Herre, Jesko (2009) Three essays on firm strategies influenced by antitrust authorities. PhD thesis, Universität zu Köln.
This thesis contains three essays which are all from the broader field of the theories on competition, collusion, and antitrust enforcement. The essays in chapter 2 and 3 provide models where firms try to sustain horizontal collusive agreements under the review of an antitrust authority. The essay in chapter 2 deals with information spillovers between the antitrust authority and collusive firms in an environment of imperfect information. The model investigates how the sustainability of collusive agreements in uncertain environments is affected by an antitrust authority that shares information with firms and by an authority that keeps the information secret. The analysis involves leniency programs as well. The subsequent essay in chapter 3 focuses on the deterrence effect of excluding ringleaders from leniency programs. In particular, the model investigates if ringleaders of cartels should be eligible for a fine reduction when cooperating with the antitrust authority or whether they should be excluded from such programs. Chapter 4 extends the topic to vertical integration, where firms interact in a vertical-merger game under the review of an antitrust authority. The model investigates how side payments can be crucial to explain the development of a market structure where a vertically integrated firm co-exists with separated competitors in a successive duopoly.
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