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

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Picture 1: “The forgotten passport”

Preface

Katrin Sowa hat sich ein höchst relevantes Thema für ihre MA Arbeit gesucht. Migration, Grenzkontrollen, Grenzzäune und -mauern, Visa, Asyl, Aufenthaltsstatus werden momentan weltweit diskutiert und angemessene Verfahren der grenzüberschreitenden Mobilität eruiert. Staatsgrenzen und Grenzübergänge werden im sub-saharanischen Afrika weiterhin intensiv kontrolliert, umfassender vielleicht als in vielen anderen Weltregionen. Derartige Kontrollen sind insbesondere in Ostafrika aus Angst vor islamistischen Terroristen in den vergangenen Jahren noch intensiviert worden. Katrin Sowas Arbeit zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass sie Grenzregimes in einem sehr umfassenden Sinne als Netzwerke von Gegenständen (z.B. Pässen, Büroräumen, Stempeln, Grenzmarkierungen) und Personen (Beamte, Reisende, Flüchtlinge) erfasst. Sie leistet damit gleichsam für die Regionalethnographie Ostafrikas aber auch für die Ethnologie in einem weiteren Sinne Wesentliches. Im Sinne der Ethnomethodologie werden Interaktions-Situationen ethnographisch umfassend beschrieben, so dass ein sehr dichtes Bild entsteht, in dem lebendige Akteure ihre Chancen ausmessen, Regeln setzen und diese wieder umgehen. Auf ausgezeichnete Weise positioniert sich Sowa dabei selber im ethnographisch erfassten Raum, in dem sie immer auch Mit(Handelnde) ist. Beeindruckend ist, wie dicht sie das Phänomen der Korruption und beschreiben kann, ohne dass die nonkonform Handelnden gebrandmarkt werden: sie verhalten sich im Rahmen ihrer Möglichkeiten angemessen und logisch. So sind Sonderzahlungen an Immigrationsbeamte keine Seltenheit, ja, sie scheinen sogar die Regel und es bestehen feste Vorstellungen, wie man sich innerhalb eines Systems, das Korruption als Regelfall kennt, regelkonform verhält. Die Ethnologin lernt an ihrer eigenen Situation, wie auf korrupte Beamte adäquat zu reagieren ist. Und sie tut dies nicht in einem moralisierenden Sinne, sondern zeigt, dass von den Beamten ein gewisses Maß an Korruptionsbereitschaft erwartet wird. Ihre Ethnographie einer innerafrikanischen Grenze wird so zu einem sehr lebendigen und lesenswerten "Ausflug" in die zeitgenössischen Widrigkeiten einer Grenzquerung.

Abstract

The former conflict-torn area of Northern Uganda has only recently developed into a 'safe haven' for refugees from South Sudan. At the same time, Ugandan state officials picture inner-African migration as a threat to the internal security of the country, and to its Northern region in particular. This thesis is based on an ethnographic study in Northern Uganda and aims to describe how the Ugandan state tries to manage and control the movements of immigrants. Law enforcement practices are illustrated and analysed in case of passport control interactions. Police and immigration officers categorize people into citizens, migrants, refugees or as illegal by making use of documents in addition to digitalised personal data. For this categorization work they further require embodied skills, knowledge and networks that they can rely on. These networks are established between various state institutions. But they also appear informally between officers and immigrants, and often involve payments that are commonly referred to as corruption. This study tries to understand networking practices from an emic point of view, whereby it combines perspectives from multiple actors. On the one hand, it presents state agents and various challenges they face during work, while on the other hand it portraits the experiences of inner-African immigrants in Northern Uganda. All in all, the thesis concludes that while the Ugandan state tries to maintain the security of the country through new policies, their practical implementation often increases the insecurity of immigrants.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank Professor Dr. Michael Bollig of the Department of Cultural and Social Anthropology in Cologne for the supervision of this thesis and for the constant support of my work. I thank the committee of the University of Cologne Faculty of Arts and Humanities for awarding this thesis with the Faculty Price. Many thanks to Jun.-Professor Dr. Martin Zillinger who recommended this thesis to the committee, and whose thought-provoking impulses helped me to develop the conceptual framework of this thesis. I would like to thank the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne for the support during my studies, and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for providing me with a PROMOS sponsorship for my fieldwork.

In Uganda, I would like to thank the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies of Gulu University. Most of all, I thank Dr. Lioba Lenhart who supervised the development of my research design. I am deeply grateful that she offered guidance through my fieldwork and provided me with many contacts. I don't think this research project would have been possible without her assistance. I also want to thank my friend Moses Odoki who helped me to understand the legal and institutional framework in Uganda. Moreover, I have to thank everyone who agreed to participate in this study. Thanks to all of my informants for contribution and openness. Some of you became close friends and make me feel like to have a second home in Gulu.

Furthermore, I would like to thank those who proofread my thesis, namely Christian Sowa, Caterina Reinker, Kathi Hager, and especially Gabi vom Bruch. I also want to thank David Vinzentz. After Uganda I realized that ethnography does not simply take place somewhere far from home, and the only thing you bring back is data. Instead I learned that what you carry back is much more than that: you may even bring back yourself as a different person - and realizing that can be quiet a hard process. So above all, I would like to thank my family for your encouragement, for your strong support throughout my studies, and throughout my whole life.

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List of Abbreviations

CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIID	Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department
CPS	Central Police Station
DISO	District Internal Security Officer
DPC	District Police Commander
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ESO	External Security Organisation
ID	Identification Document
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISO	Internal Security Organisation
JATF	Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force
LC	Local Council
LC5	Local Council Chairperson
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PRO	Public Relations Officer
PSN	Person with Special Needs
RC	Resistance Council
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
RPC	Regional Police Commander
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UHRC	Uganda Human Rights Commission
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
UPF	Uganda Police Force

Prologue: The Forgotten Passport

We are sitting in the guesthouse reception: Emma (the hotel manager from Ethiopia), Joseph (the bar employee from Gulu) and me (their Mzungu[1] customer) when we hear that a friend of us got arrested. Bless (a Nigerian who used to travel from his residence in Kampala to Northern Uganda to supply goods) ran away from a police control in another Ethiopian guesthouse but was caught by the police. The next day there is still no news from him. I ask Emma if we should go to the police station to find out what happened. He supposes it is a good idea but is afraid to go himself as his papers are not valid. So I decide to go myself.

From the police post at the bus park I am sent to the main station. It is a busy place. People enter, exit, chat, wait, and occupy the front desk: police officers in various uniforms as well as others, either plainclothes policemen and women or civilians. Some topless men seem to be detainees. Next to the front desk I see some posters with various slogans: "Your eyes are the best weapon against terrorism" and "Do not corrupt us". I ask for my friend at the desk and an officer takes me to a small and hot corrugated iron roofed office. I immediately see Bless sitting on aligned chairs with handcuffs and I am relieved to see him, maybe a bit frightened but well. There are three others in the room, none wearing uniform. Two are standing near the entrance and one is sitting opposite Bless, separated by solid wooden tables. I greet them and tell the seated man who I guess is in charge here that I was looking for my friend. He asks me to sit next to Bless and demands him to tell me the story of the arrest. Bless briefly remarks that he forgot his passport in Kampala and ran away from the police control. The seated officer interjects: "We saved him" while a mob in the bus park had tried to kill Bless, thinking he was a thief. "We could have shot him." He requires my passport and looks through it. He explains to me that the police has been checking on foreigners these days, looking for terrorists. Then I am told that the two standing officers are going to check Bless' guesthouse room for drugs while Bless should accompany them. I tell them I will wait for them to return.

The seated officer and I stay behind in the office. While I wait, we chat. He is an inspector in the crime intelligence department with many years of experience in police work. When I tell him that I am a student at Gulu University he offers to assist me in case I have questions for my research. He also offers to help me with my documents in case I need help to extend my visa. Our wait is long and I begin to wonder when the others will return. Suddenly Yonas, the Eritrean manager of the guesthouse where Bless usually stays, passes by on his way to the detention cell with water and food for Bless. He joins us waiting in the office and is interrogated about why he did not register Bless with his passport number when he checked in the hotel. At last the two plainclothes policemen return with Bless. His handcuffs are finally removed. The officers open a file from a pile of documents that lies next to an ancient typewriter. Again they require my passport and want to make photocopies. The inspector asks Bless for money so that his colleague can take the documents to a copy shop in town: "You give him 2.000[2], he is going to town. It's your document not mine." As he is broke, Yonas lends him some money for the copies. We are given a document to sign. It states that I sacrifice for Bless that he will present his

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[1] In Uganda the term *Mzungu* refers to Europeans or people with white skin colour. I willingly adopt this label that I was often given by people who I met during my research in Northern Uganda. In this thesis people are often labelled by their nationality alone, which of course is an oversimplification. It may have nothing to do with a person's perception of him or herself, but is a result of people's categorization from the perspective of the nation state.

[2] 2.000 Ugandan Shilling equal 0,60 US Dollar.

passport to the inspector before a week. Now I am getting a little nervous because I do not completely understand the impact and consequences of my signature. I fill in my name and quickly scan the form where some columns are left blank (like the amount of money I am going to pay in case Bless will not show up). We are then allowed to leave. The inspector tells Yonas "We come and check your books" and warns Bless "I know your brothers in Kampala."

When we are out of the station Bless seems relieved and thanks us. He tells us about the conditions of detention: "That place is not good for someone to be there. Serious, it's not good." Twelve people were squeezed into a dark, tiny, and poorly ventilated cell where they could either stand or cower down. Each newcomer was beaten up by the other inmates, and forced by them as some kind of 'initiation ritual' to punch and "fuck" the cell's wall. Some of them claimed they had been in there for over a week. The food that they were given smelled so bad that Bless didn't dare touching it.

After Bless has rested at Yonas' hotel he comes to see Emma, Joseph and me at the other guesthouse. He tells us about the arrest. Two undercover police officers came into the bar of Emma's hotel and asked the Eritreans and Ethiopians for their passports. Bless got nervous because of his forgotten papers and went to his room, but was followed by an officer. When the officer asked him to bring out his documents he panicked and took off towards the bus park. He was chased by the officers who started shouting him a thief in the local Acholi language. At the bus park Bless suddenly faced a mob of about twenty men who surrounded him and started beating him, until the officers interfered (not without being dealt with one or two blows themselves), and arrested him.

The same evening a Nigerian flatmate of Bless arrives from Kampala where he had heard about the arrest, and brings the passport. The next day is a Sunday, but as the inspector gave me his number during my wait in his office, we manage to make an appointment. He calls Bless and me to the stadium where he and his colleagues work out. There he invites us for a drink while he inspects the passport. When we give him a photocopy he tells us that the case is closed now. Before traveling back to Kampala Bless visits our guesthouse again. He seems annoyed, and eventually tells me that thanks to the incident he lost a lot of money. He admits that he gave money to the policemen. Before I entered the office they told him that he was going to stay in the cell until Monday, and then would be deported to Nigeria. Bless did not have his phone to inform anyone and got scared. The officers then asked him: "Now what can you do for us?" He offered them money, and while I waited in the office instead of checking his room they went to see his costumers that he regularly supplies with goods. From them he borrowed a total amount of 1.800.000 Shilling[3] and gave it to the police. Before returning to the office they advised him not to tell me about it. I now begin to understand what had taken them so long to come back to the office. Before, I was happy that everything worked out so well at the station, and I was even a bit proud that I managed to help out a friend. However, right now I wonder if my signature of the sacrifice-document really helped at all, or if my appearance made things even more complicated.

[3] This is a particularly high amount in the Ugandan context. It equals about 540 US Dollar.

1. Introduction

This study is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Northern Uganda in 2014. The prologue of this thesis originates from my fieldnotes. What is more, it marks the initiation into the research project. The study was conducted in an inductive way. Therefore, local relevance and incidents shaped the process of developing a research objective and an adequate research design. The main objective that arose in the field and which is analysed in this thesis is: What are the actual practices of immigration law enforcement in Northern Uganda?

Qualitative researchers claim that the first access to a field bares strong and meaningful information about the setting (Reichertz 1992: 15). The initiation story above already contains some of the key discourses, central motives, and main issues of the following thesis. It first of all deals with concrete practices of state agents (like police officers) who directly interact with inner-African migrants. It becomes apparent that bureaucratic practices are crucial for immigration law enforcement: documents are checked, photocopies are made, forms are filled, papers are signed, and files are opened and closed again. Bureaucratic processes might sometimes be hindered by a lack of resources. In the case mentioned, photocopies have to be made in a copy shop outside the police station. Apart from this, security and terrorism discourses are omnipresent and are directly related to immigration. Here terrorism is referred to as a justification for the police control of foreigners inside the country. Another aspect are stereotypes, like when the officers relate the nationality of the detainee to the possession of drugs. The enforcement of immigration laws does not only take place in official, bureaucratic settings but also outside of them, for example in guesthouses that are run by foreigners. The bribe, also happening outside of the office, brings in another aspect of this thesis: the impact of the informally paid money on immigration law enforcement.

No matter which setting: passports are central in situations of immigration law enforcement. Their relevance becomes especially visible when they are absent, for example because they were forgotten (Bowker & Leigh Star 1999: 3). Because of the absence of the passport the work routine of a standard passport control is disturbed and leads to the escalation of the situation: flight, chase, mob violence and arrest. The escalation also emanates from the migrant's fear of the Ugandan police and ignorance of official regulations and the immigration law of Uganda. Threats ("we know your brothers") by the officers – be they joking or serious – increase that level of uncertainty. Because of the missing passport Bless' legal status becomes unclear. The status is restored as unambiguous and legal with its reappearance only. For this, networks and cooperation between various actors are needed. Links between immigrants allow the information of the arrest to be spread as well as the forgotten passport to arrive as fast as possible. Beyond this, the inspector's attempts to link

with a *Mzungu* student (to in the future assist me with my visa) makes it possible to quicken the process and meet up with him even outside office, and office hours. Here he receives the necessary document for the file which then enables him to declare the closure of the case of the forgotten passport.

This thesis focuses on immigration law on the "street-level" (Lipsky 2010 [1980]). It does not concentrate on the legal framework alone, but looks at actual practices of its enforcement and locates them in the setting. The most relevant state actors that enforce immigration law in Uganda are immigration and police officers. Their everyday work of law enforcement mainly happens in face-to-face situations with immigrants. Concerning these encounters, the study observes the officers' techniques and methods to perform work tasks and to meet challenges. Networks are one strategy to deal with challenges and uncertainties. Actors try to establish relations that they can rely on in bureaucratic processes. Sometimes they are successful, but other times a relationship is not established. Here, networking remains only an attempt. The thesis shows that passports are a main element of encounters between officers and immigrants, but also play a crucial role for the establishment of networks. Networks as well as situational practices are sometimes informal and go against official regulations. From an anthropological perspective the occurrence of informality is not to be judged but rather understood from the emic perspective.

The study is located in Northern Uganda. After calming down from twenty years of violent conflict the region now hosts an increasing number of inner-African immigrants. Immigration is mostly related to refugee movements from the country's unstable neighbours such as South Sudan. At the same time, there are specific local security discourses and institutional challenges for (immigration) law enforcing state agents in this post conflict zone. The study approaches emic perspectives on immigration to Northern Uganda and immigration law enforcement. It combines perspectives from multiple actors: officers from different institutions, with different ranks, working inside the country and at a border post, but also refers to inner-African immigrants and how they experience immigration law enforcement in Northern Uganda.

The thesis starts (2) with an explanation of 'street-level bureaucracy'. It touches on central debates of the literature on state bureaucracy in Africa and presents theoretical perspectives that underlie this thesis. (3) contextualises, (3.1) where contemporary inner-African migration to Northern Uganda and related security discourses are portrayed. (3.2) follows an outline of the legal and institutional framework of Uganda concerning immigration. (4) presents the methods and reflects the implementation of the research project. (5) then describes practices of immigration law enforcement and locates them in the setting. This is done (5.1) for the border post of Elegu, and (5.2) for immigration law enforcement inside the country in the city of Gulu. (6) specifies networks, (6.1) networks on the institutional

level, and (6.2) informal networks between officers and immigrants. (7) reflects the occurrence of informal payment during immigration law enforcement. (7.1) highlights the unstable character of encounters between officials and immigrants, in order to explain why people engage in such payment. (7.2) describes and locates practices of corruption. (7.3) is an interpretation of an informant's statement "money is the law" where different aspects from the thesis are brought together and are discussed.

2. Street-Level Bureaucrats of African States

For the last years ethnographic studies concerning state agents and administration work have been on the rise. Nevertheless, state bureaucracy does not belong to the classical topics of anthropology at all. Historically the discipline was rather characterized by an "anthropological blind spot" for formal organisations and institutions (Rottenburg 2009: xxv). Our 'forefathers' searching for stateless societies often oversaw the local impact of colonial state implementation. It needed time and new generations of anthropologists to regard administration as an anthropological problem.[4]

The opposite can be said about sociology. In the context of the prevalence of the nation state and administrative revolution (Crozier 1971: 1) bureaucracy was one of the main concerns from the beginning. Max Weber's writings from the 1920ies still remain particularly influential. In his view, bureaucratic (legal-rational) domination characterizes the "modern state" as it is fundamentally different from other types of political leadership, for example patrimonialism (Weber 1980 [1922]: 122 ff.). For this hypothesis he described bureaucratic work as based on fast, precise, clear, and unambiguous decision making under calculable rules and laws. Bureaucrats therefore act without regard for persons and in absence of personal feelings (ibid: 562 ff.). Their work is centred in the office (*Bureau*) whereby this setting is clear cut from the bureaucrat's private sphere (ibid: 126). Later on this distinction between the public and the private was reinforced as a dualistic principle by other sociologists like Talcott Parsons.[5] Anyway, Weber's descriptions were never meant to display actual bureaucracies. Instead he used the methodological concept of the bureaucrat as an ideal type and he stated that in reality there was always deviation from the ideal (ibid: 3).

Later on, the private-public dichotomy was highly criticized as ideological (Weintraub 1997: 27). Empirical studies of organisational research led to rather different perceptions of bureaucracy compared to Weber's ideal type, for example the focus on the individual in organisations (Crozier 1971), or on comradely bureaucracy (Bosetzky et al. 2002 [1980]). Michael Lipsky analyses the US American public service and uses the concept of street-level bureaucracy: "[P]ublic service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs […]. Typically street-level bureaucrats are teachers, police officers and other law enforcement personnel" (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 3). In complex, often ambiguous situations

[4] In respect of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard who declared in *African Political Systems* to be "more interested in anthropological than in administrative problems" (Fortes & Evans-Pritchard 1961 [1940]: 1).

[5] Parsons contrasts the public professional role with the private role of an individual. His pattern variables characterize them by binary oppositions [for example "neutrality versus affectivity", or "universalism versus particularism"] (Parsons 1951).

and due to high workloads and the lack of resources street-level bureaucrats develop shortcuts aside formal procedures (ibid: 18). Law enforcement is based on discretion as the bureaucrats can only enforce the law selectively (ibid: 13 ff.). Contrary to Weber bureaucracy is no longer seen as limited to the office work place. Lipsky's notions of street-level bureaucrats coincide with other empirical studies about law enforcement agencies. Egon Bittner for example describes the importance of informal networks for police work in the streets of US skid-rows (Bittner 1967: 702).

Finally, during the 1980ies anthropologists began to see research on bureaucracy as a new paradigm for their subject (Britan & Cohen 1980). In contrast to sociologists, they studied bureaucracies also in non-'Western' contexts. Nevertheless, there are still only a few anthropological studies on bureaucrats in Africa.[6] These resemble Lipsky's approach as they focus on "interface bureaucrats" (Olivier de Sardan 2014). The few anthropological studies on Ugandan bureaucracy argue for example that "the great majority of state functionaries do not act according to Max Weber's ideal type" (Schlichte 2005: 169), and that "a clear public/private boundary […] is ambiguous and contested. The boundary may not exist at all" (Therkildsen 2014: 120).

African countries are commonly contrasted to 'the developed Western world'. Notions about deviance from ideals and official regulations are interpreted as signs for 'weak' and even 'failed states' in Africa. In this context the overall explanation of neopatrimonialism[7] is applied in a Weberian manner for all African bureaucracies. Against these notions, anthropological studies show that bureaucracies in Africa work. As shown earlier, deviation from the ideal like informality are and always have been crucial parts of bureaucratic practices everywhere in the world. Analytically, state practices should therefore be separated from ideal images of the state (Migdal & Schlichte 2005). An anthropological perspective on state bureaucracy focuses on the actor's practices in a local context and avoids normative judgement (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 2014: 8). It centres emic perspectives of bureaucrats. From this perspective "[b]ureaucrats are people first, officials in organizational positions second" (Britan & Cohen 1980: 20).

If anthropologists focus on bureaucratic practices, how do they define them? Often definitions are missing. Some authors assume "informal rules […] that underpin those practices of public actors" (Olivier de Sardan 2014: 408). This implies the proposition of an overall action scheme that specifies all practices as norm orientated or in accordance with rules.[8]

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[6] To be mentioned: *States at Work* by Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014.

[7] See Erdmann & Engel (2007) for a critical discussion of the concept.

[8] Which brings us back to where this chapter started: Talcott Parsons with his action theory based on norm and role conformity.

Such views are criticized by practice-oriented theories like ethnomethodology. Instead of the researcher to decode a hidden structure or scheme that finally explains an action, ethnomethodologists do not claim to be able to see more than the actors themselves. In their studies on bureaucracy they analyse the methods and skills of bureaucrats in practical circumstances (Zimmerman 1966: 60) "that practitioners themselves view as proper and efficient" (Bittner 1967: 701). Rules are not assumed a priori to action. It is the perception of practices "'good enough' for the members to count as satisfying the constraint that their activities 'be in accord with a rule'" (Zimmerman 1966: 13). For Harold Garfinkel everyday decision making "consists of the possibility that the person defines retrospectively the decisions that have been made. The outcome comes before the decision" (Garfinkel & Mendlovitz 1967: 114). There is evidence to transfer this possibility to the decision making of bureaucrats. As shown in connection to bureaucracy on the street-level, ambiguity "remains a core feature of bureaucratic behaviour" (Haines 1990: 264). And for law enforcement "it is the management of this ambiguity […] that commonly characterizes the activity" (Garfinkel & Mendlovitz 1967: 104).

This study focuses on a particular type of street-level bureaucrats: state agents dealing with immigration law enforcement. These agents come from various state institutions, and enforce the law together in direct interaction with immigrants. During the encounter immigrants take a very different position than state agents in terms of power imbalance. Immigrants might lose their business, prospects, home and freedom due to immigration law enforcement, while state institutions and their members "have nothing to lose by failing to satisfy clients" (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 55). Successful law enforcement relies on cooperation between actors of state institutions, and to a certain extend on the immigrants' cooperativeness. "Consensus is not necessary for cooperation nor for the successful conduct of work" (Leigh Star & Griesemer 1989: 388). This concept of cooperation without consensus exemplifies that bureaucratic work can be conducted even when such heterogeneous actors from "different worlds" are involved (ibid: 388).

This thesis analyses practices of immigration law enforcement on the street-level. At the same time it focuses on practices concerning passports. So far, there are only few ethnographic studies on state officials dealing with immigrants (for example Heyman 1995). Many mention the centrality of passports in the encounters of state bureaucrats and immigrants (for Germany see Scheffer 1997; for Zambia see Bakewell 2007). This focus on documents is found throughout studies on street-level bureaucracy. "[U]nderstanding police work requires attention to the ways in which officers author, use, and read documents" (Meehan 1986: 99). Passports are a core feature of state bureaucracy (Torpey 2000). On a theoretical level, passports as well as other standardized forms constitute the possibility of cooperation without consensus. They apply to the concept of boundary objects by Susan Leigh

Star and James R. Griesemer: “[O]bjects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites” (Leigh Star & Griesemer 1989: 393).

3. Inner-African Migration to Northern Uganda

This study on immigration law enforcement focuses on inner-African migrants in Northern Uganda. Despite the frequency of migration in Africa[9], this research area remains marginal compared to studies about migration from the 'Global South' to countries of the 'Global North'. In migration studies it has been criticized that many analysts ignore the impact of state bureaucracy and the perspective of states on migration (Torpey 2000: 5 ff.). Scholars emphasize to include state actors in migration studies (Glick Schiller & Salazar 2013: 196). For migration in Africa authors criticize perspectives that do not pay attention to the state at all. The translocality approach for example argues that because of the colonial origin of African borders international migration should analytically not be separated from internal migration. The crossing of an international border is not seen as more meaningful compared to any (cultural or ethnical) boundary (Freitag & Oppen 2010). Nevertheless, the difference between an international border and an internal boundary becomes very visible in terms of international refugees versus internally displaced people (a category especially relevant for Northern Uganda). Based on the Geneva Convention the former in contrast to the latter have access (at least on paper) to an internationally recognized label and legal status (see Zetter 1991). All in all, "there is a danger that the significance of borders, particularly African borders, may be downplayed too often. […] Despite their often 'artificial' nature, the international borders of Africa do matter" (Bakewell 2009: 41 ff.).

Contemporary policies[10] in many African countries indicate that these states regard migration as ambivalent[11] (Adepoju 2001: 56). Migration is promoted as economically beneficial, but at the same time it is restricted. "[S]ome African countries have adopted more restrictive immigration policies in an apparent effort to reduce immigration levels" (Bakewell 2009: 43). Nowadays, another topic concerns states, the Ugandan state included: "The attacks of September 11th, 2001 ushered in a new era of international security priorities" (Wright 2015: 3). All around the world, security and terrorism discourses become more relevant. This has an

[9] Statistics have to be treated with caution. Immigration data for Africa is rated as unreliable because of numerous undocumented border crossings (Bakewell 2009: 18). Yet, it is said that 82% of all international migrants in Africa are inner-African migrants (United Nations [2013]: *International Migration Report*. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, p. 3).

[10] Controlling migration has already been relevant for colonial state policy in Africa, but it was after independence that governments implemented policies of border surveillance and the management of migration (Adepoju 1995; for East Africa see Kraler 2004). Later, mobility was recognized as economically beneficial. Sub-regional organisations, like the East African Community (EAC) were established to facilitate intraregional movements (Adepoju 2001).

[11] There are references that ambivalence towards migration is not only a feature of African states. One example is the US that tries to prohibit immigration from Mexico, but at the same time benefits economically from its cheap labour supply (Fassin 2011).

impact on law enforcement practices on the street-level (for instance on policing in Niger see Göpfert 2012). This impact is described especially for immigration law enforcement practices (for example in South Africa see Landau & Vigneswaran 2007).

This chapter maps contemporary inner-African migration to Northern Uganda. It also presents Ugandan media discourses about immigration and security. After this, the legal framework of the Ugandan immigration law and the additional institutional framework are outlined.

3.1 Contemporary Migration and Security Discourses

> *We have a vast borderline with eager neighbours willing to come in, and share with us our golden cake. (Immigration Officer Michael)*
>
> *Uganda is so good. In the morning it was very cold, right now it is hot a bit. See, the weather keeps on changing naturally. God has blessed us with the weather. And people enjoy being here, I think. (Police Officer Samuel)*

These quotes from the interviews of this study present Northern Uganda as a destination for immigrants. Overall, migration has been an integral part of the history of Uganda (Mulumba & Olema 2009: 8). Exact data is not available due to the lack of regular statistical investigations, and because of high rates of unregistered border crossings. This so-called "irregular" immigration is said to be on the rise.[12]

There are only very few studies about immigration to Northern Uganda. Most of them focus on refugees, as the region "plays host to the highest numbers of refugees in Africa" (Binaisa 2013: 3). In the middle of 2014 the registered asylum seeker and refugee population in Uganda was 379,668.[13] By the end of 2015 it rose to more than 500,000 which is so far the highest number in Uganda's history and made Uganda number three of all refugee-hosting countries in Africa.[14] This influx of refugees (mainly from South Sudan and the DRC) becomes particularly visible in Northern Uganda. 116,000 South Sudanese sought protection in Uganda between the start of civil war in December 2013 until June 2014, most of them being hosted in refugee camps in the northern districts of Arua and Adjumani[15]. Northern Uganda only recently became a 'safe haven'. Until 2009 a high number of refugees and internally displaced people originated from this area, because of the violent conflict between the Lord's Resistance Army and the government of Uganda. Today, Uganda has an especially good reputation as a refugee-hosting country. The UNHCR honours the country's

[12] Int. Organization for Migration (2013): *Migration in Uganda: A Rapid Country Profile*, p. 17.
[13] UNHCR (2014): *Uganda Emergency Update*, p. 2.
[14] UNHCR (2015): Uganda hosts record 500,000 refugees and asylum-seekers. http://www.unhcr.org/ 56741 4b26.html (accessed March 31, 2016).
[15] UNHCR (2014): *Uganda Emergency Update*, p. 1.

"hospitality and generous asylum policies."[16] In contrast to other East African countries (Kraler 2004), Uganda permits refugees to work and move freely, while in rural areas they additionally have access to land (Mulumba & Olema 2009: 32). Apart from being situated in rural camps, many refugees live (often unassisted) in urban areas (Sandvik 2011). Asylum seekers do not only come from Uganda's neighbouring countries, but also from Somalia, Eritrea or Ethiopia.[17] These migrants are not mentioned in the literature at all, despite the visibility of their presence in urban daily life, for example in Kampala's popular area Kabalagala where many Ethiopian and Eritrean bars, restaurants and shops are located.

Prioritizing refugees when analysing immigration in (East) Africa is criticized: "Much research is funded by Western institutions and international agencies, which biases research agendas. Research becomes focused on specific 'crisis migration' issues" (Jonsson 2009: 13). During my stay I faced a great heterogeneity of inner-African migrants in Northern Uganda. Immigrants come from all regions of the continent, they have different legal statuses, and various reasons to immigrate apart from flight. This observation correlates with the "process of diversification" of African immigration destinations (Bakewell 2009: 22). Apart from its refugee camps, Northern Uganda becomes a destination for immigrants as economic opportunities and entrepreneurial possibilities emerge in the former war-ridden region. After the independence of South Sudan in 2011 trade routes from Sudan were shut down. The country became dependent on routes and imports from its Southern neighbouring countries. The recently renovated Great North Road from Kampala to Juba is described as South Sudan's "lifeline" (Twijnstra et al. 2014: 385). This increase of traffic and trade along the road brings economic opportunities for its passage points like the city of Gulu as well as the bordertowns Elegu and Nimule. Not only do the locals profit from this situation (Schomerus & Titeca 2012), but Northern Uganda becomes also attractive for international immigration.

To some extent the government of Uganda promotes mobility across its borders because of economic reasons. This mainly concerns regional mobility inside East Africa. The increase of mobility is facilitated for example by temporary travelling papers, which can be bought by Ugandans at border posts to the neighbouring countries. Besides, citizens of

[16] UNHCR (2015): Country operations profile: Uganda. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483c06.html (accessed March 31, 2016).

[17] Int. Organization for Migration (2013): *Migration in Uganda: A Rapid Country Profile*, p. 33.

EAC member states do not need a visa to enter Uganda. One Stop Border Posts are established to promote economic growth inside East Africa, especially for landlocked countries like Uganda.[18] So far they have not been implemented in Northern Uganda.

On the other hand, stricter border and migration surveillance is promoted in terms of security maintenance.[19] Security discourses increasingly become relevant in Uganda with regard to terrorism. The Ugandan army (UPDF) is currently involved in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to fight Al-Shabaab. In July 2010 Al-Shabaab announced to be responsible for two attacks that were launched in Kampala during the final match of the football world cup. In 2014 Ugandan security forces claimed to have prevented another attack from Al-Shabaab. A newspaper article (see Picture 3.1.1) relates the threat of terrorism to illegal border crossings into Northern Uganda. After the Al-Shabaab attack on Garissa University in Kenya 2015, Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni stated that: "the terrorism threat by extremist forces is one of the most urgent problems facing our region" (quoted in Wright 2015: 33). A worldwide strategy against terrorism is the introduction of new technologies of identification, for example electronic passports. The Ugandan Minister of Internal Affairs comments on the introduction of e-passports in Uganda: "The world has never been in a greater panic than it is right now due to threats from terrorism, and epidemics like Ebola. If you are not e-compliant, you are a step back. We do not want to be left behind."[20]

Picture 3.1.1 Newspaper article: "How al-Shabaab entered Uganda" (Source: Daily Monitor, September 16, 2014)

[18] Africa-EU Partnership (2013): One Stop Border Posts make their Way in Africa. http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/newsroom/all-news/one-stop-border-posts-make-their-way-africa (accessed April 03, 2016).

[19] Border insecurity is presented as the first category of threat for the internal security of Uganda due to military invasion, cross border raids, and illegal crossings (Government of Uganda [2004]: *White Paper Draft on Defence Transformation*, p. 18).

[20] New Vision (2014): E-passports start 2015. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1312235/-passports-start-2015 (accessed April 02, 2016).

In case of Northern Uganda threats for the internal security are related to migration from war-torn countries like South Sudan. After the conflict in Northern Uganda state security forces launched campaigns to unarm the area (Mushemeza Dickens 2008). Now there is fear of a rearming of the region. In the media, state agents blame South Sudanese to smuggle guns over the border into the country which had led to the rise of armed robberies in Northern Uganda.[21] Apart from that, the RDC of Gulu points to the threat of the South Sudanese conflict to spill over into Northern Uganda, because of a possible regrouping of the SPLA in the Ugandan border area.[22] The presented security discourses were highly present in my interviews with state agents, and often directly related to immigration to Uganda:

> *These people, the enemy of peace like Al-Shabaab, threw a bomb, you heard it, in Uganda. They are everywhere. So that thing signals to us to be very cautious with people. Specially foreigners. Because all these acts where committed by foreigners. (Police Officer Samuel)*

> *They have been in a kind of lawless situation for long. So here you have foreign nationals who come as refugees who come looking for safety, and they do not know what the law is. And some of them are very violent. (LC5 of Gulu)*

> *Most of our neighbours are not peaceful countries, like Somalia, South Sudan, Congo. They are not peaceful. Most of them when they move here, they move with guns. They end up destabilizing the security of Uganda, and of Gulu. (DPC of Gulu)*

3.2 The Immigration Law Level

In contrast to actual practices of immigration law enforcement on the street-level, this subchapter outlines the formal background for these practices. To display the contrast to the street-level I will refer to it as the 'law level'. It includes the legal framework, which means written laws and regulations that are officially recognized by the state of Uganda. It also includes the institutional framework that is the official attempt of the state to provide an infrastructure for law enforcement.

Immigration Law in Uganda is based on the 1999 *Uganda Citizenship and Immigration Control Act* (as well as its amendment from 2009) and the 1985 *Aliens (Registration and Control) Act*. These texts include interpretations of different permits, documents and statuses. They empower certain state officials to require documents, search and arrest suspects without

[21] NTV Uganda (2014): Insecurity in Gulu. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zj2JTY-2C8k (accessed April 02, 2016).
[22] Daily Monitor (2014): Influx of S. Sudanese a security threat – RDC. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Influx-of-S--Sudanese-a-security-threat---RDC/-/688334/2558846/-/jxoc1m/-/index.html (accessed April 02, 2016).

warrant. The texts demand foreigners to register and to carry certain documents all the time. These are officially issued alien identity cards as well as passports which include the permit of entry and stay. Those who alter or forge these documents, who enter and stay in Uganda without registration, and those who remain in the country after their permits have expired commit an offence as they violate the law. The two latter offences label a person a "prohibited" or "illegal" immigrant. By law, offenders have to pay a fine, and can additionally be imprisoned. Prohibited immigrants will be deported if a deportation order has been made, and until then remain in custody. There is an additional *Refugee Act* revised in 2006 that guarantees to be exempt from such penalties to those who have been granted refugee status.

Overall, there is a plurality of actors involved in handling issues of immigration in Uganda. In the case of refugees the main state institution in charge is the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM).[23] Concerning law enforcement, "[a]ll the security agencies get involved" (LC5 of Gulu). Under the government of Museveni Uganda developed a huge security apparatus (Schlichte 2005: 172). Security forces are defined by chapter twelve of the *Constitution*. Additionally, there is the *Security Act* and the *National Security Council Act*. On the district level, security maintenance is partly decentralized and transferred to the locally elected Local Council Chairperson (LC5)[24] based on the *Local Government Act*. At the same time, the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) is appointed by the president to monitor the work of the Local Council in the districts. According to the *National Security Council Act* there are security committees in each district to coordinate intelligence and security policies in the district, and to give information to the council on the national level. The committee is composed of the RDC as the chairperson, the District Internal Security Officer (DISO)[25] as secretary, the LC5, and other members that represent Ugandan security forces, like the police (UPF), the Ugandan army (UPDF), and the prison services on the district level.

It has to be mentioned that because of the conflict this institutional framework for law enforcement and security maintenance was not available for long in Northern Uganda. When fighting ended it was the first time after twenty years that police officers were actively present in the region (Mushemeza Dickens 2008: 7). In addition to the lack of trust among the

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[23] The status determination of refugees is done by a committee composed of several state ministries (Mulumba & Olema 2009). Besides, several international institutions and NGOs are involved in refugee matters, like the UNHCR, the Red Cross, the Lutheran World Federation and Save the Children.

[24] During war between the Obote government and Museveni's NRA the latter installed Resistance Councils (RCs) in the areas that were controlled by the NRA. These were later renamed in Local Councils (LC), structured from the village level (LC1) up to the district level (LC5) (Baker 2004).

[25] Based on the *Security Organisation Act*, the ESO concentrates on external security and the ISO on internal security. The latter is also available at the district level.

local population, it needed time and effort to provide the state institutions with resources and facilities to enforce the state law (ibid: 9).

The main actors that actually enforce immigration law on the street-level, work under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. These are immigration and police officers.

A) IMMIGRATION OFFICERS

The Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control has various responsibilities:

> *To facilitate the legal and orderly movement of persons to and from Uganda, regulate the residence of immigrants in Uganda, verify and process Uganda citizenship and enforce national and regional immigration laws for the development and security of Uganda.*[26]

The national headquarters are located in Kampala. The directorate is structured into three different departments: immigration control, legal services (including inspection, prosecution and deportation), citizenship and passports for Ugandan citizens.[27] On the local level however, division work according to this structure is not always possible due to the lack of resources like manpower. The regional immigration office for Northern Uganda is situated in Gulu (see Map 3.2.2). It supervises most of the border posts of the region (see Map 3.2.3) where lower rank officers conduct border management such as passport control. In the regional office, one Principle Immigration Officer as well as a lower rank officer are responsible to provide services to Ugandan citizens and immigrants, delegating specific tasks to the headquarters in Kampala, while enforcing immigration laws at the same time. This demonstrates that bureaucracy often involves that "official roles themselves [are] multiple, overlapping, and perhaps inconsistent" (Haines 1990: 265).

B) POLICE OFFICERS

In case of the police, the main actors dealing with immigration law enforcement are officers of the Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department (CIID). The fact that the police is a main actor in handling immigration matters corresponds with the international trend of "policiarization of immigration" (Fassin 2011: 221). The Ugandan Police (UPF) is highly structured by ranks (see Picture 3.2.1). On the local level there are regional offices headed by the Regional Police Commander (RPC). In Northern Uganda the regional office for the Aswa River Region is based in Gulu. There are additional offices on the district level, for

[26] Homepage of the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control: http://www.immigration.go.ug/ about/ who-we-are (accessed April 03, 2016).
[27] Homepage of the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control: www.immigration.go.ug/ about/ departments (accessed April 03, 2016).

instance the Central Police Station (CPS) of Gulu district which is headed by the District Police Commander (DPC). Police in Uganda has long been a marginalized institution compared to other security forces like the army.[28] During the last years, the UPF increased its recruitments and trainings. Especially in the North additional police officers are deployed (Biecker & Schlichte 2014: 19), but despite structural improvements of the UPF, the UPDF is still favoured by President Museveni.[29] Army personnel is appointed to high police offices, so that the UPF is criticized to be militarized and centralized (Baker 2005: 29). Researchers highlight role confusion between the police and other security agents in terms of policing in Uganda, majorly between the UPF and the UPDF (Ngufor Forkum 2007: 59), but also between the UPF, security agents of the local governments, and private security services (Baker 2005).

Picture 3.2.1 UPF poster: "Badges of Rank" (11/2014)

[28] It is said that this led to a high level of corruption inside the force (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative [2006]: *The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Uganda*, pp. 3 ff.).
[29] Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2006): *The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Uganda*, p. 5.

Map 3.2.2 Immigration offices of Uganda (Source: http://www.immigration.go.ug/about/regional-offices [accessed May 07, 2016])

Map 3.2.3 Border posts of Uganda (Source: http://www.immigration.go.ug/content/border-management [accessed May 07, 2016])

4. Methods

> *I ask the immigration officer if he has time for an interview. He interrupts me: "First I have to ask you: Are you here illegally?" I think it is a joke but then I realize that he is serious about it. I tell him that I have a Student Visa. He wants me to show it to him and I give him the black-and-white copy of my passport. He goes through the papers, and while his eyes are concentrated on the pages he asks me plenty of questions about former visas from other countries: "What were you doing there?" I start feeling a little uneasy. Finally he passes back the papers and simply says: "We can start now."*

This research was conducted during a term abroad at the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies (IPSS) of Gulu University. It is about immigration law enforcement in Northern Uganda,[30] but more specifically focuses on the area along the Great North Road. A fieldtrip to the border post in Elegu was possible, but the research concentrated mostly on Gulu. The city is one of the major 'passage points' for travellers from Kampala to Juba. It is the largest city in Northern Uganda and lodges the regional headquarters of various state institutions, for example the UPF and Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control.

The ethnographic study is based on an open and reflexive approach[31]. Objectives and research questions were formulated on the ground, and were influenced by my environment in Gulu. This environment mainly consisted of inner-African migrants (majorly people from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Nigeria, but also from Kenya, DRC, Rwanda, South Sudan and Somalia) as well as Ugandans working with them. I stayed in a lodge run by Ethiopians and we used to discuss my research objectives and strategies together. Ugandan friends who formerly studied law were very helpful for me to understand the legal and institutional framework of Uganda. Several events finally made me chose the topic of my research. Like Clifford Geertz I started to ask myself "what the hell is going on here?" These events were encounters of state agents with immigrants, whereby one of them is presented in the prologue of this thesis.

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[30] This study does not claim to include all aspects of immigration law enforcement that concern the whole region. Northern Uganda is a heterogeneous area with various local issues concerning immigration: for example Congolese and South Sudanese refugees in West Nile, as well as pastoralists' border crossings from Kenya in Karamodja (Leff 2009).

[31] Instead of testing a hypothesis (that was formulated in advance by the researcher him- or herself) priority is given to the field (Flick 2004: 69). The former opposition between researcher and the ones researched becomes blurred.

After all, this whole research project was rather exploratory, and limited in its scale. As a qualitative study the thesis does not claim to make generalizable statements about immigration law enforcement in Uganda. The findings presented here have to be treated as interpretations. Fieldwork took four months. The research design (shown in Graph 4.1) was developed under the supervision of the IPSS. It consists of "method triangulation", a mixture of different qualitative methods (Flick 2004: 81). Instead of following a fixed structure, the design and its methods were constantly adapted to the field and to the local circumstances in a flexible manner. The whole study bases on a circular process. Instead of following a linear process like statistical studies do, it shifts between the steps of research. Therefore the analysis of data was not transferred to a later point. A systematical analysis was conducted afterwards when all data was transcribed. But analysis already took place during data gathering. During fieldwork I already noted down first conclusions as initial "memos" (Emerson et al. 1995). These were reworked and specified during the main analysis. In addition to the methods presented in Graph 4.1, I analysed articles of the two major Ugandan newspapers, Daily Monitor and New Vision. The articles reflect popular discourses concerning immigration, national borders, bureaucracy and security in Uganda.

PERIOD	METHOD	AIM
1st month	(Observation)	(Focus)
2nd month	Readings	Law Level
	Interviews	Case Studies
3rd month	Interviews	Higher Ranks
	Interviews	Lower Ranks
4th month	Interviews	Lower Ranks
	Observation	Lower Ranks

Graph 4.1 Research design

Some of the main participant observations happened unplanned and accidentally. Therefore, notes were taken afterwards. These observations concerned encounters of state officials and immigrants. By the end of the research observations were conducted more systematically, and concerned everyday work routines of immigration officers. These observations were less participatory as I was not actively involved in the practices but sat by the officer's desk to observe what was going on. Bureaucratic practices cannot be studied by studying the law level alone. In fact they have to be studied "at close range" (Crozier 1971: 3). At the same time, bureaucratic settings either strictly regulate the way how public can access them, or may not be "structured for public access" at all (Nader 1972: 296). Because of restricted access to the field, observations in bureaucratic settings could only be done partially. It was possible to spend a working day together with immigration officers at the regional headquarters in Gulu, as well as at the border post in Elegu. There, the officers

were especially helpful. We took pictures and they showed me around the border, connected me to the refugee registration centre as well as to South Sudanese immigration officers for additional observation. To analyse bureaucratic settings I included sketches of offices and their interior. During my observations, I was certain that I was a source of irritation in bureaucratic settings.[32] I realised that my presence often caused surprise for those who entered the offices. In case of clients, officers did not provide any explanation about my presence, and their astonishment might have continued throughout the whole encounters. As the occasions for systematic observations were few, I took advantage of any opportunity and added observations of office settings and work practices for example during interviews.

Qualitative interviews were conducted to reflect multiple emic perspectives on immigration and immigration law enforcement. Interviews were conducted with various state agents on the one hand, and inner-African migrants on the other hand. To reflect on perspectives of immigrants, two case studies were conducted through narrative interviews. My two informants were young men who immigrated in 2012, both coming from countries that do not share a border with Uganda. What distinguishes both cases are origin and status. One case is an asylum seeker from the Horn of Africa now working in the city of Gulu. He immigrated to Uganda by crossing the border from Kenya unregistered. The other case is an immigrant from West Africa who trades goods in Northern Uganda with a tourist visa that he has to renew every three months. The interviews concerned the informants' own experiences and cases of other immigrants concerning immigration law enforcement, as well as the handling of documents.

The access to these respondents was uncomplicated. We had shared experiences with state officials together (in situations that resemble the prologue of this thesis), and had become friends. I doubt that I would have been given the same answers without these shared experiences. I believe that they had created a high level of trust, so that we could talk about sensitive topics, for example informal practices, illegality, cheating, bribes and corruption. Immigrants and especially asylum seekers[33] have to be treated as 'vulnerable' groups when it comes to research. I tried to "minimize harm" that their statements could mean for them (Bilger & van Liempt 2009: 3). Therefore the interviews were located in private places where we were undisturbed and where we could not be overheard. A recorder was used but I

[32] Other researchers also reflect on being a source of irritation in bureaucratic settings, for example in case of police stations (for Germany see Reichertz 1992; for West Africa see Beek & Göpfert 2011).

[33] Any statement which contradicts with asylum seekers' earlier statements in official interviews can mean the end of their application for a refugee status, if it becomes public.

transcribed the interviews in an anonymized form directly afterwards so that I could immediately delete the audio files. In case of narrations from the field I consistently use fake names in this thesis. Beside these case studies, additional experiences were reported to me in informal conversations with further informants. Even back in Germany, I received further news concerning mutual friends, for example about the arrest of an Ethiopian asylum seeker, or about the deportation of a Nigerian immigrant.

Interviews with state agents were conducted with various stakeholders. The respondents had to be approached with formality. Most of the times, the demonstration of an official introduction letter from the University was necessary. Altogether, everyone agreed to participate in my research, and overall people were very cooperative and friendly during the interviews. Sometimes I asked myself why the access to these state agents worked out so well. Here, I began to ask myself if it would have been the same if I had been a person of colour. There were several (awkward) situations where I (as the only *Mzungu*) found myself being pulled out from behind of a row of people, all waiting in front of an office. Another factor that had an impact on the access to the field might have been my age and gender. My interview partners were men (with only one exception), most of them much older than me. Some of their responses gave me the impression that they believed me to be inexperienced, naïve, but not a person to be suspicious of. Most of the interviews were conducted during office hours inside a person's office. This led to many interruptions, because most of the time, we were not alone but accompanied by others who at times joined the interview. In some cases I had the impression that an officer had no duties at all, and was happy about the distraction my appearance brought in.

The access to state agents was established along hierarchic structures that were already described as part of the law level. In Graph 4.2 I use the terms higher ranks and lower ranks to reflect on hierarchies. The terms only partially correlate with actual ranks but rather illustrate the difference between high rank representatives, chiefs and commissioners, compared to officers who enforce the law directly in interaction with immigrants. Starting with higher ranks, the first people I approached belong to the government of Gulu district: the LC5 (who I got connected to because he was a former student of the IPSS) and the RDC (who I contacted formally in her office hours). From here I could make use of the snowball method.[34] They connected me to other stakeholders: regional and district representatives of state security institutions: Internal Security, the UPDF and the UPF. During the research

[34] As they are part of an elite, high rank state agents are best accessed by snowball methods and through gatekeepers (Harvey 2010: 196 ff.). In one case I used the second strategy. Through a secretary of the RPC I was able to conduct interviews on the regional level of the UPF.

it was always helpful to mention the positions of my previous interview partners when introducing my research project to informants.

	INFORMANTS	INSTITUTION
HIGHER RANKS	LC5 RDC DISO PRO RPC Administrator DPC	Local Government Central Government District Internal Security District UPDF Regional Police Regional Police District Police
LOWER RANKS	Officer Mark Officer John Officer Samuel Officer Noah	Immigration > Regional Office Immigration > Border Post District Police > Crime Intelligence District Police > Criminal Investigation

Graph 4.2 List of respondents and institutions

Interviews followed guidelines which were treated in a flexible manner. The duration varied from twenty to forty minutes. Questions mostly referred to a person's office in terms of (immigration) law enforcement and evaluation concerning immigration. Like in other studies on elites and people of high ranks, the answers were often representative "rather than their own individual viewpoints" (Harvey 2010: 199). At the end of the interviews I asked my informants who the main stakeholders were that dealt with immigrants directly. The answers brought me to officers of lower ranks, working for the immigration and for the CIID of the police.

These lower rank officers correlate with street-level bureaucrats as they enforce law in direct interactions with immigrants on a daily basis. Therefore, these agents became my main informants.[35] I concentrated on four officers who belonged to different departments. In case of the police one officer worked in Crime Intelligence, and the other in Criminal Investigation. In case of the immigration officers, one worked in the regional headquarters in Gulu, while the other worked at the border post in Elegu. I already knew the police officers from previous experience with immigrants, and they connected me to the immigration officers. The interview guideline was altered from the one that I used for the higher ranks. It included further questions about work practices, routines, previous experiences and categorization of immigrants. The interviews were intensive and took much longer than the ones with higher ranks. I met two informants several times at which occasions we had time for informal conversations. Their answers were much more personal compared to the higher ranks, and they

[35] Categorizing these officers as main informants did not only derive from my own ideas. One immigration officer even introduced himself as my main informant. After I told him my research topic, he told me that he did not know who could help me more than he himself to get relevant information ("I know everything").

sometimes addressed informal practices of their work. Therefore, I decided to anonymize the lower rank officers and use fake names in this thesis.

All of my informants spoke English so that I did not have to make use of an interpreter for the interviews. Language was also not a problem during my observations, because officers spoke English during work and with each other. My informants came from various districts, belonged to all kinds of ethnic groups of Uganda and therefore spoke different languages apart from English. I was told that in Uganda, police officers are not allowed to work in the districts where they came from. Everywhere in the country, all ethnic groups should be represented in the UPF. Police and immigration officers often shift between various districts and regions during their careers, and often leave their families behind. Many of my informants only recently moved to Gulu (or Elegu). The population of Gulu mainly consists of Acholi but only few officials from the higher level (and none of my informants from the lower level) are Acholi. They presented themselves instead as Iteso, Buganda or West Nilers.

With only one exception (a denial without explanation) I was allowed to use a record machine during the interviews. Still, some encounters worked out very differently to how I had planned them. These experiences correlate with issues of "studying up" (Nader 1972), where respondents "often try to dictate conditions of an interview" (Harvey 2010: 200). When I explained my research interests to one informant with an especially high rank he suddenly started a long monologue about immigration to Northern Uganda. Eventually I found out that this was the interview already, but that I was not supposed to ask questions. Another high rank officer of older age simply took the guideline paper out of my hands, and only answered those questions that he wanted to. Again, I was not supposed to ask him questions and to guide the interview. In both cases, there was no time for me to ask for recording and I only took notes. Another time when I asked a question to a lower rank officer he turned the question back to me and told me to answer instead ("What have you learned?"), and that he would add further aspects ("I tell you what you've missed"). First I thought these interviews were total failures, because they differed so much from what I had learned about ethnographic interviews. But then, I found that all this was still data. Ideal interviewing as I had learned it, might have derived from a fairly different constellation of power that belongs to classical anthropology, which often focused on the 'poor' and the 'marginalized'. Flexibility was crucial to adapt to the local circumstances in Uganda. Sometimes interviews became stages to show off bureaucratic power, and documents like passports were involved in this presentation. As it was presented in the beginning of this chapter, the officer's legal empowerment to ask for identification was used as a resource for his demonstration of bureaucratic power towards me, marking the opening of the interview.

This study focuses on practices of immigration law enforcement including work routines. Information about routines is not always available through interviews. Routines partially

consist of embodied skills. They are characterized as implicit knowledge, often remain unquestioned and "taken for granted" (Garfinkel 1967: 35). Therefore, routinized practices cannot easily be explicated in interviews, and observation becomes a crucial approach. Nevertheless, practices can be analysed in interviews and in informal conversations as well, if the respondent's body language is included in the analysis. My respondents very often illustrated bureaucratic work with gestures that imitate stamping, or thumbing through a passport. Here, oral explanations alone did not suffice to describe practices. Sometimes the illustration was even supported by passports, files and other documents that were brought into the interview situation. Thereby, my respondents marked them as major components of immigration law enforcement practices. This study adapts this component and focuses on the documents that accompany the officers' practices, as well as the material setting where the practices are located: "involving furniture, décor, physical layout, and other background items which supply the scenery and stage props for the spate of human action played out before, within or upon them" (Goffman 1959: 22).

5. Passport Practices

The following chapters concentrate on immigration law enforcement on the street-level. In contrast to the law level that describes the official legal and institutional framework, the street-level concentrates on actual work practices. These are not mechanical applications of rules and laws. Instead, "[t]he exercise of discretion is a critical feature of decisionmaking in legal contexts" (Gilboy 1991: 571). It depends on the situation and on the setting if a pattern-following behaviour or discretion is more relevant. These tendencies will be analysed during the following chapters.

Immigration law enforcement requires the combination of territorial borders with internal boundaries.[36] In Uganda, it is structured into two domains: On Entry Management (at the border and the international airport in Entebbe) and Post Entry Management (inside the country). My main respondents have work experience in both domains, because they were deployed at the border as well as in internal offices. In both areas, passports play a central role. Officers at the border as well as inside the country make use of them. They are situational bounded instruments of identification as they always have to be compared with an individual in presence (Scheffer 1997: 196). Passports are flexible enough to adapt to various situations, and as boundary objects they satisfy informational requirements of each (Leigh Star & Griesemer 1989: 393).

Picture 5.1 President Museveni launches the National Identity Card project (Source: JLOS Bulletin 002 [2011], p. 13.)

[36] For a differentiation of territorial borders and social constructed boundaries see Fassin (2011).

Documents of identification have recently started to gain more importance in Uganda (as shown Picture 5.1 and 5.2). The National Security Information System was launched in 2013 and scheduled that registration and the possession of a national identification document become mandatory.[37] The mass enrolment started in 2014 as a preparation that only ID holders can participate at the presidential election in 2016. The Minister of Internal Affairs stated that in 2017 no child will be allowed to attend school without an ID.[38] Additionally, the Minister stated that the replacement of older machine-readable passports by e-passports in 2015 will "bolster internal security".[39]

Picture 5.2 Immigration officers lifting passports at the 2012 Independence Day Parade (Source: http://www.facebook.com/ImmigrationUganda [accessed May 07, 2016])

[37] Daily Monitor (2015): Register for national IDs or miss salaries, govt tells civil servants. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Register-for-national-IDs-or-miss-salaries--govt/-/688334/2588400/-/fj8sehz/-/index.html (accessed May 05, 2016).
[38] New Vision (2015): No national ID, no school in 2017. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/ 132 2393/ national-id-school-2017 (accessed May 05, 2016).
[39] "The e-passport is the same as a regular passport with the addition of a small contact-less integrated circuit (computer chip) embedded in the back cover. The chip securely stores the same data visually displayed on the photo page of the passport, and additionally includes a digital photograph. It can also include medical, traffic, financial and other information" (New Vision [2014]: E-passports start 2015. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1312235/-passports-start-2015 [accessed May 05, 2016]).

5.1 On Entry Management

> *The border is having these challenges. You don't have any barrier properly erected and you don't have any mechanism to identify whether this is a Ugandan or the other one. Unless you look at the documents. (Police Officer Samuel)*

This subchapter deals with law enforcement practices at the Ugandan border. The border setting is described and also the challenges that officers face regarding their work. The main task of immigration law enforcement is controlling people that want to cross the border. As the officer states in the quote above, passports and documents are central for this task. Passport control as the major practice of On Entry Management is analysed here.

Nowadays, borders are gaining significance. This can be seen in Europe, where border controls are reinstalled and intensified in context of refugee movements. But it is also described as an international phenomenon due to securitization processes since 9/11 (Feyissa & Hoehne 2010: 8; Fassin 2011: 215). In Uganda, border surveillance is a prevailing matter in security debates. In 2015, the UPF recruited additional personnel for Northern Uganda in order to "strengthen the number of Police force in the region, especially in the areas bordering South Sudan".[40]

Ugandan national borders have colonial origin and can therefore be termed as artificial constructs. Nevertheless, they might become "'real' only as long as they are […] accepted through social practice" (Migdal & Schlichte 2005: 28). The contemporary management of borders as a major security agenda demonstrates that (at least in the perspective of state security agents) borderlines are not questioned at all, but rather defended and underpinned in their existence, for example by immigration law enforcement practices in border settings. But even if Ugandan state agents do not question the border and the border line, others still might do. Recently, this led to several conflicts in Northern Uganda. During the national census in 2014, Ugandan census officials and the LC5 chairman were arrested by the South Sudanese police in Moyo, an area that is claimed by both countries. As a protest "the residents locked the border with a chain and barricaded it with a log."[41] In Lamwo in August 2015, there was a fire exchange between the UPDF and illegal South Sudanese settlers. "The district chairperson said people do not accept the GPS system saying it has been

[40] Jimmy Patrick Okema (Aswa River Regional Police Spokesperson), quoted by Acholi Times (January 05, 2015): New Police recruitment drive to seal porous border points in the North.
[41] Daily Monitor (2014): South Sudanese attacked in Moyo protest. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/S--Sudanese-attacked-in-Moyo-protest/-/688334/2453732/-/yashoa/-/index.html (accessed May 05, 2016).

corrupted by Uganda to read wrong border points".[42] And in the case of the border area around Nimule and Elegu, it is stated that "the border remains a source of permanent low-level conflict that does not necessarily end in killings, but infuses everyday life with a permanent threat" (Schomerus & Titeca 2012: 6).

5.1.1 The Border Setting

This subchapter describes the setting where On Entry Management is conducted. Elegu is one of only three border posts on the trade routes between Uganda and South Sudan. Here, the Great North Road crosses the border. Elegu is a small border town next to the South Sudanese city of Nimule. It only became an official border post a few years ago. Before, the Ugandan border post was located further inside the country in Bibia.[43]

> *The road from Gulu to Elegu passes smaller towns, like the former IDP camps Pabbo and Atiak. Other sections of the road are plain and wide lands. Our bus passes road construction sites. Suddenly the asphalt stops and the road turns bad: rough, partly muddy but most of all dusty. We stop in Elegu. The place is busy. I find wooden shacks that stand cramped in multiple lines next to the roadside. Young men are seated there, paper and notes of South Sudanese money in front of them to exchange. It looks rather improvised. Between the shacks, a few uniformed police men sit on plastic chairs. In front of them lies an iron chain on the dusty ground across the street, to stop vehicles as I imagine. I see a sign that indicates animal inspection. Plastic waste lies on the roadside. I look around and I am confused. Even if there is only one road I cannot spot a marked border, any barrier, gate or landmark. I have to ask someone to show me where to find the immigration office.*

Madi and Acholi live on both sides of the border around Elegu. State workers on the other hand come from different areas and belong to different ethnic groups. I meet Dinka immigration officers from South Sudan, and on the Ugandan side of the border I am surprised to meet many Buganda and even eat *Matooke*[44] in a restaurant.

Later I accompany immigration officer John with the office's car across the border. It turns out that the crossing of the border is not just stepping over a line from one country to another, but is rather a process where we pass by various actors and institutions involved in immigration management.

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[42] New Vision (2015): South Sudanese withdraw from Uganda territory after skirmish. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1331928/south-sudanese-withdraw-uganda-territory-skirmish (accessed May 05, 2016).

[43] During the conflict in Northern Uganda and even before, the border to Sudan remained almost unpatrolled so that the LRA was able to operate across the border, and was hiding in the border area (see Leopold 2009).

[44] A dish made from plantains that is mostly served in Central and Southern Uganda but not common in the North.

Shortly behind the Ugandan immigration office the shacks and buildings stop. A little bit further I spot a small building with a veranda. There are some flags hissed on high poles, one is from the UNHCR. Many people, mostly women and children, sit on the ground in the shade of the building, others stay around a white tent. There are a few transporters loaded with baggage, plastic chairs and even mattresses. On the veranda is a desk where two people are seated. On the tables lie piles of lists and some registration books.

Picture 5.1.1.1 Outside the refugee registration centre (12/2014)

This place is Elegu's refugee registration centre (shown in Picture 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.1.2). The bureaucratic registration of refugees is described as "a process of stereotyping which involves disaggregation, standardization, and the formulation of clear cut categories" (Zetter 1991: 44). In practice, refugee categories are often less clear, for example the categorisation between self-settled refugees and those staying in official settlements. Some refugees will register for the official settlements to receive food rations, but nevertheless settle outside the camps (Singh 2005: 250). At the border of Elegu, refugees are separated from other immigrants that register in the immigration office (shown in Picture 5.1.1.4). The two bureaucrats sitting here belong to the OPM, but tell me that also UNHCR and NGOs like Save the Children and the Red Cross are involved. The registration personnel tells me that all the people here do not have any kind of identification document. They line up to get registered. There are two lists: one registration sheet in general where name, number of household,

age and ethnic group[45] are written down. The other list registers if a person has special needs (for example in case of a pregnancy) and will receive a temporary PSN card. After the first registration the refugees wait until they are transferred to a reception centre in Nyumanzi where everyone is given an identification card. Later they are relocated to rural refugee settlements, for example Ayilo II and Mungula settlements in Adjumani.[46] Here, they receive food rations, household items and items for shelter construction.

Picture 5.1.1.2 South Sudanese refugees are getting registered (12/2014)

Behind the refugee compound follows "no man's land". Officer John explains to me that some people used to build houses here, but they were destroyed by the state as no one was allowed to live here. We pass a bridge across a small river. A sign with an arrow indicates that we have to change the side of the road.[47] Behind the river we enter Nimule. Here, the roads are in good condition. We pass South Sudanese policemen or soldiers that wave us through as soon as they spot John wearing his uniform. Trucks park in front of customs. We pass by a stone building where "Immigration" is written on its well-preserved façade.

[45] By the end of 2014 the Madi were the main ethnic group registering as refugees in the centre of Elegu. Rumours indicated that the war in South Sudan was now turning against the Madi population around Nimule. Because of the rumours many took flight to Northern Uganda at the time of my observation.
[46] UNHCR [2014]: *Uganda Emergency Update*, pp. 3 ff.
[47] In Uganda traffic drives left while in South Sudan it drives on the right side.

Picture 5.1.1.3 People crossing the “no man’s land” (12/2014)

The total border length between Uganda and South Sudan is about 435 kilometres. The map shows many parts of it as straight lines. But around Elegu and Nimule it changes to a more ‘natural’ line that is oriented towards the small river Unyama.[48] In contrast to Elegu, Nimule has been holding a border post for long and has developed a good infrastructure. I am told that Ugandan and South Sudanese immigration officers communicate and exchange information on a daily basis. This becomes visible when we arrive back at the Ugandan immigration office.

> *A colleague tells Officer John that a South Sudanese immigration officer had come to his office. He had asked him to send back the Madi refugees, as there was no real threat for them in Nimule but only rumours. The colleague asks John: “What do we do with them?”*

Afterwards, John tells his colleague that their office is not responsible for refugees and cannot do anything. On the law level, the responsibility for handling refugees is transferred to different institutions than to those dealing with other categories of immigrants. Nevertheless, on the street-level the assignment is not happening automatically. Sometimes (like in the

[48] Originally, the colonial border was roughly defined as a straight line by the British. This changed after the death of King Leopold in 1909 when a part of the former Belgian Congo was transferred to Britain. A British commission was then sent to define a new and more precise borderline between Sudan and Uganda. Some areas were not accessed easily and remained straight lines on the map. But around Nimule, the commission worked out a twisting line following the river (Blake 1997).

case of John's colleague) uncertainty is involved. Another example of sorting out responsibilities is given by Officer John during the interview: "Sometimes people come and claim that they are refugees, and yet they are not. So it becomes a bit of a challenge. Like you have to call UNHCR for them to be able to identify the responsibilities."

The immigration officers that I meet in Elegu tell me that their daily work load (all people crossing the border and getting registered apart from refugees) encompasses eight to fifteen buses. Most of them arrive in the morning and by that time the place is busy. Therefore, there is a wooden roof on poles in front of the Ugandan immigration office to protect the waiting queue from the sunshine. Here, people are supposed to line up if they want to get access to the office. There is a small table at the end of the roof where one or two workers assist to fill out forms. Officer John tells me that this is necessary because people are not always able to read or write. Next to the table is the entrance to the immigration office.

Picture 5.1.1.4 Outside the immigration office in Elegu (12/2014)

Picture 5.1.1.5 'Frontstage' of the border post (12/2014)

The office is separated by a wooden barrier that isolates clients against the bureaucrats (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 117 f.). The barrier has two windows through which the people standing in line can see immigration officers that are seated behind. Again, the people are supposed to line up in front of each occupied window. The office setting thereby "provide[s] an orderly way of bringing the public and the officials of the agency together" (Zimmerman 1966: 323). The officers are wearing white immigration uniforms which are obligatory at the border. The uniform marks the officers as state agents that represent the Ugandan state. This is reinforced by the president's portrait hanging behind them (as shown in Picture 5.1.1.5). They are seated on elevated chairs so that they look down at the people approaching them. These can only spot the upper part of their body, while the officers can oversee the whole room. On a small desk is a scanner for fingerprints. The person standing in front of the wall is facing a camera. The window has a small area without glass. This is the only spot in the setting where physical contact between officer and client is possible. This space is used for the passport to be handed over. This office environment "conditions the way [officers] perceive problems and frame solutions to them. The work environment of street-level bureaucrats is structured by common conditions that give rise to common patterns of practice" (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 27), like the common practice of passport controls in the case of a border post setting.

Only the entrance and the front of the immigration desks are meant for public access. The other side of the wall (shown in Picture 5.1.1.6) can only be reached by the officers through a covered and closed door.[49] Behind I see the high bar-stools, small desks with stamps, documents, the passport reading machine and the computer, but apart from these official utensils there are also sodas, food and newspapers lying around. Across the room a small television is installed that shows music videos and can be watched from this position. The space behind the barrier which cannot be spotted by the public is rather messy. This is the 'backstage' of the immigration office. Another 'backstage' is found in a small back room.



Picture 5.1.1.6 'Backstage' of the border post (12/2014)

The public is not supposed to enter here, where documents are kept and the generator is installed. A 'backstage' stores equipment needed for presentations on the 'frontstage', it can be used "privately" because here, "the person can relax; he drops his front, forgo speaking his lines and steps out of character" (Goffman 1959: 112). Behind this room there is a backyard with little apartments and a shared lavatory. This space serves as private space for the officers. As described here, the spatial distinction between public front and private backstage is shaped and partially controlled by the structure of the setting.[50]

[49] Closed doors are an essential part of law enforcing institutions, like the police (Beek 2012).
[50] In the case of police stations, the same dichotomized character is described between a public front and a private back-region. "Here, police control space free from the ears and eyes of members of the public" (Holdaway 1980: 84).

During the interviews my respondents name several challenges for immigration law enforcement that derive from the border setting. The main point concerns border porosity. Officially, the immigration border post in Elegu is an "obligatory passage point" (Callon 1986) for people who want to cross the border. The immigration officers can be described as gate-keepers. Nevertheless, in practice the passage point is often bypassed, for example by one of my informants: "I didn't register on the border. I just hide when I enter to Uganda. You know, when I was with the driver? I give the driver some small money. Then I told him, Sir, I don't like to see me this people. Because they can record you" (Immigrant, anonymous). Apart from a few border posts the borderline is unmonitored. Many prefer to choose informal ways to cross the border. "These *bodaboda* motorcycles they smuggle people. They smuggle all, everything. Goods, people, anything. And yet, for them they reach everywhere. They can use a foot path" (Immigration Officer John). "People have shortcuts. Where they prefer to use un-gazetted roads. We call them *panya*[51] roads. Those illegal roads which are not gazetted" (Police Officer Samuel). The officers give different explanations for this behaviour. People living in the border area have family members living on the other side of the border, which they want to visit without bureaucratic formality. Others might want to avoid visa fees, while still others simply do not know that they are supposed to get registered:

> *Most of them they are travelling for the first time. They don't even have passports. They bypass their own office when they come. And you have to explain to the person, for him to be able to understand that he or she needs a travel document from his own country. (Immigration Officer John)*

My informants from the border post state that they lack resources to successfully practice immigration law enforcement, especially when it comes to manpower. "The border is porous. A little bit stretched. So you have to be in all places at the same time. But me, I cannot be there" (Immigration Officer John).

[51] *Panya* is translated 'rat' in Kiswahili, while '*panya* roads' mean unofficial roads and shortcuts.

5.1.2 Passport Control as Categorization Work

> *Wherever you go any immigration officer will just tell you. They hold your passport like this. [He leans back and stretches one hand in front of his body. The other hand imitates the flipping of an imaginary passport's pages.] Oh, you are a Nigerian? Then they say: Ok, hold on. Wait here. [He points next to himself.] You know? Because you can't finish a Nigerian in the five minutes you have given him. You need to look at him through your glasses. Look carefully. Use the machine also. Use the passport. Before you make a decision. So you need to be very careful. (Immigration Officer Michael)*

This quote contains some of the main constituents of passport control. The passport is the central element of the situation. It is supported by technologies like computers and passport reading machines. For the officers, controls are routinized work. Repetitive body movements are involved. These are imitated during the interview. Through reading the passport[52] a person's nationality is identified. At the next time the identification leads to categorization which is mainly based on previous knowledge. As it will be presented in this subchapter, nationality is commonly linked to certain categories of crime and security issues as part of immigration law enforcement. Therefore, passport control as the main practice of On Entry Management can be called 'categorization work'.[53]

The passport control begins when the client passes his or her passport through the hole of the window of the immigration desk. The immigration officer reads through the passport with a trained "administrative sight" (Scheffer 1997). Officers undergo trainings in how to handle passports correctly. During one interview I am told to look through the passport of a Kenyan immigrant and the officer gives me instructions ("Look at it. Open it. Open it again."). The officers develop skills for this task. They adapt the sight to the movement of hands, and switch between looking at the document and looking at the person. Their movements are fast and they rapidly gather relevant information from the document.

> *As I flip through here, like this, I am talking to you. (One of his hand is holding the passport while the fingers of the other hand are flipping through the document. Simultaneously he takes a look at the pages but glances at me again and again without moving his head but only his eyes.) I will be looking to you, and talking to you, and look at it, and talking to you, and look. So at the end of this journey through the passport I will have known where he has been to, when and how. (Immigration Officer Michael)*

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[52] The control of travel documents is the main issue in the immigration office in Elegu. There are of course different types of travel documents, for example temporary travel documents. Nevertheless, the descriptions in this chapter overall focus on passports.

[53] This refers to Bowker and Leigh-Star who state that the creation and maintenance of categories overall is a "work practice" (Bowker & Leigh Star 1999: 5).

Passports as “immutable mobiles” are designed to be readable, flat, mobile, and consistent (Latour 2006). Here, the passport is treated as a source of knowledge about a person’s nationality and status (of being a refugee, resident, prohibited or illegal immigrant). Immigration officers in Uganda are also trained in document detection. Here, the materiality of the passport comes into focus. The officers develop a keen sense for the material which goes beyond everybody. Officer Michael states: “You will not know if one page was teared out before. You will flip on. But the immigration will know.”

Passport control is labour intensive (Gilboy 1991: 579). During the control the passport is combined with other tools. All this is done in a fixed order. The immigration officer follows the same steps in each encounter. On Entry Management is characterized mainly by this routine work: “Your passport please, can I look here, stand this camera. Do this, do that, do this” (Immigration Officer Michael). The passport is placed on the passport reading machine. The document that was filled at the entrance is handed over to the officer. Photographs and fingerprints are taken, both techniques that are “reading off the body” (Torpey 2000: 17).[54] The officer checks information about a person which is saved in a computer system. The system checks if the passport number and a person’s fingerprints are consistent. The officers at the border tell me that this is very useful as sometimes the identification of a person by the passport picture alone is not sufficient.

> *It is normally with the Somalis because their faces are almost the same. So sometimes, if you don’t take their fingerprints it can be hard for you. […] If the fingerprints don’t match the ones which are stored in the computer it will bring a message. Then we know that this person is holding another person’s document. (Immigration Officer John)*

The bureaucrat’s administrative vision is culturally practiced and always limited. Therefore, Scheffer calls the inability to recognise faces that bureaucrats are not familiar with a “sight disorder” (Scheffer 1997: 190). Without the computer warning the officer stamps the passport and beckons the next person over. In case of inconsistency, a red warning sign saying “invalid” is shown on the whole computer screen. This can only be seen by the officer but not by the person standing in front of the desk. The setting provides an “informal preserve” for the officers behind the barrier that controls the access of information (Goffman 1971: 63 f.).

[54] This contrasts identification techniques of “writing on the body” like branding, scarification and tattooing. Nowadays, the passport is said to have replaced these techniques to the greatest extent on the state level (Torpey 2000: 17).

But even with the check-up through the computer, the immigration officer him- or herself must constantly doubt the authenticity of the passport and the identity of a person, because often "the organizational intelligence system provides incomplete, unreliable, or dated knowledge about certain travellers" (Gilboy 1991: 579). One officer states: "If you relax wrong ones will pass and they will cause trouble." The term 'wrong ones' (as well as 'wrong elements') is an expression that many of my informants use to categorize criminals, smugglers or terrorists among immigrants. Their duty in terms of immigration law enforcement is to detect such 'wrong elements' and prevent them from entering Uganda. But at the same time the extensive control of every person is hindered by time pressure, as this is the case for every passport control at busy border posts (Heyman 1995: 272).

> *You need to be sharp. Pay attention for quick decision making. You need a quick mind. Many people are there. You only have five minutes to flip through each passport. Next, next. (He imitates a stamp by making a fist with his right hand, moving it twice towards the table.) In between, there is one smuggler carrying six kilogram of cocaine in the stomach. You have to look at the body language, look them in the eyes and make decisions immediately. Then my antennas (He points at his head.) come out. (Immigration Officer Michael)*

The officer's 'antennas' indicate that intuition is another important aspect of On Entry Management apart from passports and computer systems. Another aspect is previous knowledge. What people believe to be true influences the categorization of people. This can happen in terms of security matters, as Janet Gilboy explains when immigration officers at an US airport categorize travellers by nationality into positive and negative categories (Gilboy 1991: 587). Such a categorization on the basis of nationality is described by my informants as well: "From all experiences and knowledge we can be able to grade you by your nationality" (Immigration Officer Michael). Grading people by nationality often implicates prejudice and stereotypes, for example: "Every time you get a Nigerian at least there has to be something wrong with him" (Immigration Officer Michael). "South Sudanese are the worst. They are very feasible. No emotions with no intellect like warriors. Somalis also. Like stabbing people with knives" (Police Officer Samuel). This 'knowledge' is not provided by the computer system but brought into the passport control by the officers themselves. Sometimes it can derive from an officer's experience, but most of the times it is shared within the organisation and its members: "All this that I am telling you is not knowledge I came with, but it is knowledge I found here because of my office" (Immigration Officer Michael). The last aspects demonstrate that even if passports formally look equal, their owners are not equally treated during passport controls. Passports might contain the same legal status, but the nationality itself often leads to different treatments by state officials.

5.2 Post Entry Management

> *We hope that in the near future we should be able to improve on our Post Entry Management. Because we can't man all the borders (Immigration Officer Michael).*

The previous chapter mentions challenges that officers face concerning immigration law enforcement at the border setting. My informants describe border porosity as a threat for the security of Uganda. Recently, there has been a shift towards another strategy of immigration law enforcement that deals with it inside the country: Post Entry Management. Post Entry Management is structured into two domains: "That is the facilitation and control of aliens who have entered Uganda" (Immigration Officer Michael). In Northern Uganda facilitation is done in the regional immigration office in Gulu while control is taking place mainly outside offices. Officers check "the right people and the right country, the right purpose, using the right passes. So that's where you may find us. Check a few places, talk to a few people, moving, ask for a few documents here and there" (Immigration Officer Michael). This chapter is structured according to this organisation: first it deals with office work and afterwards it moves on to checks and controls outside the office's setting.

This analysis of Post Entry Management is concentrated on the city of Gulu. It is the city of Northern Uganda with the highest population, estimated to be around 370,000.[55] Gulu is located about one hundred kilometres away from the border to South Sudan. The Great North Road passes through the city and public buses stop here along their way between Juba and Kampala. Because of the recent influx of trade towards South Sudan the city is labelled "border boomtown" (Yoshino et al. 2012 cited in Schomerus & Titeca 2012: 6).[56] Economic opportunities for locals as well as for immigrants arise, for example in the transport sector or in the hotel sector, accommodating travellers and traders. In addition to that, many refugees and asylum seekers choose to live in urban centres. Urban refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda come from the DRC, Somalia, Eritrea, Rwanda or Ethiopia, while refugees in rural settlements mainly come from Uganda's neighbouring countries like South Sudan and the DRC (Mulumba & Olema 2009: 37). As by law they are allowed to work, many refugees stay in cities like Gulu where they are unassisted by the UNHCR, but free to start a business. As it was described in the chapter about the law level, refugee matters are transferred to specialised institutions. But in practice Uganda resembles many African states where "a refugee is treated like any other legally resident foreigner" (Ricca

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[55] LC Performance and Public Service Delivery in Uganda (2011/12): *Gulu District Council Score-Card Report*, p. 3.

[56] During the conflict in Northern Uganda this was not the case. Due to insecurities around Gulu the city of Arua in West Nile was the major crossing point towards Sudan (Leopold 2009: 474).

1989: 145). This can be observed in the case of Post Entry Management in Gulu as it will be described in this thesis.

5.2.1 Office-Work

Weber describes the office ("Bureau") as the central point for legal acting (Weber 1980 [1922]: 126). The regional immigration office of Gulu is a small room (see Graph 5.2.1.1) in a side wing of an office building where several departments of the Ministry for Internal Affairs are seated. Two chairs stand in the hall for people to sit and wait before it is their turn to enter. There are two desks in the office. The one in front of the door belongs to the Principle Immigration Officer who is in charge of the whole region. He is seated in a mobile office chair. A small Ugandan flag stands on the table. It marks that this office belongs to the state. Batches of files and documents are spread over the table. On the other side of the room there is another desk with a computer and even more files lying around. A lower rank immigration officer is sitting here. There are wooden chairs for clients standing in front of each desk.



Graph 5.2.1.1: Setting of the immigration office in Gulu

> *A young man enters the office. He shortly looks at me and seems a little confused about my presence. Officer Michael asks him to sit down in front of his desk. The man sits a bit distant from the table. During the encounter he seems a little nervous and restless. He does not take off his rucksack, sits straight on the edge of his chair while his arms are folded in front of his body. On the other side of the table the officer moves around on his mobile chair. He thumbs though the file of the young man while moving his arms far over the table when reaching for additional documents, the Constitution and office utensils.*

During this encounter different 'territories' for the participants of the situation are provided by the setting and claimed through practices (according to Goffman 1971). During the encounter, the 'use space' of Officer Michael refers to the whole table. His space is even extended through his mobile chair. On the other hand, the client is not able to make use of the table himself because the whole table is already occupied by the officer's files and utensils. His territory is restricted to the 'personal space' of his body and to the chair on which he is sitting. The young man reinforces this arrangement and does not even dare to put off

his rucksack. Here, spaces mark inequalities during the bureaucratic encounter: “[T]he higher the rank, the greater the size of all territories of the self” (ibid: 65).

During my observation I get the notion that files follow a particular path through this office. The files on the desk of the Principle Immigration Officer are sorted into various piles: “Alien Files” on his right and “Citizen Files” (labelled “Gulu”) on his left. The files have notes sticking on them where missing documents and missing information are listed, as well as tasks that have to be carried out. When the file is complete and tasks are carried out the Principle Immigration Officer removes the sticky notes. The files are passed on to the other desk where the information is typed into the computer system. Passports and other identification documents are often not physically present (unless they are to be sent to Kampala for visa extensions as this can only be done in the main headquarters). Instead, files contain their photocopies but these copies are not always trusted. Officer Samuel tells me how to cope with passports not present: “Normally you verify through the major computer we have. Compare the code. They can be frauds, but there is a code which says it is from this file number this person has been given. Then we know it. That is how we identify.”

Several challenges are formulated for immigration law enforcement in this setting. One is the shortage of manpower. In contrast to the official division of tasks of the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control that was presented in the chapter about the law level, only few officers work at the regional office and have to handle all issues at the same time. “My job is from top to bottom, filling the gaps. This man does it all” (Immigration Officer Michael). The officers are responsible for citizens and passport issues, as well as for immigrants and their legal status. At the same time, the regional office coordinates most of the border posts in the North. Even if facilitation is the main task of the regional office, the officers still are responsible for law enforcement and control. This leads to doubts about the authenticity of documents and about the truth of clients’ statements. The officers tell me about several cases where clients made false statements. “So he comes down here and wishes to beat the system so that he can get a Ugandan travelling document and use it for illicit trade. So we get such people. Coming in here” (Immigration Officer Michael).

The regional immigration office stores the contacts of the registered immigrants in Northern Uganda into the computer system. The system automatically picks the digitalized files of immigrants whose documents are soon going to expire. When documents are not renewed on time, the immigration officers are aware that a status has changed from legal to illegal. The system provides telephone numbers, work and residence addresses of registered migrants. The officers regularly call the migrants that were picked by the system and order them to come to their office. “We request them to come physically” (Immigration Officer Michael). A pile on the desk of the Principle Immigration Officer consists of those cases and the officer calls one by one during my observation.

Officer Michael calls another number with his mobile phone. "How are you? (…) I am still waiting for you in the office. (…) You should come and declare here first." He hangs up abruptly. Michael tells me that the person has an expired visa. "This one is running away. Heading towards Kampala."

During my observation only one person shows up in the office. An Indian man is begging the officers "Please tomorrow. My wife is sick." Michael seems to be annoyed. "You are delaying again." Finally the man is allowed to leave, but reminded to return the next day.
A major challenge for Post Entry Management in regional immigration offices is that many immigrants do not come to the office at all. When I tell my friends who immigrated to Uganda that I am going to the immigration office in Gulu, they are surprised that such a place even exists. Only few had been registered in the regional office. For those that are in Gulu as refugees and asylum seekers "matters, even amidst local decentralization policy in Uganda, are highly centralized" (Mulumba & Olema 2009: 33). The responsible OPM does not provide regional offices. Therefore, asylum seekers have to travel to the office in Kampala to extend their papers every three months. The regional office for other immigrants in Gulu does not issue visas directly from here, but transfers documents towards the main headquarters. So even if immigrants are aware of the regional office, many still prefer to extend their visas directly in Kampala.

5.2.2 Audit Checks

Post Entry Management is often hindered when immigrants do not come to the regional offices at all. Those that were registered are called by the immigration officers when the computer system indicates that their status has changed: "I will ask them: You want to come to my office? Can you come now? Most of them already know why I am calling. If he doesn't come I call Samuel and say: Please can you pick so and so. Bring them here" (Immigration Officer Michael). Officer Samuel works for the CIID of the police in Gulu. "Police officers, especially crime intelligence, they are the ones who do it. They can inform the authority, inform the immigration. They have right to arrest and hand over to immigration" (Police Officer Samuel). This part of immigration law enforcement happens outside of offices, and "this is where the police comes in" (DISO of Gulu).
But only some immigrants are registered and can be located by an address through the computer system. The major challenge for immigration law enforcement is claimed to be immigrants that enter and stay without getting registered at all.

In Gulu illegal immigrants, people who are unlawfully staying present in the district of Gulu are many. So challenges we have, they are there because they don't want to come willingly, even to report their presence. Even when they know that their visa has expired. So we have to follow them. (Police Officer Samuel)

Unregistered immigrants are seen as a threat for the national security.[57] Therefore, police officers check on foreigners and ask for passports on spec. The officers call this "audit checks".

> *We do audit checks. Whether in the hotel, whether in offices. We crack down on the immigrants. Any time. Maybe you have reasons to believe that some people are staying in a barrack. They are foreigners but we don't know if they are good. That's what we call audit checks. (Police Officer Samuel)*

Where do police officers undertake audit checks? There are certain "hot spots" where high numbers of inner-African immigrants can be found (Dijk 2011). "In a place foreigners do business, they come once in a while. They can take like five months, they will come and check people there and know if the papers are correct" (Immigrant, anonymous). In Gulu 'hot spots' are for example restaurants, bars and guesthouses that are run by inner-African foreigners. These informal settings differ very much from offices and border posts which are structured for the encounter between immigrants and state agents. In contrast to border posts, police officers wear no uniforms during audit checks, to "appear to be a common person" (Police Officer Noah). Instead of wearing uniform, a document identifies the officer as belonging to a state institution.

> *So you should first of all begin with humble questions. And of course you should be showing your card. Which gives you the privilege of a police officer. Warrant card, you see (He shows me a small card that he takes from the pocket of his shirt. Warrant is written on it in capital letters. It shows the emblem of the Ugandan police and his picture.) It warrants me to do the work, without I cannot act. (Police Officer Samuel)*

By regulations, showing this document is an essential part of passport control outside offices.

One example of an audit check in an informal setting can be found in the prologue of this thesis, where police officers check passports in an Eritrean guesthouse. Other times, I recognise officers sitting in foreign-run hotel bars or restaurants, but I am not sure if this is an audit check and they are there for work, or if they pass their time here privately. One informant tells me later that he feels to be on a twenty-four hours duty, where "even if I am drinking

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[57] During the interview with the LC5 he tells me that after the arrests of Al-Shabaab members in Uganda in 2014 the local governments were told by the central government to find out if foreigners in their districts were in Uganda illegally. He interprets this as a confusion of roles and responsibilities between state actors: "I said what moral authority do I have as the local government? So first of all how do I start? Which part of the law would I use? Of course we have to monitor. But I can only monitor when you are involved with organisations. I cannot find you on the street and begin asking you. That is going to be purely at the institutional level. But if I begin following you and all that, that is not my role. So that is probably the role of the police."

I am doing my work" (Police Officer Noah). A clear distinction between private and official is blurred. One time I am present during an audit check when two police officers enter the guesthouse where I am staying.

> *I am in my room when I hear loud voices from the reception area. One of the voices sounds familiar. The Ethiopian hotel manager Emma calls out my room neighbour from Kenya. After some minutes I see the Kenyan coming back from the reception. Now Emma calls my name. I enter the reception room. Two men are sitting in front of Emma's reception desk. I recognize one of them immediately. It's the inspector that I met at the CPS during Bless' arrest. He looks surprised to meet me again. We greet each other. Again he is not wearing uniform. The officer first of all asks me to present my passport to the other man who is also a police officer. He then asks me if I know the Kenyan customer. I tell him that he is attached to Gulu University. Then the inspector passes a black and white photocopy to me. "Do you know this paper?" I look at it, and read "asylum". There is a passport picture which is hard to identify. Then I realise that the document refers to Emma, the hotel manager. The inspector points at the expiry date: it expired almost two months ago. He takes back the document. Emma says: "Please forgive me Sir, this time." The inspector rejects and tells us that a period of two months is too long to forgive: "It is a state issue now." He says to his colleague: "We should take him at least for one night. We get a car and we go." Emma and I know that this means detention, and because of Bless we know what the detention cells are like. I am asked to go back to my room where I wait anxiously.*
>
> *During my wait I try to make sense of the voices I hear from the reception. Other people are arriving to the scene. They are in the compound now. I see our Ugandan friend Joseph talking to the inspector in Luo while Emma is running up and down talking Tigrinya on the phone. Later the place is quiet again. I enter the reception and I am relieved to see Emma sitting behind his desk. The police officers are gone. The whole evening we sit together and talk about what has happened together with the Kenyan customer and Joseph. But despite all kinds of explanations I can't stop being confused about what has happened and what has made the police men change their minds. The next day Emma tells me during breakfast that while the inspector was talking to Joseph outside the reception, Emma secretly gave fifty thousand Ugandan Shillings*[58] *to the other officer. After that, both officers left the guesthouse.*

Audit checks are passport controls. Compared to the passport control at the border post this control is less routinized. Law enforcement practices outside offices are placed in complex settings with a variety of actors. Here, decision-making of street-level bureaucrats is often ad-hoc, situational and intuitive (Bittner 1967: 712). With often no time and resources available for a careful evaluation of the situation in advance of their decisions-making, police officers frequently "worry […] about the law and organizational procedure afterwards" (Meehan 1986: 77). The outcome of this passport control seems less clear than at the border post. In the situation above, the immigrant gets off lightly. The outcome seems to partially depend on negotiation skills. The access to the setting is not controlled and therefore

[58] Which equals 15 US Dollar.

other actors emerge at the scene, like a friend that speaks the same language as the inspector. These actors support the immigrant during the audit check. They guarantee the police that he is not a criminal and will get his papers done as soon as possible.

Other times immigrants will not be as lucky and the outcome will be completely different. Officer Samuel tells me about the arrest of several Eritreans in an Ethiopian restaurant. They had entered Uganda without getting registered and were on their way towards Kampala. Later, I am told by the workers of the restaurant that the driver of their vehicle (probably their trafficker) was arrogant and insulting towards the officers which led to the arrests. Researchers highlight the significance of discretion for police work. Rules must be enforced selectively, because the police cannot arrest everybody who is committing an offence (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 14). Law enforcement therefore is not controllable by laws and regulations alone. Street-level bureaucrats "are not passively obeying orders; they are also moral agents" (Fassin 2011: 218).[59] In the case of immigration law enforcement Officer Noah states: "Is it the first time he is committing or she is committing the offence, we forgive. And we process the documents. If not, we deport."

Again, passport control involves categorization work. But in case of Post Entry Management the implementation of categorization differs from the border post. It is obvious that apart from official entry and exit points officers cannot ask every person for his or her passport. They either concentrate on 'hot spots' where they expect immigrants to be. In addition to that, categorization may occur even before the passport is checked. Through prior categorization, officers make a selection of people that they expect to be foreigners. Some immigrants are more often affected by audit checks than others due to their appearance, and for example due to gender perceptions.

> *Actually, a foreign woman can live very freely here, more than a man. I don't know why. I think because especially black women, I think they just look the same. Whether they are brown, too brown or dark and all that, nobody cares. (LC 5 of Gulu)*

Stereotyping is a general strategy for police patrols. "Young men in groups are suspicious, as are solitary women at night. This appears to be a specific feature not only of the Ugandan police, but a characteristic of police in general" (Biecker & Schlichte 2014: 27). Especially relevant for immigration law enforcement are practices of racial profiling.

> *The way they look. You will just know. They are extremely dark. They are tall. It is very easy to know that. You can identify them. Even in Gulu they are here. Even the*

[59] In accordance with Heyman J. (2000): Respect for outsiders? Respect for the law? The moral evaluation of high-scale issues by US immigration officers. In: *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 6(4), pp. 635-652.

hand is dark. And they are culturally, generally, also naturally hostile people. (RPC of Aswa River Region about South Sudanese immigrants)

One case demonstrates how categorization through racial profiling is related to security and terrorism discourses in Uganda:

Back in Germany one of my friends calls me and tells me that he was arrested in Gulu. It was during the election campaigns when President Museveni came to Northern Uganda. My friend, an asylum seeker from Ethiopia, was on his way home when he suddenly got in the way of the President's escort. He immediately was arrested. Because of his skin colour the security agents thought him to be a Somalian immigrant. They suspected him of belonging to Al-Shabaab and of having planned to attack the president. He had to stay in the detention cell for one night until he was released.

It is reported that in Uganda illegal arrests often happen "under the guise of expressions like 'reasons of state, hostile origin or association, acts prejudicial to public safety or defence of the state' which have been mystified and likened to subversion and even terrorism" (Ngufor Forkum 2007: 51). In the case above, passport and documents are not involved in the categorization at all. Instead, a lighter skin colour alone is enough to categorize a person as a security threat and a terrorist.

6. Making of Passport Networks

Cooperation between state agents is necessary for immigration law enforcement. The co-operation between various state institutions is described in this chapter. Apart from that, informal cooperative relations between state agents and immigrants are analysed. In both cases, cooperation goes beyond simple encounters, single interactions and face-to-face situations which were described in the previous chapter. Actors establish more durable relations: networks of cooperation that they can rely on for more than one encounter.

The term 'network' is used, but it is not related to an analysis of sets of relations that individuals have. Instead of analysing established relations, this chapter is about the making of networks. The central questions are: how do actors establish networks, and how do they make use of them? Here, networks are analysed as practices. The term 'networking' will be used to emphasize this practical implication. It will be shown that networking often remains an attempt, and a reliable relation will sometimes not be established at all.

Sometimes, passports are the main reason for an engagement. Again, documents, as well as other bureaucratic items and technologies are central elements. It will be shown that they often enable agents to establish networks in the first place.

6.1 Institutional Networking

A major reason for the establishment of networks between state security institutions is intelligence. This is also formulated in case of immigration law enforcement at the border: "I can specifically say that the borders of Uganda are intelligence led. We always share information more than anything else" (PRO of the UPDF). According to the IOM, one of the main objectives of current migration policy of the Ugandan government is to enhance inter-agency "cooperation at national, bilateral, regional and international [levels]".[60] Inter-agency cooperation on the local level in Northern Uganda is formulated by my respondents. "We do all this in coordination with other government agencies that we call stakeholders. Like the RDC office, DPC, Crime Intelligence, CID, the DISO office, district internal security organisation. We coordinate and work together" (Immigration Officer Michael). As it was presented above, the law level already provides certain platforms that structure the cooperation of these numerous state institutions. In District Security Committees representatives of different institutions come together to share information. Intelligence is further shared with the central level of state institutions that meet in the National Security Committee in Kampala.

[60] Int. Organization for Migration (2013): *Migration in Uganda: A Rapid Country Profile*, p. 60.

Nevertheless, this thesis focusses on the street-level of law enforcement. Not institutional structures of cooperation are analysed, but actual cooperation practices between street-level bureaucrats.

Biecker and Schlichte describe the UPF as highly self-referential (2014: 3). The findings of this research contradict this description. Police officers that enforce immigration laws rely on networks with other institutions:

> *It's a teamwork. Even other stakeholders are there. […] In every country there is a network of intelligence. […] So the players are many. Very many. Because me, I can go ahead but someone is also following from behind. (Police Officer Samuel)*

For the direct enforcement of immigration law my informants state that the main cooperation is between police officers of the CIID and immigration officers. This is stated by police officers: "We do this with our partners like immigration officers. We enforce the law together with them" (Police Officer Samuel). And this is also confirmed by immigration officers: "We do relate with them almost at the daily basis" (Immigration Officer Michael). In case of Post Entry Management the immigration officers call police officers to arrest immigrants with invalid papers. The police officers then take the immigrants to the immigration office. Here, their documents are checked. Afterwards, the police officers might take them further to the police station for detention. A similar cooperation is mentioned for On Entry Management at the border post:

> *Now we work closely with the police. Most especially to prevent crime. And also if there are people who are supposed to be punished. Those ones we identify and hand them over to the police. […] Cause you cannot do these things in isolation. If a person, for example someone who is suspected to be smuggling, we hand over to police. (Immigration Officer John)*

This daily cooperation between police officers and immigration officers relates to their differences in powers, knowhow and skills. Immigration officers on the one hand are trained and have developed skills of how to read and unscramble identification documents. On the other hand, police officers from the CIID are trained and skilled in checking informal settings outside offices. For undertaking arrests they are empowered by the law to carry and use weapons. The officers can be termed as specialists in different areas of work: "ground" and "paper work" (Beek & Göpfert 2011). Of course police and immigration officers carry out both areas of work, as they are often interrelated. But nevertheless, there are tendencies in the case of immigration law enforcement, and while 'paper work' concerns the handling of documents (for example passport reading) this is mostly happening inside immigration offices and border posts. 'Ground work' on the other hand relates to work outside offices, for example during audit checks which are done by the police. Apart from these powers and

skills, the settings of police and immigration offices enhances their need for stable and durable cooperation. The passport scanner and computer system is only available in the immigration office and not at the police station. In terms of an arrest, detention facilities are not found in the immigration office, but only inside the police station.

Teamwork between immigration and police officers in Northern Uganda is happening at a very personal level. The officers know each other by names. During my research officers ask me to extend greetings to one another. This is not only the case for Post Entry Management but also in between the border posts and the regional office in Gulu. During my observation at the regional immigration office, Officer Michael calls his colleague Officer John at the border post in Elegu:

> *He leans back while talking on the phone. They chat for long. It seems as if one colleague from Elegu is in hospital. Then they talk about another colleague. Michael says: "How can you behave like that? That is very poor, very childish." He starts laughing. I have the impression as if he gets along very well with the other. When he finally hangs up the phone he tells me that John has informed him about South Sudanese refugees at the border: "They thinned out but they now come back."*

This phone call illustrates the personal relations between the officers. Relevant information about immigration is shared during a relaxed chat on the phone which also includes personal conversation.

For immigration law enforcement, a major network of information is the computer system. The same system is used at the border post and in the regional office, as well as in every other immigration office in Uganda. The digitalisation of information makes possible that information is shared even without personal contacts between individual immigration officers. Through the system, the same information is given to everyone who has access to the system. This access is restricted, and during my observations I only see immigration officers accessing it. But in order to find the relevant information from the whole data, a passport or at least a passport number that was given to an individual is required. Without this, the state actors lack information. Again, the centrality of passports becomes visible. It is not only institutional structure on the law level that enables state actors to establish cooperative networks and share information. Institutional networking is also enabled by passports, computers, scanners, and not to forget by mobile phones.

6.2 Informal Networking

This subchapter presents informal networks between state actors and non-state actors: "alliances between state officials and individuals and groups in society [and] their existence outside the formal laws on the books" (Migdal & Schlichte 2005: 3). Current political anthropologists focus on non-state actors, and illustrate that they are often engaged in policing and law enforcement practices (Lund 2007; Bellagamba & Klute 2008). One similar case is presented in the prologue of this thesis. Here, the escaping immigrant is stopped by a violent mob. Mob justice is a drastic example of policing beside the state. In this case, the mob is called by the police officers themselves. They shout "thief" in the local language and thereby make use of their knowledge about informal policing practices. Now, the arrest becomes a joint operation of the mob and the police. It is nevertheless a dangerous operation for the police officers themselves, who get beaten as well because of their plainclothes. But as they are part of the work team in this situation, the offenders of the mob do not get arrested or charged afterwards.

Immigration law enforcement is said to be more monopolized by state authority than other areas (Torpey 2000: 5). Still, alliances are mentioned, for example community policing that helps to identify foreigners. "The best weapon is communities. They have very many eyes" (Police Officer Samuel). Community policing in Uganda is supported by the government in terms of decentralisation. It is considered as useful especially for law enforcement in villages where often no police posts are established (Baker 2004: 6). Such informal networks help out state agents to enforce the law, for example when their work lacks resources. But "[f]rom the very moment that state officials develop and mobilize extra-professional networks to access resources, they distance themselves from the centralized state, which can no longer control them" (Hamani 2014: 171).

This chapter concentrates on cooperative alliances between state agents and inner-African immigrants in Northern Uganda.[61] One of the main reasons why these actors establish relations are passports. This corresponds to Matthew Hull who states: "The circulation of graphic artefacts creates associations among people that often differ from formal organizational structures and draw people outside the bureaucracy into bureaucratic practices" (Hull 2012: 18). During my studies I recognized two patterns of informal networking practices

[61] Besides, there are networks that inner-African immigrants establish between each other. This becomes visible in the prologue where immigrants from different origins support each other, take food to the detention cell, and bring a forgotten document from the capital to help out a friend. Networks between immigrants and Ugandans as non-state actors are described during the audit check of Emma, where locals put in a good word for the immigrant with invalid papers.

between street-level bureaucrats and immigrants. These will be called: a) 'to do business' and b) 'to make friends'.

A) TO DO BUSINESS

I come across the term 'business' many times during my research. It is often used when an alliance between officers and immigrants is expressed. After the incidents that are presented in the prologue, Bless tells me that one of the police inspectors contacted him and asked him if he wanted to do 'business' together with him. First I do not understand what kind of business they are talking about, but later I hear the term again. Several days after the audit check on Emma, he tells me that the policemen asked him to call whenever foreigners check in. One police officer told him that this was "his business" and Emma could help him. I also come across the term in my interviews:

> *There are people they are called informants. They also work with immigration. Looking for people without passport, people without visa. So they can inform the immigration that they don't have their passports. They just do, that is their business. (Immigrant, anonymous)*

In terms of community policing the UPF is said to use civilians as spies to get information to enforce the law. This is confirmed by one of my respondents: "We have what we call those people who spy. You cannot go to buy land in Kasese and you build a house and no one will bring information to the police" (Police Officer Noah). In case of immigration law enforcement, sometimes immigrants work together with officers and operate as spies.

> *Ordinary people. Like for me, I can be an informant. I can work with immigration if I want. If I want I can make immigration my friend. Then I have to tell immigration, maybe I can know some people who don't have papers, maybe my brothers. Some people without papers. I can also inform immigration. Now you can come and get him. (Immigrant, anonymous)*

The immigrants have to engage with the officers undercover and will not inform other immigrants about their networks with state agents. Later, Bless explains to me what the inspector meant by 'business'. Bless should inform the police officer if one of his friends had no valid papers. When they were in a public place like a bar, he would pretend to get a phone call from his girlfriend and leave. Outside the bar, he would then call the inspector and tell him where to find the person. The police would come to the bar for an audit check and ask for passports.

As described before, challenges of immigration law enforcement at the border lead to the increase of passport controls inside Uganda which focus on informal settings. Not every informal setting can be checked. So, the officers focus on immigration 'hot spots' as it was

described earlier. Another strategy are ‘business networks’ where officers engage with immigrants and benefit from their inside knowledge. Here, immigrants pre-select informal places for audit checks. They guarantee that the officers will be ‘successful’ there in detecting offences against the immigration law. Especially outside offices, police work relies on such relations between officers and locals. To gain inside knowledge “one of the main routine activities of patrolmen is the establishment and maintenance of familiar relationships with individual members” (Bittner 1967: 707). Apart from the lack of manpower another challenge for police officers is the lack of language skills that would be necessary to spy on inner-African immigrants (and this is more than understandable due to over two thousand languages that are spoken in Africa). Language skills of immigrants can fill this gap. Therefore, the establishment of a ‘business network’ with them can be seen as beneficial for immigration law enforcement in informal settings.

But as the examples demonstrate, such networks are not always successfully established. More often, officers merely attempt to engage with immigrants. Their relation will fizzle out when immigrants do not call them and refuse to engage in their ‘business’.

B) TO MAKE FRIENDS

Another term that is used to express informal relations between officers and immigrants is ‘friendship’.

> *It’s like you have a friend who is policeman. Noah, I have a problem, my permit has expired. So if you approach me in case there is an operation, I will say he or she phoned me. I am aware. No one will touch you. But when you hide you are a bad person. (Police Officer Noah)*

From the officer’s perspective the term is used to express a worthwhile relationship of trust. The expression ‘bad person’ on the other hand can be related to security discourses as it correlates with similar expressions like ‘wrong ones’ and ‘wrong elements’ among immigrants. As shown above (“If I want I can make immigration my friend”) the term is also used in the same context as the ‘business’ term.

Apart from this, I come across a different meaning when I need to get a visa myself. Here, ‘friendship’ expresses a relationship of immigrants to an officer who can provide them with documents and extensions of permits.

My friends take me to the office of their brother[62]. Prince is an immigrant from West Africa. He has been in the country for many years, has a Ugandan wife and children, and owns a resident permit. The others treat him with respect and address him as 'Sir'. We ask his advice about our documents. I have a valid tourist visa but need to get a student's visa. A friend of mine, Bless from Nigeria, has an expired visitor's visa and needs an extension. Prince tells us that he is going to call his friend from the immigration. We wait while he phones him. Then he tells us that he can arrange to meet him after work. We should leave our passports with him, pay a certain amount of money, and he will get our visas done the next day. We discuss what to do. I decide to get my papers on the official way which means to go to the head-quarters in Kampala. Bless on the other hand tells me that he needs to get his visa through Prince's friend. He tells me that this was the only way for him, and that otherwise with his invalid papers he would get arrested at the headquarters.

Inner-African migrants often go on a "semi-documented path" to gain papers (Bakewell 2007: 6). It is even said that many prefer such clandestine ways over official ways, and that an immigrant may "count on a reception network composed of members of his family or ethnic group who have […] 'made it'" (Ricca 1989: 60). In this case, Bless benefits from the network of Prince who was been in Uganda for long. His network does not only consist of immigrants but also of other 'friends' such as state officials. In contrast to the 'business' pattern this time the network is shared with other immigrants. It is beneficial for them and will not lead to a passport control, but on the contrary arrests are avoided.

How do immigrants engage with such 'friends' for the first time? "We can go to the office direct and we also tell them our problem. […] From there we get to know each other. Maybe sometimes when we feel like we don't want to go there, we can call one of them, and they can help us" (Immigrant, anonymous). The first contact is made in the office setting, but later the network is maintained outside of the offices and meetings are arranged after work hours. "Maybe we can meet the good ones, they will say: Let us help you to do it. So you will not enter the office. They help you to do it" (Immigrant, anonymous). Here, the officers are termed as 'good ones' that can 'help you'. The relation to an officer as a 'friend' is presented as desirable.

The question is, what kind of friendship is involved here? It seems as if the 'friends' from the police or immigration do not engage with immigrants for other purposes apart from their papers and statuses. The relation is therefore limited to these issues. It is questionable how reliable the network really is, as "despite a good relationship, a police officer may still enforce the law against you" (Beek 2012: 560). Another aspect of the term 'friend' is, that it clearly contradicts the ideal type of bureaucrats. As mentioned above, the ideal type does not engage with the public in a personal way so that he or she will never favour an individual

[62] The term 'brother' does not label actual kinship. I am told by my friends that they use the term to express that they share the same mother tongue.

over others. Authors such as Parsons stress the opposition of the public/official and the private sphere. It is described that personal relations such as friendship and love are strictly separated from official relationships. Meeting a 'friend' from the immigration outside of the office to get papers done blurs the line between both spheres. Informal networks demonstrate again that "public and private do not exist in straightforward terms" (Baker 2005: 37). Practices of immigration law enforcement cannot be understood if informality is treated as failing the bureaucratic norm. Informality is always part of bureaucracy and crucial for successful law enforcement on the street-level. From the perspective of the bureaucrats informal networks become understandable as they help them to handle challenges of their work setting. But why do immigrants engage in such networks? This will be analysed in the next chapter.

7. “Money is the Law”

This chapter deals with the phrase ‘money is the law’ from one of my informants. Taking the phrase literally, it will be discussed how money as a law relates to the official and written immigration law. The chapter starts with a presentation of how discretion increases the incertitude of immigrants concerning the official immigration law. In practice, this law is not enforced automatically in one exclusive way but it is described as a ‘two way system’. ‘Money as the law’ is formulated by one of my informants: Prince, the resident immigrant from West Africa. He is consulted by other immigrants in terms of visas because of his experience, knowledge and networks to state officials. He uses the expression to point to money that is informally paid by immigrants to state officials to get their papers in order. Such a practice is commonly referred to as corruption. In this chapter, the informal payment of money is treated as a practice, and this practice is described and located in the setting.
All in all, this chapter mainly reflects the immigrants’ perspectives. State officials do not mention practices of informally paid money in my interviews directly. Some of the perspectives presented here surely base on the widespread prejudice about the Ugandan police (and the police in Africa in general) as a corrupt institution (a perspective that is also shared by most Ugandans). But apart from that, the findings derive from reports of actual experiences, and reflect one (unintentional participant) observation.
Coming back to informal networking that was discussed in the previous chapter: money is a major characteristic of informal networks between immigrants and state agents.[63] With this notion it becomes obvious why such a relationship might be called ‘business’ by the actors themselves. It will be demonstrated that networks and cooperation contain power imbalances. While some are able to engage in these networks, others are excluded, for example because they do not have money.

7.1 Immigration Law Enforcement as a “Two Way System”

What are the prevalent outcomes when immigration law is enforced? As presented above audit checks as a strategy for immigration law enforcement do not lead to the same outcome every time. During audit checks, the outcome of the situation is rather unclear. As mentioned before, ambiguity is always part of street-level bureaucracy and so is discretion. Researchers state that discretion is a crucial element of police work because enforcing the law every time they come across an offence is not possible. It might not be possible in general, and

[63] During my research, networking also happens for instance by inviting a person for a drink or lunch. Nevertheless, the payment of money is primarily reported and will therefore be focused here.

becomes even more problematic when resources for law enforcement are lacking. The UPF is said to have a lack of manpower while their workload is high, which is especially mentioned in the literature for the CID and for Northern Uganda.[64] In the prologue, this lack of resources was mentioned in terms of overcrowded detention cells.

In case of an offence against the immigration law, the law level prescribes that the immigrant has to be taken to court, which includes an arrest and can result in deportation. The costs for this legal process are high. When I ask Police Officer Samuel who pays for deportations and trials he says "It depends", but he is interrupted by his secretary: "The government." Samuel agrees: "That is why it has implications on our economy." In case of immigration law "often governments themselves indicate that they do not wish the law to be observed too strictly" (Ricca 1989: 58). Therefore, deviation from the official legal framework during immigration law enforcement cannot be generalized as evidence for a 'failed' or 'weak' state. On the contrary, the practices could even be wanted by the government.

On the law level, there are two possibilities to penalise offences against the immigration law of Uganda: a) the payment of a fine for each day that a person was inside the country without valid status; or b) being deported. The fine increased from thirty to one hundred dollars per day in 2014. Certainly, only few inner-African immigrants in Uganda will be able to pay this amount at all. Deportations on the other hand are happening. In 2012, about forty percent of a total of 840 registered arrests of illegal immigrants were deported.[65] According to the spokesperson of the Ugandan Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control, over 1000 illegally staying immigrants were deported in 2014, mainly to China.[66] Nevertheless, the efficiency of deportation in case of immigration from the neighbouring countries is challenged. One example of Congolese sex-workers in Northern Uganda is given: "So many of them were supported and taken back to Congo. But you know after a short time they came back. So they are back and now you can't take them again because they will come back" (LC5 of Gulu).

The findings of this study lead to the assumption that deportation is an exception of immigration law enforcement in Uganda. In police work, officers sometimes develop "alternative sanctions" (Bittner 1967: 702). A quote from one of my informants indicates that practices of immigration law enforcement often deviate from the written immigration law:

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[64] Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2006): *The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Uganda*, p. 19.

[65] Numbers according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, In: Int. Organization for Migration (2013): *Migration in Uganda: A Rapid Country Profile*, p. 44.

[66] New Vision (2015): 35 illegal immigrants arrested. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1328995/35-illegal-immigrants-arrested (accessed May 06, 2016).

> *You can be punished straight away, but you can also punish someone and take him to court to punish. From there he is deported. It's a two way system. (Police Officer Samuel)*

The formulation 'system' indicates that the officer considers both ways as established, normal and proper to use. The punishment along the 'court way' correlates with what was described before: the sentence of a fine or deportation that is pronounced by court. But what does 'to punish straight away' mean in case of the second 'alternative way'? Tidjani Alou identifies an "unofficial establishment of an alternative legal system controlled by the criminal investigation department" in the cases of Niger, Benin and Senegal (Tidjani Alou 2006: 174). It comes to an arrest, but the police might not take every case to court.[67] Instead, a person might be released after spending several days in detention. Detention itself is treated as a sufficient punishment because of the "terrible conditions of custody" (ibid: 153). In relation to the setting, a detention cell is "a place where control can be maximized" (Holdaway 1980: 89). Cells are often cramped and shared by several detainees. This often means violation of the personal space (Goffman 1971: 68 ff.). Conditions of detention are highly criticised in Uganda (Mushemeza Dickens 2008: 10).

> *Detainees are often held in overcrowded facilities, which may have an impact on their health and which increases their risk of being subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Most detention facilities in Uganda are not suitable for housing detainees, and there are frequent challenges in providing food, water and other basic necessities such as hygiene, sanitation and bedding. Moreover, many of these facilities are dilapidated, overcrowded and have inadequate space, lighting and ventilation. Most inmates do not have access to adequate food and water especially in police cells. Inmates often lack clothing and bedding, access to health services, facilities for personal hygiene and access to opportunities for exercise. (…) Detainees are often subjected to torture and ill treatment by their fellow inmates.*[68]

The detention facilities of the CPS in Gulu are described in the prologue of this thesis and resemble the conditions described above. The UHRC reports that in 2014 most complaints about detention facilities and overstay concerned Northern Uganda, while Gulu came second.[69]

In terms of immigration law enforcement immigrants in Northern Uganda are not treated differently to criminal suspects. In case of an arrest they are kept together with them in the

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[67] Such a pre-selection of court cases by the police is not only practiced in Africa. Blankenburg states that negotiations take place in German police offices whether events should become recorded cases or not (Blankenburg 1995: 15).

[68] Karugonjo-Segawa, Roselyn (2012): *Pre-trial Detention in Uganda*. APCOF Policy Paper, p. 1; 10.

[69] Uganda Human Rights Commission (2015): *2014, 17th Annual Report*, p. 18.

same facilities. One case of overstay in detention cells due to an offence against the immigration law is reported in this study by a police officer during an informal conversation. Several Eritreans were arrested during an audit check in a restaurant in Gulu, all of them former refugees from Israel.[70] Together with their trafficker they crossed the border to Uganda without getting registered. I meet Police Officer Samuel eight days after the arrest. He shows me their papers from Israel. Then he informs me that the Eritreans are still in custody, but that he is going to release them today because they were "good people" and "traumatized refugees". This demonstrates a case where the court is avoided. For the officer, the refugees are 'good people'. They are not 'bad persons' and therefore mean no threat for the national security as defined above. Eight days in the detention cell is seen as enough punishment because the detainees are after all 'traumatized'. Of course overstaying in detention is not always intended as a punishment. It often is simply a problem of administration delivery (Hamani 2014: 163).

This case of overstaying illustrates the power imbalance between state officials and immigrants. For immigrants the officer's decision-making under discretion can lead to drastic outcomes such as detention in (what can truly be called) inhuman conditions. As a 'two way system' there are alternatives to the written immigration law in situations of immigration law enforcement. So even with knowledge of the law, an immigrant can never be sure about the outcome of such a situation. He or she is left in the dark in a situation of uncertainty. In many cases, immigrants in Uganda do not know the immigration law of Uganda, and they are also not aware of their legal rights. Possibly, some have made bad experiences with police officers from their country of origin before.[71] They might be afraid of encountering state security agents, because they do not expect them to follow laws and regulations but to make arbitrary use of their powers. "They might think we beat them up. Here we arrest, but these people don't know that people have human rights. They are a little bit backwards than the Ugandans" (DPC of Gulu).

On the other hand, police and immigration officers study law to a certain level as part of their training. Compared to immigrants they are experts of the written immigration law. This

[70] There are rumours about an agreement between Israel and Uganda that in exchange for arms Uganda is taking refugees from Israeli detention centres (see for example BBC [2016]: Israel's unwanted African migrants. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35475403 [accessed May 06, 2016]; Vice [2013]: Uganda Is Taking Israel's Unwanted Asylum Seekers to Get Cheaper Weapons. http://www.vice.com/read/uganda-is-the-first-country-to-swap-african-refugees-for-israeli-weapons [accessed May 06, 2016]).

[71] Such stories are not uncommon. One refugee from Ethiopia for example tells me that without any reason he and his friends were beaten badly by the Ethiopian police on the streets when they went out at night. Another immigrant from Nigeria tells me that he got battered by soldiers on a market simply because he sold camouflage clothes.

gap of knowledge can be used in an encounter by officers to increase their own power, and to increase the uncertainty of the immigrant. During the audit check of Emma that was described earlier, the inspector threats the Ethiopian asylum seeker with detention ("We should take him at least for one night"). A report about threatening is also mentioned in the prologue. Bless tells me: "They were telling me that they are going to deport me. That they are going to do this, do that, to scare me." As described earlier, both cases then lead to the informal payment of money to the officers.

Nevertheless, the detention and overstay of the Eritreans remains an exceptional case in my study. More often, situations of immigration law enforcement do not get that far. From the immigrants' perspective another outcome is described: "So if they don't want to take you to court, they will tell you: 'Now you have to do your visa, we put your visa in order.' Then you can give them some small money for helping you" (Immigrant, anonymous). So there seems to be a third way apart from being detained without a trial or going to court. Both of these ways include an arrest, but paying informal money is described as an alternative where an arrest is avoided. This way, which is often termed corruption, will be analysed in the next subchapter.

7.2 Locating Corruption

According to Transparency International, Uganda gains high ranks among countries of East Africa. In 2012 it is called the most corrupt country of the region.[72] Corruption being widespread in Uganda is confirmed by authors who state that "today, corruption is a way of life" (Mutibwa 1992: 196), or "corruption is everywhere" (Nystrand 2014: 826). The police is viewed as the most corrupt institution by Ugandans.[73] Corruption is said to be found in all spheres of police work, while the CID is most known for bribery and embezzlement (Ngufor Forkum 2007: 31).

The following subchapter mainly deals with informally paid money during audit checks. During interviews, audit checks were presented as highly related to corruption by immigrants: "We know if they come, they need money. Even if you don't have paper you have to give them money. Then you will be safe" (Immigrant, anonymous). Corruption can not only be found during Post Entry Management but is also mentioned to be happening at borders, for

[72] Transparency International (2012): The East African Bribery Index 2012: Bribery levels remain high in Kenya. http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/the_east_african_bribery_index_2012_bribery_levels_remain_high_in_kenya (accessed May 06, 2016).

[73] Transparency International (2014): Reporting of bribery and public confidence in the fight against corruption remain low. http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/reporting_of_bribery_and_public_ confidence_ in_the_fight_against_corrup (accessed May 06, 2016).

example the border between Uganda and South Sudan (Schomerus & Titeca 2012). Overall, even if corruption is described as common for state bureaucrats in Uganda, it cannot be generalized. Not everyone engages in informal payments. If an officer does so, he or she cannot be judged as immoral, and to be seeking his or her private gain. Corruption rather becomes understandable with regards to the institutional or social background of the practice. Corruption might be motivated by social pressure, for example by expectations of family members (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 116). Sometimes, bureaucrats in Uganda are encouraged by peers and families to be corrupt (Bukuluki 2013: 32). In addition to that, Ugandan bureaucrats on the street-level complain about low salaries (Therkildsen 2014: 118). Little payment and poor housing are also mentioned by two of my informants. Police officers in Gulu live in police barracks, small iron huts in the middle of the city. One of my informants, a policewoman, moved out to another area of the town. She tells me that the barracks are not a good place to raise children.

There are several studies about corruption in Uganda. Most of them deal with statistics and surveys, or reflect on reasons for corruption. This subchapter analyses corruption as a concrete practice and locates it in the setting. Overall, practices of informal payments are located backstage and hidden from the public eye. Offices are mostly avoided, but informal settings such as bars and restaurants are preferred. “A bribe is a ritual that resists the panopticon. […] Corruption resists light and scrutiny. It is optically veiled, prefers shadows and the backstage. It summons the senses and identities in a radically different way” (Visvanathan 2012: 4). As described in the prologue, money is paid outside the office when two officers take the immigrant to his customers. The payment happens away from the office setting in a rather informal environment. In case of the ‘friend’ of Prince from the immigration, the meeting is also arranged outside the office. In the case of the audit check in the guesthouse, Emma later tells me that he gave money to the officer. Again the informal payment did not happen inside a state institution but in the guesthouse reception. Emma tells me that he gave money to the officer when everybody else was outside. Here, the reception suddenly becomes the backstage of the setting. Backstages are not always fixed in the setting, they rather have to be mutually established in a situation. While the public is concentrating on the compound, the money can be given to the officer in the reception without being noticed.

Another case about refugees who try to get citizen papers is reported by an asylum seeker. In a commission of the OPM, several representatives vote whether or not a person should get citizen papers. The immigrant describes how refugees use informal networks to connect with these officials:

You have to call them in town, eh? You have to get them in a bar or somewhere else. Because you are a good man, what, what… You have to give them some pocket money. […] You call them evening time or weekend. They don't like people to see them when they are working. Because other people they can complain. (Immigrant, anonymous)

Practices of corruption can fail. Knowledge is important to succeed. The same immigrant himself tells me how he had failed to get the papers because of insufficient knowledge.

I have to give them money indirectly. For those people. Those who are in the voting. Maybe 200, 200. Then please raise your hand if the question comes. […] Then those people who got money, they raise hand. Those people who don't know me and they didn't get money, they cannot raise their hands. That's why I fell down. You have to divide for the people. When you give everybody, everybody likes you. After you get what? The paper. (Immigrant, anonymous)

An "Anthropology of Corruption" studies the phenomenon and its cultural manifestation: "We may also discover that there are rules (albeit informal and pragmatic) and cultural codes that govern the way corruption itself should, or does, take place" (Haller & Shore 2005: 8). Pragmatic rules must be known and learned. They are partially based on implicit knowledge. During this study, it happens that informal payments are not only reported by my informants. Additionally, I make my own experiences in an unplanned and unintentional participant observation at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. To get a student's visa I decide not to rely on Prince's 'friend', but to go to the headquarters in Kampala and use the official way.

I enter the office. There is a front desk in the middle of the room. Chairs stand squeezed around the desk. Several people sit here and wait. A man in suit sits behind the desk. I ask him about the process of getting a student's visa. He looks at my documents. Then he tells me: "This process takes time." I should come back in one week. I ask him if there is a way that I could pay some extra fees to make it faster because I have to go back to the North. I ask if there is a "short cut", thinking about express passports that one can get in Germany. He looks at me: "You want a short cut?" Then he tells me to have a seat. Immediately he walks away with my documents to another room to make photocopies. During my wait, the other people are not called in by officers at all. A young Indian man next to me says to everyone: "Now it is almost lunchtime. Nothing will happen today." He tells me that he comes in every day but his documents are still not processed. When the officer comes back, I ask him how much the visa will cost me. He looks at me and simply says: "I think I told you." I am bewildered and I start to realise that it might have been a little naïve to think there was an official express visa, titled as a 'short cut'.
When the officer later comes back from an office, he walks past the front desk towards the entrance and calls me to follow him. I walk behind him to the parking ground. He stops in between the parking cars. From here our bodies are shielded from views. I am really nervous now. He gets my passport from his pocket and shows me new stamps on one of the pages. He says in a low voice "You give me 100."Hectically, I rummage around in my backpack and get my purse. I am confused if he means dollars or shillings, and I am even too agitated to count the notes. I stutter: "I don't think I have enough" when the officer interferes my confusion: "This money is ok." I give him my notes without counting at all, and he pockets them, passes me my passport, and then walks back to the office. I walk to the exit of the

ministry, relieved to have my papers but still in bewilderment about what has just happened.

Again, a backstage is used for practices of informally paid money. The office where the people waiting are sitting around the desk almost has the structure of a panopticon, but the parking ground allows me and the officer to be unseen. My confusion during the whole situation derives from the fact that this is the first time for me to participate in a practice of informal payment of money to a state official. In the situation I feel very aware that I have no knowledge at all of how to behave in this situation. Asking the officer in front of everyone how much he would charge me for a 'short cut' definitely is a case of dropping a brick, and I doubt that my informants will ever do something similar themselves. I had not developed any routines that could have been useful for such a practice. Therefore, I could not handle the situation with confidence and in the end paid much more money than the officer demanded.

Belonging to implicit knowledge, body skills are needed in situations of informal payments. In the situation above, the officer hides my passport in his pocket until we change the setting. On the parking ground he leaves his arms close to the body and uses a low voice to talk. During the interviews and during other conversations, my informants often use gestures if they talk about such practices. When Emma tells me about the payment of a police officer in the reception, he leans over his desk, stretches out one hand underneath the table as if he passes money to someone in front. Here, the furniture is used as a barrier for others to see what is happening. Joseph, the Ugandan bar employee from the Ethiopian guesthouse, later tells me how to successfully corrupt a police officer in his office if you are brought there. He would beckon the officer, using a low voice: "Can I see you for a moment?" They would go outside the office and walk around a corner. Here, Joseph would give the officer some money. While he is telling me this he holds his hand close to his body and in front of his pocket. He presses his thumb against two fingers as if he holds a note. Then he tells me that the officer would accept the money. Thereby he puts his fingers into his pocket. The officer would say with a wagging finger "Don't do it again" concerning the reason why the other was brought to the office. The officer would then return to the office alone. Joseph seems to know exactly how to behave in order to be successful in corruption. He knows that an informal setting is needed, outside the office and around the corner to hide from views. The way he presents the gestures look routinized and he seems to be confident about what he is doing.

7.3 Discussion

This subchapter discusses the phrase ‘money is the law’. It is an attempt to make understandable why many immigrants engage in informal networks, and why they often prefer to pay money informally instead of following bureaucratic processes as they are prescribed in the law level.

Practices of informally paid money are commonly generalized under the term corruption. African states (and especially African police officers) are often equated with corruption (Vigneswaran & Hornberger 2009: 1). A common definition, which even used by the World Bank, is that corruption is the abuse of a public office for private gain. “This definition reduces corruption simply to a problem of dishonest individuals or ‘rotten apples’ working in the public sector” (Haller & Shore 2005: 2). Anthropologist criticize this concept. They question if corruption should be measured at all like in the indexes of Transparency International. They also highlight that corruption is never a neutral concept and always implies moral condemnation. The anthropological perspective on corruption on the other hand does not treat “corruption as a dysfunctional aspect of state organizations” (Gupta 2006 [1995]: 212). Anthropologists try to understand corruption through emic perspectives. “[C]orruption may not be legal, but it nonetheless has its own morality, at least in the eyes of the local public” (Haller & Shore 2005: 12).

It needs to be emphasized that the informants of this study rarely use the term corruption themselves when they speak about practices of informally paid money. They rather describe such practices by other terms that were mentioned before, for instance ‘to do business’, which relates audit checks and informal networks to payment. Other common descriptions are ‘to make a friend’ that can ‘help you’. These formulations highlight the relationship and cooperativeness of an informal network that is based on informal payments. The term ‘short cut’ from my own experience implies informal payment for an unofficial bureaucratic operation. Other examples are “give them some small money for helping you” where ‘small’ might contrast ‘big money’ like the official fees; and “give them some pocket money” which resembles the practice of putting money in one’s pocket, a gesture that was imitated by Joseph as it is described above.

In contrast to corruption as a generalizing term, these emic expressions present local concepts of informally paid money with fine distinctions. Some terms are rather positive (‘friends’, ‘to help’) and may express that the payment in this case is accepted, while other times practices are criticised: “It is an offence to stay without a coin in the pocket. Because they believe you steal if you don’t have it” (Police Officer Noah). Here ‘stealing’ indicates corruption as illegitimate and a crime. “In Uganda, the term corruption is less abstract and legalistic and rather a question of degree. In this popular sense a person is corrupt if he

'eats too much'" (Schlichte 2005: 171). Vocabulary relating to food and eating is not only used in Uganda, but also common in other African countries to describe practices of corruption (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 121 f.; Bako-Arifari 2006). After I get my student's visa my friends inform me that the immigration officer at the headquarters took too much money from me: "They eat your money now." Another case where informal payment is criticised is the payment in the prologue. Bless tells me that he "lost too much money". It seems as if the acceptance of corruption relates to the rate that is paid as well as the scale of corruption. Large scale corruption (for example on the national level) is criticised in the North of Uganda, whereby local-level corruption is perceived "as part of everyday life. It [is] seen as annoying and in need of change, but it [is] just the way things [are]" (Nystrand 2014: 828).

For immigrants in Uganda bureaucratic processes often are not understandable as they remain faceless processes (Sandvik 2011: 19). As described in the beginning of this chapter, immigrants are often uncertain about the outcomes of immigration law enforcement situations, partially because of their ignorance but most of all because of unstable law enforcement practices. A case in point is Dickson from Nigeria. I am told that his bag was stolen in the bus from Kampala when he travelled to the North. His passport was inside and he went to the nearest police post to report that his passport got stolen. He was told by a policeman to wait, but then he saw the officer coming back with further policemen. Dickson was sure that they came to arrest him as an illegal immigrant and he took off. The same day he travelled to the Kenyan border, used *panya* roads to cross the border unnoticed and got a new passport from there so that he could come back to Uganda. Running away illustrates the immigrant's uncertainty of official bureaucratic processes. Because of this uncertainty he decides not to wait and to report the passport's loss, but instead chooses the informal way to get a new document.

According to the findings of this study, many inner-African immigrants in Northern Uganda prefer to use informal networks to extend documents and avoid to go to offices directly. Their networks are grounded on the informal payment of money. These networks are seen as more reliable than official processes. The 'money is the law' formulation expresses this perspective. The expression 'money is the law' widens the perspective on law. From this perspective, law can be anything and not just official regulations and written state law.[74] The outcome of an informal payment is seen as more predictable, while the written immigration "law is perceived as terrifying and unpredictable" (Tidjani Alou 2006: 157).

[74] This perspective relates to the concept of legal pluralism (Benda-Beckmann & Benda-Beckmann 2006).

But paying money informally to an officer does not dissolve uncertainty for the immigrant completely. It can even increase insecurity of immigrants. One of my informants expresses his fear that after paying money to an officer he will be seen as a source of money and will be asked for money again. Money as a scarce resource might run out. Without money informal networks to officers cannot be activated. I came across such situations when immigrants overstayed their visa simply because they did not have money for the extension. "You have to have money to move here. You have to have money. If no money, you cannot do anything" (Immigrant, anonymous). Being poor always has an impact on encounters with street-level bureaucrats. "The poorer people are, the greater the influence street-level bureaucrats tend to have over them" (Lipsky 2010 [1980]: 6). After explaining how to avoid a trial by corrupting police officers, Joseph tells me about the people that overstay in the detention cells: "Those boys in the police station are the ones that don't have money. If you don't have money then this is a big problem." This is confirmed in a report about pre-trial detention in Uganda: "Detainees who are poor and cannot afford legal services often remain in custody for a longer time".[75]

Even if an immigrant has enough money to pay, the practice is limited. An example is the arrest of the Ethiopian who was suspected of belonging to Al-Shabaab only because of his skin colour. One explanation is that in this case the arrest could not be avoided because several security organisations were involved. In Uganda, a plurality of state actors is involved in security maintenance.[76] Sometimes, this leads to confusion of roles and responsibilities: "The army and other security agencies arrested suspects without consulting the police and then dumped them in police cells. The police were afraid to release such detainees, for fear of the army or security agency reaction."[77] It might come to overstays and false arrests, but it also means that an informal network between an immigrant and only one state actor of one institution cannot always be successfully activated, because in some cases, he or she might not be at the controls.

I am told about one case of deportation. Dickson from Nigeria immigrated to Uganda several years ago and has a child with his Ugandan girlfriend. He was deported to Nigeria once when he was found with an expired visa. I ask a friend why Dickson was deported and he tells me: "Because that one has reached the headquarters. Immigration cannot even do

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[75] Karugonjo-Segawa, Roselyn (2012): *Pre-trial Detention in Uganda*. APCOF Policy Paper, p. 1.
[76] One example of joint operation between the UPF and the UPDF that became especially relevant concerning terrorism discourses is the JATF. The Joint Anti-Terrorist Task Force is criticized of abusing human rights, especially concerning its detention facilities (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative [2006]: *The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Uganda*, p. 9; 13).
[77] Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2006*): The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Uganda*, p. 13.

anything about it. They have to deport now." This is one exceptional case in this study where the official immigration law is enforced. An explanation is that here payments to single officers on the street level are not sufficient, because other actors are involved that are more powerful: the court and higher ranks in the headquarters.

Other times, immigrants totally lack such explanations for bureaucratic decision-making. After his first deportation, Dickson returned to Uganda. But back in Germany I get a message from him and I am surprised that the message comes from Nigeria. He tells me that he was deported again. He went to the immigration headquarters in Kampala with a valid visa to get an extension on the official way. There, the officers simply refused to give him the extension. He tells me that for him, their decision is still incomprehensible. This time, he does not have enough money to travel back to Uganda but stays in Nigeria without his family.

The last example reflects that from the perspective of immigrants, insecurities are part of regular bureaucratic processes of immigration law enforcement in Uganda. Immigrants therefore often prefer to engage in informal payments and informal networks with officers. These are perceived as more stable and reliable in practice. From this perspective, corruption is not per se negative but sometimes favoured. On the official way, immigrants have to enter offices. The office setting itself pre-structures the encounter of an immigrant and a state official. Offices are designed to put regular bureaucratic practices into focus. There are few backstages where hidden practices can take place. Informal payments cannot easily happen unnoticed. Sometimes there are awareness signs on the walls, like the writing "Do not corrupt us" in the CPS of Gulu which is mentioned in the prologue. Informal settings on the other hand provide shields from the attention of others. Awareness signs cannot be found here. There is no pre-structured seat arrangement. People approach each other with more equal territories. State agents cannot be distinguished from civilians by outsiders. Therefore, informal settings imply more freedom and flexibility than offices.

Informal settings such as bars are often used for meeting 'friends'. The established relation to a familiar officer who is termed as a 'friend' contrasts the ideal type of bureaucrats that remain anonymous and interchangeable. A network relation might be perceived as more reliable and stable than faceless bureaucracy, especially when bureaucrats in practice follow more than one way during law enforcement.

In addition to that, money itself can be perceived as more reliable than bureaucratic processes. For immigrants, money (at least for those who have it) is physically and practically available in encounters with state officials. As a boundary object it can lead to the informal cooperation between officers and immigrants. For all participants, bank notes are meaningful and useful. They are flexible and can be integrated in any situation. Money is small enough to be hidden from the public eye, for example in a pocket. During an encounter, it

can easily be brought in by only small and simple body movements. Like passports, money is an “immutable mobile” (Latour 2006: 299). Notes have stable inscriptions, and are therefore countable and calculable, equally by everyone. In contrast to a passport, the information that is inscribed in a banknote is less complex. The relevant information of value and currency is visible and accessible for everybody. On the other hand, information that is inscribed in a passport is not equally accessible. It needs a passport reading machine and access to the computer system of the immigration department to read the whole content.
This chapter presents how making use of money can (to a certain extent) be seen as emancipatory for immigrants in their uncertain situation concerning immigration law enforcement. Informal payments that are commonly termed as corruption cannot be understandable if they are generalized and judged as moral failures.

8. Conclusion

> *Immigration is the eye of the state. It is a very strong arm for security. Very strong. I think, without it I don't see any state surviving. (Immigration Officer John)*

This thesis is a study on state bureaucracy, whereby one area of state bureaucracy is focused in particular: the dealing of the state with immigrants. It looks at immigration law enforcement in Northern Uganda. Instead of studying the law level alone (which means the legal and institutional framework in Uganda) actual practices are analysed on the street level (Lipsky 2010 [1980]). This thesis shows that in practice, immigration law is not enforced automatically. Law enforcement situations do not lead to only one outcome. Enforcement is rather described as a 'more than one way system'. There might be some specific challenges in a post-conflict area such as Northern Uganda that prohibit straight law enforcement. But it is also said that to some extent immigration law always remains "unenforceable" (Vigneswaran & Hornberger 2009: 9).

Many informal practices are described in this thesis. It becomes visible that informality is a crucial part of police and immigration work. For instance, informal networks between police officers and immigrants appear to be a useful strategy to cope with challenges of immigration law enforcement. Informal practices are not only found in the context of African states where they are often interpreted as being signs of 'weakness' or 'failure'. Rather, as researchers highlight, formality and informality are equal elements of bureaucratic work everywhere in the world. Often, there are "good organisational reasons" (Garfinkel & Bittner 1967) for informality, and for the development of alternative paths beside the ones prescribed by the law level.

All in all, state bureaucracy is based on the existence and on the combination of passports and documents (Latour 2006: 297). Documents "precipitate the formation of shifting networks and groups of people inside and outside the bureaucracy" (Hull 2003: 291). It is shown how money and passports shape and enable the establishment of informal networks between officers and immigrants. Apart from that, passports are incorporated in all practices of immigration law enforcement. Officers that deal with immigration law enforcement on the street-level encounter ambiguous situations. Categorization work is an attempt to reduce that ambiguity. This is systematically done through passport controls at the border of Elegu or inside the country in Gulu.

Worldwide, states develop "increasingly sophisticated technologies" when it comes to immigration law enforcement (Fassin 2011: 217). In Uganda, e-passports have recently been introduced. My informants from the immigration told me that they have to undergo special trainings in how to handle this type of document. There have also been recent institutional

changes in Uganda, for example the construction of One Stop Border Posts, and the planning of a second office of the Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control in Gulu. Further research will be needed to reflect on the impact of these changes on bureaucratic practices.

Terming a person as an immigrant most often derives from bureaucratic categorization. Nevertheless, there are only few studies about migration that focus on state actors and bureaucratic practices. This is especially the case when it comes to inner-African migration. This study shows that the state's perspective is crucial to understand the phenomenon. Therefore, more research is needed to reflect on differences and similarities of local immigration law enforcement practices of African states.

Inner-African migration to Northern Uganda is intensifying. The number of refugees hosted by Uganda is still on the rise because of the insurgencies in South Sudan, DRC and lately Burundi. At the same time, security discourses re-emerge in the context of the Al-Shabaab attacks on Garissa University in Kenya.[78] During the last years, these discourses have led to the increase of border surveillance, and to the implementation of other strategies such as Post Entry Management. The latter contains audit checks where immigration law enforcement is 'outsourced' from office settings. Practices of immigration law enforcement in informal settings are less structured by bureaucratic routines, and more prone to negotiation. In this study, most of the cases of informally paid money from immigrants to state officials were reported in this area of immigration law enforcement.

Securitization is said to be a process of global scale, as well as the association of insecurity with immigration (Bakewell 2007: 16). In this context, nationalism, racial profiling and othering are widespread developments that are found in Uganda, but that also increase in Europe for example. The current increase of immigration law enforcement is meant to maintain security in Uganda. But at the same time, there are cases where it increases the insecurity of immigrants. Security is maintained one-sided in Uganda when it only refers to nationals but leaves out immigrants.[79] Immigrants including refugees and asylum seekers are now under permanent monitoring and constant suspicion. Their ignorance of the law and of their rights makes them easy targets for exploitation.

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[78] Daily Monitor (2016): Security beefed up at border points. http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Security-beefed-up-at-border-points/-/688334/2678556/-/fento0z/-/index.html (accessed May 07, 2016).

[79] Immigrants in Uganda are also targets of terrorism. One of the two targets of the attacks in Kampala in 2010 was an Ethiopian restaurant in the area of Kabalagala where many Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants live. It is said that the reason behind the attack was the military involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia (Al Jazeera [2010]: Al-Shabab claims Uganda bombings. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/2010711212520 826984.html [accessed May 07, 2016]).

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