Controlling Knowledge and the Role of Engaged Intellectuals

Introduction
by Jonathan DeVore, Andrea Hollington, Tijo Salverda, Sinah Kloß, Nina Schneider, Oliver Tappe

The desire to combat Eurocentrism and the dominance of Euro-American epistemologies in global knowledge production has been pronounced at least since the second half of the twentieth century. Contestations of these epistemological inequalities include, for example, subaltern studies, postcolonial theory, decoloniality, “Southern Theory”, and recent aims to “decolonize” curricula, more generally. These intellectual fields have helped to better explain, and challenge, concrete mechanisms of constraint resulting from exclusion in knowledge production and silencing, also referred to as “epistemicide” (de Sousa Santos) or “epistemic racism” (Mignolo). They have also shown that other traditions of knowledge production and seeing the world have existed for a long time and are anything but “new”. Yet despite these laudable discussions, epistemic biases and inequalities in global structures of knowledge production seem to stubbornly persist.

In this issue contributors from different disciplinary and national backgrounds critically reflect on processes of knowledge production. Underlying these reflections are various implicit and explicit questions: Has there been a major (epistemic) transformation towards more balanced global knowledge production, or have inequalities been intensified? How are terms defined, and what do we understand by ‘global knowledge production’ or ‘epistemic inequality’? How can we adapt our research topics or methods to shape a more egalitarian (global) kind of knowledge? Can we identify the (conscious) ‘gatekeepers’ of epistemic exclusion; for example, disciplinary conventions, modi operandi of publication and funding schemes, or interiorized ‘colonial’ practices? And if so, what can we do about them at conferences, and in the publishing and funding sectors? How can privileged scholars engage in critical self-reflection on their academic practices – not only both at a theoretical and methodological level, but also in their everyday practices? By means of addressing these questions in a variety of ways, the aim of the issue is to investigate how, why, and to what extent institutional, financial, and ideological factors constrain the manoeuvring spaces, and how scholars, artists, and civil-society institutions can sensitise themselves to, unmask, and resist them.
A key characteristic of engaged intellectuals is the aspiration to act on behalf of the marginalized, the subalterns who (allegedly) cannot speak, to address and problematize global injustice and violence. Yet what exactly does it mean when engaged intellectuals from the Global North and/or the Global South ‘give someone a voice’? The contribution by Anne and Sophie Storch reflect on the act of ‘giving them a voice’, an interaction that can imply power and appropriation, generosity and patronage. They explicitly encourage linguists working in far-away places to consider those ambivalences involved in giving a voice to the Other. In a similar vein, Chen Tian introduces a specific South-South encounter, namely that of Chinese language trainers in Africa and their experiences there (presented as poetry). This poetic experiment raises the question of whether this interaction – by avoiding Global North intermediaries – may provide new dialogues, recognition, or maybe new hierarchies. Pedro and Fernandes shift the attention to the role of autobiographies in knowledge production and in countering epistemic exclusion. In different cases of toxic contamination, autobiographies of victims open up new spaces in which to address global injustice and inequalities – certainly a field for engaged intellectuals to take sides with the marginalized.

Starting from personal experiences of ‘exile’, Rosabelle Boswell confronts (remaining) epistemic inequalities in South Africa. As a non-South African black female anthropologist, she has not only first-hand experiences of epistemic inequalities in South Africa, but also provides insights about (the lack of) more balanced global knowledge production. She shows how her awareness of the politics of knowledge production helped in dealing with these confrontations and the pursuit of her own research interests. In similarly personal way, Ana Paula Bastos recounts her journey, beginning as a trained neo-classical economist from the North who has to realise that all her development tools, models, and creeds are useless when confronted with the on-site situation in the Brazilian Amazon region. Taught to believe that well-being and development could be achieved raising the GDP and ensuring free markets, she suddenly realised not only how useless but even how detrimental this progress model was. Here, on the local ground in the Amazon, people lived healthy lives, took care of the environment, and exchanged products – quite the opposite of the ideas she had learned about the road towards ‘progress’ being associated with money circulation, increasing consumption, and the free market. This experience taught her, as she recalls, to ‘sit and listen’, and inspired her to ponder both the true ingredients of ‘well-being’, and the absurd conventions and complicity of her discipline.

Ciraj Rassool, based at the University of the Western Cape, critically engages with one of the key institutions in the remembrance and production of epistemological visions, the museum. In reflection upon histories and epistemologies of museums, in particular in South Africa and Germany, he argues that a new understanding of the idea of the ‘museum’ is required – one that allows us to overcome, and change, the colonial frameworks through which we understand societies and people.

In a timely piece, Vito Laterza, an anthropologist and development scholar, highlights the complicity of Western scholarship in the maintenance of epistemological inequalities with counterparts elsewhere in the world, particularly in Africa. Though he argues that Western scholars have long been subject to ‘schizophrenic’ tendencies regarding the production of knowledge, especially current waves of xenophobic populism in Europe are posing a serious threat to ongoing efforts to address knowledge inequalities between European and African academies. One way to counter this, he argues, is to refrain from studying African issues in isolation, and instead to aim to better understand how these relate to business, political, and societal developments elsewhere – in Europe. Ines Stolpe and Enkhbayaryn Jigmeddorj also take a critical look at English scholarship with a regional focus on Mongolia. They demonstrate how, particularly, Western scholars disregard Mongolian discourses about the question of whether the country has even been under colonial rule. Instead, local discourses about Mongolia’s past are often more complex and nuanced than English scholarship on the country accounts for. Hence, as they argue, it is important to raise awareness of knowledge production taking place in linguistic spheres other than that of English-dominated Western-centric knowledge production.
Carsten Junker, subsequently, offers a theoretical debate on the theme of the issue by focusing on the notions of differences, diversity, decolonization and destruction. These ‘4 Ds’, as he calls them, are discussed by the author with regard to developments towards inclusive ways of knowledge production within American Studies, academia and beyond. This article offers a critical rethinking of epistemologies at German universities. The piece by Ingo Warnke provides a discussion of linguistics as a discipline and how this relates to the intellectual. The author argues that linguistics is fairly invisible in the world (beyond the discipline) and that therefore, linguistics as a discipline is not open to the creative and critical thinking of the intellectual. He underlines his perspectives on linguistics and the divide between the discipline and intellectual persona ‘who is in the world and in whom the world resonates’ by shedding light on the historical development of the discipline under the influence of Noam Chomsky. By engaging with the writings of Immanuel Kant, the author criticises the status quo of the discipline and argues for more intellectuality in linguistics.

The anthropologist Doreh Taghavi offers some general philosophical reflections on the production and processing of knowledge: How is knowledge not only generated, but more importantly processed? What are the conditions for knowledge to ‘be successful’ or come to ‘be believed’? How can we overcome what she identifies as ‘dangerous’ forms of epistemic bias like those that accelerate climate change? Academics should, the author concludes, continue to develop awareness of epistemological bias and actively contribute to ending epistemological bias. In an interesting conversation with each other, Andrea Hollington and Nina Schneider equally discuss the relevance of diversity, as various epistemological approaches may actually learn from one another. By bringing different research cultures together, not only may blind spots of particular thematic and methodological approaches be revealed, but opportunities may also emerge to explore ways in which to better understand the world we inhabit.

Finally, Penelope Allsobrook addresses epistemic inequality in the form of a poetic contribution. It takes the reader on a journey to cultural ways of knowing, in particular through the lens of the Xhosa language and culture. The author involves several thought processes as well as conversations, to develop a beautiful and thought-provoking account of epistemologies that not only highlights the fact that knowledge is a process but that also illustrates different perspectives and methods of understanding. Dialogues and a poem enrich the text and underline the creative nature of the author’s way of making a point in the form of an inspiring story.

In sum, the contributions cover the theme of epistemic control and egalitarian knowledge production from a variety of perspectives. They address both the theoretical and methodological level, but also highlight scholarly everyday practices. Ultimately, they all engage with how we can, and must, be open to critical self-reflection in our academic practices!
Giving Them A Voice: A Soliloquy
by Anne Storch, Sophie Storch

I. Chapter

Linguists (others too) are often considered people doing good work because they are giving others a voice. Therefore, they often receive such encouraging replies as “Carry on with the good work!”, or “How admirable that you are giving them a voice.” This sounds really very nice, polite also, and somehow very appreciative. This is good work, not work one ever becomes estranged from. Because it involves us, our bodies and minds (involves the whole of us), this is us, and we might be inclined to think that this is what matters.

Yet, I wonder: what is this intended to mean? After all, what voice is there to give? Does one have a voice that one can give to another person? And what does this sound like?

Does the person to whom I give my voice sound like me then? Or, wait, it is not one person, it is them. I give my voice to them, don’t I, and then there will be many people who will all sound like me, won’t they, and the idea of an entire group of people, or maybe the masses, all sounding like me is a bit frightening. An echo, multiplied and out of control. This is not some kind of reflection, but an indefinite number of others to whom I gave my voice, and who may not even wish to return it to me, like money easily borrowed and never returned, or an umbrella, or a heart (Pasolini said non aver paura di avere un cuore [I owe this to my colleague Ingo Warnke], and he might have liked to say the same about a voice). So, just as the things that one gives away are afterwards used in all kinds of ways and in all kinds of places, so might a voice be treated in the same way. And like a stolen bicycle/heart/umbrella, it might be found somewhere, quite unexpectedly, and in bad shape. Or in a good shape.

Imagine: lacking this voice that has been given away, given to them, and suddenly hearing it again, spoken with by someone who says things we would not say ourselves. This has never occurred to me though, and therefore I assume that there is no voice that one can give to them. Perhaps they would not even want it. I have never been asked by anybody, or by the masses, to give my voice. Money, umbrella, yes, but not voice. Or maybe, yes: once, at a concert, the singer shouted at me (at us; we were many) and asked me (us) to give him a voice. And also to raise our hands. But I played dumb, and neither gave nor did what he requested.
Has anybody else asked us to give our voices, then? Not to my knowledge. Unless: people do sometimes ask for a voice, when they greet one another, for example.

Hi, how are you?

Fine.

Hallo hallo hallo.

Ja, hallo.

Where from.

He?

Wie geht’s?

Gut.

Hier, Brille. Heute Muttertag in Afrika.

Hab schon. Wirklich!

Heute billig morgen teuer. Hier schau mal: andere Farbe neue Kollektion.

He wanted me to reply. Maybe not even to buy immediately (yes, to buy as well), but to speak, to say something that acknowledges me seeing him, taking notice of him as a person that is also present. And this is actually very important, as you will know. If one finds oneself in a position where one has to ask something from somebody else – asking for some help, for recognition, for a reply to a difficult question, for a reply to a greeting, a word that tells that one is there in the world and that one takes some space in it (as a body that is also present) and that one speaks in a particular – not just any – voice, then one appreciates a nod and a gaze and the sounding of another voice. There is nothing more terrible in this world, under this sky and sun, an old man who was begging for alms in front of a mosque in a West African town once told me, than to pass by a beggar without any reaction at all. One is well advised, therefore, to always carry some coins in one’s pocket in order to give them – one by one – to those sitting there and waiting. If one runs out of these coins, one can still say something, spare a word. Giving a voice to them is therefore an act of humanity, a gesture of acknowledging our being there together, sharing places and time. Therefore, one is well-advised to always have enough time on one’s hands to be able to greet and say something, to give one’s voice, so to say.

But I suppose “giving them a voice” is not intended to describe this kind of encounter. It means something like “speaking on their behalf”, claiming the voice of others. To speak on somebody’s behalf is for example to explain another person, to name and define, to fix and map. “Giving them a voice” feels more like taking a voice from someone and making it one’s own voice. Like spirits do: they mount bodies and speak through them. What an irony this is: the researcher who sets out to study the other becomes his/her own ultimate other by using other voices to speak through them, about otherness and difference. Taking the voices of others, turning them into book chapters and academic talks.
II. Interruption

To give somebody a voice. This is to speak on a person’s behalf, but also, and in an important way, to give someone the opportunity to speak; to let somebody have a word. One needs to have power here by the way – the power to give the word to another person, to include or exclude, to open up the dialogue or not. One can involve another person in a dialogue simply by making it obligatory, or by suggesting that participation is prestigious and important. But then one may not even lend an ear.

As a consequence, the voice that is given becomes worthless, because that what is said seems not to be heard and not to be appreciated. The one who has given the voice to the Other could be appreciated though, as a wonderful generous person: heroic and revolutionary. And then, it is not the one who was given the voice that stands in the focus of attention, but the giver of the voice. The one who gives the voice to the Other is a (rather questionable) Robin Hood of the dialogue.

Whether the one who is permitted to speak is also heard is not easy to anticipate, and neither is it clear whether his or her voice has weight. However, this aspect of “giving voice” is not so important for the actual image that is created. It is a relevant question, of course, for the speaker, but the speaker might not be so relevant to the audience in the end. The gesture, or, rather, performance lasts, while the dialogue is ephemeral.
III. Chapter

voice and power / the power of the voice / the voice of power / power and voice

Certainly, there are more hospitable ways to give a voice. Consider the chairs in the photograph below: they are of a warm, non-intrusive color, made of long-lasting wood (they are at least half a century old, some say almost twice that), with cushions made of a clean leather substitute. They offer little shelves just underneath the seat, where one can place folders and books. They are comfortably sized, and yet not isolating: they are more like a bench actually, so that one would sit close to another person. But the most interesting feature is not so much the comfortable closeness or the storage space these chairs provide, but the electrical sockets on the right side of each seat (on the top).

These sockets were originally meant for headphones. Now, these old headphones are lost, or damaged, and the ones currently in use everywhere have completely different plugs. The man who worked as a guide in the Palace Museum in Zanzibar, where these chairs were kept, said they were used during official audiences of the Sultan and his court. During such occasions, foreign people from around the world sat on these chairs, one next another (an Indian official next to a European diplomat, who sat next to a Chinese merchant, and so on), and had their headphones on so that they could listen to what the Sultan said. Later, after the reign of the Sultan was over (after the revolution), the chairs were used for a while, he said, in meetings of the new government. The Swahili speeches given then were translated via the headphones of the attendants. Which languages were available, we asked. – What? – Which languages came out of the plugs of the chairs? – Any! Any language that was needed. When there was someone who spoke only Italian, he was given the Sultan’s speech in an Italian voice, while next to him maybe someone only spoke Arabic and therefore were given the same speech in an Arabic voice. – These, we said, were amazing chairs. – Yes, he replied: this palace is full of amazing things.
Giving a voice as providing hospitality, what a wonderful idea. And more than this: imagine receiving such generosity along with a cup of sweet coffee, in a museum that suddenly turns into a kind of home where one can spend time and listen to each other’s stories. If linguistics could be as hospitable as this, then “giving them a voice” as something that qualifies those who study languages of far-away places would sound like a good idea.

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Journey to the Third Space
by Chen Tian

The construction of cultural identity takes place in a space of enunciation, what Homi Bhabha (1994) calls the Third Space. It is the in-between space that “carries the burden of the meaning of culture” (Bhabha 1994: 38). Third Space pays special attention to the in-between spaces in the global age which “initiate new signs of identity” as a result of “elaborating strategies of selfhood” (ibid.: 1). Bhabha conceives of the encounter of two social groups with different cultural traditions and potentials of power as a special kind of negotiation that takes place in a Third Space. This negotiation is not only expected to produce an intercultural dissemination of both cultural traditions that leads to a displacement of the members of both groups from their origins, but it is also supposed to bring about a common identity, one that is new in its hybridity; it is thus neither the one nor the other. Bhabha’s critical reflections on power relations in negotiations enable us to take into account the displacement and/or replacement of powerfully ascribed identities.

Journey to the Third Space attempts to capture the shifting identities of a group of Chinese academics in South Africa. The six poems are based on 16 months of field work, and are inspired by the experiences of six Chinese language instructors. For instance, in an interview with one of the Chinese language instructors, the interviewee, who was “born a crime” as the third kid in his family under China’s One Child Policy, shared his experience of reflecting on cultural differences between China and Africa: “People call me ‘question boy’ because I like reflecting on my observations and experiences. There are so many questions to ask.” The conversation later inspired “The Question Boy”. The poems reveal that the journey to the Third Space is very often an uncomfortable one, and composed by never-ending negotiations from many aspects in life.
The Seed of Curiosity

I don’t know when and how
The urge to leave breaks out from the here and now
The eagerness to truly experience the globe
Is among my many hopes.

Family and friends try to stop me; they argue:
“It’s too far.”
“It’s too dangerous.”
“It’s too unrealistic.”

Now I plant this seed of curiosity into the African soil
Where a flower of discovery is about to grow
Let me watch this special blooming
Without touching it, without naming it; just simply embrace it.

Wonderland

It was the African sunset that first sent its welcome
The light that speaks from far away
Crossing mountains, oceans, clouds
Whispering the forthcoming plots.

A city with many gardens
And faces of many colours
“How are you?” becomes the most tricky question
Until one learns that there is a standard answer.

“Good good good!”
“And yourself?”
“I am very good!”
But really? The voices stay but the speakers have travelled away.

On African time things move to their own rhythms
Places, smiles, dinners and dreamers
On a Sunday morning the strange becomes familiar
And what was once intimate begins to disappear.
Dearest Forest

Along Cypress we walked into the Newlands woods
Passing Apple, Orange, and Strawberry Roads
The doors turn colorful and the fences go low
Our spirit high and the air smells pine.

In textbooks I once learnt about many trees
Putting my hands on them I set these names free
They are rough but they are strong
Rooting deeply into mother ground.

His extroversive hands full of rosin
She proudly waves her distorted stick
He squats leisurely on an ancient stump
She alertly watches every dog checking us out.

In our own ways we interact with this unfamiliar world
What is it that connects us all?
Not as intellectuals or Chinese nationals
But simply as humans, the very fundamentals.

Without an answer, to the woods we sing
For we know she has a key to everything
A mystery life will always be
Thank you, dearest forest, for giving us peace.

Looking Back from a Distance

We all come from a troubled past
A collective traumatized childhood
Of loneliness, hierarchies, and repressed yearnings
Without knowing much about what anything really means.

Did we write our own stories
Or did the county plot these tales for us?
From far comes clear the grand narrative
That fills up everyone’s life.

It’s the pressure from family values and expectations,
It’s about everyone conforming to the same reasoning,
It’s the story of sacrifice,
It’s about becoming rich and successful in the age of ambition.

And beyond all
Is the consent that
There are things that cannot be talked about
Revealed in our unsettling laughs.
A Better Place

An invisible island is where I arrive
Isolated from all space and time;
This is a journey
That opens many new beginnings.
Never say goodbye, instead:
“A better you
And a better me
Will meet at a better place.”

The Question Boy

His arrival is a long-expected relief,
His first sound a rebellious scream;
His steps soft but ambitious,
His curiosity locked in his dreams.

His red scarves light up the coldest winters,
His thick glasses reflect the greatest thinkers;
His white shoes land on the farthest beaches,
On his dazzling journey of searching

For destiny and where it leads,
For freedom and what it means,
For truth and how it springs,
For answers he never expects to receive.

Reference

Toxic Autobiographies in Portugal: Memory, Resistance and Co-Production of Knowledge Within the Academia
by Sérgio Pedro, Lúcia Fernandes

Assuming the production of knowledge, in its procedural perspective, as an important element of the epistemological debate about the ontology of the knowledge produced by the academy and its engagement with the contemporary reality, this article aims to present a reflection of the process of participative production of knowledge by a group of researchers of the Ecology and Society Workshop (ECOSOC-CES) in the transnational project Toxic Bios, coordinated by Professor Marco Armiero. We will present the transdisciplinary methodology and pedagogy adopted, discussing this research experience and some of the results.

Being an contraction of Toxic Autobiographies, Toxic Bios is a project of the KTH Environmental Humanities Laboratory, Stockholm (funded by the Seed Box, Mistra-Forms Environmental Humanities Collaboratory) with the participation of several countries for the co-creation of autobiographies of toxic contamination (Toxic Bios Project site, 2018). The hubs are distributed in seven countries (Brazil, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey) but the principle is that new hubs can continuously join the project.

The Toxic Bios project is the continuation of a project developed by Marco Armiero (2014) in his research on the waste struggles in Naples, Italy, were he edited a book in which eight women wrote their stories of activism and contamination (Armiero 2014).

Toxic autobiography is a distinct result of marginalized groups denouncing the environmental injustice in which they feel trapped (Armiero and Sedrez 2014), breaking the silence of the subalternized and excluded voices of those that experience the inequalities of this acts of injustice and the consequences of colonization of knowledge (Santos 2010). A map of all the biographies collected is one of the project outputs, and is shown in Image 1. Images 2 and 3 are part of the 10 Portuguese biographies available in the Toxic Bios map.

According to our experience and interpretation concerning the project main goals, we would like to reinforce three aspects: 1) the participatory research on contamination and resistance within civil society movements, 2) valuing the toxic autobiography as a distinct result of marginalized groups denouncing the environmental injustice in which they feel trapped, and 3) a prototype of bottom-up counter-history of phenomena of slow violence (Nixon 2011), challenging the oppressive narratives of progress, the commons, and science that contribute to the construction of an epistemic injustice (Santos 2017).
The adopted way of doing science aims to reflect on the barriers of scientific methodology, deepening the understanding of participatory science as a result of the influence of different social, political, cultural and ethical variables (Latour 1999) and the consequent disappearance of the distinction between power (science) and truth (social) (Callon 1986).

The research carried out by ECOSOC-CES (within the framework of national teams) collected personal stories, in video, text, sound or image formats, that articulate the individual and collective experience of mobilization against toxic contamination, through transformative actions to challenge power (Khasnabish and Haive 2014) and realign the concept of sustainability with dialogue about the environmental injustice suffered by subaltern communities and their struggles (Velicu and Kaika 2015) concomitantly building strategies toward just sustainability both in the Global North and Global South (Agyeman 2008).

By adopting an ontological understanding of the autobiography as an empowering act of knowledge production that addresses the epistemic exclusion of the affected persons and communities, questioning the domination and the co-optation of history, the ECOSOC-CES adopted as a guideline of action the co-production idiom (Jasanoff 2004), as a continuous process of re-working and mobilizing different ideas, forms of knowledge, and perspectives, and developing trust between those concerned (De Marchi and Funtowicz 2003).

In the course of the research process, particularly in an initial phase of mapping, Portugal’s sparse environmental historical record before 1974 (dictatorship decades from 1926 to 1974) was evident, specifically in terms of its actors and processes of collective mobilization. This same fact evidenced the disconnection between previous and current environmental justice movements in Portugal, in particular with regard to the adopted processes of disclosure of the disruption situation of environmental osmosis in the public sphere and the mobilization of civil society against it, thus representing a loss of relevant knowledge.

It is possible to identify in several narrative biographies and trajectories a discourse that articulates the individual experience with the group resistance, the articulation often of various causes, struggles, themes and desires that led to contamination and / or popular mobilization, showing an interconnection with the biological, the economic, and the system of industrial production and consumption, among other aspects.
Each story is constructed by the networked individual, an association with other / different actors – human and nonhuman – and their dynamics – being (re)defined as they associate and participate in alliances, conflicts, and mediation processes (Callon 1986; Latour 1999).

The narratives revealed a porosity permeated by stories that intersect and others that diverge, considering that space represents a considerable influence on the construction of the self and on the personality references of the individual. They are also conducive to the creation and verification of the existence of multiple worlds (Escobar, 2015). The videos, audios, and texts collected evidence memories of stories, perplexities, and anguishes related to the territory, to the knowledge, to community heritage, to the existent and co-constructed learning and sense of connection with the place, and to the mobilization, the thinking and the construction of alternatives around contamination.

The autobiographies revealed testimonies of contact with various toxic substances, present in the places of the participants’ geographical loci of socialization, work and leisure, as well as in the food and water they consume, always with the constant threat of contamination and fear.

This fear of these “toxic forces” is evident in the discourses of complexity and uncertainty concerning the constant transcorporeal affectation, where the internal and external borders of people and bodies are not rigid (Alaimo 2010). The stories speak of human suffering, other affected living beings, communities and the natural environment, devalued local knowledge, and a lack of public action and participation in the construction of information that influences public decision processes, as well as the need to break the silence.

The autobiographies collected consider the intergenerational injustice of such epistemicide (Santos 2010) reporting the lack of information about the consequences of the toxic contamination for the future, thus reaching people who are currently living with the contamination, as well as future generations. An injustice that contributes to a change of symbolic and concrete representations of nature for human beings (Shiva 1992). As one reads the collected autobiographies, it becomes evident that there is an understanding and recognition of the creation of economic activities accompanying the polluting activities, and of the systemic operationalization of nature as a tool for the production of goods and growth of economies, dominated by internationally articulated economic groups, exercising the hegemony of power for the defense of their interests in capitalist accumulation.

The production-destruction dialectic (Porto and Freitas 2000) is often referred to, with the polluting corporation and its products having an important role in society. The ideology of technological optimism (Porto, 2007), which advocates that technology can itself control and solve the impacts generated by its processes and products, is very present in proposed solutions for the reorganization of territories and economies.

This dialectic activity is patent in autobiographies as a participative process of construction of knowledge, understood as a right to human dignity, exerted in the biography of the individual and her/his memories through an everyday process of oppression and colonization of the space occupied by capitalism. Thus, it causes both fear and inner conflict between the individual, her/his memories in relation to space, her/his heritage and the space he experiences on a daily basis.

In the context of the manipulation of a history created from top to bottom, using an oppressive logic, the Toxic Bios project aims to broaden the scope and positioning of academic intervention within society, mobilizing non-oppressive methodologies of knowledge creation, in an open and participated way. Through this process, and specifically in the case of the Toxic Bios team in Portugal[1], the contribution of this process of dialogue through the use of the material produced to strengthen the environmental justice movement in Portugal was evident, providing a structured and reliable assessment of particular historical processes, from the perspective of the affected persons and communities.

This is a process whose outcome contributes to supporting the various individuals who are the protagonists of the autobiographies, and concomitantly, victims of direct threats and lawsuits by polluting companies.
Footnotes

[1] Advocacy officer of FIAN Portugal, national section FIAN, international NGO for the Right to Adequate Food. Former Coordinator of the TROCA – Portuguese Platform for Fair Trade. Member of the Ecology and Society Workshop the Centre for Social Studies of the University of Coimbra. Member of the Portuguese delegation of the Monsanto Tribunal.

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[3] Portuguese team: Stefania Barca, Lúcia Fernandes, Rita Pais and Sérgio Pedro

References


**Heading South**

by Rosabelle Boswell

In some ways Ariel Dorfman’s memoir, Heading South Looking North, speaks to my experience of the research process. My life, like my work, is replete with the experience of exiles from which I have attempted to recover. Exile to the African continent as an islander, exile as a black anthropologist in post-apartheid South Africa, exile in the research subject and area specialisation which I chose, and finally a form of exile in the move to a career in management. The theme of ‘exile’ also emerges in my answer to the question of this volume’s subtheme: ‘has there been a major (epistemic) transformation towards more balanced global knowledge production? Or have inequalities been intensified?’

I was born in Mauritius, a tiny overpopulated island in the southwest Indian Ocean. My ancestors were primarily African and Malagasy slaves. Their lives were shaped by more than 200 years of slavery under Dutch, French and British colonial rule. In 1965, shortly before the island obtained its independence from Britain, my family left Mauritius for Africa. There, at the tip of the Great Rift Valley, we lived strangely. Strangely because we were embedded in the same racial and ethnic landscape we had sought to escape. Deemed to be racially inferior to the white minority and expected to segregate from the African people who looked like us, we lived a life regulated by the seasons established in the production of sugar. It was a world of white male managers, black artisans, cranes, bulldozers and quotas. It was also a world disrupted by sticky molasses, fine ash rain, intolerable humidity, dust and malaria. A world in which people attempted to retain the tastes and sounds of ‘home’ by cooking island favourites and listening to LPs of traditional songs.

After fighting for a bursary from the sugar corporation, I arrived in South Africa to attend university. It was a few months after the release of Nelson Mandela but apartheid was still firmly entrenched. There, I was thrust into a place of abstract ideas and arguments. I had come to gain knowledge and to learn the way of communicating with other professionals in my ‘field of studies’. This required forgetting what I had encountered before, and adopting the language and world of the discipline. Anthropology offered the possibility of entering worlds unknown. It offered a particular language that could articulate alterity and relativism in the same breath – a way of enticingly showcasing the kind of world I had come from. But in South Africa I was a young black woman anthropologist in the dying days of apartheid. I felt at the time that such people were not taken seriously and were not really expected to become anthropologists. To be taken seriously required being able to slickly quote Geertz and Deleuze and, later on, Latour, Foucault and Povinelli. As someone with a slave history and as a black woman in a still-apartheid South Africa, how could I be a genuine anthropologist? Plus, I was not entirely proficient in the English language and I was still learning the discourse of a discipline. Thus, from the start, knowledge production was difficult to achieve because English is not my mother tongue, and even if I mastered the English language, there was still the challenge of disciplinary discourse. But a worse
obstacle to knowledge production remained. This was the sexist and racist stereotypes of the largely white academy concerning the commitment, ability and contribution of black researchers. In patriarchal and racist South Africa, these assumptions were rampant. During apartheid, black students (especially those attending university in the 1970s and 1980s) were rarely given the opportunity for further study or bursaries. They were hardly invited to disciplinary conferences, and their opinion on matters social or cultural was rarely sought. This curtailed their intellectual reach, making it impossible for them to have the kinds of conversations that lead to truly remarkable discoveries.

Having mastered the English language and found my way through the forest of anthropological discourse, I found myself with a set of unimpressive weapons. Theories heavy with ideological mud. In the late 1990s and early 2000s obstacles to epistemic change were the large, blunt and not very useful theories of identity. Nations, we were told, are imagined. Creolization is everywhere, and ‘Western’ globalization inevitable. Nervous of academic marginalization and conscious of the power of fashionable theories, I engaged and used such theories in efforts to share the findings of my research. To ‘succeed’ in an academic career in South Africa, I also had to publish in accredited journals. In these, editors rewarded appropriate references and ‘nods’ to eminent (read: Euro-American) theoreticians. Citations of eminent theoreticians increased the likelihood of the article being read and cited, which also increased subscriptions to the journals. Knowledge production was stuck in a sort of theory conga, everyone citing the same eminent theoretician and being cited in turn for citing the eminent theoretician. Like Dorfman, I looked Northwards in vain hope of finding something that would help me explain the complex social situations that I was observing and experiencing.

Choosing to do fieldwork at ‘home’ and in the southwest Indian Ocean region brought about another exile that prompted me to doubt my ability to produce knowledge, since no-one I knew had done fieldwork at ‘home’. Thus, a third obstacle to epistemic change is the problem of presuming that there are legitimate ways of engaging a discipline and that there are legitimate interlocutors. When I chose to start with fieldwork in Mauritius (Boswell 2006), the island had shaken off its plantation image and reasserted itself as a premier tourist destination. Doing fieldwork in Mauritius, Zanzibar, Seychelles and Madagascar (Boswell 2008, 2011) elicited ‘friendly’ charges of tourism and holiday-making. Not so surreptitiously, it was also conveyed to me that real anthropologists are white and are working on the difficult legacies of apartheid. No matter that not long afterwards many retreated back into the same privileges produced by the apartheid system. Parting ways from the anti-establishment anthropology of post-apartheid South Africa and choosing to work in an environment where I looked like the people I was interviewing, I produced what I consider to be some epistemologically useful findings. I wrote on everything that interested me and that I thought would shed light on the immense cultural diversity of the Indian Ocean region. I wrote on heritage, tourism, economics, scent, dress, music, story-telling and restorative justice – defying, it seems, the disciplinary insistence on having a singular interest and mining that to produce a career with depth. The process of trying to reach new knowledge opened up opportunities to learn from a wide range of interdisciplinary sources. However, it also produced another dilemma.

If I wanted research funding from the ‘transformed’ national scientific council, I needed to demonstrate that I had worked on a set of coherent research subjects and that my work had evolved answers to a set of intellectually valuable and socially meaningful issues. I am not sure still whether my ‘engagement’ in the lives of those I spoke with during research was obvious, as I had to assert this in an account of my research trajectory so that I could obtain a national research rating. The scientific council (the National Research Foundation) takes its cue from a natural sciences approach to the assessment of knowledge and knowledge production. In this, it collects ‘objective’ reviewer reports to assess the quality of the researcher’s contribution to knowledge production. It also quantifies the citations of the researcher and interprets these to constitute the impact of the researcher nationally and globally. That a researcher has written about the feasibility of restorative justice for people dispossessed by 200 years of slavery and colonialism (Boswell 2014) is lost. Thus, a fourth obstacle to epistemic change in the research process is the increasing estimation of the natural sciences and the penetration of the discourse of science in global research assessment rubrics. Researchers are ranked,
knowledge is ranked, and universities are ranked to indicate the value of the knowledge being produced by their academics. However, from what I experienced in 25 years of research in the South, the value of the knowledge that one produces depends very much on what country one lives in and at which institution one is employed. Thus, in South Africa, if one is not employed at what is described as a historically white university, one will have less access to global pools of funding and ultimately opportunities to share the knowledge one has obtained. Plus, historically black universities still do not enjoy the national and international research status that attracts the attention of global funding bodies. This is a major obstacle to knowledge production especially in the social sciences, which are already disadvantaged by a science-focused global funding pattern.

The second part of the question to be answered is whether inequalities are intensifying or not. It would seem, unfortunately, that they are, in the context of publication and in the research process. In terms of publication, many authors from the global South (especially Africa), do not even attempt to submit work to high-ranking journals in the discipline. The theory conga is well entrenched, and scholars from Africa who have difficulty getting access to online journals will hardly have the chance to keep up with the latest debates in the discipline.

At this stage of my career, I am in a position to work with global partners on a diversity of research projects. However, being in the South means that I am often only appointed as a research partner. The Principal Investigator (PI) is always in the global North. One must wait for the PI and their institution to approve a project for it to be considered along with other project submissions. The research partner almost always has a smaller research budget, replicating the same colonial relations that existed before. This inequality constrains knowledge production as it privileges the knowledge leadership of the Euro-American PI, and creates an impression that researchers in the global South are not capable of leading multilateral projects.

It was these inequalities and exiles that moved me to consider a career in academic leadership. In 2015, I became a Dean of Arts at a historically merged university. That is, a university that has both a technical college and a university proper. The situation has produced another challenge, one in which my time is affected by the rhythms and requirements of senior management. Even so, from this vantage point I have the power to help others ‘produce’ knowledge. I can share my knowledge and theories of contemporary society, and financially support academics to advance the process of knowledge production in the South. However, I cannot stop them from reifying Euro-American ideologies and approaches to knowledge-making, as they are also, in a way, ‘caught’ in a web of knowledge production that is dominated by Euro-American publishers, theoreticians and authors. But in my work, here in the South, I can transform management understanding of social science knowledge and its important contribution to social justice and equality. This is a difficult task because many South African universities are swept up in increasingly hegemonic epistemologies and value systems. For instance, more universities are now requiring a close audit of the knowledge production process (how many people will you interview? Why? What is a statistically significant sample? How will you determine that a population is not vulnerable?), including the quantification of knowledge. Thus, those publishing in higher-impact-factor journals attract more accolades than those publishing on critical social issues in national or regional journals.

Earlier, I referred to the disruptions caused by sticky molasses, fine ash and malaria in the place where I grew up. Despite the weight of oppressions, the South holds immense possibilities for knowledge production and epistemic change precisely because the research landscape holds so many contradictions. In South Africa, there are extremely wealthy people and there is economic recession. There is political instability, and poor funding for higher education, and there have recently been student protests, but also democratization and strong calls for decolonization. In my case and despite various challenges, I still wrote about everything I wanted to, even in a very difficult environment. Being aware of the politics of knowledge production (I was a student, lecturer, researcher and a journal co-editor before I became a dean) helped a great deal. I am now comfortable with the fact that my theoretical analyses have not always cited the latest authors and that my
work may not reach the most esteemed scholars in the discipline. That is just fine, because the people that did read my work, and those I met during research, acknowledge that I did in fact help others to understand their circumstances.

References


A Path with no Return: On how I Became a Sceptical Economist Regarding Development

by Ana Paula Bastos

I am a peripheral from the North and I have worked for long years in the South. When in the South, of course, I am a voice from the Centre; I came from the Centre, I was trained in the Centre. I can go even further: I had a “neutral” neo-classical training in Economics in a recognized school: I learned that well-being = development = GDP growth. I learned that countries or regions need to catch up technologically, to converge. I learned that to be competitive, firms (and thus regions and thus countries) need to agglomerate, to collaborate with other institutions; and yes, institutions need to be strong and governance efficient and effective. Also, I learned that the state needs to shrink, and that the free market will solve all our inequalities. Only under free competition can GDP grow, and thus can we re-distribute; and only under a system based on meritocracy will you be free to choose what to be and where to be in society... So, in the end, it is all about GDP growth... until where, until when?

Unequal spaces, people and opportunities always intrigue me, so I headed south trying to understand why this was the case. What were peoples’ and governments’ expectations? What were their utilities? Was there any difference between being in the urban or in rural areas? Why megacities? Why land concentration? Why so many rural conflicts and urban violence?

These questions always inspire me; although I know that model growth has its limits, my mind was set to propose catch-up policies. I am not an anthropologist; I have no training in that discipline, so blindly, after only seeing the high-tech world and understand its clever production processes, I wrongly thought that there was only one way to be “developed”.

With the wrong lenses, seeing everything blurred, I disembarked in the biggest metropolis of the Amazon! I had my PC and my boxes full of cases of success; I had all the indicators to measure and all the statistical tools to do a serious diagnosis and present some solutions. They were far from being orthodox: no free market and small state; we needed participatory planning combined with a strong state to implement the measures and development instruments, and these would be discussed after local demands.
I also knew that we should take into consideration path dependency and institutional embeddedness. Knowing the divergent path in order to pursue our ideas, we needed more investment in formal education, to increase the absorptive capacity and prepare local actors and institutions to be more effective. In a flat world we needed more access to internet connections, the extended surveys could then be done over the internet, all the information could be shared in advance, and our visits would be “more effective”. The script was ready... according to my Eurocentric standards... It took me some time to understand that my proposals and magic plans to develop usually were based on destruction of local assets to then rebuild everything, according to a new framework. This was exactly what I was doing. In the capital of the state you use the boat as a mean of transportation, in order to reach more distant places (sometimes days away up the river), in a precarious place resembling a port deck; upon your arrival you may depend on a small canoe to get to your destination. As there is little infrastructure there you rely more on people, on local people; all your years of readings, data mining, statistical analysis and models mean nothing, as you struggle to find your balance between moving boats, and to prevent your equipment from falling in the water. I was never the adventurous type of person.

As we were working with local planners we knew about the lack of electricity and basic urban services; “our equipment” was sometime just pens and paper with which to draw thematic maps and write down demands. We would travel in multidisciplinary teams and were quite prepared for various forms of data collection. What our indicators were not showing us was that the people there were healthier and wealthier than we were. Most of the people there had never seen a Western physician, but they had their medicinal backyard and were very often advised by local “health experts”. Yes, they included a hospital in their demands, but they were not aware of the costs of maintenance, and especially not that nurses and doctors, prefer to work in urban areas, in nicely located hospitals.
A few volunteer organizations come once in a while and, more recently, the federal government has institutionalized the hospital boats for small surgeries and the like. Wealthier? Yes true, this economy does not depend on money so much; a big part of it is based on products exchange in local markets. As we measure wealth, based upon GDP per capita, and poverty, in terms of dollars per day, these people are very poor and unfortunately do not count for GDP accounting, as they do not contribute to the national production function. For GDP matters they are more “productive” when they get seriously ill – they then need doctors, hospitals, transportation, etc – which creates rent in the system, but will they live longer and healthier with more hospitals?

As for education, another pillar of the Human Development Index (HDI): Sen was right, we need to measure development taking in account the liberty of people’s choices. But is our educational system providing more choices? Can they understand their important role as guardians of a tremendous environmental asset or are they exposed rather to a Eurocentric model of society (and consumption) that diminishes their self-awareness (and self-esteem sometimes) and eliminates their possible valuable contributions to our system? We propose to substitute traditional knowledge for abstract scientific reasoning – very important indeed, but maybe only if applied.

We never demonstrate the possibility of creating novelty from this resilience to the seasonal or daily tides (in the mouth of Amazon delta), tropical tempests, diseases, food shortages, etc. All our “improvements” (basic services and infrastructure) would promote increased monetary circulation, but would they really promote greater well-being? At the time I hadn’t read authors from the South, so I was not aware that “Development has a long and convoluted history; underdevelopment a very short one. (…) Underdevelopment began on 20th January 1949. [Truman’s inaugural speech]. On that same day, two billion people became underdeveloped.” (Esteva, Babones and Babcicky 2013, pp. 6-7). But by heart I could understand that our society model is not adequate; we cannot promote genocide and hunger in name of “progress” for some.

So, engaging in a humbling exercise, I disposed of all of my tools and sat and listened. It was only then that was able to des - envelop innovation and understand, not resilience, but new life paths that are far more innovative and inclusive than the free market. Still I found it difficult to produce papers and have them publish in mainstream economic or public-policy journals, which publish the theories and evidence read and followed by government planners and competitive firms...The majority of my students and colleagues (now teaching in the capital and working with central government fellows) look at me as if I am a brave alien who survived a tropical jungle disease but contracted a permanent cough... and now needs to be cured. Growth is still needed to catch-up with that same magic model, that tragically will lead us to a homogeneous life standard.

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Towards the Postcolonial Museum
by Ciraj Rassool

As we gather to deliberate about the contested nature of objects in old and even colonial museums, as well as the implications and opportunities of new understandings of the meaning of ‘museum’, we also need to consider how much the world has changed since the modern museum and its fundamental features first emerged. The creation of a world after colonialism might have occurred for the most part in political terms. However, we are still deeply immersed in the epistemic struggle to change the colonial frameworks through which we understand societies and people, as well as institutions such as museums through and within which the societies and people of the world have been collected, classified and made knowable.

Here I want to argue that the frameworks of the stewardship of collections for future generations may be insufficient to maintain and defend the old museum in the face of powerful new arguments and approaches to the museum-as-process and the interrogative museum (Silverman 2015; Karp and Kratz 2015). These new arguments do not merely seek the geographic reorganisation of collections along national lines (new national museums vs ‘universal’ museums), but demand that old museums seek a new authority for these collections in their relationship with source societies. And it is precisely in these consultations, negotiations and contests that the meaning of the new museum is to be found, and that the dilemmas of the unsettled objects in those museums will be addressed, caught as they are between being returned or staying.

The museum is not only an institution of modernity and ordered citizenship, but also the primary institutional form of empire and coloniality. It was made and is being remade and adapted through both sides of colonialism’s history: by a rapacious and violent empire of plunder and pacification, as well as by empire as ‘benevolent colonisation’, humanitarianism and trusteeship over people and things. This was a simultaneous expression of collecting, documenting and administering (‘safeguarding’ and ‘preserving’) things and people through appropriation and stewardship. The administrative and classificatory systems of the museum through which the world was made knowable drew very emphatic distinctions between people of culture and those of nature. The natural history museum became the site of collecting and displaying the material culture of subject people as well as the site for collecting and documenting the physical anthropology of race.

Humanitarianism was not simply a masked ‘packaging’ of empire and colonialism (Stoler 2006). Rather compassion and sympathy were a means of solidifying social hierarchies. Moreover, empire’s humanitarianism had another dimension to it, namely a gesture of rescue and recuperation, especially of species and life forms deemed to be in danger of extinction or disappearance. In the case of the bushmen, this humanitarianism gave birth to the first significant representations of material culture in southern Africa, in the form of the 19th-century records of /Xam language and folklore that was later constituted as an archive, known later as the Bleek-Lloyd collection. Yet all this work was conducted in the name of humanitarianism and was
completely bound up with the plundered, racialised body of the bushman, perhaps the central element in constituting the discourse of museum recuperation and heritage preservation.

Modern collecting museums in societies as diverse as Amsterdam, Toronto, Cologne and Berlin have embarked upon projects to rethink the relationship between collections and people in their nations and overseas, with perceptive awareness of wider contests of coloniality, race and history. We also take note of the emergence of important new national museums of history in the US, South Africa and elsewhere, where the museum has become a means of asserting a belonging to a new nation in the face of previous denialism or active exclusion, or indeed as part of the cultural proclamation and narration of a new nation. New history museums have also been created as site museums or memory museums or more properly as ‘politics of history’ museums, where the category of museum has often been constituted in the defence of rights to land or as part of the process of transitional justice.

In this work of the defence of community and place, museums have also been marshalled as part of the democratic organs of the people, as a social movement in their fight against injustice, impunity and forgetting, and even just to build the resources of community itself. Often these new site museums or community museums have embraced the domain of museums without substantial tangible material culture, but with a world of the experiential and immaterial, as performed voice and body that speak to deep histories of oppression and the desire of a new self-authorship and an internal expertise. These are exactly the new projects of the self-activity or museum-making that we need to embrace and advocate as part of the process of deepening democracy in the world in the 21st century.

**Museums and Colonality**

South African society has experienced very difficult histories of multiple colonialisms as well as the social engineering of a rapacious, violent apartheid regime that divided its people into races and ethnic groups. In many ways South African history can be understood as a deep, historical contest between the project of race and ethnicity of successive colonial states and apartheid on the one hand, and the project of imagining a society without race and ethnicity on the other. Sections of the South African liberation movement that emerged during the 20th century developed a substantial body of thinking about non-racialism and anti-racism, especially during the period between the 1930s and the 1980s. These ideas have enabled us to understand race, ethnicity and the administration of people in historical ways. We have also come to understand how each category of race was created as part of this administration and governmentality, and how ethnicity itself was invented through native administration as part of the processes of rule.

The museum is one of the sites where race was made. A group of colleagues and I have recently completed a project on the South African ‘empire’, with the publication of a special issue of the Journal of Southern African Studies (Volume 41, 3, 2015). This project showed how it is possible to understand Southern African history through the idea of the constitution of a regional empire of power and authority, instead of through the conventional framework of the making of nations (Henrichsen et al. 2015: Lalu 2015). Research conducted in this project also emphasised that the museum needs to be understood as an epistemology, a system of representation, and not merely as a collection or exhibition. Indeed, the museum was the very institution of empire and coloniality, marked by categories of ethnicity, and systems of classification and knowledge hierarchy (Rassool 2015; see also Bennett 1995, 2004). And as is well known, the fundamental classification was that between cultural history and ethnography; between the material culture of those deemed to be civilised and the material culture of those deemed to be ‘primitive’.
The major challenge is to shift from an understanding of colonialism as time and place and as formal system of rule to an appreciation of coloniality as an epistemology, as a politics of knowledge. This would enable a much wider understanding of coloniality as embedded in deep structures of knowledge, in the character and shape of disciplines in the museum and the university. Colonialism would then be appreciated as more than merely a topic of history, as was the approach in the exhibition on German colonialism held in 2016 at the German Historical Museum in Berlin, notwithstanding how powerful this exhibition was. The claim made by art historian Horst Bredenkamp that Germany remained relatively untouched by colonialism because of its brief colonial experience can therefore be dismissed as absurd. This claim lacked an appreciation of just how significantly German museums and universities continue to be marked by coloniality in peculiar ways through the persistence of 19th-century disciplinary systems and classificatory divisions.

As we consider these questions, it is worthwhile noting the extent to which German public cultural institutions and spaces have had a deliberate engagement with postcolonial thought in the last few years. For the most part, nevertheless, many scholars have tended to see postcolonial thought as a set body of ideas, a library that is available to be translated into German and to be quoted. Many scholars in Germany have not even begun to consider the challenges that the society faces in its quest to decolonise itself. The project of creating a Global South Studies Center at the University of Cologne occurred on top of a German disciplinary history that rendered colonised areas of the world into discreet diciplines, such as Orientalischekunde and Afrikanistik. African Studies in Cologne and in Germany more generally was created out of the connection between Etnologie and African languages. For the most part, African History did not develop in Germany as it did in Britain and France (and the United States) as part of anti-colonial struggles in the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, German historians interested in African societies have mostly been scholars of German overseas history. These questions of discipline will continue to limit the extent to which the humanities and social sciences in Germany are able to embark upon postcolonial critical studies.

At the same time, ethnographic museums in Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Hamburg and elsewhere have been undergoing processes of renovation that have sometimes seen an openness to rethinking the museum process itself. Weltkulturen Museum in Frankfurt proved to be the setting of some of the most innovative thinking of the museum as laboratory, of artists in residence engaging with collections and of the idea of the postethnographic in the museum (Deliss 2014). Berlin has perhaps been the setting of the most significant contests over colonial human remains collections, over the ethics of colonial collections, and of the persistence of colonial urban traces. With pressure brought to bear by cultural activist groups, much of the debate has focussed on the cultural politics of the Humboldt Forum, which will bring the collections of the Ethnological Museum of Berlin at Dahlem together with those of Asian Art. In perpetuating the idea of the material culture and art of those described as ‘non-European’ the Humboldt Forum has shown itself to be fundamentally a project of producing ‘Westernness’, and shoring up boundaries, part of the continuing cultural project of reimagining Berlin as a major European city, and of reasserting Germany’s position as ‘Western’.

In South Africa, the museum system was shot through with a colonial classificatory system, characterised by a division between the people deemed to have culture and history, and those deemed only to have tribe as well as the physical features of race. The South African museum system was divided between museums of cultural history and of ethnography, with the latter sometimes incorporated into natural history museums (Davison 1990). This museum inheritance posed challenges for healing a society from the ravages of colonialism and apartheid and for building a democratic, non-racial society. How could these old, divided national museum collections, marked by a colonial classificatory division, become museums of the new non-racial nation? What did non-racialism mean for the classification system, what did it mean for the museum infrastructure and what did it mean for the administration of collections and artefacts that had been segregated?

A new ‘flagship’ national museum structure was created in Cape Town out of an amalgamation of the old previously segregated national museum collections, and was named the Iziko Museums of South Africa, with
‘iziko’ being a Nguni word for the hearth of the home. As part of the amalgamation and the integration of the collections, a new collections division was created, which was simply called the ‘social history’ collections, and a new storage facility for these collections was created (Davison 2005; Rassool 2009). This new collections building was not merely a new store, but rather became the site for an internationally significant epistemological project, taking previously segregated cultural history and ethnography collections, for example of ceramics, and performing the collections management work of placing them within a single collections division. This epistemic work also involves paying attention to labelling and object biography in ways that remove administrative racism, while showing the history of race and ethnicity in labelling.

While the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam made the bold step in 2015 of removing and changing its labels that bore the stamp of colonial racism (Jones 2015), many museums across the world hold significant collections from Southern African societies that continue to carry the offensive labels acquired during their acquisition and early entry in to the collection. These labels, such as ‘Kaffir’, the colonial label for Nguni-speaking people in the Eastern Cape at the time of their 19th-century conquest by the British, present a challenge to museums as they find ways of according respect to societies from which their collections originate. An opportunity is presented to these museums in South Africa and in other countries not only to alter their offensive labels, but also to embark upon a project of thinking about the history of ethnic and ethnographic labelling as part of the cultural work of colonialism.

Labels are not merely about a sense of authenticity; they are couched in the discourses of society and the object (Price 2013). The decolonisation of museums may involve an enquiry into the ethics of acquisition, and into the relationship between collections and living, historical cultures. And it also involves a deep, critical, historical enquiry into the knowledge systems surrounding objects and collections, in an approach that questions colonial categories. The work of Hamilton and Leibhammer has shown how important this is for ‘untribing the archive’ in the case of South African collections and documentalities (Hamilton and Leibhammer 2017). More recently the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, for the first time, included items of Native American art (previously thought of as ‘artefact’) in its exhibitions of ‘American’ art, representing an important epistemic shift.

In South Africa, the work of building a society out of the ravages and deep effects of racism is also potentially a project of trying to imagine a new nation without race, and even potentially without ethnicity. Yet contradictorily, the new postparaptheid society continues to be marked by race in almost every way. You cannot attend to policies of affirmative action without some reliance on older notions of race. Non-racialism is not simply a denial of the effects of race or an opportunistic claim of racelessness. The politics of racelessness serves to assist those whom apartheid empowered, the beneficiaries of apartheid’s own affirmative action. Instead non-racialism needs to be understood as a politics of knowledge and identity in which one thinks about the racial and ethnic administration of persons historically.

Just as one problematises race and ethnicity in the history of the administration of persons, so one has to think historically about the categories of the administration of museum objects and collections. As much as we can identify how artificial and constructed ethnicity is, we need to be able to understand how ethnicity and ethnic categories themselves have history (Vail, ed 1991). And so we need to appreciate the history behind how the ethnic and ethnographic category of Zulu was made, and how Zulu social formation can be understood historically outside of the simplistic framework of the Mfecane and state formation (Hamilton 1998). This will enable museums to rethink the category ‘Zulu’ in their collections management, not just regarding its historical accuracy, but also regarding its cultural politics over time.

The museum has also been one of the sites in the making of the category of bushman, and it is important for us to understand its work and that of the museum disciplines of physical and cultural anthropology in the history of bushmanisation. What the concept of bushman has meant has changed over time, from its earliest colonial creation as a reference to people without livestock, partly as a consequence of dispossession, and to
people who in turn raided Boer homesteads for stolen livestock (Gordon 1992). This process culminated in the physical anthropological studies of the early 20th century, and the racial project of cast-making from the bodies of northern Cape farmworkers and shepherds, conducted in the name of anthropological and museum preservation (Davison 2001; Skotnes 2002).

Colonialism has also often had the effect of removing people from any sense of indigenous continuity with precolonial societies. It is important to understand how new expressions of a politics of indigeneity have been emerging in which people have sought to narrate their lives in new indigenous terms, and where this indigeneity is the basis of a new and aspiring modernity, sometimes even expressed as the ‘recovery’ of indigenous knowledge systems. For this, an older language of ethnography has often been employed, which draws upon the research and publications of the old colonial anthropologists for assistance. So while Khoisan indigenous identities were studied in the museum through the prism of racial type and the trope of disappearance, Bantu-speaking people were turned into ethnic groups through the work of anthropology and native administration. And notwithstanding their desires, it has not been possible for indigeneity to be claimed and expressed outside the frames of ethnography (Rassool 2009).

These have been some of the contradictions unfolding in South African museums, expressed most powerfully in the 1996 exhibition, Miscast: Negotiating Khoisan History and Material Culture, curated by artist and scholar Pippa Skotnes in the South African National Gallery in 1996. This exhibition sought to engage with the history of racialised cast-making and with the power of the Bushman diorama that had been installed in the South African Museum in 1959-60, utilising the body casts of racial science made 50 years before. In this significant exhibition, Skotnes sought to counterpose the violence of the gun and the museum with recovered expressions of indigenous voices, as assembled by Wilhelm Bleek and Lucy Lloyd from 19th century / Xam informants who had been imprisoned in the Breakwater prison in Cape Town on charges of stock theft (Skotnes 1996; Skotnes 2002).

Skotnes’s project failed to problematise these notions of ‘recovery’ and ‘rescue’ ascribed to the work of Bleek and Lloyd, and her concept of the museum remained couched in the discourse of atonement, preservation and stewardship, and its desires for trusteeship over people and objects (Rassool 2009). The Miscast project was also criticised for reproducing and repeating the very colonial representations of Khoisan people that it had sought to problematis. In addition, the exhibition met new assertions of indigeneity as ethnicity, as neo-Khoisan groups sought to question the authority of the curator and the museum (Schrire et al. 1996>). These assertions were part of broader neo-Khoisan demands for belated inclusion in the system of traditional authorities (formerly native administration) that also represented a shift from race to ethnicity.

**Rehumanising the Dead of Racial Science**

When you make a new national museum of a non-racial democracy, what do you do with the legacies of racial collecting and research? An important aspect of South African museum anthropology and collecting history involved supposed ‘preservation’ of the physical records of people deemed to be disappearing, such as people labelled as ‘Bushmen’, whom anthropologists saw as ‘living fossils’. As a result of these impulses to preserve and collect, the buried bodies of the ‘freshly dead’ were purchased by museums from grave robbers. This trade in stolen human remains of early 20th-century people lay at the heart of the making of the modern museum in South Africa, coinciding with birth of the Union of South Africa as a new white nation in 1910. It also saw South African museums compete with their European counterparts for priority access to the remains of the stolen dead, as an expression of the South Africanisation of science. In addition to the trade in human remains of the recently dead, there is also evidence of the purchase of bodies of people before they died (Legassick and Rassool 2000).

As part of the transformation of the old museum collections, in the Iziko Museums of South Africa, the collections of the dead who had been stolen in these ways, or acquired for the purposes of racial research, were
removed from the collection under the terms of a new Human Remains Policy, and set aside in special ‘no
access’ stores until such time as a national policy on return and repatriation comes into operation. After the
Bushman Diorama had been closed, a decision was made that racialised body casts should also be consid-
ered as unethically acquired human remains. The experience of creating national cohesion and social healing
through the return and reburial of the remains of Sara Baartman in 2002, and Klaas and Trooi Pienaar in 2012
was widely expected to influence a process of returning the dead from museums in South Africa (Rassool
2015). These returns would not merely be a roll-out of events of deracialisation, but would constitute the
new content of the museum itself, with processes of return constituting processes of remaking the museums
themselves.

As the legacies of race and physical-anthropology-as-science are attended to as part of the decolonisation
of museums in South Africa, Iziko Museums have also shown that it is possible to rethink the value of the
category of ethnography. It is not possible to make new postcolonial nations on the basis of the ethnographic
museum. The experiences of Ghana and Uganda and other countries demonstrate the dilemmas of national
museums which remain dormant, with their frozen, dusty exhibitions trapped in old languages and catego-
ries. The creation of social history collections in the Iziko Museums has shown one way in which old museums
with inherited collections can set out on a post-ethnographic path, so that people can recognise themselves
in museums outside of colonialism’s categories of race and ethnicity.

**The Museum as Process**

That museums nowadays are much more about people and creating civic forums for discussion and debate
is powerfully shown in the cultural and memory work of community history museums in South Africa that
emerged from the mid-1990s. The foremost example of this new museum of process is the District Six Mu-
seum in Cape Town, which came into existence as a site museum and a politics of history museum. It was
created to defend the land of District Six, from which people had been forcibly removed under apartheid, and
to defend the narrative of that experience, through site interpretive work. This museum that has developed
alongside a complex project of healing the community through land restitution has also deliberately set itself
the task of rethinking the city of Cape Town outside of the categories of race, with the challenge being ‘to
build a city not of people, not of races’ (Soudien 2001).

The District Six Museum has worked with the concept of museum not as collection but as site inscription,
as memory work, and as transactions of knowledge. In recent years its main methods of interpretation have
involved site visits and commemorative walks, utilising the resources of memory, trying to ensure that a land
restitution process under way pays attention to questions of memory. Here the museum is understood as the
process of knowledge formation, as part of the resources of reconstituting society, where this is the museum
not as the object and not as the exhibition. Yet the District Six museum has been through quite a substantial
process of museumisation and formalisation, as it acquired the responsibilities of stewardship and care of
collections, of objects and images of ordinary lives as well as recordings of social memory and cultural ex-
pression (Rassool 2006).

This work of regarding histories of displacement and return, of dehumanisation and the resources of reco-
yery, is part of the new museum work of remaking society and of rethinking the museum beyond its modern
impetus to discover, document and classify. This is the new museum of conversation and interrogation bet-
ween local, national and international expertise, between the oral and literate, and between academic and
public scholarship. A focus on the ‘politics of history’ enables a new approach to museums that consider
varying pasts and more than anything else offer an approach to expanding the horizons of museums beyond
the canon.

The postethnographic museum and the museum of process both point to the possibility that the modern
museum as the world has known it, which emerged as part of the making of the modern person, and which
coincided with the colonisation of the world, may have outlived its value. Yet the postmuseum can only be the outcome of a sustained engagement with the basic museum work of collecting, conservation, exhibition and education in ways that enter into battle with the colonial concepts of race and ethnic group, which seem almost naturalized and frozen into who we are. In general, it is critical to think about the connections between the administration of people and the administration of artefacts in the museum, and to rethink both society and the museum at the same time.

What we are talking about in this questioning of race, ethnicity and ethnography is a new critical citizenship and what it means to be human in a postcolonial world.

In considering how the museum is changing we need to understand how old collecting museums have been challenging themselves and how new, interrogative museums of process have begun to expand museum horizons to embrace the downtrodden, the oppressed and exploited of the world, whose experiences might previously have been confined and contained through colonial ethnography and even a denial of coevalness. This focus on local and deep histories of oppression, displacement and survival, while guarding against the triumphalism of nationalism, needs to consider the ways it offers new understandings of what museums are, as well as the possibilities for new museologies for the 21st century.

Questioning the museum is not merely about expunging its rapacious histories, and shoring up the vestiges of a remaining benevolence, framed as preservation and stewardship, but requires questions posed about the syndrome of preservation itself. The most progressive edge of that reformed, benevolent museum is the ‘contact zone’ (Clifford 1997, based on Pratt 1991), as produced through co-curatorship, and through science and indigeneity working together. This model of a reformed museum retained the classificatory order and hierarchy of empire, but relied upon greater participation by ‘source communities’, with the museum placed on a more ‘ethical’ footing.

This age of ethical engagement with human subjects and of a new ethics of collecting has seen the emergence of new programmes to prevent museums from benefiting from the illicit traffic in artefacts, and a significant move in many museums to ‘clean’ museums of culture and nature of their human remains collections and of other ‘sensitive collections’, deemed to have been unethically collected. Sometimes these changes have taken the form of a partial ‘cleaning’ through merely moving the store of human remains or sensitive collections, and creating Keeping Places, jointly managed by both scientific and indigenous parties. Such processes of reform might have created more socially responsive and ethically grounded museums, but they have left the empire of the museum intact.

Transforming the museum requires understanding its history as the locus of empire and coloniality in all of its forms, and to embark on the difficult work of interrogating its collecting histories and epistemologies, and to think about museums outside evolutionary frameworks and the impulses of preservation and atonement. The postcolonial museum may indeed require the inauguration of the postmuseum itself.
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The rise of xenophobic populism, knowledge inequalities, and the double binds of Europe-Africa academic relations
by Vito Laterza

The advance of xenophobic populism in Europe is posing a serious threat to the ongoing efforts to address knowledge inequalities between European and African academies.

Debates about the need to transform and equalise relations in academic knowledge production flourish, driven by student protests in South Africa, the UK, the US and elsewhere. At the same time, we are witnessing a closer alignment of research agendas with state strategic aims and the “national interest”. European governments extract ever greater amounts of raw materials and cheap labour from African countries, while giving little, if anything, in return to African citizens and migrants.

We are caught in what anthropologist Gregory Bateson termed a “double bind”. Bateson developed the concept to explain some of the key features of schizophrenia, analysed as a social pathology marked by a breakdown in communication between people affected by schizophrenia and their family members.

A double bind occurs when somebody is faced with two or more openly conflicting messages communicated to them by a figure of authority – in the case of the person affected by schizophrenia, they are exposed throughout their childhood to contradictory instructions given by one of the parents.

For instance, such conflicting messaging occurs when a parent, on one hand, makes constant affirmations of love and expresses a desire to be near the child; and, on the other hand provides instructions with the opposite meaning: “it’s time to go bed now”, “you need to get ready to go out”, and so on.

The verbal message of closeness and love is contradicted by verbal and nonverbal displays of distance and coldness. When such contradictory messages become routine, the patient might develop schizophrenic symptoms, which, in Bateson’s analysis, range from withdrawal and inability to express one’s feeling of discomfort and puzzlement at the conflicting instructions, to outbursts of rage and hallucinations. Bateson used his theory of schizophrenia as a theoretical metaphor applicable to several domains of social life, and the ecology of communications in society more broadly.

Predating the rise of Trump and Brexit, our double binds as European academics were shaped by our colonial legacy. We have been trained to understand our relationship with researchers and knowledges from all around the world as one of equality and mutual respect. But we have also been conditioned to embrace
ideas of superiority of “European knowledge”, defined in sharp separation from – and sometimes outright opposition to – other knowledges. Our European privilege is sustained by such assertions of distinction.

This has created a “schizophrenic” ideological condition, where we have devalued the academic labour of African colleagues and favoured the reproduction and concentration of Eurocentric knowledge and personnel, while making heartfelt statements about inclusion, mutuality and respect.

On the whole, European academy remains overwhelmingly white and Eurocentric, often in stark contrast to respective national demographics. These biases are reflected in epistemologies that continue to obscure and erase the contribution of Africa-centred knowledges. Because of the overt commitment to equality and anti-racism, much of this discrimination happens not as a clearly stated policy statement, but through informal means – what Sarah Henkeman (2018) calls invisible forms of violence in her work on racism and discrimination in South Africa.

This kind of liberal colonial double bind however has been replaced by ever more polarised injunctions:

• We are urged to acknowledge and act upon pressing demands for radical transformation and to address inequalities in material resources and symbolic capital between Europe and Africa;

and

• we are pushed towards welcoming, or at least accepting, the rise of the far right across Europe as a legitimate “movement of the people”, that deserves empathy and respect. We are asked to value our national identities above everything else, and pursue the national interest in our academic endeavours, as researchers funded by the state, and loyal citizens.

If the liberal colonial double bind was already problematic, the decolonial vs nationalist one is likely to cause more pain and incoherence. How can we work towards a world where we can include a variety of voices, and transform academic structures into equal and representative spaces, while at the same time we pursue exclusionary policies demanded by governments and the broader society? Finding a synthesis between these two demands is simply not possible.

This new competition of nationalisms is also creating divisions within Europe, where legitimate fights around precarity are quickly degenerating into calls for “Italians First”, “British First”, and so on, ironically destabilising the notion of European supremacy carried on from colonial times. The idea of a pan-European alliance of reactionary forces – what French far-right politician Marine Le Pen and others call a “Europe of nations” – is in fact an hallucination, clashing against the permanent reality of conflict and fragmentation that such vision sets in motion.

From a systemic point of view, these multiple double binds are not sustainable, and if we remain stuck in them, there will be dire consequences. Leftists, centrists and right-wingers across Europe are converging on a shared anti-immigration platform, driven by dystopian measures such as the creation of more camps for migrants and refugees inside and outside Europe.

The goal is clear: stop immigration flows at all costs, and segregate migrants and refugees outside “normal” society, as a second-class population not deserving of basic human rights. These material practices are enacted to revive European nations reminiscent of our fascist and colonial past. The cathartic effect of scapegoating migrant Others for all of Europe’s failures, is a symptom of a deep existential and moral crisis that has now infected the minds and sentiments of most Europeans.
While this destructive moral drama unfolds, the same neoliberal system that is often attacked in conspiratorial overdrive by populist forces, continues its relentless advance in all spheres of social and economic life.

Despite this worrying state of affairs, the European academy continues to have a considerable amount of material and intellectual resources, when compared to its African counterpart – which experienced decades of draconian austerity and perpetual economic crisis caused by an unequal world system dominated by Western countries and China.

With the resources at our disposal, we can do something to reverse the trend: studying society, economy and politics from a critical and engaged perspective, focusing on the structures of power and inequality that have led us to where we are today. To do this, we need to study ourselves, and sensitively unveil the complicities and collusions that sustain contemporary Eurocentric knowledge production.

In the specific case of African studies, we should avoid studying African issues in isolation, and focus more on the nexus of business, politics and society that has marked the rise to power of politicians such as Matteo Salvini – Italy’s notorious anti-migrant home affairs minister.

Rather than studying “others” and fetishising European academic heroes advocating for the “downtrodden”, we should deploy our analytical and theoretical skills to study people and organisations that produce discrimination, poverty, wars and widespread suffering. This means analysing European institutions that have militarised migration flows such as FRONTEX, and ending our complicity with the “managed migration” paradigm. Social studies that focus solely on migrant routes and migrants’ and refugees’ attitudes and behaviours often work as forms of intelligence-gathering for state security agencies. We need to abandon these practices in favour of systemic studies that examine powerful actors, rather than silently colluding with them.

We should direct our attention to the damaging effects of European raw materials strategy on Africa. We have to move beyond descriptions of the plight of dispossessed African communities objectified as recipients of our charity and outrage in isolation, and firmly cast our gaze on Western multinationals, experts and managers that make such exploitation and dispossession possible.

In short, we must take on the forces that push us in the direction of loyalty, compliance and complacency with a system that has now unambiguously declared that European supremacy is good, desirable and a feasible policy goal.

To overcome our doubts and hesitations, it is worth remembering what is at stake. As anthropologist Divine Fuh (2017) cogently puts it:

_We must recognise and acknowledge the critical context in which we find ourselves – the human is under threat. We are facing extinction. And this is not just about the ecological challenges that are driving the sustainability and Anthropocene movement, but also particularly about the core values that frame and underpin human society and relations such as interdependency and mutual respect. Modernity and its accompanying projects such as development and democracy are no longer as tenable as promised and have not successfully created wealth, stability, harmony and equality. The last several years has seen an increase in right wing political and religious fundamentalism, leading to an increase in overt bigotry and hate-motivated violence worldwide._
The recent wave of protests in the US against the horrors of Trump's anti-immigration policies shows that it is never too late to take action and change course. What we cannot do is bury our heads in the sand, in the hope that the storm will pass.

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References

Competing Narrations: Views on Mongolia’s Colonialism Discourses
by Ines Stolpe, Enkhbayaryn Jigmeddorj

Being part of the post-socialist sphere (i.e. the former Second World), Mongolia (Mongol Uls) reels like tumbleweed between the remaining worlds, the Global North and South. Apparently, this applies not only to classifications of development, but also to the country’s mapping with regard to colonialism. At one time presented to former colonies as a forerunner on the way into a brighter future, post-socialist Mongolia appears ambivalent concerning the question of whether Mongolians have ever been under colonial rule themselves. These discourses in Mongolian historiography are widely disregarded by Western scholars, some of them even promoting a biased equation of ‘post-colonial’ with ‘post-socialist’.

Post-Socialist Reproduction of the Painting “Bypassing Capitalism” on a Power Plant in Ulaanbaatar
(Foto: Johnny Baltzersen, 2012)
The sovereign nation emerged from the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR, 1924-1992), which was the second socialist state in the world and a satellite of the Soviet Union. Even though dependent, the country managed to maintain a distance from its guiding star, called “older brother to the north” (khoid akh). There is no doubt that the older brother intervened a lot, but he also facilitated a plebiscite, which led to full independence from China, including sovereignty over foreign policy, in 1945.

The Mongolian People’s Republic entered colonialism discourses in two ways: via historiography proper, and via the anti-colonial liberation struggle. The latter refers in particular to the MPR’s imaginary, yet brisk journey through the history of humankind, pursuant to the Marxist stage model of history: According to the narrative, the country had jumped out of (gloomy) feudalism and landed directly in (bright) socialism without passing through capitalism.

Bypassing Capitalism (Kapitalismyg Algasch).
Painting by Dagdangiin Amgalan (1959)

Bypassing ...? Embroidery in a Countryside Museum
(Khentii Aimag, Dadal Sum, Foto: Johnny Baltzersen 2012)

This deviation from the orthodoxy of the Marxist stage model resulted from the fact that not even rudimentary capitalism existed in the Mongolian steppe, and in place of a proletarian class there were nomadic herders. V.I. Lenin had already decided in 1920, at the 2nd World Congress of the Comintern in view of the prospective Soviet Republics in Central Asia, that “with the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries” could head directly for socialism “without having to pass through the capitalist stage” (Shirendyb 1981:20). Thus, the MPR was practically authorized to take a short cut through the prescribed course of history.
A few decades later, this bypassing-capitalism narrative provided Mongolians (for the first time since medieval times) with a solo appearance on the stage of global history: When many former colonies had gained their independence, ideologists on either side of the Iron Curtain were eager to drag them into their respective political camps. In these Cold War battles, former colonies were ascribed the role of a “third power” within internationalism, and the MPR made its grand appearance as a flagship: It was presented to ex-colonies as a verified example of stunning development, an “ascent out of medieval backwardness and feudal oppression to socialism” (Shirendyb 1981:19). Contemporary sources reported that the MPR had friendly relations with more than 40 former colonies, who supposedly showed interest in the non-capitalist way of development (Rathmann and Vietze 1978). Whether or not this was true, the exceptional representation of the country contributed to its self-perception as an essential part of the Second World.

MPR historiography had already introduced the term “colonialism” (kolonichlol) during the 1940s to denote the period of Manchu (Qing) reign. From 1691 to 1911, the Manchu ruled over what they named Outer Mongolia, which roughly correlates with the territory of the present Mongolian state. Their domination over what they named Inner Mongolia (today an autonomous region in the PR of China) had already started from 1636, whereas westward territories of the Mongolian plateau came under Manchu rule only in the 18th century. In the MPR’s historiography, the Manchu-led Qing reign (Manjiin üye) became the epitome of colonial oppression, as the following depictions from the National Museum show:

While several Western scholars capture this colonialism-narrative, which is prevalent in post-socialist Mongolia’s public discourse even today, some deny it and even equate the socialist era with colonialism. Kaplonski, for example, in the preface to his book Truth, History and Politics in Mongolia, refers to an article (as his starting point) claiming “the Mongols” would have come “out from under seventy years of essentially colonial Soviet rule” (Kaplonski 2004:viii). Further on, he states that “Unlike the situation with the Soviets, however, the period of the Qing is not remembered as a period of colonization” (Kaplonski 2004:38).
Such bold statements basically disregard Mongolian discourses, which are far more complex and nuanced. A comparative analysis of publications concerning the Qing era yields the following designations: occupation (ezerkhiilel), colonization (kolonchlol), subjugation (talkhidal), oppression (daranguilal), control (zakh-irgaa), domination (erkhsheel), hegemony (noyorkhol), usurpation (türemgiilel), and exploitation (möljög) (Jigmeddorj 2011:4-5). In contrast to socialist historiography, post-socialist accounts do not focus only on the territory of the Mongolian State (former MPR) (Boldbaatar and Mönkh-Erdene 2004:11; Manjiin erkhsheelliin üyeiin Mongol 2004:11), and many intellectuals agree that while the hegemony (noyorkhol) or domination (erkhsheel) of the Qing was the most sorrowful period in Mongolian history, people were actually vassals of the Manchu rather than colonial subjects (Sanjdorj 1998:3; Mongol ulsyn tüükh IV 2003:5; Manjiin erkhsheelliin üyeiin Mongol 2004:3). However, in Mongolian writings, historians definitely do not associate the socialist era with colonialism.

Mongolian intellectuals heatedly debate how to name and categorize the historical period of the Qing Dynasty, or more precisely, the time from the mid-17th century until the beginning of the 20th century, when most Mongol territories were under the rule of the Manchu. The cover of an “Illustrated History” published not long ago shows that historians rather avoid naming this era, and instead only mention the timeframe and, in an entangled-history manner, the then dominant powers in the area (Russians, Mongols, Manchu).

Our brief view of competing narratives illustrates what Silova et al. refer to as “the coloniality of knowledge production ... in and about (post)socialist spaces.” (Silova et al. 2017). We support their initiative “to fracture the hegemony of Western-centric knowledge and ... to gain a global viewpoint that is more inclusive of different voices,” and finally also “to reclaim our positions as epistemic subjects who have both the legitimacy and capacity to look at and interpret the world from our own origins and lived realities” (Silova et al. 2017).
Kheltei bol khöltei – this Mongolian saying, which roughly translates as “with language you get around,” has implications for us as researchers and university lecturers: In order to overcome epistemic inequality, we need to raise awareness of processes of knowledge production that happen in languages other than English, and to find ways to make them more visible rather than “mapping the Self with the categories of the Other” (Clammer 2003:21).

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**The 4D List: Knowledge Production of Difference, Diversity, Decolonization, and Destruction**

by Carsten Junker

As the editors of this special issue note, a “desire to combat Eurocentrism and the dominance of Euro-American epistemologies in global knowledge production has been pronounced at least since the second half of the twentieth century” (“Controlling” 2017). While there may be a consensus about this desire among numerous engaged intellectuals whose work is dedicated to a critical analysis and rejection of the hegemony of what Walter Mignolo calls a “European ancestrality that was sold to us as modernity” (2014:48), there is by no means a general agreement as to what consequences should be drawn from this desire and what actions should be taken in the future—in other words, how this hegemony should in actuality be combatted. The wide range of possible answers to this call for combat may be captured by a number of keywords that also serve as structuring elements for the short contribution at hand, which is informed by critical debates in (North) American Studies, the field in which I locate myself:

a) the consideration of an epistemological shift toward **differences** within and between knowledge objects and subjects;

b) the implementation of **diversity** both among knowledge producers and in curricula;

c) the **decolonization** of orders of knowledge; and

d) a movement toward **destruction**, an ultimate “call for the end of the world” (Wilderson 2010:8).

**Difference**

When I entered American Studies as a student in Berlin in the 1990s, the so-called New Americanists had begun to shape the field (see Paul:23-25). They built on the work of scholars who had sought to overcome a Cold-War narrative of American exceptionalism, a nation-based focus on the United States that had validated the country’s superior role as messenger of Western democracy. What made American Studies so attractive to me and my fellow students was a deep interest in differences within the nation—institutionalized in the wake of the social movements which had led to a thorough restructuring of curricula—and a more recent critical focus on the role of the United States as an imperial state and on phenomena of Americanization gone awry. We knew of no other interdisciplinary place in German academe where “differences” and heterogeneity were so validated and where a relentless critique of power structures had become a prerequisite for good
and appreciated work. To my knowledge, no other field thrust such critical tools at its practitioners. Even more, these tools facilitated a critical reflection on how subjects were positioned in complex ways on a spectrum ranging from center to margins in relation to a Western and Northern canon of knowledge: from critical race theory including so-called critical whiteness studies, to gender studies and queer theory, a wide range of approaches were leaving a mark on the field. The title of an influential article by public intellectual Cornell West (1990), “The New Cultural Politics of Difference,” put the agenda of the time in the fewest possible words.

**Diversity**

Such discussions around the politics of difference both reflected and pushed for an increasing diversification of students and faculty in institutions of higher education. The demand that universities should represent the demographic diversity of society has also translated into calls for the implementation of “diversity” at German academic institutions. While “diversity management” has been associated with private companies and their goals of capitalizing on diversity for the sake of innovation and financial gains, social economists also consider and put forward other arguments for the implementation of diversity in institutions of higher education: these arguments relate to dimensions of higher efficiency in heterogeneous study and research groups, dimensions of fairness in overcoming discriminatory practices, and dimensions of representing the diversity of a population on all levels of public institutions such as the university. Most importantly and in the broadest terms, these arguments address dimensions of learning for life: forming personalities through lived diversity in order to educate citizens for leadership roles in democratic societies shaped be global immigration (see Grözinger and Langholz-Kaiser 2018:199–200).

But this affirmation of diversity—easily prone to misunderstanding as a happy-go-lucky multiculturalism—also implies crucial challenges and pressing problems which were already becoming visible in the academic debates over a celebratory politics of difference. Epistemologically, a proliferation of analytical categories of difference—corresponding to categories of social differentiation—called for a reflection of the status and interrelatedness of these categories: how does “race” relate to “gender” (Crenshaw 1989) and where does “class” fit in (Collins 1993), Black feminist scholars were asking; what about “sexuality,” “ability,” “age,” et cetera? What about the “etc.” (Butler 1990:143)? How do producers of knowledge shape their objects of knowledge? As an interdisciplinary endeavor, American Studies could go to concepts of feminist epistemology for answers, such as standpoint theory (Harding 2004) and reflections on situated knowledge (Haraway 1988). More questions became apparent with respect to the diversification of curricula: what remains as common ground for scholars whose work moves into ever more fragmented subfields of specialization? A preliminary answer could be found through the lens of ethics, and this, it seemed, referred us back to the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and equality and its promises; however, Enlightenment reason had also facilitated the violent histories of fascism, colonialism, and enslavement. And moreover: how could these categories that had emerged out of post-protest U.S. American contexts be translated into German contexts shaped by the country’s unification and, more recently, global migration—at universities that, for the most part, are situated in a European tradition of Enlightenment pedagogy?

**Decoloniality**

Against this backdrop, let me take up thoughts Sabine Broeck and I developed in a working paper that came out of a conference contribution at Walter Mignolo’s invitation to the Center for Global Studies and the Humanities at Duke University in 2010, in which we called for “a decolonial epistemology of pedagogy for higher education” (Junker and Broeck 2010). We identified, not least from our own personal experiences, that demographic classroom makeups at German universities lagged far behind the racial and ethnic composition of German society. We also formulated, for the time being, a pedagogical call to move beyond an ethnographic desire to learn about non-white “others” and instead make inroads in a self-critical approach to white hegemonic knowledge production. While we acknowledged that this might re-center white Eurocentric hegemony as a primary focus of attention, it seemed to us a viable strategy for redistributing epistemic privileges and
acknowledging the opportunities afforded by a positional surrender of a-priori entitlements. We called for a “didactic shift to an *eros of conflict, friction, irritation* which teaches the sustenance of white discomfort,” noting that pedagogical difficulties might arise from avoiding what we termed a “pedagogy of guilt” in favor of a “pedagogy of accountability” (Junker and Broeck 2010, emphasis in original). Such an agenda requires a re-reading of the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and equality as intricately tied to the unfreedom, historically speaking, of the colonized and the enslaved. It is an agenda that also involves an attitude of humility toward the authoritative knowledge of those for whom the historical past of colonization and enslavement is still felt in the present (see Hartman 2007:133). In often overwhelmingly white German teaching and learning environments, the relevance of such attempts at pedagogical reflection and action—in the spirit of what Mignolo calls “decoloniality” or “decolonial thinking and doing” (2014:26)—continues to be all too apparent.

In an recent public talk about the legacy of the work of the great African-American public intellectual, political activist, and sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963), outstanding public intellectual and postcolonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak articulated her preference for the term “affirmative sabotage” over the term “deconstruction,” as a substitute concept for denoting the critical procedures of thinking inside a given discursive structure to dismantle it from within. In an interview published by the Pakistani newspaper *Dawn*, Spivak elaborates on this notion of “affirmative sabotage.” Asked to explain whether she refers to subverting a specifically imperialist discourse, or other hegemonic discourses as well, she replies: “I used the term sabotage because it referred to the deliberate ruination of the master’s machine from the inside. The idea is of entering the discourse that you are criticising fully, so that you can turn it around from inside because the only way you can sabotage something is when you are working intimately with it” (qtd. in Brohi 2014). Spivak here clearly reworks—and subverts—Audre Lorde’s (1984) proverbial phrase: “the master’s tools can never dismantle the master’s house.” As a self-identified Black lesbian feminist, Lorde was speaking to those who could not occupy positions in the “master’s house,” but whom she encouraged to turn markers of exclusion into forceful weapons of self-empowerment instead. Lorde’s dictum, importantly, is formulated in an essay in which she strongly criticizes the white, heteronormative, and middle-class biases of a feminist conference at the New York University Institute for the Humanities, to which she had been invited as a panelist. While Lorde was in fact criticizing the academy from within, she noted that she was structurally excluded from it.

### Destruction

Frank Wilderson—an outspoken protagonist of the current school of Afro-pessimist thinking, according to which Western civil societies strive at the expense of Black people’s lives—has recently reminded his readers not only of the fact that everyone produces knowledge from where they are located in the world, but also that the social positioning of those doing critical work heavily impacts upon the consequences they might draw for themselves from their intellectual labor. As far as white people engaging in Afro-pessimism are concerned, the dilemma, as he observes it, amounts to “a kind of problem of being because ultimately the work is moving towards the destruction of the very academic who’s doing the work.” (2016:9). Put differently, to assume that the epistemologies of Western and Northern modernity have been built on and intricately tied to historical processes of colonization and enslavement, the legacies of which can still be detected, entails the realization that a rejection of those very destructive processes also calls for a disavowal, if not “destruction,” of these late-modern apparatuses of epistemology, including its actors. This may bespeak a polemical stance rather than a call to action. But it is invested in stressing ongoing structural inequalities inside and outside the academy and refuting notions that racism is a thing of the past. For me as a white scholar in the field of North American Studies, Afro-pessimism is a discourse position that seems impossible and undesirable to bypass because it offers a conceptual framework that relates the foundational core ideals of Enlightenment modernity—freedom, equality, and progress—to their constitutive flip side. Since these ideals resound today and continue to have an alluring ring to them in Western and Northern institutional frameworks, it remains imperative to interrogate the complexities that made them thinkable in the first place. Engaged intellectuals like Spivak, Lorde, and Wilderson will continue to invite their audiences to take up the task of this interrogation.
Difference, diversity, decolonization, and destruction: these keywords compose a 4D list that provides answers to “[t]he desire to combat [E]urocentrism and the dominance of Euro-American epistemologies in global knowledge production” (“Controlling” 2017). Desire itself takes on the task of a metaD: it prompts a reflection on what drives, facilitates, and necessitates the attitudes and actions associated with the four concepts. Desire as metaD gestures toward the affective dimensions that connect the items on the 4D list.

References


Intellectuality and the Public Invisibility of Linguistics
by Ingo H. Warnke

... dedicated with gratitude to all linguists who read Immanuel Kant, watch Julian Rosefeldt, listen to Uum Kulthum or something similar, and anyone else with an intellectual interest in their own profession ...

There is an academic discipline professionally dedicated to language; I am talking about linguistics. But were linguistics to be abandoned from one day to the next, nobody would really notice, I claim, except for linguists themselves. This speaks to a public invisibility that can be of advantage; one can pursue one’s interests without excitement, without really getting interrupted, except by one’s peers with whom one has to enter into discussions, perhaps even quarrels once in a while. There is certainly something to be said for letting a discipline grow in an environment largely undisturbed by others from outside. But such a life in the hortus conclusus, concealed from the public, comes with decisive disadvantages. One can quickly get bored, and in such a secluded sphere, one tends to encounter only oneself and one’s own kind. What is more, one has to leave one’s discipline when one gets hungry for something else.

But isn’t that paradoxical? On the one hand there is no human form of expression that is as omnipresent, complex, multifaceted, imaginative, and generally complicated as the languages that we constantly speak and write and whisper and shout out and moan and laugh and cry. On the other hand, the larger public is oblivious to a field ostensibly dedicated to languages—if we consider linguistics a science of languages in a comprehensive sense. Put bluntly, language is everywhere, linguistics nowhere. Of course there are the clever computer linguists who teach Google to do its thing, and obviously there are forensic linguists who solve crimes, and there certainly are applications of linguistics which are “significant” because they have “obvious” technical, social, and political implications and utility. But as a field, linguistics is nonetheless largely invisible because we see Google, criminal prosecution, political success and failure and all the rest, but not linguistics itself. I think every linguist knows the following situation: you are asked what you do for a living. You answer: “linguistics”. And then there is this exaggerated, awkward pause followed by an expression of emphatic interest that is intended to cover up a complete lack of knowledge, and there are questions, and you have to explain what you do and why you do it, and you get a feeling that your interlocutor is not quite convinced. Were you a tax consultant, plumber, comedian, physician, mechanic, climate researcher or garbage collector, the conversation would somehow go more smoothly. Why is that? First of all because of the basic fact that linguistics has little visibility—be this desired or not. One lives behind one’s wall and grows interesting plants. In this sense, linguistics is actually likable because it is unobtrusive. But such an impression is also deceptive since linguists can comport themselves with a high degree of self-esteem and meaningfulness in the garden of their discipline, showing a great interest in keeping weeds and other surprises from growing in the care-
fully maintained beds and patches, as if anyone would notice. What seems plain and inconspicuous to the outside corresponds to a measured-out strictness inside the walls of the garden.

But let us stay with linguistics on the outside, in the world. To concern oneself with the *hortus conclusus* on the inside, to ask questions about the number of colonial plants nourished and cherished there, for instance, or the extent to which national traditions resound in their language terminology and so on, would be a different analysis which could lead to a call for a queering of linguistics. But this is not my concern here. I am interested in a linguistics in the world, in the outside, in public and, closely connected, in the search for a world, an outside, a public in the construction of linguistic objects. Let us think about the public invisibility of linguistics. Let me, as a linguist, deplore the fact that the field finds so little resonance, and express a sense of sorrow about this fact, and the fact that linguistics emits sounds that find so little echo. Were linguists opera singers, they could not be promised grand careers.

Of course, one could train one’s voice, loosen up, yawn, open resonance chambers. But this is precisely what linguistics rarely and reluctantly does. The field is seldom relaxed and tends toward cramped postures, at times toward slight, obstructive coughing. Obviously, this is speaking partially, even polemically. But I think linguistics knows very well what I mean. There are also, self-evidently, many savvy actors in linguistics who intervene in public discourse, in blogs, at conferences, in newspaper articles and many other fora—they jump over walls they may not even see. Accordingly, I do not mean to suggest across the board that no one is publicly engaged. But then again, only a few are. Linguistics, as a disciplinary order, is uptight. I see it that way. I would be glad to be proven wrong, accused of ignorance or blindness. It would be nice to see a different kind of linguistics, situated wholly in the world. How good that would be! Yet I still do not believe in it.

We are actually talking about a disposition in linguistics, a leaning away from public engagement toward disciplinary closure, a stronger interest in its own ideas about language than in what others think about language. Linguistics digs deep and does not reach out in breadth. Perhaps it is a field for nerds, which could actually be rather charming, were it not for the safe breeding of exemplary structure trees in institutionally guarded greenhouses in lieu of taking an interest in the much more interesting endless variety of languages. And indeed, linguistics not only leans away from the public but also excludes the world. And this is where the strict face of the groundskeeper appears. *Mind you, this is not proper linguistics.* This sentence is often uttered, extremely disciplining, excluding, bitter—not least young, interested, curious colleagues hear the grumpy coughing, especially when trying to wander off into the vast terrain of language. You won’t get away with such curiosity, you would be better off venerating the groundskeeper; back to the system patches. In other words, the discipline does not necessarily encourage creativity, not to mention subversion. One could also say it does not precisely make being creative easy.

It is about time to come to the colorful figure of the intellectual to whom this whole journal issue is dedicated, for which I am grateful. The intellectual is a smart figure of powerful, independent judgment who pursues various interests simultaneously; who listens to what is said and says what has to be said; who bears contradictions, finds creative and surprising solutions; who does not accept boundaries in thinking and saying; who is in the world, and in whom the world resonates. In short, the intellectual is a figure of complex resonances, a figure of epistemic openness. We have to note, unfortunately, that the habitat of linguistics is not exactly the preferred dwelling place of the intellectual. The linguistics that I know is essentially disinterested in such worldliness. It does not give a fig for the expectations of an intellectual who would ponder the free-floating potency of language. Naturally, this has consequences: there are preferences for evidence of phrasal structures in corpora, not for shouting, groaning, spitting, whispering, silencing, hollering, stuttering—even though all of this also belongs to language. In short: linguistics does not seem to be an intellectually inspiring place, as it does not invite intellectuals into its discussions about language.

One reason for this intellectual reticence, which I am convinced is the equivalent of public invisibility, lies in a radical distinction that linguistics drew during the twentieth century at the latest, and which came into effect.
Controlling Knowledge - Voices from around the world
Global South Studies Center, University of Cologne, Germany - http://voices.uni-koeln.de

no more visibly than in the person of Noam Chomsky, a key figure in linguistics. Chomsky was unquestionably a linguist acting in a public resonance chamber and perceiving the world, just as the world perceived him. What a stroke of luck, one might think. But it was precisely this Noam Chomsky who also massively fortified the immurement of linguistics. Strangely, the linguist Chomsky and the intellectual Chomsky acted in strict isolation from each other. And as a result, Chomsky by no means encouraged intellectual desire in linguistics, just as he was unable to arouse linguistic interest in the world.

Chomsky is virtually the figure associated with dividing linguistics from public intellectuality; he is the dissociated agent in the fields of his reception, precisely because he is an intellectual and a linguist. In an interview in the journal Radical Anthropology, British anthropologist Chris Knight considers Chomsky’s “paradoxical relationship between his activism and his science” (Knight 2010:22). He states: “One component produces science for a definite intellectual constituency while the rest of him produces political stuff for a quite different audience. As a scientist, he’s anxious to avoid slipping over into politics; as an activist, he strives to avoid anything to do with science” (Knight 2010:22). What does Knight mean? A close look reveals that this is phrased sharply; it also sounds rather personal, even aggressive. But it also makes a hardly concealed, painful point about the linguistic fear of the world, of politics, of an evaluation of language use, of ethics and potentially of other things, perhaps also of beauty, aesthetics, and scents hidden behind structural descriptions—despite all the pragmatic and other turns that the discipline has carried out. Linguistics is armed against the public interest in language, and has been for a long time. This has to do with language itself, something Knight also notes with reference to Chomsky: “Each separate role comes with its own appropriate conceptual approach and corresponding language, resistant to translation across the divide” (Knight 2010:22). The fear of the world that manifests itself as the exclusion of the intellectual is often paired with a disciplinary language that is inaccessible to an interested public. For a linguist to engage Derrida can be ridiculous to those who lose sense of how ridiculous their own structural analysis can become, were they to care. Knight attempts an interesting biographical explanation of Chomsky’s two faces—the “painfully evident tension between the two” (Knight 2010:23). But let’s not pursue Chomsky further or, what’s more, an evaluation of his works and his school, or the conclusions that Knight draws from his Marxist critique of Chomsky. I am interested in Chomsky only insofar as the discernible paradox of his persona is concerned: engaged and unengaged, interested and uninterested at once. Linguistics occupies a hemispheric field turned away from society in a neatly ordered territory of intellectual action. We could also say that linguistics lives behind its walls in a universe shut off from a public interest in language, habituating disinterest among the general public.

We can examine this on a more abstract level to gain useful insights into the relation between reason and public life in the discipline. This is because the engaged intellectual is exactly the figure who seeks to merge reason and the public. Shouldn’t we wish for many more of these figures for linguistics? Shouldn’t it be linguists’ downright duty to take a stand in an era when verbal violence, extremist language, and ideologically loaded semantics of culture and identity are creating an ever more volatile situation, and not only in Europe? Isn’t it naïve to assume that the fire being kindled will stop short of the wall linguistics erected around itself, once scholarly insights are dismantled wholesale as alternative facts? Where is linguistics in a world full of public ghosts haunting twenty-first-century language?

Thinking about reason and the public immediately and necessarily leads us to Immanuel Kant and his epoch-making call for the use of reason in 1784. For Kant, the concept of enlightenment first and foremost meant the freedom to understand in the sense of using reason comprehensively: “For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question is the most innocuous of all—freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.” (Kant 2009:3) „Zu dieser Aufklärung aber wird nichts erforderlich, als Freiheit; und zwar die unschädlichste unter allem, was nur Freiheit heißen mag, nämlich die: von feiner Vernunft in allen Stücken öffentlichen Gebrauch zu machen” (Kant 1784:484). Do these words also pass over the wall to resonate in the garden of linguistics? Kant speaks of making public use of one’s reason [in allen Stücken öffentlichen Gebrauch zu machen]. Is the division between disciplinary reason and public reason, as we can observe in the case of Chomsky, consistent with this?
As a matter of fact, Kant differentiates between two forms of the use of reason that are seemingly not far from what we encounter in Chomsky: the public and the private use of reason. The public use of reason is that “which anyone may make of it as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public” (Kant 2009:4) [„jemand als Gelehrter von ihr vor dem ganzen Publikum der Leserwelt macht” (Kant 1784:485)], and that public use “must always be free” (Kant 2009:3) [„muß jederzeit frei sein” (Kant 1784:484)]. Private use, in contrast, is that “which a person may make of it in a particular civil post or office with which he is entrusted” (Kant 2009:4) [„den er in einem gewissen ihm anvertrauten bürgerlichen Posten, oder Amte, von feiner Ver- nunft machen darf” (Kant 1784:485)]. And this use may well be restricted. For office holders, obligations to higher interests spring to mind. But can professors who are given status as civil servants justify their use of private reason alone because they have to consider superior interests? Does this justification also apply to employed professors who depend on third-party funding because their institutions may expect it from them? What about the linguist who represents linguistics? Is intellectualty expressed via the public use of reason really excluded from an institutionalized, disciplining academic life? No, of course not. That is because linguists are not only linguists but part of a public, as representatives of an institution and/or a discipline—and they should be.

I understand public here not simply as a subject-specific public. Kant unmistakably explains that someone may have obligations to a position and can yet make public use of reason under the condition that someone “acts as part of the machine also considers himself as a member of a complete commonwealth or even of cosmopolitan society, and thence as a man of learning who may through his writings address a public in the truest sense of the word” (Kant 2009:4) [„fich aber dieser Theil der Maſchine zugleich als Glied eines ganzen gemeinen Wefens, ja fogen der Weltbürgergeſellschaft anſieht, mithin in der Qualität eines Gelehrten, der ſich an ein Publikum im eigentlichen Verſtande durch Schriften wendet” (Kant 1784:485)]. This is about having a voice in public, being in the world, and seeing the world. We can also understand Kant’s scholar as an intellectual in this sense. And this is the crucial point. It is a question of self-understanding that touches on questions of the internalized control of discourse. Do I consider myself as part of an intellectual, present-day society made up of the citizens of the world, including all of its unresolvable, global contradictions, a society in which I want to raise a public voice, or do I isolate myself and declare everything supposedly adjacent to linguistics as a private matter? Kant himself speaks of a cleric, for instance, who can critically reflect on the doctrines of his church in public, despite his commitment to them. (cf. Kant 2009:5-6 [1784:486-88]).

To think aloud about language and (critically and self-critically) consider linguistics in the field of public discourse, to invite the intellectual in linguistics and in the broader public to participate in discourse—that would be making bold changes in a field which has long declared an express interest in the world of arts, politics, love, hope, music, and much more to be a private matter. Kant speaks of reasoning [räſonniren], and we know from Michel Foucault (1984:36) that for Kant, this means to reason for reasoning’s sake. The intellectual use of reason—what an ideal! And this is what linguistics should be all about: seeing the world in linguistics and linguistics in the world; in other words, creating reasonable reverberations between a world in which language is omnipresent and a discipline that should concern itself boundlessly and fearlessly with that world.

Let us dare to live more intellectuality in linguistics, more world, more sound, more resonance, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary openness, more whispering and yelling, less fear and fewer nominal phrases, more courage and, once in a while, more Broken German (Gardi 2016). One wants to shout out to linguistics: don’t be afraid to break down the wall! Be interested in intellectual dialogue in museums and all those places where the world shines and speaks; in clubs, literature, film, music, improvisation, rites, on beaches, in parlaments, in forests and apartments… in short, let us lift the veil from a discipline detached from the world and air it out with the winds of intellectuality. Giving a voice as providing hospitality, as Anne Storch says in her contribution to this issue, and this means listening to one another, being attentive to each other, in dialogue. I think then, linguistics would be an exceedingly attractive field, visible from afar, and were it to...
be abandoned, there would be loud screaming.

References


Knowledge Control & the ‘ Alternatives’
by Doreh Taghavi

They say knowledge is power, but what about when it isn’t? In many circumstances, power controls what is deemed to be knowledge. Human beings have struggled to understand unconventionality, and difference in epistemological thought, since the beginning of time. Pythagoras and Aristotle themselves were dismissed for thinking the Earth was round. Yet, centuries later, what was once deemed wildly incorrect is a fact known to most human beings on earth. What is more enticing about one form of knowledge compared with another? Is it familiarity? Culture? Comfort? And are those who know deemed the ‘knowers’ due to power, or ‘true knowledge’? How do we know that the ‘knowers’ know? The heart of epistemology is not just the production of knowledge, but the human tendency to engage in knowledge processing, belief creation, and value enforcement.

As Carayannis describes, ‘there are certain values/ideas that are valued above others – and these have become the norm in the global system’ (Carayannis, Popescu, & Pirzadeh, 2012). Take for example, a term that went viral in the United States, introduced by Kellyanne Conway: ‘alternative facts’. This was introduced in reference to the varying claims regarding attendance at Donald Trump’s inauguration. The definition of a fact is something that is known or proven. The introduction of the concept ‘alternative facts’ provided not only a way to cleverly dismiss the alternatives themselves, but further to highlight the notion that knowledge does not exist on a single plane. Depending on which side of the socio-political coin one might find oneself, one would choose which fact best suited one’s position and add it to one’s knowledge repertoire. The fact itself does not matter, since it is more about the relative value of the fact to the knower, which drives the decision about which claims to deem fact, and which falsehood. Yet, for those interested in facts unclaimed by the West, the progression of social interest in the diversification of knowledge production has been a recent trend, from which research fields have taken shape and expanded, such as Postcolonial studies or Southern Theory.

Knowledge must not only be generated, but also have the opportunity to succeed, be tested, be proven, be adopted, and finally, be believed. This explains why the asymmetry of knowledge has bubbled to the forefront as a global issue in tertiary education institutions, with much of the issue stemming from and spilling over into socio-political realms. It is difficult, however, to confirm if the path towards epistemological diversity is on the right trajectory, when we still lack an understanding of what constitutes success. A recent example of an effort to decolonize is the Fallist movement in South Africa. In recent years, Fallism caused several tertiary institutions to shut down for periods of up to three months across South Africa in a fight for the diversification of curricula and an overturning of social structures (Nyamnjoh, 2016). One message that Fallist actors quickly relayed in interviews was that merely increasing the diversity quota at the university was...
not enough of a solution. Academics and Students of Color at the University of Cape Town (UCT) believe that correcting inherent epistemological bias on a more holistic level will affect not only their tertiary experience, but also the social paradigm of inequality which, as Durkheim describes, is perpetuated through education (Durkheim, 1961). The changes being sought in the attempt to restructure education are conceivably critical for the socio-political reform of nations, particularly those previously impacted by colonialism. Researchers like Andreotti have focused on the reproduction of inequality in social systems, tackling issues of epistemology in higher education and pointing out that there is a need for ‘more intellectual and pedagogical work in the area of epistemological pluralism, especially in relation to the introduction of aboriginal epistemologies in higher education contexts’ (Andreotti, Ahenakew, & Cooper, 2011).

Now, for the sake of analogy, let’s assume that much like energy, knowledge cannot be created or destroyed, but it can be transformed from one form to another. We cannot say we created the knowledge that the Earth was round; rather, we went from not knowing, to knowing, yet, the Earth was always round. The ability to empirically measure and assert this, however, has only existed once we started to develop human knowledge. If we lost access to that knowledge, and found it again, let’s say a century later, we wouldn’t necessarily be aware that we had once known. Though we may feel as if certain knowledge has been lost, we have no way of demonstrating that this knowledge doesn’t exist elsewhere, or knowing whether it will resurface in the future. In such a case, we could say that the total knowledge of the isolated system remains constant, while what we may choose to understand as knowledge may change over time, from fact, to non-fact, and from known, to perhaps temporarily unknown. My point, is to illustrate the danger that arises from a biased homogenous population of ‘knowers’, and to demonstrate that even certainty requires critical reflection.

Epistemic bias is not only unfortunate, it’s simply dangerous, particularly with regard to topics where Western solutions are limited or inefficient. International organizations such as the United Nations are exploring how to maximize use of knowledge from the South in important global frameworks, such as climate change and environmental management, not only because doing so is inclusive, but because it’s necessary (UNESCO, 2018).

Instead of asking ourselves as an academic community if enough diverse knowledge has been produced, perhaps we should investigate whether we privileged scholars value, incorporate, and understand enough of the knowledge that already exists, and the academics behind that knowledge. Moreover, do we have access to this knowledge, and can it become more accessible? While epistemic diversification may not be complete, developing awareness of how to identify, measure, and correct the issue should be the key focus on academics on a journey to end epistemological bias. In an intertwined world of positional truths and falsehoods, Conway, Pythagoras and Aristotle have all articulated, the ‘alternatives’ are the facts themselves. The line between subjectivity and knowledge has always been blurred, and it is the job of academics to clearly define it before epistemology can make progress.

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Reflecting on New Forms of Knowledge Production and “Epistemic Violence” – a Dialogue
by Andrea Hollington, Nina Schneider

Andrea:
Nina, you have worked in a number of different countries and academic contexts. What experiences did you have with regard to knowledge production in those different environments?

Nina:
I have mainly studied in Germany and Britain, but also had the opportunity to spent several years in Brazil, and a semester at Columbia University in New York. My impression was that all research cultures have their own specific strengths and weaknesses. Of course, this is highly subjective and it is difficult to generalize on any “academic culture”. Each university has its own mission and they also develop over time. Still, it may be fair to say that while in some places critical interrogation of the subject, method, and discipline is outright expected, in others it may be a threat to your career. In Britain, for instance, it may have taken a long time to criticize the colonial period, but from the 1970s onwards there was a great interest in subaltern and postcolonial studies and subsequent critical schools. In general, it seems that most British universities have a keen interest in new methods and approaches. My impression from the US is that you have a lot of diversity within departments. Visionary intellectuals who severely criticize the status quo, coexist with more conservative intellectuals. For example, at Columbia University Edward Said (author of Orientalism and many other books) shared a departmental floor with Samuel Huntington, author of The Clash of Civilizations. Brazil and other Latin American countries seem to be marked by a critical tradition that may be labelled “socially engaged”. Again, though, you cannot generalize, for you can find diversity in every culture including clashes along ideological lines. But by and large, I would dare say that this socially engaged academic tradition is a defining feature of Latin American scholarship. From colleagues from Namibia, South Africa, and Columbia I have also learnt that these critical Southern views are given much more room in African and Latin American universities, so it may be worth exploring to what extent this applies to much of the so-called “Global South” (a problematic, but in this case helpful, heuristic category). Much critical scholarship, like subaltern, decolonial or post-colonial history, for example, has emanated from the South, and taken the form of critical responses to the colonial heritage or unequal power relations. The traditional production of knowledge, which had in many ways sustained unequal power relations and silenced the voices of the colonized, started to be disrupted, and the very production of knowledge was questioned. In sum, experiences of different research cultures are very personal. To my knowledge there is no detailed literature on key characteristics of academic
cultures across the globe, but that would be a very interesting subject! It would enable us to identify the benefits and shortcomings of different academic traditions and enable us to better identify our own methodologic and thematic blindspots.

Andrea:
The experience that I had is that there are numerous very engaged intellectuals in various institutions and contexts, and very interesting debates that challenge established norms in dominant academia – like for example in Jamaica, I was really impressed by the ways of knowledge production and the ways in which the University of the West Indies is open to so many different ideas, even from non-intellectuals, that they try to integrate into the university. They often have events where they invite poets, or writers, or musicians to give public lectures, and then they have discussions on certain topics. And the events that the university hosts will be announced on the radio and people from outside academia come and they listen to these talks and they engage. And there is not such a big gap between academia and the rest of society. And I was so impressed by that, but I often think that such ways of knowledge production do not really make it into dominant or mainstream academia. I think that is a problem: we do have a lot of different ways of thinking and ways of producing knowledge in various parts of the world but people don’t really get to know about them unless they go there and really find out for themselves. I think we need to find a way to acknowledge, circulate, and integrate such epistemological approaches. When we look at academic knowledge production on an international scale we can see that there is a hegemonic system in which (scholars at) Northern Universities and their output, especially in Europe and the USA, have more power. And this system generates, stabilizes, and reproduces itself – but there is so much that we could learn from other approaches to thinking, discussing, exchanging, presenting, and writing.

Nina:
I think there is a difference between a public outreach event, which is very much en vogue now (in British academia “public impact” has become a major funding requirement), and the ways knowledge is hierarchized or even defined (who defines what as “knowledge”). For instance: who gets a chair, who can publish in the high-ranking journals, who becomes a commission member, who sets the new research agenda in the field, right? If you look at those higher academic ranks there is less and less representation of different voices. Bringing in a Latin American perspective: I was struck by an article from 2015 that investigated who successfully publishes in the two most important journals in the field of Latin American Studies. The authors found that only 7 percent of the entirety of the publications analyzed were authored by Latin American scholars. The majority of articles was published by US scholars and a smaller percentage by US-based scholars of Latin American descent. Many reasons may explain this imbalance, including the undeniably high quality of many US universities. Yet, there are also many ways of epistemic gate-keeping [...] for instance, language issues, different writing styles, and access to good education to begin with. But if we were to elaborate a vision of an ideal world of knowledge production, in pursuit of the best possible kind of research, we would ideally assess as much other knowledge as is available (other in the sense of additional, new, still-unknown-to-me). Ideally, we would have access to different knowledges to be able to see our own blind spots, correct ourselves, and expand our horizons. In short, to learn and unlearn. This, however, does not necessarily mean that you integrate all the alternative forms of knowledge with equal weight [...]. That is yet another controversial issue for debate: Who sets the rules for hierarchizing knowledge, for defining what qualifies as academic “knowledge” or as “nonsense”? In my view, this tension between “pluralizing knowledge” and checking the quality of different knowledges remains unresolved, and one of the most interesting questions for scholars and engaged intellectuals of our times.
Andrea: Especially with regard to the aspect of publishing we have a lot of problems, because we are not only excluding others due to the way we publish, with our peer-reviewed journals and accessibility issues, we are also limiting ourselves a lot, because we have established this writing tradition, this genre of academic writing, which is like a very special genre. First of all, when we do research, we often encounter multimodal phenomena. And we already limit ourselves because we have to use language to express them… in fact, we have to use special language to express them because we have to express ourselves in a specific academic way that is acceptable for those journals. It is a special genre that we have to write in. Knowledge production in other cultures or societies may have other ways of expressing knowledge which do not fit into those particular journals. So we see that many academics and their writings get excluded from those kinds of publications. But then, it is publishing in those journals that opens up the possibilities of getting certain kinds of positions or being successful in academia. And another problematic issue is the accessibility of those journals in terms of who can read those articles, who gets beyond the big paywalls of those journals. So, it is not only a question of who can write and publish in those journals, it is also – when we include the level of students for example – about who can read the papers in such journals, which libraries provide access? So here we have several levels of exclusion of others, especially students from various parts of the world, from participating in mainstream, or commonly received, forms of knowledge production and dissemination.

Nina: You raise many interesting points […]. When you were talking about different forms of writing and genres, I was reminded of a debate about historical forms of writing. Critics of the discipline of History have argued that the way we narrate the past and our dominant concept of time is by and large very “Western”: linear or even teleological, and oriented towards a kind of “progress”. This automatically presumed “progress” “diffused” from the Western world across the globe (as if an academic heritage of Cold War modernization theory). Some Asian and African historians (prominently Ashis Nandy) have criticized this kind of historical writing and suggested alternative forms instead; for instance, a circular understanding of history, common among various indigenous cultures. Or, for instance, ambiguity, which is completely foreign to the writing style expected of Western historians – two contradictory things happen simultaneously and cannot be explained easily. The problem is how to practically and constructively include these interventions. My impression is that, by and large, the historical discipline has yet to find a way to integrate these criticisms on a deeper level. Although subaltern history and postcolonial thought have been received, and their authors are expected to write in a less Western-centric way, much of it seems to remain on a rhetorical level. These critical schools have neither significantly changed the structures and methods of the historical discipline, nor been actually included in the majority of historical writing. At least it is left to the individual historians’ decision, rather than included as a kind of obligatory self-critical method of historical knowledge production. Certainly, some individual historians have produced good accounts that include non-Western thought and methods both in their content and narrative form, but this inclusion could be much more systematic. Let me provide you with an example. The majority of historical narratives only look at either the “West”/“North” or the “South”, we lack cross-North-South comparisons, because this is taken to violate the conventions of the historical discipline [critics would say “we can’t compare apples with pears”, but who says what is an apple and what is a pear, and who dictates that they cannot be compared?]. To conclude, certain barriers within the disciplines are maintained, and it is difficult to challenge them and push them into new territory.
Andrea:
I think what you are referring to is what I would call, in a sense, hypocrisy, because we talk about wanting this change, including others, and being more open to other ways of thinking, and ways of producing knowledge. But very often when we open ourselves to other forms, we call it “alternative”; we say, for instance, this is an “alternative workshop” because it includes other voices, forms of presenting, non-academic or other-academic views that are not in the Western-centric tradition. Or we say “this is an alternative publication” because it does not follow the established rules for writing and publishing set in dominant academia. But this word, “alternative”, somehow devalues the whole project, as if it is not part of “real” academia, it is something “alternative” happening at the side. This is what Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues in his book Epistemologies of the South: by calling Southern epistemologies “alternative” you somehow play them down, as though they are not on the same level. And that’s also what you see because those things do not usually get published in the same kind of journals or get the same kind of reach, it doesn’t get the same funding in the end, it doesn’t make it to the same audience.

Nina:
And I have to confess that I myself sometimes have problems reading African scholarly narratives. I have read a lot of African and Asian literature by scholars who have passed through the US system, partly because I spot these scholars faster and their work is more accessible in our library system. But recently I read an African piece and I found it a very hard read because of its unfamiliar narrative structure. I could not identify the main idea or main argument, missed summary sentences, and overall to me it seemed very fuzzy. Probably the best way is to bring people together, discuss at a conference, and co-produce knowledge in a dialogic way. One thing is the discussion and another is to find a narrative form.

Andrea:
We can see this already happening, partly; that we have these workshops where we bring different people together and discuss. But the problem is that the engaged intellectuals who try to make a difference are probably still a minority, and their attempts to be more open and accessible in changing our ways of knowledge production are not really taken seriously by some of those who are in the position to implement these changes in the academic system. It seems it may take a long time until the diversity of thinking, discussing and publishing will be established as a norm.

Nina:
Yes, you may be right. I would like to return to another point you just mentioned, about the “alternative knowledge” and the de Sousa Santos reference. Let’s turn for a moment to power structures, because in the end it comes down to power structures, or who is given the authority to produce knowledge. So, if you look at how to change power structures, it is difficult to include “alternative” or “formerly silenced” kinds of knowledge directly. First, you have to have a counter-narrative, and then manage to “catapult” these kinds of knowledge into your discipline. Because it seems that if you include them directly, these voices get lost. Remember, for instance, our discussion at the 2017 GSSC conference, when a South African scholar argued that in order to include marginal South African positions you have to go by the national route, and then you can include those accounts in larger narratives (disciplinary field, global academia). The key point here is that this process of “alternative” knowledge inclusion in a discipline may involve several steps. What is probably difficult, from our perspective, is that you do not get much support when you try to include different knowledges. Let’s take an example: In Germany, you do not have many research centers focusing on the Global South. There are several well-established area-study centers (e.g. African and Latin American studies), but if you try
to contribute to knowledge concerning the Global South, positions have yet to be established. There is little room for renewing our disciplines by drawing on the precious critical methodological, thematic, and, as we just discussed, narrative input from the “South”. But engaging with these questions goes to the very foundations of how we produce knowledge. It is a fundamental research task (or in German: Grundlagenforschung). Concerning the discipline of History, it is true that historians have started to analyze how knowledge has been produced and circulated (and been censored) in the past, but there seems to be very little translation of this self-critical inquiry into the discipline itself and into how we actually produce knowledge ourselves. Most historians just continue writing their accounts of the past, as they did before. The history of knowledge has become a subject in German academia, but its self-reflective and socially engaged potential has not been realized or put into practice. Instead the history of knowledge and knowledge production seems like a newly added but somewhat soulless subject that trickled down from the US and Britain, but one still treated as very far detached from our own agency.

Andrea:
Coming back to Boaventuara de Sousa Santos. He actually wrote this aforementioned book, which is basically about epistemicide and how other ways of knowledge production are not really appreciated in the dominant Western-centric academic discourse. He writes about epistemologies of the South as possibilities of social and academic transformation, but he also sheds light on Southern epistemologies as shared experiences of exclusion and silencing of people and their ways of knowledge production. In other words, he addresses exactly those problems that we have touched upon in our discussion. He also emphasizes that it has to be a horizontal dialog and discussion between the many existing knowledges that leads to innovation in what he refers to as “ecologies of knowledge”. This non-hierarchical dialog between the different perspectives is something that needs much more promotion.

Nina:
I find this notion of “epistemicide” provocative but interesting. There is also the term “epistemic violence” brought in by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak […], although she soon abandoned this term. Originally, she even spoke of “epistemic rape” […]. Even though we would have to carefully specify what we mean by “epistemic violence”, as a heuristic concept it seems helpful. Basically, it tasks us to witness, problematize, and ideally put an end to the ubiquitous instances of censoring of knowledge, and to find practical methods to include a polyphony of voices. While theoretically, this may be old hat (at least for those familiar with critical thought from the South, or feminist schools), the interesting question now is how to practically and methodologically combat “epistemic violence”. Let’s return to de Sousa Santos. He is at the Centro de Estudos Sociais (CES, Centre for Social Studies) in Portugal, but also Professor at the University of Wisconsin. Moreover, he is very popular in Brazil, and often travels to Africa. He initiated a project with African scholars where they tried to produce knowledge cooperatively. They explored how scholars would approach a certain topic from an African philosophical point of view, and how the same topic would have been studied from a Portuguese philosophical perspective. Subsequently and with the insight gained from the comparative epistemic perspective, they tried to identify the weak points of their respective approaches (which does the job better), but also discovered aspects that their own (or old) approach simply failed to see, while their partners took them into account. The outcome of this project was a very interesting exchange but also valuable the realization that certain things are not translatable, because specific words or methods do not exist in another research culture. Now the question remains: what to do with this? What is the implication for our attempts to produce new and more egalitarian knowledge than before? In my view, we need many more projects of this kind, projects that bring together people from different research cultures with the goal of producing knowledge collaboratively. I know that the Volkswagen Foundation wants to initiate such a program. I think this is what we
need in the future. I hope there will be more funding for such work, because right now academic careers are built on individual achievements, and collaborative productions bring disadvantages. We need to have the opportunity to experiment with collective research production and then analyze and assess the outcomes, as de Sousa Santos did. This would involve a critical interrogation of our own practices and help us identify the “epistemic violence” we cause (if unintentionally). Crossing South-North or North-South boundaries certainly helps to include these “new” approaches in our disciplines and institutions. We may still have a long road ahead, but is there not a lot of potential here?
A Curious Confusion in the Fynbos: Taking Shape and Sound
by Penelope Allsobrook

This contribution begins by returning to the memory of a garden gathering, and to how “[i]t was the hymns, the lifting up of voices that touched us most keenly. Every so often, someone stood up to relate a story which connected them to Liz, uMaJack [...]” The sense of belonging in another language which is and which can become one’s own, already alluded to here, now continues.

“Masibonisane ngale nto sisi, let us discuss that: You know, to discuss, ukubonisana, it literally means to show each other. So, ujonge phi namhlanje, sisi? What is your intention today, sister?” Pheliwe Mbatyoti’s question rings through from Fort Hare University in our weekly lessons. I want you to test me, I say: Ndifuna andiva-vanye. Ndixelele, tell me, ndibonise, show me. I want to speak about loss surfacing on the shingle, with the push and pull of the sea. Instead, I state the banal: Injongo yam ukufunda ukuthetha isiXhosa kakuhle. Kuza kuthatha ixesha elide ukuba ndithe gca, kodwa kufuneka ndibe nomonde. My intention is to speak and to understand Xhosa to a reasonable degree, although I find myself listening out more for what surprises me in our dialogue, the ambiguities and the contradictions. Motivating me during this process is a notion made apparent in my PhD proposal, where I maintain “that white South Africans unwittingly perpetuate not only others’ but also their own domination through not speaking other South African languages and this is part of what keeps the land divided.” And while I sit at my desk in Cologne, revising the Xhosa noun classes, the words of a Southern academic from the Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa – those of my brother, Christopher Allsobrook – repeat: “Dominance of Euro-American epistemologies? Epistemic biases? Here are my two cents: The Northern Academy does not brutally and systematically neglect subaltern knowledge through prejudice. They suck it up like a baleen whale.”

The whale gets fatter and fatter in the process – and what is to be done?

“Well, it’s not much of an abstract thing, is it? The connection to the present moment is very tangible, very physical. I’ve been re-reading Levinás, and find I am understanding him better. I try to apply him to what I do.” Folkwang University of the Arts professor Brian Michaels’ words resonate after our informal meeting in Stadtgarten to discuss the idea behind this year’s production of The Taming of the Shrew: the ninth of the university’s Shakespeare Festival productions which collaborate with international drama students. Having come to Essen-Werden this April from the Drama Academy Ramallah, the Theatre Academy of the University of the Arts Helsinki, as well as the Durban University of Technology, they staged their own interpretations of the play in German, Arabic, Finnish, English and Zulu, culminating on the last two evenings with a multilingual performance. “It’s really about creating a common language through theatre,” adds Michaels, “about showing what can happen where there is no need to categorise or manipulate.”
A memory returns of Liz’s funeral mentioned above: finding a child, a young boy who had run off with the gathering dusk to play hide-and-seek in amongst the thicket of bitter aloes, blue cycads, and ericas. The delight in being hidden with the monkey beetles! But then, not being discovered? “It is more than keeping a watchful eye”, suggests his elder brother, who is with me; “Is it not also about wanting to see, being inquiring, keeping the wonderment close to your heart? Good thing we found him now, it looks like the rain is finally coming.”

Imvula, the word for rain, I learn, is derived from the verb ukuvula: to open; the rain opens the ground for ploughing. Being open, the challenge is in remaining vulnerable enough to be touched and to touch each and the other, as seen in Breyten Breytenbach’s (2009) dialogue with a fellow poet in his Voice Over: A Nomadic Conversation with Mahmoud Darwish:

here in the verged north
where earth is gleaned green
right up to the dreamt coast of longing
and the blind singer fingers the wind
for the mating call of domed dead whales
I can still hear you. (8)

but who am I
to make of the void an embarrassed verse? who?

who am I to animate this conversation
with you? Who am I?
the Whisperer could have not forsaken me
and the Whisperer is the lost one’s guide. (10)

Breytenbach’s homage to his friend Mahmoud Darwish, as he mentions in his end note, after learning of his death, is presented here in the form of a collage – his own work interwoven with verse by that of Darwish. The intensity of their engagement, their continued encounter in Voice Over, cuts to the quick, leading me to a potential conversation between the South African Nontsizi Mgqwetho and the Lebanese-American Etel Adnan: two women between whom local and global knowledge connect in true form. Mgqwetho, pioneer and the only female poet to date to have produced a corpus of such significance in Xhosa, published her writings in the newspaper Umteteli wa Bantu between 1920 and 1929 (Opland, 2007:xvi). Her conversation partner for now, Adnan, is a contemporary poet and visual artist born in 1925:

Nontsizi:
Halahoyi! Ma Afrika, something stinks like the river snake, fouling the air (2007:150).

Etel:
Where are we? Where? There is a where, because we are, stubbornly, and have been, and who are we, if not you and me? Who are we, a race, a tribe, a herd, a passing phenomenon, or a traveller still travelling to find out who we are, and who we shall be? (1997:1).

Nontsizi:
I’m excited to tell you [...] We’d do well to buy land: / the government raps for silence. / It’s time for us to be alert: / We’d do well to buy land (2007:88).

Etel:
Do we have a land? Are the balconies ours, did we dangle our legs over the balustrade, were you a child with curling hair and me, impatient to grow? (1997:38).
Nontsizi:
Shu! The death of a nation’s painful! / Why seek the why and the wherefore? / We’re just a dispossessed rabble, / fit to be stripped for thrashing [...] Compatriot, let’s cast out envy [...] / Envy sets us squabbling, / King Solomon also says so: / envy outweighs a rock (2007:170).

Etel:
But things are always impossible, what of the possible and why the absence? Is the sea forgetting its epic tales? (1997:19).

Nontsizi:
The sense of a nation? / A land of crane-feathered warriors? / [...] There’s nothing of value: / all that we once had is gone! / Will the years all roll by? / Will you mark time through this year too? / I’d better stop: I get too angry. / Truly, these people from overseas / [...] rob us of house and home (2007:268).

Etel:
Where are we to go when the lights will go out and we’ll look similar? We demand a reprieve from the drought but we’re so afraid of the water that the rain stops when it comes and we return to the sun (1997:5-6).

Nontsizi:
We’ve been barking for ages, / confronting those who pick us clean. / what nation is this whose milk / lacks strength to reach the milk sack? / There’s little indeed we can take for the truth. / This ‘Let’s build for each other’ on earth / is a clarion call to the people (2007:204).

Etel:
I’m telling you, anger dies while fires survive, and before my family tree produces the olives you’ll eat, there, in the heat the anger and the dust, stones will turn into leaves (1997:14).

Penelope:
May I mention your name in my text?

Pheliwe:
Yes, I suppose no harm would come of that. Even better, though, I am thinking, is if we write a joint article which incorporates my own PhD research with yours. So, if we can work together for the next article?
Penelope:
Yes, why not? Good idea. What was the sentence from yesterday about the hands washing each other - izandla ziyahlambana, right?

Pheliwe:
Now you are applying what you learn, yes.

*eli bali liyaqhubeka, nangomso:* this story continues, even tomorrow.

**References**


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