an originally "irrelevant" elements within the subject's network of association. As Freud writes regarding the dream-work, "...consequently, a single element of the manifest dream often represents a whole series of latent dream-thoughts, as if it were an allusion common to all of them" (Freud, 1953, 26-7, my translation)<sup>30</sup>. This happens, I will argue in part II, not only in dreams but also in a waking state through the formation of a network of "abnormal" types, viz. of derivatives. What has been described in this section, namely, the subjective, idiosyncratic, "irrational" and egoic factors that significantly condition the formation of types, demonstrates not only the essential individual variability of types but also lays down the fundament for a phenomenological description of pathological lived-experiences.

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<sup>30</sup> „...demzufolge vertritt oft ein einziges Element des manifesten Traumes eine ganze Anzahl von latenten Traumgedanken, als wäre es eine allen gemeinsame Anspielung.“

## Chapter Four: The Sphere of Affect – Sedimentation and Mood (*Stimmung*)

### 4.1 Two Forms of Mood and their Relationship to Sedimentation

The foregoing chapter explored the *intellectual* manifestation of sedimentation as type in the conscious sphere of understanding. Following that, the current chapter delves into the *affective* manifestation of sedimentation as mood in the sphere of affect (*Gemütssphäre*). The sphere of affect designates subjectivity's affective-axiological intentional relationship to the world. Unlike representing-thinking intentionality that aims most primarily at the sheer "objective" or *sachhaltig* perception of the being (*Sein*) of objects, affective intentionality is first and foremost an act of emotive consciousness that constitutively apprehends the value-being (*Wertsein*) of things. Whereas the former is an apprehensive act of simple perception (*schlichte Wahrnehmung*) or simple apperception (*schlichte Apperzeption*), the latter is termed by Husserl an act of value-ception (*Wertnehmung*) or value-apperception (*Wertapperzeption*). This distinction is made most emphatically by Husserl in the second volume of the *Studien*, which is dedicated to the study of feeling-valuing intentionality. He distinguishes at the very beginning of the volume between the empirical perception directed towards determinations of things (*Sachbestimmtheiten*) and value-ception directed towards determinations of values (*Wertbestimmtheiten*) (Husserl, 2020, 1-11). In the latter case, the value- and emotive characters of things are interwoven and each of them is apprehended by the subject through and together with the other. For instance, the emotive characters of thing, such as its being favourable or unfavourable (*gefallen oder missfallen*) for the subject, reveal, and are grasped together with, the value-characters of loveliness or unloveliness (*schön oder unschön*)<sup>31</sup> of the thing concerned.

Based on a number of textual testimonies in Husserl's manuscripts, this chapter attempts to unveil a specific sense of mood that has its genetic origin in sedimentations. Mood is closely related to the subjective feelings and objective emotive characters of things, which belong to the sphere of affect of consciousness, yet it is conceptually differentiated from them. As the phenomenological notion of mood is susceptible to confusion with other terms such as feelings and emotions, which are by themselves equivocal, a tripartite schematization of *feelings* (*Gefühle*) understood in the broadest sense will first be devised. It should be noted that, from a static point of view, the following three senses of feelings are conceived of within the founding-founded schema (*Fundierungsschema*), where the ones at the lower level found those at the upper level unidirectionally. From a genetic standpoint,

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<sup>31</sup> "Dieser Wert ist nicht etwas für sich, viel mehr 'durch' das Gefallen konstituiert sich ein erweiterter Gegenstand, der nun das Wertprädikat hat, in sich schließt" (Husserl, 2020, 2). A controversial issue remains as whether value-characters are constituted "through" feelings and based on the latter, or, conversely, feelings are aroused by value-characters that are intentionally apprehended. A preliminary answer to this question would be the two are fundamentally interwoven and no intentional, temporal, or ontological primacy should be attributed to one over another.

however, they are always intertwined with each other such that even those at the upper level keeps conditioning those at the lower level.

To the most fundamental layer of empirical apperception belong the *Gefühlsmomente* or *Gefühlsempfindungen*, viz. the (sensory) feeling-moments or -sensations, which are the subjective contents of the empirical sensations (*sinnliche bzw. empirische Empfindungen*) stimulated by non- or pre-constituted sensory things. Pre-constituted objects give themselves as the most elementary sensuous hyletic moments, such as colours, tones, warmth, etc. These hyletic moments, which are not yet constituted as an intelligibly synthetic object, are identified as the apprehension-content (*Auffassungsinhalt*) within the schema of apprehension/apprehension-content elucidated in the *logischen Untersuchungen* (See the Sixth Investigation, section 17). They await the apprehensive act of the subject through which alone they are constituted as a meaningful object. As un- or pre-constituted, however, the sensuous hyletic moments already arouse the most elementary feeling-moments from the subjective side, such as pleasure and unpleasure (*Lust und Unlust*). The latter are merely feeling-sensations that are not directed toward a *constituted* object but rather toward the unconstituted sensation-content (*Empfindungsinhalt*), viz. the hyletic data. The pleasure aroused in front of a cake, for instance, is the pleasure “about (*an*)” a lovely “visual form” or a “lovely colour,” which is how the cake gives itself as such. By contrast, as will be elaborated in the coming paragraph, the *Gefallen* is already at the next level and is “about” the colour-property *of the object* or the *object itself* as constituted<sup>32</sup>. At the most elementary level, the feeling-moments are nothing but the subjective correlates of the pre-given, scattered hyletic data of things. As Husserl writes (2020, 5, my translation), “the sensory adumbrations of the appearing thingly characteristics are, so to speak, overlaid by the fused feeling-unities (*die sinnlichen Empfindungsabschattungen der erscheinenden dinglichen Merkmale sind sozusagen belegt mit verschmolzenen Gefühlseinheiten*)”. These unities serve as the indispensable sensuous foundation for the subsequent empirical apperception.

The *apprehended* objects, then, arouse “spiritual” feelings ( “*geistige*” *Gefühle*) in the subject such as the feelings of liking (*Gefallen*), disliking (*Missfallen*), joy (*Freude*), sadness (*Traue*) and so on. Intentionally directed towards the object, those feelings in turn “lend (*verleihen*)” a certain emotional colouring (*Gemütsfärbung*) to the constituted object, by means of which the object is now apprehended not merely in terms of its being but also its emotive character *as* joyful or not joyful, for instance. In Husserl’s words, “...the empirical object and the state of affair receive an affective colouration. The object stands there as joyful or joyless (*...der empirische Gegenstand, der Sachverhalt erhalte eine Gemütsfärbung. Der Gegenstand steht da als erfreulich oder unerfreulich*)“ (Husserl, 2020, 9, my translation). The affective attributes (*Bestimmtheiten*) of an

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<sup>32</sup> „Ebenso die Lust an einer schönen visuellen Form oder einer schönen Farbe, aber ,so, wie sie sich gerade darstellt‘; das Gefallen an der Farbeigenschaft des Gegenstandes oder an der Formeigenschaft des Gegenstandes sowie am Gegenstand selbst...“ (Husserl, 2020, 57)

object are hence constituted as the objective correlates of the subject's spiritual feelings. At the same time, the value-characters of the object are also apprehended through value-ception. According to the *Gefallen* or *Missfallen* of the subject towards the object in question, the latter is apprehended in terms of its value-character as *schön* or *unschön*, *wertvoll* or *wertlos*, for instance. As such, both the axiological and affective characters of the object are constituted on the basis of empirical apperception based on empirical sensations, viz. the most elementary layer of feelings.

At the “highest” level – statically speaking – there is *mood* (*Stimmung*), an affective “state of mind (*Gemütszustand*)” that lasts and permeates the entire conscious sphere of the subjectivity even when a specific intentional entity is missing. Mood does not require any concrete entity as its intentional correlate in order to exist as a pervasively affective background of all intentional acts. Taken from the subjective side, mood is usually conceived of as the “remaining (*Verbleiben*)” of a specific spiritual feeling or a *unity* of manifold feelings lived through and sedimented in the past. It can hence also be described as the affective sedimentation that keeps haunting the subject in its ongoing conscious experiences. This will be further elaborated in the following sections. Taken from the objective side, the subject's mood “lends” a specific emotional colouring to the objects that are given, such that an object appears as something more than an object of perception and of value but rather one that bears in itself a specific affective significance. For the objects, mood is a “borrowed” or “transferred” splendour that falls upon them, as some scholars describe it (Quijano, 2018, 55).

In what follows, a closer phenomenological inspection of the mood will be carried out from three aspects. Firstly, the phenomenological difference between *feelings* (spiritual feelings) and *mood* will be examined in terms of: i) the exact meaning of the “emotional colouring” featured in both of them and its relationship to the objective determination (*gegenständliche Bestimmtheit*) of objects, and ii) the peculiar form or nature of intentionality that characterizes feelings and mood respectively. Secondly, I suggest differentiating between two “kinds” of mood, a differentiation that is not addressed thematically by Husserl but is implied in his writings. The distinction is specifically important to the understanding of the relationship between mood and sedimentation. In particular, the question of whether or not mood's alleged function of “colouring of life” belongs exclusively to the sphere of affect or the emotive side of consciousness will be discussed. Thirdly, Heidegger's account of mood and attunement (*Befindlichkeit*), as one of the most crucial phenomenological contributions to the study of the affective dimension of human subjectivity, will be examined. The Heideggerian existential-ontological analysis of mood does not only complements the Husserlian account but also sheds light on the latter's specific concern, namely, the historicity of the subject as manifested in the affective sphere.

#### a) „Gefühle“ vs. „Stimmung“



Both feelings and mood are characterized by their “function” of granting an “emotional colouring (*Gemütsfärbung*)” to objects, whereby an affective splendour radiating specifically from the object(s) in question is immediately discernible as they are given to the individual subject. The affective apperception (*Gemütsapperzeption*) is thus phenomenologically distinguished from simple perception in that the object is apprehended with an distinctively emotive character: “the empirical objectivity receives ‘colourations’ and is apprehended affectively [but not empirically again] (*die empirische Gegenständlichkeit erhält ‚Färbungen‘, wird gemütsmäßig [aber nicht wieder empirisch] aufgefasst*)” (Husserl, 2020, 10, my translation). The question is, however, how the emotional colouring or affective splendour of the objects are to be understood in terms of their ontological status and their relationship to the object itself. Does such colouring *belong to* the object as its objective quality (*gegenständliche Beschaffenheit*), or is it merely apprehensible through the exclusively subjective “lens” of the particular individual? This question is in urgent need of phenomenological clarification as Husserl writes: “[through the mood] each and every thing has its rosy gleam when I am in a joyful mood, but it has it *not as its very own gleam* ([durch die Stimmung] jederlei Sache hat ihren rosigen Schimmer, wenn ich in froher Stimmung bin, *aber nicht als Eigenschimmer*)” (Husserl, 2020, 64, my translation and emphasis). Through the mood of the subject, things acquire a special glimmer shining forth, a glimmer that, however, is *not* a glimmer “of their own”. This leads us to the fundamental difference between the emotional colouring constituted by feelings (and affective apperception) and that constituted by mood.

Put straightforwardly, *feelings* and the corresponding objective correlates, apprehended by affective value-ception, *do* belong to the object itself and are constituted as *its* emotive characters. The latter is based on and intertwined with the value-characters of the object in question. The value-characters are constituted “through” spiritual feelings (*Gefallen, Missfallen*, etc.)<sup>33</sup> and, conversely, the axiological properties contained in the object as its value-predicates arise from and intensify the subject’s affective response of *Gefallen* or *Missfallen* towards it. The intentional act of affective apperception simultaneously constitutes the value- and feeling-predicates of the object as its objective determinations. The feeling-predicates - or what Husserl (2020, 15) terms feeling-moments (*Gefühlsmomente*) and feeling-character (*Gefühlscharakter*) - fundamentally make up the objective determinations of the object along with all other determinations. This assertion finds its explicit expression in Husserl’s writings, for instance: “the colour colours, the colour is the determination of the object and belongs to its content (*die Farbe färbt, die Farbe ist Bestimmung des Gegenständlichen, gehört zu seinem Inhalt...*)” (Husserl, 2020, 9, my translation). That the emotional colouration is *more than* a merely subjective projection upon the object is also asserted by other scholars. Admitting that the colouration is “in the (transcendent) object”, Quijano (2018, 53) clearly writes, “the light lies in the object; it colours it, gives it a character, and radiates from it. It is not the

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<sup>33</sup> Please refer to footnote #31

enchantment in the subject that throws light to the object. The colouration is an objective character". In a word, feelings are always intentionally directed toward a particular entity in the thematic field of consciousness, and they constitutively grant the entity affective determinations. This marks one of the essential differences between feelings and mood, as will be seen below.

The moment when the subject turns away (*sich abwenden*) from the "original" object that was affectively intended, the concrete *feeling* that was once intentionally directed towards it is now transformed into a pervasive background *mood* of the subject. Mood, just like an intentional feeling, also lends objects an affective appearance. Thanks to a joyful mood, for instance, "each and every thing receives a rosy gleam, a character of joyfulness (*alles und jedes erhält einen rosigen Schimmer, einen Freudigkeitscharakter*)" (Husserl, 2020, 66, my translation). The problem is that it is not immediately clear whether or not such a "joyful character" makes up the objective determination of the things in question. To this question, scholars tend to offer a negative answer. Quijano suggests that the splendour, the colouration an object attains through mood is "borrowed, transferred" in the sense that the colouration ("character of sentiment") is not truly "required" by the content or value of the object itself (Quijano, 2018, 55). Rather, a mood, unlike an intentional feeling, spreads and transfers (*übertragen*) itself to all surrounding objects *indifferently* without any specific entity thematically intended. It is not a single entity that is apprehended in its emotive character but rather "the whole world" receives a unique splendour through transference of one's particular mood. Quijano hesitates to *explicitly* deny the objective character of the affective glimmering the objects attain through the mood. However, given that the colouration conferred by mood is (by its nature) not required by the specific content of a specific object itself, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the transferred splendour is not a splendour that radiates *from* the object itself, and hence it does not make up the latter's objective determination. With less hesitation some other scholars deny the objective character of the emotional colouration lent by the mood. Speaking of the transcendental significance of instinct (*Trieb*), Pugliese assigns a similar function to both instinct and mood, namely, the affective shaping (*Gestaltung*) of the surrounding world. Just like mood, the (repressed) instincts of the subject allow the world to appear differently, as Husserl writes: "...I have not smoked for 9 days. The world appears to me in a really strange way... (...Seit 9 Tagen rauche ich nicht mehr. *Die Welt mutet sich sehr fremdartig an...*)" (Pugliese, 2009, 150 from Husserl's „Sanatorium an Heidegger – 30. I. 1928", my translation and emphasis). In this respect, Pugliese explicitly affirms that the change in the world's manner of appearing does not imply the change of its objective properties (*objektive Merkmale*), but rather merely the change of its emotional colouring and imprinting (*emotionale Färbung und Prägung*) (ibid.). The distinction between the affective way of givenness of things (granted by mood) and their affective properties (granted by concrete spiritual feelings) is thus foregrounded, as Jaspers also suggested in his description of *Wahnstimmung*. According to him, the world appears for the schizophrenic patients in an uncanny and unfamiliar manner. The environment is given differently.

However, none of the objective and sensuous properties of perception are altered or removed. Rather, what is changed is nothing but the (affective) significance (*Bedeutsamkeit*) of the surroundings that appear to the subject under “an uncertain and uncanny lighting (*eine ungewisse, unheimliche Beleuchtung*)” (Jaspers, 1973, 82). In other words, mood - be it an ordinary joyful mood or the schizophrenic delusional mood (*Wahnstimmung*) - does cast a peculiar light upon things in the subject’s surrounding world, yet without constituting the latter’s objective determinations.

Besides the enigma with regard to the objective/non-objective determinations of things, the *intentional character* or the form of *intentionality* marks another essential difference between feelings and moods. Presuming that moods, despite not being intentionally directed towards any *single* concrete entity, do nonetheless have a specific kind of intentionality inherent in them, the task that follows is then to identify the intentional correlate or noematic content that belongs to feelings and moods respectively. Modifying Brentano and Geiger’s thesis on the intentionality of feelings, according to which the *being-felt* (the joyfulness of the object, for instance) of an object is apperceived through the *feeling* (the joyful feeling of the subject) itself, Husserl cautiously describes the intentionality of feelings as a kind of “objective directedness (*gegenständlich Gerichtetsein*)” (Husserl, 2020, 149). He flatly denies the apprehensive function of feeling itself and writes, “I have never said that a joy ‘grasps’ like a representation does (*das habe ich nie gesagt, dass die Freude ,erfasst‘, wie eine Vorstellung erfasst*)”. Rather, “I speak of an objective directedness, such that liking or pleasure demands the relationship to the pleasing according to its specific nature (*wohl spreche ich von einem gegenständlich Gerichtetsein, etwa, dass Gefallen seinem spezifischen Wesen nach die Beziehung auf ein Gefallendes fordere*)” (ibid.). Whereas feelings depict the “inward” affective arousal in the subject (in the face of certain objects), the *act* of value-ception directs itself “outwardly” and constitutively to the objects at issue. A feeling itself does not apprehend like a representation in the sense that it does not constitute any affective and value-attributes that belong objectively to things. It is rather the *act* of value-ception that apprehends the value-characters of an object together with the specific feelings that are aroused or accompany the act simultaneously. It is, however, still legitimate to speak of the intentionality of feelings in the sense that, by their essence, feelings must be feelings *about something*, viz. are always intentionally directed towards a specific object or, specifically, its emotional and value-characters<sup>34</sup>. “Joy (*Die Freude*)”, for instance, “is joy *about* beauty (*ist Freude über die Schönheit*)” (Husserl, 2020, 103, my translation and emphasis), and aversion is *about* wickedness (of an object). Hence, feelings always have a clearly identifiable

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<sup>34</sup> It does not mean, however, that feeling-acts are necessarily dependent on objectifying acts. It is not the case that the latter has to constitute *in advance* the very being of the object, and *on top of that* such attributes as values and feelings are “added”. The founding-founded schema is always in the focus of dispute. In chapter 6, the essential intertwinement between different kinds of intentional acts will be discussed in greater detail.

objective reference (*gegenständlicher Bezug*) as their intentional correlate, namely, a single entity with its values and affects.

Mood, unlike a concrete feeling, is a vague and pervasive feeling-background (*Gefühlshintergrund*) of the subject, an affective tonal ground in which the subject “finds itself (*sich befinden*). As nothing more than a “background” of consciousness, mood is often questioned regarding its possession of any kind of intentionality. Geiger, for example, describes the pervasiveness of certain feelings – a pervasiveness highly resembling that which characterizes the moods – that absorbs, imbues, and swallows the whole field of consciousness. He asserts that, absorbed by such pervading feelings, consciousness is doomed to lose its “objective orientation” - that is, its intentionality (Averchi, 2015, 75) - because the affectively overloaded consciousness is no longer able to thematically intend or identify any objective reference of such an overwhelming flood of feelings.

Geiger’s description as such is questionable, as the lack of objective reference (of a single entity) does not necessarily imply the lack of intentionality. In its most fundamental sense, intentionality designates the *aboutness* of consciousness and its various acts: the seeing about the seen, hearing about the heard, hate about the hated, love about the beloved, etc. In most cases, a single entity serves as the objective reference or intentional correlate of an intentional act of consciousness. Moods stand out as a difficult case since they retain their intentionality despite their very lack of objective reference in the ordinary sense: Husserl explicitly writes that (2020, 103, my translation) “mood, nonetheless, always preserves an ‘intentionality’ (*dabei behält aber die Stimmung immer eine ‚Intentionalität‘*)”. Upon closer examination, the intentionality that belongs to moods is shown to be the one that is of a special nature, namely, an affective horizon-intentionality. Mood spreads an emotive light all over the surrounding world and the things in it, granting them an affective mode of givenness to a particular subject. Husserl (2020, 103, my translation) characterizes the spreading-over and transference of moods clearly, writing that: “,...a good mood lets everything appear under a nice light; it makes one inclined to find joyfulness everywhere...if there entered once a joyful reaction through an object A apprehended as value, then there is now the tendency for other value-objects also to fill me with joy and to bring forth such joyful reaction...”<sup>35</sup>. Sometimes, a particular mood does not only shed a light on the surroundings, but it can even “oppress (*niederhalten*)” other feelings or moods to become the dominant one, such that everything shines exclusively through the particular light of either joyfulness, melancholy, hopefulness, or despair, and so on. It thus becomes clear that moods *do* have as their intentional reference *the entire surrounding world* rather than any prominent objects. The intentionality of mood turns out to be an *aboutness* directed towards the world in its entirety as an all-encompassing field of experience. As Ramirez (2015, 96) puts it, “moods have an

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<sup>35</sup> „...eine gute Stimmung lässt alles in schönem Licht erscheinen, macht geneigt, überall Erfreuliches zu finden...ist einmal durch ein als Wert erfasstes Objekt A eine Freudenreaktion eingetreten, so besteht die Tendenz dafür, dass andere Wertobjekte mich auch in Freude versetzen, diese Freudenreaktion hervorrufen...”

intentional reference, not in a way of direct or objective reference, but rather a reference to the world as a background or horizon”.

The phenomenological exploration above illuminates not only the difference between feelings and moods, but also the special “function”, significance and phenomenological characters of moods. To summarize, mood is a pervasive feeling-background against which the subject carries out its intentional acts and lives through things. Through mood, the objects of experience radiate an affective splendour, which is not founded “originally” in the objects themselves but rather “borrowed” from the mood in which the subject finds itself. As a result, this splendour, unlike the affective and axiological properties constituted by the act of value-ception, does not make up the objective determinations of an object. On the other hand, moods are characterized by a form of intentionality essentially distinguished from that which belongs to feelings and other intentional acts (perception, imagination, etc.). They have, namely, the whole surrounding world as their intentional reference. Here, it is worth remarking that these two characteristics of moods entail the potentiality for their pathological modification and manifestation (See chapter 8).

#### b) Two Forms of *Stimmung* and their Respective Relationship to Sedimentation

In the *Studien*, Husserl managed to offer an elaborate account of the moods in terms of their phenomenological functions, intentionality, and so on. However, what is left unthematized, yet remains conceptually crucial, is the subtle distinction between the two kinds of moods enunciated below.

The first form of moods is the “*remaining (Verbleiben)*” or “*lingering (Nachklingen)*” of a particular feeling. Mood in this sense is, above all, a transformation and modified manifestation of a previous feeling once aroused by and directed towards an object in an actual experience just passed. Despite the object no longer existing in the present field of experience, its affective traces in the subject do not completely disappear in a single blow. Rather, they are temporarily retained thanks to the eidetic structure of retention of temporal consciousness. As retained, the feeling in question is transformed into a corresponding mood of the subject, whose world is then coated with an emotive colouring. Husserl offers a concrete illustration of this transformation of particular feeling into a temporary mood. “I” am, for example, in a conversation with a lovely person. During the conversation, “I” affectively apperceive her loveliness of her, which causes in me a pleasant feeling in which “I” am immersed in that present. After the person left and the conversation ended, the actual object of values and emotions (the lovely person) is no longer present in the current field of experience. Nonetheless, the pleasant *feeling* that was once aroused and lived through is still retained, lingering in me in the form of a pleasant *mood* that spreads over other things in my surrounding. As Husserl describes (2020, 102, my translation): “The joyfulness can still linger on for a long time. I am still in full feather when I turn towards other persons, etc. (*Die Freude kann noch lange nachklingen*).

*Ich bin noch in gehobener Stimmung, wenn ich mich anderen Personen zuwende, etc.)*“). As long as the subject still finds itself in this pervasive, pleasant mood left over by the previous experience, everything it encounters subsequently appears to it under a peculiarly joyful, positive affective light. This temporary lingering of a feeling makes up the first form of mood.

As far as the problem of sedimentation is concerned, a deliberate reflection reveals that this form of mood is based exclusively on the retentional structure of temporal consciousness and has barely anything to do with sedimentation in its proper sense. The particular feeling is simply *retained as* the corresponding mood, without first being sedimented *before* its manifestation as the pervasive feeling-background. It is a lingering of the present (that is fading away) rather than a reactivating or reawakening of what is already past. Retained as “something-just-past” and yet “still-in-grasp” for a moment, the mood transformed from a single previous feeling structurally resembles the “still-being-retained-in-grasp (*Noch-im-Griff-Behalten*)” that characterizes all other kinds of pre-reflective and reflective experiences whatsoever. Husserl refers to such a concrete feeling that remains uninterrupted in the conscious sphere as the “core-feeling (*Kerngefühl*)”, one that extends and spreads itself all over (*“Wir haben hier ein Kerngefühl, das sich erweitert und verbreitet...”*) (Husserl, 2020, 113). Propagating itself in the form of a subjective mood, the affective background or “feeling-mood” in this sense is not the result of sedimented experiences, precisely since it is *not yet and never has been* sedimented before the moment of its manifestation. Rather, this kind of mood *is currently* undergoing a retentional process, which in the course of time leads it eventually to the sedimented field of experience.

The second sense of mood then comes to fore as the *unified affective tonality consisting of manifold “feelings of life (*Lebensgefühle*)”*. This form of mood is truly rooted in sedimented experience and is a genuine manifestation of the latter. Such unified affective tonality is no longer the lingering of a single, identifiable feeling that had an actual objective reference in the past and that fades gradually away from the present. Rather, it is a temporally extended, unitary and pervasive stream of feelings originating in numerous lived-experiences from the past. The scattered, chaotic yet unconditionally preserved feelings that accompany each and every (significant) life-event of the individual are sedimented into the latent sphere of consciousness, where they are dynamically interwoven with each other and create a unique “attunement” that belongs solely to the individual subject itself. This affective tonality composed of one’s personal histories constitutes the most fundamental mood of an individual, which subtly shapes its further experiences in an affective way. As a result of its complexity and bewildering nature, there is hardly any identifiable single “cause” located in a specific time and space for this fundamental mood. It remains, as Husserl describes, mostly unconscious and unthematic by nature: “Hence all the diverse life-feelings in ‘unconscious’ form, the totality of feelings that accompany the rhythm of life, are unthematic (*So sind all die mannigfaltigen Lebensgefühle ‘unbewusster’ Art, die den Rhythmus des Lebens begleitenden*

*Gesamtgefühle, unthematisch*)“ (Husserl, 2020, 159, my translation). Not only the fundamental mood itself but also its very “origin” is of an unconscious nature - for the latter is found precisely in the entire stream of one’s past experiences, which, though indistinctly sedimented, still exert an indirect affective influence by shaping the overall attunement or colouration of an individual’s soul. This could be characterized as affective sedimentation in the truest sense. Unlike the first form of mood explicated above, the overall affective tonality of an individual is barely susceptible to an exhaustive phenomenological exposition in terms of its experiential contents and motivating principles. Made up of the manifold sedimented feelings of life since time immemorial, this form of mood is a “confusing background (*verworrener Hintergrund*)”, “a sheer passivity and chaos (*die bloße Passivität, das Chaos*)” (Husserl, 2020, 111, 164). It is worth mentioning that despite his rationalistic optimism regarding the phenomenological method of epoché and reconstruction, Husserl expresses hesitation and even contradictory statements with regard to the possibility of a phenomenological explication of the “grounds/causes (*Gründe*)” of mood in this sense. On the one hand, he writes, “Concerning the question of the ground of cheerfulness, it could be the case that I no longer remember this or that, and that I am not capable of stating all the causes or even of offering particular causes (*Auf die Frage nach dem Grund der Fröhlichkeit kann es sein, dass ich mich des einen oder anderen nicht mehr erinnere, nicht alle Gründe angebe und vielleicht gar keine bestimmten Gründe anzuführen vermag*)“ (Husserl, 2020, 182, my translation). The manifoldness involved in affective sedimentations basically rules out an exhaustive recollection and reconstruction of all its significant details. On the other hand, however, a kind of optimism that contradicts this hypothesis is preserved when it is asserted “...that mood is often formed in such a way that we can inquire and look at its motives. That it has ‘grounds’, which we could bring out from the consciousness-background, is beyond doubt (*...dass Stimmung oft so geartet ist, dass wir nachforschen können nach ihrem Motiven, dass wir ihr ansehen können, sie habe „Gründe“, Gründe, die wir aus dem Bewusstseinshintergrund hervorholen können, ist sicher*)“ (Husserl, 2020, 104, my translation). Such apparent contradiction and hesitation are not developed into a thematic exposition in the text itself, and a sophisticated study of this problem would likewise exceed the scope of our current study. It suffices, I believe, to indicate from an empirical standpoint that Husserl’s rationalistic optimism sounds relatively untenable and unrealistic. Given the indubitable complexity, manifoldness and bewildering nature of a subject’s affective sedimentations, it is more plausible to retreat to a more conservative stance, one that does not guarantee a complete recollective reconstruction of the experiential constituent parts and motives of one’s overall affective tonality.

Another crucial question to be considered with respect to the second sense of mood is raised by Quijano (2018), who contributes a fruitful study to the problem of mood and colouration in Husserl’s *Studien*. He argues that the mood in the second sense, which belongs almost exclusively to the sphere of affect, is not to be identified with the all-encompassing colouring of life. Despite

agreeing that mood, as (a) stream(s) of sentiment and unity of affective colouration, may “primarily extend to the very life of consciousness” and lend specific splendour to one’s immediate surroundings, he insists on the differentiation between mood – even denoted as *Gesamtgefühl*, *Gefühlsmilieu*, etc. – and “the total intertwining, the entire state of the soul” (Quijano, 2018, 63, 71). The latter, he argues, does not “belong to” the emotional side of consciousness but rather “embraces” it. The total intertwining of the soul, also termed by him as “the colouring of life”, is essentially something “more than” what is located or discernible in the affective sphere of consciousness. The colouring of life, or “the entire fullness of concretion of the lived-experiences of consciousness”, encompasses not only one’s emotions and moods but also its entire past, various kinds of passivities, sedimentations, habitualities, associations, and all kinds of horizons, etc. (ibid.). To this we may even add such psychical moments as (primal) drives and instincts, which some scholars describe as “the attuned aspiration (*die stimmungshafte Strebung*)” or “the darkened primal-instinctive mood (*die dunkle urinstinktive Stimmung*)” (Lee, 1993, 122, my translation).

The question of whether what is designated here as the colouring of life is limited to the so-called “emotive” side of consciousness and hence to mood finds its clarification in the critical notion of affection (*Affektion*) employed by Husserl. Affection or affective force (*affektive Kraft*) plays a crucial role in the phenomenology of association, the analysis of passive synthesis of constitution, and so on. It refers to the allure (*Reiz*), the motivating “call” or attraction exercised by anything given to the subject, which is regarded at the end as *affective* rather than purely cognitive or intellectual by nature. What motivates, attracts or repels us, what draws or escapes from our attention, is not, phenomenologically speaking, the factual and sensuous data or the objective contrast and similarity of things themselves. Rather, it is the affection or “affective radiation (*Strahlen*)” of the givenness that exercises a moving force upon consciousness. This is a fundamental phenomenological principle embraced by Husserl; he writes, for instance that “According to this methodological principle, we thus ascribe to every constituted, prominent datum that is for itself an *affective allure* [acting] on the ego” (Husserl, 2001, 211, my emphasis). All that which has the possibility of motivating or repelling the conscious subject or simply of “coming into contact” with it is affective by nature, though the notion must be understood in a much broader sense than its ordinary usage. Steinbock (2002, 246, my translation) offers a concise and illuminating definition of affection as follows: “Husserl rather understands under the notion of affection the exertion of an affective allure acting upon us, an impression from the side of the ‚object‘, a motivational demand or a drawing power that calls forth attention, which finally provokes a reaction from the region of the ego or that of knowledge...”<sup>36</sup>. It follows that, from the phenomenological perspective, the fact that we really hear, see, or smell

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<sup>36</sup> „Viel mehr versteht Husserl unter Affektion die Ausübung eines affektiven Reizes auf uns, eine Anmutung von der Seite des ‚Gegenstandes‘, eine motivatorische Aufforderung oder Aufmerksamkeit hervorrufende Anziehungskraft, die letztlich eine Reaktion aus dem Bereich des Ich oder des Wissens provoziert...”



something, is nothing but the result of affective radiation stemming from objects (Steinbock, 2002, 247).

Analogously, it is fairly legitimate to respond to Quijano's thesis by pointing out that the allegedly "non-emotive elements" (associations, habitualities, passivities, etc.) that makes up the individual's all-encompassing colouring of life must also be affective by nature, if they are attributed with a certain motivating force for the subject. A careful scrutiny of our experiences offers empirical support for this assertion. Consider, for instance, the influence of one's past upon the present. It is indeed not what "factually" happened that contributes to the colour or overall attunement of one's life. Instead, the much more decisive factor lies in the affective meaning connoted in such events, such as their traumatizing, surprising, disappointing, etc. effects. The force a particular event has upon the present subject depends to a large extent on its affective intensity and emotional significance rather than its sheer factuality. Likewise, habitualities are not act- and decision-motivating simply because they are repeated behavioural patterns. More importantly are the very feelings of familiarity and security associated with habitualities, which motivate the subject's (conscious or unconscious) repeated conformity with them, especially in unfamiliar and insecure situations. Analogously, what serves as the principle of Husserl's own analysis of the passive constitution of sense is also applicable to the characterization of mood and the colouring of life. What is prominent and potentially effective or noticeable for the subject is by nature affective. As Steinbock affirms, "...something that becomes prominent is always an affectively oriented terrain (...*etwas, was zur Abhebung kommt, ist immer affektiv angereichertes Relief*)" (Steinbock, 2002, 248; See also Husserl, 1966, 168). The apparently non-affective elements of the concrete fullness of consciousness necessarily constitute the colouring of life in an affective manner. What is referred to as the overall colouring of the soul should, therefore, be characterized as the overall *mood* of an individual, which turns out to be the affective manifestation of sedimentation.

### c) The Heideggerian Account of *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit* at a Glance

This section is not meant to conduct an in-depth comparative analysis between the Husserlian and Heideggerian notion of mood. However, a quick look at Heidegger's well-discussed account of mood and attunement in *Sein und Zeit* alongside Husserl's exposition of the same notion in the *Studien* might serve as a valuable supplement to what is at issue so far.

As explicated above, Husserl underlines the expanding and transmissive character of moods. They are destined to expand themselves into the immediate surroundings and to cast an emotive light upon them, such that the *already constituted* objects – above all, those already constituted by sheer perception – attain a new, affectively striking mode of appearing for the subject. In this sense, moods illuminate anew the surroundings that are *already given* and even vaguely constituted. By contrast, Heidegger emphasizes the existential-ontological function of mood as *Befindlichkeit*, which in the

very first place discloses (*erschließen*) or closes-off (*verschließen*) a particular existential field within a given situation - a field in which alone things *might* enter into the subject's concern and *might be* constituted. In each and every situation, according to Heidegger, there are always abundant possibilities of Being (*Seinkönnen*) that are logically and theoretically available for a Dasein subject. Nonetheless, for each individual Dasein, only a limited number of possibilities do actually come into consideration for practical actions and decisions. Mood, then, is precisely the existential structure that is responsible for the initial disclosure of this realm of possibilities, viz. for revealing what "matters" and what does not, what *might* enter into one's field of concern and attention and what never does. This essential ontological function of moods is explicated by Heidegger (2008, 175-7) as follows: "the 'bare mood' discloses the 'there' more primordially, but correspondingly it *closes* it *off* more stubbornly than any 'not-perceiving', and 'existentially' a state-of-mind [*Befindlichkeit*] implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us"<sup>37</sup>. Only through finding oneself (*sich befindet*) affectively in a particular situation, is Dasein able to submit itself to the world in a disclosive way and encounter something that truly "matters to it". This ontological function of moods is not thematically explored by Husserl in the *Studien*. Nonetheless, a few theoretical traces in this regard are discernible in his notion of *affektives Relief* mentioned above<sup>38</sup>. In *APS*, it is written that "the *affective terrain* has as the practical underlayment the structural nexus of the present... (das *affektives Relief* hat als sachliche Unterlage die Strukturzusammenhänge der Gegenwart...)" (Husserl, 1966, 168, my translation). This means that the present is affectively structured in such a way that the subject's attentive consciousness is pre-scribed (*vorzeichnen*) and shaped to be disposed to some external allures and repelled by the others. Brudzinska offers a precise understanding of this notion. Taken from the objective side, the *Relief* bespeaks the "context of the objective affectability (*Zusammenhang der objektiven Affizierbarkeit*)" (Brudzinska, 2020, 172). That is, the present field of experience is structured as a context of various possibilities of affective allure radiating from objects. Taken from the subjective side, more crucially, the *Relief* serves as the "subjective readiness to be affected (*die subjective Bereitschaft, sich affizieren zu lassen*)" (ibid.). The *affektives Relief* of the subject pre-scribes for it the readiness and the possibility to be affected by *particular* allures, depending on the subject's current interest, dispositions, lust, desire, and so on. In this sense, *affektives Relief* bears a similar ontological function as the Heideggerian *Befindlichkeit* in that it discloses and pre-delineates realm of possibilities that "matter to" the subject and that *might* become its thematic object of thought, perception, emotion, and so on. Echoing this theoretical resemblance, some scholars even explicitly attribute to moods the "function of opening the world as a universal horizon incorporating all other horizons" (Lee, 1998, 114-5). Thus understood, moods in

<sup>37</sup> „Die bloße Stimmung erschließt das Da ursprünglicher, sie verschließt es aber auch entsprechend hartnäckiger als jedes Nicht-wahrnehmen“ and „In der Befindlichkeit liegt existenzial eine erschließende Angewiesenheit auf Welt, aus der her Angehendes begangen kann.“ (Heidegger, 2006, 136-8)

<sup>38</sup> In my article on emotions and borderline personality disorder, I argue that *affektives Relief* is a more inclusive notion than the *Stimmung* (See Wun 2024b).

Husserl are not merely empirically transmissive to the immediate surroundings, but also transcendently constitutive with respect to the disclosure of the world.

While Heidegger's account of *Befindlichkeit* sheds light on the ontological function that is less thematically addressed - yet still indubitably present - in Husserl's texts, there is another difference that fundamentally distinguishes the two accounts of the mood - namely, its temporal or historical dimension. According to Heidegger, whenever Dasein is thrown (*geworfen*) into a situation in which it now finds itself, a mood immediately arises and penetrates Dasein. This mood, however, neither originates from the Dasein subject itself nor from the external situation alone. Rather, it is "sparked" instantly at the moment of confluence between Dasein and its world, that is, the instantaneous moment when Dasein is thrown into *that* situation as *that* Being-in-the-world. As Heidegger writes (2008, 176), "A mood assails us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside', but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being"<sup>39</sup>. Dasein's mood stems neither from the instincts of the organic body, nor is it rooted in its individual drives, habitualities, unconscious, or personal histories, etc. It is nothing more than an affective invasion incited at the instant of thrownness when Dasein is confronted with its thrown situation. Understood in this way, mood is stripped of its historical and temporal dimension - that is, of the fact that it is a unitary stream of feelings made up by the individual subject's sedimentations, including its past lived-experiences, habits, repressed drives, and so on. In Heidegger's account, the "spatial" or "horizontal" aspect of the moods proves to be dominant. A significant contrast to this is unveiled when Husserl underlines the "vertical" or temporal aspect of moods. He speaks frequently of the "ground" or "motive" of a mood, which is potentially (though not exhaustively, as discussed above) identifiable in one's previous experiences. When he inquires, for instance, into the very motive(s) of a depressive mood, which directs the gaze of the subject exclusively towards the negative sides of things around them, he asserts that mood "has its motive in the constant experience of 'misfortune' (*hat ihr Motiv in der beständigen Erfahrung von ,Unglück'*)" (Husserl, 2020, 104, my translation). This brings to light his awareness of the historicity of the origin and nature of moods as rooted in the subject's sedimented experiences, which have become in certain sense unconscious yet continue to condition the future intentional experiences. Moods are, especially as becomes conspicuous in Husserl's account, the affective manifestation of sedimentations.

#### 4.2 The "Passive Tential Bringing-Forth" of Moods

In the last chapter, the manifesting mechanism of types is identified as a passive associative awakening. By virtue of this form of association, as already elaborated, what is sensorily given in the present "reminds me" of the corresponding types formed in and by the sedimented experiential

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<sup>39</sup> „Die Stimmung überfällt. Sie kommt weder von ‚Außen‘ noch von ‚Innen‘, sondern steigt als Weise des In-der-Welt-Seins aus diesem selbst auf“ (Heidegger, 2006, 136).

contents. Hence, as an associative passivity triggered by the current givenness – one that directs itself towards the resembling types and typifying horizons -, it is a form of association that takes its departure from the *present* and heads to the distant *past* (See Smith, 2010, 289). The manifestation of moods, however, is subject to a different mechanism, which is termed by Husserl passive tendential bringing-forth (*passiv-tendenziöses Hervortreten*). It operates in an opposite direction to passive associative awakening. Instead of moving from the present towards the past, tendential bringing-forth bespeaks the quasi-spontaneous intrusion of the *past* upon the *present*. A mood brings itself forth in such a way that what is affectively sedimented in the past violently intrudes itself upon the present conscious sphere of the subject, without the subject ever truly turning itself towards it and even without any apparent external stimuli given in the present. To attain a clearer understanding of this mechanism, we should bring the notion of perseverance (*Perseveranz*) into view.

Perseverance, according to Husserl, is what characterizes the affective force, here conceived of as a kind of passive motivation, that stems from unconscious contents. The unconscious complex, consisting mainly of sedimented experiences, habitual thoughts, kinaesthesia, etc., is not the object of one's conscious awareness. However, the complex does not cease engaging dynamically with present conscious activities. This incessant living force of the unconscious is designated by Husserl as perseverance, which he briefly describes in *Ideen II* and *D-Manuskript*. In the *Ideen II*, perseverances - together with such structural moments of the stratum of hidden reason as associations, and determining tendencies -, are regarded as what make the constitution of nature as well as that of spirits possible (Husserl, 1989, 289). This is because they are what enable the “blind operation” of drives, feelings, obscure tendencies (and so on) in the natural-sensual stratum, which at the same time permeates and continuously affects the life of the spirit. In the *D-Manuskript*, perseverance, the way in which particular unconscious contents affect consciousness, is further characterized as “*ein passiv-tendenziöses Hervortreten, Affizieren*” (Husserl, D-14/53). This phrase depicts the sunken contents that still remain in active force and shape the subject's interests even without the subject's attention: “...a sunken object can still remain within ‘interest’ without attention [of the subject]. The being-interested can, departing from the form of the attentive engagement of wakefulness, take on the form of inactivity, that of the ‘unconscious’ retaining-in-grasp and from it the continuously ‘being-affected’ (tendency of perseveration)...This is hence not awakening but rather a remaining-in-force”<sup>40</sup> (ibid., my translation). In our case, the “remaining-in-force” of the sedimented unconscious complex manifests in the conscious sphere specifically as moods in their manner of perseverance. A mood brings itself forth, intrudes itself upon (*sich aufdrängen auf*) consciousness in a violent way regardless of the objective givenness in the present and of the subject's current thematic interest. A mood haunts

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<sup>40</sup> “...eine Versunkenes kann auch ohne Aufmerksamkeit im ‘Interesse’ bleiben. Das Interessiertsein kann aus der Form der aufmerksamen Beschäftigung der Wachheit die Form der Inaktivität, des ‘unbewussten’ In-Griff-behaltens und davon fort ‘affiziert-werdens’ erhalten (Perseverationstendenz)...Das ist also nicht Weckung sondern in-Kraft-Bleiben.“

and reigns over us, such that we are often powerless to get rid of it freely. By its essence, it is destined to expand and spread itself over the environment in order to prolong and reinforce itself. The mood does so by orienting the subject's attention towards the objects that share similar affective properties with it. This fundamental tendency of mood is foregrounded in the *Noten*, where Husserl writes, "the mood has so taken possession of the soul that a lasting feeling dominates and simultaneously has the disposition to strengthen itself through 'each and every thing', viz. through receiving new stimulation and foundation" (Husserl, 2004, 177, my translation)<sup>41</sup>. Moods tend naturally to search for new stimuli that correspond to and consolidate their existence by navigating the subject's attentive consciousness. For instance, a person pervaded by a melancholic mood cannot help but simply be disposed to be almost exclusively attentive to "negative" things or facets of things in their surroundings and to view them under a darkened light. The melancholic mood has the power to direct one's gaze as such, to "passively regulate interest by motivating 'me' to be interested in unlikable objects or events" (Byrne, 2022, 460). As Husserl continues to write, "the objects that he now stares at are not the objects of his mourning, although he is now likely disposed to be aware of the unpleasantness and simply of those which are suitable for nourishing his sorrow" (Husserl, 2004, 176, my translation)<sup>42</sup>. Rooted in unpleasant experiences in the past, a melancholic mood continuously draws its affective force from sedimented experiences and neglects other sources of affection, simply in order to invade the subject in the present and strive to prolong its existence. It is therefore a passive tendential bringing-forth of itself, rather than a passive associative awakening that underlies types, for types are always awakened by a particular givenness in the present. As a result, some scholars even speak directly of the "spectrality" of mood<sup>43</sup> and of mood's tendency to "occupy or to invade the life of consciousness as a whole, to extend to the entire objective spectrum of consciousness, [which] forces us to consider them, as it were, from the other side" (Quijano, 2018, 66).

Furthermore, this unique and rather violent mode of manifestation of mood sheds light on two disputable issues in Husserl's phenomenology. The first concerns the presumable primacy or sometimes absoluteness of the affective force stemming from experiential contents in the impressional present. In general, Husserl upholds the primacy of perception among other modes of intentionality, for perception offers the most direct and apodictic intuitiveness to consciousness. This is especially decisive for his early studies, which demanded the most absolute *Evidenz*, viz. the utmost distinctness and indubitability, of any conscious givenness. Only what was most directly, distinctly and indubitably given to the sphere of pure consciousness was qualified to be the object of

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<sup>41</sup> „die Stimmung hat von der Seele derart Besitz ergriffen, dass ein dauerndes Gefühl dominiert und zugleich die Disposition besteht, durch ‚alles und jedes‘ darin bestärkt, d.h. neue Anregung und Begründung zu empfangen“

<sup>42</sup> „die Gegenstände, die er nun ansieht, über die trauert er nicht, obwohl er nun vielleicht geneigt ist, an ihnen auch Missfälliges und überhaupt solches zu bemerken, was seine Trauer zu nähren geeignet ist.“

<sup>43</sup> Prof. Nicolas De Warren employed this notion to describes the not-completely-sedimented emotions in his talk in a conference on sedimentation in Vilnius, 2022.

phenomenological description. Likewise, among the three dimensions of time-consciousness, the present (*Gegenwart*) is also attributed with a primacy in comparison to the other two temporal modalities, the past and future. The reason for this is that, normally, those contents which are given (perceived) in the living present (*lebendige Gegenwart*) demonstrate the highest degree of liveliness and intuitiveness, and hence exercise the most affective force upon the subject. In the *APS*, as mentioned above, Husserl speaks of the “graduality of liveliness (*Gradualität der Lebendigkeit*)” (Husserl, 1966, 167). The degree of liveliness and affectiveness reaches its peak when the concrete data are (still) experienced in the “lively sphere of present (*lebendige Gegenwartssphäre*)”. Such liveliness is, as time progresses, subject to gradual diminution in the retentional process, where the experiential data fade away from the present and sink into the distant past.

Now, the problem of mood and its way of manifestation calls into question the primacy of the impressional present in terms of its degree of affection. As discussed, mood is characterized by a certain degree of violence and spectrality, such that it intrudes itself upon the subject *regardless of* the latter’s present encounters and current interests or focuses<sup>44</sup>. This is even more undeniable when a mood is sufficiently intensive, such as the grief caused by the passing-away of one’s beloved. The grieving person sees even the most joyful things through a dim light or is unconsciously drawn exclusively by the negativities of things, for only the negativities resonate with the deepest grief they are currently living through. Something joyful in the impressional present proves to be much less affectively motivating for this person than their grief. Even if the person is temporarily distracted by something else, they are “forced” to rebound to the grief left by the past significant event, viz. the passing-away of a beloved, and to be trapped in it continuously. In a sense, we might conclude that the affective force of mood, though stemming from the sedimented past instead of being directly given in the present, can nonetheless override that which radiates from present occurrences. It can overshadow the entire experiential field of the present and occupy the conscious sphere of the subject. This response to the question of the affective primacy of the living present is echoed by Steinbock, when he speaks of the phenomenology of the unconscious and the notion of repression in Husserl. Put straightforwardly, he writes, “It could, for instance, be the case that something affectively meaningful is ‘repressed’ and nonetheless exercises a stronger affective force than a present event (*Es kann beispielsweise der Fall sein, dass etwas affektiv Bedeutsames „verdrängt“ wird und dennoch eine stärkere affektive Wirkung ausübt als ein gegenwärtiges Ereignis*)“ (Steinbock, 2002, 249, my translation). This coincides with what I depicted as the violent and the intrusive character of moods. A present event does not necessarily possess more affective force than something repressed or

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<sup>44</sup> To be sure, not all moods are violent to the same degree. A mood of disappointment due to the cancellation of a train is normally not as violent as a nostalgic mood when one thinks of a significant person in one’s childhood, for instance. Nonetheless, it is still phenomenologically appropriate to characterize moods as violent to different extent, as long as “violent” is understood in a metaphorical way. It depicts, in this regard, the tendency of moods to pervade one’s consciousness and to remain more or less within one’s conscious awareness, despite one’s attention and thematic intentionality bring currently directed towards something else.

sedimented, and, conversely, that something is pushed back into the unconscious does not necessarily mean that they it has entirely lost its affective significance in the present. Instead, the repressed, or the sedimented, like moods, is potentially able to overshadow a present occurrence. The very primacy of the latter is thus called into question.

The second issue brought up by the current problematic of mood concerns the relationship between interest or attention and feelings or the emotive side of consciousness. Scholars such as Thomas Byrne identify the *Noten*, dated back to 1893, instead of *logische Untersuchungen*, as the origin of Husserl's phenomenology of feelings. *LU* devises the well-known founding-founded schema in its exploration of affective, axiological and practical acts - in contrast to cognitive acts. The former are thought to be founded in the latter, which alone and first constitute the sheer being (*Sein*, or what something *is*) of things, on which other properties (joyfulness, valuableness, beautifulness, etc.) are *then* founded. On certain occasions in the *Noten*, this schema seems to be adopted implicitly when interest and attention are conceptually differentiated from such feelings as pleasure (*Lust*) and unpleasure (*Unlust*). “*Interesse / Aufmerksamkeit* (interest / attention)” is not equal to “*Lust des Bemerkens* (desire to notice)”, and the subject can turn itself attentively towards an object without any pleasure felt in it (Husserl, 2004, 169). Interest and attention are regarded as belonging to the intellectual side of consciousness, which is not based on any emotive feelings. On the other hand, as paradoxical as it might seem, the intertwinement of feelings and cognitive acts in general is frequently emphasized in the same text. For instance, it is asserted that “An intellectual state is never completely devoid of emotional colourings, and vice-versa (*Ein intellektueller Zustand ist nie von emotionellen Färbungen ganz frei und umgekehrt*)” (Husserl, 2004, 164, my translation). The intellectual side of consciousness is always penetrated with some affective tincture or dyeing, and the affective colouration of conscious life is never completely free from cognitive or intellectual activities. Apparently contracting the founding-founded schema later developed in the *LU*, Husserl continues to argue that affective feelings are not *founded on* the sheer being of things as something “extra” or “beside” it. Rather, the being of an object is apprehended intellectually *and* affectively *in* the subject's sensuous feelings: “when something arouses my desire, the desire is not an objective content beside another one; rather, in the desire I enjoy the object... (*wenn mir etwas Lust erregt, so ist die Lust nicht ein objektiver Inhalt Neben einem anderen, sondern in der Lust genieße ich den Gegenstand...*)” (Husserl, 2004, 177, my translation). Hence, the occasional differentiation between interest/attention and feelings is merely conceptual and does not imply the practical uncoupling of interest/attention and the emotive side of consciousness. The intertwinement between these two sides proves to be even more undeniable when the notion of mood comes into light. As described above, there is a tendency inherent in moods to prolong and fortify themselves by searching for new sources of excitement. Moods do not only overshadow the current state of consciousness but also fiercely direct the subject's *interest* and *attention* toward objects that coincide with the tone of the mood. In

this sense, despite interest and attention not being equivalent to positive feelings, they are always conditioned, tintured and oriented by the emotive dimension of consciousness, viz. moods. Furthermore, as far as moods are concerned, such intertwining characterizes not only thematic objects of constitution but also objects whose contents have literally nothing to do with the relevant mood. It is perfectly possible that “we are in a holy mood while *there is no present content* that justifies it (wir sind in weihvoller Stimmung, *aber ohne präsenten Inhalt*, der sie begründet)” (Husserl, 2004, 176, my translation and emphasis). All in all, mood’s unique way of tendentially bringing itself forth poses a great challenge not only to the presumable primacy of the present in terms of its affective force, but also to the alleged independence of cognitive acts of intentionality, especially those of interest and attention.

#### 4.3 Mood and the Problem of “Surrender (*Hingabe*)”

In the final section of this chapter, it is worth bringing to light the often-overlooked distinction between so-called “first-order moods” and “second-order moods”, the latter of which relate specifically to the important notion of surrender. Husserl himself does not thematically address this dimension of mood, but this issue inevitably arises with the problematic of feelings and affective value-ception. In the latter’s case, the distinction between the sheer value-ception of feelings and values on the one hand, and the position-taking of the mind (*Gemütsstellungnahme*) with respect to the apperceived feelings and values, on the other, should be made clear. Sheer value-ception bespeaks nothing more than the simple apprehension (*Auffassung*) of the emotive and axiological attributes of objects, viz. apprehension of, for instance, a picture *as* nice, *as* valuable, *as* artistic, etc. (See Husserl, 2020, 121). This process constitutes the value- and emotive characters of the object as its objective determinations. Nonetheless, the way in which a subject genuinely reacts to the determinations so apprehended, that is, the position it takes with respect to them, is another matter. It deals no longer with the “objective determinations in the sense of its apperceptions (*objektive Bestimmtheiten im Sinn seiner Apperzeptionen*)”, but rather “the peculiar ways of reaction with their qualitative characters (*die eigentümlichen Reaktionsweisen mit ihren qualitativen Charakteren*)” (Husserl, 2020, 120, my translation). This is a matter of whether or not the subject turns itself attentively and affectively towards the so apprehended axiological object in question and lets itself “be immersed in” the feelings thus aroused. The subject takes a position in this respect and decides whether or not to let itself truly “live through (*erleben*)”, for instance, the delight (*Entzücken*) prompted by the artistic and valuable picture hanging above. This is the question of *Hingabe*. It is always possible that one “finds (apprehends)” something (as) joyful, yet without simultaneously genuinely enjoying and devoting oneself to the joyfulness as such. As Husserl writes, “A thing containing value delights me. However, I can find something delightful *without surrendering myself to the delight and without rejoicing in a fully lively way* (Ein Wertgehaltenes erfreut mich. Ich kann aber etwas erfreulich finden, *ohne dass ich*



*mich der Freude hingebe, ohne dass ich mich voll lebendig freue*)“ (Husserl, 2020, 102, my translation and emphasis). Examined more closely, this means that there *is*, or *can be*, a distance between “me” and “my momentary feeling”. The human subject is born with a certain room of freedom to decide whether to let itself be flooded with a particular feeling in the present or to hold a relatively detached attitude towards it. This potential can further be conceived of as a kind of splitting of the ego (*Ichspaltung*) that plays a significant role not only in such intentional activities as imagination and memory-recollection, but also in practical capabilities such as emotional regulation and perspective switching in the context of psychopathology. “A feeling can move us without capturing us (*Ein Gefühl kann uns berühren, ohne uns einzunehmen*)” (Husserl, 2004, 165, my translation), and the capability of resisting being “swallowed” by feelings is particularly essential to the regulation of emotions and control of impulsive drives (See chapter 8).

Hence, with regard to feeling, we can distinguish between “feeling as value-grasping (*das Fühlen als Werterfassen*)” on the one hand, and “the enjoying, the living-in-affect, the living-in-silent-feeling (*das Genießen, das Im-Affekt-leben, das Im-ruhigen-Gefühl-leben*)”, on the other (Husserl, 2020, 102, 129, my translation). The latter bespeaks the reaction of a mind on a “higher” level. Here, one of the determining factors that motivates or holds the subject back from surrendering to a feeling is, again, the mood in which the subject currently finds itself. Given their tendency of constantly bringing themselves forth, moods can either intensify or block a concrete feeling in the present. They can either elevate a feeling of a similar nature (e.g. a pleasant mood and a feeling of delight) or hinder that of an incompatible nature (e.g. a melancholic mood and a feeling of delight). With the “right” mood in the former case, the subject is much more disposed to surrender itself to the feeling in question and to let itself genuinely indulge in it, often even with a higher intensity than usual. When “I” am in a joyful mood, “everything gives me double joyfulness (*alles macht mir doppelte Freude*)”, as Husserl writes (2020, 172, my translation). In other word, the position-taking of the mind with respect to an apprehended feeling and value is affectively motivated by one’s current mood. It follows that, on the contrary, when “I” am melancholically attuned, “I” am still able to apprehend something *as* positive, yet am unconsciously reluctant to really let myself be immersed in such positivity. This subtlety is also explicitly acknowledged by Husserl (2020, 104, my translation): “...I am not entirely incapable to see the beauty and to rejoice, but I cannot surrender myself to the joyfulness (*...ich bin nicht ganz unfähig, das Schöne zu sehen und mich zu freuen, aber ich kann mich nicht der Freude hingeben*)”. The dynamic between moods and feelings turns out, to a large extent, to be a matter of position-taking and surrender.

It is, moreover, fairly reasonable to conceptually extend the notion of surrender to the problem of mood itself and use it to mark the distinction between “first-order mood” and “second-order mood”. This is suggested by Quijano who defines second-level mood as “moods that start with

some emotional reaction to the mood we live in, a reaction that evolves into a new mood” (Quijano, 2018, 66). This can be best understood by analogy to the problem of the position-taking of the mind and of surrender with respect to concrete feelings. Admittedly, moods are by nature pervasive and intrusive; they assail the subject without its conscious “consent” or its interest in turning itself towards them. However, it remains undeniable that human beings still retain, despite all that, a certain room for freedom in this respect, namely, the freedom of *how* to react to the permeating mood in which one seems to be “trapped”. Despite being apparently trapped in a particular mood, a healthy human subject does not *completely* lose its capability to take a certain mental distance from it and to decide whether or not to be immersed in it and or to what extent, etc. The possible ways of reacting include, for instance, repression and inhibition, distraction, surrender, and so on, which determine, to certain extent, the effectiveness of a mood and the “violence” with which it imposes itself on the subject. The capability of distance-keeping and position-taking with respect to one’s momentary feelings and moods bears particularly significant implications for psychopathologies, which will be the focus of the second main part of this work. To mention a quick example, affective disorders such as depression are generally conceived of as the unreasonable persistence and intensity of negative moods (of melancholy, emptiness, worthlessness, grief, etc.). Usually, this occurs when a subject experienced some striking misfortunes and suffers persistently from a negative mood that thoroughly overwhelms them. Nonetheless, as I venture to argue in chapter 8, the core of such an affective disorder lies not (only) in the paralyzing mood *itself* but also the subject’s loss of the freedom and capability to moderately distance or distract itself from the mood. The most pathologizing feature of affective disorders as such thus lies in the problem of surrender and position-taking in the sense so far elucidated. What differentiates depression from the ordinary emotion of sadness is the depressed subject’s incapability of taking a proper “position” with respect to the depressive moods, such that it “involuntarily surrenders” to them, “is swallowed” by them and is closed off from other possibilities. This will be further elaborated under the notions of *Ichspaltung* (*splitting of the ego*) and *Verstimmung* (“*bad mood*”), which I identify as the pathological correlate of *Stimmung*.

## Chapter Five: The Sphere of Volition – Sedimentation and Habits (*Habitus*)

### 5.1 A General Characterization of Habits and their Origin in Sedimentation

While the problems of types and mood might not be as prominent as they deserve to be in Husserlian phenomenology, the thematization of the notion of *habitus* or habitualities marks a significant shift in Husserl's thought in general, particularly in terms of his conceptualization of the ego (*das ich*). Through foregrounding the notion of habits, the ego is no longer conceived an empty "I" (*das leere ich*), but rather as a concrete, human "I" (*das konkrete, menschliche ich*). The former occupies not only the focus of the early Husserl but even serves as the Archimedean point of his phenomenological enterprise. The ego is, according to Husserl in *Ideen I*, an atemporal and absolute ego-pole (*das Ichpol*) of pure consciousness. It is regarded, similar to Descartes, as the only field of certainty that survives *epoché* and the possibility of the annihilation of natural reality. Correspondingly, its pure intentional correlate - viz. that which appears directly and is intended by pure consciousness - is considered to be the sole legitimate object for phenomenological investigation. Such pure experiences (*Erlebnisse*) alone possess the absolute evidence (*Evidenz*) and eideticity required by phenomenology. In *Ideen I*, Husserl explicitly states: "[the pure consciousness with the pure ego] *has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the phenomenological disconnection*" (Husserl, 2012b, 62-3). The sphere of pure consciousness is the only "thing" that remains intact when the whole natural world of facts and materialities is bracketed by the radical phenomenological epoché. This absolute region, the "phenomenological residuum" (*ibid.*), so to speak, is the transcendental ground for the contingent and empirical "knowledge" acquired by the natural sciences, metaphysical speculations, and ordinary beliefs and judgements. Inherent to this absolute region of pure consciousness is the eidetic structure of the pure ego, which remains unchanged throughout all temporal experiences and is untouchable by empirical accidents.

The pure ego as such is later described by Husserl himself as an empty ego-structure deprived of temporality, historicity and individuality. In the *Cartesischen Meditationen*, particularly, the ego is characterized in section 32 as a "*Substrat von Habitualitäten*". Simply expressed, the ego is no longer (merely) an empty pole of identity (*ein leerer Identitätspol*) that remains completely identical despite all the historical occurrences that happen to the subject. Rather, the ego has a transcendental genesis that accounts for its very formation in time and history. Seen from this perspective, the ego is a constant flux with multilayered structures of sedimented experiences, a flux where each and every act and lived-experience might transform it bit by bit by being sedimented as its "lasting peculiarity (*bleibende Eigenheit*)" (Husserl, 2012a, 66). Here is where genetic phenomenology comes into the scene as far as the historical formation-process, viz. the transcendental genesis, of such a concrete human ego is concerned. The ego is, genetically speaking, a substrate of *habits*, which are nothing but the products of repeated acts, judgments, convictions, and decisions sedimented and preserved

throughout the temporal existence of the ego-subject. This ego-subject is, therefore, also a personal ego (*personales Ich*) that contains unique attributes attained and re-shaped throughout its concrete, individual experiences. They confer upon the personal ego an inimitable “style (*Stil*)” as well as its personal characteristics that determine its intellectual and practical interest and dispositions, its capabilities and limitations, the comfortable way in which it perceives things and copes with the daily life-world, and so on. This thematization of the monadic personal ego is the full concretion of the ego in contrast to the transcendental ego that occupies Husserl’s early period. However, the relationship between the two is not one of contradiction or mutual exclusion. Rather, together they constitute concrete subjectivity in the form of parallelism. Parallely existing and mutually enriching and conditioning each another, the transcendental ego is inseparable from its empirical constitution, while the monadic personal ego is equally impossible without the self-constitution of the transcendental ego (See Husserl, 2012b, 65-9). While static phenomenology devotes itself to the study of the eidetic structures of intentional acts of the transcendental pure ego as it is given in one single temporal point, genetic phenomenology delves into the experiential history, the motivating nexus, and the individual basis of those acts (See Bernet, Kern & Marbach, 1999, 195-204; Lohmar, 2011). Focusing particularly on the notion of habitualities, this section is dedicated to a genetic exploration of the historical genesis of the formation of concrete subjectivity through habitual sedimentations in the practical-volitional sphere.

First of all, a brief and concise definition of habitus is found in the *CM* as the “lasting possessions (*bleibende Habe*)” (Husserl, 2012a, 60) of all that is sedimented. More precisely, these possessions are not simply “stored” in the ego but rather they constantly shape the subject anew by leaving effective traces upon it: “Each lived-experience leaves a trace of disposition and creates, in view of the psychical reality, something new (*Jedes Erlebnis hinterlässt Dispositionen und schafft in Hinsicht auf die seelische Realität Neues*)” (Husserl, 1989, 140). Offering a systematic and in-depth study of the problematic, Moran (2014, 29) identifies the different levels of conscious life that is permeated by habits, including the lower stratum consisting of unconscious instincts, drives, and bodily motility, as well as the higher, autonomous rational life of culture. Drawing from his insights, I suggest distinguishing between three main kinds of habits, namely, i) the theoretical and perceptual habits (types), ii) practical habits involved in volitional acts and decisions made in the practical life-world, and iii) bodily habits, discussed most extensively by Merleau-Ponty. After an overview of these three forms of habits, the rest of this chapter will focus on the second form, which belongs to willing-acting intentionality directed towards the world.

The first form of habits, mainly theoretical by nature, can be understood as another expression of types (See chapter 2). Types, or typifying-horizons – as the “horizon of typical familiarity and precognizance (*Vorkenntnis*)” (Husserl, 1973a, 122) - are products of *repeated* experiences of similar

objects. The repetition of the experience of a single entity *A* as constituted by and belonging to the type of *A* contributes to the later habit of associatively awakening *A* whenever *A* or something similar is given. The awakening of the type as an anticipatory horizon that offers us “clues” about what the current givenness might be is in essence an *inductive* expectation in accordance with our pre-knowledge and habits of perception. By being inductive, both the formation and associative awakening of types are based largely on the number of repetitions of past experiences. Sedimented experiences “inform” us through theoretical habits of – specifically, through the awakening of the types that are to be “expected” and apprehended under similar circumstances as in the past. Correspondingly, an increase of the number of repeated instances leads to the reinforcement of the “strength” of such habitualities, and eventually that of the certainty of the apperceptive anticipatory horizon. As Husserl (2001, 240, my emphasis) writes, in passing, “Even the force of this apperceptive expectation increases with *the number of ‘instances’*—or with *habit*, which amounts to the same thing. At the same time, *a more forceful formation of unity* occurs here—a *habitual* one—as the regularity of the expectation being ratified...”<sup>45</sup>. Conversely, of course, each and every new lived-experience and piece of knowledge is again preserved “in the form of a habitus” (Husserl, 1973a, 122), modifying, enriching and conditioning further perceptual acts and judgments. Typifying anticipation (and apperception) is, in a word, by nature *habitual* anticipation (See Lohmar, 2016) grounded in the repeatability of sedimented experiences.

The third form of habits, namely, bodily habits, is not extensively elucidated by Husserl, though it is still moderately addressed. Despite being dedicated to the study of consciousness, he clearly affirms that a concrete person is a composition of the flow of consciousness of cogito *and* its corporeality. The ego is an embodied ego embedded in physical nature through the lived- (*Leib*) and physical body (*Körper*). The body not only possesses this double nature of being a subjective-autonomous agency (lived-body) and an objective-physical thing (physical body), but also the corporeal habitus “that invokes a person’s overall ‘bearing’, ‘form’, i.e., how they physically present themselves...the way we hold ourselves, move our bodies, walk, sit, eat, look, etc.” (Moran, 2014, 32). Whereas inner states of consciousness (thoughts, emotions, etc.) remain in principle invisible to others, they are presented in the intersubjective world through bodily expressions that are irreducibly individual. Each and every person has their own unique corporeal habitus developed and adopted throughout the past, with which they convey their inner psychical states and realize intentional activities in physical reality. One’s intentional act of perception, for instance, is rendered possible and visible through the movements of the eyes and other bodily parts: “Even further back lies the expression of specific corporeality, ‘perceiving’ the free activity of the perceptual organs: the act of the

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<sup>45</sup> „Auch die Kraft dieser apperzeptiven Erwartung wächst mit *der Zahl der ‚Instanzen‘* - oder mit der *Gewohnheit*, was dasselbe ist. Es tritt hier als Regelmäßigkeit der sich bestätigenden Erwartung zugleich *kräftigere Vereinheitlichung – gewohnheitsmäßige* – ein...” (Husserl, 1966, 190, my emphasis)

eye looking, fixing, turning away, the probing hand movement, walking, and thus the shifting of standpoints...” (Husserl, 1973b, 76, my translation)<sup>46</sup>. The fact that a perceptual act is made possible by virtue of kinaesthetic movement is an unquestionable and universal eidetic law identically valid for all human egos. Nonetheless, the very “style”, the concrete ways or patterns in which those movements are presented (despite their differences being for the most part subtleties) are matters of irreducibly individual characters and habits. While Husserl sheds light on the corporeal habitus as the individual expressions of the psyche, the most primordial corporeal dimension of perception and experience in general is studied most extensively by Merleau-Ponty. The latter devises such notions as body-memory and body-schema to designate the habitual structure of one’s bodily skills and knowledge, the forms of action and reaction towards external stimuli, the style of movements, the sense of physical distance and boundaries in the life-space, and so on (See Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Within this conceptual framework, Fuchs (2012) highlights the horizontal, corporeal dimension of the unconscious and how it latently delineates the boundaries of one’s life-space and conditions its force of attraction and repulsion. His work contains valuable insights for the study of phenomenological psychopathology, to which we will turn in the second part of this work.

In what follows, the second form of habits, viz. practical habits in the volitional-acting sphere, will be our focus. As a structural moment of willing-acting intentionality, the practical habitus is an indispensable condition for the unhindered realization of acts in the practical life-world as well as for the appropriate and immediate responses to daily affairs. The possession of a daily habitus of acts and decisions prevents one from the overtly hyperreflexive process of stance-taking (*Stellungnahme*) and decision-making, which creates fundamental hurdles for the properly “smooth” living of one’s life. In *Ideen II*, Husserl thematically characterizes the concrete subject as a subject of freedom and rationality on the one hand, and as a subject of habits, on the other. He writes, “I am of course not only the subject, the Ego, that can consider a thing in a certain freedom...I am also the subject that is used to being pleased by such and such matters, that habitually desires this or that, goes to eat when the time comes, etc., i.e., the subject of certain feelings and of certain habits of feeling, desire, and will...” (Husserl, 1989, 269). The human subject is distinguished from other organic beings by virtue of its *spiritual* facet, namely, its inviolable freedom and rationality. However, it is simultaneously a being of nature that is largely conditioned by its habitual dispositions, movements, desires and emotions - the existence of which mostly lacking in rational justification yet is essential for the activity (*Handeln*) one’s ordinary life. Such habits guard specifically against the “irrational” extension

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<sup>46</sup> „Noch weiter zurück liegt aber der Ausdruck der spezifischen Leiblichkeit, das ‚Wahrnehmen‘ an freier Betätigung der Wahrnehmungsorgane, das Hinsehen des Auges, das Fixieren, das Abwenden, die tastende Handbewegung, das Gehen und damit den Standpunktwechseln...”

Besides, regarding the physical expressions of emotions, Husserl writes, „Vorán liegt der Ausdruck psychischer Akte und Zustände (wir ‚sehen‘ in körperlichen Äußerung den Zweifel, die Entscheidung, wir sehen den Zorn, Mut, Zaghaftigkeit, Feigheit, Scham, etc.)“ (ibid.)

of pure rationality to daily affairs, which creates unnecessary obstacles and hesitations for the practical life of the subject.

Examined more closely, the practical habitus includes, for Husserl, not only the habits of desires and feelings, etc., but more significantly, the habitual knowledge of one's *interests* and (*limited*) *capabilities*, which determines in advance one's own "practical possibilities" of acting and one's mode of comportments in response to different daily encounters. In this regard, a crucial distinction between logical and practical possibilities is made. To repeat, willing-acting intentionality is responsible for the implementation and realization of the possibilities intended by the will. However, "I cannot will anything that I do not have consciously in view, that does not lie in my power, in my competence" (Husserl, 1989, 270). Only possibilities that are within "my" scope of power and interest can truly be the objects of my will, for they alone can be said to be something *practically possible* "for me", and hence for "my" practical possibilities. This can be further clarified by a contrast with so-called logical possibility, which is nothing more than "mere possibility on the basis of intuitive representation" (Husserl, 1989, 273). Logical possibilities are those which can be imaginatively represented – or presentified (*vergegenwärtigt*) - with certain degree of intuitive givenness through phantasy. The sole criterion for such imaginative intuitive representation of logical possibilities is the non-violation of logical rules such as the law of non-contradiction. For example, it is logically impossible to intuitively phantasize a rounded triangle or the co-existence of the colour of red and not-red on the same surface. However, it is perfectly possible to imagine the possibility of becoming the U.S. president or of travelling to the moon alone, as long as no violation of logical rules is discerned in the phantasy. Nonetheless, that something is logically possible (for everyone) in no way means that it is practically possible (for "me"). The former designates nothing more than some "free fictions", free-floating possibilities that disregard all the practical conditions both of the present reality as well as of an individual's competence and facticity. They cannot truly be the objects of will, for they are not potentially realizable in practice once practical restrictions are taken into consideration. By contrast, what belongs to one's practical possibilities "automatically" takes one's restraints and interests – or one's "I can (*ich kann*)" - into account. This means that the projection of the genuine objects of will that correspond to my own "being-able-to-do" or the "lived I can" (Husserl, 1989, 273) requires one's (pre-)knowledge of oneself acquired through repeated lived-experiences of one's actions, decisions, and judgments in the past. These lived-experiences are sedimented as practical habits that guide and motivate us "without further ado" toward the possibilities truly "available" for further actions and reactions in different daily situations, as in accordance with our previous similar experiences and the habitual knowledge of our limitations. This ensures the unobstructed functioning of everyday life willing-acting intentionality. Hence, on another occasion, Husserl asserts (1973c, 378, my translation), "I am but not (only) a current I, but also a habitual I (*Ich bin aber nicht (nur) aktuelles, sondern auch habituelles ich*)". The ego is in no way an

empty structure that merely has an actual present without past and future. Rather, it is a habitual one in possession of its *past* sedimented experiences, which not only make up its unique style and characters but also delineate its *future* existentially realizable possibilities of being. Habituality, therefore, bespeaks “a certain egological possibility, a ‘I can’ ‘I could’, ‘I could have had’, and the capability to realize them points to I-actuality, to current I-lived-experiences, as the realization of the possibilities (*eine gewisse ichliche Möglichkeit, ein ‚ich kann‘, ‚ich könnte‘, ‚ich hätte können‘, und das Können wieder sich verwirklichend weist hin auf Ichaktualitäten, auf aktuelle Icherlebnisse, eben als Verwirklichung des Könnens*)” (ibid., my translation). One’s lived-experience never reaches beyond one’s capability (*Könnens*), understood in the broadest sense, to live through them. Put otherwise, each and every lived-experience is nothing more than the realization of one’s *Könnens*, viz. of one’s practical possibilities rooted in habitualities.

As a remark and a concrete illustration, it is worth mentioning the thematization of the relationship between habits, “directions of the will (*Willensrichtungen*)”, and the passivity of will in the *Grenzprobleme*. The habitus can be conceived of as something that transforms the activity of will into passivity. The first time one is driven by a particular desire or instinct, one is almost “forced” to *actively* search for the appropriate object(s) for the fulfilment of the originally blind, objectless instinctual drive. Initially, therefore, active and reflective deliberation are necessarily involved in the process of decision-making and stance-taking. After several repeated experiences of similar situations, the activity of the will as such naturally retreats into the background and is replaced by a passivity of the will based on one’s habits (habitual knowledge, choices, and ways of movement, etc.) formed in the course of experiences. However, passivity of the will does not mean the privation of volitional intentionality in actions; rather, it simply means the absence of the reflective process of deliberation and its replacement by immediate and unquestioned realization of practical possibilities. To illustrate the will’s transformation from activity to passivity, an example of someone going for a walk is offered by Husserl. At the very beginning (when “I” moved to this new environment), “I” am required to actively reflect on which path to take for a walk, scrutinizing different factors that might affect the quality of the walk. “Depending on the temperature in summer, I prefer sometimes to go to this, sometimes to that path, *originally with deliberation* (Ich gehe aber je nach der Sommertemperatur bald mit Vorliebe den, bald jenen Weg, *ursprünglich mit Überlegung*)“, so Husserl (2013, 96, my translation and emphasis). Gradually, after several repetitions of the activity, “I” am able to pick a path suitable for every temperature nearly “automatically” and “without deliberation (*ohne Überlegung*)”. The ego is in this regard shaped through experiences as a habitual ego that deals with the relevant situations skilfully and pre-reflectively - that is, with a passivity of will.

Finally, a skilful interaction with the daily world based on practical habits also includes the capability of properly “anticipating subsequent modes of comportment” of oneself *as well as* of others



by means of making reference to “previous modes of comportment and the previous position-takings” (Husserl, 1989, 278). The anticipatory horizon of will contains not only one’s possible choices of action, but also the expectation and estimation of *others’* possible reactions, ways of behaving, and the ground and motives for their words and actions, etc. These are pre-reflective pieces of knowledge acquired through repeated interactions with and observations of another person, which shape in our own mind an “individual type”, a “unitary style” “tailor-made” for that person. By virtue of the different individual types, the understanding of other human beings is rendered more precise and even effortless within an “experiential system of possible expectations” (ibid.). In this sense, habitualities make possible an immediate intelligibility within interpersonal relationships, without which “normal” living in the practical life-world would be severely burdened.

## 5.2 The “In-Betweenness” of Habitus in its Way of Manifesting

I argue that the manifesting mechanism of habit is located somewhere between passivity and activity, between the passive-tendential bringing-forth of itself and passive-associative awakening. Whereas the former designates the way in which *moods* invade the conscious sphere in their entirety, the latter describes the awakening of *types* through a similar givenness in the present. *Habits*, by contrast, are realized in a way between both associative processes. Such “in-betweenness” can initially be illustrated by a closer look at the relationship between habits and i) the repeatability of sedimentations, ii) the freedom of the subject.

To be sure, all three structural moments elucidated so far are the products and manifestations of (repeated) experiences that are subsequently sedimented. What differentiates the nature of habits from the other two structural moments is the significance of the *repeatability* of experiences. Regarding the formation process of types and moods, the repeatability of experiences, viz. the number of similar incidents in the past, does not play the *sole* or the most determinant role. Types, as the transcendental moment of the subject’s intellectual/cognitive intentional relationship to the world, bear first and foremost *epistemic* significance. Representing-thinking intentionality strives most primarily for the apprehension of the *being* of objects. However, the repeated empirical confirmation of a type through perceptual experiences does not necessarily lead to an epistemological justification of the type. A larger number of instances related to the type unquestionably grants more inductive power for the latter. However, repeatability itself does not serve as the *sole* source of justification for the type awakened in that particular present, for epistemological justification is not attained through the number of repeated experiences in the past but rather through an intuitive fulfilment in the present. A typifying apperception of an object is affirmed, negated, doubted, etc., in light of what is given intuitively to the subject in the impressional present. Moods, on the other side, neither bear any epistemic significance nor does it strive for any of it. Rather, they are sustained and characterized simply by their *axiological* and *existential* significance for the individual subject. This significance is

scarcely based on the number of repetitions of the experience of a particular emotion or mood. The mood that lasts the longest and that pervades the subject with the highest intensity is not (necessarily) that which was repeatedly experienced the most. Instead, the formation of mood is largely dependent on the affective meaning of *the* sedimented experience, which in most cases is merely a single, non-repeatable incident - but one that left indelible emotive traces in one's conscious life. The mood that accompanies or originates in daily routine usually does not bear much irreplaceable significance despite its recurrent, daily appearance. A sorrowful breakup with a beloved person, however, despite being a single, unrepeatable incident, could leave the deepest grief and melancholy throughout the whole life of the person. This melancholy, then, is doomed to transform into a melancholic mood that persists for a considerable period of time and that, even in the far future, makes up at least part of the overall mood of the person during the rest of their life. Instead of its empirical repeatability, the very affective and existential value one attributes to *the* relationship with that beloved person is what contributes to such an intensity and prominence of the mood.

By contrast, the formation of habits depends almost exclusively on the number of repeated experiences of similar acts, decisions, judgements, and so on, regardless of their epistemic or ethical correctness as well as existential or affective significance. Habits are by definition what one has gotten used to doing, thinking or opting for. The more frequently an experience of something is repeated, the more "fixed" the habit about that thing is and the harder it is to reserve, forgo, or change it. The rigidity and fixity of habits granted by the repeatability of relevant experiences are hardly affected by the interference of a new cognitive acquisition incompatible with pre-established habits, or even the willful resoluteness to alter them. This does not mean, of course, that habits are essentially unchangeable, as will be discussed later. What is undeniable is the mere fact that the force of habits, unlike that of types and moods, bears the most direct relationship to sedimentation in terms of the latter's "quantity". Lohmar (2016, 51-2) offers an interesting example in his discussion of the problematic. One has the habit of making coffee every morning by placing an old-fashioned Italian style coffee maker on a certain burner of the stove. One day, the burner stops working and the person calls a technician for repair work. Despite this very conscious acknowledgement and practical reaction to the instance, on the next day the person still – unconsciously – follows the habitual routine of putting the same coffee maker on the same burner, which was already broken yesterday. This example shows that, even in face of newly acquired knowledge and freshly implemented acts, habits still easily prevail - at least before the emergence of extra conscious reflection and active interference.

This leads us to the second issue concerning the relationship between habits and the freedom of the subject. Whereas habits apparently belong to the "lower", natural substratum of consciousness, they are interwoven with its "higher", spiritual sphere. As Husserl (1989, 267) states, "Here *habit and free motivation intertwine*". Habits are called forth by external (familiar) situations and are rooted in

the subject's personal histories; nonetheless, they simultaneously leave open a large space for potential intervention actively initiated by the free subject itself. This can be illustrated, again, by a contrast with types and moods in relation to the problem of freedom. In normal cases, types are passively awakened by the sensuous givenness of objects "from outside", and the subsequent typifying apperception strives, first and foremost, for the intuitive fulfilment (potentially) offered by the "external" object in question. That is, in perceptual experience, the intentional subject does not *freely* apprehend something as something simply based on its internal states or personal interests. It does not decide or change what is perceived or how something is perceived. Rather, typifying apperception apprehends something as something in accordance with the givenness radiating from the object itself. In this sense, it is more a passivity conforming to the external – or a passivity instinctually striving for the fulfilment from the external – than any active execution initiated by the free subject alone. In quite the opposite way, moods invade the subject "from within". In both normal and pathological cases, moods are loaded with affective power so impregnable, that they violently assail the subject - regardless of the present external situation or even the subject's active (re-)orientation of the will or voluntary shift of attention. Faced with the intrusion of moods, the conscious subject is scarcely capable of defending itself against them or of freely rewriting its nature simply through its "free will". It is, for instance, hardly possible to transform a melancholic mood into a joyful mood in one stroke by a deliberate change of one's attitude.

Habits, in contrast, are something "in-between" the two. They are motivated by both "external" occurrences as well as "internal" habitual routines of the subject itself, *yet in no case completely determined by either of them*. Despite being strongly motivated by both external and internal forces, habits leave open a certain room for the subject's freedom of intervention. This ambivalent nature of habits, between passivity and activity, is part of the double nature of concrete human subjectivity, which is, on the one hand, a free ego and a rational agent of active decision-making and stance-taking, and, on the other hand, a human ego that belongs to nature with its unfree and sensual psychophysical basis (See Moran, 2016, 2017). Husserl identifies this as "two-fold subjectivity" - consisting of the spiritual ego, "the stratum of the *intellectus agens*, of the free ego as the ego of free acts, including all proper acts of reason", and of the unfree ego, "dragged down by the sensual...the obscure underlying basis of traits of character, original and latent dispositions" (Husserl, 1989, 289). The latter includes, without question, experientially shaped habitual traits. At first glance, the natural, habitual basis of subjectivity is deprived of any rationality and activity. It is a mere product of repeated sedimented experiences, which belongs exclusively to the sphere of passivity and sensibility. Acts that emerge "in 'analogy' with the former [experiences]", writes Husserl, are "a-rational" and driven by the sphere of passivity. Their motives, mostly habitual in nature, are "unnoticeable" and "unconscious", "deeply buried" and may be brought to light solely by psychoanalysis (Husserl, 1989, 234). Nonetheless, the crucial distinction between motivation and

causality, already spelled out in chapter one, should be called into mind here. Without doubt, habits *are* the unconscious, sensual or even forceful motivational basis for the subject's acts; but they *do not determine* the subject, nor *cause* the subject to act completely in conformity with them. Unlike types that strive necessarily for intuitive fulfilment from the external and moods that violently invade the subject from within, habits preserve a relatively large space for subjective freedom. This space of freedom, essential to the implementation of habits, is granted by the "double-meaning of the will (*Doppeldeutigkeit des Willens*)", namely, the will of "I want/intend to (*das wollen; Ich will*)" and "the will of willing what I wanted/intended (*das wollen wollen; Ich will es, was ich will*)" (See Holzhey-Kunz, 2020, my translation). Whereas the former designates *first order will/volition* - the wishes, desires, intentions, etc. that arise pre-reflectively (and usually *habitually*) and without mediation in the subject -, the latter designates *second order will/volition* through which the subject takes a stance with regard to the aroused first order will. One's habitual ways of acting and thinking belong to the first order will. By virtue of second order volition, the subject can either affirm (*bejahen*), reject, suspend, or contemplate their first order pre-reflective intentions, and decide whether or not to realize them in practice, or whether to negate, modify, or ignore them, etc. This capability of taking a stance reflectively with respect to one's primary, pre-reflective and habitual *ich will* is where the leeway of freedom lies. Whether the subject is obeying or acting against habits, in both cases, freedom of will is necessarily involved. Firstly, even the apparently unfree and unreflective obedience to a habit is in practice a *free* act implicitly approved by "me" via the second order affirmative attitude towards it. The implicit freedom at play here is clearly acknowledged by Husserl (1989, 267-8) as well, who writes, "Now, if I act freely, then I am indeed obeying habit too, but I am free insofar as it is the motive, the reason, that I am obeying in a free decision". Without exception, an act following a habit implies the subject's *choice* to act in accordance with such a habit. Secondly, while the "choice" to follow a habit is for the most part pre-conscious, instead of strictly unconscious, it *can always be* made conscious, especially when defects or hurdles are encountered during the implementation of the habit. An alternative description of this change of attitude in the face of "deficiency" is found in Heidegger when he speaks of the transformation of the being ready-to-hand of things (*Zuhandenheit*) into that of present-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) (Heidegger, 2006, 61). Things remain out of our reflective gaze until the use of them is interrupted or becomes deficient. Analogously, habits are in principle always subject to reflection when their implementation is obstructed or proves to be problematic. In the example offered above, once the person notices that the burner is actually broken, their daily habit of putting the coffee maker on it immediately becomes the object of awareness and thematic reflection. Thirdly, once the subject's conscious gaze is directed towards a habit, it has the potential to voluntarily initiate a difference course of action. Unlike the effectuation of types, which strives for the intuitive fulfilment from what is given in the present, and the intrusion of moods, which disregards both objective occurrence and subjective resistance, habits allow a greater room for conscious alteration initiated by the subject's will alone. Being able to actively take a stance with

respect to passively established habits, the concrete human being is shown to be both a subject of (sensuous) motivation *and* a subject of reason.

Given the ambivalent nature of the habitus in terms of its relationship to sedimentation and freedom, we may proceed to unfold the special way that habits manifest - a way between the passive-tendential bringing-forth of moods and the passive-associative awakening of types. As elucidated, moods manifest as a spontaneous invasion upon one's present consciousness, an invasion inaugurated by the subject's own affective sedimentations in the distant past. Types, by contrast, are awakened by a particular sensuous givenness in the present and are subject to possible alterations as soon as different profiles of the object in question are further revealed (by kinaesthetic movements or other sensual receptivities). Moods are barely tameable, blind, and involve a fierce flow of affects from within the subject itself, whereas types are modified and selected on the basis of external givennesses. The manifestation of habits, we might say, shares characteristics of both and yet is irreducible to either one of them. On the one hand, as a constituent of the "stratum of hidden reason", habits serve as the unconscious motivations and "blind operations of associations, drives and feelings" that "emerge in obscurity" (Husserl, 1989, 289). Habits resemble moods to a certain extent as they are also more or less a blind force surging from the individual's sedimented past and intruding upon the present. The habitual subject, in its implementation of habits, often unreflectively overlooks subtle changes in the present situation in comparison with those—yet not identical—situations in the past, adopting the same pattern of behaviours despite differences between the past and the present. Inherent to habit is the tendency to superimpose itself upon various situations, just like the tendential-passive bringing-forth of the moods. This more or less "violent" nature of habituality can be illustrated by the habitual-typical interpretation (apprehension) of sensory elements. When, for instance, I hear the sound of a car speeding up coming from behind, "I" nonetheless tend to interpret the sound as something coming from the car "I" see in front of me, such that it *fits* better with what "I" can see and habitually expect regarding what the sound is and from whence it comes (Lohmar, 2016, 56). The habits formed by apprehending similar cases in the past *teleologically* orient the direction of interpretation in the present, so that the latter conform to one's pre-established habitual expectation. Lohmar (*ibid.*, my emphasis) concludes that "Even if the acoustic sound has another sense of direction it is *reframed* with a new sense of direction so that it *fits* what I can see". Such subjectively imagined fulfilment of the empty-anticipatory intention is referred to as the phenomenon of "vivid phantasmata". The subject, while projecting an empty horizon awaiting intuitive fulfilment, is silently driven by its habits to fantasize certain contents (the phantasmata) that are (almost) as vivid as sensory intuition, in order to imaginatively fulfil the empty horizon. For example, when we see something like a lemon, which is actually made of plastic, from a certain distance, we immediately imagine its other sensory attributes as if they were given to us at the same time (*ibid.*). The fantasized contents, in this case the smell, taste and texture of a real lemon, stem, above all, from one's habitual pre-knowledge about the

presumed object - but not what it *actually* is or given. Furthermore, the vivid phantasmas do not merely fill in the missing sensory contents that are anticipated but might even repel the presently given contents or replace them with subjectively imagined contents based on one's habitual dispositions and pre-knowledge. Even when we come closer to the plastic lemon and acknowledge its abnormalities, we are not directly convinced of its deviation from our past knowledge of what a lemon is or "should be" according to our habitual cognition. In this sense, habits, similar to moods, drive us to certain extent to overlook, misinterpret, or repel what is presently and sensorily given.

On the other hand, however, the manifestation of habits is much less "violent" than that of moods, in that the former does not entirely dismiss what is given externally from the current surrounding world. Habits are triggered by practical, spatial-temporal conditions that are *vaguely* perceived by the subject. Unlike types, which are also awakened by what shows up in the present, habits are not reactivated by the appearing profiles of a single, concrete entity. Instead, they are unreflectively incited by the *general* situation or atmosphere embedded in the subject's daily routine, in which details of concrete objects are usually left out of sight. Imagine the difference between getting up at home, a place where you have already been living for several years, and getting up in a hotel room in which you have been spending just a couple of nights. Without a doubt, the entire setting of the two places differs greatly; the bedside cabinet is placed at another side of the bed, the cupboard in the hotel has one door instead of two, and the bathroom is located closer to the bed and in a different direction from it, etc. However, in order to carry out your daily routine in the hotel room after getting up from the bed, no reflective effort is required to acknowledge each of the details mentioned. Almost unreflectively your hand reaches for the bedside cabinet (located on a different side of the bed than the one at home) to turn off the alarm clock and you go toward the bathroom located in another direction. After just a few days spent there, you "automatically" adopt another "set" of habits of routine in the hotel room, without actively noticing each and every detailed difference among the concrete objects in the overall environment. (And when you get back home after a week, you do not need to learn another set of habits again; the previously established set is still retained and automatically reactivated once you step into the home-like place.) Instead, the *general setting*, the different ("unusual"), vaguely perceived spatial-temporal conditions, are themselves sufficient to reactivate a particular set of newly acquired habits that are conformable to the current situation. Practical habits are not carried out identically in all situations; rather, they do modify themselves, just like types, so that they can "fit" the present conditions better. Different from the types is that the reactivation of selective sets of practical habits is not strictly dependent upon any concrete object or its given profiles, but instead upon the current, vague, and general surrounding-world, which is given with more or less familiarity.

A peculiar two-sidedness of habits thus comes to light: on the one hand, they are deeply rooted in an individual historical subject and have a fundamental tendency to intrude themselves upon the present situation; on the other hand, habits are sensitive to changes in the overall environment and are reactivated differently in order to better conform to the current particular context. The ambivalent manifesting mechanism of habits can be summarized as *the unreflected transference of repetitive acquisitions of the past onto the general situation of the vaguely apprehended present*. A significant implication of this the double-sidedness is that an imbalance of it – either the collapse or the polarization of one of the two sides - might lead to the occurrence of pathological experiences to be studied in the second main part of this work. In the last part of this section, I will outline the possible empirical consequences of an imbalance of between two facets of habits.

The preservation and unreflective reactivation of habits in present situations significantly facilitate the uninterrupted “functioning” of everyday life. Engraved upon the individual subject as unquestioned “common sense” or “*Selbstverständlichkeit*”, habits ensure the “smoothness” of daily life by prescribing the appropriate and practically possible ways of acting in most ordinary situations. The subject is granted a sense of security and certainty by the habitual knowledge of itself as well as of recurrent similar situations already experienced in the past. Despite the subtleties varying from day to day in their most detailed constitution, an unhindered coping-with in everyday life is typically ensured. This is because pre-established habits enable one to “filter out” variables that are presumably insignificant for practical decisions, such that familiar patterns of behaviour and thinking can be comfortably adopted without much anxiety being evoked in the subject. Put otherwise, the possession and adoption of habits prevent one from paranoid overthinking and unnecessary deliberation over insignificant changes, details, or purely logical possibilities in ordinary situations. Correspondingly, once the security granted by habits established in the past is lost and common sense is constantly put into question, such such as schizophrenia would result, as Blankenburg (2012) famously asserts. This occurs when the dimension of the “past” inherent in the double nature of habit collapses and the “present” prevails with all its detailed constitutions suddenly become prominent. When, as Blankenburg (2012, 90) describes it, “*Selbstverständlichkeit wird zu Fragwürdigkeit (the self-evident becomes questionable)*”, the authority of habitual knowledge acquired in the past is challenged and each and every triviality of the present becomes the object of endless reflection. Consequently, hardly any decisions could be made, or any practical actions carried out, as the subject is stuck within an endless thinking process. What is supposed to be the work of habits constituted anonymously and unconsciously in “passive genesis” is inevitably replaced by the incessant “active synthesis” of the ego (Blankenburg, 2012, 106), which is then characterized as schizophrenic hyperreflexivity (See chapter 9).

Another form of pathological experience may take place when, in contrast to the instance above, the “past” completely prevails and present particularities are completely excluded from the conscious field. This happens when one is helplessly *fixed* on one’s own habitual patterns of thought and behaviour and is no longer capable of freely breaking through the established system of habits by virtue of one’s second order volition, viz. by taking a different stance towards it. Instead of being stuck in endless deliberation about present trivialities, the subject is in this case trapped in the sedimented past and loses sight of the concrete present. Admittedly, the “screening out” of insignificant details in the present is one of the conditions for the practical realization of habits. Nonetheless, in pathological or extreme cases, the complete fixation on habits, or on traces left by the past, turns out to be a blinding veil covering up the peculiarity and concreteness of the present. The result is a reckless transference of the past (habits) onto the present, a transference that is hardly reasonable and advantageous for the current context. In psychoanalysis, Freud names this tendency the *Wiederholungszwang* or repetition-compulsion inherent in human nature (See chapter 7). In opposition to *Ausgesetztsein* (*being-exposed*) in the world of schizophrenic patients, in this case one is isolated *within* the system established in the past - closing oneself off from alternatives offered by present and future and eventually eliminating the freedom and flexibility that enable one to change or renew the pre-existing system of habits. This is experientially most obvious in neurodivergences such as autism spectrum disorder. People on the spectrum are characterized by their isolation from the changing environment, fear or aversion of novelty, and the tendency to remain in their own, pre-established, familiar “life-world”. Their “autistic repetitive behaviours”, which feature a high level of rigidity and closeness, “manifest themselves at different levels of complexity, stretching from simple stereotyped actions and increasingly elaborate routines to forms of withdrawal into often sophisticated areas of interest” (Barale et al., 2021, 696). Expressed in our vocabularies, people on the spectrum are disposed to repeat what was already established in the past, to “dwell” in their habitual life-world, and to refuse any unknown “inputs” from the present. As far as types and moods are concerned, it is unquestionable that the polarization of either their passivity or activity also contributes to pathological phenomena. Nonetheless, this is shown to be most conspicuous in the case of the habitus.

### 5.3 Habits and the Problem of “Common Sense (*Selbstverständlichkeit*)”

As elucidated above, sedimented experiences are transformed into and manifest as different forms of habits, including habitual theoretical and practical knowledge, the anticipatory projection of practical possibilities, expectations regarding possible reactions of oneself and others, embodied habits, etc. In general, habits conceptualized in these various senses have the character of “common sense”, namely, a “sense” that is taken for granted (*selbstverständlich*) and rarely subject to question. Habits are something adopted naturally and unreflectively; their validity and suitability are seldom challenged unless obvious obstacles are encountered. One’s obedience to and practical realization of them barely



require any reflective and rational deliberation, including thematic “consent” from the egological subject itself. In this sense habits are essentially something taken for granted and belong to a kind of common sense. In general, common sense refers to the personal habitualities of an individual person, (as we have discussed so far) as well as to the traditions, customs, social norms, shared knowledge, etc. constituted by a particular group of communal subjects and adopted intersubjectively and intergenerationally by other subjects. Whereas personal habitualities entail the genetic sense of sedimentation, social-cultural common-sense points to what Steinbock (2003) identifies as its generative sense. Understood within “socio-historical temporalization or historicity”, the generative sense of sedimentation designates the communal and cultural habitualities constituted among the subjects within the same society, which are taken over by subsequent generations through appropriation and disappropriation (Steinbock, 2003, 303, 308). Both individual-subjective and communal-intersubjective common sense – or habits – provide a vague orientation for one’s practical life, ensuring that it is lived without much unnecessary frictions. Nonetheless, a closer examination of the notion reveals its inherent ambiguity, namely, the equivocal “sense” of “common sense”. What *is*, precisely, the “sense” of common sense? How should its nature and meaning be conceptualized? In what follows, three “senses” of common sense will be distinguished and elaborated: i) *cognitive* sense, which refers to certain widely shared, basic forms of knowledge; ii) *volitional* sense, which refers to some fundamental ontological beliefs about the world; iii) *affective* sense, which refers to an essential feeling of security and familiarity in a situation.

Common sense conceived of as i) basic knowledge of oneself and of the world is the most prevalent meaning of the notion. Husserl also tends to underline this cognitive or intellectual nature of habits - for instance, when he attributes the possibility of projecting an anticipatory horizon for the explication of objects to “*a knowledge in the form of a habitus*” (Husserl, 1973a, 122). With regard to pre-predicative experience and predicative judgement, previous perceptions as well as cognitions (*Kenntnisse*) and judgements are preserved as *knowledge*, which allows itself to be reactivated, applied or repeated in future experiences. As it is reawakened (especially in the form of the typifying-horizon of apperception), common-sense knowledge is transformed into a kind of unquestioned habitual pre-knowledge (Lohmar, 2016, 50), for which no “conscious participation” (Husserl, 1973a, 123) of the ego-subject or “intuitive recollection of the earlier cases of comparison” (Husserl, 1973a, 328-9), is necessary. Without such pre-knowledge, no perceptual acts would ever truly be possible (See chapter 2). In addition to the knowledge acquired through individual experiences, common-sensical basic knowledge also includes that which is sedimented in and taken over from others within the same historical-cultural community. These forms of knowledge are not individual constitutions in the past, yet the possession of them is presumed – or taken for granted - by almost each and every member of the society. Examples of this kind of basic knowledge are the cognition that the sunrise takes place in the east whereas the sun-set occurs in the west, or that it is a courtesy to maintain a

certain physical distance while talking with a stranger. Lastly, practical habits, as discussed in the previous sections consist largely in the knowledge of oneself, particularly of one's competence, limitations, life-goals, interests, dispositions, and so on. As explained above, something can be the object of will only as long as it is something within "the scope of my power", that is, "to the extent that the performance of the thesis itself is for me something practically possible" (Husserl, 1989, 270). It follows that the projection and willing of the horizon of practical possibilities presupposes this basic, habitual pre-knowledge of oneself, which guides one's everyday coping with practical situations.

Furthermore, common sense can be conceived as volitional by nature; this refers particularly to ii) a fundamental belief about the world, namely, the belief in the structural constancy and stability of the world. From what was explicated above, we can see how, based on the habitual knowledge of the world, one is usually able to anticipate the subsequent modes of comportments of oneself and others, the possible consequences that follow a particular event or act, and the most probable reactions of others toward "my" particular actions, etc. What was missing in this description is that such anticipation is based not only on one's habitual knowledge (acquired empirically from past) experiences, but also presupposes a metaphysical belief about the world, which is hardly a product of empirical induction. This fundamental belief inherent in natural human being is the "belief in the uniformity and constancy of the course of causal events in nature" (Lohmar, 2016, 61). Hume (1896), among others, emphasizes the role of this belief when he speaks of the "subjective" nature of causality. The idea of causality bespeaks a necessary relationship between two or more events. As a radical empiricist, Hume casts great doubt on the epistemic validity of the idea of causality, insisting that no experiential basis is ever discernible for it. Instead, he argues, what we term as cause and effect between two objects or events amounts to nothing but "two impressions conjoined together" (Hume, 1896, 59), viz. the repeated experiences of one event happening after another. "Causality" between the two events is never sensorily experienceable – no causality is ever "seen" – and hence is epistemologically untenable. Rather, the notion is nothing more than a *belief* based on habits, which are formed by the repeated impressions of the consecutive occurrence of two events – one following another. Such habitual belief is an unreflectively adopted conviction "that like objects, placed in like circumstances, will always produce like effects" (Hume, 1896, 60). Without this fundamental conviction, the anticipation of future events and any inductive reasoning based on previous experiences is barely possible. To be sure, Hume's radical sceptical account of causality is highly disputable and widely refuted. Nonetheless, his insight into the interrelationship between belief and habits, or rather the volitional aspect of habits, proves to be of great importance. Whereas repeated experiences in the past, preserved in the form of habits, reinforce the belief in the constancy and uniformity of worldly events (as well as in the validity of inductive thinking and anticipating), this belief serves, in turn, as the metaphysical foundation for the "application" of habits to future

situations. Without such allegedly “ungrounded” belief in the stability and vague homogeneity of different daily affairs, one would hardly dare to adopt what was merely acquired previously as a basis what is supposedly “new” or “unknown” in the future. In a word, what is “taken for granted” is not only certain habitual knowledge, but also the metaphysical belief in the basic unchangeability of the structure of world and its inductive nature.

Lastly, common sense also encompasses an affective dimension and bespeaks iii) an essential feeling of security and familiarity. In the course of one’s repeated and habitual coping within a certain environment, an affective sense of safety, stability, comfort and familiarity with it is usually co-developed. As Heidegger (2008, 80) describes, to live “in” a world means essentially to be habituated to it, to “dwell” and to “reside” in it in such a way that “I am accustomed”, “I am familiar with” it. To genuinely *be in* a world means more than inhabiting it in a spatial sense or collecting abstract knowledge about its traditions and cultures. Rather, *being-in-the-world* includes first and foremost the sense or feeling of trust and security while living in it, such that there is no need to constantly or paranoically put each and every daily triviality into question. In this context, Ratcliffe speaks of “existential feeling”, which depicts the bodily and affective way the self relates to the world. The different kinds of existential feeling include, for instance, the feeling of being “at home”, being “abandoned”, being “overwhelmed”, being “disconnected (from the world)”, being “there”, being “real”, and so on (Ratcliffe, 2013, 20). In “normal” cases, a subject relates itself to the world most time in such a way that it feels “at home”, surrounded by an environment in which a comforting sense of familiarity is always co-present. It does not live in it in such a way that it is constantly haunted by the anxiety of unknown and unexpected strangeness, for the subject has already familiarized itself with the environment and possesses sufficient basic knowledge of how everything normally “works”. In pathological experiences, by contrast, an altered relationship occurs between oneself and the world, one which is characterized by a “lack of connectedness to the world”, “an absence of warming familiarity” (Ratcliffe, 2013, 24). In cases such as schizophrenia, habits acquired in one’s foregoing life are deprived of the *sense* of validity, which is more a subjective or an affective “sense” than any kind of epistemological validity based on deliberative rationality. In an environment where one feels completely foreign and disconnected, one lacks the (subjectively *felt*) security and confidence to adopt one’s habitual modes of comportment and expectations in current encounters. Analogous to the interrelationship between habits and belief, there is a reciprocal relationship between habits in general and the sense of familiarity. Whereas repeated experiences in a particular surrounding create for the subject the existential feeling of familiarity, the sense of familiarity with the surrounding world provides the subjective confidence for the implementation of previously acquired habitual patterns of actions and thoughts. More or less surprisingly, on several occasions, Husserl does also address the affective dimension of habits as the habitual feeling of safety and warming familiarity. One’s recurrent activity of positing and unfolding being (*Seinssetzung und Seinsauslegung*) institutes a habituality of

the ego, and such “remaining acquisitions [habituallities] constitute each of my *familiar* surrounding world (bleibende Erwerbe [Habitualitäten] konstituieren meine jeweilige *bekannte* Umwelt...)” (Husserl, 2012a, 68, my translation and emphasis). Here, the *bekannt* does not (only) refer to the intellectual pre-cognizance of the world but (also) a vague, affective sense of familiarity, which differentiates one’s homeworld (*Heimwelt*) from the alien-world (*Fremdwelt*). The homeworld, according to Husserl, is an organized system of purposes (*Zwecksystem*), such that the teleological meaning of each of its layers or aspects (a particular custom, entity, career, ritual, etc.) is given to the indigenous people as a kind of habitual knowledge (Husserl, 2008, 164). A homeworld as such can hence always be apprehended by its subjects in its “habituelle Vermöglichkeit (habitual making-possible of possibility)” and “typisch *vertraute* Verfügbarkeiten (typical *familiarized* availability)” (ibid., my emphasis), including the sense of being-familiar with it. Elsewhere in *Ideen II*, the sense of safety and trustworthiness does not only underlie the world but also (knowledge regarding) oneself, including one’s limits, competences, dispositions, etc. This is designated as the “doxic habit” with respect to oneself, “a certain familiarity in the present behaviour of the ego” (Husserl, 1989, 268). Such familiarity with oneself is indispensable for the healthy functioning of the ego-subject, for it grants the very sense of agency and ownership of one’s own memories, thoughts, and behaviours. The lack of this essential sense of warmth and intimacy to oneself would result, correspondingly, in pathological phenomena such as depersonalization. For instance, the break with one’s own traumatic past in people with borderline personality disorder results in the depersonalization of memories and thus in the fragmentation of self-identity (See chapter 9 & 10).

## Chapter Six: The Reciprocal Determination of the Three Structural Moments

In this concluding chapter of the first main part of this work, a step back will be taken and the interrelationship between the three structural moments explicated, so far as the conscious manifestations of sedimentation are concerned. In the first place, it should be emphasized again that the tripartition of consciousness into the sphere of understanding, sphere of affect, and sphere of volition, is merely a conceptual operation that serves as the theoretical basis for a systematic understanding of the multiple forms of the manifestations of sedimentation. This division does not represent three separate spheres of consciousness but rather three modes or dimensions of one and the same consciousness that are essentially interlaced with each other in the flux of conscious life. Correspondingly, the three structural moments that belong respectively to each of the spheres are always intertwined and mutually conditioned in all intentional acts. In what follows, the reciprocally determining relationship of types, moods and habits will be brought into light. Firstly, the notion of horizon-consciousness (*Horizontbewusstsein*) will be introduced, whose genetic meaning can be unravelled in its full concreteness in light of the notion of sedimentation as explicated so far. Secondly, the horizontal nature of the three structural moments will be unfolded in relation to the genetic notion of horizon-consciousness. Thirdly, given the horizontality of types, moods, and habits, their irreducible intertwinement will be further illustrated through the associative awakening of types. In contrast to Husserl's objectivistic account, I argue that this process should be understood as an association *subjectively* conditioned by the subject's moods and habits (*gestimmte und habituelle Assoziation*).

### 6.1 The Horizontal Structure of Types, Moods, and Habits

The notion of *horizon* plays a central role in phenomenological studies, and its conceptual significance is no less than that of more prominent notions such as intentionality, constitution, epoché, reduction, etc. Briefly put, a horizon (of perception or intentional experience in general) bespeaks a *Vorzeichnung* or pre-configuration of what is not (yet) intuitively given in the impressional present, but what is or can be expected to be given in the further course of experience. It projects and point to (*verweisen auf*) a system of senses and implications potentially following what is already given in the present, revealing itself as a context of reference (*Verweisungszusammenhang*) and an indeterminate halo that surrounds the current thematic object of consciousness. The horizon can be conceptualized both statically and genetically – as some scholars assert (Geniusas, 2012, 89), “the horizon is a distinctly genetic phenomenon”. From a static perspective, the notion of horizon depicts nothing other than the noema-noematic structure between consciousness and its intentional correlate. Husserl dedicates himself to the study of this atemporal structure in early works such as the *Ideen I* (See Husserl, 2012b, section 87-96), where a deepened analysis of the essential correlation between transcendental consciousness and the world as pure givenness is carried out. However, this statically

conceptualized notion of horizon is restricted to the impressional present, where consciousness is conceived of as an ahistorical empty structure and the intentional objects as “finished” and unchanged. Consciousness is deprived of its historicity, temporality and individuality, and the genetic question of *how* an experience of objects as such comes into being is left unaddressed. In view of this, an enriched, more concrete conceptualization of horizon is required and the turn to genetic phenomenology is necessitated. In *Cartesischen Meditationen*, Husserl expressly recognizes the centrality of the problem of horizon in intentional analysis, highlighting the horizon-structure of all kinds of intentionality, which calls for a new phenomenological method: “the horizontal structure of all intentionality thus prescribes for phenomenological analysis and description a completely new methodology (*die Horizontstruktur aller Intentionalität schreibt also der phänomenologischen Analyse und Deskription eine total neuartige Methodik vor*)” (Husserl, 2012a, 49, my translation). The horizon-intentionality (*Horizontintentionalität*) spoken of here is further thematized in his later works as horizon-consciousness (*Horizontbewusstsein*), which characterizes the subjective life of consciousness in its entirety and “bespeaks the *subjective reference* that each and every horizon entails” (Geniasas, 2012, 95). The horizon, as horizon-consciousness, is no longer merely a horizon of objective reference that surrounds the object itself. Rather, the horizon is also “*the horizon of the ego...the horizon of transcendental subjectivity*” (ibid.) containing egological, historical and individual dimensions – dimensions which can be unravelled primarily in light of the notion of sedimentation and its conscious counterparts.

The genetic notion of horizon-consciousness is better explained through a contrast with its static conceptualization. As mentioned above, the static notion of horizon and horizon-consciousness is interpreted within the noetic-noematic framework of intentional consciousness. It can be explicated in terms of three layers of sense (See Geniasas, 2012, 98). The first layer starts with pre-given objectivities, either real or ideal by nature, within the *noematic* horizon of sense. The noematic horizon, which can be further separated into inner- and outer horizon, refers to the context of the object’s background-appearance. It denotes either the anticipated internal attributes of the object or its external surroundings. The second layer that follows is the more rudimentary *noetic* horizon of the intentional subject itself, upon which the noematic horizon is built. Eventually, the noetic horizon is fully unfolded as nothing but the stream of consciousness, an egological unity that encompasses all past and future lived-experiences of the subject. This very last layer truly reveals the horizon as a horizon of consciousness, where each and every intentional content is necessarily given against a subjective background of intentions. Each intentional content in the present points implicitly to other intentional contents within a network of sedimented past experiences, anticipated future appearances, and other co-present appearances in consciousness. There is always such a constitutive framework belonging to the ego-subject, such that each and every one of its intentional act necessarily co-intends a whole system of intentions - including, for instance, the empty-intention of a typifying-anticipatory

horizon. Only within such a constitutive framework can the present givenness be meaningfully apprehended.

The unraised questions in this static account are: *How* is this whole horizon of pre-configured senses and implications formed in the life of consciousness? *Whence* does such a constitutive system of intentions specific to each individual consciousness originate? These are questions to be clarified by genetic phenomenology and, in particular, through the genetic notion of sedimentation. Sedimentation, as elucidated so far, necessitates the preservation and perseverance of senses and experiences obtained in the past, and this alone constitutes subjectivity in its utter individuality and concreteness. The horizon-consciousness of the sedimented subjectivity can henceforth no longer be understood merely as a formal structure, but rather as “a field that condenses the sedimentations of sense, i.e., a field into which each and every *Erlebnis* ‘streams in’ and leaves its permanent imprint” (Geniasas, 2012, 104). Therefore, the horizon is in no way anything *a priori*, pre-given or universally identical, as the Kantian categories and transcendental ego presumably are. Rather, each horizon of senses and implications is idiosyncratic, formed historically and constantly modified in the course of the subject’s experiences, which are then sedimented in the flux of consciousness. What is sedimented then reemerge as the constitutive framework for further intentional acts - that is, as an intellectual (types), affective (moods) and volitional (habits) horizon. Given the idea of horizon-consciousness, each of the structural moments discussed so far can be now unfolded anew in terms of its horizontal structure. Intertwined, these moments constitute the egological and sedimented dimensions of horizon-consciousness.

The cognitive or intellectual aspect of sedimented horizon-consciousness is depicted by types, which emerge, above all, in perceptual experiences as a *typifying-anticipatory horizon* (as already elucidated in chapter two). The typifying horizon, awakened by presently given sensory data, offers a *Spielraum* of possibilities (Husserl, 1973a, 36) for the subject’s apprehension of sense. Such a *Spielraum* is an intentional empty horizon in which the sensory data are given, surrounded by an indeterminate halo (*Hof*) radiating from the core-type and surrounding the present givenness. The horizon, or the halo, is a determinable indeterminability (*bestimmbare Unbestimmtheit*) (Husserl, 1966, 6) that unfolds itself into typifying *undetermined* possibilities of sense that await intuitive fulfilment through experiential *determination*. This delineated room of possibilities for the sense-apprehension of particular object is circumscribed by the awakened type that assembles similar objects of previous experiences. The reemergence of types in the constitutive activities of present consciousness is essentially *horizontal*; that is, types necessarily emerge as horizons for the current perception, namely as the “horizon of typical familiarity and precognizance (*Vorbekanntheit*)” (Husserl, 1973a, 40). Owing to their horizontal structure, types are able to prescribe the possible “what” of the object as well as its internal and external attributes. In each case, these are a specific

system of intentions that open up room for possible ways of “making sense” of the incompletely presented sensory chaos. In effect, this horizon of non-intuitive sense always “rules over” the intuitive givenness by pre-determining its possible senses of apprehension. No apprehension of the appearing phenomenon as *A* is possible if there is no *possible-A* included in the typifying-anticipatory horizon. Importantly, the various projected possibilities entailed in the horizon are nothing other than products of the sedimented experiences of the historically and culturally shaped individual subject. Horizons, in particular the typifying horizons of perception, “are projections of sense which consciousness itself brings forth by way of awakening what is sedimented through the past accomplishments of consciousness” (Geniusas, 2012, 104).

Whereas types are manifested as an *objectivating* (*objektivierend*) horizon constitutively indispensable for the apprehension of the being (*Sein*) of things, moods - representing the affective dimensions of horizon-consciousness - are manifested as a *non-objectivating affective background-horizon* of intentional subjectivity. By non-objectivating I mean that moods do not contribute to the constitution of *what* things are themselves, but rather *how* they appear to the affectively conditioned subject. In chapter three, mood is characterized as the feeling-background (*Gefühlshintergrund*) that lets everything appears under a special light of affection. For instance, “when we are in a cheerful mood, this or that thing that enters into our sight, they all look friendly, rosy, lovely (*sind wir heiter gestimmt, so sieht sich dies oder jenes, worauf unser Blick fällt, freundlich, rosig, lieblich an*)” (Husserl, 2020, 111, my translation). The affective background or horizon is not the usual kind of intentionality that directs itself toward a specific givenness, that grasps it *as* a unitary object or *as* an attribute belonging to the object. However, even without enabling us to apprehend something *as X*, mood drives us to apprehend *X* through an affective lens, viz. the permeating feeling-background against which all intentional activities and lived-experiences take place and are coloured. An intricate question that follows from this understanding of mood as an affective horizon is whether or not it is in any sense *transcendentally constitutive* for the object itself. In his detailed exploration of the Husserlian account of mood, Lee attributes a transcendental significance to its colouring function, arguing that the moods alone open up horizons that are transcendently essential to the apprehension of objects as well as the world as a whole. He writes, “mood owes this transcendental function of access to individual objects to its function of opening various forms of horizon, and, primarily, to its function of opening the world as a universal horizon incorporating all other horizons.” (Lee, 1998, 115). That is, mood, as an affective “light”, does not only alter the way of appearing of *already constituted* objects of experience, but also serves, *in the very first place*, to illuminate the surrounding things, such that they may be accessible for the subject *at all* (*überhaupt*) for any subsequent constitutive acts whatsoever. This might be more of a Heideggerian conceptualization of mood as the ontological-existential structure of *Befindlichkeit* than a strictly Husserlian idea, which is nonetheless also echoed by other scholars. Ramirez (2015), for example, studies mood from the perspective of



horizon-intentionality and argues that mood does indeed have an intentionality and intentional reference. It is simply not an intentionality directed towards any single entity (*Einzelobjekt*) but rather to the world itself as a whole. Indeed, the intentional structure of mood is asserted explicitly by Husserl (2020, 103, my translation), who writes, “however, mood also always preserves an ‘intentionality’ (*dabei behält aber die Stimmung immer eine ,Intentionalität’*)”. The distinctive horizontal intentionality of mood consists in its “background reference to the surrounding world”, which implicitly projects a horizon that allows for “an emotive form of transmission (*Übertragung*) of sense” (Ramirez, 2015, 100). This (emotive) transmission of sense can be understood in analogy with the transmission of sense that takes place in the context of reference unfolded by types, which point to something that goes beyond what is intuitively given and transfer, by virtue of the apperceptive act, the non-intuitive sense onto the intuitive one. Likewise, moods open a horizon of a system of implicit references and anticipation of sense – yet in a distinctively affective manner. By virtue of its horizontal structure, moods transmit implied or anticipated emotional qualities onto the surrounding objects. These qualities are not intuitively given by the objects themselves, but instead radiate exclusively from the subject. In this way, the objects are granted a transmitted sense of affect.

However, the attribution of such a transcendental function to moods is not undisputable. Quijano (2018), for instance, raises objections against this characterization and rejects the horizontal structure of moods as phenomenologically untenable. He asserts expressly in a footnote that “moods do not constitute any horizons, although they may illuminate those already constituted”, and even when they illuminate present objects, persons or events, they do so in a “non-horizontal way” (Quijano, 2018, 66). Despite admitting (in line with the descriptions above) that moods are something “regularly lived in the background of consciousness”, he insists that they themselves do not constitute horizons but merely have “a special vocation for horizons” (*ibid.*). For him, moods have nothing more than a *contingent*, though special, meaning for horizons projected in some other way, such as the objectivating typifying horizon. In view of these disputes, questions arise as to whether it is phenomenologically appropriate to attribute a horizontal structure to moods and conceptualize them as an affective horizon. If the answer is affirmative, in what sense could the horizontality of moods be properly spoken of? In what follows, I propose a moderate response to the questions.

I agree that a mood *does* constitute an affective horizon in which things are presented to the subject and through which they are affectively coloured by virtue of the transmission of emotive senses. Nonetheless, moods constitute *neither* any horizon “by itself”, nor an ontologically most primordial horizon that allows for primary access of the subject to its surroundings. That is, in no case do moods open up a (primordial) horizon in isolation from other structural moments that are equally transcendently constitutive with respect to horizon-consciousness as a whole. In our context, types and habits are singled out as the co-constitutive moments of all horizons, which are intellectual,

affective, and volitional all at the same time. Section 3.2, in particular, has illustrated the intertwinement and reciprocal conditionality of feelings and cognitive intentional acts. Therefore, it seems that Lee has gone too far when he attributes to moods a transcendental function (the “light”), without which the subject’s most primary access to worldly things is literally impossible. As mentioned, this idea comes close to the ontological-existential clearing (*Lichtung*) Heidegger attributes to Dasein. According to Heidegger, Dasein as Being-in-the-world *is* itself a clearing, a space of light in and through which alone the Being (*Sein*) of other entities (*Seiende*) is revealed or “lit up (*aufleuchten*)” (See Heidegger, 133, 2006; 2012). Dasein, as this primordial clearing, is ontologically and universally pre-determined by its very Being. Nonetheless, once moods are given such a fundamental ontological function, they would be reduced to a formal and ahistorical existential structure of human subjectivity. As a universally shared formal structure, moods would be immediately deprived of their concreteness and historicity rooted in the sedimented individual subject, as well as their equiprimordiality (*Gleichursprünglichkeit*) with the intellectual and volitional dimensions of consciousness. Rather than being *the* primordial horizon, mood is instead *one of the* structural moments that co-constitutes the horizon-consciousness and the concrete horizons projected in each and every constituting process.

On the other hand, in light of the essential intertwinement of the different dimensions of consciousness, it is hardly justified to assert that moods contribute merely “occasionally” or “contingently” to what is *already* constituted. The “contingency” that Quijano ascribes to moods implies that they do not necessarily take part in the constitutive accomplishments of intentional consciousness, and that horizon-consciousness is or can be stripped bare of its emotive aspect. This, to my mind, does not do justice to the moods as the affective background or *Relief* that always accompanies conscious life in some way or other. Mood is not something dispensable that simply appears in experiences out of total contingency; rather, it is one of the transcendental constituents making up horizon-consciousness itself. Its “participation” and intertwinements with other structural moments do not contingently “add” something inessential to the intact act of horizon-intentionality or to objects that are already fully constituted. Rather, the intentional projection of any horizon must encompass an emotive aspect, which, in the first place, co-determines the character and the nature of the constitutive horizon. Moreover, these different structural moments of consciousness are not merely interwoven, but often lead to significant mutual alterations, and eventually to a change in the horizon as a whole. In the *Noten*, Husserl expressly acknowledges the reciprocal relationship between the cognitive and affective dimensions of an intentional act. He writes, “intellectual acts, or acts of interest, can initiate or justify such affective confirmation, and vice-versa. Through this, however, they lose their original character (*intellektuelle Akte, Akte des Interesses können solche der Gemütsbetätigung einleiten oder begründen und umgekehrt, doch verlieren sie an ihrem ursprünglichen Charakter dadurch*)“ (Husserl, 2004, 159). The emotive constituents do not add

something extra and on top of what is already complete and self-sufficient as an intentional act. Rather, they co-constitute the act in such a way that the intellectual act itself is always already shaped and oriented *affectively* – thus, the apprehended object is rarely a pure object of cognition to which we can “return” by extracting it from its emotional colouration. This also applies, conversely, to the intellectual conditioning of the emotive aspect of consciousness. In a word, the emotive aspect in general, and moods in particular, are in no case purely an empirical and psychological additions to intentional experiences, merely adding an inessential tinge of colour to the already, “purely” constituted object of cognition. Rather, in the constitutive process of the pre- or non-constituted, moods are always transcendently presupposed. Returning to the problem of the horizontality of moods, I would therefore suggest that whereas moods alone do not open a formal and ontologically primordial place of illumination that allows the subject the most primary access to other beings, they do nonetheless make up an equiprimordial moment of horizon-consciousness - together with other structural moments such as intellectual types and practical habits.

Alongside types and moods, the habitus depicts the volitional side of horizon-consciousness and unfolds as the practical horizon of possibilities of actions, decisions, and perceptions realizable in the practical life-world. Habitus represents a kind of typicality analogous to the types of things, yet it is the typicality of individual human subjects rather than that of objects. Whereas types open up a halo of apperceptive possibilities surrounding an object, practical, habitual typicality portrays a “type” of an individual human being, according to which one’s reactions toward particular occurrences can be roughly anticipated, and the meaning of one’s behaviours interpreted. More concretely, the type of human subjects can be divided into the universal typicality of human beings in general and the “character type” of a concrete individual. The former includes structures such as corporeality, which serves as the presupposition of empathy and the universal structure of “ego, pre-givenness, affection, etc.” (Husserl, 1989, 284-5). The latter, also referred to as individual type, bespeaks the typicality of a personal life, which is shaped to a large extent by one’s peculiar habitualities. The typicality of an individual describes one’s “unitary style” or “character...his style of life in affection and action, with regard to the way he has of being motivated by such and such circumstances” (Husserl, 1989, 283). Such habitual pre-knowledge of the typicality of individual human being facilitates the practical horizon not only for the apperceptive understandings of *others* but also for the orientation of *oneself*. Acquired through repeated interactions with him or her, the pre-knowledge of someone else’s style or character type opens up an anticipatory horizon of how the person might behave or react in particular situations, how s/he would be motivated under different circumstances, etc. Similar to types, an “apperceptive horizon of indeterminate determinability” is projected in accordance with (our habitual knowledge of) the typical character of the person, “an intentional framework that...concerns precisely one of the modes of behaviour which corresponds to the style” (ibid.). The same applies to the habitual pre-knowledge of oneself. What was once constituted and experienced in the past, including

one's own perceptions, convictions, judgements, repeated acts and thoughts, etc., is sedimented as one's style as well as one's self-knowledge (of the style itself). Even the trivialities and singularities "I" have lived through in situations "which I hardly notice" subtly "predelineate the horizon of my lived-experience" and sometimes "enlarge the framework of [my] pre-givenness" (Husserl, 1989, 283-4). Here, pre-givenness is to be understood as the practical possibilities gathered within the practical horizon of one's possible actions and decisions, which correspond to and are predelineated by one's interests, competences, dispositions, etc., as elaborated in the last chapter. This practical horizon of habitualities significantly facilitates the orientations and organization of one's daily life.

In a word, the structural moments of types, moods, and habits, are not only the conscious manifestation of sedimentations, but they manifest, thanks to their horizontal structure, as the various sides of horizon-consciousness in its concreteness and individuality. Intertwined, they are constantly constitutive of all intentional experiences whatsoever, as will be demonstrated in the next section in light of the problem of association.

## 6.2 The Mood-Conditioned Habitual Associative Awakening of Types

The collaborative transcendental contribution of types, moods and habits is discernible in different forms of intentional acts and lived-experiences. In this section, a concrete illustration of the interplay between the three moments at issue will be sketched by foregrounding the associative awakening of types, which was addressed in chapter two. As a synthetic moment belonging to the passivity of consciousness, the associative awakening of types is less a rational and sophisticatedly reflective accomplishment of the ego and more an "immediate happening" beyond egological deliberation. The associative connection does not presuppose any reflective act such as the "intuitive recollection of the earlier cases of comparison" (Husserl, 1973a, 328-9). Rather, the passive associative synthesis of consciousness designates an "unconscious" and immediate "leap" from what is given in the present to the type(s) established in the past. The "leap" in question, as discussed in the previous chapters, is presumably grounded in both objective and subjective variables that refuse to become completely transparent to the subject itself. In the foregoing elucidations, it was clear that the awakening (*Weckung*) initiated in the impressional present and aiming at a reproductive present (in the sense of a presentifying recollection of the past in the present) is, for Husserl, primarily a "special synthesis through similarity (*spezielle Synthese durch Ähnlichkeit*)" (Husserl, 1966, 123). The *objective* resemblances between the two termini, the awakening and the awakened, are of primary importance here. Nonetheless, Husserl himself does indeed cast doubt on the exclusiveness of the objective basis of association and raises the question, "whether or not the immediate association as such is possible and is conceivable, in case we would give up on the relation of similarity between the awakening and the awakened... (*ob unmittelbare Assoziation als solche möglich ist, denkbar ist, wenn wir die Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung zwischen Weckendem und Gewecktem aufgeben...*)" (ibid., my translation).

The example, also discussed above, of one valley-end reminding “me” of another valley-end leads to the further question of *why* this particular valley-end in the past is reawakened instead of the others and what peculiar motives from the subjective side are in play. It was mentioned that Husserl does briefly address this question by shedding light on the sensuous and instinctual variables stemming from the individual subject, such as the “privileged sensible feelings like a passionate desire founded by a prominence in its unity. We may even allow originally instinctive, drive related preferences...” (Husserl, 2001, 198)<sup>47</sup>. Following our exposition so far, I single out moods and habits as the two most prominent subjective variables for the passive synthesis of association. As subjectively motivated, the awakening of types should be understood as a mood-conditioned and habitual associative awakening (*gestimmte und habituelle assoziative Weckung*), for the very “direction” of the associative process is continuously navigated by these two structural moments of horizon-consciousness.

In our description of moods in chapter three, it was shown that moods are characterized by their tendency to prolong themselves and spread over the surrounding world. Moods do so by secretly directing the subject’s attentions towards specific things or aspects of things that resonate with themselves, as well as by motivating the subject to react to these things with emotions that coincide with the original mood pervading the subject. For instance, when “I” am permeated with a depressive mood, the negative (aspect of) things appear extraordinarily more prominent to “me” than usual, and I am disposed to react to them in a particularly negative manner. That is, as Husserl (2020, 104, my translation) describes, “I am subject to the tendency to react without reason everywhere only to the unbeauty and the negative values through negative affects (*ich unterläge der Tendenz, grundlos überall nur auf das Unschöne und die negative Wertseiten durch negative Affekte zu reagieren*)”. More strikingly, even when nothing “objectively” negative is discernible, the subject with a negative temper (*schlecht gestimmt*) is motivated to react to random things in a way that emotively resonates with the nature of the current temper. The original emotion of anger, for example, permeates my whole sphere of experience and is transmitted to other contingent objects: “At first, I am angry about the constant obstruction of the chain of thoughts for my research; afterwards I tend to be angry about something else: about the grey sky, about the romp of the children on the street, etc. (*ich ärgere mich zunächst über die ständige Hemmung meines forschenden Gedankenverlaufes; dann bin ich geneigt, mich auch über anderes zu ärgern: über den grauen Himmel, über das Tollen der Kinder auf der Straße, usw.*)” (Husserl, 2004, 177, my translation). There is originally nothing irritating with the sky and the children; however, the mood of anger makes “me” extraordinarily irritable and unreasonably sensitive. I argue that this orientating-motivating force of moods does not only affect the perceptual subject in its *present surrounding world*, but also the passive synthesis of associative reawakening that directs itself towards the *past*. It is easily conceivable that the horizon projected in the reawakening of

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<sup>47</sup> „...bevorzugenden sinnlichen Gefühle, wie einer durch das Abgehobene in seiner Einheit fundierten Wolllust. Auch ursprünglich instinctive, triebmäßige Bevorzugungen dürfen wir zulassen...” (Husserl, 1966, 150)

the sedimented past, whether it be of concrete events or of unconsciously formed types, is also navigated and delineated by the present mood of the subject. What exactly comes into mind, whether it be *this* or *that* particular valley-end, is dependent to a large extent on the emotional attributes attached to the objects respectively and the emotional connection between them and the current temperament of the subject. This will be further elaborated soon.

Habits, likewise, also contribute to the constitutive process of perception. Habits are formed in the course of one's personal experiences, but they also contribute – simultaneously and for most of the time – to the intersubjective validity of the pre-predicative apprehension of object, as habits bespeak the repeatability of certain experiences and the connections between them. The associative awakening of the typifying horizon in perception, as Husserl recognizes it, is motivated and consolidated by one's theoretical (or even practical) habits. It is clear that objects of experience are known (apprehended) in accordance with their types. This has its basis not only “in the sedimentation of all apperceptions”, as already elaborated, but also “in their *habitual* continued action on the basis of associative awakening” (Husserl, 1973a, 321, my emphasis). The more frequently that  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots$  are apperceived according to the type  $X$ , the more habitually and likely  $X_4$  will awaken the type  $X$  as well. Such reinforced habituality usually also implies an increased epistemological credibility of the apperception, for the typifying apperception that follows the associative awakening of type is by nature inductive. The certainty or epistemological force of the passive synthetic unification between the present givenness and the past types is increased or decreased in proportion to the number of repeated apprehensive accomplishments of the same kind. As already quoted above, “Even the force of this apperceptive expectation increases with *the number of 'instances'*—or with *habit*, which amounts to the same thing” (Husserl, 2001, 240). Each and every typifying apperception of an object serves as a further confirmation of the synthesis involved between the awakening and the awakened. Sedimented and preserved as habits, these repeated experiences constitutively guide the future associative awakening.

Hence, the awakening of types is always a mood-conditioned and habitual associative awakening, which is based not solely on the objective similarities between the termini, but is also directed by the perceiving subject's moods and habits. Here, a distinction should be made between two kinds of passive associative awakening, namely, the empirical-psychological and the transcendental-constitutive one (See Lohmar, 1998, 230-52). Empirical-psychological association is what underlies intentional objects or events that are *already constituted*, experienced and sedimented. It bespeaks the classical associative mechanism of “something reminding (me) of something else (*etwas erinnert an etwas anderes*)”, such as the representation of an object awakening (*erweckt*) the representation of one of its attributes, or a representation of an event awakening that of another event (Lohmar, 1998, 248). In this regard, the objective similarities between the awakening and the

awakened play a minimal role, especially in the awakening of a previously experienced event. Instead, the passive recollection of memories triggered by present encounters takes place in the stream of individual consciousness, which serves as a context of reference or implication (*Verweisungszusammenhang*) consisting of one's lived-experiences (*Erlebnisse*). Following this fundamental structure of consciousness is the intentional referencing (*intentionale Verweisung*) (Husserl, 2012a, 79) inherent in each and every lived-experience. That is, each lived-experience that takes place in the present always points to – viz. awakens – other *personal* lived-experiences in the past. Crucial to our discussions is that the referencing or “pointing-to” is to a large extent affectively loaded and unconsciously motivated. That is, the relationship between the referencing and the referenced is grounded most primarily in their affective and existential significance specifically for the subject in question, and especially with regard to subjective “weight” of the referenced (the recalled memory). What is more affectively loaded is more susceptible to reawakening and recollection, regardless of the active intention of the willing subject and of the objective traits and temporal distance between the awakened and the present. A beautiful example is offered by Brudzinska (2020, 177) when she addresses the psychological, unconscious motivation of reproductive association. One day, while she is collecting chestnut in a park, the unique freshness, texture and irregular shape of a fallen chestnut suddenly reminds her of her childhood when she was collecting chestnuts with friends and creating stories and figures for those collected. This is a piece of memory that was buried for a long time and entered, without explicit reason, abruptly into the sphere of consciousness. To (attempt to) explain the sudden reawakening of this immemorial piece of lived-experience, Brudzinska suggests that, convincingly enough, we are required to go beyond “superficial, easily discernible connections (*oberflächlichen, leicht einsehbaren Verknüpfungen*)” such as the season of chestnut-collecting and the feeling of holding one in one's hand, which presumably involves an “objective” relation between the present experience and the recalled childhood memory. Rather, the unexpected coming-into-mind of the latter *and precisely the latter* is rooted in - and psychoanalytically reveals - the person's deepest wishes, needs and cravings, which lie mostly in the unconscious. The psychoanalytic inspection of the associative-reproductive recollection of memory shows it to be overwhelmingly motivated by unconscious moments and unveils the ego-subject in its concreteness as a “wishing, searching, needing (*wünschendes, suchendes, bedürftiges*)” ego-subject, which is no longer merely a detached and affectless observer of its own experiences (ibid.). Slightly translated into our terminologies, the passive associative awakening of experiences sedimented in the distant past is likewise significantly oriented by the “irrational”, “non-objective” substratum of the ego, in particular by its affective background-horizon or *affektives Relief* in general. These unconscious dispositions, feelings, wishes, etc. configure the very affective terrain on which the association takes place and the direction towards which it heads. This phenomenological insight finds empirical support in psychology, which experientially discovers the “mood-memory congruence” or “mood-state-dependent-memory” (See Bower, 1981; Lewis & Critchely, 2003). “Mood-memory

congruence” depicts the fact that the kind of memories recalled at the present (viz. reproductive association, in Husserlian terms) is largely dependent on – congruent with – the current affective state of the subject, that is, on its current mood. In other words, the recalled piece of past lived-experience – whether actively recalled or passively reawakened in the present – is, for most of the time, of the same or a similar emotional nature as the current subject. As psychologists put it, “events learned in one psychic state can be remembered better when one is put back into the same state one was in during the original experience” (Bower, 1981, 130). A psychological experiment was carried out in which the subjects were induced with either a bad or happy mood. After that, they were asked to freely report a series of unrelated childhood incidents that came into their mind through a relatively active recollection. The result was that “what they reported was enormously dependent on their mood at the time” (Bower, 1981, 133). When they were in a bad mood, they tended to recall unpleasant childhood incidents, and vice-versa. This experimental result coincides with our phenomenological description of the orienting-motivating force of moods, whether in present perceptual experiences or in the recollection and reawakening of past events. In the latter case, the intentional direction of the associative chain as well as the horizon of memories that “matter”, are unconsciously pre-delineated by the subject’s current affective state. Just as in perceptions, in recollective process mood silently seeks prolongation and consolidation of itself by “forcing its way” into the past incidents or objects of similar emotive connotations. This bears crucial implication for pathologies such as borderline personality disorder, where the fluctuation of moods usually results in fragmentation of recollected memories as well as polarized interpretation of them during the narrative establishment of self-identity (See Wun, 2024b). A further discussion of this will be held back until the final chapter of this work.

Whereas psychological-empirical association, the recollection or reawakening of memories, is concerned with objects or events that were already constituted in the past, transcendental-constituting association is related to non- or pre-constituted objects that “call for” typifying apperception, which is transcendently constitutive of their very being. In pre-predicative experience, the sensuous data or *hyle* pre-given to the perceiving subject associatively awaken in it a type, which serves as the typifying-horizon in and through which they are apprehended as a meaningful and synthetic object. In comparison with the empirical-psychological awakening of lived-experiences in the past, the passive awakening of types is based more on, and restricted by, the objective pre-givenness, for intellectual intentionality most fundamentally seeks intuitive fulfilment of its empty horizon. A long, strip-shaped, soft and brown-coloured thing in a car repair shop, for example, normally awakens – by virtue of its shape, form and colour, etc. – the type of a “rope” in the perceiving subject, an ordinary tool for car-repair or similar aims. The objective traits shared by the awakening and the awakened, as well as the theoretical habits of (most of the other) subjects, contribute to the subsequent apperception of the thing *as* a rope. Nonetheless, even in such ordinary experience of perception, the objective traits do



not necessarily play the dominant role. Imagine someone who was attacked by a snake – either during childhood or on a hike an hour ago – and who is still haunted by the fear and shock of the attack. The fear is then transformed into an anxious mood that does not cease to pervade the person, even when s/he has already left the place where the actual incident took place and which originally (and reasonably) induced in him/her the emotive reaction. Subsequently, when s/he entered into the same car repair shop mentioned above and caught a glimpse of the same “long, strip-shaped, soft and brown-coloured thing”, what is immediately awakened in his/her consciousness is most likely the type of “snake” rather than “rope”. The anxious mood of the subject directs association to something that is threatening and will potentially even lead even to repetition of the unpleasant experience, such that the anxiety acquires its experiential consolidation. At least at the very first glance, the anxious subject is predominantly disposed to apprehend the given thing *as* a snake rather than a rope. In a word, the anxious mood – either a residue of a childhood trauma long buried in the unconscious, or that of a recent incident – secretly steers the very direction of the associative awakening of types, *transcendentally* affecting or even distorting the constitutive act of apperception. Sketching a metaphorical railway track on which the train of association rides, one’s mood and personal habits motivate the latter heading towards the destination in favour of one’s hidden dispositions and desires. The problematic of association, be it psychological and transcendental by nature, demonstrates the intricate intertwinement of the different dimensions of horizon-consciousness. In our case, the three structural moments of types, moods, and habits - rooted in the individual sedimented experiences - are revealed to be reciprocally determining, and together they co-condition all intentional accomplishments of concrete subjectivity.

## Part II – Phenomenological Psychopathology of the Unconscious

### Chapter Seven: Pathological Sedimentation and its Manifestations

Having explored the concept of the unconscious - conceived of as sedimentation - and its various forms of manifestation in consciousness within the classical phenomenological framework, we will now, in the second main part of this work, turn to the problematic within the context of phenomenological psychopathology. Based on the conceptual results acquired in the Husserlian-phenomenological exposition of sedimentation, this part attempts to go moderately beyond traditional Husserlian phenomenology and explore the practical relevance of the notion of sedimentation in pathological phenomena. It aims to offer a systematic and phenomenological framework for understanding the role that the unconscious – or sedimentation – plays in different psychopathologies. Based on the schematic exposition of the conscious manifestations of sedimentation as *types*, *moods*, and *habits*, the following chapters suggest that in pathological lived-experiences, these structural moments undergo a pathological modification. As modified, they do not cease to be constitutive of further experiences, which are regarded as diverged from typicality and normality. The task of the coming chapters, more precisely, is to explore the pathological counterparts of the three structural moments elucidated in the first part: *Typus* is transformed into the Freudian *Abkömmlinge* (*derivative*), *Stimmung* into *Verstimmung* (“*bad mood*”), and *Habitus* into *Hyperreflexivität* (*hyperreflexivity*). In pathologies such as schizophrenia, depression, borderline personality disorder, and so on, one’s sedimented experiences keep returning to the conscious sphere, yet in these distinctive pathological forms. Just as sedimentation is indispensable for the formation of the transcendently constitutive moments of types, moods, and habits, their pathological correlates, also rooted in sedimentation, are no less constitutively essential to psychopathological lived-experiences. Through the following systematic exploration of the pathological manifestations of sedimentations, I hope to offer a schematic framework for a phenomenological understanding of the subjective lived-experiences in different mental disorders.

#### 7.1 A Layered Concept of *Erfahrung* and Sedimented *Erfahrung*

Not only does each of the three structural moments explored in part one has its pathological counterparts, *sedimentation* itself is also potentially modifiable into what I term as the *pathological sedimentation*, which serves as the foundation for the various abnormal manifestations in consciousness. Nonetheless, since sedimentation is necessarily sedimentation of *Erfahrung*, a closer inspection of the very nature of *Erfahrung* is first required<sup>48</sup>. In particular, this refers to the several

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<sup>48</sup> In this section, it is more appropriate to employ the term *Erfahrung* than *Erlebnis*, despite the overlapping of their meaning in Husserl’s phenomenology. While both could be properly translated as (lived-)experience, they depict the different aspects of experience as such. *Erlebnis* highlights subjective immediacy, the transience of

layers or aspects of lived-experiences, which subsequently lead to a stratified conception of *sedimented* lived-experience. The latter unquestionably goes beyond Husserl's original account of the notion, in which a specific sense of "thinness" or one-dimensionality is discernible. According to the foregoing chapters, sedimentation is, for Husserl, above all an eidetic structure to which *all* temporal experiences are subject *indifferently* - that is, *regardless of* their respective ethical implications, affective qualities, existential significance, and so on, regarding the particular subject. Understood as such, sedimentation designates nothing but the necessary and continual diminution of distinctiveness and affective force of experiential contents *in proportion to* their *temporal* distance from the impressional present. Simply as time progresses, all experiential contents are doomed to gradually retreat from the present thematic consciousness *and hence* become less and less differentiated and intuitively presented. As Husserl writes, to briefly recap, sedimentation is the "process of clouding over (*Prozess der Verneblung*)" through which "the affective force accruing to them [the sedimented contents] and to the whole is constantly diminished in the process" (Husserl, 2001, 218). In borrowing from geology the term *Sedimentierung*, which refers originally to a "natural process through which rock formations come into existence" as small pieces of sand, stone and other materials are piled up (Geniusas, 2024a, 2), Husserl does indeed retain its connotation as describing a layered and stratified phenomenon. Nonetheless, the stratification of sedimented experiences is, in Husserl, restricted to the *temporal stratification* of experiences. Lived-experiences that are sedimented are piled up exclusively in terms of their respective temporal distance measured from the impressional present. An *affective* or *emotional* stratification that allows for different depths of sedimented experiences in terms of their emotional intensity or existential significance for the subject, and hence a truly "layered" conception of the notion, is missing here. This should be supplemented by drawing on material from our own concrete experiences as well as discourses in psychology and psychoanalysis for further phenomenological reflection. This is how the current chapter will proceed. Before that, a brief remark on the notion of affection or affect (*Affekt*) should be added. One may argue that this notion does play a core role in Husserl's phenomenology and that it at least allows for the conceptual possibility of the emotional stratification of sedimentations. In effect, however, he does not employ the term in its ordinary sense conceived of as concrete emotions and psychological affections or feelings. Instead, the Husserlian *Affekt* denotes nothing but a general structure of receptivity of experience - that is, the extent to which a certain allure (*Reiz*) is able to awaken a subject's epistemic interest (*Erkenntnisinteresse*) and attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*). At least in Husserl's original conceptualization, this has barely anything to do with one's psychological, affective state. As already quoted in 3.1,

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the impressional present, as well as the subjective act of intentional consciousness, inherent to a piece of lived-experience. By contrast, *Erfahrung* is conceived of as a more encompassing notion that emphasizes the historically accumulative and integrated structure of personal experiences that unfold and develop over time, and that are synthetically connected with all other experiences sedimented in one's personal history. For this reason, the employment of the notion *Erfahrung* is technically more preferable than *Erlebnis* in the current section.

Steinbock (2002, 246) defines, clearly and concisely, *Affektion* or *affektive Kraft* within the Husserlian context as an object's exertion of affective allure upon the ego-subject, who might or might not be motivated (non-causally) to direct its attentive gaze towards the object in question. The more something is "affective", the more it attracts and occupies the thematic centre of consciousness and is given with higher degree of liveliness and intuitive distinctiveness. Affection has much less to do with one's emotional attachment to something than the phenomenological clearness and motivational force of the sensory givenness to consciousness. As Husserl (2001, 219; 1966, 170) writes, "Positive affective force is the fundamental condition of all life in dynamic connection and differentiation (*positive affektive Kraft ist die Grundbewegung alles Lebens in beweglicher Verbindung und Sonderung*)". That something is affective means nothing but that it is able to "move" the subject, to motivate particular intentional activities in it, and to connect itself with other entities and simultaneously differentiate itself from them. Correspondingly, when things are subjected to the process of sedimentation, their affective force is gradually diminished until it reaches the "zero" of liveliness, viz. zero degree of affection.

It turns out that the Husserlian conception of sedimentation is inevitably "one-dimensional" in the sense that all qualitatively differentiating emotional, moral, and existential significance of lived-experiences is left out of sight. In the process of sedimentation, all experiential contents are *equally* affective or affectless depending solely on their temporal distance from the impressional present, sinking down *indifferently* into the sphere of the unconscious simply as time progresses. The problem is that this can hardly account for the "unproportionate" degree of liveness of particular past lived-experiences with regard to their actual temporal distance from the present. Some sedimented experiences retain a high degree of vividness and affective intensity despite their displacement into the distant past (conversely, some other become immediately vague and unrecognizable despite their temporal proximity to the present). Their existential *significance* for the individual subject does not simply diminish (or endure) in proportion to their actual temporal position in the stream of consciousness. For example, an unforgettable journey with your ex-partner or a heartbreaking separation from a beloved person five years ago, despite being more or less sedimented as time passes, could remain irresistibly vivid and intense in the present – at least in comparison to the memory of what you had for lunch with colleagues a few days ago. Therefore, there is an indispensable distinction between *temporal* and *emotional* stratification, as far as sedimentation of experiences is concerned. Sedimentation as the sinking down and stratifying of the past should not only account for the latter's actual temporal position in the stream of consciousness, but also its emotional or existential depth and intensity for concrete subjectivity. Steinbock (2002, 249), concerned with the problem of affection in Husserl's phenomenology, counters the absolute primacy of the living present in terms of its affective force, as already discussed in 3.2. A repressed wish, desire or memory is for the most part more affectively intense for consciousness than what is actually

given right now in the living present. This is also true for particular lived-experiences already sunken down into the distant past. Therefore, a more sophisticated, layered conceptualization is required in order to account for the different emotional intensities and existential depths of sedimented experiences, as well as for the possibility of the latter's pathological modification. In what follows, we will proceed by laying bare the multi-dimensionality of *Erfahrungen* and sedimented *Erfahrungen* - beyond their factual occurrences in a specific time and space. Their multiple dimensions are responsible for the multiple stratifications and interlacements of sedimentations. However, since the multi-dimensionality of *sedimented Erfahrungen*, as well as their deviation from "normality" are grounded in *Erfahrungen* themselves, we will start with a layered concept of *Erfahrung*.

Admittedly, Husserl's phenomenology does address the overlapping of different layers or dimensions of lived-experiences, especially in perceptual acts, from various perspectives. It is clear that not all receptive givennesses are equally attractive (affective) for the intentional subject. Already at the pre-constituted level, several givennesses may compete with one another; in other cases, a particular givenness appears epistemologically more convincing or practically more attractive than the others. The subject does not receive all presented allures completely passively - with an equal level of attention and cognitive or practical interest. Even passive receptivity is not indifferent regarding each allure; instead, it is highly selective and relative to the background field of consciousness and that of the actual surroundings. For instance, from the perspective of time and inner time-consciousness (See Husserl, 1971), a present givenness never shows itself unilaterally in isolation from the retentive past and protentive future given in the essential structure of time-consciousness as retention-impression-protention. Consciousness of the living present is always surrounded by other horizons of consciousness, above all that of the (distant) past that is "no longer", as well as that of the imagined, feared or wished future that is "not yet" (Moran, 2017, 16; Horvath, 2024, 90). This bespeaks the layering and interlacement of the three temporal dimensions of lived-experience. In addition to such temporal interlacement, conflicts between different theoretical or practical interests are often encountered in relation to the subject's interest, such that the subject is forced to opt for the "best" object for its attentive gaze. In *GZ*, Husserl describes a phenomenon in which the subject's thematic attention to a current activity is interrupted and becomes distracted. "I am carrying out an action (*Ich bin in einer Handlung*)", for instance writing this thesis, "[but] I am distracted by this [another] affection (*durch diese Affektion abgelenkt*)" (Husserl, 2013, 128, my translation) when my friends text me and invite me over to playing video games. The original, primary intentionality directed at my thesis-writing is interrupted by the notification of my mobile phone such that the former's affection is weakened and becomes the secondary object of my intentionality. Tempted by the friends' invitation, I am faced with two conflicting interests and their respective objects of intentionality. I am forced to actively opt for one of them while the other still remains more or less affective in the background of consciousness. The entire field of consciousness is changed even I decide to return to the original

activity, viz. writing the thesis, for it is now interlaced with the negated (repressed) affection of joining my friends. The latter does not simply disappear but rather forms one of the layers of the current activity and is unified with it. As Husserl writes, “the negative of the desiring affection [is] unified with the repetition of the still-living active *fiat* as the ‘affirmative’ restitution (*die Negation der begehrenden Affektion [ist] in eins mit der Wiederholung des noch fortlebenden handelnden fiat als ‚bejahende‘ Restitution*)”, for „*the suppressed desire* (the wish of accepting the friends’ invitation, in our example) *is still my desire in another mode* (*das zurückgedrängte Begehren ist noch mein Begehren in einem anderen Modus*)” (ibid., my translation). Lastly, the intentional interweaving of different contents, or different aspects of one single content, is also demonstrated by the competition between types in perception. Types are, as already demonstrated, awakened by a current pre-given sensibility. Usually, however, “due to the very multitude of motivating factors of arousal, different types aroused at the same time...step into a kind of competition to become [intuitively] fulfilled” (Lohmar, 2016, 55). Something appearing “like” a human being can arouse the types of human being, robot, or puppet, which overlap and compete with each other in the process of perception. It follows that even pre-predicative experience in the sphere of passivity does not take place straightforwardly and one-dimensionally. Rather, there are often different types interwoven with each other, reaching different degree of intuitiveness and striving for empirical affirmation. Even if, at a certain point, some of them are negated or given up, they necessarily leave a “trace” that shadows the eventual apperception of the object and even the further constitution of experiences (See Husserl, 1973a, 87-101).

In a word, Husserl does explicitly acknowledge the conflicts, competitions, and intertwinements of the multiple objects and/or dimensions of a single intentional experience. Nonetheless, his phenomenological enterprise is mainly dedicated to descriptions of the ideational, colourless contents of different modes of consciousness (perception, imagination, memory, anticipation, etc.) and to their transcendental structures. Although he does occasionally address the allegedly irrational substratum of one’s drives, feelings, dispositions, etc. which underlie the free, rational ego (for instance in *Ideen II* where the “stratum of hidden reason” is mentioned), the affective and personal dimensions of *Erfahrung* are rarely thematized as an object of closer inspection. Given this lacuna, I will draw insights from Freud and Binswanger in order to lay bare the three main dimensions of *Erfahrung*, namely, its *Vorstellungsinhalt* or ideational content that is cognitive in nature, its *Affektbetrag* or emotive charge that is emotive in nature, and its *Bedeutsamkeit* or significance that is existential and hermeneutic in nature. The idea is that a lived-experience consists not only of its colourless ideational content, but also of the emotional and existential significance that an individual subject bestows upon it.

In his meta-psychology, Freud distinguishes between the *Affektbetrag* and *Vorstellungsinhalt* of an experience or, more precisely, of a traumatic experience (See Smith, 2010, 228-40). *Affektbetrag* is best explained in relation to what he calls drive-representative (*Triebrepräsenz*). Being the genuine object of repression, a drive-representative is composed of “an idea or group of ideas invested with a certain quantity of energy (libido, interest) from the drive” (Freud, 2005, 40). The latter, viz. the “certain quantity of energy”, which is not truly repressed, is precisely the emotive charge at issue. It is attached to or detached from an idea or an experiential content and is mainly experienced by the subject as emotions. It strives to gain an access to the conscious sphere by attaching itself to particular ideas or events, and the emotively charged contents are subsequently experienced by the subject as affectively meaningful - for example, as pleasant, disappointing, sorrowful, regretful, etc. From a phenomenological perspective, emotive charge bespeaks first and foremost the constitutively apprehended affective properties that are present when we experience something that arouses the emotional reaction of pleasure, disappointment, suffering, regret, etc. They make up one of the indispensable dimensions of a lived-experience even when it has already left the impressional present. The *Vorstellungsinhalt*, in contrast to and alongside with the emotive charge, refers to the “colourless mnemonic content” (Freud, 1955, 195) of an experience. Basically, it is composed of sheer facts and information about an event, including the time and space when it happened, the members and things involved, etc. To be sure, *what* exactly the colourless factual contents of memory is made up of is a rather complex matter. It might be helpful to draw references from the categorization of memories in psychology, which distinguishes, for instance, between motor, sensory, semantic, autobiographical, and other forms of memory. This will be further elaborated in the next section of this chapter. For the time being, it suffices to conceive of the ideational contents as the part of memory deprived of its emotive charge. In particular, this is how Freud defines trauma. “The trauma”, as he writes, “is deprived of its affective cathexis (*Affektbetrag*), so that what remains in consciousness is nothing but its ideational content (*Vorstellungsinhalt*), which is perfectly colourless and is judged to be unimportant” (ibid.). In cases such as obsessional neurosis, the emotive charge of the previous traumatic experiences is repressed, leaving nothing but their affectless contents, which *appear* to be harmless and insignificant. This leads to obsessive thoughts intruding upon the patient, who is unconscious of their origin in previous trauma and remains ignorant of their affective meaning rooted in the trauma. Nonetheless, the opposite might happen in other pathological experiences. It could well be that only the scattered, intense emotions remain at the surface of consciousness, to such an extent that they might even overshadow the present experiences. At the same time, the ideational contents – the factual contexts in which the relevant emotions originated – are accessible for the subject merely partially or fractionally. In any case, pathological experiences always take place in paradoxical and complex situations where the subject is merely aware of certain fragments of its traumatic past, be they emotive ones or the emotionless factual fragments. Freud captures the very paradoxical nature of such predicaments concisely, when he writes, “...and it is just as reasonable to hold that the patient ‘knows’ his traumas

as that he does *not* ‘know’ them. For he knows them in that he has not forgotten them, and he does not know them in that he is unaware of their significance” (Freud, 1955, 196). The partial and fragmentary preservation (memorization) and recollection of past experiences described here is, I argue, precisely the result of the emotional stratification of sedimented experiences. Depending on the overall personal significance attributed to different sedimented experiences, each of them might remain at a more or less shallow level of conscious life. Likewise, depending on the emotional intensity (and existential meaningfulness, as discussed below) of a single piece of sedimented experience, its various aspects or dimensions (such as its affective traces) might sediment into a more or less deep realm of consciousness. Whereas some dimensions of sedimentations are “buried” more deeply and hence are rather inaccessible for the conscious subject, others might not have fully undergone the process of sedimentation and continue to float on the surface of the sphere of the unconscious. Empirically, it turns out that only particular limited aspects of an entire piece of sedimented experience is (repeatedly) reawakened or reactivated, in such a way that the subject remains thoroughly ignorant of the very origin as well as the meaningfulness of certain recurrent thoughts, feelings or behaviours - which eventually appear as diverging from typical normality. For this reason, in order to better understand and describe pathological lived-experiences, a layered conception of sedimentation *and* pathological sedimentation is theoretically indispensable.

There still remains, in addition to the colourless *Vorstellungsinhalt* and the *Affektbetrag*, the third dimension of a lived-experience, namely, its *Bedeutsamkeit* or (existential) significance/meaningfulness. This does not denote one’s immediate emotional reaction towards the objects of experiences in the past or their apprehended affective attributes. Rather, the meaningfulness of a lived-experience is by its nature existentially and hermeneutically constituted through the subject’s retroactive *interpretation* of it during later moments of life. Depending on the different interpretations of one’s past life in its entirety, the existential significance of a sedimented experience is always subject to renewal and alterations. It is more a matter of judgement and understanding of one’s own past than of an instantaneous reaction, as Freud implies above, where he states that an ideational content is “judged to be” unimportant and the subject is unaware of its “significance”. The retroactive and continuous (re-)interpretations of one’s past in general, or a sedimented instance in particular, are substantially grounded in one’s overall value- and belief-system, sense of self, persisting life-goals, projection of future, current life-situation, mood, and so on. With reference to and embedded in the nexus of these conditions, the subject attributes to its own sedimentations various kinds of “subjective” existential significance, developing an understanding of what certain past experiences *mean* to the current self. Among others, Binswanger sheds a special light on this issue. For him, *Bedeutsamkeit* is necessarily *Bedeutsamkeit* for someone in the sense that it is irreducibly individual and intelligible only in relation to a specific subject. In addition, the *Bedeutsamkeit* of a single incident for an individual subject is made intelligible solely with reference



to the latter's understanding-interpretation of the world as a whole („*verstehende Auslegung von Welt*”), together with its thrownness into a specific attunement or mood („*Geworfenheit in eine bestimmte Befindlichkeit oder Stimmung*”), to borrow Heidegger's expressions (Binswanger, 1994, 199). Therefore, *Bedeutsamkeit* is fundamentally differentiated from *Bedeutung*. The latter depicts the semantic meaning of an object, a sentence or an event - a meaning that is shared intersubjectively and understandable in isolation from any individual concrete context. The former, by contrast, remains inevitably private; it is interpreted by an individual and is rendered intelligible only within the interpreter's own stylistically formed world-horizon (*Welthorizont*). Binswanger offers an example of “der Geizige (the stingy person)” to illustrate this idea. A stingy person is generally understood as someone who is obsessed with possessing money and unreasonably reluctant to spend even the least bit of it. Nonetheless, this apparently “irrational” obsession with the “possession of money” is not to be understood merely by tracing back to the stingy character of the person. Rather, to truly make sense of the obsession, a “conversion of values (*Umwertung der Werte*)” that takes the “attunement of the individuality (*Befindlichkeit der Individualität*)” (ibid., my translation) and the person's overall world-horizon into account is needed. Through the lens of such embedded way of understanding, the “objective” possession of something (in this case, of money), “the objective being-well-off (*das objektive Gutdransein*)”, is revealed as a particular *value* or *Bedeutsamkeit* for the stingy subject, namely, as “the subjective well-being (*das subjektive Wohlbefinden*)” that is, for him, found nowhere else than in possessing money. The money-obsession has a much more profound existential (and affective) significance for the subject - namely, a peculiar feeling of well-being - than merely materialistic value or sheer selfishness and stinginess. It *means* something unique *for* the individual who is uniquely “attuned” in its existence. Therefore, Binswanger (1994, 200, my translation) concludes, reasonably I reckon, that “in the filling [of boxes and crates] and having-filled there lies the happiness and joyfulness of the stingy person to whom the enthusiasm belongs (*im Füllen [von Kisten und Kästen] und Gefüllthaben liegt das Glück und die Freude des Geizigen, ihm gehört die Leidenschaft*)”. For the individual in question, the obsessive possession of money *means* for him a profound joyfulness of life, which is for him existentially indispensable and highly valuable. The “*Füllen*” and “*Gefüllthaben*”, the seemingly superficial possession of money, has in effect an emotional foundation (*emotionale Fundierung*) discernible only in particular subjects, for whom the obsession or the “event” has a peculiarly emotive and existential *Bedeutsamkeit*. This foundation is barely intelligible for other subjects (who, for instance, do not share the same worldview, value-system, and historical-cultural background, etc.) but it constitutes one of the most central dimensions of subjective lived-experience - namely, its existential-hermeneutic aspect - which is rooted in an individual's affective situatedness and stems from its own retrospective understanding-interpretation of the experience.

Taken together, there are three crucial dimensions of a lived-experience: its colourless ideational contents, emotive charge, and existential meaningfulness or significance. This multi-dimensionality leads to a layered conception of *Erfahrung* and, subsequently, of sedimented *Erfahrung*, as will be seen in the upcoming section. It is worth mentioning that Erwin Straus, speaking in the context of psychiatry and psychopathology, brought forth a comparable idea in his “Ästhesiologie der Wahrnehmeng”, developed most extensively in *Vom Sinn der Sinne* (1956). Counteracting the naturalistic reductionist position, Straus argues that the human subject, who perceives, thinks, imagines, etc., is fundamentally more than his brain, which is often conceived of as an enclosed room detached from the world and the rest of the subject itself. Instead, he is inevitably an embodied subject who is always embedded in the flesh-and-blood world and exists *in* a relationship to it. Correspondingly, perception, as one of the ways in which the human subject relates itself to the world, is necessarily embodied perception. This means that perception is more than any abstract cognition or “knowing” of things by means of simple representation (*Abbild*) of “external” entities “in” the brain, as modern neuroscientists and Cartesians would claim, as if the brain were a cinema continuously projecting a “movie”, a realistic “copy” of the “real” world behind the screen. This idealistic conception of the human brain and of perception is perfectly illustrated by Rene Magritte’s artwork *La condition humaine* (Fuchs, 2015, 138-9). Straus, in opposition to that, argues that perception as embodied is composed of two structural moments: the *gnostic* (*gnostisch, erkennend*; knowing), and the *pathic* (*pathisch, erleidend*; suffering). Briefly defined, whereas the *gnostic* moment brings forth the “what” of an object, an “objective” knowledge that can be repeated and shared by other subjects, the *pathic* moment refers to “how” an object is given and experienced in that concrete, particular moment of perception that belongs exclusively to the perceiving individual itself, who “senses” the object affectively, sensuously, and expressively. The “objective” knowledge of the “what” of an object is non-perspectival, such that, thanks to the *gnostic* moment, perceptual experiences are transferable and communicable among different subjects. The subjective manner of givenness of a perceptual experience is, by contrast, perspectival and momentary. It is restricted to a particular moment - viz. the momentary present where the perception takes place - and to the individual alone. It refuses to be shared with the others through simple communication and to be repeated simply by means of words that carry a stabilizing and objectifying function. To further characterize these two moments of perception, Straus compares the “geographical” and “landscape” spatiality of *Erleben*, which corresponds respectively to the *gnostic* and *pathic* moments of the perception of the world. Geographical space, which occurs in maps or textbooks, for instance, involves objective, universal and repeatable knowledge that is presumably accessible to all typical human subjects. It is abstracted from the space of flesh and blood, stripped of immediate sensuous and emotive experiential givenness, which is restricted to the perceiving subject (such as the one who draws the map). In opposition to that, the landscape is something one (can) genuinely “enjoy” in a given moment, immersing oneself with one’s entire bodily existence in the beauty of the scene and

standing in an immediate, concrete and embodied relationship to it. The landscape is not “read” or “heard” through portrayals and words; rather, it and its aesthetic properties are directly lived through by “my” whole body and its sensations. This bespeaks a purely individual and immediate *Erlebnis* only available to “me” at that specific moment. Correspondingly (and briefly put), Strauss is convinced that most pathologies could be understood as disturbances of one of these two structural moments. People with schizophrenia, for instance, are characterized by the partial disturbance or complete loss of the gnostic moment of perception. The objective, impersonal side of perception is no longer accessible to them, resulting in what Fuchs (2015, 150) calls the “subjectivization of lived-experience (*Subjektivierung des Erlebens*)”. These patients are incapable of adopting a detached, “objective” position towards things and of shifting between different perspectives, a stance which prevents one from being defencelessly exposed to the most trivial sensory stimuli in the surroundings. A more elaborate discussion of concrete pathological experiences will be reserved for the coming few chapters. What is crucial to our current discussion is Strauss’ insight into the twofold nature of perception, which anticipates the three dimensions or layers of *Erfahrung* explored above. While the gnostic, epistemic moment corresponds to the colourless ideational contents of a lived-experience, the pathic, idiosyncratic aspect of perception encompasses its emotive charge and existential meaningfulness, which belongs exclusively to the experiencing concrete subjectivity. This multidimensionality of *Erfahrung* is, then, legitimately “transferred” to sedimented *Erfahrung* and its pathological form.

## 7.2 Pathological Sedimentation and the Pathological Modification of Being-in-the-world

### a) Pathological Sedimentation

The multiple dimensions of *Erfahrung* in general imply the stratification of sedimented *Erfahrung* not only in terms of its actual temporal position in the stream of consciousness but also in terms of its emotive and existential significance for individual subjectivity. Stratification taken in this sense means that while certain aspects of the lived-experience in question remain relatively on the “surface” of the unconscious sphere and are rather susceptible to conscious awakening, the others are buried in a much deeper “region”, or even “locked up” - refusing an effortless reactivation or reawakening in the conscious sphere.

Generally speaking, for neurotypical persons, the emotional intensity (which for most of the time includes or is intertwined with the existential meaningfulness) of a piece of memory determines the profoundness of the remembered event, and hence its accessibility for the conscious subject. The more an experience is emotionally loaded, the less it is deeply sedimented and the more vividly it is retained in the stream of consciousness. An emotionally shocking and/or existentially significant lived-experience, though also necessarily sedimented, is more easily brought back to consciousness

with a high degree of liveliness and intuitiveness than a trivial one. In this regard, psychology speaks of emotional memory, which depicts the fact that “at encoding, emotionally salient information is typically prioritized over information that is non-emotional” (Kensinger & Murray, 2012, 1129). Not only are emotionally loaded memories preserved more profoundly, but they are also more likely to be retained “on the surface” of the unconscious for a long time and “to be consolidated into long-term memory” (ibid.). In pathological cases, however, the situation proves to be much more complicated. Freud has already indicated this complexity when he describes the patients as who “know” and “do not know” their own traumatic past at the same time. Pathological sedimentation resulting from pathological lived-experiences always has, due to its traumatizing emotive charge and unaccommodating existential implications, different facets that overlap, suppress, intertwine or contract with each other. Sometimes fragmentary yet overwhelming feelings make their unexpected invasion upon the subject, sometimes certain scenes in the past simply flash back without any concrete context from which they are “extracted”. For instance, in obsessive neurosis (as Freud understands it) and borderline personality disorder (BPD), the emotive charge of a past experience is unconsciously deeply repressed due to its unbearably traumatizing effect upon the subject. As the emotive dimension of the experience is not properly sedimented and “assigned to” a comfortable position in the ordinary stream of consciousness, what is left as practically accessible is, for the most part, its colourless and overgeneralized ideational content (the gnostic moment). This content is but disembodied and decontextualized since it is uncoupled from the pathic, emotive moment. In other pathologies such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the situation is reversed. While the original factual context in which overwhelming emotions are provoked is usually deeply buried, the weaves of traumatizing feelings remain on the surface of the memory of the person and are easily triggered by certain (seemingly random) external sensory stimuli. Something in the present unexpectedly triggers in the traumatized subject unpleasant feelings that are usually dissociated from the original event and are re-experienced as a foreign, single affective invasion - or else they are misinterpreted as an emotional reaction *merely* to the present stimuli. The gnostic moment of the original traumatic experience remains in the unreachable distant past, the deepest place of the sedimented unconscious.

The various ways in which the different moments of a pathologically sedimented experience stratify, overlap, and resist each other could be formulated in a more systematic manner as follows. Drawing insights from psychologists and neuroscientists such as Pierre Jent and Hughlings Jackson, who develop the dissolution thesis with respect to traumatic memory, Russell Meares (2000, 51, my emphasis) explicitly asserts that “the memory of catastrophic event will be recorded, according to the dissolution hypothesis, in a *hierarchical* way”. Such hierarchical registration of traumatic events in our memory system, as described in psychology, echoes precisely what I here refer to as the stratification of pathological sedimentation. Psychologists devise various ways to categorize memory. Some of the usual categories include, for example, sensory memory, short- and long-term memory,

semantic memory, spatial memory, and so on. Here, I would like to shed light on a categorization that underlies and illustrates the hierarchical registration of traumatic experiences in memory. On the most elementary level, *primitive memory* is related mostly to what is found in the body. It includes such bodily dimension of an event as sensory feelings, kinaesthetic sensations, procedural information of the muscles, etc. It might not only be visual and gustatory, but also tactile, like the painful sensation of being burnt by fire, and auditory, like hearing the noise from an air raid alarm. All these bodily components of an experiences are then retained as sensory imprints in memory. There is also *semantic memory*, which is verbal in nature. This denotes the storage of sheer facts and information related to the event, such as the place and time where it took place, and the people involved. They might or might not assemble into a coherent, complete story when the information is connected in a meaningful manner. What is distinct about semantic memory is that it is deprived of the personal engagement with the experience - that is, of the subjective feelings and the most direct, individual and concrete *Erleben* of the event, which Straus calls the pathic moment. It is also worth mentioning that the facts and information recorded as semantic memory include “information” about the attributes of oneself and others attained or learnt from, for instance, the words of others. Now, we could say that both primitive and semantic memory are the registration of the affectless ideational contents or *Vorstellungsinhalt* of an experience. The registration of the emotive charge or *Affektbetrag*, on the other side, belongs to *affective memory*. It records the (intense) weaves of feelings that accompany the original experiencing of the event, the emotional properties that were once constitutively attached to it. In pathological cases, this refers for the most part to extreme shock, intense fear and anxiety, the insurmountable feeling of insecurity, etc. Finally, there is the all-encompassing *episodic/autobiographical memory*. Autobiographical memory registers neither sheer information nor simply webs of emotions. Instead, it is the memory of the concrete, subjectively lived through *Erlebnis* of the event itself, in which all such facts, sensations, and affective feelings originate and are embedded. More precisely, the event is not simply *an* event but rather the event *as experienced by “me”* in a concrete context and *as motivated by “my”* personal interests and intentions. Autobiographical memory alone renders the otherwise remembered facts, sensations and feelings truly personal for they are now situated in a coherent life-story that is structured with a specific meaningfulness for the subject itself.

Keeping this categorization of memory – which is simultaneously a theoretical breakdown of the various elements of an experience - in mind, we might imagine that pathological sedimentation is the sedimentation of traumatic experiences that are helplessly shattered and whose pieces are scattered around at different depths of the unconscious. Certain “pieces” - for instance the sensory imprints - remain on the surface and are at the mercy of the slightest external stimuli, while others are hardly brought back into the light of consciousness despite repeated, active attempts at recollection or reactivation. Correspondingly, the manifestation of pathological sedimentations as such is characteristically fragmentary in that only particular layers or components of the original experience

are called forth, without the concrete context in which they originate. Adopting the categorization above, this can well be designated as the absence or defect of episodic/autobiographical memory. In what follows, several examples will be provided to illustrate the empirical manifestation of pathological sedimentations.

Traumatic experiences that result in PTSD are commonly registered as unerasable sensory imprints on the subject, which make their unexpected, decontextualized appearance in further experiences. Meares (2000, 52) describes a patient who “had been raped by one man while being pinned down by the forearms by another”. The pain and the unpleasant sensation of the muscle are so unforgettable that, since then, every time when she feels anxious, “she could feel the skin in her forearms twisting laterally” (ibid.). This is because one aspect of the trauma, namely, the bodily sensations, is not truly “sedimented” or “forgotten” but rather remains as solid sensory imprints of her body. The entire traumatic event, despite also being unquestionably unerasable from the patient’s mind, is not reawakened as often as the mere sensory imprints it left, for the sensations are preserved on the relative surface of the life of consciousness whereas the event itself is buried rather deeply. Indeed, the very origin of the unpleasant muscular sensations in her ongoing life is not the anxiety experienced in other situations, but rather the particular traumatizing instance. Nonetheless, the patient remains mostly unaware of this causality. Another example offered by Meares (2000, 36-7) shows someone’s loss of episodic memory and the retention of sheer semantic memory. A patient K.C. came to visit Dr. Tulving, had a conversation with him, and was told to identify a stapler and remember where it is hidden (behind the bookcase). On K.C.’s next visit, he was asked to find the stapler and successfully did so without hesitation. Nevertheless, he crudely denied any memory of the episode of his last visit and the conversation with Dr. Tulving. This shows that although K.C.’s semantic memory of factual information, viz. the stapler and its place, remains perfectly correct and intact, he lacks access to the whole personal experience (of the visit and the conversation) from which this information stemmed. Likewise, there are many cases where traumata related to bullying and verbal insults are not recorded as single incidents but “only” as information or “knowledge” of negative characteristics of oneself (the bullied person) (Meares, 2000, 79-80). A semantic memory of these attributions is retained and continues to affect the person’s self-perception and -value; at the same time, s/he is “unconscious of the origins of these attributions” and eventually becomes incapable of recognizing their irrationality. Finally, there is the classical phenomenon of PTSD where patients experience a flashback of *fragments* of previous violent situations. Evoked by certain sensory stimulations, those fragments include almost exclusively intense weaves of feelings, such as extraordinary anxiety, a state of shock, fear of death, or else an unbearable feeling of being-delivered (*Ausgeliefertsein*) and overwhelmingness (*Überwältigung*) - all which originate in and are unconsciously associated with previous traumata (Brensell, 2014, 126). The concrete situations of violence, viz. the episodic memory of them, are not simultaneously recalled; but their emotive charge

does not cease invading the conscious subject *as if* the violent situations were taking place again here and now, constituting the core symptom of PTSD. This demonstrates the dissociation of the *Affektbetrag* from the *Vorstellungsinhalt*, or else that of sensuous and affective feelings from the episodic memory.

It is not inconspicuous that in most of these cases, the episodic (personal) memory of unfavourable events is sedimented into the deepest level of the unconscious, while the fractions of which - viz. these events' factual, sensory, or emotional components - are left relatively on the surface. It turns out that the former, the very origins of all those undesirable bodily sensations, negative attributions of self, paralyzing weaves of feelings, etc., remain thoroughly unconscious for the suffering subject. Moreover, they are usually misconstrued as something stemming "properly" and exclusively from the present encounters, in such a way that they attain repeated confirmation from ongoing experiences, while in fact they are rooted in extraordinary instance(s) in the past. This anticipates the phenomenon of transference (*Übertragung*) to be discussed in the upcoming chapter, namely, the transference of the past onto the present. What was originated in the past is not apprehended *as* past but is transferred unreflectively onto the present and experienced *as* present. This phenomenon of transference is precisely what underlies many pathological experiences where the subject has lost a reflective distance from its own past and the emotive traces it. As Meares (2000, 77) describes it, "she [a patient, whose intense emotions are constantly triggered by daily occurrences] was sunk within it, precipitated into the traumatic system...the reflective process is almost lost, impairing the function of episodic memory and along with it the monitoring and evaluating systems which are part of the function of the 'I'". The heightened affective intensity of the past appears recurrently in the present in the form of emotional splinters, which severely disturbs and even overshadows the person's present experience.

In sum, pathological sedimentation designates the hierarchical, fractional, and "incomplete" sedimentation of the different facets of an *Erfahrung*, which results in the scattered reappearance of the past in the form of abstracted and shattered pieces of facts, intensive emotions or self-attributions without any contextualization. In light of this conception, two features of pathological sedimentation (and its mode of manifestation) can be singled out. Firstly, it is *fragmentary* in the sense that the *Erfahrung* is shattered into pieces of sensations, feelings, or trivial information of which the subject can hardly make sense. What is practically accessible is no longer a narratively structured and organized story. There is barely any intelligible sequencing, progressing, motivational and associative linkage between the various facets of the event, such that each and every flashback of the fragments appears to the subject as an unexpected invasion "from without". This is because the concrete, embodied, and personal lived-experience is no longer available - what is left for the subject is nothing but the meaningless sensory, affective or factual "data" contingently evoked in the later course of

experiences. Seen from the perspective of psychology, “this kind of memory [semantic memory] does not allow access to the episodes during which these ‘facts’ [for instance, the attributes of self and other] were created” (Meares, 2000, 52). The traumatic memory itself, which is the personal and experiential origin of those “facts” (and emotions), remains utterly unconscious - deeply buried due to its traumatizing effect. Only some of the *isolated parts* of it manage to be expressed consciously, albeit often in a morbid manner. Because of its fragmentary nature, pathological sedimentation and its manifestation is also characteristically *dissociated*. It is dissociated from the ordinary stream of consciousness since the sedimented experience is not successfully integrated into the latter, as if it were segregated from it by an abyssal gap and denied any access to it. This happens due to the unbearable existential meaningfulness and/or the overwhelming emotional connotations unconsciously associated with the original (traumatic) experiences, which are then repressed into a “distant” region of the conscious life. This dissociation could lead to the transformation of trivial social situations into limit situations with disturbing existential meanings, which are date back to previous traumatizing experiences (See Irarrazaval, 2022). The vulnerable person becomes highly sensitive to unimportant daily situations that recall for him/her the disturbing existential meaning rooted in concrete incidents in the past, of which s/he is currently unaware. The dissociated sedimented experiences, deprived of personal relatedness and intimacy, are then either “forgotten” (amnesia) or occasionally given in a depersonalized manner as something “from without”, viz. something that lacks a personal origin in “my” own life-history. In this regard, psychology speaks of “uncoupled consciousness”, where traumatic memories apparently lie “outside” of one’s personal consciousness as a result of their failure to be integrated into the prevailing personality structure of the individual. The phenomenon of uncoupled consciousness and the dissociation of traumatic experiences from the ordinary stream of consciousness are experientially most prominent in persons with such disorders as BPD. According to Fuchs (2012, 203), these individuals are characterized by the “tendence to dissociate”, which is a disposition explainable to a large extent by traumatic and aversive experiences in one’s early childhood. The patients hence suffer from incoherence and gaps of autobiographical memories and, eventually, from a sense of fragmented self- or narrative identity. A more elaborate discussion on BPD is to be found in the last chapter of this work.

#### b) Pathological Modification of Being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*)

The empirical manifestations of pathologically sedimented experiences are identified in the field of psychopathology through well-known phenomena such as obsessional neurosis, hysteria, panic attack, flashbacks, flights of ideas (*Ideenflucht*), and so on. In light of our phenomenological explication above, all of these could now be conceived of as the fragmented manifestations of different aspects of sedimented experiences (and repressed drives and desires). Panic attacks, for instance, are the sudden invasion of extreme anxiety stemming from somewhere in one’s distant past. Such symptoms are,



generally speaking, psychopathological conditions to be treated clinically by psychiatrists and psychologists. However, there is always the lingering difficulty of truly making sense of these apparently irrational, atypical and “random” phenomena. This section attempts to offer a Binswangerian response to this difficulty.

Binswanger levels serious criticisms against the clinical psychology and psychiatry of his time, which, to my mind, continue to be valid in ours. These empirical disciplines strongly favour so-called symptomatology in their practices. Symptomatology refers to the supposedly systematic categorization of abnormal phenomena into different naturalistic forms and kinds. Its contemporary representatives are without question the DSM-V and ICD-X, which offer a sharp and clear “checklist” of symptoms in clinical practices. With their help, diagnosis is made by means of the “counting” and identification of symptoms demonstrated by patients. The symptoms of an individual are then treated as *isolated* phenomena *and* as nothing more than an individual instance subordinate to a greater category listed in the handbooks. For Binswanger (1994, 57), this commits the naturalistic-reductionistic mistake of anatomizing psychical life into different natural parts that *respectively* demonstrating different abnormal activities - as if it were a physical body composed of separable organs<sup>49</sup>. An abnormal thought or behaviour is traced back to the abnormality of a particular malfunctioning *part* of the psyche – or of the brain, in modern neuroscience - and is conceived solely as an isolated phenomenon, on that can simply be located in a larger objective framework (the handbooks) and subsequently subsumed in a pre-established category of symptoms. The single, individual pathological lived-experience is understood only as one instance among infinite others, as Binswanger describes it: “the single pathological lived-experience or the single pathological function is always regarded merely as a special case of a genus... (*das einzelne pathologische Erlebnis oder die einzelne pathologische Funktion immer nur als Spezialfall der Gattung betrachtend...*)” (ibid., my translation). The problem with this practice is that the individual pathological *Erlebnis* is not really treated in its individuality and concreteness as belonging to the individual subject, as an *Erlebnis* that is intertwined with or embedded in other *Erlebnisse* or *Erfahrungen* of the subject itself. The subsumption of an individual subjective symptom into an “objective” category does not lead to a genuine understanding of the “meaning” and genesis of the symptom. Rather, the symptom is regarded as nothing more than a brain malfunction that causes disturbing thoughts and behaviours, which are basically meaningless and are simply to be removed. In the clinical setting, the elimination of the symptoms is the only goal of treatment, for the privation of abnormality is synonymous with normality.

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<sup>49</sup> „die deskriptiv vorgehende Psychopathologie...teilt das abnorme seelische Geschehen in natürliche Klassen, Gattungen und Arten ein, die durch ein hierarchisches System von Merkmalen miteinander zusammenhängen...”

Disagreeing with the conceptions of psychiatrists and psychologists at that time, Binswanger's phenomenological psychopathology seeks most primarily to unveil the genuine *meaningfulness* of pathological phenomena or *Erfahrungen*. He does this by treating them as experiences that are personally and concretely lived through - embedded in the whole nexus of an individual's life-history. Instead of observing and evaluating the pathological phenomena "from the outside", identifying and counting them in accordance with a list from a handbook, one ought to unfold their very meaning for the subject by means of empathetic understanding: "empathize, put yourself in their shoes, instead of picking up and listing the single features or properties! (*Sich einleben, hineinversetzen, statt einzelne Merkmale oder Eigenschaften abheben und aufzählen!*)" (ibid., my translation). Simply put, the "single (pathological) phenomenon", if it is to be truly understood, must be placed against the background of the concrete subjectivity of the person<sup>50</sup>. In this regard, Binswanger's notions of being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*) and world-horizon (*Welthorizont*) come to light. Obviously, these are conceptual developments of Heideggerian ideas within a psychiatric context. Heidegger's notion of being-in-the-world is first and foremost a rebuttal against the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy of the human subject and its world. Since the time of Descartes, modern natural scientists generally adopted this conceptual framework as the hidden presupposition of their scientific enterprise. In opposition to them, Heidegger emphasizes the essential inseparability between Dasein and its world, arguing that Dasein *is* nothing but *In-der-Welt-sein*. Following Heidegger, Binswanger emphatically asserts the ontological unity of subject and world and argues that the *ich* must be an *ich* in the world and the world is nothing but the world for the *ich* (or multiple *ichs*): "the individuality is what its world is as *the world for it* (die Individualität ist, was ihre Welt als *die ihre* ist)" (Binswanger, 1994, 188, my translation). He further proceeds by devising the notion of *inner life-histories* (*die innere Lebensgeschichte*) as the primal phenomenon (*Urphänomen*) of this synthetic unity of I and the world. The inner life-histories of a person are spiritual in nature and are contrasted with the functioning of the psychical-bodily organisms. The former encompass each and every non-recurring acts and decisions made by the subject in the past and the sequence of significant existential moments that were genuinely lived through: "the non-recurring historical sequence of the contents of lived-experience of the individual spiritual person as the origin or centre of all experiencing (*die einmalige historische Abfolge der Erlebnisinhalte der individuellen geistigen Person als Ursprung oder Zentrum allen Erlebens*)" (Binswanger, 1994, 81, my translation). This idea reminds us immediately of the core notion of this work, namely, sedimentation and sedimented lived-experiences. For Binswanger, as for Husserl, it is the inner life-histories that shape and form the

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<sup>50</sup> To be sure, the notion of the person as a concrete subjectivity that is essentially being-in-the-world includes inevitably not only its own personal inner histories (the genetic sense of sedimentation) but also the entire social-cultural world together with its tradition (the generative sense of sedimentation) in which it is embedded. Drawing mainly from Binswanger, the current section focuses more on the historical totality of the individual person, whereas whose cultural embeddedness remains relatively in the background and cannot be elaborated in much detail as limited by the scope of the current study.

“inner essence of man, his spiritual person (*das innere Wesen des Menschen, seine geistige Person*)” (Binswanger, 1994, 85). This includes an individual’s core traits, dispositions, system of values and convictions, nexus of motivations, and so on. Conversely, an individual is and can be truly understood only in light of its inner life-histories rather than through the functioning of psychophysiological organisms. The notion of inner life-histories constitutes the core of Binswanger’s conception of human subjectivity.

As a being inevitably inseparable from the world, subjectivity develops an idiosyncratic world-horizon (*Welthorizont*) or world-projection (*Weltentwurf*) during the course of its existence, which is an understanding-horizon of a world (*Verständnishorizont einer Welt*) (Töpfer, 2015, 51). Here, understanding-horizon means a general pre-understanding of the world as a meaningful context in and through which one interpretively understands the very being of each singular worldly entity and event. It could be conceived of as a special stage (*Spezialbühne*) on which an individual “performs” its life and with reference to which alone their thoughts, decisions, and behaviours - be it normal or pathological - can possibly make sense. In other words, as an irreducibly unique world-project with its own equally unique self, one’s world-horizon constitutes the “the peculiar horizon for the understanding of what ‘happens’ here with Dasein (*eigentlichen Horizont für das Verständnis dessen, was sich daseinmäßig hier, ‚abspielt‘*)” (Binswanger, 1947, 207, my translation). It follows that the hermeneutic dimension of a (pathological) lived-experience, viz. the existential meaningfulness expounded above, remains unintelligible until it is placed within the world-horizon that belongs exclusively to an individual subjectivity. As Binswanger (1994, 186, my translation) writes, “‘sense and meaning’ have sense and meaning at all only for the individuality, that is, for this particular ego and its world (*„Sinn und Bedeutung’ haben Sinn und Bedeutung überhaupt nur für die Individualität, d.h., für dieses bestimmte Ich und seine Welt“*). Put otherwise, each and every word, idea, behaviour and thought of an individual is nothing but different *expressions* of one’s own world-horizon and, eventually, of one’s concrete subjectivity. Subjectivity is in no way a formal structure but rather a “region of subjectivity”: “a region of subjectivity...[where] a certain fabric is to be recognize; a region from which every word, sentence, idea, drawing, act or gesture receives its special imprint (*ein Gebiet der Subjektivität...[wo] ein bestimmtes Gefüge zu erkennen ist, von dem jedes Wort, jeder Satz, jede Idee, jede Zeichnung, Handlung oder Geste ihr besonderes Gepräge erhält*)” (Binswanger, 1947, 204, my translation). This applies with equal legitimacy to typical as well as (so-called) abnormal subjectivity. Therefore, even the abnormal words, ideas, and behaviours of pathologically conditioned persons, which appear at first sight to be utterly unintelligible and meaningless, do in fact attain a meaning with respect to the whole nexus of the inner life-histories, viz. of sedimented *Erfahrungen*, that make up the core of the person in question. Neurodivergent persons are in any case still being-in-the-world that possess a pre-reflective horizon of understanding that bestows a specific existential meaningfulness upon other entities as well as their own thoughts and acts.

Hence, symptomology that treats abnormal phenomena exclusively as phenomena isolated from an individual subjectivity and subsumes them to pre-established categories does not do justice to the individuality and meaningfulness of the phenomena *for* the suffering subject in question. While being-in-the-world and world-horizon are fundamental structures belonging to all human subjects, pathologies should be understood as nothing but *modifications* of or *deviations* (*Abwandlung*) from these fundamental structures, which in no case means a *deprivation* of them. A modified world-horizon still remains a horizon of understanding in which the subject performs its activities and from which the activities attain their meaningfulness. The description of psychopathologies is nothing but a description of the modified fundamental structures of human beings, as Töpfer (2015, 50, my translation) rightly concludes: “all concrete ways to be a human should be described as *variation*, as *modification* or realization of this fundamental structure of being-human, including – and that is what concerns the psychiatrist Binswanger – the psychically ill Dasein (*alle konkreten Weisen, Mensch zu sein, sollen sich als Variation, als Abwandlung oder Realisierung dieser Grundstruktur des Menschseins beschreiben lassen, auch – und darum geht es dem Psychiater Binswanger – das psychisch kranke Dasein*)”. Binswanger’s thematic phenomenological study of *Ideenflucht* (flight of ideas) in schizophrenic persons offers us a concrete illustration of this thesis, viz. pathological phenomena that initially appear as meaningless and random for others are meaningful expressions of the patient’s meaningful world-horizon and their being-in-the-world. Flight of ideas refers to the capriciousness (*Sprunghaftigkeit*) and free associations of ideas, which lead to the apparently incoherent, non-sensical, fragmentary and meaningless trains of thought and hallucinations demonstrated by persons of schizophrenia. Within the clinical setting, the flight of ideas as such is nothing more than a (psychological and physiological) deficiency completely irrelevant to and insignificant for any ordinary experience, and hence a deficiency to be “fixed” simply by eliminating it from the patient. In opposition to this conception, Max Herzog, summarizing Binswanger’s method of phenomenological description of psychopathologies, regards *Ideenflucht* as something essentially more than a random abnormal phenomenon. In his introduction to Binswanger’s study of schizophrenia, Herzog writes, explicitly, “the symptomatology of the flight of ideas, of eccentricity, etc., appears first of all as an *extended variant* of general human features, which also occur in the ‘normal’ everyday life (die Symptomatik der Ideenflucht, der Verschrobenheit usf. erscheint zunächst als *erweiterte Variante* allgemeinmenschlicher Eigentümlichkeiten, die auch im ‚normalen‘ Alltag auftreten)” (Binswanger, 1992, XXVIII, my translation and emphasis). Schizophrenic phenomena barely differ from other phenomena of the ordinary life-world where meaningfulness inhabits. In particular, *Ideenflucht* does not show itself without any intelligible reason and “exclusively” in “abnormal” persons. Rather, it is a (derivative) phenomenon *of* human beings in general, a phenomenon essentially rooted in the fundamental structure of human existence and *in* ordinary human reality: “the structure of the pathological appearance does not in principle lie outside of the human possibilities *at all* (*die Struktur der pathologischen Erscheinung liegt nicht prinzipiell*

*außerhalb der menschlichen Möglichkeiten überhaupt*)” (ibid., my translation). Pathological phenomena such as the flight of ideas do not reside, so to speak, “outside” normality and “normal” human beings; rather, they are one of the *possibilities* inherent in human existence itself. In order to make sense of such atypical human possibilities, viz. pathological phenomena, the allegedly “singular symptom (*Einzelsymptom*)” should in no case be studied in isolation from the individual human being itself but instead as a moment belonging to the entire structure of its being. As Binswanger (1992, 216, my translation) writes, “...what they [the clinic] love to assess as a singular symptom, such as the fleetingness of thoughts or of the urge to talk, [are] components of highly complex structures (...*was sie [die Klinik] als Einzelsymptom zu werten liebt, wie z.B. die Flüchtigkeit des Denkens oder der Rededrang, [sind] Glieder hochkomplexer Strukturen*)”. A deviated thought or idea does not (only) indicate the malfunction of a single “area” of the psyche; rather, it indicates and *is* the alteration of the entire structure of the *Erlebens* (“*die Veränderung der Gesamtstruktur des Erlebens*”) of the individual, which in turn serves as the ground on which a genuine understanding of the singular symptoms is alone rendered possible. In a word, *Ideenflucht* bespeaks not a single appearing symptom but rather a “human with flight of ideas (*ideenflüchtiger Mensch*)” or “being-in-the-world in the form of flight of ideas (*ideenflüchtige Art des In-der-Welt-sein*)” as a whole (See Binswanger, 1992, 26-7, 216-7), and its meaning is to be uncovered by being studied as a partial moment of the entire structure of the patient („*als Teilmoment der Gesamtstruktur der Kranken*”). This *Gesamtstruktur* means nothing other than what was elucidated as concrete subjectivity shaped by its personal inner life-histories and existing as a peculiar being-in-the-world with its peculiar world-horizon, which in pathological cases is fundamentally modified. In the first main part of this work, it was shown, within the classical phenomenological framework, that the sedimented inner life-histories of neurotypical being-in-the-world manifest formally and transcendently as *types*, *moods*, and *habits*. In the upcoming chapters, on the ground of the pathologically modified being-in-the-world made up of pathological sedimentation, the pathological correlates of the three moments will be brought to light respectively as *derivatives*, *bad mood*, and *hyperreflexivity*.

## Chapter Eight: The Sphere of Understanding: Type and *Derivatives* (*Abkömmlinge*)

### 8.1 The Freudian Notion of *Abkömmlinge* as the Pathological Correlate of *Typus*

In chapter two, it was demonstrated that *Typus* makes up the core of the typifying-anticipatory horizon for the intentional apprehension (*Auffassung*) of objects of perception. As a transcendental condition of apprehension, *Typus* is one of the essential structural moments that belongs to the sphere of understanding, especially to pre-predicative perceptual experience. Types alone make possible the typifying apprehension of objects as something meaningfully intelligible to average human subjects. That is, an object is apprehended as intersubjectively shared in terms of its very being only when it is an object of typifying apprehension. However, as discussed in 2.2 and 2.3, the associative reawakening as well as the original unconscious formation of types are inevitably “subjectively” conditioned and even “irrationally” pre-shaped. Both reawakening and the formation of types do not necessarily or merely follow the principle of objective likeness and similarity among things. Rather, “subjective and irrational” elements, such as the individual’s wishes, desires, and their contingent social-cultural background, play an indispensable role in both processes. Theoretically, it is thus always possible for types to undergo some radically subjective modifications – such as pathological ones – in an individual person. Having undergone a peculiarly pathological transformation, I argue that the network of types becomes a network of *Abkömmlinge* or *derivatives*, which are equally constitutive of the perceptual experiences of an individual subject. The only difference is that objects apprehended in accordance with derivatives are distorted to a certain degree and unintelligible to anyone but the apprehending subjectivity itself. Since the network of derivatives is formed exclusively *in* the individual and is motivated by his/her (unconscious) wishes and desires, the accordingly apprehended objects turn out to be so distinctively “private” and idiosyncratic that they are barely sharable with other average human subjects. In this section, I will first outline the meaning of the notion *Abkömmlinge* as devised by Freud. Secondly, the very relationship between *Typus* and *Abkömmlinge* will be explored in terms of the former’s pathological transformation into the latter. Lastly, the way in which the *Abkömmlinge* serve as a modified horizon of apprehension will be elucidated. As nothing other than a “product” of sedimentations, *Abkömmlinge* bring in light the way in which pathologically sedimented experiences manifest in the conscious sphere of understanding.

#### a) The Freudian Notion of *Abkömmlinge*

Simply defined, derivatives are the substitute-representations (*Ersatzvorstellungen*) or -ideas of what is repressed (*verdrängt*) into the unconscious. They are, just like types, products of the unconscious. It is important to note that what is repressed is, according to Freud, not the drives (*Triebe*) or instincts themselves, as it is commonly misunderstood. The latter are, in fact, the source of psychic or cathectic energy (*Besetzungsenergie*), as he calls it. Instead, the objects of repressions are nothing but the

(original) *representatives* of the drives, or *Triebrepräsentanz*. Psychic energy (drives and instincts) itself cannot be an object of consciousness. In order to be graspable as an object, it must be expressed and *represented* via particular ideas or thoughts, which alone are the primary objects of repression. However, because the original representatives of drives are repressed, the untameable energies attached to them do not cease their aggressively dynamic movement. They continue to pass through the censorship threshold and to strive for access to the conscious sphere. In order to do so, the psychic energies attach themselves to other ideas, filling them with an emotive charge that was not “originally” possessed by them. These substitutive ideas, as alternative representatives of the drives and desires whose original representatives are repressed, are what Freud terms *Abkömmlinge*. They are relatively harmless and granted access to consciousness more easily, at least at first sight. *Abkömmlinge* are tasked with serving as the apparently “neutral” symbolic signifier of the dynamic energies as well as of their original representatives, which are now pushed back into the unconscious. It should be noted that in a broader sense of the notion, *Abkömmlinge* do not only denote the particular substitutive ideas of the unconscious, but also more comprehensively empirical phenomena such as neurotic and psychotic symptoms, (free) associations of thoughts, phantasies, dreams, and so on. In our upcoming discussion, however, I tend to focus on the narrower sense, which describes alternate representatives of ideas that are affectively charged and which subsequently form a network of derivatives that can even replace, in pathological cases, the network of types in perceptual experiences.

With this general idea of *Abkömmlinge* in mind, we are now in the position to undertake a closer inspection of the relationship between derivatives and repression (*Verdrängung*). According to Freud (2005, 37-42), there are three phases of repression: primal repression (*Urverdrängung*), post- or actual repression (*Nachdrängung* or *eigentliche Verdrängung*), and the return of the repressed (*die Wiederkehr des Verdrängten*). The primal repression has as its object the original ideational representatives of the drives. After the original drive-representatives are denied access to consciousness, there is a fixation (*Fixierung*) established between the drive and its very first representative, which is now repressed. As repressed, however, the original representative serves as “a first pole of attraction for all secondary, actual instances of repression” (Smith, 2010, 45). That is, the repressed representative fixated with the drive impulse now becomes a source of attractive power that continues to exist in the unconscious, initiating further organization and associations with other potential representatives. The original representative “collaborates” with the drive striving incessantly to enter the conscious sphere by investing other seemingly harmless ideas with the drive-energy. It is at this point the substitute-representatives or derivatives are unconsciously formed. Appearing as innocuous ideas, they are now inundated with so-called *anticathexis* (*Gegenbesetzung*), whose aim is nothing other than the perpetuation of the dynamic movement of the contents of repression. In their unceasing attempt to break through into the sphere of consciousness, the derivatives subsequently

encounter the second phase of repression - namely, the actual repression - which for Freud is “repression proper”. “Actual repression”, he writes, “affects psychic derivatives of the repressed representative, or trains of thought that, though originating elsewhere, have become associated with it” (Freud, 2005, 37). Here, it is made clear that derivatives are the ideas associated with the representatives originating from drive-energy and repressed in the first stage of repression. Primal repression “does not prevent the drive representative from continuing to exist in the unconscious, from undergoing further organization”, and, eventually, “from forming derivatives, or from making new connections” (ibid.). It should be emphasized that, in the second stage, not *all* derivatives are pushed back to the unconscious. Some do indeed get past the censorship mechanism and gain free access to consciousness, as long as they are sufficiently remote or distorted from the primarily repressed drive-representatives and appear much less threatening or morally undesirable than the latter. Neurotic symptoms, dreams, phantasies, and so on, are empirical demonstrations of the success of the drive and its original representative wresting the access to consciousness by disguising themselves as harmless derivatives. Furthermore, empirical observation shows that people with mental illness appear to be more “vulnerable” than usual, in the sense that they are particularly sensitive to certain external or internal stimuli, which trigger their atypical reactions. In part, this phenomenon could be traced back to the “network of associations surrounding the substitute idea [viz. the derivative] being invested with particular intensity, making it extremely sensitive to excitation” (Freud, 2005, 66). Consider, for instance, a sexual instinct; while its original representative (e.g. a particular person) is repressed, the instinct itself constantly ventures to attach itself to other ideas (e.g. other persons or even objects) that are associated with the original representative. Subsequently, the derivatives - invested with the psychic energy seeking its own discharge (*Abfuhr*) - form a network of ideas that is composed of the associations between the derivatives themselves and the original drive-representatives. As will be discussed below, this network of derivatives is analogous to the network of types in terms of its constitutive function with respect to further pre-reflective experiences. Given the formation of derivatives in the second stage, it is not difficult to anticipate that the eventual, third stage of repression is comprised precisely of the eternal return of the repressed, which includes not only the original representative but also its derivatives. This stage further highlights the incessant and violent attempts made by the repressed contents and the drive-energy to break through into consciousness. Despite the primal and actual repression, they “develop more rampantly and exuberantly...[they] proliferate in the dark, so to speak, and find extreme forms of expression” (Freud, 2005, 37-8). What is repressed, be it in the primal or secondary phase, simply do not cease re-emerging time and again in an uglier, more distorted, and hence less recognizable way. This, in turn, fosters the continuous expansion of the associative network of derivatives.

In the manuscript “*das Unbewusste*”, which was published in the same year (1915) as the text “Repression (*Verdrängung*)” and where Freud established the „erste Topik” of his metapsychology, a



few additional characterizations of the derivatives are identified. Here, derivatives are designated explicitly as “derivatives of the unconscious (*die Abkömmlinge des Unbewussten*)”, by virtue of which the unconscious keeps “moving forward (*sich fortsetzen*)” in a lively and developing manner (Freud, 2020, 33, my translation). As ideas of the unconscious, derivatives share the features that characterize unconscious contents in general. They are, first of all, not governed by logical rules such as the law of non-contradiction. They allow or even embrace logical oppositions and conflicts, unifying in themselves contradictory attributions (“*die entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen in sich vereinigen*”) and hence being free from contradiction (*widerspruchsfrei*). On the other side, the derivatives are inundated with anticathexis (*Gegenbesetzung*), which seeks its discharge and relaxation (*Entspannung*) through bursting into consciousness and being realized. By attempting to do so, the derivatives serve in effect as a mediator between the unconscious and consciousness - for they are both the alternative representatives of the unconscious contents and its psychic energy, as well as the conscious sphere’s only bridge to the unconscious. One of Freud’s main objects of study, the phenomenon of dream, could best illustrate the essence of the mechanism of derivatives. The dream phenomenon is, according to Freud, comprised of a (patent) dream-image and (latent) dream-content. Dream-images that appear to us in dreams are the derivatives, the symbols or signs that represent the repressed dream-contents - namely, the buried unconscious wishes, fears, desires, and so on. They are denied the direct realization in the actual world through their original representatives as well as (most of the time) access to wakeful consciousness. Consequently, the only way for them to be expressed and discharged is the representation through harmless alternative ideas, which now manifest in the form of various dream-images. In the search for substitutive representatives, one of the core formation mechanisms of dream-images is transference (*Übertragung*), namely, the transference of the emotive intensity of unconscious ideas onto relatively harmless representations that eventually make their appearance in dreams. Freud describes the fact of transference in dreams as “an unconscious idea...[which] is quite incapable of entering into the preconscious and...[which] can exert an influence there only by establishing touch with a harmless idea already belonging to the preconscious, to which it transfers its intensity, and by which it allows itself to be screened” (Freud, 1995, 475). Two of the concrete mechanisms of transference are known as condensation (*Verdichtung*) and displacement (*Verschiebung*). Whereas the former depicts the compacted representation of several or even manifold chains of associations that are affectively compressed into a single representative (a single dream-image, for instance), the latter refers to the transition of the intensity of a representative to another less intensively charged representative. The main task of psychoanalysis is, accordingly, to unveil the very *meaning* of dreams by means of unwrapping the latent dream-contents, viz, the unconscious wishes and fears, hidden “behind” the appearing dream-images. What is crucial for our current project is that mechanisms of transference through which dream-images are formed, such as condensation and displacement, are simultaneously mechanisms that underlie the formation of derivatives.

## b) Formation of Derivatives as Pathological Modification of Types

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, I argue that derivatives can be conceived of as the pathological counterparts of types, and that the formation of the former is fundamentally a pathological modification of the latter. A type is, to briefly recap, a unifying “notion” under which similar objects of experience are grouped together. In such a formational process, several kinds of unity are presupposed. In order to unwarp the transformational process from types to derivatives, viz. the disturbance interfering with the formational process of types, it is necessary to foreground, in advance, the three kinds of unity involved in normal type-formation. The first unity is known as the *temporal unity* of the lived-experiences of an ego. By temporality it does not mean the objective temporality of world-time. Unquestionably, all experiential contents are constituted in a particular “objective” now-point according to the absolute world-time (or clock-time). They are destined to gradually fade away from the impressional present and to undergo the process of retention, through which they eventually land in the distant past. For subjective consciousness, this is designated as the process of sedimentation and sedimented experience, of which we have been speaking throughout our current study. Despite having vanished from the objective, “actual” present of world-time, all our sedimented lived-experiences still “have their temporal unity” in consciousness. It is a unity “constituted in the absolute flow of internal time-consciousness (*inneres Zeitbewusstsein*)” wherein all sedimented experiences have their own position and uniqueness in the temporal flow of the life of consciousness (Husserl, 1973a, 175). This points back to what was above termed as the temporal stratification of sedimentation, which originally depicts the stratigraphy of natural materials beneath the earth. Analogously, by virtue of a kind of association, sedimented experiences are synthetically brought together in the temporal unity of the flux of a time-consciousness, occupying respective temporal positions within the flux. However, not only sedimented past experiences have their temporal unity in a single time-consciousness; in recollection, for instance, the flash of memory of the past-world (the memory as a lived-experience) and the present perception of this-world (the lived-experience of perception) are also contemporaneous with each other in consciousness. There is, hence, “a temporal unity among all lived-experiences of an ego”, a unity that implies the “possibility of the establishment of an intuitive connection among all objectivities constituted in it” (Husserl, 1973a, 176). That all lived-experiences are unified in the single stream of time-consciousness is the very condition for the possibility of synthetically associating, grouping, and bringing together different ideational contents in subjectivity. This leads us to the second kind of unity, namely, the *sensuous unity* involved in both the unconscious formation of types and the associative awakening of types by a present givenness. Previous objects of experience, now sedimented and unified in the stream of time-consciousness, are grouped together under a type insofar as they share a certain degree of objective resemblance with each other. Likewise, the givenness of the present is synthetically unified with the past vivified by it. Both processes presuppose, as their condition of possibility, a sensuous unity of

“the like and the similar” that is passively pre-constituted in advance in “subconsciousness”. That is, sensuous unity based on likeness and similarity is always already pre-constituted, such that both the grouping and awakening are nothing but the “vivifying of something which previously was already there” (Husserl, 1973a, 179). Finally, there is the *intuitive unity* grounded in the temporal unity of the lived-experiences of the ego. This denotes the bringing together, in the unity of intuitive presence, of things that are non-intuitive (or no longer intuitive) and does not “materially” belong together. One of the most prominent forms of intuitive unity is the unity between the present (*das Gegenwärtige*), viz. the perceived and the intuitive, and the non-present and merely presentified (*das Vergegenwärtigte*), such as the remembered, imagined, and the phantasized. These do not belong together in material space. However, by virtue of synthesizing consciousness, “the remembered table”, for example, can be “placed mentally in perceptual space beside the table which is actually perceived”; together, they form an intuitive unity present consciousness (Husserl, 1973a, 183). The remembered table is then beside the actual one in the mode of the “quasi”, without any actual spatial occupancy or absolute temporal position. Thanks to such intuitive unity, a “relation of ideas” is formed and a comparison between the two is made possible. Likewise, the typifying apperception of things is in essence a synthetic intuitive unity of the present intuitive givenness and the associatively awakened non-intuitive type. The intuitive – and habitual - connection between the two termini is strengthened by each and every actual, “successful” act of apprehension. In normal cases, the contents of the types are constantly enriched, corrected, and crossed out, depending on the actual experience of objects.

These three kinds of unity, viz. the *temporal*, *sensuous*, and *intuitive*, open up the possibility of the formation as well as the constitutive function of types. At the same time, however, they also entail the potentiality of a pathological modification of all the intentional and unconscious processes so far discussed. The essence of pathological modification consists in the “messing up” of sedimented contents, such that they are no longer “organized” solely in terms of their temporal position in the stream of time-consciousness and their pre-constituted objective sensuous unity. This possibility is addressed by Husserl as the possibility of the passive commingling of “discrete matters” or of a “confused muddle of rememberings” (Husserl, 1966, 160; Biceaga, 2010, 62). This bespeaks, to put it in our language, the breakdown of the temporal stratification and sensuous organization of lived-experiences in the process of sedimentation, resulting in the contingent interaction and muddling of past experiences. Biceaga (2010, 62) specifically describes it as the possibility for affective awakening to “dislodge some parts of past objective experiences from their location on specific sedimented strata and combine them into wholes with no objective correspondent”. Instead of an objectively unified nexus of sedimentations and types, which are formed into an intuitive unity on the basis of sensuous unity and their respective temporal position in consciousness, a nexus of “inadvertently associated discordant contents” (ibid.) is formed. Basically, this entails the possibility of the emergence of what we called above the associative network of derivatives, whose formation is

motivated to a large extent by the subject's own (unconscious) wishes, desires, repressed drives, phantasies, and so on.

This is not a contingent empirical phenomenon caused solely by the neurological malfunction of pathological individuals and it is not completely uncoupled from the "typical" life of consciousness. Just as Binswanger argues that the flight of ideas is modified from ordinary processes of association, the formation of the network of derivatives is transcendently grounded in the eidetic structures of consciousness elaborated above. This process is not cut off from the typical ordinary life-world but is a deviation (or modification) that remains rooted within it. The temporal unity of lived-experiences of the ego serves as the condition of the possibility of "all unity of the intuition of a plurality of objects" (Husserl, 1973a, 182). In effect, this unity simultaneously serves as the condition of possibility for the inadvertent combination and contingent association of ideational contents of consciousness. Such possible deviation has to do with the fundamental difference between the genesis and functioning of the conscious system and that of the unconscious. As Bernet (2020, 260) explains, clearly and convincingly enough to my mind, the conscious mental system is "entirely devoted to the task of representing real objects through perceptions", viz. through typifying apperception, whereas the unconscious "makes use of memory...of memories preserved as memory traces (*Erinnerungsspuren*)". This means that the latter is hardly concerned with actual, real objects and their objective properties, but rather with what is preserved in the subjective mind in a highly discrete and even distorted manner. While the temporal unity of the lived-experiences (or memories) remains, they are dislodged from their original temporal position in the stream of consciousness. This results in the possibility of an apparently random and even chaotic combination of them and their traces. Likewise, the sensuous unity of ideational contents, which is based on likeness and similarity, no longer plays any role in the dynamic interactions among unconscious contents, and intuitive unity is no longer simply a unity between the present (the actual) and the non-present. Contents could be "freely" brought together despite the absence of objective likeness, and unity could be formed on the basis of any sort of association. Shattering the different forms of unity (yet at the same time grounded in them), the formation of derivatives consists of two main structural moments that are related exclusively to one's subjective and unconscious contents. The first is what was already explicated as the (re-)investing or transference of drive-energy onto other ideas or representations. In particular, as Bernet suggests, those representations are usually the memory traces left by previous drives, which were once satisfied through successful encounters with real objects (*ibid.*). As the whole process takes place in the unconscious, the "selection" of the objects for energy-investment is not based on their objective or rational relationship. Rather, it follows nothing but the guidance prescribed by one's subjective motives. Secondly, besides the reckless selection of objects of energy-investment, there is also the inadvertent associative connection between the repressed original drive-representatives and the substitute-representatives, which in most cases are the memory traces precipitated in subjective

life. In light of what was explicated above as the various forms of unity, we might conclude that “sensuous” unity is now revealed as the unity of drive-energies and contingent ideas or representations (memory traces), and “intuitive” unity is discernible only as the unity of the original and substitutive representatives of drives, which are both non-present and non-intuitive. It turns out that the very relationship between drive-energies, original drive-representatives, and substitute-representatives (derivatives), is not grounded in actual objects or their actual properties, nor is it concerned with the representation of real objects. Rather, the relationship is that of *signification* (Bernet, 2020, 260-2), in which the affective charges (drive-energy) - in the absence of original or actual objects for their discharge or satisfaction - search for substitution through *signs*, viz. through affectively loaded derivatives. These *signs* are essentially different from conscious intentional representation of objects in typifying apperception; what they signify are not actual objects but rather the missing objects of drive-satisfactions and drive-energies in the subject itself. In this sense, derivatives are but (seemingly harmless) signs or signifiers secretly signifying one’s hidden wishes, drives, desires, fears, and so on, as well as their original, usually repressed objects. Derivatives are thus significantly different from the apperceptive types that are devoted to representing real objects in the “external” world, so to speak.

### c) Derivatives as a Modified Typifying-Horizon of Apperception

In what follows, I will further develop Freud’s notion of derivatives in a new direction. While Freud conceptualizes derivatives as affectively invested substitute-representatives that strive towards the conscious sphere from the unconscious (like dreams, phantasies, symptoms, etc.), I will demonstrate below that they are also susceptible to associative awakening initiated from the conscious sphere; that is, derivatives do not only actively burst into the latter but are also passively brought forth by it in a similar way as types. Despite not being designed to represent external objects of perception, the associative network of derivatives does, when called forth into the conscious sphere, have a “constitutive” effect upon various intentional activities, especially those of pre-reflective perception. This network is “constitutive” in the broadest sense of contributing to the individual’s peculiar apperception of a present givenness, whose result is eventually not shared with other perceiving subjects. This is then conceived of as atypical or abnormal apperception, which underlies various pathological phenomena. In “normal” apperceptive experiences, the passive-associative awakening of types as typifying horizon is based more or less on “objective” resemblances between the awakening and the awakened. To be sure, as elucidated in chapter 2.2, objective likeness is not the *sole* basis of the associative relationship. Subjective variables such as the perceiving subject’s own mood and practical interest, should also be taken into account. Nonetheless, the associative connection between the awakening and the awakened in normal cases does at least follow a certain “logic” that is immediately understandable – for instance, one that can be traced back to the subject’s prominent

habits or interests. Differently from what is regarded as pathological, even subjectively conditioned association is not considered to be completely contingent or to lack any intelligible motive. However, it is precisely the indispensability of subjective variables in associative performance that entails the fundamental possibility of the latter's pathological modification. This possibility is also addressed by traditional Husserlian scholars (See Lohmar, 2016), despite not being elaborated further within the context of psychopathology. Lohmar correctly suggests that (normal) typifying apperception is in its essence *interpretative*; that is, it is by definition an "*interpretation* of sensory elements", which is "influenced and motivated by types" (Lohmar, 2016, 56) that are pre-established in the course of the subject's past experiences. In effect, it is therefore perfectly possible that a sensory givenness is simply "reframed" such that it "fits" what "I" can or tend to see, whatever this particular tendency actually consists of. Lohmar gives the example of hearing the noise of a car speeding up coming through the open window (*ibid.*). "I" immediately interpret it as the sound of the car "I" currently see in front of me, despite the fact is that the noise actually comes from another direction and from another car that is not within my perceptual field. The acoustic sound is "reframed" with a new sense of direction and origin such that it is concordant with my current perception (of the car in front of "me"). This shows that the subject is able to – and does always – interpretatively (re-)configure what is given to it *according to* its own (unconscious) tendencies, interests, moods, or even simply its current perceptual experiences. In particular, the phenomenon of "vivid phantasma" can best illustrate the subjective configuration of sensory givenness in the act of typifying apperception. This term describes the contents of an expectation that we vividly project with respect to certain properties of the object that do not (yet) appear intuitively, while part of the which is already given in the present. For instance, when we see a lemon (more precisely, something like a lemon) at a certain distance, its fruity smell and texture, which are not sensorily given in the present, simultaneously flash through our mind as phantasma that are nearly as vivid as the sensory intuition and are experienced "as though" they were already sensibly given (*ibid.*). This is because what we *expect* or simply *wish* to experience according to the type of lemon - in light of the sensory givenness - immediately appears to us imaginatively in our mind, despite the absence of its actual givenness. We might go a step further to assert that the phantasm is not merely motivated by the pre-established "normal" types, but also by one's deeper affectivities, wishes, and desires, which are translated into the different subjective derivatives of which we have been speaking so far. In this case, the normal typifying horizon of apperception is modified into the horizon of derivatives, which one may characterize as a pathologically apperceptive horizon. As contents belonging exclusively to the unconscious system, derivatives differ from types in that they are distinctively private and subjectivistic. As an apperceptive horizon of perception, derivatives are awakened by *highly specific* aspects or (sensuous) properties of what is presently given; notably, most of the time, these are properties that are inessential to the being of the object itself but that contingently manage to evoke certain repressed contents in the subject. In the foregoing chapter, it was argued that due to the (emotional) stratification

of sedimented experiences, particular aspects of an experience remain at a relatively “superficial” level and are hence more susceptible to provocations and reawakening. These include, to repeat, de-contextualized sensory imprints, fragmented semantic contents, negative attributes of self and others, and so on. Among other “random” ideas, these traces of memory could also serve as representations that are invested with psychical energy and continue to exist in psychic life in the form of derivatives. The derivatives are likewise particularly sensitive to external excitation (Freud, 2005, 66), as already mentioned above. Thus, in the process of perception, sensory givenness radiating from the object might turn out to include specific stimuli that “accidentally” call forth the derivatives. These stimuli are either external cues that are decontextualized - such as a flash of noise or visual image, a spark of light, a wave of smell, etc. -, or internal triggers such as a sudden emotion or feeling or anxiety, inferiority, or offensiveness (See Meares, 2000, 52-3). Trivial (social) situations in the present might likewise evoke memories of intense sensations or emotions originating in certain past instances; however, the subject itself could remain unaware of these instances themselves as the latter’s origin and misconstrue the triggered sensations or emotions as located exclusively in the present. A repressed traumatic experience can be “accidentally” touched upon and reawakened, yet not in its concreteness but rather merely by sensual, emotional, and existential fragments loosely belonging to it, which appear in the form of derivatives, viz. substitutive representatives of the “forgotten” original experience as well as of its scattered fragments. The derivatives, then, serve as an apperceptive (quasi) “glass” or *horizon* of the ongoing perception, in and through which things in the present are interpretatively apprehended. One of the most illuminating examples of how subjective derivatives function as an apperceptive horizon is found in phobic experiences. Consider the example of the rope and the snake briefly addressed in 2.3. Someone who was shockingly frightened by snakes in childhood is left permanently in him/her with an extreme and unerasable fear of the animal. For this person, anything that seemingly resembles a snake in terms of its shape, colour or noise, etc. - such as a rope - might immediately evoke his/her deep sense of fear and even be grasped (mistakenly) at first glance as a threatening snake. According to what has been elaborated so far, this phenomenon could be further explained by the notion of derivatives. The previous traumatic experience that was accompanied by emotional intensity - viz. in this case the extreme fear towards snakes as a result of a childhood wound related to this animal - is to a certain extent repressed together with its original object (the snake in the past). However, the fear is unconsciously *transferred* to ideas associatively connected with the original object, such as rope or anything that appears long and soft. As emotively charged, the latter become derivatives representing the irrational fear and unconsciously associated with the original object of fear. What is given in the present as “long and soft” (such as a rope) thus awakens in the person not the emotionally indifferent type of “rope” but rather the type of “rope” as an emotively charged derivative of fear closely related to the original object of fear (the snake). The derivative, which is pre-constituted in the unconscious through an immediate association with the original object, becomes now the *alternative* constitutive horizon for the apperception of the “long

and soft” thing as the affectively loaded idea of “snake”. By virtue of the derivative apperception, the repressed original object of fear (the snake) finally makes its way into the present conscious sphere *through* the “long and soft” thing that distantly *signifies* it and that evokes a similar sense of extreme fear. Freud argues further that in the phobia of animals, the emotive intensity of the repressed is reinvested not only into other representations (*Ersatzvorstellungen*) but even into their associative surrounding field (*Assoziationsumfeld*). For instance, speaking of a phobia of dogs, he writes that, “in the case of animal phobia, it could mean that, for instance, the patient sometimes not only avoids a confrontation with dogs, but he also subsequently even avoids the regions where he could run across dogs” (Freud, 2020, 71, my translation)<sup>51</sup>. This quote indicates the indefinite extension of the associative network forming around the core-feeling and the original traumatic experiences, which eventually expand to the potentially countless contextual cues that might provoke the derivatives as well as what they signify. There is another, non-pathological and rather ordinary example offered by Fuchs (2012, 75-6). It mainly illustrates, among other things, the “reframing” or “reconfiguring”, motivated by the subject’s personal interests, of sensory elements in accordance with the derivatives imbued with unconscious desires. Fuchs retells a short story by Heinrich von Klein, where a soldier addicted to alcohol is forced to become abstinent after several punishment in the military. While running through the town, the soldier, attempting to refrain from alcohol, hears the names of various brandies such as “Kümmel! Kümmel” - whereas what is in fact resounding in the town is the tolling of the bells coming from the townhall. This could be explained within our theoretical framework of derivatives. The actual sensory elements (e.g. the sound of the ringing bell) are interpretatively reconfigured by the soldier into something that he *wishes* to hear but that is repressed and prohibited, and hence as that which alternatively represent the repressed wish (to consume alcohol) and its original object (alcohol). Here, the ringing bells of the town hall are derivatives imbued with emotive charge and pre-constituted unconsciously as the substitute-representative of the repressed desire, and they are awakened in immediate and unconscious association with the original representative, serving the purpose of (quasi) satisfying the forbidden desire. Thus awakened, they (the original representative connected with and signified by its derivative) effectively contribute to co-configuring the perceptual world of the subject – a world that *seems* to fit with his wishes (e.g. one with alcohol) - in similar a way as types sometimes do in typifying apperception. As Fuchs (2012, 75) writes, “the experiential field is, so to speak, interspersed with suppressed desire which becomes crystallized finally around certain perceptions – namely those which are sufficiently vague while offering a certain similarity for the purpose”. This points exactly to the idea of derivatives of which we have spoken so far and their constitutive function with regard to perceptual experience.

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<sup>51</sup> „im Fall der Tierphobie kann das z.B. bedeuten, dass der Patient irgendwann nicht mehr nur der Begegnung mit Hunden aus dem Weg geht, sondern dass er schließlich sogar überhaupt Gegenden meidet, in denen er Hunden begegnen könnte.“



## 8.2 The (Re-)Occurrence of Derivatives as Repetition Compulsion (*Wiederholungszwang*)

Derivatives as products of the unconscious make their recurrent appearance in consciousness, whether by means of “actively” bursting into conscious life as dreams, neurotic symptoms or phantasies, or by being “passively” awakened in the course of perception and co-shaping the apperceptive horizon. In both cases, as disguises of the repressed desires, traumatic experiences, “forgotten” childhood memories, etc., derivatives empirically confirm and reveal the tendency toward repetition compulsion rooted in human nature. According to Freud, there is a fundamental tendency for one to repeat one’s past or pre-existing patterns of thoughts, behaviours, social and romantic relationships, etc. - despite their unpleasant and even traumatizing nature. These patterns are repeatedly crystalized in different concrete events or other individuals in the present through the recurrent manifestations of the signifying derivatives, while they are in essence nothing more than reoccurrences of the past or of the repressed. In this sense, the apperceptive configuration of a perceptual givenness in and through the horizon of the derivatives - which are, as elucidated, signifiers of one’s unconscious contents - is in practice an imposition of one’s past upon the present, a violent act driven by humanity’s fundamental *repetition compulsion* (*Wiederholungszwang*). Let us take a closer look at this distinctive feature of human nature and its relationship to derivatives.

First, two conditions for the possibility of the awakening of “appropriate” types in normal perceptual experience should be identified: recognizing the present *as* present and the past *as* past. By recognizing the present as present, I mean that what is presently given is truly taken as something present in its individuality and actuality. That is, the present givenness is taken as itself and does not succumb to *overgeneralization* according to one’s pre-established mental schema. Despite being apprehended in accordance with a type (a product of the subject’s sedimented past) the present givenness is not conceived of as something *completely identical with* what was constituted and lived through in the past. It retains its presentness and uniqueness for the subject. In normal cases, typifying apperception is *not* an indifferent identification of the present with the past. Despite its “typifying” function, it respects the particularities of what is apperceived in the present, which distinguish it from what was experienced in the past and from the type itself. Typifying apperception also acknowledges the givenness’ actual temporal position in the present and its temporal distance from the past. Such awareness of the presentness and uniqueness of the present prevents the thorough collapse of the present into the past, which, as we shall see, is exactly what happens in pathological perception. On the other side, the past should be recognized *as* past in the specific sense that it is truly sedimented or “forgotten”. The unreasonable lingering the past in (or its haunting of) the present cannot help but create hurdles for future progresses, as is already hinted by Husserl in his thematic discussion of sedimentation. In *der Ursprung der Geometrie*, he writes, concerning the progress of modern natural sciences, “when he [the scientist] continues to work on the current work, does he firstly have to run

through the whole tremendous chain of the founding up until to the primal premisses and the whole thing actually reactivate? Would that be so, then a science like our modern Geometry would obviously be not possible (*muss er, wenn er sich an die aktuelle Fortarbeit macht, erst die ganze ungeheure Kette der Fundierungen bis zu den Urprämissen durchlaufen und das ganze wirklich reaktivieren? Offenbar wäre dann eine Wissenschaft wie unsere moderne Geometrie gar nicht möglich*)“ (Husserl, 1987, 215, my translation). Unquestionably, the primal evidence (*Urevidenz*) of ideal objectivities in modern natural science is found in pre-reflective lived-experiences in the life-world. Nonetheless, progresses will be impossible if each and every instance of sedimented lived-experience from the past and the entire chain of development is always reactivated and carried along. Rather, they ought to be more or less “forgotten” such that they do not constantly obstruct the present progressive work. Analogously, the constitutive function of types also transcendently presupposes such forgetfulness or “genuine” sedimentation of the past. By “genuine” I mean that the past is truly constituted as the absent past through temporal contraction and affective fusion (See Eldridge, 2020). That is, in the process of retention, the present – temporarily retended - object of experience is gradually merged with the undifferentiated past located in the zero-region of affectlessness and undifferentiatedness, such that what was once a thematic object of consciousness does not remain inappropriately prominent and dominant in the present sphere. More concretely, Eldridge (2020, 405) characterizes this as the constitution of an absent past and describes it as follows: “As experiences recede from the living present, they progressively lose their differentiation; their temporal articulation becomes compacted...It is a collapse of the scope of retentional nuance...”. For them to be genuinely “forgotten” or sedimented into the past, the once vivified objects of experiences ought to recede into – and merge with - the inarticulate background of the indifferent past (viz. temporal contraction), and their special affection (*Sonderaffektionen*) is meant to pass over and collapse into a general undifferentiated affection (*Gesamtaffektion*) (viz. affective fusion). The constitution of the absent past as such is what alone enables the past to be truly experienced *as* past.

As one fails to constitute the past as a sedimented absent past, the repetition compulsion that underlies the awakening of derivatives drives one to capture - in complete opposition to the typifying apperception of experiential objects - the past *as* present and the present *as* past. For individuals obviously succumbing to repetition compulsion, Freud (2000, 208, my translation) writes, “it is much more compelling to *repeat* the repressed [the repressed past] as present lived-experience, than to *remember* it as a piece of past, as the doctor would prefer to see (*es ist viel mehr benötigt, das Verdrängte [die verdrängte Vergangenheit] als gegenwärtiges Erlebnis zu wiederholen, anstatt es, wie der Arzt es lieber sähe, als ein Stück der Vergangenheit zu erinnern*)”. Motivated by the compulsion, human beings are subject to the tendency to *repeat* in their present practice what was repressed or/and faded away, instead of *remembering* and narrating it as something truly belonging to the past. Before a

undertaking closer inspection of this collapse of past and present into each other, the theoretical background of the concept of repetition compulsion should be sketched in advance.

The notion finds its most elaborate exposition in Freud's *Jenseits des Lustprinzips* (1920). The leading task of the text is to account for (pathological) phenomena that lie beyond the explanatory power of the pleasure principle (*Lustprinzip*), which is conceived of as one of the most fundamental principles of unconscious psychical operation. In general, the unconscious operates most primarily in accordance with the pleasure principle, which strives exclusively for the avoidance of displeasure and the attainment of pleasure through the fulfilment of drives and desires. Dreams, in particular, as the indirect revelation of the unconscious, aim at the attainment of pleasure through their basic function of the (quasi) fulfilment of wishes (*Wunscherfüllung*) that are unfulfilled in reality. Nonetheless, empirical observation shows that there are at the same time numerous dreams of traumatic neuroses, where traumatic experiences repeatedly and vehemently return to the traumatized person in their dream-life, causing nothing but extreme distress and displeasure. Those dreams succeed in nothing but reinforcing the subject's fixation (*Fixierung*) on a traumatic event and barely contributes to any attainment of pleasure. As presumptive products of the unconscious, dreams of traumatic neuroses apparently contradict the pleasure-principle and are left unexplained by it. The apparent opposition between "the dreams of the neurotics of an accident (*die Träume der Unfallsneurotiker*)" and "the dream's tendency to fulfil a wish (*die wunscherfüllende Tendenz des Traumes*)", as Freud (2000, 223) recognizes, reveals a contradiction that seems unresolvable and inexplicable merely by appealing to the pleasure principle. This makes it necessary to search for principles governing human nature other than the pleasure principle (thus the title "*Jenseits des Lustprinzips*"). In this search, Freud finally arrives at his study of the problem of repetition compulsion and, in close relationship to it, the death-drive (*Todestrieb*). Repetition compulsion is, to define again briefly, "the expression of the power of the repressed (*die Kraftäußerung des Verdrängten*)", "the tendency to bring forth again those lived-experiences of the past (*solche Erlebnisse der Vergangenheit wiederbringt [wiederzubringen]*)" (Freud, 2000, 230, my translation). It consists in the violent intrusion and constant repetition of the past and the repressed in the present, or, put differently, the subject's unconscious and recurrent returning to what was lived through in the past despite its distressing and traumatizing nature. This tendency is, as Freud argues further, to be traced back to the more fundamental drive of human beings, namely, the death-drive. The death-drive captures the conservative nature of humans. It bespeaks our hidden wish of restoring (*wiederherstellen*) the previous state of being and even the original state of lifelessness (*Unbelebtheit*), where conflicts and stimuli are completely absent, and the purest harmony and tranquillity of the psyche is found. The conflicts between different wishes and drives, or those between subjective wishes and the constraints of external reality, are the main sources of disquiet and suffering. The death-drive is therefore nothing but humanity's most fundamental desire for the resolution of inner conflicts and disquiet through "the striving for reduction, constant

preservation, and cancellation of the internal tension of stimuli (*das Streben nach Herabsetzung, Konstanterhaltung, Aufhebung der inneren Reizspannung*)” (Freud, 2000, 264, my translation). This is also identified by Barbara Low (1920, 73) as the *Nirwanaprinzip*, which, through a theoretical detour, eventually arrives at a reconciliation with the pleasure principle, for ultimate harmony in the psyche bespeaks a kind of pleasure. Correspondingly, repetition compulsion, as rooted in the death-drive and as an empirical consequence of it, seeks a sense of inner calm and safety for the subject through the repetition of the apparently “safe and familiar” past and its pre-established patterns. This leads eventually to the “permanent returning of the same (*ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*)”, for the “same” creates the (fake) sense of safety, familiarity and tranquillity.

The awakening and returning of the *derivatives* is, I further suggest, a concrete manifestation of the repetition compulsion. As a pathological deviation from normal typifying apperception, the constitutive horizon of the derivatives unreflectively grasps the past as present and the present as past. As mentioned above, the repressed and the past are - seduced by the repetition compulsion - repeatedly experienced as something in the present. This means that a certain past does not sediment “successfully” as the past. It is neither temporally contracted with the inarticulate distant past nor affectively fused with the zero-region of affectlessness and undifferentiatedness. Rather, as described in our last section about pathological sedimentation, some aspects of the past or repressed contents remain at the “surface” of the unconscious and are still unusually prominent for the present conscious realm. As a result, they are prone to being extraordinarily sensitive to external excitation and to being repeatedly re-awakened and re-experienced as something present and as a peculiar thought- and behavioural pattern of the individual. Psychologists speak of the “traumatic script” that, though the subject is unaware, prescribes patterns the individual is to adopt in their interactions with the world and in their relationship to others – namely, the same pattern constituted in and taken over from the past. The unreflected adoption of the subjective past in the present presupposes - and implies - the neglect of the actuality and particularities inherent in the present reality. It concerns the recreation of the past and the repressed rather than the representation of the present. It does so by virtue of derivatives – the trivial objects or present encounters that are pre-constituted as substitute-representatives of the past and/or of the repressed, such as the ringing bells of the town hall in the example above – thanks to their signifying function and immediate connection with the unconscious contents. Such blindness with respect to the present is clearly captured by Freud, who writes in another text, *Zur Dynamik der Übertragung* (1912), “the sick person ascribes, like in dream, *presentness and reality* to the results of the awakening of his unconscious impulses; he wants to act out his passions, *without* taking the real situation into consideration (der Kranke spricht ähnlich wie im Traume den Ergebnissen der Erweckung seiner unbewussten Regungen *Gegenwärtigkeit und Realität* zu; er will seine Leidenschaften agieren, *ohne* auf die reale Situation Rücksicht zu nehmen)“ (Freud, 1992, 48, my translation and emphasis). A “presentness and reality” is attributed to

the past regardless of the actual, concrete situation currently encountered. This shows itself most commonly as the phenomena of transference (*Übertragung*) and resistance (*Widerstand*) in the therapeutic process in general, in which patients practically transfer what was related to their traumatic past (e.g. verbal or physical assaults by their parents) onto the therapist (e.g. perceiving them to be someone as threatening as one's own parents), while being unconsciously resistant to truly remembering and narrating what was traumatizing in the past. Persons with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) suffer most obviously from such an oblivion of the past and, at the same time, from the "fragmented" traces of such oblivion. For instance, someone who has experienced traumatizing violent situations, is extremely sensitive to cues from his/her surroundings. Even the slightest environmental cues – pre-constituted as the signifying derivatives closely related to and representing the repressed or forgotten contents – are sufficient to bring back *fragments* of the previous traumatizing situations, especially the intense weaves of feelings relating to them. These are constantly and randomly re-experienced by the subject *as if* the old situations had taken place anew in the present. This is explained by the unconscious association of the current environmental cues, viz. the derivatives, with the violent lived-experiences, of which the subject is not fully aware and which it is even incapable of recalling properly. The intensive feelings, "the feeling of being-delivered-over and overwhelmingness is lived through again, '*here and now*', *as if the violence took place anew*" (Brenssell, 2016, 126, my translation and emphasis)<sup>52</sup>. Likewise, the apperception of things through the lens of the derivatives is essentially a violent superimposition of one's subjective wishes, desires, unfavourable past experiences, etc. onto the innocent present. In this sense, the past is not truly sedimented and keeps surfacing *in* and *as* the present. On the other side of the same coin, the present cannot help but be repeatedly experienced as past. Overshadowed by the unconscious past, the subject is deprived of the fundamental openness to new possibilities offered by the present and the future, but it is instead trapped in the thought- and behavioural patterns established previously. In the further course of experience, the individualities, actualities, concrete contextual nuances of the present, and even its temporal distance from the past, etc., completely escape the attention of the subject, such that the present is experienced as nothing "new" but merely as the permanent returning of the same. Among other factors, overgeneralization is one of the main ways in which the particularities of single instances are neglected or excluded. In most pathological cases, overgeneralization is driven by the unconscious tendency to avoid the distressing affect connected to an original, particular instance, whose affective meanings (e.g. the obsessive wish and obsessive fear) are repressed. In analysing the case of obsessional neurosis, Freud (1955, 163) acknowledges this tendency of the patient: "the instance is the original and actual thing which has tried to hide itself behind the generalization". The unconscious reluctance to embrace singularity and concreteness pertains not only to traumatic lived-

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<sup>52</sup> "das Gefühl von Ausgeliefertsein und Überwältigung wird wieder erlebt, '*hier und jetzt*', *als würde die Gewalt erneut stattfinden*."

experiences in the past but also to present instances, for the latter are prone to evoke the former in a way unbearable to the subject. Despite both (normal) typifying apperception of things and (distorted) apperception through derivatives being more or less a kind of “overgeneralization” - understood as the subsumption of present particular instances under the general schema established in and through past experiential objects - they are significantly different from each other in terms of their purpose and nature. Typifying apperception takes into account as comprehensively as possible the various aspects of properties actually belonging to the object in question. As an act of perception of the conscious system, it strives essentially for empirical givenness as intuitive fulfilment of the originally empty horizon of typifying anticipation. It does so by, for instance, conscious kinaesthetic movements of the body, which reveal the different, previously invisible profiles of the object. By contrast, apperception guided by derivatives “singles out” – unintentionally and for the most part unconsciously – highly specific dimensions or properties of the present givenness that represent or signify the repressed or the past. It is not concerned with truly “knowing” the object itself in the present. Rather, it is exclusively interested in seeking repetitive manifestation and confirmation of what is already past, as well as in seeing what “fits” “my” unrealizable dispositions and wishes, as shown in the cases of the alcoholic soldier and the plastic lemon. Apperception through derivatives is, therefore, the kind of schematizing generalization that leaves the current object itself out of sight and quietly seeks to identify it with what lies in the past or with one’s subjective wishes alone. It is driven mainly by the repetition compulsion which is, as Freud (1992, 90, my translation) writes, “the transference of the forgotten past...onto all other regions of the present situation (*die Übertragung der vergessenen Vergangenheit...auf alle anderen Gebiete der gegenwärtigen Situation*)”. Because its present is overgeneralized and experienced merely within the pre-established framework left by the past, the subject is deprived of its very openness towards anything “new” in the present, as is experienced in typifying apperception. It is eventually stranded in a past that does not cease to overshadow and even swallow the open future.

To summarize the indifferent “collapse” of the present into the past (and vice-versa) in derivative apperception driven by repetition compulsion, it is worth taking a look at Fuchs’ explication of the horizontal nature of the unconscious in light of the notions of lived-space and body-memory (See Fuchs, 2012). The unconscious past is horizontal in the sense that it shapes a sensomotoric, emotional and interactive field for the individual subject that delineates its implicit dispositions of perception and behaviour, thus vaguely pre-determining what might attract or repel the subject’s interest and attention. In pathological cases, however, the phenomenon of “fixation” comes into the foreground, in which the negative sedimentation “imprisons the traumatized person in a past which is still present”. The past refuses to be truly sedimented but it rather “spreads out in front of us...remains our true present [and is] ...constantly hidden behind our gaze” (Fuchs, 2012, 78; Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 83). At the somatic level, the past leaves its unerasable traces on the subject’s body-memory. The traumatized person “becomes hypersensitive to threatening, shaming situations

*similar to the trauma in some manner...and tries to circumvent them*” (ibid., my emphasis). This echoes perfectly what we identified above as the unconscious tendency to attend to highly specific dimensions of the present. This hypersensitive associative reawakening of what is threatening can be illustrated by a Jewish person who experienced the second world-war at the age of 13 and was hiding in the woods of the Ukraine. As the Jewish person recounts, everything that was traumatically experienced during the war “has left its mark in the cells of my *body*...has deep roots in the *body*”. The traumata from that time delineated the lived space of this person such that he “did not walk in the middle of the pavement or path, but always close to the wall, always in the shade...” (ibid.; Appelfeld, 2005, 57, 95). More precisely, in phenomenological terms, the life-space of the person is both negatively and positively curved. It is negatively curved for the sake of the unconscious avoidance of certain “repelling zones”, such as the middle of the pavement. It is, however, also positively curved in the sense that precisely those features that resemble past traumatizing situations exercise an extraordinary, unnoticed *attraction* upon the subject - despite its conscious attempts to avoid them. Though well aware of their unpleasant nature, the person, paradoxically, “continues to be drawn into the same, most damaging behaviour or relationship patterns” (Fuchs, 2012, 79). This is rooted precisely in the insurmountable repetition compulsion of human nature, which unstoppably brings what belongs to the past back to the present despite the former’s unquestionable undesirability. The traumata are not truly sedimented, and the present life-space is permeated with resemblances (viz. derivatives) closely related to the traumata, which keep being re-enacted or re-awakened either intracorporeally (as body-memory) or non-corporeally (in perception).

In short, derivatives, as substitute-representatives in the unconscious, are apparently harmless signifiers (ideas) invested with psychic energies and closely associated with the repressed original representatives of these energies. They do not stop wresting access to consciousness and, during the process, they occasionally encounter actual repression. There are two ways or directions in which derivatives manifest in the conscious sphere. The first way is captured by Freud through the phenomena of dreams, neurotic symptoms, phantasies, and so on, where original drives and their repressed representatives indirectly reveal themselves through the signifying derivatives. The second way is what I designate as the modified horizon for apperception in accordance with derivatives, which are hypersensitive to excitations. In this case, the apperceptive horizon is awakened by highly specific aspects of what is presently given, which are already pre-constituted in the subject as derivatives invested with a specific emotive charge and connected with the repressed contents. The horizon in which the apperceptive act takes place is thus no longer the horizon of a “neutral” type, but rather that of a derivative attributed with distinctively subjective meaning. This leads eventually to distorted or deviated perception that is either emotionally unbearable for the subject (as in the case of PTSD) or simply mistaken and unintelligible for others (as in the case of the rope and the snake). In essence, this phenomenon is a kind of violent transference of the past and the repressed onto the

present, an unconscious mental operation that is rooted in the fundamental human nature of repetition compulsion, viz. the tendency to repeat what was lived through in the past despite its unpleasant nature, to adopt the thinking, behavioural, and social patterns left by traumatic experiences and to be repeatedly drawn into them. Seen in light of our notion of sedimentation, this could be explained by the “failure” or pathological modification of sedimentation, which leaves fragments of the past so prominent in the stream of consciousness that they even overshadow the particularities and actuality of the present. Finally, given their constitutive function for perceptual experience, derivatives as such could be understood as the pathological counterpart of types. Differing from typifying apperception, apperception based on derivatives is interested not in the conscious representation of actual objects but rather solely in the symbolic expression of the unconscious.



## Chapter Nine: The Sphere of Affect - Mood and “*Bad Mood*” (*Verstimmung*)

### 9.1 A General Characterization of *Verstimmung* and its Differences from *Stimmung*

This chapter aims to bring to light the notion of *Verstimmung* as the pathological counterpart of *Stimmung*, which was elucidated in chapter 3 of this work as the affective manifestation of sedimentation in typical conscious life. Despite being a usual word used in colloquial German and as technical term employed in a psychiatric context, *Verstimmung* lacks an articulate phenomenological-psychological definition in terms of what precisely constitutes its essence and how it differentiates itself from “normal” *Stimmung*. In view of this gap of understanding, this chapter ventures to offer a phenomenological account of the notion within the context of various psychopathologies. It begins, in the current section, with an overview of the colloquial and technical usage of *Verstimmung* and their philosophical implications. Drawing from existing accounts developed within these contexts, I will summarize the differences between *Verstimmung* and *Stimmung* as they are commonly understood. However, I then argue that these differences are neither sufficient nor necessary criteria for the conceptual differentiation of pathological from normal “mood”. A more precise characterization of the essential features of *Verstimmung*, which truly make up its pathological nature, is required. To tackle this task, in the following sections, the problem of *surrender* (*Hingabe*) as discussed by Husserl will be foregrounded again and specifically examined within the context of phenomenological psychopathology.

#### a) *Verstimmung* as a Daily Notion in Colloquial German and as a Technical Term in Psychiatry

“Die *Verstimmung*” is an ordinary word used in colloquial German, which more often employs its verb form in such expressions as “ich bin verstimmt”. The most common English translation of *Verstimmung* – at least in the philosophical context – is as “a bad mood”<sup>53</sup>. Nonetheless, this English translation fails to capture the philosophical implications and connotations contained in the German prefix “ver-“ even in its daily usage. In order to preserve the philosophical significance associated with this notion, I will leave the term untranslated in the rest of the discourse.

In colloquial German, the prefix “ver-“ contains rich etymological meaning. It might, in some cases, indicate a transformation or change of state of something, such as in the words *verbrennen* (to burn up) and *verschmelzen* (to melt), or else a change in position or a complete removal, such as *verschieben* (to postpone) or *verlassen* (to leave). Specifically, as a change, it might also indicate a

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<sup>53</sup> Jone Stambaugh, Macquarrie & Robinson’s translation in *Sein und Zeit*. Another less common translation is “detuning”, as in correspondence with the musical connotation of *Stimmung* understood as a kind of “attunement” (See Thonhauer, 2021).

change in a determinant direction of intensification, such as *vertiefen* (to deepen) and *vergrößern* (to enlarge). Another wholly different yet core connotation that “ver-“ carries is something that is mistaken, distorted or has gone wrong. Examples of this include *verfehlen* (to fail or to fall short of), *sich verschreiben* (to mistype), *sich verlaufen* (to get lost). Accordingly, *Verstimmung* or *verstimmt sein*, in its everyday usage, is usually understood as a form of *Stimmung* that contains all those connotations. First, *Verstimmung* is considered to be a change or modification of *Stimmung*. The former is based on and refers back to the previous “normal” *Stimmung* of the subject in question, the *Stimmung* that subsequently underwent a transformational process and is subject to certain movements. Bollnow (1988) well captured this ordinary understanding and expressed it in philosophical terms, emphasizing that *Verstimmung* is differentiated from sheer switches between moods (*Stimmungswechsel*). He writes, “...[it lies] in the essence of the bad mood that it necessarily points back to another mood that precedes it, the mood from which it is deviated (...[es liegt] im Wesen der Verstimmung, dass sie notwendig auf eine andere ihr vorausgehende Stimmung verweist, die in ihr verstimmt ist)” (Bollnow, 1988, 62, my translation). A previous *Stimmung* underwent a modification - namely, it is *verstimmt* in the subject, and becomes a *Verstimmung* that necessarily refers back to its (neutral) predecessor. Included in this transformation is, as indicated by the prefix “ver-“ - the intensification of the original *Stimmung* in terms of its level of intensity as well as temporal duration. However, not *all Stimmungen* that are intensified could be characterized as a *Verstimmung*, but rather exclusively those of *negative* nature. For instance, according to the ordinary usage of the notions, it is inappropriate to speak of the transformation and intensification of a joyful mood into an “extreme” and long-lasting joyful *Verstimmung*. Instead, a slightly melancholic mood is indisputably identified as (or transformed into) a *Verstimmung*, which has, “quantitatively” speaking and in most cases, a higher intensity and increased duration than sheer “negative emotions or moods” such as temporary sadness. The most significant implication here is that in colloquial understanding, what most fundamentally differentiates *Verstimmung* from *Stimmung* is nothing but their emotional nature, viz. whereas *Verstimmung* is necessarily negative, *Stimmung* is for the most part either moderately positive, slightly negative, or even simply neutral. A *Verstimmung* is, therefore, nothing other than a *negative Stimmung* (which, by the way, perfectly echoes the English translation of *Verstimmung* as “bad mood”), and *verstimmt sein* is simply being negatively *gestimmt*. Concrete examples of daily *Verstimmung* thus include (moderately) persisting such feelings as irritation, melancholy, desperation, grief, etc. However, later in this section and in the next one, I argue that the ordinary distinction between negativity and neutrality/positivity turns out to be a rather superficial and insufficient criterion for the distinction between *Verstimmung* and *Stimmung*. Before that, a few remarks with respect to the daily usage of the notions should also be added. Firstly, while *Stimmung* can be employed to describe the subjective-affective state of an individual or a group of individuals *as well as* the “objective” atmosphere of an external setting (See Thonhauser, 2019), only an individual subject can be *verstimmt*. In the everyday context, it is linguistically improper to speak of the

*Verstimmung* of a surrounding world in a similar way as its *Stimmung*. Secondly and more importantly, while *Verstimmung* is necessarily negative and bespeaks an emotion, mood or feeling with a higher intensity and duration than usual, it is *in no case* pathological by nature. Despite its negative connotation, *Verstimmung* is nothing but a daily and “healthy” bad mood, the kind that is experienced by every human being and is simply triggered by trivial incidents, rather than being the product of a complex of sedimented (traumatizing) lived-experiences that are affectively overwhelming. The daily usage of *Verstimmung* is never identified with moods that characterize such affective disorders as depression and manic. The pathological moods that belong to the latter cases are usually conceived of as being more demanding and existentially unbearable for the person concerned.

In contrast to the colloquial usage of the notion, especially the second remark above, *Verstimmung* is employed within the context of psychiatry and psychopathology precisely as a technical term that designates different kinds of *pathological* moods in various affective disorders. A general, clinical definition of *Verstimmung* within these contexts is the transformation of a certain *Stimmung* until it reaches the pathological region in which terms such as “depressive *Verstimmung*” are employed to describe a persistent depressive mood in dysthymia (See World Health Organization ICD-10, 2019, 957). Other *Verstimmungen* that are pathological include, for example, the manic mood in manic disorder, the *Wahnstimmung* (delusional mood) that leads to *Wahrnehmung* (delusional perception) in schizophrenia, and so on. Remarkably, *Wahnstimmung* as a kind of *Verstimmung* is not an ordinary word in colloquial German but instead has been devised as a technical term within a psychiatric and psychopathological context. Within this context, Fuchs suggests a circumplex model of four categories of *Stimmungen*, organized according to their phenomenological character, and explains their pathological modification into *Verstimmungen*. According to him (Fuchs, 2012, 12-13), two of the four categories include choleric tensions (*cholerische Anspannung*) and melancholic heaviness (*melancholische Schwere*). Choleric tensions include *Stimmungen* such as desperation, timidity, petulance and displeasure (*Mismut*); melancholic heaviness includes sadness, woefulness (*Wehmut*), dejection (*Niedergeschlagenheit*), boredom, etc. Despite their negativity, these remain healthy and typical *Stimmungen* and should not be regarded as pathological until they are transformed and intensified into the *Verstimmungen* that underlie different pathologies. For instance, an exalted *Stimmung* such as exhilaration (*Heiterkeit*) is healthy until it reaches its peak and becomes a manic *Verstimmung*; a weighty and suppressing mood such as sadness or dejection becomes the pathologically depressive *Verstimmung* when it reaches its extreme form (ibid.). In a word, *Verstimmung* as a technical term bespeaks the unreasonable intensification of daily *Stimmungen* to the extent that the latter persistently pervade, overwhelm or even swallow the individual - eventually resulting in the affective disorders spoken of in psychiatric settings. Rather than a merely quantitative change in terms of the intensity and duration of daily moods and emotions, *Verstimmung* here indicates a *qualitative* change in the sense that it is no longer “normal” but rather pathological. Also,

in contrast to the colloquial understanding (and Bollnow's philosophical description of it), a pathological *Verstimmung* does not necessarily presuppose a previously neutral or positive *Stimmung*, nor is there necessarily something like the latter is to be referred back to (*verweisen auf*) for the current existence of the *Verstimmungen*. Upon closer inspection, the psychiatric and psychopathological account even implies that *Verstimmungen* are *not necessarily* negative or “bad” moods in essence. Rather, they can be “positive” in some sense or are at least quantitatively derived from a presumably “positive” *Stimmung* such as exhilaration. Understood normally as “positive” by nature, exhilaration could also be pathological if it is overreaching (*übersteigernd*) to the extent that it becomes a hyper, over-excited mood in a manic state.

To sum up, whereas colloquial German employs the word *Verstimmung* to refer to typical, daily *Stimmungen* that are negative, relatively persisting and intensified, psychiatry and psychopathology attribute a technical meaning to the notion so that it exclusively depicts the pathological moods underlying different mental disorders. From a phenomenological-psychopathological perspective, I agree with the implicit insight by the latter that *Verstimmung* is not necessarily negative, viz. “negativity” alone does not suffice to differentiate between *Verstimmung* and *Stimmung*. Nonetheless, a more concise differentiation – from the perspective of subjective lived-experience – is still missing, and *what* exactly constitutes the pathological nature of *Verstimmung* remains a phenomenological problem to be solved. In what follows, I will extract from both accounts above the common criteria differentiating the two interrelated notions and demonstrate their inadequacy.

## b) The Common Differentiating Criteria of *Stimmung* and *Verstimmung*

Three common criteria or principles differentiating *Stimmung* from *Verstimmung* could be drawn out based on the ordinary and technical understanding of the notions elaborated above. The first one concerns their temporal durability and spatial or horizontal extensibility. It is almost common sensical in the psychiatric context to say that whereas a (negative) *Stimmung* is only temporary, lasting for hours or at most a few days, a pathological *Verstimmung* such as a depressive *Verstimmung* is far more persistent. Durability is, in a clinical setting, one of the most important criteria for the diagnosis of depression as distinguished, for example, from “normal”, episodic sadness. This is again captured by Bollnow (1988, 62) when he compares between “uncomfortable (*unangenehm*) *Stimmung*” and *Verstimmung*: “the *Verstimmung* is namely that which is in many cases overlooked and is something different from simply an uncomfortable mood, which is resolved again through the time (*zwar ist die Verstimmung, was vielfach übersehen wird, etwas anderes als einfach eine unangenehme Stimmung, die sich mit der Zeit wieder behebt*)”. A daily emotion or mood is usually provoked by a clearly identifiable incident; for example, an episode of anger or sadness is always “about” someone's deeds or words. By contrast, *Verstimmung* does not always have an easily recognizable, single origin in a

specific daily incident (but rather a bundle of intricate sedimented lived-experiences), and it is not resolved or dissolved simply as time passes and as the incident fades away from thematic consciousness. Furthermore, as far as horizontal extensibility is concerned, (even negative) *Stimmungen* are much less pervasive and prevailing than pathological *Verstimmungen*. The former, despite also haunting the subject's consciousness in the present, do at least allow for it the cognitive grasp of emotions and affective attributes of the opposite nature, and even an occasional living-through of them. A *Verstimmung*, however, as pathological, is way more violent in that it reigns over almost the whole subjective consciousness and blocks it from even momentary or scattered apprehensions of feelings that do not resonate with itself. For instance, patients suffering from major depression can barely feel any positive emotions or genuine joyfulness in things, not even momentarily, and this can even endure for the rest of one's life. Searching for a way to phenomenologically distinguish typical grief and major depression, Ratcliffe (2021, 539) also acknowledges this difference, asserting that: "positive emotions still arise during grief, while depression is more pervasive and persistent". In other words, the horizontal pervasiveness of the two with respect to the subject's capability to affectively experience "something else" serves as one of the differentiating principles of normal and pathological moods. To my mind, both temporal durability and spatial extensibility are, unquestionably, significant criteria for making this distinction. Nonetheless, they are way too vague for drawing the line in terms of a *quantitative* measurement alone. These criteria fail to provide a solid phenomenological and scientific basis to decide to what extent of the quantitative change results in qualitative change, transforming the "normal" into pathological. For instance, this approach faces, from a phenomenological (instead of a clinical, DMS-) perspective, the difficulty of determining whether an episode of sadness is "persistent enough" to cross the threshold and be diagnosed as a pathological depressive *Verstimmung*. Another criterion for the differentiation, which was mentioned a few times, concerns the emotional nature of neutrality/positivity and negativity. This distinction is implied most obviously in colloquial German, which takes the prefix "ver-" to indicate something that "went wrong" or "is distorted". It thus employs the word *Verstimmung* to refer to temperaments that are necessarily negative yet indubitably normal, and that are nothing but the typical counterpart of *Stimmungen* (or: simply another expression for "schlechte Stimmungen", viz. bad moods). In my view, the negative connotation of *Verstimmung* is, most of the time, an undeniable feature. It reminds us of, for instance, Ratcliffe's description of the core pathological existential feeling as that which is stripped of the warming familiarity belonging to the world of practical significance, viz. as a pervasive affective background of strangeness and defamiliarization in one's encounter with the world (See Ratcliffe, 2013). Pathological is, in general, always negative. *Nonetheless*, upon closer, phenomenological inspection, negativity alone does not constitute the essence of *Verstimmung*. As argued above, though it sounds kind of paradoxical, *Verstimmung* must be *not* necessarily or simply by nature negative. In many cases, it can simply be a derivation of an original "positive" *Stimmung* and an extreme intensification of the latter. An exalted

mood is in general and by nature positive, yet it can also be transformed into a pathological *Verstimmung* (a manic state) without having undergone any qualitative change in terms of its “positive” nature. An overreaching state of exhilaration, as positive as it may sound, can also be a violent manic *Verstimmung* that requires psychiatric treatment.

The third differentiating criterion is formulated philosophically by Heidegger, despite also being implicitly presupposed in our general understanding of the two notions. Seen from the ontological-existential angle, Heidegger distinguishes between *Stimmung* and *Verstimmung* in terms of their “function” of opening-up (*erschließen*) and closing-off (*verschießen*) the world for an individual Dasein. In general, Dasein always already finds itself in this or that mood (“*Dasein ist je schon immer gestimmt*”) (Heidegger, 2006, 134). As one of the a priori ontological structures of Dasein, the *Stimmung* or *Gestimmtsein* reveals to Dasein – in a way that is ontologically prior to all practical dealing with concrete objects and any intentional apperception of them – its *Da* or “wie einem ist”, viz. how and *that* Dasein is, beyond its own freedom, thrown into *this* situation with its existential facticity. By virtue of its own mood, Dasein unveils to itself the factual situation as it *is*, which includes its insurmountable limitations (or “thrownness/*Geworfenheit*”), the existential possibilities within these limitations, as well as its own irreversible past. All of this constitutes the *Da* of Dasein. Under this conceptualization of *Stimmung*, Heidegger identifies *Verstimmung* as one of the main, ontologically distinct forms of *Stimmung*. Explicitly contrasting the two notions, he writes, “the ‘bare mood’ discloses [*erschließt*] the ‘there’ more primordially, but correspondingly it *closes it off* [*verschießt*] more stubbornly than any *not-perceiving*. This is shown by *bad moods* [die *Verstimmung*]” (Heidegger, 2008, 175)<sup>54</sup>. Grounded in the difference between *erschließen* and *verschießen* is the difference between *Stimmung* and *Verstimmung*. The former bears the ontological function of disclosing the Being-in-the-world of Dasein (its *Da*) in its entirety, revealing not only its thrownness but also entities (*Seiende*) as well as possibilities of Being (*Seinkönnen*) that “matter to (*angegangen werden kann*)” and are practically accessible for Dasein. The *Stimmung* as such thus enables Dasein, in the very first place and in advance of all ontical decisions and deeds, to have a pre-reflective glance at the various possibilities of Being towards which it might direct itself. „*Die Stimmung*”, Heidegger (2008, 176; 2006, 137) writes, “has already disclosed, in any case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct one-self towards something (*hat je schon das In-der-Welt-sein als Ganzes erschlossen und macht ein Sichrichten auf... allererst möglich*)”. *Verstimmung*, by contrast, is prone to ontologically closing off certain possibilities of Being, including those which *are there (da)* and inherent in the authentic Being of Dasein itself. It renders Dasein partially “blind” with regard to its own Being and even led astray by its own concerned circumspection: “...This is shown by *bad moods*. In these, Dasein becomes blind to itself,

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<sup>54</sup> “die ‘bloße Stimmung’ erschließt das Da ursprünglicher, sie *verschießt* es aber auch entsprechend hartnäckiger als jedes *Nicht-wahrnehmen*. Das zeigt die *Verstimmung*.” (Heidegger, 2006, 136)

the environment with which it is concerned veils itself, the circumspection of concerns gets led astray (...*Das zeigt die Verstimmung. In ihr wird das Dasein ihm selbst gegenüber blind, die besorgte Umwelt verschleiert sich, die Umsicht des Besorgens wird missleitet*)“ (Heidegger, 2008, 175; 2006, 136). *Verstimmung* is responsible for Dasein’s existential blindness and, above all, for the prior concealment of certain ways of Being, such that its existence appears to be severely restricted and stripped of a better way-out. Its concrete *Da* is revealed by *Verstimmung* as nothing but a desperate situation in which it is stranded. Surprisingly, Heidegger’s ontological description of *Verstimmung* as such comes incredibly close to some empirical-psychological accounts of the notion understood technically as pathological *Verstimmung*. Depressive *Verstimmung*, for instance, does not only overflow the *affective* dimension of consciousness. Rather, it also hinders the subject from projecting and accessing its own possibilities of change, of “being-differently (*Anders-sein*)” than it currently is and was in the past, viz. of alternative ways of Being that might rescue her from the present predicament that appears as nothing but hopeless. Among other features, depression is characterized (both psychologically and phenomenologically) by a profound loss of access to “kinds” of possibilities that require an opposite attitude of “hope”. The only things left for the depressed subject are nothing other than those possibilities that are homogeneously prescribed by a depressive *Verstimmung* and coincide with it (See Ratcliffe, 2021, 540-44). This loss or closing-off of existential possibilities related to *Verstimmung* is also echoed and well demonstrated by Blankenburg’s contrast between anxious mood (*Verstimmung*) and hopeful mood. Both moods are directed specifically towards the future: whereas anxiety (*Angst*) bespeaks the uncertainty and unknown threats, risks, and failures possible in the future, hope is always hope for the brightening possibilities of upcoming success, positive changes, and achievements. Nonetheless, more essential than the distinction between negativity and positivity is their respective closing-off and opening-up function in relation to the future. In an expectation (*Erwartung*) driven by anxiety and fear, the future literally closes itself off (*sich-verschließen*) for the subject - in the sense that *only* desperate situations are projected and imaginatively visible for it as future possibilities of existence. The future is unveiled in an extraordinarily restricted manner, where possibilities incongruent with the anxious *Verstimmung* are thoroughly concealed. By contrast, with the hopeful attitude of a hopeful *Stimmung*, a much wider range of kinds of possibilities is ontologically accessible to the subject. The future opens up itself (*sich-erschließen*) as a relatively free realm of various possible existence that is (to a certain extent) liberated from the subject’s past in which people with depression are trapped. (Blankenburg, 1993, 322). Heidegger’s existential-ontological account of *Stimmung* and *Verstimmung*, and Blankenburg’s phenomenological-psychiatric differentiation between them in terms of their respective opening-up and closing-off function for world and existence, stunningly coincide with each other<sup>55</sup>. Together they

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<sup>55</sup> By “closing-off (the world)” I in no way mean to suggest that the *verstimmt* subjects are worldless or that the world is completely closed off for them. Instead, it simply means that those subjects *are* in a different kind of world in which only *particular* kinds of possibilities *can be* revealed to them, namely, those possibilities that are

offer a phenomenologically convincing and empirically inspiring understanding of the notions, especially for psychopathologies such as depression. Without refuting the validity and significance of their accounts, I would like to remark that, in some cases, the closing-off of possibilities alone does not serve as a sufficient or/and necessary condition for identifying a *Stimmung* as (pathological) *Verstimmung*. What is meant by this is that there are ordinary and moderately positive *Stimmungen* that might likewise be existentially misleading and concealing, but they are not and should not be recognized as *Verstimmungen* simply out of their blinding or closing-off features with respect to one's existential situation. A "blindly" hopeful and optimistic *Stimmung*, for instance, exclusively reveals to the subject positive outcomes or desired results in the future, disclosing these under a unilaterally bright and beautiful light. Upon reflection, such blindly optimistic *Stimmungen* barely differ from the depressive *Verstimmungen* in terms of their shared distorting function. The former projects a one-sided – exclusively positive - anticipation of the future by veiling the possible risks or negative outcomes that might actually take place, leading to an incomprehensive understanding and unrealistic projection of the future. It is therefore unquestionably also a *Stimmung* of blindness, one that veils a certain dimension of the *Da*, namely, the unpleasant possibilities or negative occurrences one might practically encounter. Nonetheless, such veiling of the situation and the existential possibilities does not, on its own, suffice to characterize the naïve optimistic attitude as a kind of *Verstimmung*. Instead, it is indubitably normal and even a common experience for most of us.

It turns out that the common criteria for differentiating *Verstimmungen* from *Stimmungen*, despite touching upon certain important aspects of the former, do not manage to capture the most essential characteristic of it. In the rest of this section and in the next, I argue that as the pathological counterpart of *Stimmung*, *Verstimmung* is not defined first and foremost by *what* emotive nature it has (whether it is negative, positive, or neutral), *which kinds of* possibilities of Being it reveals, or even *how long* it abides. Rather, the most decisive question is *how* the subject itself is related to its own *Stimmung*. Such relatedness or internal attitude determines the intensity and pervasiveness of the *Stimmung*, and thus the point at which a typical *Stimmung* reaches the threshold and is transformed into something pathological. At this point, the significance of *how* the subject relates to its own *Stimmung* can be demonstrated by a discussion of an intricate, phenomenologically unsolved question concerning the difference between the fundamental "colouring function" of *Stimmungen* in general (as explicated in chapter 3), and the schizophrenic pathological *Wahnstimmung* (delusional mood) - a prominent example of *Verstimmung*. Both contribute to a change in the affective appearance of objects and their overall surroundings without simultaneously altering their objective being (*Sein*). As elaborated in chapter 3, a joyful mood lets everything shine under a joyful light, just as a melancholic

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in line with their *Verstimmung* (depressed subjects can only project depressive future possibilities). It is not a matter of cognitive deficiency but rather an affective engulfment: even if the subjects were offered new perspectives for thinking about the future, they remain in the concealment (being closed-off from) of those alternative possibilities.



mood sheds a melancholic light on the surroundings. As far as *Wahnstimmung* is concerned, Jaspers (1973, 82), for instance, speaks of a change in the *Bedeutsamkeit* rather than that in the *Bedeutung* of entities for a schizophrenic individual in a delusional mood. While everything has a deviated affective *Bedeutsamkeit* and the subject is surrounded by an altered overarching meaning structure of the world as its functional context (Henriksen & Parnas, 2021, 745), the sensuous sides of perceptions remain unchanged - even by the pathological, delusional mood of schizophrenia. A difficulty thus arises as “normal” *Stimmungen* also contribute to an atmospheric change of the living context without imposing any alteration upon the objective (sensuous) contents of single entities. That being said, we may then ask: what, then, exactly makes up the pathological nature of the schizophrenic *Wahnstimmung*? The *Verstimmung* in schizophrenia and depression serves as a paradigmatic example shedding light on our leading question of what indeed constitutes the essence of *Verstimmung* from a phenomenological perspective. The answer goes beyond quantitatively measurable durability and intensity, the simple distinction between negativity and positivity, the ontological closing-off of the world and world-possibilities, as well as the typical gestaltic change of the world and its affective colouration. I propose, in the upcoming section, that the notion of *Hingabe* (surrender) serves as the key to answering the question. The problem of surrender indicates most primarily the problem of the subject’s relationship to its own mood, viz. the problem of *how* the subject internally relates itself to its own affective state.

## 9.2 The Problem of Surrender, Affective Position-taking, and the Splitting of Ego

This section aims to show that the most essential characteristic of *Verstimmung* - understood technically as a pathological correlate of *Stimmung* - consists in the subject’s loss of the capability to establish a moderate distance from its own affective state; that is, in its incapability of creating a leeway (*Spielraum*) between the present temporarily *gestimmtes Ich* and the relatively stable and overarching sense of *Ich*. This results empirically in the subject’s immediate immersion in, or unreserved submission to, its present fleeting moods or emotive states in general. Expressed in phenomenological terms, the pathologically *verstimmt* subject is the one who is deprived of the practical capability of splitting the ego (*Ichspaltung*) into the empirically affected ego and the transcendental ego; consequently this subject is denied the possibility of creating a distance from and taking a free affective stance (*Gemütsstellungnahme*) with respect to its episodic moods or emotions in the present. The deprivation of those capabilities entails the involuntary surrender (*Hingabe*) to one’s own moods, which means empirically a pathological imprisonment in them. These, I contend, are what make up the essence as well as the pathological nature of *Verstimmung*.

An initial remark on the meaning of “distance-taking” should first be made. The creation of distance between oneself and one’s affective state, as a presupposition of free affective position-taking, bespeaks not (merely) a theoretical or pre-theoretical (pre-reflective) *awareness* of the current

pervasive mood or simply the *cognition* of its unhealthy nature. It is well acknowledged, in some cases, that even people suffering from major depression can and do have an awareness of their extraordinarily intrusive depressive mood and its abnormal nature. Nonetheless, such a (pre-)theoretical awareness and cognition of one's own pathological state, on its own, neither practically alleviates the depressive *Verstimmung* nor contributes to the patient's battle with the illness. It is perfectly possible that despite patients being pre-reflectively aware of the irrationality and the unjustified dominance of their *Verstimmung* or being able to grasp it reflectively, they are still hopelessly swallowed by it without a single moment of being able to truly escape from it. As Husserl acknowledges, a subject pervaded by a depressed mood may theoretically apprehend the positive sides of things around it and recognize the bright sides of the world. However, it is simply unable to genuinely live through such beauty and brightness: "...I am not quite unable to see the beauty and to rejoice, *but I cannot surrender myself to the joyfulness*. It remains a less vivid joyfulness... (Ich bin nicht ganz unfähig, das Schöne zu sehen und mich zu freuen, *aber ich kann mich nicht der Freude hingeben*. Es bleibt eine wenig lebhaftere Freude...)" (Husserl, 2020, 104, my translation and emphasis).

This leads us back to the phenomenological distinction already addressed in the foregoing chapters, namely, the distinction between *Wertapperzeption* (the theoretical apperception of the affective and axiological predicates of objects and the pre-reflective awareness of one's own current affective state) and *Gemütsstellungnahme* (the practical capability to take a stance with respect to the apperceived properties and one's acute emotional reactions, to actively decide the extent to which one surrenders oneself to them and to be vividly affected by them). The former is a theoretical, observational assertion: "the contemplating, perceiving, observing, theoretical asserting (*das Betrachten, Wahrnehmen, Beobachten, theoretische Feststellen*)". The latter is, on the other hand, a practical decision of whether to remain in the detached theoretical attitude or rather to let oneself be immersed in, enjoy and "live in" them genuinely, viz. "the enjoying, the living-in-affect, the living-in-silent-feeling (*das Genießen, das Im-Affekt-Leben, das Im-ruhigen-Gefühl-Leben*)" (Husserl, 2020, 129, my translation). This is precisely the choice between *Hingabe* and *Nicht-Hingabe*, including the various degrees in-between. For so-called "normal" individuals, the above distinction is a phenomenological difference of which the subject is aware from a first-person perspective. The subject itself is practically aware of the difference between, on the one hand, the apprehending act that constitutes something *as* desirable, *as* it should-be, *as* regrettable, etc. - which makes up the affective properties that "stand there (*dasteht*)" -, and, on the other hand, the degree of surrender and that of the subjective liveliness of those properties ("*die Hingabe, die mehr oder minder lebendige Freude, Trauer, Wunsch, etc.*") (Husserl, 2020, 109). The embodied internalization of this distinction – instead of a mere theoretical cognition of it – is for the most part inherent to neurotypical individuals. Empirically, it enables the immediate activation of the regulatory mechanism in the face of the

ephemeral emotions or intrusive moods in the present by creating a distance, or a “free space”, between the stable, overarching sense of “I” and the “I” who is experiencing the fleeting emotive weaves. Such a free space is a buffer zone that prevents the subject from being immediately and thoroughly swallowed up by its own spontaneous affects. It serves as the space for the I to reflect upon and evaluate its very own emotional drives or reactions, and subsequently for its voluntary, affective position-taking (*Gemütsstellungnahme*) with regard to them, such that a blind and unfree surrendering is to a large extent prevented. As Husserl (2020, 116, my translation) describes, for instance, “...an anger strikes me, something stands there as irritating...but I do not surrender to it (*...ein Ärger berührt mich, etwas steht als ärgerlich da...aber ich gebe mich ihm nicht hin*)”. Despite the fact that “I” “see” and even feel the anger, “I” and my deed are not completely determined by it; no impulsive and aggressive actions are carried out simply out of the episodic outburst of anger. This is equally applicable for presumably “positive” emotions and moods, which are also potentially pathological if they are not properly regulated as in the case of the overreaching exhilaration of a manic state. “I can”, for instance, “apprehend a picture as enchanting without now living through the enchantment (*Ich kann ein Bild als entzückend auffassen, ohne ich jetzt aktuell Entzücken erlebe*)” (Husserl, 2020, 125, my translation). In typical healthy cases, a feeling, whether negative or positive, can touch upon the subject and flow through the stream of consciousness without fully ensnaring and imprisoning it: “A feeling can move us without capturing us (*Ein Gefühl kann uns berühren, ohne uns einzunehmen*)” (Husserl, 2004, 165, my translation). As argued in chapter 3.3, although Husserl speaks predominantly of acute emotional episodes or feelings, everything described here entails the distinction between first- and second-order mood. In a word, the practical realization of the phenomenological distinction creates, for the subject, a safety distance between the present, empirical, affectively conditioned self *and* the stable, transcendental, observant self.

This affective stance-taking means not only the creation of distance and a buffer zone in the subject between the “two” egos; it also includes an axiological reflection and evaluation initiated by the overarching observant self in the face of the empirically affected self. These are described by Fuchs (2021, 335-58) as two of the three main structural moments of the will in terms of its regulatory function - namely, conation, inhibition, and volition. The aroused or triggered *conation* is subject to *inhibition* from its immediate realization in practical deeds and subsequently to reflective deliberation and evaluation by *volition*. For the third moment to be possible, a specific mode of intentionality of consciousness regarding the current mood or emotion should be adopted. It is inadequate for the intentional consciousness to be merely “aware of (*bemerken*)” the current affect and the so conditioned self; rather, it is required to “objectify (*objektivieren*)” them as a thematic object for conscious reflection. Empirically, the latter requires an additional reflective effort of the subject and does not always accompany pre-reflective awareness: “then I can be angry that I am in a bad mood, and I can be aware of the anger. [However], do I then have to objectify the anger itself again as ,I am

angry’? (*Dann kann ich mich ärgern, dass ich verstimmt bin und kann den Ärger bemerken. Muss ich dann den Ärger selbst wieder als ‚ich ärgere mich‘ objektivieren?*)“ (Husserl, 2020, 147, my translation). Husserl’s rhetorical question here highlights the indispensable distinction between the sheer *bemerken* and the reflective act of *objektivieren*. Only by virtue of the latter can the essential splitting of the ego fully take place, viz. the splitting of “the experiencing ego (*das erlebende ich*)” from “the contemplating/observing I (*das betrachtende ich*)”, This process was already implied – yet not thematically unfolded within regard to consciousness - in the structural moment of inhibition and the creation of distance described above. Indeed, the idea of the splitting of the ego is what Husserl takes over from Geiger, who writes, explicitly, “here the ego split itself for my lived-experiencing. One ego is living through, the other [ego] is contemplating (*hier teilt sich das ich für mein Erleben. Das eine Ich erlebt, das andere [ich] beobachtet*)” (ibid.). “Das ich teilt sich selbst“ is nothing but another expression of *Ichspaltung* of which Husserl later speaks. Geiger’s idea here is further developed by Husserl under the notion of *Stimmung*, where he distinguishes the ego who finds itself (*befindlich*) in various *Stimmungen* from the ego “behind” (*das ich “dahinter”*), which observes and is “curious” in the background consciousness. While the former, the experiencing and affectively conditioned ego, does always have a pre-theoretical awareness (*bemerken*) of its own affects, the thematic separation of it from the ego “behind” is not possible until the act of objectification is implemented as well as the relatively stable and coherent self is successfully established (both are missing in pathologies such as borderline personality disorder, as will be discussed in the last chapter). I argue that the practical capability of *Ichspaltung*, which Husserl originally identifies as the necessary transcendental structure of certain modes of intentionality, is the key to distinguishing *Stimmung* from *Verstimmung*. It is the condition of possibility for creating the buffer zone for free *Gemütsstellungnahme*, for the voluntary decision of surrender/not-surrender, and eventually for emotional regulation and prevention from impulsive behaviours. The failure of it constitutes the essence of pathological *Verstimmung*.

It is worth remarking that according to Husserl’s original account, *Ichspaltung* makes up the necessary structure of presentifying (*vergegenwärtigend*) consciousness, in opposition to presentational (*gegenwärtigend*) consciousness. The latter refers to perception, which takes place in and only in the present (*Gegenwart*) where things are (or could be) given intuitively. The former includes such modes of intentionality as phantasy, memory-recollection, and anticipation, whose intentional objects are not given intuitively in the present as in perception. They could therefore only be given as quasi-perceptual objects by means of a presentification (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of what is not given with a certain degree of intuitiveness in the present. Inherent to presentifying consciousness is, therefore, a dual stratification (*Zweischlichkeit*) (Husserl, 1966, 596) of the current flow of impressions in living experience, viz. the present living experience of remembering, anticipating, imagining, on the one hand; and the flow of the presentified non-present experience, viz. the

remembered, anticipated, and imagined intentional contents, on the other (See Biceaga, 2010, 50-1). The nesting of the flow of presentations and that of presentifications implies the splitting of ego into the actual ego in the present field and the non-actual, presentified ego in the non-present field. In remembering (*Wiedererinnerung*), for instance, there is a splitting between the remembering ego who is now experiencing the flow of impressional living experiences (including the surrounding world here and now and its intentional contents, viz. the past experiences as they are remembered now) and the remembered ego presentified in the non-present experience residing in the past, viz. the ego who was the experiencing subject of the past events in question (See Geniusas, 2020). Likewise, the intentional act of anticipation structurally implies the anticipating ego *here and now* and the anticipated ego in the presentified future *then*; and in imagination, there is always the imagining ego in the actual world of presence and the imagined ego in the imaginary world with an imagined time and space. Within Husserl's framework, the splitting of ego, viz. the "double self-awareness of self-awareness-in-the-now and self-awareness-in-the-then" (Geniusas, 2020, 5), is a *transcendental* structure of presentifying consciousness, a sheerly descriptive a priori fact of our phenomenological experience. This notion contains, as I attempt to exhibit, a fruitful *empirical* significance when situated in the context of phenomenological psychology and psychopathology. Here, the splitting of ego is no longer a transcendental structure necessarily implied in relevant intentional acts. Rather, it bespeaks a practical capability (*Vermögen*) that is missing in certain individuals suffering from mental disorders. As elucidated above, this is the capability to establish a reflective distance *internally* between the ego experiencing the fleeting emotions *here and now* and the ego "behind", viz. the overarching sense of self-identity consisting of one's fundamental value-system, lasting dispositions, convictions, persisting life-goals, and so on. By taking the latter as a "foothold", typical individuals are usually able to objectify their empirical self as an object of scrutiny and prevent themselves from reckless deeds driven directly by their spontaneous conations. Thus, the splitting of ego, practically initiates a "moratorium that opens up the room of freedom (*Moratorium, das den Raum der Freiheit eröffnet*)" (See Fuchs, 2020, my translation). Thanks to this buffer zone, the subject is granted the free space to voluntarily take an affective stance with respect to its current moods or emotions. In this sense, the splitting of ego is the empirical condition for what empirical psychology refers to as emotional regulation. Accordingly, the loss of such a capability cannot help but lead to immediate and unreflected submission to one's impulsive emotional arousal, to an unfree affective surrendering that psychopathology describes as stimulus entrapment. What constitutes the essence of *Verstimmung* – returning to the leading question of this chapter – is precisely a deprivation of the ability to practically split one's ego internally and subsequently to create a free space and reflective distance "within" oneself. Pathological *Verstimmung* differs from typical *Stimmung* in that the former violently engulfs the entire subject to such an extent that the *verstimmtes* subject is helplessly surrendered to the mood in which it finds itself, regardless of the emotive nature of the mood (whether it be positive or negative).

As far as psychopathologies are concerned, not only classical *affective* disorders such as depression or manic depression are characterized by the dominance of *Verstimmung* (which is indisputably the axis of the disorders). The failure of the splitting of the ego and the resulting involuntary, thorough surrender to the immediate givenness of the (affective) impressional present do also feature in pathologies of other kinds, such as schizophrenia. Patients suffering from schizophrenia are, as mentioned above, pervaded by *Wahnstimmung*, one of the main forms of *Verstimmung*. Blankenburg (2012) carries out a phenomenological study of schizophrenic lived-experiences, and his descriptions coincide perfectly with my definition of *Verstimmung* elucidated so far. First, he identifies schizophrenic alienation in different aspects of subjective lived-experiences: relationship to the world (*Weltverhältnis*), temporalization (*Zeitigung*), constitution of the ego (*Ichkonstitution*), and intersubjective constitution. Most crucial to our current discussion are the aspects concerning the constitution of the ego and its relationship to the world. The problem of the constitution of the ego is the problem of the constitution of *Selbststand* or *Selbstständigkeit*. This bespeaks the “foothold” constituted by and for oneself, which encompasses not only one’s lasting dispositions and life-goals (mentioned above), but also the self-affirmation and self-value one determinedly attributes to oneself, the resolute “yes-saying” to what one chooses and values. By virtue of such a foothold or *Selbststand*, even in face of an ever-changing reality and the chaotic manifoldness of the present, one is still able to remain on a self-affirming ground on which one firmly “stands” and carries out reflection, evaluation, reasonable decisions and actions. The *Selbststand* is a *self-grounding ground* (*Grund*) that provides the subject itself with justification and reasons (*Gründe*) for its own actions and decisions. Based on a relatively stable value-system and system of convictions to which one entrusts oneself, this ground plays the role of an inner judge that affirms or denies the appropriateness of different existential possibilities of itself. The *Selbststand*, so understood, renders possible for the subject to be the very ground of its own, as Blankenburg (2012, 121, my translation) writes: “to draw a reason of motivation out of its very self (*den Grund einer Motivation aus sich selbst zu schöpfen*)”. Alternatively, it could also be conceived of as “the ego behind (*dahinter*)” (mentioned above), as Blankenburg describes the *Selbststand* as the “Hinterhalt” - literally meaning the hold or stand (*Halt*) that is behind (*hinter*) one’s momentary desires, emotional outbursts, impulsive thoughts, and so on. It is, therefore, not to be identified with the empirical or natural self. Instead, it is the self as the transcendental ground of trust and confidence (“*das Selbst als transzendenter Vertrauensgrund*”) (Blankenburg, 2012, 126), where “transcendental” specifically means the condition for the possibility of autonomous decision-making, of *Selbstbestimmung*, and of “saying-yes” to one’s own existential choices. In pathological cases such as schizophrenia, Blankenburg continues, such self-affirming *Selbststand* is disturbed or even lost, such that one is completely stripped of the trust (*Vertrauen*) towards oneself and one’s own perceptions and decisions. As compensation for this loss, the patient cannot help but be forced to seek someone else as the foothold of his/her being - for instance their mother. As one of Blankenburg’s patients reports, “The

trust [or confidence] cannot come from myself. I still need a foothold, a person to trust... From myself alone I cannot do that [embracing the self-evident] (*Das Vertrauen kann nicht von allein kommen. Ich brauche noch einen Halt, einen Menschen, an den man glaubt... Von mir aus kann ich das [das Annehmen der Selbstverständlichkeit] nicht*)“ (Blankenburg, 2012, 120, my translation). Instead of seeking *internal* validation and affirmation for their own perceptions and decisions, the patient relies unconditionally on the words or even commands of another person, without any possibility of establishing a reflective distance from them. More fundamentally, this does not merely affect a singular decision the subject makes. Rather, it describes its overall existential situation where - as a result of the loss of self-affirming ground that is typically taken for granted - the subject is completely “blended with” the surrounding things and people, is hypersensitive and thus is extremely susceptible to the most trivial encounters. The absence of distance and boundary between oneself and the world leads to the fundamental moments of *Ausgesetztsein* and *schizophrene Wehrlosigkeit* (*schizophrenic defencelessness*) (Blankenburg, 2012, 111). That is, the subject is completely exposed to the world and defenceless against what is given there, such that everything appears to be unbearably overwhelming and violently intrusive. It experiences everything as being forcibly imposed on its mind. In the sphere of affect, this manifests as the paranoid *Wahnstimmung* of which we have spoken. Finding itself in the *Wahnstimmung*, the subject perceives everything as strange and threatening. It constantly suspects that there is a concealed, devilish intention “behind” even the most ordinary trivialities, an intention against which the subject is way too powerless to defend itself. As Fuchs (2021, 159) describes, “the originally unobtrusive mood has changed itself strangely; it receives an uncertain, mysterious meaningfulness, a threatening physiognomy (*Die an sich unauffällige Situation hat sich befremdlich verändert, sie erhält unbestimmte, mysteriöse Bedeutsamkeit, eine bedrohliche Physiognomie*)”. Such extreme mental tension and extraordinary sensitivity for daily situations lead, for Blankenburg, to the inability to be “casual (*lässig*)” when faced with the most contingent occurrences of ordinary life - that is, the inability to remain casually and relaxedly on one’s *Selbststand* despite the random chaos happening in the changing world as well as in oneself. “The ability to be casual (*Lässig sein zu können*)”, as Blankenburg (2012, 129) writes, presupposes the “ability of letting-be (*sein-lassen-können*)”, viz. of being able to “let” oneself and the surroundings “be” simply as they are, without constantly assuming or construing the secret meaning behind them. The ability of “letting-be”, in turn, is not possible without the self-affirming ground of oneself and the creation of distance through the splitting of ego: “The ability to let oneself and all that one encounters be is not possible without ‘distance’ (*Sein-lassen-können seiner Selbst und alles Begegnender ist nicht möglich ohne ‚Abstand‘*)” (ibid., my translation). The *Abstand*, viz. the buffer zone and free space of momentary detachment, is both the complete opposite of *Ausgesetztsein* and what allows a relatively casual and relaxed attitude towards daily occurrences and most unexpected trivialities. More precisely, as Blankenburg writes, this is not *merely* a distance between the person and what is externally encountered (“*zwischen Mensch und Begegnendem*”), but rather an internal one between,

again, “the natural ego who is immediately engaged in intentional occurrences (*dem im intentionalen Geschehen unmittelbar engagierten natürlichen Ich*)” and “the transcendental ego (*dem transzendentalen Ich*)” (ibid., my translation). The splitting and creation of distance between these “two” egos allow one to be detached from the instantaneous emotions, moods and external incidents by remaining “casually” on one’s foothold, viz. the transcendental self that offers a ground of trust and confidence for oneself. The disturbance or failure of this process results in a defenceless *Ausgesetztsein* or, in Husserl’s term, in an immediate and unreflected *Hingabe* to the empirical ego, for instance, in the schizophrenic *Wahnstimmung* or other forms of *Verstimmung*. Hence, in a word, the *Verstimmung* is essentially a *Stimmung* to which the subject is submitted involuntarily and from which it is unable to escape.

Besides Blankenburg’s phenomenological study of schizophrenia, Binswanger’s phenomenological-existential analysis of depressive and depressive-manic *Verstimmung*, conceived of as a kind of existential affective *Befindlichkeit* in the Heideggerian sense, also resonates with the definition of *Verstimmung* I propose. In affective disorders such as depression and manic-depression, the undefeatable dominance of the *Verstimmung* over the entire subject prevents the latter from taking a “step-back” from its own *verstimmtes* self. Binswanger (1992, 38) begins with portraying the depressive *Verstimmung* as a “*präsentische Bewegung*” analogous to dancing. Different from purposeful movement (*Zielbewegung*), which is fundamentally oriented towards a goal and moves in a determined direction towards a determined destination, dancing is not goal-directed and is never restricted to a particular direction of movement. There is no prescribed goal for dancing or, more precisely, the one and only goal of dancing is simply to present itself in a certain space by filling it up with its own artistic performance. Dancing is therefore a *präsentische Bewegung* in the sense of being sheerly *presentive* instead of *purposive*. At the same time, through the presentive movement of dancing, the entire organic body (*Leib*) is transformed into a “dancing body” and the whole lived-experience of the surrounding world is likewise modified. Analogously, a depressive *Verstimmung* is not purposively directed towards specific concrete entities. Instead, it is pervasive and presentive in that it fills up the whole space of life („*allseitige Erfüllung des Raums*”) intrusively and unrestrictedly, initiating, eventually, an all-encompassing transformation of living experience („*Veränderung des Erlebens*”) (ibid.). Depressive pervasiveness is thus no less violent and inescapable than the schizophrenic *Wahnstimmung*. In addition to the permeant colouration of *Erleben*, the depressive and depressive-manic *Verstimmungen* also result in a pathological „*Ausgefülltsein mit Erleben*” of the subject; that is, its *Erleben* is overwhelmingly and exclusively something present and its living-space is seamlessly filled up with the present („*ihr Erleben [ist] vorwiegend gegenwärtigend, d.h., ihren Erlebensraum ganz ‚mit Gegenwart‘ ausgefüllt*”) (Blankenburg, 1992, 40). The seamless filling-up of the *Erleben* with the present means nothing other than what has been elucidated so far, namely, one’s immediate identification with and affective *surrender* to the present happenings without the practical



possibility to retreat from them. Whereas Blankenburg speaks of the schizophrenic *Ausgesetztsein* in the world and the defencelessness against one's surroundings, Binswanger speaks here of the manic-depressive *Ausgefülltsein* with the present for the patients engulfed in such a *Verstimmung*. The latter reports that not only the *Erlebnis* itself “fully fills me up (*erfüllt mich ganz*)”. Also, the “about which (*Worüber oder Worauf*)” of the *Erlebnis*, viz. the instantaneous event that evokes “my” emotional reactions, fills up the entire conscious life of the subject, leaving it no space for “something else” („*dieses Vorkommnis, über das ich mich so ärgere, erfüllt mich ganz, dieser Zeitmoment, auf den ich mich so freue, erfüllt mich ganz, usw.*”) (ibid.). Such complete being-filled-up by instantaneous contingencies implies a lack of distance from the present as a result of the failure of *Ichspaltung*. In this regard, the paralyzing effect makes up the essence of pathological *Verstimmung* as atypically intrusive and pervasive in comparison to the ordinary *Stimmungen*. It is worth mentioning that even disorders that are not typically affective by nature also demonstrate this phenomenon. According to Fuchs (2021), borderline personality disorder, for instance, is characterized by the fragmentation of narrative identity. As a failure of the reflective capacity of the ego, the fragmented sense of narrative self can indeed be understood as what Blankenburg terms a lack of *Selbststand* or *Hinterhalt*, viz. the lack of the *Ich ,dahinter'* described above. As an interpretive reconfiguration of scattered lived-experiences in the past into a coherent life-story, narrative identity encompasses not only a meaningful understanding of one's personal history but also one's abiding moral values and existential aspirations. All of these serve as the self-affirming ground for ongoing existential decisions as well as the foothold on which one remains in the face of a chaotic reality. One of the most significant symptoms of people with BPD is therefore known as stimulus entrapment, which refers to their oversensitivity and extreme susceptibility to the immediate environment and the inability to “turn off” the stimuli impinging upon them (See Meares, 59). Expressed differently, we can also describe this phenomenon as an overidentification with the present affect (*Überidentifikation mit dem aktuellen Affekt*), the unreserved surrender to a present emotive outburst (See Schmidt, 2020). Inner feeling of emptiness and the depersonalization can be explained precisely by the absence of a stable ground for oneself, which leads, as a compensatory reaction, to further emotional dysregulation and impulsivity of BPD-patients. Analogous to schizophrenic *Wahnstimmung* and depressive *Verstimmung*, one might say that the dysphoric mood is the kind of *Verstimmung* that underlies BPD. Originally meaning “unbearable”, dysphoria intrudes into the affective life of BPD-patients, bringing an insurmountable feeling of emptiness, which then searches desperately and incessantly for fulfilment from external stimuli as compensation. The problem of narrative identity and BPD will be further discussed in the last chapter. In any case, it suffices for the moment to conclude that *Vestimmung*, as a pathological correlate of *Stimmung*, is what leads to the subject's failure to establish an internal distance between one's stable sense of self and the empirical ego in the fleeting present, and hence to retain a certain degree of freedom and resilience in face of the ongoing flood of external and internal stimulations.

## Chapter Ten: The Sphere of Volition - Habits and *Habitual Hyperreflexivity*

### 10.1 “Common Sense (*Selbstverständlichkeit*)” of the World and the Loss of it

The natural and social-cultural world normally taken for granted makes up one of the main aspects of one's habituality and serves as a commonsensical basis for the actions and interactions within a community and even for humankind. While subjective derivatives lead to distortions in perceptual experiences and *Verstimmung* leads to imprisonment in a mood, the loss of habits results in insurmountable hinderance to practical actions and forces a person to be hyper reflexive. The last issue is to be clarified through a careful study of the problem of common sense and the essence of what is meant by the (common sensical) “world”. In the first part of this section, therefore, a phenomenological exploration of the worldliness of the world (*die Weltlichkeit der Welt*) – understood as part of one's habitual sedimentations and in terms of the various aspects that constitute it as “common sense” - will be carried out. In this regard, I draw intensively on insights from Heidegger's expositions in *Sein und Zeit*. Against the background of the phenomenological understanding of the worldliness of world taken as common sense, the second part of this section will introduce Fuchs and Blankenburg's phenomenological psychopathology of schizophrenic lived-experience, which is, according to them, characterized most markedly by the subject's loss of such a world and its habituality in general. In spite of the sophistication of their accounts, I argue that some theoretical refinements are required.

#### a) The Heideggerian-phenomenological Account of the *Worldliness of the World*

To briefly recap, in chapter 4, the habitus is identified as the product and manifestation of sedimentation in the volitional sphere of consciousness. Stemming mainly from the sedimented experiences of an individual (viz. the genetic sense of sedimentation), various forms of habits are brought into light, including the theoretical (types in perception), the bodily (body schema and body memory), and the practical. Among others, our study foregrounds practical habits belonging to the volitional sphere and realizable through decision and action in external reality. These mainly include the habitual pre-knowledge of one's competence, limits, and dispositions, learnt from one's past experiences, by virtue of which alone a pre-reflective projection of the horizon of action of one's practical possibilities is possible. Closely related to the habitus is what is usually referred to as “common sense”, which designates the intersubjective and worldly dimension of a habitus - namely, habitual pre-knowledge about others and the *world*. Common sense could be conceived of as habituality that is intersubjectively shared in the communal world, such as basic knowledge and customs that are unreflectively taken over from other subjectivities in the present as well as those from past generations. (Hence, here we touch upon the *generative* sense of sedimentation.) As will be demonstrated below, common sense is not only cognitive but also volitional and affective by nature.

Even more importantly, the adoption of common sense as such serves as the indispensable presupposition for the adoption and realization of one's own individual habits, be they the theoretical ones operative in perception or the practical ones involved in actions or *Handeln*. The unhindered practical life of habituality includes and is grounded in the habituality of the world in terms of its worldliness, which is typically taken for granted cognitively, affectively and volitionally as a safe and familiar life-space.

The phenomenological question of *what*, exactly, constitutes the world as such, viz. the *worldliness* of the world, leads us to Heidegger's thematic explication in his early *Daseinanalyse* in *Sein und Zeit*. Briefly put, the world is not – as it often appears to be – an objective container of entities but rather a totality of involvements (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) and a context of references (*Verweisungszusammenhang*), which constitute the ontological-existential structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*). To start with, Heidegger introduces his well-known distinction between the two modes of Being of things: present-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) and ready-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*). For Dasein, the most primary mode of Being of entities (*Sein der Seiende*) is their being *used* without any conscious deliberation, viz. as being ready-to-hand for Dasein. Things encountered in the ordinary life-world are rarely placed “in front of (*vor*)” Dasein as pure objects of detached observation and cognition, as in the setting of natural science. This mode of Being of present-at-hand that dominates the natural sciences is ontologically derived from and grounded in that of ready-to-hand, for the Being of beings is revealed first and foremost in our daily pre-reflective “dealings (*Umgang*)” with them in a practical manner. More precisely, things are revealed most primordially as tools or equipment (*Zeug*) used by Dasein (See Heidegger, 2006, section 15). Correspondingly, things' most primary mode of Being is their “equipmentality (*Zeughaftigkeit*)”, meaning that something is used serve for particular purposes (“*etwas um-zu*” or “something in-order-to”) (Heidegger, 2006, 68). The Being of a hammer, for instance, consists first and foremost in its usage in (or “in-order-to”) hammering (*hämmern*). Furthermore, things as equipment are never used in isolation. Rather, their *um-zu* is possible only when it has a reference or assignment (*Verweisung*) to something else in the context. The context encompasses not merely other entities surrounding it (such as a table, paper, ink, window, etc.), but also the entire environment or setting (such as a car-repair shop) and even its material compositions (leather, needle, etc.). For its Being to be truly captured and made intelligible, the entity in question must always be already embedded in a totality of involvement in which it is related to other entities and to which it refers. That is, its Being is understandable only with reference to its surrounding world (in which other things are co-given) taken as a concrete meaningful context. A hammer, to return to the example above, *is* not simply to hammer (*Wozu*) anything contingent but rather to hammer *for* a certain purpose (*Wofür*) projected by Dasein, such as building a house. Such a meaningful context of referential totality in which each single entity finds its position and usage, *is* nothing but the world of Dasein. More precisely, it is Dasein's situated

understanding of its own Being-in-the-world that discloses (*erschließen*) the world as the context of purposiveness, relatedness, and meaningfulness, which in typical situations is unreflectively taken for granted as a sort of common sense. The question that follows is *how* such ontologically antecedent disclosure of the world (*das Erschließen der Welt*) takes place pre-reflectively, and whether this is the all-encompassing horizon lost in pathologies such as schizophrenia. In what follows, the various aspects of the worldliness of world will be unravelled in terms of Dasein's ontologically constitutive structures.

First, Dasein's *understanding* (*Verstehen*) of its own *Da*, viz. its own Being-in-the-world, discloses the world as a meaningful context in accordance with its *Worumwillen* (for-the-sake-of-which). That is, Dasein discloses its current world first and foremost in terms of a determined practical (life-)purpose it might serve, such that everything in it is understood, correspondingly, as more or less relating or contributing to this purpose. My one-room apartment, for instance, is for me not merely a place of accommodation like a random hotel. During the daytime, it is unveiled for me specifically as a workplace *for* writing my dissertation and, further, *for* the pursuit of my academic career. Correspondingly, the entities within this place - the laptop, the stationary, the table, etc. -, are practically and perceptually revealed as organized and related to each other in a specific way and as a specific relational totality (*Bezugsganze*) serving this overarching purpose, which lends them a determined meaning. The laptop, for instance, is not understood or used by "me" primarily *as* a tool for gaming or watching Netflix, but rather most of the time *as* a tool *for* completing my dissertation. Occasionally, however, when I decide to take a break from my work, the same laptop is used *for* some other (short-term) purposes, such as *for* entertainment and relaxing. Therefore, the Being of entities, or what the entities *mean* for us, is understandingly disclosed in terms of the *Bedeutsamkeit* stemming from the world as a referential totality with certain purpose or *Worumwillen* projected by Dasein itself. Put otherwise, the pre-reflective disclosure of the world as such a relational and referential totality is prior to, and presupposed by, all particular understanding or using of a single concrete entity. The *Wozu* of the latter, viz. the primordial meaning of its Being, is necessarily understood within and with reference to the disclosure of the world as such by virtue of Dasein's *understanding* of its own Being-in-the-world in accordance most primarily with its own *Worumwillen*.

The description above sheds light on the apparently "cognitive" aspect of the prior disclosure of the world (or: of common sense). However, it is not cognitive in the sense of being an act of reflective deliberation that objectifies the world as a thematic object of impartial observation and then constitutes it "rationally" as an organized field of objects. Rather, such understanding-disclosure of the world takes place – in typical cases – passively and pre-reflectively in the ordinary life. In Husserl's own terms, it is an accomplishment of passive genesis that does not require active interference of the ego. This process is, nonetheless, still "cognitive" by nature, in contrast to the other

ontological structures that co-constitute the prior disclosure of the world - namely, to what will be addressed as *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit*. Before this, it should be added (for a more articulated description) that the disclosure of the world in the current sense is at the same time a “the letting-be of the worldly objects that are encountered (*Freigabe des innerweltlichen Begegenden*)” (Heidegger, 2006, 86, my translation). Such a disclosure “lets” the beings *be* encountered within the totality of involvement lit up by Dasein and be unveiled under its own light in terms of their *wobei* (aside from and in relation to the surrounding objects), *wozu* (their instrumental in-order-to), and *wofür* (their service for Dasein’s own for-the-sake-of-which). Together these make up the primordial Being of worldly entities, according to Heidegger. On the other side, the understanding of single entities as such simultaneously or retroactively contributes to the overall meaning of the all-encompassing world-context in which they are embedded. A more detailed grasp of single entities might either enrich or deplete the meaning of the overall context itself. Finally, the world disclosed understandingly is by nature not simply a cognitive and practical world for Dasein, but is also revealed typically as a world of trust and familiarity. This is referred to as *Weltvertrautheit* by Heidegger, and it belongs inherently to the worldliness of the world for average human beings. Such inherent trust in and familiarity of the world is best illuminated by the preposition “in” from *In-der-Welt-sein*. Dasein is essentially *in* the world (instead of, for instance, existing as an immaterial mind or a detached observer of the world) as a meaningful and practical field of existence. However, it is not “in” it in the sense of a cloth being spatially in a cupboard, water in a glass, or a bench in a seminar room, and so on. From an etymological perspective, “in” stems from “innan”, “wohnen”, and “habitare”, which mean literally to live and to habituate oneself in a place instead of simply physically being “in” it. To live and to habituate oneself in the world means “I am accustomed to, I am familiar with, I look after something (*ich bin gewohnt, vertraut mit, ich pflege etwas*)” (Heidegger, 2008, 80; 2006, 54). That is, *to be in* the world means to inhabit it as a living place in which one “feels” secure and safe, and with which one is simply very familiar - for instance one is familiar with its pre-existing customs and traditions, social style, patterns of events, or its overall cultural “character”. *In* this world of familiarity, one rarely feels frustrated, anxious or threatened in ordinary life, for the world and its customary settings are given to the Dasein in it as common sense and taken for granted. This points us back to what was designated in chapter 4 as the volitional dimension of the world, which is a taken-for-granted (*selbstverständlich*) context for habitually motivated perceptions and actions. The latter are supported by the fundamental and unreflected belief that there will rarely be any abrupt or groundbreaking changes or conflicts wholly beyond the range of our typical experiences, the habitual pre-knowledge acquired from them, or the anticipation based on them. The practical adoption of all these products of sedimented experience presupposes one’s confidence and security *in* the world; these are not acquired through any intellectual act of reflection or cognition but are instead a habitual belief and fragile feeling developed throughout time. In general, such senses of confidence, security,

familiarity and trust are identified as what is lost in schizophrenic lived-experience. This will be unpacked later.

In addition to Dasein's pre-reflective disclosure through understanding and its fundamental belief in its general stability, the world as the primordial, commonsensical context of involvement and referentiality is also constituted by the affective structure of *Stimmung/Befindlichkeit*<sup>56</sup>. It should be remarked in advance that by allegedly being affective, these are not to be identified with any acute or changing emotions at the ontic level, viz. concrete emotions that are intentionally related to particular entities. Rather, *Stimmung* is an ontological-affective pervasiveness in which one finds oneself (*sich befinden*) even when one is "emotionless" (indifferent or calm, for instance). Together with the disclosive *Verstehen*, *Stimmung* as an ontological-existential structure that co-constitutes Dasein's Being-in-the-world in accordance with its own *Worumwillen*, an existential possibility or purpose it projects and steadily opts for. Dasein's *Verstehen* of its various *Seinkönnen* and its particular *Worumwillen* is essentially interwoven with the affective structure of *Stimmung/Befindlichkeit*. Being in the world, Dasein understandingly projects its existential possibilities of Being (*Seinkönnen*), but such projected possibilities are in no case contingent and free-floating. Rather, they are rooted in and constrained by different concrete situations revealed by Dasein's *Befindlichkeit*. Heidegger does not cease emphasizing the intertwinement and equiprimordiality (*Gleichursprünglichkeit*) of the two structural moments: "State-of-mind [attunement] is *one* of the existential structures in which the Being of the 'there' maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this Being is *understanding* [*Verstehen*]" (Heidegger, 2008, 182)<sup>57</sup>. The "Da" of Dasein encompasses not only its possibilities of Being but also its insurmountable limitations. There is always a factual (*faktisch*) situation into which Dasein is thrown (*geworfen*) without its free consent. This is depicted as a "*gestimmtes Sichbefinden*" in facticity (*Faktizität*), which refers to the ontological conditions and restrictions that Dasein is never able to change, reverse, overcome or get rid of. These include such existential facets as one's irreversible past, the social-cultural world in which one is born and raised, etc. The "Da" of Dasein essentially includes such thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) in its Being-in-the-world with various ontological facticities revealed most primordially by the *Stimmung* in which Dasein finds itself. In this regard, the disclosure of this facet of the world is primarily affective in nature: it is "...the Being of the 'there' [that] is disclosed *moodwise* in its 'that-it-is' (...die *stimmungsmäßige* Erschlossenheit des Seins des Da in seinem Dass [*dass es so ist*])" (Heidegger, 2008, 173; 2006, 135, my emphasis), viz. that it is simply *there* as ontologically finite and without any rational justification. Similar to

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<sup>56</sup> More precisely, whereas *Befindlichkeit* designates the existential-ontological structure of Dasein (juxtaposed equiprimordially with *Verstehen* and *Rede*), *Stimmungen* bespeak the particular, ontic manifestations of *Befindlichkeit* in different situations.

<sup>57</sup> „Die Befindlichkeit ist *eine* der existenzialen Strukturen, in denen sich das Sein des ‚Da‘ hält. Gleichursprünglich mit ihr konstituiert dieses Sein das *Verstehen*. Befindlichkeit hat je ihr Verständnis... Verstehen ist immer gestimmtes“ (Heidegger, 2006, 142).

*Verstehen*, the affective or “*stimmungsmäßig*” disclosure of one’s Being-in-the-world in terms of its facticity is not a reflective accomplishment of the ego. It takes place passively, and what is revealed to Dasein as its factual situation remains for the most part the insurmountable grounding presupposition for any understanding (*verstehend*) revelation and projection of one’s existential possibilities. Always able *to be* something more than what it is *factually* is at the present, Dasein “is ‘more’ than it factually is (*ist ,mehr’ als das, als es tatsächlich ist*)”; however, it is never able to overcome what it *factually* is and is allowed to move only within an ontologically pre-delineated field of possibilities: “but Dasein is never more than it factually is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially (*es ist aber nie mehr, als es faktisch ist, weil zu seiner Faktizität das Seinkönnen wesentlich gehört*)” (Heidegger, 2008, 185; 2006, 145). The potential space for existing circumscribed and unveiled by one’s *Stimmung* thus makes up the affective dimension of the world that is commonsensical for typical human subjects.

#### b) Blankenburg and Fuchs: The Loss of the Worldliness of World in Schizophrenia

According to the contemporary discourses within phenomenological psychopathology, the loss of the world as characterized above is what underlies certain psychical disorders such as schizophrenia. to summarize, the worldliness of the world that is absent in pathological lived-experiences consists in the world disclosed understandingly and “affectively” as a meaningful context of references and purposive involvement in which every single entity is properly embedded, as a finite realm of one’s existential possibilities, and as a habitat that grants one a sense of familiarity, security, stability and trust when one is *in* it. In light of this Heideggerian-phenomenological account of the world, a glance at Blankenburg and Fuchs’ phenomenological studies of schizophrenia might lead us to further reflection upon the pathological modification of habits and habitual common sense.

Already in 1971, applying the method of phenomenology in the study of mental disorders, Blankenburg identified *der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit* (*the loss of natural common sense*) as the axis of schizophrenic experiences. Basically, the loss of the *Selbstverständlichkeit* or common sense, according to Blankenburg, refers to the loss of the habitual patterns and organization of one’s own world. This includes losing the power to project feasible possibilities for actions offered by the world and the capability to anticipate their consequences, as well as losing the relatedness among worldly objects and their contextual embeddedness and, eventually, their entrusted meaningfulness for the individual subject itself. Characterized positively and more particularly, the loss of these capacities practically entails distorted perceptions and hallucinations of worldly events and objects, which are experienced by schizophrenic subjects specifically as something intruding on one’s mind “from without” and posing serious threats to their life. In this regard, Blankenburg (2012, 105, my translation) makes a crucial distinction between “the object apprehension of things (*gegenständliche Auffassung der Dinge*)” and “the meaningfulness and context of involvement

(*Bedeutsamkeiten und Bewandtniszusammenhänge*)”, viz. roughly the worldliness of the world explicated above. For him, the objective apprehension of single entities remains to a large extent intact and undistorted in schizophrenic subjects (a table is still perceived by them as a table, for instance). What is different from normal perceptions is simply that the single objects are apprehended *in isolation* from their referential relationship to other objects and from their world-context, which is always presupposed and taken for granted by typical subjects. Upon closer inspection, the *selbstverständlich* world as such, which remains invisible until its schizophrenic loss or disturbance is further divided into two aspects: its “rules of the game (*Spielregeln*)” and the subject’s “tactful feeling (*Feingefühl*)” towards it. The former includes not only practical social-cultural rules with respect to interpersonal relationships, but even more primarily the “transcendental projections (*transzendente Entwürfe*)” or “categories” that preside over both theory and *praxis* (ibid.). These are typically inner systems of rules of organization by virtue of which a subject is able to mentally arrange and structure the empirical manifold – e.g., it the numerous objects, occurrences, or semantic inputs, etc. – it contingently encounters on a daily basis. Implicitly highlighting the *intellectual* nature of such “rules of the game” of the world, Blankenburg (2012, 103) even refers to them as a system of “conceptual generalities (*begriffliche Allgemeinheiten*)”. To employ our terminologies, these rules are thus nothing but a pre-established system of *typifying schemata* for ordinary perceptions and actions. As a product of sedimented experiences, the conceptual schema enables for the subject immediate apperceptions of things that have already and repeatedly been constituted in the past, such that it is spared unnecessary scrutiny of and deliberation over each and every daily object. Whereas the rules of game understood as such sheds light on the cognitive aspect of the commonsensical world, the tactful feeling (or “world-feeling/*Weltgefühl*”) foregrounds the affective side of it. The subtle feeling in question is, first of all, not an acute or episodic emotion that is triggered occasionally. Instead, it is a fine, implicit background “feeling” of “how things work” in the surrounding world, a subtle “intuition” that guides “my” daily actions and decision by telling “me” whether or not they are appropriate in specific social situations. This feeling is particularly crucial to daily trivialities of the most elementary level - such as deciding which fork to pick for today’s breakfast or how my hand should move in order to grasp the cup of coffee – which hardly allow for (or require) an exhaustively rational and explicit justification (they are “problems that do not allow themselves to be determined clearly [*Probleme, die sich nicht eindeutig bestimmen lassen*]”) (Blankenburg, 2012, 106). Such a subtle, intuitive feeling not only spares most of one’s mental effort from executions of daily practices, it even grants us a feeling of “rightness” about our habitual bodily movements and all sorts of theoretical and practical habits. Such rightness does not stem from any intellectual discourse but is merely an intimate feeling grounded in one’s confidence in and familiarity with oneself and that which is the historical accomplishments of one’s lived-experiences. The opposite of this feeling is the *depersonalization* of what is originally personal and “rightful” (for “myself”): one’s habitualities, which certainly do not require any impersonal, objective justification for their validity.



It should be emphasized that Blankenburg does not explicitly distinguish between these two aspects of the *Selbstverständlichkeit* of the world, presumably implying the very mixture of their cognitive and affective facets. Correspondingly, what is lost in persons with schizophrenia is the worldliness of the world - comprised of both a pre-constituted, habitual system of typifying schema for perception and anticipation, as well as of intuitive, justifying feeling granted by one's established habitualities. What was taken for granted in typical experiences is constantly put into question, leading to numerous "lacunae (*Lücke*)" in the systematic and referential totality of the world, as well as in one's confidence, belief and subtle feeling of rightness towards oneself. All of these are originally unconscious accomplishments in the passive genesis of typical consciousness. However, once they are penetrated with the incessant doubts in the world of schizophrenic persons, these accomplishments become filled with lacunae that are filled up by artificial, apparently rational bridges constructed by the active synthesis of the ego. That is, commonsensical knowledge and the tactful feeling of rightness regarding one's habitualities are replaced by one's effortful excogitation of a seemingly "rational" justification for each and every triviality (for instance, "which fork to pick for breakfast today"). In other words, habits, in the broadest sense of the notion, are substituted for by *hyperreflexivity*; more precisely, by a *habitual hyperreflexivity* that takes place compulsively and recurrently in each and every daily encounter of the subject - ranging from one's bodily movement to practical acts and life-decisions. One might, at first glance, wonder why hyperreflexivity is subsumed here in the sphere of volition instead of that of the understanding, especially when notions such as compulsive thoughts or *Zwangsgedanken* are called to mind. It seems that the latter also designates a kind of hyperactivity of the cognitive mind that reflects upon itself uninterruptedly, such that it might be more appropriate to place hyperreflexivity under the cognitive sphere of understanding. There are, in my view, several reasons for not doing so. Firstly, the essential intertwinement between the three spheres of consciousness and their respective intentional activities should be emphasized once again. The placing of one structural moment into one of the spheres of consciousness in no way excludes that moment's influence upon the other two. Secondly, it is theoretically more convincing to reserve another notion – repetition compulsion – for the sphere of understanding, since, upon closer inspection, hyperactive thinking is predominantly repetitive and compulsive. It designates, basically, either the intrusive and repeated anxiety and fear directed towards a possible future or the recurrent thoughts of a distressing past. In this sense, hyperreflexivity in the cognitive sphere is more a compulsive repetition of the *same* sets of thoughts than the unstoppable doubting and putting-into-question of one's thoughts and behaviours - which precisely describes the case of habitual hyperreflexivity in the practical sphere of volition and action.<sup>58</sup> At the most elementary level, even

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<sup>58</sup> It might be added that a reversed question could be raised as to whether repetition compulsion is also in play in practical-habitual hyperreflexivity. A clearer distinction between the two notions could be made in this regard. Whereas the former bespeaks the (unconscious) repetition of the same – the radicalization of habits –, the latter refers to the constant challenging of the established habits as a result of the subjective sense of losing them.

one's own body appears to be alienated, and its habitual patterns of movement, its felt distance from surrounding objects and its overall relation to lived-space are also subject to doubt. For instance, the distance between "my" hand and the glass of water in front of me, or the way in which "I" usually grasp the glass, could hardly be decided until endless reflective deliberation is carried out. Likewise, at the level of perception, the unconsciously pre-constituted system of typifying schemata, as well as the habitual associative relationship between a present givenness and previous ways of typification, no longer appear as "safe" or "trustworthy". In the perceptual experience of schizophrenic subjects, the constitutive process never comes to an end since they cannot stop interrogating whether there is a threatening message or intention hidden behind the perceived objects. Finally, in the sphere of volition, practical habits, including habitual pre-knowledge of one's limitations, competence, dispositions, and patterns of living, are also depersonalized and distrusted. They are no longer able to offer a supposedly reliable "guideline" one may simply follow, nor a familiar *Spielraum* for the subject's ordinary actions and decisions. In sum, the schizophrenic loss of *Selbstverständlichkeit* depicts the endless invalidation and even complete collapse of one's habits and commonsensical pre-cognition about oneself and the world. As a compensational reaction towards this loss, a habitual hyperreflexivity is developed in the patients, which aims to search for an alternative justification or "foothold (*Halt*)" for even insignificant decision. Such a justification or foothold was originally provided by habituality itself, yet habituality can now no longer serve this function as the unquestioned ground for a secondary affirmation or denial of one's primary will or conations (See chapter 4.2 where the double-meaning of the will is discussed). For instance, a patient of Blankenburg reports that she encounters severe difficulty with the question of "which clothing material is suitable for which dress and for which occasion" (ibid., my translation). Instead of relying on her own habits of dressing or common fashion sense, she attempts to generate a highly rational and sophisticated account of the reasons *why* such and such is suitable for this and that or why it is not. However, this hyperreflexive deliberation in search of a lost self-certainty (*Selbstgewissheit*) (See Sass & Parnas 2003; Fuchs, 2010) never suffices and never comes to an end ("*es ist verständlich, dass sie damit nie an ein Ende kommt*") (Blankenburg, 2012, 106), and the patient's everyday life is largely hampered. In this sense, habitual hyperreflexivity is shown to be the pathological (compensational) correlate of the habitus or *Selbstverständlichkeit*, which encompasses, for Blankenburg, the pre-constituted worldliness of the world as both the context of totality of involvement and meaningfulness, as well as the self-grounding foothold of certainty and the sense of security for one's practical decisions.

Whereas Blankenburg sheds light on both affective and cognitive dimensions of common sense, Fuchs, drawing extensively from Jaspers, instead foregrounds the affective disturbance of the basal self in light of the notion of *Wahnstimmung*. In his study of the phenomenology of uncanniness (*das*

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Among others, the former case describes particularly the condition of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), whereas the latter captures more generally the schizophrenic conditions of various forms.

*Unheimliche*), Fuchs (2020, 163, my translation) brings forth schizophrenia as the paradigm of “the uncanny alienation of the world in the delusional mood (*die unheimliche Verfremdung der Welt in der Wahnstimmung*)”. Despite also focusing on the modification of the world (the worldliness of world), he tends to underscore its atmospheric – affective – alternation from typical *Stimmung* to schizophrenic *Wahnstimmung*. In this respect, a distinction, borrowed from Jaspers and analogous to that suggested by Blankenburg above, is made between the sensuous side of perceptions and the worldly *Stimmung* or atmosphere (See Fuchs, 2020, 157, 161). The former refers to the perceptual objects constituted as *Sinneinheiten*, viz. as having a unity of meaning and function for human subjects. This dimension, Fuchs contends, remains to a large extent unchanged and intact in the lived-experience of persons with schizophrenia. They still preserve the perception – objective apprehension – of the Being of single entities (e.g. a table is still perceived as a table), yet exclusively in isolation from their relationship to other surrounding objects and from the overall world-context. In contrast, the worldly atmosphere, here specifically understood as the context of involvement (*Bewandtniszusammenhang*) characterized by a sense of familiarity (*Vertrautsein*), undergoes a pathological transformation. The typically familiar, homelike world is now pervaded with an uncanny atmosphere. Basically, this does not result in any change of the objective apprehension of things in terms of content, viz. the sensuous side of them. Instead, there is a fundamental alteration of the overall surrounding world (*Umwelt*), which was originally unobtrusive and barely drew any attentive gaze. For people with schizophrenia, this world suddenly appears as inexplicably strange and even threatening, and as if it had set itself apart from the whole perceptual background to such a prominent extent that it has become the thematic object of conscious inspection and reflection. This world, pervaded with the hallucinatory mood that makes it uncomfortably not-homelike (*unheimlich*) for the subject, still retains a certain *Bedeutsamkeit* – which is unveiled in typical cases according to the individual’s *Worumwillen*. Nonetheless, in schizophrenic lived-experience, the *Bedeutsamkeit* is exclusively “an indefinite, mysterious meaningfulness (*eine unbestimmte, mysteriöse Bedeutsamkeit*)” that renders the world itself and the things in it unreal, enigmatic and contrived (Fuchs, 2020, 159, my translation). The atmospheric uncanniness, strangeness and indefiniteness ceaselessly haunting the surrounding world eventually motivates the subject’s endless reflection upon everything encountered within it and the futile attempts to unravel the secretly encoded threatening “messages” behind all phenomenal appearance. Finding itself in this permeating *Wahnstimmung*, subjects with schizophrenia reckon everything as signals pointing to something “hidden behind (*dahinter*)”, to a concealed intention waiting to be decoded. This leads, again, to what was depicted above as habitual hyperreflexivity. Both Fuchs and Blankenburg suggest that against this background mood, the objective apprehension of singular entities is apparently preserved. However, they are unable to find a “secure place” for themselves, viz. a proper position within the world in which each of every of them is “safely” related to each another and incorporated into an organized and meaningful totality that is familiar for the individual in question. Dislodged from the familiar worldliness of the world, objects

are perceived by schizophrenic persons as isolated, fragmented and mostly unreal. Corresponding to *Wahnstimmung* is therefore a *Wahnwahrnehmung* that is never settled for the subject, which, in turn, reciprocally reinforces the *Wahnstimmung*.

To sum up, the contemporary phenomenological study of schizophrenia by Blankenburg and Fuchs (inspired by Jaspers) locates the axis of the pathology in the loss or severe disturbance of the worldliness of the world, which is typically taken for granted as the common sense or habituality that is presupposed in both theoretical and practical activities in daily life. While Blankenburg sheds light on both the intellectual (viz. the rules of game, transcendental categories, etc.) and affective (the tactful feeling or *Feingefühl*) aspects of common sense, Fuchs places more emphasis on the affective dimension of it - namely, the atmospheric alteration of “normal” *Stimmung* into the uncanniness of *Wahnstimmung*. In the next section, their accounts will be subject to further examination as to whether they truly grasp and exhaust the very “sense” of common sense that is found absent in schizophrenic lived-experience.

## 10.2 The Affective Loss of Trust and Familiarity of Common Sense

It is indisputable that persons with schizophrenia experience a collapse or large-scaled trembling of the world of habitualities, which is typically a result of passive constitution, and which is taken over without question (*selbstverständlich*) by normal subjects. The exposition above shows that schizophrenic subjects encounter an earthquake of this habitual ground of perception and actions and compensate for its loss via daily active hyperreflexivity. While this description remains basically faithful to the subjective experience of these subjects, it implies – problematically, to my mind – that the breakdown of *Selbstverständlichkeit* is identified with (complete) breakdown of *the world* itself, for both Blankenburg and Fuchs seem to equate the worldliness of the world (in the Heideggerian sense) with the *Selbstverständlichkeit* that is lost in schizophrenia. In what follows, I attempt to unpack the internal conflicts in this identification and inquire into the exact “sense” of the common sense in question. I argue that, instead of a complete loss of the world, the world is still preserved in certain aspects in schizophrenic experience despite no longer being taken for granted - for the world is fundamentally *more than* the *Selbstverständlichkeit* and irreducible to it. Put otherwise, a conceptual distinction is required between the total collapse of the world *and* the collapse of the *Selbstverständlichkeit* of the world. While, as will be argued below, the former is not applicable to schizophrenic subjects, the latter is that from which they suffer, namely, the “loss”<sup>59</sup> of a *part* of the

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<sup>59</sup> I mean a “loss” not only in the sense of deprivation, but also as a change in terms of the entire structure of experience, in particular one’s experience of the world. As will be demonstrated in this section, the very “loss” of the familiarity with and trust in the world is indeed an essential – pathological – change of one’s attitude or position-taking towards the world.

worldliness of the world. This significant loss will be further unfolded later – one more in light of the problem of affective surrender (*Hingabe*).

Instead of a total collapse of the world, I argue that there is a partial preservation of the world in people with schizophrenia. What is basically preserved is above all the so-called “intellectual” or “cognitive” part - that is, the transcendental categories and system of typifying schemata in perception, and even specific habitual pre-knowledge about oneself and the world. Without the minimal preservation of these structures, I will show that both i) the objective apprehension of objects in their isolation and ii) the paranoid questioning and doubting of one’s world, would be impossible. Below I will unfold the inherent tensions in Blankenburg’ and Fuchs’ account in these two respects and demonstrate that a minimal preservation of the world cannot be denied for their descriptions to be coherent.

Firstly, the objective apprehension of things as unities of sense (*Sinneinheiten*) and function is impossible without presupposing a minimal sense of the world. As seen above, both scholars agree that the apperception of objects in their Being remains, for schizophrenic subjects, intact to a large extent; for instance, a table is still perceived by them as a table. However, upon close phenomenological reflection, there is nothing that allows us to ontologically separate between the apperception of objects and their world-context (the context of involvement and reference), including their relationality to other objects within it. In particular, Heidegger’s account (drawn upon by both Blankenburg and Fuchs) of the worldliness of world and ready-to-hand places extra emphasis on the ontological inseparability of the understanding of an object and that of its world, for the former bespeaks nothing but the revelation of its Being in terms of its “function” or “in-order-to (*Um-zu*)” in relation to its surrounding objects (*wobei*), as well as to Dasein’s own “for-the-sake-of-which (*Worumwillen*)”. As Heidegger (2008, 114) writes, “The ready-to-hand is encountered within-the-world. The Being of this entity, readiness-to-hand, thus stands in some ontological relationship towards the world and towards worldhood. In anything ready-to-hand the world is always ‘there’”<sup>60</sup>. The antecedent disclosure of the world through Dasein’s *Verstehen* and *Stimmung*, is what sets the worldly entities “free” in the very first place and what allows the subsequent encounter and revelation of their Being<sup>61</sup>. It follows that, for the people with schizophrenia to be able to perceive something as something - even in a fragmented and unstable manner -, a minimal disclosure of the worldliness of the world as a context of involvement and meaning is necessarily presupposed. Otherwise, even the revelation of the objects in terms of their functional Being would be ontologically impossible. For the

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<sup>60</sup> „Zuhandenes begegnet innerweltlich. Das Sein dieses Seienden, die Zuhandenheit, steht demnach in irgendeinem ontologischen Bezug zur Welt und Weltlichkeit. Welt ist in allem Zuhandenen immer schon ‚da‘” (Heidegger, 2006, 83).

<sup>61</sup> „Das vorgängige Erschließen dessen, woraufhin die Freigabe des innerweltlichen Begegnenden erfolgt, ist nichts anderes als das Verstehen von Welt, zu der sich das Dasein als Seiendes schon immer verhält“ (Heidegger, 2006, 86).

table to be perceived or understood *as* a table, for instance, a vague pre-understanding of its context of involvement, such as its relationality to a chair, a laptop, a living room, etc., is always already implied. Therefore, even in schizophrenic experiences, at least a *Vor-verstehen* of the world - or what Blankenburg (2012, 103) refers to as the conceptual universalities (*begriffliche Allgemeinheiten*) with regard to the world - is still retained. It is ontologically inappropriate to speak of the preservation of the objective apprehension of single objects and *simultaneously* of the complete absence of the worldliness of world. Equally contradictory is the simultaneous assertion of the phenomenon of paranoid “putting-into-question” of the world (including the entities in it and one’s own existence) *and* that of the complete collapse of the world as such. In order to question and doubt something, a certain understanding of that which is doubted and questioned must be presupposed in the first place. Otherwise, there will literally be nothing to be doubted. In his phenomenological description of patients suffering from schizophrenia, Fuchs (2021, 160, my translation) speaks of the frequent phenomenon of “the putting-into-question of their [the patients’] own existence (*die Infragestellung ihrer [die Patientens] eigenen Existenz*)” and their ceaseless attempts to “decipher” the encoded messages behind every worldly situation. Likewise, Blankenburg (2012, 106) speaks of the endless “rational” reflection upon one’s habitual ways of living and the attempts to devise “rational” justification for every possible move (such as in the example of choosing materials for one’s clothing). Such constant reflective deliberation implies, in effect, a recurrent suspicion and denial of one’s habits in any possible form. In both cases, however, the problem is that what is constantly subject to doubt by the subject must be more or less something already accessible to and retained by it. In Fuchs’ case, it is the understanding of one’s own existence as Being-in-the-world that is (minimally) preserved; in Blankenburg’s case, it is one’s habitual pre-knowledge of oneself and one’s common sense about the daily world. All of these do not completely disappear into a void for schizophrenic subjects. As paradoxical as it might sound, the part of the world that is repeatedly doubted is precisely the part that is preserved. The question that follows is, then, *what* exactly is lost when we speak of the loss of *Selbstverständlichkeit* or common sense in schizophrenic subjects, if it is not the total collapse of the world? In response to this question, I propose that, in light of the notion of surrender (*Hingabe*) elucidated in the previous chapter, it is the *affective surrender to what is still preserved (the habitualities in general, the worldliness of world, etc.) that is lost*, and results in the incapability of taking this for granted as something trustworthy, safe, familiar, and practically adoptable.

The problem of *Selbstverständlichkeit* is the problem of *affektive Hingabe*. Slightly deviating from Blankenburg’s formulation, I suggest that it is *not* that the *selbstverständliche (habitual, commonsensical) world* that is lost, but rather that the *Selbstverständlichkeit of the world*. The world and habits are, as argued above, more or less preserved by subjects with schizophrenia; however, it is the subject’s unreflected *trust (Vertrauen)* in and *familiarity (Vertrautheit)* with the world’s habitual

manner of givenness that is lost. This is what *Selbstverständlichkeit* truly consists of: namely, the subject's very attitude or the "affective stance (*Gemütsstellungnahme*)" it takes towards what is given, constituted, or encountered – in this case, the passively retained habitualities with regard to the world and oneself. In typical experiences, human beings unreflectedly surrender to what is habitually established in the sense of taking it over with a considerable degree of trust and sense of safety. One's *home-world* (*Heimwelt*), in opposition to an *alien-world* (*Fremdwelt*), is for the most part characterized by such unquestioned surrender accompanied with an inexplicable sense of familiarity and *Selbstverständlichkeit*, which are never pure matters of cognition or the accumulation of knowledge (about the world). Therefore, when Husserl speaks of the distinction between the *Heim-* and *Fremdwelt*, he emphasizes that to truly "know" an alien-world is not merely to learn and understand the individual *Typik* of each and every object there and even its "position" in the world. It is rather, more crucially, to intuitively capture the world's "historical tradition" - that is, the "determined yet living past within it (*ihre darin beschlossene lebendige Vergangenheit*)" and the "lively horizon of future (*der lebendige Zukunftshorizont*)" (Husserl, 2008, 163, my translation). This does not mean reciting the actual historical events of an alien-world, but rather grasping the tradition's overall goal-system (*Zwecksystem*), which silently determines the teleological meaning of the concrete things and events in it. Nonetheless, even this understanding of the alien-world is only possible to certain extent and is never "complete", as Husserl (*ibid.*) asserts: "but of course it is not possible to the fullest extent, just like it is not possible in the fullest sense for me to appropriate myself in complete concreteness to the type of the junkers, etc. (*aber natürlich ist das im vollen Sinne nicht möglich, ebenso wie es im vollen Sinne nicht möglich ist, dass ich mir in voller Konkretion den Typus des Junkers etc. zueigne*)". The reason for this destined incompleteness is that a genuine appropriation (*Aneignung*) of and integration with an alien tradition requires the "habitualization" and "internalization" of what is understood or learnt about it. Instead of an intellectual accomplishment, this is more a matter of time and of unconscious attributing an affective sense of trust and familiarity to it over the course of experience. Only by virtue of which this can the tradition, together with its teleology and overall "style", becomes "*ihre* (the subject's internalized) *Habitualitäten*", such that what is offered and encountered within it is given as „*habituelle Vermöglichkeit*" and „*vertraute Verfügbarkeiten*" (Husserl, 2008, 164). Eventually, what is sedimented habitually can be practically realized without extra reflective effort. Correspondingly, a home-world as "our world" is a world "of our historicity", "a unity of normal familiarity (*eine Einheit normaler Vertrautheit*)" and a "familiar tradition (*vertraute Tradition*)" (Husserl, 2008, 339, 341, my translation). A sense of trust and familiarity must imbue the world and its tradition, if they are to be experienced as homelike and safely taken for granted by a subject. This bespeaks, in other words, a fundamental affective stance or attitude one takes or can take in the face of what is "learnt" and given. While the latter is partly retained for people with schizophrenia, the former is disturbed such that an unreflected and safe surrender towards the latter is almost impossible.

To briefly recap, as far as the problem of surrender is concerned, section 3.3 distinguishes between sheer value-apperception (*Wertnehmung*) and the affective position-taking of the mind. The latter, having apprehended the emotional properties of an object, decides whether or not to truly live through them by “wholeheartedly” devoting oneself to them. Applying this idea to our current discussion, we may assert that the extent to which one is able to internally habitualize certain forms of pre-knowledge, habits or common sense - to take them for granted (*selbstverständlich*) and allow their effects upon one’s life through their unobstructed realization in the practical sphere - precisely involves the problem of whether or not one is capable of devoting oneself to them. For instance, the “effect” of the affective property of complacency (*Wohlgefallen*) upon the subject’s affective life is analogous to that of the habits and common sense upon its practical life. Regarding the former, Husserl (2020, 119, my translation) writes, “the liveliness of the complacency is, however, something different from the intensity, which lies in the sensuality...here the liveliness lies in me, in my ‘actuation’ of the liking... (*die Lebhaftigkeit des Wohlgefallens ist aber etwas anders als die Intensität, die in der Sinnlichkeit liegt...Hier liegt die Lebhaftigkeit in mir, in meiner ‚Betätigung‘ des Gefallens...‘*)“. Analogously, it is phenomenologically justified to speak of the “liveliness (*Lebhaftigkeit*)” of habitualities, or, more precisely, of liveliness conceived of as *Selbstverständlichkeit* - for the more “lively” a habit is to a subject, the more likely it would appear with certainty and as source of confidence and to be taken over as something *selbstverständlich*. Furthermore, similar to emotional properties, the degree of *Selbstverständlichkeit* of habitualities is determined by the degree of the subject’s surrender to them, for surrender means nothing but an unreserved adoption of them, which presupposes (and implies) a considerable degree of trust invested into the subject matter. Therefore, to take something as *selbstverständlich* is (to be able) to affectively surrender oneself to it with trust, a sense of security and familiarity. In this sense, the problem of *Selbstverständlichkeit* is a problem of *affektive Hingabe*.

It follows that, what people with schizophrenia suffer from is not the loss of the worldliness of the world in the sense of its cognitively accessible organizational principles, its rule of game, the transcendental categories to conceptualize the worldly manifold, or one’s own theoretical and practical habitualities in general. Instead, what is lost is *the subject’s ability to truly surrender itself to all of these* as a result of its lack of a sense of safety and security regarding them. Due to the constant feeling of insecurity and even of being-threatened, the concerned subjects are also characterized by what is termed as existential vulnerability (See Stanghellini, 2000; Fuchs, 2013; Irarrazaval, 2022). As existential vulnerable, these persons are (so-called) overly sensitive and experience trivial, daily social situations as unbearable limit-situations (*Grenzsituation*) (See Jaspers, 1919, 202-247) that are extremely disturbing or even life-threatening. To compensate for this lack of security, the subject thus initiates endless attempts at decipherment and at “rational” deliberation about trivialities - as described above in terms of habitual hyperreflexivity. It is worth mentioning that such vulnerability



and lack of security in schizophrenic subjects is well captured by Ratcliffe who deploys the notion of existential feeling. He starts with the Husserlian notion of natural attitude, which depicts typical human experiences, and highlights its grounding upon the *Urdoxa* of the independent existence of the world. Schizophrenia, then, bespeaks nothing but the pathological breakdown of this attitude, which leads to the “crisis of common sense” (Ratcliffe, 2013, 6; See also Stanghellini, 2001). More significantly, the collapse of the *Urdoxa* that underlies the breakdown of the natural attitude is, for him, mainly affective in nature. That is, it is above all a change of in existential feeling of the patients - namely, the feeling of “a lack of connectedness to the world, an absence of warming familiarity, of significance, of belonging” (Ratcliffe, 2013, 24). Once unpacked, the absence of all these feelings points exactly to what is designated in this section as the inability to surrender and entrust oneself to the world and to the attained habitualities. This, I argue, makes up the essence of the “loss” suffered by schizophrenic subjects as well as the genesis of the substitution of a habitus for habitual hyperreflexivity.

## Chapter Eleven: Concluding Remarks – The Narrativity of Sedimentation and the Un-/Conscious Dynamics

### 11.1 Sedimentation and Innovation: Narrative Identity and Borderline-Personality Disorder

#### a) The Hermeneutic Reconfiguration of the Past

So far, our whole study of sedimentation adopts the phenomenological approach and is aimed at systematically unravelling the effects (*Auswirkungen*) of the unconscious – conceptualized mainly as sedimentation – upon conscious activities. Against this background, this closing chapter initiates a turn from the Husserlian-phenomenological approach to the Ricoeurian-hermeneutic one, with the hope of opening up another dimension of the problematic for further reflection. Drawing largely from Ricoeur's account of narrativity and narrative identity, it aims to demonstrate the innovative aspect of sedimentation and, in contrast to the foregoing chapters, the retroactive effects (*Rückwirkungen*) of present consciousness upon the sedimented unconscious past. Whereas the narrativity of sedimentation remains for the most part inconspicuous in normal lived-experiences, the pathological disturbance of the latter renders the undeniable significance of the narrative (re-)construction of one's sedimented past empirically discernible. Therefore, after introducing Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity in relation to our previous study of sedimentation, we will turn to a phenomenological exploration of borderline-personality disorder, which is characterized mainly by a disturbance of narrative identity in the suffering subjects.

A shift from phenomenology to hermeneutics necessarily initiates a shift in the theoretical framework in which the problem of sedimentation is conceptualized. Aware of this shift, Ricoeur, in his hermeneutic exposition of the selfhood, explicitly juxtaposes the two frameworks and the corresponding conceptualization of sedimentation. As far as the character-formation of an individual is concerned, he identifies one's habit - the "product" of sedimented personal histories - as that which gives a history and content to character. However, as persisting and stabilizing as it might sound, the notion of character sometimes conceals its inherent creativity and the indispensable possibilities of change and enrichment. He writes, for instance, "...habit gives a history to character, but this is a history in which sedimentation tends to *cover over* the *innovation* which precedes it, even to the point of abolishing the latter" (Ricoeur, 1994, 121, my emphasis). An individual's persistent "core", viz. the character, which appears to be stably abiding, often obscures the innovative dimension of its historical origin, viz. one's sedimented experiences. In order to reclaim this concealed aspect of sedimentation, the problem of narration must be foregrounded, as Ricoeur (1994, 122) states: "What sedimentation has contracted, narration can redeploy". Here, a delimitation is drawn between the Husserlian-phenomenological conception of sedimentation and the hermeneutic approach towards it. According to the former, sedimentation is the eidetic process to which all lived-experiences are subject and

through which they are contracted, in the unconscious, into an indistinct and undifferentiated mass. This mass, despite (as seen from our previous exposition) continuing to resurface in the conscious sphere in various ways, *seems* to remain untouched by the ongoing acts and new experiences of the conscious subject. The act of narration, by contrast, bespeaks precisely the essential possibility of redeploing the sedimented contents in the sense of reorganizing them and bestowing upon them meanings other than those sedimented in the past. Through narration, sedimentation removes its appearance of being an inert mass with a faceless character. Among others, Geniusas (2024b) has best summarized the distinction between the Husserlian and Ricoeurian approach to the concept of sedimentation. According to him, for Husserl, the concept of sedimentation is coupled with that of *reactivation* and *reawakening*, while, for Ricoeur, such a conceptual coupling is replaced by that of sedimentation and *innovation*. This perfectly echoes our foregoing investigation of the three manifesting mechanisms of sedimentation - namely, active reactivation (*Reaktivierung*) or recollection (*Wiedererinnerung*), passive associative awakening (*Weckung*), and passive-tendential bringing-forth, as well as their respective structural moments. The lived-experiences in which the eidetic insights of geometry are rooted, as well as episodes of personal memories, *can be* voluntarily reactivated. *Types* and *habits*, on the other side, *are* constantly reawakened as transcendental moments of pre-predicative experiences and practical life. Finally, *moods* do not cease haunting subjectivity in its entirety by always bringing themselves forth tendentially regardless of one's present encounters. *All* of these depict the "one-sided" returning or reemergence of what is sedimented and unconsciously "processed", leaving almost out of sight the present consciousness' active renewal, possible intervention in, or reconstruction of what was already preserved and contracted in the unconscious sphere. Consciousness passively lets itself be conditioned and shaped by what was constituted in the past. However, instead of the unidirectional effects of the past upon the present, Ricoeur (and Gadamer) undertakes a hermeneutic approach and brings to light the reversed direction of the dynamic between the past/unconscious and the present/consciousness. Hermeneutic understanding and narration are anchored in the present and directed towards the sedimented past, aiming at a creative and interpretative reconfiguration of it. Reconfiguration does not mean changing what has factually happened, but rather refreshing its very meaningfulness or *Bedeutsamkeit*<sup>62</sup> through the act of narration. In both phenomenology and hermeneutics, the problem of meaning occupies a central place (See *ibid.*). However, hermeneutics conceives of the problem of meaning specifically in terms of an innovation of meaning and extends its study from the meaning of a text (textual interpretation) to that of selfhood or personal identity (interpretation of personal histories). In both respects, the creative power of interpretation is placed in focus.

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<sup>62</sup> Please refer to the threefoldness of *Erfahrung* (ideational content, affective charge, meaningfulness) elucidated in chapter 6.

Before delving into the hermeneutic discourse of interpretation and narration, it is worth drawing attention to Freud's notion of *Nachträglichkeit* ("deferred action"), which coincides – perhaps surprisingly - with our current hypothesis regarding the retroactive effects of the present upon the past. Despite being known for his emphasis on the dominant power of the unconscious and that of the repressed past over conscious acts and perceptions, Freud does indeed acknowledge the very possibility of retroactively reshaping and reprocessing one's past experiences from a present standpoint. For him, past experiences and their memory-traces (*Erinnerungsspuren*) can be or even *are* revised and rewritten (*umarbeitet*) by the current subject who has accumulated more experiences throughout time and reached another stage of development in life (See Laplanche & Pontalis, 1972, 313-4). This change of perspectives in the different present is always followed by a change of the meaningfulness of the past. Similar to the hermeneutic narrative, such rewriting is concerned with the *Sinn* of what was experienced and is always "deferred" or retroactive after a sufficient temporal and developmental distance is established between the current subject and its past. In a letter to Wilhelm Fließ in 1896, Freud (1950, 185, my translation) writes that "...from time to time the existing material of memory-traces undergoes a *transcription*, a *restructuring* according to a new relationship ( ...von Zeit zu Zeit das vorhandene Material von Erinnerungsspuren eine *Umordnung* nach neuen Beziehung, eine *Umschrift* erfährt)". Past experiences and their traces are not only transcribed, but their positions in the stream of the individual consciousness are also re-registered after new, significant experiences are collected. The development of life always involves a fundamental change in the overall character, system of values, or life-concerns of the individual, such that things – including one's past - are now weighed and evaluated differently when compared with one's previous self. For instance, an ex-partner who was extremely important in the past and for the past self might now occupy an insignificant position in one's present life, since new people have come into one's life over the course of further experiences. Freud's notion of *Nachträglichkeit* depicts this possibility or even inescapable necessity of rewriting and reorganizing one's past from the current perspective, entailing at the same time the very plasticity of sedimentation in terms of its existential meaningfulness. Nonetheless, it is equally important to note that the motive of such rewriting, according to the psychoanalytic conception, is rather specific. It is not really a voluntary and reflective act motivated by the intention of understanding one's past "better" or in a new manner, or of deliberately placing it in a more appropriate position in one's life-history. Instead, the rewriting is conceived of as a strategy to escape from an unpleasant reality through taking flight in an imaginative past created by oneself. This is what Jung refers to as "backward fantasy (*Zurückphantasieren*)" (See Jung, 1991) which, due to the limited scope of this study, cannot be further elaborated at this moment.

While the hermeneutic narration of the past is fundamentally a rewriting and reorganizing of one's personal histories in terms of their meaningfulness for the current subject, it is not merely an escape strategy, but is motivated by the active intention to understand these histories anew in order to

attain an enriched conception of one's self-identity. However, prior to the problem of personal identity, Gadamer and Ricoeur begin their hermeneutic enterprise with the problem of text-interpretation. A glimpse of such a beginning, as well as the core concern of their study, will facilitate our later exposition of the notion of narrative identity. Before Gadamer and Ricoeur, hermeneutics was dominated by the romanticist and historicist tradition represented, among others, by Schleiermacher and Dilthey. As far as the interpretation of historical texts are concerned, these traditions grant an unshakable authority and hermeneutic priority to the authors of the works as well as to the original intention imbued in their compositions. Given the apparent privilege of the authors, the task of hermeneutics is said to be nothing but tracing the "original meaning" of historical texts by means of reconstructing the psychology of the authors and the historical-social context they lived in during the composition. In this manner, they contend, an objective understanding of the texts, without any subjective partaking of the interpreter, is possible, and this alone is what the task of understanding and interpretation is devoted to. Against this conception, Gadamer and Ricoeur suggested that to understand a text is in no way to reactivate an alleged original meaning "behind" it, which stems from the original intention "in" the author's mind or his psyche in his era. Rather, the general hermeneutic principle bespeaks the attempt to understand the author better than he understood her-/himself by unveiling the diverse meanings and possibilities enclosed in the works s/he created. The hermeneutics aiming at a reconstruction of the original meaning of texts and of the psychology of their authors is rejected by both Gadamer and Ricoeur for two major reasons. First, it is simply ontologically impossible given the insurmountable finitude of human beings. Human beings, including of course the interpreters, are essentially finite subjectivities that are thrown into a contingent historical-social setting from which they are incapable of fully escaping *and* which at the same time serves as the enabling condition for all forms of understanding. This is referred to by Gadamer (2004, 308) as one's hermeneutic facticity, a notion clearly inspired by the Heideggerian account of the ontological limits Dasein is unable to get rid of. For Gadamer, this ontological condition (as well as restriction) is especially prominent in a human being's act of understanding and interpretation, as he writes, "...being situated within an event of tradition, a processing of handing down, is a priori condition of understanding" (ibid.). In understanding a historical text, it is impossible to truly "leave" one's factual situation and to relinquish *all* prejudices of one's own for the sake of an "objective" reconstruction of the allegedly original meaning buried in the past. A complete "Sich-Hineinversetzen (putting oneself into...)" into someone else's psyche or historical contextuality, or a total withdrawing from one's hermeneutic situation and an impartial "jumping-into" another one is ontologically impossible. For the finite human subjectivity, each and every encounter and attempted understanding of the past must take place within the horizon of the present and from the present perspective; more precisely, as Gadamer (2004, 305) puts it, "within the historical consciousness" that "involves the experience of a tension between the text and the present". In the act of interpretation, the interpreter poses "questions" that concern himself in his own era and opens up a contemporary horizon of understanding that is

never identified with the horizon of the past where the text is originated. Therefore, in the interpretation of texts, there are always two horizons that are irreconcilable and never totally identified, but that allow themselves to be *fused*. As Gadamer (ibid.) writes, “the task of hermeneutics consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a naïve assimilation of the two [horizons] but in consciously bringing it out”. The fusion of horizons (*Horizontverschmelzung*) as the goal of hermeneutics depicts the harmonized merging of the interpreter’s present horizon and the past horizon of the text. While retaining each in its peculiarity (facticity), the fusion not only allows the interpreter to move within an alien horizon in order to search for the “answers” to the questions s/he raised from her/his contemporary perspective, but it also uncovers a rich meaningfulness of the historical text that was previously unseen. This very last point leads us to the second reason why the romanticist position is considered unfavourable by Ricoeur, who inherited various ideas from Gadamer and of course differs from the latter in multiple aspects. For Ricoeur, the romanticist’s attempt to reactivate the alleged original meaning is not only ontologically impossible but also normatively undesirable. It does not do justice to the historical texts themselves as it overlooks or even denies the “surplus of meaning” (See Ricoeur, 1976) of each and every text. By “surplus”, he means that the meaning of a text is never exhausted by the author himself but is always *more than* what was originally intended by him and has remained concealed to him. In his interpretation theory on the surplus of meaning, Ricoeur, inspired by Frege, distinguishes between the sense and reference of a text. Whereas the proposition content or the “what” of an utterance makes up the objective side (sense) of a discourse, its reference or the “about-what” designates its subjective side (reference) (See Ricoeur, 1976, 19-22). Depending on what subjective reference the objective sense of sentence has, the overall meaning of a sentence, and the entire discourse, greatly varies. The interpretation of texts does not differ from the phenomenon of discourse in this respect, for both essentially involve the unfolding of possible meanings inherent in the text/discourse by situating them in different referential contexts or system of meaning, such as one’s contemporary hermeneutic situation. The surplus of meaning proves to be especially crucial in understanding literary texts due to their extensive employment of symbols, metaphors and rhetoric (See Geniusas, 2024b, 45). These literary elements are characterized by their lack of *one* fixed meaning. They are distinguished by their openness to diverse interpretations within different referential frameworks, be this a social-historical-cultural context or a personalistic living context. By situating and appropriating the texts (or in this case, the literary elements) in different hermeneutic contexts, the act of interpretation is also an act of *Aneignung* in the sense of appropriating something (the text) through some other systems it was not related to previously, thus giving the interpreted text a “new voice” in the contemporary world and within a wholly different horizon of understanding. In a word, what was/is sedimented (the historical texts) is not supposed to be reactivated as it “originally” was, but rather is destined to be constantly re-innovated in terms of its manifold meaningfulness.

Analogously, personal lived-experiences sedimented in the distant past are and should always be subject to a perpetual innovation of their meaningfulness through the narrative act initiated by the subject itself. Only through one's self-narration can one's *narrative identity* be established, which describes most essentially the "who" of oneself. To narrate is to constitute one's self-identity, as Ricoeur (1985, 355, my translation) writes, "to answer the question 'who' means...to tell the story of one's life (*Répondre à la question 'qui ?', comme l'avait fortement dit Hannah Arendt, c'est raconter l'histoire d'une vie.*)". Narrative identity, as it is unravelled, is a distinctive form of personal identity given its duality; it is, namely, a dynamic movement and mediation between *idem* and *ipse*, the two major conceptions of identity throughout the philosophical tradition. Identity as *idem* bespeaks the sameness/*Gleichheit* of a self; it points to a substantial self consisting in numerical and qualitative identity. Just as one's medical insurance number or an invariable noun designating the numerous "same" things, the *idem* is an uninterrupted and unchanged continuity that remains untouched by empirical contingencies and is thus permanently identical throughout time. It is, therefore, "a principle of *permanence in time*" (Ricoeur, 1994, 117). By contrast, identity as *ipse* means one's selfhood/*Selbstheit*, which is in no way an absolute, formal numerical identity but rather an empirically adaptable "product" of experiential development in time. It does also represent a form of permanence in time, but not that which is subsumed under the category of substance. Rather, the permanence of *ipse* is made up, for Ricoeur (1994, 118), of two models: character and keeping one's word (*Versprechen*). Both of these are historically determined products that stretch from the past to the present and the future, yet they are simultaneously historical products that manage to create an "illusionary" stable unity of self. *Character* is formed empirically by one's habits and it always contains the possibility of change. However, it "pretends" to be the abiding structural core of a person such that their identity is, to a large extent, depictable by their apparently long-lasting character traits: "...my character is me, myself, *ipse*; but this *ipse* announces itself as *idem*" (Ricoeur, 1994, 121). *Keeping one's word*, likewise, is also a form of permanence that contains or implies changes and accidentalities. As a *present* (and *future*) realization of promises made in the *past*, keeping one's word presupposes and in effect *proves* the temporal extension of the self from the past to the present and future. Since only the "same" self stretching from the past to the present can truly realize a promise, the act of keeping one's word also establishes a kind of temporal permanence, one that is differentiated from the substantial numerical sameness.

Structurally speaking, *narrative identity* is thus a synthesis and oscillation between *idem* and *ipse*, viz. between the abiding, substantial identity (sameness) of oneself and the empirically adapting selfhood consisting of a set of distinctive marks (such as values, ideals, models, norms). Formally, it is the concordance of discordances, a synthesis moving dynamically between "a demand of concordance" and "the admission of discordances", or else "the synthesis of the heterogeneous" (Ricoeur, 1994, 141). By virtue of the narrative act, what was or appeared to be fragmented,

contradictory and unrelated – but still belonging unquestionably to our selfhood (*ipse*) - is interpretatively reorganized in such a way that it now constitutes a presumably abiding unity and identity (*idem*). This is basically the narrative sense of self or narrative identity of which Ricoeur speaks: the stabilizing of the unstable, the making-permanent of the temporary, and the unifying of the manifold. It is, in a word, a self-constructed identity among diversity by virtue of the act of narration.

More than a formal and structural determination of the self, narrative identity is a complex creation shaped by concrete personal contents and the peculiar act of narration. The latter, as an act of storytelling, is an act of emplotment that transforms mere *occurrences* into meaningful *events* by reconfiguring the former as the constitutive “plot elements” of a coherent story. The distinction between occurrences and events plays an important role here. The former are the unprocessed lived-experiences that are considered to be contingent and trivially senseless, stripped of any existential significance for the experiencing subject in question. They appear as scattered pieces of scenes, unrelated to other experiences, and emerge as frustratingly unexpected and surprising, for the subject can make no sense of their very happening. Events, on the other hand, are occurrences that are reconfigured as integral and existentially significant episodes of subjective life in its entirety. They are no longer senselessly contingent but rather necessary for the coherence of the life-story as a whole and are connected meaningfully with the other parts (plot elements) of the story. “The narrative event”, writes Ricoeur (1994, 142), “is defined by its relation to the very operation of configuration; it participates in the unstable structure of discordant concordance characteristic of the plot itself”. The event itself, as personally empirical, neither possesses nor makes up any absolute identity. However, after being transformed from the contingency of mere occurrences, it is imbued with a necessity in the sense of narrative necessity through the act of emplotment, or narration. Put differently, sedimented lived-experiences from the past are narrated from the present perspective in such a way that they become indispensable parts of the life-story of the individual subject. Interestingly, the “life-story” in question is *fictive* by nature, for it is nothing but a creation of the subject itself who “imaginatively” projects an overarching “theme” for its own life. It is only with reference to such a *fictive* theme that one’s *actual* lived-experiences could be bestowed with a certain meaning, namely, meaning *for* and contributing to the theme itself. In this sense, the narrative act and the resulting narrative unity of life is determined to be “an unstable mixture of fabulation and actual experience” (Ricoeur, 1994, 162). In spite of its fictive character, the fabulation (the subjectively invented theme) serves as an abiding and unifying reference point for the reconfiguration and reorganization of the fleeting and scattered moments of life. Such a fictional element is indispensable for the narrative understanding of self since “it is precisely because of the elusive character of real life that we need the help of fiction to organize life retrospectively” (ibid.). Therefore, the task of narration is again twofold and contains two “kinds” of truth: it is, on the one hand, an invention of a fictive story-theme, which is nonetheless the



*subjective truth* for the individual itself, and, on the other hand, an interpretive treatment of one's sedimented actual experiences, viz. the *empirical truth*, with reference to one's subjective truth.

Ricoeur employs the example of chess game to illustrate the appropriating process (*Aneignung*) of the senseless actual occurrences with the fictive rules, aims and themes of a life. "Originally", viz. before any subjective interference and prescription of rules, the moves and position of a sheer piece of wood (the chess piece) on a quadratic board marked off with patterns of lines do not themselves convey any meaning beyond their physical and spatial information. It is only after the invention of rules and goals for the chess game that the gesture of moving the chess piece on the chessboard attains particular meaning. For instance, a move is "counted as" a gesture of attack, defence, disguise, and so on, which all have the *telos* of conquering the opposite side by finally checkmating the king. "The rule", fictively projected by the chess-players, "all by itself, gives the gesture its meaning", and so it is also called the *constitutive rule*. "[When] moving a pawn", Ricoeur (1994, 154) writes, "[its] meaning stems from the rule as soon as the rule is constitutive, and it is so because it constitutes meaning, 'counting as'". By analogy, as far as the constitution of narrative identity is concerned, one's persistent story-theme - fabulized by oneself for one's life - serves precisely as the constitutive rule for mere occurrences happened in the past. Despite being a fictive invention, the theme of one's life is indeed projected on the basis of a life-goal or -project one consistently strives to achieve. In the act of narration, this goal serves as both the "scale" of measurement and the reference point that determine the existential significance of the interpreted lived-experiences and lend them specific meaning. For instance, with reference to the theme a piece of experience can be understood as contributing to the realization of one's life-project, creating obstacles for the achievements related to it, or functioning as a detour towards or away from the path to the goal, etc. At this point, a significant dimension of the act of narration is brought to light, which is not treated thematically by Ricoeur. Narration is not only a narrative configuration of the sedimented *past* from the *present* perspective; rather, it also entails a *future* orientation in its invention of the constitutive rule for narration, viz. the story-theme. The future dimension belonging to the narrative act is addressed by Ricoeur (1994, 123) in passing, when he employs the Heideggerian notion of "anticipatory resoluteness (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*)" in his account of selfhood (*ipse*). While he does not thematically elaborate the notion, the explicit reference to Heidegger indicates the indispensability of the *future* and its inseparability from *past* and *present*, even in the hermeneutic act of narration. It is well-known that in *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger emphasizes the ontological unity of the three temporal ecstases of past, present, and future. To each ecstasis there corresponds one of the three ecstatic modes of Being of Dasein in either authentic or inauthentic form; this results in a total of six ecstatic modi comparable with the Kantian schematism (See Kwan, 2012). From an ontological-existential standpoint, temporal unity alone constitutes Dasein as an essentially a temporal being always stretching between the three temporal horizons: "With one's factual Being-there, a

potentiality-for-Being is in each case projected in the horizon of the *future*, one's 'Being-already' is disclosed in the horizon of *having been*, and that with which one concerns itself is discovered in the horizon of the *Present* (Mit dem faktischen Da-sein ist je im Horizont der *Zukunft* je ein Seinkönnen entworfen, im Horizont der *Gewesenheit* das ‚Schon sein‘ erschlossen und im Horizont der *Gegenwart* Besorgtes entdenkt)'' (Heidegger, 2008, 416; 2006, 365, my emphasis). Each of Dasein's existential structures (*Befindlichkeit*, *Rede*, *Verstehen*) can be realized and attain practical meaning only when it is temporalized in each of these ecstatic horizons. Among these, Heidegger gives the *future* a priority, for Dasein orients its existence first and foremost towards its future possibility. For example, he writes that "anticipation makes Dasein *authentically* futural, and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, *as being*, is always coming towards itself – that is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in general (*das Vorlaufen macht das Dasein eigentlich zukünftig...dass das Vorlaufen selbst nur möglich ist, sofern das Dasein als seiendes überhaupt schon immer auf sich zukommt, das heißt in seinem Sein überhaupt zukünftig ist*)" (Heidegger, 2008, 373; 2006, 325). Whereas temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is unquestionably a unity of the three ecstases, it *temporalizes* (*zeitigt*) itself most primarily as „*gewesende-gegenwärtigende Zukunft*” (Heidegger, 2006, 326, 350), that is, as "a future which makes present in the process of having-been" (Heidegger, 2008, 374). Dasein is always ahead of itself, projecting possibilities of Being that are other than what it irreversibly was and factually is. The future, therefore, always plays a leading role for Dasein's temporal existence. The *past*, he asserts, stems in certain way from the future ("Die *Gewesenheit entspringt in gewisser Weise der Zukunft*"), for one's "having-been (*Gewesenheit*)" is only revealed when Dasein anticipatorily and understandingly "comes back" to it (See Heidegger, 2008, 373)<sup>63</sup>. This perfectly echoes what was indicated as the future orientation implied in the narration of the past, namely, the meaning of the past is always uncovered with reference to the life-goals of the subject. The same applies to the *present* of Dasein, whose meaning is likewise disclosed by virtue of Dasein's anticipatory resoluteness: "anticipatory resoluteness discloses the current Situation of the 'there' (*Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit erschließt die jeweilige Situation des Da*)" (ibid.). This priority of the future in the unitary synthesis of the three temporal ecstases calls for an existentialist formulation that exemplifies it in real-life scenarios. Kwan (2012, 54) offers an illustrative description of this phenomenon as follows: "...by being ahead of (*vorlaufen*) her own possibilities (*Seinkönnen*) and through her determination for a future projection (*Entwurf*), [a person] keeps recalling or repeating (*wiederholen*) her past experiences so as to learn lessons from them while trying to figure out what to do now at the present moment (*Augenblick*) to help her to achieve her future goals". Against the "background" of one's future projects (and life-goals, persisting convictions, values, dispositions, etc.), one understands the past (e.g. as certain lessons to learn from) from a particular perspective and

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<sup>63</sup> „Das Vorlaufen in die äußerste und eigenste Möglichkeit ist das verstehende Zurückkommen auf das eigenste Gewesen. Dasein kann nur eigentlich gewesen sein, sofern es zukünftig ist. Die Gewesenheit entspringt in gewisser Weise der Zukunft" (Heidegger, 2006, 326)

it reveals the present in a way that might facilitate one's path to success (e.g. by starting to act appropriately). This is precisely what the innovative narration of one's personal histories is all about. Narrative identity is nothing but the fruit of an interpretative treatment of one's sedimented experiences by made by referencing one's future projection, which serves as the constitutive rule that grants meaning to the interpreted events by means of configuring them as the indispensably significant plot elements of a coherent life-story one proudly tells.

## b) The Fragmentation of Narrative Identity in Borderline-Personality Disorder

Empirically speaking, the coherent and stable sense of narrative identity established by means of the retrospective narration of one's past is essential for the overall stability of one's psychical life. However, it is always taken for granted by normal human beings, and its significance remains mostly invisible until pathological disturbance takes place. Hence, in this section, a phenomenological study of one of the psychopathologies, borderline-personality disorder (henceforth BPD), will be carried out in order to demonstrate the fundamental significance of narrative identity at the empirical level. Generally, according to the list of descriptions in the DSM-V handbook, BPD is characterized by symptoms such as affective instability, emotional dysregulation, identity disturbance, a chronic feeling of emptiness, pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships, and so on (See APA, 2013, 663). Whereas there are a total of nine diagnostic criteria listed in the handbook for clinical use, a phenomenological formulation usually underscores the instability involved in three major aspects, namely, affectivity, identity, and interpersonal relationships. Our current section opts to focus on BPD since, according to the relatively prevalent position in contemporary phenomenological psychopathology, the axis of this disorder is attributed to a disturbance of self-identity - more precisely, of the narrative identity we have spoken of so far. Identity disturbance is considered to be the major cause of or foundation for instability in other aspects of the BPD-patients' psychical and practical lives (See Fuchs, 2020, 2021; Fuchs & Schmidt, 2021; Bortolan, 2020, 2021; Bois et. al., 2023, etc.). For example, Fuchs (2021, 198, my translation), explicitly states that "BPD marks a putting-into-question of the traditional conception of personal identity". Put positively, people with BPD are marked by the *fragmentation* of narrative identity, which depicts a vague picture of oneself that is often filled with breaches, rapidly switching between different roles, and a profound feeling of inner emptiness (See Fuchs, 2021, 202). Most of the other symptomatic phenomena shown by BPD are derived from this core disturbance. Likewise, Bortolan (2020), sheds light on narrativity as that which is essential for the structuring of affective experiences. Through narrative alone the various aspects of an emotional experience are coherently connected to one another and to the other significant events in one's life. Rather than simply being an unreasonable outburst, an emotional experience can be understood as an intelligible unitary phenomenon through being narrated. In light of the significance of narrativity, she further asserts that, in line with Fuchs, the axis of BPD is located

in the disturbance of the relevant subject's narrative self-understanding, which serves in typical cases as the enabling condition for a meaningful reconstruction of affective experience and hence for emotional regulation. She suggests that narrativity is the ground of regulatable affectivity; and through the study of the lived-experiences of people with BPD it is empirically attested that "the disturbances of narrativity typical of the illness can determine various alterations in the structure of patients' emotions and in their ability to regulate their affective experience" (Bortolan, 2020, 220).

The failure of establishing and maintaining a stable sense of narrative identity in a BPD-subject is, according to our elucidation in the last section, the result of the subject's incapability to retroactively come to term with its own sedimented past experiences in a way that would render them existentially intelligible and accommodating for the overall life of consciousness. The lacuna that the subject is unable to narratively process and that fragmentizes its sense of identity is attributed to traumatic experience of various kinds. The trauma that is lived through by subjects with BPD that leaves a destructive trace upon them sometime includes concrete traumatic events that are acutely shocking and obviously life-threatening, though they do not need to be. This includes typical traumatic events such as warfare, natural disasters, severe accidents, sexual abuse, and so on. The experience of these events is usually overloaded with high emotional intensity, such as extreme shock, fear, anxiety, and so on, which renders it extremely difficult for a retrospective encounter, let alone a thematic reflection, to take place in the narrative process. In addition, their occurrences are so rare and unexpected that their existential meaning goes far beyond one's usual understanding of the world. Given their extraordinary nature, the subject finds it almost impossible to "make sense of" them, even from a temporally distant position. Eventually, they are left narratively unprocessed and unconsciously excluded (repressed) from the ordinary stream of consciousness. On the other hand, traumata that hardly allow for proper narrative treatment can also include – or mostly *are*, especially in BPD – daily traumata that appear to be trivial and harmless for others. Daily trauma refers to the invalidating experiences that takes place repeatedly in ordinary life and over an extended period of time, especially during one's childhood when the formation of one's sense of self is particularly susceptible to environmental influences. Examples of daily trauma are verbal assaults from fellows, invalidating expressions by parents, or implicit exclusion from certain social circles, etc. The recurrent occurrence of these apparent trivialities is experienced by the subject as a substantial invalidation of its thoughts and behaviours, and even as a direct attack launched against its core self, which consists of its self-perception and self-worth, beliefs, and understanding of the world, etc. One's expressions and communications seldom meet with appropriate or expected responses by the surrounding people and, hence, "instead of being validated, private experiences are trivialized, their expression is discouraged, and emotions (especially painful emotions) are disregarded" (Stanghellini & Mancini, 2021, 672). In any case, both acute traumatic events and daily traumata result in the dissociation or uncoupling of consciousness (See Meares, 2000, 43-54). That is, the subject is unable, by means of

narration, to confer upon those traumatic memories a proper existential meaning and to integrate them into its own prevailing personality structure or personal core. It follows that a part of its sedimented past is unconsciously segregated from the ordinary stream of consciousness, resulting in narrative breaches during the attempted configuration of one's biographical histories into a meaningfully unified and coherent story. Therefore, the diffusion of self-identity suffered most often by subjects with BPD is a direct consequence of the incapability to narrate one's sedimentations. Nonetheless, it should be remarked that instead of a complete absence of narrative identity, what underlies BPD is rather an unstable and fragmented sense of self containing unbridgeable lacuna and oscillations between roles. More precisely, the past is narrated *as* fragmentary and scattered, where certain sedimented pieces are simply missing or unconnected to each other.

The unsuccessful narrative processing of one's past, and accordingly the lack of a stable and coherent narrative identity for oneself, has various empirical consequences for the lived-experience of people with BPD. The first one concerns time-perception. Whereas time is typically perceived and experienced as a synthetic unity of past, present, and future, it is reduced to an absolute "now" for subjects with BPD. Each and every moment is nothing more than a "pure present" with numerous unconnected "now-points" deprived of any continuity stretching from the past and towards the future. Such temporal contraction is an inescapable result of the lack of an overarching and stable identity of the self, which strings together the tripartite temporal dimensions by virtue of its persistence. For the self with a fragmented sense of narrative identity that is unable to tell a temporally extended story about itself, what is left is nothing but an empty and shallow "now" that lacks any temporal extension and connection to what was before and what will be after. In Husserl's terminology, this is solely an impressional present without retention of the past or protention of the future; in Nietzsche's expression, the "plug of the moment (*Pflock des Augenblicks*)" is all that is left. At the same time, and against the background mood of dysphoria (also resulting from the fragmented sense of identity), the "pure" impressional present is experienced by the concerned subjects more intensively and momentarily. While pervaded by the dysphoric mood of insurmountable inner emptiness, what is encountered in the present (and only in the present) is experienced as overwhelmingly and often unreasonably significant. The "stagnant 'ocean of spleen'" is "punctuated with moments of excitement during which one's blind vitality finds its fulfilment" (Stanghellini & Mancini, 2021, 670). However, the moments of excitement remain nothing more than momentary instants that are temporally isolated and do not contain any substantial contents or meaningfulness for the subject's life formed by its sedimented past and possible future. Secondly, the instability of narrative identity also leads to the affective instability of BPD, whose major manifestations include impulsivity and emotional dysregulation. As explicated in the previous chapters, a stable and coherent narrative identity serves in affective (and practical) life as a transcendental foothold – the self-affirming ground – on which one remains even in the face of the evanescent and chaotic world as well as one's

empirical self within it. Narrative identity encompasses not only a coherent understanding of one's biographical history, but also entails, as seen above, one's projected future and life-goals, which are subjectively perceived as axiologically preferable and existentially meaningful. Therefore, it contains a corresponding system of values and belief, as well as one's ideal self-image and desirable way of life, and so on. As far as its role in affective life is concerned, narrative identity also functions as a steady foothold from which one (temporarily) distances oneself from instantaneous emotions and instinctual desires (the splitting of ego discussed above), and also subsequently as the axiological and existential standard (*Maßstab*) for the reflective evaluation of the instantaneity in question.

Eventually, it allows one's free position-taking and practical treatment with respect to surging emotions and affective impulses. It follows naturally that in the case of BPD, since the pathological disturbance of the stable sense of narrative identity bespeaks the lack of a steady foothold for such inhibition, evaluation, and execution, recurrent impulsive acts, emotional dysregulation, and stimulus entrapment necessarily result (See 8.2). Lastly, instability of interpersonal relationships is also closely tied to the instability of a sense of self-identity. People with BPD experience excessive distress in social relationship due to their unproportionally high sensitivity towards others' words, behaviours, and internal psychological states (See Schmidt, 2020, 168-9). In many cases, this leads to the subjects' extreme attachment to or sudden detachment from others, and subsequently to abrupt and rapid changes of one's social circle. Subjects with BPD either get too dependent upon others or they tend to decide without a second thought to completely break off contact with them. This mostly has to do with, again, the lack of a clear and self-affirming sense of self, and hence the absence of a clear boundary between oneself and others. The failure to establish social boundaries, together with the outstanding capability of affective empathy, lead to the "pathological fusing of one's own affects with the affective life of others (*pathologische Verschmelzung des eigenen Affekts mit dem Gefühlsleben anderer*)" (Schmidt, 2020, 169, my translation). Not surprisingly, this failure can even lead to a manipulative tendency towards others (See Potter, 2006), which proves to be yet another compensational mechanism adopted by the patients: suffering from the inability to regulate one's own emotional life, they make attempts to control others' life as an alternative and compensatory resolution. However, social distress and unstable relationships turn out to be the sole consequence of these attempts.

In sum, the notion of narrative identity and the act of narration exemplifies the retroactive effect of the present upon the past – or more generally that of consciousness upon the sedimented unconscious. The narrative treatment of the past is, furthermore, not merely a contingent way of reflectively processing one's biographical memories. From a psychological and practical perspective, it constitutes a sense of identity that is essential to the normal function of intentional consciousness and a healthy psychical life. Its significance is empirically exhibited by a phenomenological study of the lived-experiences of BPD-patients. Suffering from the pathological disturbance of the constitution

and maintenance of a stable sense of narrative identity, they demonstrate various derivative symptoms in their perceptual, affective, and interpersonal life.

## 11.2 Concluding Remarks: The Dynamics between Consciousness and the Unconscious

Since its appearance in the academic world, the idea of the unconscious has always been regarded as a controversial and mystical invention of philosophy and psychoanalysis. Starting with the unconventional phenomenological identification of the unconscious with sedimentation, this research attempted to disenchant the mystery by recontextualizing the unconscious within the phenomenological realm of consciousness. The unconscious is in no way simply the negation or privation of consciousness, but rather a substratum – as darkened and concealed as it might be – belonging intrinsically to the life of consciousness as a whole. Otherwise, the unconscious would be unjustifiably reduced to what neuroscience usually depicts as *non-conscious*, which apparently lies “outside” consciousness and whose relationship to the latter hardly remains explicable. As this study tried to demonstrate, a genuine understanding of the unconscious can be attained only when the unconscious is placed in relation to consciousness and its intentional activities. In this regard, the idea of sedimentation plays a pivotal role as it is essentially something that *was* once conscious and *has then* sunken down into the unconscious ground. Through sedimentation, the intertwinement between the unconscious and consciousness first comes to light as the *sedimented unconscious*.

Despite the fact that Freudian psychoanalytic conceptualization of the unconscious as something highly autonomous and independent is almost no longer tenable, and the inseparability of the unconscious from consciousness gains increasing affirmations in current research, a systematic account of the specific interactions between the un/conscious realms is still missing in the contemporary discourse. This study hopes to fill the conceptual gap by exhibiting the 3x2 structural moments as different ways the sedimented unconscious manifests. In both normal and anomalous or pathological consciousness, the sedimented manifests in all *intellectual*, *affective*, and *volitional* forms respectively as *types/derivatives*, *moods/bad mood*, and *habits/hyperreflexivity*. With such multiplex manifestations in consciousness, empirical sedimentation attains its transcendental significance in co-determining and co-shaping the performances of intentional consciousness in its constitution of the objects of experience. Transcendental consciousness is in its concreteness a *sedimented* transcendental subjectivity with an unconscious substratum of historicity and “irrationality”.

Nonetheless, the dynamical relationship between the sedimented unconscious and consciousness is not unidirectional. Not only does the former keep resurfacing and affecting the latter in the multiple ways elucidated; the present consciousness is likewise capable of exerting retrospective influences upon the sedimented past by means of a narrative reconfiguration of its meaningfulness. While the former depicts the “forward” effects of the unconscious upon

consciousness, the latter exhibits the “backward” counteracting of consciousness against the unconscious. A reinterpretation and rewriting of the significance of the sedimented might, in turn, redetermine the latter’s influence upon one’s present life. At this point, the life of consciousness is shown to be a constant dynamic between its unconscious and conscious realms: a dynamic consisting of their incessant reciprocal determination as life unfolds itself – this can even be conceived of as a life of *un/conscious* dynamics.

Hopefully, the phenomenological exposition of the unconscious in this study has significant implications in various aspects. *Philosophically*, it is no longer a necessity to conceptualize the unconscious as a thoroughly mystical and incomprehensible idea that fundamentally escapes philosophical, rigorous rumination. Instead, it is nothing but an indispensable dimension that belongs intrinsically to consciousness, and an well rounded study of the latter requires at least a certain degree of attention to its concealed layer. From a *medical* and *natural science* perspective, the problem of sedimented consciousness foregrounds the very individuality and peculiarity of each and every subject, which cannot be reduced to a sum of bio-physiological particles or a mechanical brain of neurons and neuron connections. In particular, for the medical treatment of people suffering from mental disorders, the idea of sedimentation implies the idea of medical humanities that respect and value the personal history and character of an individual. This involves above all an awareness of the irreducibility of individuality into biological, physiological, and neurological functioning and malfunctioning. Finally, to be aware of one’s unconscious force also contains an *existential and moral* significance. It would be an ignorance to believe that one is in full control of one’s own thoughts and behaviours and that conscious life is completely transparent to itself. It would further be an arrogance to contend that one acts exclusively in accordance with one’s rationality and that one’s judgments are thoroughly rational and objective and purified of any “irrational subjectiveness”. To be aware of the existence of the unconscious is to remain humble and cautious with one’s own deeds. Conversely, the awareness as such also nourishes a more tolerant attitude towards other persons: dumb and careless mistakes, disturbing emotional outbreaks in face of trivial situations, the unnecessary anxiety or fear about something banal, etc. - these behaviours of others that appear at first glance as unbearably annoying are perhaps not carried out consciously and deliberately with an evil intention. Rather, they might be motivated by certain concealed wounds, unexpressed wishes, or unprocessed traumas, etc., which remain unconscious for the person themselves, and which nonetheless keep directing the course of their life in some way or other. A more tolerant and understanding attitude towards others would create a better room for interpersonal communication. All the theoretical and academic matters aside, this, I hope, is the most important moral of this study for both philosophers and non-philosophers.



## Epilogue

This year marks the 13<sup>th</sup> year of my philosophical journey – from Hong Kong to Germany, it is a long and arduous journey in both literal and metaphorical sense. For me, as for everyone else, the past few years have not been easy: wars and cruelty are everywhere, the world is at the edge of collapsing, life is facing challenges of all conceivable kinds. To do philosophy almost feels like the last attempt to rescue the tiniest sense of rationality and tranquillity.

The most beautiful thing is, however, knowing that we are not alone in this difficult situation. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my academic supervisors, Prof. Dr. Thiemo Breyer and Prof. Dr. Saulius Geniusas. Having such supportive, knowledgeable and friendly supervisors is a privilege that should not be taken for granted. Throughout the years, they have always been offering both academic and administrative support in various respects. What I have learnt from them is not only philosophical knowledge, but the way to live a philosophical life with compassion and generosity. Of course, I also owe much to other scholars, Prof. Dr. Dieter Lohmar and Dr. Jagna Brudzinska, as well as the lovely colleagues of the Cologne Husserl-Archive, who have significantly contributed to my intellectual development throughout the doctoral study.

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