Mischkowski, Dorothee, Stone, Rebecca and Stremitzer, Alexander (2019). Promises, Expectations, and Social Cooperation. J. Law Econ., 62 (4). S. 687 - 713. CHICAGO: UNIV CHICAGO PRESS. ISSN 1537-5285

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

Promising serves as an important commitment mechanism by operating on a potential cheater's internal value system. We present experimental evidence on why people keep their promises, identifying three motives. First, people feel duty bound to keep their promises regardless of whether promisees expect them to do so (promising per se effect). Second, they care about not disappointing promisees' expectations regardless of whether those expectations were induced by the promise (expectations per se effect). Third, they are even more motivated to avoid disappointing promisees' expectations when those expectations were induced by a promise (interaction effect). Clear evidence of some of these effects has eluded the prior literature because of limitations inherent to the experimental methods employed. We sidestep those difficulties by using a novel between-subject vignette design. Our results suggest that promising may contribute to the self-reinforcing creation of trust as expectations of performance encourage promise keeping and vice versa.

Item Type: Journal Article
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCIDORCID Put Code
Mischkowski, DorotheeUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Stone, RebeccaUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Stremitzer, AlexanderUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:38-128409
DOI: 10.1086/706075
Journal or Publication Title: J. Law Econ.
Volume: 62
Number: 4
Page Range: S. 687 - 713
Date: 2019
Publisher: UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
Place of Publication: CHICAGO
ISSN: 1537-5285
Language: English
Faculty: Unspecified
Divisions: Unspecified
Subjects: no entry
Uncontrolled Keywords:
KeywordsLanguage
GOVERNANCE; CONTRACTSMultiple languages
Economics; LawMultiple languages
Refereed: Yes
URI: http://kups.ub.uni-koeln.de/id/eprint/12840

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

Altmetric

Export

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item